The national intelligencer and Washington advertiser. (Washington City [D.C.]), 1805-08-09 00:00:00

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, AND WASHINGTON ADVERTISER.
VOL. V. WASHINGTON CITY, PRINTED BY SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH, PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. NO. DCLIV. FIVE DOLLARS PER ANNUM. FRIDAY, AUGUST 9, 1805. PAID IN ADVANCE.
IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE CHASE.
SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23.
MR. HARPER.
IT was greatly to be desired, Mr. President, and might have been confidently expected, that in a case every way so important, where it so greatly concerns the public happiness, that the decision should command the public confidence, nothing would be presented to the view of this honorable court in aid of the prosecution, except the law which ought to govern the decision, and the proofs relied on for supporting the allegations.
But it has not so seemed good to the honorable managers. They have thought proper to introduce into the discussion, the political opinions and party connections of the respondent; for the purpose of throwing a shade of doubt over his motives, and of establishing inferences unfavorable to his character. How far this conduct ought to be commended, is not for me to decide. My confidence in the justice and discernment of this honorable court forbids me to apprehend that it can be successful.
But since these opinions and connections have been introduced, permit me to use them for a different purpose.
The duty imposed on judges is at all times delicate: and in criminal cases, where life or liberty may be affected, where reputation dearer than both depends on the issue, this duty becomes peculiarly arduous and painful to an honorable and generous mind. But there be a situation more delicate, more embarrassing than every other to such a mind, it is that of a judge sitting on the trial of a person who, from political opposition, or any other cause, may have excited hostile or angry feelings in his mind. It is then that he most fears to trust himself. It is then that he most dreads the influence of his passions, in misleading his judgment. It is then that he feels the strongest alarms for his reputation; lest he should possibly afford ground for the suspicion, that he had gratified his resentments under the semblance of executing the law.
Hence he constantly leans towards the side of the accused, and requires the clearest conviction before he condemns. Hence he rejects all doubtful or contradictory testimony, lays out of the case all little indiscretions and slight shades of suspicion; and is rigid in requiring from the prosecutors the unequivocal proof of unequivocal offences. That his enemy is in his power is always a reason for the utmost forbearance. The fear that he may possibly be misled by his passions, is always a reason for acquittal, where doubt can exist.
Need I invoke those noble and generous sentiments in the breasts of this honorable court? No! my heart tells me I need not. I see on those benches distinguished soldiers and eminent statesmen, who have triumphed alike in the fields of politics and war, and who always disdained to tarnish their laurels by the blood or the humiliation of a vanquished foe.
If then the person now arraigned at your bar be connected with a political party in opposition to any of those who sit as his judges; if it were possible that, in promoting the views of that party, he may have excited feelings of anger or resentment in the mind of any member of this honorable tribunal; if it were possible, that any portion of the angry passions, engendered by the conflicts of party, could find a place within these hallowed walls, and could attach itself to him who stands upon his trial at this bar; the existence of such a possibility would furnish every member of this honorable court, with the strongest motives that can operate on a generous and noble mind, for leaning constantly to the side of the accused, and for pronouncing in favor of an acquittal, wherever their remains a doubt of guilt.
Attempts have also been made to enlist the sympathy of this honorable court on the side of the prosecution, and for this purpose a criminal twice convicted, who did not hesitate to risk civil bloodshed in support of political theories, and is now indebted for his life to the clemency of that government, against whose laws he armed his ignorant and misguided neighbors, is presented to view, decked out in all the ornaments which rhetoric can bestow. We, Mr. President, disclaim the aids and protect against the interference of rhetoric and sympathy. However proper in other situations, they ought to be excluded from courts of justice; whose decisions should be
governed by truth and not by feeling.
But if sympathy could find a place in this tribunal, what object more fit to awake it, than that now presented at your bar!
An aged patriot and statesman, bearing on his head the frost of seventy winters, and broken by the infirmities brought upon him by the labors and exertions of half a century, is arraigned as an offender, and compelled to employ, in defending himself against a criminal prosecution, the few and short intervals of ease allowed to him by sickness. Placed at the bar of a court, after having sat with honor for sixteen years on the bench, he is doomed to hear the most opprobrious epithets applied to his name, by those whose predecessors were accustomed to look up to him with admiration and respect, and whose fathers would have been proud to have been numbered among his pupils. His footsteps are hunted from place to place to find indications, which may be exaggerated into crimes. The jests which, flowing from the gaiety and openness of his temper, were uttered in the confidence of private conversation; the expressions of warmth produced by the natural impetuosity of his character, are detailed by companions converted into spies and informers, and are adduced as proofs of criminal intention.
This cup so full of bitterness for one who has been accustomed for forty years to fill the most honorable stations in his country, he drinks to the dregs without complaining. In this sad reverse, he supports himself with a calmness, a fortitude, and a resigned dignity, which melt the hearts of those who are not his enemies, and extort the respect of those who are.
If sympathy must be excited, here let it find a nobler object. If from generous breasts it cannot be excluded, let it be turned towards
"A brave man struggling with the storms of fate,"
and greatly supporting himself under a pressure of evils the most afflicting that an elevated mind can know.
Not content with endeavoring to blow up a flame of party spirit against the respondent, and to engage sympathy in the ungracious, and to her unnatural task of aiding a criminal prosecution, the honorable managers have resorted to a principle, as novel in our laws and jurisprudence, as it is subversive of the constitutional independence of the judicial department, and dangerous to the personal rights and safety of every man, holding an office under this government. They have contended, "that an impeachment is not a criminal prosecution, but an enquiry in the nature of an inquest of office, to ascertain whether a person holding an office be properly qualified for his situation; or whether it may not be expedient to remove him." But if this principle be correct; if an impeachment be not indeed a criminal prosecution, but a mere inquest of office; if a conviction and removal from impeachment be indeed not a punishment, but the mere withdrawal of a favor once granted, I ask why this formality of proceeding, this solemn apparatus of justice, this laborious investigation of facts? If the conviction of a judge on impeachment, is not to depend on his guilt or innocence of some crime alleged against him, but on some reason of state policy or expediency, which may be thought by the House of Representatives, and two thirds of the Senate, to require his removal; I ask why the solemn mockery of articles alleging high crimes and misdemeanors, of a court regularly formed, of a judicial oath administered to the members, of the public examination of witnesses, and of a trial conducted in all the usual forms? Why not settle this question of expediency, as all other questions of expediency are settled, by a reference to general political considerations, and in the usual mode of political discussion? No! Mr. President! This principle of the honorable managers is so novel and so alarming; this desperate expedient, resorted to as the last and only prop of a case, which the honorable gentlemen feel to be unsupported by law or evidence; this forlorn hope of the prosecution, pressed into its service, after it was found that no offence against any law of the land could be proved, will not, cannot avail. Every thing by which we are surrounded informs us that we are in a court of law. Every thing that we have been three weeks employed in doing reminds us, that we are engaged not in a mere enquiry into the fitness of an officer for the place which he holds, but in the trial of a criminal case on legal principles. And this great
truth, so important to the liberties and happiness of this country, is fully established by the decisions of this honorable court, in this case on questions of evidence; decisions by which this court has solemnly declared, that it holds itself bound by those principles of law, which govern our tribunals in ordinary cases. These decisions we accepted as a pledge, and now rely on as an assurance, that this cause will be determined on no newly discovered notions of political expediency, or state policy, but on the well settled and well known principles of law and the constitution.
The honorable managers, indeed, are as much at war with themselves on this point, as with the constitution and the laws. For when they have told us in one breath, that this is merely a question of policy and expediency, they resort in the next to legal authorities, both English and American, for the purpose of explaining the doctrine of impeachment, and of proving that the acts alleged against the respondent amount to impeachable offences: thus paying an involuntary homage to truth, and furnishing an instance of the irresistible power with which she forces herself on the mind, even when most obstinately determined to resist her. Let us also, Mr. President, be permitted to adduce the authority of an elementary writer, of very high authority, on the laws of England, in support of the principle for which we contend. Woodeson in his lectures, vol. 2. p. 611, treating on the law of impeachment, speaks thus: "As to the trial itself, it must of course vary in external ceremony, but differs not in essentials from criminal prosecutions before inferior courts. The same rules of evidence, the same legal notions of crimes and punishments prevail. For impeachments are not formed to alter the law, but to carry it into more effectual execution, where it might be obstructed by the influence of too powerful delinquents, or not easily discerned in the ordinary course of jurisdiction, by reason of the peculiar quality of alleged crimes. The judgment therefore is to be such, as is warranted by legal principles or precedents. In capital cases the mere stated sentence is to be specifically pronounced." Thus far this learned professor and commentator of the laws of England; and he cites as authorities for this doctrine, Selden and the state trials; the latter of which, this honorable court need not be informed, is a collection of adjudged cases in the highest courts of England; and the former a writer of great learning and very high authority, peculiarly tenacious of every principle tending to the security of public liberty, and not likely to mistake on a point so essential, as the law of impeachment.
Thus we find that even in England, where the power of impeachment is subject to no express constitutional restrictions; and where abuses of that power, for the purpose of party persecution and state policy, have sometimes been committed, and more frequently attempted; an impeachment has never been considered as a mere inquest of office, but always as a criminal prosecution, differing not in essentials from those which are carried on before the ordinary tribunals of justice; and subject to the same rules of evidence, and the same legal maxims concerning crimes and punishments: as a proceeding contrived not to alter the law, but to carry it into more effectual execution. These authorities, sanctioned by the practice of one hundred and fifty years, prove the principle for which we contend. Instances may no doubt be found in the history of that country, where these salutary principles have been disregarded, and impeachments have been converted into engines of oppression. But this abuse does not destroy or impair the principle. That remains as eternal as the laws of reason and justice, on which it is founded; while the abuse passes into oblivion, with the temporary interests and fleeting projects which it was made to subserve: or remains in our recollection as a sad monument of the excesses into which frail man is hurried by his passions.
And has not this great principle of English jurisprudence, which in that country has weathered so many storms of faction, revolution and civil war, received the sanction also of this honorable court? Has not testimony been rejected, because it was judged illegal, according to the ordinary rules of evidence? And how could those rules apply to this case, unless it were considered as a criminal prosecution?
The constitution of the United States will as little bear out the managers in their position, as the laws of England. That constitution gives the power of impeachment to the House of Representatives, and to the Senate the power of trying impeachments. Had the authors of that instrument, and those who adopted it, intended to leave this power at large, or to erect it into a general inquest, for enquiring into the qualifications of judges, and the expediency of removing them, nothing more would have been done than merely to give the power. But it will be found that vari-
ous restrictions are imposed in the subsequent parts of the instrument, which prove that no person can be impeached except for an offence.
Thus, for instance, in speaking of the power of pardoning, the constitution provides (Art. 2. Sec. 2.) that "the President may grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment." Is not this the same thing as saying, that cases of impeachment are cases of offences? What, Mr. President, are offences, in the language of the constitution and the laws? For a definition of the term "offence," in a constitutional sense, we must consult our law books and not the caprice, or the varying opinions of popular leaders or popular assemblies. Those books tell us, that the word "offence" means some violation of law. Whence it evidently follows, that no officer of government can be impeached, unless he have committed some violation of the law, either statute or common. It is not necessary for me to contend, that this offence must be an indictable offence. I might safely admit the contrary, though I do not admit it: and there are reasons which appear to me unanswerable in favor of the opinion, that no offence is impeachable, unless it be also the proper subject of an indictment. But it is not necessary to go so far: and I can suppose cases where a judge ought to be impeached, for acts which I am not prepared to declare indictable. Suppose, for instance, that a judge should constantly omit to hold court; or should habitually attend so short a time each day as to render it impossible to dispatch the business. It might be doubted whether an indictment would lie for those acts of omission; although I am inclined to think that it would. But I have no hesitation in saying, that a judge in such a case ought to be impeached. And this comes within the principle for which I contend; for these acts of culpable omission, are a plain and direct violation of the law, which commands him to hold courts a reasonable time for the dispatch of business; and of his oath, which binds him to discharge faithfully and diligently the duties of his office.
The honorable gentleman who opened the case on the part of the prosecution, cited the case of habitual drunkenness and profane swearing on the part of a judge, as an instance of an offence not indictable, and yet punishable by impeachment. But I deny his position. Habitual drunkenness in a judge, and profane swearing in any person, are indictable offences. And if they were not, still they are violations of the law. I do not mean to say that there is a statute against drunkenness and profane swearing. But they are offences against good morals, and as such are forbidden by the common law. They are offences in the sight of God and man, definite in their nature, capable of precise proof and of a clear defence.
The honorable managers have cited a case decided in this court, as an authority to prove that a man may be convicted on impeachment, without having committed an offence. I mean the case of judge Pickering. But that case does not support the position. The defendant there was charged with habitual drunkenness, and gross misbehavior in court, arising from this drunkenness. The defence set up was that the defendant was insane; and that the instances adduced of intoxication and improper behavior proceeded from his insanity. On this point there was a contrariety of evidence. It is not for me to enquire on which side the truth lay. But the court, by finding the defendant guilty, gave their sanction to the charge, that his insanity proceeded from habitual drunkenness. This case therefore, proves nothing further, than that habitual drunkenness is an impeachable offence.
As little aid can the honorable gentlemen derive from the case of Judge Addison, on which also they have relied. The articles of impeachment will shew, that judge Addison was not impeached, as the honorable gentlemen suppose, for rude and ungentlemanlike behavior in court to one of his colleagues; but for a supposed usurpation of power, in preventing his colleague by an exertion of authority, from exercising the right which he was supposed to possess, to charge a grand jury; and in exerting his official influence and power, to prevent the jury from paying attention to the legal opinions expressed by his colleague, in a civil case. The report of that trial, now in my hand, will attest the correctness of this statement; and will shew also that Judge Addison was so far from being charged with rude and ungentlemanlike behavior to his colleague, that the honorable gentleman himself towards whom that behavior is supposed to have been used, and who gave evidence on the trial, bore testimony to the mildness and politeness of Judge Addison's manner, on the occasions which furnished the grounds of impeachment. Whether the acts done by that learned and distinguished Judge, did amount to an usurpation of unconstitutional power; or whether his colleague did possess those rights in the exercise of which he was supposed to have been improperly restricted; are
questions foreign from the present enquiry. But I am free to declare, that if Judge Addison's colleague did possess those rights, and if he did arbitrarily prevent and impede the exercise of them, by an unconstitutional exertion of the powers of his office, he was guilty of an offence for which he might properly be impeached; because he must in that case, have acted in express violation of the constitution and laws.
The great principle for which we contend, and which is so strongly supported by the clause of the constitution already cited, that an impeachment is a criminal prosecution, and cannot be maintained without the proof of some offence against the laws, pervades all the other provisions of the constitution, on the subject of impeachment. The fourth section of the second article declares, "that the President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." This provision, I know, has been considered by some, as a mere direction of what shall be done, in those specified cases; and not as a prohibition, confining impeachments to those cases. But it must be recollected, Mr. President, that the constitution is a limited grant of power; and that it is of the essence of such a grant to be construed strictly, and to leave in the grantors all the powers, not expressly, or by necessary implication granted away. In this manner has the constitution always been construed and understood: and although an amendment was made, for the purpose of expressly declaring and asserting this principle, yet that amendment was always understood by those who adopted it, and was represented by the eminent character who brought it forward, as a mere declaration of a principle inherent in the constitution, which it was proper to make, for the purpose of removing doubts and quieting apprehensions. When, therefore, the constitution declares for what acts an officer shall be impeached, it gives power to impeach him for those acts, and all power to impeach him for any other cause is withheld. The enumeration in the affirmative grant implies clearly a negative restriction, as to all cases not enumerated. This provision of the constitution therefore, must be considered, upon every sound principle of construction, as a declaration that no impeachment shall lie, except for a crime or misdemeanor; in other words, for a criminal violation of some law.
The same idea is found in the second section of the third article, third clause; where it is declared that "the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury;" plainly implying that cases of impeachment, are cases of "trials for crimes."
It is material also, Mr. President, to advert to the peculiar force of the term "conviction," which is employed in several parts of the constitution, in application to cases of impeachment. The third section of the first article, sixth clause, speaking of the trial of impeachments, says, "and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present." The seventh clause of the same section, treating on the extent and operation of a judgment in impeachment, says, "but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject, &c." And the fourth section of the second article declares, that certain officers "shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, &c." This term "conviction" has in our law a fixed and appropriate meaning. There is indeed no word in our legal vocabulary, of more technical force. It always imports the decision of a competent tribunal, pronouncing a person guilty of some specific offence, for which he has been legally brought to trial. In an instrument so remarkable as the constitution of the United States, for technical accuracy in the use of terms, the frequent and indeed constant use of this term is decisive to prove, that in the intention of the framers of that instrument, no man could be impeached, except for some offence against law, of which he might in legal language be said to be "convicted."
In fixing the construction of this instrument no safer guide can be followed, than contemporaneous expositions, furnished by those who made or ratified it; and among those expositions, the most authoritative are to be found in the constitutions of the several states, formed about the same time, and drawn up in many instances by the same persons. Whenever it appears clearly from the context of these constitutions, that they affix a certain meaning to particular terms, we may safely infer that those or similar terms, in the constitution of the United States, were intended to have the same meaning. And we shall find, by inspecting the constitutions of the several states, that impeachment has been considered by all of them as a criminal prosecution, for the punishment of defined offences against the laws.
Let us begin with that of Pennsylvania. In treating of impeachments, article the fourth, it speaks of "conviction" on impeachment; and declares that all civil officers shall be liable to impeachment

For any misdemeanor in office. The term misdemeanor is of an accurate meaning, and of as much technical force, as any term in the law. It describes a class of offences against law, as well defined as any in the criminal code. A still stronger argument is furnished by the second section of the fifth article, which provides that for any reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient grounds of impeachment, the governor may remove any of the judges, on the address of two thirds of each branch of the legislature. It is most manifest, that this provision would have been wholly unnecessary, had the people of Pennsylvania, in framing their constitution, considered impeachments, like the honorable managers, merely as inquests of office, by which a judge might be removed for any cause, which two thirds of each branch might think reasonable. And the arguments derived from the constitution of Pennsylvania, have more force, in as much as the terms "misdemeanor in office," used by it for describing impeachable acts, are much less strong, than "treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors," employed by the constitution of the United States for the same purpose.
The constitution of Delaware, sec. 22, directs, that impeachments shall lie against all persons "offending against the state, either by mal-administration, corruption, or other means by which the safety of the state may be endangered." This is a very broad description of impeachable acts. And yet it is clear from the context, that those general words were intended to express specific offences against the laws, liable to punishment in the regular course of justice. It is declared that all impeachments shall be commenced "within eighteen months after the offence committed," and shall be prosecuted by the attorney general, or such other persons as the house of assembly shall appoint, according to the laws of the land . Persons found guilty on impeachment are to be disqualified, or removed "or subjected to such pains and penalties as the laws shall direct." And the term "conviction," whose peculiar technical force has been already remarked, is applied by this constitution to cases of impeachment.
The people of Maryland did not think fit to invest their legislature with the power of impeachment; but have directed by their bill of rights, sec. 30, and by their constitution, sec. 40, that misbehavior in office shall be proceeded against by indictment, in a court of law only; and that removal, and in some cases disqualification, shall be the consequence of conviction. It will not be denied, that misdemeanor and misbehavior in office are convertible terms. If there be any difference, the latter is the less strong: and yet the people of Maryland have declared, that the term "misbehavior in office" means an indictable offence, of which a person may be convicted in a court of law.
The constitution of Virginia provides, that persons offending against the state by mal-administration, corruption, or other means by which the safety of the state may be endangered, "shall be impeachable by the house of delegates," in the general court according to the laws of the land: "and that if all or any of the judges of the general court, should, on good grounds (to be judged of by the house of delegates) be accused of any of the crimes or offences above mentioned, such house of delegates may in like manner impeach the judge or judges so accused, to be tried in the court of appeals." Hence it appears most clearly, that these general words "offending against the state by mal-administration, corruption, or other means by which the safety of the state may be endangered," words far more general and indefinite in themselves than those employed by the federal constitution, were considered by the people of Virginia as meaning specific crimes or offences, which might be proceeded against in a court of law, according to the usual course of criminal justice. The words "any other means by which the safety of the state may be endangered," are certainly broad enough, to embrace those reasons of political expediency and state policy, for which the honorable managers contend, that a judge may be removed by impeachment—but we find that the people of Virginia had no idea of giving them a construction, so contrary to the notions entertained in this country, respecting legal rights, personal safety, and constitutional liberty.
The provisions made on this subject by the constitution of North Carolina, breathe the same spirit. That instrument declares, section 23, "that the governor and other officers offending against the state, by violating any part of this constitution, mal-administration, or corruption, may be prosecuted on the impeachment of the general assembly, or presentment of the grand jury, of any court of supreme jurisdiction in this state." This plainly implies that impeachable acts, though described in terms the most indefinite, were neither more nor less than offences, indictable in the ordinary course of law.
In the constitution of South Carolina, article 5, we find the same idea necessarily implied. The words "misdemeanor in office," are used as the description of impeachable offences; the term conviction is applied to impeachments; and it is provided that persons so convicted, "shall nevertheless be liable to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment, according to law." It is plain, therefore, that the words "misdemeanor in office," were understood and intended by the people of South Carolina to mean offences against the laws, for which the offender might be indicted and "convicted."
The constitution of Georgia contains no words, which can operate in any
manner to define or describe impeachable offences. It merely directs who shall have the power of impeaching, who shall try impeachments, and what description of persons may be impeached. But in that of Vermont there is a provision on this subject, which, though very concise, is very strong to our present purpose. Among the powers given by it, sect. 9, to the House of Representatives, is that to "impeach state criminals." This term "criminals," which in our laws is never applied except to persons charged with offences of the highest nature, sufficiently declares that the people of Vermont considered impeachments as applicable to cases of crimes only, and not to removals for reasons of state expediency: not even to cases of smaller offences, much less of indiscretion or impropriety of behaviour, such as is alleged against the respondent in this case. For surely it would be an abuse of language to apply the term "criminal" to improper interruptions of counsel; to rude, hasty or intemperate expressions; to ridicule employed by a judge against counsel, who in his opinion conducted themselves incorrectly; or to the precipitate and ill-timed expression of a correct legal opinion. No, sir. This word imports the intentional violation of some known law; the perpetration of some specific defined crime, which may admit of precise proof, which every citizen may be able to avoid, and against which, when accused of it, he may know how to make his defence.
Such, Mr. President, is the solemn exposition of impeachable offences, given by the people of the United States, through the medium of their constitutions. Though not much accustomed to talk about the will of the people, there is no man that bows with more reverence to that will, when constitutionally declared. And shall we, Mr. President, let go this sheet anchor of personal rights and political privileges, to commit ourselves to the storms of party rage, personal animosity and popular caprice? Shall we throw down this great land mark, fixed by the wisdom and patriotism of our fellow-citizens and fathers? Instead of having our best and dearest rights secured, by fixed and known principles of law, shall we leave them to be governed and disposed of by the ever varying whims and passions of the moment? No, sir, I trust not. When I look at those benches and recollect how deep a stake the members of this honorable court have in those rights which form the palladium of our safety, and are now entrusted to their care and keeping, I cannot but confidently expect that they will feel the whole importance of the great trust reposed in them by their country; that they will regard themselves as acting for future generations, as well as for the present age; and will elevate themselves above the sphere of little views and momentary feelings. They will recollect, sir, that unjust principles, adopted to answer particular purposes, are two edged swords, which often rebound on the head of him who strikes with them; and that justice, though it may be an inconvenient restraint on our power, while we are strong, is the only rampart behind which we can find protection when we become weak. They will remember that power which depends on popular favor, is of all sublunary things the most fleeting and transient; that it must from time to time change hands; and that when the change which sooner or later must arrive, shall have taken place; when those who now direct the thunder of impeachment, shall be placed, as ere long they must, in a situation to be smitten by its bolts, they will be glad to invoke, and unless they now set a great example of correct decision, will invoke in vain those constitutional privileges to which we now cry for safety.
Need I, Mr. President, urge the necessity of adhering to those principles, as it respects the independence of the judiciary department? Need I enlarge on the essential importance of that independence to the security of personal rights, and to the well being, nay, to the existence of a free government? These considerations of themselves strike the mind with a force not to be encrased by any efforts of mine. It is sufficient merely to bring them into the view of this honorable court.
But it is not to the party accused, to the nation, to posterity, and to the interests of free governments that the observance of settled constitutional principles, in cases impeachment, is alone important. It is equally so to the character and feelings of those appointed to judge. Is there any member of this honorable court, who would wish, nay, who would consent, in deciding this cause, to be set free from the restraints of the law, or more properly speaking, to be deprived of its guidance, and left to the influence of his own passions, feelings or prepossessions? Were causes like this to be determined on views of expediency, and not on fixed principles of law, to what suspicions might not the Judges be liable, of having sought the indulgence of some animosity, or the attainment of some selfish end, instead of consulting for the public good? But when they are known to be governed by the settled rules of law, and are considered as merely its organs, their motives will be more respected, and their conduct less liable to suspicion or reproach. Is any member of this honorable body prepared to relinquish the high and venerable station of the organ and expounder of the laws, in order to assume the doubtful and dangerous character of a Judge subject to no rule but his own arbitrary will?
To a Judge, too, it is the sweetest consolation in the discharge of his painful duties, that when he has doomed a fellow-citizen to dishonor and misery, he has merely pronounced the decision of
the law, and not the dictates of his own will: that he is not the author of the sentence by which so much calamity is brought on others, but merely its official organ. This reflection soothes his mind under the anguish which it must feel from another's woe. And is there any member of this honorable court, who would consent to relinquish this consolation? I boldly say no. I feel that every heart will respond to the assertion. And if any who hear me be capable of entertaining a contrary opinion, or would wish in the same situation to hold a different conduct, I envy not their feelings, however highly I may estimate their intellectual powers.
In every light, therefore, in which this great principle can be viewed, whether as a well established doctrine of the constitution; as the bulwark of personal safety and judicial independence; as a shield for the characters of those whose lot it may be to sit on the trial of impeachments; or as a solace to them under the necessity of pronouncing a fellow-citizen guilty; it will equally claim, and I cannot doubt that it will receive, the sanction of this honorable court, by whose decision it will I trust be established so as never hereafter to be brought into question, that an impeachment is not a mere enquiry, in the nature of an inquest of office, whether an officer be qualified for his place, or whether some reason of policy or expediency may not demand his removal, but a criminal prosecution, for the support of which the proof of some wilful violation of a known law of the land is to be indispensably required.
Before I proceed, Mr. President, to apply this principle to the case now under consideration, permit me to notice briefly another proposition advanced by the honorable managers, which I perfectly concur in, and shall take the liberty of using against them. They have laid it down, that the testimony of witnesses equally credible in themselves, is entitled to different degrees of credit, according to the means which they respectively enjoyed, of correctly discerning the truth, in the matter about which they testify. To this proposition I fully assent. Let the principle be applied to the case now under consideration. Look at the witnesses on each side. With some few exceptions perhaps, about which I do not feel it necessary to make any particular remarks, they are equally credible in themselves, equally disposed to state correctly the facts. But who are the witnesses on the part of the prosecution? It must be answered, that almost all of them are persons who have supposed themselves to be ill-treated by the respondent; whose resentment the lapse of four years has not been able to assuage; and who come here under the manifest influence of those angry feelings, to complain of their imaginary wrongs. It is plain that such persons, however correct in their intentions, however desirous of speaking the truth, are liable to be misled by the irritation which these events excited in their minds, and to state as facts the recollection of their erroneous impressions. It is perfectly manifest that those gentlemen were very much irritated by the transactions of which they complain, and in which they were or supposed themselves to be parties. It is equally clear their anger has not yet cooled. And I will ask whether men in such circumstances, giving them the utmost credit for correct intentions, are equally entitled to belief with persons who like the witnesses on the part of the respondent, were calm, and disinterested spectators of the events which they relate? Equally respectable with the witnesses for the prosecution; much more cool; free from that irritation which the parties in contention can hardly ever avoid; and testifying their impartiality by expressing without reserve their disapprobation of some things in the respondent's conduct; it must be admitted that in every collision of testimony, they possess the highest title to belief.
Having taken this view of these preliminary points, I now proceed, Mr. President, to consider the various charges against our honorable client, in the order in which they have been stated by the prosecutors. It is not my design to go over the same ground, which has been so recently trodden by my able colleagues. The task assigned to me, is to range rapidly over the first six articles; to present some views of the subject, which the multiplicity of the matter induced my learned colleagues to omit; and then to discuss at large the law and the facts, under the seventh and eighth articles, which have not yet been touched.
On the case of John Fries, the subject of the first charge, permit me, Mr. President, to avail myself of a distinction, laid down by the honorable gentleman who opened the case on the part of the prosecution (Mr. Randolph). That honorable gentleman, in his opening address, made a distinction between a general maxim or principle of law, such as the definition of a crime, and a particular opinion on the law, as applicable to a particular case. The former he admits to be proper in a judge, at any stage of a trial. The latter he denies to be so. He has chosen the definition of one offence to illustrate his position; I will take that of another. Suppose a man to be indicted, and put on his trial, for burglary. The crime of burglary consists in "breaking and entering a dwelling house in the night time, with intent to commit felony." This is the established definition of this offence. According to the distinction of the honorable gentleman, the judge might at the commencement of the trial, or at any stage of it, declare this general principle respecting the nature of the offence, even before counsel were heard. Nay more, he would be justified in preventing counsel from attempting, before the jury, to controvert this principle. This latter point is not expressly admit-
ted by the honorable gentleman; but it flows from his admission, as a necessary consequence. So far the judge might safely go. But should he advance a step further, and declare before counsel had been heard, that the acts done by the person on trial did amount to burglary, then he would be culpable, and even criminal: and this, the honorable gentleman contends, was done by the respondent in the case of Fries.
I consent to be judged by the rule which the honorable gentleman has himself established; and I undertake to show, that nothing more was done by the respondent in the case of Fries, than the honorable gentleman admits may be properly done by a judge: that he merely stated the general definition of the crime of treason, by levying war against the United States, but expressed no opinion whether the prisoner was guilty or innocent, whether the acts which he had done amounted to treason. For the correctness of this position I appeal to the opinion itself, as in evidence before the court. It is contained in exhibit No. 2, filed with the answer. In this paper the court after some preliminary observations, to show that the questions relative to the constitutional definition of treason, were questions of law and not of fact, proceed to state as their opinion, "that any insurrection, or rising of any body of people, within the United States, to effect by force or violence, any object of a great public nature, or of public and general (or national) concern, is a levying of war against the United States, within the contemplation and construction of the constitution of the United States." "That on this general position, any such insurrection or rising, to resist or prevent by violence, the execution of any statute of the United States, for levying or collecting taxes, duties, imposts, or excises, or for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, or for any other purpose; under any pretence, as that the statute was unequal, burdensome, oppressive, or unconstitutional; is a levying war against the United States, within the contemplation of the constitution." "That military weapons, as guns and swords, mentioned in the indictment, are not necessary to make such insurrection or rising amount to levying war; because numbers may supply the want of military weapons, or military array." "That the assembling bodies of men, armed and arrayed in a warlike manner, for purposes only of a private nature, is not treason; although the judges and peace officers should be insulted or resisted, or even great outrage committed on the persons and property of our citizens." "That the true criterion to determine whether acts committed are a treason, or a less offence (as a riot) is the quo animo the people did assemble." "That, if a body of people conspire and meditate an insurrection to resist or oppose the execution of any statute of the United States by force, they are only guilty of a high misdemeanor: but if they proceed to carry such intention into execution by force, they are guilty of the treason of levying war; and the quantum of the force employed, neither lessens nor increases the crime." "That a combination or conspiracy to levy war against the United States, is not treason; unless combined with an attempt to carry such combination or conspiracy into execution," and that "some actual force or violence must be used, in pursuance of such design to levy war; but it is perfectly immaterial, whether the force used is sufficient to effectuate the object."
This no doubt is a long definition.—Perhaps it might have been expressed in much fewer words. But still is a general definition of the crime of treason by levying war; without application or reference to any particular case, much less to the case of John Fries. It amounts nearly to this, "that for any number of people, however small or inadequate, to rise, with intent to resist or prevent by force the execution of any general law of the United States, and to employ actual force for that purpose, amounts to levying war against the United States, although neither military weapons or military array be used." This is the substance of the opinion. All the rest is merely illustration, and in this shape it is as much a general definition, as that of burglary.
How wide a field of defence do these definitions leave open! In the case of an indictment for burglary, would any counsel peevishly or insolently retire from the prisoner's defence, because the court might, in the commencement of the trial, have stated this to be the legal definition of the crime. Would he insist on the absurd and mischievous privilege of controverting so plain and well settled a principle of law? No. Far different would be his conduct. He would enquire whether any acts had been done, amounting in law to the breaking open of a house? Whether the prisoner was the perpetrator of those acts, or a party in them? Whether the house was broken open in the night time? Whether it was entered by the prisoner as well as broken? Whether it was a dwelling house? And whether it was broken open and entered with intent to commit any crime, amounting to felony? All these questions would be perfectly open, under the general definition which has been stated; and on the result of these enquiries, would the guilt or innocence of the prisoner depend.
So in the case of Fries, it was perfectly competent to his learned counsel, under the general definition of treason given by the court, to contend that the acts proved did not amount to a rising of any number of people: that John Fries was not implicated in those acts; that they were not done with intent to resist or prevent, by force or violence, the execution of any general law of the United States; or that no force or violence was actually employed, in pursu-
ance of such intention. All these questions were perfectly open to them, notwithstanding the general definition of treason given by the court. Not one of these questions did the court in any manner decide. These questions involved the application of the general definition, to the particular case; an application in which the true, proper and only defence of the prisoner consisted, and which the court neither made, nor intended to make.
Surely these questions offered full scope to the learned gentlemen, for the exertion of those argumentative powers, and the display of that legal learning, of which they have given in the shape of testimony, so handsome a specimen at this bar. Even that eager fondness for legal disputation, which has carried them on this occasion so far beyond the limits prescribed by the law of evidence, might have been gratified in this ample field. There was room enough for the learned and ingenious distinctions, which one of the gentlemen (Mr. Dallas) has told us that he intended to make, between the case of Fries and that of the western insurgents. It was his intention, he says, had he not been prevented by this unfortunate definition, to dwell on several circumstances, which, in his apprehension, distinguished the former of these cases from the latter. He tells us that his mind turned itself towards these distinctions, and was occupied upon them, from the moment when the court granted a new trial, after the first conviction of Fries. His mind was led into this course of reflection, by the stress which he had observed the court to lay, in the first trial of Fries, on the decisions in the cases of the western insurgents. It would surely have been very unkind in the respondent, to prevent the learned gentlemen from exhibiting the results of these long and profound reflections. But happily the respondent did not prevent him. His disappointment must be attributed solely to himself. The circumstances on which he informs us that he intended to rely, for distinguishing the case of Fries from those of the western insurgents, were the martial array at Bradock's field; the march to Pittsburg, for the avowed purpose of attacking the garrison; and, I think, the attack on Nevil's house. The first of these circumstances applied to the nature of the assemblage, whether it amounted to a rising or insurrection; the second to the intent with which the rising was made; and the third to the degree and nature of the force or violence committed. They were all open to the learned gentleman under the opinion; which did not declare what sort of an assemblage would constitute an insurrection or rising; what circumstances would be sufficient evidence of the improper intent; or what kind or degree of force or violence must be employed; but merely stated that a rising or insurrection, proceeding from such an intent, and accompanied by actual force or violence, would amount to levying war. Whether the assemblage in Bucks and Northampton, had the necessary ingredients to constitute a rising or insurrection; whether the acts done afforded sufficient evidence of an intent to resist or prevent by violence or force, the execution of the act of Congress; whether the force or violence committed were sufficient, in nature or degree; and whether, in all or any of these points of view, the case of Fries in Bucks and Northampton, was weaker than that of the western insurgents, or materially different from it; were questions not at all affected by the opinion, but left entirely open to the learned gentleman; who might, notwithstanding this opinion, have discussed them before the court and jury, at all the length into which the exuberance of his genius so much delights to shoot.
These learned gentlemen possessed, therefore, under the opinion communicated to them by the respondent, even if it had not been withdrawn, all the latitude which moderate counsel could have desired. All the questions of fact; all the questions of intention, which are questions of fact; the whole business of deciding, whether the case proved came within the general principle of law; of applying the general rule to the particular case; remained within the province of the jury, and furnished the only proper means of defence. Even if the facts had been admitted, as the honorable managers contend, still the intent remained to be ascertained, and was a question of fact solely cognizable by the jury. But it is utterly incorrect to say that the facts were admitted. It was indeed admitted, or rather it was not doubted, that certain acts had been done by John Fries and others; but whether those acts were of such a nature, and proceeded from such an intention, as to bring the case within the general rule of law laid down by the court, was a point unsettled, which formed the proper and sole ground of enquiry. And this point was not affected by the opinion communicated by the respondent to the prisoner's counsel.
And here, Mr. President, let me be permitted to notice what I deem a most dangerous error, respecting the constitutional power of juries in criminal cases. It is constantly asserted that the jury are to decide the law and the fact in criminal cases; and this is correct when properly explained; but taken in its literal and unqualified sense, it is contrary to every principle of law, and every dictate of common sense. It is the province of the court to expound and declare the law generally, in all cases criminal as well as civil. To apply the law to each particular case; to decide whether the facts proved in any case

bring it within the general rule of law, is the province of the jury, and their only province. They have no dispensing power over the laws of the land. Will any man in the least acquainted with our system of jurisprudence declare, that a jury has a right to decide, that breaking open a dwelling house in the night time with intent to steal, is not burglary, unless an actual theft be committed? I presume that no one will hazard such an opinion. The jury in such a case, may decide that the house was not broken open, that is, was not a dwelling house, that the fact was not committed by the person accused, that it was not committed in the night time, or that it was not committed with an intent to commit a felony. But if they believe the affirmative on all these points, they must find the prisoner guilty or commit a direct violation of their oaths. They are bound by the general principle of law, as declared by the court. Their duty, and their sole duty, consists in applying it to the particular case. In this sense, and in this alone, are they judges of the law as well as of the fact.
It is well known that a new trial may be granted in a criminal case, where the verdict is against the party accused, and is supposed by the court to be contrary to law. This proves that the jury are not the judges of the law, in the unqualified sense contended for by some persons; for if they were the judges of the law in that sense, it would necessarily follow, that a new trial could no more be granted in favor of the prisoner in a criminal case, than against him. The rule that it cannot be granted against him has been established by the courts in favor of life, through a laudable motive of tenderness and humanity; and not because they had not power to grant new trials in this case, as well as in others, where the verdict is contrary to law.
FOREIGN NEWS. NEW-YORK, August 4. The ship Ous, capt. Phillips, which arrived at this port on Saturday evening brings London papers to the 17th of June, seven days later than before received. From these papers it appears, that in the House of Commons the 11th of June, the subject of the impeachment of lord Melville commenced; and after an animated discussion the House divided, 195 being for the impeachment and 272 against it—majority 77. When this was divided, a motion which had been previously made by Mr. Bond for a criminal prosecution, 238 against lord Melville, was taken up. For the criminal prosecution 238—against it 229—majority 9. On the latter question lord Sidmouth (late Mr. Addington) and his friends voted with the opposition against ministers. Lord Melville will thus be obliged to stand a trial at the court of king's bench; where the reports of the secret committee of the House of Commons had already been presented.
LONDON, June 12. Yesterday being the day fixed for the motion for an impeachment against lord Melville, a great crowd assembled at an early hour, in the avenues of the House of Commons. At 12 the doors were opened, and a severe pressure ensued. The gallery, of course, was filled in a few minutes. In the early part of the day an opinion prevailed that Mr. Whitebread would open the debate; but about 3 o'clock it was said that lord viscount Melville would be previously heard in his defence. This excited a great degree of expectation, and a great number of persons crowded into the lower lobby, and also lined the stairs to the gallery of the House, which commands a view of the lobby through which lord Melville was to pass. About half past 4, his lordship entered the lobby, and passed in the Secretary's room on the left hand—The House was at this time engaged in private business. Shortly after 5, the Speaker read a letter from lord viscount Melville, requesting to be admitted into the body of the House, to be heard in his defence. The hon. Robert Dundas Saunders, his son, then moved that his lordship be called in; which being agreed to, the Speaker desired Mr. Colman, the Sergeant-at-Arms to take the Mace, and conduct lord viscount Melville into the House. In the mean time Mr. Bellamy, the principal messenger, brought in a square armed chair, and placed it within the body of the House, within the bar, on the left hand side. The Sergeant-at-Arms then took up the Mace, and having waved it three times, went out of the House, and took his station outside, in the lobby, in front of the door of the House, and also opposite the door of the treasury room. Mr. Heard, one of the messengers, had previously thrown open the folding doors of the latter apartment, and lord viscount Melville being informed by him that the House requested his attendance, his lordship came out, and walked uncovered into the House, attended by the Sergeant and Mace. His lordship was dressed in black, and wore a close buckled wig powdered. He bowed three times as he approached, and on coming within the bar, the Speaker, who wore his hat on all the time, addressing him, said, "My lord Melville, there is a chair for your lordship." His lordship then sat down and put on his hat. There was a loud murmur in the House on his coming in. As soon as it subsided, which was in less than
two minutes, his lordship arose, and taking off his hat, he laid it upon the seat of the chair, and upon the hat several papers. His lordship then standing at the back of the chair, commenced his speech, in the course of which he frequently refreshed his memory from the papers before him. His lordship spoke for two hours and a quarter. His manner was firm and impressive; and he did not, even in the part of it where he appealed to the feelings, appear the least shaken. The moment he had concluded he took up his papers deliberately, one by one, and having put his hat under his arm, made a bow to the Speaker and withdrew, attended by the Sergeant, who, during the whole of the speech, remained standing on the right hand side of his lordship, but at the distance of a few yards, with the mace resting upon the ground and his hand upon it. The House was uncommonly crowded. Not fewer than 500 members were present. Lord viscount Melville's speech will be read with interest. Upon the subject of the 10,000l. and other sums of the public money received by him, and not applied to naval purposes, his lordship positively declared, that "private honor and personal convenience" must prevent him from ever giving any account of them.
JUNE 11. —Accounts are said to have reached town yesterday from Lisbon, which represent the Portuguese Cabinet in a very embarrassed situation, in consequence of some fresh demands having been made upon it, the tendency of which is to exclude all English ships and merchandise from the ports of that country. We give this statement as we received it, without being able to ascertain the degree of credit to which it is entitled. In a former paper we stated, that the French and Spanish Ambassadors at Lisbon remonstrated against the entrance of the expedition under General Sir James Craig into the port of Lisbon. The following additional particulars have since been related: "While General Craig was at Lisbon, the French and Spanish Ambassadors remonstrated with much warmth on the shelter which the Portuguese government afforded to the ships and troops under General Craig. The Prince Regent answered that the English Convoy had been forced into the Tagus by stress of weather, ( caribada .) They demanded that it be ordered to sea immediately. But General Craig resolved not to stir till he was assured there was no danger of his meeting the combined fleets of the enemy; and, in case of receiving a peremptory order to quit, we are assured that he had resolved to take possession of the forts on the Tagus, and keep his post by force, rather than risk the falling into the hands of the enemy, by sailing prematurely. The Portuguese government evidently extended its indulgence to the utmost of its power."
JUNE 13. —Extract of a letter from an officer on board of one of his Majesty's ships in the Downs, dated June 10. "We have thirteen sail of the line here now; the North-sea squadron being ordered round; and we expect five sail more from the westward; I believe it is expected that the combined fleet is coming north-about. By every cruiser that comes in, I learn, that the French appear in all their ports ready for a push out, and most of the officers are of opinion they certainly will do it shortly, as their preparations with their shipping are different from what they have seen before." We yesterday received a letter from an officer on board one of the transports in the Cove of Cork, in the expedition under Sir Eyre Coote. It says, "this morning, June 5th, the troops were brigaded as follows:—The 1st or Highland brigade, consisting of the 71st, 72d, 93d, and 99th, under the command of Gen. M c Farlane. The 2d, of the 8th, 24th and 83d, with artillery under Gen. Balfour. The brigade of the 32d, 38th and 62d, under the command of Gen. Montresor. The 89th regiment is to form a detached corps, under the command of Lieut. Col. Blayney. I have not yet heard who is to command the artillery, or staff corps. Gen. Drummond is second in command under Sir Eyre Coote."
"The troops are all in good health, and are landed every other day to keep them so. Our destination is not yet known; but it is supposed we are going upon some remote and desperate expedition, and not to the West-Indies, for all the married officers are ordered to send their wives on shore immediately; and the transports are to be furnished with provisions for six months."
JUNE 17. —We received this morning the Paris papers to the 9th, and the Dutch to the 12th. Some of the former hint a plot to have been executed at Milan, which, as usual, is attributed to the English government. It is thus mentioned in the Bulletin de l'Europe : "Persons will be very much astonished in Italy if they hear reported there the absurd stories which indolence or malevolence have been for some days circulating in Paris, upon a pretended conspiracy which was to burst forth at Milan, and whose object would have been to change, into a day of mourning, a day of the liveliest and purest joy." "If England has sent some spies to Milan, they have produced as little effect in the capital of that kingdom, as in the capital of the French empire. Discarded, dishonored, they have not been able to succeed in entering into a correspondence with any class of citizens. The moment of their arrival, the nature of their instructions were little known before hand: their arrest was as little known and with as little eclat as that of the vilest adventurers." Of the movements, operations, and destination of the different squadrons at sea, the Moniteur affords us no information, it merely says in a brief note on some of the English papers, that "in a month we will hear where the combined squadrons are gone;" we hope the first intelligence we receive will be from Lord Nelson, after having come up with them.
The mission of M. Novozilow occupies much of the Paris Journals, and an article from Hamburg in one of them, says, that a Congress for a General Peace, is to be held at Brussels; that Novozilow and the Prussian Minister are to mediate for Great-Britain, and the port of Ostend is to be opened to carry on the diplomatic correspondence with England. The Paris papers of the 8th state, that the Arch-Treasurers set off for Milan the day before, preceded by the Finance Minister—"The departure of these two grand functionaries affords us room to believe, that Paris will be much longer deprived of the presence of its sovereign, than was supposed. It is believed, that the affairs of Henoa will keep his Majesty much longer in Italy; it is proved besides, that he is expected at the camp of Castiglione, where he will remain a fortnight, and he is to reside sometime at Boulogne."
WASHINGTON CITY.
FRIDAY, AUGUST 9.
There is great force in the following remarks, taken from the Norfolk Public Ledger . It is a disgrace to any member of the American confederacy to deny to the Catholics the equal enjoyment of political rights with the protestants. We are well satisfied, that however conscientious the narrow spirit, which dictated the restrictions, may have been to the day in which they were made, that spirit has long ceased to exist; it has perished in the crucible of the revolution. For the honor of the American name, let these disgraceful memorials of a persecuting spirit be obliterated; and let there be raised on their ruins, a monument of the enlightened justice of republics.
FOR THE PUBLIC LEDGER. MR. COWPER, I have read with pleasure the able speech of Mr. Fox on the Catholic Petition, which has suggested some reflections on the subject, as applicable to the United States.
Few of your readers I believe suppose that there is any state in the union, in which the Catholics are under any restrictions in their civil rights, and yet the fact is so, as appears by the following extracts from the constitutions of New-Jersey, North-Carolina, and South Carolina.
"No Protestant inhabitant of this colony shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil right, merely on account of his religious principles; but all persons, professing a belief in the faith of any protestant sect, who shall demean themselves peaceably under the government, as hereby established, shall be capable of being elected into any office of profit and trust, &c."
Constitution of New Jersey, sec 19. "No person who shall deny the truth of the protestant religion, shall be capable of holding any office or place of trust or profit in the civil department within this state."— Constitution of North Carolina, sect. 32.
"No person shall be eligible to a seat in the senate, unless he be of the protestant religion."— Constitution of South Carolina, sect. 12.
"No person shall be eligible to a seat in the House of Representatives, unless he be of the protestant religion." Idem, 13.
Upon this subject a committee on behalf of the Roman Catholic Clergy and Laity addressed General Washington in the year 1790, he being then President of the United States, in the reply of that great man are the following words:
"As mankind become more liberal, they will be more apt to allow, that all those who conduct themselves as worthy members of the community ARE EQUALLY ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. I hope ever to see America among the foremost nations in examples of justice and liberality. And I presume that your fellow-citizens will not forget the patriotic part which you took in the accomplishment of their revolution, and the establishment of their government."
I believe however that no alteration has been made in the Constitutions of those states, a circumstance that must excite astonishment if not indignation in every liberal mind.
A CATHOLIC. The Editor of the National Intelligencer owes an apology to Demophilus for the non-appearance of his communication. After a diligent search he has not been able to find it. He, therefore, avails of the opportunity of extracting from the Star , its most important contents; and will afterwards insert such remarks as may be forwarded.
TO THE DEMOCRATIC CITIZENS OF MARYLAND. Persuaded that every citizen may with propriety recommend for adoption, such measures as, if adopted, would tend to the advancement of the general welfare, I take the liberty of proposing the annexed resolutions, and of requesting you to meet on Saturday the 17th August next for the purpose of taking the same into consideration.
RESOLUTIONS.
1. That district meetings be held in each county, at the places of holding elections therein, on the second Saturday of June annually. 2. That each district meeting nominate one candidate for delegate to the General Assembly—vote for a candidate for Sheriff, in the year when Sheriffs are to be elected; and elect seven committee men, who when united with like committee men from the other districts of the county, shall be a committee of arrangement for the same, and continue to act until the second Saturday of June following. 3. That the chairman of each district meeting, cause to be conveyed to the committee of arrangement for the county, a written statement, under his hand, of the votes and proceedings of such meeting. 4. That each committee of arrangement meet on the Saturday next after that on which district meetings are held, at eleven o'clock, A. M.—Complete the nomination of four candidates for delegates, either when the number of districts in the county are less than four; or when any district shall have failed to nominate, or when two or more districts shall have nominated the same candidates—Examine the votes given in district meetings for a candidate for Sheriff, and declare the citizen having the greatest number of such votes the candidate in nomination; or in case two or more have such greatest number, nominate one of them—and also nominate two candidates for electors of the Senate, in the year when such electors are to be elected. 5. That for making nominations that require the concurrence of two or more counties, each county have a committee of conference to consist of a number exceeding by two, the number of districts in each county, and to be chosen as follows:—The citizens having the highest number of votes on the list of committee men chosen by any district meeting (besides being a member of the committee of arrangement) shall belong to the committee of conference: If two or more have such highest number on the same list, the committee of arrangement shall choose one of them: and one member being thus taken from each district, the committee of arrangement shall choose two others. 6. That on the second Saturday next after that on which district meetings are held at eleven o'clock, A. M. each committee of conference meet and unite with a like committee from the county with which it is to act, for the purpose of nominating a candidate for elector of President and Vice President, in the years when such electors are to be elected, and proceed to make such nomination accordingly—And on the third Saturday after that on which district meetings are held, at eleven o'clock, A. M. meet and unite with like committees for the counties with which it is to act, for the purpose of nominating a candidate for representative to Congress, in the years when such representative is to be elected and proceed to make such nomination accordingly. 7. That the committee of arrangement make all new nominations of candidates for delegates, electors of the Senate, and Sheriffs, whenever they shall be necessary in consequence of the refusal, death, resignation or removal of any citizen when elected or nominated; and that the joint committee of conference have like powers, in cases relating to the candidates to be nominated by them respectively. 8. That in all such cases when a new nomination is necessary, the chairman of the committee which is to make the same, notify each member of such committee of the place, day, and hour, when and where such nomination will be made—and in case the nomination to be made by a joint committee of conference which shall not previously have met, the chairman of the committee of arrangement for the counties interested in such nomination, shall correspond and fix such time and place, of which they shall give the like notice. 9. That no chairman of a district meeting or committee vote, except when the votes of the meeting or committee be equally divided, in which case he may vote viva voce —all other votes to be by ballot, and no nomination or choice to take place, either in district meeting or committee, unless the citizen so chosen or nominated, have a majority of the whole number of votes taken. 10. That no committee proceed to make any nomination or choice before a majority thereof be met; but after such majority shall have met, any of the members shall withdraw from a disposition not to act, so as to leave a member less than such majority, the members that remain shall proceed to act in the same manner as if their members had not withdrawn. 11. That the chairman of each committee of arrangement twenty days before the time of service of such committee shall expire, cause to be set up at least ten advertisements in each district of the county for which the committee acts, notifying the democratic citizens thereof to meet in district meetings on the ensuing second Saturday of June, and specifying the house.
Fellow-citizens, the foregoing resolutions are offered to your most serious consideration; they are submitted without unnecessary comment, and you will decide upon their intrinsic merit: you will consider whether it is advisable to establish a uniform and systematic mode of making nominations in the state, and whether these resolutions are well calculated for the purpose?
DEMO-PHILUS.
FRENCH & ENGLISH FLEETS.
Capt. Bradford, (who arrived at Boston the 30th ult.) last from Madeira, reports, that on the 2d July, in lat. 36, long. 33, he passed 10 line of battle ships, and 4 frigates steering E. S. E. They did not show any colours, but from their appearance, he supposed them to be English. This fleet could have been none other than lord Nelson's, as the number of ships answers to the force which his lordship had with him, when he passed Antigua, in pursuit of the enemy, and from the course he was expected to steer, must have reached the latitude above mentioned.
The combined French and Spanish fleet was last spoken with on the 29th June, in the same latitude, and steering nearly the same course, and long. 43.
Norfolk, Aug. 1, 1805. The following extract of a letter from Marseilles, although not of a very recent date, contains some interesting observations. It is from an intelligent American gentleman to his friend in this borough.
"I have arrived in this place within a few days. I very fortunately made my escape from Leghorn; as that place is now afflicted by the same pestilential disorder that has ravaged many parts of Spain.—Had I delayed there but a few days longer, I should not have been allowed to leave it, as there is actually a cordon of troops round Leghorn and Pisa. It is hourly expected that all Italy will be in a state of quarantine, both by land and sea: Switzerland has already cut off all communication; the Genoese were the first to quarantine those from Leghorn; more than two months ago."
"This pestilential disorder is called the yellow fever; but it is in reality no such thing. I was informed by a physician of eminence, when I was at Cadiz in 1801, that the disorder which occasioned so much mortality in 1799, had its origin in the country or was brought from the coast of Africa. It was remarked that year, that the sheep were unfit to be eaten; the liver having been generally found rotten, and the flesh producing immediate sickness. What is singular, is that the same circumstance was observed in Andalusia the beginning of the last summer; so much so that the sale of mutton was prohibited at Cadiz in May last. The appearances after death by this disease were, nearly in equal numbers, jet black, yellow, and a whiteness superior to anything the human body was thought capable of exhibiting."
"In this place the board of health have gravely pronounced the yellow fever to be the plague; and they have imposed upon Americans, considering them as the source of all this contagion, a quarantine of thirty days; on the expiration of which they are visited in the same way as those who come from the Levant; that is to say, they are shipped quite naked, to the no small confusion of the poor Yankees, who swear that Frenchmen have no decency, and punched with sticks in various parts of the body. Americans should be very careful in coming here, to report truly whether or no they have been boarded on their passage, as they are liable to very severe punishment if detected in a falsehood in this respect."
"There can be no doubt that the disease at present prevalent in Italy, is the same which prevailed in Spain this year, and which was there so destructive in 1799."
JUVENILE EXHIBITION.
MR. GARDINER'S Pupils will this Evening recite, Speeches, Dialogues, &c. at Rhodes's Tavern, and commence at 4 o'clock. Ladies and Gentlemen are respectfully invited. August 9.
ALEXANDER M'CORMICK, Has just received 3,000 weight of BACON, which he offers for sale. August 9—3t
RAGS.
The highest price, in Cash or Books will be given for any quantity of clean Linen and Cotton Rags, by Rapine Conrad and Co. Capitol Hill. June 24—

1500 DOLLARS REWARD.
HIGHWAY ROBBERY.
Y ESTERDAY about 11 o'clock in the forenoon, Mr. JOHN PETER, an Officer of the BANK OF COLUMBIA, was stopped on horseback on the road between this town and Alexandria, and within about a mile of the latter place, by some unknown villain, shot through the body with a pistol, and robbed of a sum of money in his possession belonging to this Institution which he was taking to Alexandria, for the purpose of exchanging with the banks there.
The whole sum taken amounted Eighteen Thousand One hundred and Fourteen Dollars and Sixty-five Cents, made up in several packages, among which were,
 1 post note of the Bank of Virginia, for 800  1 do. of the same, for 500  1 do. of the same, for 500  1 do. of the same, for 450  1 do. of the Bank of Potomac in favor of Joseph Riddick by him endorsed to Washington Bowie, dated 6 July, 1803 No 117 149 05 
A check of the Union Bank, on the Bank of Alexandria drawn by R. Highnforth cashier, in favor of Greatham and Devereux, by them endorsed and by Benj. Stodder, and C. Smith, Teller.
There were also a parcel of post notes of the Bank of Alexandria for 100 dollars, and for 50 dollars each. The remainder was in current notes, principally of the banks of Alexandria and Potomac, and some few of the Bank of Virginia of different sizes and denominations.
As the attack was sudden, and the wound received of a nature to deprive Mr. Peter instantly of his senses, (although it is now hoped he will recover) the description obtained may not be very accurate. As far as we are informed—the man who perpetrated the act, is of middle stature, good countenance, and had a genteel appearance. He had on a dark blue or black coat, nankeen pantaloons, shoes, and a black hat, he was on foot and alone at the time, but may have had accomplices concealed, and will probably charge his clothes.
FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS will be given to any person or persons, who will detect and bring to conviction the robber: and ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS additional for the recovery of the whole of the money, or in proportion for any smaller sum recovered—should they be accomplices, and one of them make a discovery, so that it leads to the conviction of the robber, or to the recovery of the money, he shall receive the above reward, and interest will be made to obtain his pardon.
WILLIAM WHANN, Cashier of the Bank of Columbia. George Town, July 31—
Fifty Dollars Reward.
R UNAWAY on the 9th inst. from the subscriber's farm near Frederick Town, (Maryland) a dark mulatto fellow named MOSES,
But commonly called LANHAM, He was raised near Piscataway and sold by a Mr. Burrells to the late James Marshall, deceased, of Frederick county. Lanham is about thirty years of age, nearly six feet high, stout and very active, fond of spirituous liquors, has been accustomed to working aboard shipping, likewise in a brick yard and is well acquainted with the management of horses and with the ferrying business; he is a very able fellow, and I expect he has obtained a pass and will pass under the name of Samuel Beall. He had on and took with him an Elizabeth shirt & trowsers, a blue cloth coat with a black silk velvet cape bound with silk serpetting, a black fur hat nearly new, a pair of shoes nearly new, an old drab fur-trimmed coat, with sundry other clothing not recollected; he has a scar under one of his eyes but it is not recollected which, somewhat hard of hearing and round shouldered. From his acquaintance in the city of Washington I suppose he has made for that place or some other tea port. Whoever takes up and secures said fellow in any jail so that I get him again shall receive if taken ten miles from home eight dollars, if twenty miles sixteen dollars, if thirty miles twenty dollars, if fifty miles thirty dollars, and if a greater distance the above reward with all reasonable charges if brought home.
JOHN L. HARDING. N. B. Masters of vessels and others are cautioned against harboring said runaway at their peril. July 26—tm
To be Sold,
Or exchanged for other property in the City, or its vicinity.
T WO valuable and contiguous TRACTS of LAND in the state of Kentucky, the one containing 6380 acres, and the other 6252 acres, by late re-measurement. They are under old and indisputable titles of more than twenty years, and situate in a populous county, adjoining flourishing settlements. All taxes thereon have been duly paid. Apply to the subscriber,
JOHN BECKLEY. City of Washington, July 17—epsm
ADAM KING, & Co.
A T their wine store in High street George Town, have in addition to their stock of old wines, laid in a large and general assortment of all kinds of Liquors and Groceries suitable to the present season; where bills of any description, in their line, will constantly be filled up on the shortest notice and they flatter themselves, from the quality of their wines, &c. they will be able to give general satisfaction to all those who may think proper to favor them with a call—where all kind of commission business as usual will be attended to with the utmost attention George Town, November 5—tf
ELIAS B. CALDWELL,
ATTORNEY AT LAW,
HAS removed his Office, to the house lately occupied by Mr. LAW, on Capitol Hill. Washington, July 26—tf
PUBLIC SALE.
I N virtue of an order issued from the hon. court of Calvert county, will be offered at public sale, on the 23th day of August next, (if fair, if not, the first fair day thereafter) at the late mansion of Benjamin Ward, deceased, at the hour of 12 o'clock, a valuable plantation, containing 184 acres of Land, lying on the Chesapeake Bay, in Calvert county. The improvements are a small dwelling house, kitchen, tobacco house, corn house, and other out houses; a large orchard of fine fruit. This fertile spot has every advantage, it abounds in heavy timber, and has a great proportion of rich low ground, capable of being made into meadow at a very trifling expense. The soil is extremely rich—tobacco, wheat, rye, and Indian corn, grow with little labour—the neighbourhood affords a society of very genteel and friendly people—places of worship surround it—convenient to mills, and a ware house for the inspection of tobacco within two miles of the premises. This Land will be laid off in small parcels, or sold all together, as may best suit purchasers.—Bond with approved security will be required, carrying interest from the day of sale, payable in two equal payments, the first in 12, and the last in 18 months from the day of sale.
WM. M. CARCAUD, DAVID L. WREMS, CHAS. WILLIAMSON, Commissioners.
July 3—ep8w Council, Annapolis, May 16, 1805.
ORDERED, That the act to provide for the trial of facts in the several counties of this state, and to alter, change and abolish, all such parts of the constitution and form of government as relate to the general court and court of appeals, be published twice in each week for the space of three months in the Maryland Gazette at Annapolis; the American Telegraph and the Federal Gazette at Baltimore; the National Intelligencer; the Republican Advocate and Bartgis's paper at Frederick Town; Greaves's paper at Hagerstown, and in Smith's and Cowan's paper at Easton.
By order, NINIAN PINKNEY, Clerk.
AN ACT To provide for the trial of facts in the several counties of this state, and to alter, change and abolish, all such parts of the constitution and forms of government as relate to the general court and court of appeals.
B E it enacted by the general assembly of Maryland, That this state shall be divided into six judicial districts in manner and form following to wit: St. Mary's, Charles and Prince George's counties, shall be the first district; Cecil, Kent, Queen Anne's and Talbot counties, shall be the second district; Calvert, Anne Arundel and Montgomery counties shall be the third district; Caroline, Dorchester, Somerset and Worcester counties, shall be the fourth district; Frederick, Washington and Allegany counties shall be the fifth district; Baltimore and Harford counties shall be the sixth district; and there shall be appointed, for each of the said judicial districts, three persons of integrity and sound legal knowledge, residents of the state of Maryland, who shall previous to and during their acting as judges, reside in the district for which they shall respectively be appointed, one of whom shall be styled in the commission chief judge, and the other two associate judges, of the district for which they shall be appointed; and the chief judge, together with the two associate judges, shall compose the county courts in each respective district; and each judge shall hold his commission during good behavior, removable for misbehavior on conviction in a court of law, or shall be removed by the governor, upon the address of the general assembly, provided that two thirds of all the members of each house concur in such address; and the county courts, so as aforesaid established, shall have, hold and exercise, in the several counties of this state, all and every the powers authorities and jurisdictions, which the county courts of this state now have, use and exercise, and which shall be hereafter prescribed by law; and the said county courts established by this act shall respectively hold their sessions in the several counties at such times and places as the legislature shall direct and appoint, and the salaries of the said judges shall not be diminished during the period of their continuance in office.
II. And be it enacted, That in any suit or action at law hereafter to be commenced or instituted in any county court of this state, the judges thereof, upon suggestion in writing by either of the parties thereto, supported by affidavit or other proper evidence, that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county court of the county where such suit or action is depending, shall and may order and direct the record of their proceedings in such suit or action to be transmitted to the judges of any county court within this district for trial, and the judges of such county court, to whom the said record shall be transmitted, shall hear and determine the same in like manner as if such suit or action had been originally instituted therein; provided, nevertheless, that such suggestion shall be made as aforesaid before or during the term in which the issue or issues may be joined in the said suit or action; and provided also, that such further remedy may be provided by law, in the premises, as the legislature shall from time to time direct and enact.
III. And be it enacted, That if any party presented or indicated in any of the county courts of this state, shall suggest in writing to the court in which such prosecution is depending, that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in such court, it shall and may be lawful for the said court to order and direct the record of their proceedings in the said prosecution to be transmitted to the judges of any adjoining county court for trial, and the judges of such adjoining county court shall hear and determine the same in the same manner as if such prosecution had been originally instituted therein; provided that such further and other remedy may be provided by law in the premises as the legislature may direct and enact.
IV. And be it enacted, That if any attorney general, or the prosecutor for the state, shall suggest in writing to any county court, before whom an indictment is or may be depending, that the state cannot have a fair and impartial trial in such court, it shall and may be lawful for the said court, in their discretion, to order and direct the record of their proceedings in
the said prosecution to be transmitted to the judges of any adjoining county court for trial, and the judges of such county court shall hear and determine the same as if such prosecution had been originally instituted therein.
V. And be it enacted, That there shall be a court of appeals, and the same shall be composed of the chief judges of the several judicial districts of the state, which said court of appeals shall hold, use and exercise, all and singular the powers, authorities and jurisdictions, heretofore held, used and exercised, by the court of appeals of this state, and also the appellate jurisdiction heretofore used and exercised by the general court; and the said court of appeals hereby established, shall sit on the western and eastern shores for transacting and determining the business of the respective shores, at such times and places as the future legislature of this state shall direct and appoint, and any three of the said judges of the court of appeals shall form a quorum to hear and decide in all cases pending in said court and the judge who has given a decision in any case in the county court, shall withdraw from the bench upon the deciding of the same case before the court of appeals; and the judges of the court of appeals may appoint the clerks of said court for the western and eastern shore respectively, who shall hold their appointments during good behavior, removable only for misbehavior on conviction in a court of law; and in case of death, resignation, disqualification or removal out of the state, or from their respective shores, of either of the said clerks in the vacation of the said court, the governor, with the advice of the council, may appoint and commission a fit and proper person to such vacant office, to hold the same until the next meeting of the said court; and all laws passed after this act shall take effect, shall be recorded in the office of the court of appeals of the western shore.
VI. And be it enacted, That all and every part of the constitution and form of government which relates to the court of appeals and the general court, or the judges thereof, or that is in any manner repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the provisions of this act, be and the same is hereby repealed, abrogated and annulled upon the confirmation hereof; provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as to authorize the removal of the clerks of the respective county courts being in commission at the time of the passing of this act, in any other mode or manner than that prescribed by the constitution and form of government.
VII. And be it enacted, That if this act shall be confirmed by the general assembly, after the next election of delegates, in the first session after such new election, as the constitution and form of government directs, that in such case this act, and the alterations and amendments of government therein contained, shall be taken and considered, and shall constitute and be valid, as a part of the said constitution and form of government, to all intents and purposes, any thing in the said constitution and form of government to the contrary, notwithstanding. May 31—2aw3m
STELLE'S HOTEL & CITY TAVERN.
T HE Subscriber takes this method of thanking his friends and the public for their favors whilst on the Capitol square and begs leave to acquaint them that having purchased and now occupying the tavern, late Tunnicliff's hotel; which he has commenced enlarging and improving—he respectfully solicits a continuance of the patronage of his friends and the public, assuring them that his full determination to fit up his present hotel, and so to conduct it, as to merit, he hopes, the preference of the public travelling, as well as those coming to the permanent seat of the Government of our Land of Liberty.
PONTIUS D. STELLE. Washington City, March 25—tf
BOOT-MAKING.
JOHN MINCHIN, boot maker, from Philadelphia, respectfully acquaints his friends, former customers, and the public, that he has recommenced his business in all its various branches, at his established stand, where he will thankfully receive all orders in his line, which he will endeavor to execute with punctuality and satisfaction. He has on hand gentlemen's boots of all kinds, dress and strong shoes.—Wanted, a number of men to make strong shoes, and a few boot men.—Also two apprentices to the above business. New Jersey Avenue, July 17—eptf.
CHARLES H. VARDEN, MERCHANT TAYLOR.
Has received from Philadelphia a handsome assortment of FALL goods, consisting of the best London and French superfine cloths, cassimeres, patent Bener's cord, toiletene, fancy and white Marceilles, black and figured silk, moleskins, fancy silk, Marceilles, constitution cords, velvets, Genoa cord, silk and satin Florentines, superfine coating, knapped cloths, with a variety of other articles suitable for the winter season. N. B. Ladies habits, regimentals, and navy uniforms made in the first style of fashion. New Jersey avenue near the Capitol, December 10—tf
District of Columbia, County of Washington, to wit.
U PON the Petition of JOHN DETTERLY an insolvent debtor confined in jail, in the county of Washington, in the district aforesaid, praying relief under the act of Congress entitled "An act for the relief of insolvent debtors within the district of Columbia." It is ordered that notice of his application be given to his creditors, and that on the 12th day of August inst. at 9 o'clock, A. M. at the court room in the Capitol the oath of an insolvent debtor, will be administered to the said John Detterly and a trustee appointed agreeably to the said act, unless sufficient cause then and there be shown to the contrary.
It is ordered that this notice be published in the National Intelligencer, and Washington Federalist twice prior to that time.
By order of the hon. Wm. Cranch, assistant judge of the circuit court. WM. BRENT, Ck. August 7—2t
Ten Dollars Reward.
W AS missed on Sunday, the 5th of May a double cased silver Watch, maker's name Crosthwaite, Dublin, and in the outer case was a watch paper with Mr. Parker's name of Philadelphia.—Whoever will bring the said watch to the office of the National Intelligencer, shall receive the above reward, and no questions will be asked. May 10—tf.
On a liberal credit.
T HE subscriber will dispose of at private sale, his estate called Chichester, lying on the eastern branch, immediately on the city of Washington. This tract of land containing 697 acres is laid off in lots from 83 to 144 acres for the convenience of purchasers. Plats of the estate and the terms of sale are in the hands of colonel Hanson at the navy yard, and Charles Wayman of George Town. The lots will be shown by Mr. Wedden, living on the premises, near the Eastern Branch bridge. ANTHONY ADDISON. Barnaby, 12th June 1805—tf
I will sell upon a liberal credit, the following valuable property.
M Y plantation on St. Charles's branch, containing 800 acres, about three miles from Upper Marlboro, and not more than one from Patuxent River.
Few plantations in Prince George's County combine greater advantages, or flatter an industrious man with better prospects of profit.
The situation of the dwelling house is elevated, pleasant and remarkably healthy.—The spring water, fine and abundant.—The arable land, extremely favorable to the growth of Tobacco, Corn and all kinds of small grain. The meadows, sure to remunerate, are extensive, and with proper management will produce two hundred tons of Hay annually.—This plantation abounds with fire wood, rails, and fine timber, so distributed that little labor is required in making the necessary repairs, and much can be spared in the vicinity of a good market towards refunding the purchaser his money. In 1803 it produced 28,000 lb. of tobacco, with only 11 hands, the product would have been greater the next year, but for the succession of uncommon frosts. The dwelling, out houses, four tobacco houses and four quarters, are in good repair, and the plantation abounds with fruit trees.
The purchaser may be furnished with the negroes on it, about 20 in number, twelve of whom are working hands and of them eleven are men. Mules, horses, about sixty head of cattle, a waggon, a cart, and every necessary for carrying on said plantation. Strawberry Hill, containing 180 acres within two miles of Upper Marlboro, on the post road leading from thence to the City of Washington. The soil is remarkably fertile and nearly one third may be made good meadow. The buildings are sufficient for a small family, who, with care and industry, would be sure to reap, on land, so congenial to the growth of tobacco, corn, small grain and grass the full benefit of their labor.
Its situation renders it a pleasing retreat to a gentleman of fortune, disposed to take the advantages it promises to health, and amuse himself with the cultivation of a small rich plantation, in a genteel neighborhood, at the distance of about 12 miles from the seat of the general government, to which the road is very level, and nearly equal to a turnpike.
Four hundred acres of land about 2 miles from Hancock in Washington County Maryland. About 40 acres of this land is cleared, and a small house on it; the balance heavily timbered, well watered and level, the post road from Hancock to Allegany passes through it; near the road about the centre of the land is a fine spring, well calculated to turn a saw mill, or to carry on a Distillery; timber may be easily taken from this land to Hancock, and from thence floated to the city of Washington, where it always commands a handsome price.
1 Lot in the City of Washington, sq. 652. No 12 fronting 173 feet 7 inches on South North Street, and 55 feet 3 inches on half Street West.
Upper Marlboro, July 10—10w.
Twenty Dollars Reward
STRAYED or stolen from the subscriber on the night of the 4th inst. two BAY HORSES , one a large bay six years old, one of his eyes appears to be injured, his tail bobbed very short, shod all round; the other an old horse, with two white hind feet, several white saddle spots, has a white tail, which has been lately cut at the ends; the first accustomed to the carriage, trots & paces, the second made use of as a road horse, trots easy, but paces badly, very lately shod all round. As I am satisfied they have been stolen, I will double the reward, on conviction of the thief or thieves, and on getting the horses. DANIEL CARROLL of Dudn. July 12—F&Wtm.
HISTORY
Of the West Indies :
A WORK in the contents of which every citizen of America must be interested, whether devoted to business, or desirous of information through the medium of amusement.
A new & revised edition of Mr. EDWARDS's History of the West Indies, with a third volume, (completed by his amiable author a short time previous to his death) has lately been published in London. This third volume contains the interesting and important history, with a large Map of the island of St. Domingo, or Hispaniola, as also that of Tobago; likewise a history of the war in the West Indies from its commencement in 1793, and a tour of Sir William Young through several of the islands. It is accompanied by a highly finished portrait of Mr. Edwards, a history of his life written by himself, and a prefatory advertisement by Sir William Young, Baronet, M. P. F. R. S. &c. under whose editorship it has been given to the public.
The subscriber, impressed with a sense of the great importance a general knowledge of the History, civil and commercial, of the West Indies, must be to every citizen of America, and of the great celebrity of the above work, proposes to print it by subscription, and respectfully offers the following for public patronage and encouragement.
Proposals for Printing,
From the London copy, 3 volumes quarto, THE HISTORY, CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL, Of the British Colonies in the West Indies.
BY BRYAN EDWARDS, ESQ. F. R. S. A. S. Containing, with a variety of other matter:—
A political and topographical survey of the sugar islands.
A comprehensive account of the ancient and present inhabitants, agriculture, productions, laws, government, constitution and commerce.
An historical review of the slave trade; including observations on the character, genius, dispositions, and situations of the enslaved Africans.
An historical review of St. Domingo, comprehending an account of the former government of the French part of that island, its political state, populations, productions, and exports; a narrative of the calamities which have desolated the island ever since the year 1789; and a detail of the transactions of the British army in that island.
Also, a tour through the islands of Barbadoes, St. Vincent, Antigua, Tobago and Grenada, by Sir William Young, Baronet, &c. And
A history of the war in the West Indies from its commencement in 1793, &c. &c.
CONDITIONS.
It will be printed in four volumes, large octavo, on a perfectly new and beautiful type, and on a handsome large medium paper, agreeable to a specimen, which may be had at the subscriber's Book Store.
The price to subscribers to be three dollars the volume, in boards; each volume to be paid for on delivery.
With the last volume will be given an ATLAS , (without any additional price) containing the following maps, viz
 1 A large general map of the West Indies.  2 Map of Jamaica.  3 Barbadoes.  4 Grenada.  5 St. Vincent.  6 Dominica.  7 St. Christopher.  8 Nevis.  9 Antigua.  10 Virgin Islands.  11 St. Domingo, or Hispaniola.  12 Tobago. 
To prevent disappointment or complaint, it is now promised, that on the publication of the second volume the subscription price will be advanced to three dollars and a half the volume, and on the publication of the last volume the price will be again enhanced.
With the last volume, besides the Atlas, will be given an elegant engraving of the celebrated author. Also a list of the subscribers names.
The London copy of the foregoing work in three volumes cannot be sold in America, in boards, under sixty dollars. JAMES HUMPHREYS.
Subscriptions are received by said Humphreys at his book-store the corner of Second and Walnut streets, and by the principal Booksellers through the Union. Philadelphia, July 15—
Pursuant to a decree of the Court Chancery,
I shall sell at Public Auction in the town of Piscataway, on Tuesday the 6th day of August next,
ALL the real estate (not heretofore sold) of Thomas Claget, Esq. late of Prince George's county deceased, containing about the quantity of eleven hundred acres, of which that handsome well improved lot in the town of Piscataway is a part.
Two hundred and twenty-five acres of good forest land part of Marlow's survey, being about three miles from Piscataway—eight hundred and fifty acres, part of several different tracts, commodiously adjoining each other on Piscataway creek, about a quarter of a mile from the Tobacco Warehouse, on the navigation of Potomac river—This is a valuable tract of land, and will be sold in one body, or divided into lots as may best suit those who wish to purchase.
These lands will be sold on a credit of four years, payable in four equal annual installments, the purchaser or purchasers giving bond with approved security to the trustee on interest from the day of sale—on the chancellor's ratifying the sales and the whole of the purchase money being paid (and not before). The trustee by a good deed, will convey and transfer to the purchaser or purchasers and his or their heirs, the land to him, her, or them sold, free, clear, and discharged from all claims of the heirs of the aforesaid Thomas Claget.
THOMAS DUCKETT. Prince George's county, June 14—copier