Norfolk gazette and publick ledger (Norfolk [Va.]), 1807-09-09 00:00:00

NORFOLK GAZETTE And PUBLICK LEDGER  INT HIC ETIAM SUA PRÆMIA LADUNT
VOL. IV.]
WEDNESDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 9, 1807.
[NO. 24.
THIS PAPER IS PUBLISHED THREE TIMES A WEEK PRICE TO SUBSCRIBERS SIX DOLLARS PER ANNUM, PAYA- BLE IN ADVANCE—SINGLE PAPER TWELVE AND ONE HALF CENTS—ADVERTISEMENTS ARE INSERTED AT THE RATE OF FIFTY CENTS FOR THE FIRST, AND TWENTY FIVE CENTS PER SQUARE FOR EACH SUCCEEDING INSERTION.
For Freight or Charter, The new Ship MARK & ABIGAIL, bur- then 240 tons, now in order for the reception of a cargo. For terms apply to the master on board, or
C. FRY.
Who offers for Sale, 25,000 feet Boards and Scantling. September 4. tf
For Freight or Charter, The remarkable fine copper fastened Ship MARYLAND, Robert Inot, master, bur- then 400 tons, now on her first voyage, and ready for the reception of a cargo. For terms apply to the master on board, or
William Dickson. tf
For Freight or Charter, The fast sailing Ship ANACREON, Henry Peter, master, burthen 350 hds. tobacco and will be ready to receive a cargo in four days. For terms apply to
William Dickson. tf
For LIVERPOOL, The Ship LACONA, captain Walker, the greater part of her cargo being engaged, will sail with all possible dispatch—for freight of 100 hogsheads or passage, having good accommodations, ap- ply to the master on board, or
Phinehas Dana. tf
For Sale, Freight, or Charter, The good copper bottomed Ship STRAN- GER, Barnaby Swain, master, burthen 206 tons, will carry about 250 hds. of tobacco, now in complete order for the reception of a cargo.
Also for Charter, The excellent fast sailing Ship RUSSELL, William Taber, master, 300 tons burthen, supposed to carry 450 hogsheads, copper bot- tomed, and now on her second voyage. For terms apply to
Richard Blow. tf
For Charter, The fine new Ship ISABELLA, Abel Lin- coln master, burthen 368 tons, will be ready for the reception of a cargo in three days.— For terms apply to
Moses Myers. tf
Who offers for sale, 600 boxes Havanna SUGARS, Landing from on board the ship Cabinet. August 14. tf
FOR LONDON, The fine American copper bottomed Ship AMELIA, burthen 369 Tons, or 500 Hds of Tobacco; daily expected from Philadel- phia.—For freight apply to
A. Maclure. tf
Leather, Cordage, and Loaf Sugar. The subscriber will hereafter expose for Sale at his Warehouse on Campbell's wharf the above Articles, of the manufacture of Norfolk, at reduced prices for Cash, or on short credits only.
Theo. Armistead. tf
He will sell or lease for a term of years, the STORES at the end of Marsden's and Rothery's wharves. Feb. 20. tf
Thirty Dollars Reward.
Ranaway from the subscriber about the 20th May last, living in the county of Princess-Anne, a negro man named AFRICA, about 30 years of age, has a scar on his right cheek. All persons are forewarned from harbouring him, and I will give the above reward to any person who will bring him home, or so secure him that I may get him again. Joshua James. tf
Princess-Anne County, Aug. 10. tf
The HOUSE on Smith's Point, adjoining Mr. H. Brunet's dwelling-house, and lately in the occupancy of Mr. Robert Smith, is offered for Rent; posses- sion may be had immediately. For terms apply at the Ware House of Brunet & Thompson, on Maxwell's wharf. August 12. 1w3w1w
For SALE, 35 punch. Windward Island RUM. Brunet & Thompson. tf August 19.
Just Received, The New Hungarian Broad Sword Exercise, dedicated to the gentlemen of the volunteer ca- valry of the United States. Regulations for the order and discipline of the troops of the United States, by Steuben. Trial of Thomas O. Selfridge, for killing Charles Austin on the Publick Exchange in Boston. A correct statement of the whole controversy between Tho- mas O. Selfridge and Benjamin Austin. An enquiry into the validity of the Methodist Episcopacy. Rev. Dr. Kemp's Tact on Conversion. Bonsal, Conrad, & Co. August 19. 1w3w
For Sale on board the Ship Anacreon, 23,000 feet white pine BOARDS, of excellent quality, fit for inside joiner's work, which will be sold low if taken from on board. Apply to William Dickson. tf September 2.
TRIAL OF AARON BURR.
OPINION
Of the Court, on the motion to arrest the evidence de- livered on
MONDAY, August 31.
The question now to be decided has been argued in a manner worthy of its importance, and with an earnestness evincing the strong conviction felt by the counsel on each side that the law is with them.
A degree of eloquence seldom displayed on any occasion has embellished a solidity of argument and a depth of research by which the court has been greatly aided in forming the opinion it is about to deliver.
The testimony adduced on the part of the United States, to prove the overt act laid in the indictment, having shown, and the attorney for the United States having admitted, that the prisoner was not present when the act, whatever may be its charac- ter, was committed, and there being no reason to doubt but that he was at a great distance and in a different state, it is objected to the testimony offered on the part of the United States, to connect him with those who committed the overt act, that such testimony is totally irrelevant and must therefore be rejected.
The arguments in support of this motion respect in part the merits of this case as it may be sup- posed to stand independent of the pleadings, and in part as exhibited by the pleadings.
On the first division of the subject two points are made.
1st. That conformably to the constitution of the United States, no man can be convicted of treason who was not present when the war was levied.
2d. That if this construction be erroneous, no tes- timony can be received to charge one man with the overt acts of others, until those overt acts as laid in the indictment be proved to the satisfaction of the court.
The question which arises on the construction of the constitution, in every point of view in which it can be contemplated, is of infinite moment to the people of this country and to their government, and requires the most temperate and the most deliberate consideration.
"Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them."
What is the natural import of the words "levy- ing of war? And who may be said to levy it?" Had their first application to treason been made by our constitution, they would certainly have admitted of some latitude of construction. Taken most literal- ly, they are perhaps of the same import with the words raising or creating war, but as those who join after the commencement are equally the objects of punishment, there would probably be a general admission, that the term also comprehended making war, or carrying on war. In the construction which courts would be required to give these words, it is not improbable that those who should raise, create, make or carry on war might be comprehended. The various acts which would be considered as coming within the term, would be settled by a course of de- cisions, and it would be affirming boldly to say, that those only who actually constituted a portion of the military force appearing in arms could be consid- ered as levying war. There is no difficulty in affirm- ing that there must be a war or the crime of levying it cannot exist, but there would often be a considera- ble difficulty in affirming that a particular act did or did not involve the person committing it in the guilt and in the fact of levying war. If for ex- ample, an army should be actually raised for the avowed purpose of carrying on open war against the United States and subverting their government, the point must be weighed very deliberately, before a judge would venture to decide that an overt act of levying war had not been committed by a commis- sary of purchases, who never saw the army, but who, knowing its object and leaguing himself with the rebels, supplied that army with provisions, or by a recruiting officer holding a commission in the rebel service, who, tho' never in camp, executed the par- ticular duty assigned to him.
But the term is not for the first time applied to treason by the constitution of the United States. It is a technical term. It is used in a very old statute of that country, whose language is our language, and whose laws form the substratum of our laws. It is scarcely conceivable that the term was not employ- ed by the framers of our constitution in the sense which had been affixed to it by those from whom we had borrowed it. So far as the meaning of any terms, particularly terms of art, is completely ascer- tained, those by whom they are employed must be considered as employing them in that ascertained meaning, unless the contrary be proved by the con- text.—It is therefore reasonable to suppose, unless it be incompatible with other expressions of the constitution, that the term "levying war" is used in that instrument in the same sense in which it was understood in England and in this country, to have been used in the statute of the 25th of Edward 3d from which it was borrowed.
It is said that this meaning is to be collected only from adjudged cases. But this proposition cannot be conceded to the extent in which it is laid down. The superior authority of adjudged cases will never be controverted. But those celebrated elementary writers, who have stated the principles of the law, whose statements have received the common appro- bation of legal men, are not to be disregarded. Prin- ciples laid down by such writers as Coke, Hale, Foster, and Blackstone, are not lightly to be reject- ed. These books are in the hands of every student. Legal opinions are formed upon them, and those opinions are afterwards carried to the bar, the bench and the legislature. In the exposition of terms, therefore, used in instruments of the present day, the definitions and the dicta of those authors, if not
contradicted by adjudications, and if compatible with the words of the statute, are entitled to re- spect. It is to be regretted that they do not shed as much light on this part of the subject as is to be wished.
Coke does not give a complete definition of the term, but puts cases which amount to levying war. "An actual rebellion or insurrection, (he says) is a levying of war." In whom?—Coke does not say whether in those only who appear in arms, or in all those who take part in the rebellion or insurrection by real open deed.
Hale, in treating on the same subject puts many cases which shall constitute a levying of war, with- out which no act can amount to treason, but he does not particularize the parts to be performed by the different persons concerned in that war, which shall be sufficient to fix on each the guilt of le- vying it.
Foster says "the joining with rebels in an act of rebellion, or with enemies in acts of hostility will make a man a traitor." "Furnishing rebels or ene- mies with money, arms, ammunition or other neces- saries will prima facie make a man a traitor."
Foster does not say that he would be a traitor un- der the words of the statute independent of the legal rule which attaches the guilt of the principal to an accessary, nor that his treason is occasioned by that rule. In England this discrimination need not be made except for the purpose of framing the in- dictment, and therefore in the English books we do not perceive any effort to make it. The surren- dering a castle to rebels, being in confederacy with them is said by Hale and Foster to be treason under the clause of levying war, but whether it be levy- ing war in fact, or aiding those who levying it is not said.—Upon this point Blackstone is not more satisfactory. Although we may find among the commentators upon treason enough to satisfy the enquiry, what is a state of internal war? Yet no precise information can be acquired from them which would enable us to decide with clearness whe- ther persons not in arms but taking part in a rebel- lion, could be said to levy war independent of that doctrine which attaches to the accessory the guilt of his principal.
If in adjudged cases this question has been taken up and directly decided, the court has not seen those cases. The arguments which may be drawn from the form of the indictment, though strong, is not conclusive. In the precedent found in Termaine, Mary Speake, who was indicted for furnishing pro- visions to the party of the Duke of Monmouth, is indicted for furnishing provisions to those who were levying war, not for levying war herself. It may correctly be argued, that had this act amounted to levying war, she would have been indicted for levy- ing war, and the furnishing of provisions would have been laid as the overt act. The court felt this when the precedent was produced.—But the argu- ment, though strong, is not conclusive, because in England, the enquiry whether she had be- come a traitor by levying war, or by giving aid and comfort to those who were levying war, was unimportant, and because too it does not appear from the indictment that she was actually concern- ed in the rebellion, that she belonged to the rebel party, or was guilty of any thing further than a crimi- nal speculation in selling them provisions.
It is not deemed necessary to trace the doctrine, that in treason all are principals to its source. Its origin is most probably stated correctly by Judge Tucker, in a work, the merit of which is with plea- sure acknowledged. But if a spurious doctrine has been introduced into the common law, and has for centu- ries been admitted as genuine, it would require great hardihood in a judge to reject it. Accordingly, we find those of the English jurists who seem to disap- prove the principle, declaring that it is now too firm- ly settled to be shaken.
It is unnecessary to trace this doctrine to its source for another reason. The terms of the con- stitution comprise no question respecting principal and accessory, so far as either may be truly and in fact said to levy war: Whether in England a person would be indicted in express terms for levying war, or for assisting others in levying war, yet if in cor- rect and legal language he can be said to have levi- ed war, and if it has never been decided that the act would not amount to levying war, his case may without violent construction be brought within the letter and the plain meaning of the constitution.
In examining these words the argument that may be drawn from felonies, as for example, from murder, is not more conclusive. Murder is the sin- gle act of killing with malice aforethought. But war is a complex operation composed of many parts, co operating with each other. No one man or body of men can perform them all if the war be of any continuance. Although then in correct and in law language, he alone is said to have murdered a- nother who has perpetrated the fact of killing, or has been present aiding that fact, it does not follow that he alone can have levied war who has borne arms. All those who perform the various and es- sential military parts of prosecuting the war which must be assigned to different persons, may with cor- rectness and accuracy be said to levy war.
Taking this view of the subject, it appears to the court, that those who perform a part in the prose- cution of the war may correctly be said to levy war and to commit treason under the constitution. It will be observed that this opinion does not extend to the case of a person who performs no act in the prosecution of the war, who counsels and advises it, or who being engaged in the conspiracy fails to perform his part. Whether such persons may be implicated by the doctrine, that whatever would make a man an accessory in felony makes him a principal in treason, or are excluded, because that doctrine is inapplicable to the United States, the constitution having declared that treason shall con- sist only in levying war, and having made the proo-
of overt acts necessary to conviction, is a question of vast importance which it would be proper for the supreme court to take a fit occasion to decide, but which an inferior tribunal would not willingly determine unless the case before them should require it.
It may now be proper to notice the opinion of the supreme court in the case of the United States a- gainst Bollman and Swartwout. It is said that this opinion in declaring that those who do not bear arms may yet be guilty of treason, is contrary to law, and is not obligatory, because it is extrajudi- cial, and was delivered on a point not argued. This court is therefore required to depart from the prin- ciple there laid down.
It is true, that in that case after forming the o- pinion that no treason could be committed, because no treasonable assemblage had taken place, the court might have dispensed with proceeding further in the doctrines of treason. But it is to be remem- bered, that the judges might act separately, and perhaps at the same time, on the various prosecu- tions which might be instituted, and that no appeal lay from their decisions. Opposite judgments on the point would have presented a state of things infi- nitely to be deplored by all. It was not surprising then that they should have made some attempt to settle principles which would probably occur, and which were in some degree connected with the point before them.
The court had employed some reasoning to show that without the actual embodying of men, war could not be levied. It might have been inferred from this, that those only who were so embodied could be guilty of treason. Not only to conclude this inference, but also to affirm the contrary, the court proceeded to observe, "It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can be guilty of this crime who has not appeared in arms against the country. On the contrary, if war be actually levi- ed, that is, if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable object, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspi- racy, are to be considered as traitors."
This court is told that if this opinion be incor- rect it ought not to be obeyed, because it was extra- judicial. For myself, I can say that I could not lightly be prevailed on to disobey it, were I even convinced that it was erroneous, but I would cer- tainly use any means which the law placed in my power to carry the question again before the supreme court, for re-consideration, in a case in which it would directly occur and be fully argued.
The court which gave this opinion was compos- ed of 4 judges. At the time I thought them una- nimous, but I have since had reason to suspect that one of them, whose opinion is entitled to great re- spect, and whose indisposition prevented his enter- ing into the discussions, on some of those points which were not essential to the decision of the very case under consideration, did not concur in this parti- cular point with his brethren. Had the opinion been unanimous, it would have been given by a ma- jority of the judges. But should the three who were absent concur with that judge who was pre- sent, and who perhaps dissents from what was then the opinion of the court, a majority of the judges may overrule this decision. I should therefore feel no objection, although I then thought, and still think the opinion perfectly correct, to carry the point if possible again before the supreme court, if the case should depend upon it.
In saying that I still think the opinion perfectly correct, I do not consider myself as going further than the preceding reasoning goes. Some gentle- men have argued as if the supreme court had ad- opted the whole doctrine of the English books on the subject of accessories to treason. But certain- ly such is not the fact. Those only who perform a part, and who are leagued in the conspiracy are de- clared to be traitors. To complete the definition both circumstances must concur. They must "per- form a part," which will furnish the overt act, and they must be "leagued in the conspiracy." The person who comes within this description, in the opinion of the court levies war. The present mo- tion, however, does not rest upon this point; for, if under this indictment the United States might be let in to prove the part performed by the prisoner, if he did perform any part, the court could not stop the testimony in its present stage.
2nd. The second point involves the character of the overt act which has been given in evidence, and calls upon the court to declare whether that act can amount to levying war. Although the court ought now to avoid any analysis of the testimony which has been offered in this case, provided the decision of the motion should not rest upon it, yet many rea- sons concur in giving peculiar propriety to a deliv- ery, in the course of these trials, of a detailed opin- ion on the question, what is levying war? As this question has been argued at great length, it may probably save much trouble to the counsel now to give that opinion.
In opening the case it was contended by the at- torney for the United States and has since been maintained on the part of the prosecution, that nei- ther arms nor the application of force or violence are indispensably necessary to constitute the fact of levying war. To illustrate these positions several cases have been stated, many of which would clear- ly amount to treason. In all of them, except that which was probably intended to be this case, and on which no observation will be made, the object of the assemblage was clearly treasonable; its char- acter was unequivocal, and was demonstrated by evidence furnished by the assemblage itself; there was no necessity to rely upon information drawn from extrinsic sources, or in order to understand the fact, to pursue a course of intricate reasoning and to conjecture motives. A force is supposed to be

collected for an avowed treasonable object, in a condition to attempt that object, and to have commenced the attempt by moving towards it. I state these particulars because although the cases put may establish the doctrine they are intended to support, may prove that the absence of arms, or the failure to apply force to sensible objects by the actual commission of violence on those objects, may be supplied by other circumstances, yet they also serve to show that the mind requires those circumstances to be satisfied that war is levied.
Their construction of the opinion of the supreme court is, I think, thus far correct. It is certainly the opinion which was at the time entertained by myself, and which is still entertained. If a rebel army avowing its hostility to the sovereign power, should front that of the government, should march and countermarch before it, should manoeuvre in its face, and should then disperse from any cause whatever without firing a gun, I confess I could not without some surprise, hear gentlemen seriously contend that this could not amount to an act of levying war. A case equally strong may be put with respect to the absence of military weapons.—If the party be in a condition to execute the proposed treason without the usual implements of war, I can perceive no reason for requiring those implements in order to constitute the crime.
It is argued that no adjudged case can be produced from the English books where actual violence has not been committed. Suppose this were true. No adjudged case has, or it is believed, can be produced from those books in which it has been laid down, that war cannot be levied without the actual application of violence to external objects to external objects. The silence of the reporters on this point may be readily accounted for. In cases of actual rebellion against the government, the most active and influential leaders are generally most actively engaged in the war, and as the object can never be to extend punishment to extermination, a sufficient number around among those who have committed actual hostilities, to satisfy the avenging arm of justice. In cases of constructive treason, such as pulling down meeting houses, where the direct and avowed object is not the destruction of the sovereign power, some act of violence might be generally required to give the crime a sufficient degree of malignity to convert it into treason, to render the guilt of any individual unequivocal.
But Vaughan's case is a case where there was no real application of violence, and where the act was adjudged to be treason. Gentlemen argue that Vaughan was only guilty of adhering to the king's enemies, but they have not the authority of the court for so saying. The judges unquestionably treat the cruizing of Vaughan as an overt act of levying war.
The opinions of the best elementary writers concur in declaring, that where a body of men are assembled for the purpose of making war against the government, and are in a condition to make that war, the assemblage is an act of levying war.—These opinions are contradicted by no adjudged case and are supported by Vaughan's case. This court is not inclined to controvert them.
But although in this respect, the opinion of the supreme court has not been misunderstood on the part of the prosecution, that opinion seems not to have been fully adverted to in a very essential point in which it is said to have been misconceived by others.
The opinion I am informed, has been construed to mean, that any assemblage whatever for a treasonable purpose, whether in force, or not in force, whether in a condition to use violence or not in that condition, is a levying of war. It is this construction, which has not indeed been expressly advanced at the bar, but which is said to have been adopted elsewhere, that the court deems it necessary to examine.
Independent of authority, trusting only to the dictates of reason, and expounding terms according to their ordinary signification, we should probably all concur in the declaration that war could not be levied without the employment and exhibition of force. War is an appeal from reason to the sword, and he who makes the appeal evidences the fact by the use of the means. His intention to go to war may be proved by words, but the actual going to war is a fact which is to be proved by open deed. The end is to be effected by force, and it would seem that in cases where no declaration is to be made, the state of actual war could only be created by the employment of force or being in a condition to employ it.
But the term having been adopted by our constitution, must be understood in that sense in which it was universally received in this country, when the constitution was framed. The sense in which it was received is to be collected from the most approved authorities of that nation from which we have borrowed the term.
Lord Coke says, that levying war against the king was treason at the common law. "A compassing or conspiracy to levy war, he adds, is no treason, for there must be a levying of war in fact." He proceeds to state cases of constructive levying war, where the direct design is not to overturn the government, but to effect some general object by force. The terms he employs in stating these cases, are such as indicate an impression on his mind, that actual violence is a necessary ingredient in constituting the fact of levying war. He then proceeds to say, "an actual rebellion or insurrection is a levying of war within this act." "If any with strength and weapons invasive and defensive doth hold and defend a castle or fort against the king and his power, this is levying of war against the king." These cases are put to illustrate what he denominates "a war in fact." It is not easy to conceive "an actual invasion or insurrection" unconnected with force, nor can "a castle or fort be defended with strength and weapons invasive and defensive" without the employment of actual force. It would seem then to have been the opinion of Lord Coke, that to levy war there must be an assemblage of men in a condition and with an intention to employ force. He certainly puts no case of a different description.
Lord Hale says (149. 6) "what shall be said a levying of war is partly a question of fact, for it is not every unlawful or riotous assembly of many persons to do an unlawful act, though de facto they commit the act they intend, that makes a levying of war; for then every riot would be treason, &c." "but it must be such an assembly as carries with it speciem belli , the appearance of war, as if they rid or march vestitiis explicatis , with colours flying, or if they be formed into companies or furnished with military officers, or if they be armed with military weapons as swords, guns, bills, halberds, pikes,
and are so circumstanced that it may be treasonably concluded they are in a posture of war, which circumstances are so various that it is hard to describe them all particularly."
"Only the general expressions in all the indictments of this nature that I have seen are more guer-rino arraiati ," arrayed in warlike manner."
He afterwards adds, "If there be a war levied as is above declared, viz. an assembly arrayed in warlike manner, and so in the posture of war for any treasonable attempt, it is bellum livatum but not per-cussum ."
It is obvious that Lord Hale supposed an assemblage of men in force, in a military posture, to be necessary to constitute the fact of levying war.—The idea he appears to suggest, that the apparatus of war is necessary, has been very justly combatated by an able judge who has written a valuable treatise on the subject of treason; but it is not recollected that his position, that the assembly should be in a posture of war for any treasonable attempt, has ever been denied. Hawk. ch. 17, sec. 23, says, "That not only those who rebel against the king and take up arms to dethrone him, but also in many other cases, those who in a violent and forcible manner withstand his lawful authority are said to levy war against him, and therefore those that hold a fort or castle against the king's forces, or keep together armed numbers of men against the king's express command, have been adjudged to levy war against him."
The cases put by Hawkins are all cases of actual force and violence. "Those who rebel against the king and take up arms to dethrone him," in many other cases those "who in a violent and forcible manner withstand his lawful authority." "Those that hold a fort or castle against his forces, or keep together armed numbers of men against his express command."
These cases are obviously cases of force and violence.
Hawkins next proceeds to describe cases in which war is understood to be levied under the statute, although it was not directly made against the government. This Lord Hale terms an interpretative or constructive levying of war; and it will be perceived that he puts no case in which actual force is dispensed with.
"Those also, he says, who make an insurrection in order to redress a publick grievance, whether it be a real or pretended one, and of their own authority attempt with force to redress it, are said to levy war against the king, although they have no direct design against his person, inasmuch as they insolently invade his prerogative by attempting to do that by private authority which he by public justice ought to do, which manifestly tends to a downright rebellion. As where great numbers by force attempt to remove certain persons from the king, &c." The cases here put by Hawkins of a constructive levying of war, do in terms require force as a consistent part of the description of the offence.
Judge Foster, in his valuable treatise on treason, states the opinion which has been quoted from Lord Hale, and differs from that writer so far as the latter might seem to require swords, drums, colours, &c. what he terms the pomp and pageantry of war, as essential circumstances to constitute the fact of levying war. In the cases of Damaree and Purchase, he says, "the want of those circumstances weighed nothing with the court, although the prisoner's counsel insisted much on that matter." But he adds, "the number of the insurgents supplied the want of military weapons: and they were provided with axes, crows and other tools of the like nature, proper for the mischief they intended to effect.— Favor arma ministrat ."
It is apparent that Judge Foster here alludes to an assemblage in force, or as Lord Hale terms it, "in a warlike posture"—that is in a condition to attempt or proceed upon the treason which had been contemplated. The same author afterwards states at large the cases of Damaree and Purchase from 8th state trials, and they are cases where the insurgents not only assembled in force, in the posture of war, or in a condition to execute the treasonable design, but they did actually carry it into execution, and did resist the guards who were sent to disperse them.
Judge Foster states, section 4, all insurrections to effect certain innovations of the publick and general concern by an armed force , to be in construction of law, high treason within the clause of levying war.
The cases put by Foster of constructive levying of war, all contain as a material ingredient, the actual employment of force. After going through this branch of his subject, he proceeds to state the law in a case of actual levying of war, that is, where the war is intended directly against the government.
He says, sec. 9, "An assembly armed and arrayed in a warlike manner for a treasonable purpose is bellum livatum though not bellum per-cussum . Listing and marching are sufficient overt acts without coming to a battle or action. So cruizing on the king's subjects under a French commission, France being then at war with us, was held to be adhering to the king's enemies though no other act of hostility be proved."
"An assembly armed and arrayed in a warlike manner for any treasonable purpose," is certainly in a state of force; in a condition to execute the treason for which they assembled. The words "enlisting and marching," which are overt acts of levying war, do in the arrangement of the sentence, also imply a state of force, though that state is not expressed in terms for the succeeding words, which state a particular event as not having happened, prove that event to have been the next circumstance to those which had happened—they are "without coming to a battle or action." "If men be enlisted and march," (that is, if they march prepared for battle or in a condition for action, for march is a technical term applied to the movement of a military corps) it is an overt act of levying war though they do not come to a battle or action. This exposition is rendered the stronger by what seems to be put in the same sentence as a parallel case with respect to adhering to an enemy. It is cruizing under a commission from an enemy without committing any other act of hostility. Cruizing is the act of sailing in a warlike form and in a condition to assail those of whom the cruiser is in quest.
This exposition which seems to be that intended by Judge Foster, is rendered the more certain by a reference to the case in the state trials from which the extracts are taken. The words used by the chief justice are "when men form themselves into a body and march rank and file with weapons of-
fensive and defensive, this is levying of war with open force, if the design be publick." Mr. Phipps, the counsel for the prosecution afterwards observed, "Intending to levy war is not treason unless a war be actually levied." To this the chief justice answered, "Is it not actually levying of war, if they actually provide arms, and levy men, and in a warlike manner set out and cruise, and come with a design to destroy our ships?" Mr. Phipps still insisted "it would not be an actual levying of war unless they committed some act of hostility." "Yes, indeed, said the chief justice, the going on board and being in a posture to attack the king's ships." Mr. Baron Powis added, "but for you to say that because they did not actually fight it is not a levying of war, is it not plain what they did intend? That they came with that intention, that they came in that posture, that they came armed, and had guns and blunderbusses and surrounded the ship twice; they came with an armed force, that is a strong evidence of the design."
The point insisted on by the counsel in the case of Vaughan, and in this case, was, that war could not be levied without actual fighting. In this the counsel was very properly overruled; but it is apparent that the judges proceeded entirely on the idea that a warlike posture was indispensable to the fact of levying war.
Judge Foster proceeds to give other instances of levying war.—"Attacking the king's forces in opposition to his authority upon a march or in quarters is levying war." "Holding a castle or fort against the king or his forces, if actual force be used in order to keep possession , is levying war. But a bare detainer as supposed by shutting the gates against the king or his forces, without any force from within, Lord Hale conceives will not amount to treason."
The whole doctrine of Judge Foster on this subject, seems to demonstrate a clear opinion that a state of force and violence, a posture of war must exist to constitute technically as well as really the fact of levying war.
Judge Blackstone seems to concur with his predecessors. Speaking of levying war, he says, "This may be done by taking arms not only to dethrone the king, but under pretence to reform religion, or the laws, or to remove evil counsellors or other grievances, whether real or pretended. For the law does not, neither can it permit any private man or set of men to interfere forcibly in matters of such high importance."
He proceeds to give examples of levying war, which show that the contemplated actual force as a necessary ingredient in the composition of this crime.
It would seem then from the English authorities, that the words "levying war," have not received a technical different from their natural meaning, so far as respects the character of the assemblage of men which may constitute the fact. It must be a warlike assemblage, carrying the appearance of force, and in a situation to practice hostility.
Several judges of the United States have given opinions at their circuits on this subject, all of which deserve and will receive the particular attention of this court.
In his charge to the grand jury when John Fries was indicted, in consequence of a forcible opposition to the direct tax, Judge Iredell is understood to have said, "I think I am warranted in saying, that if in the case of the insurgents who may come under your consideration, the intention was to prevent by force of arms the execution of any act of congress of the United States altogether, any forcible opposition calculated to carry that intention into effect, was a levying of war against the U. States and of course an act of treason." To levy war then, according to this opinion of Judge Iredell, required the actual exertion of force.
Judge Patterson, in his opinions delivered in two different cases, seems not to differ from Judge Iredell. He does not, indeed, precisely state the employment of force as necessary to constitute a levying war, but in giving his opinion in cases in which force was actually employed, he considers the crime in one case as dependent on the intention, and in the other case he says, "combining these facts and this design," (that is, combining actual force with a treasonable design) "the crime is high treason."
Judge Peters has also indicated the opinion that force was necessary to constitute the crime of levying war.
Judge Chase has been particularly clear and explicit. In an opinion which he appears to have prepared on great consideration, he says, "The court are of opinion, that if a body of people conspire and meditate an insurrection to resist or oppose the execution of a statute of the United States by force, that they are only guilty of a high misdemeanor; but if they proceed to carry such intentions into execution by force, that they are guilty of the treason of levying war; and the quantum of the force employed neither increases nor diminishes the crime; whether by one hundred or one thousand persons, is wholly immaterial."
"The court are of opinion, that a combination or conspiracy to levy war against the United States, is not treason unless combined with an attempt to carry such combination or conspiracy into execution, some actual force or violence must be used in pursuance of such design to levy war; but that it is altogether immaterial whether the force used be sufficient to effectuate the object. Any force connected with the intention will constitute the crime of levying of war."
In various parts of the opinion delivered by Judge Chase, in the case of Fries, the same sentiments are to be found. It is to be observed, that these judges are not content that troops should be assembled in a condition to employ force. According to them some degree of force must have been actually employed.
The judges of the United States, then, so far as their opinions have been quoted, seem to have required still more to constitute the fact of levying war, than has been required by the English books. Our judges seem to have required the actual exercise of force, the actual employment of some degree of violence. This however may be, and probably is, because in the cases in which their opinions were given, the design not having been to overturn the government, but resist the execution of a law, such an assemblage would be sufficient for the purpose, as to require the actual employment of force to render the object unequivocal.
But it is said all these authorities have been overruled by the decision of the supreme court in the case of the United States against Swartwout and Bollman.
If the supreme court have indeed extended the doctrine of treason, further than it has heretofore been carried by the judges of England, or of this country, their decision would be submitted to. At least this court could go no further than to endeavour again to bring the point directly before them. It would however be expected that an opinion which is to overrule all former precedents, and to establish a principle never before recognized, should be expressed in plain and explicit terms. A mere implication, ought not to prostrate a principle which seems to have been so well established. Had the intention been entertained to make so material a change in this respect, the court ought to have expressly declared, that any assemblage of men whatever, who had formed a treasonable design, whether in force, or not, whether in a condition to attempt the design or not, whether attended with warlike appearances or not, constitutes the fact of levying war. Yet no declaration to this amount is made. Not an expression of the kind is to be found in the opinion of the supreme court. The foundation on which this argument rests is the omission of the court to state, that the assemblage which constitutes the fact of levying war ought to be in force, and some passages, which show that the question respecting the nature of the assemblage, was not in the mind of the court when the opinion was drawn, which passages are mingled with others, which at least show that there was no intention to depart from the course of the precedents in cases of treason by levying war.
Every opinion, to be correctly understood, ought to be considered with a view to the case in which it was delivered. In the case of the United States against Bollman and Swartwout, there was no evidence that even two men had ever met for the purpose of executing the plan, in which those persons were charged with having participated. It was therefore sufficient for the court to say that unless men were assembled war could not be levied. That case was decided by this declaration. The court might indeed have defined the species of assemblage which would amount to levying of war, but, as this opinion was not a treatise on treason, but a decision of a particular case, expressions of doubtful import should be construed in reference to the case itself; and the mere omission to state that a particular circumstance was necessary to the consummation of the crime, ought not to be construed into a declaration that the circumstance was unimportant. General expressions ought not to be considered as overruling settled principles without a direct declaration to that effect. After these preliminary observations the court will proceed to examine the opinion which has occasioned them.
The first expression in it bearing on the present question is "to constitute that specifick crime for which the prisoner now before the court has been committed, war must be actually levied against the United States. However flagitious may be the crime of conspiracy to subvert by force the government of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war and actually to levy war, are distinct offences. The first must be brought into operation by the assemblage of men for a purpose treasonable in itself, or the fact of levying war cannot have been committed."
Although it is not expressly stated that the assemblage of men for the purpose of carrying into operation the treasonable intent, which will amount to levying war, must be an assemblage in force, yet it is fairly to be inferred from the context, and nothing like dispensing with force appears in this paragraph. The expressions are "to constitute the crime war must be actually levied." A conspiracy to levy war is spoken of as "a conspiracy to subvert by force the government of our country," speaking in general terms of an assemblage of men for this, or for any other purpose, a person would naturally be understood as speaking of an assemblage in some degree adapted to the purpose. An assemblage to subvert by force the government of our country, and amounting to a levying of war, should be an assemblage in force.
In a subsequent paragraph the court says, "It is not the intention of the court to say, that no individual can be guilty of this crime who has not appeared in arms against his country. On the contrary if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually assembled in order to effect by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, &c. and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are traitors. But there must be an actual assemblage of men for the treasonable purpose to constitute a levying of war."
The observations made on the preceding paragraph apply to this. "A body of men actually assembled, in order to effect by force a treasonable purpose," must be a body assembled with such appearance of force as would warrant the opinion that they were assembled for the particular purpose; an assemblage to constitute an actual levying of war should be an assemblage with such appearance of force as would justify the opinion that they met for the purpose.
This explanation, which is believed to be the natural, certainly not a strained explanation of the words, derives some additional aid from the terms in which the paragraph last quoted commences. "It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can be guilty of treason who has not appeared in arms against his country." These words seem to obviate an inference which might otherwise have been drawn from the preceding paragraph. They indicate that in the mind of the court the assemblage stated in that paragraph was an assemblage in arms. That the individuals who composed it had appeared in arms against their country. That is in other words that the assemblage was a military, a warlike assemblage.
The succeeding paragraph in the opinion relates to a conspiracy and serves to show that force and violence were in the mind of the court, and that there was no idea of extending the crime of treason by construction beyond the constitutional definition which had been given of it.
Returning to the case actually before the court, it is said "a design to overturn the government of the United States in New-Orleans by force , would have been unquestionably a design which if carried into execution would have been treason, and the assemblage of a body of men for the purpose of carrying it into execution would amount to levying of war against the U. S."
Now what could reasonably be said to be an assemblage of a body of men for the purpose of overturning the government of the U. States in New-Orleans by force ? Certainly an assemblage in force; an assemblage prepared and intending to act with

force; a military assemblage. The decisions there- fore made by the judges of the United States, are then declared to be in conformity with the princi- ples laid down by the supreme court. Is this de- claration compatible with the idea of departing from those opinions on a point within the contem- plation of the court? The opinions of Judge Pat- terson and Judge Iredell are said "to imply an ac- tual assembling of men though they rather designed to remark on the purpose to which the force was to be applied than on the nature of the force itself."— This observation certainly indicates that the nec- essity of an assemblage of men was the particular point the court meant to establish, and that the idea of force was never separated from this assemblage.
The opinion of Judge Chase is next quoted with approbation. This opinion in terms requires the employment of force.
After stating the verbal communications said to have been made by Mr. Swartwout to gen. Wilkin- son, the court says "if these words import that the government of New-Orleans was to be revolu- tionized by force, although merely as a step to or a means of exciting some greater projects, the design was unquestionably treasonable, and any assemblage of men for that purpose would amount to a levying of war."
The words "any assemblage of men" if construe- ed to affirm that any two or three of the conspira- tors who might be found together after this plan had been formed, would be the act of levying war, would certainly be misconstrued. The sense of the expressions "any assemblage of men" is restricted by the words "for this purpose." Now could it be in the contemplation of the court that a body of men would assemble for the purpose of revolution- izing New-Orleans by force, who should not them- selves be in force?
After noticing some difference of opinion among the judges respecting the import of the words said to have been used by Mr. Swartwout the court proceeds to observe: "But whether this treasonable intention be really imputable to the plan or not, it is admitted that it must have been carried into execu- tion by an open assemblage for that purpose, previ- ous to the arrest of the prisoner, in order to con- summuate the crime as to him."
Could the court have conceived "an open assem- blage" "for the purpose of overturning the govern- ment of New Orleans by force" to be only equiva- lent to a secret furtive assemblage without the ap- pearance of force?
After quoting the words of Mr. Swartwout, from the affidavit, in which it was stated that Mr. Burr was levying an army of 7,000 men, and observing that the treason to be inferred from these words would depend on the intention with which it was levied, and on the progress which has been made in levying it, the court say "the question then is, whe- ther this evidence proves col. Burr to have advanced so far in levying an army as actually to have as- sembled them."
Actually to assemble an army of 7000 men, is unquestionably to place those who are so assembled in a state of open force.
But as the mode of expression used in this pas- sage might be misconstrued so far as to countenance the opinion that it would be necessary to assemble the whole army in order to constitute the fact of le- vying war, the court proceeds to say, "It is argued that since it cannot be necessary that the whole 7000 men should be assembled, their commencing their march by detachments to the place of rendezvous must be sufficient to constitute the crime."
"This position is correct with some qualifica- tion. It cannot be necessary that the whole army should assemble and that the various parts which are to compose it should have combined. But it is necessary there should be an actual assemblage; and therefore this evidence should make the fact unequiv- ocal."
"The travelling of individuals to the place of rendezvous, would perhaps not be sufficient. This would be an unequivocal act, and has no warlike appearance. The meeting of particular bodies of men, and their marching from places of partial to a place of general rendezvous would be such an assem- blage."
The position here stated by the counsel for the prosecution is, that the army "commencing its march by detachments to the place of rendezvous (that is of the army,) must be sufficient to consti- tute the crime."
This position is not admitted by the court to be universally correct. It is said to be "correct with some qualification." What is that qualification?
"The travelling of individuals to the place of ren- dezvous," (and by this term it is not to be understood one individual by himself, but several individuals either separately or together but not in military form) "would perhaps not be sufficient." Why not sufficient? Because says the court, "this would be an equivocal act and has no warlike appearance." The act then should be unequivocal and should have a warlike appearance. It must exhibit in the words of Sir Matthew Hale speciem belli , the appearance of war. This construction is rendered in some mea- sure necessary when we observe that the court is qualifying the position, "that the army commen- cing their march by detachments to the place of rendezvous must be sufficient to constitute the crime." In qualifying this position they say, "the travel- ling of individuals would perhaps not be sufficient." Now, a solitary individual travelling to any point, with any intent, could not, without a total disre- gard of language, be termed a marching detach- ment. The court, therefore, must have contem- plated several individuals travelling together; and the words being used in reference to the position they were intended to qualify, would seem to indi- cate the distinction between the appearances attend- ing the usual movement of a company of men for ci- vil purposes, and that military movement which might in correct language be denominated "march- ing by detachments."
The court then proceeded to say, "the meeting of particular bodies of men, and their marching from places of partial to a place of general ren- dezvous, would be such an assemblage."
It is obvious from the context, that the court must have intended to state a case which would in itself be unequivocal, because it would have a war- like appearance. The case stated, is that of dis- tinct bodies of men assembling at different places and marching from places of partial to places of ge- neral rendezvous. When this has been done, an as- semblage is produced which would in itself be unequivocal. But when is it done? what is the assem- blage here described? The assemblage formed of the different bodies of partial at a place of general
rendezvous. In describing the mode of coming to this assemblage the civil term "travelling" is drop- ped, and the military term "marching" is employ- ed. If this was intended as a definition of an as- semblage which would amount to levying war, the definition requires an assemblage at a place of ge- neral rendezvous, composed of bodies of men who had previously assembled at places of partial ren- dezvous. But this is not intended as a definition, for clearly if there should be no places of partial rendezvous, if troops should embody in the first instance, in great force for the purpose of subvert- ing the government by violence, the act would be unequivocal, it would have a warlike appearance, and it would, according to the opinion of the su- preme court properly construed, and according to the English authorities, amount to levying war.— But this, though not a definition, is put as an ex- ample; and surely it may be taken as an example. If different bodies of men, in pursuance of a trea- sonable design plainly proved, should assemble in warlike appearance at places of partial rendezvous, and should march from those places to a place of ge- neral rendezvous, it is difficult to conceive how such a transaction could take place without exhibiting the appearance of war, without an obvious display of force. At any rate, a court in stating generally such a military assemblage as would amount to le- vying of war, and having a case before them in which there was no assemblage whatever, cannot reasonably be understood in putting such an exam- ple, to dispense with those appearances of war which seem to be required by the general current of authorities. Certainly they ought not to be so un- derstood when they say in express terms, that "it is more safe as well as more consonant to the prin- ciples of our constitution, that the crime of treason should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases; and that crimes not already within the con- stitutional definition, should receive such punish- ment as the legislature in its wisdom may provide."
After this analysis of the opinion of the supreme court, it will be observed, that the direct question whether an assemblage of men which might be con- strued to amount to a levying of war, must appear in force or in military form, was not in argument or in fact before the court, and does not appear to have been in terms decided? The opinion seems to have been drawn without particularly advert- ing to this question, and therefore upon a transient view of particular expressions, might inspire the idea that a display of force, that appearances of war were not necessary ingredients to constitute the fact of levying war. But upon a more intent and more accurate investigation of this opinion, although the terms force and violence are not employed as des- criptive of the assemblage, such requisites are de- clared to be indispensable as can scarcely exist without the appearance of war and the existence of real force. It is said that war must be levied in fact, that the object must be one which is to be ef- fected by force; that the assemblage must be such as to prove that this is its object, that it must not be an equivocal act, without a warlike appearance, that it must be an open assemblage for the purpose of force. In the course of this opinion, decisions are quoted and approved, which require the employ- ment of force to constitute the crime. It seems ex- tremely difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile these various declarations with the idea that the su- preme court considered a secret unarmed meeting, although it met with a treasonable intent, as an ac- tual levying of war. Without saying that the as- semblage must be in force or in warlike form, they express themselves so as to show that this idea was never discarded, and they use terms which can- not be otherwise satisfied.
The opinion of a single judge certainly weighs as nothing if opposed to that of the supreme court; but if he was one of the judges who assisted in fram- ing that opinion, if while the impression under which it was framed was yet fresh upon his mind, he delivered an opinion on the same testimony, not contradictory to that which had been given by all the judges together, but showing the sense in which he understood the terms that might be differently expounded, it may fairly be said to be in some mea- sure explanatory of the opinion itself.
To the judge before whom the charge against the prisoner at the bar was first brought, the same tes- timony was offered with that which had been exhibi- ted before the supreme court, and he was required to give an opinion in almost the same case. Upon this occasion he said, "war can only be levied by the employment of actual force. Troops must be embodied; men must be assembled in order to levy war." Again he observed, "the fact to be proved in this case is an act of publick notoriety. It must ex- ist in the view of the world or it cannot exist at all. The assembling of forces to levy war is a visible transaction, and numbers must witness it."
It is not easy to doubt what kind of assemblage was in the mind of the judge who used these expres- sions, and it is to be recollected that he had just re- turned from the supreme court, and was speaking on the very facts on which the opinion of that court was delivered.
The same judge in his charge to the grand jury who found the bill, observed, "to constitute the fact of levying war, it is not necessary that hostili- ties shall have actually commenced by engaging the military force of the U. States, or that measures of vi- olence against the government shall have been car- ried into execution. But levying war is a fact in the constitution of which force is an indispensable in- gredient. Any combination to subvert by force the government of the United States, violently to dis- member the union, to compel a change in the ad- ministration, to coerce the repeal or adoption of a general law, is a conspiracy to levy war, and if the conspiracy be carried into effect by the actual em- ployment of force, by the embodying and assem- bling of men for the purpose of executing the trea- sonable design which was previously conceived, it amounts to levying of war. It has been held that arms are not essential to levying of war provided the force assembled be sufficient to attain, or per- haps to justify attempting the object without them." This paragraph is immediately followed by a refer- ence to the opinion of the supreme court.
It requires no commentary upon these words to show, that in the opinion of the judge who uttered them, an assemblage of men which should consti- tute the fact of levying war must be an assemblage in force, and that he so understood the opinion of the supreme court. If in that opinion, there may be found some passages, a want of precision, and indefiniteness of expression, which has occasioned it to be differently understood by different persons, that may well be accounted for when it is recollect-
ed that in the particular case there was no assem- blage whatever.
In expounding that opinion the whole should be taken together, and in reference to the particular case in which it was delivered. It is however not improbable that the misunderstanding has arisen from this circumstance. The court unquestionably did not consider arms as an indispensable requisite to levying war; an assemblage adapted to the ob- ject might be in a condition to effect or to attempt it without them. Nor did the court consider the actual application of the force to the object as, at all times, an indispensable requisite; for an assem- blage might be in a condition to apply force, might be in a state adapted to real war, without having made the actual application of that force. From these positions, which are to be found in the opin- ion, it may have been inferred, it is thought too hastily, that the nature of the assemblage was un- important, and that war might be considered as ac- tually levied by any meeting of men, if a criminal intention can be imputed to them by testimony of any kind whatever.
It has been thought proper to discuss this question at large and to review the opinion of the supreme court, altho' this court would be more disposed to leave the question of fact, whether an overt act of levying war was committed on Blannerhasset's island to the jury under this explanation of the law, and to instruct them, that unless the assemblage on Blan- nerhasset's island was an assemblage in force, was a military assemblage in a condition to make war, it was not a levying of war, and that they could not construe it into an act of war, than to arrest the fur- ther testimony which might be offered to connect the prisoner with that assemblage, or to prove the inten- tion of those who assembled together at that place. This point, however, is not to be understood as de- cided. It will, perhaps, constitute an essential en- quiry in another case.
Before leaving the opinion of the supreme court entirely on the question of the nature of the assem- blage which will constitute an act of levying war, this court cannot forbear to ask, why is an assemblage absolutely required? Is it not to judge in some mea- sure of the end by the proportion which the means bear to the end? Why is it that a single armed in- dividual, entering a boat and sailing down the Ohio, for the avowed purpose of attacking New-Orleans could not be said to levy war? Is it not that he is apparently not in a condition to levy war? If this be so, ought not the assemblage to furnish some evi- dence of its intention and capacity to levy war be- fore it can amount to levying war? And ought not the supreme court, when speaking of an as- semblage for the purpose of effecting a treasonable object by force, be understood to indicate an assem- blage exhibiting the appearance of force?
The definition of the attorney for the United States, deserves notice in this respect. It is "when there is an assemblage of men, convened for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable object, which force is meant to be employed before the as- semblage disperses, this is treason."
To read this definition without advert- ing to the argument, we should infer that the assemblage was itself to effect by force the treasonable object, not to join itself to some other bodies of men and then to effect the object by their combined force. Under this construction it would be expected the appear- ance of the assemblage would bear some proportion to the object and would indicate the intention. At any rate that it would be an assemblage in force. This construction is most certainly not that which was intended, but it serves to show that general phrases must always be understood in reference to the general principles of law.
(To be Continued.)
THE PUBLICK LEDGER.
WEDNESDAY EVENING, SEPT. 9, 1807.
We have occupied a very large proportion of our paper this day, with the opinion of the Chief Justice, on points of law submitted by the counsel of Col. Burr; the particular points will be found by referring to our paper of Friday last, in the second column of the second page.
The limits of our paper do not permit us to notice the particulars of the capture of the pirate which boarded the Othello; indeed they are without inte- rest. As we expected, the whole turns out to be the work of a few desperate villains, for which neither the government or the publick agents of any nation can or ought to be responsible. The master of this privateer or pirate, whose name is Begon , calls his ves- sel the Massena , he is a Frenchman and so are all his crew, chiefly deserters from the French ships Patriot and Eole ; yet the Aurora says—
"It appears after all, that the late piratical enter- prize in the Chesapeake Bay, on the ship Othello , is a brilliant achievement of our good friends the Bri- tish—but no doubt the British prints will say it was "unauthorized."
It is to be regretted that attempts to impose on the publick should be made by the editors of papers, when a fair statement of facts are so much more de- sirable. We were led into a mistake, from what was first published, in supposing the pirate had boarded the Othello in sight of the Patriot ; this was not the case, and we correct the error with pleasure.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT AT RICHMOND.— We have been compelled to omit the proceedings of the court, in the cases of Burr and others, and shall present only a very short sketch of them. With re- spect to Burr, the court will immediately proceed to his trial on the misdemeanour.
The court having decided that the assemblage of persons on Blannerhasset's island, as before noticed, did not amount to an overt act of levying war against the United States, the attorney-general has entered a nolle prosequi , as to Blannerhasset and Smith, on the indictments against them for treason. Jonathan Dayton, by his counsel appeared in court, when the attorney-general entered a nolle prosequi on the indictment against him for treason. These three last named persons, will be proceeded against as soon as col. Burr's trial is over.
BRITISH IN SOUTH AMERICA.—The account of the re-capture of Monte Video, by the Spaniards, was one of those tales, which we had no confidence in. By later and authentic advices published in this day's paper, it will be seen that general Crawford had arrived, and that a formidable force was pro- ceeding against Buenos Ayres. The British force at the date of the last advices from that quarter, was about 10,000 men, and by an arrival at Phila- delphia, we notice that general Stewart, with 19 transports, left Madeira the 14th June, for the River of Plate; the troops under general Stewart, will in- crease the British force to about 13,000 men, besides the naval forces. From this formidable armament it may be inferred that the British are intent upon the conquest of that country.
PHILADELPHIA, September 2.
Hostile disposition of the Northern Indians.
We are informed that the governors of Ohio, Mi- chigan, and Indiana, are immediately to be called on by the government of the United States, to put forth the requisite militia to check the hostile spirit, which is manifested by the Northern Tribes, (sup- posed to have been instigated by the English traders among them) and if necessary, to chastise the sav- ages.
NEW YORK, September 1.
FROM MONTE VIDEO.
By the ship Whampoa , in 69 days from Monte Video, the editors of the New York Gazette have received a file of the "Southern Star," (published at that place) down to the 21st of June.
Admiral Murroy's squadron, with 6000 troops un- der gen. Crawford, had arrived at that place—but another fleet expected from England had not yet ar- rived.
A victory was obtained over the Spanish army of 2000 men under the command of col. Elis, strongly posted at St. Pedro.
The official dispatch from gen. Whitelock, dated June 10, states that "the enemy had his front and flanks strongly secured by a deep and marshy river, and defended by six pieces of cannon. The difficul- ties of the position were however overcome by the bravery of the British troops, consisting only of 950 men; and they completely succeeded in routing the enemy, with the loss of 120 killed, and a great many wounded, leaving in our possession a stand- ard, 6 pieces of ordnance, near 300 stand of arms, with a quantity of ammunition and ordnance stores, and 105 prisoners. The 2d in command (lieut. col. Juan Baptiste Raymond), one major, two captains and two lieutenants, are among the prisoners. The British in this affair had only 2 men killed, and 23 wounded. But we are sorry to add, that major Gardner and assistant surgeon Turner were slightly wounded by the explosion of an ammunition cart, after the action was over."
The British troops were commanded by col. Pack. So far from the intelligence of Monte Video being retaken by the Spaniards being true, captain Bourne informs that a British fleet which had arrived with a reinforcement of five thousand men from the Cape of Good Hope, under ad- miral Murray, sailed the 21st of June from Monte Video for Buenos Ayres, for the purpose of re-tak- ing that place. It was expected that Buenos Ayres would fall an easy prey to the English. The whole force gone against that place was 10,000 men, un- der the command of gen. Whitelock.
ALBANY, August 28.
After a considerable number of this day's paper had been printed, we were favoured by the polite- ness of a gentleman, with the following important article, and stop the press to insert it.
Extract of a letter from Geneva, to a gentleman in this city, dated August 28.
We have just received intelligence, that the Indi- ans have been committing depredations in the neigh- bourhood of Detroit, and massacred several of the inhabitants; and that the people in the vicinity were flying to the fort for protection.
This intelligence came in a letter from judge Por- ter, who resides on the Niagara river, to his bro- ther col. Porter, in Canandagua. If this be the case, (as I am apprehensive it is) our company will have to march sooner than they expected.
FALMOUTH, (ENG.) July 8.
Arrived, the American sloop of war Wasp , capt. Smith, from Norfolk in 28 days passage; a Mr. Purvis, formerly Secretary of Legation from the United States, is on board her, charged with dispatches for the American ministers near the British government; she is a remarkable fine vessel, and carries eighteen forty-two pounders.— On the 6th inst. a few leagues to the westward of Scilly, spoke the homeward bound Medi- terranean fleet, about 50 sail, all well; the fri- gate having lost six of her crew on her passage, she is ordered into quarantine.
POSTPONED SALE.
On Wednesday, the 16th inst. at the house of Mrs. Helen Read, at XI o'Clock, Will be Sold for ready money, by order of the Executrix.
All the Personal ESTATE, of the late Dr. John K. Read, sen. deceased—consisting of Five Negroes, sundry Household Fur- niture, and one Still. Francis Smith, V. M.
Sept 7.
tds
One Hundred Dollars Reward.
RAN-AWAY from the Subscriber, living in Nansemond, within one mile of Scott's Landing, a negro man named MO- SES, who since he has run off has changed his name to TOM SCOTT, having bought a free negro's pass registered in the Court of Isle of Wight county, by the name of Tom Scott; he is about 26 years of age, black complexion, about 5 feet 6 or 7 inches high, rather stout and well made—he has a plea- sing countenance when spoken to, and lips in his common talk, but much more so when angry or talks fast; he was brought up on a farm, but as he has been run-away for these four years, he has been employed on board of different vessels, and now has the appearance of a sailor. I understand he was at Norfolk on the 30th last month as a sailor in one of the Baltimore Packets; he has a scar on his right wrist, occa- sioned by a burn, and a small knot between the elbow and shoulder of the right arm, occasioned by a whip.
As he purchased the free negro's pass as above mention- ed, it will appear on examining the pass and the fellow, that there is no mark as mentioned on this fellow in the pass un- less they are intended.—I forewarn all masters of vessels from carrying the said negro man out of the state, and all persons from harbouring him. I will give the above reward to any person that will deliver him to me, or secure him in Norfolk County Jail.
Ann Carstarphen.
Nansemond County, Aug. 24.
90

NOTICE. The business hitherto transacted by John C. Niemeyer, will, from this day, be continued under the firm of Niemeyer and Von Kapff. All those indebted to John C. Niemeyer are requested to make payment, and those having claims against him will please present them for payment to Niemeyer & Von Kapff. Who offer for Sale, an extensive assortment of GERMAN LINENS. September 2. 3
FAMILY FLOUR, of a superior quality in half barrels, for sale by J. & W. Southgate. September 2. 3w  FOR SALE, Situated in an agreeable and handsome situation in Hampton, on the Main-street, the premises owned and lately occupied by the subscriber, consisting of A DWELLING-HOUSE, three stories high, the lower part finished for a store, with out-houses, all in complete order, with a large lot and good garden. A liberal credit will be given, and bond and security required. The House is at present well furnished, and will be rented by the month if not sold, with the furniture. For terms apply to Mr. William Proby, next door to the premises, or to James Gilbert. Hampton, Sept. 2. tf
LINENS, HOSIERY, &c. 2 cases 4-4 Irish Linens; 1 do. 5-4 do. Sheetings, 1 do. 7-8 do. Long Lawns; 2 do. Cotton Hosiery, 1 do. 4-4 gold edged undressed Cambric Muslins, for gentlemen's neck cloths, An assortment of Broad Cloths, &c. just received and for sale by Wood & Hastings. August 17. tf  20 hogsheads Carraccas COCOA, of superior quality, for sale on our wharf. C. & F. Whittle. August 17. 3
FOR RENT, (until the first of November.) A pleasant House and Garden, now occupied by the Subscriber, situated near Capt. Keele's, a remarkable pleasant retreat during the warm season. Apply to Messrs. Richard Bowden, & Co. or James Tarlington. August 31. 3t
SAMUEL COLEMAN, Opposite the Market westward, has a very extensive assortment of ENGLISH KID SHOES, in all the variety of that article, of the latest (legal) importation, with the necessary embellishments. An extensive assortment of Boston SHOES of a great variety of kinds. Also, a good assortment of New-York SHOES, of which kind particularly, he is enabled to sell the best Shoes in town—since no other person here, that he knows of, is largely supplied from that place; the superiority of the workmanship of New-York is well known to many people, and will be known by all who try it. A considerable assortment of British, New-York, Philadelphia, and Boston BOOTS—and is in expectation of a large quantity of Shoes and Boots of all descriptions from New-York, which will be sold at the prices of that place, wholesale and retail. He has just received, New-York SHOES and BOOTS, and an assortment of Mr. Vernon's elegant Baltimore Boots at least equal, it is believed, to any made on this continent. Being anxious to sell off his Boston Shoes and Boots, he will take in retail for Men's finest Shoes 10s. 6d. and in the same proportion for others—Swarrows Boots at 6 dollars—He will also reduce the price of English Kid Shoes with heels, to 10s. 6d.; without heels to 9s. He has for Sale, a considerable quantity of India COTTONS, very low for Cash. May 27. 2awtf
400 barrels Tar, 20,000 pipe Staves, 50,000 White Oak Hoghead do. do. 50,000 Red do. do. do. 100 Barrels Flour—For Sale by L. Mansfield. Portsmouth, May 8. tf
FOR SALE, 50,000 white oak hoghead draw Staves 50,000 red do. do. 50,000 rough do. do. 20,000 Cypress Pales 2,000 Cedar and Chinquapin Posts 50,000 building Shingles. Proby, Harman & Co. March 2. tf
NOTICE. The partnership of B. Nottingham, & Co. is this day dissolved by mutual consent; all those who have demands against the said firm are requested to exhibit them, and all those indebted to said concern are requested to make payment to B. Nottingham, who is fully authorized to settle the same. B. Nottingham, & Co. N. B. The business in future will be carried on by B. Nottingham. July 1. tf
FOR SALE at my Brew-House, Strong, Table, and ship BEER, by the hoghead, barrel, and half barrel—and a constant supply of bottled PORTER in packages and by the dozen. And in Store, Wines, Liquors, and Groceries, wholesale and retail. Joseph Hayes. Feb. 18. tf
Forty Dollars Reward, Will be given to any person who will apprehend and deliver to Warren Ashley, Esq. of Norfolk, or the subscriber, two runaway Negro Men, named JEMMY and JEFFERY, purchased a short time since as part of the Glebe property in Hampton. Jemmy is about 22 years of age, very strong and well built, and about 5 feet 9 inches high—Jeffery is at least 6 feet high, about 21 years of age, very black and likely. These Negroes absconded from the subscriber with a wish to be sold in Norfolk or Hampton, where they have been seen frequently since their having quitted my plantation. All captains and masters of vessels are hereby cautioned against receiving them on board, or employing them in any way. Henry Heffernan. Glebe, Middlesex, July 4. tf
Cash will be given for a few tons of Old Copper, Brass, and Pewter, for the use of my Foundry. Leven Dorsey. Who offers for Sale, 50 Casks CUT-NAILS, assorted, at his Nail-Factory, on Town Point. July 27. tf
For Sale by the Subscribers, 100 tierces RICE, 25 casks Claret Wine, 200 boxes Spanish Segars, D. R. Waddey, & Co. August 19. tf
THE SUBSCRIBER Has removed to the brick store at the head of Campbell's wharf, fronting said wharf and Wide Water-street, where he offers at wholesale or retail his assortment of Groceries and Ship Chandlery, Among which are 14 hogsheads Muscovado SUGAR, 1 do. and 6 barrels loaf do. 6 do. Antigua, Jamaica, and Grenada Rum, 3 pipes French Brandy, 2 hds. and 6 bbls Rye Whiskey, 4 barrels Apple Brandy, 1 do. Peach do. 10 bags Coffee, Imperial, Hyson, Young Hyson, and Souchong Teas, Pepper, Pimento, and Nutmegs, Madeira, Sherry, and Port Wines, London and Philadelphia Porter, English Cheese, B. Iron and Castings, Nail and Spike Rods, German Steel, Powder and Shot, Tar, Pitch & Turpentine, Paints and Oil, black and bright Varnish, Canvas and Cordage, Nails and Spikes. Also just received, 20 boxes Lemons, 12 half bbls. Beef Tongues, 20 kegs Tongues and Sounds, 40 kegs and 2 bbls. Salmon, 5 bbls. Mackerel, 15 cases Sallad Oil, 1 cask Currants, 10 boxes Olives, Capers and Anchovies, 6 dozen bottles Cayenne Pepper, 3 do. do. Pickled Peppers, 30 boxes Soap, 20 boxes Candles, 50 barrels Alexandria superfine and fine Flour. John D. Haldane. July 31. tf
200 boxes Mould CANDLES, 30 half boxes brown Soap, 10 boxes white do. 60 bags Coffee, 5 tierces do. prime green, 4 hogsheads and 10 barrels loaf Sugar, 12 do. Muscovado do. 10 quarter casks old Sherry Wine, 2 bbls old L. P. Madeira do. 3 hds. Red Port, 50 do. remaining Molasses, 15 crates well assorted Queen's Ware, Country Rum and Gin in hds and pipes—For Sale by Phinehas Dana. June 8. tf
THE SUBSCRIBER Being authorised by the Portuguese Consul General, to furnish the necessary certificates for property, and countersign Bill's Health for vessels going to Portugal or Madeira, advises those whom it may concern, that he will grant such on application at his office, No. 21, Main-street. Robert Dickson. June 15. tf
NOTICE. On Saturday the 11th instant, was stolen or taken by mistake from Southgate and Dickson's wharf, a quarter cask of PORT WINE, marked and numbered on the head No. 1551, Baltimore, Federal Jack, Port, 30 gallons, Delogier, November 4. 1809. Twenty Dollars will be given to the informer if the Wine has been stolen and recovered, or thanks to any person who may have received it through mistake, by applying to William Dickson. July 15. tf
FOR RENT, for one or more years, The Dwelling-House and Wharf in the occupancy of the subscriber, in that part of the town of Portsmouth called Gosport. William Wilkinson. July 29. tf
The Subscriber has for Sale, 136 hhs. 14 tierces and 47 barrels Muscovado SUGAR, And a few barrels of COFFEE of the first quality, which will be sold on liberal terms Henry Hastie. July 10. tf
NOTES OF HAND, according to the new form established by the Directors of the Office of Discount and Deposit of the Bank of the United States, for sale at this office. ALSO, NOTES for the Virginia Bank; Checks; Bills of Lading, and of Exchange, printed on paper of superior quality; and Shipping Articles on large paper, and approved form. LEDGER OFFICE. Spring and Summer GOODS. The subscribers have received by the ship Hunter, from London, their supply of Fancy and fashionable GOODS, which they offer on reasonable terms for cash, or approved notes. Mackinder & White. May 1. tf
FOR RENT, (and possession given immediately,) MY WHARF and WARE-HOUSES, at present occupied by Mr. John Moore, and others—It is the best situation in the Borough for a Lumber Yard, and will be let low to a good tenant. Also to Lease, That convenient Lot of LAND, on Commerce and Little-Water-Street. For terms apply to James Tucker. May 20. tf
This day landing from on board the schooner Huldah and Anna, capt. Fitzhugh, from Philadelphia, 8 hogsheads refined SUGAR, 10 pipes Cogniac Brandy, 15 quarter casks Imperial Tea, latest importations, 10 hogsheads and 10 barrels Rye Whiskey, 6 pipes and 4 barrels American Gin, 30 boxes Yellow Soap, 9 boxes China—For Sale by Jennings & Roddey. July 9. tf
THE SUBSCRIBER Has lately received per the ship Dumfries, from Liverpool, and just opened for sale in the Cordage and Leather Store of Mess. Wm. Plume, & Co. A general assortment of SHIP CHANDLERY, Among which are the following articles of superior quality, viz. British CANVAS, from No. 1 to 8, Paints in kegs and pots, ground in oil, Powdered Venetian Red, Putty in bladders, refined Salt Petre, Green Copperas, Spikes, Nails, &c. of all sizes, Stock, Pad, and Stepped Draw Locks, Charts, Compasses, Quadrants, and Spy Glasses, Seamen's Journals, Paper, Ink Powders, Quills, &c. Sheathing Paper, Velvet Corks, Cork Wood, Shot in bags, Pig and Sheet Lead, Copper Scales and Weights, Tea and Camp Kettles, Spades and Shovels, Butchers' Cleavers, &c. Mill, Whip, X Cut, Hand, Pannel, and Mitre Saws, Carpenters' Tools of every description.—All of which will be disposed of on moderate terms for cash or approved paper. J. Moran. June 8. tf
Liverpool and Cadiz SALT, loose and in Sacks—Also, 150 crates Queen's Ware, and China of superior quality—For Sale by William Pennock. August 26. tf
At Private Sale, BY S. MARKS, JUN. No. 31, Water-street, corner of Commerce-street, 30 hogsheads Sugar, 10 do. Molasses, 10 do. W. I. Rum, 2 do. Shrub, 9 pipes Cogniac Brandy, 10 do. country Gin, 100 bags Green Coffee, 200 boxes mould Candles, Teas, manufactured Tobacco, and Lard. July 13. tf
FOR RENT or Lease, The HOUSE now in the occupancy of Mess. Caton and Veale, fronting the Market; it contains an excellent Cellar, a Dry Good Store, and two Rooms below stairs, and three above; a Kitchen may be had with the house. Apply to Mess. Caton & Veale, or to Robert Taylor. May 4. tf  At the Old CUT-NAIL Manufactory, corner of Main and Church-streets, the subscriber keeps on hand constant supply, and can furnish at short notice, any quantity of Nails, Flooring Brads and Sprigs, At the following reduced prices, by the Keg—for cash only, viz. 8, 10, 12, and 20d Nails and Brads at 7 1/2 d. lb. 6d. Nails, 9 1/2 d. 4d. do. 2s. 9d. m. or 11d. 3d. do. 2s. 3d. or 12d. Sheathing, 7 1/2 d. 1d. Sprigs, 4s. 6d. per M. 6d. do. 2s. 9d. 2d. and 3d. do. 2s. 3d. He offers also for cash only— HOOP IRON ASSORTED. Thos. Seaman. May 25. tf
RICHARD JEFFERY, & Co. Have just received from London by the last arrival a very full assortment of DRUGS & MEDICINES, Of the best quality, which are offered for Sale on moderate terms at No. 66, Main-Street—Attention has been paid to procure every article of the most genuine kind; and it is intended to have the assortment regularly furnished from the best markets; among a great variety are now offered the following: Aloes, Allum, Ether of Vitriol, Antimony, Aquia Fortis, Pale, red, and yellow Bark, of superior quality, Borax, Camphor, Cantharides, Cochineal, Cream of Tartar, Camomile Flowers, Cinnamon, Cocculin, Calomel, Flowers of Benzoin, Ginger, Glauber Salts, Ipsom do. Rochelle do. Gums Ammoniac, Assafoetida, Benzoin, Guaiacum, Gamboge, Myrrh, Kino, Scammony, and Arabic, Lint, Liquorice refined, Manna Flake, in sorts, Magnesia in small and large squares, Musk, Nutmegs, Opium, Jalap, Rhubarb, Ipecacuanha, Tartar Emetic, Balsams Capivi, Tolu, Peru, Spirit of Lavender, Spermaceti, Sugar of Lead, Letharge of Gold, Saltpetre refined, White Wax, Verdigris, Essences of Bergamot, Lemons, and Lavender, Quicksilver, Lunar Caustick, Sal Ammoniac.
In addition to the above importation from London, they have from Liverpool a variety of GLASS WARE, suitable to Apothecaries—PHIALS and GALLI POTTS by the crate or in smaller quantities—Nooth's MACHINES, URINALS, BREAST PIPES, SHELLS, &c. MEDICINE CHESTS for ships and family use, and orders from the country executed with care and dispatch. October 1. tf 216
An extensive, useful, and elegant variety of GOODS, Lately imported by the Subscriber, and on hand from former importations and consignments, which he offers for Sale on accommodating terms for approved paper, amongst which are GERMAN LINEN, &c. 22 bales coarse German Linen, 3 boxes 100 pieces each do. Rolls entitled to drawback, 3 boxes white and brown Platiilas, 1 do. fine Dowlass, 2 do. Rouans, 1 do. quadruple Silesias, 2 do. Table Cloths and Table Linen, 5 bales Ruffia Sheeting, 1 case of 140 pieces German Lace and Edging, 1 do. fine Thread Hose, 2 do. coarse do. 1 do. extra fine Shirt Linen, 1 do. fine Lenoes and Bed Bunts two yards wide, 3 do. containing 450 pieces Paper Hangings, 8 do. Tumblers, Decanters, and Wine Glasses, 80 do. Window Glass, 100 do. short Pipes, 140 do. Havana Segars from 12 to 20 dollars per box, 11,000 best Coffee Bags, 4000 cheep Gunny Bags, 300 dozen empty Bottles, 200 wt. brafts and iron nealed bottling Wire, 800 do. Glue. ALSO, 3 pair large and very elegant gilt framed Looking Glasses; seine, sewing, and Apothecary's Twine; Scarlet Plush for saddles; a great variety of toilet Glases; dreffing and shaving Cases; Mufical Instruments and Mufick; Chessmen and Dice; Cutlery; Jewellery and fine Lace; velvet Ribbons; Flannels Sheethings; Waffle Irons and Coffee Toasters; Liquor Cafes; Oil Cloth, &c. &c. John C. Niemeyer. July 17. tf
VIRGINIA, to wit: At a Chancery District Court, held at the former capitol in the city of Williamsburg, the 28th day of April, 1807, Josiah Riddick, plff. } against Michael and John Wallace, and Barnet Pulliam, defts. } The defendant, Barnet Pulliam, not having entered his appearance and given security according to the act of assembly and the rules of this court, and it appearing to the satisfaction of the court that he is not an inhabitant of this country; on the motion of the plaintiff, by his counsel, It is ordered , that the said defendant do appear here on the first day of next term, and answer the bill of the plaintiff, and that a copy of this order be forthwith inserted in one of the newspapers published in the borough of Norfolk, for two months successively, and posted at the front door of the former capitol in this city. A copy. Anthony Robinson, C. C. May 18. 2m.
Superfine Pilot Bread and Crackers, made from new Flour, for sale by the subscriber at his Bake Houses on Town Point and Commerce-Street. Stephen Harris. August 19. tf
The Subscriber has for Sale, 400 barrels superfine FLOUR, 2500 bushels Corn, and 150 barrels Pork, good quality. Just received, 50 boxes fresh Lisbon LEMONS. GEORGE WILSON, No. 9, Market's wharf. July 20. tf  We want to Purchase, A few Shares of STOCK in the Virginia Bank. Campbell & Wheeler. May 22. tf  To RENT, That commodious TAVERN oppo- site the Borough Court-House, at present occupied by Mr. Thomas Holliday, and possession given the 15th of next month. Also for Lease, That vacant LOT on Commerce and Little Water-Str. etc. For terms apply to James Tucker. July 22. tf
NOTICE. The assignees of the estate of Gilbert Robertson, and of the estate of James Brown, insolvent debtors, give notice pursuant to the act entitled "An act for giving relief in cases of insolvency," to the creditors of the said insolvent debtors, that on the first day of October next, from the hours of ten to one o'clock of that day, at the court-house of Alexander V. Foster, in Washington street, in the City of New-York, the assignees will proceed to make a division of all the money, which shall have come to their hands of such estates—Dated this 24th day of June, 1807. James M'Evans, Alex. V. Pfister, John Jones, jun. } Assignees. 3m
To Elizabeth Plume, one of the devisees of William Plume, Esq. deceased; Fortesque Whittle, sole administrator of William Davies and Mary his wife, and Theo. Armistead. In a certain suit in equity, instituted in the Superior Court of law and equity, for the district of Edenton, by Wills Cowper, against the President and Directors of the Dismal Swamp Canal Company, William Plume, deceased, William Davies, deceased, and Theo. Armistead, certain proceedings were had in the said Court, and at March term last, at a Superior Court of law and equity, held at Edenton, in the county of Chowan, in the first circuit of the Superior Courts of law and equity for the State of North-Carolina, (to which court all suits in equity, &c. lately depending in the Superior Court of the district of Edenton, where the defendants resided out of the state, were by law transferred) it being suggested by the plaintiff's counsel that William Plume and William Davies were dead, the court directed that the plaintiff have leave to bring in the representatives, executors, or administrators of the said William Plume, William Davies, by scire facias or otherwise, to defend the said suit if they think proper, and that Theo. Armistead answer agreeable to the following order of the said court. Therefore, Notice is hereby given to you by the subscriber, attorney of the plaintiff and complainant, that the following order was made at March term, 1807, of the said court, that you the said Elizabeth Plume, Fortesque Whittle, and Mr. Davis his wife, may appear and make defence to the said suit at Edenton on the first Monday after the fourth Monday in September next, and you the said Theo. Armistead answer pursuant to the said order. J. Hamilton, Attorney for Complainant. Near Edenton, 30th June, 1807.
Wills Cowper, against The President and Directors of the Dismal Swamp Canal Co. et al. State of North Carolina, } first circuit, in equity, } Chowan County. } March Term, 1807. In this cause it is ordered, that the rule against the defendant the said Armistead be made absolute, unless he file his answer in two months—The death of Davies and Plume being suggested by the complainant, it is ordered that he have leave to serve the executors, administrators, or representatives of the said Davies and Plume, with process of scire facias, to bring them in, and by such means scire facias or otherwise, as he may think proper. A true Copy, (Signed) J. B. Blount, C. & M. C. C.
For Sale by the Subscriber, 70 crates EARTHENWARE, 12 casks Glassware, 30 groce Bottles, 100 boxes 8 by 10, 4 1/2 do. 10 by 12 Window Glass, 90 pieces twilled Sacking, 5 boxes Pipes, 6 hogsheads Philadelphia Loaf Sugar, 6 pipes Cogniac Brandy, 1 pipe Madeira Wine, 1 9 do. Sicily Wine, 12 hogsheads Whiskey, 8000 bushels coarse Liverpool Salt, 5000 do. fine do. 100 sacks fine do. do. 50 hogsheads Richmond, 100 do. Petersburg Tobacco, 15 bales Cotton, 3780 bushels Corn. Alexander Maclure. July 10. tf
300 dozen empty BOTTLES, will be sold low if applied for immediately. John C. Niemeyer. ALSO, An invoice of fine Linen GAUZE, for Musquito Curtains. May 27. tf
FOR RENT, The Store and Dwelling-House, on Market-Square, at present occupied by Mess. Quemper & Duon. Apply to William B. Lamb. WANTED, A few Shares Virginia Bank Stock. April 18. tf
FOR RENT, (And immediate possession given) That commodious Fire-Proof WARE- HOUSE, on the North side of Wide Water-street, a few doors West of Commerce-street, at present in the occupancy of Mr. R. Gibson. David Patterson. January 16. tf
NOTICE. The Street Commissioners will allow to all Craft from the rivers and shores of the bay, One Dollar per ton for every ton of good round paving Stone, which may be delivered upon their wharf in Norfolk, between this time and the 20th June next. May 11. tf
NORFOLK: PUBLISHED THREE TIMES A-WEEK, BY WILLIAM DAVIS, FOR THE PROPRIETOR, OPPOSITE THE EXCHANGE COFFEE HOUSE Price Six Dollars yearly, in advance.