The Vickrey Mechanism (EC2261@UWO)
Channel: Bruno Salcedo
Date: 2020-03-27

The Vickrey auction (second-price auction) is an efficient and incentive-compatible mechanism to allocate a single object in some settings. It may fail if all the bidders assign the same value to the object being auctioned (common values) or if there are consumption externalities. 

These videos were prepared with very short notice due to the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, there are some typos and minor mistakes. For example, at 2:48 I should have written "The highest bid of i's opponents" instead of "the highest bid of j's opponents." Sorry for the confusion this may cause. 

Virtual Lectures for EC2261 at Western University. 

Find the corresponding lecture notes at http://brunosalcedo.com/2261.html