Norfolk gazette and publick ledger (Norfolk [Va.]), 1807-02-25 00:00:00

STATE PAPERS
RELATIVE TO THE LATE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND.
No. VII.
Downing-Street, 21st April, 1806.
SIR,
I received ere yesterday your excellency's dispatch of the 26th instant.
After perusing and re-perusing it with all possible attention, I find in it no argument sufficient to induce our government to change the opinion it has already emitted, viz. that all negotiation in which Russia should not be comprised as a party, is absolutely inadmissible.
We wish for peace—but we can wish for nothing that could be derogatory to the dignity of our sovereign, or to the honour or interests of the nation.
Now if we treated without Russia, considering the close ties which unite us to that power, we should think ourselves exposed to the reproach of having been wanting to that scrupulous fidelity in our engagements, which we pride ourselves upon; whereas on the other hand, and persisting in our demand that Russia be admitted, we think we do nothing contrary to the principle of equality which we both claim.
When the three plenipotentiaries shall be together, how can it be thought that any thing could be carried by the plurality of votes? or even that such an assembly bore any resemblance to a general congress: There would really exist only two parties: on one side, France; on the other, the two allied Powers.
Moreover, if so many advantages be seen in an affair of this nature in being two against one, there would be no objection to any of your allies intervening whom you might judge proper.
Sincerely desiring to avoid useless disputes, I do not chuse to enter into the discussion of the consequences which your excellency draws from the events of the last campaign.
I shall only observe by the bye that I do not see for reason an alliance is to be looked upon as null with regard to the powers who hold to it, because one of those who compose it has been detached from it by the misfortunes of war.
As to the overture which Russia has made to you, we know nothing about it; but whatever be its nature, we are persuaded that that court will never behave so as to compromise the known loyalty of its character, or to weaken the ties of friendship and confidence which subsist between it and England.
To return to the point, your excellency says that in the proposed negotiation, you see only three possible forms of discussion, the first appears inadmissible to you.
From what I have had the honour of writing to you, you must judge, Sir, that the third is incompatible both with our fundamental ideas of justice and honour, and with our perception of the interest of our country. The second is perhaps not bad in its principle; but besides the delays it would occasion, it would hardly be practicable in the present conjuncture.
It is then with great regret that I must freely declare to your excellency, that I see no hope of peace at this moment, unless on your side of the water they be disposed to treat in the form which we have proposed.
I think it necessary to add that this form is essential to us not only from the reasons which I have had the honour to set forth to your excellency, but in as much as any other might give rise to suspicions that you really entertained the chimerical project with which you are reproached (wrongfully as I love to believe) of excluding us from all relation with the powers of the continent of Europe; and even as such an idea is less revolting for us than it ought to be and that it is in reality. It is not to a minister so enlightened as your excellency that it can be necessary to declare that England can never consent to an exclusion which would degrade her from the rank she has hitherto held, and which she thinks she shall always be able to hold among the nations of the world.
The thing in fine is reduced to a single point:—Will you treat conjointly with Russia? Yes. Will you have us treat separately? No.
Although we have not succeeded in the grand object which we proposed to ourselves, both governments have reason to congratulate themselves upon the politeness and frankness which have characterised the discussion of their differences; and I owe you upon my particular account, Sir, thanks for the obliging manner in which you express yourself concerning me.
I beg you to accept the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.
I have the honour to be, Your excellency's Most humble and most obedient servant. C. J. Fox.
No. VIII.
Paris, 2d June, 1806.
I have laid before the emperor the last letter which your excellency did me the honour to write to me. I cannot but repeat to you, by his orders, that to require of France to treat with you upon the principle of your alliance with Russia, is to wish to reduce us to a forced form of discussion, and to suppose us in such an abject state as we have never been in. No power must ever flatter herself to impose upon France either conditions of peace or mode of negotiation contrary to custom. To exact either of these points equally affects the French character, and I do not hesitate to assert that to triumph in this respect over all our repugnance, it would not be too much for an English army to have invaded Belgium and to be on the eve
of penetrating into Picardy by the mouths of the Somme.
I must again repeat to you Sir, that his majesty heartily wishes for peace, and why should I not add what we might have said, nay what we have really said at every period when the negotiations were broken off? that the prolongation of the war has never been prejudicial to French greatness, and that in time of peace a great state can make use of its strength only to maintain itself and to preserve such as they are, its relations with its neighbours.
France does not dispute your right of choosing and preserving your friends; in war, she has not the choice of her enemies, and she must fight them united or separate, according as it suits them to concert together for the purpose of accomplishing their wishes of aggression and resistance, and to form alliances so little conformable to the true policy of their country, that the first clause of these alliances has ever been to keep them secret.
Because we wish to follow in this circumstance the form of negotiation which has been in use at all times and in all countries, you thence conclude that we do not wish you to have connections upon the Continent. I do not think we have ever given cause for such an induction. It does not depend upon us to prevent any government from connecting itself with you, and we cannot wish for either what is unjust, or what is absurd; but it is a different thing that you should form connections at your option, and that we should co-operate and assist you in contracting them. Now to consent to treat upon the principles of your alliances and to admit them into the discussion of the direct and immediate interests which divide us, is more than to suffer and acknowledge them; it is in some measure consecrating and guaranteeing them. I have already observed to you, Sir, that we cannot yield in this point, because principle is for us.
However, that no room may henceforth be left for any misapprehension, I think it my duty to propose to you, 1st, to negotiate in the same preliminary forms which were adopted under the ministry of the marquis of Rockingham in 1782, and which were not so happily renewed for the negotiations of Lisle, but which were fully executed in the negotiation which preceded the treaty of Amiens; 2d, to establish for bases two fundamental principles, the first which I draw from your letter of the 27th March, viz. "that the two states shall have for their object that the peace be honourable to both for them and their respective allies, at the same time that this peace shall be of a nature to secure, as much as in their power, the future repose of Europe." The second principle shall be an acknowledgment in favour of both powers of all right of intervention and guarantee for continental affairs and for maritime affairs. Not only it is not repugnant to his majesty to make such an avowal, but he even loves to establish it as a principle, and in thus exposing to you his real intentions, I think I have given you a decisive proof of his pacific dispositions. His majesty persuades himself at the same time, that in preventing for ever in this respect all subject of complaint, uneasiness and declamation, he has done, upon a point which essentially interests the good of humanity, his duty as a man and as a sovereign.
It would be, Sir, with regret that I should see a discussion ended which began under such good presages. I should, however, have, upon losing a hope which is very dear to me, the consolation of thinking that the wrong of having made it vanish cannot be imputed to France, since she only demands and wishes for what is reasonable and just.
Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.
Signed, CH. M. TALLEYRAND, Prince of Benevento.
No. IX.
Downing Street, 18th June, 1806.
SIR,
I received, two days ago, your excellency's dispatch of the 2d of this month.
I cannot conceive how, in treating with Russia and us conjointly, you have to acknowledge the principle of the alliance between her and us. At most you only acknowledge the fact.
Still less can I divine how this manner of treating supposes you to be in any abject state whatever. We by no means pretend to impose upon France either the conditions of peace or a mode of negotiation contrary to custom. In 1782, a period which your excellency cites yourself in your dispatch, we did not think ourselves in an abject state: however, when Mr. de Vergennes told us that, for the honour of his court, we must treat conjointly with France, Holland and Spain, we adopted, without thinking we in any sense degraded ourselves, the mode which that minister appeared to set such a value upon. Your government sincerely wished for peace; here it is equally desired; and I might, however, say of England what your excellency says of France, that the prolongation of the war has never been prejudicial to her glory or to her greatness; perhaps so indeed to her real permanent interests, but equally so to those of France.
As to the secrecy observed in our treaty of alliance with Russia, your excellency is too enlightened not to acknowledge that, for what concerned the propositions which we should have to make to Prussia and Austria, secrecy was necessary. All that is past. To act in concert for the purpose of procuring in the first place repose to Europe and of preserving it to it after, is the principal, I might even say, the only object of our connections.
After the frank manner in which you discover the intention which has been wrongfully imputed to you, with regard to what concerns our continental connections, there can no longer exist the least doubt upon this essential point; and it would only
be the more grievous that difficulties which regard the form rather than the thing, should make a continuation, which both governments equally wish to put an end to.
Let us come to what your excellency observes. The form which took place in the ministry of the Marquis of Rockingham is the more present to my memory, as I then occupied the same post which his majesty has lately been graciously pleased to honour me with. Let France and England change their positions, and it is precisely the one which I proposed. We then treated with France and her Allies. Let France now treat with us and our Allies.
The basis offered in your second proposition is perfectly conformable to the wishes of our government; well understood that, when we mutually acknowledge our respective rights of intervention and guarantee for the affairs of Europe, we also mutually agreed to refrain from all encroachments on each side on the states more or less powerful which compose it.
I should not less regret than your excellency that this discussion should end. Provided we can act so as not to be reproached with having been wanting in good faith towards an ally who is in every respect deserving of entire confidence on our part, we shall be contented; and the more so as we know that an honourable peace would not be less conformable to the interests of Russia than to those of France and England.
I have the honour to be with the most distinguished consideration, Sir, Your excellency's most humble and most obedient servant, C. J. Fox.
SIR,
I write you only two words to inform you that much I am inclined with the desire to have terminated for some time past the negotiation, possesses the wish to terminate it, you may believe all the wishes of the same man as if I had expressed them myself.
London, 21st June, 1806.
The Lord Yarmouth, to Lord Malmesbury.
No. X.
Paris, 21st June, 1806.
SIR,
The undersigned plenipotentiary of his Britannick majesty, before entering into the negotiation now pending between his sovereign and the court of France, believes it necessary briefly to retrace the circumstances which had led to it. At the same time he thinks it conformable to the character of frankness and sincerity which as plenipotentiary of his Britannick majesty, he is resolved constantly to maintain, to declare as the only basis on which he can consent to negotiate, the principle which France has herself set out with stating, as well as to desire the discussion into which he is ready to enter.
The strong and energetic language in which the French government expressed some months since its desire for peace, whilst it inspired his majesty with a confidence in the real sincerity of the desire of the French court, left him only the regret, that the proposal for treating with her, or separately with her allies, appeared to binder France and England from availing themselves of this happy disposition of their respective governments, as at that time it was impossible for his Britannick majesty, conformably to the good faith which he has always manifested, to treat otherwise than conjointly with his ally the emperor of Russia.
From that time, when his majesty found that circumstances, which it is not necessary to detail in this place, permitted him to treat separately, it was with pleasure that he received the proposal of treating generally upon the basis of the uti possidetis , which ought scrupulously to be observed, excepting in the case of Hanover, which was proposed to be ceded wholly to his majesty.
It is true that this proposal was not made either directly or by the channel of an accredited minister, of its authenticity; however, not the slightest doubt could be entertained.
Independently of the authority it received from the character of the person employed to communicate it, it appeared that it was in perfect unison with what had been already stated. "The emperor desires nothing of what England possesses." (An avowal made at the beginning of the correspondence between the two courts, was a natural prelude to such a proposal.)
This majesty looked on the cession of Hanover as a testimony of the spirit of justice in which the proposal had been conceived, because this electorate, although occupied on a supposed identity of interests and measures, formed, in fact no part of the differences, which brought on the present war; and he has seen, in the principle until then acknowledged as the general basis of negotiation (a basis particularly adapted to the relative situations of the two parties) what he judged to be a proof that France was in like manner sincerely disposed with Great Britain to put an end to an order of things equally prejudicial to the interests of the two countries.
In fact, it appeared to his majesty to be the only principle on which a negotiation could probably be brought to a happy conclusion. Of the nature of the interests of the parties who participated in it, there was but little hope that any other arrangement could be made by any.
Stationed, giving up their respective acquisitions, which on the other hand, the principle of the uti possidetis naturally presented itself as the way to put an end to the unfortunate hostilities between the two empires, both of which are in possession of extensive and important conquests, with regard to territory and influence, France on the continent of Europe and Great Britain in other parts of the world.
To his majesty this truth appeared still more striking, when representing to himself, that both nations enjoyed in their respective acquisitions, a state of possession which would not suffer any important change by the continuation of the war; the superiority of the naval forces of Great Britain being according to all appearances not less firmly established by sea, than that of the armies of France on the continent of Europe.
It is under the impression which these ideas naturally produced that his majesty without hesitation, accepted the proposal for treating on the principle of the uti possidetis , with the reserve due to the connection and concert, which existed with the Emperor of Russia; and as a proof of his sincerity chose the person, by whom this communication has been made, in order to announce the sincerity with which he has proceeded to the basis produced for concluding a treaty.
The undersigned is not disposed to conceal the satisfaction his majesty felt at these happy prospects of quickly restoring the blessings of peace to his subjects upon just and equitable principles, and which are conformable to the honour of his crown, nor the regret to feel when, almost at the very moment when his majesty acceded to the principle offered to his acceptance, was announced, this principle was suddenly abandoned, by a demand of the execution and retention of Sicily; a demand, which hitherto has only been modified by schemes of indemnity for his Sicilian majesty, which appeared equally insufficient and inadmissible.
The demand, so incompatible with the avowed principle on which the two parties treat, was of itself sufficient to put an end to the negotiation; but the anxiety of his majesty the king of Great Britain and Ireland to concur with his ally the emperor of Russia, and to secure to his subjects the blessings of peace, has persuaded him to receive any other new proposals that may be made, for procuring his Sicilian majesty, in exchange for Sicily, a real and satisfactory equivalent, which may obtain the consent of that sovereign.
No satisfactory proposal of this nature having yet been made, the undersigned declares that he cannot consent to treat otherwise than on the principle of the uti possidetis , as originally proposed to his sovereign by the court of France. At the same time he desires that it may be well understood that the adoption of this principle will not prevent him listening to a just and satisfactory indemnity to his Sicilian majesty, for the cession of Sicily, nor accepting any proposal for the exchange of territory between the two high contracting parties, upon just and equitable principles, and such as may tend to the reciprocal advantage of both countries.
The undersigned is well aware that since the uti possidetis has been proposed by the court of France, peace has been concluded between France and the emperor of Russia, and consequently that the relative situation of the two countries is no longer the same; but on the contrary, he must also observe, that since that time France has acquired new advantages by the extensive changes she has made in the constitution of the Germanic empire, an arrangement the scheme of which was submitted by her to the court of Great Britain, as a powerful motive for the immediate conclusion of peace, on the basis of the uti possidetis . If then this principle appeared to be just and reasonable before, it cannot fail, at present, according to her own views of the object, to be still more favourable to her interests than to those of the British empire.
The undersigned thinks proper to remark that, although France may have other views of important acquisitions on the continent of Europe, his majesty the king of Great Britain and Ireland may justly have prospects in the other parts of the world, of infinite importance to the commerce and power of his empire, and consequently that he cannot, either conformably to the interests of his people or the honour of his crown, negotiate on any principle of inferiority, declared or supposed. He can treat on no other footing than the supposition that the continuation of hostilities is equally disadvantageous to both parties. He can see no reason in it to suppose that the conquest which his majesty proposes to keep by the peace, could be wrested from him by war, and the undersigned must suppose that the best proof of the equity of the basis on which he proposed treating, is to be found in the fact that they were proposed by France on the first overture of these communications between the two governments, which led to the mission with which his sovereign charged him conjointly with lord Yarmouth.
Paris, 7th August, 1806. (To be continued.)
Jamaica Rum and Pimento. This day landing on Commerce-street wharf, from on board the brig Sunbeam , capt. Frith, 86 puncheons choice Jamaica RUM, and a few bags Pimento. On hand, Sugar in tierces and bbls. and Coffee in bags, Also, Large Assortment 13 to 1800 weight, of various sorts of Patent Candles, all of which will be sold at a discount. B. Richardson.

[The following debate in the British Parliament, on the motions in each House for a vote of address, in answer to the King's speech, derive their interest from the unequivocal and positive manner in which they contradict the assertions of Talleyrand , that Great Britain was the author of the war between France and Prussia. Certain papers in this country, without any information upon the subject, and against every appearance of reason, boldly advanced the same assertion. It appears that so far from Great Britain being the instigator of that war, that the British Ministry scarcely knew of it, until it had commenced. The conduct of Prussia, and her fate, are well described, and may serve as a warning to other countries, that they must defend themselves in time.]
HOUSE OF LORDS, December 19.
The Earl of Jersey rose, and in a very neat and elegant speech, which recapitulated the heads of his majesty's speech, moved an address in the usual terms.
Lord Somers seconded the address.
Lord Hawkesbury then rose, he said, there were circumstances connected with the speech to which he could not avoid calling the attention of their lordships. It was not his intention to question the king's power to dissolve parliament; but this, like every part of the prerogative, should be exercised with a wholesome and sound discretion. What was there in the state of the country to have justified the late unexpected and premature dissolution of parliament—of a parliament which had only sat four sessions, and which had nearly three years to run? There was, also, his lordship said, another measure of ministers, of which he could not approve; he meant the declaration which had been issued pending the suspension of parliament. The country was not in a condition to judge of that declaration, except it were accompanied by the documents upon which it was founded. If the rupture of the negotiation overwhelmed ministers with any apprehension of difficulty, the fair mode would have been, not to have dissolved parliament, but to have called the existing parliament together, and submitted the whole grounds of the negotiation to it. He would next come to the most material point alluded to in the speech from the throne. With respect to the disorders which had fallen upon Prussia, he agreed with his noble friend, that there could be but one feeling in the house. With respect to the cause of these disorders, it was impossible that any two men could differ. It arose from the narrow policy in which Prussia had entangled herself. He approved as much as any of his majesty's ministers of the proceeding which had been adopted towards Prussia, though he could not account for the delay which took place in communicating with her. No direct communication with Prussia appears to have taken place until hostilities were on the eve of commencing. This was to him a subject of great regret. As to the negotiation, he should say nothing upon it, until the papers were laid before parliament. Whatever difference of opinion might exist as to particular parts of it, with respect to the main question there could be but one general and unanimous sentiment, and that was to concur in giving his majesty every support that should enable him to prosecute the war with vigour and effect. As to the address proposed by his noble friend, it was not his intention to give it any opposition. He assented to it, because it did not pledge their lordships to any of those points which might possibly become the subject of future inquiry.
Lord Grenville said that the first point of discussion selected on this occasion, had excited in him no small degree of astonishment. It was not now necessary for ministers to shew why, at this critical time, the sanction of the country was sought to the measures of government; it was rather for the noble lord, and his friends, to explain, why this harmony should not be obtained between the people and the servants of the crown, when unanimity amongst all ranks appeared to be indispensable to the public security. The noble lord said, that when the measures with respect to Prussia were first submitted to the attention of their lordships, he was most solicitous to express his concurrence with them. But, he says, matters are now differently situated. Prior to the appointment of Lord Morpeth, there was no possibility, by any means, of acting in concert with that power. Not all the dangers with which it was threatened, could produce any union or cordiality. No co-operation could be effected, either to resist France, or for any other purpose. The minister of the court of Berlin remained here until August: it was encouraged to continue, and the means of intercourse and communication were thus anxiously preserved. Toward the conclusion of that month he was peremptorily recalled, and not the smallest disposition was manifested on the part of Prussia to unite with Britain against the common enemy. The fact was, that this court was not acquainted with its real danger, and it went on from week to week, believing it could obtain from France, not only security but a large accession of territory, and abundant means of aggrandizement. The folly of Prussia, in the final effort, was less than in her former conduct, and by this series of errors she brought on the dreadful catastrophe. Respecting the late negotiations with France, for the purpose of terminating the distresses of war, it would not be proper that he should now say much on that subject; the period would soon arrive, when it would be in a regular course of inquiry: he would, however, say, that if the nation was, after a protracted series of wars, anxious for repose, it was unanimous in the sentiment, that no peace was desirable which was inconsistent with the honour of Britain, and with good faith to her allies; and he entertained no doubt, that when the papers on this important question were examined, the house would be persuaded, that no pacification could have been effected which would not have surrendered either the one or the other. He would conclude with expressing his satisfaction to the general unanimity which seemed to prevail throughout the nation. Resistance was our only security: the resources of the country were abundant, and a beneficial termination of the war might be expected, by a vigorous employment of the means we had in our power; yet, if we should be finally disappointed in our endeavours, we should, at least, have the satisfaction of having honourably done our duty, in defence of the rights and liberties of mankind.
HOUSE OF COMMONS.
Friday, December 19.
When the house returned from the Lords, and the speech was read.
The hon. Mr. Lambton rose, after moving an
address to his majesty, which was seconded by Mr. John Smith.
Mr. Canning declared that he never felt more anxiety in rising in that house than at the present moment, from the deep conviction he felt of the unparalleled importance of the crisis. At the outset he should beg leave to say, what he was intimately persuaded of, that there were resources amply sufficient in this country to meet and to brave all difficulties, and to avert all dangers. But he should intrust the house to consider whether all had been done that ought to be done. If ever there was a period of importance to the country, it was the present, which called upon us to stand, first, for our own defence, and in the second place, to afford our help to other states. The administration had entered into office not twelve months ago. According to them, all that had preceded them was wrong. We were all in clubbed battalions, dilapidated resources, no protection for ourselves or for the world. What did we hear now? Not that these resources were re-established, but that they remained unimpaired. It was a satisfaction indeed to hear such a tribute paid to those whose reputation had been so much attacked. Nothing, it was exclaimed, was so bad as our foreign affairs—confederacies ill put together, and falling to pieces by their own weakness. He should examine what better had been done by those who negotiated alone, and then called it joint negotiation. What might further appear, he could not precisely tell. It might seem that the negotiation was not sufficiently dexterous; that there was too long delay, and too much shifting allowed; and that the termination might have been foreseen by any man. He must, however, think that the conduct of ministers towards Prussia was rash and hasty. He must, however, in stating his sentiment, call upon gentlemen to go back to the last confederacy, and consider, after its failure, what was the obvious policy of France and England. No man could hesitate to agree that, unfortunately as the confederacy was, when disjointed and broken, its scattered limbs yet retained life and vigour. It was then the interest of England to keep them together, or at least to keep up an open, constant, and harmonious intercourse. Of France it was clearly the policy to complete their dismemberment, or to effect their apparent separation. That there was guilt on the part of Prussia he would not attempt to deny; but was the house apprized, when they were told Prussia had taken Hanover, that we were negotiating with France? It was our interest to preserve Prussia, but our great object was to limit the power and dominion of France, to overlook minor offences, to put up with some things, even though a just cause of war, when there was a more politic mode of getting separation elsewhere. See the labyrinth of errors into which ministers had drawn themselves. They had sent a minister to Paris, negotiating for Hanover, and at the same time denouncing it of Prussia, when a war was between Prussia and France—in a great measure occasioned by this very subject. Undoubtedly, Hanover was not the sole cause of war between France and Prussia. But it is a subject they complained of. Ministers ought to have foreseen, that their own demands might cause hostilities between Prussia and France, in which they ought to have had the alliance of Prussia. To that policy at last became converts, when they sent a minister to Prussia, not knowing but that the war might be actually begun before the negotiator arrived. When they heard, however, that the whole Prussian army was gone, they sent a military mission; and when they should hear that the monarchy is destroyed, they would probably send part of an army. Of all the weak measures of their predecessors, nothing was to be more improved than our diplomacy; nothing was so shabby as our diplomacy. We were to have a clear simple diplomacy, free from all the tricks and calumnies of former ministers. Now see the defect—Our ministers at Paris for peace, and our ministers at Berlin for war, are both employed to get Hanover back again. Far from congratulating his majesty that he had no share in the councils of Prussia respecting this war, his opinion was quite contrary. Had ministers shown that they endeavoured to keep back Prussia, it might have been so far well; but to say that they had nothing to do with it, is an inconceivable perversion of policy. They should have taken care not so suddenly to kindle the flame, lest it should be too soon extinguished. It was at the instigation of France that Prussia took Hanover, and her contrivance was evident in thus planting the seeds of disunion with Great Britain. He did not wish to descend too much to particulars, but he considered our declaration as stating three things of which he was not convinced. First, that the overture came from France. There might be something behind to be published for aught he knew. But he did not find fault merely with making the overture. If it was fit to make peace, it was fit to make an overture; but the assertion in the declaration was made out. The next point he objected to was, the statement respecting the uti possidetis ; it might, perhaps, be almost as well called the propria quæ maribus , or by any other words. He objected, in the third place, to our statement concerning our insisting on negotiating jointly with our allies. Now, as the speech made mention of Sweden, and made her equal with Russia, how happened it that there was nothing about Sweden in the negotiation? As to the dissolution of parliament, there was no question about his majesty's prerogative, but how far it might be right, and fair, and wise to do so under all circumstances. The measure was needless, and useless, and only tended to divert men's minds from external transactions to internal disputes. If this should be connected with unprecedented and inexcusable interference in elections, will it be contended, that such conduct does not tend to prevent union, to impair unanimity. With respect to the war in which we are engaged, no man who heard our debates would know that we are at war. There was not an act of war mentioned in the king's speech. As to our internal defence, great part of last session was employed on a most laboured and complicated plan, which was pressed most eagerly on the house at a late period; and when it was asked, whether it was so hurried from its being intended for immediate operation, it was always answered that it was so intended. One part of the kingdom was exempted from its operation, because the machinery could not be got ready there in time. But in what part of the kingdom had it been executed? Every thing was to be done, and nothing whatever had been done. There had been a good deal heard about fitting out expeditions, which had ended only in orders, counter-orders, revocations of counter-orders, and counter-orders of revocations. After sailing about the channel, they took Plymouth, as they might any other place abroad, as ill prepared to expect them as Plymouth. They made excellent voyages. They sail from the Downs, and go to Plymouth, to surprise the dockers. But this was not the worst. Had they not done more to disgust the army, by one improper and irregular appointment, than all they can effect by arranging shoulder-knots and cockades? Let him hear in that house the sense of the public on that subject; and let him tell what had been the result of that measure for giving animation and enthusiasm to the army, to raise an officer, certainly of skill, to a situation for which his rank did not qualify him! On the grounds he had now stated, he professed his want of concurrence in the address.
Lord Howick rose, and spoke to the following purport:—“The right hon. gentleman has had the ingenuity and address so to interweave and mix his arguments with such a variety of matter, that he has called on me to defend and vindicate the conduct not only of the present government, but also that of a fifteen years' opposition. Sir, with respect to that opposition, I will only say, speaking for myself as a mere single individual forming one of that opposition, during the whole period alluded to, that it was on my part, an opposition founded on the strictest principle and the most lively anxiety for the welfare and prosperity of the country, against those measures which have been (without the meaning to attribute the fault to the rt. hon. gent. and the hon. gent. near him) followed by the desolate and destructive state in which we see the continent at the present moment. I can, also, Sir, with great truth and safety answer for my rt. hon. friend, now, alas! no more, and all those who acted with us during that eventful period, that they were all guided by the same constitutional motives, and that none of us were ever actuated by the base and mischievous design of forming an opposition for the ungenerous and unworthy purpose of embarrassment, and of harassing, distressing, and impeding the efforts and exertions of his majesty's ministers. I own, Sir, I am still farther surprised that the rt. hon. gent. should have entered into so broad and extensive an opposition to the address, from the very cautious manner in which it has been brought forward. It is not my intention, sir, to detain the house at so much length, as to enter into all the various points of the rt. hon. gent.'s speech. The first part to which I shall beg leave to advert, is that respecting the negotiation; on this, he has stated three points: 1st. Who made the first overture? 2d. The uti possidetis ; and 3d. Treating jointly with our allies. The right hon. gent. has allowed, that he cannot depend on the accuracy of the grounds on which he blames his majesty's ministers on the authority of the papers published by the French government—and yet he has argued on them with almost as much confidence as if they had been laid on the table of this house. He has quoted the declaration, as having differed from those papers on the material fact—of who made the first overture? There, sir, the rt. hon. gentleman has shown how liable those are to be misled or mistaken who venture to found opinions on uncertain or unverified documents; and I contend, sir, that a first overture might come from the French government, and be subsequent to the letter respecting the assassin. The fact is, as will appear by the papers when laid on the table, that there was another letter to Mr. Fox, which came at the same time, and by the same inclosure, in which M. Talleyrand says, “Perhaps it may not be disagreeable to hear news from hence. We are peacefully inclined in Paris. To shew which, I refer you to the emperor's speech to the senate;” and the reference was to that passage where Buonaparte said, “I wish for peace with England, and they may have it as soon as they please on the basis of the treaty of Amiens.” This was certainly, from a person standing as mons. Talleyrand did, what might be fairly called an opening to those who were really desirous of peace. The rt. hon. gent. has allowed that there is no disgrace in making an overture for peace. I am of the same opinion, and I hesitate not to declare that if I did at any time see a fair opportunity of obtaining a peace which was likely to be honourable and permanent, and to secure the interests of this country, I would be one of the first to propose an overture. Every one who knew the candid generous heart and enlightened mind of my late rt. hon. friend, knew how much he was inclined to peace, and I really believe that had not death pulled him down, and placed him by the side of his great rival (rival I mean, in political measures, not personally rivals) we should not now have to lament the difficulties and distresses of a state of warfare. I come now to the second point, the uti possidetis ; this was one of the bases first proposed by France in the communications to Lord Yarmouth, and by him transmitted to his majesty's ministers. The third point is, that of treating jointly with our allies, and that we certainly never did depart from, till M. D'Oubril had signed a separate treaty of peace between Russia and France. Finding he had done so, what other course remained for his majesty's ministers to pursue, than that which they have taken. The rt. hon. gent. has attempted to found an argument on that part of the negotiation which related to Hanover. He says we were attempting to gain Hanover by negotiation from the French, while we were at war with Prussia on the very same account; but the rt. hon. gent. is mistaken. It will be remembered, that Hanover had some time before been taken possession of by Prussia, and was, by a subsequent art. given to that power by France.—Before the rt. hon. gent. made this charge of being at war with Prussia on account of Hanover, he should have refreshed his memory by looking at the address of this house on the war with Prussia, in which he would have found, that the house thanked his majesty for having passed over unnoticed the unjust acquisition of his hereditary dominions by Prussia; and that the real cause of the war was an actual and violent act of hostility, committed on her part, by refusing admittance to our ships and commerce into her several ports in the Baltic, and elsewhere, and not for the acquisition which she had so honestly taken from a power that had no right whatever to bestow it. And with respect to the negotiating, for it, he is equally mistaken: it was unequivocally offered by the French government as one of the conditions. The rt. hon. gent. has been equally free in his criticism on his majesty's ministers, for their not having been sufficiently prompt and speedy in their assistance of Prussia. Here again he shows himself to be equally unreasonable and incorrect. The first information ministers received of the war between
Prussia and France, was on the 13th of Sept. in a letter from Mr. Thornton, at Hamburgh, inclosing a dispatch to him from Mons. Jacobi, in which he says that he coming to England sous un caractere quelconque , in some particular character. He did not reach England till the 10th of Oct. and it was the 11th before I saw him. Lord Morpeth had in the mean time been dispatched on an embassy to Prussia, but did not arrive till the delivery of his credentials was rendered impossible by the unfortunate calamities which had so rapidly taken place. When the proposals of M. Jacobi came to be considered, they were found very vague, and it was thought necessary to send a second mission to Prussia, for it was impossible to conceive that the loss of one battle could have been so tremendously fatal as it has since been found to be. The same inattention also unfortunately took place with respect to Russia, who was kept in the dark with regard to the intention and the time of the Prussians going to war, by which means her favourable intentions for the service of Prussia have been, in a great measure, frustrated by not having set out on their march before the time, that, to have acted jointly and effectually with the Prussians, they ought to have been in the neighbourhood of Berlin. The rt. hon. gent. in the extensive range of criticism and censure, which he has indulged himself against his majesty's government, has not failed to notice particularly our military measures, in which, he certainly has not treated us with much candour. When we came into Administration, it was allowed that the circumstances of the country were truly alarming.—We took upon us, however, to do the best we could to retrieve them, and we ought to be allowed a reasonable time before it is expected we are to do all that can be achieved. He says our expeditions have been fruitless and unavailing, without knowing where they are designed to act, or what may be the nature of their operations. There has been no delay in those expeditions which ministers do not feel themselves perfectly able to satisfy. As to the discontent that the hon. gent. states to have been produced by gen. Craufurd's appointment, I must only observe that he certainly knows nothing of the nature or the objection of that expedition which has been confided to gen. Craufurd. But why are we to suppose that this selection of gen. Craufurd has given great offence? Sir Home Popham has at least as many superiors in the navy, as gen. Craufurd has in the army, and his selection should be quite as offensive to the navy, yet he was appointed by the late ministry. With respect to the recall of sir Home Popham and sir David Baird, I freely confess that I was one of those who advised it, and upon the ground that they did without orders, and upon their own judgment and responsibility, undertake the expedition of South America. In prosecution of their scheme, they did not leave a single ship of the line to protect the Cape of Good Hope. They even obliged a frigate that was sent out to India with money for the payment of troops there, to desert the destination that it was intended for and go upon this South American expedition. Such conduct as this I consider highly reprehensible, and a subversion of all discipline and government. This is not all: Sir Home Popham has wrote circular letters to manufacturing towns, on the principle, and from the fatal influence of that patriotic society at Lloyd's, which is held out to the navy as giving greater encouragements than the government of the country. I do consider the conduct of sir Home Popham, as highly reprehensible in a British officer, and, therefore, altho' I should be sorry to pronounce strongly on the conduct of any man until he had an opportunity of justifying himself, yet I will say, that there is nothing in the first appearance of this transaction, which a British parliament could approve of. As to the dissolution of parliament, it is by no means surprising, that after the negotiation had completely failed, his majesty's ministers should advise his majesty to recur to the sense of his people, as the means most likely to obtain that unanimity which is so desirable under the present circumstances. I believe that no administration ever interfered less in the elections; but of this I am perfectly sure that not one shilling of the public money has been spent at any one election in the kingdom. The Rt. honourable gentleman has acted prudently in not pressing his amendment to a division, for had he done so, he would have found himself in such a minority as could give him little reason to be proud of.
The original address was then carried nem. con.
The following Memoir and Documents were submitted to the House of Representatives by the President.
(TRANSLATION.)
Note of the Minister Plenipotentiary of France, to the Secretary of State.
The undersigned, minister plenipotentiary of his imperial and royal majesty, to his excellency the president of the United States of America; has the honor to remind the secretary of state, that at the beginning of last year and during the session of congress, Mr. Chevallé, attorney in fact of the heirs of Mr. de Beaumarchais, took various steps with the secretary of the treasury to obtain a liquidation of the debt contracted by the United States, with the said Mr. de Beaumarchais.
At the request of the attorney in fact to whom the treasury opposed a receipt of Mr. de Beaumarchais, in order to place to the debt of his heirs a million of livres tournois , the undersigned addressed, on the 1st of January, 1806, to the secretary of the treasury, an official note, which left no doubt of the destination of the million in dispute, the employment of which, agreeably to the orders of the king, was consecrated to a special and secret service, and consequently, which had not and could not have any connection with the transactions, bargains, supplies, and generally with any mercantile operations which Mr. de Beaumarchais might have been concerned in with the government of the United States of America.
This note, or rather this official declaration of the minister plenipotentiary of France, ought to have removed the only obstacle which was opposed to the entire liquidation with the heirs of Mr. de Beaumarchais, because the justice of their claim is demonstrated to conviction, and they were far from expecting that the secretary of the treasury would still retain doubts upon the legitimacy of their credit.
The heirs of Mr. de Beaumarchais now confide their interests to the protection of the French government, as well as to the justice of the federal government; and the undersigned, in declaring to the secretary of state, that this affair, on being exa-

mined in France with the most scrupulous attention, has presented to the judgment of the most enlightened and impartial men nothing but an incontrovertible conclusion in favor of the heirs of Mr. de Beaumarchais...
When the French government raises its voice in favour of the unfortunate heirs of Mr. de Beaumarchais, the undersigned thinks it useless to recall to view the nature and the importance of the services...
After the ministerial declaration respecting the employment of the million, a declaration, which doubtless (and as a consequence of those mutual sentiments of respect and confidence, which government ought to have for communications of this nature) would have been sufficient for the secretary of the treasury...
The undersigned seizes with eagerness this occasion of offering to the secretary of state the homage of his high consideration. (Signed) TURREAU.
Washington, the 14th January, 1807. Faithfully translated, JACOB WAGNER, Chief clerk, department of state.
(TRANSLATION.) Claim of Mr. Beaumarchais, to a million against the United States, as payment for supplies which he furnished them.
OBJECTIONS OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES.
"It was afterwards discovered that only two millions out of the three granted as a gratuitous gift, before the treaty of February, 1788, had been then received by the United States; and to an application made to count de Vergennes in 1786, for the purpose of ascertaining when, and to whom, the other million had been paid, an answer was returned that the said million was paid on the 10th day of June, 1776; but a copy of the receipt was refused, and the minister did not think proper to disclose the name of the person, who had received the money.
"No doubt remains, that the advance of one million, made by the French government, on the 10th June, 1776, for the use of the United States, and the payment of one million on the same day, by M. Beaumarchais, were but one and the same transaction."
Answer.—Before answering the objections of the treasury of the United States, it is of importance correctly to state the question which forms the subject of the present claim, because by this means all suppositions foreign to it will be avoided.
Did Mr. Beaumarchais receive from the government of France a million on account of his supplies to the U. States? This is the question.
The identity of the date given by M. de Vergennes, and of the receipt of Mr. de Beaumarchais, communicated by Mr. Buchot, has until now been the cause of a delay of justice on the part of the treasury of the United States, to the heirs of Mr. de Beaumarchais, and of the prejudices which the treasury has conceived against this claim.
In Mr. de Beaumarchais, we are to perceive and recognize two characters; one, the secret agent of the French government; and the other a furnisher of supplies to the United States.
As a secret agent of the government of France, he received a million on the 10th June, 1776. In the same year M. de Vergennes, who had caused it to be given to him, and who had imposed upon him the obligation of rendering an account to himself for it, presented that account to the king, who approved of it and gave a discharge to Mr. de Beaumarchais.
As a furnisher of supplies to the United States, he did not receive the said million, and consequently he is a creditor, and will remain a creditor of the United States for this sum until it is paid to him. Among the nine millions given as a free gift by the king, three were stated by the convention of 1788, as having been before 1778. Of these three the U. States had only the use of two; and it is of that which is wanting that they require an account from M. de Beaumarchais.
Although the nine millions in question have been formerly acknowledged to have been received by the convention of 25th February, 1783, signed by the American commissioners and ratified by congress, and although this public act discharges M. de Beaumarchais from all accountability; nevertheless the government of France, in order to fulfil the claims of justice, as well as the desire of the United States to know what has become of this million, causes its minister plenipotentiary to declare:
1st, That the French government has always remained a stranger to all the mercantile transactions of M. de Beaumarchais, with the United States. 2d, That the million given on the 10th of June, 1776, to the said Sieur de Beaumarchais was for a secret political service, of which the king reserved to himself the knowledge. 3d, That the account of the employment of the said million was presented at the close of 1776 to the king, and approved by him. 4th, That M. de Beaumarchais has been discharged from it by his majesty himself. 5th, And lastly, that the said million was not given on account of his supplies.
pose the contrary, would be to think that this minister withheld a million more to be paid by the United States to M. de Beaumarchais than was due to him. This opinion would shock whosoever was acquainted with the probity of M. de Vergennes.
Objection.—"It is urged in behalf of the claimant, that it is now in proof that the money was advanced for secret services of a political nature. That argument could not by the officers of the treasury, be taken into consideration, because they were bound to require positive proof of the application of the money in order to credit M. Beaumarchais for the expenditure."
Answer.—When the treasury debited the account of M. de Beaumarchais with the said million, it had not the declaration of the government of France, that the said million had been employed in a political secret service, and had not been given on account of supplies. Now this circumstance is known, it may balance the account. It can be no more disputed that the king, who gave the 9 millions had the power of employing one of them towards the views and to the advantage of the cause which he supported, than his ministers can be required to disclose the object of the service in which it was employed; because it is a secret which they ought to keep, and which M. de Vergennes declared it inconvenient to communicate even ten years afterwards.
The secretary of the treasury is so well persuaded of it, that he says in his report, it must be observed, that the declaration of the French government should be taken in its strictly literal sense.
After an opinion thus expressed, and which manifests the respect and attention we owe to the declarations of a government, it is justly believed he would not have hesitated to strike the balance of Mr. de Beaumarchais's account, without comprising in it the said million, if he had not found himself bound by the premature opinion of his predecessors, and by the limitation of his powers.
Objection.—"Nor would it be extraordinary that advances made in 1776, in order to enable an individual to furnish war-like supplies to the United States, should have been considered by the French government as an expense for a secret political service."
Answer.—Did the government of France keep as a secret from the United States, that it had given permission to M. Beaumarchais to obtain cannon, muskets, &c. from the magazines of the king? No.
Why, therefore, would it have been made a secret of this million, if it had been given for the same articles?
Can it be supposed that the king gave a million to pay himself?
It will not be disputed, that at the epoch of the treaty of 1778, which united the two powers, there no longer remained any secret about M. de Beaumarchais having before this time furnished cannon, muskets, &c. taken from the magazines of the king. The arms of France engraved upon these pieces published the secret.
The convention of 1783, openly avowed, that three millions, gratuitously given by the king, had been given before the treaty of 1778.
Thus the destination of the million given on the 10th June, 1776, must be looked upon as very extraordinary, and as a secret, and it cannot with justice, be debited to M. de Beaumarchais, on account of his supplies.
Objection.—"It is further objected, that M. de Beaumarchais, having fairly accounted to his own government, and to their satisfaction, for the application of that million, must be considered as discharged from any accountability to the United States."
Answer.—Is it correct to say, that an accountability is not due to a third party not named in the deed or obligation?
If this principle cannot be brought into doubt, M. de Beaumarchais, or rather the government of France says, M. de Beaumarchais has received from me a million, for which he is to account to me; he has rendered this account to me, I have approved it, and I have given him a discharge.
The transcript of this receipt will demonstrate to conviction, the truth as well as the justice of what has been advanced.
Copy of the Receipt. "I have received from Mr. du Vergier agreeable to the orders which have been given to him by the count de Vergennes, on the 10th current, the sum of a million, of which I will render an account to my said Sieur de Vergennes."
"At Paris the 10th June, 1776. (Signed) CAIRON DE BEAUMARCHAIS."
From whom did Mr. de Beaumarchais receive a million, according to this receipt?
From M. de Vergennes, by the hands of Mr. Vergier.
To whom did his own receipt, and the will of him who gave him the million, impose upon him the obligation of accounting?
To Mr. de Vergennes.
Who received this account?
M. de Vergennes.
Who approved of the account, and gave M. de Beaumarchais a discharge?
The king himself, who gave the said million, and who ordered the definition of it.
The candour and the justice of the secretary of the treasury equally oppose, after this exposition of the said receipt, the demand of an account of the said million from M. de Beaumarchais; for if even the account had not been rendered to the government of France, no power, no person, (unless he was delegated to its rights by a special power) could demand it; for M. de Beaumarchais, by his billet, is made a debtor of the government of France; and if it had been otherwise, he might as well have been the debtor of any other power, or of any other person, as of the United States.
If M. de Beaumarchais were paid by the United States, does the secretary of the treasury think, that, possessed of his original receipt, he could prosecute him before any court of justice, and hope to recover the amount contained in the said receipt?
If his opinion should be in the affirmative, what risk would the United States run in paying the Beaumarchais family; because they would be certain of recovering what they paid.
To start a doubt, and yet draw from this doubt a conclusion in your favour, is contrary to justice; and by removing the doubt we remove the consequences.
M. de Beaumarchais by this obligation is accountable only to the government of France. The above observations prove it to a demonstration.
Objection.—"It is evident that if he was rightfully charged by the United States for that sum, it is them and not to the French government that he is accountable. The solemn declaration that the million was a gratuitous gift to the United States, seems inconsistent with the supposition that it was not applied as an aid and subsidy, but given without their knowledge to an individual responsible for its application, not to the government who had received, but to that who gave the subsidy."
Answer.—He has rendered this account. The king has approved it, and he has been discharged from it. The million was given for a political secret service. Why would not the secretary of the treasury with to look upon the destination given by the king, to that one of the nine millions which is millions, as an aid and subsidy, because this destination (which is a secret and always will remain one) can have no other object than to favour the views and to assure advantages to the United States, and may be denominated aid and subsidy.
The present government of France has made all possible research, in order to enlighten its equity and its justice in an affair, which interests a family, whose head employed all the fortune which he ought to have left it, to the support of the American cause; and it is after the most intimate conviction, that this sum is due to M. de Beaumarchais, that it has charged its minister plenipotentiary to declare anew, that the million given on the 10th of June, 1776, to M. de Beaumarchais was employed in a secret service, that an account of it has been rendered to the king, and approved by him, and that it was not given on account of supplies furnished by the said Beaumarchais to the United States. (Signed) TURREAU.
Washington, Jan. 14, 1807. Faithfully translated, JACOB WAGNER, Chief Clerk Dep. State.
FOR SALE. A likely young Negro Man, about twenty-two years of age, a Bricklayer by trade. Enquire of the Printer. Feb. 25.
For SALE, 3 pipes Cogniac Brandy, 4th proof, 2 do Holland Gin; 5 hogsheads Antigua Rum, 7 hogsheads Molasses, 10 barrels 8 years old Peach Brandy, very superior quality, 100 do. family Flour, 50 do. do. 10 boxes Chocolate, no. 2 & 3, 2000 lbs. Coffee; and 50 barrels brown Sugar, &c. B. Nottingham, & Co.
THE PUBLICK LEDGER.
WEDNESDAY EVENING, FEB. 23, 1807.
A Gentleman, on whose correctness we can rely, arrived last night in the stage, informs us that accounts has been received at Washington, which stated that Colonel Burr had been taken with about 100 men, and without any opposition.
In addition, and in confirmation of the above we extract the following from a Washington paper of the 18th inst.
Dr. Lattimer [Delegat from the Mississippi Territory] has received a letter from Natches, and the secretary of war also one to the same effect—that Mr. Burr, after a conference with Mr. Mead, acting as governor of the Mississippi Territory, has surrendered himself, his boats, and 90 men, to the civil authority. This was done on the 10th inst. and he was taken to New Orleans, and was bound to this district.
Mr. Martin spoke about 4 hours in court this day, [the 18th] in behalf of Messrs. Bollman and Swartwout, when the court adjourned—Tomorrow morning we expect their decision. It is supposed that the prisoners will be discharged.
A Gentleman who landed this morning from the ship Century, capt. Dade, in Hampton Roads, bound to Alexandria, from Liverpool, which place she left the 9th, has favoured us with London papers to the 6th January. We have had just time to make a few extracts for this day's paper, some of which are of the first interest. The accounts of the re-capture of Buenos Ayres had reached England in such shape as to obtain belief, though it was not official. The French accounts of a war between Russia and Turkey turns out to be a fabrication. Accounts from various quarters had been received, stating that the French had experienced a severe check from the Russians. But the circumstance from which we derive the greatest pleasure, and upon which we congratulate our friends, and the country in general, is to be added to by before them the official notification, that a Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation has been signed between the United States and Great Britain. This pleasing information, given by Lord Hawick, the secretary of state, will be found among the extracts from the London papers. Thus has the United States the power of those who have favoured us with the production of reports between two countries, whose mutual interests are always, and now more than ever, to be promoted by peace and good understanding.
Report from LONDON, January 20. Two Gottenburgh mails arrived this morning and brought intelligence from Gottenburgh of the 16th ult. A letter from Elsinour received this morning, states, that a vessel had arrived from Stettin 10 hours, with the news of the French having received a severe check from the Russians, on the other side the Vistula, and that Bonaparte was shot in the cheek.
After two days for the passage from Elsinour to Gottenburgh, and two days from Stettin to Elsinour, the intelligence from Stettin would be of as late a date as the 11th. But the mails from Helsing, which arrived last Monday, brought accounts from Berlin to the 13th inclusive. These accounts stated that the Russians were retiring from the Vistula to Kamieniec, and that one division of the French army had crossed the Vistula to Praga, opposite to Warsaw. No mention was made of any battle having been fought. Undoubtedly, however, these are the enemy's accounts.
Stralsund expects to be attacked, but it is capable of sustaining a long siege. We are happy to believe that there is no truth in the account of Russia having declared war against Turkey. On the contrary, the best understanding is said to subsist between the two powers. The intrigues of Sebastiani had not been able to destroy or disturb it—but they had, it is said, produced the effect of procuring his own dismissal and departure from the capital of the Turkish empire.
Scarcely had we finished writing the above when a third Gottenburgh mail arrived with news from Gottenburgh of the 19th.
GOTTENBURGH, Dec. 19. "A letter has just been received here from Altona, stating that the French have been defeated (twice by the Russians; another letter from Dantzic of the 2d says, that they have evacuated Thorn, and that there is not a single French soldier on the other side of the Vistula. Bonaparte is calling his troops to him from all quarters; and the letters from Stralsund state, that there are not any French troops in all Pomerania: from this it would appear that he expects to meet a formidable resistance."
Out readers do not forget, that we have already had news from Altona and Hamburg of the 16th, and Dantzic on the 9th.
Some neutral ships which sailed within these few days for Holland, were not suffered to enter a Dutch port. On their arrival off the coast a boat was sent off to stop their coming in—as an embargo had been laid in every port, and no ships were permitted to go out or in.
January 3. OFFICIAL. Downing-Street, Jan. 1, 1807. "I have the honour of acquainting you for the information of the merchants concerned in the trade with America, that the Treaty of Amity, Navigation and Commerce, between his Majesty and the United States, was yesterday signed by the Commissioners respectively appointed for that purpose by both Governments. The Treaty will be immediately transmitted to America; but until the Ratifications on both sides shall be exchanged, it cannot be made publick."
"I have the honour, &c. Howland." PHILIP SAXON, Esq. Chairman to the Committee of American Merchants. Three months probably will elapse before the Treaty can be ratified.
most anxious for their publication, particularly as there is a rumour in circulation which would lead us to suspect, that the fears of a war in 1756 has been abandoned. We see no reason for not suffering a sketch or outline of the treaty to be made public.—(Courier.)
The rumour of the re-capture of Buenos Ayres, and of Sir Home Popham and general Beresford, having been made prisoners, is repeated in one of the letters brought by the Lisbon mail yesterday—several merchants at Lisbon are said to have received the information—We trust there is no foundation for the rumour. Should it unfortunately prove true, what censure will not "all the talents in the country" deserve! and what regret will not the public feel, that reinforcements were not sent out from this country sooner!
Mr. J. Morier arrived in town last night, in 4 days from Gottenburgh. He left Constantinople on the 20th of October, at that period the Russians and Turks had settled their differences. In his way to Gottenburgh, he passed through the Russian army in Poland, 80,000 strong, apparently fine troops, and in high spirits. They had several campaigns with the French, and always came off victorious. At one time two regiments of Cossacks defeated four regiments of cavalry. The Russians expected only a reinforcement of 75,000 men, and gen. Michelson was also coming with 30 or 40,000 from the frontiers of Turkey. Gen. Kaminsky was on his way from St. Petersburg to take the chief command. The army have the greatest confidence in his abilities, &c. as a general. The king and queen of Prussia were at Koninsberg, where he had part of his treasure. He has there an army of 20 or 30,000 men. Koninsberg, if attacked, was incapable of much resistance.
The French were supposed to have 180,000 men in Poland, and an immense artillery. Nothing certain was known of their force or plans.
January 6. An intimation, we understand, has been given from Lloyd's to the captains of vessels bound to Buenos Ayres, to put into some intermediate port for information.
We received yesterday letters and papers from Gibraltar to the 10th of December. They contain no intelligence of moment. Expectations have been entertained at that place that the Spaniards would attempt to run out the five ships of the line and the frigates, which are in readiness in Cadiz. Their destination is supposed to be South-America. Thirteen Russian ships of war passed up the Mediterranean on the 29th of November.
FRONTIERS OF TURKEY, Nov. 22.
On the 1st of October an alliance offensive and defensive was concluded between the Porte and Russia of the following tenor:
1st, The affairs of the Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia, both as far as respects their restoration and their depositions shall be decided by the two powers. 2d, The Republick of the Seven Islands shall remain under the dominion of Russia. 3d, The customs shall continue upon the old footing. 4th, The Russians shall, during the successive years, have permission to lead their armies through the Ottoman territory, as well against their own enemies as against those of Turkey. 5th, The Russians shall have permission to bring their ships of war to anchor in the Straits of Constantinople, and shall moreover obtain from the Porte the necessary supply. 6th, Russian subjects, old or new, wherever they may be, shall have the privilege of trading through the whole extent of the Turkish empire, and even to possess property there. 7th, The Greek vessels that carried the Russian flag and were forced to lay it aside by order of the Porte, shall have the liberty of resuming it. 8th, The Grecian subjects of Turkey shall be allowed to enter the Russian service when they please; the Porte gives them permission to do so. 9th, The rights of Legations relative to interpreters, shall remain on the old footing. 10th, The Ambassador of France shall quit Constantinople. 11th, No Piranhas shall be any longer granted to the vessels of the Turkish subjects to proceed to the countries of the enemies of Russia.
POSTPONED SALE.
The Wine advertised for sale this day on Maxwell's wharf, will take place on Friday the 27th inst. at 12 o'clock, when it will be sold without reserve. Francis Smith. Feb. 25.
On Saturday the 28th instant, on Newton's and Gibson's wharves, at XII o'clock will be sold for ready cash,
50 punch. Rum, 20 hhds. Molasses, Being part of the cargo of the Schooner Morning Star, capt. P. Shearman, on a voyage from St. Vincent to Boston, and put into this port in distress, and sold by order of the captain to pay expenses—Also, some old Sails and Rigging saved from the wreck. Christopher Fry. Feb. 25.
FOR SALE. On board the ship Betsey, from Liverpool. 7,000 bushels coarse Salt. 1168 sacks fine do. filled in Liverpool. 94 crates Earthenware.
The BETSEY is a fine fast sailing ship, almost new, and will return direct to Liverpool—for freight apply to A. MACLURE. Who has also in store for sale, 88 crates Earthenware, 16 crates Glassware, 3 gross Bottles in crates, 10 pipes Cogniac Brandy, 8 pipes fine old Sackey Wine, 2 boxes coarse Salt, 5 boxes Fine, 9 boxes Castle Soap, 11 cases Anhydrous and Soda each, 7 casks Claret Wine. Feb. 25-47
FOR SALE.
A HOUSE on Brigg's Point. If not sold at private sale before Saturday the 28th instant, it will on that day be exposed to public auction, the sale to commence at the premises at 12 o'clock—Any person wishing to purchase or to inspect the private property know the same as soon as possible, will be most welcome to inspect the same.