Angie Pepper (CRÉ), “Delimiting Justice: Animal, Vegetable, Ecosystem?”
Channel: Radio-CRÉ
Date: 2017-10-30

The last decade has seen the so-called ‘political turn’ in animal ethics in which theorists have focused on extending the domain of justice to sentient animals and “imagining how our political institutions, structures and processes might be transformed so as to secure
justice for both human and non-human animals” (Cochrane, Garner & O’Sullivan, 2016). For many of these theorists possession of sentience is a necessary requirement for consideration within schemes of justice (e.g. Cochrane 2012; Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011; Nussbaum 2006). However, attempts to draw the bounds of justice at sentience have been met with renewed criticism by those working in environmental ethics. Some have objected, for instance, that “the sentience threshold fails for being inappropriately anthropocentric” (Fulfer 2013) and is unjustifiably biased towards sentient beings (Schlosberg 2007). These critics have further argued that nonsentient entities can also be subjects of justice, with some arguing for the inclusion of all forms of life, including plants and insects, and others advocating on behalf of the inclusion of collective entities such asentire ecosystems.

In this paper I show that existing attempts by sentientists, biocentrists, and ecocentrists to establish the bounds of justice are inadequate. I further suggest that we must take a closer
look at the distinctive features of the domain of justice in order to determine which entities can be potential recipients. I begin by noting that all parties to the dispute are interested in what I will call ‘political justice’, which concerns institutionally enforceable rightful
entitlements. While there is significant disagreement about the substantive content of entitlements and duties of justice, theorists agree that political justice is concerned with the protection of inviolable rights, and with ensuring that the benefits and burdens of social cooperation are fairly distributed. I then explain and defend the idea that one central function of justice is to protect the rights of beings who have the capacity to experience things as negatively or positively valenced. The upshot of this view is that insentient
entities, such as plants and ecosystems, cannot be the direct recipients of justice and thus they cannot be treated unjustly. I conclude by responding to two objections. First, I consider
the objection that justice need not be characterised in terms of moral rights. In response, I argue that extending the concept of justice to entities that cannot possess rights has theoretical implications for theorising about justice that are too costly. Second, it might be
argued that the view I advance here is too restrictive because it excludes entities widely believed to have standing as subjects and agents of justice such as nation-states and cultural groups. In response, I cast doubt on the claim that abstract entities can act justly or be treated unjustly apart from the subjectively aware beings that constitute them.