The national intelligencer and Washington advertiser. (Washington City [D.C.]), 1809-01-18 00:00:00

National Intelligencer.
WASHINGTON ADVERTISER.
WASHINGTON CITY, PRINTED BY SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH, PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE.
NO. 1291.
VOL. IX.
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 18, 1809.
PAID IN ADVANCE.
FIVE DOLLARS PER ANNUM.
(BY AUTHORITY.)
An act to the relief of Augustin Serry .
B it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the proper accounting officers of the Treasury be, and they are hereby authorised to settle the account of Augustin Serry , formerly a boatswain on board the United States brig Somalia ; and that they allow him the pay and emoluments of a boatswain, from the fifteenth day of October, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-six, until the sixteenth day of February, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight; and that they pay the balance which may be found due to the said Augustin Serry , out of any monies in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated.
J. B. VARNUM, Speaker of the House of Representatives.
GEO. CLINTON, Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate. January 12, 1809.
APPROVED,
TH: JEFFERSON.
An act to revive and continue in force, for a further time, the first section of the act, entitled "An act further to protect the commerce and seamen of the United States, against the Barbary powers."
B it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That so much of the act, passed on the twenty-fifth day of March, one thousand eight hundred and four, entitled "An act further to protect the commerce and seamen of the United States, against the Barbary powers," as is contained in the first section of the said act, (and which was revived and continued in force, for the time therein mentioned, by an act, entitled "An act to revive and continue in force, for a further time, the first section of the act, entitled "An act further to protect the commerce and seamen of the United States, against the Barbary powers," passed the nineteenth day of January, one thousand eight hundred and eight,) be and the same hereby is revived and continued in force, until the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and ten: Provided however , That the additional duty laid by the said section, shall be collected on all such goods, wares and merchandise, liable to pay the same, as shall have been imported previous to that day.
J. B. VARNUM, Speaker of the House of Representatives.
GEO. CLINTON, Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate. January 10, 1809.
APPROVED,
TH: JEFFERSON.
An act supplemental to an act, entitled "An act for extending the terms of credit on revenue bonds in certain cases, and for other purposes."
B it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the payment of all bonds given, subsequent to the date of the act to which this act is a supplement, for duties on coffee, sugar, pepper, indigo, cocoa, and wine paying a duty of twenty-three cents per gallon, and which remain unpaid, for the same articles which may arrive hereafter in any of the ports of the United States, and whilst the act, entitled "An act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United States," shall continue in force, may be suspended, subject however to all respects to the conditions and provisions made and provided in the act of the tenth of March, one thousand eight hundred and eight, to which this act is a supplement: Provided , That nothing herein contained shall be construed to extend to imports made in vessels dispatched under permission granted by the President of the United States in pursuance of powers in him vested by the seventh section of the act, entitled "An act in addition to the act entitled, "An act supplemental to an act, entitled "An act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United States."
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That if the amount of any bond given for the payment of duties on the importation of coffee, sugar, pepper, indigo, cocoa, or wine paying a duty of twenty-three cents per gallon, made subsequent to the passing of the act to which this is a supplement, and which bond would by virtue of this act have been entitled to an extension of credit, shall have been previously paid, the money so paid shall by the proper collector be refunded to the person or persons who shall have paid the same, or to his, her, or their agent or agents, on his or their giving a bond with sureties, in the same manner and on the same terms, conditions and restrictions, and on a compliance of the person or persons receiving the indulgence hereby granted, with all the provisions of the act to which this is a supplement.
J. B. VARNUM, Speaker of the House of Representatives.
GEO. CLINTON, Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate. January 12, 1809.
APPROVED,
TH: JEFFERSON.
State of Maryland—In Chancery, January 10th, 1809.
O RDERED That the sales made and reported by JOHN KILTY and JOSIAS W. KING, trustees under a decree of this court, for the sale of certain lots in the district of Columbia, in a suit wherein the Executors of Mordacai Lewis and Edward Bond , were complainants, and the Administrators of the city of Washington and others were defendants, be ratified and confirmed, unless cause to the contrary be shown on or before the 16th day of February next. Provided a copy of this order be inserted in the National Intelligencer once in each of three successive weeks before that day. The report after specifying the several lots and squares sold to the respective purchasers, states that the gross amount of the sales was 16,049 dollars.
True copy. Test NICH. BRISBEE, Reg. C.C. January 16—w3t.
The following address to the President of the United States, has been agreed to by both branches of the Legislature of the state of Georgia.
SIR, The Legislature of the state of Georgia, the immediate organs of the public will, think proper, at this all-important period of time, to address you. It is sensible, sir, that while the great powers of Europe are involved in a contest, almost unexampled in magnitude, consequences and duration—that the people of these shores although happily situated at a distance from the scene of carnage, yet being largely engaged in the pursuit of commerce, must of necessity suffer great privations from the want of a vent for the produce of a country fertile, extensive and inhabited almost exclusively by agriculturists. But, sir, the citizens of this state, strong in their independence, and proud of their government—feel happy that a measure has been adopted, which they conceive to be at once pacific and manly—they will never wish to see the lives and property of their brethren exposed to the insult or rapacity of a foreign power—and should this measure fail to produce the desired effect immediately, they will cheerfully submit to its continuance—if, on the other hand, our present embarrassments should eventuate in a war, they will in proportion to their numbers and resources, give zealous aid to the government of their choice—confident that from the judicious management of the public funds, and the easy pressure of taxation hitherto, a conflict could be maintained to every advantage, which pecuniary means would bring in support of a people, patriotic and brave. You, sir, when retired to the peaceful walks of life, will not be an insensible spectator; you will exult in the future prosperity of your country—or mourn in case an all-wise Providence should see fit to afflict it by any public calamity. The real friends to these states will feel sorry that they are deprived of the benefit of your counsels—you will carry with you their blessings, and unfeigned regret will follow you to the grave.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
DEBATE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.
DECEMBER 7. Mr. QUINCY's Speech Concluded.
The second branch of the alternatives under consideration is equally deceptive, "War with both nations." Can this ever be an alternative? Did you ever read in history, can you conceive in fancy, a war with two nations, each of whom is at war with the other, without an union with one against the other immediately resulting? It can not exist in nature. The very idea is absurd. It never can be an alternative, whether we shall fight two nations each hostile to the other. But it may be, and if we are to fight at all, it is a very serious question which of the two we are to select as an adversary. As to the third branch of these celebrated alternatives, "a continuance and enforcement of the present system of commerce," I need not spend time to show that this does not include all the alternatives, which exist under this head. Since the committee immediately admit, that there does exist another alternative, "partial repeal," about which they proceed to reason.
The report proceeds. "The first" (abject and degrading submission) "cannot require any discussion." Certainly not. Submission of that quality, which the committee assume and with the epithets of which they choose to invest it, can never require discussion at any time. But whether trading under these orders and decrees, be such submission, whether we are not competent to resist them in part, if not in whole, without a total abandonment of the exercise of all our maritime rights, the comparative effects of the edicts of each upon our commerce, and the means we possess to influence or control either, are all fair and proper subjects of discussion. Some of which the committee have wholly neglected and none of which have they examined, as the House had a right to expect.
The committee proceed "to dispel the illusion," that there is any "middle course," and to reassert the position before examined, that "there is no other alternative than war with both nations, or a continuance of the present system." This position they undertake to support by two assertions. First, that "war with one of the belligerents only, would be submission to the edicts and will of the other." Second, that "repeal in whole or in
part of the embargo, must necessarily be war or submission."
As to the first assertion, it is a miserable fallacy, confounding coincidence of interest with subjection of will; things in their nature palpably distinct. A man may do what another wills, may, what he commands, and not act in submission to his will, or in obedience to his command. Our interest or duty may coincide with the line of conduct another presumes to prescribe. Shall we vindicate our independence at the expence of our social or moral obligations? I exemplify my idea in this way. Two bullies beset your door, from which there are but two avenues. One of them forbids you to go by the left, the other forbids you to go by the right avenue. Each is willing that you should pass by the way, which he permits. In such case, what will you do? Will you keep House forever, rather than make choice of the path through which you will resume your external rights? You cannot go both ways at once, you must make your election. Yet, in making such election, you must necessarily coincide with the wishes and act according to the commands of one of the bullies. Yet who, before this committee, ever thought an election of one of two inevitable courses made under such circumstances, "abject and degrading submission," to the will of either of the assailants. The second assertion, that "repeal in whole or in part of the embargo must necessarily be war or submission," the committee proceed to maintain by several subsidiary assertions. First—"a general repeal without arming would be submission to both nations." So far from this being true the reverse is the fact, it would be submission to neither. G. Britain does not say, "you shall trade with me." France does not say "you shall trade with me." If this was the language of their edicts, there might be some color for the assertion of the committee, that if we trade with either we submit. The edicts of each declare you shall not trade with my adversary. Our servile, knee-crooking embargo, says, "you shall, therefore, not trade." Can any submission be more palpable, more "abject, more disgraceful?" A general repeal without arming, would be only an exercise of our natural rights, under the protection of our mercantile ingenuity, and not under that of physical power. Whether our merchants shall arm or not, is a question of political expediency and of relative force. It may be very true that we can fight our way to neither country; and yet it may be also very true, that we may carry on a very important commerce with both. The strength of the national arm may not be equal to contend with either, and yet the wit of our merchants may be over-match for the edicts of all. The question of arming or not arming, has reference only to the mode in which we shall best enjoy our rights, and not at all to the quality of the act of trading during these edicts. To exercise commerce is our absolute right. If we arm, we may possibly extend the field beyond that which mere ingenuity would open to us. Whether the extension thus acquired, be worthy of the risque and expence is a fair question. But decide it either way, how is trading as far as we have ability, made less abject than not trading at all?
I come to the second subsidiary assertion. "A general repeal and arming of merchant vessels, would be war with both, and war of the worst kind, suffering the enemies to plunder us, without retaliation upon them." I have before exposed the absurdity of a war with two belligerents, each hostile to the other. It cannot be true therefore, that "a general repeal and arming our merchant vessels," would be such a war. Neither if war resulted, would it be "war of the worst kind."—In my humble apprehension, a war, in which our enemies are permitted to plunder us, and our merchants, not permitted to defend their property, is somewhat worse than a war like this; in which, with arms in their hands, our brave seamen might sometimes prove too strong for their piratical assailants. By the whole amount of property, which we might be able to preserve, by these means, would such a war be better than that in which we are now engaged. For the committee assure us, [p. 14.] that the aggressions, to which we are subject, "are to all intents and purposes a maritime war, waged with both nations against the United States."
The last assertion of the committee, in this most masterly page, is that "a partial repeal must, from the
situation of Europe, necessarily be actual submission to one of the aggressors, and war with the other."
In the name of common sense, how can this be true? The trade to Sweden, to Spain, to China, is not now affected by the orders or decrees of either belligerent. How is it submission then, to these orders for us to trade to Gottenburgh, when neither France nor Britain command, nor prohibit it? Of what consequence is it to us, in what way the Gottenburgh merchant disposes of our products, after he has paid us our price? I am not about to deny, that a trade to Gottenburgh would defeat the purpose of coercing Great Britain, through the want of our supplies, but I reason on the report upon its avowed principles. If gentlemen adhere to their system, as a mean of coercion, let the administration avow it as such, and support the system, by arguments, such as their friends use every day on this floor. Let them avow as those friends do, that this is our mode of hostility against Great Britain. That it is better than "ball and gunpowder." Let them shew that the means are adequate to the end; let them exhibit to us beyond the term of all this suffering, a happy salvation, and a glorious victory, and the people may then submit to it, even without murmur. But while the administration support their system only as a municipal regulation, as a mean of safety and preservation, those, who canvass their principle, are not called upon to contest with them on ground, which not only they do not take, but which, officially they disavow. As partial repeal would not be submission to either; so also it would not be war with either. A trade to Sweden would not be war with Great Britain, that nation is her ally, and she permits it. Nor with France, though Sweden is her enemy, she does not prohibit it. Ah! But say the committee, [page 13] "a measure which would supply exclusively one of the belligerents, would be war with the other." This is the state secret; this is the master key to the whole policy. You must not only do what the letter of these orders prohibits, but you must not sin against the spirit of them. The great purpose is to prevent your product from getting to our enemy, and to effect this you must not only so act, as to obey the terms of the decrees, but keeping the great purpose of them always in sight, you must extend their construction to cases, which they cannot by any rule of reason be made to include.
Sir, I have done with this report. I would not have submitted to the task of canvassing it, if gentlemen had not thrown the gauntlet with the air of sturdy defiance. I willingly leave to this House and the nation, to decide whether the position I took in the commencement of my argument is not maintained; that there is not one of the principal positions contained in this 12th page, the heart of this report, which is true, in the sense, and to the extent assumed by the committee.
It was under these general impressions that I used the word "loathsome," which has so often been repeated. Sir, it may not have been a well chosen word. It was that which happened to come to hand first. I meant to express my disgust, at what appeared to me a mass of bold assumptions, and of ill cemented sophisms.
I said also that "the spirit which it breathed was disgraceful." Sir, I meant no reflection upon the committee. Honest men and wise men may mistake the character of the spirit, which they recommend, or by which they are actuated. When called upon to reason concerning that, which by adoption, is to become identified with the national character, I am bound to speak of it as it appears to my vision. I may be mistaken. Yet, I ask the question—is not the spirit which it breathes disgraceful? Is it not disgraceful to abandon the exercise of all our commercial rights, because our rivals interfere with a part—not only to refrain from exercising that trade which they prohibit, but for fear of giving offence, to decline that which they permit? Is it not disgraceful, after inflammatory recapitulation of insults, and plunderings and burnings, and confiscations, and murders, and actual war made upon us, to talk of nothing but alternatives, of general declarations, of still longer suspension of our rights and retreating farther out of "harm's way?" If this course be adopted by any country, I hope I am in error, concerning its real character. But to my sense, this whole report is nothing else than a recommendation to us of
the abandonment of our essential rights and apologies for doing it.
Before I sit down, I feel myself compelled to notice some observations, which have been made in different quarters of this House, on the remarks, which at an early stage of this debate, I had the honor of submitting to its consideration. My honorable colleague (Mr. Bacon) was pleased to represent me as appealing to the people, over the heads of the whole government, against the authority of a law, which had not only the sanction of all the legislative branches of the government, but also of the judiciary. Sir, I made no such appeal. I did not so much as threaten it. I admitted expressly, the binding authority of the law. But I claim a right which I ever will claim, and ever will exercise, to urge, on this floor, my opinion of the unconstitutionality of a law, and my reasons for that opinion, as a valid ground, for its repeal. Sir, I will not only do this, I will do more. If a law be, in my apprehension, dangerous in its principles, ruinous in its consequences, above all, if it be unconstitutional, I will not fail in every fair and honorable way, to awaken the people to a sense of their peril; and to quicken them, by the exercise of their constitutional privileges, to vindicate themselves and posterity from ruin.
My honorable colleague (Mr. Bacon) was also pleased to refer to me as a man of divisions and distinctions, waging war with adverbs and dealing in figures. Sir, I am sorry that my honorable colleague should stoop "from his pride of place," at such humble game, as my poor style presents to him. Certainly, Mr. Speaker, I cannot but confess, that "deeming high" of this station, which I hold; standing, as it were, in the awful presence of an assembled people, I am more than ordinarily anxious, on all occasions, to select the best thoughts, in my narrow store-house, and to adapt to them the most appropriate dress in my intellectual wardrobe. I know not whether, on this account, I am justly obnoxious to the asperity of my honorable colleague. But on the subject of figures, Mr. Speaker, this I know, and cannot refrain from assuring this House, that as, on the one hand, I shall, to the extent of my humble talents, always be ambitious, and never cease striving to make a decent figure on this floor, so on the other, I never can be ambitious, but on the contrary, shall ever strive chiefly to avoid cutting a figure like my honorable colleague.
The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Troup) the other day, told this House that if commerce were permitted, such was the state of our foreign relations, none but bankrupts would carry on trade.—Sir, the honorable gentleman has not attained correct information in this particular. I do not believe that I state any thing above the real fact, when I say, that on the day this legislature assembled, one hundred vessels at least were lying in the different ports and harbors of New England loaded, riding at single anchor, ready and anxious for nothing so much as for your leave to depart. Certainly, this does not look much like any doubt, that a field of advantageous commerce would open, if you would unbarr the door to your citizens. That this was the case, in Massachusetts, I know. Before I left that part of the country, I had several applications from men, who stated that they had property in such situations, and soliciting me to give them the earliest information of your probable policy. The men so applying, Sir, I can assure the House, were not bankrupts; but intelligent merchants, shrewd to perceive their true interests; keen to pursue them. The same honorable gentleman was also pleased to speak of "a paltry trade in potash and codfish," and to refer to me, as the representative of men, who raised "beef and pork, and butter and cheese, and potatoes and cabbages." Well, sir, I confess the fact. I am the representative, in part, of men, the products of whose industry are beef & pork, and butter, and cheese, and potatoes and cabbages. And let me tell that honorable gentleman, that I would not yield the honor of representing such men to be the representative of all the growers of cotton and rice, and tobacco & indigo, in the whole world. Sir, the men, whom I represent, not only raise these humble articles, but they do it with the labor of their own hands, with the sweat of their own brows. And by this their habitual mode of hardy industry, they acquire a rigour of nerve, a strength of muscle and a spirit and intelligence somewhat characteristic. And let me assure that

honorable gentleman that the men, of whom I speak will not, at his call, nor at the invitation of any man, or set of men, from his quarter of the union, undertake to "drive one another into the ocean." But, on the contrary, whenever they once realize that their rights are invaded, they will unite, like a band of brothers, and drive their enemies there.
(The remainder of Mr. Quincy's speech, necessarily excluded by the President's Message, in our next.)
WASHINGTON CITY.
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 18.
In our last we laid before our readers the insidious letter of Mr. Canning, published by the emissaries of the British government, (if not penned by Mr. Canning himself) to divide the people from their government by impressing upon their minds absolute untruths—to animate faction, to excite rebellion. We defy any man, attentively to examine the letter, and consider the place where it first appeared (Boston) and the season of its appearance (when the government was about vigorously to enforce the embargo) and to doubt the inference we have drawn. We have now the satisfaction of presenting an ANTIDOTE, of whose complete efficacy we entertain no question. Like the fictitious attempt of Genet, this diplomatic artifice will recoil on its authors. The President yesterday laid before Congress the following important MESSAGE, which by a great exertion we are enabled to publish entire. A short but animated debate arose in the House of Representatives on the proposition to print the Message, not from any difference of opinion on this point, but from the universal indignation felt at this audacious foreign effort to interfere with our concerns. This feeling was not expressed alone by the Republican, but likewise by several federal members of the house. Mr. Key, in particular, did himself great honor by the manly terms in which he avowed his abhorrence of the attempt. 5000 copies were ordered to be printed. The debate shall be given in our next.
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States—
I communicate to Congress certain letters which passed between the British Secretary of State, Mr. Canning, & Mr. Pinkney, our minister plenipotentiary at London. When the documents concerning the relations between the United States and Great Britain were laid before Congress at the commencement of the session, the answer of Mr. Pinkney to the letter of Mr. Canning had not been received, & a communication of the latter alone would have accorded neither with propriety nor with the wishes of Mr. Pinkney. When that answer afterwards arrived, it was considered that as what had passed in conversation had been superseded by the written and formal correspondence on the subject, the variance in the statements of what had verbally passed was not of sufficient importance to be made the matter of a distinct and special communication. The letter of Mr. Canning, however, having lately appeared in print, unaccompanied by that of Mr. Pinkney in reply, and having a tendency to make impressions not warranted by the statements of Mr. Pinkney, it has become proper that the whole should be brought into public view.
TH: JEFFERSON.
Jan. 17. 1809.
LONDON, Sept. 24, 1808.
Sir,
I am now enabled to transmit to you a copy of Mr. Canning's answer, received only last night, to my note of the 23d of August.
This answer was accompanied by a letter, of which also a copy is enclosed, recapitulating what Mr. Canning supposes to be "the substance of what has passed between us in our several interviews previous to the presentation of my official letter."
To the accompanying paper I think it indispensable that I should reply without delay—Supporting with politeness, but with firmness, the statements, which I have already had the honor to make to you, of the conversations in question, and correcting some errors upon points, which Mr. Canning has thought fit to introduce into his letter, but which I had not supposed it necessary to mention in detail in my dispatches.
I shall not detain Mr. Atwater with a view to this reply; but will take care to forward a copy of it by an early conveyance. My official note and the answer to it being perfectly explicit, Mr. Canning's misapprehensions (for such they are) of previous verbal communications can scarcely be very important in a public view; but it is, nevertheless, of some consequence that, whatever may be the object of his statement, I should not make myself a party to its inaccuracies, by even a tacit admission of them.
I do not perceive that a formal reply to the more official paper can now be of any advantage; but I shall probably take occasion to combine with my reply to the one paper some observations upon the other.
I regret extremely that the views which I have been instructed to lay before this government, have not been met by it as I had at first been led to expect. The overture cannot fail, however, to place in a strong light the just and liberal sentiments by which our government is animated, and in other respects to be useful and honorable to our country.
I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servt.
WM. PINKNEY.
Hon. James Madison, Esq. &c.
[Here follows the letter of Mr. Canning to Mr. Pinkney, published in our last. If, on examination, there should appear to be any variation between the original and the copy, we shall notice it in our next.]
Great Cumberland Place,
Sept. 24, 1808.
Sir—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your answer to my official note of the 23d of last month, relative to the British orders in Council of January and November 1807, together with a statement of "the substance of what has passed between us at our several interviews, previous to the presentation of that note."
I shall lose no time in transmitting to my government copies of both these papers, upon the last of which I will take the liberty, in the course of a few days, to trouble you with some observations.
I have the honor to be, With the highest consideration, Sir, your most obedt. servt.
WM. PINKNEY.
The Right hon. Geo. Canning, Esq. &c.
LONDON, Oct. 11, 1808.
Sir,
I have the honor to transmit enclosed a copy of my reply to Mr. Canning's letter to me, of the 23d of last month, accompanying his official answer of the same date to my note of the 23d of August.
I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,
WM. PINKNEY.
Hon. James Madison, Esq. &c.
TO MR. CANNING.
GREAT CUMBERLAND PLACE,
October 10, 1808.
Sir,
If my reply to the letter, which you did me the honor to address to me on the 23d of last month, should be of greater length than the occasion may be thought to require, you will, I am sure, impute it to its real cause, an earnest desire on my part, arising from a feeling of sincere respect for you, that the statement, which I am to give of facts deemed by you to be important, should be full as well as accurate.
I will not fatigue you, sir, with assurances that no person could be less disposed than I am, to find fault with the object of your letter, which appears to be to guard against any misrepresentation of "what has passed in our last interviews, beyond what you find recorded in my note." You have told me, that I have, personally, no concern in that object, and I did not require to be told that my government has as little. I understand, indeed, that the circumstance, which has suggested a peculiar motive for this proceeding, was one of those newspaper misrepresentations, which every day produces where the press is free, which find no credit and beget no consequence, and for which it is greatly to be feared your expedient will provide no remedy. Of my conduct, when that circumstance occurred, in giving you unsolicited proofs that I had transmitted to Mr. Secretary Madison, a faithful report of our conferences, mistaken by public rumor or private conjecture, it is not necessary for me to speak; for you have yourself done justice to it.
The motive, to which I am indebted for the honor of your letter, appears to have been instrumental in producing another effect equally unexceptionable. But you will allow me to say, that, until the receipt of that letter, I had not been apprised, by the slightest intimation, that it was in any degree owing to such a cause that you declined, on the part of his Majesty's government, after two conferences, in which I had been suffered, if not encouraged, to unfold myself, individually as well as officially, at great length and with perfect frankness, to give an answer to my verbal overture.
At our first interview (on the 29th of June) verbal communication was not discountenanced, but commenced:—For, after I had made myself understood as to the purpose for which the interview had been requested, you asked me if I thought of taking a more formal course; but immediately added that you presumed I did not; for that the course I had adopted was well suited to the occasion. My reply was in substance, that the freedom of conversation was better adapted to our subject, and more likely to conduct us to an advantageous conclusion, than the constraint and formality of written intercourse, and that I had not intended
to present a note. At the second interview (on the 22d of July) it did not occur to me that I had any reason to conclude, and certainly I did not conclude, that verbal communication had not continued to be acceptable as a preparatory course; and it was not until the third interview (on the 29th of July) that it was rejected as inadmissible. But even then I was not told, and had not the smallest suspicion, that this rejection was to be ascribed, either wholly or partially, to the motive which your letter has since announced to me. That this motive had, nevertheless, all the influence now imputed to it, I am entirely confident, and I take notice of it only because, as I have not mentioned it to my government in my official account of our conferences, I can no otherwise justify the omission, either to it or to you, than by shewing that I had in truth no knowledge of the fact when that account was transmitted.
I may take occasion to set forth, in the present letter, the import of all that can be material of our several conversations, according to my recollection of them; but there are some points to which I ought to pay a more particular attention, because you have thought them entitled to it; although I should myself, perhaps, have been inclined to think that they had lost much of their importance by the presentation of my note, and the receipt of your written answer; both of which are perfectly intelligible, upon these points at least, without the aid of the conferences that preceded them.
You observe, that "the principal points, in which the suggestions, brought forward by me in personal conference, appear to you to have differed in some degree from the proposal stated by me in writing, are two; the first, that in conversation the proposal itself was not distinctly stated as an overture authorised by my government; the second, that the beneficial consequences, likely to result to this country from the acceptance of that proposal, were "pursued" through more ample "illustrations."
With regard to the first of these supposed differences, I feel persuaded, Sir, that upon further recollection, it will occur to you, that, at our first conference, I told you explicitly that the substance of what I then suggested, that is to say, that your orders being repealed as to us, we would suspend the embargo as to Great Britain, was from my government; but that the manner of conducting and illustrating the subject, upon which I had no precise orders, was my own. I even repeated to you the words of my instructions as they were upon my memory; and I did not understand, either then or afterwards, that there was any doubt as to their existence or their sufficiency, or any desire to have a more exact and formal communication of them while the result of our discussions was distant and uncertain. I said undoubtably that I had been directed to require the revocation of the British orders in council; but I said also that, although the government of the U. States, still supposed itself to be authorised to expect their repeal upon the ground of right as it existed from the first, (a subject, however, which I informed you I did not wish at that time to agitate), I was notwithstanding empowered to give you the abovementioned assurances, which would, as I presumed, hold out inducements to Great Britain, as well on the score of policy as on that of justice, to fulfil that expectation. I should scarcely have undertaken to offer such assurances as from myself, or upon my own "conviction," that the President would act in conformity with them. And I should still less (if that were possible) have ventured to ask of you that you would make them, in that form, the subject of repeated conferences, and even of reference to others, as placing the question of a recall, or continuance of the orders in council, upon new grounds of prudence and equity.
If it is merely intended (as I doubt not it is) to say that I did not make, or declare my intention to make, my overture in writing, before I had endeavored to prepare for it by personal explanations such a reception as I felt it deserved, and before I could ascertain what shape it would be most proper to give to it, or how it would be met by this government, nothing can be more correct.
It was my sincere wish that my proposal, which I believed to be advantageous to Great Britain, as well as honorable to the United States, should be accepted; and accordingly I preferred a mode of proceeding which, while it was calculated to avoid unprofitable discussions, upon topics of some delicacy and great difficulty, would furnish opportunities for frank and friendly communication upon all the bearings of my proposal, and lead to the result at which I aimed, if that result should be practicable. In such way as, upon mature reflection, and after a liberal interchange of sentiments, should be found to be most for the honor of our respective governments. These views were laid before you without reserve, and seemed to be approved; and I
confess to you sir, that when I was afterwards informed that, if I would obtain an answer to my overture, I must make it in writing, and that I must not look for any previous intimation of the nature of that answer, I did not allow myself any longer to anticipate with much confidence such an issue as I desired.
The second difference which your letter supposes to exist between my note and verbal suggestions, cannot, I think, in any view be very material. I will say something upon it, however.
My note declares that if I forbear to pursue certain ideas through all the illustrations of which they are susceptible, it is because our personal conferences, as well as the obvious nature of the idea, themselves, render it unnecessary. This implies undoubtedly, that more had been said in our conferences explanatory of these ideas, than is to be found in the note itself; and that implication can scarcely be otherwise than true, if I "expatiated largely" as you very justly say I did, "upon the consequences of a suspension of the embargo as to Great Britain, while it still continued to be enforced against France."
The general idea to which the note refers is that justice and interest conspired to recommend that you should take advantage of my proposal. The particular positions are, that, if your orders and our embargo should be rescinded in the manner suggested, our commercial intercourse would be immediately revived; that, if France followed your example and retracted her decrees, the avowed purpose of your orders would be accomplished; that, if France refused to retract, the American embargo, continuing as to her, would occupy the place of your orders, and perform their office, even better than they could perform it themselves, without any of the disadvantages inseparable from such a system.
It is certain that in our conversations I endeavored to prove that these general and particular notions were founded in truth, by a variety of arguments, thrown out in a very desultory way, with more zeal than precision, and with that entire freedom which unlimited confidence in your candor, and a firm opinion that the views of my government would derive new titles to respect from a full examination, were calculated to produce.
I should not deal ingenuously with you, sir, if I were to pretend that I think myself able to recapitulate these disjointed arguments as they were actually delivered. And I am quite sure that I shall consult your gratification, as well as my own credit, by declining such an undertaking. But I think I can state, in a condensed form, what I intended you should understand; and I presume that what I did say was not very wide of my real impressions.
Upon the footing on which my overture would place the justice of the British orders, I did not go into much detail, at any one of the three interviews mentioned in your letter. But, combining my unconnected and occasional observations on that point as they were made at different times, and more especially as they were afterwards given and enlarged upon when I had the honor to see you on the 26th of August (of which, however, it is proper to say I have only a very scanty memorandum) their import will not, perhaps, be found to be much if at all mistaken in such parts of the following statement as relate to that branch of the subject.
I meant to suggest, then, that upon your own principles it would be extremely difficult to decline my proposal, that your orders inculcate, as the duty of neutral nations, resistance to the maritime decrees of France, as overturning the public law of the world, and professedly rely upon that duty, and an imputed abandonment of it, for their inducement and their justification; that, of these orders, that of the 7th of January 1807, (of which the subsequent orders of November are said, in your official reply to my note of the 23d of August, to be only an extension, "an extension in operation not in principle") was promulgated and carried into effect a few weeks only after the Berlin decree had made its appearance, when the American government could not possibly know that such a decree existed, when there had been no attempt to enforce it, and when it had become probable that it would not be enforced at all to the prejudice of neutral rights, that the other orders were issued, before the American government, with reference to any practical violation of its rights, by an attempt to execute the Berlin decree, in a sense different from the stipulations of the treaty subsisting between the United States and France, and from the explanations given to general Armstrong by the French minister of marine, and afterwards impliedly confirmed by general Champagny, as well as by a correspondent practice, had any sufficient opportunity of opposing that decree otherwise than as I did oppose it; that your orders, thus proceeding upon an assumed acquiescence not existing in fact, retained
sand-fold, through the rights of the United States, wrongs rather threatened than felt, which you were not authorised to presume the United States would not themselves repel, as their honor and their interests required; that orders, so issued, were, to say the least of them, an unreasonable interposition between the injuring and the injured party, in a way the most fatal to the latter; that by taking justice into your own hands, before you were entitled to do so, at the expence of every thing like neutral rights, and even at the expence of other rights, justly the objects of yet greater sensibility, and by inflicting upon neutral nations, or rather upon the United States, the only neutral nation—injuries infinitely more severe and extensive than it was in the power of France to inflict, you embarrassed and confounded, and rendered impracticable, that very resistance which you demanded of us; that my proposal destroyed all imaginable motives for continuing, whatever might have been the motives for adopting this new scheme of warfare; that it enabled you to withdraw, with dignity and even with advantage, what should not have come between France and us; that its necessary tendency was to place us at issue with that power, or, in other words, in the precise situation in which you have maintained we ought to be placed, if it should persist in its obnoxious edicts; that the continuance of our embargo, so modified, would be, at least equivalent to your orders; for that, in their most efficient state, your orders could do no more, as regards the United States, than cut off their trade with France and the countries connected with her; and that our embargo, remaining as to France and those countries, would do exactly the same; that if the two courses were barely, or even nearly upon a level, in point of expediency, Great Britain ought to be forward to adopt that which was consistent with the rights and respectful to the feelings of others; that my proposal, however, had powerful recommendations which the orders in council had not; that it would re-establish without the hazard of any disadvantage, before new habits had rendered it difficult if not impossible, a traffic which nourished your most essential manufactures, and various other important sources of your prosperity; that it would not only restore a connection, valuable in all its views, but prepare the way for the return of mutual kindness, for adjustments greatly to be desired, and in a word for all those consequences which follow in the train of magnanimity and conciliation, associated with prudence and justice.
Among the observations intended to illustrate my opinion of the certain, probable, and possible effects of the concurrent acts which my proposal had in view, were those to which you allude in the 6th paragraph of your letter. Having stated that renewed commercial intercourse between G. Britain and the U. S. would be the first effect, I remarked, in the progress of the conversation, that the edicts of France could not prevent that intercourse, even if France should adhere to them, although G. Britain, by her superior naval means, might be able to prevent the converse of it; that the power of France upon the seas was in no degree adequate to such a purpose, and if it were otherwise, that it was not to be supposed that the U. S. resuming their lawful commerce with this country, after a recital of the British orders, in council, would take no measures against systematic interruptions of that commerce by force and violence, if such should be attempted.
If, when I was honored with the different interviews before mentioned, I had been able to conjecture the nature of the arguments which were to have an influence against my proposal as I now find them stated in your answer to my note, I should probably have ventured to suggest, in addition to the remarks actually submitted to you for consideration, that, if "the blockade of the European continent," by France and the powers subservient to or in combination with her, to which your orders as "a temperate but determined retaliation" were opposed, has been "raised even before it has been well established," & if "that a system," so opposed, "of which extent and continuity were the vital principles, has been broken up into fragments utterly harmless and contemptible," there seems scarcely to be left, in your own view of the subject, any intelligible justification for persevering in such of the retaliatory measures of G. Britain, as operate through the acknowledged rights of a power confessedly no party to that combination, and ready to fulfil her fair neutral obligations, if you will suffer her to do so. Under such circumstances, to abandon what is admitted to have lost its only legitimate object, is not "concession;" it is simple justice. To France, indeed, it might be concession. But it is not France, it is the government of America, neither subservient to France, nor combined with France, a third party, whose rights and interests

any adequate necessity according to your own showing, that requires their recall; and that too upon terms which cannot but promote the declared purposes of those orders, if any remain to be promoted. I say "without any adequate necessity according to your own showing;" for I am persuaded, sir, you do not mean to tell us, as upon a hasty perusal of your answer to my note might be imagined that those rights and interests are to be set at nought, lest "a doubt should remain to distant times of the determination and the ability of G. Britain to have continued her resistance," or that your orders may, indefinitely, give a new law to the ocean. Lest the motive to their repeal should be mistaken by their enemy. If this might indeed be so, you will perhaps permit me to say, that highly as we may be disposed to prize the firm attitude and vast means of your country at this eventful moment, it would possibly suggest to some minds a reluctant doubt on the subject of your observation "that the strength and power of G. Britain are not for herself only, but for the world."
I might also have been led to intimate that my proposal could apparently lose nothing by admitting that "by some unfortunate concurrence of circumstances, without any hostile intention, the American embargo did come in aid of the 'before mentioned' blockade of the European continent, precisely at the very moment when, if that blockade could have succeeded at all, this interposition of the American government would most effectually have contributed to its success." Yet I should probably have thought myself bound to remind you that, whatever may be the truth of this speculation, the same embargo withheld our tonnage and our productions from the colonies of your enemies and with the European continent, which you had asserted your right to prevent; which as a direct communication (with the continent) you had in fact prohibited; which, even through British ports or in other qualified forms, you had professed to tolerate, not as that which could be claimed, but as an indulgence that could at any time be withdrawn; which, as a traffic for the U. S. to engage in, you had at least discouraged, not only by checks and difficulties in the way of its prosecution, but by manifesting your intentions to mould it into all the shapes which the belligerent, fiscal or other peculiar policy of G. B. might require, and subject it to the exclusive jurisdiction of her municipal code, armed with all the prerogatives of that universal law to which nations are accustomed to look for the rights of neutral commerce.
In giving an account of our second conference you say "that, though not stating myself to be authorised by my government formally to offer the suspension of the embargo, as an immediate consequence of the repeal of the orders in council, yet I did profess my readiness to take upon myself to make that offer, provided that you would give me before hand an unofficial assurance that, coupled with that offer, so made, the demand of the repeal of the orders would be favorably received; that you, of course, declined to give any such previous assurance; but, as I appeared to attach great importance to this suggestion, and you were led to think that a compliance with it might relieve me from a difficulty in executing the instructions of my government, you consented to take a few days to consider of it, and to reserve your definitive answer until you should see me again." You then observe that you "never doubted, in your own mind, as to the inexpediency and impropriety of encouraging me to take an unauthorised step, by an unofficial promise that it should be well received." I am sure you did not, sir; but I must take the liberty to say that I am equally sure that I never thought of asking you to give me encouragement to take an unauthorised step of any kind. I am, indeed, truly mortified, that my conduct has appeared to you in that light; and I should not be readily consoled, if I did not reflect that, in condescending to listen, even for a moment, to what must have struck you as an irregularity, as vain and nugatory in its purpose as reprehensible in its principle, you must at least have given me credit for good intentions, and for a strong desire, sincerely felt altho' erroneously obeyed, that our countries should find themselves in that relative position which suits the interests and tends to the happiness of both.
When I professed a readiness to make my proposal in writing, it was, as you state, provisionally; but I did not intimate that I was acting without authority, nor did I comprehend that such was, as I now know it to have been, your impression. The provisional nature of my offer arose out of circumstances, & was afterwards pressed upon conviction that, if it was meant to adopt the views of the President, nothing more could be necessary. I understood you to be desirous of ascertaining, whether I was empowered and disposed, with a view to a final arrangement, to present, what I had suggested, in a written form, as an overture originating with my govern-
ment? I said, of course, that, everything being first matured, a note should be presented, but that I would, with your permission, take a little time to consider of the manner and terms. I did not at that time suppose that we were conversing about a written proposal, which was to be made only to be rejected, or even for the purpose of deliberation, and consequently, in professing my willingness to make it as soon as we were prepared for it, I presumed that I had done all that you had desired. And I was confirmed in this opinion, not only by your saying nothing, as I supposed, to the contrary, but by your requesting me, as I was about to leave the room, to employ myself, before, the next interview, upon such a note as we had been talking of, and then retracting that request, by observing, that I would doubtless first desire to know what were your ideas and intentions upon the subject of it, with which I was given to understand I should be made acquainted at another conference.
At the third interview, after speaking of a transaction upon the Lakes, of which your traders complained, and of another occurrence in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, you observed, that you had thought long and anxiously upon what I had suggested to you;—that the subject had at first struck you as being much more simple than upon careful examination it had been found to be; that, in the actual state of the world, it behoved both you and me to move in this affair with every possible degree of circumspection; that, without some explicit proposal on my part in writing, upon which the British government could deliberate and act, nothing could be done; and, finally, that you must leave me to consult my own discretion whether I would make such a proposal.
It appeared to me that, if this determination should be persisted in my overture was not likely to be successful, & I urged, accordingly, the propriety of going on in a course which would lead us to a better issue. That course was, that we should understand one another as to our respective views, and that a concise note, which I had in fact prepared since the last meeting, should then be presented and acted upon. You informed me that my wish in this particular, could not be acceded to; that, if I presented a note, you must be left at perfect liberty to decide upon what it proposed; that you could not give me even an intimation of the probable consequences of it; and, in a word, that you would neither invite nor discourage such a proceeding. You added that there were some points, belonging to the subject, which it would be proper to discuss in writing; one of which was the connection between our Embargo and your Orders of November, supposed to be implied by my proposal. I remarked that, with an actual result in view, and with a wish to arrive at that result without delay, it could not be advisable to entangle ourselves in a written correspondence, undefined as to its scope and duration, upon topics on which we were not likely to agree; and that, if I were to frame my note, with a knowledge that it was to provoke argument, instead of leading at this crisis to a solitary change in the state of the world, you must be conscious that I too must argue. And where would this end? To what wholesome consequence would it conduct us? At the close of the interview I observed that, as the footing, upon which the subject was now placed, made delay of no importance, I should take time to prepare such further proceeding as the occasion required.
On the 26th of August I had the honor to see you again, and, after entering more at large, than I had before believed to be proper, into a consideration of the effect of my proposal on the equity of adhering to your Orders in Council, and after reading to you parts of my instructions, I delivered an official note in which the proposal was made in the form required.
Something was said at this interview of the affair of the Chesapeake, and the President's proclamation, which, it is not, I presume, necessary to repeat. It will be sufficient to state, that you asked me what was to be done with these subjects? and that my reply was, that they had no connection with the present; but that I could say, with confidence, that my government had every disposition to attend to them, with a view to such an adjustment, as would be honorable to both parties. I did not suppose that it was expected (for you did not intimate such an expectation) that renewed negotiation upon these points should, as well as the repeal, upon terms, of your orders in council, be invited by a formal overture from the government of America.
I will not trouble you with many observations more.
You state in your letter that "there was one point upon which you were particularly anxious to receive precise information, and upon which, from my candor and frankness, you were fortunate enough to obtain it." This was "whether in fact the orders in council of November, had been known
to the government of the U. States, previous to the message of the President proposing the embargo, so as to be a moving consideration to that message." I quote this passage, principally, that I may recall to your recollection, that my suggestions, upon the subject of it, were not made officially, or as being authorised, or furnished, by any communication from my government, or in answer to any direct enquiries on your part. They were very briefly made, near the close, as I think, of our third interview, in consequence of your intimation, intended perhaps to amount to an enquiry, that my proposal implied, that the embargo had been produced by the orders of November; to which you added that this could not be admitted, and (as I comprehended what you said) that it even required to be made the subject of some notice or discussion in writing as intimately connected with my proposal, if it should be brought forward in that shape; and I understood you to assign this as one of the reasons why a written overture was indispensable. In replying to that intimation, and the remarks which followed it, I professed to speak, as I did in fact speak from general information only, and disclaimed, as it was my duty to do, all authority to say more, upon the nature and origin of the embargo, than I had some time before communicated to you, in obedience to the orders of the President. The purpose of my observations was chiefly to shew that there was no inducement for embarking in formal discussions upon this point; and I assured you that it was not in my power, either as respected instructions from my government, or knowledge of facts, to do so. My opinion was, and I spoke accordingly, that it was one of those questions which might be left completely at rest, without the least injury to the wisdom or the justice of our conclusions, upon the great object of our conferences. There could be no objection, however, to my giving you on this head such conjectural information as I was able. On the contrary, by fully disclosing to you my own materials for forming an opinion upon it, you would be enabled more distinctly to see that I could take no part in any discussion which you might propose to apply to it, and I could not but be assured, that any anxiety you might feel to obtain a knowledge of the facts in question, sprung from considerations which had every claim to my respect; for I knew that your mind was far above the reach of prejudices which would ascribe the American embargo to participation in the councils or views of your adversary, or of any foreign power whatever.
My suggestions were to the following effect: that I believed that no copy of your orders of November had arrived in the U. S. at the date of the President's message; that a recent change in the conduct of France to our prejudice did appear to be known; that intelligence had been received, and a belief entertained, of your intention to adopt some further measure, as a measure of retaliation against France, by which our commerce and our rights would be affected; that there was reason to conclude that you had actually adopted such a measure; that (as I collected from American newspapers) this had appeared from private letters, and the newspapers of this country, received in the U. S. some days before the message of the President, and probably known to the government; that, in a word, various information concurred to shew that our trade was likely to be assailed by the combined efforts of both the belligerent parties; and that the embargo was a measure of wise and peaceful precaution, adopted under this view of reasonably anticipated peril.
You observe, in another part of your letter, "that you have always rather wished to refer the argumentative discussion of the subject of the orders in council to the official correspondence which you have more than once been taught to expect me to open upon it." If I should object to any part of this statement, of which the substance is undoubtedly correct, it would be to the words "more than once." Your wish has always appeared to be such as you now represent it, and you had reason to expect that I would commence a written discussion of the orders of November, soon after their publication. I had told you that I should do so, and you had said that there could be no objection to it. But you were afterwards informed that, upon reflection, I had determined to leave the subject where it was until I should know the pleasure of my government.
The orders had been officially communicated, not to me, but to Mr. Madison, through the British minister at Washington. I seemed, therefore, to be proper (unless my instructions should make it otherwise) that the view, which the government of the U. S. took of them, should find its way to you through the same channel; and, accordingly, the letters of Mr. Madison, to which I have referred in my note of the 23d of August, did open, at great length, a discus-
sion, which I could have no inducement to shun, although I did not continue to think myself authorised to commence it.
It only remains to add that you share in our several conversations was, what you represent it to have been, not considerable, and that your manner, although reserved, was, as it always is, perfectly friendly.
I need not say that, if in this letter, written under the influence of sincere concern that the proposal I had the honor to lay before you has been unsuccessful, any thing is to be found which you could wish to be otherwise than it is, I shall be the first to regret, that I have not been able to do justice to my own feelings and intentions.
I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration,
Sir, your most obedient, humble servant, WM. PINKNEY.
The New-York papers of the 14th inst contain the proceedings of a meeting of the federal citizens of that place, protesting against the Embargo, pronouncing the act just passed to enforce it unconstitutional, &c. &c. These are the honorable means pursued by the outs to get in! But they will be disappointed. Even Mr. Cuming cannot save them from the award already pronounced by a nation free and resolved to remain so. The Embargo will be enforced, and our country saved from ignominious submission.
New-York, Jan. 14. NEWS EXPECTED.—A Spanish ship, in a short passage from Cadiz, bound to this port, has arrived at New-London.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MONDAY, JAN. 16. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.
The Speaker (Mr. Varnum) laid on the table a petition from 76 inhabitants of the town of Dunstable, in Massachusetts, stating it as their opinion that the electors of the state of Massachusetts were illegally appointed, and praying that the subject may be taken into consideration by Congress.
Mr. Seaver laid on the table 16 petitions from eight towns in the county of Norfolk, (Mass.) of the same tenor.
Mr. Barker also laid on the table a petition from the town of Hingham, of the same tenor.
DISTRESSED SEAMEN. The bill for the relief of sick, disabled and distressed seamen, was read the third time, and its passage decided by Yeas and Nays as follows:
YEAS—Messrs. Alexander, W. Alston, Barker, Bassett, Blackledge, Blake, Boyle, G. W. Campbell, Culpepper, Cutts, Dana, Dawson, Deane, Durrell, Ely, Gardner, Harris, Holmes, Howard, Humphreys, Isley, Jenkins, Johnson, Jones, Kelly, Lambert, Lyon, Marion, Masters, McCreery, Milner, J. Montgomery, N. R. Moore, Jr. Morrow, John Morrow, Mumford, Nelson, Newton, Pitkin, Porter, J. Richards, Riker, Russell, Seaver, Shaw, Sloan, Smelt, Smilie, J. Smith, Stedman, Storer, Story, Sturges, Swart, Taggart, Tallmadge, Taylor, Thompson, Troup, Van Cortlandt, Verplank, Wharton, Wilbour, D. R. Williams, N. Wilson, and Winn—66.
NAYS—Messrs. L. J. Alston, Bard, Boyd, Brown, Burwell, Eppes, Franklin, Garnett, Gholson, Gray, Heister, Hoge, Kenan, Lloyd, Love, Macon, D. Montgomery, Pugh, Rea, (P.) Rhea (T.) M. Richards, Rowan, S. Smith, Stanford, Upham, Van Dyke, Van Horn, Van Rensselaer, Whitehill, and A. Wilson—30.
INDIANA TERRITORY.
On motion of Mr. Thomas, the House resolved itself into a committee of the whole, Mr. W. Alston in the Chair, on the bill for the division of the Indiana territory. The blanks in the bill were filled, and it was reported to the House.
[The bill, as reported, provides that after the 1st day of March next, all that part of the Indiana territory, which lies west of the Wabash river, and a direct line drawn from the said Wabash river and Post Vincennes, due north to the territorial line between the United States and Canada, shall, for the purpose of temporary government, constitute a separate territory to be called ILLINOIS, and that until otherwise ordered by the Legislature of the said Illinois territory, Kaskaskia on the Mississippi, shall be the seat of government of the territory.]
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading—without a division.
On motion of Mr. Dana, the bill for the relief of Edward Beemont, now imprisoned for the sum of 400 dollars due, as a penalty to the United States, went through a committee of the whole, Mr. Pitkin in the Chair, was reported to the House, and ordered to be engrossed for a third reading.
NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT.
On motion of Mr. Story, the House took up the report of the committee of the whole on the amendments of the Senate to the bill authorising the President of the United States to employ an additional number of seamen and marines.
The question having been stated on concurring with the committee of the whole in their disagreement to the first amendment of the Senate, in the following words:
"That there be fitted out, officered, manned, and employed, as soon as may be, all the frigates and other armed vessels of the United States, and gun-boats: That the President of the United States be authorised and empowered to cause the frigates and armed vessels, so soon as they can be prepared for actual service, respectively, to be stationed at such ports and places on the sea coast, as he may deem most expedient, or to cruise on any part of the coast of the United States or territories thereof."
Mr. Minor explained the reasons why he should now vote differently from his vote on a former occasion. He wished that the House would not concur with the committee of the whole in their disagreement to the first amendment.
Mr. Sturges assigned the reasons for his vote in a speech of about twenty minutes.
Mr. Story made a speech of about an hour and a quarter in favor of the amendments from the Senate.
Mr. Rhea (T.) spoke about minutes against them.
Mr. D. R. Williams replied to Mr. Story in a speech of near an hour.
Mr. Smilie spoke on the same side for about fifteen minutes.
Messrs. Bacon, Lyon and Durrell, each spoke a short time in favor of the amendments from the Senate.
The question was then taken on concurring with the committee of the whole in their disagreement to the first amendment of the Senate, and carried by Yeas and Nays, as follows:
YEAS—Messrs. Alexander, W. Alston, Bard, Bassett, Blackledge, Biount, Boyd, Boyle, Brown, Burwell, Butler, Calhoun, G. W. Campbell, Chittenden, Clopton, Culpepper, Deane, Desha, Eppes, Franklin, Gardenier, Gholson, Goodwyn, Gray, Heister, Hoge, Holland, Howard, Johnson, Kenan, Kirkpatrick, Lambert, Lloyd, Macon, Marion, McCreery, D. Montgomery, N. R. Moore, Jr. Moore, Jer. Morrow, J. Morrow, Nelson, Newbold, Nicholas, Porter, Pugh, Randolph, Rea, (P.) Rhea, (T.) J. Richards, M. Richards, Seaver, Smelt, Smilie, J. Smith, S. Smith, Southard, Stanford, Taylor, Upham, Verplank, Wharton, Whitehill, Wilbour, D. R. Williams, A. Wilson, N. Wilson, Winn—68.
NAYS—Messrs. Bacon, Blake, Clay, Cutts, Dana, Davenport, Dawson, Durrell, Elliot, Ely, Findley, Fisk, Gardner, Goldsborough, Green, Harris, Holmes, Humphreys, Isley, J. G. Jackson, R. S. Jackson, Jenkins, Jones, Kelly, Key, Lewis, Livermore, Lyon, Masters, Milner, J. Montgomery, Moseley, Mumford, Newton, Pitkin, Quincy, Riker, Rowan, Russell, Shaw, Sloan, J. K. Smith, Stedman, Storer, Story, Sturges, Swart, Taggart, Thompson, Troup, Van Alen, Van Cortlandt, Van Dyke, Van Horn, Van Rensselaer—55.
So the amendment of the Senate was NEGATIVED, by a majority of thirteen.
The other amendments of the Senate were severally negatived. The Yeas and Nays were taken on the amendment for inserting 4,440 seamen instead of 2000—Yeas 41—Nays 73.
The bill of course is now sent back to the Senate, as it originally went from this House, divested of the amendments which that body had made, and simply authorises the employment by the Executive of 2000 additional seamen and marines.
TUESDAY.—A message was received from the Senate, informing the House that they insisted on their amendments to the bill for employing an additional number of seamen and marines, and that they have appointed a committee of conference on their part to confer with a committee of the House of Representatives on the subject. The house did not act on the message.
THE STOCKHOLDERS of the Commercial Company of Washington are hereby notified that an instalment of Two Dollars & Fifty Cents on each share is required to be paid at the office of the Company, on Monday the 20th of March next, agreeably to the Articles of Association. Those who neglect to pay will not be entitled to Dividend. JOSEPH FORREST, Fr. January 18—
FRESH GARDEN SEEDS. THE Subscriber has an assortment of Garden Seeds, and mostly of his own saving last summer, for Sale at his Nursery Garden, Eastern Branch, and at Dr. Ott's Medicine Store, Georgetown. THEO. HOLT. Washington city, January 18—2aw2m
FOR SALE.
A Most valuable MULATTO LAD, about 22 years of age, has served five years under two good Scotch gardeners, well accustomed to all sorts of plantation work and handy at any very intelligent. Since he eloped from me, he has hired himself to do house-work and take care of horses, at both which he is said to be dextrous. Ha'ing ran away without any provocation, he will be sold only to those who would carry him to the West-Indian country, and I have no doubt he will make an excellent body servant. Apply to JOHN TAYLOR. Upper Marlinton. January 16—3t