The enquirer (Richmond, Va.), 1807-09-05 00:00:00

The Enquirer.
PUBLISHED BY THOMAS RITCHIE, OPPOSITE THE POST-OFFICE.....AT FIVE DOLLARS PER ANNUM.....(PAYABLE IN ADVANCE.)
VOLUME 4.]
RICHMOND, SATURDAY MORNING, SEPTEMBER 5, 1807.
[NUMBER 34.]
The Enquirer.
RICHMOND, 5th SEPTEMBER.
TRIAL OF AARON BURR,
(CONTINUED BY ADJOURNMENT, AND HELD AT THE CAPITOL, IN THE HALL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES.) FOR HIGH TREASON AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
OPINION
OF THE COURT, ON THE MOTION TO ARREST THE EVIDENCE. DELIVERED ON MONDAY, August 31.
The question now to be decided has been argued in a manner worthy of its importance, and with an earnestness evincing the strong conviction felt by the counsel on each side that the law is with them.
A degree of eloquence seldom displayed on any occasion has embellished a solidity of argument and a depth of research by which the court has been greatly aided in forming the opinion it is about to deliver.
The testimony adduced on the part of the United States, to prove the overt act laid in the indictment, having shown, and the attorney for the United States having admitted, that the prisoner was not present when that act, whatever may be its character, was committed, and there being no reason to doubt but that he was at a great distance and in a different state, it is objected to the testimony offered on the part of the United States, to connect him with those who committed the overt act, that such testimony is totally irrelevant and must therefore be rejected.
The arguments in support of this motion respect in part the merits of the case as it may be supposed to stand independent of the pleadings, and in part as exhibited by the pleadings.
On the first division of the subject two points are made.
1st. That conformably to the constitution of the United States, no man can be convicted of treason who was not present when the war was levied.
2nd. That if this construction be erroneous, no testimony can be received to charge one man with the overt acts of others, until those overt acts as laid in the indictment be proved to the satisfaction of the court.
The question which arises on the construction of the constitution, in every point of view in which it can be contemplated, is of infinite moment to the people of this country and to their government, and requires the most temperate and the most deliberate consideration.
"Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them."
What is the natural import of the words "levying war"? And who may be said to levy it? Had their first application to treason been made by our constitution, they would certainly have admitted of some latitude of construction. Taken in a literal sense, they are perhaps of the same import with the words raising or creating war, but as those who join after the commencement are equally the objects of punishment, there would probably be a general admission, that the term also comprehended making war, or carrying on war. In the construction which courts would be required to give these words, it is not improbable that those who should raise, create, make or carry on war might be comprehended.
The various acts which would be considered as coming within the term, would be settled by a course of decisions, and it would be affirming boldly to say, that those only who actually constituted a portion of the military force appearing in arms could be considered as levying war. There is no difficulty in affirming that there must be a war or the crime of levying it cannot exist, but there would be considerable difficulty in affirming that a particular act did or did not involve the person committing it in the guilt and in the fact of levying war. If for example, an army should be actually raised for the avowed purpose of carrying on open war against the United States and subverting their government, the point must be weighed very deliberately, before a judge would venture to decide that an overt act of levying war had not been committed by a commissary of purchases, who never saw the army, but who, knowing its object and leaguing himself with the rebels, supplied that army with provisions, or by a recruiting officer holding a commission in the rebel service, who, though never in camp, executed the particular duty assigned to him.
But the term is not for the first time applied to treason by the constitution of the U. States. It is a technical term. It is used in a very old statute of that country, whose language is our language, and whose laws form the substratum of our laws. It is scarcely conceivable that the term was not employed by the framers of our constitution in the sense which had been affixed to it by those from whom we borrowed it. So far as the meaning of any term, particularly terms of art, is completely ascertained, those by whom they are employed must be considered as employing them in that ascertained meaning, unless the contrary be proved by the context.
It is therefore reasonable to suppose, unless it be incompatible with other expressions of the constitution, that the term "levying war" is used in that instrument in the same sense in which it was understood in England and in this country, to have been used in the statute of the 25th of Edward, 3d, from which it was borrowed.
It is said that this meaning is to be collected only from adjudged cases. But this position cannot be conceded to the extent in which it is laid down. The superior authority of adjudged cases will never be controverted. But those celebrated elementary writers, who have stated the principles of the law, whose statements have received the common approbation of legal men, are not to be disregarded. Principles laid down by such writers as Coke, Hale, Foster and Blackstone, are not lightly to be rejected. These books are in the hands of every student. Legal opinions are formed upon them, and those opinions are afterwards carried to the bar, the bench and the legislature. In the exposition of terms, therefore, used in instruments of the present day, the opinions and the dicta of those authors, if not contradicted by adjudications, and if compatible with the words of the statute, are entitled to respect. It is to be regretted that they do not shed as much light on this part of the subject as is to be wished.
Coke does not give a complete definition of the term, but puts cases which amount to lev-
ing war. "An actual rebellion or insurrection, he says is a levying of war." In whom?—Coke does not say whether in those only who appear in arms, or in all those who take part in the rebellion or insurrection by real open deed.
Hale in treating on the same subject puts many cases which shall constitute a levying of war, without which no act can amount to treason, but he does not particularize the parts to be performed by the different persons concerned in that war, which shall be sufficient to fix on each the guilt of levying it.
Foster says "the joining with rebels in an act of rebellion, or with enemies in acts of hostility will make a man a traitor." "Furnishing rebels or enemies with money, arms, ammunition or other necessaries will prima facie make a man a traitor."
Foster does not say that he would be a traitor under the words of the statute independent of the legal rule which attaches the guilt of the principal to an accessory, nor that his treason is occasioned by that rule. In England this discrimination need not be made except for the purpose of framing the indictment, and therefore in the English books we do not perceive any effort to make it. Thus surrendering a castle to rebels, being in confederacy with them is said by Hale & Foster to be treason under the clause of levying war, but whether it be levying war in fact, or aiding those who levy it is not said.—Upon this point Blackstone is not more satisfactory. Although we may find among the commentators upon treason enough to satisfy the enquiry, what is a state of internal war? Yet no precise information can be acquired from them which would enable us to decide with clearness whether persons not in arms but taking part in a rebellion, could be said to levy war independent of that doctrine which attaches to the accessory the guilt of his principal.
If in adjudged cases this question has been taken up and directly decided, the court has not seen those cases. The arguments which may be drawn from the form of the indictment, though strong, is not conclusive. In the precedent found in Tremaine, Mary Speake, who was indicted for furnishing provisions to the party of the Duke of Monmouth, is indicted for furnishing provisions to those who were levying war, not for levying war herself. It may correctly be argued, that had this act amounted to levying war, she would have been indicted for levying war, and the furnishing of provisions would have been laid as the overt act. The court felt this when the precedent was produced. But the argument, though strong, is not conclusive, because in England, the enquiry whether she had become a traitor by levying war, or by giving aid and comfort to those who were levying war, was unimportant; and because too it does not appear from the indictment that she was actually concerned in the rebellion, that she belonged to the rebel party, or was guilty of anything further than a criminal speculation in selling them provisions.
It is not deemed necessary to trace the doctrine that in treason all are principals to its source. Its origin is most probably stated correctly by Judge Tucker, in a work, the merit of which is with pleasure acknowledged. But if a spurious doctrine has been introduced into the common law, and has for centuries been admitted as genuine, it would require great hardihood in a judge to reject it. Accordingly, we find those of the English jurists who seem to disapprove the principle, declaring that it is now too firmly settled to be shaken.
It is unnecessary to trace this doctrine to its source for another reason. The terms of the constitution comprise no question respecting principal and accessory, so far as either may be truly and in fact said to levy war: Whether in England a person would be indicted in express terms for levying war, or for assisting others in levying war, yet if in correct and legal language he can be said to have levied war, and if it has never been decided that the act would not amount to levying war, his case may without violent construction be brought within the letter and the plain meaning of the constitution.
In examining these words the argument which may be drawn from felonies, as for example, from murder, is not more conclusive. Murder is the single act of killing with malice aforethought. But war is a complex operation composed of many parts, co-operating with each other. No one man or body of men can perform them all if the war be of any continuance. Although then in correct and in law language, he alone is said to have murdered another who has perpetrated the fact of killing, or has been present aiding that fact, it does not follow that he alone can have levied war who has borne arms. All those who perform the various and essential military parts of prosecuting the war which must be assigned to different persons, may with correctness and accuracy be said to levy war.
Taking this view of the subject, it appears to the court, that those who perform a part in the prosecution of the war may correctly be said to levy war and to commit treason under the constitution. It will be observed, that this opinion does not extend to the case of a person who performs no act in the prosecution of the war, who counsels and advises it, or who being engaged in the conspiracy fails to perform his part. Whether such persons may be implicated by the doctrine, that whatever would make a man an accessory in felony makes him a principal in treason, or are excluded, because that doctrine is inapplicable to the United States, the constitution having declared that treason shall consist only in levying war, and having made the proof of overt acts necessary to conviction, is a question of vast importance which it would be proper for the supreme court to take a fit occasion to decide, but which an inferior tribunal would not willingly determine unless the case before them should require it.
It may now be proper to notice the opinion of the supreme court in the case of the United States against Boister and Swartwout. It is said that this opinion in declaring that those who do not bear arms may yet be guilty of treason, is contrary to law, and is not obligatory, because it is extra-judicial, and was delivered on a point not argued. This court is therefore required to depart from the principle there laid down.
It is true, that in that case after forming the opinion that no treason could be committed, because no treasonable alliance had taken place, the court might have dispensed with proceeding further in the doctrines of treason. But it is to be remembered, that the judges might act separately, and perhaps at the same time, on the various propositions which might be instituted, and that no appeal lay from their decisions.
Opposite judgments on the point would have presented a state of things infinitely to be deplored by all. It was not surprising then that they should have made some attempt to settle principles which would probably occur, and which were in some degree connected with the point before them.
The court had employed some reasoning to show that without the actual embodying of men war could not be levied. It might have been inferred from this, that those only who were so embodied could be guilty of treason. Not only to exclude this inference, but also to affirm the contrary, the court proceeded to observe, "It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can be guilty of this crime who has not appeared in arms against his country. On the contrary, if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable object, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors."
This court is told that if this opinion be incorrect it ought not to be obeyed, because it was extra-judicial. For myself, I can say that I could not lightly be prevailed on to disobey it, were I even convinced that it was erroneous, but I would certainly use any means which the law placed in my power to carry the question again before the supreme court, for re-consideration, in a case in which it would directly occur and be fully argued.
The court which gave this opinion was composed of 5 judges. At the time I thought them unanimous, but I have since had reason to suspect that one of them, whose opinion is entitled to great respect, and whose indisposition prevented his entering into the discussions, on some of those points which were not essential to the decision of the very case under consideration, did not concur in this particular point with his brethren. Had the opinion been unanimous, it would have been given by a majority of the judges. But should the three who were absent concur with that judge who was present, and who perhaps differs from what was then the opinion of the court, a majority of the judges may overrule this decision. I should therefore feel no objection, although I then thought, and still think the opinion perfectly correct, to carry the point if possible again before the supreme court, if the case should depend upon it.
In saying that I still think the opinion perfectly correct, I do not consider myself as going further than the preceding reasoning goes. Some gentlemen have argued as if the supreme court had adopted the whole doctrine of the English books on the subject of accessories to treason. But certainly such is not the fact. Those only who perform a part, and who are leagued in the conspiracy are declared to be traitors. To complete the definition both circumstances must concur. They must "perform a part," which will furnish the overt act, and they must be "leagued in the conspiracy." The person who comes within this description, in the opinion of the court levies war. The present motion, however, does not rest upon this point; for, if under this indictment the U. States might be let in to prove the part performed by the prisoner, if he did perform any part, the court could not stop the testimony in its present stage.
2nd. The second point involves the character of the overt act which has been given in evidence, and calls upon the court to declare whether that act can amount to levying war. Although the court ought now to avoid any analysis of the testimony which has been offered in this case, provided the decision of the motion should not rest upon it, yet many reasons occur in giving peculiar propriety to a delivery, in the course of these trials, of a detailed opinion on the question, what is levying war? As this question has been argued at great length, it may probably save much trouble to the counsel now to give that opinion.
In opening the case it was contended by the Attorney for the United States and has since been maintained on the part of the prosecution, that neither arms nor the application of force or violence are indispensably necessary to constitute the fact of levying war. To illustrate these positions several cases have been stated, many of which would clearly amount to treason. In all of them, except that which was probably intended to be this case, and on which no observation will be made, the object of the assembly was clearly treasonable: its character was unequivocal, and was demonstrated by evidence furnished by the assembly itself; there was no necessity to rely upon information drawn from extrinsic sources, or in order to understand the fact, to pursue a course of intricate reasoning and to conjecture motives. A force is supposed to be collected for an avowed treasonable object, in a condition to attempt that object, and to have commenced the attempt by moving towards it. I state these particulars because although the cases put may establish the doctrine they are intended to support, may prove that the absence of arms, or the failure to apply force to sensible objects by the actual commission of violence on those objects, may be supplied by other circumstances, yet, they also serve to show that the mind requires those circumstances to be satisfied that war is levied.
Their construction of the opinion of the supreme court is, I think, thus for correct. It is certainly the opinion which was at the time entertained by myself, and which is still entertained. If a rebel army avowing its hostility to the sovereign power, should front that of the government, should march and countermarch before it, should manoeuvre in its face, and should then disperse from any cause whatever without firing a gun, I confess I could not without some surprise, hear gentlemen seriously contend that this could not amount to an act of levying war. A case equally strong may be put with respect to the absence of military weapons. If the party be in a condition to execute the purposed treason without the usual implements of war, I can perceive no reason for requiring those implements in order to constitute the crime.
It is argued that no adjudged case can be produced from the English books where actual violence has not been committed. Suppose this were true. No adjudged case has, or it is believed, can be produced from those books in which it has been laid down, that war cannot be levied without the actual application of violence to external objects. The silence of the reporters on this point may be readily accounted for. In cases of actual rebellion against the
government, the most active and influential leaders are generally most actively engaged in the war, and as the object can never be to extend punishment to extermination, a sufficient number are found among those who have committed actual hostilities, to satisfy the avenging arm of justice. In cases of constructive treason, such as pulling down meeting houses, where the direct and avowed object is not the destruction of the sovereign power, some act of violence might be generally required to give to the crime a sufficient degree of malignity to convert it into treason, to render the guilt of any individual unequivocal.
But Vaughan's case is a case where there was no real application of violence, and where the act was adjudged to be treason. Gentlemen argue that Vaughan was only guilty of adhering to the king's enemies, but they have not the authority of the court for so saying. The judges unquestionably treat the cruising of Vaughan as an overt act of levying war.
The opinions of the best elementary writers concur in declaring, that where a body of men are assembled for the purpose of making war against the government, and are in a condition to make that war, the assembly is an act of levying war. These opinions are contradicted by no adjudged case and are supported by Vaughan's case. This court is not inclined to controvert them.
But although in this respect, the opinion of the supreme court has not been misunderstood on the part of the prosecution, that opinion seems not to have been fully adverted to in a very essential point in which it is said to have been misconceived by others.
The opinion I am informed, has been construed to mean, that any assembly whatever for a treasonable purpose, whether in force, or not in force, whether in a condition to use violence or not in that condition, is a levying of war. It is this construction, which has not indeed been expressly advanced at the bar, but which is said to have been adopted elsewhere, that the court deems it necessary to examine.
Independent of authority, trusting only to the dictates of reason, and expanding terms according to their ordinary signification, we should probably all concur in the declaration that war could not be levied without the employment and exhibition of force. War is an appeal from reason to the sword, and he who makes the appeal evidences the fact by the use of the means. His intention to go to war may be proved by words, but the actual going to war is a fact which is to be proved by open deed. The end is to be effected by force, and it would seem that in cases where no declaration is to be made, the state of actual war could only be created by the employment of force or being in a condition to employ it.
But the term having been adopted by one constitution, must be understood in that sense in which it was universally received in this country, when the constitution was framed. The sense in which it was received is to be collected from the most approved authorities of that nation from which we have borrowed the term.
Lord Coke says, that levying war against the king was treason at the common law. "A compassing or conspiracy to levy war, he adds, is no treason, for there must be a levying of war in fact." He proceeds to state cases of constructive levying war, where the direct design is not to overthrow the government but to effect some general object by force. The terms he employs in stating these cases, are such as indicate an impression on his mind, that actual violence is a necessary ingredient in constituting the fact of levying war. He then proceeds to say, "An actual rebellion or insurrection is a levying of war within this act." "If any with strength and weapons invasive and defensive doth hold and defend a castle or fort against the king and his power, this is levying of war against the king." These cases are put to illustrate what he denominates "a war in fact." It is not easy to conceive "an actual invasion or insurrection" unconnected with force, nor can "a castle or fort be defended with strength and weapons invasive and defensive" without the employment of actual force. It would seem then to have been the opinion of Lord Coke, that to levy war there must be an assembly of men in a condition and with an intention to employ force. He certainly puts no case of a different description.
Lord Hale says (149. 6.) "what shall be said a levying of war is partly a question of fact, for it is not every unlawful or riotous assembly of many persons to do an unlawful act, though de facto they commit the act they intend, that makes a levying of war; for then every riot would be treason, &c." "but it must be such an assembly as carries with it speciem belli , the appearance of war, as if they ride or march vestitiis bellicis , with colours flying, or if they be formed into companies or furnished with military officers, or if they are armed with military weapons as swords, guns, bills, halberds, pikes, and are so circumstanced that it may be reasonably concluded they are in a posture of war, which circumstances are so various that it is hard to describe them all particularly."
"Only the general expressions in all the indictments of this nature that I have seen are more guerrino arraiati ," arrayed in warlike manner."
He afterwards adds, "If there be a war levied as is above declared, viz. an assembly arrayed in warlike manner, and in the posture of war for any treasonable attempt, it is bellum levitatum but not percussum ."
It is obvious that Lord Hale supposed an assembly of men in force, in a military posture, to be necessary to constitute the fact of levying war. The idea he appears to suggest, that the apparatus of war is necessary, has been very justly combated by an able judge who has written a valuable treatise on the subject of treason; but it is not re-argued that his position, that the assembly should be in a posture of war for any treasonable attempt, has ever been denied. Hawk. ch. 17, sec. 23, says, "That not only those who rebel against the king and take up arms to dethrone him, but also in many other cases, those who in a violent and forcible manner withstand his lawful authority are said to levy war against him, and therefore those that hold a fort or castle against the king's forces, or keep together armed numbers of men against the king's express command, have been adjudged to levy war against him."
The cases put by Hawkins are all cases of actual force and violence. Those who rebel against the king and take up arms to dethrone him, in many other cases those who in a violent and forcible manner withstand his lawful
authority." "Those that hold a fort or castle against his forces, or keep together armed numbers of men against his express command." These cases are obviously cases of force and violence.
Hawkins next proceeds to describe cases in which war is understood to be levied under the statute, although it was not directly made against the government. This Lord Hale terms an interpretation or constructive levying of war; and it will be perceived that he puts no case in which actual force is dispensed with.
"Those also, he says, who make an insurrection in order to redress a public grievance, whether it be a real or pretended one, and of their own authority attempt with force to redress it, are said to levy war against the king, although they have no direct design against his person, inasmuch as they insolently invade his prerogative by attempting to do that by private authority which he by public justice ought to do, which manifestly tends to a downright rebellion. As where great numbers by force attempt to remove certain persons from the king, &c." The cases here put by Hawkins of a constructive levying of war, do in terms require force as a constituent part of the description of the offence.
Judge Foster, in his valuable treatise on treason, states the opinion which has been quoted from Lord Hale, and differs from that writer so far as the latter might seem to require swords, drums, colours, &c. what he terms the pomp and pageantry of war, as essential circumstances to constitute the fact of levying war. In the cases of Damaree and Purchase, he says, "the want of those circumstances weighed nothing with the court although the prisoner's counsel insisted much on that matter." But he adds, "the number of the insurgents supplied the want of military weapons: and they were provided with axes, crowns and other tools of the like nature, proper for the mischief they intended to effect. Exercit arma ministrat ."
It is apparent that Judge Foster here alludes to an assembly in force, or as Lord Hale terms it, "in a warlike posture"—that is in a condition to attempt or proceed upon the treason which had been contemplated. The same author afterwards states at large the cases of Damaree and Purchase from 8th state trials, and they are cases where the insurgents not only assembled in force, in the posture of war, or in a condition to execute the treasonable design, but they did actually carry it into execution, and did resist the guards who were sent to disperse them.
Judge Foster states, sec. 4, all insurrections to effect certain innovations of a public and general concern by an armed force, to be in contravention of law, high treason within the clause of levying war.
The cases put by Foster of constructive levying of war, all contain as a material ingredient, the actual employment of force. After going through this branch of his subject, he proceeds to state the law in a case of actual levying war, that is, where the war is intended directly against the government.
He says, sec. 9, "An assembly armed and arrayed in a warlike manner for a treasonable purpose is bellum levitatum though not bellum percussum . Lifting and marching are sufficient overt acts without coming to a battle or action. So cruising on the king's subjects under a French commission, France being then at war with us, was held to be adhering to the king's enemies though no other act of hostility be proved."
"An assembly armed and arrayed in a warlike manner for any treasonable purpose," is certainly in a state or force; in a condition to execute the treason for which they assembled. The words "enlisting and marching," which are overt acts of levying war, do in the arrangement of the sentence, also imply a state of force, though that state is not expressed in terms for the succeeding words, which state a particular event as not having happened, prove that event to have been the next circumstance to those which had happened—they are "without coming to a battle or action." "If men be enlisted and march" (that is, if they march prepared for battle or in a condition for action, for marching is a technical term applied to the movement of a military corps) it is an overt act of levying war though they do not come to a battle or action. This exposition is rendered the stronger by what seems to be put in the same sentence as a parallel case with respect to adhering to an enemy. It is cruising under a commission from an enemy without committing any other act of hostility. Cruising is the act of sailing in warlike form and in a condition to assail those of whom the cruiser is in quest.
This exposition which seems to be that intended by Judge Foster, is rendered the more certain by a reference to the case in the state trials from which the extracts are taken. The words used by the Chief Justice are "when men form themselves into a body and march rank and file with weapons offensive and defensive, this is levying of war with open force, if the design be public." Mr. Phipps, the counsel for the prisoner afterwards observed, "Intending to levy war is not treason unless a war be actually levied." To this the Chief Justice answered, "Is it not actually levying of war, if they actually provide arms, and levy men, and in a warlike manner set out and cruise, and come with a design to destroy our ships?" Mr. Phipps still insisted "it would not be an actual levying of war unless they committed some act of hostility." "Yes, indeed, said the Chief Justice, the going on board and being in a posture to attack the king's ships." Mr. Baron Poins added, "but for you to say that because they did not actually fight it is not a levying of war, is it not plain what they did intend? That they came with that intention, that they came in that posture, that they came armed, and had guns and blunderbusses and surrounded the ship twice; they came with an armed force, that is a strong evidence of the design."
The point insisted on by counsel in the case of Vaughan, as in this case, was, that war could not be levied without actual fighting. In this the counsel was very properly overruled; but it is apparent that the judges proceeded entirely on the idea that a warlike posture was indispensable to the fact of levying war.
Judge Foster proceeds to give other instances of levying war. "Attacking the king's forces in opposition to his authority upon a march or in quarters is levying war." "Holding a castle or fort against the king or his forces, if actual force be used in order to keep possession, is levying war. But a bare detainer or stoppage by shutting the gates against the king or his forces, without any other force from within, Lord Hale conceives will not amount to treason."

The whole doctrine of Judge Foster on this subject, seems to demonstrate a clear opinion that a state of force and violence, a posture of war must exist to constitute technically as well as really the fact of levying war.
Judge Blackstone seems to concur with his predecessors. Speaking of levying war, he says, "This may be done by taking arms not only to dethrone the king, but under pretence to reform religion, or the laws, or to remove evil counsellors, or other grievances, whether real or pretended. For the law does not, neither can it permit any private man or set of men to interfere forcibly in matters of such high importance."
He proceeds to give examples of levying war, which show that he contemplated actual force as a necessary ingredient in the composition of this crime.
It would seem then from the English authorities, that the words "levying war," have not received a technical different from their natural meaning, so far as respects the character of the assemblage of men which may constitute the fact. It must be a warlike assemblage, carrying the appearance of force, and in a situation to practice hostility.
Several judges of the United States have given opinions at their circuits on this subject, all of which defer and will receive the particular attention of this court.
In his charge to the grand jury when John Fries was indicted, in consequence of a forcible opposition to the direct tax, Judge Iredell is understood to have said, "I think I am warranted in saying, that if in the case of the insurgents who may come under your consideration, the intention was to prevent by force of arms the execution of any act of the Congress of the United States altogether, any forcible opposition calculated to carry that intention into effect, was a levying of war against the United States, and of course an act of treason." To levy war then, according to this opinion of Judge Iredell, required the actual exertion of force.
Judge Patterson, in his opinions delivered in two different cases, seems not to differ from Judge Iredell. He does not, indeed, precisely state the employment of force as necessary to constitute a levying war, but in giving his opinion in cases in which force was actually employed, he considers the crime in one case as dependent on the intention, and in the other case he says, "combining these facts and this design," (that is, combining actual force with a treasonable design) "the crime is high treason."
Judge Peters has also indicated the opinion that force was necessary to constitute the crime of levying war.
Judge Chase has been particularly clear and explicit. In an opinion which he appears to have prepared on great consideration, he says, "The court are of opinion, that if a body of people conspire and meditate an insurrection to resist or oppose the execution of a statute of the United States by force, that they are only guilty of a high misdemeanor; but if they proceed to carry such intention into execution by force, that they are guilty of the treason of levying war; and the quantum of the force employed neither increases nor diminishes the crime; whether by one hundred or one thousand persons, is wholly immaterial."
"The court are of opinion, that a combination or conspiracy to levy war against the United States is not treason unless combined with an attempt to carry such combination or conspiracy into execution, some actual force or violence must be used in pursuance of such design to levy war; but that it is altogether immaterial whether the force used be sufficient to effectuate the object. Any force connected with the intention will constitute the crime of levying war."
In various parts of the opinion delivered by Judge Chase, in the case of Fries, the same sentiments are to be found. It is to be observed, that these judges are not content that troops should be assembled in a condition to employ force. According to them some degree of force must have been actually employed.
The Judges of the United States, then, so far as their opinions have been quoted, seem to have required still more to constitute the fact of levying war, than has been required by the English books. Our Judges seem to have required the actual exercise of force, the actual employment of some degree of violence. This however may be, and probably is, because in the cases in which their opinions were given, the design not having been to overturn the government, but to resist the execution of a law, such an assemblage would be sufficient for the purpose, as to require the actual employment of force to render the object unequivocal.
But it is said all these authorities have been overruled by the decision of the supreme court in the case of the United States against Swartwout and Bollman.
If the supreme court have indeed extended the doctrine of treason, further than it has heretofore been carried by the judges of England, or of this country, their decision would be submitted to. At least this court could go no further than to endeavor again to bring the point directly before them. It would however be expected that an opinion which is to overrule former precedents, and to establish a principal never before recognized, should be expressed in plain and explicit terms. A mere implication, ought not to prostrate a principle which seems to have been so well established. Had the intention been entertained to make so material a change in this respect, the court ought to have expressly declared, that any assemblage of men whatever, who had formed a treasonable design, whether in force, or not, whether in a condition to attempt the design or not, whether attended with warlike appearances or not, constitutes the fact of levying war. Yet no declaration to this amount is made. Not an expression of the kind is to be found in the opinion of the supreme court. The foundation on which this argument rests is the omission of the court to state, that the assemblage which constitutes the fact of levying war ought to be in force, and some passages, which show that the question respecting the nature of the assemblage, was not in the mind of the court when the opinion was drawn, which passages are mingled with others, which at least show that there was no intention to depart from the course of the precedents in cases of treason by levying war.
Every opinion, to be correctly understood, ought to be considered with a view to the case in which it was delivered. In the case of the United States against Bollman and Swartwout, there was no evidence that even two men had ever met for the purpose of executing the plan, in which those persons were charged with having participated. It was therefore sufficient for the court to say that if men were assembled war could not be levied. That case was decided by this declaration. The court might indeed have defined the species of assemblage which would amount to levying war, but, as this opinion was not a treatise on treason, but a decision of a particular case, expressions of doubtful import should be construed in reference to the case itself; and the mere omission to state that a particular circumstance was necessary to the consummation of the crime, ought not to be construed into a declaration that the circumstance was unimportant.
General expressions ought not to be considered as overruling settled principles without a direct declaration to that effect. After these preliminary observations the court will proceed to examine the opinion which has occasioned them.
The first expression in it bearing on the present question is "To constitute that specific crime for which the prisoner now before the court has been committed, war must be actually levied against the United States. However flagitious may be the crime of conspiracy to subvert by force the government of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war and actually to levy war, are distinct offences. The first must be brought into operation by the assemblage of men for a purpose treasonable in itself, or the fact of levying war cannot have been committed."
Although it is not expressly stated that the assemblage of men for the purpose of carrying into operation the treasonable intent, which will amount to levying war, must be an assemblage in force, yet it is fairly to be inferred from the context, and nothing like dispensing with force appears in this paragraph. The expressions are "to constitute the crime war must be actually levied." A conspiracy to levy war is spoken of as "a conspiracy to subvert by force the government of our country," speaking in general terms of an assemblage of men for this, or for any other purpose, a person would naturally be understood as speaking of an assemblage in some degree adapted to the purpose. An assemblage to subvert by force the government of our country, and amounting to a levying of war, should be an assemblage in force.
In a subsequent paragraph the court says, "It is not the intention of the court to say, that no individual can be guilty of this crime who has not appeared in arms against his country. On the contrary if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually assembled in order to effect by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, &c. and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are traitors. But there must be an actual assemblage of men for the treasonable purpose to constitute a levying of war."
The observations made on the preceding paragraph apply to this. "A body of men actually assembled, in order to effect by force a treasonable purpose," must be a body assembled with such appearance of force as would warrant the opinion that they were assembled for the particular purpose; an assemblage to constitute an actual levying of war should be an assemblage with such appearance of force as would justify the opinion that they met for the purpose.
This explanation, which is believed to be the natural, certainly not strained explanation of the words, derives some additional aid from the terms in which the paragraph last quoted commences. "It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can be guilty of treason who has not appeared in arms against his country." These words seem to obviate an inference which might otherwise have been drawn from the preceding paragraph. They indicate that in the mind of the court the assemblage stated in that paragraph was an assemblage in arms. That the individuals who composed it had appeared in arms against their country. That is in other words that the assemblage was a military or a warlike assemblage.
The succeeding paragraph in the opinion relates to a conspiracy and serves to show that force and violence were in the mind of the court, and that there was no idea of extending the crime of treason by construction beyond the constitutional definition which had been given of it.
Returning to the case actually before the court, it is said "a design to overturn the government of the U. States in New Orleans by force, would have been unquestionably a design which if carried into execution would have been treason, and the assemblage of a body of men for the purpose of carrying it into execution would amount to levying of war against the U. S."
Now what could reasonably be said to be an assemblage of a body of men for the purpose of overturning the government of the U. S. in New Orleans by force? Certainly an assemblage in force; an assemblage prepared and intending to act with force; a military assemblage. The decisions therefore made by the judges of the United States, are then declared to be in conformity with the principles laid down by the supreme court. Is this declaration compatible with the idea of departing from those opinions on a point within the contemplation of the court? The opinions of Judge Patterson and Judge Iredell are said "to imply an actual assemblage of men though they rather designed to remark on the purpose to which the force was to be applied than on the nature of the force itself." This observation certainly indicates that the necessity of an assemblage of men was the particular point the court meant to establish, and that the idea of force was never separated from this assemblage.
The opinion of Judge Chase is next quoted with approbation. This opinion in terms requires the employment of force.
After stating the verbal communications said to have been made by Mr. Swartwout to Gen. Wilkinson, the court says "if these words imply that the government of New Orleans was to be revolutionized by force, although merely as a step to or a means of exciting some greater projects, the design was unquestionably treasonable, and any assemblage of men for that purpose would amount to a levying of war."
The words "any assemblage of men" if construed to affirm that any two or three of the conspirators who might be found together after this plan had been formed, would be the act of levying war, would certainly be misconstrued. The sense of the expressions "any assemblage of men" is restricted by the words "for this purpose." Now could it be in the contemplation of the court that a body of men would assemble for the purpose of revolutionizing New Orleans by force, who should not themselves be in force?
After noticing some difference of opinion among the judges respecting the import of the words said to have been used by Mr. Swartwout the court proceeds to observe: "But whether this treasonable intention be really imputable to the plan or not, it is admitted that it must have been carried into execution by an open assemblage for that purpose, previous to the arrest of the prisoner, in order to consummate the crime as to him."
Could the court have conceived "an open assemblage" "for the purpose of overturning the government of New Orleans by force" to be only equivalent to a secret future assemblage without the appearance of force?
After quoting the words of Mr. Swartwout, and from the affidavit, in which it was stated that Mr. Burr was levying an army of 7,000 men, and observing that the treason to be inferred from these words would depend on the intention with which it was levied, and on the progress which had been made in levying it, the court say "the question then is, whether this evidence proves col. Burr to have advanced so far in levying an army as actually to have assembled them."
Actually to assemble an army of 7,000 men is unquestionably to place those who are to assemble in a state of open force.
But as the mode of expression used in this passage might be misconstrued so far as to countenance the opinion that it would be necessary to assemble the whole army in order to constitute the fact of levying war, the court proceeds to say, "It is argued that since it cannot be necessary that the whole 7,000 men should be assembled, their commencing their march by detachments to the place of rendezvous must be sufficient to constitute the crime."
"This position is correct with some qualification. It cannot be necessary that the whole army should assemble and that the various parts which are to compose it should have combined. But it is necessary there should be an actual assemblage; and therefore this evidence should make the fact unequivocal."
"The travelling of individuals to the place of rendezvous, would perhaps not be sufficient. This would be an equivocal act, and has no warlike appearance. The meeting of particular bodies of men, and their marching from places of partial to a place of general rendezvous would be such an assemblage."
The position here stated by the counsel for the prosecution is, that the army "commencing its march by detachments to the place of rendezvous (that is of the army,) must be sufficient to constitute the crime."
This position is not admitted by the court to be universally correct. It is said to be "correct with some qualification." What is that qualification?
"The travelling of individuals to the place of rendezvous," (and by this term is not to be understood one individual by himself, but several individuals either separately or together but not in military form) "would perhaps not be sufficient." Why not sufficient? Because says the court, "this would be an equivocal act and has no warlike appearance." The act then would be unequivocal and should have a warlike appearance. It must exhibit in the words of Sir Matthew Hale Speciem belli , the appearance of war. This construction is rendered in some measure necessary when we observe that the court is qualifying the position, "That the army commencing their march by detachments to the place of rendezvous must be sufficient to constitute the crime." In qualifying this position they say, "the travelling of individuals would perhaps not be sufficient." Now, a solitary individual travelling to any point, with any intent, could not, without a total disregard of language, be termed a marching detachment. The court, therefore, must have contemplated several individuals travelling together; and the words being used in reference to the position they were intended to qualify, would seem to indicate the distinction between the appearances attending the usual movement of a company of men for civil purposes, and that military movement which might in correct language be denominated "marching by detachments."
The court then proceeded to say, "the meeting of particular bodies of men, and their marching from places of partial to a place of general rendezvous, would be such an assemblage." It is obvious from the context, that the court must have intended to state a case which would in itself be unequivocal, because it would have a warlike appearance. The case stated, is that of distinct bodies of men assembling at different places and marching from these places of partial to a place of general rendezvous. When this has been done, an assemblage is produced which would in itself be unequivocal. But when is it done? What is the assemblage here described? The assemblage formed of the different bodies of partial to a place of general rendezvous. In describing the mode of coming to this assemblage the civil term "travelling" is dropped, and the military term "marching" is employed. If this was intended as a definition of an assemblage which would amount to levying war, the definition requires an assemblage at a place of general rendezvous, composed of bodies of men who had previously assembled at places of partial rendezvous. But this is not intended as a definition, for clearly if there should be no places of partial rendezvous, if troops should embody in the first instance, in great force for the purpose of subverting the government by violence, the act would be unequivocal, it would have a warlike appearance, and it would, according to the opinion of the supreme court properly construed, and according to the English authorities, amount to levying war. But this, though not a definition, is put as an example; and surely it may be safely taken as an example. If different bodies of men, in pursuance of a treasonable design plainly proved, should assemble in warlike appearance at places of partial rendezvous, and should march from those places to a place of general rendezvous, it is difficult to conceive how such a transaction could take place without exhibiting the appearance of war, without an obvious display of force. At any rate, a court in stating generally such a military assemblage as would amount to levying war, and having a case before them in which there was no assemblage whatever, cannot reasonably be understood in putting such an example, to dispense with those appearances of war which seem to be required by the general current of authorities. Certainly they ought not to be so understood when they say in express terms, that "it is more safe as well as more consonant to the principles of our constitution, that the crime of treason should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases; and that crimes not already within the constitutional definition, should receive such punishment as the legislature in its wisdom may provide."
After this analysis of the opinion of the supreme court, it will be observed, that the direct question whether an assemblage of men which might be construed to amount to a levying of war, must appear in force or in military form, was not in argument or in fact before the court, and does not appear to have been in terms decided? The opinion seems to have been drawn without particularly advertising to this question, and therefore upon a transient view of particular expressions, might inspire the idea that a display of force, that appearances of war were not necessary ingredients to constitute the fact of levying war. But upon a more intent and more accurate investigation of this opinion, although the terms force and violence are not employed as descriptive of the assemblage, such requisites are declared to be indispensable as can scarcely exist without the appearance of war and the existence of real force. It is said that war must be levied in fact, that the object must be one which is to be effected by force; that the assemblage must be such as to prove that this is its object, that it must not be an equivocal act, without a warlike appearance, that it must be an open assemblage for the purpose of force. In the course of this opinion, decisions are quoted and approved, which require the employment of force to constitute the crime. It seems extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile these various declarations with the idea that the supreme court considered a secret unarmed meeting, although that meeting be of conspirators, and although it met with a treasonable intent, as an actual levying of war. Without saying that the assemblage must be in force or in warlike form, they express themselves so as to show that this idea was never discarded, and they use terms which cannot be otherwise satisfied.
The opinion of a single judge certainly weighs as nothing if opposed to that of the supreme court; but if he was one of the judges who assented in framing that opinion, if while the impression under which it was framed was yet fresh upon his mind, he delivered an opinion on the same testimony, not contradictory to that which had been given by all the judges together, but showing the sense in which he understood terms that might be differently expounded, it may fairly be said to be in some measure explanatory of the opinion itself.
To the judge before whom the charge against the prisoner at the bar was first brought, the same testimony was offered with that which had been exhibited before the supreme court, and he was required to give an opinion in almost the same case. Upon this occasion he said, "War can only be levied by the employment of actual force. Troops must be embodied; men must be assembled in order to levy war." Again he observed, "The fact to be proved in this case is an act of public notoriety. It must exist in the view of the world or it cannot exist at all. The assembling of forces to levy war is a visible transaction, and numbers must witness it."
It is not easy to doubt what kind of assemblage was in the mind of the judge who uttered these expressions, and it is to be recollected that he had just returned from the supreme court and was speaking on the very facts on which the opinion of that court was delivered.
The same judge in his charge to the Grand Jury who found this bill, observed, "to constitute the fact of levying war, it is not necessary that hostilities shall have actually commenced by engaging the military force of the U. S. or that measures of violence against the government shall have been carried into execution. But levying war is a fact in the constitution of which force is an indispensable ingredient. Any combination to subvert by force the government of the U. S. violently to dismember the union, to compel a change in the administration, to coerce the repeal or adoption of a general law, is a conspiracy to levy war, and if the conspiracy be carried into effect by the actual employment of force, by the embodying and assembling of men for the purpose of executing the treasonable design which was previously conceived, it amounts to levying of war. It has been held that arms are not essential to levying war provided the force assembled be sufficient to attain, or perhaps to justify attempting the object without them." This paragraph is immediately followed by a reference to the opinion of the supreme court.
It requires no commentary upon these words to show, that in the opinion of the judge who uttered them, an assemblage of men which should constitute the fact of levying war must be an assemblage in force; and that he so understood the opinion of the supreme court. If in that opinion, there may be found in some passages, a want of precision, an indefiniteness of expression, which has occasioned it to be differently understood by different persons, that may well be accounted for when it is recollected that in the particular case there was no assemblage whatever. In expounding that opinion the whole should be taken together, and in reference to the particular case in which it was delivered. It is however not improbable that the misunderstanding has arisen from this circumstance. The court unquestionably did not consider arms as an indispensable requisite to levying war; an assemblage adapted to the object might be in a condition to effect or to attempt it without them. Nor did the court consider the actual application of the force to the object as, at all times, an indispensable requisite; for an assemblage might be in a condition to apply force, might be in a state adapted to real war, without having made the actual application of that force. From these positions, which are to be found in the opinion, it may have been inferred, it is thought too hastily, that the nature of the assemblage was unimportant, and that war might be considered as actually levied by any meeting of men, if a criminal intention can be imputed to them by testimony of any kind whatever.
It has been thought proper to discuss this question at large and to review the opinion of the supreme court, although this court would be more disposed to leave the question of fact, whether an overt act of levying war was committed on Blennerhassett's island to the jury under this explanation of the law, and to instruct them, that unless the assemblage on Blennerhassett's island was an assemblage in force, was a military assemblage in a condition to make war, it was not a levying of war, and that they could not construe it into an act of war, than to arrest the further testimony which might be offered to connect the prisoner with that assemblage, or to prove the intention of those who assembled together at that place. This point, however, is not to be understood as decided. It will, perhaps, constitute an essential enquiry in another case.
Before leaving the opinion of the supreme court entirely on the question of the nature of the assemblage which will constitute an act of levying war, this court cannot forbear to ask, if it not an assemblage absolutely required? Is it not to judge in some measure of the end by the proportion which the means bear to the end? Why is it that a single armed individual, entering a boat and sailing down the Ohio, for the avowed purpose of attacking New Orleans could not be said to levy war? Is it not that he is apparently not in a condition to levy war? If this be so, ought not the assemblage to furnish some evidence of its intention and capacity to levy war before it can amount to levying war? And ought not the supreme court, when speaking of an assemblage for the purpose of effecting a treasonable object by force, be understood to indicate an assemblage exhibiting the appearance of force.
The definition of the Attorney for the United States, deserves notice in this respect. It is "when there is an assemblage of men, convened for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable object, which force is meant to be employed before the assemblage disperses, this is treason."
To read this definition without advertising to the argument, we should infer that the assemblage was itself to effect by force the treasonable object, not to join itself to some other bodies of men and then to effect the object by their combined force. Under this construction it would be expected the appearance of the assemblage would bear some proportion to the object and would indicate the intention. At any rate that it would be an assemblage in force. This construction is most certainly not that which was intended, but it serves to show that general phrases must always be understood in reference to the subject matter, and to the general principles of law.
(To be Continued.)
A more particular account of the proceedings on
Tuesday, Sept. 1.
The Jury retired, and after an absence of 20 minutes returned a verdict in these words:
"We, of the Jury, find that AARON BURR is not proved to be guilty under this indictment, by any evidence submitted to us. We, therefore, find him NOT GUILTY."
This form of a verdict was objected to by col. Burr and his counsel, who insisted that it should be in the usual form, simply, Not Guilty .
Mr. Hay contended, that the jury had a right to find their verdict in this form if they thought proper; and that it should be recorded in the very words of the verdict. It might be more satisfactory to them, and announced in effect to the same thing as a general verdict of Not Guilty . He knew of no law, and he was certain there was no principle against it; and in criminal cases form was law . Why else are precedents always consulted to ascertain what the law is.
Col. Burr contended that the jury had no right to bring in a written verdict, or to say more than whether he was guilty or not guilty. The form of the charge given to the jury, (which was read, at his request, by the clerk,) would point out their duty. This was, that they were to say whether guilty or not guilty, and no more.
Mr. Hay observed that if the verdict were not in writing the same objections might occur, if the jury should persist in the form adopted by them. They might direct their foreman to deliver it ore tenus , in the very words which had been indorsed on the indictment.
Colonel Burr. The charge given to the jury, so far from including such matters as they have inferred in their verdict expressly excludes it. If they had delivered it ore tenus it would have been considered as nothing more would have been thought of it. But they had no right to defer a record of the court.
Mr. Parker, one of the jury, enquired whether the endorsement on the indictment could not stand, and the verdict be entered on the record in the common form of not guilty . If he were sent out again he should not agree to return a verdict in any other form; and if he were to answer ore tenus , he should use the very same words.
Chief Justice. If the jury think proper to alter their verdict it is very well; but if they insist upon retaining the form in which they have returned it, the court cannot reject it; because it is a full endorsement remained as the jury had inserted it, and the clerk recorded the verdict in the common form not guilty .
WEDNESDAY, Sept. 2.
Mr. Hay wished to know whether he understood the opinion of the court correctly, as to what would constitute an overt act of treason. According to his construction of that opinion, the evidence of the transactions at Blennerhassett's island did not amount to an overt act. If so, it would be improper to proceed with the prosecution of Blennerhassett and Smith, on the indictments now found against them. He certainly should not press upon the jury, doctrines in opposition to the opinion of the court; but should consider it his duty, to enter a nolle prosequi , and move to send them for trial to the place where an overt act was committed.
The Chief Justice said that it was undoubtedly the opinion of the court, that the facts proven to have been committed at Blennerhassett's island did not amount to an overt act of treason. But the court did not intend that their opinion should apply to the facts of any particular case. They only meant to declare the law, leaving it to the jury to determine from the facts submitted to them, whether an overt act of treason had been committed or not.
Mr. Hay observed, that he should enter a nolle prosequi as to Blennerhassett and Smith, and move the court to commit them together with the person who now stands before them indicted of a misdemeanor, in order that they may be sent to the place where the overt act was committed; if the court should be of opinion, after hearing the evidence that it would be proper to do so. For this purpose he moved that Blennerhassett and Smith be brought into court.—Col. Burr contended, that his case and that of Mr. Blennerhassett and Mr. Smith was quite separate and distinct, and that the motion could not be blended. To hear them together would tend to produce confusion. He should insist that the motion against him be taken up separately. He should also insist that there be a specification of the place where the offence is supposed to have been committed.—Mr. Hay said, he did not know that he was bound to specify the place; but he had no objection to doing it as far as was in his power. It is said that Col. Burr was at the mouth of Cumberland; there he was joined by Blennerhassett and Smith; & from thence descended the river with the forces which he had been collecting; their number of men and military accompaniments increasing till the moment when they were finally dispersed. It will be in the power of the court to say after the evidence should be heard, whether they should be sent to another place for trial, and to what place. He confessed that he made the motion with a great deal of reluctance. He had paid more than his full share of the cost; and it was the course which he considered and a sense of duty prescribed. The form of the motion was objected to. It was said that we had no right to blend the examination of the three persons accused. The propriety of this course must be obvious. Blennerhassett & Smith would not be bound by evidence which was not delivered in their presence. If a motion should be made separately, the evidence must be three times repeated. It is supposed that much confusion will result from a joint examination. He did not expect to have heard much observations addressed to the court. However chaotic, however confused the case may be, the court will have no difficulty in separating the evidence and applying it to each person. But he believed the testimony would bear equally upon all; for they were all present. If however, it should be the pleasure of the court to hear the motions separately, he should acquiesce.
Col. Burr remarked, that there would be no necessity to repeat the testimony, because the court could recollect it and apply it to the case of each individual. Besides some evidence might be deemed necessary by some, which would not be by another.
Mr. Ewing said, that Col. Burr, having gone thro' one trial for the whole treason, he had open different grounds from any one of the others. Different, not only as it related to many legal questions, but to the evidence which might be adduced. When the evidence should be gone through, he expected that Mr. Hay's overt act would be to himself a subject of ridicule. Besides there were separate counsel retained for the several gentlemen; and the examination ought, as nearly as possible to assume the shape of a final and regular trial.
Mr. Wilkinson observed, that Col. Burr had been tried for treason; and the jury had found a verdict of not guilty . He was consequently entitled to his discharge, though he had not as yet moved for it.—He appears as any other innocent man, and unless something else should be exhibited, he could not with any degree of propriety be detained longer in custody. Again, the scene of action laid by the counsel for the prosecution, embraces a range of fifteen hundred miles. Suppose a man arrested by a warrant on suspicion of treason or felony. Would not the prosecutor be compelled to designate some place where the crime was supposed to have been committed? Surely he would.
Chief Justice. With respect to the verdict not guilty, that is a question of law and not of fact. On the question of a general charge of treason or felony, I understand the law to be that the accusation may be brought against any individual; and it is the duty of the judge to enquire whether a crime has been committed against the United States. If the judge shall be of opinion that an offence has been committed, but not within the jurisdiction of the court, it is the duty of the district judge to remove the accused to the district where the offence was committed. That a G. Jury may find a bill against several persons, he believed, there could be no doubt; but he was not certain whether they could be tried together before the petit jury, without their own consent. It was rather inclined to think that they could not.

There could be no doubt but that there could not be a joint trial without consent of parties. The Chief Justice mentioned a difficulty which he did not know how the court could get over. Colonel Burr was now in custody of the marshal, and bound to answer an indictment for a misdemeanor. He did not know how he could be taken out of that custody and sent to a foreign jurisdiction for trial of another offence. Mr. Hay, I shall make the motion to the court, and leave it to the court to decide. Chief Justice said he did not know how he could do it. Mr. Hay, I know how to do it. When the court is called upon to decide, and the difficulty prevents itself, I will remove it. I do not expect to untie the knot, but I can cut it. Mr. Wickham contended, that the difficulty should be removed in the first instance. Col. Burr was now in custody. Mr. Hay observed, that it was obvious the question did not occur till the court was called upon to transmit the accused. Then the difficulty will present itself and not before. Mr. Bots, said, the subject presented two questions, one to commit, and the other to transmit to a foreign court. Which was the most regular in the order of proceedings? Surely the commitment. Suppose Col. Burr had been in custody, and bound to answer in another court—Could this court act upon him till he was discharged from his prosecution there? Mr. Wickham, after making some observations as to the course of proceedings in this case, said, that this might be sport to the government. He would not say it was death to Col. Burr; but it was death to every individual whom the government might think proper to persecute. Chief Justice. This court commits, the district judge transmits. But why commit for custody? He is already in custody. Mr. Hay. The application to you, Sir, is to commit. If the district judge should find any difficulty, upon enquiring into the circumstances, it will be removed. Chief Justice. The only doubt is whether this court is not bound to hear the whole case before a decision is made. Suppose the motion had been made before the district judge, might he not require a decision upon the present indictment before he committed?—(After examining the law) The C. J. said, that when a person was to be transmitted to a foreign court, if the offence was bailable, the court was to take a recognizance of bail. Now, can the court take a recognizance to appear in another court when the party is bound to appear in this? This court is bound to specify the court to which the accused is to be sent; and the district judge is bound to send him. Mr. Blennerhassett and Mr. Smith were brought into court by the Marshal. Mr. Hay observed, that the three persons then before the court, all stood in the same situation and the same difficulty applied to all. He regretted that the court had not expressed an opinion before the prisoners had been sent for. He was not disposed to disturb the opinions of the court; but would go on with the trial for a misdemeanor against Col. Burr. The clerk was about to read the indictment for a misdemeanor, when he was interrupted by Col. Burr, who said he was not to be arraigned, but might plead by attorney. He said that he was not in court upon that indictment. He was only in court because he had not moved to be discharged from the first indictment. He hoped that nothing which had passed would prevent a full consideration of this subject. In this case he wished to get up certain land marks by which others might be guided, who were to follow; and he feared there would be many. Mr. Wirt enquired as to the effect of the proclamation which was made by the marshal after the jury had returned their verdict. The usual course was, (and the one which had been adopted in this case) to know of any treasons, felonies, or other misdemeanors committed or done by the prisoner at the bar, let them come forth and they shall be heard. The prisoner at the bar stands upon his deliverance, that is, his discharge. Mr. Hay. It was at first objected that Col. Burr was in custody, and therefore he could not be transmitted to any other court. We are now told that he is not in custody. Mr. Bots went into a lengthy argument to prove that although Col. Burr was corporally present, he was not legally in court. He produced a number of precedents from the records of the general court of this state, as well as of the Federal court, to show that after an indictment for a misdemeanor, the regular process was a summons , and not a capias by which the body could be arrested. He relied particularly on the opinion of Judge Todd pronounced in Mundell's case, in which he considered the practice of the state courts as adopted throughout by the judicial act of Congress, and on the practice in Sinclair's case which was a prevention under this very act.—In the latter case, the process was a summons . Col. Burr observed, that his counsel considered it a question of policy not to move for his discharge immediately. In submitting to give bail to the misdemeanor in the first instance, it was never his intention to admit the right to demand it. The C. J. said, that he had determined, in the first instance that bail was demandable, without considering the subject fully. He thought the law was clear. But he was open to conviction. He did not think himself precluded from a full examination of its propriety. Mr. Hay said, he was not solicitous as to the result of the motion. The question now was, whether the prisoner should appear to the indictment for a misdemeanor without bail. Whenever a motion should be made to discharge him altogether, he should object to it, on the ground that treason had been committed elsewhere. He relied upon the act of Congress, which said, that for any crime or offence against the U. S. the prisoner upon an arrest should be committed or give bail. He also relied upon the practice of this court in the case of Logwood . He had no doubt as to the application of the law of Congress to the practice of the state courts in civil cases. His only doubts were whether it applied to criminal cases. Mr. Wickham considered that the act of Congress declaring that the usual mode of process of the several states in criminal cases should be adopted, was conclusive upon this question—The act of Congress fixes the punishment, but the proceedings are to be according to the laws of the several states. It had no objection to state the motives which governed the counsel of Col. Burr, in submitting to bail as to the misdemeanor. Such was the infatuation of the public mind, that if the grand jury had not found a true bill as to the treason, it was believed that Col. Burr would have been taken with or without process, and sent to some other place. He therefore gave bail as to the misdemeanor, in order that he might be under the protection of the court. The C. J. said, that when he gave his opinion on the question of entering into an examination of evidence with a view to send the accused to Cumberland or to some other place, it was predicated on the idea that he was actually confined by the process of this court. The precedents of this court which have been quoted, seem to settle the practice very differently from my ideas of the law of Congress, in relation to criminal prosecutions. The question deserves consideration; and if I should be of opinion that I am bound by those precedents then the foundation on which I gave my opinion falls. Mr. Hay enquired, where would be the propriety of issuing a process to bring a person into court, who was already before it. The C. J. said, that if a capias should be determined to be the proper process, he should consider the marshal to take him into custody; but if a summons should be considered the regular process, he could not make such an order; and a summons must be awarded. If a venire issues, it will involve a question, whether the party is not entitled to a continuance. The court took time to consider, and adjourned till to-morrow 10 o'clock.
THURSDAY, September 3rd. The Chief Justice delivered his opinion as to the proper process on an indictment for a misdemeanor of the kind charged against Col. Burr; the result of which was, after examining the laws of Congress and reviewing all the precedents, that the regular process was a capias . As soon as this opinion was delivered, Mr. Hay observed that he would then proceed to the trial of the indictment for the misdemeanor—C. J. The issue must be made up. I suppose—Mr. Burr. A letter has been demanded from the President of the U. S. which has been often promised, but never produced. I wish to know if that letter is in court, and whether it cannot be put into the hands of the clerk—Mr. Hay. I believe that it is not in my possession, for I have not been able to find it among my papers after a minute search. It is possible that it may be among them. Perhaps it may not be necessary to produce it, as there is a copy of it which is ready to be verified by the oath of more than one person—Mr. Burr. I cannot admit a copy. It is certainly strange, that after the President's promise, this letter is not here. Mr. Martin. It is within my knowledge, that Mr. Rodney has been to the city of Washington since the application was made for this paper—Mr. Hay. I have made a minute search, among the large bundles of papers, which Mr. Rodney has transmitted to me, but I have not yet found it. General Wilkinson has a copy of the letter verified on oath—C. J. Unless the loss of the original be proved, a copy cannot be admitted. Mr. Hay then observed that he should now call the attention of the court to the subject of Bail; as the opinion just delivered by the court demands bail; that since bail was demanded of him on a former occasion, circumstances had considerably varied, and some had occurred which ought to mitigate the amount of bail: that it was useless for him to mention those circumstances as they were well known, and it would consequently be understood that he was not as able to give as much bail; that it should also be recollected, that the prosecution for treason had failed; and that under such circumstances he conceived that half the sum which was demanded on a former occasion was sufficient for the present. Mr. Bots repeated the same idea. He observed that in this country the state of a man's property was a criterion for the amount of bail; and that it could not be expected that a man of no property should give high bail. Col. Burr's circumstances were well known. Mr. Hay differed in one respect from the opposite counsel. Col. B. had certainly been acquitted on the charge of treason, but it was not after a full exhibition of the evidence. A small portion indeed had been produced; but the greatest part of the most interesting evidence had been excluded. It was proper that the charge for treason should be fully investigated somewhere; either in Kentucky, Tennessee or the Mississippi Territory; and that Mr. Burr's person should be kept safe until he himself could have an opportunity of moving for his commitment, which he should certainly do, as soon as the trial for the misdemeanor would permit him. Mr. Wickham hoped that bail would not be taken in reference to a future motion. Col. B. has been tried and acquitted. And what has been proved with respect to the misdemeanor? Nothing, that was done in the state of Virginia. Mr. Bots hoped when this motion was made that the court would see in it an attempt most alarming; and they would consider it as a germ, which if not crushed in time, would hereafter grow up to the extreme danger of the rights and liberties of American citizens. It was best however to lay at this time as little about it as possible.—The government had indeed a particular place for Col. Burr's trial; and easily argue the case of that prosecution, the court will as to the motion which was menaced by Mr. Hay, it would not be forgotten that inquests had been already held on these acts in Kentucky and Tennessee. The C. J. observed, that in demanding bail on the present occasion, he would not make any reference to any charge which may be made hereafter—that on the former occasion, he had not taken into view the charge of treason, nor ought he to do it on the present occasion; that he thought and does still think that his former bail was a very high sum; for to bail any man in a sum six times higher than the fine to which the punishment of that offence could subject him, was certainly a high sum, particularly in a country whose constitution forbids the exaction of excessive bail; but that he was disposed on that occasion to require as high a bail as he could reconcile with his ideas of propriety. Circumstances however had varied since that occasion. Debts of a civil nature had come against the accused, which would necessarily increase the difficulty of his giving bail. Under all these considerations he should be content with the sum of 5000 dollars. Mr. Wirt suggested, whether the taking of bail would not entangle the prosecution in their motion for commitment; and whether this motion could not be heard before the present measure was adopted.—Would not this recognizance impede the motion for commitment? The C. J. observed, that the court could not hear such a motion at present. They could hear it at any time, if the counsel for the prosecution would get rid of the trial for misdemeanor. For so long as Mr. Burr was bound by his recognizance, he himself could not take him out of the possession of the court to send him to another court for trial. Mr. Wirt. Is the court then prepared to say, that after a man is bailed for an inferior offence, he is exempt from any motion to commit him for a higher offence? will not such a motion operate to exonerate him from his recognizance? C. J. The court have no right to hear such a motion? Mr. Wirt. I mean no disrespect to the court; but they will permit me to enquire, whether a man if bound only for 5000 dollars, is thereby exonerated from any responsibility for the perpetration of some enormous crime; such as murder or treason. Does not such a doctrine hold out the chance of impunity to every man that is charged with a capital offence? C. J. Does not this inconvenience arise from your placing yourselves in this situation?—Mr. Martin. The counsel may easily get rid of this difficulty by entering a Nolle Prosequi to the indictment for the misdemeanor. Mr. Wirt. This subject is really important in a national point of view. Suppose that this man should go into another district and perpetrate some heinous offence, such as murder or treason, is there no means of holding him in confinement for his trial? Is the recognizance in which he is now to be bound, to exonerate him from all responsibility? Mr. Burr observed, that the gentleman should state an analogous case, such as the present; or levying war, where two indictments grew out of the same act. Let the attorney enter a Nolle Prosequi and he may then proceed to his motion for commitment. Mr. Hay suggested a method for removing the difficulty. He wished to remove Mr. Burr for his trial to another district. Most of the witnesses have been here for a long time, and he wished to dismiss them as soon as possible. Let the court then hear this motion; if after the evidence is produced, and not till then does the difficulty occur, he cannot be removed until existing circumstances, the counsel for the prosecution would then enter an Exoneratur , or waive the necessity of his appearance altogether. Mr. Bots objected to this method of bargaining with the court, that "they will exonerate, if the court would only commit." Who occasioned the present difficulty? Not the court; but the counsel for the prosecution. Was this difficulty a meritorious or a necessary one? Is it meritorious? The fact alleged is the very same out of which both the treason and the misdemeanor have grown. Can the counsel for the prosecution make two offences out of one fact? if so, he may make 2000. If a man be acquitted on this indictment, he might be indicted for a riot; he might be indicted for every man's life who falls in the way; he might be indicted for an unlawful assembly. There is no merit then in this duplicate prosecution; there is no fairness in thus multiplying offences.
A long and desultory conversation on this subject ensued, when the C. J. observed that he was disposed to give it a more serious consideration. Mr. Wirt. This question is not so optional with us, as the court may conceive. The accused may move for a continuance of the cause; and I consider his mention of a letter as the harbinger of such a motion. C. J. If I do continue this cause, I will consider on the propriety of granting the motion for a commitment, after the merits of that motion have been opened. Mr. Burr. Shall they cut up this fact into two offences? It is oppression to be thus giving so many faces to one offence; particularly after they have been so completely baffled in one of their prosecutions. Mr. Wirt. If we give two different faces to this prosecution, it is because he has given so many faces to his transactions. It is because he was looking at the same time to the North as well as to the South; and while projecting a central revolution; he was meditating an invasion to Mexico. As to our being baffled in the other prosecution, it was not from the want of evidence, but from his escaping under the shelter of the law. We have thought as the Grand Jury did, and as the most illuminated men in the state have done, we have been misled by that very interpretation of man in the state would have given. Mr. Bots was going to show on a previous occasion, that it was impossible to make two charges out of one overt act; but Mr. Wirt now says that it is because the act itself has two faces. But is there any act which may not have two faces?—Gentlemen are misled by a species of fanaticism against Col. Burr; and it will be in our power hereafter to demonstrate that we are directed by a regard to the rights and liberties of the people. Mr. Burr then observed that he had lately discovered that a letter of Gen. Wilkinson's of 12th of Nov. was material to his defence. He had made an affidavit to that effect. Mr. Hay observed that he had that letter; but he would beg leave to state, that in Gen. W's letters there was a great deal of matter which ought not to be made public; among the rest several strictures upon certain characters in the Western country, which were freely imparted to the government in the strictest confidence. Would it not be better to trust the court with the selection of such parts as it might deem necessary to the defence of the accused? Mr. Martin. Are we to have a secret tribunal? Let the argument be in writing. Mr. Hay then proposed to submit those letters to the inspection of either Mr. Randolph, or Mr. Bots, or Mr. Wickham; the man so selected to pledge himself upon honour not to divulge the confidential contents. If there was any difference of opinion as to what were confidential passages, the court were to decide. Mr. Burr's counsel objected to inspecting anything which was not also submitted to their client. The subject was waved for the present, on Mr. Burr's suggesting that the opposite counsel might perhaps come to some understanding on this point during the recess of the court. Chief Justice determined that he would proceed upon the trial of the indictment for a misdemeanor, to-morrow, if Col. Burr should be ready. Col. Burr was declared by the court to be discharged from the indictment for Treason. General Jonathan Dayton appeared in court; and Mr. Wickham observed, that if it was the pleasure of the prosecution to proceed upon the indictment for Treason, found against general Dayton, some steps would be necessary preparatory to a trial. Mr. Hay said that after the decision of the court upon the doctrine of Treason, he did not see the propriety of incurring the expense and trouble of a trial; especially as he did not know of any act charged against him which would amount to treason, under that decision. He therefore thought it the most correct course to enter a nolle prosequi as to that indictment; which was accordingly done. Mr. Wickham then, as attorney for general Dayton, pleaded not guilty to the indictment for a misdemeanor.
Some conversation then ensued upon the arrangements necessary to the trial for misdemeanor. The marshal was instructed to summon a jury, and Monday was fixed for the trial. COMMUNICATION. On the first day of the last Hanover quarterly court, William D. Pope, esq. delivered an address to the citizens of Hanover county, on the subject of British aggressions, which produced a very great sensation. The plaudits, when he concluded, were as full and glorious, as the enthusiasm and zeal of several hundred citizens could render them. This address was not only chaste, classical and argumentative; but bold, eloquent and patriotic; and eminently calculated to inspire that enthusiastic ardor and patriotic zeal, for which the people of Hanover have always been remarkable, and which, on this occasion, they manifested and displayed, by a sudden and involuntary burst of applause. The corresponding committee of Hanover solicited a copy of his address for publication which Mr. Pope modestly declined. A Citizen of Richmond.
NOTICE. ALL persons having claims against the estate of John Sandridge, deceased, are requested to bring them forward, to the publisher, duly authenticated, on or before the first day of November next, at which time a dividend of the assets in my hands will take place; those failing to comply with this advertisement, will be excluded from the benefit of said dividend. Sept. 5. THOMAS WHITE. law2m.
THE BROAD-ROCK FALL RACES
Will commence on Monday the 28th day of September next; the first day the
GREAT PRODUCE SWEEPSTAKES, for which there is 22 Cols entered at 200 dollars each, half forfeit, running 2 mile heats, weights agreeable to the rules of the Jockey Club.
Gentlemen's names who have entered Colts:
1. John Hoopes enters the produce of Trumpella by Dragon . 2. David M. Randolph produce of Defiance by Bedford . 3. John Randolph ( Reancke ) prod. Legania by Dragon . 4. Wm. B. Hamblin prod. Spt by Dragon . 5. Wm. Allison prod. Mabrina by Bedford . 6. John Stitt prod. Bellona by Bedford . 7. Turner Dixon prod. Bluffton by Bedford . 8. Hugh Willis prod. Patsy by Walthall by Dragon . 9. James Cretcher prod. Bellona by Sharriot . 10. Joseph Ruffin prod. Nancy by Walthall by Jonah . 11. Thomas Gray prod. his Pantalon mare by Dragon . 12. John Kibbey prod. Dido by Whip . 13. Edward Watkins prod. Kitty Brimmer by Dragon . 14. John Mayo prod. Juliana by Stirling . 15. Daniel Wilson, sen. prod. Signat by Dragon . 16. Thomas Watkins prod. Andersdon's bay mare by Dragon . 17. John Clayton prod. his black mare by Sterling . 18. Robert Temple prod. Virginia by Bedford . 19. Miss Selden, sen. prod. Keron by Happough by Wacey . 20. John Taylor prod. Maria by Bedford . 21. John Hoopes, jr. prod. Fairy by Dragon . 22. William Tassiford prod. Dido by Bedford .
2nd day. The Jockey Club Purse of 400 dols. four mile heats.
3rd day. The Proprietor's Purse of 200 dols. three mile heats.
4th day. A Post Sweepstakes for 3 year old colts, running one mile heats. Entrance 100 dollars play or pay. To this stake there are two subscribers; four to make a race; subscription to close on the 20th September. Any gentleman wishing to subscribe to this stake, can do it by letter when it is not convenient to do it personally. Letters sent to the Manchaster Post-Office , directed to the Proprietor of the course will be duly attended to. Also, will be run for the same day this stake, a Plenty Cap , Purse, two mile heats. Entrance 20 dols. To this stake, which run for the three first days races to be Handy Capped agreeably to their performance. Winning mgs for each day to carry their full weight. Any gentleman was first a horse for this purse, whether he is a member of the Jockey Club or not. Sept. 5. Wm. BALL, Proprietor. law2sup.
Domestic.
NEW-YORK, Aug. 28.
At a meeting of the Common Council yesterday afternoon, the report of the Committee on the subject of fortifying the harbor was adopted.
A Bermuda paper of the 15th inst. contains a tedious account of Buonaparte's defeat in Poland, and of his having been taken prisoner; but the vessel said to have brought the news left England about the 12th of June!
The same paper states, that Admiral Cochrane, in proceeding to the Northward with the homeward bound convoy, would call at Halifax.
We mentioned in a former paper that Admiral Berkeley had offered a free pardon to all deserters from his Britannic Majesty's service in the navy.—Since which we have received the following copy of the order:
"BRITISH SEAMEN. "As the Hearts of all true British Seamen, are like their native Oak, honest, tough, and unchangeable, and never can be induced to countenance hostilities against old England; the Admiral and commander in chief of His Majesty's Squadron on this coast, proclaims a FREE and UNQUALIFIED PARDON to all those deluded men (mutineers excepted) who have been induced to quit his Majesty's ships of war, on condition they return immediately to their duty.—And every other BRITISH SEAMAN, who shall voluntarily enter for His Majesty's Service, shall receive the full and additional bounties, upon joining any of His Majesty's ships. Applying for conveyance to His Britannic Majesty's Consuls, so that he may be sent to Halifax. GIVEN under my hand, this 14th July, 1807, at HALIFAX, NOVA-SCOTIA. G. C. BERKELEY."
August 29.
To the Editor of the American Citizen.
SIR, I arrived this afternoon at 4 o'clock, in the steam boat, from Albany. As the success of my experiment gives me great hope that such boats may be rendered of much importance to my country, to prevent erroneous opinions, and give some satisfaction to the friends of useful improvement, you will have the goodness to publish the following statements of facts.
I left New-York on Monday at 1 o'clock, & arrived at Clermont, the seat of Chancellor Livingston, at 1 o'clock on Tuesday, time 24 hours, distance 100 miles: on Wednesday I departed from the Chancellor's at 9 in the morning, and arrived at Albany at 5 in the afternoon—distance 50 miles, time 8 hours; the sum of this is 150 miles in 32 hours, equal near 5 miles an hour.
On Thursday, at 9 o'clock in the morning, I left Albany, and arrived at the Chancellor's at 6 in the evening; I started from thence at 7, and arrived at New York on Friday, at 4 in the afternoon; time 50 hours, space run thro' 150 miles, equal 5 miles an hour. Throughout the whole-way my going and returning the wind was ahead; no advantage could be drawn from my fails—the whole has, therefore, been performed by the power of the steam-engine.
I am, Sir, Your obedient servant, ROBERT FULTON.
BALTIMORE, Aug. 29.
An express from the governor to the mayor, brings information, that five of the crew of the pirate passed through Annapolis on their way to this city, and that a detachment of horse were sent by the governor to apprehend them: these men were yesterday taken and confessed themselves a part of the crew. A French boat under lieuut. Mano, and a French officer, with volunteers and Frenchmen out of Annapolis, and a packet with two field pieces, under the command of capt. Muir and Duvall, failed in pursuit of the pirate; the packet had returned without success; the other boat had not returned.
August 31.
We are happy at being able to announce to the public the return of the detachments of Volunteers under command of Captains Sterrett, in conjunction with capt. Porter, which went in pursuit of the pirate that attempted to carry off the Othello. The expedition has been successful; and the Schooner and three of the buccaneering crew were yesterday brought up to our harbor; the men are safely lodged in our jail. When capt. Porter came within sight of her, four of the pirates were seen to take to their boat and make off to shore; from which they were not deterred by a gun that was fired at them. Five others of the gang, who had gone to Annapolis for the purpose of procuring provisions, have also been arrested.
The corps of riflemen that went down the bay to aid in taking the Schooner, have landed near Patuxent, and gone in pursuit of those who made their escape to land.
By virtue of a deed of trust, executed to me by Mr. James Poindexter, for the purpose of securing the payment of a certain sum of money, therein mentioned—I shall, on Thursday, the first day of October next, between the hours of one and four o'clock, P. M. proceed to sell, at the dwelling-house of the said James Poindexter, in Albemarle county, to the highest bidder, for ready money,
The following NEGROES, to wit:
CELEA, Isaac, Lewis, Martin, Rachael, Davy, Patrick and Dick; or so many of them as will answer the aforesaid purpose and expenses of sale.—I shall convey only such title as I hold as trustee.
THOS. DIVERS. Sept. 5. law3t.
JOHN ALCOCK,
INFORMS his friends and the public at large, that he has just received, and is now opening, next door to Messrs. Prosser and Moncure's windows, a large assortment of
MERCHANDIZE,
CONSISTING OF THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES:
CARPENTERS and joiners Tools, iron and steel Locks and Hinges, for house work and cabinet Ware. I also carry on my
CABINET MANUFACTORY,
By virtue of a decree of the court of the U. S. for the fifth circuit and district of Virginia, between Josephine Morando Le Normand, executrix of Simon Emanuel Julian Le Normand decd. plf. and Nathaniel Colley, def. will be sold, by public auction, to the highest bidder, at the Tavern of John R. Brewer in the town of Petersburg, on Wednesday the 30th of Sept. next, for ready money (subject to the possession of the said Colley, until Christmas next) that valuable tract of Land in Prince George county on James river, called Sionhill; containing by estimation five hundred and seventy acres. This land lies about twelve miles below the town of Petersburg, between the well known, productive Lands of George Ruffin, Esq. and of the late Richard Bland of Jordans Point; is naturally fertile in corn, wheat and other small grain; and being situated on the margin of the river, will afford to its owner the option of the markets of Petersburg, Richmond and Norfolk. Captain Colley will allow the purchaser to stay his crop of wheat immediate-ly after the sale. Further particulars will be made known on the day of sale by
PETER EPPES, } Com'rs. WM. BAIRD, S. PERKINS. Sept. 5. tdf.
TOMKINS & MURRAY,
ARE now receiving from on board the ship Hercules at City Point, a large and general assortment of Liverpool GOODS, selected and assorted, to accommodate country merchants.—They are in daily expectation of receiving by the ship Calpe an assortment of useful Goods, which they are determined to sell by wholesale on very liberal terms. They will open in a few days in the house at present occupied by Bohn & Hubner, nearly opposite the Post-Office.
Sept. 5. tf.
FRANCIS NEALE,
OFFERS his thanks to the public, for the flattering encouragement which he has experienced, and although the general scarcity has heretofore counteracted his efforts and disposition to afford the best accommodation—he begs leave to assure his friends, that hereafter, at all times, the most satisfactory entertainment will be provided for those who may favor him with their company.
King and Queen Court. } house, Sept. 5. ep2w
FOR RENT,
And possession given Christmas next, for a term not less than three nor more than seven years,
MY TAVERN and the plantation thereunto adjoining in the county of Mecklenburg, about one mile from Lady Slipwith's, and Somerville's ferries on Roanoke river, on the main road leading from the Carolina's, Georgia, &c. to Petersburg, Richmond and the Federal City.
The Tavern-house is large and commodious, good stables and all other necessary out houses—on this place is a good apple and peach orchard, which never fail bearing fruit—there is a quantity of hickory timbered land convenient which may be cleared and used at the discretion of the tenant. It is deemed unnecessary to say more as it is presumed that those who wish to rent would first view the premises. But the subscriber can with propriety say the advantages attached to this place, renders it by far the most advantageous stand for a tavern and store in that part of the country. There will be a tolerable crop of wheat sowed on the place. For terms, &c. apply to the subscriber living on the premises.
HOWEL GRAVES. Sept. 5. oaw3m.
LAND—FOR SALE.
THE subscriber offers for sale, a Tract of LAND, lying on Tye river, in the county of Amherst, being part of the estate of the late Col. John Rose, containing by actual survey 1005 acres. It is three miles distant from the Court-house, and twenty miles from Warminster. There are from 150 to 200 acres of this tract cleared, the residue is heavily timbered with oak, hickory, chestnut, &c. The soil of the land, which is inferior to none in its vicinity, is admirably adapted to the culture of tobacco, corn, wheat, &c. Its contiguity to Maj. Massey's manufacturing mill, will be a circumstance of great consideration to a purchaser. Possession will be given on the first day of the ensuing year, with liberty to sow small grain this next fall. One third of the purchase money will be required in hand; for the other payments, a liberal indulgence will be given. The land will be shown by Mr. Alexander B. Rose or Capt. A. Morgan, residing in the neighborhood. Those wishing to purchase, may know the terms of sale by applying to the subscriber.
THOMAS FITZHUGH. Boscebel, Stafford county, Sept. 5. law3m.

TO RENT, For three or five years: THAT valuable TAN-YARD of the late Mr. Jacob Boekius, and now occupied by the Subscriber situated on the Main-Street of this city, between the Capitol and Basin of the canal, its conveniences are superior to any other in this place. A large Carrying Shop, Cellar and drying loft, a spacious Bark- HOUSE , two Bark Mills and Houses, a Beam House and every other requisite for the tanning of from 2 to 3000 hides a year, exclusive of skins: Also on the same tenement a convenient DWELLING HOUSE , Kitchen, Smoke House, Stable and Garden, the renter may be accommodated with about one hundred cords of excellent red and black oak Bark, now in the Bark House at fair price. Proposals for the above will be received by the subscriber. Bond with approved security will be required, and possession given of the whole, except a few of the vats, on the first of September next. The reason assigned for offering the foregoing property for rent, is the ill state of health of the Subscriber to pay that attention the business requires. MARCUS ELCAN. April 3. iawtf.
FOR SALE, THE TAN-YARD in this place, formerly occupied by Wm. Hamby, which is now in good repair, with every improvement necessary to carry on the business extensively. The flock in said yard which is now in full operation, would be sold also, so that a purchaser would have an opportunity of commencing the business under every advantage the situation is capable of. A very liberal credit will be given for both the yard and flock, on receiving satisfactory security for the payment of the purchase money, for terms apply to John Cunningham & Co. Richmond, or to JOHN & E. CUNNINGHAM. Carterville, June 18. iawtf.
Also for sale or rent: A convenient BRICK LUMBER-HOUSE , situated on the bank of the basin, particularly adapted to the easy reception and storage of flour, &c. For this property a liberal credit will be given if sold, on receiving satisfactory security for the payment of the purchase money, or it may be rented on easy terms and immediate possession obtained, by applying as above. Carterville June 20. oawtf.
TRACT OF LAND, whereon Francis West Quarles now resides, in the upper part of said County, as will raise the sum of five hundred dollars and interest from the first day of January last, with a small additional sum for costs of suit and charges of sale. BEVERLEY ROBINSON, JOHN FOX, Com'rs. July 1. oaw4w.
This sale not taking place, the Land will be privately sold on Thursday the third day of September. B. ROBINSON, J. FOX, oaw4w.
ROYSTON & BOHANNON. Respectfully inform their friends and the public generally, that they have just received a general assortment of GROCERIES, which they will sell low for cash, country produce, or good acceptances in town: AMONG WHICH ARE— BROWN Sugar in bar—Madeira } Loaf, do. do. } Coffee in barrels and } bags } Imperial } Young Hyson } Hyson Skin } Pimento } Nutmegs } Antigua } W. India } N. England } Molasses in hds. & bla. } Whiskey in ditto } Sack Salt } Crates were assorted, } Leeper's Snuff } Hibbert's brown Stout } and Porter } June 24. iawtf.
FOR SALE, 25 Hds. or CIDER VINEGAR, Of superior quality, which will be disposed of, on moderate terms, by wholesale and retail. SAMUEL WHITE. May 19. iaw6m.
VALUABLE LAND FOR SALE. Will be offered for sale, on the 6th day of October next, on the premises, (if not privately disposed of before that day.) THE LAND, whereon Joseph Michaux, deceased, late of the county of Cumberland lived, containing about eight hundred acres, within two miles of the town of Farmville; not inferior in quality to any in the county, for the production of corn, wheat and tobacco; and more than one half of the same uncleared and full of heavy timber, conveniently situated for building, fences, firewood, &c. It will be divided into two or more Lots to suit purchasers, if required. There are on the premises, good and sufficient improvements, for the reception of a genteel family; and all other necessary out-houses for the saving a crop of grain and tobacco. For soil, health and good water, it is truly an enviable situation, scarcely equalled by any on this side of the mountains. A more minute description is unnecessary, as any person inclined to purchase, would no doubt view before hand, which will best recommend it. The terms, one third paid down, the balance in two annual equal payments, giving bond and approved security, bearing interest from the date, if not punctually paid. Possession will be given immediately, and undoubted right and title made. Those who wish to view, or bargain for the premises, will apply to John Michaux living near, or to Jesse Michaux, residing at Cumberland Court-House. JNO. MICHAUX, JESSE MICHAUX, Executors. Cumberland, August 28. iaw4w.
ADVERTISEMENT. I have taken possession of that well known Tavern , in the town of Manchaster , called the COLUMBIAN , and lately occupied by Mr. Zachariah Brooks. The character this House has acquired, shall be carefully maintained. The tables shall be well attended to, and the subscriber promises upon his part, to make his accommodations as agreeable to those who may favor him with their company, as possible. JAMES BROOKE, iaw4m.
NOTICE is hereby given to Mr. John Acre, who is intermarried with a daughter of Mr. John Scholes, now deceased, who formerly lived in the county of King & Queen, a Legacy being left said Acre, wife and children, in the last will and testament of the aforesaid Scholes, the division will take place at the end of the year, after the crop is finished:—Therefore the aforesaid Acre, is hereby requested by the executors, to make application for their portion of said estate. August 18. 1m&2m.
TO BE SOLD, FOR READY MONEY. In pursuance of a Deed of Trust, from David Ross, Esq. bearing date on the 5th day of July, 1806, and recorded in the general court, in order to raise the sum of 57,768 25-1000 dollars, and interest due on Sunday bonds, to Granbery and Hancock and to Littleton Waller Tazewell, and a further sum of 10,000 dollars, and upwards, with interest due also on Sunday bonds, to the said Granbery and Hancock, and the charges and expenses of sale: THOSE well known MILLS with the appurtenances in the city of Richmond, called the Columbia Mills . Two undivided third parts of the Deep Run Coal Pits , in the county of Henrico, containing about 1750 acres more or less. Two undivided third parts of the Falling Creek Coal Pits in the county of Chesterfield, containing about one hundred acres. Two undivided third parts of the Dever Coal Lands in the county of Goochland, containing about ninety acres, which three several tracts of Coal Land were held in partnership between the said David Ross and James Currie, deceased. Also all that tract or parcel of Land in the county of Goochland, known by the name of Goochland Court-house , containing about fifteen hundred acres more or less; Also twelve hundred acres of Land in Goochland county, called Howards Neck , before pledged to Gallego and Gilson, for a debt due to them and secured by deed of trust, bearing date on the 24th day of May, 1806, and recorded in the general court. The Columbia Mills & appurtenances, are subject to a ground rent to Samuel Overton; and the said Mills and the two tracts of Coal Land , first mentioned, are pledged for the security of sundry sums of money, due to Mrs. Frances Tabb and Wm. B. Giles, administrators of John Tabb, deceased—a large proportion of which, is stated by the said Ross to have been paid to have been paid, & other estates are pledged for the balance. For further information on this subject, persons inclined to purchase, are referred to the said Ross, or it may be obtained on application to the subscribers. The greater part of the debt due to P. Gibson, and secured by deed of trust above mentioned, bearing date the 23th day of May, 1806, has been paid, there being now a balance due him of only 1254 dls. 75-1000 with some arrears of interest; a particular statement of which will be exhibited on the day of sale. The sales will take place at the Eagle-tavern , on Tuesday the 15th day of September next. E. W. ROUTES, WILSON ALLEN, Trustees. July 11. tdf.
WILLIAM HART, OPPOSITE THE SCALE-HOUSE, HAS JUST RECEIVED— 5000 wt. Salt Petred Ba- } con, } 9000 wt. Copperas, } 30 Boxes Liver pool Pipes, } Short and long, } 90 Barrels Shad. } And has on hand, Real Cogniac Brandy, } French, Peach & Apple } Brandy, } Antigua, W. Island and } N. England Rum, } Gin, Whiskey, C. Bounce, } &c. } Imperial & Young Hyson } All of which he will sell at the lowest ready money prices, or exchange for country produce. July 14. tf.
FOR SALE, 175 Ton Liverpool Stoved Salt, } 80 Do. Do. Common Do. } 60 Pieces Sacking, } 50 Crates well assorted Earthen Ware, } On board the Ship Vulcan , Capt. Bosworth, at Bermuda Hundred. Apply to WM. BROWN & Co. July 8. tf.
DRUMS, Fifes, Swords, Belts, Nots, Epaulettes, Stocks and Cockades, to be had at Enoch Salivans Jewelry Store. August 7. tf.
FOR SALE, THAT well known Farm , in the town of Charlottesville, Albemarle County, formerly the property of Isaac Miller, and now in the occupancy of Mr. Triplett T. Estes, consisting of an elegant two-story House, sixty-six by forty feet, in excellent repair; in which there are on the first floor, four Rooms, a large and commodious bar, and a passage through the centre of the building, eighteen feet wide. On the second floor, eight lodging Rooms, four of which are sufficiently large for the accommodation of travelling families. Also, a dining Room, immediately over the passage, of the same size as the passage; the Garret is divided into six different Rooms, four of which have Fire-places. There is also, an excellent well of water in the back yard, from whence water is conveyed by subterraneous pipes to the Bar, and different parts of the Lot. There are also, convenient and well furnished Stables, with Stalls for about fifty horses, together with about thirty Sheltered Stalls, raised on locust posts; and two inferior Stables; so that about one hundred horses can be accommodated on public days. Also, about seven acres of Land, adjoining the town, and very convenient to the Stables; known by the name of clover Lot , extremely rich and productive, and well enclosed. The whole of the buildings are insured. It would be useful to dilate on the eligibility of this stand for business of this sort, or the real value of this property, as every person inclined to purchase will enquire in to these facts; suffice it to say, that it is not exceeded by any, & equalled by few in all the upper country. The former proprietor, & his immediate successor, having in a few years made fortunes, and retired, & the present occupant rapidly following their steps. For the information of strangers, it may be observed, that at this house stop both the Richmond and Fredericksburg stages, and by the same route pass a number of genteel families and others the Springs every season. Also, at this place is held twice a year the District Court , composed of several of the most opulent Counties in Virginia. Also, spring and fall racing; these advantages, together with the County Courts, and one of the most public roads in the state, open a vast advantage to this house; it is now under lease to the present tenant for three present tenant for three years from October next, the benefit of which will be transferred to the purchaser, on the receipt of the first payment. Terms of sale, one third on the first of January next, and the balance in two equal annual payments from that date. Bond with approved security, and a deed of trust on the property to secure the payments, will be required, which are to bear interest from the date if not punctually paid will be required. If the above property is not sold before, it will be offered at public sale, on the premises on the fifteenth day of September next, if fair, if not, the next fair day. Stock of the Bank of Virginia, at its current value, would be received in payment for the whole, or any part, or undoubted bonds due at the time of sale, for the two last payments, the ultimate payment being made entirely secure. For further particulars, enquire of Nathaniel and Benjamin Sheppard in Richmond, or the subscriber living at Scotch-Town, in Hanover. JOHN M. SHEPPARD. June 10. ept155.
TO BE RENTED, THE TENEMENT opposite the post-office, at present occupied by Mr. John Southgate. On the lowest floor are a store and counting room, and under there is a dry cellar. The upper apartments are adapted to the accommodation of a family. Attached to this tenement are a kitchen and smoke-house, and a piece of ground, immediately back of it, extending to the Capitol Square, and having upon it a small wooden lumber house. Possession will be given the first day of October next. For terms enquire of Messrs. Taylor & Brown. August 25. JOHN BROWN. eptc.
MARSHAL'S SALES. WILL be sold, to the highest bidder, for ready money, under a decree of the court of the United States for the fifth circuit, in the Virginia district, between Phoebe Bond , attorney in fact for the creditors of Ezekiel Edwards , plaintiff, and David Ross and others, defendants, in order to raise the sum of fifteen thousand six hundred and sixty-five dollars and sixty-six cents, due and payable the first day of last month, and the expenses and charges attending the sale: a number of very valuable SLAVES . The sale will take place at the Oxford Iron Works , in the county of Campbell, on the 23th day of September next. BEN. MOSBY, D. M. JOSEPH SCOTT, M. V. D. August 7th, 1807. 228
PROPOSALS, For carrying MAILS of the UNITED STATES , on the following routes, will be received at the General Post-Office, until the 15th of October next. 1st. From Petersburg by Harrisville , Goldensville , Drummondsburg , Warrenton , Lewistown , Raleigh and Averiboro , to Fayetteville , three times a week. Leave Petersburg every Monday, Wednesday and Friday at 8 a.m., arrive at Warrenton same days by 8 p.m. Leave Warrenton every Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday at 8 a.m., arrive at Raleigh same days by 6 p.m. Leave Raleigh, Wednesday, Friday and Monday at 8 a.m., arrive at Fayetteville same days by 5 p.m. Returning—Leave Fayetteville every Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday at 4 a.m., arrive at Raleigh same days by 6 p.m. Leave Raleigh every Wednesday, Friday and Monday at 8 a.m., arrive at Warrenton same days by 6 p.m. Leave Warrenton every Thursday, Saturday and Sunday at 1 a.m., arrive at Petersburg same days by 8 p.m. 2nd. From Fayetteville by Lumberton , Barefields , Mills , Ports ferry , Gaules and Georgetown to Charleston three times a week. Leave Fayetteville every Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday, at 4 a.m., arrive at Ports ferry on Wednesday, Friday and Monday by 6 p.m. Leave Georgetown every Thursday, Saturday and Tuesday at 2 p.m., arrive at Charleston same days by 4 p.m. Returning—Leave Charleston every Monday, Wednesday and Friday at 5 a.m., arrive at Georgetown same days by 6 p.m. Leave Georgetown every Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday at 2 a.m., arrive at Ports ferry on Wednesday, Friday & Monday by 6 p.m.
NOTES. 1. The post master general may expedite the mails and alter the times of arrival and departure at any time during the continuance of the contracts, he stipulating an adequate compensation for any extra expense that may be occasioned thereby. 2. Fifteen minutes shall be allowed for opening and closing the mails at all offices where no particular time is specified. 3. For every thirty minutes delay (unavoidable accidents excepted) in arriving after the time prescribed in any contract, the contract or shall forfeit one dollar; and if the delay continues until the departure of any depending mail, whereby the mails destined for each depending mail, lose a trip, an additional forfeiture of five dollars shall be incurred. 4. Newspapers, as well as letters, to be sent in the mail; and if any person making proposals, desires to carry newspapers, other than those conveyed in the mail, for his own emolument, he must state in his proposals for what sum he will carry with the emolument, and for what sum without that emolument. 5. Should any person making proposals desire an alteration of the times of arrival and departure above specified, he must state in his proposals the alteration desired, and the difference they will make in the terms of the contract. 6. Persons making proposals are desired to state their price by the year. Those who contract will receive their pay quarterly, in the months of August, November, February and May, if one month after the expiration of each quarter. 7. No other than a free white person shall be employed to convey the mail. 8. Where the proposer intends to convey the mail in the body of a large carriage, he is desired to state it in his proposals. 9. The post master general reserves to himself the right of declaring any contract at an end, whenever one failure happens which amounts to the loss of a trip. 10. The contracts for the above routes are to be in operation on the first day of January next, and to continue in force until the 31th day of March, 1810. GIDEON GRANGER, Post Master General. General Post-Office, Washington, } ton city, July 31. (Aug. 14.) eptw
THE SUBSCRIBERS HAVE JUST RECEIVED A SUPPLY OF COLOGNE MILL-STONES, OF DIFFERENT SIZES, WHICH will be disposed of for CASH or approved negotiable NOTES at 60 days. TAYLOR & BROWN. June 10. tf.
TO BE SOLD, BETWEEN five and six hundred acres of the well known TRACT OF LAND , in the neighborhood of New-Castle, and county of Hanover, whereon Captain Nicholas Syme now resides. The part to be sold, is the upper part of that portion of the said Land, which lies between the road leading from New-Castle to Hanover Town, and Pocahontas river , and is generally allowed to be the most valuable part of the said Tract , which the best judges consider equal, if not superior to any in the lower parts of the state; but as such an intent to purchase, will probably wish to view the same, a more tedious description thereof, appears to be unnecessary. The Land will be surveyed to the purchaser. Credit will be given for one year, for one third of the purchase money, for two years for the second third, and for three years for the last third thereof, and for each of these installments, a bond with approved security will be required and also a lien, by deed of trust on the Land itself, as a further security for the whole. The subscriber, who lives in New-Castle, will show the Land to such as mean to purchase, and in his absence, it will be shown to such, by John W. Tomlin, Esq. whose residence is very near. Possession will be given the first of January next, with liberty of sowing wheat this fall. WM. CUNNINGHAM. New-Castle, August 25. tf.
TEN DOLLARS REWARD. DESERTED from my recruiting rendezvous, in this city, on the 12th of the present month, PETER E. BUTLER , who was duly enlisted on the 10th, as a private in the army of the United States. He was born (according to his own account) in Dinwiddie county, Virginia; aged 24 years. He is 5 feet 9 3/4 inches high, brown hair, blue eyes, fair complexion, and he seems to be very knowing and inquisitive. I am lately informed, that "he was on board the Chesapeake Frigate when attacked by the British pirate, where he bore the name of James Eppes , and in consequence of a slight wound, he was sent to the hospital in Norfolk, from whence he came to this place." The above reward with reasonable expenses will be paid on the delivery of the said deserter at this place or to any officer of the Army of the U.S. EDMD. P. GAINES, Captain 2d U. S. Infantry. Richmond, August 25. tf.
A GENERAL ASSORTMENT OF BLANKS, FOR SALE AT THIS OFFICE. August 25. MICHAEL GRANTLAND. iaw&w
WANTED, FOR THE ENSUING YEAR, A N OVERSEER—None need apply but one who can come well recommended for honesty, sobriety, industry & a thorough knowledge of farming. To a person of this description, liberal wages will be given. EDWIN JAMES HARVIE. August 7. tf.
FOR SALE, THE following PROPERTY , belonging to Robert Alexander, Esq. of Woodford county, in the State of Kentucky:— ALOT OF GROUND , in the City of Richmond, with a valuable House thereon, one room of which is occupied by the Jews as a Synagogue—under the house there are a set of Vaults, originally intended for a Wine Cellar; also the TRACT OF LAND whereon William Alexander, Esq. formerly resided, about three miles from the City of Richmond. Two years credit, from the first day of January next will be allowed the purchaser, of whom bond with good security bearing interest from the first day of January, and a mortgage on the premises will be required, and to whom a conveyance in fee simple with a warranty will be granted. Possession of the tract of Land may be had on the day of sale, and of the Vaults, but the Jews are entitled to the possession of the rest of the house until the first day of May next.—Unless the property is sold by private bargain, it will be sold publicly at the front door of the Eagle Tavern between the hours of 12 and 3 o'clock, P.M. on Saturday the 24th day of October next. The title papers may be seen and every information granted by applying to me. WM. MAY, Attorney in fact for ROBERT ALEXANDER. Richmond, Aug. 7th, 1807. eptf.
JUST RECEIVED AND FOR SALE, BY FITZWILYSONN & POTTER, Price 25 Cents, A Treatise on the Nature and Subjects of CHRISTIAN BAPTISM. LIKEWISE a new edition of the AMERICAN PRECEPTOR , and a general assortment of other School Books , which will be sold cheap, and the Trials of the Hon. James Workman and Col. Lewis Key at New Orleans for High Misdemeanor. They have also Music and Musical Instruments , Paper Hangings , Patent Razors and Pen Knives , Ladies and Gentlemen's Pocket-Books , and a fresh supply of Fools-Cap and Post Paper . July 31. eptw.
ANDREW STEVENSON, HAS been commissioned by the Governor and Council of Virginia, NOTARY PUBLIC , in and for the District of Richmond. He takes, therefore, the liberty of saying, that all business confided to him, shall meet with the most marked attention and dispatch. August 21. eptw.
VIRGINIA, TO WIT: At a Chancery District Court , held in the City of Williamsburg, the 23th day of April, 1807. Robert Edwards, and Priscilla his Wife, Pliffs. against James Ewell and Ann Robertson, executors of Andrew Robertson, } Defts. THE defendant James Ewell , not having entered his appearance and given security according to the act of Assembly and the rules of this court, and it appearing to the court that he is not an inhabitant of this country, on the motion of the pliffs. by their counsel; It is ordered, that the said defendant do appear here on the fourth day of October term next, and answer the bill of the pliffs, and that a copy of this order be forthwith inserted in some newspaper of the City of Richmond, for two months successively, and posted at the front door of the former Capitol in this City. A Copy. Teste, ANTY ROBINSON, c. c. July 17. eptm.
BY virtue of a deed of trust, executed on the 24th day of May, 1806; whereby David Ross conveyed to us, a tract of Land called Coles , in the county of Goochland, containing by a then late survey, 1510 acres; also, another tract a small distance from that called Coles , containing 200 acres, more or less, it being the same land, that the said Ross purchased from John Hughes & wife , and also the tract of land called Mount Prospect , the greater part of which lies in Fluvanna , containing by estimation 1200 acres, except 225 acres herefore sold by the said Ross , out of the said tract, to Samuel Pettie , to raise the sum of eleven thousand and four hundred dollars, with interest thereon, from the 1st January, 1807, together with all charges and expenses of sale; and in pursuance of a requisition made in writing, under the provision of the said deed: I shall on the 22th day of September next, before the front door of the Eagle Tavern , in this city of Richmond, sell for ready money, all and singular, the land and estates above-mentioned, at which time and place, conveyances will be made to the purchasers. A more particular description of the above property, may be seen by tracing the references contained in the said deed now of record, in the general court, under an acknowledgment of the same in court, on the 12th June 1806. August 24. THOS. NORVELL. tdf.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT. WASHINGTON, April 28, 1807. Public notice is hereby given, THAT in pursuance of a Resolution of the Commissioners of the sinking fund, at a meeting held on the 23th day of March 1807, James Davidson Esq. CASHIER of the office of Discount and Deposit at Washington, has been appointed agent under the superintendence of the Secretary of the Treasury, to make purchases at private sale of the eight per cent stock, on public account. Such persons, therefore, who are proprietors of eight per cent stock, standing on the books of the Commissioner of Loans for Virginia, and who may be desirous of selling the same, within the price limited by law, are requested to make application to the commissioner of Loans at Richmond, who will inform them of the course to be pursued. It is further made known for the information of the parties concerned, that agreeably to a resolution of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, the principal of the eight per cent stock will be reimbursed to the respective proprietors thereof, on the 1st day of January 1809. ALBERT GALLATIN, Secretary of the Treasury May 12. eaw1RO.
FOR SALE, ABOUT four acres of LAND in Adams's Valley , beautifully situated, as a recluse from town, although within the corporation; with meadow and upland; and two springs of excellent water. If not disposed of, entire, before Thursday the 10th of September, it will on that day be sold in half or quarter acre Lots; a plan of which will be shown those who wish to purchase. TO RENT —The tenement lately occupied by Messrs Murphy & Blackburn , on the main street, a few doors below the market house, inferior to few in this city for a GROCERY . ALSO, TO RENT —A tenement on the first cross street below the market house, near Mason's Hall ; pleasantly situated, and convenient for a family. August 25. MICHAEL GRANTLAND. iaw&w
In King William County Court, August 25th, 1807. Landon Carter, Compt. } Against } Thomas Reeves and John Temple, In Chancery. Defts. THIS day came the complainant by his counsel, and the defendant Thomas Reeves , not having entered his appearance, and given security according to the act of Assembly and the rules of this court, and it appearing to the satisfaction of the court, that he is not an inhabitant of this country; On the motion of the complainant; It is ordered, that the said defendant, Thomas Reeves , do appear here on the fourth Monday in November next, and answer the bill of the complainant; and that a copy of this order be forthwith inserted in some newspaper published in the city of Richmond for two months successively, and another copy posted at the front door of the court house of this county. And it is further ordered, that the defendant Temple do not pay, convey away or secret any debts by him owing to the defendant Reeves , until the further order or decree of this court. A Copy. Teste, RO: POLLARD, Jr. D. C. C. Sept. 1. eptm.
In King William County Court, August 25th, 1807. Lawrence Muffe, Compt. } Against } Thomas Reeves and John Temple, In Chancery. Defts. THIS day came the complainant by his counsel, and the defendant Thomas Reeves , not having entered his appearance and given security according to the act of Assembly and the rules of this court, and it appearing to the satisfaction of the court that he is not an inhabitant of this country. On motion of the complainant, It is ordered, that the said defendant, Thomas Reeves , do appear here on the fourth Monday in November next and answer the bill of the complainant; and that a copy of this order be forthwith inserted in some newspaper published in the city of Richmond for two months successively, and another copy be posted at the front door of the court house of this county: And it is further ordered, that the defendant Temple , do not pay, convey away or secret any debts by him owing to the defendant Reeves , until the further order or decree of this court. A Copy. Teste, RO: POLLARD, Jr. D. C. C. Sept. 1. eptm.
FOR SALE, THE  BRICK HOUSE , and its appurtenances, consisting of a good brick Kitchen, Garden & Well of good water; at present in the occupation of Mr. Ben. Moffy . The situation is pleasant and healthy, and the house in good repair. For terms apply to THOS. NORVELL. Sept. 1. tf.
MARSHAL'S SALE. By virtue of a Decree of the United States' Court for the fifth circuit and Virginia District, pronounced May term, 1807; between the Executors of John Somervell , deceased, plaintiffs, and David Ross defendant.—Will be sold, for ready money, on Wednesday the 23th of September next, so much of the TRACT OF LAND , commonly called, & known by the name of the FALLS PLANTATION , lying in the county of Chesterfield , as will raise the sum of one thousand six hundred and eighty dollars, with interest after the rate of six per cent per annum, from 1st January, 1807, till paid and costs. The sale will take place on the premises, on the day above mentioned, precisely at twelve o'clock. TH. H. DREW, D. M. for JOS. SCOTT, M. V. D. Sept. 1. tdf.
SALES OF LAND. Pursuant to a decree of the Richmond District Court of Chancery , will be sold on the premises, to the highest bidder, on Tuesday the 29th day of September next, that certain tract of land, situate in the county of Fluvanna , containing by estimation 1200 acres, except 225 acres herefore sold by the said Ross , out of the said tract, to Samuel Pettie , to raise the sum of eleven thousand and four hundred dollars, with interest thereon, from the 1st January, 1807, together with all charges and expenses of sale; and in pursuance of a requisition made in writing, under the provision of the said deed: I shall on the 22th day of September next, before the front door of the Eagle Tavern , in this city of Richmond, sell for ready money, all and singular, the land and estates above-mentioned, at which time and place, conveyances will be made to the purchasers. A more particular description of the above property, may be seen by tracing the references contained in the said deed now of record, in the general court, under an acknowledgment of the same in court, on the 12th June 1806. August 24. THOS. NORVELL. tdf.
VALUABLE PROPERTY FOR SALE. In pursuance of a Decree of the High Court of Chancery , for the Richmond District , by consent of parties, the following property, belonging to the estate of James Anderson , dec'd. will be sold to the highest bidder, on a credit of twelve months, to wit: On Tuesday the 29th day of September next, THAT commodious and well-finished HOUSE & LOT , on the main street in the city of Williamsburg, at present occupied by Mrs. Camp . Also, two vacant half acre LOTS , near the Free School in the said city. The sale to be made on the premises. On Monday the 13th day of Dec. following, That valuable HOUSE and LOT , situated at the foot of the Capitol hill, in the city of Richmond, in the occupancy of Charles Beller and others. The sale to be made on the premises. Also, at the same time and place, two valuable Tracts of LAND , lying on Wills Creek state of Kentucky, and within a few miles of the Ohio river. There are eight thirty-five parts of the above named property, which belongs to infants; and where the price of any one separate parcel exceeds fourteen hundred dollars, an interest with the purchaser must be retained in that portion for them. Additional information may be had on application to Robert Anderson of Williamsburg. THE COMMISSIONERS. Sept. 1. Sawt29th tawtf18th Sept14th.
THE Gentleman, who, while I was on Saturday last, addressing the court, took my Cane from the feet behind me and carried it away, is respectfully requested to send it, when he has done with it, to the Bar of the Swan Tavern . September 1. LUTHER MARTIN. tf.
FOR SALE, IN WILLIAMSBURG, THE two story BRICK HOUSE and LOT , on the main street, near the Capitol , belonging to the estate of Charles Hunt , deceased. On this tenement there is a large Store House & Granary , besides other necessary out-houses. The above property may be purchased on an accommodating credit at private sale, by application to Dr. William Tazewell , at any time previous to the 29th day of September next, when it will be set up to the highest bidder, on a credit of 12 months. The title to the above property is indisputable. Sept. 1. tf.
Printing, IN ALL ITS VARIETY, EXECUTED AT THE OFFICE OF THE ENQUIRER.