Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty Land Warrant Application File R. 5, Richard Barron, Va. Sea Service

SERVICE
NUMBER
Va. Sea Service
Barron, Richard
R 5 N Va. Half Pay
CONTENTS
See Acc No. 837- Virginia State Navy Richard Barron, File Y8 Va. Half Pay

No 5
ACT OF JULY 14, 1862.
3014
former residence of Capt. Richard Barron
Va State Navy Revolution
Discharged _____, 186
3014
Admitted
Pay Act 32
Received _____, 187
5

Capt Rich d Barron 2nd Half pay Cert.
Jan. 8. '50.

Pension Office January 8. 1850
Upon an appeal to the Secretary of the Interior, in the case of the administratrix of the late Captain Richard Barron, he has decided, after taking the opinion of the Attorney General, that the said Administratrix is entitled under the acts of July 5. 1832 and March 3. 1835, to commutation of five years full pay and interest up to the present time, in account of Barron's service in the Virginia State Navy. I therefore certify that under this decision Ann Hubbard formerly Ann Barron, the Administratrix is entitled to two thousand five hundred and nine dollars and thirty cents, being five years full pay and interest thereon, at six per centum per annum from the 22 d April 1783 to this date: the sum of $2615 62 1/2  $1338 54 1/2 paid by the State of Virginia on the 15 th December  22 nd March 1833 to be deducted. Interest on interest not to be allowed. The amount is payable to Frederick Vincent Esquire of Philadelphia, Attorney of the Administratrix.
Approved
Commissioner of Pensions
Secretary of the Interior.

Argument in Barron's Case
Mr. Sykes.
Filed in the Case of Cooke
B

WILLARD'S HOTEL,
August 2, 1849.
SIR,
I submitted the accompanying papers, touching the claims of the representatives of Commodore James Barron and Captain Richard Barron, to commutation and interest for the revolutionary services of those officers, to Mr. Edwards, and as the counsel of Commodore Barron's representatives, and representing for the moment the counsel of the representatives of Captain Barron, asked for the proper requisition for the several amounts. After examining the evidence, the commissioner allowed the claims, there being no doubt of any fact involved in the cases, the proof of which was necessary to establish the right to recover. But upon farther consideration, on the same day the commissioner of pensions reconsidered his determination, and refused to allow the claims, upon the ground that the court of appeals of Virginia had determined in the case of Markham, 1 Leigh's Reports, p. 516, that naval officers were not entitled to "commutation." See his note, marked No. 1. Of course I make no complaint of the commissioner for this. It was not only his right, but his duty, to reconsider the opinion which he had formed and expressed, and regardless of any question of consistency, or pride of opinion, to change his opinion and reject the claim, if the law and the evidence, or either of them, required him to do so. Indeed, I would not have the claims allowed, if I could, if they be not sustained both by the law and the evidence. If the amount claimed be not justly and fairly due, I would not dishonour myself, and the gallant and distinguished officer whom I represent, by asking the payment of it. But as it is my right, and duty to my client, to do, I respectfully appeal from that decision to you, as the head of the department to whom the adjustment of such claims belongs.
In presenting the cases to you, I shall not discuss the evidence, because there is no doubt or difficulty as to the facts. It will suffice to say, that Commodore Barron was the commander of the navy of Virginia, and served as such throughout the whole war of the revolution, and his representatives have received his "half pay" and land bounty for his services. See Doc. No. 2, 3. Capt. Barron was a captain in the same service, also served until the end of the war, and his representatives have received the like compensation. See the same Doc's. Upon these facts, the question arises, Whether an officer of the navy, who served until the end of the war, is entitled to his "commutation" of five years full pay and interest? Does he not stand upon an equal footing with an officer of the army, who performed no more service than he did? To me, I confess, it seems that to state the question is to resolve it, as I can conceive of no motive for a conclusion so dishonouring to the intellect and patriotism of the governments, both state and national, as that would be which convicted them of so un-

equal and unjust a discrimination between the defenders of the country, in the different branches of the service, and at such a time as that of our revolution. In this opinion I cannot doubt that your superior intelligence will concur with me. But as I know your habit of investigating thoroughly every question which is submitted to you, and of requiring a reason, as well as a fact, for every conclusion, I beg your indulgence while I present briefly, but in detail, the grounds of my opinion.
1. By an act passed on the _____ day of May 1779, Hen. Stat. at Large, vol. 10, p. 25, concerning "officers, soldiers, sailors and marines," Virginia offered half pay for life to all the officers, physicians, surgeons, chaplains, &c. who served until the end of the war.
Doubts arose as to the meaning of this act, whether it embraced officers of the state line as well as continental officers, (a very strange doubt,) and by another act, passed on the 16th of December 1790, that doubt was removed by an express provision that the same compensation of half pay should be given to officers of the state line as was given to the officers of the continental line.
Looking to the act of 1779, the "doubt" is most remarkable, as that act expressly includes those "on the continental establishment, or serving in the battalions raised for the immediate defence of the state or for the defence of the United States." It is hardly possible to conceive of a definition of state troops more complete than this. Still doubts did exist, as it appears by the preamble to the act of 1790, and that act was in reality merely declaratory, explanatory of the act of 1779. The two together stand therefore as one act, and that the act of 1779. So that the act of 1779 gave half pay to all the officers, state and continental, who served until the end of the war, or became supernumerary.
At the May session of the legislature in the year 1780, a series of resolutions was reported by a committee, one of which recommends the reduction of the navy, and is in the following words, to wit: " Resolved , That all commissioned officers, the master, surgeon and surgeon's mate in the service of the navy, be entitled to half pay during life, under the limitations and restrictions as are contained in the act 'concerning officers, soldiers, sailors and marines.'" The act here referred to is the act of 1779 before cited. In consequence of these resolutions, an act was passed at the same session for the purpose of carrying these resolutions into effect, and after providing for the reduction of the navy and the enlistment of sailors and marines, which it declares to be of great importance, and after providing a bounty of $1000 for the sailors, and that they shall have all the privileges and emoluments granted by the act of 1779, it provides for the organization of the marine corps, and then provides that "the captains, together with the subalterns, and all other commissioned officers in the service of the navy , the master, surgeon and surgeon's mate, shall be entitled to the same pay and rations, the same privileges and emoluments, and rank in the same degree with officers of the like rank belonging to regiments heretofore raised for the internal defence of the state." 10 Hen. Stat. at Large, p. 298. Thus it appears that Virgi-

nia first gave half pay for life to the officers, &c. of the line, state and continental; secondly, she ordered a reform of her navy, to make it more efficient; and thirdly, she placed the naval officers upon the same footing, as to rank, pay and emoluments, with the officers of the line, according to the act of 1779. The act of 1780 was carried into effect by the reduction of the navy, as appears by the report of the navy board, of which Commodore Barron was the president. Doc. No.     ; and also by the act of November 1781, 10 Hen. Stat. at Large, p. 462, 7, the 14th section of which provides, that "the officers and seamen of the navy of this state, as they stand arranged by a late regulation, shall be entitled to the same advantages as the officers belonging to this state in the land service, according to their respective ranks." Commodore Barron was not only one of the officers retained by that regulation for service to the end of the war, but he was the president of the board who made the arrangement and continued as commander in chief of the navy. Now it would seem to me, that if it were possible to have doubted before, whether the officers of the army and navy stood upon the same footing in all respects according to rank, such could not be entertained after the passage of this act of 1781. That act entirely removed it; for the legislature, not confining itself to the term "pay," declares that the naval officers shall be entitled to the same advantages , that is, to all the advantages to which the officers in the land service were entitled. Is not the pay , whether full or half pay, an advantage? And is not commutation an advantage? Was it not given expressly upon the ground that it was more advantageous than half pay? And was not that the express ground upon which it was asked by the officers? If then, it be an advantage to which the officer of the land service is entitled, how can it be denied to the naval officer in the face of this act? I confess I cannot perceive—I cannot understand how any advantage, any gain, profit, privilege, perquisite or emolument, which the officer in the land service was entitled to, can be denied to the officer of the naval service, and this conclusion is more clear and irresistible when you recollect the resolutions in favour of the navy, before cited, from which this act ultimately proceeded.
But the legislature did not stop here, but continued to legislate for the protection of her navy, and by the act of May 1782, 11 Hen. Stat. at Large, p. 85, declared "that the navy officers, sailors and marines of this state, shall in all respects have the same claims , &c. as are allowed to the officers and soldiers in the land service;" and again, in October 1782, 11 Hen. Stat. at Large, p. 161, it was by another act provided "that all officers, seamen and marines, or (and) their representatives, shall be entitled to the same bounty in land and other emoluments as the officers and soldiers of the Virginia line on continental establishment." Surely it may be safely affirmed, upon these acts, that Virginia placed her land and naval forces upon the same footing, as far as it was in her power to do so. She provides,
1st. That all officers, soldiers, surgeons, &c., who serve to the end of the war, or become supernumerary, shall receive half pay.

2d. She expounds this act by another shortly after, declaring that the state, as well as continental troops, are entitled to the benefit of it.
3d. She declared that the officers of the navy should have all the advantages belonging to the officers in the land service.
4th. She declared that the officers of the navy should have in all respects, the same claims as are allowed to the officers of the land service; and
5th. She declared that the officers of the navy should have the same bounty in land, " and other emoluments, as the officers and soldiers of the Virginia line on continental establishment. "
If these laws do not place the army and navy upon the same footing, as far as Virginia could do it, what language would have that effect? Whatever debt, then, she incurred to her land forces for her defence and emancipation from the power of a tyrant, she incurred to the officers of the navy and her gallant tars, and whatever debt for that cause, she incurred to them, the government of the United States assumed, and is bound to pay. That this is true as to the "half pay," and all other emoluments, except "commutation," is perfectly clear, has been so adjudged to be, by all the courts, supreme and others of Virginia, by congress, (in the acts of 1832 and 1848,) and the departments at Washington; and half pay has been allowed, and paid to every naval, as well as land officer, who served until the end of the war, or became supernumerary, and the Barrons have received half pay. But it is said that although true to the extent indicated, it is not true as to "commutation of half pay"—and it is maintained that while every officer in the land service, who served until the end of the war, even the lowest subaltern, is entitled to "commutation," the chief of the navy, the most distinguished by service, as he was by rank, is not entitled to it. That here the "claim" of the subaltern is higher than that of his superior, and his "advantages" greater; and that there are "other emoluments" than the "bounty in land," to which the officers and soldiers in the land service are entitled, and to which the officers of the navy are not entitled, although the act of 1782 expressly declared that the officers of the navy should have "the same bounty in land and all other emoluments" which were allowed to the officers of the line; and for this anomaly, the authority of the supreme court of Virginia, in the case of Markham, is cited. Although Judge Coalter, in Lilly's case, decided after Markham's, 1 Leigh, expressly declares, without dissent from any judge, that Markham's case had settled that the acts passed subsequent to the act of 1779, were to be considered as explanatory of that act, or as substantive provisions placing the army and navy upon the same footing.
To the authority of that court, I bow at all times with great respect; but eminent as it is, it is not infallible, and the value of its decisions as authority in parallel cases, must depend upon the force of its reasoning, and the soundness of its learning. With the candour which is always characteristic of the just judge, it subjects its own decision to the trial by these tests, and sustains or reverses them as that trial shall indicate. You, sir, sitting as an independent judge, cannot do less. Justice to your own reputation as a lawyer and a high functionary of

the government, to that government whose organ you are, and to the parties, demands it. I proceed then, to examine that authority, and with all respect, I submit that it should have no weight with you.
First, because it is an " obiter dictum ," a decision upon a point not properly before the court—and
Secondly, because it is founded in manifest error as to fact as well as law.
First. The general question whether a naval officer who served until the end of the war was not properly before the court, Markham having been made a prisoner in 1781, was paroled and continued on his parole until the end of the war—that is, so far from being in actual service, he voluntarily entered into and engaged that he would not serve again until exchanged; and, therefore, could not serve by the laws of war without forfeiture of his honour and his life, and he was, therefore, at the most, a supernumerary. If he had chosen to remain a prisoner until retaken or exchanged, the case would have been different. He would have been, in fact, in the service, labouring under a physical and temporary disability, at liberty to enter the field the moment that disability was removed; but preferring freedom at home to confinement among the enemy, he expressly contracted not to serve. How can it be said, then, that he actually served until the end of the war?
Now, it is my opinion that the supernumerary who held himself in readiness to re-enter the service, is as much entitled to commutation, as one who served until the end of the war; but that was not the opinion of the court of appeals at that day, and, therefore, the decision in Markham's case as to commutation, was not pertinent to the case, for, under the opinion then entertained in that court, Markham was not entitled to commutation, however the law might be as to officers who served until the end of the war. Hence, I say, the decision was obiter dictum , and you, sir, who are more learned in the law than I am, know what weight attaches to such decisions.
Secondly. But if the question was properly before the court, the error of the opinion is most manifest. To shew this it is necessary now to trace up the right to commutation by state officers of any kind.
Congress, by a resolution passed on the 21st of October 1780, " Resolved , That the officers who shall continue in service to the end of the war shall be entitled to half pay during life, to commence from the time of their reduction." Virginia, by her act of 1779, gave half pay to all officers who should serve to the end of the war, or become supernumerary; and by her explanatory act she declared that this provision should apply to state and continental troops, if congress did not make some tantamount provision for them.
In May 1783, professing its willingness "to compensate those whose services, sacrifices and sufferings have so just a title to the approbation and rewards of their country," congress
Resolved , 1. That all officers then in service in the lines of the states, under the command of Washington, should have commutation of five years full pay in lieu of half pay.
2. That the same commutation should extend to the corps not be-

longing to the lines of particular states, and who are entitled to half pay for life, as aforesaid.
3. That it shall extend to the officers of the hospital department and to retired half pay officers; and
4. To all officers entitled to half pay for life not included in the preceding resolution.
In May 1790, Virginia, by her act, declared that the same compensation of half pay which had been allowed to officers of the continental line, "should be extended," [using the very language of the resolution of congress,] to the officers of the state line—and the court of appeals of Virginia decided, in the very first case which came up after the war, and always since that time, that every officer who made out a good case for half pay was entitled to commutation, after the passage of the act of 1790. See Markham's case, in 1 Leigh, and Marston's case, 9 Leigh. Well, the question is, how was this done, as the act of 1790, speaks of half pay only, and has not the word commutation in it? The answer is obvious, viz: that half pay and commutation were the same thing in substance, the one being a mere substitute for the other, and the only mode of establishing a claim to commutation was to prove a claim to half pay, because commutation was not an independent right but a consequential one, being given to the half pay officers in lieu of half pay . And as this was the right of the continental officer, as a half pay officer, and then the same compensation of half pay which had been allowed to the continental officer, was allowed to the state officer; by necessary consequence the state officer was entitled to his commutation, and accordingly he has always received it.
This was the " principle " established by the court of appeals of Virginia, and congress, seeing the manifest justice of it, approved and expressly adopted it in the acts of 1832, 1835 and 1848, and you, sir, under the advice of the Attorney General, in the case of Dr. John Minson Galt, which I had the honour to present to you, decided that "half pay" was the generic term embracing "commutation," and, therefore, commutation might and should be paid under the act of 1832, without any farther appeal to congress, and accordingly the claim of Dr. Galt's representative was paid to me.
How, then, is the officer of the state navy excluded from his commutation? Because, as it is said by Judge Green, in Markham's case, the officers of the line are mentioned in the act of 1790, and the word "navy" is not there. Now, it seems to me that the fallacy of this reasoning is perfectly clear. First, because I have shewn that the officers of the army and the officers of the navy stand precisely upon the same footing as to half pay, and have exactly the same rights as to it; and the act of 1779, and the subsequent acts, being, as Judge Coalter properly says, in Lilly's case, without dissent from any Judge, to be construed as if they were one. Now, if these positions be true, viz:
1. That the officers of the army and navy stand upon the same footing as to half pay; and
2. That by virtue of the provisions as to half pay, the officers of the army are entitled to commutation, how can it be denied to the officers of the navy?

I confess that to me the conclusion appears to be irresistible that if the officer of the state line of the army is entitled to commutation, the officer of the navy is, and that the decision in Markham's case, is direct authority upon the "principle" involved, in my favour. Thus, then, the argument runs. The officers of the navy are entitled to half pay, because they have been placed upon the same footing with the officers of the army. The officers of the army are entitled to commutation, because it is but a substitute for half pay, and the consequence of the right to half pay; therefore, the officers of the navy, who, upon the same grounds, are entitled to half pay, are entitled to commutation. Markham's case, then, is authority directly in favour of my client, under the act of 1832, because it establishes, or rather, it re-affirms the principle which entitles the officer of the navy to commutation, and errs in the application of it, and the act of '32 adopts the principles of decision which had been established by the court of appeals of Virginia. But suppose the decision in Markham's case to be out and out against the naval officer, would that warrant the rejection of his claim when the principle established by every other decision of the same court, and recognized by congress in the act of '32 is in his favour? Congress did not adopt the decision in any particular case; but "the principles" of decision established by the court of appeals of Virginia in half pay cases, and the principles established by that court, give the naval officer an undoubted right to commutation. Congress must be presumed to have seen this, and to have had a motive in directing, by the act of 1832, payment to revolutionary officers according to the "principles" established by the court of appeals of Virginia, and yet more emphatically when it admitted the principle expressly as applied to naval officers, by providing for the payment to Virginia of the judgments which had been rendered in favour of officers of the state navy. This was a clear and distinct admission that congress was bound to pay to officers of the state navy whatever they were entitled to demand of the state government.
The error of the opinion in Markham's case, in this respect, is very remarkable, as the judge who pronounced it was one of the most eminent that Virginia has produced, and I speak of him with great veneration; but the error is not the less palpable, and it is most remarkable, because it is in direct conflict with the principle established in the same case, by which commutation is given to the officers of the army under the act of '90, because half pay was considered as embracing commutation. It is manifest that the judge would have had no hesitation in giving the commutation to officers of the navy as well as the army, if the act of '90 had mentioned officers of the navy, although the act speaks only of half pay . But what matters it whether the officers of the navy are mentioned in that act or not, if by other acts they are entitled to half pay, and the title to half pay gives the right to commutation?
Having demonstrated, as I respectfully submit I have, the right of the naval officers to commutation upon every principle of justice as well strict law, I proceed now to consider the only other question in the

case, to wit: the power of the honorable secretary to order the payment of the claim.
Upon this point, the first and most obvious remark to be made, is, that if the claim be due upon the principles of decision settled by the court of appeals of Virginia, there is no need for farther argument, for that settles the question; but as I understand the doubt, for I do not understand that it is more than a doubt, arises from the use of the term "corps," I proceed to examine the question more minutely.
The act of 1832 provides for the payment of five classes of claims, viz:
 1. Gibson's regiment, the amount of judgments recovered and remaining unsatisfied.  2. The state regiment commanded by Brent and Dabney, judgments unsatisfied.  3. The regiments of Clarke and Crockett, and Rogers's cavalry, being the Illinois troops, judgments unsatisfied.  4. The state artillery under Marshall and Mutter, and the state cavalry under Nelson, judgments unsatisfied.  5. The officers of the navy of Virginia, judgments unsatisfied. 
And then follows the last clause of the act which directs the secretary of the treasury to settle "those claims for half pay of the officers of the aforesaid regiments and corps which have not been paid or prosecuted to judgment."
In this enumeration there is a distinct admission of the rights of the naval officers and of the obligation to pay them, because congress, by this act, did not intend to create a new liability, but to discharge an old one, in directing the payment of all judgments which had been rendered in their favour against the state of Virginia, therefore, congress admitted the original liability of the United States to the naval officers.
But the act intended to do more than to provide for those cases in which judgments had been rendered. It intended to provide for, and direct the payment of all the claims for which Virginia was liable "upon the principles of the half pay cases already decided by the supreme court of appeals of Virginia," "which have not been prosecuted to judgment," and hence, the last clause in the act before recited. This is not denied by any one, as I understand, and it has been recently settled, indeed, in Ewell's case, that in cases of officers of the line, no judgment is necessary if the evidence in support of the claim be otherwise satisfactory. But it is said that naval officers are not embraced by this act unless they have obtained judgments, because the secretary is directed in express terms to pay those naval officers who have obtained judgments; and in truth that I understand to be the whole ground of the doubt. But this argument can be of no avail, because the direction in that respect is identical with the direction in all the other cases enumerated, and yet officers of the line who had not obtained judgments have been paid; and it is now settled that judgments are not necessary, not only because of the terms of the act aforesaid, but because it is absurd, as well as dishonest, for a debtor, and especially a government debtor, to require itself to be

sued and convicted before it will pay its just debts; and above all others, such a debt as the nation contracted with its liberators and defenders. But it is said that these payments and positions are justified by the terms " aforesaid regiments and corps ," and these terms do not embrace naval officers. Now, I submit in all respect, to those who entertain such an opinion, that it does gross injustice to the obvious meaning of congress, and is in no wise justified by the words of the act—and does even greater injustice to the naval officers. The terms " aforesaid regiments and corps ," mean by the plainest rules of grammar and interpretation, all the regiments and corps previously enumerated, and therefore embraces the naval officers, unless the terms " regiments and corps " exclude them, because having been previously enumerated as the fifth class to be paid, they are embraced by the term aforesaid , which means, before said, that is, before or already enumerated. Now so far from excluding the naval officers, I submit that the terms cannot be satisfied without embracing them; for except the naval officers and Rogers's troop of cavalry, none but regiments are enumerated, and the plural would not be used to cover a single troop of cavalry, and it cannot be satisfied without embracing the corps of naval officers.
Again: The term " corps " as much defines a naval as a military body, and, indeed, one branch of the naval arm is known only by that term, to wit, the marine corps. The term properly means a body of men in the armed service of the country, and a " corps of officers " may as well be naval as military, or vice versa . Again: Congress having, by the fifth enumeration of the act, admitted the claims of the naval officers and directed payment of all the judgments, if it had intended to make a distinction between naval and military officers where there was no judgment, would it not have expressly excepted them? and does not the failure to except shew clearly that there was no intent to except them? And why should they have been excepted? Can any reason be given why congress should make such a distinction between the naval and military officers? Why should it direct the payment of all military officers to whom it was indebted without judgment, and withhold payment from the naval officers until they obtained judgments? The discrimination would be unjust and absurd; and, therefore, the intent to make it is not to be ascribed to congress by any strained interpretation at least. The language must be plain which will justify any officer of the government, or other person, in imputing to the legislature the design to do a useless and absurd, as well as unjust, act.
That congress owed the military officers and intended to pay them without waiting for a judgment, is clear. That it owed the naval officers and meant to pay them is equally clear; and then the simple question is, did it in the latter case intend to require the judgment against, not itself, but Virginia, before it would pay? It is impossible to believe so. No man can doubt that congress intended to do equal justice—to mete out the same measure to the naval and military officers. It intended to satisfy the just and blood bought claims of each, and that intent is not to be defeated by a little inaccuracy of expression, if there be any, or by a strain-

ed or rigid construction of the words of the act. The merit of the naval officers, and especially of such as the Barrons, who served through the whole war in the highest grades, was at least as great as that of any other body of men, and the members of the revolutionary congress, appreciating their merits, and the hazard of their service, placed them upon the same footing in all respects with the officers of the line. Is it lightly to be supposed that a later congress, when enjoying the benefits of their services and perils, in the inestimable blessing of free government, which they assisted to procure, intended to repudiate their claim—to degrade them from their equal rank, which those who employed them assigned them in advance.
But the act of 1835 transferring the duty of settling these claims to the treasury department, expressly directs the payment of the commutation claims—the deficiency of commutation—meaning clearly, and so practically interpreted, the balance due to those officers who had received only half pay when entitled to commutation. If, then, commutation be properly due to the naval officers, this department is bound to pay it, because the act of 1832 makes no discrimination but provides for the payment of all commutation claims.
But I submit that the uniform practice of the department has settled the question, that it is not limited to the payment of judgments only in favour of naval officers, and, therefore, that the last clause of the act of 1832 and the whole spirit of the act embraces them. I allude to the settled practice, pursued in every case where the claim has been proved to the satisfaction of the department, of paying naval officers half pay who have recovered judgments since the passage of the act, and those who have obtained no judgments at all.
Now it is clear that the act of 1832 does not limit the payment to judgments then recovered, if a naval officer may be paid half pay upon judgments since rendered. It is equally clear that it does not limit the payment to judgments only, if naval officers may be paid half pay without a judgment at any time—and it is equally clear that if the department may allow half pay without judgment when commutation was due, it not only may, but is bound to, pay the commutation by the authority of all the acts of congress and the express decision in Galt's case. Now all the allowances of half pay to naval officers who had obtained no judgments, and to such of them as have obtained judgments since 1832, were erroneous, or the act of 1832 does not limit the power of the department to judgments then rendered; and if it does not, then the only limitation is, to pay what is really due; half pay where that is due; commutation where that is due.
If, then, I have shewn, as I respectfully think I have, that the gallant and patriotic commander of the navy of Virginia in the war of the revolution, was entitled to his commutation of half pay, then the department has ample authority to pay, and with confidence I appeal to it, satisfied that with you, sir, authority to pay a just debt so long deferred, will be regarded as imposing an obligation to pay it, which with pleasure you will discharge; as I am satisfied that no man will do justice with more pleasure than you, and especially to a gallant officer of the revolution, now represented by one who has inherited his father's

gallantry and patriotism, and like him has devoted his life to his country. When they shall meet again, let him be able to say to his venerable parent, "Our country has done you justice."
With great respect,
I have the honour to be, sir,
Your obedient servant,
JAMES LYONS.
HON. THOMAS EWING, Secretary of the Interior, Washington City.
ore rel vi-