The national intelligencer and Washington advertiser. (Washington City [D.C.]), 1805-08-12 00:00:00

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, AND WASHINGTON ADVERTISER.
VOL. V.
WASHINGTON CITY, PRINTED BY SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH, PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE.
NO. DCCLV.
FIVE DOLLARS PER ANNUM.
MONDAY, AUGUST 12, 1805.
PAID IN ADVANCE.
IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE CHASE.
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25.
MR. HARPER, CONTINUED.
So in the case of an offence created by statute, a jury may declare that the case proved on an indictment, under the statute, does not come within it; for want of the improper intent, or some other necessary ingredient. But it has never entered into the head of any man to suppose, that the jury in such a case has a right to declare, that the statute itself is not a law of the land: has been repealed, has expired, or does not create any offence. All these questions of law, which come within the exclusive province of the court.
This consideration, by the way, furnishes the true answer to the famous Richmond syllogism, of which we have heard so much of in this case; and proves the correctness of that decision, by which the counsel of Callender were prevented, most properly, from contesting before the jury the constitutionality of an act of Congress; a decision which the honorable managers have had the good sense not to call in question. This decision, undeniably correct as it is, and strange as the absurdities are to which a contrary principle would lead, can be defended on no other ground than that for which I contend.
And I will ask how the case of treason can be distinguished, in this respect from that of burglary? If a jury be bound by the general rule of law which defines the crime of burglary, and be confined solely to the enquiry, whether the case proved comes within that rule; upon what principle can it be contended that they are not equally bound by the general definition of treason?
Will it be contended that the latter definition is not as well settled as the former? This position I deny. How was the definition of burglary settled? It was not by any legislative act remaining on record, or known by tradition; but by judicial determinations, declaratory of the law. In the same manner has the definition of treason by levying war been settled. Three solemn adjudications in the same court, and one of them in the same case, had declared it to be law; and it was the law of the land, as much as the law defining burglary, or any other offence. If gentlemen deny that three solemn decisions on the same point, by a court of the highest jurisdiction, are sufficient to settle the law; will they inform us how many decisions are necessary for that purpose? Or are we never to have fixed principles, or settled definitions of crimes? Is the law of treason never to be established on a certain basis? Are the nature and definition of this high offence to be left for ever floating, on the uncertain and varying opinions of courts and juries? Is that which was not treason to-day, to be treason to-morrow, according to the caprice, the interests or the prejudices of those who may be appointed to determine, or to the power, influence or intrigues of the accuser or the accused? If succeeding courts and juries are not to be bound by precedents established by their predecessors, then will every thing be treason when a man is tried by his foes, and nothing when he is tried by his friends. There will no longer be any security, in times of party contention, for life, liberty, or property; and we are destined to see acted over in this land, vainly boasting of its freedom and happiness, the scenes of judicial murder and pillage, which disgraced our mother country, during the struggles between the houses of York and Lancaster. Sooner than live under such a system, I would take refuge in Turkey; where by bribing the Cadi, I might escape from judicial tyranny; and might be safe from the oppressions of the government, provided I avoided the offence of growing rich.
Not for one moment would I live in a country, where I should be tantalized with the semblance of liberty, and in fact liable to the penalties of treason, whenever I might by any act of opposition, or any assertion of my rights or those of my fellow-citizens, become obnoxious to a party in power. This must be the consequence should the principles contended for by the managers finally prevail. When the rules of law defining offences are fixed and certain, then is every man safe, because he may know the law, and may avoid offending against it. But if no respect is to be paid to former decisions; if counsel are to be allowed to controvert points, which have been solemnly and repeatedly adjudged; if our courts and juries, without regard to former decisions, are to declare that to be law in each particular case, which the passions, the prejudices, or the political views of the moment may dictate; then indeed have we grasped a shadow, while the substance has escaped from us; and the blood of our fathers has in vain bedewed their native soil. But no. So monstrous a principle cannot be endured, and will not receive the sanction of this honorable court. Rules of law, once established, must be adhered to. Courts must regard them as sacred, and must
not allow them to be called in question. In this case the opinion communicated had been solemnly settled, and was a part and a most important part of the law of the land. There was no superior tribunal to review it; and if there be one, the argument is still stronger; for then the acquiescence of the parties, who took no measures to have these decisions reversed, is added to the authority of the court which made them. The court, therefore, where the respondent presided, was bound to consider these decisions as the law of the land; to declare them as such, and to prevent them from being called into question, for the purpose of misleading the jury.
Another charge urged against our honorable client, under the first article of impeachment, is, that he prevented the prisoner's counsel, in the case of Fries, from citing to the jury certain English adjudications on the law of treason, and some statutes of the United States. So far as this charge relates to the statutes, I shall leave it most cheerfully where it has been placed by my learned and ingenious colleague who commenced the defence. Nothing can be added to the striking and satisfactory view which he has given of that point. As to the English authorities, I will make one observation, which did not fall within the scope of his argument.
The respondent did say that English adjudications, at common law, on the doctrine of treason, ought not to be read to the jury; that English decisions before the revolution of 1688, under the statute of treasons, were deserving of very little attention, and ought to be received with great caution; and that such decisions since that revolution, though proper to be cited, were not to be considered as absolute authorities, but merely as strong arguments. Into the legal correctness of this opinion, it is not now my purpose to enquire. That point has been sufficiently discussed. But I beg this honorable court to remark, that this opinion of which the learned counsel for Fries so loudly complain, was an opinion precisely in their favor, and gave them all the advantage on this subject, that they expected to derive from citing these English cases. It was, they tell us, to convince the jury of the very thing which the court thus declared to them; namely, that these English decisions before the revolution of 1688, were entitled to little or no attention; and that even those since the revolution, being in some degree founded on the former, ought to be received with caution, and not to be considered in the light of absolute and binding authorities. These were the points which they wished to establish, by citing the English adjudications; and these were precisely the points which the court established. The decision was completely in their favor, and yet they complain of it as a grievous injury. They complain of it, though in their favor, because it was made without giving them an opportunity of speaking. Whence this causeless discontent, this most unreasonable complaint? Did it proceed from the disappointment of a childish and little vanity, which made them wish to exhibit their talents before the public? Surely we cannot suspect those learned gentlemen of so contemptible a motive. Why then, I repeat, do they complain of a decision made in their favor? They have been compelled by the force of truth, to explain the reason. The truth is, as it appears on their own testimony, that they complained, not because they thought themselves, or their client injured, by this decision; but because it suited their purpose to represent themselves as injured, their client as oppressed, the case as prejudged, and the conduct of the court as arbitrary and precipitate; in order to excite odium and resentment against the court, and commiseration towards their client, and to induce the President, by erroneous impressions thus made on his mind, to extend his mercy to a person, who could not have been thought a fit object for compassion, had the truth been known. The whole of this pretended displeasure; all this affected out-cry about the privileges of counsel, the rights of jurors, and prejudged opinions; was a mere finesse, an artful contrivance, to procure the pardon of a criminal twice convicted of treason: and to procure it by holding up a falsehood to the view of the President, and of the public; by calumniating the court, deceiving the executive, weakening the confidence of the people in the administration of the laws, and sacrificing truth and justice to the attainment of a momentary purpose.
The learned gentlemen thought themselves justified in all this, by their duty to their client. It is not for me to condemn them. I am not here to enquire into the propriety of their conduct. But I may be permitted to ask, whether such a contrivance ought to receive the countenance of this high court? And whether gentlemen who have thought it right thus to act, ought not to be listened to with caution, when they come here, after their finesse has completely succeeded, to complain of injuries, which in the same breath
they tell us are entirely fictitious? I will ask whether this honorable court ought not to discountenance such proceedings in future, by vindicating the conduct of the respondent in this particular? Counsel, Mr. President, have duties to themselves and to the public, as well as to their clients. They are at all times bound by the obligations of candor and of truth. They are at all times bound to respect the courts of justice and themselves. They owe to their clients every honorable exertion of their talents and industry, and the zealous use of every fair means of defence. In criminal cases, and especially when life is in jeopardy, we expect more zeal, and are willing to allow greater latitude. In favor of this zeal, we are disposed to excuse some departure from the strict line, which propriety would in other cases prescribe. But to be countenanced, upheld and commended, for attempting to excite odium unjustly against a court; and to induce the President to believe, that the prisoner was deprived by the court of a fair trial, when they knew the fact to be directly otherwise; is more than modest men would ask, or any man has a right to expect.
But let it be admitted for a moment, Mr. President, that on the first day of the trial of Fries, the respondent committed an error. I ask if it was not atoned for by his full and honorable retraction on the second? By the pains which he took to do away all the proceedings of the first day; to induce the prisoner's counsel to go on with the defence, and to secure to him, in the utmost latitude, every advantage for making that defence? One of the honorable managers has told us, that the respondent's conduct on the first day was an unpardonable sin; that repentance, if it came at all, came too late. But this, sir, is not the rule by which we hope one day to be judged. We live in the comforting hope, that repentance if sincere can never come too late. We hope that by a short or death-bed repentance, we may obtain pardon for a life of errors and sins. Our holy religion permits us to believe, that there is but one unpardonable sin, and that is hardness of heart, or refusal to repent. And shall we, frail and sinful mortals, mete to each other a measure, which an all just and all powerful God does not mete to us? Shall we refuse to each other the effects of that repentance, by which alone we can ourselves hope for happiness hereafter? If for one error thus atoned for the respondent must be punished, let the first stone be cast by him, who has always retracted and corrected his errors, as soon as he was made sensible that they had been committed.
I do not, Mr. President, with my learned colleague who commenced the defence, disclaim the term "repentance" for my honorable client. Repentance is a term that suits creatures so frail and liable to error as men, even the best of men. We all have need of it, and I trust that we shall be ashamed of our errors, but not of our repentance. I have often had occasion to repent myself. I fear that I have not done it often enough. And however slight the error which the respondent may have committed, I am willing, in his behalf, to rely on the plea of repentance and amendment.
But this amendment, we are told by the honorable managers, was a mere pretence, a cloak beneath which the respondent sought to hide the supposed deformity of his conduct, when he found that it began to attract attention. But I ask was it a pretence to entreat, to supplicate the prisoner's counsel to proceed with the defence, till the cup of humiliation was drained to the dregs? Was it a cloak to be anxiously solicitous, after the prisoner was abandoned by his counsel, to protect him from the dangers into which his ignorance of the law might betray him; to urge his acceptance of other counsel; to inform him carefully of his right to challenge; to assist him in cross examining the witnesses; suggesting such questions as might be to his advantage, and guarding him against such as might draw forth unfavorable answers; to prevent the witnesses in the submitted cases from being examined before his trial, least the jury might hear testimony unfavorable to him, which he could have no opportunity of cross examining? Was this the conduct of a designing hypocrite, seeking to gloss over his wicked purposes, by a fair outside of humanity and justice? Of an artful and ruthless oppressor, thirsting for the blood of an innocent victim? If this be oppression, God grant that I and mine may never be otherwise oppressed!
I come now, Mr. President, to the case of Callender. But before I enter into those views which remain to be taken of the charges arising out of that case, let me be indulged in some preliminary remarks, on that part of the evidence adduced in their support, which was supposed by the honorable managers to furnish direct proof of corrupt intentions, on the part of the respondent.
This evidence was given by Mr. Ma-
son, Mr. Triplett, and Mr. John Heath. As to the first gentleman, his testimony relates to a private and jocular conversation, no part of which he recollects perfectly, and the most material part of which, the part that furnishes the true explanation of the whole affair, he has entirely forgotten. It cannot be doubted that this honorable gentleman was dragged with extreme reluctance, to detail at the bar of a court of justice, a private and of course a confidential conversation, the most material parts of which a lapse of five years has effaced from his memory. It must have been to him a most painful necessity, a most cruel violence, which obliged him to do an act that, if done voluntarily, would have amounted to a violation of that confidence, which in the intercourse of society men of honor place in each other. Ought a species of examination to be countenanced, which must place honorable men in so painful a situation, and subject them to so cruel a necessity? Which must compel them, after having been considered as companions, and perhaps as friends, to assume the odious character of spies, and to fulfil the detestable functions of informers? Which must destroy all the confidence, and of course all the pleasures of social intercourse, that great sweetener of the ills of life; must spread the gloom of mistrust over all our moments of hilarity and relaxation; and must convert our parlors, our breakfast tables, and even our friendly suppers, where the bosom is wont to expand, and the heart is laid on the table, into scenes of watchful jealousy, of dark and cautious silence! Ought a practice to be tolerated, which thus strikes at the root of social harmony, private honor, and public morality?
How dangerous too is this species of testimony, to the interests of truth and the safety of innocence! In this very case, the honorable witness, with all his accuracy of recollection, and all his desire to represent the transaction in a light as favorable to the party accused as the truth would permit, has forgotten the most material part of the conversation; that part in which he himself was immediately concerned, which drew forth the rest, and which furnishes the true explanation of the respondent's meaning. The part which he has thus forgotten, has been happily supplied by another witness, judge Winchester, who was also present at the conversation. But what might have been the situation of the respondent, had judge Winchester's memory been equally frail, or had he died before this trial? That most satisfactory explanation which he has given, and which has removed every shadow of doubt from this part of the case, would then have been wanting; and the respondent might have been convicted, on a recollection which would in that case have appeared complete, though we now know it to be utterly imperfect.
This explanation proves the whole conversation to have been a mere jest, and a jest provoked and drawn out by Mr. Mason himself. Without the explanation, it might have borne an improper, though not a criminal aspect. With the explanation, it amounts to nothing more than an expression of the respondent's intention, made in jest, by way of reply to a jest of Mr. Mason, to have the affair of "The prospect Before Us," investigated, when he should arrive at Richmond, and to bring the author and publisher to punishment. Will it be said that in this there is any thing criminal, or even improper? Is it not the duty of a judge, presiding in a court of criminal jurisdiction, to cause enquiry to be made into offences which he knows to have been committed, and to take steps for bringing the offenders to justice? Suppose that instead of a libel, a piracy had been committed; and that the respondent, being informed that the parties were lurking in the district of Virginia, had declared that he would have them brought to trial, if they could be caught, and punished if guilty?—Would this have been improper? And does the difference between offences make any difference in the duties of a judge? Is he not equally bound to execute all the laws? If gentlemen say no, will they be pleased to draw for us the proper line of discrimination, between those laws which a judge must execute, and those which he ought to neglect? Or is this line to be drawn by his own caprice? Was not the sedition act a law of the land, and was not "The Prospect Before Us" a violation of that law? If there were any circumstances which rendered it proper to dispense with the penalties of this law, or to pardon the offences committed against it, there was a power in the constitution to do so; but that power resided in the executive department, and not in the judicial; whose duty it was to execute all the laws without respect to circumstances, persons, or cases.
As to the testimony of Mr. Triplett, I cannot conceive what proof it can furnish of criminal intentions. It amounts to this, and nothing more, that the respondent, in the course of some very loose and thoughtless conversations, from which it would have been much more prudent to abstain, applied some harsh epithets to "The Prospect Before Us," and its reputed author; and expressed an apprehension that he would escape
punishment. But does it follow, that because a judge remarkable for hasty and strong expressions, has applied some harsh and angry epithets to a person believed to be an atrocious offender, he will not do him justice, when he comes on trial? It must also be remarked, that Mr. Triplett is manifestly in a mistake, respecting the last conversation which he has attempted to detail. He represents the respondent as saying, that the marshal had returned without Callender. But we know that the marshal did not return without Callender. This mistake on the part of Mr. Triplett, may induce us to doubt, whether with the most sincere desire to represent nothing but the truth, which I have no doubt that he felt, he may not have viewed the other circumstances also in too strong a light. We well know that facts of this nature derive their complexion, almost entirely, from small circumstances of time, manner and connection; and when we find so candid a witness, mistaken in so material a circumstance, we may fairly conclude that he has omitted on one hand, or too much heightened on the other, some of those finer shades, on which the character of the piece always depends.
With respect to the facts related by John Heath, I have no difficulty in admitting that, if true, it fixes the stain of corruption on the character and conduct of the respondent, and ought to produce his conviction. Juries in every case, and especially in criminal cases, ought to be selected without respect to any circumstance but their impartiality and legal qualifications. Of all circumstances, that of political opinion and party connection is the most improper to govern, and ought the most carefully to be avoided. For a judge to interfere with the marshal, and direct him to strike off from a jury list, in a criminal case, all those persons who were supposed to agree in political opinion with the party accused; or in other words, to combine with the marshal in packing a jury, for the purpose of ensuring the conviction of the party accused, would be an offence for which he ought to be punished. But this testimony of John Heath is deeply shaken by one witness, and flatly contradicted by another. I will not enquire into the character of John Heath; which I have no means knowing or making known; but I will say that it cannot stand on higher ground than that of David Mead Randolph, who has flatly contradicted Mr. Heath; or of William Marshall, who has gone as near to a positive contradiction, as it is possible to go without making one. There must be a mistake somewhere. But we cannot believe the fact stated by John Heath, without believing that David M. Randolph has been guilty of a flat and wilful perjury, and that William Marshall has gone as near it as possible. These gentlemen are known to all Virginia. The evidences of their character are to be found in the breast of every man in that state. But as to Mr. Randolph, there is direct evidence in this case to support his veracity. Mr. Hay has declared at this bar, that he did not recollect having used certain expressions which were attributed him, but had no doubt that he had used them, after Mr. Randolph had said so. Such was his reliance on Mr. Randolph's veracity and recollection! It is not possible to have stronger testimony in favor of a witness. If stronger could exist, it would be found in another circumstance which has appeared in evidence. When one juror whom he had summoned for the trial of Callender, told him that he had made up his mind to convict the traverser, and urged that circumstance as an excuse, the excuse was admitted by Mr. Randolph, and the juror was discharged. But when Col. Harvey applied thro' the chief justice, to be excused in a similar situation; and alleged as a reason that he was predetermined to acquit Callender, let the evidence against him be what it might, because he believed the sedition law under which he was indicted to be unconstitutional, Mr. Randolph would not excuse him. This fact appears by the testimony of the chief justice. Can it be for a moment believed, that a marshal acting in this manner would enter into a corrupt and profligate combination with a judge to pack a jury for the conviction of Callender; and would come to this bar and complete his turpitude by a flat and wilful perjury? His conduct in office; the universal respect which he enjoys in his country, among men of all parties and opinions; his manner of giving testimony at this bar; and the evidence which his political enemies have here borne in his favor, all preclude the idea.
This witness, so honorably supported by the principal witness on the part of the prosecution, so high in his character, (Continued on last page.)

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It has moreover been proved under the two learned colleagues who discussed this charge, that this question, as propounded to the jurors in the case of Callender, was a great relaxation of the law, in favor of the traverser. It was therefore an indulgence instead of an act of oppression; and adds one more to the numerous proofs displayed by the respondent in this case, of a disposition full of humanity and kindness towards the party accused.
Under the third charge, which is founded on the rejection of Col. Taylor's testimony, it has been contended by the honorable managers, that the respondent rejected this testimony without knowing what it was. But this, sir, is an utter mistake. No part of Col. Taylor's testimony was rejected except what related to the three questions stated by the counsel for Callender. From any thing that appears we cannot conclude, that any other testimony which Col. Taylor might have been able to give, would have been rejected. It was not suggested that he could give any other, and there was no question about any other. Into the legal correctness of rejecting these questions, it is not necessary for me to enquire. That point I most cheerfully leave to be decided on the very learned and conclusive arguments of my two colleagues. But I will request the indulgence of this honorable court, while I advert, as briefly as possible, to some of those considerations which shew conclusively to my mind, that admitting the decision on this doubtful and difficult point of law to have been incorrect, it could not have proceeded from improper intention.
And here let me remark, that the respondent could not have been ignorant of Col. Taylor's high standing and character in the state of Virginia, of the influence attached to his name and his opinions, or the resentment which must in all probability be excited, by any act of oppression or impropriety, whereof he might in any degree be considered as the object. The respondent could not be ignorant of the state of irritation which then existed, in that part of the nation, on the subject of the sedition law; nor of the extreme offence which must be given by any conduct of the court, having or capable of receiving the appearance of oppression, under that law. He could not be ignorant that to reject Col. Taylor's testimony was extremely capable of receiving that appearance, and could hardly fail to assume it in the state of personal and political feeling which then existed. He is admitted on all hands to be a man of sense; and would a man of sense, without some strong motive, commit deliberately a crime, so likely to blow up a flame of resentment against himself, and those with whom he was connected?
What motive could the respondent have for rejecting improperly this testimony? To secure the conviction of Callender? No: for he was equally sure of that without the rejection—Col. Taylor's testimony applied to but one charge, and there were nineteen others undefended. If then he rejected this testimony, knowing it to be proper, he committed without motive or object, the crime the most likely to heap odium on himself, and to bring disgrace and ruin on the party with which he was connected.
Had he been actuated by a criminal intention to oppress Callender, it is far more probable that he would have received this testimony, believing it to be improper, than that he would have rejected it, believing it to be proper. A judge capable of acting deliberately under the influence of such a design, must be as regardless of the law as of his oath. His considering the testimony as illegal would not prevent him from receiving it, if receiving it could serve his purpose better than its rejection. In this case it would have served his purpose better. To reject it gave him no additional hold on Callender, who was placed completely in his power by the nineteen undefended charges; but to receive it would throw a cloak of fairness and humanity over his conduct, under cover of which he might more safely and more fully glut his vengeance. The more he had saved appearances in this respect, the more safely might he have indulged his vindictive temper afterwards.
But it is clearly proved, by his requesting the district attorney to consent to this evidence, that he was actuated not by a wish to exclude it, but by a conscientious belief that it was illegal and inadmissible. This request may perhaps be represented, and I think already has been, as a mere cloak; as an artful subterfuge, to escape from the indignation which he saw rising. But how does this agree with the character of open and high-handed violence, which the honorable gentlemen attribute to the respondent? How does it agree with that incautious openness in his conversation, that indiscreet promptness in his conduct, almost amounting to precipitation, which appear throughout to enter essentially into his character? And had he been thus artificial, thus capable of throwing an hypocritical cloak of candor over his wickedness, must he not have perceived that his true policy consisted in receiving the testimony without regard to its illegality.
If there could remain any doubt as to the correctness of his motives in rejecting this testimony, it would be removed by his offer to submit the question to the judges of the supreme court, and to respite the sentence until their opinion could be known: the traverser, in the mean time, remaining at large on bail. It is distinctly stated by Mr. Robertson and Mr. William Marshall, that this offer was made in reference to the decision of this point. We have had indeed some cavilling about bills of excep-
tions in criminal cases. Perhaps the judge may have expressed himself inaccurately. He may have spoken of a bill of exceptions instead of a case stated; or he may have been misunderstood by the witnesses in this particular. But it is unquestionably proved, that in substance he offered to submit the question, whether this testimony was properly rejected or not, to the revision of all the judges of the supreme court; to let the sentence await the result of their deliberations; and to grant a new trial, if they should think the decision erroneous. It is well known to every lawyer, that although no writ of error or bill of exceptions lies in criminal cases, yet it is the usual practice in England as well as in America, when any new and difficult point arises in a criminal trial, to state it for the consideration of a superior court, and to respite the judgment till the decision of that court can be had. The point in such cases is regularly argued by counsel, before the superior court; to whose decision the judgment of the inferior court is made to conform. It is also known that a new trial may be granted in a criminal case, where there is a conviction, though not where there is an acquittal. What the respondent offered in this case, might therefore have been done: and he went further. He offered to assist Callender's counsel in doing it. He offered them the assistance of his legal knowledge and experience, in framing the case to be stated on the record, for the consideration of the supreme court. This appears from the testimony of Mr. William Marshall. It is not for me to decide or enquire why these offers, and all the others made by the respondent in this trial of Callender, were contemptuously rejected by his counsel. It is enough for me that the offers were made; and that the conduct of my honorable client in making them, taken in connexion with the other circumstances which have been noted, proves beyond all possibility of doubt, that however erroneous in point of law his rejection of Col. Taylor's testimony may have been, it proceeded from his honest judgment, and not from a corrupt intention to oppress.
I come now, Mr. President, to notice some of the charges embraced by the fourth article: and first the refusal to continue the case of Callender till the next term. To prove the correctness of this refusal, in point of law, I desire no better authority than that produced by the honorable managers themselves, from 6, Bacon's Abridgement, new edition, page 652. It is there laid down, on the authority of Tidd's practice, 500, 3 Burrows, 1514, and 1 Black. Rep. 436, that "where there is no cause of suspicion, the affidavit to put off the trial, on account of the absence of a material witness, is sufficient in the common form: namely, that the person absent is a material witness, without whose testimony the defendant cannot safely proceed to trial; that he has endeavored without effect to get him subpoenaed, but that he is in hopes of procuring his future attendance. But if there be any cause of suspicion, the court should be satisfied from circumstances, first, that the person absent is a material witness; secondly, that the party applying has not been guilty of any laches; and thirdly, that he is in reasonable expectation of being able to procure his attendance at some future time." Here it appears that even where there is no cause of suspicion, that is, no cause for suspecting that the application for a continuance is made merely for the purpose of delay, still the affidavit must state, that the party applying for the continuance, "is in hopes of procuring the future attendance of the witness." The affidavit in Callender's case is contained in the exhibit No. 5, filed with the answer. Let it be examined, and contrasted with this authority. It will be found to contain no such statement; and is, therefore, clearly insufficient, even had the case been free from suspicion of affected delay. But is it possible for any man to say, that it was free from such suspicion, after having heard the testimony delivered at this bar? Has not the leading counsel for Callender, who filed the affidavit, and made the motion for a continuance, impliedly acknowledged that his sole object was delay? Has he not acknowledged that he knew Callender to be incapable of defence, on any other ground than the unconstitutionality of the sedition law; and consequently that he knew the absent witnesses to be unnecessary, and was as well prepared for trial without them, as he could be with them; since nothing that they could prove, could have any effect on that question? Has he not expressly declared, that one great object which he had in wishing for the continuance, was to get the trial before a different judge? And when this is admitted by the learned gentleman himself to have been the truth, was it very unnatural that the respondent should suspect it? If he had grounds for suspecting it, of which he was to judge, the authority informs us that there ought to have been circumstances stated by the affidavit, sufficient to satisfy him that the absent witnesses were material, and that the party applying was in reasonable expectation of being able to procure their attendance at some other time. No such expectation is stated in the affidavit, which was clearly insufficient on that ground: and a comparison of it with the indictment plainly shews, that the absent witnesses were not material.
The learned managers are therefore entitled to our thanks, for furnishing us with an authority which conclusively establishes our case.
But admitting the respondent to have decided incorrectly, in refusing this continuance, where is the evidence of improper intention? If it were an honest error in judgment, he is free from blame. And how can we doubt the uprightness
of his intentions, when we recollect that although he considered himself unauthorised to grant a continuance till the next term, because it was not a matter of mere discretion, and no legal ground for it was in his opinion shewn, he yet offered a postponement for six weeks, which it was in his power to grant without legal cause? This offer to postpone for six weeks, which throws so strong a light of upright intention and humane indulgence, on the whole conduct of the respondent, has been forgotten by Mr. Hay; but fortunately for us it is remembered distinctly by three or four most respectable witnesses, and especially by Mr. Edmond Lee and Mr. William Marshall. There can be no doubt of the fact. It is even manifest that three or four months would have been allowed, had they been asked for. To give six weeks would have made it necessary for the judge to return home, in order to hold the court in Delaware; and when he had returned, it would have been more agreeable and convenient to remain some time at home, than to hurry immediately back to Richmond, in order to hold the court at the end of six weeks. How is this humane and accommodating offer to postpone, at a great inconvenience to himself, to be reconciled with a corrupt disposition to oppress Callender? And why should the respondent refuse to continue the case till the next term, which would have exposed him to no inconvenience or trouble, and yet offer to postpone it for six weeks, at the expence of a new journey to Richmond? It could have been for no other reason, than a belief that he was obliged by the law to refuse the continuance, and a desire to indulge the traverser and his counsel, as far as the rules of law would permit.
Here again I forbear to enquire into the motives of Callender's counsel, for refusing this indulgence, by which they would have completely obtained all the legal and proper objects of a continuance. With their motives we have nothing to do. It is into the motives of the judge alone that we are bound to enquire; and of the purity of them, this offer so indulgent and humane, and so unaccountably rejected, leaves no doubt.
As to the rude, unusual, and contemptuous expressions, which are charged under the fourth article, and have been detailed by one of the witnesses for the prosecution, it is material to remark, how different an impression these expressions made on different persons, according to the various states of mind in which they were heard. Mr. Hay was so highly irritated, as to construe a bow into an affront. There had been much mirth at his expence, in which Col. Taylor tells us that he did not at all partake; and he thought these expressions rude and contemptuous. To Col. Taylor, who, though perhaps not inclined to view the respondent's conduct with very favorable eyes, had not the same causes of irritation with Mr. Hay, and was far more cool, they appeared in the less exceptional light of "imperative, sarcastic and witty."—Mr. Gooch may be considered perhaps as favorably inclined towards the respondent, but has shewn no disposition to extenuate his conduct; and ne regarded these expressions, as mere efforts on the part of the respondent to shew his wit. Wit, I allow, has nothing to do on the bench. If a judge should happen to possess it, attempts to display it in the discharge of his official functions, would perhaps be unbecoming, or even improper; but certainly not criminal. To Mr. Basset, who appears to be of a warmer temperament, and whose feelings seem to lean towards the respondent, those expressions appeared to be firm without being imperative, and facetious but not sarcastic. And is criminality to be inferred from acts which thus receive their hue, not from any thing in themselves perceptible to this honorable court, but from the characters, the feelings, and the modes of thinking of those who relate them? If so, then innocence and guilt must depend not on the conduct of the accused, but on the temper and discernment of the witnesses. The chief justice of the United States, who was present during all these transactions, saw nothing improper or unusual in the conduct of judge Chase. These expressions, which so forcibly struck the heated and angry mind of Mr. Hay, conveyed no idea of impropriety to the mind of the chief justice; a gentleman as remarkable for the delicacy of his manners, as for quick discernment and sound understanding. Mr. Edmond Randolph was in court during a great part of Callender's trial, and he perceived in the conduct of the court, nothing rude, unusual, or indicative of a disposition to oppress. I appeal to all who have the pleasure of knowing that gentleman, whether such conduct could have taken place without arresting his attention. So remarkable himself for urbanity of manners, and correctness of personal deportment, he must have been shocked by so glaring a departure from them, in a judge, seated on the bench. That lively and instinctive sense of propriety, which forms the basis of refined good breeding, would have made him feelingly alive to such a departure, in such a place, from that line of conduct which decorum no less than duty prescribes to a judge. On those finely attuned nerves, which render him the delight of every social circle where he appears, expressions rude and contemptuous, would have grated most harshly, and would have made an impression not to be forgotten. Yet Mr. Randolph remembers no such expressions.
And we find no less difference between the different witnesses, respecting the specific terms of those expressions, than respecting their general character. Of this one instance may suffice. Mr. Hay has stated that the respondent interrupted Mr. Wirt, and rudely and peremptorily ordered him to sit down. The expressions which
this witness attributes to the respondent, on this occasion, are, "sit down, sir;" than which the language furnishes none more harsh or indecorous. But from the testimony of Mr. Robertson, a disinterested spectator, who took down in short hand all that passed at the trial, it appears that the expressions addressed to Mr. Wirt, were, "please, sir, to be seated." And Mr. Gooch, who attended the trial for the express purpose of observing all that passed, states that the respondent being about to deliver an opinion while Mr. Wirt was up, said to that gentleman, "please, sir, to take your seat." Thus it is that passion distorts every object to the view, magnifies mole hills into mountains, and converts the most complaisant phrases into "rude, unusual, and contemptuous expressions." To the heated imagination of Mr. Hay, the expressions which he has thus detailed no doubt appeared in that light; but this honorable court will be guided, not by the exaggerated and distorted views presented to his irritated mind, but by the testimony of those calm and dispassionate witnesses, who were able to view the subject through an unclouded medium.
Let me now, Mr. President, be indulged in one or two remarks respecting the interruptions of counsel, which form one of the charges under this article. Mr. William Marshall has told us that he remembers a case, in which counsel were more frequently interrupted by Judge Iredell, than they were, on this occasion, by the respondent. We all know the character of that eminent and excellent judge, whose just eulogium the honorable managers have pronounced at this bar, and whose example they have set up as a standard, whereby to measure the conduct of the respondent. Will they not in this instance consent to be judged by their own rule? Will they still insist on condemning in the respondent, that which has been practised to a greater extent by judge Iredell?
But we know the cause which produced the greater part of these interruptions, and which rendered them proper and necessary. Mr. Basset has informed us, that Callender's counsel appeared to rest their case wholly on the unconstitutionality of the sedition law; that they wished to argue this point before the jury; and had flattered themselves with the hope of success; that after the court had formally declared this attempt to be improper, and that the jury could not take cognizance of the question, they continually renewed the attempt, and as often as they did so were stopped by the court. This statement is supported by Mr. Gooch and colonel Gamble. And will any man say that under such circumstances, it was not proper to interrupt the counsel? Will any man say, that counsel ought to be suffered to fly in the face of the court's authority, and to set at nought its orders and decisions?
These interruptions, moreover, as the chief justice has informed us, were made in the ordinary manner of the judge, and were not more frequent, than was usual with him in civil cases.—Therefore they afford no proof of an oppressive disposition towards Callender; or of an improper disposition towards any person. They afford proofs of that promptness, sometimes bordering on precipitation, which is well known to make part of his character. It is in proof by the testimony of Mr. Purvis, who has long practiced in courts where the respondent presided, that he is much in the habit of interrupting counsel, even those to whom he is known to be most strongly attached; that in his interruptions there is no discrimination between his friends and those who are not so; and that if counsel when thus interrupted keep their temper, and coolly and respectfully insist on their right to be heard, they never fail to obtain a hearing, and frequently succeed in removing impressions, which the judge had too hastily taken up against their cause. If there be weakness, there is magnanimity which atones for it; and if in this case Mr. Hay, instead of contemptuously leaving the court, when he thought himself improperly interrupted, had maintained his ground with firmness, but with that respectful manner also which was due to the age and station of the judge, and which would have been highly becoming in himself, there is no doubt that he would have obtained as full a hearing as he could have desired.
On the "indecent solicitude" charged by this article to have been manifested by the respondent, for the conviction of Callender, I will remark, that if its existence had been proved, till it broke out into an overt act of oppression or injustice, and therefore is not the object of punishment, or of judicial cognizance. Intentions, unless accompanied by acts, solicitude and wishes, unless carried into effect, are offences unknown to our criminal code, and inconsistent with the principles of our constitution.
The fifth and sixth charges, relative to the operation of the Virginia laws on the case of Callender, and their supposed violation by the respondent, have been so ably and clearly refuted by my two learned colleagues, who immediately preceded me, that nothing remains to be said on the points. I will merely remark, that had an error been committed, in awarding a capias against Callender on the presentment, and making it returnable to the court then sitting, it would have been the error of the district attorney and the clerk, for which the respondent could have been in no manner answerable. It is in evidence by the testimony of the clerk himself, Mr. William Marshall, that when the
presentment against Callender was returned into court, the respondent, then sitting alone, asked Mr. Nelson, the district attorney, what was the proper process in such a case? who answered, a capias; and that the capias actually issued, was immediately drawn up at the bar by the clerk, was inspected and approved by Mr. Nelson, and was then ordered by the judge. In a case of this nature, relating to the local laws and practice of the state, the respondent being then unassisted by the district judge, could apply to no better guides than the clerk and the district attorney, both at that time practitioners in the state courts; and had they led him into an error, which they certainly did not, it would be the height of absurdity as well as of injustice, to impute it to him as an offence.
I have now, Mr. President, concluded my remarks on those charges, which arise out of the trial of Callender.
[Mr. Harper was proceeding to the next article, when, it being three o'clock, a motion was made to adjourn till the next day. When the question was about to be taken, Mr. Harper observed to the court, that altho' an adjournment would be a personal convenience and gratification to him, yet if his wishes could be at all consulted, he would prefer to conclude his argument on that day: that the time had become very short; which afforded some ground to apprehend that a postponement of the decision till next session might be thought necessary; and that it was, therefore, extremely desirable, and very much desired by his client and himself, to close the argument as soon as possible.
An adjournment for half an hour was then moved and carried.]
[TO BE CONTINUED.]
FOREIGN NEWS.
LONDON, JUNE 13.
We have received Dutch papers to the 9th and Paris Journals to the 5th.
The Moniteur contains the following article:
"Since the English call the late operations of our squadron in the West-Indies plunder, it is but just they should know that this plunder will not be over so soon as they think. We flatter ourselves even that ere a week has passed over our heads, intelligence from every part of the world will announce to the English commerce other events of the like nature. We shall then print, perhaps, a little work composed under the eyes of Mr. Pitt, and published by his orders, a short time before the first hostilities, in order to establish the propriety, the advantages, and the necessity of the perpetuity of the war against France. This perpetual war then appeared suitable, advantageous, and necessary to British rapacity, and to that pride which was even then misplaced, and now nothing less than ridiculous. The proud, the powerful, the circumpect English, hear the departure of the French fleet spoken of when it has taken Dominica; of the departure of the Toulon squadron when it has passed the Straits; they will hear no more of it for some months."
"Lastly, they have not heard of the second Rochefort squadron, sailed a long time since, and which the English frigates came to watch and observe not more than eight days ago. We shall say nothing concerning several large frigates which have been sent out of our ports, to which the English may attach little importance, but which will strike them a blow on those coasts they think hardly known to our seamen. They have been dreaming that there is no longer any wood in our forests and arsenals, that there exists no longer a maritime population on our coast; let them learn, however, that there are no less than 30 men of war on our stocks, all of which will be ready for sea in eighteen months."
"Were all the squadrons which the emperor has sent forth to perish, after having laid waste the English commerce, great fleets are preparing, and numerous young men are ready to man them; it would be easier for the king of England to be crowned king of France, in Paris itself, than to disinherit the great nation from the commerce of the world. It is not that we entertain the haughty idea of preventing England from being a great and powerful nation, but we wish to share with her the commerce of India and America; and we will not suffer the English to have any possession in the Mediterranean, Gibraltar excepted."
"If the English ministry purpose sending forth secret expeditions to those possessions which are too weakly garrisoned, to what point will they direct their forces? To the coast of Africa, where they are null? To the island of Ceylon, where they will be but few in proportion to the danger? To the coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and Bengal, where they will also be insufficient? To Jamaica where they will also be inferior to the want? to Canada, to Surinam, Demerara, &c. We do not entertain the ridiculous pretensions of conquering every where; but we wish every where to destroy our enemy, to destroy his commerce every where, to be in short the strongest wherever we please to present ourselves. The insurance companies will do well to augment their rates from day to day, for, until peace be signed, they will have pretty pickings. We inform them thus publicly, that there is not an important part of the vast ocean, where French ships are not cruising. But the conditions of

the peace we are speaking of are simple; the peace of Amiens, the whole peace of Amiens, nothing but the peace of Amiens; France will never sign any other."
A new religious sect has sprung up in the western parts of India and extended their doctrines by fire and sword. Their leader, Shah Azza, is cruel, crafty, and enterprising, and his successes have obtained him numerous followers on the frontiers of Guzzurat and on the borders of the desert.
By a recent return made to the court of Denmark, it appears that 28,866 persons have been inoculated for the cow-pock since the introduction of this practice, without a single instance of mortality occurring from it.
The interesting madame Jerome Bonaparte was yesterday in Kensington Gardens, accompanied by her brother and a party of friends; and those by whom she was recognised, were highly gratified by contemplating the innocent simplicity of her countenance, and sympathised in the infamous treatment she has experienced. It is understood, that she is to be present this evening at the Grand Oriental Gala given at Vauxhall; and no event, we may venture to prognosticate, would prove a greater source of attraction.
Jerome Bonaparte still resides at Genoa; his unnatural brother, who has so cruelly obliged him to separate himself from his amiable and interesting spouse, not having yet permitted him to approach his royal person.
WASHINGTON CITY.
MONDAY, AUGUST 12.
The United States frigate Adams, commanded by captain Murray, has sailed from Alexandria.
FROM THE BALTIMORE EVENING POST.
We recommend the following statement to all those who are open to conviction—The antidotes should be dispersed as wide as the poison—and it would be but fair in those who have published the falsehood, to state the truth. If this narrative, or any similar to it, were ever published before—it cannot be amiss to endeavor again to impress it upon the minds of those, who like their great example Mr. P. use forget their own hand writing. We could in this way furnish the particulars of all the other events in which our venerable President and patriot, is said to have acquired disgrace—Sed satis—Mr. Jefferson at home, in the vicinity of Monticello, is universally respected—and where he is best known—calumny hides her unblushing face—envy is silenced in the contemplation of his dignity—and the unanimous voice of the neighborhood, proclaims him altogether worthy of the confidence, and all the honor which a free people can possibly bestow—The character of our chief magistrate is universally esteemed by all those among whom he resides.
Confirmation strong as proof from holy writ—that the tales of federalism—are calumnies—and his opposers—unworthy of the blessings which they enjoy.
During the late revolutionary war, while Mr. Jefferson was governor of Virginia, the assembly of that state, in order to be secure from the enemy, held their sessions at Charlottesville, a small village within two miles of which, is Monticello—As the accommodations in the town were scarce and coarse, Mr. J. with his wonted hospitality and readiness to remove difficulties, invited such of the members as he had been particularly acquainted with, to a room in his house and a seat at his board. One night after the family had all retired to rest, Mr. J. was aroused by an express, who brought dispatches to inform him that Tarleton's troop of horse would be at Charlottesville, in the course of a few hours; he called up the family and awakened his friends, and communicated to them the information which he had just received. They one and all proposed instantaneous flight, and recommended the same to him, urging as reasons peculiarly forcible with regard to himself, that should he, the governor, be taken prisoner, and the legislative body dispersed, the whole affairs of the state, would for a time at least, be most seriously paralyzed: that his personal safety was not only a matter of importance to himself, but of vast consequence to the state, besides it was a sacred duty which he owed his country, to avail himself of every means of baffling the enemy, and discharging the functions of his office, and this could only be effected and secured in the present crisis by flight. Mr. J. calmly replied, that he thought himself secure where he was, and therefore should not leave his own plantation: but his friends were right in taking such measures for their own safety as they should deem best. You certainly, said they, would not oppose your single arm to a troop of horse; and by what means can you expect safety to remain here—or of what service will your stay be to the state? Mr. J. replied, that so soon as he perceived the enemy approach the house, he would step up to the top of the neighboring mountain, where, even should they
learn whither he had gone, it would be impossible for them to pursue him on horseback, and unacquainted as they must be with its crags and defiles, he was sure it would be thought useless to make the attempt on foot. It could not, he said, be the intention of Tarleton, to make any long stay, and so soon as he departed, it was of importance that he should be in the place, to take charge again of the public records and documents, to issue the necessary orders, and take such measures as the exigency of affairs might require. His friends then proposed that Mrs. J. should be removed, and offered their escort and protection to a place of safety, after some little hesitation, it was agreed to, horses were prepared, and several members of the assembly with Mrs. J. left Monticello that night. On the ensuing morning Tarleton appeared—Mr. J. retired to the proposed place of safety—After alighting and walking through the house, and finding it deserted by every one but the servants, the enemy re-mounted and rode off without doing the least injury to any thing whatever. One of Tarleton's officers saw a book lying on the table in Mr. J.'s study, and being pleased with it, took the liberty of putting it in his pocket, but left a polite note, saying to Mr. J. that he hoped the liberty would be excused, and that the book should soon be safely returned, which was done. Tarleton left the neighborhood, those who had fled returned, and in a few days things were in statu quo. This is a plain, faithful narrative of that distordly fight from the enemy, with which Mr. J. has been so often upbraided, and which has been the foundation of so many coarse federal jokes. The truth of the above narrative might, if necessary, be verified by the living testimony of W. F. a resident of Alexandria— A good federalist now, but who was at that time, a good whig member of the assembly.
GODWIN, HOLCROFT and WOLCOTT.
EXTRACTS from AUSTIN's letters.
IMAGINE to yourself a man of short stature, who has just passed the prime of life, whose broad high forehead is fast approaching to baldness, but whose ruddy, thoughtful, yet open countenance discovers both the temperament of health and philosophy; of manners remarkably mild, unassuming, rather reserved; in conversation cautious, argumentative, frequently doubting, yet modestly courting reply, more from a desire of truth than a love of contending; in his family, affectionate, cordial, accommodating; to his friends, confidential, ready to make any sacrifice; to his enemies, you would never know from Mr. Godwin that he had an enemy.
Mr. Godwin lives at Somerstown, about three miles from the city. His house with us would be considered neat and simple; here it is called a cottage. His study is small, and looks into the country; his library not extensive, yet sufficiently large for a man who depends more on his own resources than on the labors of others. The portrait of Mary , taken by Northcote, hangs over the fire place. This rendered the study one of the most interesting places I ever visited. Though I have frequently been in the study, I have only ventured to look at the portrait. Mr. Godwin is since married to a charming woman, who seems devoted to domestic happiness. He is at present occupied with Geoffry Hamilon , a work of great expectation.
A billet from Mr. Godwin informed me this morning, that Mr. Holcroft and Dr. Wolcott would dine there to-day.
Mr. HOLCROFT, though nearly sixty, has suffered nothing, either from years, laborious mental exertion, or persecution. He has all the activity and vivacity of youth. Just returned from the continent, whither he had voluntarily banished himself in compliance to the wishes of the English government, he has brought back with him not the least resentment. Persecution, instead of embittering his disposition, has had that effect which it has on all good men. A villain will always hate mankind in proportion to his knowledge of the world; a good man on the contrary will increase in philanthropy.
Literature is not a little honored, when one of her votaries, leaving a mechanical employment at a period of life when habit is usually become nature, has successfully holden the pen and realized a handsome support. Still more charming is it to see her votaries giving proofs of the strongest friendship. Holcroft and Godwin are firm friends. A striking likeness of the former, by Northcote, is in the dining room.
Dr. WOLCOTT, in appearance, is a genuine John Bull, and until he opens his mouth, you would little suspect his relationship to the Poet of Thebes . He is a portly man, rather unwieldy, and I believe not in haste to leave his chair, when he is pleased with his seat. He is hastening to old age, and seems disposed to make the most of life he can. There is little similarity of character between Wolcott and Godwin. They are constant in mental exertion; but the one prefers to sit on a silver cloud and be wafted through the four quarters of the world, looking down on all the varieties of nature and the follies of man. The other, possessed of the nicest moral feelings, loves to envelope himself in darkness and abstraction, in order to contemplate whatever is just, fit or useful. The one laughing, dress-
ed in all the gaiety of spring, enters society with a pruning hook; the other more serious, labors with the ploughshare. Holcroft, who never began to think until his reasoning powers had come to maturity, owing to a neglect of education, embarrassed by no system, follows the dictates of his own mind, and if he is sometimes erroneous, the error is always his own, it is never a borrowed error. Hence his conversation, embellished by the variety of life which he has seen, is rendered rich, brilliant, original and impressive.
It is singular, but I believe old age is more disposed to egotism, and more open to flattery than youth. I can account for it only from their fondness for the past, and a certain kind of jealousy natural to old age. But a man like Wolcott, and a poet too, whose society has been courted as much as his works have been read, will naturally, in the company of friends, frequently find in himself a subject for conversation; nor is this in the least displeasing. Those are always the greatest egotists who are most offended at the egotism of others. Wolcott seemed delighted with the following anecdote respecting certain of his works. He said the ministry had it in contemplation to prosecute him for a libel; and when the good policy of the prosecution was questioned, the gracious lord Thurlow, to whom he owed great obligations, rose and asked the jury fellows if they were sure the jury would condemn him; and on the surmise of a mere doubt, Thurlow said, he would be damned then, if it was expedient to prosecute. But I was struck with surprise and horror, when Mr. Godwin informed me, the ministry once had it on the carpet to prosecute the Political Justice ! I took occasion on this to ask him how long he had devoted himself to literature before he was known to the world? He replied it was ten years before he was known as an author. This ought to inspire the persevering with new ardor.
Wolcott, like most men of genius, has a contempt for mere scholars, who walking on the stilts of pedantry, imagine themselves a head taller than other folks. The talents of a certain famous man being questioned, Wolcott observed, he was not a man of genius, but a man of great capacity; and said, that if he would attend to him, he would distinguish between the learned man , the man of capacity , and the man of genius . "Here," says he, "we will suppose a quantity of coins, ducats, pistoles, dollars, guineas on this table. The learned man will be able, after thumbing his dictionaries for half an hour, to tell you the names of these coins in all languages. The man of capacity will go farther and tell you the value of each, and the amount of the whole together, with every thing relative to their use, difference of exchange and origin. But who invented these coins? The man of genius." This gave general satisfaction. However, it was replied, and I thought very justly, that unless the man of genius should acquire capacity, his genius without capacity would be less useful than capacity without genius. For the exertion of genius is rare. God does not every day create a world; and altho' genius may claim a higher prerogative than capacity, they are mutually indebted to each other. If genius gives employ to capacity, not unfrequently does capacity give direction and result to genius.
Adieu.
Charleston, July 24. COMMUNICATION.
A circular letter dated St. Domingo, 6th Floreal (April 26) addressed by Gen. Ferrand to the captains general, governors, and commanders in the French, Spanish, and Dutch colonies, the minister plenipotentiary, &c. &c. has just been received in this city. The object of the letter appears to be to dissipate the doubts and fears of the tidentant colonists, and refute the aspersions cast upon the army and government by the weak and the wicked, (who were most active in traducing the few brave soldiers) who had the courage and confidence to remain at the post of danger because they considered their cause as lost and the government as careless of the fate of St. Domingo. The circular contains a long extract from a letter of the French minister Decree, to Gen. Ferrand, received by admiral Mississipi: it fully develops the paternal care of the emperor for the colonists, his intention to preserve the island, and his entire approbation of the judicious conduct of Gen. Ferrand and the soldiers under his command, while complaint is made in the following terms of those who have failed in fidelity and zeal:
"I had flattered myself," says the minister, "that the rest of the army of St. Domingo, in the island of Cuba, would have gone to Santo Domingo; and I have learned, with regret, that but the smallest part have returned to the post of honor and danger. This conduct, justly reprehensible in the generals and officers, who, notwithstanding your call, have abandoned the defence of the half of the colony confided to them, marks, in a more honorable manner, the devotedness of the troops and the general, who have not despaired to preserve it to the French Empire; and his majesty justly appreciates this new proof of their courage and their zeal."
Subjoined to the letter of the minister is a P.S. in his own hand writing; he says—"The firmness of your conduct, general, towards enemies exterior and interior, and by these I mean the knaves you are sending away or shall send away, and I invite you to use the greatest latitude in this respect: the honor that you have acquired by your deportment in the half of the island gives you such particular claims to the favor of the emperor, as are agreeable to me to present to him."
"As to the assistance you ask, it is not suitable to go into details here; but do not despair, for you are a particular object of the solicitudes of the government; and meantime, witness to the troops under your command the satisfaction of the emperor, in which you have an important part."
Extract from the circular.
"The events that have just taken place at Santo Domingo, where Dessalines, with all his forces, has failed in his designs, are sufficient to encourage those persons who, desiring to come to Santo Domingo, were prevented only by the fear of a new evacuation. The protection given to commerce ought to draw merchants thither; the advantages that culture offers, the cutting of wood, &c. are attractive for the late inhabitants; and I am assured, as to the course of proceeding, that you would do well to second me. In re-peopling the colony, an end will be put to the misery in which many families languish, who have emigrated from St. Domingo, and are scattered in the neighboring colonies. They may count, by applying to me, upon the same protection that I promised them in my address of the 26th Ventose (6th March) year 12."
G."
New-York, August 5.
GENERAL MOREAU.
Capt. Howland, of the ship Washington, arrived at New-Bedford on the 28th ult. informs, that General Moreau was still at Cadiz, and it was said that he would remain there as long as he could with safety; he did expect to have come out in the Washington, and went so far as to get the terms, and had his lady on board to see the accommodations, but on receiving a letter from Paris, gave up the voyage.
Foreign—In the Glasgow Journal, of the 14th June, we find the following remarks on the present situation of Europe:
Our foreign news for last week, have been inconsiderable. Russia, by accounts coming down to a late date in May, appears still to prosecute most strenuously, the extension of her power on the Black Sea. The internal improvement of the empire advances at this time more rapidly than ever. The Georgians, Mingrelians, Circassians, and those other barbarous tribes which desolate and infest the regions between the Russian and Persian empires, are about to be subdued, retrained and civilized. The Emperor Alexander seems to incline to peace with France, yet prepares for war. Sweden, speaking in some sort the very voice of Russia, declares against Bonaparte, with a spirit and firmness, second only to those of Britain. Denmark is silent, on account of the vicinity of the French troops, or for other reasons, but will not ultimately resist the influence of Russia and Sweden—Prussia still maintains a double part, cautious, but scarcely honorable, and certainly remote from sublime and manly wisdom—The Turkish government acting, like Sweden, under Russian influence, has boldly set the menaces of Bonaparte at defiance—Austria hesitates, maintains a threatening posture and aspect, and tries to wrest from Prussia, the pride of being umpire in the present contest—Portugal is still secure in a fort of neutrality, by the prudence of its government, by the readiness of its contributions, by the danger, left Russia should take arms, and Spain revolt, as soon as the Portuguese were actually attacked.—We should not be surprised to learn, that Bonaparte had offered to sacrifice all his other pretensions in an offer of peace upon terms which should procure the general recognition of his powers and titles as Emperor of France and King of Italy—But, should he obtain this much—he will soon demand even ten times more.
New-York, August 8.
Capt. Jenkins, arrived at Boston in 33 days from Cadiz, informs, that he understood at that place, that the United States Gun-Boat, No. 3, was cut out of Gibraltar, by the Spaniards, on the supposition of her being an English vessel; but on discovering their mistake, was immediately given up. Capt. J. also informs, that General Moreau and family had actually taken passage on board the ship New-York, bound for Philadelphia, to sail next day.
Capt. Jenkins heard nothing of any rupture between this country and Morocco.
FOR SALE.
An unfinished two story brick house with an excellent cellar fronting on Seventh street, east, square No. 907, in the city of Washington, if not disposed of at private sale previous to the 4th day of September next, it will on that day be offered at public sale, for terms apply to the subscriber.
And on the same day will positively be sold a frame house situated on the same street and square as the above property; and a quantity of household and kitchen furniture.
The vicinity of the above property to the navy yard renders it an object worthy of attention.
WILLIAM PROUT.
Aug. 12—
POSTSCRIPT.
Just as this paper was put to press, arrived captain Haynes, in the schooner Paragon, 15 days from St. Bartholomews, from whom we learn the following particulars: That the day before he sailed information was received at St. Bartholomews from Barbadoes, which advised that a frigate had arrived at that island after a short passage from England, with dispatches, which stated that the British fleet had put to sea, and that an engagement had taken place between it and the British channel fleet, in which 6 ships of the line of the French were taken 8 sunk, and the remainder returned to Brest in a very shattered condition.
(Norfolk Ledger, Aug. 5.)
Twenty Dollars Reward.
STRAYED or was stolen from the commons of the city of Washington on the night of the 4th inst. a Bright Bay Riding Horse, about eight years old and fifteen hands high—he has a star in his forehead, and as well as it is recollected one of his fore feet is white:—he canters, paces and trots, and posses great spirit—he has had for some time a sore on his back which has prevented his being rode. His tail is cut square and is trimmed remarkably close. The above reward will be paid on the recovery of the horse, and if stolen, for the conviction of the thief, and ten dollars will be paid for the delivery of the horse to the subscriber and all reasonable charges.
WILLIAM BRENT.
Aug. 12—
ENTERTAINMENT
FOR Man and Horse.
THE subscriber takes this method to inform the public, and particularly those travelling to the City of Washington, that he has opened a house of entertainment opposite the Branch Bank of the United States, where travellers shall be well accommodated on the most reasonable terms.
THOMAS THORPE.
July 3—12wtf.
FOR SALE,
ONE HUNDRED ACRES OF LAND, in a healthy situation near Hugh's bridge on Rock Creek, and near also to Mr. Leconer Jones's and Charles Jones's mills. It is about eight miles from George Town, from whence there is a good road. If not sold at private sale before the 20th of August next, it will be on that day exposed to public sale on the premises if fair, it not on the next fair day.
Mr. Wm. Carroll on Rock Creek will show the land and give any information to persons willing to purchase.
ROBERT BRENT.
Washington, July 17—w20 Aug.
Forty Dollars Reward.
RANAWAY from the subscriber on the 3th April 1805, a small negro man named NACE, 21 years old, about five feet high, dark complexion, a small scar on his upper lip, quick spoken: had on when he went away an orange shirt, striped cotton round over jacket, white dimity waistcoat, striped cotton pantalettes and a straw hat, but no doubt has changed his dress by this time: he was seen at the fishing landings on the Potomac a few days after he left home; probably he might get a passage in a fishing vessel to Baltimore or elsewhere. Whoever apprehends and secures the said negro man in any jail, or brings him home, so that I may get him again, shall be entitled to the above reward, including what the law allows.
THOMAS MUDD,
Prince George county near Piscataway, Md. and—July 29—w3t
TO BE SOLD,
AT PUBLIC VENDUE,
At Sadsky's Hotel, in Alexandria, on Monday the 16th day of September, at 12 o'clock at noon.
ALL THAT TRACT OF LAND late Presly Thornton, Esquire's situated in Northumberland county, Virginia, lying immediately on the Potomac river. The following description is given of this property by persons well acquainted with it. "It contains 2500 acres, 1700 acres of which are the most valuable low grounds on the river, between 3 and 400 acres heavily timbered, and the remainder very high land extremely productive. The soil of this tract is equal to any in the state for the cultivation of corn, wheat, tobacco, timothy, and small grain of all kinds. On this tract are a large commodious Brick Mansion House and two Offices, a large Brick Stable, valuable Barn, Cow House, and many other out houses. The Orchards and Garden contain a variety of valuable fruit trees, and the waters abound with excellent fish and oysters. It is situated about a day's sail from Alexandria and Norfolk. There are two good mill sites for grist and saw mills on the estate, and plenty of cedar and chestnut timber, for which an excellent market may be found at the city of Washington."
The terms of sale are—one fourth cash, fourth in one year, one fourth in 18 months, and the residue in two years from the day of sale. The payments to be secured by bonds, with mortgages on the premises, and to be on interest from the day of sale.
For further information, application may be made in behalf of the subscriber, Thomas Robinson, to Richard Peters, jun. attorney at law in the city of Philadelphia, or to William Lewis, in the same city, (Philadelphia.)
(THOMAS ROBINSON,
W. LEWIS.
June 19—cp Sep. 16
Rapine, Conrad, & Co.
On New Jersey Avenue Capitol Hill,
HAVE just received and offer for sale, at a low price, a quantity of PERUVIAN BARK by the pound and smaller quantity.
They have also, lately received an addition to their former assortment of books and stationery.
July 10—

(Continued from first page.) To scrupulously delicate in his conduct, so ready to discharge a juror who had made up his mind to convict the traverser, while he refused to discharge one who was predetermined to acquit him, is said by John Heath to have presented the panel of jurors to the respondent, who told him that if he had any "of those creatures called democrats on it," they must be immediately struck off. He positively declares that no such conversation as that stated by Heath ever took place: that the respondent never saw the panel; and that it was not completed till after the meeting of the court, when the respondent was on the bench, and therefore could not have been shown to him.
In this positive contradiction of Heath, he is strongly supported by William Marshall; the irresistible effect of whose testimony, derived from the peculiar candour, solemnity and precision with which it was delivered, as well as from his high character, all who have heard him, have felt and acknowledged.
Heath has declared, that the incident which he relates took place at the lodgings of the judge; that he was there but once, which was in the morning, a little before the time when the court usually met; that he remained about half an hour; and that no person was present except the judge, the marshal and himself.
William Marshall declares, that in the morning he called on the judge, according to his custom, a little before the meeting of the court; that when he entered the room, Heath had left it, or was in the act of leaving it, and immediately went away; and that the judge did not say one word in his hearing, which it was possible for Heath to hear. Thus far he speaks positively. He adds that he firmly believes, but cannot positively assert, that the marshal, David M. Randolph, went with him to the judge's lodgings, and left them with him; and that they both together attended the judge to the court house. His reasons for this belief are, that he has a strong impression of the facts on his mind, tho' not a perfect recollection; that it was his daily custom to call on the judge in the morning, on his way to the court house; that in going from his own house to the lodgings of the judge, he passed by or near to the office of the marshal, who usually accompanied him, in order to attend the judge to court; and that he perfectly recollects a conversation between himself and the marshal, on the way from the judge's lodgings to the court house, in which he remarked to the marshal the circumstance of having seen Heath with the judge. This conversation with Mr. Randolph, Mr. Marshall perfectly recollects, and that it took place on the way from the judge's lodgings to the court house; and he very naturally infers from it, that they left the judge's lodgings at the same time; as the circumstances which he has stated induced him to believe with equal probability, that they went there together.
If they went together, then is Mr. Marshall also in positive contradiction with Mr. Heath. The only way in which they can be reconciled, is to suppose that Mr. Randolph went there without Mr. Marshall, and had, before that gentleman's arrival, the conversation which is related by Mr. Heath. It could not have been afterwards; for Heath went away as Marshall entered, & did not return. He has said that he was there but once; and that when he left the judge he went immediately on the hill, and related the conversation. That Marshall and Randolph went together, is in the highest degree probable; not only from Marshall's belief of the fact, and the strong impression of it remaining on his mind; but also from the circumstances which he has stated. If they went together, then it is clear, if Marshall tells the truth, that Heath left the room as they entered it; that no conversation could have taken place between Randolph and the judge, in the hearing of Heath, without being heard by Marshall also; and that none in fact did take place. Consequently it is manifest, that unless we believe, contrary to all probability, and to the belief and strong impressions of Marshall himself, that Randolph went to the judge's lodgings before him, we must admit that his testimony, as well as that of Randolph, is in flat contradiction to the testimony of Heath.
To this double contradiction we must add, the extreme improbability of the fact itself. A judge having a design to pack a jury, for the purpose of procuring the conviction of a person, whose supposed offence was intimately connected with the political struggle, in which the country was then so warmly engaged; about to execute this design, at the place where the prosecution had excited the greatest irritation; surrounded on all sides, and watched at every moment, by those whom he knew to have most zealously espoused the cause of the supposed offender; and entering into a corrupt combination with the marshal, for the purpose of carrying this criminal design into effect; a judge in these circumstances and with these views, develops his plan to a perfect stranger; whom, if he had known any thing of
him, he must have known to be perfectly devoted to the political friends and supporters of the party accused! Sir, the thing is incredible. The judge must have been a fool, as well as a knave, to act in this manner. Conspiracy, fir, looks darkness and not light. Its plots are formed in secret corners. Its communications are wrapt up in cyphers, or conveyed in cautious whispers. Had the respondent intended to hold such a conversation with the marshal, he would have waited till Heath was gone, would then have drawn his accomplice into one of those dark hiding places which conspirators love, and there would have muttered his corrupt orders. If the words which Heath relates had been spoken, the single circumstance, that they were spoken openly in his presence, would be sufficient to prove, that they were nothing more than a foolish jest, devoid alike of criminal intent and serious meaning. It is indeed possible that Heath may have heard the respondent utter some inconsiderate jest, about democrats on the jury, which his zeal led him to mistake, for a direction to the marshal to strike them off. I am desirous of supposing, that something of this sort may have happened; for I can see no other way of rescuing this man from the imputation of wilful false swearing; which it would be most painful to see fixed on any person, and especially on one who has filled an honorable station under the government of his country.
Before I quit the subject of Heath's testimony, let me be permitted, Mr. President, to ask why, if it was believed, it was not taken a year ago, when witnesses were convened from all parts of the continent, and the testimony was collected on which these articles of impeachment were founded? It must have been well known at that time; for he has declared that he mentioned the fact to Hugh Holmes, Merrivether Jones, & some others, as soon as it happened; and to a great many persons afterwards. Had this testimony then been taken, and presented to the public, with the rest of the evidence, we might have been prepared to contradict or explain it. I will ask why the honorable managers have not summoned some of those persons, to whom this story was related by Heath, and who might have corroborated or refuted his testimony? Those persons were fully within their reach. Nay! the minutes of this court shew, that Mr. Hugh Holmes has actually been summoned; and, if I am rightly informed, he has attended for three days past. Why is he not produced? I will not undertake to account for this omission; but I will say, that if Heath's testimony was believed, it ought to have been taken at first, so as to give us an opportunity of investigating it fully; and that it appears probable, that the managers would have adduced the witnesses who were certainly in their reach, to corroborate Heath, did they not apprehend a contradiction instead of a corroboration.
So much for the proofs adduced, of a previous corrupt intention in the respondent, to procure the conviction of Callender. Weak as they are in themselves, and broken by the opposing testimony, let us complete their overthrow, by bringing against them the proofs which the evidence exhibits, of a disposition full of justice and humanity. It is written that "by their fruits ye shall know them." Let us then look to the fruits. Let us examine the conduct of the respondent towards Callender, throughout the trial; and enquire whether it bears the marks of a disposition to oppress.
And first, let us oppose conversation to conversation; the conversation with William Marshall about the jury to those with Mr. Mason and Mr. Triplett. William Marshall has informed us that the Judge, having heard the name of Mr. Giles mentioned in court, enquired if that was the celebrated Mr. Giles, member of Congress; that he afterwards asked the witness whether it was probable that Mr. Giles would remain in Richmond, till the trial of Callender; and afterwards added that he should wish Mr. Giles to be on that jury; and indeed, if it were proper for him to give any intimation to the marshal respecting the jury, would request him to compose it entirely of persons, who agreed with Callender in political opinions. What is to be inferred from this conversation? That he wished to convict Callender? No. But that as he knew the case to have excited strong party feelings, he wished the person accused to have a trial which would silence clamor, and preclude all suspicion of improper bias; so that a conviction, should one take place, being free from the imputation of party vengeance, might operate more strongly as an example, to check the licentiousness of the press. Surely this motive was humane towards the party accused, and highly patriotic as it respected the public.
When Callender was taken, the respondent, instead of committing him to prison, as he might have done, there to wait till bail should be offered, manifested the utmost readiness to let him go out and seek for bail, and an anxious solicitude that he should find it. Instead of demanding bail in a large sum, one, two or three thousand dollars, for instance, which it was in his power to do, he demanded only what Callender himself declared that he could give; and bail was actually taken, in the very moderate sum of two hundred dollars.
After the counsel of Callender had been most properly over-ruled, on legal grounds, in their attempts to obtain a continuance; the respondent, being obliged to refuse the continuance, for which no sufficient ground was laid, humanely offered to postpone the trial, for weeks and months, for the accommo-
tion of the traverser and his counsel. When this was refused, he postponed it from day to day, as long as they desired, to give the witnesses who were within reach an opportunity of coming in; and offered to issue attachments for those who did not appear, which would have induced necessarily a further delay.
And, lastly, when Callender was convicted, and thus placed completely within the power of the court, the respondent, instead of going to the utmost verge of the law, in the severity of punishment, fined him only one tenth of the sum, and imprisoned him only for but little more than a third of the time which the law allowed. The sum limited by law was two thousand dollars; and the fine imposed was two hundred. The term of imprisonment which the law allowed, was two years, and the time fixed by the court was nine months.
Are these, Mr. President, the fruits of a disposition, oppressive and corrupt? Again I say, if this be oppression, God grant that I and mine may never be otherwise oppressed.
It is urged against the respondent, under the second charge, that he refused to let the indictment be read to the jury, when it was requested by Callender's counsel. Why did they wish the indictment to be read? It was, they tell us, for the purpose of making known to John Basset and the other jurors before they were sworn, the nature of the charges; and thereby enabling them to declare whether they stood indifferent, or had made up and expressed an opinion as to the matter in issue. But John Basset has informed us, that when the question whether he had formed and expressed an opinion was put to him, he was perfectly apprised of the nature of the charges, and knew that Callender was indicted under the sedition law, for printing and publishing "The Prospect Before Us." As to the other jurors, it is in evidence that before the question was propounded to them, the respondent explained to them fully the subject and object of the prosecution, and the nature of the issues which they were called upon to try. Where then was the necessity, where would have been the use of reading the indictment? It could have informed John Basset of that only which he knew before; and the other jurors of that which the respondent explained to them, much better than they could have understood it, by merely hearing a long indictment read in court. The object of the counsel, they say, and certainly the only proper object, was to inform the jury. The judge took a shorter and much more effectual method of attaining the object. He clearly and fully stated to the jury the matter in issue, the points in dispute, and the legal principles which ought to govern their determination. He told them that Callender was indicted for printing or publishing certain libelous matter, extracted from "The Prospect Before Us;" that he must be proved to be the author or publisher of that Book; that the passages stated in the indictment must appear to be contained verbatim in the book, and to be false, scandalous, and malicious; and that the book must appear to have been published with intent to defame the President of the United States, and to bring him into disrepute and contempt. All this he fully explained to the jurors, before the question was propounded to them. Will any one say that all this could have been as clearly understood by the jury, from simply hearing the indictment read? And is a Judge to be censured, because, instead of consuming the time of the court in reading a long indictment, he took a shorter and more effectual method of attaining the only proper object that could be attained by the reading?
As to the main point of the second charge, the over-ruling of Mr. Basset's supposed objection to serving on the jury, I leave the legal correctness of that decision where it has been placed by the testimony of Mr. Basset himself, and by the very learned arguments of my two colleagues, who took up this part of the case. But admitting it for a moment to be incorrect, it is not impeachable, unless it proceeded from an improper motive. And what evidence of an intention to oppress, or other improper motive does it furnish? The respondent did not know, and had no means of knowing the political opinions of Basset. And if he had known them, they could have furnished no reason for a particular wish to retain that gentleman on the jury. It would have been very easy to find another juror of the same opinions, who would have answered the purpose equally well. It is in evidence that the city of Richmond, where the court sat, and from whence a new juror must have been summoned had Basset been excused, abounded with persons of the same politics. Why then commit a crime, from which it was manifest that no advantage could have been derived?
Stress has also been laid on the question propounded to the jurors in this case; "whether they had formed and delivered an opinion on the charges in the indictment." But this question, it will be recollected, was the same which had been settled in the case of Fries, after much deliberation. This appears by the testimony of Mr. Rawle. If, therefore, it were an improper question, it would furnish no proof of improper intentions against Callender; since it merely followed a precedent, which was established without the least reference to his case; a precedent too, in which Judge Peters concurred; and although judge Peters was, I presume, included in the general charge of imbecility of character, advanced against the district judges by the honorable manager who opposed the prosecution, he has never been charged with a deficiency in legal knowledge.
(Continued on second page.)
1500 DOLLARS REWARD
HIGHWAY ROBBERY.
YESTERDAY about 11 o'clock in the forenoon, Mr. JOHN PETER, an Officer of the BANK OF COLUMBIA, was stopped on horseback on the road between this town and Alexandria, and within about 2 miles of the latter place, by some unknown villain, shot through the body with a pistol, and robbed of a sum of money in his possession belonging to this Institution which he was taking to Alexandria, for the purpose of exchanging with the banks there.
The whole sum taken amounted Eighteen Thousand One hundred and Fourteen Dollars and Sixty-five Cents, made up in several packages, among which were,
  1 post note of the Bank of Virginia, for 800   1 do. of the same, for 500   1 do. of the same, for 500   1 do. of the same, for 450   1 do. of the Bank of Potomac in favor of Joseph Riddle by him endorsed to Washington Bowie, dated 6 July, 1805. No 117 149 65 
A check of the Union Bank, on the Bank of Alexandria, drawn by R. Higinbotham, cashier, in favor of Greatham and Devereau, by them endorsed and by Benj. Stoddert, and C. Smith, Teller.
There were also a parcel of post notes of the Bank of Alexandria for 100 dollars, and for 50 dollars each. The remainder was in current notes, principally of the banks of Alexandria and Potomac, and some few of the Bank of Virginia of different sizes and denominations.
As the attack was sudden, and the wound received of a nature to deprive Mr. Peter instantly of his senses, (although it is now hoped he will recover) the description obtained may not be very accurate—As far as we are informed—the man who perpetrated the act, is of middle stature, good countenance, and had a genteel appearance. He had on a dark blue or black coat, nankian pantaloon, shoes, and a black hat, he was on foot and alone at the time, but may have had accomplices concealed, and will probably change his clothes.
FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS will be given to any person or persons, who will detect and bring to conviction the robber: and ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS additional for the recovery of the whole of the money, or in proportion for any smaller sum recovered—should there be accomplices, and one of them make a discovery, so that it leads to the conviction of the robber, or to the recovery of the money he shall receive the above reward, and interest will be made to obtain his pardon.
WILLIAM WHANN, Cashier of the Bank of Columbia. George Town, July 31—
Fifty Dollars Reward.
RANAWAY on the 9th inst. from the subscriber's farm near Frederick Town, (Maryland) a dark mulatto fellow named
MOSES,
But commonly called LANHAM, He was raised near Piscataway and sold by a Mr. Burrell to the late James Marshall, deceased, of Frederick county. Lanham is about thirty years of age, nearly six feet high, stout and very active, fond of spirituous liquors, has been accustomed to working aboard shipping, likewise in a brick yard and is well acquainted with the management of horses and with the ferrying business; he is a very artful fellow, and I expect he has obtained a pass and will pass under the name of Samuel Beall. He had on and took with him an cznaburg shirt & trowers, a blue cloth coat with a black silk velvet cape bound with silk ferritting, a black fur hat nearly new, a pair of shoes nearly new, an old drab surcoat, with sundry other clothing not recollected; he has a scar under one of his eyes but it is not recollected which, somewhat hard of hearing and round shouldered. From his acquaintance in the city of Washington I suppose he has made for that place or some other seaport. Whoever takes up and secures said fellow in any jail so that I get him again shall receive if taken ten miles from home eight dollars, if twenty miles sixteen dollars, if thirty miles twenty dollars, if fifty miles thirty dollars, and if a greater distance the above reward with all reasonable charges if brought home.
JOHN L. HARDING.
N. B. Masters of vessels and others are cautioned against harboring said runaway at their peril. July 26—1m
To be Sold,
Or exchanged for other property in the City, or its vicinity.
TWO valuable and contiguous TRACTS of LAND in the state of Kentucky, the one containing 6880 acres, and the other 6252 acres, by late survey. They are under old and indisputable titles of more than twenty years, and situate in a populous county, adjoining flourishing settlements. All taxes thereon have been duly paid.
Apply to the subscriber, JOHN BECKLEY. City of Washington, July 17—epam
ADAM KING, & Co.
AT their wine Store in High street George Town, have in addition to their stock of old wines, laid in a large and general assortment of all kinds of Liquors and Groceries suitable to the present season; where bills of any description, in their line, will constantly be filled up on the shortest notice and they flatter themselves, from the quality of their wines, &c. they will be able to give general satisfaction to all those who may think proper to favor them with a call—where all kind of commission business as usual will be attended to with the utmost attention George Town, November 5—tf
ELIAS B. CALDWELL,
ATTORNEY AT LAW,
HAS removed his Office, to the house lately occupied by Mr. LAW, on Capitol Hill. Washington, July 26—tf
PUBLIC SALE.
IN virtue of an order issued from the court of Calvert county, will be offered at public sale, on the 28th day of August next, (if fair, if not, the first fair day thereafter) at the late mansion of Benjamin Ward, deceased, at the hour of 12 o'clock, a valuable plantation, containing 184 acres of Land, lying on the Chesapeake Bay, in Calvert county. The improvements are a small dwelling house, kitchen, tobacco house, corn house, and other out houses; a large orchard of fine fruit. This fertile spot has every advantage, it abounds in heavy timber, and has a great proportion of rich low ground, capable of being made into meadow at a very trifling expense. The soil is extremely rich—tobacco, wheat, rye, and Indian corn, grow with little labour—the neighbourhood affords a society of very genteel and friendly people—places of worship surround it—convenient to mills, and a ware house for the inspection of tobacco within two miles of the premises. This Land will be laid off in small parcels, or sold all together, as may best suit purchasers—Bond with approved security will be required, carrying interest from the day of sale, payable in two equal payments, the first in 12, and the last in 18 months from the day of sale.
WM. M. CARCAUD, DAVID L. WIEMS, CHAS. WILLIAMSON, Commissioners. July 3—ep8w
STELLE'S HOTEL & CITY TAVERN.
THE Subscriber takes this method of thanking his friends and the public for their favors whilst on the Capitol Square and begs leave to acquaint them that having purchased and now occupying the tavern, late Tunnicliff's hotel; which he has commenced enlarging and improving—he respectfully solicits a continuance of the patronage of his friends and the public; assuring them that 'tis his full determination to fit up his present hotel, and so to conduct it, as to merit, he hopes, the preference of the public travelling, as well as those coming to the permanent seat of the Government of our Land of Liberty.
PONTIUS D. STELLE. Washington City, March 25—tf
BOOT-MAKING.
JOHN MINCHIN, boot maker, from Philadelphia, respectfully acquaints his friends, former customers, and the public, that he has recommenced his business in all its various branches, at his established stand, where he will thankfully receive all orders in his line, which he will endeavor to execute with punctuality and satisfaction. He has on hand gentlemen's boots of all kinds, dress and strong shoes.—Wanted, a number of men to make strong shoes, and a few boot men—Also two apprentices to the above business. New Jersey Avenue, July 17—cpuf.
CHARLES H. VARDEN, MERCHANT TAYLOR.
Has received from Philadelphia a handsome assortment of FALL goods, consisting of the best London and French superfine cloths, cassimeres, patent Bennet's cord, toilenettes, fancy and white Marceilles, black and figured silk, moleskins, fancy silk, Marceilles, constitution cords, velvets, Genoa cord, silk and fatten Florentines, superfine coating, knapped cloths, with a variety of other articles suitable for the winter season. N. B. Ladies habits, regimentals, and navy uniforms made in the first style of fashion. New Jersey avenue near the Capitol, December 10—tf
ALEXANDER M'CORMICK,
Has just received 2,000 weight of BACON, which he offers for sale. August 9—3t
RAGS.
The highest price, in Cash or Books will be given for any quantity of clean Linen and Cotton Rags, by Rapine Conrad and Co. Capitol Hill. June 24—
Ten Dollars Reward.
WAS missed on Sunday, the 5th of May a double cased silver Watch, maker's name Crosthwaite, Dublin, and in the outer case was a watch paper with Mr. Parker's name of Philadelphia.—Whoever will bring the said watch to the office of the National Intelligencer, shall receive the above reward, and no questions will be asked. May 10—tf.
On a liberal credit.
THE subscriber will dispose of at private sale, his estate called Chichester, lying on the eastern branch, immediately on the city of Washington. This tract of land containing 697 acres is laid off in lots from 83 to 144 acres for the convenience of purchasers. Plats of the estate and the terms of sale are in the hands of colonel Hanlon at the navy yard, and Charles Weyman of George Town: The lots will be sown by Mr Wedden, living on the premises, near the Eastern Branch bridge. ANTHONY ADDISON. Barnaby, 12th June 1805—tf
PUBLIC SALE.
ON the first Monday in November next will be held at Public Auction, on the premises at the hour of eleven o'clock A. M. all those Lots of ground, No. 18 and 26 which were allotted and set apart for JAMES WIGFIELD, of Washington county, District of Columbia, situated near the fourth end of the Eastern Branch Bridge, and vested in me in virtue of a deed of trust from said Wigfield. Terms of sale CASH. BENSON L. M'CORMICK, July 29—1w1n.