Norfolk gazette and publick ledger (Norfolk [Va.]), 1809-02-04 00:00:00

NORFOLK GAZETTE AND PUBLICK LEDGER.  SINT HIC ETIAM SUA PREMIA LAUDIS
[VOL. V.
SATURDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 4, 1809.
NO. 85.]
THE PUBLICK LEDGER.
SATURDAY EVENING, FEB. 4, 1809.
In order to lay before our readers, as soon as possible the interesting official letters of General Lake, and the documents laid before Congress by the President, we have been induced to publish this EXTRA. The Ledger will not appear again until Wednesday Evening, unless something of importance is received. The important Resolutions of Boston are unavoidably omitted.
CONGRESS.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
Monday, January 30.
A message in writing was received from the President of the United States, by Mr. Coles, his secretary, as follows:
"To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States."
I transmit to congress a letter recently received from our minister at St. James', covering one to him from the British secretary of state, with his reply. These are communicated as forming a sequel to the correspondence which accompanied my message to both houses, of the 17th inst.
TH: JEFFERSON.
January 30, 1809."
London, November 25, 1808.
Sir,  I have the honour to send enclosed, a copy of a letter, received last night from Mr. Canning, in answer to my letter to him of the 10th of last month.
The tone of this letter renders it impossible to reply to it with a view to a discussion of what it contains; although it is not without farther inadvertencies as to facts, and many of the observations are open to exceptions. I intend, however, to combine, with an acknowledgment of the receipt of it, two short explanations. The first will relate to the new and extraordinary conjecture, which intimates, that my authority was contingent; and the second will remind Mr. Canning that my letter of the 10th of October does not, as he imagines, leave unexplained the remark, that "the provisional nature of my offer, to make my proposal in writing, arose out of circumstances;" but, on the contrary, that the explanation immediately follows the remark.
The Union is not yet returned from France. Lieutenant Gibbon arrived in London more than three weeks ago, and delivered your letter of the 9th of September, with duplicates of papers in the case of the Little William, and copies of letters which lately passed between the department of state and Mr. Erskine.
I have the honour to be, With the highest consideration, Sir,
Your ol't. humble servant, WM. PINKNEY.
The hon. James Madison, &c. &c. &c.
London, December 3, 1808.
Sir,  I have the honour to send enclosed, a copy of my reply to Mr. Canning's letter to me of the 22d ult. A copy of the letter, to which it is an answer, was transmitted a few days since by the British packet, and a duplicate has been sent to Liverpool.
The Union is not yet arrived from France, and we have no intelligence of her.
I have the honour to be, With the highest consideration, Sir,
Your most ol't. humble servant, WM. PINKNEY.
The hon. James Madison.
Foreign Office, Nov. 22d, 1808.
Sir,  I regret exceedingly that an unusual and unintermitting pressure of official business has prevented me from finding an earlier opportunity to reply to your letter of the 10th of last month.
The observations which I have to offer upon some parts of that letter are not, indeed, of such a nature, as to make it matter of any great importance whether you receive them a week sooner or later, as they refer less to any point of publick interest to our two governments than to what has passed personally between ourselves.
But I should have been much mortified if you could have been led to believe me deficient in attention to you; the manner, as well as the substance, of the communication which I have had the honour to receive from you, entitled it to the most prompt and candid consideration.
Your understanding of the motives, which induced me to accompany my official note, of the 2d of September, with my letter of the same date, is so far imperfect, as that you seem to imagine that the wish to guard against misrepresentation was the only motive which induced me to write that letter; and that from the motive alone, I should, in any case, have troubled you with it. Whereas I must have expressed myself very incorrectly indeed, if I did not convey to you the assurance, that, if what had passed between us in conversation had not been referred to by you in your official letter of the 23d of August, I certainly should not have thought it necessary or proper to preserve any written record of our verbal communications, which I understood at the time to be confidential; and which
I certainly was so far from attempting to "discountenance," that I have no doubt but what I expressed myself (as you say I did) in favour of "the course which you adopted as well suited to the occasion." But you state, at the same time, most correctly, that it was a "preparatory" course, that I understood and encouraged this verbal communication. I never did, nor could understand it as being intended to supersede or supply, the place of an official overture. I never did nor could suppose that the overture of your government and the answer of the British government to it, were intended to be entrusted solely to our recollections. Accordingly, when the period arrived at which you appeared to be prepared to bring forward an official proposal I did, no doubt, express my expectation that I should receive that proposal in writing.
It is highly probable that I did not, (as you say I did not) assign to you, as the motive of the wish which I then expressed, my persuasion that written communications are less liable to mistake than verbal ones, because that consideration is sufficiently obvious, and because the whole course and practice is in that respect so established and invariable that I really could not have supposed that the assignment of any specific motive to be necessary to account for my requiring a written statement of your proposals previous to my returning an official answer to them.
I had taken for granted all along that such would, and such must be, the ultimate proceeding on your part, however you might wish to prepare the way for it by preliminary conversations.
In framing your note, I did not pretend to anticipate how much of what had been stated by you in our several conferences, you would think it proper to repeat in writing. But, whatever the tenor of your note had been, I should have felt it right to conform strictly to it, in the official answer, avoiding any reference to any part of your verbal communications, except such as, by repeating them in writing, I should see that it was your intention to record as official.
I confess, however, I was not prepared for the mixed course which you actually did adopt, (I am sincerely persuaded) without any intention of creating embarrassment, that of referring generally to what had passed in our conferences, as illustrative of your official proposition, and, as tending to support my recommendation, but without specifying the particular points to which such reference was intended to apply; a course which appeared at first sight to leave me no choice except between the two alternatives of either recapitulating the whole of what you had stated in conversation, for the purpose of comprehending it in the answer, or of conforming myself to your written note, at the hazard of being suspected of suppressing the most material part of your statement.
The expedient to which I had recourse, of accompanying my official note with a separate letter, stating to the best of my recollection, the substance of what I had heard from you in conversation, appeared to me, after much deliberation, to be the most respectful to you.
Such having been the motives which dictated my letter, I cannot regret it was written, since it has produced, at a period so little distant from the transaction itself, an opportunity of comparing the impressions left on our minds respectively, of what passed in our several conferences, and of correcting any erroneous impressions on either side.
There are two points in which our recollections do appear to differ in some degree.
The first relates to the authority which you had, and that which I understood you to state yourself to have, at the time of our first conference for bringing forward a direct overture, in the name of your government, the second to the expectation which I stated myself to have entertained "more than once," of your opening an official correspondence on the subject of the orders in council.
With respect to the first point you will give me credit when I assure you that my understanding of what was said by you, not only in the first, but in our second conference, was precisely what I have stated it to be in my letter: and you will (I hope) forgive me if, after the most attentive perusal of your letter of the 10th October, and after a careful comparison of different passages in it, while I am compelled by your assurance to acknowledge that I have misapprehended you, I find grounds in your statement to excuse, if not to account for my misapprehension.
According to your recollections, you told me explicitly, in our first conference, "that the substance of what you then suggested, that is to say, that our orders being repealed as to the United States, the United States would suspend the embargo as to Great Britain, was from your government; that the manner of conducting and illustrating the subject (upon which you had no precise orders) was your own," and you even quoted part of your instructions to me which was to that effect.
In a subsequent paragraph you state, that "nothing can be more correct than my apprehension that you did not make, nor profess to intend making an overture in writing, before you had endeavoured to prepare for it such a reception as you felt it deserved; and before you ascertained what shape it would be most proper to give to that overture, and how it would be met by the British government."
And, in another part of your letter you admit that, "when you expressed your readiness to make your proposal in writing, it was (as I have stated) provisionally;" and you informed me that "the provisional nature of your offer arose out of circumstances," the nature of which circumstances you do not explain, nor have I any right to require such an explanation.
But, comparing these several statements together
seeing that, in our first interview, you declared no intention of making a proposal in writing—that in our second interview, (a month or five weeks afterwards) you described that intention as "provisional" and contingent, and protesting at the same time (as I do in the most solemn manner) that I cannot find any trace in my memory of any communications whatever of any part of your instructions, communicated to me as such, seeing also that whatever might be the nature and extent of your instructions from the president of the United States, as to the substance of the overture to be made to the British government, the manner, the time and the conditions of that overture were evidently considered by you as left to your own discretion—it surely may be pardonable in me to have mistaken, (as I most unquestionably must have done) the precise limits at which the authority of your government ended and your own discretion began, and to have imagined, (which I very innocently did) that a proposition over which you appeared to have a power so nearly absolute, was a proposition, in a great measure, of your own suggestion. I do not mean that I supposed you to bring forward such a measure without reference to the knowledge which you must of course have had of the general feeling, disposition and intentions of your government, but without its specific instructions, for that purpose, at that time.
In attributing to you this exercise of judgment, in addition to the many others, and which it is confessed you were at liberty to exercise, I really intended to convey no imputation disrespectful to you; I can conceive abundance of cases in which it would have been, not only excusable, but highly meritorious.
My mistake, at least, was a very harmless one; as, whether the fact were, that you had no precise authority to give in an official proposal, or that you had such an authority, but subject to contingencies which had not occurred, the practical result must be, of necessity, the same.
What these contingencies might be, it is not for me to enquire; but, if they were of the nature, of which I now cannot but conjecture they may have been; if the overtures, which you were authorized to make to the British government, was to be shaped and timed according to the result of any other overture, I am then at once able to account for those appearances, which misled me into a belief of the want of a precise authority on your part. This consideration leads me to the other point, on which alone there appears a difference between us, upon any matter of fact, but a difference by no means so wide as it appears.
Admitting the general correctness of my statement of the expectation which I was taught to entertain of a written communication from you on the subject of the orders in council, you add that it was however only in November last, and immediately after the publication of the orders in council, that you had directly announced to me your intention of opening a correspondence upon them; an intention from which you afterwards desisted, "until you should receive the pleasure of your government." The correctness of this statement I do not dispute; but you, I am sure, will agree with me, sir, in recollecting how many times "more than once" since the period of that first intention of yours being announced and withdrawn, my expectations that you were about to "receive the pleasure of your government" upon this subject, have been excited, by the notification in America, and the destination hither, of ships employed by the United States, as it was generally supposed, for the special purpose of conveying representations or proposals, from the American government, to the governments of France and Great Britain, upon the subject of their respective maritime decrees and orders.
Such was the universal belief, both in America and in England, upon the arrival of the Osage, upon that of the Hope, of the St. Michael, and of another vessel, named, I think, the Union. I have certainly no right to affirm that you shared in the expectation which so universally prevailed. I have no right to say the government of the United States designedly created that expectation. But that it did prevail, and that I very sincerely believed it to be well founded, you I think must do me the justice to recollect; as, in one instance at least, that of the Osage, so strong was my persuasion that you must have received instructions from your government, that I took the liberty of sending to you to enquire whether you had not some communication to make to me; and received for answer that you had none.
It was to these missions that I particularly referred when I said that I had "more than once expected you to open a correspondence with me upon the orders of council." This expectation it was, that alone prevented the sending instructions to Mr. Erskine to reply to the note addressed to him by Mr. Madison on the 25th of March, in answer to that note of Mr. Erskine's in which he communicated the orders in council, and in allusion to these missions, particularly to that of the Osage, and to the expectation which had been founded upon the return here of that vessel, after its voyage to France, it was, that I made that declaration in parliament, which, I see, has been the subject of some misapprehension, (I will not say misrepresentation,) in America, that "since the termination of Mr. Rose's mission, the American government had not made any communication here in the shape of remonstrance, or in a tone of irritation." I am not aware, sir, that there is any other part of your letter which requires that I should trouble you with many observations. Your report of your answer to the enquiry, which I took the liberty of making "whether the orders in council of November were known to the government of the United States pre-
viously to the message of the president proposing the embargo, so as to be a moving consideration to that message; does not appear to differ, in any material degree, from my statement of it. That your answer to such an enquiry was official, or authorized by your government, I did not assert nor presume. I have already said, that it was not till you had, in your official letter of the 23d of August, referred to what passed in conversation, that I should have thought any such reference allowable on my part; and even then the generality of your reference precluded me from judging correctly, how much of what you had stated in conversation was from official authority, how much from your own personal information or opinion.
You inform me that your answer to this question was of the latter description only: But, even if it were only from your own individual authority, it was very material, and highly gratifying to learn, that the embargo, which had been some time represented, both here and in America, as the direct and immediate consequence of the orders in council of November, and as procured solely by them, was in your opinion "a measure of precaution against reasonably anticipated peril."
The purpose of this letter is not to renew the discussion upon the subject of your proposal, but merely to clear up any misunderstanding which had existed between us in the course of that discussion. I cannot conclude it, however, without advertting very shortly to that part of your letter, in which you argue that the failure of France in the attempt to realize her gigantic project of the annihilation of the commerce of this country, removes all pretext for the continuance of the retaliatory system of Great Britain.
This impotency of the enemy to carry his projects of violence and injustice into execution, might, with more propriety, be pleaded with him, as a motive for withdrawing decrees at once so indefensible and so little efficacious for their purpose, than represented as creating an obligation upon Great Britain to desist from the measures of defensive retaliation which those decrees have necessarily occasioned. If the foundation of the retaliating system of Great Britain was (as we contend it to have been) originally just, that system will be justifiably continued in force, not so long only as the decrees which produced it are mischievously operative, but until they are unequivocally abandoned. And if it be thus consistent with justice to persevere in that system, it is surely no mean motive of policy for such perseverance, that a premature departure from it, while the enemy's original provocation remains unrepented, might lead to false conclusions, as to the efficacy of the decrees of France, and might hold out a dangerous temptation to that power to resort to the same system on any future occasion: A result which, not Great Britain alone, but all commercial nations are deeply interested in preventing.
I have now, sir, only to express my sense of the candour and liberality with which this discussion has been conducted on your part, and my acknowledgments for the justice which you render to my disposition to treat you at all times with reciprocal respect, and to listen to you with the attention, to which personally as well as officially you have every claim.
I cannot forego the hope that it may yet fall to our lot to be instrumental in the renewal of that understanding between our two governments, which is as congenial to the feelings, as it is essential to the interests, of both countries; which nothing but the forced and unnatural state of the world could have interrupted; and which there is, on the part of the British government, the most anxious and unabated desire to restore.
I have the honour to be,
With the highest consideration, Sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
GEORGE CANNING.
William Pinkney, Esq. &c. &c. &c.
GREAT CUMBERLAND PLACE, November 28, 1808.
Sir—I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 22d inst. and to transmit a copy of it to my government.
Without desiring to protract a discussion in the conduct of which neither your sincerity nor mine, will, I feel assured, be doubted by any one, I may be permitted to say, that the authority under which I acted in our late communications, was not contingent, as you now appear to conjecture; and that the remark, contained in my letter of the 10th of October, "that the provisional nature of my offer, to make my proposal in writing, arose out of circumstances," will be found explained in the same letter, by passages which immediately follow the remark.
I have said in my letter of the 10th of October, that "I had no precise instructions as to the manner of conducting and illustrating the subject" confided to my management; but you will suffer me to enter my friendly protest against all suppositions that "the manner, the time and the conditions of the overture were left to my own discretion," that I had the power nearly absolute over it, or that it was "in a great measure of my own suggestion."
I will trouble you no further, sir, on this occasion, than to assure you that nothing could give me more sincere pleasure than to see fulfilled the hope which you express, that it may yet fall to our lot to be instrumental in the renewal of a good understanding between our two governments.
I have the honour to be,
With the highest consideration, &c.
(Signed)
WM. PINKNEY.
The Right Honourable
George Canning, &c. &c.
The said message and the papers transmitted therewith were read and ordered to lie on the table. The house then resolved itself into a committee

of the whole house on the motion made by Mr. Nicholas on the 24th instant relative to a REPEAL OF THE EMBARGO LAWS, and defending our neutral rights on the high seas, to which committee of the whole house was also committed on the 27th instant a motion of Mr. Bacon, for arming the merchant vessels, and to authorise the crews of said vessels to repel by force any attempt to "search, restrain, or seize" the same by any French or British armed vessel,—and after some time spent therein, the committee rose, Mr. Macon, the chairman, reported progress, and had leave to sit again.
The house adjourned at about half past three o'clock.
NEW-YORK, January 25.
On a review of the news from Spain, the editor of the London Courier thus pertinently asks: Who could rationally expect that the line of success was to be unbroken, or that when Buonaparte had assembled all the means and resources which the fertility of France and of his own mind could furnish, he was to be repulsed in the first instance, and to be beat back at once to his own frontiers? Ill indeed have men learned the lesson of experience, superficially indeed have they viewed the events of late years, if they supposed that conquest and independence were to be the easy and speedy effects of the noble efforts of the Spaniards. If the Spaniards themselves tho't so, we should augur most unfavourably of the time of the present contest; because men whose expectations are fixed on the immediate success of their exertions, droop when they find those expectations disappointed, and are easily subdued.—They are not fitted for such a contest as this—they are not capable of a continuity of efforts—they have no constancy nor perseverance.—They lose at once all hope, and because their courage is not immediately crowned with victory, they abandon themselves to despair. But the Spaniards are cast in a different mould—All the publications that we have seen from their juntas or generals—all their proclamations breathe not only courage and patriotism, but a conviction of the necessity of making up the minds of the people to a long and arduous contest. They have not disguised or diminished the perils of their position, nor the resources of the enemy with whom they have to contend—they have preached this doctrine—"that final success is only to be looked for after much bloodshed, after many defeats, after long privations, after having afforded proofs of unwearied constancy and unshaken perseverance." That such a nation must be eventually successful, we might predict from the experience which history affords us of other nations, who, by following such a path, have found that it led at last to victory and independence.
"That such a nation must be eventually successful we might predict from the nature of things, because the invader will not bear beyond a certain degree of suffering, and therefore is not a match for the invaded—who is determined to bear any thing rather than submit to the invader. This determination we think the Spaniards have—we think so, not merely from their proclamations or their publications, but from some knowledge of their character which is grave, reflecting, persevering—not subject to hasty ebullitions, not sudden in its resolves, but firm and unbending when it has resolved. It is this that darts a ray of consolation athwart the gloom—it is this that enables us to contemplate the present state of affairs without absolute despondency.
"I depart in a few days to put myself in person at the head of my army, and with God's help, to crown the king of Spain in Madrid." On this errand he has departed, and ere now he may have accomplished the first object of his expedition: Bursting from the Pyrenees, with an accumulated force, like a torrent of lava from Vesuvius, he may have borne down all before him: at this very hour he may be crowning his brother at Madrid, after marching thither over a highway formed of the dead bodies of the thousands and ten thousands of brave men, marshalled to oppose his progress!—This is a terrible anticipation. Yet, the cause itself may not be crushed, though it be beaten to the ground. It is a giant; it falls upon its native soil, and it may raise again with a spirit and strength that shall at last overpower even the Hercules of the French Revolution."
CONTINUATION OF INTERESTING NEWS.
Selected from late London and Cork papers, received at the office of the Commercial Advertiser.
SPAIN.
Supplement to the Madrid Gazette of the 15th November.
ARANJUEZ, Nov. 11.
The secretary of state for the war department has received the following despatches from lieutenant general Don Joseph Blake, dated at Valmaseda on the 7th and 8th inst.
"Most Excellent Seignor.—In order to secure the means of re-concentrating my forces, a matter of importance upon all occasions, and more particularly under the circumstances of my army being attacked by such superior numbers, and to approximate the only road by which I could procure the means of subsistence I determined on the 3d instant to unite the different divisions including that of the North, which had just reached the vicinity of the little town of Neva. All effected a junction, with the exception of the second division of Galicia, and a part of the troops of Asturias, forming a corps under the command of his excellency D. Vincent Acevedo.—This corps was attacked by the enemy in superior force on the 3d inst. between the Llameno and Menegarei; and the enemy, tho' vigorously repulsed, took a position between
the corps under Seignor Acevedo and the army, apparently, and according to the information I received, with the exception of a reinforcement, in order to prevent Acevedo from effecting a junction with me. This information reached me on the morning of the 4th. I instantly saw the necessity of a decisive movement against the enemy: and accordingly gave orders that, the same night, the 3d division commanded by Brigadier D. Francisco Riquelme with one of the corps of Asturias, under the orders of Field Marshal D. Gregorio Quiros, should proceed in quest of, and attack the corps of the enemy that intercepted the passage of Acevedo; that the 4th division and the advanced guard should march for Valmaseda, with a view of attacking whatever troops of the enemy they might fall in with; that the first, and reserve should proceed, under my immediate command, to Cordejuela, to cut off the communication between the different French divisions: and finally, that the whole corps of the north should remain posted at Berron as a general reserve.
"At the very instant of commencing our march, I received advice that the corps of Seignor Acevedo had been able to change its position, and had taken up a new and very advantageous one between Cordejuela, Valmaseda, and Orrantia, but that the enemy, in considerable numbers, were still occupied in watching its movements. This new disposition of Seignor Acevedo necessarily led to some alterations in mine. The troops under Seigniors Quiros and Riquelme were accordingly ordered to attack the enemy, which, from the indications they had shewn, and the information of the peasantry, were supposed to be at Arciniega.—Their main body was conceived to be at Orrantia, and I took upon myself the task of dislodging them, with the first, the advanced guard and the reserve.—The fourth, under the command, ad interim , of brigadier Don Esteban Portier, owing to the indisposition of Marquis del Portazgo, pursued their original destination to Valmaseda, but under a caution of not attacking them should they fall in with a superior force.
"I am at a loss to what I should ascribe the resolution taken by the French to draw off their forces from the corps of Acevedo: but certain it is, that at Orrantia and Arciniega, we met only with accounts of their retreat which they effected the same night; and thus the divisions which it was our object to disengage, happily joined us. The fourth division, however, was more fortunate than the rest; for reaching the environs of Valmaseda, where there were 7000 of the enemy, under the command of the general of division Villat, they attacked them with the greatest impetuosity, drove them out of the town, and pursued them more than a league, when they halted in consequence of night coming on.—The enemy fled in the utmost disorder, having suffered a great loss in killed and wounded; we also took forty of them prisoners, among whom was an officer; and they left in our hands a four pounder, and two ammunition waggons, some of them belonging to their general's establishment; papers also belonging to him, and an immense number of other articles of booty.—What much contributed to decide this brilliant affair, was the rapidity and ardour with which some corps of the Asturias, and of the second division of Galicia, descended upon Valmaseda, the instant they observed the contest which the fourth division were commencing. This, and the above-mentioned corps have acquired an indisputable right to the esteem of their fellow-countrymen—a claim which indeed belongs indiscriminately to all our inimitable soldiers, who continually in the open air since the 23d ult. during rainy nights, and the most inclement weather, all without hats and a great part of them without clothes, or even without shoes or stockings, and what is more, passing whole days without food, underwent with alacrity the greatest fatigues, exhibiting not the smallest symptom of dissatisfaction under such extraordinary privations, and manifesting no other wish than that of destroying the enemy by the sacrifice of their own lives.
"The above I have transmitted to your excellency, that you may be pleased to communicate the same to his majesty.—May God preserve your excellency many years.
(Signed) "JOAQUIN BLAKE." Valmaseda, Nov. 7, 1808. "The Secretary of State for the War Department."
"Most Excellent Seignor, Being without positive information of the force and situation of the enemy, which it was indispensably necessary I should obtain, with a view to regulate my operations, I marched yesterday with the first and second divisions in the direction of Guenas and ordered the advanced guard to proceed by Cordejuela as far Sodupe. The body of troops under my immediate command very soon fell in with four French regiments forming an effective force of 8000 men, and a firing took place, which lasted the whole of the day, without any advantage on either side. Towards dusk the enemy fell back a little, and we suspended the movements which we had begun to make from right to left, with a view of attacking them in a new direction.
"We should have executed our meditated attack this morning, with every prospect of success, had not the extreme inclemency of the night, and the exhausted condition of the troops from want of food and intolerable fatigue, compelled me to endeavour to procure for them some shelter, rest, and refreshment. I therefore marched them back to head-quarters here a little before day break.
"The force of the enemy has been ascertained by the declarations of some of the prisoners, and also that marshal Lefebvre com-
manded in the action. I learn that the vanguard was attacked by 5000 men, and that after maintaining their ground with their usual firmness, might also put an end to the conflict.
"In communicating the above to your excellency, and requesting that you will have the goodness to submit the same to his majesty's consideration, I cannot but mention in terms of the warmest commendation, the gallantry, constancy, patience under fatigue and privations, and distinguished patriotism, manifested by the generals, chiefs, officers, and soldiers.
"I ought not to omit to state that in the number of the wounded is Seignor Birch, captain in the service of his Britannick majesty, an officer of distinguished skill and cool resolution, who would not leave the field until he was carried off by the troop. I was also assisted by the lieutenant colonel Seignor Carrol, who, for three months, has been with this army in that capacity, taking a part in every engagement, and in all of them giving an example of valour.—May God preserve your excellency many years.
(Signed) "JOAQUIN BLAKE." Head-quarters at Valmaseda, Nov. 8, 1808. To the Most Excellent Seignor, the Secretary of State for the War Department.
VITICH, October 31.
Our Junta has received the following letter from that of Manresa, dated the 29th instant.
"The French being apprised that we were sending a convoy of ammunition to col. D. Francisco Melaus, made an attempt to intercept it, advancing for that purpose to within three miles of Sabadel: but, thank God, the escort being informed of the design of the enemy, disappointed it by falling back."
PALAMOS, Oct. 31.
The letters received here from Mahon, contain the following advices:—"You need not now expect the 5000 English who were coming from Sicily, since they received orders, on the voyage, to put back, in consequence of the Neapolitans having applied for their assistance to shake off the yoke of the French. All the troops that were in Sicily, both English and Sicilians, have already landed on the continent. We conceive that at this moment the kingdom is in a state of general insurrection, and expect that the French there will be totally exterminated.
"This afternoon arrived in this harbour, in six days from St. Pedro, in Sardinia, the St. Josef felucca, Marlin Mone, master. He affirms, that at St. Pedro, positive accounts had been received of the landing of the English and Sicilian troops in the kingdom of Naples, of their having been joined by the Calabrians, and of their acting in the most vigorous manner against the usurper Murat, with an united force of 80,000 men. He adds, that the Spanish consul at St. Pedro directed him to communicate this intelligence on his arrival in Spain."
CORUNNA, Nov. 22.
An officer of distinction who left Reinoso on the 8th, states, that our loss in the action of Sornozi amounts in the whole to 400 men.
November 23.
Our army, which, immediately after its organization, marched to the defence of the country, and occupied the heights of Reinoso. From that place it advanced, under continual fighting, into Biscay, and took post 3 leagues from Durango. The exertions of our army attracted the attention of the enemy who attacked our troops in the above position, and from his vast superiority in number, compelled them to fall back to Valmaseda, as we have already published.
Since the 31st of last month, when that retrograde movement was performed, we have not received any official accounts: but general Broderick, of the British service, has received an express from the army, and communicated to us the following intelligence:
"On the 5th, general Blake attacked the French—defeated and pursued them beyond Valmaseda and Urraba. On the 7th, general Blake attacked the enemy in Guenas and moved further; but the centre of his army not having kept pace with his wings, he resumed the position of Valmaseda. On the 8th his rear was engaged. On the 10th the enemy attacked our army in Espinosa with double its strength; the action lasted from one o'clock in the afternoon till night, and remained undecided, or was rather in our favour. On the 11th, the enemy renewed the attack, and having occupied the road by which our troops were to retreat, part of our army began to be dispersed. On the 12th, general Blake retreated to Reinoso, to rally his army in this position. He was again attacked by the enemy, with fresh and superior forces, and our army fell back to a valley in the vicinity of St. Andero."
The officer who communicates this intelligence, speaks in terms of the highest praise of our troops, and their worthy commander. They fought seven successive severe actions, and a stronger proof than this cannot possibly be given of their persevering valour. The supreme council of the kingdom makes no doubt however, but that our army, after it shall have again completely rallied, will attack and pursue the enemy.
A column of from 7 to 8000 men, have already actually penetrated into the plain of Reinoso by the way of Burgos, in order to prevent any accident that might happen, orders have been given to fortify the point of Sanabria. The Marquis de Valladores has also to march to the frontiers with all the troops found in this province, and an army of reserve is to be immediately formed, which is to join the troops of his Britannick Majesty, who are destined for the defence of this coun-
try. The subscription which has been set on foot for the benefit of the English women who follow the army, amounts this day to 1000 rials.
MADRID, November 12.
The major general count de Belveder has transmitted the following dispatch to count de Florida Blanca, from Lerina, dated the 10th instant.
"Most Serene Lord, Since I arrived at Burgos I have been twice attacked by the enemy, and have twice repulsed him; but to day, after having sustained a fire of 13 hours, he attacked me with double forces, especially cavalry, of which there were, I imagine, 3000, and at least 6000 infantry. Though my troops sustained the shock with great valour during all that time, they could not resist the enemy's cavalry, and I saw myself obliged to retire to Lerina, and from thence shall proceed to Aranda to re-unite my army.
"The major general Don Juan de Henechosa, who commanded in the action, acted with that valour and honour which is well known to the whole army. I will send to your highness, by an officer, a circumstantial account of the action, as soon as it can be obtained.
"The volunteers of Serena and Zafra, Valencia, and the first battalion of the infantry of Truxillo, and the provincial infantry of Badajoz, had not arrived at Burgos, and, consequently, I can with these corps take a firm position at Aranda.
"I am informed that the enemy is following me only in a small number, but as I suspect that he will pursue me to-morrow, I am now (ten at night) leaving this place.
"I yesterday received advice from lieutenant general Don Joachin Blake, of the apprehensions he entertained of being attacked to-day, but the precautions he had taken, and the dispositions he had made, prevented it.—God preserve your highness many years.
(Signed) "El Conde de Belveder." Lerina, November 10."
The Supreme Junta of government, which, to avoid every unfortunate accident, had previously adopted the most prudent measures, by sending the division of Estremadura, under the command of major general Don Joseph Heredia, and giving express notice to all the generals on the right, in order that they might continue their movements, has to day given the strictest orders that a most powerful reinforcement shall be sent to the said division, well provided, artillery, ammunition, and provisions, as also whatever assistance may be necessary shall be sent to the generals of the army.
"Hence, we have a firmly founded hope that the enemy, far from having cause to boast of having been able to advance to Burgos, will be punished for his temerity and presumption; and if it be true as asserted by some accounts from the frontiers, that the emperor of the French wishes to be a witness of the conduct of his generals and troops in Spain, it is also to be hoped that the brave defenders of their country, will aspire to the glory of obliging him to fly with the same precipitation as they forced his brother Joseph to abandon the throne and court which he so vainly imagined that he had usurped.
Gazette Marine Memoranda.
ARRIVED.
Schooners Carlton, Johnson; and Margaret, Freeman, 4 days from New-York.
By virtue of a deed in trust, from Bartholomew Yates to James Henderson, WILL BE SOLD in the City of Williamsburg, on Monday the 13th February, being James City court day,
Two Houses & Lots,
in the said city, lately in the occupancy of the said Bartholomew Yates, and situated opposite to the Lot of James Semple, esq. Terms ready money.
The Trustee.
Williamsburg, January 9. law4w
Attention—Cavalry!
YOU are hereby notified to attend a meeting of the company on Saturday evening the 4th inst at 6 o'clock, at the Exchange Coffee House. As there will be business of importance before them for their consideration, they are requested to be present in attendance.
T. McCandlish, Lt. Com.
February 2.
At a Meeting of the Proprietors of the Dismal Swamp Company, held at Williamsburg on the 19th ultimo, a Dividend of TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS on each quarter share was declared; whichsum will be paid by a draught from the Managers upon their agent at Suffolk, after the first of March next; proper vouchers of the right of the claimants being produced, and subject to any discount the company may have against the claimants.
A Meeting of the Company is to be held annually at Suffolk on the first Tuesday in May, and it is requested the proprietors will be punctual in their attendance, either personally or by their attorneys.
William Nelson, John Bracken, Corbin Griffin, Jas. Henderson, Managers.
February 24. law8m
The GLEBE LAND in the Parish of Portsmouth being without an incumbent, the same will be Sold on Monday the 6th day of February next, on the premises, at 12 o'clock. This Tract of Land contains about 175 acres, and is pleasantly situated at the mouth of Elizabeth River, a proportion of which is cleared, and the balance abounds with good Timber. It is situated about two miles from the Towns of Norfolk and Portsmouth, by land, or water, which renders it a desirable situation.
A credit of 12 months will be allowed the purchaser, agreeable to the Act of Assembly, upon giving bond and approved security to
The Overseers of the Poor Norfolk County. Jan 4. 1m
TURKS ISLAND SALT.
3000 bushels Turks Island Salt now on board the brig Alert, captain Hatchard, from Turks Island, for sale by
William Pennock.
Dec. 21.