The national intelligencer and Washington advertiser. (Washington City [D.C.]), 1802-07-02 00:00:00

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, AND WASHINGTON ADVERTISER.
Vol. II
WASHINGTON CITY. PRINTED BY SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH, PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE.
No. CCLVIII
FIVE DOLLARS PER ANNUM.
FRIDAY, JULY 2d, 1802.
PAID IN ADVANCE.
FROM A LATE POEM
Entitled Sorrows of Switzerland , BY BOWLES.
Why art thou come, Man of despair and blood, To these green vales, and streams o'erhung with wood? These Sills, where far from life's discordant throng, The lovely goat-herd chants her matin song? This cottag'd glen, where Agan's peace re- clines, Sooth'd by the whisper of his native pines; Where, in the twilight of his closing days, Upon the glimmering lake he loves to gaze; And like his life flows on the shadowy flood The will sweet eve descending? Man of Blood! Burst not his holy musings. Innocence And Peace there dwell; in his thee hence To the waste wilderness, the mournful main, To caves, where silence and deep darkness reign. (Where God's eye only can the gloom per- vade) And shroud thy visage in their dearest shade! Or if these scenes so beauteous may impart A momentary softness to thine heart, Let Nature plead—plead for a guileless land— Ere yet thou lift the desolating brand; Ere yet thou bid the peaceful echoes swell With havoc's shouts, and many a mingled yell! Pause yet a moment! By the white white beard Of him whose tear-red eyes to Heaven are rear'd; By her, who frantic lifts her helpless hand— By those poor little ones, that speechless stand— If thou halt nature in thee, oh, relent! Nor crush the lowly shed of virtue and con- tent!
From the Boston Independent Chronicle. To the People of Massachusetts—On the repeal of the Excises.
[Continued]
Without however considering the ex- cise as forming part in a system of mea- sures unfavorable to liberty, or creating an influence unknown to the constitution, calculated to humble the state govern- ments, and to effect a consolidation of the general government, or as vexatious and oppressive to the citizens, the following view of its partial and unequal operation, together with the enormous expense of collection, will justify the abolition to every candid mind.
The whole of these duties for the year 1800, amounted to 993,661 dollars 82 1-2 cents.
   Num. of officers. Expence of collecting.   Dolls. Cts.     New-Hampshire, 9 3,255 70 1-2   Massachusetts, 40 32,209 84 1-2   Rhode-Island, 8 6,392 6   Connecticut, 12 5,733 96   Vermont, 4 2,656 30 1-2   New-York, 33 19,666 45   Jersey, 14 5,922 79   Pennsylvania, 26 40,977 43 1-2   Delaware, 4 2,870 51   Maryland, 38 19,304 93   Virginia, 133 40,670 76   Ohio, 40 8,422 7 1-2   Tennessee, 12 3,511 61   North-Carolina, 67 20,583 56   South-Carolina, 67 11,357 89   Georgia, 9 3,995 15   Total, 467 227,431 58  
Of the whole sum of 993,661 dollars 82 1-2 cents, the state of Massachusetts paid 172,894 83, which exceeds one fifth part. The state of Virginia paid 144,168 97, which is rather short of one seventh part. Of course in these taxes Massachusetts paid 28,725 dollars 91 cents, more than Virginia.
Of the direct tax of two millions of dollars, laid in 1798, the proportion of Massachusetts was 260,435 31, being nearly one eighth of the whole.— That of Virginia amounted to 345,480 66, being rather more than one sixth part of the whole.
At the same rate Virginia ought to pay 165 610 9; and Massachusetts 129,392. So apportioning the internal revenue between Massachusetts and Vir- ginia according to the ratio of the direct tax, it will be found, under the operation of the internal duties, that Mass- achusetts paid 43,502 dollars more than her proportion, and that Virginia paid 21,441 12 less than her proportion.— And yet the people of Massachusetts have been most impudently told, that their interest was sacrificed to Virginia policy, by the repeal of these taxes, par- ticularly that of the carriage tax.—As this has been a subject of much federal clamour, the reader may be gratified by the following official statement.
STATEMENT of the duties upon car- riages for the conveyance of persons; during the year ending on the 31st December, 1800.
[This table is given in the Chronicle with great minuteness. We confine our view to the sum paid by each state.]
   Dolls. Cts.     New-Hampshire, 1,908 50   Massachusetts, 14,096 81   Rhode-Island, 1,046 73   Connecticut, 4,564 77   Vermont, 180 68   New-York, 7,807 75 1-2   New-Jersey, 5,233 86   Pennsylvania, 7,335 77   Delaware, 2,565 58   Maryland, 8,683 79   Virginia, 13,701 47   Ohio, 287 25   Tennessee, 85 50   North-Carolina, 4,834 03   South-Carolina, 4,320 44   Georgia, 1,214 48   Total 77,871 41 1-2  
From which it is evident that al- though the just proportion of Massachu- setts was only 10,135 27 yet she paid 14,096 81, Virginia 13,701 47, New- York, no more than 7,807 75 1-2, and Pennsylvania only 7,335 77; notwith- standing, the proportion of each of these States, upon the principle of direct tax- ation, would exceed that of Massachu- setts. The next Federal objection is, that the carriage tax falls upon articles of luxury, and for that reason ought not to have been repeated. But is this true? By the schedule the reader perceives that 12,024, dollars, out of the 14,096 81, paid in Massachusetts, were levied on 3,969 chaises and 39 chairs, at three dollars each. The reader knows that these are generally articles of conven- ience and comfort, rather than of luxu- ry; and they were subject to an equal tax, without any discrimination between the best and the poorest, the most luxu- rious and the most ordinary.
Having appropriated the sum of sev- en millions three hundred thousand dol- lars annually to the payment of the in- terest, and gradual extinguishment of the principal, of the national debt, the pre- sent administration have made the fol- lowing retrenchments in the public ex- pences, viz:
Retrenchments, by acts of the late ses- sion of Congress.
   Dolls.     1st. In the appropriation for the army, being the differ- ence between the appropria- tion for the year 1801, and that for the present year, 554,000   2d. In the appropriation for the navy, being the difference be- tween the navy peace es- tablishment for the year 1801, and the appropriation for the present year, 200,000   3d. In the appropriation for fortifications of ports and har- bours, being the difference between the appropriation for those objects, and for the de- fensive protection of the fron- tiers, in the year 1801, and the appropriation for the same objects the present year, 139,500   4th. By the act to repeal the late judiciary act, constituting additional circuit courts and judges, 45,000   5th. By the discontinuance of the offices of the commis- sioners of the revenue, and superintendent of stamps, pay- able out of the civil list app- ropriations, 12,033   6th. In the appropriation for foreign intercourse, being the difference between that for the year 1801, and that for the present year, 21,000   7th. A like difference in the ap- propriation of those years, for the relief of American se- amen, 15,000   9th. A like difference in the ap- propriation of those years, for prosecuting claims for captu- red property, 35,000   Dolls. 1,021,533  
It followed, that some of the public burthens might be dispensed with. The external revenue derived from import and tonnage, collected in comparatively few places and of few persons, at an expense of less than 5 per cent. and by a set of officers whom it was necessary to retain in service; and the internal revenues de- rived from another set of laws, collected by a different set of officers, at an ex- pence of fifteen per cent. were before them for selection; and which ought to have been preferred? The duties on salt, on bohea tea, on brown sugar and coffee were comprehended in the import; were laid by the first Congress, and have from time to time been increased by subse- quent laws—have been collected at a small expense and with a certainty ap- plicable to the internal duties. A re-
duction of so much of the import would reduce the whole expense of that system but very little, and not discharge a sin- gle officer. The internal duties on "do- mestic distilled spirits and stills—lites at auction—refined sugars—(that is, of American manufacture, not imported re- fined sugars, which are subject to an im- post duty) on carriages—retailers licen- ces and stamps upon vellum, parchment and paper," were unequal in their ap- plication to individuals and states, vexa- tious in their operation, some of them ex- tremely obnoxious, some directly coun- teracting the policy of domestic manufac- tures, others evaded by collusion or fraud, most of them to be collected in almost every town and village in the United States, requiring the vigilance of more than four hundred officers, and an annual expense of two hundred and twenty- seven thousand four hundred and thirty- one dollars in their collection; diminish- ing the respect for oaths, offering strong temptations to bribery and perjury, and thus corrupting the morals both of officers and people.
Is it possible that a wise and prudent legislature should hesitate between them? Is it not obvious that the whole, if any part, of these internal taxes ought to be repealed, because a partial repeal would retain all the collecting officers and con- sequently increase the expense of collec- tion compared with the amount collect- ed? Is it not evident that the proposal to repeal the duties on salt, on brown sugar, &c. was either an attempt to de- feat the repeal of the internal taxes, or a grasp at that popularity which the mi- nority affect to despise? Sit down, fellow- citizens, by yourselves; banish, if possi- ble, all distinctions of parties; take the statements furnished by official docu- ments; make your interest the criterion, and form your own calculations, com- parisons and conclusions.
Is there in Massachusetts an indi- vidual, who even if he approved of the system of patronage, of loaning and of taxation, adopted by the last adminis- tration, would consent to the continu- ance of a burthen so unequal and so op- pressive to the citizens of this state? Who can deny the merit of the present Congress, in contracting the means of government, and lightening the burthens of the people? Or, who, in fine, can withhold his admiration at the magnani- mity of the Chief Magistrate, in recom- mending a measure which must diminish his own influence and power, while it dismisses from public service, and returns to private stations, four hundred active disappointed spirits, to increase the pro- portion of his political enemies, and add to the number and zeal of his calumnia- tors? Between the calumnies of such a faction, and their own true interest the people now have leisure to decide. In forming this ultimate decision, there is less need of subtlety and refinement than of candour, common sense and arithme- tical computation. If there is any cer- tainty in principles, or any dependence on reason and experience, the discharge of useless officers, specially of those con- cerned in the pecuniary operations of government, is essentially favourable to the freedom and republi canism. If two and two make four, if a part is less than the whole, the retrenchment of unnecessary public expenses, the correspondent re- duction of public taxes, and the conse- quent simplification of our public con- cerns, are so many points gained in fav- our of the people. Fellow-citizens of Massachusetts, the measure under con- sideration is particularly interesting to us. If the repeal of that unequal system of internal taxes is not materially beneficial to our interest, calculation is a cheat and arithmetic a liar.
[From an English Publication] A TRIBUTE to the MEMOIR of Mr. WAKEFIELD.
[Continued]
The formation of a dissenting college at Hackney, which it was hoped, by the powerful aid of the metropolis, would be- come both more considerable and more permanent than former institutions of a like kind, produced an invitation to Mr. Wakefield to undertake the classical pro- fessorship. With this he thought proper to comply; and accordingly, in 1790, he quoted his abode at Nottingham, and removed to Hackney, upon the plan of joining, with public tuition, the instruction of private pupils. He has himself in- formed the public that "both of these sources failed him, and left him little bark with which to cross the ocean of life." It is neither needful nor desirable to revive the memory of differences between per- sons so lively, respectable and well-inten- tioned, but under the influence of different
habits and views of things. We shall con- fine ourselves to a remark or two.
Mr. Wakefield was a person who de- rived his opinions entirely from the source of his own reason and reflection, and it will not be easy to name a man who stood more single and initiated in this respect throughout life than he. Although his principles had induced him to renounce his clerical office in the church of Eng- land, and he had become a dissenter from her doctrine and worship, yet he was far from uniting with any particular class of those who are usually denominated dis- senters. He has an insuperable repug- nance to their mode of performing divine service; and he held in no high estimati- on the theological and philosophical knowledge which it has been the princi- pal object of their seminaries of education to communicate. It has already been observed, that the basis of his own divi- nity was philosophy. Classical literature, therefore, as containing the true rud- iments of all other science, was that on which he thought the greatest stress should be laid, in a system of liberal edu- cation. This point he inculcated with an earnestness which probably appeared from what dictatorial to the conductors of the institution.
Further, in the progress of his specu- lations, he had been led to form notions concerning the expediency and propriety of public worship, extremely different from those of every body of Christians, whether in sects or establishments; and as he was incapable of thinking one thing and practicing another, he had sufficient- ly made known his sentiments on this subject, as well in conversation, as by abstaining from attendance upon every place of religious assembly. They who were well acquainted with him, knew that in his own society was one of the most predominant affections; but the as- sembling for social worship, had for so many ages been regarded as the most powerful instrument for the support of general religion, that to discountenance it was considered as of dangerous example, especially in a person engaged in the edu- cation of youth. Notwithstanding, there- fore, his classical instructions in the col- lege were received by the students al- most with enthusiastic admiration, and con- ferred high credit on the institution, a dissolution of his connection with it took place in the summer of 1791.
The subsequent publication of his pamphlet on Public Worship, de- veloped him (as he lays) of the only two private pupils he expected. From that period he continued to reside at Hackney, in the capacity of a retired man of letters, employing his time partly in the education of his children, partly in the composition of works which will perpetuate his name among those who have cultivated literature with most ard- our and success. His "Translation of the New Testament, with Notes," 3 vols. 8vo. appeared towards the close of 1791, and was very respectably patronized. In language it preserves as much as possible of the old version. Its numerous devia- tion from that in sense, will be regarded as happy alterations or bold innovations, according to the propensities of the read- er. A long list might be given of his succeeding labours, but we shall only particularize some of the most considera- ble. He printed (no longer at the Cam- bridge-press) two more parts of his "Silva Critica." He gave a new edition, much corrected, of his "Translation of the New Testament," and besides, proved his zeal for Christianity, by en- larging a former work "On the Evid- ences of the Christian Religion," and by replying to Thomas Paine's attack upon it in his "Age of Reason."
To the works of Pope, as our most cultivated English poet, and the most perfect example of that splendid and felicity of diction which is not attained without much study of the poetic art, Mr. Wakefield paid particular attention. It was his design to have published a complete edition of his work; but after he had printed the first volume, the scheme was rendered abortive by Dr. Watson's edition. He, however, printed a second volume, entitled, "Notes on Pope," and also gave a new edition of Pope's "Iliad and Odyssy." In these publications he displayed all that variety of comparison and illustration, that power of tracing a poetical thought through different authors, with its successive stages and improvements, and that ex- quisite feeling of particular beauties, which distinguish him as an annotator of the writers of Greece and Rome.
As a classical editor he appeared in a selection from the Greek tragedians, in editions of Horace, Virgil, Bion and Moschus; and finally, in his "Euer- getis," a vast performance, which alone might fill the labour of many industri- ous years. On his character, as a man of
letters, I have been favoured with the following estimate by an able judge, the rev. E. Cogan, of Cheshunt:
"In extent of erudition, particularly if an acquaintance with the Oriental lan- guages be taken into the account, he was perhaps inferior to no man of his present age; and they who have been considered as having had the advantage over him in some of the less important minutiae of Greek literature, have prob- ably limited their attention to fewer ob- jects, and certainly commenced their li- terary course with a more advantageous preparation. In conjectural criticism he exhibits much of the character of Bent- ley and Markland; men whom he es- teemed according to their high desert in that species of learning to which his own mind was peculiarly directed. Like these illustrious scholars, he is always learned, sometimes bold, and frequently happy. Like them he had a mind which dictat- ed to be held in a servile subjection to authority; and in defence of it, lifted readings, which too often substitute the dreams of transcribers for the gems of antiquity, he followed, without fear, where reason and probability seemed to lead the way. In his earlier critical works he exhibited, amidst some errors which his riper judgement discarded, the promise of his future greatness; and even his faults were the infirmities of genius; they flowed from that ardour and enthu- siasm which cannot always wait for the slow decisions of cool enquiry. They were faults which, though they afforded a just consolation to dull manhood, did not diminish his praise in the estimation of one fided and impartial judge. His favourite study was poetry, and in an ex- tensive acquaintance with the ancient po- ets, both Greek and Roman, few in since the revival of letters have equalled him, and no one ever surpassed him in the perception of their beauties. When he applies to them the hand of conjecture, his rays fail to give new fire and ani- mation by his touch; and where we are obliged to dissent from his corrections, we are nevertheless sorry for the credit of the poet that he does not appear to have written what the critic has suggested. He was peculiarly fond of tracing the influence of poetical expression from the various modifications which it assumed in the hands of different writers, and in the il- lustration of ancient phraseology he could not overlook the poets of his own coun- try, with many of whom he was very fa- miliar. His great work is destined by his edition of Lucretius, (a work which ignorant critics have called a translation) to which he has added a commentary, to exhibit the richest display of the flow of poetry that ever was presented to the world, and will amply reward the perusal of every man who has sensibility to relish the sweet touches of human genius."
"Mr. Wakefield, even before this im- mortal specimen of his talents, was de- servedly held in the highest estimation by the literati of Germany; and if his hon- ours at home have not equalled his re- putation abroad, the candid mind will ca- sily find the explanation of his honou- ring in the violence of political party, and the mean jealousy which has too often degraded the scholars of Great Britain. The name of Bentley is confounded with poet enough of the justice of this annota- tor."
I shall now proceed to an incident of his life which will be viewed with regret by the ingenuous of all parties; the ad- ditional revelations it affords, will, of course, be different according to the par- ticular sentiments of readers. It has already been hinted that Mr. Wakefield, from the time of his residence in Liver- pool, had begun to be a detestator of that party which trampled upon the rights of mankind, and was founded upon an unfeeling avarice and impie- ous ambition. His study of Christianity more and more convinced him that the mix- ing of the world and of religion were in direct opposition; and in common with many other excellent and learned men, he became persuaded of the absolute incompatibility of Christianity with the Christian character. He had not yet received those principles of the origin and end of government, which, however they may now be regarded, were once thought fundamental to the British Con- stitution, and the basis of all civilized life. He had occasionally, in the private tests of his country, publicly expressed his opinions upon the subject; but the French Revolution was an event which

to call forth all his ardour in the cause. His sanguine temper led him to consider it as the undoubted common cement of a better order of things, in which rational liberty, equitable policy, and pure religion, would finally become triumphant. He watched its progress with an ardent interest, execrated its unhappy deviations, and abhorred the combination of arbitrary power which threatened its destruction. It was impossible that he should refrain from employing his pen on the occasion, or that he should do it with a "cold and unperforming air." In his "Remarks on the General Orders of the Duke of York," he had arraigned the justice of the war with France in terms which were supposed to have exercised the utmost forbearance of the ministry. But in his "Reply to Lord Parts of the Bishop of Llandaff's Address," he pushed those limits. From that systematic progress in reforming the free communication of political opinions which may be traced in the acts of the late ministry, it is not unreasonable to conclude, that a victim to the liberty of the press, of name and character sufficient to insure a wide alarm, was really desired. Yet, as the attorney general solemnly protested that his prosecution of this pamphlet was spontaneous, and falsely dictated to him by the heinous and dangerous nature of its contents, it would be un candid to call his assertion in question. A man of sense, however, may be allowed to unite at the notion of real danger to supreme power, supported as well by public opinion, as by every active energy of the state, from a private writer, arguing upon principles little applicable to the practice of the world, as those of the Gospel. Further, a man of a truly liberal and generous mind will perhaps view, not without indignation, the thunders of the law hurled upon a head distinguished for virtue and learning, without any humane allowance for well-intentioned, if misguided zeal. The attack was commenced, not against the principal, who boldly and honestly came forward to avow himself, but against the agents; and the grand purpose of it was sufficiently declared by the superior severity with which a bookseller was treated, who was not the editor, but only a casual vendor of the work; but who had long been obnoxious as a distinguished publisher of books of free enquiry. Mr. Wakefield himself next underwent prosecution; and his sentence, upon conviction, was a two years' imprisonment in Dorchester gaol. There exists no other measure of punishment in such a case than committal, and perhaps, upon the application of this rule, it will not be found inordinately severe. Two years' abode in a prison is, however, a most serious infliction; it is cutting off so much from desirable existence. Mr. Wakefield, notwithstanding his natural fortitude, felt it as such. Though, from his habits of society and seclusion, he had little to resign in respect of the ordinary pleasures of the world; his habits of pedestrian exercise, and his enjoyment of family comfort, were essentially infringed by confinement. He likewise found all his plans of study deranged, by the want of his library, and the many inconveniences of his situation, that he was less able to employ that resource against tedious and melancholy than might have been expected. One powerful consolation, however, in addition to that of a good conscience, attend him. A set of warm and generous friends employed themselves in raising a contribution which should not only indemnify him from any pecuniary loss, but also, upon his release, but should alleviate his cares for the future support of his family. The purpose was effected; and it is to be hoped that Englishmen will ever retain spirit enough to take under their protection men who have faithfully, though perhaps not with prudence and consideration, maintained the noble cause of mankind against the frowns of authority.
A length the tedious period elapsed, and the last of May, in this year, restored him to liberty. He was received by his friends, many of whom had visited him in prison, with the most cordial welcome. He was endeared to them by his sufferings, and his character was generally thought to have received a meliorating tinge of mildness and moderation from the redactions which had passed through his mind. He formed extensive plans for future literary labours, and he seemed fully capable of enjoying and benefiting that world to which he was returned. When—Oh what is man!—a fever, probably occasioned by his anxious exertions to fix himself in a new habitation, cut short all his prospects. From the first attack he persuaded himself that the termination would be fatal, and this conviction materially opposed every attempt of medicine in his favour. He surveyed death without terror, and prepared for it by tender offices to the survivors.
It is presumed that the character of Mr. Wakefield is sufficiently developed in the preceding sketch of his life. It may however be added, that there was in him an openness, a simplicity, a good faith, an ardent ardour, a noble elevation of soul, which irresistibly made way to the hearts of all who nearly approached him, and rendered him the object of friendly attachment, to a degree almost unexampled. Let this be placed
in balance to all that might appear arrogant or self-sufficient, harsh, or irritable in his literary conduct. His talents were rare—his morals pure—his views exalted—his courage invincible—his integrity without a spot. When all the place of such a man is supplied!
Stoke Newington, J. ATKIN. Sept. 18 1801.
CONGRESS.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, March 3, 1802.
DEBATE.
On the bill received from the Senate, entitled "An Act to repeal certain acts respecting the organisation of the courts of the United States."
Mr. Clopton rose and said—
Mr. Speaker, having voted against striking out the first section of the bill before you, and intending to vote for the passage of it, I wish that the principal reasons, which govern me in that vote, should go forth with it. I therefore am induced to ask the indulgence of the house for a few minutes in order to state those reasons. In doing this, I beg leave to assure the house, that I shall not depart from the question to wander into remote regions, but shall confine myself closely to the bill itself—that I shall endeavour strictly to avoid the introduction of extraneous matter—that, as I have risen purely for the purpose of announcing the reasons on which my vote is grounded, so shall it be my particular care not to trouble the house with any remarks, which do not apply to the important subject on which that vote is to be given.
Gentlemen opposed to this bill have contended that it is both unconstitutional and inexpedient.
With respect to the latter point of objection, I will remark in a very few words that I am strongly impressed with a belief that it is expedient from a view of the business now before the courts, which is proposed to be discontinued. From the decrease of that business, which has in fact been brought about under the old system, from the actual decrease and great probability of still further decrease of the sources of future litigation on subjects of property of federal jurisdiction, it appears to me, Sir, that the new courts are essentially unnecessary. The document, which has furnished a statement of the Calcutts, though it has been much cavilled at, and by some gentlemen declared to have been improperly communicated to this house, I consider not only as a very proper subject of communication, but as furnishing a degree of information highly useful to guide our enquiries on this point. To me, I confess, it has afforded a view of the subject, which contributes very much towards convincing me of the inutility of the courts, to discontinue which is the object of this bill. Under these circumstances, while I believe it to be a good maxim not to multiply offices unnecessarily, nor to create expensive systems, that are useless, both from political considerations and from considerations of economy, my impressions are that the bill is expedient and proper.
On the other point of objection much indeed has been said. On this ground gentlemen have declaimed with great vehemence. They have displayed much admiration, much pathos; and with abundant zeal they have contended that the constitution gives no authority to pass this bill.
In support of this doctrine that part of the constitution is taken for its strong ground, which is contained in the first section of the third article; for reading which section I hope the house will pardon me, although it has already been often read—in these words, "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." Gentlemen opposed to the bill have contended that this section secures a perpetuity to all courts. They have contended that, if congress shall, at any time, have exercised the power granted in the first article—that of "constituting tribunals inferior to the supreme court," by this section they are inhibited from annulling any of them on any account whatsoever. They have contended that, if a power to abolish is admitted, the independence of the judges will vanish; and that an act to abolish will deprive the judges of an absolute right, which, they say, is vested in them by this section of the constitution.
In considering this part of the subject I beg leave, first, to make a few remarks on that independence, a theme on which gentlemen have dilated very copiously.
Here, Sir, I would beg leave to ask, are not the judges as completely guarded as they can be, against any arbitrary removal from office?—It is by all ac-
knowledged that they are placed beyond the reach of the executive department. They are also placed above any dependence on the legislature for compensation for their services by having salaries previously ascertained by law, which cannot be diminished during their continuance in office. So long as they behave well they cannot be removed from their offices, but are entitled to hold them, if the offices exist so long, and their salaries cannot be reduced. During their continuance, therefore, in office—while in the actual performance of their duties—the actual exercise of administering justice, the great end of securing their independence in the exercise of the duties of their offices, under the construction contained in this bill, is, I conceive, as effectually answered, as if the courts were immovably fixed, and were to exist for ever. If at any time it should be found that any of the courts are unnecessary, and that it will be more for the public interest to abolish, than to continue, them, with their abolition their duties cease; and then the judges will have no services to render, and consequently no longer need to be shielded from improper influences.
For what reason, I would ask, was the principle of securing the independence of judges adopted? Was it not for the purpose of promoting a faithful and upright discharge of their duties in office? Surely, it was; and in order to place them beyond the fear of removal by one branch of the government, and beyond the fear of having their salaries reduced by the other branch, left, if they should be left subject to either of those impressions, they might in the exercise of the duties of their offices, be too much inclined to subscribe the other branches; this provision, I apprehend, was inserted in the constitution in order to secure that important object, their independence in office, which independence, I believe, remains unshaken by the principle of the bill, as to all the purposes intended, and fully satisfies the constitution.
It is sufficient that this object be secured so long as there is a necessity for it; that is to say, so long as there is a necessity for keeping up the courts. If that necessity ceases, or if courts have been created when there existed no necessity for them; can it be a rational, can it be a proper construction of this part of the constitution, or indeed of any other part of it, to say that, although the courts should be unnecessary (for such is the extent of the doctrine opposed to the bill) and although the independence of the judges is complete during their continuance in the offices, nevertheless, the courts must be for ever kept up? Does such a construction necessarily result from these words, "the judges, &c. shall hold their offices during good behaviour?" Is there any idea of perpetuity attached to the word "officers," or to any other words, in this sentence?—Sir, I cannot perceive any such necessary construction. I cannot perceive that any such idea is involved in the sentence. I cannot discover any natural connexion between any such idea and this sentence or any part of it. The phrase "during good behaviour" is a phrase well understood, as contradistinguished from the phrase "during pleasure," and attaches no idea of perpetuity to the office. It has no reference to the duration of the office. It imports indeed that the office shall be holden, not at the will of another person, but on the good behaviour of the officer. It does not follow, therefore, that the duration of the office must necessarily be commensurate with the good behaviour of the person on whom the office had been conferred, or of his own will to hold. I believe that an office may be created expressly for a term of years, and be filled by an officer to hold during good behaviour. Although he continues to behave well beyond the term, yet at its expiration there is an end of the office. Thus an office may be created for a term of 10 years. A may be appointed to hold this office during good behaviour. You cannot remove him from this office at all while he behaves well; but at the expiration of 10 years the office ceases of course. A cannot be said to be removed from the office by its cessation: for he cannot be removed from a non-entity. But if he hold at the pleasure of B, at any time before the expiration of the term, B. may deprive him of the office; and then he may be said to be removed from the office, because it still continues in existence. So also, I think, an office created for an indefinite term, as these courts are, may be discontinued, and although the officer hold during good behaviour, he cannot be said to be removed by its discontinuance; but, if he hold at the pleasure of another person, he may by him be removed before a discontinuance of the office. The cases are analogous, I think, at least in relation to the effect produced by a cessation of the offices in both cases. For, as in the first case the officer is entitled to hold the office during the term of 10 years, which is the whole term of its existence, if he continues to behave well; so in the latter case the officer is entitled to hold during the existence of the office, if he continues to behave well. It will not be pretended that the tenure of the office, in the first case, is violat-
ed by its cessation at the fixed period of 10 years, the term for which it was created: neither can it be justly said that, in the latter case, the tenure is violated by the determination of the office, although no definite term of existence was affixed to it at the time of its creation. In each case the tenure of the office rests equally on the ground of "good behaviour," and continues on that ground, without interruption, during the existence of the office. Hence the words, "shall hold their offices during good behaviour," can only apply to existing offices, and designate the species of tenure, by which they are holden during their existence; but do not refer to the duration of the offices, or determine the period of their existence. The whole reasoning of gentlemen against this principle is grounded on the position that the phrase gives a kind of perpetuity to the offices. This is undoubtedly begging the question. It is first assumed as a datum that the offices derive such a perpetuity from those words, and then it is inferred that the power of the legislature cannot reach them. On the other hand the converse of this proposition is believed to be true. It is contended in favour of the bill that a contrary construction is most natural—that it is more apparent that the words give no such perpetuity—that consequently the offices may be abolished by the same power, which created them; and that such abolition does not violate the tenure, by which the judges hold them. Sir, from such a view, as I have been able to take of this subject, and which I have had the honor just now to submit to the house, this deduction appears to me to be a fair and a regular one.
I will now proceed, Sir, to consider the other position, which has been laid down by gentlemen, that the judges have a vested right in their offices, from whence it has been argued, that an act to abolish courts deprives the judges of that right; and upon that ground it has been contended, that the action of the constitution, which has been cited, inhibits the legislature from passing any such act. It has been strongly insisted that from these words, "the judges, &c. shall hold their offices during good behaviour," the duration of the offices (that is, of the courts) shall be at least commensurate with the duration of the good behaviour of the judges; indeed the idea of one rather than the other, when once created, they cannot be constitutionally abolished; that so long as the judges behave well the offices belong to them, and that the court must be continued in existence for their benefit, whether the public interest requires it or not, or even although a continuance of them should be injurious to the public interest.
In considering the force of this reasoning, though I have already troubled the house with some remarks, which, I think, apply to this point; yet I hope to be pardoned for taking a further view of it, in doing which I beg leave to revert to the first clause of the section, which has been cited—"the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish." This clause, I think, in express terms recognizes in the legislature a full power over this subject. Here, Mr. Speaker, notwithstanding what has been said to the contrary, it is clear that the words, may from time to time ordain and establish, do leave a discretion with the legislature; and if it were to be admitted (as seems to have been contended for) that the constitution, by delegating and limiting the jurisdiction of the supreme court, presupposes the expediency of establishing some inferior courts; yet I apprehend that it will not be denied, but by all acknowledged, that the clause gives to Congress a discretionary power of determining the number and the kind of courts. If so, and if in the exercise of this discretionary power, at any time, the Congress discovers that too many courts, or courts of improper structure have been created, does there not exist in the Congress which discovers this evil, the same and equal power to correct it, with that which existed to authorize the former Congress to create those courts. To deny this would be to deny this Congress powers of legislation equal to those which the former Congress possessed.
Again I would not be prepossessed to say that the Congress have a discretionary power of fixing the number of courts, and yet shall exercise that discretionary power but in one way, that is, in augmenting the number, but shall never exercise it in diminishing the number. This would indeed be a new and a curious kind of discretion. It would be the achme of absurdity to call it a discretion. They must, therefore, have the discretion in the latitude contended for, or they have none at all; and, if they have any at all, they have the power to annul courts when the public good requires it, as well as to create them. It is evident, therefore, that such a discretionary power as this which I have stated does exist; and that the section of the constitution which has been adduced for the purpose by the opponents of this bill, does not vest in the judges such a right, such an absolute property in their offices as to place them beyond the reach of the legislature, and so as to inhibit the legislature from annulling such of the
courts as it shall be found necessary or expedient for the public good to annul.
Further to tell the accuracy of this deduction, permit me, Sir, to take a view of the constitution and to analyze its principles. Whenever I contemplate this valuable system, I perceive from its nature, as a federal government, that it is a government of specific limited powers. I perceive to a demonstration that, whenever power is granted, the benefit or good of the people must always be understood to be the primary object of the grant; that the powers granted are special powers for special and particular purposes, which are secondary objects, and means of attaining the primary one; that the department to which a power is entrusted should be always responsible to the people for a proper application and use of that power towards the attainment of both objects; and that it must be competent to the particular purposes for which it was granted; otherwise there would be a responsibility on the department without full power to discharge its obligation to the community.
I will now beg leave, Sir, to apply these principles to some of the grants of power enumerated in the constitution; and, if they apply to any, they apply to all. I will begin with the first grant.
The Congress shall have power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." These are the special purposes for which the power is granted—The Congress is the department, in exercising this power, to effect these purposes in the best manner it can, and most for the interest and convenience of the people, under the restrictions specified in the grant; herein consists its responsibility. Its power must be competent to make such laws immediately connected with these objects as shall be necessary to effect them: otherwise it would be responsible without sufficient power to discharge that obligation.
Passing over other grants, for the sake of brevity, I will proceed, Sir, to a grant immediately relating to the subject, which has been debated.
The Congress shall have power "to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court."—Here the special purpose for which the power is granted, is to "constitute inferior courts." Again, the Congress is the department to whom the power is entrusted. It is responsible to the people, to provide, from time to time, for the due administration of federal justice, in the best manner it can, and most for the interest and convenience of the people; and it must be competent. Here, Sir, is the important point in question—it must be competent to what? According to the principles which have been stated, it must be competent to enact, from time to time, such laws immediately relating to that subject as shall be necessary and proper for making such provision; otherwise its responsibility would be unattended with power adequate to a full discharge of its obligation. The friends of the bill before you contend, Sir, that towards the establishment of such a provision that bill is necessary and proper; that the interest and convenience of the people will be better served by abolishing the system than by its continuance.
But gentlemen have contended that the power in this case does not extend so far as to authorize the repeal of a law which had already created courts; for, that the clause only expresses a positive grant of power to constitute courts; that the grant merely authorizes a creation of new courts in addition to the old, or a new organization of the old courts. Sir, the same feature marks every clause in the enumeration. How then is that inference drawn in this particular case? Is it contended for because a power to repeal is not expressed in the grant? No such power is expressed in any of the grants. Will it, therefore, be also contended that a law "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts or excises" cannot be repealed; or that, if any law should be passed relative to either of those subjects, it must be a law either for laying and collecting new taxes, duties, imposts or excises, in addition to the old, or for new in addition to the old ones? Sir, I can undertake to vouch for gentlemen that such an absurdity will not be assented to; and yet I do not see how it can well be avoided, if the inference is insisted upon in the other case. The power of repeal I believe, Sir, equally exists in both cases; and the responsibility attached to this department of the government requires an exercise of that power, in both cases, whenever it is found to be expedient for the public good, as well as in all other cases where that power exists. To deny this would be a denial of all discretion to the legislative department; a denial of sufficient power to support its responsibility, or to effect the purposes for which the special grants of power had been confided to it.
Mr. Speaker, having endeavoured to show (and to my mind the deductions are self-evident) that the doctrine which has been contended for by gentlemen opposed to this bill, is not supported by the section of the constitution which has been often cited, and on which they have

which relied, that it is not adverse to the principle of the bill, but rather to its operation, either as it respects the required independence of the judges, or as it regards the tenure of their offices; I will now, with permission of the house, proceed to state a few ideas resulting from a comparison of their doctrine and their construction of that section with the general principles of our government.
I presume, Sir, that in the construction of an instrument, it must ever be in respect to give such interpretation to any clause of that instrument, as would militate against the main design or end of the instrument. I apprehend that every construction to be correct, must support that object. This I hold to be a good rule in respect to any instrument, however small its dignity. If this be a correct idea, of how much importance must it be, to adhere to the rule in constructions of the constitution of our government!
Sir, I profess not to be a legal character, or to derive ideas on this head from that kind of research which professional gentlemen are accustomed to pursue. I form my opinion from the reasonable-ness of such a rule, and the obvious tendency of a contrary rule. I figure to myself a striking distinction between the two modes of construction. While the one cherishes and preserves the constitution in its true and natural state of energy; the other must unquestionably enfeeble it, and eventually annihilate its vital principles.
The American mind is so well instructed in the great and essential principles which form the basis of our government, the leading characteristic features of which are so strongly marked; its presentiment attributes so clearly distinguished from the genius of the corrupt systems of the old world; and springing, as it does, from the only legitimate source on earth, the people; that its first and greatest object is universally recognized; and would have required no explicit declaration to the world to the effect what it was; yet it is seen in the preamble of the constitution. Among other important purposes for which the people of the United States have declared that they ordained and established this constitution, one is to promote the general welfare . This indeed may be said to comprehend all the other specific objects of its institution; and every benefit and advantage derivable to the United States from a just and proper exercise of the powers delegated to them by this constitution may, not to propriety, be concentrated in this expression. I consider the term as synonymous with the public good . I believe, therefore, that I am bound to keep steadily in view this great object, whenever I venture to put constructions on any part of the constitution, and to explode all constructions not compatible therewith.
Sir, when I listened (as I have with close attention) to gentlemen, and heard them contending with unusual degree of warmth, that the legislature have no authority to annul courts, and urge for reasons that the judges have a property in their offices, I was induced to believe from the course of their arguments that, if we are to be guided by them, they would direct us to this conclusion that, if no salaries were involved in the question, in discussing the constitutionality of this bill, proposing a repeal of certain acts respecting the organization of the courts of the United States, there would be no enquiry into the right of merely abolishing the courts—that it is the effect, which the abolition will have in relation to the salaries and not the effect which it will have in respect to the administration of justice which is considered as rendering the repeal unconstitutional; or rather the constitutionality of it would not then be questioned at all. This object, so zealously contended for, is called the independence of the judges. It is not deemed sufficient security for their independence that they really possess it by having salaries, which cannot be diminished while they continue in office, and from which offices they cannot be removed while they behave well, even if it be to the end of their lives, if the officers exist so long; but it is urged also that the officers must be perpetual, in order to perpetuate the salaries. Considering this object, therefore, as the main spring of the doctrine, which has been thus advocated, I contend, Sir, that it cannot stand when tested by sound principles. I feel certain in my mind that it is incompatible with the genuine republican principle which ought ever to be maintained as a vital, essential attribute of our government—incompatible with that fundamental principle, which makes the good of the people the paramount object of our constitution.
In this government then, where the good of the people so confessedly is the supreme object, I believe it is dangerous to sanction a doctrine like this, which goes to declare that in fact no considerations of public utility are allowed by the constitution to be of sufficient avail to abolish any courts which have once been created, merely because such abolition will effect the interest of the judges. This doctrine may, for the present, be of despotic government, where the welfare of the people, but the aggrandizement of their rulers is almost the sole
object; where the body of the people are indeed considered as mere property, and even preserved in existence more for the purpose of swelling the pomp, the pageantry, the splendor and magnificence of those, who domineer over them than for any other purpose; where the great mass of the people, so far from having any rights protected by the government, are the miserable subjects of oppression in every shape, which fancy can devise, and which a mixture of whim and cruelty can inflict. In that kind of government there is indeed colour for a doctrine, which would perpetuate offices for the benefit of those, who hold them, in exclusion of every consideration in respect to the people.
But does not the genius of our free government utterly forbid that the interest of any individual should be consulted in preference to the good of the community; when the good of the community and the interest of that individual shall come in competition? Surely it does, and yet what is the scope of the doctrine, which has been so strenuously contended for in opposition to a repeal of the law in question? It positively maintains that, although the present legislature should have the strongest evidence that the courts created by that law are unnecessary; or even if there should be unquestionable ground to believe that a continuance of them would be injurious to the interests of the community; nevertheless, because an abolition of them will be followed by a cessation of salaries to the judges, whereby their interests will be affected, the interests of those particular individuals shall preponderate and forbid the repeal. Does not this position flatly contradict that valuable principle of our government, which maintains that the good of the community should be the great object of all our institutions? To my mind this conclusion is perfectly clear, and the doctrine is in complete hostility to that principle.
If, Sir, we retrace the course of discussion in this case, how has it stood? On the one hand the bill has been advocated and supported, as to its expediency, on the ground that the courts in question are unnecessary and productive of useless expense to the community; that this circumstance of itself would be good reason, if no other existed, though it is deemed that other strong reasons, taken in connection with this, do exist, why the courts should be discontinued. On the other hand the doctrine, contended for in opposition to this bill, is tantamount to a positive assurance that, whether the courts are necessary or unnecessary, you must not put them down—that, in whatever manner the public interest may be affected, the courts must be suffered to remain in force—that the interest and convenience of the public , in this case, must yield to the particular interest and convenience of the judges—that courts were no longer created than they were enjoined within the value of the constitution—that the constitution is to them a sanctuary, which should protect them against the rude hand of legislation—that you break through this sanctuary—you sacrilegiously violate it, if you dare to enter and interrupt the permanence of the courts—have you struck with unallowed hands, if you presume to strike out of existence any of these offices, after having once been in possession of the judges—that how much soever you may think that the public good requires it; however detrimental to the public interest you may think a continuance of the courts will be if you must not touch the law, which creates them, at least, any further than to amend—that the courts are sacred; because, if you undertake to annihilate them, the consequence will be that the judges will suffer the loss of salaries; and you have no authority to cause such a loss to the judges, in order to promote that, which you conceive to be the public good , or to discontinue what you apprehend to be injurious to the public interest—that the constitution secures to those officers salaries for life, and inhibits you from any act, which directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately has a tendency to operate a deprivation of them, notwithstanding any such public considerations . Such, Sir, is the very essence of the arguments adduced by gentlemen opposed to the bill before you, so far as they apply to the question of constitutionality. But, good God! can this be the language of our constitution? It every page in the volume of this sacred instrument was to be carefully unfolded, and examined with the strictest eye, is there a single sentence to be found, which breathes such language? Can the eye trace out by the most laborious search even a single word, which can bear such construction? I am persuaded, Mr. Speaker, that I should commit an high offence against the sanctity of this venerable instrument, were I for a moment to indulge a belief that such a sentence—such a word could be found.
In another point of view, Mr. Speaker, I consider the tendency of this doctrine to be highly objectionable. It is confidently believed, as hath been before stated, that the courts, opposed to be annihilated by the operation of this bill are unnecessary; that, consequently a continuance of them will be attended with an infinite expense. If, then, the due administration of justice, the only object, for which courts ought to be established, does not require the aid of these additional courts in order to effect that object, they
must be an useless burthen upon the country.
Contemplating these circumstances, therefore, as attending this case, and supposing the doctrine, which has been advocated, to operate as gentlemen have contended for, I am inevitably drawn to this conclusion that, if it should be established as a principle that courts once constituted, though on experiment, cannot be abolished by any power existing under the constitution, however unnecessary, however burdensome they may be found to be; then will the constitution exhibit that singular phenomenon in the political world, which will be capable of producing an evil, to which it will not be capable of applying any remedy, after that evil is found to have been produced. It will then be determined that this instrument gives power to legislate so as to create an evil and then to augment that evil, but that it gives no power to legislate so as to diminish the evil; that it authorizes an extension of the mischief in infinitum , but that it denies all right or authority to contract the sphere of the mischief.
There is another consideration of no small moment, and highly worthy of remark. Public institutions in all governments, particularly in their infancy, and still more particularly in the infancy of republics, are more or less experimental. What a solodocin, then, does this doctrine present to us! It pronounces this strange and contradictory proposition that, although a system, originated merely by legislative act, should be tried and found useless, defective, or even vicious; nevertheless it cannot be subject to any radical correction—that the power which formed the system, is incompetent to cure its defects—has no right or authority to ameliorate the system in such a manner or to such extent as that power should deem necessary and proper. Sir, what would be the consequence of the establishment of such a principle as this? Would it not have a direct tendency to arrest the benefits derivable to society from the progress of experience? Such undoubtedly would be its operation—in operation, which would in fact go to defeat one of the greatest advantages according to mankind from the social state.
Experience must be acknowledged to be a great source of improvement; and it is an important attribute of free government, which requires that its institutions should receive such improvements, as shall be discovered from that source to be essential for the benefit of the people. Hence the doctrine, which has been contended for, presents itself in an attitude extremely hostile to that principle, inasmuch as it does not allow that extent of improvement in judicial systems, which experience might dictate; for it is not to be imagined that the systems any more than other institutions, can always receive the highest degree of improvement from merely a new modification of the existing arrangements; but that sometimes more radical alterations may be necessary in order to the attainment of that end. The system now proposed to be discontinued is believed to be precisely in that predicament.
I am not unmindful, Mr. Speaker, that gentlemen have said that this system has not been tried long enough to tell its propriety or usefulness. On the other hand it has been equally contended that the system, although it has not been for any considerable time in operation, is nevertheless attended with sufficient evidences of its inutility; and indeed that the circumstances of the country did not require it at the time of its creation—that it had all the marks of inpropriety about it when first brought into existence. But independently of these circumstances, I cannot accede to the doctrine. Its principle is the same and would equally apply, if the system had been commenced with the first transactions of the government, and had been found from an experience of 12 years to be palpably useless. It is the principle of the doctrine, which would operate universally, and apply as well to a long as to a short term of experience, that I explode.
Mr. Speaker, I have submitted to this honorable house these reasons, which are most impressive on my mind in favor of the vote which I am about to give on the very important subject of the bill before you. Those, which have reference to the great constitutional question, that has been agitated, are the result of such a view of the constitution, as my own judgment has been able to take on a serious and diligent examination of it. On a subject so momentous I have deemed it duty, which I owe to my country and to myself, to pursue this course of investigation. While I have approached the subject with a degree of awe, I have endeavored to be free upon it the most deliberate consideration. I have also attended closely to the arguments of gentlemen against the bill—and weighing them dispassionately and with candour, I must say that I have heard nothing, which has convinced me that the issue of my researches is an improper one; on the contrary, I feel confirmed in the belief that the doctrine, which gentlemen have advocated in opposition to the bill, is neither supported by any express provision in the constitution, nor compatible with its essential principles.
(To be continued.)
WASHINGTON CITY.
FRIDAY, JULY 2, 1802.
As the FOURTH of JULY will be celebrated on Monday, no paper will appear on that day.
We understand, by a letter received from Mr. Dunbar, that the Vaccine has been very generally and successfully introduced into the Mississippi Territory.
NEW-YORK, 25th June, 1802.
Capt. Rogers, of the Sch. Sincerity, arrived here this morning, in 13 days from St. Croix, via St. Thomas, informs that on his sailing it was reported that the French troops had completely conquered the negroes at Guadeloupe, and that 2000 blacks, who had bravely held out to the last hour, rather than surrender, joined hand in hand, in one of the fortifications, round the magazine, and blew themselves up.
The pilot boat Sch. Perseverance, from St. Domingo, arrived at St. Thomas on the 11th of June, with the American Consul on board. There were a number of other American vessels at St. Thomas. A brig, with flour had just arrived from Baltimore. Flour had been 16 dollars, but the arrival of this cargo reduced it to 12—Flour was selling at St. Croix for 24 dollars, there being but a few barrels on hand.
On Saturday the 19th inst. Capt. D. Stone arrived at Newbury-Port from Point Petre. He left that place on the 1st of June, and July co. firms the account published by captain Langdon, who arrived at Boston on Thursday 17th, viz. That Delgrez, commanding the black troops at the fort in Belleterre, left that fort on the night of the 23rd of May, whether by stratagem or compulsion he cannot tell, and made a sudden push at Point Petre, burning and destroying all the plantations in their way. The white army followed, and had several skirmishes with them before their arrival at the Point, which was on the 27th or 28th when they had a very free engagement, wherein the negroes were beaten and dispersed, losing about seven hundred men, and the next day about 400 were taken prisoners and brought to the Point, where they were immediately shot. Delgrez was second in command in the white army during the engagement. Captain S. thinks that the blacks will soon be finished; and yet, from some circumstances he mentions, there is reason to apprehend it will not. He informs that all Grand Terre remained quiet until the day he failed, when he saw a number of large fires; from which it is to be feared the negroes on that quarter, expecting that Delgrez would be successful, have joined in the rebellion; and if so, it will be a very difficult thing to quell them. However, this is only conjecture, and may not be realized. The property they destroyed in their route from Belleterre to the Point must be very great, as they passed through Cape Terre where are some of the largest and finest plantations on the Island. Capt. Stone cannot say whether the plantation negroes joined the insurgents.
On Sunday the 13th ult. a tremendous tornado was experienced in several towns in New-Hampshire, which did immense damage. It was accompanied with thunder lightning and hail—houses were unroofed, windows broken—barns, trees, fences, &c. were levelled to the ground. About 50 feet of the roof of Dartmouth College was taken off by the violence of the gale, and carried to a great distance.
RALEIGH, June 24.
The fear of an insurrection amongst the negroes, has created the greatest alarm in the county of Bertie and the adjoining counties. During the sitting of the county court in Northampton, on Tuesday last night, a letter was received from the Majr. Genl. of the division, advising the militia officers to hold themselves and corps in a state of preparation to embody. In consequence we are told, the magistrates adjourned the business of the court. Upwards of one hundred negroes are said to be imprisoned in the jail of Martin county and many others in the neighbourhood. Five negroes were executed at Halifax court-house, Virginia, on the 15th ult.
Extract of a letter from Concord, New-Hampshire.
The very worthy Wm. Plumer, of Epping, is elected a senator in congress, instead of James Sheafe, esq. resigned, by a majority of ten votes. His resignation was candidly conceded from all but his own party, until a day or two before the election. The other candidate was N. Gilman, esq. who I suppose is now with you, and must have been entirely ignorant of Speaker's intention to resign.
Philadelphia, June 28, 1802.
Letters by capt. Logan, from the Rio de Plata, represent the situation of American citizens, and property, there in terms the most distressing and humili-
ting. The following remonstrance drawn up and signed by the Americans, will enable our readers to appreciate the species of oppression and injustice which is experienced in that quarter:
May it please your Excellency, We the undersigned citizens of the United States of America, and now within the jurisdiction of your excellency, having waited in vain with silence, but anxious expectation, for the determination of your excellency, on those cases which many of your memorialists have long had pending in this colony, and now viewing with alarm, lament, grief and indignation the abuse and injury they have here unmeritedly suffered, do, as the free citizens of the same independent country, feel compelled, with one voice, respectfully to represent:
That vessels, the property of citizens of the United States of America, of immense value, are now mortgaged, and forcibly detained in these ports, where they are rotting and apparently forgotten; which vessels came here, either for the fulfilment of fair and lawful contracts, entered into with Spanish subjects, or to seek, under sanction of treaties, that hospitality which they had a right to expect from a friendly nation, or which were accidentally met with, and lawfully seized upon and conducted hither by cruisers in the service of the Spanish government.
That the merchandise brought hither in vessels of this last description is in like manner torn from its rightful owners by the strong hand of this government.
That many of our countrymen, both captains, officers, and seamen, have been rigorously confined in common prisons, and some have occupied the same horrid apartments with the vilest malefactors, and the mangled limbs of executed offenders, and this without the concurrence, or even the accusation of a crime.
That many of us are forced to remain here in exile from our friends, our families and our country, and to waste the best part of our lives, not only without being serviceable to ourselves or others, but to our own certain ruin to the great loss of those who have employed us, and to the inevitable distress of those who are dependent on us for subsistence.
That many of us came here at a time when Spain was at war with a powerful nation, and we came to carry to market, on account of his catholic majesty's subjects, the perishing produce of this colony, which could not be transported with safety under the Spanish flag. Some of us even brought with us property, belonging to those subjects, rescued from imminent danger in an enemy's port.
That an evident distinction has been made between us, and the citizens or subjects of other nations, that we have felt ourselves the objects of unrelieved contempt, and have had the mortification to hear our government calumniated.
There are the grievances of which we complain to your excellency, and for which we respectfully demand immediate and complete redress, in that way which to your excellency may seem most just and proper, and at the same time assuring your excellency of our highest respect for your excellency's character, and exalted station.
Buenos Ayres, 26th March, 1802.
Here follows a list of 42 American vessels detained in the different ports of Rio de la Plata.
This is to give Notice,
THAT in virtue of an act of congress passed the 11th May, 1802, that we will receive Subscriptions personally, or by power of attorney, for opening a Canal, to communicate from the Potomac river to the Eastern Branches. Ten Dollars must be paid down on each share of 100 dollars—and subsequent payment made after one month's previous notice.
The Book will remain at Mr. Smith's Hotel, till the Sum of 80,000 dollars is subscribed for, when a meeting will be duly called.
THOS. LINCOLN, THOS. LAW, DANIEL C. PRENT, DAN. CARROL, of Dublin, Washington, 2d July, 1802
NOTICE.
THIS is to give notice, that the subscriber of Washington City in the District of Columbia, hath obtained from the orphan's court of Washington county, in said district, letters testamentary on the personal estate of Col. William on, late of said city and county deceased. All persons having claims against the said deceased are hereby warned to exhibit the same, with the vouchers thereof, to the subscriber at or before the 10th day of January next—they may otherwise by law be excluded from all benefit of the said estate. Given under my hand this 11th day of July, 1802.
MARGARET W. EMERSON, Ex. cutrix.
July 2, 1802.
HARLES VARDEN,
MERCHANT TAILOR from Philadelphia,
Canal Hill, New-Jersey Ave. W.
HAS received an assortment of summer goods consisting of the best superfine
Cloths. Cashmere, Silk B. robes, English Striped Markeens, White India do. do. White and printed Markeens, With a variety of other articles suitable for the summer season. N. B. Every Habit, Regimental and Navy uniforms, made in the best style of fashion. July 2, 1802.