Signalling (biology) | Wikipedia audio article
Channel: wikipedia tts
Date: 2019-02-18

This is an audio version of the Wikipedia Article:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signalling_theory


00:02:43 1 Sexual selection
00:04:03 2 Honest signals
00:07:27 3 Dishonest signals
00:09:40 4 Sports handicapping metaphor
00:16:10 5 Costly signalling and Fisherian diploid dynamics
00:18:03 6 Examples
00:18:51 7 Human honest signals
00:19:25 7.1 Costly signalling in hunting
00:28:08 7.2 Physical risks as a costly signal
00:30:32 7.3 Religion as a costly signal
00:34:38 8 See also



Listening is a more natural way of learning, when compared to reading. Written language only began at around 3200 BC, but spoken language has existed long ago.

Learning by listening is a great way to:
- increases imagination and understanding
- improves your listening skills
- improves your own spoken accent
- learn while on the move
- reduce eye strain

Now learn the vast amount of general knowledge available on Wikipedia through audio (audio article). You could even learn subconsciously by playing the audio while you are sleeping! If you are planning to listen a lot, you could try using a bone conduction headphone, or a standard speaker instead of an earphone.

Listen on Google Assistant through Extra Audio:
https://assistant.google.com/services/invoke/uid/0000001a130b3f91
Other Wikipedia audio articles at:
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=wikipedia+tts
Upload your own Wikipedia articles through:
https://github.com/nodef/wikipedia-tts
Speaking Rate: 0.8639004311884873
Voice name: en-GB-Wavenet-D


"I cannot teach anybody anything, I can only make them think."
- Socrates


SUMMARY
=======
Within evolutionary biology, signalling theory is a body of theoretical work examining communication between individuals, both within species and across species.  The central question is when organisms with conflicting interests, such as in sexual selection, should be expected to provide honest signals (no presumption being made of conscious intention) rather than cheating. Mathematical models describe how signalling can contribute to an evolutionarily stable strategy.
Signals are given in contexts such as mate selection by females, which subjects the advertising males' signals to selective pressure. Signals thus evolve because they modify the behaviour of the receiver to benefit the signaller. Signals may be honest, conveying information which usefully increases the fitness of the receiver, or dishonest. An individual can cheat by giving a dishonest signal, which might briefly benefit that signaller, at the risk of undermining the signalling system for the whole population.
The question of whether selection of signals works at the level of the individual organism or gene, or at the level of the group, has been debated by biologists such as Richard Dawkins, arguing that individuals evolve to signal and to receive signals better, including resisting manipulation. Amotz Zahavi suggested that cheating could be controlled by the handicap principle, where the best horse in a handicap race is the one carrying the largest handicap weight. According to Zahavi's theory, signallers such as male peacocks have 'tails' that are genuinely handicaps, being costly to produce. The system is evolutionarily stable as the large showy tails are honest signals. Biologists have attempted to verify the handicap principle, but with inconsistent results. The mathematical biologist Ronald Fisher analysed the contribution that having two copies of each gene (diploidy) would make to honest signalling, demonstrating that a runaway effect could occur in sexual selection. The evolutionary equilibrium depends sensitively on the balance of costs and benefits.
The same mechanisms can be expected in humans, where researchers have studied behaviours including risk taking by young men, hunting of large game animals, and costly religious rituals, finding that these appear to qualify as costly honest signals.