Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty Land Warrant Application File R. 18489, for John Thruston, Virginia

SERVICE
NUMBER
Va
Thruston, John
R. 18489
Va. Half-Pay
CONTENTS

Nonl. J. F. Dowdell
Award. July. 17/57
Col. Geo. Thurston dis? v o
Referred to Mr. Giddis for answer regarding to "help pay for life" —
Room N o 98.
Res? July. 12. 1857

House of Reps
Feb 9 th 1817
Hon Mr. Whiting
A constituent of mine Mrs Catharine Lockett daughter of Col Jno Thruston of Va attorney of Ky. had some claims against the government. They were placed in the hands of Mr. Curran Pope of Kentucky for collection - she is informed by Mr. Pope that an Agent in this City Mr. F. Cosby has made collection or obtained the lands. This occurred in 1853 or 1854. precise date not known. Will you be kind enough to have the

Records examined & let me know at your earliest convenience what has been done in the premises - By so doing you will much oblige your obed Servt
J. H. Dowdell

Power of Atty of Chas M. Johnston

Know all men by these presents That I Charles M. Hunston Administrator de Bonis non of John Hunston a Comt of Horse in the Regiment of Genl G. R. Clark of the Virg- =inia State Line in the Army of the Revolution, do hereby nominate Constituts And appoint Stephen F. Walker My true and lawful Attorney for me and in My name to prosecute by petition suit or otherwise against the Commonwealth of Virginia or the Government of the United States the claim and the estate of said John Hunston as Comutation of his pay full pay with interest thereon from the close of the Revolu- =tionary war in lieu of half pay for life under any act or acts resolution or resolutions either of the Common- =wealth of Virginia or the General Governments of the Uni- =ted States - and when said Claim is adjusted and an amounts or amounts found due then My said Attorney is hereby authorized to demand and receive a Warrant or Warrants therefor payable to me or my order. And my said Attorney is hereby authorized to do any and all legal acts in the premises in order to ob- =tain a speedy Consideration and adjustment of said Claim for Comutation & interest and the reception of the Warrants as aforesaid for which he is hereby authorized to execute

receipts in my name. hereby ratifying and confirming all which my said attorney may do by virtue of these presents
Witness my hand and
seal this 20 th day of August 1849.
attest
McEwen
W P Bugg
State of Kentucky
Jefferson County set
J. M. Thornton attested Seal
De Bonis Non
Mr. Thornton Secy
On this the 21 st day of August 1849 Personally appeared Charles M. Hunston above named personally appeared to me, the administrator de Bonis Non of the estate of Comt John Hunston of Illinois Regiment in the Revolution. Army War, and acknowledged the signing sealing and delivering the foregoing power of attorney to be his own free act and deed.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto subscribed my name.
McEwen J.P.

State of Kentucky Jefferson County Set
I Emanuel Pake clerk of the county court of the county aforesaid do certify that John  John Barick whose name is signed within is an acting Justice of the peace in & for said county duly commissioned. And sworn and that full faith & credit is due all his official acts as such. That his signature is genuine.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand & seal of office this 21 st day of Augt 1849.
Emanuel Pake C By H Stucky DC

Va allowance to Mrs Mrs Thurston
B
3.

In Council 30. Aug. 1830.
It is advised that the Heirs of John Thruston be allowed land bounty as a Comt in the Virginia State line for services during the war
Attest
P. V. Daniel
J. W. Pleasants
A Copy of a paper on file in the Virginia Land Office by virtue of which Warrants for 2555 1 / 3 acres issued to the heirs of John Thruston
Teste,
S. H. Parker Reg. S. Office.

Case of Geo. Thurston
Add l Evidence
Thurston's admin v Committee } Copy sent.

At a Superior Court of Law for Henrico County, held November 13 th 1830.
William D. Wren Committee of the estate of John Thruston dec d . } upon an appeal against } from a decision of the The Commonwealth } Auditor of Public
Accounts refusing to allow certain claim of the appellant against the Commonwealth, for services rendered by the said John Thruston in his lifetime as an Officer in the revolutionary war.
This day came as well the appellant by his attorney, as the Attorney General for the Commonwealth, and it appearing by the evidence on the part of the appellant filed in this cause, that the said John Thruston was a cornet in a Troop of Cavalry attached to the regiment of the Virginia State line, known as the Illinois regiment, in the revolutionary war, and became a supernumerary before the close thereof, the Court is of opinion that the said John Thruston was entitled to half pay during his life, and that the Auditor of Public accounts erred in rejecting the claim thereto presented by the appellant. It is therefore ordered that the said Auditor do issue and deliver to the appellant a warrant on the Treasurer of this Commonwealth, for the said half pay, to wit; from the 14 th day of December 1783, till the death of the said John Thruston which occurred on the 15 th day of January 1802.
From which Judgment the Attorney General for the Com- monwealth prayed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which is allowed.
I, John Robinson, Clerk of the Circuit Superior Court of Law and Chancery for the County of Henrico and City of Rich- mond on the common law side, having in my possession, and under my care, the records and papers of the former Superior Court of Law for Henrico County, do certify that

That the preceding is a true copy of a Judgment rendered in the Superior Court last mentioned - And I further certify that it appears by the records of that Court the said Judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
J Robinson

Comet John Huston
Act July 1832
Let. J. F. Dowdell (H. G. B.)
Feby. 19. 1837

Robert Houston
Landed to Can
30 April 1857.

THIS IS TO CERTIFY, That it appears from a list in this office of such Officers and Soldiers of the Virginia State  Line as settled their accounts and received certificates for the balance of their Full Pay, according to an act of assembly, passed the November session 1781, directing the Auditors of Public Accounts to settle and adjust the pay and accounts of the said Officers and Soldiers from the 1st January 1777 to 31st December 1781, (see Hening's Statutes at Large, vol. 10, p. 462,) that a settlement was made on the 15 th day of Dec 1783 in the name of John Thurston as Cornett Cav. and evidence of the indebtedness of the State to him for £157,, 19,, 10 delivered to himself but as the original settlements or copies thereof are not to be found in this office, the term of service embraced therein cannot be stated.
Given under my hand at the First Auditor's Office, Richmond, this 16 th — day of Feb — 1850
J. E. Heath V m aud or
[No Seal of Office.]

Certificate of Admission
A.
1.

II.
6.
This to be returned to files in John Thurston claim for half-pay.

THOMAS GREEN.
[To accompany bill H. R. No. 365.]
MAY 15, 1844.
Mr. DROMGOOLE, from the Committee of Ways and Means, made the following
REPORT:
The Committee of Ways and Means, according to order, have had under consideration the memorial of Thomas Green, commissioner on behalf of Virginia, together with the accompanying papers, and herewith report a bill in conformity with the prayer of the memorialist. The committee deem it unnecessary to make any elaborate report on the subject, as the memorial and accompanying papers fully explain and substantiate the claims for the payment of which the bill reported provides.
To the Speaker and Members of the House of Representatives, and the Senators of the United States in Congress assembled.
The memorial of Thomas Green, commissioner on behalf of the State of Virginia,
RESPECTFULLY REPRESENTS:
That the General Assembly of Virginia, at its session of 1842-'43, directed the appointment of a commissioner, who should present to the consideration of the General Government the claims of the State for payments made by her since the 5th July, 1832, for certain revolutionary services. That he was appointed by the Governor of the State to discharge that duty; and in July last presented the claims to the head of the War Department, who, in the first instance, rejected the application, but subsequently reconsidered the case—so far, at least, as to refer the questions involved to the Attorney General for his opinion. On the 8th instant, that officer gave his opinion that the payments could not be made without an appropriation in the one case, and authority in the other by Congress. The papers that were before the Attorney General, together with copies of his opinions, will accompany this memorial. The views on behalf of the State are so clearly presented in the opinions of Mr. Patton and others, (which will be found among those papers,) it is not considered necessary here to repeat them. It may suffice to say, the claims are of no new character, but are for payments actually made by Virginia, which, she thinks, were provided for by Congress in its act of the 5th July, 1832, entitled "An act to provide for liquidating and paying certain claims of the State of Virginia." Under the second section of that act, the sum of $241,345 was paid to the State, for the satisfaction of the judgments in that section referred to. The fiscal officer of the Commonwealth, in a vigilant discharge of his duties, reduced the de-
Blair & Rives, print.

mands against the Government, and, finding a surplus of that appropriation on hand, under the direction of the General Assembly, in its act of 4th March, 1835, refunded to the treasury of the United States the sum of $9,414 66. It subsequently appeared there was an error in supposing those judgments had been fully paid; and the Commonwealth of Virginia has, since that sum was refunded to the United States treasury, been compelled to pay $6,304 21, in satisfaction of those judgments, which had been provided for by the act of Congress, and which would have been paid out of the $9,414 66, if that fund had not been returned to the United States treasury. This statement of facts is fully made out and admitted, as will appear by reference to the opinion of the Attorney General of the United States, dated the 8th April, 1844, and the accompanying papers, copies of which are herewith filed, marked A to A 9, inclusive.
The Attorney General, in that opinion, says: "Upon the first question, I am clearly of opinion that the claim is just, and falls within the provisions of the 2d section of the act of 1832," "and that the balance of $9,414 66 of the appropriation made by that act, if now within the control of the department, would be applicable to the payment of the demand. But the difficulty suggested by the second question is, I think, insuperable. The balance above indicated was, under the circumstances of the case, properly carried to the surplus fund, from which it can be withdrawn by the appropriating power of Congress alone."
The other class of claims to the consideration of which your attention is asked, embraces payments, in nine cases, made by Virginia under judgments against her, for the commutation of half-pay , and which she thinks ought to have been made by the War Department, under the 3d section of the act of 5th of July, 1832. The question is, whether the terms "half pay" in the 3d section shall have the same interpretation as is given to the same words in the first section, so as to include cases of the commutation of half pay, as well as the other half pay cases.
Your memorialist will not consume your time with a recapitulation of the argument so ably presented in the opinions of the eminent counsel already referred to; but will state that, when the head of the department, soon after the passage of the act of 5th July, 1832, expressed doubts whether these commutation cases were embraced in its provisions, a declaratory resolution passed the House of Representatives by a very large majority on the 7th February, 1833, for the removal of these doubts. On this resolution the Senate did not act, (for want of time, it is believed,) and the claimants resorted to their remedy against the State of Virginia, and obtained judgments which were paid by her. Whether the right to have this money refunded to her be a strictly legal right, under the 3d section of the act of July 5, 1832, or not, your memorialist submits that every consideration of justice and equity which induced Congress to enact that law, applies with equal force to the payment of the claims now presented. Those considerations are fully stated in Report No. 191 of the House of Representatives at the 1st session of the 22d Congress.
Copies of your memorialist's letters of the 14th and 19th July, 1843, marked B 1 and B 2, and of the nine judgments marked C 1 to C 9, also of the opinion of the Attorney General, and of the papers that were before him, marked D to D No. 8, inclusive, are herewith presented. Your memorialist asks that these sums so paid by Virginia, with interest, may be returned to that Commonwealth by the United States.
THOMAS GREEN, Commissioner ,

A.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, April 8, 1844.
Sir: The Hon. James M. Porter, your predecessor in the Department of War, by letter dated the 6th of February last, submitted for my examination the accompanying application of Thomas Green, esq., agent of the State of Virginia, (which, with the papers transmitted, numbered from 1 to 8, inclusive, is herewith returned,) upon which he desires my opinion—
1st. Whether the claim thereby presented is one for which the Government of the United States is liable under the act of Congress of the 5th of July, 1832? and,
2d. Whether, if such liability exists, it will not be necessary for Congress to make an appropriation before it can be paid, the unexpended balance appropriated by the 2d section of that act having been carried to the surplus fund?
Upon the first question, I am clearly of the opinion that the claim is just, and falls within the provisions of the 2d section of the act of 1832; that the exceptions taken to it by the Commissioner of Pensions cannot be sustained; and that the balance of $9,414 66 of the appropriation made by that act, if now within the control of the department, would be applicable to the payment of the demand.
But the difficulty suggested by the second question, is, I think, insuperable. The balance above indicated was, under the circumstances of the case, properly carried to the surplus fund, from which it can be withdrawn by the appropriating power of Congress alone.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant, JNO. NELSON.
Hon. WILLIAM WILKINS, Secretary of War.
A 1.
WASHINGTON, January 22, 1844.
Sir: In my communication to you of the 19th July last, I presented for your consideration certain claims paid by Virginia under judgments for commutation obtained against her by certain officers of her State line in the Revolution. In that letter I stated, "there are a few other cases, for small sums, not embraced in the above classes, with the consideration of which it is not proposed to trouble you at this time."
I beg leave now to ask your attention to them. They are four in number, and are for payments made under judgments of the supreme court of appeals in favor of the following officers, viz:
   Joseph Saunders, for  -  -  -  -  $1,168 88    J. M. Marshall, for  -  -  -  -  2,200 00    Benjamin Roberts, for  -  -  -  -  1,415 33    Thomas Young, for  -  -  -  -  1,520 00   
  $6,304 21
Enclosed are transcripts of the judgments, with copies of the receipts,

statements of the accounts, and references to the special act of the Virginia Assembly authorizing the payments—all duly certified by the auditor of public accounts.
These were among the judgments directed to be satisfied by the second section of the act of Congress of 5th July, 1832, as will be seen by reference to the transcripts and copies herewith furnished, and to the last clause of page 5 of Report No. 191, House of Reps., 22d Cong., 1st session, and to Document No. 17, being a statement bearing date the 4th of January, 1831, prepared by the auditor of public accounts, of the judgments for half pay then recently rendered against the Commonwealth of Virginia, and will be found bound up with the Journals of the House of Delegates of that date.
The statement of the auditor shows that the aggregate of the judgments, as estimated by him, including these four , amounted to the sum of $241,345, the precise maximum specified in the 2d section of the act of Congress of the 5th July, 1832. That section directed the amount of the judgments above referred to, should be paid to the State of Virginia, not exceeding $241,345.
The estimate was professedly conjectural to a certain extent, and Congress manifestly intended to pay to Virginia the true amount, not exceeding the specified limit. Accordingly, the $241,345 were placed at the disposal of the State, with that understanding; and the auditor proceeded to satisfy the judgments, by paying the correct amounts, as he supposed. It appeared , the aggregate of his estimates in January, 1831, had been too large by the sum of $9,414 66, which he returned to the treasury of the United States in 1835. Subsequently it was ascertained that the judgments on behalf of the four officers hereinbefore named were for larger sums than had been estimated in their respective cases, and the Legislature of the State felt bound to pay the sums actually due. If the fiscal agent of the State had retained the sum which he returned to the United States treasury till the judgments had been actually satisfied, it would clearly have been within both the spirit and letter of the law that the money should be applied in that way until that full and final satisfaction had been made. No conceivable ground of complaint could have existed, if he had pursued that course. Nor should the State be placed in a worse situation for the prompt return of the large supposed surplus, under the erroneous impression that the judgments were fully satisfied. Congress directed these judgments to be paid, and Virginia was the mere agent of the United States for that purpose. As such, she performed the duty, as she supposed; settled her accounts, and returned the excess of funds in her hands. It turns out she did not perform the whole duty; that a part was left unpaid; that the law is still unexecuted pro tanto , and she now asks that the law may be executed fully .
At the date of the enactment of this law, nearly all these judgments had been superseded by appeals to the supreme court of appeals, in which the suits were then pending.
In order to illustrate the view here taken, (viz: that the law has been executed in part only,) let it be supposed that after the sum of $241,345 had been placed under the control of Virginia, the judgments had been reversed, and the whole sum had been immediately returned. Let it also be supposed the cases were such as to authorize writs of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, and that court had reversed the decision of the appellate court, and confirmed these very judgments of the superior court of Henrico, which were directed to be paid: is it not manifest, upon that supposition, that the law would have to be executed by the payment of the

$241,345 to Virginia, for the purpose indicated? and if so as to the whole , it must be as to a part. A temporary declining of a trustee to act, or a voluntary return under a misapprehension by him of the funds placed in his hands, should not defeat the execution of a law in such a case.
I may be mistaken, however, in imagining that any such difficulty may present itself to your mind. I beg leave, therefore, to submit the claim, on behalf of Virginia, to have the amount paid by her, in satisfaction of these four judgments, returned.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS GREEN.
HON. J. M. PORTER, Secretary of War.
P. S.—The act of 5th July, 1832, has a clause of appropriation in it.
A 2.
At a superior court of law for Henrico county, held the 15th day of November, 1830—
  Joseph Saunders, appellant , vs. The Commonwealth.  Upon an appeal from a decision of the auditor of public accounts, refusing to allow a certain claim of the appellant against the Commonwealth, for services rendered by him as an officer in the revolutionary war.  
This day came, as well the appellant by his attorney, as the Attorney General for the Commonwealth; and it appearing by the evidence on the part of the appellant filed in this cause, that he was a lieutenant in the Virginia State line in the revolutionary war, and became a supernumerary before the close thereof. the court is of opinion that the appellant is entitled to half pay during his life, and that the auditor of public accounts erred in rejecting the said appellant's claim thereto. It is, therefore, ordered that the said auditor do issue and deliver to the appellant a warrant on the treasurer of this Commonwealth for the said half pay, to commence from the 22d day of April, 1783. From which judgment the Attorney General for the Commonwealth prayed an appeal to the court of appeals, which is allowed; and by consent, as well of the counsel for the appellant as of the Attorney General, the agreement subjoined to the judgment in the case of William Helme, administrator of Robert Cowne, against the Commonwealth, is to be made a part of the record in this cause.
A copy—Teste:
J. ROBINSON, Clerk Circuit Court for Henrico, &c., law side.
In the clerk's office of the circuit superior court of law and chancery for Henrico county, January 9, 1833:
A copy of the judgment of the court of appeals in the foregoing cause was this day received by the clerk of this court, in the vacation thereof, and is in the words and figures following:

"Virginia.—At a court of appeals held at the Capitol, in the city of Richmond, on Wednesday, December the 5th, 1832—
  The Commonwealth  vs. Joseph Saunders, appellee.   { Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered in favor of the appellee against the Commonwealth, by the superior court of law of Henrico county, on the 15th day of November, 1830.  
This day came as well the Attorney General on behalf of the Commonwealth, as the appellee by his counsel; whereupon the court having maturely considered the transcript of the record of the judgment aforesaid, is of opinion that there is no error in the said judgment: therefore it is considered that the same be affirmed, which is ordered to be certified to the circuit superior court of Henrico county.
A copy—Teste:
J. ALLEN, C. C."
A copy—Teste:
J. ROBINSON, Clerk Circuit Court for Henrico, &c., law side.
  55 years, at $160 - - - - - $8,800 00   3 months, - - - - - - 40 00   20 days - - - - - - 8 88   8,848 88   Paid 23d February, 1833 - - - - - 7,680 00   $1,168 88 
AUDITOR'S OFFICE, March 25, 1842.
Received a warrant for one thousand one hundred and sixty-eight dollars and eighty-eight cents.
HENRY L. BROOKE, Attorney for Jno. M. Ferguson, sergeant of the city of Richmond, and, as such, administrator of Joseph Saunders, deceased.
I hereby certify, that the foregoing receipt is a true copy of the original given in this case.
I further certify, that a power of attorney to receive the same, duly authenticated, is now on file in this office.
Given under my hand, at the auditor's office, Richmond, this 10th day of July, 1843.
JAS. E. HEATH, Auditor Va.

A 3.
At a superior court of law for Henrico county, held the 11th day of November, 1830—
James M. Marshall, appellant , vs. The Commonwealth.
{ Upon an appeal from a decision of the auditor of public accounts, refusing to allow a certain claim of the appellant against the Commonwealth, for services rendered by him as an officer in the revolutionary war.
This day came as well the appellant by his attorney, as the Attorney General for the Commonwealth; and it appearing, by the evidence on the part of the appellant filed in this cause, that the said appellant was a lieutenant in the State artillery regiment in the revolutionary war, but became a supernumerary before the close thereof, the court is of opinion that the appellant is entitled to half pay during his life, and that the auditor of public accounts erred in rejecting the appellant's claim thereto. It is, therefore, ordered that the said auditor do issue and deliver to the appellant a warrant on the treasurer of this Commonwealth for the said half pay, to commence from the 6th day of February, 1784. From which judgment the Attorney General for the Commonwealth prayed an appeal to the court of appeals, which is allowed; and, by consent as well of the counsel for the appellant as of the Attorney General, the agreement subjoined to the judgment in the case of William Helme, administrator of Robert Cowne, against the Commonwealth, is to be made a part of the record in this cause.
A copy—Teste:
J. ROBINSON, Clerk Circuit Court for Henrico, &c., law side.
In the clerk's office of the circuit superior court of law and chancery for Henrico county, January 9th, 1833:
A copy of the judgment of the court of appeals in the foregoing cause was this day received by the clerk of this court, in the vacation thereof, and is in the words and figures following:
" Virginia. —At a court of appeals held at the Capitol, in the city of Richmond, on Thursday, December the 13th, 1832:
The Commonwealth vs. James M. Marshall, appellee .
{ Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered in favor of the appellee against the Commonwealth, by the superior court of law of Henrico county, on the 11th day of November, 1830.
This day came as well the Attorney General on behalf of the Commonwealth, as the appellee by his counsel; whereupon the court having maturely considered the transcript of the record of the judgment aforesaid, is of opinion that there is no error in the said judgment: therefore it is con-

sidered that the same be affirmed, which is ordered to be certified to the circuit superior court of Henrico county.
A copy—Teste :
J. ALLEN, C. C."
A copy—Teste :
J. ROBINSON,
Clerk Circuit Court for Henrico, &c., law side.
  Judgment 11th November, 1830, for half pay for life, to commence 6th February, 1784; from thence to 6th February, 1842—58 years, at $200 - - - $11,600 00   Paid 19th February, 1833 - - - 9,400 00   Balance 6th February, 1842 - - - $2,200 00 
$2,200
AUDITOR'S OFFICE, April 11, 1842.
Received a warrant for two thousand and two hundred dollars, in full, on account of judgment up to the 6th of February, 1842.
WM. B. ARCHER,
Attorney for J. M. Marshall.
I hereby certify, that the above receipt is a true copy of the original given in this case.
I further certify, that a power of attorney to receive the same, duly authenticated, is now on file in this office.
Given under my hand, at the auditor's office, Richmond, this 10th day of July, 1843.
JAS. E. HEATH, Auditor Va.
A 4.
At a superior court of law for Henrico county, held on the 13th day of November, 1830—
Benjamin Roberts, appellant , vs. The Commonwealth.
{ Upon an appeal from a decision of the auditor of public accounts, refusing to allow a certain claim of the appellant against the Commonwealth, for services rendered by him as an officer in the revolutionary war.
This day came as well the appellant by his attorney, as the Attorney General for the Commonwealth, and it appearing by the evidence on the part of the appellant, filed in this cause, that the said appellant was a captain in a Virginia State regiment under the command of Colonel Joseph Crockett, in the revolutionary war, and became a supernumerary before the close thereof, the court is of opinion that the appellant is entitled to half pay during his life; and that the auditor of public accounts erred in rejecting his claim thereto. It is therefore ordered that the said auditor do issue and deliver to the appellant a warrant on the treasurer of this Commonwealth

for the said half pay, to commence from the 22d day of April, 1783. From which judgment the Attorney General for the Commonwealth prayed an appeal to the court of appeals, which is allowed. And by consent, as well of the counsel for the appellant, as of the Attorney General, the agreement subjoined to the judgment in the case of William Helme, administrator of Robert Cowne, against the Commonwealth, is to be made a part of the record in this cause.
A copy—Teste:
J. ROBINSON, Clerk Circuit Court for Henrico, &c., law side.
In the clerk's office of the circuit superior court of law and chancery, for Henrico county, January 9, 1833:
A copy of the judgment of the court of appeals in the foregoing cause was this day received by the clerk of this court, in the vacation thereof, and is in the words and figures following:
" Virginia. —At a court of appeals held at the Capitol, in the city of Richmond, on Wednesday, December 5, 1832:
  The Commonwealth  vs. Benjamin Roberts, appellee.   { Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered in favor of the appellee against the Commonwealth, by the superior court of law for Henrico county, on the 13th day of November, 1830.  
This day came as well the Attorney General on behalf of the Commonwealth, as the appellee by his counsel; whereupon, the court having maturely considered the transcript of the record of the judgment aforesaid, is of opinion that there is no error in the said judgment. Therefore it is considered that the same be affirmed; which is ordered to be certified to the circuit superior court of Henrico county.
A copy—Teste:
J. ALLEN, C. C. "
A copy—Teste:
J. ROBINSON, Clerk Circuit Court for Henrico, &c., law side.
  From 22d April, 1783, to 17th March, 1837, the day of R.'s decease—53 years 10 months 23 days, at $240 per annum  $12,935 33    Cr. Paid 23d February, 1833  11,520 00    Balance  $1,415 33  

AUDITOR'S OFFICE, June 17, 1842.
Received a warrant for one thousand four hundred and fifteen dollars and thirty-three cents.
HENRY L. BROOKE,
Attorney for Jno. M. Ferguson, adm'r of Benj. Roberts, deceased.
I hereby certify, that the above receipt is a true copy of the original given in the case.
I further certify, that a power of attorney to receive the same, duly authenticated, is now on file in this office.
Given under my hand, at the auditor's office, Richmond, this 10th day of July, 1843.
JAS. E. HEATH, Auditor of Virginia.
A 5.
At a superior court of law for Henrico county, held the 13th day of November, 1830—
  Thomas Young, appellant,  vs. The Commonwealth.  { Upon an appeal from a decision of the auditor of public accounts, refusing to allow a certain claim of the appellant against the Commonwealth, for services rendered by him as an officer in the revolutionary war.  
This day came as well the appellant by his attorney, as the Attorney General for the Commonwealth; and it appearing by the evidence on the part of the appellant, filed in this cause, that the said appellant was a captain in a Virginia State regiment under the command of Colonel Joseph Crockett, in the revolutionary war, and became a supernumerary before the close thereof, the court is of opinion that the appellant is entitled to half pay during his life, and that the auditor of public accounts erred in rejecting his claim thereto. It is therefore ordered that the said auditor do issue and deliver to the appellant a warrant on the treasurer of this Commonwealth for the said half pay, to commence from the 21st day of December, 1781. From which judgment the Attorney General for the Commonwealth prayed an appeal to the court of appeals, which is allowed; and by consent as well of the counsel for the appellant, as of the Attorney General, the agreement subjoined to the judgment in the case of William Helme, administrator of Robert Cowne, against the Commonwealth, is to be made a part of the record in this cause.
A copy—Teste:
J. ROBINSON, Clerk Circuit Court for Henrico, &c., law side.
In the clerk's office of the circuit superior court of law and chancery for Henrico county, January 9, 1833:
A copy of the judgment of the court of appeals in the foregoing cause was this day received by the clerk of this court, in the vacation thereof, and is in the words and figures following:

" Virginia. —At a court of appeals, held at the Capitol, in the city of Richmond, on Wednesday, December 5, 1832 :
The Commonwealth, vs. Tho. Young, appellee. { Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered in favor of the appellee against the Commonwealth, by the superior court by law of Henrico county, on the 13th of November, 1830.
This day came as well the Attorney General on behalf of the Commonwealth, as the appellee by his counsel ; whereupon the court having maturely considered the transcript of the record of the judgment aforesaid, is of opinion that there is no error in the said judgment, therefore it is considered that the same be affirmed ; which is ordered to be certified to the circuit superior court of Henrico county.
A copy—Teste :
J. ALLEN, C. C."
A copy—Teste :
J. ROBINSON, Clerk Circuit Court for Henrico, &c., law side.
  From 21st of December, 1781, to 21st of April, 1837, (about which time Young died,) 55 years and 4 months—   At $240 per annum . - - - - $13,280 00   Cr. Paid February, 1833 - - - - 11,760 00   $1,520 00 
AUDITOR'S OFFICE, June 17, 1842.
Received a warrant for one thousand five hundred and twenty dollars.
HENRY L. BROOKE,
Attorney for John M. Ferguson, adm'r of Tho. Young, deceased.
I hereby certify, that the above receipt is a true copy of the original given in this case.
I further certify, that a power of attorney to receive the same, duly authenticated, is now on file in this office.
Given under my hand, at the auditor's office, Richmond, this 10th day of July, 1843.
JAS. E. HEATH, Auditor of Public Accounts, Virginia.
A 6.
PENSION OFFICE, January 31, 1844.
SIR : I herewith return the papers in the cases of Joseph Saunders, J. M. Marshall, Benjamin Roberts, and Thomas Young. These claims are presented for half pay under the 2d section of the act of the 5th of July, 1832.

These claims should not, in my opinion, be allowed; because—
1st. The 2d section of the act appropriating two hundred and forty-one thousand three hundred and forty-five dollars, does not authorize the General Government to pay any individual for revolutionary service, but directs the Treasury Department of the United States to pay the money to the State of Virginia.
2d. There is no evidence that these claims have not been already paid by the State of Virginia.
3d. In all cases where claims are made under the law of July, 1832, at this office, the claimants must show that they are the legal representatives of the deceased officers; and such proof is not exhibited in these cases.
4th. Of the amount paid to the State of Virginia under the 1st and 2d sections of the act of July, 1832, the sum of nine thousand four hundred and fourteen dollars and sixty-six cents was refunded by the State; but it does not appear whether the surplus arose under the appropriation made by the 1st or the 2d section. If under the former, no part of the sum returned to the United States treasury could now be paid to satisfy claims under the 2d section of the law.
The first of the foregoing objections I consider insuperable, and any additional objection would seem to be superfluous; but I deemed it proper, in making a report, to state every objection, in order to bring the business to a more speedy termination.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. L. EDWARDS.
HON. JAMES M. PORTER, Secretary of War.
A 7.
WASHINGTON, February 1, 1844.
SIR: The objections made by Mr. Edwards, in his letter of yesterday to you, to the payment of the claim I had the honor to present in my communication of the 22d ultimo, will be answered in the order in which he has made them.
The first objection is answered by the statement that this claim is not presented on behalf of any individual , but on behalf of the State of Virginia; and this being true, the second objection also fails.
To the third , the answer is equally obvious: the demand being made by the State , and the 2d section of the act of 5th July, 1832, requiring the payment of the judgments referred to, to be made to the State , it is not a matter to be inquired into by the Department of War, who were the legal representatives of the officers.
The act of the Virginia Assembly of the 4th March, 1835, directing the return of the $9,414 66, furnishes the information desired in the fourth and last objection made.
I am your obedient servant,
THOMAS GREEN.
HON. J. M. PORTER, Secretary of War.

A S.
WASHINGTON, February 3, 1844.
Sir: Your suggestion of a doubt whether the sum of $6,304 21 could be refunded to Virginia, even if confessedly just, without a new appropriation by law, leaves me to suppose the remarks in my letter of the 22d ultimo, on that point, were not satisfactory.
I beg leave to add, that the act of Congress directing appropriations, not called for within two years, to be carried to the surplus fund, had reference to specific , and not to general or continuing appropriations. This very act of July 5, 1832, is an instance of the latter class; as payments are constantly made under the third section, although more than eleven years have elapsed since its date.
This daily practice of the department illustrates the general understanding of the intention of Congress in enacting that third section of the law, viz: that the claims should be paid whenever they should be presented and proved—whether within one year, or ten years, or any subsequent period. But it may be said the second section is much more definite. I answer, that the sum to be paid is limited, but not the time . The amount of the judgments (including these four now presented) was to be paid to Virginia. No time is specified; and the only reasonable interpretation that can be given, is, that the payments should be made in time to meet the demands against Virginia under those judgments. The payments were not to be made, except as a trust . It was not the intention to pay one dollar, except in satisfaction of the judgments. If the court of appeals had reversed and annulled the judgments, no payments ought to have been made at all, under the second section of the act. Suppose one half had been affirmed, and the rest had remained undecided in the appellate court until this time, and were now affirmed, and the amount of the first moiety only had heretofore been actually paid over to Virginia: could it be questioned whether the other moiety should now be paid? It is supposed no such question could be made. The whole policy and object of the law forbid the idea. The clear and indubitable intention of Congress was to pay the amount of the judgments, if Virginia were bound to pay them, and not otherwise. If Virginia had resisted the payment in the appellate court, for any number of years, but ultimately without success, (not in the mean time having asked for any part of the appropriation,) no one could imagine that that resistance, made for the benefit of the United States, could exonerate them from all payment under the law; and if not, it shows that this appropriation was not of the character that would pass to the surplus fund at the expiration of two years.
But it may be supposed that when the maximum of $241,345 was paid over to Virginia, the second section had performed its office, and could never after be resorted to.
The answer is this: that no such payment, in its proper signification, ever was made to Virginia. The department could not pay more than "the amount of the judgments ;" and yet it did deposite in the treasury of Virginia the maximum , with the understanding that the true amount of the judgments should be applied in satisfaction of them, and the residue be returned. Virginia held the money in trust, as the agent of the United States; applied as much of it as she thought, at the time, could be demanded of her, and returned the excess; which ought to be considered in the same light as

if it had never passed out of the treasury. Until the amount of the judgments was demandable of her, the money was on deposite with Virginia—as much so as if it had been on deposite in any one of her banks. It could not properly be considered as out of the treasury of the United States.
If one half of the judgments had been speedily recovered against Virginia, and she had paid the amount out of the trust fund; and the other half had been placed in such a situation, in the appellate court, as to justify the belief that five or ten years would elapse before any decision, and Virginia had restored the other half of the trust-fund to the United States, until it should be needed, either from an unwillingness to risk the loss of the money in her hands, or from a sense of justice to the United States; and at the expiration of the five years the judgments had been affirmed,—could there be a doubt, in that case, about the propriety of the payment by the department? It is supposed there could not be, but that the intention of Congress, thus scrupulously pursued by Virginia, would be carried out. Yet if it would, in that case, it would be because the restoration of the trust-fund placed it just where it was before the deposite; or, if the fund had been restored in consequence of a mistake or misapprehension by the trustee, the same result would follow.
It was a trust, as is shown in every feature of the transaction. Indeed, it was clearly wrong to deposite more than “the amount of the judgments,” unless with the understanding of the contingent return of the surplus. If the maximum had been a million , the payments under the second section would still not have exceeded about the sum of $238,000; and yet it would have been just as legal to deposite the million of dollars, as it was to deposite the whole of the $241,345. Justice to the department requires us to suppose it was a mere transfer of the fund from one place of deposite to another, until the payments of the judgments should be made. The fund, then, not used in execution of the trust, but restored to the original depository, ought to be considered as never having been out of the treasury; in other words, as never having been paid under the second section.
If these $9,414 66 be in the treasury as an undrawn balance of the appropriation of $241,345, (which is manifestly the case,) and it has been shown that this appropriation was not of that specific class which was directed to be carried to the surplus fund if not expended within two years, it would seem that no difficulty ought to exist in directing the payment now asked, as the claim is palpably just, and the appropriation unexhausted.
These remarks are submitted with great deference to your better judgment, by your very obedient servant,
THOMAS GREEN.
Hon. J. M. PORTER, Secretary of War.
B 1.
WASHINGTON, July 19, 1843.
SIR: The act of Congress of the 5th July, 1832, entitled “An act to provide for the liquidating and paying certain claims of the State of Virginia,” was designed not only to refund to her the money she had paid, but to guard her against further liability for similar claims. Under the 3d section of the act, many of the claims were satisfied, first by the

Treasury, and subsequently, by the War Department—the duties of executing the law having been transferred to the latter. The department adjusted the claims by paying strictly the half pay from the termination of the officer's command to the period of his death; and in no instance allowed the commutation of half pay with interest, which occasionally exceeded the half pay for life. According to the principles decided in the cases of Markham and Lilly, in the supreme court of appeals of Virginia—decisions referred to and adopted by the act of 5th July, 1832—she was liable for the commutation of half pay, with interest, in several of the half pay cases. The claimants in those cases, after receiving the half pay from the United States, brought suits against Virginia for the difference, recovered judgments, and have received the money out of the State treasury. Schedule A (enclosed) specifies the cases thus paid. Schedule B is a list of three other cases paid by Virginia, under like circumstances; but in which no part of the half pay had been received from the United States.
The authentic evidences of these payments will be furnished, if you recognise the validity of the present demand, and direct its adjustment. There are a few other cases, for small sums, not embraced in the above classes, with the consideration of which it is not proposed to trouble you at this time.
The Legislature of Virginia, believing the payments ought to have been made by the United States, under the act of 5th July, 1832, instructed the Executive to cause this application to be made for the return of the money.
It was manifestly the intention of Congress to indemnify Virginia fully against these claims; and if the terms of the act of 5th July, 1832, will authorize this obvious intention to be carried out, it is supposed there can be no serious difficulty in admitting the propriety of the claim now presented.
That act of Congress adopts, as correct, the principles of the half-pay cases already decided in the supreme court of appeals of Virginia. In one of those previous decisions, (Markham's case,) the court expressly recognised the right to commutation, with interest, in those half-pay cases where the officers of the Virginia State line served to the end of the war . (See Leigh's Reports, vol. 1, p. 524.) That the class of commutation cases was considered by the court a mere branch of the half-pay cases, is manifest, when, upon reference to the act of 1790, (13 vol. Hen. Stat. at Large, page 131,) it is seen that no commutation cases are mentioned, as such; but the words "compensation of half pay," "as was allowed to the officers of the continental line," are construed by the court as giving the commutation , and interest, whenever the officers served to the end of the war. When Congress, by the 3d section of the act of 5th July, 1832, directed the adjustment of "those claims for half pay," for which Virginia would be bound, "on the principles of the half-pay cases already decided," it cannot be supposed that any one class , more than another, of those claims to half pay, was intended. On the contrary, the only fair construction is, that Congress, in using the general phraseology of "those claims for half pay," meant them to be co-extensive with the construction of the like terms given by the court, in its approved decisions. The words "those claims for half pay" apply as well to the commutation, or ten years' half-pay cases, as to those of five or fifteen years; and to one por-

tion of the ten years' half-pay cases, (those, for instance, that carried interest according to the principles decided by the court,) as strongly as to any other ten years' half-pay claims.
Taking into consideration the terms of the Virginia act of 1790; the interpretation of them by the court; the adoption of that interpretation by Congress; and its selection of terms, so nearly identical,—it is difficult to perceive how a doubt could ever have arisen on this subject. If it be conceded that the 3d section of the act of 5th July, 1832, authorized the adjustment of all these half-pay cases—the commutation as well as the other classes—then the only remaining question for your consideration is one of fact . Did these officers serve to the end of the war? The law requires the Secretary of War to decide this question. The mode and means to be adopted to ascertain the fact, are left to his sound discretion, and may be varied, restricted, or enlarged, from time to time, as circumstances may justify, or his sense of propriety may dictate. Whenever satisfied of the fact that the officer served to the end of the war—either by the certificate of the head of a bureau acting under prescribed regulations, or by the decision of the judiciary to which the question might be referred, or by any other reliable testimony—the obligation arises to pay the claim. The claim now presented on behalf of the State of Virginia, is for the amount paid by her since 1832, in satisfaction of judgments rendered by her courts, that these officers had actually served to the end of the war, and were entitled to the commutation of half pay, and that she was still liable for the claims of the officers, notwithstanding the act of 5th July, 1832; but, in the settlement, was entitled to credit for whatever sums had been received under that act.
The payments were not voluntary—the claims were resisted by the State; her attorney general opposing every one alike with zeal and ability. The claimants, in every case, (two excepted,) were non-residents, entitled to none of her sympathies, except so far as their meritorious ancestors were entitled to the grateful recollection of the whole country. The courts were constituted, not for the special purpose of trying these cases, but were the intelligent, impartial, disinterested, and independent tribunals of the State, for the settlement of all questions involving the rights of a citizen or of the Commonwealth. Putting aside the immunity which sovereignty affords, Virginia, by an ancient statute, had placed herself, in all questions of mere right , on an equality with her humblest citizen, or the citizen of any other State or country. If he has a just claim against her, the courts are open to him for a fair, equal, and impartial trial. Her interests, however, are represented by her fiscal officer and her attorney general, in every case; and the court of last resort most usually attests the zeal of their defence. The Legislature, moreover, reserves to itself the power of appropriation to satisfy the judgment, so as to be able to arrest it, if, by possibility, it should be afterwards discovered that the judgment was in any manner unjustly obtained.
With all these guards thrown around her, these claims were judicially determined in favor of the officers, and Virginia has advanced the money to them. She announces, through her Legislature, the fact, thus ascertained, that these officers did serve to the end of the war. Since the act of 5th July, 1832, her position has been that of surety or endorser; and from her the money has been obtained by the creditor. Whatever rules may be adopted, in the wise discretion of any department, to ascertain

any series of facts, as the foundation of legal rights, it is believed none afford such universal satisfaction as the judgments of the courts; in these tribunals, neither prejudice, nor partiality, nor the unconscious influences of the pride of consistency, have sway. And where these judgments are confirmed by the grave and deliberate acts of a sovereign member of our Union—against its own interests, too—it is supposed the proof of these facts assumes the most solemn and imposing, as well as the most satisfactory form which the department could require. The payments by Virginia of these judgments, in favor of citizens of other States, were those deliberate acts, against her own interest, which are thus claimed to be entitled to respect. The circumstances under which these judgments were paid, and the habitual deference, throughout our country, to the unbiassed and impartial decisions of the courts—to say nothing of the usual courtesy of one Government to another—forbid the idea that you will require a reproduction of the evidence submitted to the courts, in order to satisfy you that these officers did serve to the end of the war.
Supposing it to be conceded that the services are satisfactorily proved, and the right to commutation admitted, it only remains to be shown that Virginia is entitled to receive, under the act of 5th July, 1832, the amount advanced by her, and now claimed. By the 3d section of the act, the Secretary is directed to pay “those claims for half pay,” for which Virginia was bound—whether to the officer, his children, his heirs, his executor, administrator, or his assignee, is not specified. The chief object of the law was to indemnify Virginia. The claims are considered as valid, legal claims, which are to be paid. In practice, they have been so recognised by the departments, and the payments have been made, under the advice of the Attorney General of the United States, to the legal representatives of the officers, as other assets of the estates of the deceased. Perhaps the payment to any ordinary assignee might have been declined properly, as the department might be unwilling to take the hazard of recognising acts that may have been invalid. But no such considerations operate between two Governments, where there can be no hazard. The Executive of the United States is directed to pay “those claims for half pay,” in exoneration of Virginia. The payments must be made to the rightful owners of those claims—no matter who they are—otherwise no protection would be afforded. Virginia is ready to show that she represents these rightful owners, and is authorized to give any receipt, in discharge of the claims, which the legal representatives of the officers could be required to give.
I am, with great respect, your obedient, humble servant,
THOMAS GREEN, Commissioner.
Hon. J. M. PORTER, Secretary of War.
B 2.
WASHINGTON, July 19, 1843.
Sir: Your favor of yesterday, enclosing a copy of the report of the Commissioner of Pensions on the subject of my communication of the 14th instant, has been received.

While I take censure to myself for not having more perspicuously explained the grounds upon which Virginia considers herself entitled to have the money in question refunded to her, I beg leave to add, this report strengthens the conviction, previously entertained, that, when the subject shall be fully presented to your consideration, you will not hesitate to direct the payment of the claim, as the view taken by the Commissioner of Pensions is doubtless the strongest that can be presented on that side, and it must soon be obvious how slight are its objections.
Without following the order of these objections, it may be observed, the opinion of the Attorney General, referred to in the document mentioned, does not, in the slightest degree , conflict with the claims now presented. It is not necessary to controvert a single position taken in that opinion, although it is very evident the Attorney General had not before him the act of 1790, and it was not necessary that he should refer to it in order to justify his opinion that those half-pay cases, in which the commutation had been paid prior to the passage of the act of 5th July, 1832, could not be readjusted under the 3d section. That section provided for the payment of these claims for half pay "which have not been paid or prosecuted to judgment;" and the opinion of the Attorney General was, that, as the case then before him had been paid before the passage of the act, it could not be reconsidered. The cases now presented had not been paid or prosecuted to judgment prior to the act of 1832.
A hasty view of the remarks of the Attorney General, in that opinion, touching the right of choice in the officer to the commutation or the half-pay, might create the impression that Congress, by the act of 1832, meant to give the "half pay" only, in contradistinction to the commutation; but the slightest consideration will show he alluded, in that part of his opinion, not to any distinction between commutation and half pay , but to a distinction between those cases (whether for the one or the other) in which the election had, or had not, been made prior to the passage of the act of 1832. If the election had been indicated, by obtaining judgment or receiving payment, the 3d section of the act of 5th July, 1832, did not provide for such cases. But if the officers had made no election; if they had neither received payment in any form, nor prosecuted to judgment, then this section did provide for them, and direct the adjustment and settlement of their claims. And no matter what might be the obligations of Virginia, those of the United States under this act, and particularly the 3d section, could be construed no further than above indicated. Such is unquestionably the only extent to which the Attorney General meant to go; and his views are entirely consistent with the claims now presented. It is, however, as already stated, abundantly shown, on the face of the opinion itself, that the act of 1790 was not before the Attorney General at the time of giving that opinion; and his omission to refer to it may have been the cause of some of the objections now made.
The claim presented on behalf of Virginia is for the payment, under the 3d section of the act of Congress of the 5th July, 1832, of "those claims for half pay" which had not been paid nor prosecuted to judgment prior to the date of that act, but which have been prosecuted since that period, and for which Virginia was bound, according to the principles decided in the very cases referred to in the act of Congress itself. These claims are embraced in two classes, schedules of which were furnished in my last communication, viz: Schedule A embraced the class where

the services had been proved to the end of the war, and the commutation, with interest, had been paid by Virginia since 1832, after deducting from the claims the amount of half pay which had been received from the United States under the 3d section of the act aforesaid. In other words, this branch of the claim now urged is for the difference between the amount of half pay received under that section, and the amount in those cases for which Virginia was bound , according to the principles decided by the court in the cases referred to.
This difference has been paid by Virginia, who thinks it ought to have been paid by the United States. Schedule B comprised other claims of the same description, but in which nothing had been received from the United States.
It is not pretended that commutation, with interest, and half pay also, could be justly demanded in any case. No such idea was ever designed to be intimated. The ground taken is, that commutation, with interest, was due in every case in the above schedule by Virginia, according to the principles decided by the supreme court of appeals in the cases referred to in the act of 5th July, 1832; and, consequently, that the United States ought to have paid them, under the express directions of the 3d section of that act; whereas the United States paid no part of any one claim in schedule B, and a part only of each claim in schedule A. The claims having been paid by Virginia, under judgments against her, it is presumed nothing further is required to show that this money ought to be refunded to her, if you shall be satisfied Virginia was bound for them according to the principles decided and referred to in the act of 5th July, 1832.
It is difficult to argue this proposition, except as one depending on the facts of each case. Nothing can be more explicitly stated (see Markham's case, 1 Leigh, p. 524) than that Virginia was bound for commutation and interest, in those half-pay cases where the services of the officers are proved to have continued to the end of the war—they being of the State line. The principle was considered as settled and established, and the court rejected Markham's claim to commutation, with interest, because the facts of his case did not bring him within the principle so settled and decided. The 3d section of the act of 5th July, 1832, referred particularly to this then recent decision of the supreme court of appeals, as determining a principle by which the State was bound; and Congress directed the adjustment of the unsatisfied claims, (or those not paid or prosecuted to judgment at that date,) clearly with a view to protect Virginia from the effect of the principles so decided. If Virginia had paid these claims prior to the assumption acts, the General Government would have refunded to her every dollar, without hesitation; but she doubted their legal right, and refused payment until the decisions of her courts left her no grounds for further resistance. She applied to Congress to assume the obligation, as it had assumed those of all the States for every expense on account of the war; and the act of 5th July, 1832, was passed with that view. It evidently intended the remedy to be co-extensive with the injury that threatened Virginia, of having to pay out of her own treasury debts that were incurred for the general defence. The first section of that act directed the repayment to Virginia of the amount of all the half-pay cases which she had paid since 9th April, 1791—not only those payments that were made of half pay from the termination of the

officer's command to the day of his death , but those that were for commutation—some with, and some without interest , according as the one or the other had been actually paid by Virginia. These facts are not apparent on the face of the act, but they are clearly stated in the report (No. 191, House of Representatives, 22d Congress, 1st session,) which accompanied the bill. The 2d section of the act directed the payment to Virginia of the amount for which judgments had been recently obtained against her. The 3d section directed the payment of all "those claims for half pay," "which have not been paid or prosecuted to judgment," "for which the State would be bound on the principles of the half-pay cases already decided in the supreme court of appeals of said State." The intention is clear, that under this section all the half-pay cases of every class not embraced in either of the preceding sections, but for which Virginia was bound, according to the principles therein recognised, should be adjusted and paid.
But the Commissioner of Pensions says no allusion is made in the act of 5th July, 1832, to cases of commutation; and that the act last mentioned nowhere recognises the act of 1790. The act of 5th July, 1832, in its 1st section, directs the repayment of a certain sum to Virginia; and the report of the committee shows that that sum was the aggregate of various enumerated cases, much the larger number of which were stated in the report to have been commutation cases—some with, and some without interest.
The 3d section, although it does not, in terms, refer to the Virginia act of 1790, does refer to the decisions of the courts which had reviewed that act, and settled its effect upon the half-pay cases, and directed the adjustment of those half-pay cases for which Virginia would be bound according to the principles thus decided.
The Commissioner of Pensions states that the act of July 5, 1832, gives no option to the officer to take half pay or commutation. That right is not asserted. The principles decided by the court as obligatory on Virginia, so far as that point is involved, were that those officers who became supernumerary, and remained so, liable and ready to re-enter the service if called on, were entitled to half pay so long as they lived, and nothing more. And that those who continued in actual service, or were prisoners to the close of the war, were entitled to commutation with interest. These principles have been applied in the cases mentioned in the schedules A and B; and as they were shown to belong to the latter description of officers, Virginia has been held bound to pay the amount of commutation with interest in each case.
So far as schedule B is concerned, neither commutation nor half pay has been paid under the directions of the act of July 5, 1832. Those officers, not choosing, perhaps, to be turned from their original debtor, have made their claims good out of her, as they had a right to do. It is fortunate for Virginia that more of them did not pursue that course. If all of the half-pay cases "neither paid nor prosecuted to judgment" on the 5th July, 1832, had subsequently been satisfied out of her treasury, the difficulty in getting back any part might have been as great as that which is now encountered.
But I persuade myself the remarks of the Commissioner of Pensions are not sufficient to justify the course he recommends; and that you will not

violate, as Virginia thinks, not only the spirit and intention, but the very terms of the act of July 5, 1832, by a rejection of the present demand.
I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
THOMAS GREEN.
Hon. J. M. PORTER, Secretary of War.
C 1.
At a superior court of law for Henrico county, held the 15th day of November, 1830—
Philip Nadenboush, administrator de bonis non of George Walls, deceased, appellant, vs. The Commonwealth.
Upon an appeal from a decision of the auditor of public accounts, refusing to allow a certain claim of the appellant against the Commonwealth, for services rendered by the said George Walls in his lifetime, as an officer in the revolutionary war.
For reasons appearing to the court, it is ordered that the judgment entered in this case, on Saturday last, be set aside. Whereupon, came again as well the appellant by his attorney, as the Attorney General for the Commonwealth; and it appearing, by the evidence on the part of the appellant filed in this cause, that the said George Walls was a major in a Virginia State regiment, commanded by Colonel Joseph Crockett, in the revolutionary war, and continued to serve as such until after the end of the war, the court is of opinion that the said George Walls was entitled to half pay during his life, or five years' full pay in lieu thereof; and that the auditor of public accounts erred in rejecting the claim thereto, presented by the appellant. The court is further of opinion, as it was decided by the court of appeals in various cases in 1792, 1793, and 1794, and particularly in the case of Vivion Brooking, administrator of Isaac Holmes, decided on the 24th of April, 1794, that an officer in the State line, who continued in command till the end of the war, was entitled, by virtue of the act of 1790, to the commutation of five years' full pay with interest till paid; but, as the court understands the case of Markham's administrator against the Commonwealth, that the interest ought not to be allowed beyond a reasonable period, within which the claimant or his representative might, with due diligence, have prosecuted his claim and obtained a judgment, and that ten years from the end of his service may be considered as that reasonable period: It is therefore ordered, that the said auditor do issue and deliver to the appellant a warrant on the treasurer of this Commonwealth for the said five years' full pay, claimed by the appellant, with lawful interest thereon for the term of ten years. From which judgment both the Attorney General for the Commonwealth, and the appellant, prayed appeals to the court of appeals, which are allowed; and, by their consent, the agreement subjoined to the judgment in the case of William Helme, administrator of Robert Cowne, against the Commonwealth, is to be made a part of the record in this cause.
A copy—Teste:
J. ROBINSON, Clerk Circuit Court for Henrico, &c., law side.

In the clerk's office of the circuit superior court of law and chancery for Henrico county, January 9, 1833:
A copy of the judgment of the court of appeals, in the foregoing cause, was this day received by the clerk of this court, in the vacation thereof, and is in the words and figures following:
" Virginia. —At a court of appeals held at the Capitol, in the city of Richmond, on Saturday, December 1, 1832—
The Commonwealth
vs.
Philip Nadenboush, administrator de bonis non of George Walls, deceased, appellee ; and
Philip Nadenboush, administrator de bonis non of George Walls, deceased, appellant ,
vs.
The Commonwealth.
Upon appeals from a judgment rendered by the superior court of law of Henrico county, in favor of the appellee in the first case, and the appellant in the second, against the Commonwealth, on the 15th day of November, 1830.
This day came as well the Attorney General on behalf of the Commonwealth, as the appellee in the first, and the appellant in the second case, by his counsel; whereupon the court, having maturely considered the transcript of the record of the judgment aforesaid, is of opinion that the said judgment is erroneous: Therefore, it is considered that the same be reversed and annulled; and this court proceeding to render such judgment as the said superior court ought to have given, it is ordered that the auditor of public accounts do issue and deliver to the appellee a warrant on the treasury for five years' full pay, to which his intestate was entitled, with lawful interest thereon from the 22d day of April, 1783, till paid; which is ordered to be certified to the circuit superior court of Henrico county.
A copy—Teste:
J. ALLEN, C. C."
A copy—Teste:
J. ROBINSON,
Clerk Circuit Court for Henrico, &c., law side.
   Five years' full pay - $3,000 00   Interest from 22d April, 1783, to 1st January, 1833 - 8,944 00   11,944 00   Paid by the General Government - 4,800 00   $7,144 00  
AUDITOR'S OFFICE, March 12, 1836.
Received a warrant of seven thousand one hundred and forty-four dollars.
C. J. FAULKNER,
Administrator of Geo. Walls.
I hereby certify, that the above receipt is a true copy of the original given in this case.

I further certify, that a power of attorney to receive the same, duly authenticated, is now on file in this office.
Given under my hand, at the auditor's office, Richmond, this 10th day of July, 1843.
JAS. E. HEATH, Auditor of Virginia.
C 2.
VIRGINIA:
At a circuit superior court of law and chancery for the county of Henrico and city of Richmond, held at the Capitol, in the said city, on Saturday, February 15th, 1840—
William D. Wren, sergeant of the city of Richmond, and, as such, administrator of Robert George, deceased, appellant ,
vs.
The Commonwealth.
This cause came on this day to be heard by consent of the appellant, by his counsel, and the Attorney General on behalf of the Commonwealth, upon the petition of appeal, the answer thereto of the auditor of public accounts, and exhibits, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it appearing to the court that the appellant's intestate served in the army of the Revolution as a captain of a company of artillery belonging to the Illinois regiment, from the fourth day of June, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-nine, to the fifteenth day of February, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-four, inclusive; and the court being of opinion that the said intestate was at the time of his death entitled, under the provisions of the acts of Assembly in such cases made and provided, to the commutation of five years' full pay of a captain of artillery, with interest thereon at the rate of six per centum from the twenty-first day of April, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, until paid; and that the appellant, as his administrator, is now entitled to the said commutation and interest, after deducting therefrom the amount received of the Treasurer of the United States under the provision of the act of Congress passed in one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two; and that the auditor of public accounts erred in rejecting the claim thereto presented by the appellant,—doth therefore adjudge, order, and decree that the said auditor do issue and deliver to the appellant a warrant on the treasurer of this Commonwealth for a sum equal to the difference of the said commutation and interest, and the amount so received of the Treasurer of the United States as aforesaid.
A copy—Teste:
WM. G. SANDS, Clerk.

Estimate of the amount of the foregoing decree, viz :
  Five years' full pay - - - - - $3,000 00   Interest from 15th February, 1784, to 15th February, 1840 10,080 00     13,080 00   By half pay received from General Government - - - 5,023 56     8,056 44   Interest from 15th February, 1840, on $3,000, to the date of the passage of the law, to be added (16th March) - 15 00     $8,071 44   
AUDITOR'S OFFICE, 19th March, 1840.
Received a warrant of eight thousand and seventy-one dollars and forty-four cents.
WM. D. WREN, Sergeant city of Richmond, and administrator of R. George, deceased.
I hereby certify, that the above receipt is a true copy of the original given in this case.
I further certify, that a power of attorney to receive the same, duly authenticated, is now on file in this office.
Given under my hand, at the auditor's office, Richmond, this 10th day of July, 1843.
JAMES E. HEATH, Auditor Virginia.
C 3.
Virginia. —At a circuit superior court of law and chancery for Henrico county, held at the Capitol, in the city of Richmond, on Monday, February 17, 1834:
George Woolfolk, administrator of James Meriwether, deceased, late of the county of Jefferson, in the State of Kentucky, plaintiff ,
vs.
Susanna Meriwether, executrix of James Meriwether, deceased, late of the county of Putnam, in the State of Georgia, and the auditor of public accounts of the Commonwealth of Virginia, defendants .
This cause came on this day to be heard, by consent of the parties by their counsel, on the bill, answers, exhibits, replications, and examinations of witnesses, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, the court being satisfied, from the proofs in the cause, that James Meriwether of Kentucky, the intestate of the plaintiff, and not James Meriwether of Georgia, the testator of the defendant Susanna Meriwether, was a lieuten-

ant of cavalry in Captain John Rogers's troop of horse attached to the Illinois regiment, in the regular service of the State of Virginia on State establishment; that he continued in service until the end of the war, and upon the uniform decisions of the court of appeals is entitled from the Commonwealth of Virginia to commutation of five years' full pay, with interest thereon, to be computed at the rate of six per centum per annum, from the twenty-second day of April, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, until paid, in lieu of half pay for life, doth therefore adjudge, order, and decree, that the auditor of public accounts do issue a warrant on the treasurer of this Commonwealth, in favor of the plaintiff, the administrator of the said James Meriwether of Kentucky, for the amount of his commutation of five years' full pay as lieutenant of light dragoons in the company aforesaid, with interest thereon, to be computed at the rate of six per centum per annum from the said twenty-second day of April, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, until paid.
A copy—Teste:
WM. G. SANDS, Clerk.
   5 years' full pay $2,000 00   Interest from 22d April, 1783, to 17th March, 1835—51 years $6,120 00   10 months 23 days 100 00   7 67   6,227 67   8,227 67   Amount of half pay allowed by the Secretary of the Treasury 3,722 74   4,504 93  
March 17, 1835.—Received a warrant of four thousand five hundred and four dollars and ninety-three cents.
C. JOHNSON, Attorney.
I hereby certify, that the above receipt is a true copy of the original given in this case.
I further certify, that a power of attorney to receive the same, duly authenticated, is now on file in this office.
Given under my hand, at the auditor's office, Richmond, this 10th day of July, 1843.
JAS. E. HEATH, Auditor of Virginia.

C 4.
At a circuit superior court of law and chancery for Henrico county, held on the 11th day of June, 1836:
William D. Wren, sergeant of the city of Richmond, and administrator of Jarrett Williams, deceased, appellant , vs. The Commonwealth.
Upon an appeal from a decision of the auditor of public accounts, refusing to allow a certain claim of the appellant against the Commonwealth, for services rendered by the said Jarrett Williams in his lifetime, as an officer in the revolutionary war.
This day came as well the appellant by his attorney, as the Attorney General for the Commonwealth; and it appearing by the evidence on the part of the appellant filed in this cause, that the said Jarrett Williams was a lieutenant in the Illinois regiment, in the Virginia line, commanded by Colonel George R. Clarke, in the revolutionary war, and continued to serve as such till the end of the war; that he was entitled to five years' full pay, with interest thereon from the 22d day of April, 1783, till payment; and that the auditor of public accounts erred in rejecting the claim thereto presented by the appellant: It is therefore ordered, that the said auditor do issue and deliver to the appellant a warrant on the treasury for the said five years' full pay, with interest thereon, to be computed after the rate of six per centum per annum from the said 22d day of April, 1783, till payment; deducting from the amount the sum received by the appellant from the treasury of the United States, under an act of Congress passed in July, 1832.
A copy—Teste:
J. ROBINSON,
Clerk Circuit Court for Henrico, &c., law side.
Judgment for commutation due.
   Jarrett Williams - $1,600 00   Interest from 22d April, 1783, until 17th February, 1837 - 5,166 93     6,766 93   Received from the General Government - 1,795 64     $5,061 29  
AUDITOR'S OFFICE, February 21, 1837.
Received a warrant of five thousand and sixty dollars 29 cents.
WM. D. WREN, Sergt. C. R., and Adm'r of J. Williams, dec'd.
I hereby certify, that the above receipt is a true copy of the original given in this case.
I further certify, that a power of attorney to receive the same, duly authenticated, is now on file in this office.
Given under my hand, at the auditor's office, Richmond, this 10th day of July, 1843.
JAS. E. HEATH, Auditor of Virginia.

C 5.
At a circuit superior court of law and chancery for Henrico county, held the 11th day of June, 1836 :
William S. Scott, administrator with the will annexed, of William Clarke, deceased, appellant ,
vs.
The Commonwealth.
Upon an appeal from a decision of the auditor of public accounts, refusing to allow a certain claim of the appellant against the Commonwealth, for services rendered by the said William Clarke, in his lifetime, as an officer in the revolutionary war.
This day came as well the appellant by his attorney, as the Attorney General for the Commonwealth ; and it appearing by the evidence on the part of the appellant filed in this cause, that the said William Clarke was a lieutenant in the Illinois regiment in the Virginia line, commanded by Colonel George R. Clarke, in the revolutionary war, and that he continued to serve as such till the end of the war ; that he was entitled to five years' full pay, with interest thereon from the 22d day of April, 1783, till payment ; and that the auditor of public accounts erred in rejecting the claim thereto presented by the appellant : It is therefore ordered that the said auditor do issue and deliver to the appellant a warrant on the treasury for the said five years' full pay, with interest thereon, to be computed after the rate of six per centum per annum from the said 22d day of April, 1783, till payment ; deducting from the amount the sum received by the appellant from the treasury of the United States, under an act of Congress passed in July, 1832.
A copy—Teste :
J. ROBINSON,
Clerk Circuit Court for Henrico, &c., law side.
   Judgment for Wm. S. Scott, administrator of Wm. Clarke, a lieutenant in the Illinois regiment, for five years' full pay -  $1,600 00     Interest at 6 per centum from the 22d April, 1783, to the 10th February, 1837. To the 22d April, 1837, would be 54 years amounting to - - - - -  $5,184 00     Deduct 71 days - - - - -  18 94       5,165 06           6,765 06    Received from the General Government - - - - -   1,310 68           $5,454 38        
AUDITOR'S OFFICE, February 11, 1837.
Received of the auditor of public accounts a warrant for five thousand four hundred and fifty-four dollars and thirty-eight cents.
WILLIAM S. SCOTT, Administrator of William Clarke.
I hereby certify, that the above receipt is a true copy of the original given in this case.
Given under my hand, at the auditor's office, in Richmond, this 10th day of July, 1843.
JAS. E. HEATH, Auditor of Virginia.

C 6.
Virginia.—At a court of appeals, held at the Capitol, in the city of Richmond, on Saturday, December 10, 1842.
William Lambert, administrator de bonis non with the will annexed, of Valentine Thomas Dalton, deceased, plaintiff ,
vs.
The Commonwealth.
Upon a writ of supersedeas to a judgment rendered by the circuit superior court of law and chancery, held for Henrico county and the city of Richmond, on the common law side, on the 30th day of December, 1841, affirming a decision of the auditor of public accounts made on the 10th day of December, 1841, rejecting a claim presented by the plaintiff for the balance of commutation and interest due to his testator, as second lieutenant in the Illinois regiment.
This day came as well the plaintiff by his counsel, as the Attorney General in behalf of the Commonwealth; whereupon the court, having maturely considered the transcript of the record of the judgment and decision aforesaid, and the arguments of counsel, is of opinion that the said judgment is erroneous; therefore it is considered that the same be reversed and annulled. And this court, proceeding to render such judgment as the said circuit superior court ought to have rendered, is of opinion that the decision of the auditor of public accounts is also erroneous; therefore it is further considered, that the same be also reversed and annulled; and that the said auditor do issue a warrant on the treasury in favor of the plaintiff, for the balance of the commutation of five years' full pay of his testator, in lieu of half pay for life, with interest thereon from the 22d day of April, 1783, till paid, after deducting the amount received from the treasury of the United States: which is ordered to be certified to the said circuit superior court.
A copy—Teste:
J. ALLEN, C. C.
    $4,400  22    Interest on $2,000 from January 3, 1843  56  67     $4,456  89   
AUDITOR'S OFFICE, June 20, 1843.
Received a warrant of four thousand four hundred and fifty-six dollars eighty-nine cents.
HENRY L. BROOKE, Administrator de bonis non of V. T. Dalton.
The above is a true copy of a receipt given in this case.
Given under my hand, at the Auditor's office in Richmond, this 15th day July, 1843.
JAS. E. HEATH, Auditor.

At a circuit superior court of law and chancery for the county of Henrico and city of Richmond, on the common law side, held the 30th day of December, 1841 :
Wm. Lambert, administrator of Valentine Thomas Dal- ton, deceased, appellant . vs. The Commonwealth.
{ Upon an appeal from a decision of the audi- tor of public accounts, rejecting a certain claim presented by the appellant, for ser- vices rendered by the said Dalton in his lifetime, as a second lieutenant of Captain Robert George's company of artillery, in a regiment raised for the defence of the State of Virginia during the revolution- ary war, and known as the Illinois regi- ment, commanded by Colonel Crockett.
This day came as well the appellant by his attorney, as the Attorney General for the Commonwealth; who being heard, and the evidence produced on the part of the appellant being seen and inspected, it seems to the court that there is no error in the said decision of the auditor of public accounts. Therefore, it is considered that the same be affirmed, and that the Commonwealth recover against the appellant the costs by her expended in defending the said appeal, to be levied of the goods and chattels of the appellant's intestate in the hands of the appellant to be administered.
Commonwealth's costs, $9 52.
A copy—Teste :
J. ROBINSON, C. C.
C 7.
At a circuit superior court of law and chancery for Henrico county, held the 26th day of May, 1834 :
John M. Gregory, administrator de bonis non of Ralph Graves, deceased, appellant , vs. The Commonwealth.
{ Upon an appeal from a decision of the auditor of public accounts, rejecting a certain claim of the appellant against the Commonwealth, for services ren- dered by his intestate in his lifetime, as an officer in the revolutionary war.
This day came, as well the appellant by his attorney, as the Attorney General for the Commonwealth; and the court having maturely considered the evidence on the part of the appellant, filed in this cause, and the arguments therein, is of opinion that Ralph Graves, the intestate of the appellant, was a cornet in Major John Nelson's company of cavalry in the revolutionary war, and continued to serve as such until the end of the war; and that the said Ralph Graves was the person alluded to and designated as —— Graves, cornet, in the report made by the board of field officers assembled in 1782, in pursuance of an act of the General Assembly of Virginia of November, 1781; that he was entitled to commutation of five years' full pay, with interest thereon from the 22d day of April, 1783, till payment; and that the auditor of public accounts erred in rejecting the

claim thereto presented by the appellant. It is therefore ordered that the said auditor do issue and deliver to the appellant a warrant on the treasury for the said five years' full pay, with interest thereon, to be computed after the rate of six per centum per annum from the said 22d day of April, 1783, till payment.
A copy—Teste :
J. ROBINSON, Clerk Circuit Court for Henrico, &c., law side.
5 years, at $26 66 \frac{2}{3} per month.
12
320 00
5 years' commutation - - - $1,600 00
Interest on $1600, from 22d April, 1783, to the 1st January, 1835.
6
9600
51 years.
9600
48000
4800 6 months.
1600 2 months.
240 9 days.
Interest - - - - - 4,962 40
6,562 40
AUDITOR'S OFFICE, January 2, 1835.
Received a warrant of six thousand five hundred and sixty-two dollars and forty cents.
JOHN M. GREGORY, Adm'r de bonis non of Ralph Graves, deceased.
I hereby certify, that the above receipt is a true copy of the original given in this case.
I further certify, that a power of attorney to receive the same, duly authenticated, is now on file in this office.
Given under my hand, at the auditor's office, Richmond, this 10th day of July, 1843.
JAS. E. HEATH, Auditor Virginia.

C 8.
At a circuit superior court of law and chancery for Henrico county, held the 12th day of March, 1836:
Jesse E. Weems, administrator with the will annexed of Thomas Winder Ewell, deceased, this day, by his attorney, presented his petition praying an appeal from a decision of the auditor of public accounts, rejecting a certain claim of the petitioner for services rendered by his testator in his lifetime, as an officer in the revolutionary war. Whereupon the said appeal is allowed, and ordered to be placed on the docket of this court; and by consent as well of the appellant, by his attorney, as the Attorney General for the Commonwealth, the cause was heard upon the said petition, the answer of the said auditor, the evidence produced on behalf of the appellant, and filed in the cause, and the arguments as well of the said attorney for the appellant, as the Attorney General for the Commonwealth: On consideration whereof, the court is of opinion that the said Thomas Winder Ewell was a captain of infantry in the Virginia regiment on State establishment, commanded by Colonel George Gibson, and remained therein until that and another State regiment were consolidated and placed under the command of Colonel Charles Dabney, and commanded a detachment of his regiment stationed at the Point of Fork; that he continued in service in the corps then called Dabney's legion, until the end of the war; and that he was entitled to half pay for life, or to commutation of five years' full pay in lieu thereof, with interest thereon from the 22d day of April, 1783, till payment; and that the auditor of public accounts erred in rejecting the claim presented by the appellant to the said five years' full pay and interest thereon as aforesaid. It is therefore ordered that the said auditor do issue and deliver to the appellant a warrant on the treasury for the said five years' full pay, with interest thereon at six per centum per annum from the said 22d day of April, 1783, till payment.
A copy—Teste:
J. ROBINSON,
Clerk Circuit Court for Henrico, &c., law side.
   5 years' full pay  -  $2,400 00    Interest to 12th of January, 1837, from 22d April, 1783  -  7,736 00      10,136 00   
Received a warrant of ten thousand one hundred and thirty-six dollars, this 12th of January, 1837.
WILLIAM HELM,
Attorney in fact for Sarah E. Hays.
I hereby certify, that the above receipt is a true copy of the original given in this case.
I further certify, that a power of attorney to receive the same, duly authenticated, is now on file in this office.
Given under my hand, at the auditor's office, Richmond, this 10th day of July, 1843.
JAS. E. HEATH,
Auditor Virginia.

C 9.
At a circuit superior court of law and chancery for Henrico county, held the 15th day of February, 1836 :
John H. Gwathmey, administrator of Richard Clarke, deceased, appellant , vs. The Commonwealth.
Upon an appeal from a decision of the auditor of public accounts, refusing to allow a certain claim of the appellant against the Commonwealth, for services rendered by the said Richard Clarke in his lifetime, as an officer in the revolutionary war.
This day came as well the appellant, by his attorney, as the Attorney General for the Commonwealth ; and the court having maturely considered the evidence on the part of the appellant, filed in this cause, and the arguments therein, is of opinion that the said Richard Clarke was a lieutenant of infantry in the Illinois regiment in the revolutionary war, and served under the command of Major George Walls, and continued to serve as such until after the end of the war ; and that he was entitled to commutation of five years' full pay, with interest thereon from the 22d day of April, 1783, till payment ; and that the auditor of public accounts erred in rejecting the claim thereto presented by the appellant. It is therefore ordered that the said auditor do issue and deliver to the appellant a warrant on the treasury for the said five years' full pay, with lawful interest thereon from the said 22d day of April, 1783, till payment.
A copy—Teste :
J. ROBINSON, Clerk Circuit Court for Henrico, &c., law side.
   Judgment for commutation  - $1,600 00    Interest from 22d April, 1783, to the 12th January, 1837  - 5,157 33     6,757 33   
12th January, 1837.—Received a warrant of six thousand seven hundred and fifty-seven dollars and thirty-three cents.
C. JOHNSON, Attorney for the plaintiff.
I hereby certify, that the above receipt is a true copy of the original given in this case.
I further certify, that a power of attorney to receive the same, duly authenticated, is now on file in this office.
Given under my hand, at the auditor's office, Richmond, this 10th day of July, 1843.
JAS. E. HEATH, Auditor Virginia.

D.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, April 8, 1844.
SIR: I had the honor on the 18th of January last to receive a communication from your predecessor, in relation to a claim preferred by Mr. Green, the agent of the State of Virginia, against the United States, for the sum of $58,148 66, paid by that Commonwealth to the representatives of George Walls, and others, for commutation claims for revolutionary services; the answer to which has been delayed by my necessary engagements in the Supreme Court, and other engrossing duties, which left me until recently without the leisure required for the satisfactory examination of the subject to which it refers.
The question submitted to me is—Whether, under the 3d section of the act of Congress of the 5th of July, 1832, "the liability of the United States is for the half pay for life to the persons therein named; or, whether it extends to the commutation for five years' full pay, they having died within ten years after the close of the revolutionary war."
The 1st section of the act of Congress referred to, provided for refunding to the State of Virginia the sum of $139,543 66, for payments made by said State "to the officers commanding in the Virginia line in the war of the Revolution, on account of half pay for life promised the officers aforesaid by that Commonwealth."
The 2d section directed to be paid to the State of Virginia $241,345, to be applied to the payment of five classes of judgments that had been recovered against said State, and were then unsatisfied.
The 3d section, upon which the question under consideration arises, is in the terms following:
"That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, directed and required to adjust and settle those claims for half pay of the officers of the aforesaid regiments and corps which have not been paid, or prosecuted to judgment against the State of Virginia, and for which said State would be bound on the principles of the half-pay cases already decided in the supreme court of appeals of said State; which several sums of money herein directed to be settled or paid, shall be paid out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated by law."
On the part of Virginia, it is insisted that, by the true interpretation of this section, the claims now preferred are embraced by the act of Congress; whilst by the decision of the late Secretary of War, it is affirmed that it extends only to half pay claims, and not to cases of commutation for five years' full pay.
The question is not altogether free from difficulty; and if it were an open one, I should feel myself called upon, in any opinion I might express, to give a very full and particular statement of the reasoning by which that opinion was controlled. But, in view of the uniform action of the several departments of the Government, founded upon an interpretation placed on the law by an eminent jurist then at the head of the Treasury Department, immediately after its passage; and fortified by the subsequent decisions of a Secretary of the Treasury, and an Attorney General, no less distinguished,—I regard the matter as having passed into judgment, and the construction of the law to which the late Secretary of War has conformed his decisions, as far as the executive departments of the Government are concerned, as

fixed, and as properly subject to modifications or change by the power of Congress alone.
I am of opinion, therefore, that the claims in question ought not to be paid without an act of Congress to authorize it.
The papers accompanying the communication of your predecessor are returned.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant, JOHN NELSON.
HON. WILLIAM WILKINS, Secretary of War.
D I.
PENSION OFFICE, July 17, 1843.
SIR: I have carefully examined the enclosed papers handed to you by Thomas Green, esq., commissioner of the State of Virginia for settling certain claims under the act of the 5th July, 1832.
I confess that I am wholly unable to discover any grounds whatever for the claims now set up by the State. The 1st section of the law has long since been executed, and the Commonwealth has received from the treasury of the United States the sum mentioned therein. The sum allowed under the 2d section has also been paid.
The 2d section points to certain claims founded on a promise contained in a law of Virginia passed in May, 1779. The act of Virginia designates half-pay cases, and no other description whatever. Indeed, the law-makers could not have had any other description of cases in view, as it was only after the close of the war that Congress declared that the continental officers should commute their half pay for life for five years' full pay.
If I rightly understand Mr. Green, the claim is made under the 3d section of the law; and he asks for the payment of certain claims for commutation which the State has paid, notwithstanding the United States has allowed half pay in the same cases. The law of July 5, 1832, does not make the most distant allusion to cases of commutation. It nowhere recognises the act of 1790. The case of Markham, (alluded to in Leigh's Reports, vol. 1, page 524,) shows that in all cases after the act of 1790, in which the district court gave judgment in favor of the officers claiming half pay, they were allowed the commutation of five years' full pay, with interest; but no court has ever yet decided that an officer was entitled to half pay and commutation too. The principles upon which the United States Government has always acted, are, that the continental officers who were entitled to half pay should receive commutation; and the Virginia State officers, whose cases are provided for by the act of July 5, 1832, are entitled to nothing more from the United States than half pay. The law gives no option in either case. Under the 3d section of the act of July 5, 1832, the United States are required to pay those claims only for which the State of Virginia would be bound on the principles of the half-pay cases which were decided in the supreme court of appeals of that State prior to July, 1832. None of the cases in which Mr. Green claims, are cases of that description; they must, therefore, be rejected.
I would respectfully invite your attention to the opinion of the Attorney

General on this subject, which will be found on pages 900 and 901, Executive Document No. 123, House of Representatives, 26th Congress 2d session.
Respectfully, &c.,
J. L. EDWARDS.
HON. JAMES M. PORTER, Secretary of War.
D 2.
PENSION OFFICE, January 9, 1844.
SIR: I enclose herewith the papers of Mr. T. Green.
The papers in the cases of Robert George and Valentine Thos. Dalton are in the Third Auditor's office.
The papers in the cases of James Meriwether, Jarrett Williams, and William Clarke, are in the office of the Register of the Treasury. All the above claims have been allowed under the act of July 5th, 1832.
The following cases have not been allowed, and I herewith enclose the papers:
Thomas W. Ewell's representatives; evidence not satisfactory.
Ralph Graves's representatives; evidence not sufficient.
George Walls's heirs; case not provided for. Vide letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, dated March 20, 1833, a copy of which is herewith enclosed.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. L. EDWARDS.
HON. JAMES M. PORTER, Secretary of War.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, March 20, 1833.
SIR: I have examined the copy, which you filed in this department, of the judgment recently obtained in the case of George Walls. The 3d section of the act of Congress of 5th July, 1832, requires the Secretary of the Treasury "to adjust and settle the claims for half pay" which have not been paid or prosecuted to judgment against the State of Virginia, and for which the said State would be bound upon the principles of the half-pay cases already decided in the supreme court of appeals of said State. It appears that, in the case of Walls, a judgment had been obtained against the State of Virginia for commutation with ten years' interest, and that the amount of that judgment has been paid by the United States to the State of Virginia. It is, consequently, a claim which has been both paid and prosecuted to judgment. The 3d section of the act of Congress does not mention commutation or interest. The judgment for interest has been obtained since the passage of the act of Congress, and is consequently in no way binding on this department. Under all these circumstances, I do not consider the case embraced

by the act of Congress, and do not consider myself authorized to pay the claim.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
L. McLANE, Secretary of the Treasury.
CHARLES J. FAULKNER, Esq., Martinsburg, Berkeley county, Virginia.
D 3.
PENSION OFFICE, January 13, 1844.
SIR: I herewith return the papers in relation to the question whether officers of the Virginia State troops are entitled to five years' full pay, or commutation with interest, under the act of July the 5th, 1832. The law of the United States is the only sure guide we have in the case. The claimants ask for five years' full pay, with interest; but the law says nothing about five years' full pay, but grants half pay for life, and nothing more. Whatever the State of Virginia intended to have done for her officers, we cannot determine precisely; nor are we to look for an interpretation of the laws of Congress in the acts or resolutions of the Virginia Legislature. A very full and perfect history of the origin of the Virginia claims for half pay may be found in the House of Representatives, Report No. 191 of the first session of the 22d Congress. Upon the statement of facts contained in that report, the law of the 5th of July, 1832, was passed. It is clearly shown by that report, that the State of Virginia never commuted the half-pay claims of her officers, and never asked the United States to do more than she had promised to do. (Vide page 65 of the Report, 3d paragraph from the top.)
In February, 1834, the Secretary of the Treasury, (now the present Chief Justice of the United States,) in a letter to Chapman Johnson, esq., of Richmond, rejected the claims for five years' full pay, or commutation. I enclose herewith a copy of his letter to Mr. Johnson, to which I would respectfully refer you.
The Attorney General has already decided that the law of July the 5th, 1832, gives half pay only, and not five years' full pay, or commutation. His opinion will be found on pages 900 and 901, in the House of Representatives Document No. 123, of the 26th Congress, 2d session.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. L. EDWARDS, Commissioner of Pensions.
HON. JAMES M. PORTER, Secretary of War.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, February 26, 1834.
SIR: In answer to your letter of the 19th instant, I have to inform you that, when I came into this department, I found the question of allowing commutation, or commutation with interest, under the act of Congress of

the 5th July, 1832, settled; and, as far as appears by the records of the department, finally settled. I do not, therefore, feel authorized to disturb it. I am strengthened in this conclusion by the opinion of the Committee of the House of Representatives who reported the bill which finally passed into the act of the 5th July, that the act would be so construed by the United States as not to allow commutation; and also by a report from the Committee on Revolutionary Claims, made at the present session of Congress, rejecting a claim of that sort which was presented to them. Under these circumstances, the difference between commutation with interest, and half pay for life, cannot be paid by this department in the case of General George R. Clarke; and in the case of James Meriwether, half pay for life, only, has been allowed by this department.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. B. TANEY, Secretary of the Treasury.
CHAPMAN JOHNSON, Esq. Richmond, Va.
D 4.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 27, 1843.
In the matter of the claims of the State of Virginia for $58,148 66, paid for the following commutation claims:
   George Walls - - - - - $7,144 00   Robert George - - - - - 8,071 44   James Meriwether - - - - - 4,504 93   Jarrett Williams - - - - - 5,061 29   William Clarke - - - - - 5,454 38   V. T. Dalton - - - - - 4,456 89   Ralph Graves - - - - - 6,562 40   Thomas W. Ewell - - - - - 10,136 00   Richard Clarke - - - - - 6,757 33  
If I had any doubt about the case, I would refer it to the Attorney General; but it is so perfectly clear, that I cannot hesitate.
The act of 5th July, 1832, provides that the Secretary of the Treasury (by a subsequent act, the duty is enjoined upon the Secretary of War) be directed and required to adjust and settle those claims for half pay of the officers of the aforesaid regiments and corps which have not been paid or prosecuted to judgment against the State of Virginia, and for which said State would be bound on the principles of the half-pay cases already decided in the supreme court of appeals of said State, &c.
The plain reading of this act is, that the United States are to adjust and settle claims for half pay. There is no provision to adjust and settle any claims for the five years' full pay allowed by the State of Virginia to her revolutionary officers. In the first six of the cases stated in the heading, the half pay has been adjusted, settled, and paid by the Government of the United States; and the sums claimed are the excess of the five years' full pay, with interest over and above the half pay of the officers respectively,

from the close of the Revolution to the time of their death; they having died within ten years. In the last three of the cases, if any half pay had accrued before the deaths of the claimants, respectively, and it has not been paid, the State of Virginia will be entitled to receive the amount of the half pay adjusted upon the principles on which it was allowed and paid in the first six cases.
I consider the State of Virginia as standing in the place of the claimants, and entitled to receive from the United States whatever the claimants were entitled to under the act of Congress cited—upon the well-settled principle, that where a surety has paid a debt for the principal, he has a right to stand in the creditor's place as to the amount so paid. The amount, however, is limited to what the creditor might have recovered from the principal.
I do not think that there is anything in the expressions "for which said State would be bound, on the principles of the half-pay cases decided in the supreme court of appeals of said State," &c., which would extend the allowance for half pay to commutation. On reference to the decisions in Markham's and Lilly's cases, it will be found that the court held the claimants in those cases to be entitled to the commutation under the Virginia statute, because they would have been entitled to their half pay for life under the statute. These decisions having been made before the passage of the act of Congress of 1832, and the cases reported, if Congress had intended to provide for commutation instead of half pay, they would have said so.
J. M. PORTER.
D 5.
OPINION.
I have been requested by Mr. Green to give an opinion on the question, "Whether an officer of the Virginia State line, who served to the end of the war of the Revolution, and thereby became entitled to the commutation of half pay, can claim that compensation at the proper department at Washington, under the 3d section of the act of Congress of 5th July, 1832, entitled 'An act to provide for the liquidating and paying certain claims of the State of Virginia?'"
In order satisfactorily to answer this question, it is proper, in the first place, to see the origin and character of the claim of officers of the description mentioned in the question. The claim originated in the act of the Virginia Assembly, (passed May, 1779, to be found in 10 Hening's Statutes at Large, page 25,) which provides that "All general officers of the army," &c., and "all field officers, captains, and subalterns," &c., "in the battalions of this Commonwealth on continental establishments, or serving in the battalions raised for the immediate defence of this State, or for the defence of the United States," &c., "provided Congress do not make some tantamount provision for them, who shall serve henceforward, or from the time of their being commissioned, until the end of the war," &c., "shall be entitled to half pay during life, to commence from the determination of their command or service." This is the contract made by the State of Virginia with the officers of the State line

who served until the end of the war. (It will be seen that I have omitted all those provisions of the law providing for supernumeraries.) It is well known that Congress did not make any tantamount provision for them; the act or resolution of Congress providing or offering the commutation of half pay, limiting that provision to the troops on continental establishment—at least, it has always been so construed.
On the 16th December, 1790, the Virginia Assembly passed a law (vide 13th Hen. Stat. at Large, 131) by which it was enacted. " that the same compensation of half pay should be extended to those officers of the State line who continued in actual service to the end of the war, as was allowed to the officers of the continental line," &c. &c. The title of this act is, " An act giving the compensation of half pay to certain officers of the State line ." If the terms used in this law, " compensation of half pay ," had been construed to mean " half pay for life ," then it is obvious that the law is superfluous and supererogatory; for the act or resolution of May, 1779, had, in terms, and as explicitly as by this law, provided for all the officers mentioned in the act of December, 1790; and, consequently, it was necessary to understand those terms " compensation of half pay ," as meaning something else than a mere repetition of what already had been solemnly enacted. It could only be understood as indicating the same commutation of five years' full pay as was offered by Congress to continental officers, in lieu or " instead " of the half pay for life; and such has been the uniform interpretation of the courts of Virginia, as is distinctly stated by Judge Green, delivering the opinion of the court of appeals of Virginia. (Vide 1 Leigh, Markham's case, page 524.) This act of Assembly, and the interpretation put upon it by the district court of Virginia, affirmed by the court of appeals in the case just cited, conclusively shows that the payment of commutation was a " compensation of half-pay claims ;" that when officers claimed " half pay " for life, the commutation allowed them was allowed as " compensation of half pay ;" and that, whether " compensation of half pay ," (or commutation,) or half pay for life, were claimed and allowed, the demand was equally made and admitted as the adjustment and satisfaction of " half-pay claims ." Under the above-recited resolution of 1779, and the act of December, 1790, the State of Virginia either voluntarily, or under judgments against the State, had paid claims of the officers of her State line ; and many other claims were also pending and unadjusted, to a very large amount. When the State presented her claim for reimbursement of what she had paid, and for protection against the judgments rendered, and the claims not yet presented and carried to judgment, from the Congress of the United States, the claim asserted by the State, and for the prosecution of which she appointed a commissioner, (vide sessions acts 1830-'31, page 131,) was, in the words of the law, " for various large sums of money which have been paid, and which this Commonwealth may be bound to pay, on account of the services of our State line during the war of the Revolution ." These claims consisted of three classes:
 1. The amount of claims which had been paid by Virginia, either voluntarily, or under judgment against her, amounting to $139,543 66.  2. The amount for which judgments had been obtained, but which the State had not paid, $241,345.  3. The claims which had not been paid or prosecuted to judgment, estimated at about $300,000. 

A list of the claims of the class No. 1 accompanied the memorial of the commissioner of Virginia to the Congress of the United States. (Vide Report and Document 191, 22d Congress, 1st session, January, 1832—statement of Auditor Heath, No. 12, page 61.)
On the face of this list, it appears that the State had allowed, upon application to the Legislature, or been compelled by judgments to pay, "half-pay claims" in the shape of " commutation ," to a very large amount. Indeed, that much the larger portion of the sum of $139,543 66 which she claimed to have reimbursed of the United States, were claims for half pay satisfied by " commutation ." The committee to whom the memorial of the State was referred in the House of Representatives, made a report in January, 1832, accompanied by a bill, the interpretation of which is the subject of this inquiry. In that report, after stating the grounds of justice and right on which the claim of Virginia rested, the committee concluded by declaring their conviction that " the United States should pay and acquit the judgments rendered, or those which may be hereafter rendered against Virginia, in her courts, for and in behalf of her officers, for and on account of the half pay promised for life by that State, in 1779; that in like cases where no judgments have been obtained, nor suits instituted, that payment should be provided for by the United States; and that the future half pay accruing, and hereafter payable, should likewise be provided for, " &c.
The above extract shows the opinion of the committee, and the design of the bill they introduced, to provide for all claims paid by Virginia, or for which she was bound by judgments already rendered, or for which judgments might be hereafter obtained, or for which Virginia was bound under the decisions of her courts , whether these claims were for "half pay for life," or " compensation of half pay for life ," (or commutation.)
In order to maintain that the claims we are now considering are not embraced by the law, it must be shown that, by the terms of the law, a limitation has been put upon it, inconsistent with the intention of those who framed it; and that phrases used in the law must be understood in a different sense than that in which they were used and understood by the committee who reported it. Let us, then, examine the law. The first section of the law recognises, in terms, the payments made by Virginia, both voluntarily and under judgments for " commutation " under the law of 1790, (in which, as before shown, " commutation " is called " compensation of half pay ," as payments made " on account of half pay for life, promised to the officers commanding in the Virginia line by that Commonwealth ." I quote the precise terms of the law, transposed so as to show its effect in this respect more plainly. It provides for the payment of the sum of $139,543 66, which was composed, in great part, of payments made by Virginia for commutation under the act of 1790, and in terms and expressly describes them as payments " on account of the half pay for life " promised those officers by Virginia.
The 2d section provides for certain judgments recovered against the State and not paid. I believe they were exclusively composed of claims for "half pay for life" of supernumeraries.
The 3d section, the interpretation of which I am specially considering, then follows.
It requires the Secretary of the Treasury (a duty since devolved on the Department of War) to adjust and settle those claims for half pay of the

officers, &c. which have not been paid , or prosecuted to judgment against the State , and for which said State would be bound on the principles of the half-pay cases already decided in the supreme court of appeals of said State, &c.
The whole question under this section obviously is, what is the meaning in this section of the expressions "claims for half pay," and "half-pay cases?" Do these expressions apply to the claims for "commutation" under the Virginia laws of 1779 and 1790?
It has already been shown that Virginia, both by her Legislature and her courts , regards claims for "commutation" as half-pay claims. The Legislature, when it is about providing for "commutation," calls it "compensation of half pay for life." The court of appeals, in Markham's case, says, "in all cases in which, after the passage of the act of 1790, the district court gave judgment in favor of officers claiming half pay , they were allowed the commutation of five years' full pay," &c.
It has been shown that the committee that reported the bill understood the provision for "half-pay claims" as embracing payments of claims allowed for commutation of half pay, and directly provided for the reimbursement to Virginia of sums of money paid by her for commutation, under the law by which she bound herself to make such "compensation of half pay." The claims were presented by Virginia as "half-pay claims," and the list of them exhibited to Congress on its face showed a large portion (I believe much the larger portion) were "half-pay claims," satisfied by the commutation of five years' full pay. When, therefore, Congress provided for the payment of certain claims, describing them by terms which the Legislature and the courts of Virginia, and the committee of Congress itself that reported the bill, all understood as embracing "commutation or compensation of half pay;" when the whole of the claims have for their foundation a "promise of half pay for life,"—how can the department appointed to execute the law be justified in giving those terms any other signification than the one which has been thus decisively affixed to it?
One of the most obvious and best established rules for the interpretation of statutes is, that when we find an expression or word used in one part of a law where its meaning is plain, the same meaning will be attributed to it in another part of the same law where its signification is doubtful. Apply this rule to the interpretation of this law, and the question must be at an end.
In the 1st section of the law, payments made to the officers of the Virginia line, for "commutation of five years' full pay," are described and recognised as payments "on account of the half pay for life" promised to those officers. The obligation and duty of the United States are declared to reimburse Virginia for commutation she has paid on account of claims for half pay ; and yet it is argued, that when provision is made to protect Virginia from half pay claims in like cases in future, by paying them itself, the half-pay claims thus provided for means something different and exclusive of the half-pay claims already admitted, and the obligation to discharge which has been declared by a previous section; in short, that claims "on account of half pay" in the 1st section, does not mean the same thing as " claims for half pay " in the 3d section. This is a conclusion that cannot be justified on any principles of sound reasoning.
But what renders the interpretation still more clear in favor of the claim

of the officers, is, that the 3d section itself furnishes an explanation of the disputed phrase. It provides for such claims as the State would be bound for "ON THE PRINCIPLES of the half pay cases already decided by the court of appeals." We have already seen what the court of appeals considered as half-pay cases, and that some of them were always allowed and satisfied by judgments for five years' full pay, with interest. The law itself refers to the decisions of the court of appeals, as showing what are half-pay cases, and the principles on which they are allowed, and their extent measured; and the law has provided for the payment to Virginia of those half-pay cases, established against her by those very decisions, which are appealed to, to ascertain the extent of her future obligations, and from which the law proposed to relieve her, by imposing the duty of adjusting and paying them on a department of the United States. If, under a decision of the court of appeals of Virginia, the claims now in dispute would have been adjudged against Virginia, the treasury was bound, by the 3d section of the law, to allow and pay them. The claims now in question are precisely similar as to the service—as to the foundation of them—as to the law and principles by which Virginia is bound for them, with those which have been adjudged against the State, and reimbursed by the United States; and the conclusion seems to be inevitable, that they too must be paid by the United States.
In fine, the law provides, and intended to provide, in the 3d section, for the same description of claims it had provided for in the 1st. And whenever a claim is presented, which, if it had been prosecuted to judgment and paid by Virginia, would have been provided for under the 1st section, because Virginia was bound for and had paid it , it must now be repaid under the 3d section; because Virginia, although she has not paid it, is bound for it , on the principles on which similar cases have already been decided against her in her own courts.
I answer the question that has been propounded to me, then, in the affirmative; and I would say that I considered it very clear, if it were not that I understand the Department of War had given a different opinion. Respect for that high office has caused me to examine the question with more care, and not without distrust of the soundness of my own views; but, after the fullest and most careful consideration, I cannot bring my mind to any other conclusion than that stated above. After I had formed my opinion upon the question, I was gratified to find that a declaratory or explanatory resolution was introduced into the House of Representatives by Mr. Wickliffe of Kentucky, (now Postmaster General,) intended to explain and remove all doubt of the interpretation of the third section of the law under consideration, and which gives it precisely the interpretation I have given it. This resolution was introduced in February, 1833; passed the House of Representatives (which was the same body in which the law of July, 1832, passed) by a very large majority; and it would doubtlessly have passed the Senate, but that it was overlaid by the pressure of the very important business which occupied the last days of that Congress, to the exclusion and defeat of hundreds of bills, about which there was no difficulty but want of time.
This explanatory resolution was occasioned by some doubts expressed at the department in regard to the claims presented under the 3d section of the law. It is supposed it was not renewed, because the claimants found it more expeditious and convenient to prosecute their claims against Vir-

ginia. They have done so; and thus, in regard to these "half-pay claims," as well as those already reimbursed by Congress, have, by obtaining judgments, demonstrated that Virginia was bound for them on the principles of the half-pay cases already decided by the supreme court of appeals of Virginia. I am therefore of opinion, that an officer of the State line of Virginia, who served to the end of the war of the Revolution, and who is entitled to receive from Virginia, on the principles decided by her court of appeals, the commutation of five years' full pay in lieu of the half pay for life, promised by the resolution of May, 1779, ought to be paid that commutation and interest, as "compensation" or satisfaction for his "half-pay claim," if he demand it at the proper department, according to the true intent and meaning of the 3d section of the act of Congress of the 5th of July, 1832.
JNO. M. PATTON.
I concur in this opinion.
S. S. BAXTER, Attorney General of Virginia.
RICHMOND, January 1, 1844.
I concur with Mr. Patton in this opinion.
C. JOHNSON.
I concur also.
JAMES LYONS.
D 6.
A RESOLUTION explanatory of the 3d section of the act of the 5th of July, 1832, entitled "An act for liquidating and paying certain claims to the State of Virginia."
Whereas, by the 3d section of the act entitled "An act for liquidating and paying certain claims of the State of Virginia," approved July 5, 1832, it is enacted "that the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, directed and required to adjust and settle those claims for half pay of the officers of the aforesaid regiments and corps, [recited in said act,] which have not been paid or prosecuted to judgment against the State of Virginia, and for which said State would be bound on the principles of the half-pay cases already decided in the supreme court of appeals of said State;" and, as the said supreme court of appeals have uniformly decided that the officers of the army entitled to half pay under the laws of the said State, who continued in actual service to the end of the war, under the true construction of the act of the Virginia Legislature of 1790, are entitled to the commutation of five years' full pay, in lieu of half pay for life, with interest thereon at six per cent. per annum, from the 22d day of April, 1783, until paid; and that the officers of the navy, and supernumerary officers of the army, are entitled to half pay for life without interest—
Be it therefore resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the principles

of the decisions aforesaid, as above declared, shall be applied by the Treasury Department to the claims of the said officers, respectively, as well those which have been adjusted, as those which may be hereafter presented for adjustment.
Passed the House of Representatives February 7, 1833.
D 7.
GADSBY'S HOTEL, January 17, 1844.
SIR: In my letter of the 19th of July last, I endeavored to show the question now presented for your determination had not been decided by the Attorney General in his opinion of the 21st of March, 1833. To sustain the views I presented in my letter, I beg leave to enclose to you the opinion of Mr. Chapman Johnson, who is now in this city attending the Supreme Court. He states it to have been the uniform decision of our court of appeals, that officers of the State line, who had served to the end of the war, were entitled to commutation; and that he is satisfied the obligation of Virginia to pay commutation was not founded on compromise, but on the judicial interpretation of the laws of the State. After assigning his reasons, he concludes "that, if everything in Mr. Taney's opinion were settled law, the question now made upon the claim of Virginia would be an open question."
I would merely add, that portion of the opinion of Mr. Taney in regard to the decisions of our courts upon supposed compromise, was unnecessary in order to sustain the conclusions to which he had come on the cases submitted to him, and he evidently so regarded it . Or, instead of referring to presumptions of fact which did not exist, he would probably have referred to the Virginia reports, which would have given accurate information.
I beg leave to make one remark respecting the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 7th of February, 1833. I have understood it has been the practice of all the executive departments to give great weight to the decisions of committees of Congress on the proper construction of doubtful laws; and that, in numerous instances, a previous practice of a department has been changed upon the authority of a report of a committee to the House of Representatives, or to the Senate.
In this case, we have the decision of the House of Representatives itself, in a resolution passed by an immense majority. The question before the House was, not what the law should be, but upon the proper construction of the law as it is.
I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
THOMAS GREEN.
Hon. J. M. PORTER, Secretary of War.

D S.
AT GADSBY'S, Tuesday night, January 16, 1844.
DEAR SIR: I have read with care the letter of the Attorney General, (Mr. Taney,) dated on the 23d of March, 1833, given to the Secretary of the Treasury, upon an application for half pay, presented by Lieutenant Vawters and others; and, in answer to the question you ask, how far the opinion of Mr. Taney, given on that occasion, conflicts with the opinion given during the present winter by Mr. Patton, in which I concurred, I have to say, that the opinion of Mr. Taney, as far as it respects the right of one who, having been entitled to half pay, had elected to receive commutation, and had received it without suit afterwards, under the 3d section of the act of Congress to demand half pay, giving credit only for the commutation received, is entirely coincident with mine, and in nowise in conflict with the opinion of Mr. Patton. I have no doubt that the commutation of five years' full pay, whether more or less valuable than half pay for life, was intended as a substitute for it, and, when received with the assent of him entitled to the election, was an entire discharge of the claim for half pay.
But that part of the Attorney General's opinion embraced in the fourth paragraph of his letter, and which relates to the obligation of Virginia to give commutation to her officers in lieu of half pay, and which supposes that judgments against Virginia for commutation must have been matters of compromise between her and her officers, and that in a contested suit the only judgment which could have been rendered in favor of the officers, must have been on the promise made by the State in her resolve of 1779, is not in accordance with the opinion given by Mr. Patton, in which I concurred. I am satisfied that the obligation of Virginia to give commutation in lieu of half pay, was not founded on compromise, but was based upon the judicial interpretation of the laws of the State, and chiefly on the Virginia act of 1790, to which Mr. Patton's opinion has traced it. This I believe has been the uniform opinion of our courts in contested suits.
But, however this may have been as an original question, it seems to me not in any degree to affect the question now to be decided upon the claims of Virginia which you are now prosecuting. Previous to the passage of the act of Congress in 1832, judgments to a very large amount upon these commutation claims had been rendered against Virginia; and Congress, by their act of 5th July, 1832, provided for their payment: thus sanctioning the justice of indemnifying the State against them. But the State still remaining liable to similar judgments for unsatisfied claims, the Congress we suppose enacted the 3d section of the law, by which original claimants were to be allowed to settle their claims at the Treasury Department, on the same principles on which they would be settled in the Virginia courts, according to the decisions of the court of appeals, and thus indemnify the State against future suits.
I should therefore conclude, that if everything in Mr. Taney's opinion were settled law, the question now made upon the claim of Virginia would be an open question.
Respectfully, your very obedient servant, C. JOHNSON.
Mr. GREEN.

Claim of John Thurston's representative for Commutation - Act 5 th July 1832.
The said John Thurston was a Cornet in Capt. John Rogers Troop of Light Dragoons, in the Illinois Regiment. In 1830 he recovered judgment for half-pay in the Sup. Ct. of Henrico Co. Va. $2.680
His administrator now claims, that he served as Cornet as aforesaid, until the end of the War, and that he is entitled to commutation of 5 years full pay, with interest, de- ducting the amount of half pay rec d under said Judgment.
The evidence presented to prove service to the end of the War, is as follows:
1 st The Certificate of Mr. Auditor Heath, show- ing that Cornet Thurston settled his accounts and rec d Ctf. for balance of pay, 15 th Dec r . 1783. (marked A.) 2 o The Judg t of the Sup r Court of Henrico Co. noted on printed list, accompanied by Richard's report.

3 rd Copy of an order of the Executive of Va. allowing Munston's Service Bounty bond for services during the war. (B.)
4 th The Deposition of W m Meriwether, who was a sergeant in Capt. Rogers troop of Cavalry, in the Illinois Regiment. He says that Munston was a cornet in said Regiment, and served faithfully as such until after the capture of Cornwallis, and the disbanding of Rogers' troop. That after disbandment and said Munston were discharged, they returned together from the Falls of Ohio to Virginia, &c (C.)
5 th Copy of Indgt. rendered in the Supr. Ct. of Henrico Co. in 1834, for commutation with interest for the services of James Meriwether to the end of the war, as a Lieutenant in said Captain Rogers troop of Cavalry - (See pamphlet marked D. p. 24, 25)
6 th Pay Abstract of Capt. Rogers' troop of Dragoons, up to 13 th February 1782, showing Munston in service as Cornet at that date. (E.)
[This is the latest record to be found, in regard Munston's services, or in relation to Capt n Rogers' troop of Dragoons]

by the The deposition of Bland W. Ballard, taken in the case of James Meriwether above referred to. He says he was acquainted with James Meriwether a lieutenant in Capt. Rogers' troop , at the Hills of the Ohio, and that he continued in the service until the end of the war. (F.)
[It is shown in other cases, beyond all doubt, that Ballard himself continued in the service at the West, with Clark's troops, until some time after the close of the war.]
3 It is shown by the report of the Board of officers made in Feb. 1782, that Capt. Rogers, Lieutenant Meriwether , and Corral Merston , were all superannuated , at the time of the sitting of the Board. This, however, must be a mistake. There was no officer from the Western Army present at the sitting of the Board. The board expressly say, in their last day's proceedings, that having no returns from

the Illinois Regiments, they cannot pro- ceed to consider. therefore It appears, however, from the proceedings of the Board of the 13 th Feby. that "a return of the Illinois light dragoons , and a list of the officers was received." It was from this re- turn, doubtless, that the Board obtained  the the statement information as to said officers being supernumerary. Of course any return received by the Board on the 13 th February, must have been made out some time (probably some months) before that date.
The Pay roll of Capt. Rodgers' Troop, (Exhibit F.) shows that on the very day that the return was received by the Board, (13 th Feb. 1782) said Captain, Lieutenant and Cornet, were all in the service.
Wm  Meriwether , a sergeant in Capt Rodgers' Troop, says in his deposition, that Meriwether remained in service in said troop, until the same was disbanded . The Sup t . Court found, in James Meri- wether's case (a lieut in said troop.)

that he remained in the service to the end of the war . Holland testi= fies to the same fact.
If James Meriwether continued in the service, in  Capt  Rogers  Troop , to  the end of the war , then the Troop could not have been disbanded before  the end of the war .
If Wm Meriwether testifies to the truth, he shows that Meriwether was in the service as long  late as any offi= cer in said Troop, for he says he was in the service till  the  Troop  was disbanded .
I know of no evidence tending to show that the officers in Capt. Ro= gers Troop left the service before  the close of the war , except the Report of the Board of Officers, which I think is pretty clearly proved to be erroneous, so far as this Troop is concerned.
I think the affirmative evidence to show that said Troop did re= main to in service to the end of the war, is to say the least, color

Claim of St. M c Thrus- ton's Adm r .
Commutation -
As of 5 th July 1832.

ably strong. It seems to have been sufficient to satisfy the Court, in the case of James McCothers. Respectfully submitted J. G. Goolsby

Washington
25 th February 1850
Wm J. G. Edwards
Comm ee of Pensions
Sir
I have the honor to present to you the claim of the legal representatives of John Hinston who was a Count of Cavalry in Captain John Rodgers troop of horse attached to the Illinois Regiment for Commutation with interest, deducting them from the half pay received, under the act of Congress of 5 th July 1832. I respectfully refer to the following documents as establishing the Claim:
1 st The Certificate of James E. Heath Esq, Shewing that Count Hinston settled his accounts and read a certificate for the balance of his pay, on the 15 th December 1783.
2 nd The Allowance by Virginia for Judgment at Richmond, in the Superior Court of Henrico Co, 1830 Of Half Pay from 14 th December 1783, to 15 June 1802, the day of his death. See printed list of Judgments rendered, against Virginia, Account No 17. page Of the Virginia legislation on file in the office of the Hon Comm ee of Pensions.
3 rd A Copy of the order of the Executive of Virginia allowing the heirs of John Hinston land Bounty for

His Services in the Virginia State Line during the War.
4 th ly
A Certificate of James E. Heath Esq. Auditor of Va. in a bound Volume Stys "Virginia Claims" in the Pension Office Pages 93 & 94 - Which Shews that Cornet Thurston was in Actual Service in Rodgers troop of horse at the time of the Sitting of the Board of Officers at Richmond, on the 14 th of April 1782.
5 th ly
The deposition of William Merrivatt who was a Sergeant in Captain Rodgers troop of Cavalry - who States that Said Thurston "was a Cornet in said troop, of the Illinois Regiment and continued in Actual Service until the same was finally disbanded.
6 th ly
The Copy of a Judgment obtained, in the Circuit Superior Court of Law and Chancery at Richmond, in 1834 for the Commutation with interest for the Service of James Merrivatt a Lieutenant in the Said Corps until the end of the War.
There were 3 Officers Only in Said Corps - Captain Rodgers, Lieutenant Merrivatt and Cornet Thurston. The Court in this Case expressly decides That Captain Rodgers Company of light dragoons continued in the Service until the end of the War. See Copy of Judgment in Document No 475 of the House of Representatives Pages 24 & 25 herewith Filed.
Also accompanies the foregoing a Copy of

an order of Court showing that Charles M. Thurston of Louisville Kentucky, a son of Count Thurston is the administrator of his estate, and a power of attorney may to Stephen H. J. Trabue.
I am Sir
Very respectfully
Yours & C
S. H. J. Trabue

Washington, April 11 th 1850
Sir:
I am much gratified at the discovery of the document which you exhibited to me yesterday, showing that Comt John Thruston was paid $48.00 half-pay on the 13 th of December 1783; as it completely corroborates my previous view of the case, and settles the fact, beyond all reasonable doubt, that Thruston remained in the service until August, 1783 . You will recollect that I took the ground, that Capt. Rogers' troop must have remained in the service up to the 27 th August 1783 - as on that day he gave Lieut. Meriwether a Certificate as to his services, signing the same as Captain - and that said Certificate was probably given, on the disbanding of the troop . The document you showed me yesterday, leaves no doubt on my mind, as to this being the true state of the facts.

because $48.00 is the exact amount of the half-pay of a Comt. , from August 27 th to Dec r 13 th — 3 months and 18 days, The half-pay of a Comt is $13.33 1 / 3 per month: 3 months, at that rate, amounts to just $40.00 — and 18 days to just $8.00 — as a short arithmetical calculation will show.
The list which you showed me states, it is true, that Thurston was paid one years half pay, on the 13 th of December 1783 — but the amount paid, shows that this cannot be so, — that instead of one years half-pay, which would amount to $160, he was in fact paid only $48.00, The half pay for 3 months and 18 days, the exact period of time which we have always claimed elapsed , from the disbanding of Capt. Rogers' troop , until said 13 th of December 1783 .
As this evidence so completely confirms my former view of the case,

I trust it will be sufficient to satis- fy you of its correctness, and that you will now feel authorized at once to allow the claim for Com- mutation.
I have the honor to be
Very respectfully
Yours obt servt
J. J. Coombs,
Hon J. L. Edwards
Comr. of Pensions

Paper marked both C and D - viz: certified copy of affidavit of Sergeant David Muncaster taken from in half-pay case of Lt M c Houston, taken out & handed to the Com r to be filed in the half-pay case of Lt W m Muncaster. The original of this affidavit is on file in the Circuit Court of Henrico Pa in the case of W m W m Com r  of the estate of M c Houston dec d vs the Com wth .

Washington, April 9 th 1850
Sir:
I have the honor to present, herewith, additional testimony in the Case of John Hruston's Administrator, now pending before you, for commutation with interest, under the Act of 5 th July 1832.
As the Case was formerly presented, although the parol Evidence showing service to the end of the war was very strong, yet there was no record Evidence showing him in the service later than the 13 th of February 1782.
The Certificate of the Auditor of Virginia, now presented, shows that Hruston was paid up to the 13 th of February 1783 , just one year later than the records formerly presented showed him in the service. This, together with the evidence already on file, showing that Captain Rogers' troop was unquestionably in the service to the end of the war, and that Hruston was discharged left the

service at the time the troop was finally disbanded, it appears to me ought to be considered as settling the question as to his service to the end of the war, beyond all reasonable doubt.
In addition to the paper we just mentioned, we also now present a copy of a certificate given by Capt. Geo. Rogers, to James Meriwether, who was a Lieut. in the same Company, and which was signed by said Rogers as Captain , in August 1783 . As I understand this paper, it shows that Capt. Rogers was still in the service, in August 1783. Otherwise, he would have signed it " late Capt. "
We also present a copy of the record of the Judgment of the Sub-Court of Appeals Henrico County, in favor of  the administrators of of said Thruston's administrator, for half-pay -
The Court, in this case find, it is true, that Thruston became supernumerary in before the close of the war. I beg leave

to say, however, that it has been recently decided, in several cases, that a Judgment for half-pay, is no bar to a claim for commutation, provided it can be clearly shown that the judgment was erroneous. In this case the Court unquestionably decided Thurston to be a supernumerary, from the fact that he was so reported by the Board of Officers in February 1782. Now we most conclusively show, by record evidence, that on the very day that the Board reported Thurston supernumerary, he was in service at the Falls of Ohio. We also show by like testimony that he was still in service, one year subsequent to that day.
I also beg leave to refer you to two letters from Capt. Rogers Rogers, dated 27 th Jany. 1790 - one addressed to Gen. Muhlenberg, and the other to the Hon. Mr. Page, which will be found with the papers in the case of Capt. Rogers Administrator

now pending before you for Commutation, in which Capt. Rogers asserts that he and his Officers remained in the service to the end of the war. He was then subject to Commutation from Congress, on the ground that the service of himself and his Officers, was more properly Continental, than State service. In making this application, therefore, he had no motive for representing that they had served to the end of the war, if such had not been the fact.
If he could have succeeded in making out the service Continental , they would have been equally entitled to Commutation, whether they had become supernumerary or served to the end of the war.
I have the honor to be
Very respectfully
Your obed Servt
J. F. Coombs.
Hon J. L. Edwards, Chair of Pensions

NO 18489  am
ACT OF FEBRUARY 14, 1871.
WAR OF 1812.
3327
REJECTED
John Thurston Court
va Dray Revolution
Discharged _____, 18
6021
N. Pay — act 32
Received _____, 187
Attorney.

Pay Roll of Capt Rogers track
(E)

Pay abstract of a Troop of light Dragoons in the Service of the State of Virginia Commanded by Captain John Rogers commencing the first day of January 1782 and ending the 13 th Day of February 1782.
   Names Rank In Service Pay per Month Sub s Amount   Mos Days     John Rogers Cap n 1 13 50 Dols 10 dol s £ 25 16 0 rec d himself   James Meriwether Lt 1 13 33 2 / 3 5 16 9 8 deliv d Capt Rogers   John Houston Cor n t 1 13 26 2 / 3 5 13 12 4 do Capt Rogers   Henry Goodloe Serg t 1 13 10 4 6 deliv d do   Dominick Walch Private 1 13 8 1 / 3 3 11 8 deliv d do   Gasper Galar do 1 13 8 1 / 3 3 11 8 deliv d Capt Rogers   W l Froggch do 1 13 8 1 / 3 3 11 8 rec d himself   James Corder do 1 13 8 1 / 3 3 11 8 deliv d Capt Rogers   Michael Glass do 1 13 8 1 / 3 3 11 8 deliv d do   James Darrett do 1 13 8 1 / 3 3 11 8 deliv d Capt Rogers   George Smith do 1 13 8 1 / 3 3 11 8 deliv d do   Flance Mahoney do 1 13 8 1 / 3 3 11 8 deliv d Capt Rogers   John Wheeler do 1 13 8 1 / 3 3 11 8 deliv d do   Dick Richards do 1 13 8 1 / 3 3 11 8 deliv d do   96 0 8  
City of Richmond
Sworn to by John Rogers before me this 10 th day of June 1785.
W. Lunshee
I certify that the foregoing is truly copied from the 1 st Vol. of "Illinois Papers" now in this Office.
Auditor's Office 16 Feby 1850
Jac e Heath and

Copy of Administrata to Chas M. Hamton on estate of Col. Jno Hamton

State of Kentucky
At a County Court held for Jefferson County at the Court House in the City of Louisville on the fifth day of January 1830.
On the motion of Charles M. Thruston and proof made in Open Court that Thomas Samuels, Alexander Scott Bullitt & Elizabeth T. Thruston three of the Executors and Executrix named in the will of John Thruston dec d are dead and that the other Executor Edmund H. Taylor has been found by inquisition of record a Lunatic and person of unsound mind administration with the will annexed of the Estate of said John Thruston is granted him. Whereupon the said Charles M. Thruston took the Oaths required by law and Entered into bond with Warden Pope his security in the penalty of five hundred dollars conditioned according to law.
In Testimony Whereof that the above is truly copied from the record in the office of said Court. I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal of office this fifteenth day of August 1849.
Curran Pope CLK By Chas M Thruston DC
State of Kentucky
Jefferson County ss.

I Samuel Churchill presiding Judge, and presiding Justice of the County Court of Jefferson County in the State of Kentucky, do hereby certify that Owman Pope, whose signature is annexed to the foregoing Certificate by Chas M. Thornton for his his deputy was on the day of the date of his Certificate sworn the 18 th August 1849. Clerk of the said County Court of Jefferson County and keeper of the records thereof, and still is, and that his Certificate is in true form of Law, Given under my hand as presiding Justice as aforesaid. This 22 day of August 1849.

Commonwealth of Kentucky
Shelby County, set:
The deposition of Bland W. Ballard, taken at his own house in said state & county, on the first day of May 1833, to be read as evidence in the trial of a cause, now depending in the Superior Court for the County of Henrico in the Commonwealth of Virginia, wherein George Woodfork administrator of James Meriwether of Kentucky deceased is plaintiff, and the Auditor of Public Accounts and Mrs. Susanna Meriwether executrix of James Meriwether of Georgia deceased are defendants.
This deponent of full age, having been first sworn according to law to give full, true and perfect answer to all interrogatories proposed to him, deposeth and saith:
1st Quest. by plaintiff. Were you acquainted with James Meriwether of Kentucky, the plaintiffs intestate, and if you were, say what acquaintance you had with him? Who was his father? When and where was he born? Where did he live during the whole time of your acquaintance with him? When and where did he die? What children did he leave who administered on his estate? Answer. I served with him in the army and also in the legislature of Kentucky. I was acquainted with him well. I became acquainted with him in 1780 at Louisville in Kentucky. He does not know who was his father, nor when and where he was born. At the close of the war he went to Virginia - Not long afterwards he returned to Ky. settled near Louisville and lived there until his death. He died there in 1800 or 1801. He does not know what children he left, nor who administered on his estate in Kentucky.
2nd Quest. by Same. Who are now the descendants of the said James Meriwether of Kentucky? Who the surviving husbands of his deceased female descendants, if any are dead, and where do they reside?
Answer. Living in Shelby county, myself, the decedent having lived in

Jefferson county, he knows nothing of his descendants.
3rd Question by same. Do you know whether the said James Meriwether of Kentucky was an officer in the army of the revolution? If he was, state when and where he entered the service? In what corps did he serve? What was his rank? How long did he continue in the service? State particularly what opportunity you had of being informed of the facts, of which you speak?
Answer. When I first became acquainted with him in 1780, he was a lieutenant in Capt. Rogers' corps of dragoons under Genl. George Rogers Clarke, and he served in that capacity until the close of the war. Having served in the same corps with James Meriwether, and also in the legislature of Kentucky with him, is the opportunity I have had of being informed of the facts of which I speak.
4th Question by same. Do you know whether the said James Meriwether of Kentucky, or his heirs, have received any bounty land for his services as an officer in the army? If he or they did receive such land, where is it situated? Who now owns it, and state all you know about the manner and the circumstances under which it was acquired?
Answer. I know nothing about it. If he or they ever got any land, I never heard of it.
5th Question by same. Have you any knowledge of the defendant's testator James Meriwether of Georgia, who it is said was a brother of Major Thomas Meriwether, an officer of the revolution in the Virginia line? If you have any knowledge of the said James Meriwether of Georgia, state all you know as to his residence, his service as an officer during the revolution, whether in the state or continental line, and say what relation he bore to James Meriwether of Kentucky?
Answer. I never heard of such a man, until since this controversy has arisen.

1st Question by defendants. Was you personally acquainted with the plaintiffs intestate James Meriwether of Kentucky? Did you ever hear him speak of his services as an officer in the revolutionary war, or of any claims upon the government for such services?
Answer. I have already answered as to our personal acquaintance. That acquaintance continued from 1780 until his death, having frequently been together at his own house in Jefferson and at my house in Shelby. I have heard him speak of services rendered, and unrewarded by the government. We have equally complained to each other on this subject. He stated the time would yet come, when our services would be remembered & rewarded by the government.
2nd question by same. Was the said Meriwether in the state or continental line? In what regiment did he serve, and how long was he in service and in what campaign?
Answer. He belonged to the Virginia state line, in Rogers' Legion his regiment, under the command of Capt Rogers of the light dragoons. He was in commission in 1780, when I first became acquainted with him, but do not know how long he had been in commission. He served until the end of the war. He does not know in what campaign he served.
3rd Question by same. Did the said Meriwether continue to reside in Kentucky until his death? If not, to what state did he remove? In what state and county did he originally reside before he entered the service? With whom did he intermarry?
Answer. I do not know what county he removed from, but it was from the state of Virginia. He was not long absent from Kentucky after the close of the war, say a year or two, before he returned and settled near Louisville and there remained until his death. I do not know with whom he intermarried.
4th Question by same. Are you related to said Meriwether of Ky. or in any way directly or indirectly interested in the recovery of the claim in controversy? Answer. I am no ways related to the

said Meriwether of Kentucky, only by descent from Adam. I am not ways interested in the recovery of the claim in controversy. And further saith not.
Bland W. Ballard.
Commonwealth of Kentucky.
Shelby County, Set.
The aforegoing deposition of Bland W Ballard was taken, subscribed, and sworn to in my presence, at the time and place & for the purposes expressed in the caption of the same.
Given under my hand & seal as justice of the peace in and for the Commonwealth of Kentucky and County of Shelby this first day of May 1833.
Mark Keardin J.P.
Justice's fee one dollar paid by plff.
Mark Keardin J.P.
Copy of a deposition filed in the suit, styled Meriwether's admr. against Meriwether's exec. tals. Determined in the late Circuit Superior Court of Law and Chancery for the county of Warren, at the October Term one thousand eight hundred and thirty three.
Teste,
Isaiah Roberts, clerk of the Superior Court of Chancery for the Richmond Circuit.
February 26. " 1830
Exp for copy 98 cts.
I know Bland Ballard, of Shelby County Ky and state that I would share his estate much under oath. He is a man of great integrity of purpose & high character - now very old.
H Marshall
Meriwether's admr. Copy deposition of Bland W. Ballard for info. pay
This paper to be returned to files - do not Thurston's claim

Richmond Virginia 18 June 1783.
Wray
Warrant to Captain John Rogers for his pay and subsistence from 1st January 1782 to 13th February 1783 £ 25.16.0 to be paid out of the Military Fund agreeable to the order of the Executive
Warrant to Colonel John Thruston for £ 13.12.4
The above entries are truly copied from Journal A N o 2 - page 313.
Given under my hand at the Auditor's Office Richmond this 16th day of March 1850.
R. Johnston First Auditor.

Copy
I certify that Lieut James Morrisson has served three years successfully in the Virginia State Line and has not been superseded or cashiered
(signed)
Thos Rogers Capt Aug t 27 th 1783
Executive Department Richmond 4 th Sep r 1832
The above is a copy of a document filed in this department
Thos Richardson Secy Com m

W. Memorable depos. in case of The Thurston.
C.
J.

State of Kentucky } Jefferson County to wit }
Personally appeared before the undersigned a justice of the peace for said County Captain William Merriwether, who being duly sworn, saith that he was a Sergeant in Captain John Rogers' troop of light horse of the Regiment of the Virginia State line, commonly known as the Illinois Regiment in the army of the Revolution, and he says that John Houston was a Colonel of the said Regiment, and faithfully served as such until after the capture of Cornwallis and the disbanding of Rogers' troop, part of said Regiment. And after this deponent and said Houston were discharged they returned to Virginia together from the falls of Ohio. That said Houston removed from Virginia to Kentucky and settled near to Louisville where he died some years since, having several children and further he saith not.
Sworn to and subscribed } W. Merriwether before me this 19 th day of } April 1830
W. Tompkins J. P. J. C.
I, John Robinson, Clerk of the Circuit Superior Court of Law and Chancery for the County of Henrico and City of Richmond, on the common law side, in Virginia, hereby certify that the above is a true copy of a Paper filed in the case of Wm D. Wren Committee of the estate of John Thurston dec d against The Commonwealth, decided in the former  late Superior Court of Law for Henrico County, the 13 th day of November 1830
In testimony whereof I hereto set my hand & affixed the seal of the said Circuit Superior Court

Count at Richmond this 14 th day of February one thousand eight hundred and fifty
J Robinson