The national intelligencer and Washington advertiser. (Washington City [D.C.]), 1807-09-28 00:00:00

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER,
AND WASHINGTON ADVERTISER.
VOL. VII.
WASHINGTON CITY, PRINTED BY SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH, PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE.
No. 105.
FIVE DOLLARS PER ANNUM
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1807.
PAID IN ADVANCE.
TRIAL OF A. BURR.
OPINION of the Court on the motion to arrest the evidence, delivered on Monday, August 31—Concluded.
The crimes then are not the same, and may not indifferently be tried under the same indictment. But why is it that an acquittal as principal may be pleaded in bar to an indictment as accessory? If it be answered that the accessory crime may be given in evidence on an indictment as principal, but that the principal crime may not be given in evidence on an indictment as accessory, the question recurs, on what legal ground does this distinction stand? I can imagine only this. An accessory being quodammodo a principal, indictments where the law does not require the manner to be settled, which need not be special evidence of accessory guilt, if the punishment be the same, may possibly be received—but every indictment as an accessory must be special. The very allegation that he is an accessory must be a special allegation, and must show how he became an accessory. The charges of this special indictment therefore must be proved as laid, and no evidence which proves the crime in a form substantially different can be received. If this be the legal reason for the distinction it supports the exposition of these dicta which has been given. If it be not the legal reason, I can conceive no other.
But suppose the law to be as contended by the counsel for the U. S. Suppose an indictment charging an individual with personally assembling among others and thus levying war, may be satisfied with the proof that he caused the assembly. What effect will this law have upon this case?
The guilt of the accused, if there be any guilt, does not consist in the assembly, for he was not a member of it. The simple fact of assembly no more affects one absent man than another. His guilt then consists in procuring the assembly, and upon this fact depends his criminality. The proof relative to the character of an assembly must be the same whether a man be present or absent. In the general, to charge any individual with the guilt of an assembly, the fact of his presence must be proved. It constitutes an essential part of the overt act. If then the procurement be substituted in the place of presence, does it not also constitute an essential part of the overt act? Must it not be proved? Must it not be proved in the same manner that presence must be proved? If in one case the presence of the individual makes the guilt of the assembly his guilt, & in the other case the procurement by the individual makes the guilt of the assembly his guilt, then presence and procurement are equally component parts of the overt act, and equally require two witnesses.
Collateral points may, say the books, be proved according to the course of the common law, but is this a collateral point? Is the fact without which the accused does not participate in the guilt of the assembly, if it was guilty, a collateral point? This cannot be. The presence of the party, where presence is necessary being a part of the overt act, must be positively proved by two witnesses. No presumptive evidence; no facts from which presence may be conjectured or inferred, will satisfy the constitution and the law. If procurement take the place of presence, and become part of the overt act, then no presumptive evidence, no facts from which the procurement may be conjectured or inferred, can satisfy the constitution and the law. The mind is not to be led to the conclusion that the individual was present by a train of conjectures or inferences, or of reasoning—the fact must be proved by two witnesses. Neither where procurement supplies the want of presence, is the mind to be conducted to the conclusion that the accused procured the assembly, by a train of conjectures or inferences, or of reasoning—the fact itself must be proved by two witnesses, and must have been committed within the district.
If it be said that the advising or procurement of treason is a secret transaction which can scarcely ever be proved in the manner required by this opinion—the answer which will readily suggest itself is, that the difficulty of proving a fact will not justify conviction without proof. Certainly it will not justify conviction without a direct and positive witness in a case where the constitution requires two. The more correct inference from this circumstance would seem to be that the advising of the fact is not within the constitutional definition of the crime. To advise or procure a treason is in the nature of conspiring or plotting treason, which is not treason in itself.
If then the doctrines of Keeling, Hale and East, are to be understood in the sense in which they are pressed by the counsel for the prosecution, and are applicable in the U. S.—the fact that the accused procured the assembly on Blannerhasset's island must be proved, not circumstantially, but positively, by two witnesses, to charge him with that assembly. But there are still other
most important considerations which must be well weighed before this doctrine can be applied to the United States.
The 8th amendment to the constitution has been pressed with great force, and it is impossible not to feel its application to this point. The accused cannot be truly said to be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation," unless the indictment shall give him that notice which may reasonably suggest to him the point on which the accusation turns, so that he may know the course to be pursued in his defence.
It is also well worthy of consideration, that this doctrine so far as it respects treason, is entirely supported by the operation of the common law which is said to convert the accessory before the fact into the principal, and to make the act of the principal his act. The accessory before the fact is not said to have levied war. He is not said to be guilty under the statute. But the common law attaches to him the guilt of that fact which he has advised or procured, and as contended, makes it his act. This is the operation of the common law, not the operation of the statute. It is an operation then which can only be performed where the common law exists to perform it. It is the creature of the common law, and the creature presupposes its creator. To decide then that this doctrine is applicable to the U. S. would seem to imply the decision that the U. S. as a nation, have a common law which creates and defines the punishment of crimes accessory in their nature. It would imply the further decision that these accessory crimes are not, in the case of treason, excluded by the definition of treason given in the constitution. I will not pretend that I have not individually an opinion on these points, but it is one which I should give only in a case absolutely requiring it, unless I could confer respecting it, with the judges of the supreme law.
I have said that this doctrine cannot apply to the U. S. without implying those decisions respecting the common law which I have stated, because, should it be true as is contended, that the constitutional definition of treason comprehends him who advises or procures an assembly that levies war, it would not follow that such adviser or procurer might be charged as having been present at the assembly. If the adviser or procurer is within the definition of levying war, and, independent of the agency of the common law, does actually levy war, then the advice or procurement is an overt act of levying war. If it be the overt act on which he is to be convicted, then it must be charged in the indictment, for he can only be convicted on proof of the overt acts which are charged.
To reiterate this distinction more intelligible, let it be recollected, that although it should be conceded, that since the statute of William and Mary, he who advises or procures a treason may in England be charged as having committed that treason by virtue of the common law operation which is said, so far as respects the indictment, to unite the accessory to the principal offence and permit them to be charged as one, yet it can never be conceded that he who commits one overt act under the statute of Edward, can be charged and convicted on proof of another overt act. If then procurement be an overt act of treason under the constitution, no man can be convicted for the procurement under an indictment charging him with actually assembling—whichever may be the doctrine of the common law in the case of an accessory offender.
It may not be improper in this place again to advert to the opinion of the supreme court, and to show that it contains nothing contrary to the doctrine now laid down. That opinion is that an individual may be guilty of treason "who has not appeared in arms against his country; that if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable object, all those who perform any part however minute or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors."
This opinion does not touch the case of a person who advises or procures an assembly, and does nothing further. The advising certainly, and perhaps the procuring, is more in the nature of a conspiracy to levy war, than of the actual levying of war. According to the opinion, it is not enough to be leagued in the conspiracy, and that war be levied, but it is also necessary to perform a part; that part is the act of levying war. This part, it is true, may be minute, it may not be the actual appearance in arms; and it may be remote from the scene of action, that is from the place where the army is assembled, but it must be a part, and that part must be performed by a person who is leagued in the conspiracy. This part however minute or remote, constitutes the overt act on which alone the person who performs it can be convicted.
The opinion does not declare that the person who has performed this remote and minute part, may be indicted for a part, which was in truth performed by others, and convicted on their overt acts. It amounts to this and nothing more, that when war is actually levied, not only those who bear arms, but those also who are leagued in the conspiracy, and who perform the various distinct parts which are necessary for the prosecution of war, do in the sense of the constitution levy war. It may possibly be the opinion of the supreme court that those who procure a treason and do nothing farther, are guilty under the constitution; I only say that opinion has not yet been given; still less has it been indicated that he who advises, shall be indicted as having performed the fact.
It is then the opinion of the court that this indictment can be supported only by testimony which proves the accused to have been actually or constructively present when the assembly took place on Blannerhasset's Island, or by the admission of the doctrine that he who procures an act may be indicted as having performed that act.
It is further the opinion of the court that there is no testimony whatever which tends to prove that the accused was actually or constructively present when that assembly did take place. Indeed the contrary is most apparent. With respect to admitting proof of procurement to establish a charge of actual presence, the court is of opinion that if this be admissible in England on an indictment for levying war, which is far from being conceded, it is admissible only by virtue of the operation of the common law upon the statute, and therefore is not admissible in this country, unless by virtue of a similar operation; a point far from being established, but on which, for the present, no opinion is given. If, however, this point be established, still the procurement must be procured in the same manner and by the same kind of testimony which would be required to prove actual presence.
The second point in this division of the subject is the necessity of adducing the record of the previous conviction of some one person who committed the fact alleged to be treasonable.
This point presupposes the treason of the accused, if any has been committed, to be accessory in its nature. It's being of this description according to the British authorities, depends on the presence or absence of the accused at the time the fact was committed. The doctrine on this subject is well understood, has been most copiously explained, and need not be repeated. That there is no evidence of his actual or legal presence, is a point already discussed and decided. It is then apparent that, but for the exception to the general principle which is made in cases of treason, those who assembled at Blannerhasset's Island, if that assembly was such as to constitute the crime, would be principals, and those who might really have caused that assembly, although in truth the chief traitors, would in law be accessories.
It is a settled principle in the law that the accessory cannot be guilty of a greater offence than his principal. The maxim is, accessorius sequitur naturam sui principalis ; the accessory follows the nature of his principal. Hence results the necessity of establishing the guilt of the principal before the accessory can be tried. For the degree of guilt which is incurred by counselling or commanding the commission of a crime, depends upon the actual commission of that crime. No man is an accessory to murder unless the fact has been committed.
The fact can only be established in a prosecution against the person by whom a crime has been perpetrated. The law supposes a man more capable of defending his own conduct than any other person, and will not tolerate that the guilt of A shall be established in a prosecution against B. Consequently, if the guilt of B depends on the guilt of A, A must be convicted before B can be tried. It would exhibit a monstrous deformity, indeed, in our system, if B might be executed for being accessory to a murder committed by A, and A should afterwards, upon a full trial, be acquitted of the fact. For this obvious reason, although the punishment of a principal and accessory was originally the same, and although in many instances it is still the same, the accessory could in no case be tried before the conviction of his principal, nor can he yet be tried previous to such conviction, unless he requires it, or unless a special provision to that effect be made by statute.
If then, this was a felony, the prisoner at the bar could not be tried until the crime was established by the conviction of the person by whom it was actually perpetrated.
Is the law otherwise in this case, because in treason all are principals?
Let this question be answered by reason and by authority. Why is it that in felonies however atrocious, the trial of the accessory can never precede the conviction of the principal? Not because the one is denominated the principal and the other
the accessory, for that would be ground on which a great law principle could never stand. Not because there was in fact a difference in the degree of moral guilt, for in the case of murder committed by a hardy villain for a bribe, the person plotting the murder and giving the bribe is, perhaps, of the two, the blacker criminal; and, were it otherwise, this would furnish no argument for precedence in trial.
What then is the reason? It has been already given. The legal guilt of the accessory depends on the guilt of the principal; and the guilt of the principal can only be established in a prosecution against himself.
Does not this reason apply in full force to a case of treason?
The legal guilt of the person who planned the assemblage on Blannerhasset's Island, depends, not simply on the criminality of the previous conspiracy, but on the criminality of that assemblage. If those who perpetrated the fact be not traitors, he who advised the fact cannot be a traitor. His guilt then, in contemplation of law, depends on theirs, and their guilt can only be established in a prosecution against themselves. Whether the adviser of this assemblage be punishable with death as a principal or as an accessory, his liability to punishment depends on the degree of guilt attached to an act which has been perpetrated by others, and which, if it be a criminal act, renders them guilty also. His guilt, therefore, depends on theirs, and their guilt cannot be legally established in a prosecution against him.
The whole reason of the law then relative to the principal and accessory, so far as respects the order of trial, seems to apply in full force to a case of treason committed by one body of men in conspiracy with others who are absent.
If from reason we pass to authority, we find laid down by Hale, Foster and East, in the most explicit terms, that the conviction of some one who has committed the treason must precede the trial of him who has advised or procured it. This position is also maintained by each in his notes on Hawkins, and is not, so far as the court has discovered, any where contradicted.
These authorities have been read and commented on at such length that it cannot be necessary for the court to bring them again into view. It is the less necessary because it is not understood that the law is controverted by the counsel for the U. S.
It is, however, contended, that the prisoner has waived his right to demand the conviction of some one person who was present at the fact, by pleading to his indictment.
Had this indictment even charged the prisoner according to the truth of the case, the court would feel some difficulty in deciding that he had by implication waived his right to demand a species of testimony essential to his conviction. The court is not prepared to say that the act which is to operate against his rights, did not require that it should be performed with a full knowledge of its operation. It would seem consonant to the usual course of proceeding in other respects in criminal cases, that the prisoner should be informed that he had a right to refuse to be tried until some person who committed the act should be convicted, and that he ought not to be considered as waiving the right to demand the record of conviction, unless with the full knowledge of that right he consented to be tried. The court, however, does not decide what the law would be in such a case. It is unnecessary to decide it because pleading to an indictment in which a man is charged as having committed an act, cannot be construed to waive a right which he would have possessed, had he been charged with having advised the act. No person indicted as a principal can be expected to say I am not a principal, I am an accessory; I did not commit, I only advised the act.
The authority of the English cases on this subject depends in a great measure on the adoption of the common law doctrine of accessory to felonies. If that doctrine be excluded, this branch of it may not be directly applicable to treasons committed within the U. S. If the crime of advising or procuring a levying of war be within the constitutional definition of treason, then he who advises or procures it must be indicted on the very fact, and the question whether the treasonableness of the act may be decided in the first instance in the trial of him who procured it, or must be decided in the trial of one who committed it, will depend upon the reason, as it respects the law of evidence, which produced the British decisions with regard to the trial of principal and accessory, rather than on the positive authority of those decisions.
This question is not essential in the present case, because if the crime be within the constitutional definition, it is an overt act of levying war, and to procure a conviction ought to have been charged in the indictment.
The law of the case being thus far settled, what ought to be the decision
of the court on the present motion? Ought the court to sit and hear testimony which cannot affect the prisoner, or ought the court to arrest that testimony? On this question much has been said—much that may perhaps be really under consideration. The motion has been indicated as a motion confessedly made to stop relevant testimony, and in the course of the argument, it has been repeatedly stated by those who oppose the motion, that irrelevant testimony may and ought to be stopped. That this statement is perfectly correct, is one of those fundamental principles in judicial proceedings which is acknowledged by all and is founded in the absolute necessity of the thing. No person will contend that in a civil or criminal case, either party is at liberty to introduce what testimony he pleases, legal or illegal, and to consume the whole term in details of facts unconnected with the particular case. Some tribunal then must decide on the admissibility of testimony. The parties cannot constitute this tribunal, for they do not agree. The jury cannot constitute it, for the question is whether they shall hear the testimony or not. Who then but the court can constitute it? It is of necessity the peculiar province of the court to judge of the admissibility of testimony. If the court admit improper, or reject proper testimony, it is an error of judgment, but it is an error committed in the direct exercise of their judicial functions.
The present indictment charges the prisoner with levying war against the U. S. and alleges an overt act of levying war. That overt act must be proved, according to the mandates of the constitution and of the act of Congress, by two witnesses. It is not proved by a single witness. The presence of the accused has been stated to be an essential component part of the overt act in this indictment, unless the common law principle respecting accessories should render it unnecessary; and there is not only no witness who has proved his actual or legal presence; but the fact of his absence is not controverted. The counsel for the prosecution offer to give in evidence subsequent transactions, at a different place, and in a different state, in order to prove what? The overt act laid in the indictment? That the prisoner was one of those who assembled at Blannerhasset's island? No—that is not alleged. It is well known that such testimony is not competent to establish such a fact. The constitution and law require that the fact should be established by two witnesses, not by the establishment of other facts from which the jury might reason to this fact. The testimony then is not relevant. If it can be introduced, it is only in the character of corroborative or confirmatory testimony, after the overt act has been proved by two witnesses, in such manner that the question of fact ought to be left with the jury. The conclusion that in this state of things no testimony can be admissible, is so inevitable, that the counsel for the U. S. could not resist it. I do not understand them to deny, that if the overt act be not proved by two witnesses so as to be submitted to the jury, that all other testimony must be irrelevant, because no other testimony can prove the act. Now an assemblage on Blannerhasset's island is proved by the requisite number of witnesses, and the court might submit it to the jury, whether that assemblage amounted to a levying of war, but the presence of the accused at that assemblage being no where alleged except in the indictment, the overt act is not proved by a single witness, and of consequence all other testimony must be irrelevant.
The only difference between this motion as made, and the motion in the form which the counsel for the U. S. would admit to be regular, is this. It is now general for the rejection of all testimony. It might be particular with respect to each witness as adduced. But can this be wished, or can it be deemed necessary? Enough is proved to show that the indictment cannot be supported, and that no testimony unless it be of that description which the attorney for the U. S. decl. res himself not to possess, can be relevant, why should a question be taken on each witness?
The opinion of this court on the order of testimony has frequently been adverted to as deciding this question against the motion.
If a contradiction between the two opinions does exist, the court cannot perceive it. It was said that levying war is an act compounded of law and fact, of which the jury aided by the court must judge. To that declaration the court still adheres.
It was said that if the overt act was not proved by two witnesses, no testimony in its nature corroborative or confirmatory, was admissible or could be relevant.
From that declaration there is certainly no departure. It has been asked, in allusion to the present case, if a general commanding an army should detach troops for a distant service, would the men composing that detachment be

traitors, and would the commander in chief escape punishment?
Let the opinion which has been given answer this question. Appearing at the head of an army would, according to this opinion, be an overt act of levying war; detaching a military corps from it for military purposes might also be an overt act of levying war. It is not pretended that he would not be punishable for these acts, it is only said that he may be tried and convicted on his own acts, in the state where those acts were committed, not on the acts of others in the state where those others acted.
Much has been said in the course of the argument on points, on which the court feels no inclination to comment particularly, but which may, perhaps not improperly, receive some notice. That this court dares not usurp power is most true.
That this court dares not shrink from its duty is not less true.
No man is desirous of placing himself in a disagreeable situation. No man is desirous of becoming the peculiar subject of calumny. No man, might he let the bitter cup pass from him without self-reproach, would drain it to the bottom. But if he has no choice in the case; if there is no alternative presented to him but a dereliction of duty or the opprobrium of those who are denominated the world, he merits the contempt as well as the indignation of his country who can hesitate which to embrace.
That gentlemen, in a case the utmost interesting, in the zeal with which they advocate particular opinions and under the conviction in some measure produced by that zeal, should on each side press their arguments too far, should be impatient at any deliberation in the court, and should suspect or fear the operation of motives to which alone they can ascribe that deliberation, is perhaps a frailty incident to human nature; but if any conduct on the part of the court could warrant a sentiment that they would deviate to the one side or the other from the line prescribed by duty and by law, that conduct would be viewed by the judges themselves with an eye of extreme severity, and would long be recollected with deep and serious regret.
The arguments on both sides have been intently and deliberately considered. Those which could not be noticed, since to notice every argument and authority would swell this opinion to a volume, have not been disregarded. The result of the whole is a conviction as complete as the mind of the court is capable of receiving on a complex subject, that the motion must prevail.
No testimony relative to the conduct or declarations of the prisoner elsewhere and subsequent to the transaction on Blannerhasset's island can be admitted, because such testimony, being in its nature merely corroborative, and incompetent to prove the overt act, in itself, is irrelevant, until there be proof of the overt act by two witnesses.
This opinion does not comprehend the proof by two witnesses that the meeting on Blannerhasset's island was procured by the prisoner. On that point the court, for the present, withholds its opinion for reasons which have been already assigned; and as it is understood from the statements made on the part of the prosecution that no such testimony exists, if there be such let it be offered and the court will decide upon it.
The jury have now heard the opinion of the court on the law of the case. They will apply that law to the facts, and will find a verdict of guilty or not guilty as their own consciences may direct.
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 14.
The chief justice delivered the following opinion on the question concerning the admissibility of evidence on the present indictment, for a Misdemeanor against Col. Burr.
The U. States vs. Aaron Burr, On a misdemeanor.
The present motion is particularly directed against the admission of the testimony of Neale, who is offered for the purpose of proving certain conversations between himself and Herman Blannerhasset. It is objected that the declarations of Herman Blannerhasset are at this time inadmissible on this indictment.
The rule of evidence which rejects mere hearsay testimony, which excludes from trials of a criminal or civil nature the declarations of any individual then of him against whom the proceedings are instituted, has been generally deemed all essential to the correct administration of justice. I know not why a declaration in court should be unavailing unless made upon oath, if a declaration out of court was to criminate others than him who made it; nor why a man should have a constitutional claim to be confronted with the witnesses against him, if mere verbal declarations made in his absence may be evidence against him. I know of no principle in the preservation of which all are more concerned. I know none by undermining which, life, liberty and property, might be more endangered. It is therefore incumbent on courts to be watchful of every inroad on a principle so truly important.
This rule, as a general rule is permitted to stand, but some exceptions to it have been introduced concerning the extent of which a difference of opinion prevails, and that difference produces the present question.
The 1st exception is that in cases of conspiracy the acts, and it is said by some the declarations, of all the conspirators may be given in evidence on the trial of any one of them, for the purpose of proving the conspiracy, and this case, it is alleged, comes within the exception.
With regard to this exception a distinction is taken in the books between the admissibility and operation of testimony which is clear in point of law, but not at all times easy to practice in fact. It is that although this testimony be admitted, it is not to operate against the accused unless brought home to him by testimony drawn from his own declaration or his own conduct.
But the question to be considered is, does the exception comprehend this case? Is this a case of conspiracy according to the well established law meaning of the term?
Cases of conspiracy may be of two descriptions.
1st. Where the conspiracy is the crime, in which case the crime is complete although the act should never be formed, and in such cases if several be indicted, and all except one be acquitted, that one cannot, say the books, be convicted, because he cannot conspire alone.
2d. Where the crime consists in the intention, and is proved by a conspiracy so that the conviction of the accused may take place upon evidence that he has conspired to do any act which manifests the wicked intention.
In both these cases an act is not essential to the completion of the crime, and a conspiracy is charged in the indictment as the ground of accusation. If the conspiracy be the sole charge, as it may be, the question to be decided is not whether the accused has committed any particular fact, but whether he has conspired to commit it. Evidence of conspiracy in such a case goes directly to support the issue. It has therefore been determined that the nature of the conspiracy may be proved by the transactions of any of the conspirators in furtherance of the common design; the degree of guilt however of the particular conspirator upon trial, must still depend on his own particular conduct.
In the case at bar the crime consists not in intention but in acts. The act of Congress does not extend to the secret design if not carried into open deed, nor to any conspiracy however extensive if it do not amount to a beginning or setting on foot a military expedition. The indictment contains no allusion to a conspiracy, and of consequence the issue to be tried by the jury is not whether any conspiracy has taken place; but whether the particular facts charged in the indictment have been committed.
I do not mean to admit that by any course which might have been given to the prosecution, this could have been converted into a case of conspiracy; but most assuredly if it was intended to prove a conspiracy, and to let in that kind of testimony which is admissible only in such a case, the indictment ought to have charged it.
I have not been able to find in the books a single decision, or a solitary dictum which would countenance the attempt that is now made to introduce as testimony the declarations of third persons made in the absence of the person on trial, under the idea of a conspiracy where no conspiracy is alleged in the indictment. The researches of the counsel for the prosecution have not been more successful. But they suppose this case, though not within the letter, to come clearly within the reasoning of those cases where this testimony has been allowed.
It has been said that wherever the crime may be committed by a single individual, although in point of fact more than one should be concerned in it, as in all cases of felony, the prosecution must be conducted in the usual mode, and the declarations of third persons cannot be introduced at a trial; but whenever the crime requires more than one person where from its nature it cannot be committed by a single individual, although it shall consist, not in conspiracy, but in open deed, yet it is in the nature of a conspiracy and evidence of the declarations and acts of third persons connected with the accused, may be received whether the indictment covers such testimony or not.
I must confess that I do not feel the force of this distinction. I cannot conceive why, when numbers do in truth conspire to commit an act, as murder or robbery, the rule should be that the declaration of one of them is no evidence against another, and yet if the act should require more than one for its commission, that the declarations of one person engaged in the plot would immediately become evidence against another. I cannot perceive the reason of this distinction; but admitting it, I know not on what ground to dispense with charging in the indictment the combination intended to be proved. If this combination may be proved by the acts or declarations of third persons made in the absence of the accused, because he is connected with those persons; if in consequence of this connection the ordinary rules of evidence are to be prostrated, it would seem to me that the indictment ought to give some notice of this connection.
When the terms used in the indictment necessarily imply a combination, it will be admitted that a combination is charged and may be proved. As where A, B and C are indicted for murdering D. Yet in such a case the declarations of one of the parties made in the absence of the others have never been admitted as evidence against the others. If then this indictment should even imply that the fact charged was committed by more than one person, I cannot conceive that the declarations of a particeps criminis would become admissible on the trial of a person not present when they were made, unless those declarations form a part of the very transaction charged in the indictment.
If in all this I should be mistaken yet it remains to be proved that the offence charged may not be committed by a single individual. This may in some measure depend on the exposition of the terms of the act; and it is to be observed that this exposition must be fixed. It cannot vary with the varying aspect of the prosecution at its different stages. If as has been said, a military expedition is begun or set on foot when a single soldier is enlisted for the purpose, then unless it be begun as well by the soldier who enlists as by the officer who enlists him, a military expedition may be begun by a single individual. So if those who engage in the enterprise follow their leader from confidence in him without any knowledge of the real object, there is no conspiracy, and the criminal act is the act of an individual. So too if the means are any means, the crime may unquestionably be committed by an individual. Should the term be even so construed as to imply that all the means must be provided before the offence can be committed, still all the means may, in many cases, be provided by a single individual. The rule then laid down by the counsel for the prosecution, if correct in itself, would not comprehend this case.
2dly. There are also cases in the books where acts are in their nature joint and where the law attaches the guilt to all concerned in their commission. So that the act of one is in truth the act of others, where the conduct of one person in the commission of the fact constitutes the crime of another person; but this is distinct from conspiracy.
If many persons combine to commit a murder, and all assist in it and are actually or constructively present, the act of one is the act of all and is sufficient for the conviction of all. So in acts of levying war, as in the cases of Damane and Purchase, the acts of the mob were the acts of all in the mob whose conduct showed a concurrence in those acts, and in the general design which the mob were carrying into execution. But these decisions turn on a distinct principal from conspiracy. The crime is a joint crime, & all those who are present aiding in the commission of it participate in each others actions, and in the guilt attached to those actions. The conduct of each contributes to shew the nature of this joint crime; and declarations made during the transaction are explanatory of that transaction; but I cannot conceive that in either case declarations unconnected with the transaction would have been evidence against any other than the person who made them, or persons in whose presence they were made. If for example one of several men had united in committing a murder should have said that he with others contemplated the fact which was afterwards committed, I know of no case which would warrant the admission of this testimony upon the trial of a person who was not present when the words were spoken. So it Damane had previously declared that he had entered into a confederacy for the purpose of pulling down all meeting houses, I cannot believe that this testimony would have been admissible against a person having no knowledge of the declaration & giving no assent to it.
In felony the guilt of the principal attaches to the accessory, and therefore the guilt of the principal is proved on the trial of the accessory. In treason all are principals and the guilt of him who has actually committed the treason does, in England, attach to him who has advised aided, or abetted that treason. Consequently the conduct of the person who has perpetrated the fact must be examined on the trial of him who has advised or procured it. But in misdemeanors by statute, where the commission of a particular fact constitutes the only crime punished by the law I believe there is no case where the declaration of a particeps criminis can affect any but himself.
3dly. The admission of the declarations of Mr. Blannerhasset may be instituted upon under the idea he was the agent of Col. Burr. How far the acts of one man may affect another criminally, is a subject for distinct consideration, but I believe there is no case, where the words of an agent can be evidence against his principal on a criminal prosecution. Could such testimony be admissible, the agency must be first clearly established, not by the words of the agent but by the acts of the principal, and the word must be within the power previously shown to have been given.
The opinions of the circuit court of New York, in trials of Smith and Ogden, have been frequently mentioned. Although I have not the honor to know the judge who gave those decisions, I consider them as the determination of a court of the U. S. and shall not be lightly induced to disregard them, or unnecessarily to treat them with disrespect. I do not however perceive in the opinions of Judge T. Edmudge, any expression indicating that the declarations of third persons could be received as testimony against any individual who was prosecuted under the act. If he has given that opinion, it has certainly escaped my notice, and has not been suggested to me, by counsel. He unequivocally says, in page 113, of the trial, that the person who was made to the decision of conspiracy, did not apply in that case. The reference alluded to
was the observation of Mr. Emmet, who had said, "that if the object was to charge Col. Smith with the acts of Captain Lewis, they ought to have laid the indictment for a conspiracy." The opinion of the judge that the doctrine of conspiracy has no application to the case, appears to me to be perfectly correct.
I feel therefore no difficulty in deciding that the testimony of Mr. Neale, unless he can go further than merely stating the declarations made to him by Blannerhasset, is at present inadmissible.
But the argument has taken a much wider range. The points made comprehend the exclusion of other testimony suggested by the attorney for the U. S. and the opinion of the court upon the operation of testimony. As these subjects are entirely distinct, and as the object of the motion is the exclusion of testimony supposed to be illegal, I shall confine my observations to that part of the argument which respects the admissibility of evidence of the description of that proposed by the attorney for the U. S.
The indictment charges the accused in separate counts with beginning, with setting on foot, with preparing, and with providing the means for a military expedition to be carried on against a nation at peace with the U. S. Any legal testimony which applies to any one of these counts is relevant. That which applies to none of them must be irrelevant.
The expedition, the character and object of that expedition, that the defendant began it, that he set it on foot, that he provided and prepared the means for carrying it on, are all charged in the indictment, and consequently these charges may be all supported by any legal testimony. But that a military expedition was begun or set on foot by others, or that the means were prepared or provided by others, is not charged in this indictment, is not a crime which is or can be alleged against the defendant, and testimony to that effect is therefore not relevant.
All testimony which serves to show the expedition to have been military in its character, as for instance testimony respecting their arms and provisions, no matter by whom purchased, their conduct, no matter by whom directed, or who was present, all legal testimony which serves to shew the object of the expedition, as would their actual marching against Mexico, an public declarations made among themselves stating Mexico as their object, any manifesto to this effect, any agreement entered into by them for such an expedition, these or similar acts would be received to shew the object of the expedition.
In the trials of Smith and Ogden they were received. Whether the particular act of the accused on which his guilt or innocence depends must precede this species of testimony or may be preceded by it, is a question which merely respects the order of evidence. There can be no doubt but that at some stage of the prosecution either before or after the particular part performed by the accused has been shewn, the character and objection may be shown, and that by any legal testimony calculated to develop that character and object. Whether this testimony is admissible before the proof which particularly applies to the part performed by the accused, or ought to be introduced by first proving that part, is a question which is not made in this case and which was not made in the cases of Smith and Ogden. In that case it was certainly entirely unimportant, and it is probably not less so in this.
(To be continued.)
SATURDAY, SEPT. 19.
The court was opened at 10 o'clock. The proceedings of this day commenced with the examination of Jacob Dunbaugh, a witness on the part of the United States. But the interruptions were so incessant, arising from the various objections made to the questions propounded to him, that his examination was not closed when the court adjourned, at 4 o'clock.
This witness proved the assemblage at the mouth of Cumberland, and that the arms (to the amount of forty or upwards) which were on board the boats, were sunk in the river by the direction of Col. Burr, before his boats were searched by the persons sent for that purpose, by the civil authority.
The great point in controversy at present seems to be this. The court considered the fact of the assemblage at the mouth of Cumberland as an equivocal act, and that testimony might be adduced to shew the character of that act, and the intention with which the assemblage took place. On the other hand, it was contended by Col. Burr and his counsel that there could be no such thing as an equivocal act. That the meeting at the mouth of Cumberland was either innocent in itself or criminal. If innocent, no testimony drawn from any other source could make it criminal. Upon this point it is expected that the counsel of Col. Burr will urge to be heard on Monday next.
MONDAY, SEPT. 21.
After a variety of dilatory debate of a very extraordinary nature, in which Col. Burr and his counsel endeavored to prevent any evidence of transactions in the Mississippi Territory from being heard, although by way of explanation of the overt act alleged to have been
committed at the mouth of Cumberland river, the Chief Justice declared his opinion to be that such evidence was admissible; the assembly of men at that place appearing on the testimony already examined, to have been of a doubtful and equivocal nature, and such as might possibly by farther evidence be proved to have been treasonable; but that, if the counsel for Col. Burr insisted on a regular argument to convince him his opinion was erroneous, he was willing to hear it.
Mr. Hay then rose, and observed that the witnesses for the United States had been attending a tedious length of time, in the vain expectation of being examined in court; that the expense of their attendance was enormous; that the accused and his counsel seemed to labor to spin out time, on purpose that the witnesses against him, being wearied with waiting, might go away. He therefore declared that he should not attend to the argument proposed, nor answer any thing which might be said, but should proceed immediately to take the depositions of the witnesses; and thereupon, gave notice to Col. Burr and his counsel that he should commence taking those depositions at the Washington tavern, within one hour. He accordingly retired for that purpose; Col. Burr and his counsel declaring they would not attend in conformity with the notice.
After some debate, the Chief Justice permitted Jacob Dunbaugh to go on with his testimony and to relate the transactions in the Mississippi Territory. His examination consumed the greater part of the day; after which Israel Miller was examined & the court adjourned until Tuesday ten o'clock.
TUESDAY, SEPT. 22. This day several other witnesses were heard on the part of the United States. Considerable progress appears now to be making in the elucidation of the mysterious proceedings of Aaron Burr. Full information shall be given to the public as soon as possible.
The court adjourned until this day (Wed.) ten o'clock.
From the London Morning Chronicle, of the 28th July.
The circumstances respecting the engagement between the Leopard and the American frigate Constellation, [Chesapeake] are stated to be as follows:— "It appears that some British deserters had taken refuge on board the American frigate. The Leopard falling in with her demanded that they should be given up, and insist upon searching for them. This was peremptorily refused by the American captain; after which the Leopard fired a shot, which was answered by a broadside, and an action immediately commenced, which, however, did not continue long, upon the Constellation, [Chesapeake] upon having a few men killed and wounded, struck her colors. The deserters were then taken out of her, and she was permitted to depart, and we understand, she returned immediately to the Chesapeake. The Constellation [Chesapeake] is a large 44 gun frigate, very little inferior in size to the Leopard."
Such is the account given of this affair in the ministerial paper the Sun, of last night. Other reports mention, that it was not the Constellation, but the Chesapeake, and that she was carried to Halifax—but we take it for granted, that the above is the correct account.
Out of this statement, as it stands, various considerations arise—though, to enable us to judge of the true state of the case, much more information is necessary. If the American captain received on board his vessel deserters from British ships of war, knowing them to be such, perhaps he was culpable, notwithstanding the practice of one nation receiving the subjects of another into its service without any questions asked. On the men being demanded, he ought, for the sake of peace and good understanding, perhaps, to have given them up, though we do not know, that by any law of nations, far less by any existing treaty, he was bound to deliver them on demand of any British ship. If he was called upon, however, to deliver them up on a menace of search, and if that accompanied the demand, he did no more than his duty in refusing to allow his ship to be searched—because, had he yielded to the menace, he surrendered an important right belonging to his country.
It is to be observed, that this is a case different from any that has yet occurred, respecting the right of taking British sailors out of American ships. The Americans dispute outright of taking them out of private ships, and allege, great outrages in doing so. Here the case stands upon totally different grounds. The Constellation [Chesapeake] was a ship bearing a flag and commission of the U. S. The question then is, whether this country, or any ship bearing the king's authority and commission, had a right to insist on visiting by force the ship of a neutral and friendly power, for the purpose of searching for deserters? It is not whether there actually were or were not deserters on board the American frigate, or whether the American captain knew of it? That fact at present is of no manner of consequence. The question is, whether we had the right to pursue the address of an alleged grievance in the way resorted to by the commander of the Leopard. A man may have a very good action at law, when he must not take the law into his own hands.

We hardly imagine that any civilian will contend, that a British ship could have the right of search by force, because such a right is wholly inconsistent with the sovereignty of the U. S. of America. To all intents & purposes the sovereignty of the U. S. is complete in all its branches, and surely therefore, in what relates to military jurisdiction and authority over its public force, is as complete as that of this or any other nation over its army or navy. But what can be a more direct invasion of this right of sovereignty, what a more flagrant attack on the honor of an independent nation, than to insist as a matter of right, on going on board a ship of war, and searching for deserters? We do not know any case that would support such a demand, for there can be no necessity for it—but the pretence in this case is very trifling, and far below what could justify one nation in demanding that another should submit to such a badge of ignominy. Let any military man, or any seaman, reflect for a moment what the thing demanded is! It is that the public ships and vessels of one power shall when and where they please, send on board the public ships and vessels of another, with the whole crew, search the whole ship, and do every thing the most inconsistent with the discipline of the ship visited, and the dignity of the nation submitting to this supposed right!
Let us put this home to ourselves. Suppose the Constellation, [Chesapeake] had been lying at Portsmouth. Suppose captain Truxton, or any hot headed American had got information that some runaway American sailors were on board a British sloop of war. Admitting that they were runaways, would any English officer commanding such a sloop of war, have acceded to the impudent and insulting demand of Truxton, to send or come on board his vessel, make his crew pass muster, each tell where he was born, search every cranny, and do that which in the very nature of things cannot be done without outrage and insult? Yet if there be right in this pretension, it is a right common to both nations; and captain Truxton would have been full as much entitled to exercise it at Spithead or in the Downs, as the commander of the Leopard in Hampton Roads. The claim is so inconsistent with the clearest rights of independent sovereignty, that it can have no foundation in the law of nations; and it would necessarily lead in practice to such disorders among the high spirited officers of two different navies, as must satisfy every reasonable man that, being utterly repugnant to common sense, it cannot form part of the international code of civilized societies.
This is not a case in the smallest degree affected by that of the Swedish convoy. The principle is wholly different. In the case of the Swedish convoy there was no claim made to visit and search the ship of war. Our claim was to visit the merchant ships under convoy; and the Swedes said "no—the presence of our ship of war is sufficient security that this convoy carries no contraband." We again denied this and insisted upon visiting the ships under convoy, provided we had a reasonable ground of doubt or suspicion.
The demand to visit and search a ship bearing the flag and commission of an independent neutral power, on pretence of catching deserters, is of a quite different nature. Surely if any place ought to be privileged from a forcible entry on such ignoble pursuits, it is the royal, or the national navy of an independent state. Surely if any courtesies are mutually due, it must be to prohibit such indelicate and disorderly intrusions. We do not plead the cause of the American navy here—we plead that of the British navy. We say that British ships of war are not, and cannot be subject to such visits from the Americans, or any other nation; and therefore the Americans are not bound to submit to them from the British. The law is equal to both, and the existence of a law at once so humiliating and so dangerous, cannot be supposed. We deny then that such a law exists. We defy ministers to produce a single paragraph from any respectable writer on public law, or any admitted case, by which the proceedings of the commander of the Leopard, can be authorized or defended. His conduct, come what may of the dispute, ought to be disavowed.
We are glad to find that Sir John Nichol, the King's Advocate, was present at the Council upon this affair. The learning and sound sense of Sir John Nichol, we trust would correct the intemperance of ministers, and satisfy them that the intention insisted upon in this case is wholly unprecedented, and is utterly inconsistent with the common rights and dignity of independent states.
What may be the facts of this case, we do not pretend to be yet informed. It is said, however, that the deserters in question were really Americans and not British sailors; that, as we have said, does not alter the question of right. If they were British sailors, redress surely might have been obtained by application to the American government; and there was no such pressing emergency or urgent danger, from the escape of these deserters, as to justify the adoption of a violent remedy, or the appeal to that sort of law which nothing but necessity can sanction.
Complaints of taking each others men are common to us and the Americans, and probably in both cases to some extent well founded. But this is to be considered, that in the one our men follow their own inclinations, in the other they are pressed. We do not believe, however, that there 1000
British seamen altogether in the American service.
FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER.
Observations on the conduct of Great Britain—Continued.
No. V.
Great Britain was not contented to make and execute her own anti-neutral orders of council and to give open indemnity for those breaches of public law, in the manner we have seen, but she used her utmost endeavors in the year 1793, to lead other powers into the adoption of those unprecedented and illegitimate provisions in her convention with Russia, which we have already noticed. Prussia, Austria, and Spain were drawn by England into similar engagements, and America, Genoa, and Tuscany immediately witnessed the separate or joint efforts of Great Britain and her lawless associates to coerce them into an injurious and degrading submission to this new English project of depriving the opposite belligerent of all the benefits of neutral commerce. Let it be well remembered, that this act was commenced, matured and published in London, under the official signatures of the British and Russian ministers on the 25th of March, 1793. There, then and thus was the unlawful foundation laid for all the subsequent violations of neutral rights by this great anti-neutral combination.
Let us suppose for a moment, that upon the receipt of that Anglo-Russian treaty at Paris in the close of March, 1793, whereby the French were attempted to be deprived, by dint of naval power, of all rightful and legitimate intercourse with neutrals, the government of France had instantly avowed the right, the duty and the necessity of retaliating the measure, in form and substance, and had immediately passed legislative and executive acts, directing the total prevention of neutral intercourse with England and her dominions. No sober and honest American will doubt, question, or deny that such a law and decree of France in 1793 would have been justly chargeable to Great Britain, & that it would have been a clear, simple and mere retaliation on the part of the French. It requires but a little effort of a sound mind and an honest heart then to place to the account of the government of Great Britain the various infractions of our neutral rights by the governments of France and her allies, which have occurred since the dates of those numerous and stupendous violations of those rights in the years 1793, and 1793, which have been faithfully represented in the three former numbers of these papers.
"The law of nations," till England thus began, was the great charter of American peace—that peace the God of nature gave, and we estimate, as a most blessed fruit of his divine will. We had but to be just, and public happiness was ours!—But alas, the scene is changed. The foundations of the law of nations have sustained from the hands of England, in her early treaties with Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Spain a rude and malignant stroke intended to destroy it—and with that law, to destroy our peace. If we trace the conduct of Great Britain, further and similar evidences but thicken around us.
Let us proceed in the painful, but necessary duty. In the progress of the war, Spain and all her allies, including England, were unable to protect her from the vigorous attacks, which this unprecedented engagement with England in 1793 brought upon her. She was forced to abandon her English connexion and to save herself from ruin by engaging on the side of France. No sooner had this new war of Spanish necessity taken place, than the English admiral, Nelson, published a proclamation, dated off Cadiz, declaring to the neutrals, that on that account, "It was found right that Spain should no longer have any trade!" The history of the civilized world never before witnessed an instance of a mere blockading admiral at a port, attempting to proclaim to all nations that a whole kingdom was no longer to have any trade, to the total, consequent and illegitimate destruction of neutral rights. Will any man wonder, that powerful belligerent monarchs should, in retaliation, do half what a secondary English admiral had thus done many years before.
This strange and extravagant act of admiral Nelson's is a part of that monstrous and crude mass of British violations of neutral rights, which are to be found in the orders of their king in council, in the proclamations of their generals and admirals, and even in the acts of their parliament, under the two heads of
Blockades and Regulations of Neutral Trade.
These acts of the British government are in a great many very important instances, and far more than the greater part, entirely unsupported by law or reason, in direct violation of the law of nations and indisputably injurious to neutral rights. As they apply to one important subject, they are most accurately, faithfully and ably characterized in the following concise summary of the English conduct, in the pamphlet (of 1806), written by Mr. Madison: a work which every neutral statesman and merchant, and every honest belligerent, should carefully read and well consider.
"The system of Great Britain (says this invaluable pamphlet) may, therefore now be considered, as announced to all the world, with its disguise, and by the most solemn acts of her govern-
ment. Her navy having destroyed the trade of her enemies, as well between the mother country and their colonies, as between the former and neutral countries, and her courts, by putting an end to re-exports from neutral countries, reducing the importation into these to the mere amount of their own consumption, the immense surplus of productions accumulating in the American possessions of her enemies can find no outlet, but through the free ports (of the British West Indies), "provided for it, nor any other market near the British market, and those to which she finds it her interest to distribute it; with a view to which she not only allows her enemies to trade with her possessions, but allows her subjects to trade with her enemies. And thus, in defiance as well of her treason laws, and of her laws of trade, as of the rights of neutrality, under the law of nations, we find her, in the just and emphatic language of the President, "taking to herself, by an inconsistency, at which reason revolts, a commerce with her own enemy, which she denies to a neutral, on the ground of its aiding an enemy in the war."
Could it have been credited of Great Britain or of any other respectable government, that they could have passed laws to promote and facilitate trade between the British dominions, (and by British subjects) with the dominions and ports of France, after entering into four solemn treaties with the great European states to prevent the neutrals from trading with those very French ports and dominions, under the penalty of a degrading and fatal confiscation? Can it be expected by Great Britain, that the neutral world will for ever submit to the substitution of so monstrous a system of monopolizing inconsistency and oppression for the eternal justice of the law of nations.
The hostile influence of the government of Great Britain upon neutral trade, has been manifested in another form, particularly unjust, injurious and offensive. From the earliest time the British courts of admiralty have burdened both acquitted and condemned vessels with costs and charges, fatal to ordinary adventurers; and every shade of inconsistent opinion, from acquittal to condemnation in cases turning on the same principle, has marked the decrees of the judges themselves. The more high and proud are the claims of the British judiciary department to honor and confidence, in its dispensations at home, the deeper is the stain of such facts, in their administration of law to neutral suitors.
Such as we have stated in these papers was the conduct of the British government towards her belligerent adversaries and the neutral states, in the first months of the war of '93. So did she teach that adversary, by her own illegitimate example, to impede, to harass, to despoil, to mulct, to diminish, & to destroy the commerce of neutrals—so did she induce and teach Spain, Russia, Prussia and Austria. So did she coerce the U. States, Genoa & Tuscany; and so did she attempt Denmark and Sweden. So did she still continue to act towards us in the month of November, 1806, when the government of France adopted its act of avowed and actual retaliation. For this act of France, erroneously supposed at the first to be a total prohibition of neutral trade with the British kingdoms, England sets up, against the universal law of nations, and a new formed treaty with the U. S. a pretension to a right to retaliate; profiting of her own wrong against the maxims of law, and the absolute rules of reason and justice.
The great original parent-aggressor and seducer of Europe, in the moment of a retaliation inferior far to her acts of provocation, and drawn by years of misconduct on herself, preposterously claims from that retaliation a right to repeat her innumerable malefactions against the most useful and necessary of her neutral friends! The law of nations she had long and often torn in public to miserable tatters, and our new treaty was not to bind her, because she had taught France her own new system of commercial blockade. On us, the written letter of the treaty articles and the old fashioned rules of the law of nations were to continue absolutely obligatory. The treaty with England, tho' suspended or annihilated there by a convenient rider of her dictation, was to be and continue "the supreme law of the land" in the U. S. Thus did England prove, that she had repeated her injuries till our apparent insensibility caused her to believe we had no feeling; and that she had deceived us by the color of law in her council orders and of regularity in her pretended blockades, till we had no sense. The hopes of the two countries are brought now into a narrow ground, capable of fair and thorough explanation. We are two nations. Both independent. The universal prescriptive law of nations must govern both as to men and things. No dispensation can be claimed by either party, as of right. We can yield no solid provision of the law of nations, with safety or innocence. The times require of us an enlightened, a sincere, and an undaunted neutrality.
JURISCOLA.
NOTICE.
AT A Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Institution for the education of Youth in the city of Washington, it was resolved that the Election of PRINCIPAL TEACHER for the Western School, be postponed until the 2nd Monday in October next, and that applications for the said place be received by the Secretary until that day. WASHINGTON P. FYD, Secretary to the Board of Trustees. September 23—84
WASHINGTON CITY.
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 23.
The British government has, it appears, signified to Mr. Monroe, that it neither does, nor has at any time maintained the pretension of a right to search ships of war, in the national service of any state, for deserters; and that if it should appear that the act of the British officers in the affair of the Leopard and Chesapeake rested on no other grounds than the simple and unqualified assertion of such a pretension, there would be no difficulty in disavowing the act and making the reparation really due.
If the following are the effects of an apprehended, what would be the effects of a real war between the United States and Great Britain?
Charleston, Sept. 15. By the arrival of the schooner Clarissa and Eliza, captain Revelle, we were yesterday favored with Kingston papers to the 14th August.
The account of the affair with the Chesapeake reached Kingston, and excited considerable sensations. The inhabitants generally deprecated a war with America, and entertained sanguine hopes that matters would be amicably adjusted. Markets, however, had experienced a considerable change; Rice was advanced to 10 dollars, and lumber which was previously selling at 40 dollars rose to 70. Other articles of export from the United States were proportionally advanced.
St. Jago de la Vaga, Aug. 8. The accounts received by the last packet of the deplorable state of the sugar market are fully confirmed by many sales we have seen, in which the unfortunate sugar planter has, instead of reaping any benefit from his immense capital been brought into debt on account of the necessary supplies for his negroes and plantation, the net proceeds of his crop not being sufficient to meet those expenses. Such being the case, from the exorbitance of the duties on internal consumption, and the exclusion from a foreign market, the ruin of this island is at hand unless very speedy and effectual measures be adopted to save it from destruction. An income tax of half or two-thirds the net value of the colonists produce would be lenity to the present system, which swallows up every thing, and unless the mother-country, find means of relieving us from so much oppression, she will realise the ancient fable of Saturn destroying his children!!
By the ships Gold-Hunter from London, and Eliza, from Liverpool, arrived at New York, we are furnished with London dates to the 15th of August. The details given in the British prints are ample; but the interesting nature of our domestic articles compels us to condense their substance into a small compass.
The most important articles respect the relations between this country and England. Insurance on American vessels from England to America had fallen to three guineas. The Chamber of Commerce of Liverpool had transmitted a Circular Letter to the several trading and manufacturing towns, representing the great importance of preserving amity between the two nations, and stating that they held themselves in readiness, in case it should be found necessary, to co-operate with the merchants and manufacturers of England and Ireland to that effect. Mr. Canning had, on the 12th, in an interview with Mr. Sanforn, informed him that he had sent to the American Envoys, to know whether they had received any farther information, adding "that if they had, the British government was ready to enter into an amicable adjustment of all differences." The answer was "that they had received no instructions." On the 11th Mr. Canning had declared, in the House of Commons, that "finding upon their entrance into office that a treaty had been signed, though not ratified, his majesty's ministers felt it to be their duty to give the fullest effect to the stipulations of the treaty. They had therefore made no alteration whatever in the course pursued by their predecessors. No new instructions whatever were sent to our minister at the American court; and as to our naval force off the American coast, they had precisely the same orders as those which prevailed under their predecessors." He added that no official information had been received of the affair between the Leopard and Chesapeake. The Revenge had not arrived—There was no prospect of peace between England and France—Bonaparte is represented as more intent than ever on securing the liberty of the seas and the independence of every flag. The English Parliament was on the 14th prorogued. The Monitor of the 4th says that Prussia will not only shut her ports against England, but likewise declare war against her—40,000 men are to be assembled at Bayonne to comp'l Portugal to shut her ports against England. Hamburg letters say a Russian squad-
ron is to join the Danish fleet to shut the Sound against England. Several English vessels had left St. Petersburg, with half their cargoes, through the fear of an embargo being laid on all British vessels.
A London paper of Aug. 11, says "the orders for preventing aliens from quitting the country, was taken off a few days ago."
ANECDOFE
OF THE VENERABLE G. CLINTON.
We are informed that our worthy Vice-President, GEORGE CLINTON, who had been detained at the city of Washington, after the rising of Congress, by the illness of his youngest daughter, having taken his passage home with her in the N. York revenue cutter, was fired at repeatedly by the British ship of war Leopard, in order to bring her to and search her. The Vice-President being then on deck, the captain asked him what he should do, and whether it would not be best to heave too. "Why, captain," replied our venerable Sachem, at the same time taking a pinch of snuff with that coolness so peculiar to himself, "It will be time enough to heave too when the Cutter begins to sink." The captain kept on his course and the Cutter was soon out of reach of the English men of war.
Farmers Reg.
By a vessel arrived at N. London, information is received of the death of Victor Hughes, governor of Cayenne.
By captain Conklin, in 12 days from Hayti, we learn that the war between Petion and Christophe continued with varied success, but it was expected Christophe would finally prevail.
Bull. paper.
A Quebec paper of Sept. 4, observes, "that the whole of the Indian nations have offered their services to the British government in case of a war with the U. States."
New York, Sept. 22.
The master of a vessel who left Tonnigen on the 24th July, informs that the only reports current at the time of his sailing were, that by a supplementary article between Bonaparte and the Emperor of Russia, Prince Constantine was to be declared king of Poland; in that Bonaparte had expressed his determination to take, under his protection the Danish fleet.
THE WASHINGTON JOCKEY CLUB RACES.
Comme ce on Tuesday the 27th October.
First day's purse, 4 mile heats 600 dollars Second day's purse, 3 miles 300 do. Third day's purse, 2 mile heats, (free only for colts) 300 do. On the first day will also be run for a Colt Sweepstake of 500 dollars for owners. All races are to be run agreeably to the rules of the Club
SAMUEL BOOTS, S. J. Sept. 28—13.
PLATING MANUFACTORY.
GEORGE SHARP, No. 19, North street Baltimore.
Where COACH and HARNESS FURNITURE may be had at reduced prices for cash; any person inclining to purchase can be furnished with a list of prices of each article, separate or in sets complete for Gigs and Coach Harness by forwarding a line as above. N. B. A few pair handsome Coach Handles, and Door, do. at six dollars for the Coach, and Four for the Door do. Baltimore, Sept. 28—41
NOTICE.
This is to give notice that the Subscriber of Washington city, hath obtained from the Orphan's Court of Washington in the district of Columbia, letters of administration on the persona estate of MUEL KIRKPATRICK, late of some city deceased. All persons having claims against the said deceased, are hereby warned to exhibit the same with the vouchers thereof, to the subscriber at or before the 31st day of March next, they may otherwise by law be excluded from all benefit of said estate. Given under my hand this 26th day of September in the year 1807. GEORGE KIRKPATRICK, Administrator. Sept. 28—w4t.
Valuable Lands for Sale.
In pursuance of a decree of the honorable the United States Circuit Court, of the district of Columbia, for the county of Alexandria, will be sold, on the premises, on Tuesday the 25th day of September next to the highest bidder, on a credit of 6, 12, and 18 months.
One Moiety of a Tract of Land, called "Abingdon," formerly the residence of Mr. Robert Alexander, lying on the Potomack and four mile creek and about 3 miles above the town of Alexandria, commanding a handsome view of the Potomac. Alexandria, Washington City, and George Town and the new road to Washington passing nearly thro' the center of the tract, which contains 573 acres, and is laid off into four lots of different sizes to accommodate purchasers; a plan of which may be seen at any time on application to the subscribers. The sale will commence at 12 o'clock.
Thos Swann, G. Dendale, Richmond T. Lee, } Com'rs. August 22.

New & Valuable BOOKS.
JUST received, and now opening, at D. RAPINE'S Book Store on Capitol Hill, a Choice and Valuable Collection of BOOKS and STATIONERY...
Dr. Rees' Cyclopaedia, Vol. 5th. Part 1st. or the 6th. half volume, is just received and ready for delivery...
BANK OF COLUMBIA, Sept. 17th, 1807. The President and Directors having this day declared a Dividend on the Capital Stock...
Charlotte Hall School. The Trustees of said School will receive applications for an appointment of an Assistant Master in the Latin language...
CAPITOL of the UNITED STATES. NO Person whatever can be admitted into the South Wing of the Capitol, excepting those actually engaged in the work.
CHARLES H. VARDEN, Merchant Taylor, New Jersey Avenue, near the Capitol. RESPECTFULLY informs the gentlemen of the district of Columbia...
District of Columbia, to wit: It is remembered that on the 15th day of August in the thirty second year of the Independence of the United States...
PUBLIC NOTICE.
PURSUANT to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the United States, of the 3rd day of March last...
FOR THE STATIONERY.
Table with 2 columns: Item, Price. Includes items like 'Very best superfine English letter paper', 'Best plain letter paper', 'Best wove do. do.', etc.
FOR THE PRINTING.
Table with 2 columns: Item, Price. Includes items like 'For plain work, octavo per sheet of 300 impressions', 'figure work, do. do. do.', etc.
FOR THE FUEL.
Good found Hickory Wood delivered in the city at the Capitol at Nine Dollars and Seventy-five Cents per cord.
Fifty Dollars Reward
RANAWAY from the subscriber residing in the District of Columbia, on the first of August, 1807, a black man named MOSES...
LITERARY NOTICE.
WM. DUANE, of Philadelphia, will thank such Book sellers, Printers, and others, as may have had the goodness to collect subscribers for the LIFE & WORKS OF DR. FRANKLIN...
PROPOSALS
For carrying mails of the United States on the following routes will be received at the General Post Office until the 15th of October next.
1st. From Petersburg by Harrisville, Goldsboro, Drummondburg, Warrenton, Lewistown, Raleigh, and Averysboro, to Fayetteville, three times a week.
2nd. From Fayetteville by Lumberton, Barefields Mills, Porters Ferry, Gauley and Georgetown to Charleston three times a week.
NOTES.
1. The Post master general may expedite the mails, & alter the times of arrival and departure at any time during the continuance of the contracts... 2. Fifteen annuities shall be allowed for opening and closing the mails at all offices where no particular time is specified. 3. For every thirty minutes delay (unavoidable accidents excepted) in arriving at the time prescribed in any contract the contractor shall forfeit one dollar... 4. Newspapers, as well as letters, to be sent in the mail; and if any person making proposals, desires to carry newspapers, other than those conveyed in the mail, for his own emolument, he must state in his proposals for what sum he will carry with the emolument, and for what sum without that emolument. 5. Should any person making proposals desire an alteration of the times of arrival and departure above specified, he must state in his proposals the alteration desired, and the difference they will make in the terms of the contract. 6. Persons making proposals are desired to state their prices by the year. Those who contract will receive their pay quarterly in the months of August, November, February, and May, in one month after the expiration of each quarter. 7. No other than a free white person shall be employed to convey the mail. 8. Where the proposer intends to convey the mail in the body of a stage carriage, he is desired to state it in his proposals. 9. The Post master general reserves to himself the right of declaring any contract at an end, whenever any failure happens which amounts to the loss of a trip. 10. The contracts for the above routes are to be in operation on the first day of January next, & to continue in force until the 31st day of March 1810.
GIDEON GRANGER, Postmaster general. General Post-Office, Washington city, July 31—Oct 15
20 DOLLARS REWARD.
RANAWAY from the subscriber in August last, Negro CHARLES—he is a straight well made black man, about 26 years of age, 5 feet 9 or 10 inches high...
FOR SALE OR RENT.
HE subscriber will SELL or RENT the HOTEL, situated on the Capitol Hill and near to the Capitol, at present occupied by Mr. P. D. STELLE.
FOR SALE,
A valuable tract of land called Westbury, containing 1464 acres, situated in Anne Arundel County, state of Maryland, at the head of Well river 12 miles from Annapolis, and 42 from Baltimore.
EDITORIAL ADDRESS.
In the early part of June the Editor intimated his purpose to retire from the establishment of the National Intelligencer, and invited the offers of individuals disposed to enter on its superintendence.
A considerable time has since passed without any offer being made, which has been considered satisfactory on this ground. The Editor, has, therefore, determined to continue to superintend the National Intelligencer.
Looking forward to the ensuing session of Congress as probably one of the most interesting since the era of the present government, he has exerted himself in making arrangements, which he trusts will render the National Intelligencer the full and faithful organ, as well of the proceedings of the government as of the public sentiment.
More regard will likewise be paid to the mechanical management of the paper. For some time past, the Editor has had to regret the necessary use of an inferior paper, and of a press somewhat out of repair, from his inability immediately to retrieve at the City of Washington the disappointment experienced in these respects.
The great additional expenses which will be incurred render it indispensable that Subscribers should be punctual in their payments. It is, therefore, expected that every new Subscriber advance five dollars, the price for a year, at the period of subscription, and that the existing subscribers pay off their arrears and make the necessary advance before the opening of the session.
GENERAL NOTICE.
THE BOARD OF CITY COMMISSIONERS, appointed in pursuance of an act of the City Council passed the 30th of May last, having entered on the duties of their office, hereby inform all whom it may concern...
First Council.
"An act to establish and regulate markets," passed October 6th, 1802. "An act for laying a tax on hackney carriages, theatrical and other public amusements," passed 28th October, 1802. "An act to regulate weights and measures," passed 19th November, 1802. "An act to provide for the prevention and extinction of fires," passed 10th January, 1803. "An act for the preservation of footways and trees on the streets and avenues in the city," passed March 25th, 1803. "An act requiring annual licences to be taken out by pedlars and ordinary keepers, and for the keeping of carriages and billiard tables," passed the 25th May, 1803.
Second Council.
"An act supplementary to the act to establish and regulate markets," passed 12th September, 1803. "An act concerning nuisances, and creating a superintendent of police," passed 20th September, 1803. "Section 9 of "An act, imposing certain taxes and providing for their collection," passed 12th September, 1803. "An act supplementary to an act for laying a tax on hackney carriages, theatrical and other public amusements," passed 26th November, 1803.
Third Council.
"An act requiring annual licences to be taken out by ordinary or tavern keepers, retailers and hawkers or pedlars," passed 19th July, 1804. The 3 and 4 sections of "An act making an appropriation for sinking wells, the erection and repair of pumps, and for the preservation thereof," passed 13th May, 1805. "An act for the better collection of the tax on private and hackney carriages," passed 10th December, 1804. "An act amendatory to an act concerning nuisances, and creating a superintendent of police," passed 30 May, 1805.
Fourth Council.
"An act for licencing and regulating auctions in the city of Washington," passed 10th February, 1806. "An act concerning markets," passed March 29th, 1806. "An act supplementary to the acts licencing hackney carriages within the city of Washington," passed April 17, 1806. "An act regulating the weight and quality of bread," passed the 17th April, 1806.
Fifth Council.
"An act supplementary to the act, to regulate weights and measures," passed 2d November, 1806. "An act to establish a market at the market house on the market square at the Eastern Branch, and for other purposes," passed 28th November, 1806. "An act to establish the size of brick moulds in the city of Washington," passed 19th March, 1807.
MICHAEL JOURNEE } City THOS. H. GILLISS } Commissioners. DANL. RAPINE, } GEORGE COLLARD, }
This is to give notice, That the subscriber of Georgetown in the district of Columbia, hath obtained from the Orphan's Court of Washington county, and district aforesaid, letters of administration on the personal estate of Christopher Richmond, late of the said county, deceased.
All claims forwarded by mail must be paid.
JOS. CARLETON, Georgetown, September 18—1807
By the Orphans Court of Saint Mary's county—June Term, 1807.
ORDERED That Joseph Edwards, administrator of Stourton Edwards, late of St. Mary's county, deceased, give the notice required by law for creditors to exhibit their claims against the estate of the said deceased, and that the same be published once a week for six weeks, in the Washington Federalist and National Intelligencer.
JAMES FORREST, Reg. Wills for Saint Mary's county.
This is to give notice, that the subscriber of St. Mary's county, hath obtained from the Orphan's court of St. Mary's County in Maryland, letters of administration on the personal estate of Stourton Edwards, late of the county aforesaid, deceased.
JOSEPH EDWARDS, Adm. Sept. 18—1807.