Pape’s “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism” discusses the growing prevalence of suicide attacks in the arsenal of terrorist movements from 1980 onward. The author’s main question is why terrorist groups have been increasingly choosing this way of attacking their enemies as opposed to other options. The article’s essential premise is that terrorists are rational actors who seek to advance their declared political goals. Pape’s conclusion is that terrorists opt for suicide attacks because they further the achievement of political goals more efficiently. In particular, the author mentions that most terrorist movements that had used suicide attacks between 1980 and 2001 made “more gains after the resort to suicide operations” than before. At the same time, Pape posits that this increase in efficiency is inversely proportional to magnitude: while a modest-scale suicide campaign may achieve modest gains, ambitious campaigns are unlikely to bring significant results. Overall, Pape interprets suicide terrorism as a high-risk strategy that offers potential for greater gains at the expense of higher risks. Pape’s insistency on interpreting suicide attacks as coercive terrorism – that is, the vehicle for violently pursuing political agenda – rests on the premise that it cannot be demonstrative terrorism – that is, a vehicle for recruitment. According to the author, suicide attacks indiscriminately target the greatest number of people, and maximizing casualties “alienates those in the target audience who might be sympathetic to the terrorists cause.” Based on this reasoning, Pape posits that suicide attacks undermine popular support and threaten to alienate moderate elements within the terrorist community itself. As a result, he concludes that suicide terrorism is a last-resort strategy only used by the most radicalized movements. While the reasoning regarding the loss of support due to radicalization seems solid, it does not pay enough attention to is a psychological profile of a typical suicide bomber. Abrahms’s “What Terrorists Really Want” can be of significant use in this respect. In this article, the author points out that the terrorist recruitment efforts generally appeal more to “certain psychological types of people, namely, the socially alienated.” Those who do not feel attached to and appreciated in the society they live in may join a terrorist movement to “maintain or develop social relations.” From this perspective, it is actually possible to interpret suicide attacks as an act of what Pape would call ‘demonstrative terrorism.’ Since attacks target the members of the same society that potential terrorists feel unappreciated by, its victims are perceived as ‘others.’ Consequently, the large number of casualties is unlikely to alienate potential recruits – if anything, it should attract them even more as a greater blow struck against the society they perceive as alien and hostile. The fact that Pape does not take this factor into account prevents him from understanding the function of suicide terrorism as a vehicle for social solidarity building. To summarize, Pape’s analysis of the logic of suicide terrorism accounts for pragmatic political rea