Is a syntax–semantics homomorphism cognitively plausible [Talk Bochum 2013]
Channel: Simon Kasper
Date: 2019-09-13

In the presentation I explore the problem of the relationship between objects and events in cognition and language. Today, many of the frameworks modeling the relationship between syntax and semantics and claiming cognitive plausibility for their theories assume one or another kind of “homomorphism” between semantic and syntactic “algebras”. A discussion of the cognitive psychological plausibility and ramifications of the relationship between predicates and arguments – ultimately reducible to the cognitive distinction between states/processes/activities (henceforth: “circumstances”) and objects – has, at least to my knowledge, not taken place. 
I will point out that, if one takes the embodied-simulative perspective seriously, the assumption of a syntax–semantics homomorphism possibly misconceives the relationship between predicates and arguments (or circumstance and object concepts) on the one hand and between verbs and complements on the other, since the relationship between predicates and arguments is ontologically different from that between verbs and complements. 
Within the newly developed Instruction Grammar framework (cf. Kasper, 2013/2015), a speaker’s utterance can be conceived of as set of instructions for a hearer to incrementally assemble a concept on the basis of the incoming linguistic material, i.e., to simulate a perception of some circumstance from an utterance. This instructional character of utterances is also evident on the formal, syntactic side: basic syntactic constructions are diagrammatically iconic with respect to the structure of concepts.
Re-assessing the notion of homomorphism in the light of the newly developed Instruction Grammar framework (cf. Kasper, 2013 [update: 2015], a straightforward relationship between verbs and complements can be found on the formal, syntactic side. In an utterance, both verbs and complements are physical parts of the speech stream. Conceptually, they are both represented as some kind of an “acoustic image”. On the semantic side (i.e., in terms of conceptual structures originating in retinal images from visual perception), however, it is hard to tell what exactly in the retinal image is to be called the “predicate” (or circumstance), and what is the “argument” (or object). What one finds, in fact, is that objects in the visual world make retinal images, and that circumstances are no more than aspects of these objects. Circumstances manifest themselves only “at” objects and never without them. Hence, while we can clearly distinguish verbs and complements in syntax, we cannot clearly distinguish an object concept from a circumstance concept. Circumstances are inherent to objects as they present themselves in perception and cognition. 
For a semiotic system to be an effective means of sharing concepts among interlocutors, the inherence of circumstances within objects on the conceptual level cannot be preserved in the semiotic system. Instead, symbols must be developed that “outsource” aspects of objects in order to be able to communicate the circumstance in which the objects stand. This is where verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and prepositions arise as “concessions” to the semiotic system, which – due to its nature – is less perfect than the embodied simulations it encodes. These considerations lead to the tentative claim that the assumption of a homomorphic relationship between predicate–argument and verb–complement structures is inadequate for a cognitively plausible modeling of the ability to relate form and meaning.

References
Butt, M. (2006). Theories of case. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chomsky, N. (1968). Language and mind. Hartcourt: Brace and World.
Ganis, G./Thompson, W. L./Kosslyn, S. M. (2004). Brain areas underlying visual mental imagery and visual perception. An fMRI study. Cognitive Brain Research, 20, 226–241.
Geeraerts, D./Cuyckens, H. (Eds.) (2007). The Oxford handbook of Cognitive Linguistics. Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press.
Goldberg, A. (1995). Constructions. A Construction Grammar approach to argument structure. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.
Jackendoff, R. (2002). Foundations of language. Oxford: Clarendon.
Kasper, S. (2013). Grounding the linking competence in culture and nature. How action and perception shape the syntax-semantics relationship. PhD thesis, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Germany. [published as:
Kasper, S. (2015). Instruction Grammar. From Perception via Grammar to Action. Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter.}
Levin, B./Rappaport Hovav, M. (2005). Argument realization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Meine persönliche Homepage:
https://www.simonkasper.info