The national intelligencer and Washington advertiser. (Washington City [D.C.]), 1805-08-26 00:00:00

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, AND WASHINGTON ADVERTISER.
VOL. V.
WASHINGTON CITY, PRINTED BY SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH, PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE.
NO. DCCLXII.
FIVE DOLLARS PER ANNUM.
MONDAY, AUGUST 26, 1805.
PAID IN ADVANCE.
ELEGANT HOUSEHOLD FURNI- TURE, FOR SALE.
AT PUBLIC AUCTION on Monday the 2nd day of September next, at 10 o'clock in the morning, at the house of Mr. DAVID RAWN, deceased, a variety of Household and Kitchen Furniture, consisting of Tables, Chairs, Bureaus, Bedsteads, Beds, Bedding, Carpets and Curtains, one superb double barrel'd Fowling Piece, one Franklin, and one Ten plate Stove, together with a variety of other articles, too lengthy to enumerate.
Purchasers to pay cash for all sums not exceeding 20 dollars, and six months credit for all purchases above 20 dollars with approved indorsed notes, (negotiable at the Branch Bank of this city) bearing interest from the day of sale.
All persons having demands against the estate are requested to bring in their accounts for settlement within three weeks from this time.
ELIZA RAWN. JOHN H. CHEYNEY, } Admr's. August 23-3t
ISAIAH BALDONTON, & SON,
AT the sign of the Fan and Screen, No 52 Front Street, Old town, and 1 Hanover Street (nearly opposite Evans's Tavern) Baltimore, Manufacture and sell the following articles, viz — Fans for cleaning wheat, Wire Sifters of the most approved kinds, Rolling & Standing Screens (for merchant mills, and flaxseed Rolling Screens may be had on the common construction, or on Isaiah Baldonton's improved plan, which is found to be superior to any heretofore in use for separating garlic from wheat) Riddles and Sifters for corn, coal, ore, barley, rye, oats, flax and clover seeds, wheat, cockle, lime, sand, snuff, starch, and brick dust. Woven Wire for milk houses and cellar windows, together with all kinds of wire work, of which they constantly keep a complete and extensive assortment.
Orders for any of the above articles left with Wm. Morgan, George Town, or forwarded to them will be executed with punctuality and dispatch moderate terms. 8th Mo. 23—
NOW PUBLISHED, By G. DOUGLAS, BALTIMORE, Forensic Eloquence.
SKETCHES OF TRIALS IN IRELAND FOR HIGH TREASON, &c. INCLUDING THE SPEECHES OF MR. CURRAN At length, to which are prefixed,
A brief sketch of the History of Ireland, and a Biographical account of Mr. CURRAN: with an Elegant engraved Likeness of that orator.
CEDEDIT ARMA TOGA, CONCEDEBAT LAUREA LINGUA. NOSCE HAEC OMNIA EST ADOLESCENTULIS.
SECOND EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS. August 23-3t
BOARDING SCHOOL FOR YOUNG LADIES.
MRS. LEE takes this method of returning her grateful acknowledgments to her friends and the Ladies and Gentlemen of Washington and its vicinity, for their liberal patronage, and solicits a continuance of their favors which she hopes to deserve by a strict attention to their morals, as well as the other branches of education, and flatters herself from her long residence in Paris, that she is enabled to teach the French language with peculiar advantage.
TERMS AS FOLLOWS: DOLLARS Board and Tuition, per quarter, } 30 Needle and Fancy work, English, } 5 Writing, and Arithmetic, } 4 French, } 4 Small children, } 4 Pennsylvania avenue, three doors west of the President's square } August 23-6t
NOTICE.
THE Battalion court for the 1st battalion of the 1st legion of Militia of the district of Columbia will meet at Rhodes's tavern, in the city of Washington, on Saturday the 24th inst. at 10 o'clock in the morning. And the Court of the 2d battalion of same legion will meet at McLaughlin's Union tavern in George town, on Saturday the 31st inst. at 10 o'clock in the morning.
The Legionary court will meet the 13th September next at Rhodes's tavern in the city of Washington, at 10 o'clock in the morning. By order,
WM. D. BEALL, acting adjt. August 19.—1aw13Sept.
RAGS.
The highest price, in Cash or Books will be given for any quantity of clean Linen and Cotton Rags, by Rapine Conrad and Co. Capitol Hill. June 24—
IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE CHASE.
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26.
The court opened at about half past ten o'clock, A. M. the Managers, the House of Representatives, and the counsel of the respondent having taken their seats,
Mr. NICHOLSON, as one of the managers, addressed the court in reply to the counsel of the accused. He said the House of Representatives having impeached Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme court of the United States, of high crimes, and misdemeanors; the evidence on their part having been adduced, and that on behalf of the accused, and the arguments of his counsel having been fully and patiently heard, it now became his duty to reply in support of the impeachment. To me, Mr. President, said he, this duty is an unpleasant one. Upon all occasions and under all circumstances, the office of a public accuser is the most painful that can be imposed on us; but it is more peculiarly so when the object of accusation appears before us, covered with age and infirmities. I think I speak the sentiments of my brother managers and of the House of Representatives, when I say, that this impeachment never would have been instituted, that it never would have arrived at its present crisis, if we had not believed that the best interests of our common country required, that the conduct complained of should not go unpunished. There is no nation on earth, sir, in which the freedom of man and the consequent happiness of society are not inseparably interwoven with the full, free and impartial administration of justice.
"Una salus ambobus erit commune periculum."
It was to preserve this unity of safety, to avert this common danger, that we thought ourselves bound by the most solemn obligation, to bring these charges before the highest tribunal of the nation. We may in vain make laws to secure our property, to protect our liberty and to guard our lives, if those to whom we appeal, and to whose decrees we are bound to submit, shall prove unfaithful in the discharge of their duty. If our laws are not faithfully administered; if the holy sanctuary of our courts is to be invaded by party feeling; if justice shall suffer her pure garment to be stained by the foul venom of political bigotry, we may indeed boast that we live in a land of freedom, but the boast will be vain and illusory.
In this point of view, therefore, this cause may justly be called an important one. I need not however urge its importance to the court, for the feelings of every honorable member will speak its importance more forcibly than anything that I can utter. But I do trust that those frequent appeals which you have heard, those frequent instances in which you have been reminded that posterity will pass between the accused, his accusers and his judges, will have no influence on your minds. A desire to secure the approbation of posterity is an honorable feeling pervading every human breast, and is almost inseparable from our nature: but to secure the approbation of posterity, we must take care to pursue the dictates of our own consciences, and by doing justice here, trust to posterity to do us justice too.
Our country it is true are now looking on with anxious solicitude for the event of this cause; but the sentence which they shall pass will not depend upon the judgment given here.—To the world and to posterity the conviction of the accused, by this court, will not establish his guilt; and I thank God, as the case has been put in issue between us, his acquittal will not prove his innocence. The facts in the cause, sir, those facts which we have proved by the most undeniable evidence, and upon which your judgment must be given; those facts will be presented to the eyes of the world and of posterity, and upon those only will they decide. If it should ever be the fortune of my humble name to descend to posterity, by the vote which I gave for instituting this impeachment, and by my conduct in discharging the great duty now committed to me, I cheerfully consent to be tried. To this awful tribunal I willingly submit. If the judge is guilty, posterity will heap on him all that odium which his guilt deserves, if he is innocent, let that odium be turned upon his accusers.
Because Sidney and Russell bled upon a scaffold, have their names been less the objects of veneration with posterity; and because Scroggs and Jeffries escaped the punishment due to their crimes, have they therefore been less the objects of universal execration? No, sir; and the honorable counsel
(Mr. Hopkinson) who first addressed you on behalf of the accused, gave us himself a memorable example of the poor respect which posterity will feel for the decisions of those who have gone before them. That honorable gentleman told you that Warren Hastings was impeached for the murder of princes and the plunder of empires ,—and yet that he was acquitted. But is there any who hears me that believes he was innocent?—If we read the history of that trial; if we look to the facts charged, and listen to the unexampled eloquence by which they were supported, our only wonder will be, that he was not condemned. Sir, it has been said, that those plundered millions were the best witnesses to prove his innocence; and I greatly fear that the day will come, when the crying blood of those murdered princes will be the best witnesses to prove his guilt. The most splendid action in Edmund Burke's life was his accusation of Warren Hastings ; the foulest stain upon the national justice of England, was his acquittal.
We have been charged, sir, by one of the honorable counsel, (Mr. Harper) with having endeavored to enlist on our side the sympathies of the court. Permit me to ask what sympathy have we endeavored to excite? What feelings have we endeavored to engage? To what passion have we addressed ourselves? None, sir. We came here to demand justice. The constitution has placed in your hands the power of punishing guilt; we have proved the guilt of the person accused, and at your hands we demand his punishment. To your consciences, and your understandings we appeal, and not to your feelings.—These have been assailed by our adversaries. They have exhibited their client to you, covered as they say with the frost of seventy winters, and have endeavored to hide the magnitude of his crimes, in the length of his years, and the infirmity of his health. In attempting to excite your compassion, they have wished to drown the voice of justice, and have addressed you, not as judges, but as men. I do trust, however, that if any sympathy is to be excited, it will be neither for the accused, nor his accusers. Let your feelings be turned towards the nation! Let your sympathy be awakened for those who are to come after you, for by the sentence which you pronounce in this case, it must ultimately be determined whether justice shall hereafter be impartially administered, or whether the rights of the citizen are to be prostrated at the feet of overbearing and tyrannical judges. We, who are engaged in this prosecution, feel that our fathers handed down to us a glorious birthright, and we appear at this bar to demand that it be transmitted to our children, unimpaired, and unspotted. Do the nation justice, and you will do justice to us, to yourselves, and to posterity.
We were also told by the honorable counsel for the accused, that when we found the accusation shrunk from the testimony, and that the case could no longer be supported, we resorted to the forlorn hope of contending that an impeachment was not a criminal prosecution, but a mere inquest of office. For myself I am free to declare, that I heard no such position taken. If declarations of this kind have been made, in the name of the managers I here disclaim them. We do contend that this is a criminal prosecution, for offences committed in the discharge of high official duties, and we now support it, not merely for the purpose of removing an individual from office, but in order that the punishment inflicted on him may deter others from pursuing the baneful example which has been set them.
Nor do we mean to take another ground which the counsel for the accused have thought proper to assign us, for we never entertained the most distant idea, that any citizen might be impeached. It was with no little surprise that I heard such doctrines ascribed to us, and I was astonished to hear the attorney general of Maryland combating positions which we had not laid down, and searching for argument to prove that which we should not have hesitated to admit.
But, sir, there is one principle upon which all the counsel for the accused have relied, upon which they have all dwelt with great force, and to the maintenance of which they have directed all their powers, that we cannot assent to—we mean to contend against it, because we believe it to be totally untenable, and because it is of the first importance in the decision of the question now under discussion. We do contend that to sustain an impeachment, it is not necessary to show that the offences charged are of such a nature as to subject the party to an indictment, for the learned counsel have said that the person now accused is not guilty, because the misdemeanors charged against him are not of a nature for which he might be indicted in a court of law.
To show how entirely groundless this position is, I need only pursue that course which has been pointed out to us by the respondent himself, and his counsel. I might refer to English authori-
ties of the highest respectability, to show that officers of the British government have been impeached for offences not indictable under any law whatever. But I feel no disposition to resort to foreign precedents. In my judgment the constitution of the United States ought to be expounded upon its own principles, and that foreign aid ought never to be called in. Our constitution was fashioned after none other in the known world, and if we understand the language in which it is written, we require no assistance in giving it a true exposition. As we speak the English language, we may indeed refer to English authorities for definitions, as we would refer to English dictionaries for the meaning of English words; but upon this as upon all other occasions where the principles of our government are to be developed, I trust that the constitution of the United States will stand upon its own foundation, unsupported by foreign aid, and that the construction given to it will be, not an English construction, but one purely and entirely American.
The constitution declares, that "the judges both of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their commissions during good behavior." The plain and correct inference to be drawn from this language is, that a judge is to hold his office so long as he behaves himself well in it; and whenever he shall not demean himself well, he shall be removed. I therefore contend that a judge would be liable to impeachment under the constitution, even without the insertion of that clause which declares, that "all civil officers of the United States shall be removed for the commission of treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors." The nature of the tenure by which a judge holds his office is such, that for any act of misbehavior in office he is liable to removal. These acts of misbehavior may be of various kinds, some of which may indeed be punishable under our laws by indictment; but there may be others which the law makers may not have pointed out, involving such a flagrant breach of duty in a judge, either in doing that which he ought not to have done, or in omitting to do that which he ought to have done, that no man of common understanding would hesitate to say he ought to be impeached for it.
The words "good behavior," are borrowed from the English laws, and if I were inclined to rest this case on English authorities, I could easily shew, that in England these words have been construed to mean much more than we contend for. The expression durante bene gesserit , I believe first occurs in a statute of Henry VIII. providing for the appointment of a custos rotulorum , and clerk of the peace for the several counties in England. This statute recites, that ignorant and unlearned persons had by unfair means procured themselves to be appointed to these offices, to the great injury of the community, and provides that the custos shall hold his office until removed, and the clerk of the peace shall hold his office durante bene gesserit . The reason then for making the tenure to be during good behavior was, that the office had been held by incapable persons, who were too ignorant to discharge the duties; and it was certainly the intention of the legislature that such persons should be removed whenever their incapacity was discovered. Under this statute, therefore, I think it clear that the officer holding his office during good behavior, might be removed for any improper exercise of his powers, whether arising from ignorance, corruption, passion, or any other cause. To this extent, however, we do not wish to go. We do not charge the judge with incapacity. His learning and his ability are acknowledged on all hands;—but we charge him with gross impropriety of conduct in the discharge of his official duties, and as he cannot pretend ignorance, we insist that his mal-conduct proceeded from a worse cause.
If, however, a judge were not made liable to removal from the very nature of the tenure by which he holds his office, we still insist that every judge conducting himself improperly in office, comes under that clause of the constitution which declares, that "the President, Vice-President, and civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors."
We do not mean to contend against a position which one of the learned counsel took so much pains to prove, that the word high applies as well to misdemeanors as to crimes; nor do we deem it important at this time to enquire whether a civil officer of the United States can be removed for offences not committed in the discharge of his official duties. It will be time enough to make this enquiry when the case presents itself. At present we aver that the party charged has been guilty of a high misdemeanor in office, and that he ought to be removed for it.
Here however we are met by being told, that although his conduct may have been improper, yet that he is not liable to impeachment, unless the offence was
of such a nature as that he might be indicted for it in a court of law.
If this be true as it relates to a judge, the constitution, to be consistent with itself, must make it universally true; and yet if the doctrine be admitted, the constitution will be found to be at variance with itself. Treason is an offence which may or may not be committed in the discharge of official duty, and no doubt the party committing it may be indicted. Bribery is an offence for which a judge may be indicted in the courts of the United States, because an act of Congress makes provision for it, and declares the punishment; but there is no law by which any other officer of the United States can be indicted for bribery. If, therefore, the President of the United States should accept a bribe, he certainly cannot be indicted for it, and yet no man can doubt that he might be impeached. If one of the heads of departments should undertake to recommend to office for pay, he certainly might be impeached for it, and yet I would ask under what law and in what court could he be indicted?
To this perhaps it might be answered, that bribery is one of those offences for which the constitution expressly provides, that the officer may be impeached.—This is true, but let us proceed further, and enquire whether there are not other offences for which an officer may be impeached, and for which he cannot be indicted.
If a judge should order a cause to be tried with eleven jurors only, surely he might be impeached for it, and yet I believe there is no court in which he could be indicted. You, Mr. President, as Vice-President of the United States, together with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chief Justice and the Attorney General, as commissioners of the sinking fund, have annually at your disposal eight millions of dollars, for the purpose of paying the national debt. If, instead of applying it to this public use, you should divert it to another channel, or convert it to your own private uses, I ask if there is a man in the world who would hesitate to say that you ought to be impeached for this misconduct? And yet there is no court in this country in which you could be indicted for it. Nay, sir, it would amount to nothing more than a breach of trust, and would not be indictable under the favorite common law.
But, sir, this ground, which was so strenuously fought for, will probably be abandoned, and instead of our adversaries maintaining that the offence must be of an indictable nature, they will, like one of the honorable counsel (Mr. Harper) go a step back, and say that it must be a breach of some known positive law. Thus they will endeavor to shelter their client by saying that there is no act of Congress declaring it illegal for a judge to deliver his opinion on the law before counsel have been heard, or to make political harangues from the bench.
There are offences for which an officer may be impeached, and against which there are no known positive laws. It is possible that the day may arrive, when a President of the United States, having some great political object in view, may endeavor to influence the legislature by holding out threats or inducements to them. A treaty may be made, which the President with some personal view may be extremely anxious to have ratified.—The hope of office may be held out to a Senator, and I think it cannot be doubted, that for this the President would be liable to impeachment, although there is no positive law forbidding it. Again, sir, a member of the Senate or of the House of Representatives may have a very dear friend in office, and the President may tell him unless you vote for my measures, your friend shall be dismissed. Where is the positive law forbidding this, yet where is the man who would be shameless enough to rise in the face of his country and defend such conduct, or be bold enough to contend that the President could not be impeached for it?
It was said by one of the counsel that the offence must be a breach either of the common law, a state law, or a law of the United States, and that no lawyer would speak of a misdemeanor, but as an act violating some one of these laws. This doctrine surely is not warranted, for the government of the United States have no concern with any but their own laws. In a state court, I would speak of a misdemeanor as an offence against a state law; in the courts of the United States, I would speak of it as an offence against an act of Congress; but, sir, as a member of the House of Representatives, and acting as a manager of an impeachment, before the highest court in the nation, appointed to try the highest officers of the government, when I speak of a misdemeanor, I mean an act of official misconduct, a violation of official duty, whether it be a proceeding against a positive law, or a proceeding unwarranted by law.
If the objection that the offence must be of an indictable nature, or an

against some positive law, means any thing, it must be that the misconduct for which a judge or any other officer may be impeached, is either made punishable by, or is a violation of an act of Congress, for we are not to be regulated either by the common law or a state law. What then would be the result? I have pointed out several instances of gross misconduct, in violation of no act of Congress, and yet under this doctrine, he is to be permitted to pursue his wicked courses until every possible offence is defined by statute. This too would teach us that we have done wrong heretofore; for at the last session a judge was impeached and removed from office for drunkenness and profane swearing on the bench, although there is no law of the United States forbidding them. Indeed I do not know that there is any law punishing either, in New-Hampshire, where the offence was committed. It was said by one of the counsel that these were indictable offences. I however do not know where—certainly not in England. Drunkenness is punishable there by the ecclesiastical authority, but the temporal magistrate never had any power over it, until it was given by a statute of James I. and even then the power was not to be exercised by the courts, but only by a justice of the peace, as is now the case in Maryland, where a small fine may be imposed.
But the attorney general of Maryland, (Mr. Martin) admits that offences may be of so heinous a nature that their punishment carries infamy with them, and that though not committed in the discharge of official duty, yet if against a state law, the party may be impeached and removed from office. This though not very material to the present question, may serve us in shewing how inapplicable the doctrine is, that the offence must be against a state law or the common law. I will suppose that in New-Hampshire there is no law punishing profane swearing—In Maryland a magistrate is authorised to impose a fine of thirty-three cents, and if this is not paid instantly, the offender may be put in the pillory and receive thirty-nine lashes. The punishment is infamous, and if inflicted on a judge, according to the idea of this gentleman, he is to be impeached and removed from office. If the same offence is committed in New-Hampshire, the judge is not to be removed, not because he has been guilty of a lighter offence, but because there is no state law punishing it. If then the state law is to be made the criterion, a judge in Maryland is to be removed from office for that which he might do with impunity in another state.
To carry this idea a little further—There was once in the state of Connecticut, and may be yet for ought I know, a celebrated code called the Blue Laws . Under the provisions of this code, I believe it is a fact, that a captain of a ship was tied up and publicly whipped, because, on returning from a long voyage, he met his wife on a Sunday at the front door and kissed her. This was deemed a high offence, and was ignominiously punished. Now if we are to be governed by the state laws, I trust the blue laws of Connecticut will be rejected, and that our grave judges may be allowed to kiss whom and where they please, as to their wisdom shall seem meet, without incurring the pains and penalties of an impeachment. Thus, sir, may be somewhat ludicrous, but I hope it is not therefore the less illustrative of the absurdity of the doctrine contended for. It has been said that the offences for which a judge or other officer is to be impeached, ought to be defined by act of Congress. This is impossible. Such is the multiplicity of passions that sway the human heart; such is the variety of human action, that a code of laws never did and never can exist, in which all human offences are defined. The constitution is sufficiently definite, when it declares that a judge shall hold his office during good behavior, and that all civil officers shall be removed for high crimes and misdemeanors. The law of good behavior is the law of truth and justice. It is confined to no soil and to no climate. It is written on the heart of man in indelible characters, by the hand of his Creator, and is known and felt by every human being. He who violates it, violates the first principles of all law. He abandons the path of rectitude, and by not listening to the warning voice of his conscience, he forsakes man's best and surest guide on this earth. The best and ablest judge will often err in mere matters of law, but as to principles of duty, in discharging acts of common justice to his fellow men, he can never err so long as he follows conscience as his guide, and suffers justice to be the only object which he has in view.
How far judge Chase has governed himself by this great, unerring rule of human action, it is your province to determine;—how far he has excused himself by his answer and the arguments of his counsel, I shall now beg leave to examine, premising at the same time, that it is my intention to confine myself to the first article.
It has been alledged by the counsel for the accused, that my honorable colleagues have argued this case upon the
articles and not upon the evidence; and this allegation contains an admission, that if the articles are proved, the guilt of the party is established. It shall be my endeavor to shew that there is no material variance between the charges as laid in the articles, and the evidence brought to support them; but that they are amply and fully proved by the very best testimony which could be adduced.
One of the learned counsel in commenting upon the first article declared that he discovered but a single truth in it, which was, that the judge had formed and reduced to writing an opinion upon the law; and that gentleman as well as the attorney general of Maryland labored with great zeal, and with much display of talent, to convince the Senate that there could be nothing wrong in this. Unfortunately for these learned gentlemen, even that truth is not to be found in it; for by recurring to the article it will be found that the judge is not charged for having formed an opinion, or for having reduced that opinion to writing, but for "having delivered an opinion in writing on the question of law, on the construction of which the defence of the accused materially depended, tending to prejudice the minds of the jury against the prisoner, before counsel had been heard in his defence."
In this we find no charge against him for having formed an opinion, or for having reduced it to writing, and certainly the learned counsel might have spared themselves the trouble of proving what I am sure every member of the court was fully convinced of before, that there was no impropriety in a judge's forming an opinion on any subject whatever, whether legal or philosophical. It is not however unusual for skilful advocates to attempt to draw the attention from the material points in dispute, for the purpose of fixing it on others of little or no importance. Such has been the course pursued by our adversaries. But, Mr. President, the real charge is, that Samuel Chase did, upon the trial of John Fries for treason, endeavor to prejudice the minds of the jury against him, by delivering an opinion to them upon the law, before his counsel were heard; and this too in a case of life and death, where the jury had an ample, uncontrollable right to decide as well the law as the fact. It is the right and duty of judges to inform their minds upon all questions of law whatsoever, but it is an unwarrantable proceeding, it is an unauthorised assumption of power in them, to deliver that opinion to the jury in a criminal cause, before the jury is sworn, and before the counsel of the prisoner have been heard in his defence.
I did not expect to hear the fact denied by the counsel, but I did expect to hear it would be admitted, and attempted to be justified. This, however, has not been done; and they have pretended to deny the fact by insisting on an impossibility I had almost said an absurdity. They have declared that judge Chase did not make the opinion known, but that it became public by what they call the warm and improper conduct of Mr. Lewis. Sir, it is impossible. What are the facts, as proved even by their own witnesses? That judge Chase handed the written opinion down to the bar. That it was put into the hands of Mr. Lewis, who without reading it, immediately and disdainfully threw it from him declaring that his hand should never be tainted by receiving a prejudged opinion in any case. How then I ask was it made known by Mr. Lewis? He refused to read it, and threw it from him with the correct feeling and indignation naturally arising from a high sense of the injury done to his client. No, sir, it was made public by judge Chase, "as I will presently prove beyond the possibility of doubt, in the hearing of the whole panel of jurors. But permit me here to meet one of the honorable counsel (Mr. Harper) upon that ground, to which he defied my friend who first opened this cause, (Mr. Randolph.) The learned counsel avails himself, he says, of the difference between a general opinion and a direct application of the law to a particular case, and insists that judge Chase's was nothing more than an opinion upon the law generally. Here I meet him, and if I do not prove that the judge delivered the opinion, that he applied it in the most direct terms to Fries's case; that he knew there was no controversy about the facts, and of course that the defence must rest upon the construction which the jury would give to the constitutional definition of treason; that he publicly pronounced the opinion so as to make an impression not only upon the jury, but upon the by-standers; if I do not prove all this, then I will agree to surrender this article, and indeed the whole impeachment.
In order to prove this, I might rest satisfied with referring the Senate to the clear and pointed testimony of Mr. Lewis, Mr. Dallas and Mr. Tilghman. But as Mr. Rawle and Mr. Meredith do not recollect so much as these other gentlemen, and it has therefore been argued that the former must be mistaken, because it is said that their warmth at the moment gave a colour-
ing not warranted by the facts, I shall not rely solely on the information derived from them. But I mean to shew, that Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas are supported in their statement by the judge himself, while Mr. Rawle and Mr. Meredith are pointedly contradicted by him. In truth, sir, it would seem as if the counsel for the accused had entirely forgotten that he had ever filed an answer, or they had never read it. We alledge that the judge delivered the opinion, and that he applied it directly to Fries's case in the hearing of the jury; they deny this. We have proved it by Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas, they rely on Mr. Rawle and Mr. Meredith who do not recollect it. Let us hear the judge himself.
In the 14th page of the answer the judge says "it was for these reasons that on the 22d of April, 1800, (acknowledged by all to be the first day of this memorable transaction,) when the said John Fries was brought into court, and placed in the prisoner's box for trial, but before the jury was impaneled to try him, this respondent informed the above mentioned William Lewis, one of his counsel, the aforesaid Alexander James Dallas not being then in court, that the court had deliberately considered the indictment against John Fries for treason, and the three overt acts of treason stated therein: that the crime of treason was defined by the constitution of the United States: that as the federal legislature had the power to make, alter or repeal laws, so the judiciary only had the power to declare, expound and interpret the constitution and laws of the United States."
Here then we find the attention of the counsel and of every body else, called in open court to the case of John Fries, and all the witnesses agree, that the jury though not then sworn, were in the box for that purpose, as might naturally be supposed when the prisoner was brought in for trial. We find too that the court had deliberately considered the indictment and the three overt acts of treason charged in it—Now let us see what the result of that consideration was: in the 15th page of the answer the judge proceeds with the statement then made by him from the bench, in which he declared, "that the question, what acts amounted to treason, was a question of law, and had been decided by judges Paterson, and Peters in the cases of Vigol and Mitchel, and by judges Iredell and Peters in the case of John Fries, the then prisoner at the bar, in April 1799. That judge Peters remained of the same opinion which he had twice before delivered, and he, this respondent, on long and great consideration, concurred in the opinion of judges Paterson, Iredell and Peters."
What opinion was it that judges Iredell and Peters had before given, and in which judge Chase then publicly declared that he concurred? Why, that the overt acts charged in the indictment against Fries did amount to treason, for upon those very overt acts, the judge himself admits Fries had before been tried in April 1799, when these same acts were decided by judges Iredell and Peters to amount to treason, and in this opinion judge Chase then declared that he himself concurred. Here then was a full expression of the opinion. Here it was publicly pronounced in the hearing of the jury, in the face of the prisoner, before his counsel were heard in his defence, and so eager was the judge to make it known that he could not even wait until the jury was sworn. Here too was a direct application of the law to the case of John Fries, then about to be tried for treason, by which application of the law, the fate of the prisoner was fixed, and all hopes of life entirely cut off.
But gentlemen say that no opinion was given as to facts. True, sir, for he perfectly knew that there was no controversy about the facts; these were all admitted. And because he knew this, his offence was the greater; for when he was convinced the facts were undisputed, he placed the whole case beyond the reach of hope, by pronouncing the law, before the jury was sworn. That he did know there was no dispute about the facts is proved in the 12th page of his answer, in which he says, "it was not suggested or understood that any new evidence was to be offered," and one of his counsel, the attorney general of Maryland, has said, that the judge had the use of Mr. Rawle's and Mr. Peters's notes of the former trial. From these notes, and from his conversation with these gentlemen, he became perfectly acquainted with the facts in the case. Knowing them to be undisputed, he resolved to seal the doom of the wretched prisoner, by publicly pronouncing his opinion before the trial commenced, in the presence of the jury, thereby attempting to prejudice their minds against anything which might afterwards be urged in his favor.
The learned counsel for the judge having denied that the opinion was publicly delivered, they endeavor to give a coloring to the transaction, by alledging that it was delivered to Mr. Lewis only, as
* Fries had been tried in April, 1799, for the same offences, and had, under the direction of the court, been convicted of treason; but this last was a new trial, granted in consequence of supposed prejudice in some of the jurors who sat in the former trial.
counsel for the prisoner; and this they, as well their client pretend was intended for the benefit of Fries, in order that himself and his friends might see the necessity of procuring new testimony. This is the excuse offered by the judge in the 12th page of his answer, and it has been reiterated over and over again, by his counsel at the bar. Let us examine it, and determine for ourselves, whether this could be the motive. In the 10th page of the answer, it is stated, that the indictment against Fries was found by the grand jury, on the 16th day of April, 1800, and "that his trial was appointed to be had on the 22d day of the same month." Thus six days intervened between that on which the indictment was found, and that fixed for the trial, agreeably to the judge's own statement. The court was in session every day, and we may fairly presume that Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas, both being extensively engaged in business, attended constantly. If this great favor to Fries was intended, and there was a wish to apprise his counsel of the opinion of the court, in order that new testimony might be procured, one would naturally suppose, that some opportunity of conversing with the counsel privately, might have been embraced, and this special favor might have been thus conferred. But what is the fact? This information was never given until the day arrived, which was fixed for the trial, nor until after the prisoner was brought to the bar. Was this a time to procure new testimony? Did it afford any opportunity to send fifty or sixty miles into Northampton county, for the purpose of bringing other witnesses? Could this possibly be the motive which actuated the judge? Surely not—or why defer it to the very latest moment preceding the trial? Why deliver the opinion publicly, not only in the hearing of the counsel, but of the jury, and every other person present? Sir, I am persuaded the court will agree with me, that the reason assigned is, as it has been stated in the replication, an unworthy evasion.
The counsel (Mr. Hopkinson) who first addressed the court in favor of the accused, viewed this part of the subject in a different light. He very ingeniously offered another excuse. He considered it a great favor done to the prisoner, not because it was intended to give him an opportunity of introducing new testimony, but he says the judge declared the opinion of the court, for the purpose of drawing the attention of the counsel to those particular points, which it would be necessary for them to argue, in order that the error of the court might be corrected if it was an error. This he called a very great advantage, and supposed that counsel always ought to be thankful for it. Such a course may sometimes give advantages, but in my judgment the disadvantages generally are much greater. On that occasion, however, it gave no advantage, and could not be intended to give any. The court knew precisely what ground the counsel meant to take. One of them had been present at Fries's former trial, and we are told that judge Chase had the benefit of his notes, as well as those of the district attorney. He knew therefore perfectly well, that the points intended to be relied on, were precisely those which he had peremptorily decided against them. He knew that there could be no necessity for drawing the attention of counsel to them, for they had been relied on at the former trial. This therefore could not be the motive, and is, like the other nothing more than an evasion.
Let us see too, how this reason or excuse will correspond with the principal ground of defence set up by the judge, and very much dwelt on by his advocates. In the 12th and 13th pages of the answer, the judge states that there were more than one hundred civil causes then depending in the court, and he conceived that an early communication of the court's opinion would tend to the saving of time. Now permit me to ask if any time whatever could be saved, if as the gentleman supposes it was the intention of the court to draw the minds of the counsel to the particular points stated in the judge's opinion? For it must be conceded, that if the counsel were to attempt to convince the court that their opinion was erroneous, no time whatever could be saved, as the very attempt itself would tend to the consumption of that time which the judge deemed so precious.
I have therefore proved that the opinion was publicly delivered; that it was applied by the judge in direct terms to the case of Fries, in the presence and hearing of the jury, who were to decide upon his life and death, thus tending to prejudice their minds against him; and I flatter myself I have also proved the entire futility of those excuses which have been seen up for him, as well by himself as by his counsel.
Much has been said with a view to convince the court that the opinion thus delivered was a correct one, and it has therefore been argued that his conduct was perfectly justifiable. For my own part I consider it totally immaterial in the present case, whether the doctrine of treason as laid down by the judge was correct or not; for even if it were correct, the time and manner of delivering it, and the persons to whom it was delivered, formed the substance of the charge against him. It is a misdemeanor, a high misdemeanor in a judge, wantonly to give an opinion upon any case which is to come before him, previously to the swearing of the jury; and the offence is made much greater by the opinion being publicly declared in the presence of the jury, who ought to come to the trial of every cause with minds wholly free from prepossession against either party.
Although the judge has said in his answer, that no gentleman of established reputation for legal knowledge would deliberately give a contrary opinion,
yet I have not the slightest apprehension that any little reputation that I may possess, can be in any manner affected by my expressing, as I now do, my entire conviction that the doctrine of treason, as laid down in Fries's case, is wholly repugnant to the spirit and meaning of the constitution. It is not my intention at this time to enter into an argument to prove this, for I have before said, that I consider it quite immaterial in the present discussion; but I will offer some few observations, to demonstrate to the Senate that there was nothing very unreasonable in the wish expressed by Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas, to shew that the constitution was susceptible of another construction.
The constitution declares, that "treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid & comfort." John Fries was indicted for levying war against the United States, and the facts I believe were, that he, with some others, did in a forcible manner, rescue some prisoners from the marshal of Pennsylvania. This was called a resistance to a law of the United States, and by construction, was determined at the former trial to be the treason of levying war. It was in opposition to this construction of the constitution that Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas wished to be heard. It was certainly not a very extravagant wish on their part, for it ought to be recollected that we are a young nation, and it is deeply interesting to us all, that the constitution of the United States should not receive a construction unwarranted by its letter. After the decisions had taken place in the courts, upon the western insurrection, (I mean in the cases of Vigol and Mitchel) Congress had passed an act declaring that to resist a law of the United States should be deemed a high misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment; and they had before provided by the act of 1789, that to rescue prisoners from the custody of the marshal, should also be punishable by fine and imprisonment. Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas were desirous of shewing, that Fries's case came within the provisions of these laws, and that his offence was not of such a nature as to forfeit his life. They also wished to have an opportunity of proving, that the terms levying war ought not to receive the same construction here as in England. To convince the Senate that they were not singular in their ideas, and that the construction given by the court has not been unanimously assented to, I shall take the liberty of referring to an author of merited reputation, to whom I believe our adversaries will not refuse their respect. Judge Tucker of Virginia, in his valuable edition of Blackstone's commentaries, in the appendix to the 4th vol. under the title Treason , after reciting that part of the constitution relating to the subject, observes,
"It is probable that no part of the constitution of the U. S. was supposed to be less susceptible of various interpretations than that which defines and limits the offence of treason against the U. S. the text is short, and until comments upon it appeared, might have been deemed explicit; it is as follows:
"Treason against the U. S. shall consist ONLY in levying war against THEM, or in adhering to THEIR enemies, giving them aid and comfort."
"From this declaration contained in the constitution of the U. S. the supreme law of the land, and the fountain both of the authority of the government and of the crime against it, a plain man might draw conclusions very different from the artificial reasoning, and subtle refinement of technical men; and seeing that that instrument is to be regarded as the act of the people of the U. S. both collectively and individually, it might seem reasonable that the interpretation of nine hundred and ninety-nine plain men, who were parties to it, ought to serve as a guide to the thousandth man, who may happen to be called upon to expound it. But as technical men are not very apt to respect the opinions of such as have not been educated in the same habits with themselves, the probability is, that the opinions of one man in a thousand or rather in a hundred thousand, will outweigh that of the rest of the community, unless the latter should deem it an object worthy of their attention to express their opinion, in some way that may be regarded as obligatory upon the few who dissent from them."
"As new fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which violent factions in free states have usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other, the convention have, with great judgment, opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a constitutional definition of the crime."
"Judge Wilson, in the first charge which he delivered in the federal circuit court of Pennsylvania, expressed himself thus on the subject. "It well deserves to be remarked, that with regard to treason a new and great improvement has been introduced into the government of the U. S.: Under that government the citizens have not only a legal but a constitutional security against the extension of that crime or the imputation of treason. Treasons capricious, arbitrary and constructive have often been the most tremendous engines of despotic or legislative tyranny."
"Judge Iredell, on a similar occasion in South-Carolina, observes—Treasons consist in two articles only; levying war against the U. S. or adhering to their enemies giving them aid and comfort. The plain definition of this crime was justly deemed of such moment to the

Liberties of the people, that it was made a part of the constitution itself. None can so highly prize the importance of this provision as those who are best acquainted with the abuses which have been practiced in other countries in prosecutions for this offence. No man of humanity can read them without the highest indignation; nor in particular, can they be read by any citizen of America, without emotions of gratitude for the much happier situation of his own country.
Such probably were the opinions of the citizens of America in general, when they adopted the constitution; but technical men have since made some important inferences and deductions from the use of some words in that definition, which are to be found in the statute of treasons in England; from whence they conclude, that the decisions made upon that act in England, during a period of near five hundred years, however contradictory or inconsistent they may be with the text or with each other, have been adopted also by the constitution, "as a direction whereby the courts are to understand the application of that act." And it has even been advanced on a very important occasion, that what in England is called constructive levying of war, in this country must be called direct levying of war.
"It is on the authority of a Passage in the Mirror, that Sir Edward Coke lays it down, that levying war against the king was treason by the common law. We find then that the common law sense of this obscure phrase, as Sir Matthew Hale calls it, was the bringing in or raising an army . And in this sense it is probable that every man in America [with the exception perhaps of half a dozen lawyers] understood the term levying war, when the constitution was adopted: and in this sense it seems to be still understood by some gentlemen, whose professional talents are both an honor and an ornament to their country."
Such we find are the opinions of Judge Tucker, an able and upright lawyer, who thinks that the constitution ought to be construed agreeably to the plain import of its language, and ought not to be involved in technical abstruseness. In that series of publications entitled the Federalist, written at the commencement of the present government, by some of the ablest men in this nation, for the purpose of defending the constitution, it is matter of boast, that treason was fully defined, and not left to wild and arbitrary construction. But what avails the definition, if the constructive treasons of England are to be drawn in as precedents for us?
Sir Matthew Hale, than whom an abler, or a better judge never graced the English bench, tells us that the words levying war, were formerly construed to mean "the raising an armed force or bringing in an army," and surely such a man of plain sound sense, would appear to be their true meaning under our constitution. He says that the first instance which he finds of constructive treasons, was in the reign of Henry the eighth, when certain persons who had combined for the purpose of raising servant's wages, were adjudged to be guilty of levying war; and the next was in the reign of Elizabeth. Thus, from these two decisions constructive treasons became fashionable, and scarcely any thing could be done, but arbitrary judges were found to construe it into treason. All was either levying war or conspiring against the life of the king, and executions and attainders innumerable followed. Every new case formed a new precedent, and strengthened the old ones. In the reign of Charles the second, a number of apprentices were indicted for the treason of levying war, and this levying of war consisted in their having pulled down a certain description of houses. Hale was then one of the judges, and although these constructive treasons had been fashionable for an hundred and fifty years, he doubted. His brethren however over-ruled him, and these decisions in the worst of times have governed England since, and are now to be introduced here to govern us. Hale's reasons for differing with the other judges are stated in his pleas of the crown, and more at large by Keelyng in his reports. Although he lived in bad times he wished to make them better, by resisting that torrent of oppression which threatened to overwhelm the subject. I am sorry to add that since the revolution of 1688, the courts of England have thought themselves bound by those prior determinations, and decide accordingly. But we are not bound by them, and I do trust that they will be rejected. It is impossible to say to what lengths we are to be carried, but I cannot help feeling some alarm when I find it declared by Mr. Rawle, the then district attorney, upon Fries's trial, that "what in England is called constructive levying of war, must in this country be called direct levying of war."
* Idem , vol. XII, part 2, p. 36. † 25 Edw. III. ‡ Trial of Fries p. 123 & 168. § The passage stands thus. "If you exchange what is a direct levying of war, there can no such thing as treason be found; either the law is wrong, or the arguments used on the other side. Gentlemen, the law is established, but the arguments vanish like vapour before the morning sun; what then in England is called constructive levying of war, in this country must be called direct levying of war." Trial of Fries, p. 161. I should incline to suspect the reporter of some mistake in this passage, but it would seem that it had been submitted to the inspection of the counsel to whom it is ascribed. || 3 Inst. p. 9. ¶ 1 Hale's Hist. P. C. 148. ** Trial of Fries, 92, 99, 139, &c.
direct levying of war." (See Fries's trial, p. 161.)
I before stated that I did not mean to enter into an argument against the correctness of the court's opinion; nor have I done so, but have offered these remarks to show that it was not unreasonable in Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas to wish that another construction of the constitution might be received. The counsel for Judge Chase seem to think it monstrous that they should have wished to argue the point after the law had been settled by three former decisions, which had taken place in the course of four years. Let it be remembered that Sir Matthew Hale doubted, after the lapse of one hundred and fifty years from the first of these constructive treasons, and after, for aught I know, one hundred and fifty cases had been decided. Mr. President, far from thinking their conduct on that occasion extraordinary, I, as a free man of America, most cheerfully accord them my thanks for the stand they made; and I do hope and trust, that if ever a similar case should occur, in which the same doctrine of constructive treasons shall be urged to a jury, men like Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas will be found, men of exalted talents and extensive learning, who will be bold enough to assert the rights of the citizen, and save the constitution of their country from destruction.
Another justification of a peculiar nature is set up in defence of Judge Chase, by a statement made in Keelyng's Reports. It is there said that "after the happy restoration of King Charles the 2nd, Sir Orlando Bridgman, chief justice of the king's bench," and some six or eight others, judges, prosecutors and king's solicitors, assembled for the purpose of determining in what manner the regicides should be tried, and they settled many points which it was supposed would occur upon the trials. This, sir, is an unfortunate period to refer to for a justification of the conduct of judges in our day. Never was there a moment of such fawning servility; never was there a period of such unbounded licentiousness. The hope of reward or the fear of punishment brought almost every man crouching at the foot stool of the throne, and all united in singing Hosannas to the king, and crying aloud for the crucifixion of the miserable regicides. This conspiracy (which has been quoted) against the wretched victims whose sacrifice was resolved on, was headed by that most servile of all servile tools, Sir Orlando Bridgman. His character and those of his brother judges who conspired with him, may be collected from the charge which he gave to the grand jury on that occasion. It will found in the fourth vol. of state trials, and it will there be seen how flamboyantly he talked of divine right of kings , who he called God's vicegerents on earth ; their persons he said were too sacred for their conduct to be enquired into: they held their power from God, and were accountable to him alone: it was treason in their subjects to enquire into the propriety of what they did , with much more of the same cast. These are the times, these the men, and this is the conduct now introduced for the justification of Judge Chase. If they will afford him a justification he is welcome to it for me. They were woful times indeed—one would have thought the parliament which the king found in session upon his return, was submissive enough; but he was not satisfied, and finding the whole nation ready to bow at his nod, he ordered a new one elected, and they proved so compliant to all his wishes, that he continued them for eighteen years. Thus sufficiently proves the servile spirit of those whom the king thought proper to employ on this noted occasion, and it is not much to Mr. Keelyng's honor that he was one of them. The points which they did settle were of an extraordinary nature, and one of them was read a few days since by one of the counsel (Mr. Key) to show that Basset was a good juror in Callender's trial.
If however this famous precedent had been made in the best of times, it does not apply to the present case. For these judges bad as they were, yet had modesty enough to keep their opinions to themselves, till after the trials had commenced, and did not deliver them until the occasions arose which called for them. Judge Chase, we have fully proved, delivered his opinion before hand, publicly, and in the hearing of the jury, so that the authority of Mr. Justice Keelyng and Sir Orlando Bridgman does not justify him. He outstripped even them.
Having thus, as I conceive, fully established the first specification contained in this article, and having answered the only colourable excuses advanced in favor of the judge, I shall proceed to the second specification. This is a charge against him for "restricting Fries's counsel from recurring to such English authorities as they believed apposite, and from citing certain statutes of the United States, which they deemed illustrative of the positions upon which they intended to rest the defence of their client."
The restriction is in some sort admitted, for we are told that the counsel on both sides were restricted, and Mr. Rawle's testimony is relied on to support this allegation. If the counsel on both sides were restricted, it was a restriction of a most curious nature, as far as it related to the district attorney, Mr. Rawle; for the only restriction imposed on him was that he should not defend Fries, which his duty would not permit, nor perhaps his inclination. It is in vain therefore to talk about both being restricted, when the opinion of the court was all on one side; and it was well ascertained by the course taken by Mr. Rawle on the former trial, that he had no disposition to controvert the doctrine of treason, as laid down by the court. That the counsel of Fries was pro-
hibited from recurring to such English authorities, as they believed apposite, and from citing certain statutes of the United States, I consider entirely proved by the testimony of Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas. Without meaning to impeach Mr. Rawle's veracity, or that of any other person, I contend that Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas are entitled to more credit than he is, because he took no notes of the first day's proceedings, and is contradicted in many very material points by the admission of the judge himself. Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas gave their testimony a year ago; they have confirmed it at the bar now, and are supported by the judge in his answer, as far as he thought it prudent to go. That Mr. Rawle is contradicted, and Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas supported by the judge in many material points, I will proceed to show.
Mr. Rawle says that the judge, when he handed down the written opinion, declared the counsel on each side were to have a copy, and another copy was to be taken out by the jury. Mr. Lewis states this materially different, for he says the judge declared that a copy was to be delivered to the jury as soon as the case on the part of the prosecution was opened or gone through. Here these gentlemen differ. Let us see what the judge says. In the 15th page of the answer, he says that he stated that "three copies were to be made out, one to be delivered to the attorney of the district, one to the counsel of the prisoner, and one to the petit jury, after they should have been impanelled and heard the indictment read to them by the clerk, and after the district attorney should have stated to them the law on the overt acts in the indictment, as it appeared to him." Thus Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas are supported, and Mr. Rawle pointedly contradicted.
Again, Lewis and Dallas state a long conversation, not of a very mild nature on the part of Lewis, which took place between him and the judge on the first day, in which the contents of the written paper were very fully disclosed by the judge. Mr. Rawle recollects nothing of this, but expressly says the court when they handed down the papers, only stated that they had thought proper to draw up their sentiments of the law, likely to arise in the cases of treason, in order that they might be perfectly understood, which would tend to save time. He does not recollect that anything more was publicly said about it that day. In the 14th and 15th pages of the answer, the judge states a long conversation that took place between himself, Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas, and in this supports the testimony of these two gentlemen, while he contradicts that of Mr. Rawle.
Another fact in which Mr. Rawle differs from Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas is as to John Fries being in court that day. Mr. Rawle does not recollect that he was; Mr. Lewis swears that if he was not in the prisoner's box at the moment the paper was handed down, he was placed there a few minutes after, and Judge Chase in the 14th page of his answer expressly states, that Fries was placed in the prisoner's box, before any of the events occurred which form the subject of enquiry to day.
When Mr. Rawle's memory is so defective as to these three important facts, in the statement of which Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas are so strongly supported by the judge himself, I ask if their testimony ought not to have infinitely more weight than his. In noticing these contradictions, I have not relied on my own notes of the evidence, or on my own memory, but have referred to the three printed affidavits of Mr. Rawle, Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas, made out by themselves last year, and corroborated by the oral testimony which each has delivered at the bar.
I must therefore be permitted to insist that Fries's counsel were prohibited from recurring to English authorities, and from citing certain statutes of the United States. It is fully proved by Mr. Lewis, and corroborated by Mr. Dallas. The latter was not in court when the conversation took place; but coming in immediately after, he was informed of it by Mr. Lewis, and then stated to the court what Mr. Lewis had told him. The court did not deny it, and certainly it is to be presumed, if Mr. Lewis had made an erroneous statement of facts to Mr. Dallas, and they had been repeated by Mr. Dallas, the court would have contradicted them. This was not done, and both these gentlemen now swear that they were prohibited.
Let us enquire why there was a wish on the part of the prisoner's counsel to refer to English authorities. On the former trial of Fries, the court had grounded their opinion upon the construction which had been given in England, to the words levying war . The district attorney and his assistant, had relied on the same authorities. The counsel for the prisoner were desirous of showing, as they themselves have stated, that although these interpretative treasons had been admitted in England since the revolution of 1688, yet that they were founded on precedents made during arbitrary reigns, by which the courts in England afterwards conceived themselves bound. I have already shown to you from Hale's pleas of the crown, what was held to be the plain and simple meaning of the words levying war , antecedent to the reign of Henry VIII. when these interpretative treasons were first introduced, and it cannot be doubted that the object of Fries's counsel was to convince the jury that the constitution of the United States ought to be construed agreeably to the plain import of its own language, without being subjected to those wild and arbitrary constructions, which had originated in the worst of times for the worst of purposes. The reason why they wished to cite the statutes of the United States I have before mentioned to be, to show that the offences charged against
Fries were of such a nature as to subject him to fine and imprisonment only, and not to a forfeiture of his life.
But sir, a doctrine as novel to me as any I have lately heard, has been advanced on this occasion. A distinction is attempted to be taken between the right of the jury to decide the law as well as the fact, and their power to do so. I have always thought that in criminal cases the jury had both the right and the power. This is the first time I have ever heard it denied, and I trust it will be the last. This right is one of the most valuable features in the trial by jury, and if the jury should be so servile on a question of life and death, to surrender their own opinions to those of the court, they would be unworthy of the name of freemen. Although the right is denied, the power is admitted. I contend therefore that the power includes the right. For if they have been suffered to exercise this power for more than an hundred years, without being restricted by law, it surely cannot be questioned that they have acquired the right. The right to decide both the law & the fact is admitted in England, it has been acknowledged there for more than two hundred years, although I believe an instance or two may be found in the time of the noted J. Fries , when juries were attainted for daring to exercise this right. The power to attain however has been long since abolished, and no instance can be produced since the revolution of 1688, in which a verdict of acquittal has been ever set aside, because the jury have ventured to decide against the opinion of the court. The judge in his answer admits the right of the jury to decide both the law and the fact, and if he had not, but had taken the ground contended for by his counsel, I should have considered it a strong evidence of his guilt under the third specification.
The third and last specification charges the judge with "debaring the prisoner from his constitutional privilege of addressing the jury (through his counsel) on the law as well as on the fact, which was to determine his guilt or innocence, and at the same time endeavoring to wrest from the jury their indisputable right to hear argument and determine upon the question of law as well as the question of fact, involved in the verdict which they were required to give."
We do not contend that the counsel were debarred from addressing the jury by the interference of stetits and contables, for it is not necessary to prove the actual exercise of force. But we do allege, and we have proved it by Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas, that the judge declared on the first day, that they must address the court and not the jury. I have before shown that these gentlemen are entitled to more credit than either Mr. Rawle, Mr. Meredith, or Mr. Tilghman, for their testimony is better supported than that of the others, by the answer of the judge. It ought to be remembered too that they were more particularly interested in the transaction than the rest of the gentlemen, and therefore the probability is, that the facts were more strongly impressed on their minds.
An attempt however is made to shelter the judge from this part of the accusation, by saying that he declared counsel would be heard although this opinion was given. Sir, this is another evasion. The opinion itself carries with it internal, uncontrovertable evidence of the determination of the court that the counsel should not address the jury. What is the principal ground of defence, what is the leading reason urged for giving this extraordinary opinion before the jury was sworn? It was, as the judge says, and as his counsel have argued, to save time. They state that there were more than one hundred civil causes then pending, that the delay of business in Pennsylvania had been long a subject of complaint, and the judge was anxious to make Fries's trial a short one, in order that they might have time to proceed with the other business. Now suffer me to enquire how time was to be saved, how the trial of Fries was to be shortened, if his counsel were to be allowed to address the jury on the law which the court had already decided? Was not the opinion of the court given for the express purpose of preventing them from addressing the jury, or if not for this, let me ask for what purpose it was given? Was it to prejudice the minds of the jury, to close their ears and their understandings against any arguments which might be offered them? Gentlemen say no. Was it to save time? This was impossible, because the time was full to be occupied by the counsel being permitted to address the jury. Why then let me again ask was the opinion given? The answer is ready: It was intended to produce both these effects: The minds of the jury were to be pre-occupied by the imposing authority of the court, and in this manner it was expected to deter the counsel from addressing them on the law. Nothing therefore can be clearer, than that the counsel were prevented from addressing the jury, and that the judge "endeavored (in the language of the article) to wrest from the jury their right to hear argument, and determine upon the question of law." But it is said that the right
of the jury to decide the law does not give them a dispensing power over the law, and that therefore they are bound by the opinion of the court. Nor does the right of the court to decide the law give them a dispensing power over the law. The jury have a right to decide the law and are not bound by the opinion of the court. In order to enable them to decide correctly they have a right to hear argument, and any attempt to prevent this, is an attempt to wrest from them their right to decide the law, and is a high misdemeanor.
We are told however that if any thing wrong was done on the first day, ample atonement was made on the second. It is true that the judge exhibited some appearance of a wish that the counsel would proceed on the second day, but Mr. Lewis well remarked, that altho' the papers were withdrawn, the impression which had been made on the minds of the jurors could not be removed. What sort of an atonement too was this? It carried insult with it, and the language in which it was made, had a still greater tendency to strengthen the impression made the day before. The counsel were publicly informed they might proceed as they pleased, but it must be at the hazard of their character, and under the direction of the court. Is there a man of reputation on earth, possessed of the smallest spark of feeling, that would consent to disgrace himself, at addressing a jury under such circumstances? This alone, if nothing else had taken place, was sufficient to drive them from the defence of their client; and if they thought that their abandoning him might eventually save his life, they were fully justified in doing so.
The learned advocates for the judge have talked highly of the independence of the judiciary, and have asked what inducements any judge could have to act as we have charged Judge Chase with acting. Are there then no inducements for a judge to swerve from his duty? Has he no feelings to gratify, and is it impossible for him to become a partisan? Does his character as a judge divest him of his ambition as a man? Is he so incorruptible that temptation cannot assail him? Look through the annals of other nations—Read the history of England for the last forty years. Judicial independence has been for a long time as well secured there as here; and yet how many instances shall we find in that country, of prosecutions in which the feelings of the ministry had been engaged, and in which their influence over the judges has been too flagrant to be mistaken? In Ireland, miserable Ireland, a still more gloomy prospect presents itself. They too have boasted an independent judiciary; but an over-riding influence has crumbled it into ruins. The demon of destruction has entered their courts of justice, and spread desolation over the land. Execution has followed execution, until the oppressed, degraded and insulted nation has been made to tremble through every nerve, and to bleed at every pore. Let us then be warned by the fate of Ireland. In state prosecutions her judges look to the castle—although they cannot be put down, they may be elevated. Some of our judges have been elevated to places of high political importance; splendid embassies have been given to them. I will not say that they were given or accepted with improper views; but they have been given, and surely they hold out inducement enough for a judge to bend to the ruling party. It is our duty to prevent party spirit from entering into our courts of justice. Let us nip the evil in the bud, or it may grow to an enormous tree, bearing destruction upon every branch. You have now an opportunity of doing it, and I trust you will not suffer it to escape you. I therefore hope that you will not only remove Judge Chase from the high office which he now fills, but that by your judgement you will forever hereafter disqualify him from holding any office of profit or trust under the government of the United States.
I have thus, Mr. President, gone through the first article of the impeachment, and will not encroach upon the others; their elucidation I shall leave to my friends, who will follow me. A sense of public duty alone led to the present prosecution, and having discharged this, we shall have nothing to reproach ourselves with, let your decision be what it may.
The Wilmington Mirror states that the ship New-York, with GENERAL MORRAN, & family on board, all in good health, passed up the Delaware on Friday last.
WANTED, At the PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE and CITY TAVERN, a good HOSTLER and one more WARR. W. man COOK, to whom liberal wages will be given.
S. MYERS August 26—St FLOWER ROOTS. THEO: HOLT has for sale at his Nursery Garden the following Flower Roots imported by him last spring, but came too late then to offer them for sale, consisting of, Double Yellow Hyacinths, Red do. Blue, do. White, do. Polyanthus Narcissus of sorts. Double Roman, do. Fine mixed Tulips, Large Double Jonquils, Crown Imperials, &c. &c. Washington city, Aug. 26—wgt

PUBLIC SALE.
IN virtue of an order issued from the hon. court of Calvert county, will be offered at public sale on the 28th day of August next, (if fair, if not, the first fair day thereafter) at the late mansion of Benjamin Ward, deceased, at the hour of 12 o'clock, a valuable plantation, containing 184 acres of Land, lying on the Chesapeake Bay, in Calvert county. The improvements are a small dwelling house, kitchen, tobacco house, corn house, and other out houses; a large orchard of fine fruit. This fertile spot has every advantage, it abounds in heavy timber, and has a great proportion of rich low ground, capable of being made into meadow at a very trifling expense. The soil is extremely rich—tobacco, wheat, rye, and Indian corn, grow with little labour—the neighbourhood affords a society of very genteel and friendly people—places of worship surrounded it—convenient to mills, and a ware house for the inspection of tobacco within two miles of the premises. This Land will be laid off in small parcels, or sold all together, as may best suit purchasers. Bond with approved security will be required, carrying interest from the day of sale, payable in two equal payments, the first in 12, and the last in 18 months from the day of sale.
WM. M. CARCAUD, DAVID L. WREMS, CHAS. WILLIAMSON, Commissioners.
July 3 ep8w
Twenty Dollars Reward.
STRAYED or was stolen from the commons of the city of Washington on the night of the 4th inst. a Bright Bay Riding Horse, about eight years old and fifteen hands high—he has a star in his forehead, and as well as it is recollected one of his fore feet is white: he canters, paces and trots and possesses great spirit—he has had for some time a fore on his back which has prevented his being rode. His tail is cut square and is trimmed. Remarkably close. The above reward will be paid on the recovery of the horse, and if stolen, for the conviction of the thief, and ten dollars will be paid for the delivery of the horse to the subscriber and all reasonable charges.
WILLIAM BRENT.
Aug. 12—tf.
To be Sold,
Or exchanged for other property in the City, or its vicinity.
TWO valuable and contiguous TRACTS of LAND in the state of Kentucky, the one containing 6330 acres, and the other 6252 acres, by late survey. They are under old and indistinguishable titles of more than twenty years, and situated in a populous county, adjoining flourishing settlements. All taxes thereon have been duly paid.
Apply to the subscriber.
JOHN BECKLEY.
City of Washington, July 17—cp2m
Fifty Dollars Reward.
RANAWAY on the 9th inst. from the subscriber's farm near Frederick Town, (Maryland) a dark mulatto fellow named M - S E S ,
But commonly called LANHAM , He was raised near Pitsylvania and sold by a Mr. Burrells to the late James Marshall, deceased, of Frederick county. Lanham is about thirty years of age, nearly six feet high, stout and very active, fond of spirituous liquors, has been accustomed to working aboard shipping, likewise in a brick yard and is well acquainted with the management of horses and with the ferrying business; he is a very artful fellow, and I expect he has obtained a pass and will pass under the name of Samuel Beall. He had on and took with him an old blue shirt & trousers, a blue cloth coat with a black silk velvet cape bound with silk serpeting, a black fur hat nearly new, a pair of shoes nearly new, an old drab fur coat, with sundry other clothing not recollected; he has a scar under one of his eyes but it is not recollected which, somewhat hard of hearing and round shouldered. From his acquaintance in the city of Washington I suppose he has made for that place or some other seaport. Whoever takes up and secures said fellow in any jail so that I get him again shall receive if taken ten miles from home eight dollars, if twenty miles sixteen dollars, if thirty miles twenty dollars, if fifty miles thirty dollars, and if a greater distance the above reward with all reasonable charges if brought home.
JOHN L. HARDING.
N. B. Masters of vessels and others are cautioned against harboring said runaway at their peril.
July 26—tm
STELLE'S HOTEL & CITY TAVERN.
A Subscribers takes this method of thanking his friends and the public for their favors whilst on the Capitol Square and begs leave to acquaint them that having purchased and now occupying the tavern, late Tunnicliff's hotel, which he has commenced enlarging and improving—he respectfully solicits a continuance of the patronage of his friends and the public, assuring them that in his full determination to fit up his present hotel, and to conduct it, as to merit, he hopes, the preference of the public travelling, as well as those coming to the permanent seat of the Government of our Land of Liberty.
PONTIUS D. STELLE.
Washington City, March 25—tf
Ten Dollars Reward.
WAS missed on Sunday, the 5th of May a double cased silver Watch, maker's name Goldwater, Dublin, and in the outer case was a watch paper with Mr. Parker's name of Philadelphia—Whoever will bring the said watch to the office of the National Intelligencer, shall receive the above reward, and no questions shall be asked.
May 20—tf
1500 DOLLARS REWARD.
HIGHWAY ROBBERY.
YESTERDAY about 11 o'clock in the forenoon, Mr. JOHN PETER, an Officer of the BANK OF COLUMBIA, was stopped on horseback on the road between this town and Alexandria, and within about 2 miles of the latter place, by some unknown villain, shot through the body with a pistol, and robbed of a sum of money in his possession belonging to this Institution which he was taking to Alexandria, for the purpose of exchanging with the banks there.
The whole sum taken amounted Eighteen Thousand One hundred and Fourteen Dollars and Sixty-five Cents, made up in several packages, among which were,
 1 post note of the Bank of Virginia, Dol. 600  1 do. of the same, for 500  1 do. of the same, for 500  1 do. of the same, for 450  1 do. of the Bank of Potomac in favor of Joseph Riddle by him endorsed to Washington Bowie, dated 6 July, 1805. No 117 149 65 
A check of the Union Bank, on the Bank of Alexandria, drawn by R. Higginbotham, cashier, in favor of Greenham and Deveraux, by them endorsed and by Benj. Stoddert, and C. Smith, teller.
There were also a parcel of post notes of the Bank of Alexandria for 100 dollars, and for 50 dollars, each. The remainder was in current notes, principally of the banks of Alexandria and Potomac, and some few of the Bank of Virginia of different sizes and denominations.
As the attack was sudden, and the wound received of a nature to deprive Mr. Peter instantly of his senses, (although it is now hoped he will recover) the description obtained may not be very accurate—as far as we are informed—the man who perpetrated the act, is of middle stature, good countenance, and had a genteel appearance. He had on a dark blue or black coat, nankeen pantaloon, shoes, and a black hat, he was on foot and alone at the time, but may have had accomplices concealed, and will probably change his clothes.
FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS will be given to any person or persons, who will detect and bring to conviction the robber; and ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS additional for the recovery of the whole of the money, or in proportion for any smaller sum recovered—should there be accomplices, and one of them make a discovery, so that it leads to the conviction of the robber, or to the recovery of the money he shall receive the above reward, and interest will be made to obtain his pardon.
WILLIAM WHANN, Cashier of the Bank of Columbia. George Town, July 31—
TO BE SOLD, AT PUBLIC VENDUE,
At Gadsby's Hotel, in Alexandria, on Monday the 16th day of September, at 12 o'clock at noon.
ALL that TRACT of LAND late Presly Thornton, Esquire's, situated in Northumberland county, Virginia, lying immediately on the Potomac river. The following description is given of this property by persons well acquainted with it:—It contains 2,500 acres, 1700 acres of which are the most valuable low grounds on the river, between 3 and 400 acres heavily timbered, and the remainder very high land extremely productive. The soil of this tract is equal to any in the state for the cultivation of corn, wheat, tobacco, timothy, and small grain of all kinds. On this tract are a large commodious Brick Mansion House and two Offices, a large Brick Stable, valuable Barn, Cow House, and many other out houses. The Orchards and Garden contain a variety of valuable fruit trees, and the waters abound with excellent fish and oysters. It is situated about a day's sail from Baltimore Alexandria and Norfolk. There are two good mill seats for grist and saw mills on the estate, and plenty of cedar and chestnut timber, for which an excellent market may be found at the city of Washington.
The terms of sale are—one fourth cash one, fourth in one year, one fourth in 18 months and the residue in two years from the day of sale. The payments to be secured by bonds, with mortgages on the premises, and to be on interest from the day of sale.
For further information, application may be made in behalf of the subscriber, Thomas Robinson, to Richard Peters, jun. attorney at law in the city of Philadelphia, or to William Lewis, in the same city, (Philadelphia.)
THOMAS ROBINSON, W. LEWIS. June 19—cp Sept 16
CHARLES H. VARDEN, MERCHANT TAYLOR.
Has received from Philadelphia a handsome assortment of FALL goods, consisting of the best London and French superfine cloths, cashmeres, patent Bennet's cord, toilenettes, fancy and white Marseilles, black and figured silk, molekins, fancy silk, Marseilles, constitution cords, velvets, Genoa cord, silk and satin Florentines, superfine coating, knapped cloths, with a variety of other articles suitable for the winter season.
N. B. Ladies habits, regimentals, and navy uniforms made in the first style of fashion.
New Jersey avenue near the Capitol, December 10—tf
Twenty Dollars Reward
STRAYED or stolen from the subscriber on the night of the 4th inst. two HAY HORSES , one a large bay six years old, one of his eyes appears to be injured, his tail bobbed very short. And all round; the other an old horse, with two white hind feet, several white saddle spots, has a switch tail, which has been lately cut at the ends; the first accustomed to the carriage, trots & paces, the second made use of as a road horse, trots easy, but paces badly, very lately shod all round. As I am satisfied they have been stolen, I will double the reward, on conviction of the thief or thieves, and on getting the horses.
DANIEL CARROLL of Dud'o. July 12—F&Wit
On a liberal credit.
THE subscriber will dispose of at private sale, his estate called Chichester, lying on the eastern branch, immediately on the city of Washington. This tract of land containing 697 acres is laid off in lots from 83 to 144 acres for the convenience of purchasers. Plats of the estate and the terms of sale are in the hands of colonel Hanson at the navy yard, and Charles Wayman of George Town. The lots will be shown by Mr. Wedden, living on the premises, near the Eastern Branch bridge.
ANTHONY ADDISON. Barnaby, 12th June 1805—tf
Rapine, Conrad, & Co.
On New Jersey Avenue Capitol Hill,
HAVE just received and offer for sale, at a low price, a quantity of PERUVIAN BARK by the pound and smaller quantity.
They have also, lately received an addition to their former assortment of books and stationery. July 10—
For Sale
IN the county of Prince William, Virginia, a Neabico furnace and its appendages, with four or five thousand acres of land adjoining, near the town of Dumfries, and within four or five miles of the Potomac—the soil is generally adapted to small grain, and it is too considerable for one purchaser, will be laid off in Lots suitable for small farms—a description of the land is thought unnecessary—as those wishing to purchase will no doubt first view it: the payments required will be one third cash, and the other two thirds in annual installments, to be secured by a mortgage on the land; and no deed given until the last payment is made; any person wishing to purchase, may know the terms by applying to Mr. Thomas T. Page, living near the premises, who is fully authorized by me to sell the whole or any part.
JOHN TAYLOR. August 16—3m.
N. B. A valuable mine bank in Maryland may be had with the furnace if required. J. T.
SALE at AUCTION.
ON the 7th of October at 11 o'clock in the forenoon will be sold at public auction (at the COLUMBIAN INN in GEORGE TOWN)
a handsome assortment of HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE, consisting of beds, bedsteads and furniture, mahogany dining tables, side board, walnut tables, looking glasses, carpets, chairs, bras, andirons, fenders, shovels and tongs, &c. &c. and a great variety of other articles—a liberal credit will be given for all sums above one hundred dollars.
JOHN TRAVERS, Auc. Aug. 21—3awtf
West Indies.
BERNARD M'MALON SERDESMAN, No. 129. CHESNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA.
Has just imported from London by the ship Columbia, A GENERAL ASSORTMENT OF Garden Seeds,
PARTICULARLY of such kinds as are most in demand in the West Indies, as other hot climates; and also of such sorts as are necessary for summer and fall sowing in the United States. They are all fresh, of the last season's growth, and will be disposed of on moderate terms.
He has likewise imported from one of the most eminent Turnip farmers in England, a quantity of the genuine White Norfolk field Turnip seed, which is the most profitable kind yet known for cattle feeding, and exceeded by none for ordinary purposes.
FLOWER ROOTS. His flower roots being now taken up, his friends and the public may be supplied with upwards of three hundred varieties of the most superb Tulips, all named, and arranged in their proper divisions, a large collection of the best double Hyacinths, Anemones, Ranunculus and Jonquils; likewise Crown Imperial, crocus spring and autumnal Cyclamen roots, with several other kinds. BOOKS.
He is constantly supplied with the best and most approved works on Agriculture, Botany and Gardening, and in a few weeks will have ready for publication his treatises on AMERICAN GARDENING, adapted particularly to the climates, seasons, and vegetable productions, that are, or may be profitably cultivated in the United States.
He is also supplied with the best English flour of mustard and split peas; white and brown mustard seed for mangoes, &c. watering pots, bas, mats, pruning, grafting, and inoculating knives; garden rakes, hoes, reels, lines, spades, shovels, trowels and edging irons, hot bed lights and glass, hyacinth glasses, red, white, and yellow clover seed, burnt lucerne, ray grass, timothy, herd grass and orchard grass seeds, lentils, vetches, peas, beans and every other necessary article in the seed trade.
M'MALON invites, nay he solicits a correspondence and reciprocity of services with the admirers of curious and useful vegetable productions, in the United States and elsewhere; and having it considerably in his power, being generally supplied with an immense number of scarce, curious, and valuable seeds, he hopes they will find in him an attentive and useful correspondent. July 15.
ELIAS B. CALDWELL, ATTORNEY AT LAW,
Has removed his Office, to the house lately occupied by Mr. LAW, on Capitol Hill, Washington, July 26—tf
SULLIVAN'S LECTURES,
PROPOSALS
By THOMAS B. WAIT & Co.
FOR PRINTING, BY SUBSCRIPTION,
AN HISTORICAL TREATISE
ON THE
FEUDAL LAW,
AND THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF ENGLAND;
With a Commentary on Magna Charta, and Illustrations of many of the English Statutes.
BY THE LATE
FRANCIS STOUGHTON SULLIVAN, L. L. D. Royal Professor of Common Law in the University of Dublin.
To which authorities are added, and a Digest is prefixed, concerning the Laws and Government of England,
BY GILBERT STUART, L. L. D.
THE Lectures of Professor Sullivan, delivered to the Students in the University of Dublin, are in very high repute among all Lawyers of eminence, and have been uniformly recommended as an elementary book to those young gentlemen who begin the study of Law with a view to render themselves respectable in the profession.
However obsolescent the feudal policy may now seem to be, it having gradually disappeared as mankind grew more civilized and became better acquainted with their natural and inalienable rights and privileges; yet a research into the history of the government of jurisprudence of the nations of Europe, will satisfy any one, that many consequences of that system still exist and influence the opinions and decisions of the highest and most enlightened tribunals of justice. Every author who has undertaken to give a regular and systematic account of the rise and progress of modern nations, has felt himself obliged to resort to the history of feuds and feudal rights, as the fundamental principle from which all existing civil and political institutions have taken their rise; and every jurist who has employed himself in explaining the constitution and laws of his country, has gone to the same source for the correct materials of his essays and dissertations. Robertson, in his history of the Emperor Charles V. has with great beauty and perspicuity illustrated so much of the feudal policy as was necessary to enable the scientific reader to understand that valuable book; and Sir Wm. Blackstone has in the course of his commentaries, led the student to a contemplation of the ancient tenures, many of which depend upon the doctrine of feuds, as established in England by the Norman conqueror.
But in both those invaluable productions, the feudal policy was adverted to, only as incidental to the principal object of the author, and therefore cannot be supposed to furnish a complete and satisfactory account, as would be given by a distinguished lawyer as professor Sullivan, who declares the great purpose of his lectures, to be the full discussion of the subject, which was of necessity but partially considered by the other writers.
This work has become so scarce in this country, as to be seldom seen, even on the shelves of a practicing lawyer; a fact to be accounted for only by the difficulty of obtaining the book; for it cannot well be supposed that any one of the profession, who has higher views than the mere pecuniary advantages of the practice, would willingly neglect an enquiry into those ancient institutions, upon which, notwithstanding the lapse of ages, most modern improvements are founded. But it is not the profession alone, that this book may be considered useful. In this rising empire, where political knowledge to a certain degree is claimed by all, and actually possessed by many; a book which succinctly and perspicuously brings to view the laws, institutions, manners and customs of those nations from which our English ancestors descended, must be peculiarly useful, as it will enable young politicians to trace all our civil regulations to their source, and thus to account methodically and scientifically for many modern usages and practices, of which their knowledge is extremely superficial. In this book they will see how our ancestors struggled for the establishment of those privileges which artful monarchs and a proud nobility were continually attempting to destroy; and they will also learn that the persevering industry of the people, aided by the wealth which their skill and enterprise brought into the country, finally obtained a complete victory in the establishment of principles and customs, which, transplanted into America by our progenitors, terminated in those glorious constitutions which distinguish the people of America, for liberty and happiness, from every other people on the earth.
CONDITIONS.
The work shall be elegantly printed, in two octavo volumes, on fine wove paper, with a new and beautiful type.
It will be delivered to Subscribers, bound in calf, at Five Dollars; and in boards, at Four Dollars—To non subscribers the price will be enhanced. No money will be required till the delivery of the work.
Those who subscribe for ten sets shall have one gratis. To booksellers the usual allowance will be made.
Portland, June 24—
The above work will be printed from a correct London Edition—The few copies of an Irish Edition now circulating in this country are considered by the first law characters as extremely incorrect, and not to be relied on as historical authority.
HISTORY
Of the West Indies :
A WORK in the contents of which every citizen of America must be interested, whether devoted to business, or desirous of information through the medium of amusement.
A new & revised edition of Mr. EDWARDS's History of the West Indies, with a third volume, (completed by its amiable author a short time previous to his death) has lately been published in London. This third volume contains the interesting and important history, with a large Map of the island of St. Domingo, or Hispaniola, as also that of Tobago; likewise a history of the war in the West Indies from its commencement in 1773, and a tour of Sir William Young through several of the islands. It is accompanied by a highly finished portrait of Mr. Edwards, a history of his life written by himself, and a prefatory advertisement by Sir William Young, Baronet, M. P. F. R. S. &c. under whose editorship it has been given to the public.
The subscriber, impressed with a sense of the great importance a general knowledge of the History, civil and commercial, of the West Indies, must be to every citizen of America, and of the great celebrity of the above work, proposes to print it by subscription, and respectfully offers the following for public patronage and encouragement.
Proposals for Printing,
From the London copy, 3 volumes quarto,
THE HISTORY,
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL, Of the British Colonies in the West Indies.
By BRYAN EDWARDS, ESQ. F. R. S. A. S. Containing, with a variety of other matter:—
A political and topographical survey of the sugar islands.
A comprehensive account of the ancient and present inhabitants, agriculture, productions, laws, government, constitution and commerce.
An historical review of the slave trade; including observations on the character, genius, dispositions, and situations of the enslaved Africans.
An historical review of St. Domingo, comprehending an account of the former government of the French part of that island, its political state, populations, productions, and exports; a narrative of the calamities which have devastated the island ever since the year 1789; and a detail of the transactions of the British army in that island.
Also, a tour through the islands of Barbadoes, St. Vincent, Antigua, Tobago and Grenada, by Sir William Young, Baronet, &c. And
A history of the war in the West Indies from its commencement in 1793, &c. &c
CONDITIONS.
It will be printed in four volumes, large octavo, on a perfectly new and beautiful type, and on a handsome large medium paper, agreeable to a specimen, which may be had at the subscriber's Book Store.
The price to subscribers to be three dollars the volume, in boards; each volume to be paid for on delivery.
With the last volume will be given an ATLAS, (without any additional price) containing the following maps, viz.
 1 A large general map of the West Indies.  2 Map of Jamaica.  3 Barbadoes.  4 Grenada.  5 St. Vincents.  6 Dominica.  7 St. Christophers.  8 Nevis.  9 Antigua.  10 Virgin islands.  11 St. Domingo, or Hispaniola.  12 Tobago. 
To prevent disappointment or complaint, it is now promised, that on the publication of the second volume the subscription price will be advanced to three dollars and a half the volume, and on the publication of the last volume the price will be again enhanced.
With the last volume, besides the Atlas, will be given an elegant engraving of the celebrated author. Also a list of the subscribers names.
The London copy of the foregoing work in three volumes cannot be sold in America, in boards, under sixty dollars.
JAMES HUMPHREYS.
Subscriptions are received by said Humphreys at his book-store the corner of Second and Walnut streets, and by the principal Booksellers through the Union, Philadelphia, July 15—
FOR SALE.
AN unfinished two story brick house with an excellent cellar fronting on Seventh Street, east, square No. 907, in the city of Washington; if not disposed of at private sale previous to the 4th day of September next, it will on that day be offered at public sale, for terms apply to the subscriber.
And on the same day will positively be sold a frame house situated on the same street and square as the above property; and a quantity of household and kitchen furniture.
The vicinity of the above property to the navy yard renders it an object worthy of attention.
WILLIAM PROUT. Aug. 12—
Runaway Negro.
WAS committed to the jail of Frederick county, on a runaway, on the 25th day of last June, a negro man who says his name is BEN JOHNSON,
he is about 30 years old; is 6 feet 1 inch high, and has a scar above his left eye—His clothes are a check and a linen shirt; one red cassimere and one striped jacket; one pair of blue, one pair of nankeen, and one pair of osnaburg overalls; two pair of stockings, one brown cloth coat, two round-about jackets with sleeves, and one fur hat. His owner is desirous to release him, or he will be sold for his jail fees agreeably to law.
GEORGE CREAGER, Sheriff of Frederick county. August 9—w8c