The national intelligencer and Washington advertiser. (Washington City [D.C.]), 1808-01-06 00:00:00

National Intelligencer.
WASHINGTON ADVERTISER.
VOL. VIII.
WASHINGTON CITY, PRINTED BY SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH, PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE.
NO. 1128.
FIVE DOLLARS PER ANNUM.
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 1808.
PAID IN ADVANCE.
CONGRESS.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10.
Debate on the bill from the Senate authorizing the building of gun-boats and for the defence of ports and harbors.
(CONTINUED.)
MR. STOKES said he did not rise to illustrate this subject after the long discourse of the gentleman who had just sat down, (Mr. Elliot) nor should he presume to follow him through his almost superhuman flights. When the gentleman first began, Mr. S. listened with attention and a great degree of solemnity, to what appeared to be a political funeral sermon. He attempted to follow the gentleman's course, but alas! said Mr. S. he ascended so far beyond the reach of my feeble optics, that I was under the necessity of dropping down into my humble seat. Whether he returned to his proper atmosphere, Mr. S. could not exactly say; for if he did, his voice had become so feeble that it could not be heard. Mr. S. would not enlarge upon the subject, but merely say, that after waiting so long in suspense, from all he could discover of the gentleman's meaning, he was convinced that the difference of opinion betwixt him and that gentleman must be as great as the difference between "the mole's dim curtain and the lynx's beam." In order to discover (said Mr. S.) whether the gentleman's very eloquent and elaborate speech was as much beyond the comprehension of others as it transcended my understanding, I know no better way than to call for the Yeas and Nays on this important question.
MR. FISK said he did not rise to enter into the discussion at this time, but to answer an observation of his colleague to the purport that the confidence of the people of Vermont was withdrawn from the Executive. Mr. F. said, as far as he knew their opinion, they had perfect confidence in the government, and would have as long as it should be continued to be administered in the same wise manner as had always been pursued by their present chief magistrate.
MR. DANA observed, that from some things which had been said, he perhaps ought to be admonished, and relinquish his right of speaking; but as he had not yet become so humble as tamely to give up a right which he possessed, he would take the liberty to make a few observations.
The question he understood to be a bill from the Senate, appropriating a sum of money for the construction of an additional number of gun-boats. It had not been printed for that House, but as he understood its intention, it was to give to the President a certain limited discretionary power to cause money to be expended. It was not an act by which the President could be obliged to make the expenditure, but an authority to make it, which he might or might not exercise, as he judged the public interest required. The question was not, should 188 gun-boats be at all events built, but should the President be armed with a discretion to build, if he was of opinion the public interest required it. If then members were not satisfied that the number of gun-boats already built are adequate to that species of service required of them, they would be in favor of building others.
What was the situation of the legislature at that time? In respect to foreign relations, they had not the necessary information to enable them to judge so well as could be wished. That House had not in its possession any dispatches relative to the affair between the Chesapeake and Leopard. There had not been laid before them any general system of defence, nor had they been told the probable issue of the negotiations with England. In all points they were in the dark. It was a well known provision in the constitution, that the President should give to Congress information of the state of the union, and recommend to them the adoption of such measures as he deemed expedient; and it must be well known to every member, that it was all in vain to think of attacking, when the chief did not direct the mode of attack. It would be perfectly in vain to provide means of defence which the executive would not think proper to use. What had the President recommended? He was known
to them as commander in chief, and to him belonged the right of directing the public force. What, then, did the commander in chief require? What was that force for which he was willing to pledge his responsibility? No other than gun-boats. At the last session, in a message to the House on that subject, he had explicitly recommended them. They were also understood to have been recommended to the present session, though not in such explicit terms. As President— as commander in chief of the national force, he desires to be furnished with gun-boats, as a means of defending the nation. He requires nothing more. Amid all the anxiety, agitation and alarm into which the country had been thrown, gun-boats were asked for as the principal means of defence. It was all, in point of force, which the President required for taking satisfaction for the wrongs committed against the country. In this situation, what was the duty of the House? Considering the President as highly responsible in regard to our foreign relations, would the House refuse to him the means of defence for which he applied? If, indeed, all that had been said about the public danger was illusory—mere tales to sport with the public feeling, there would be no need for any mode of defence. But when these things were represented in earnest, would the House refuse to the executive such means of defence as he required for the public safety, or would they press on him other modes of defence which he thought perfectly useless? It appeared to him the most correct course to vote for the bill, especially as it only gave a discretion to build, and was not a positive order to build.
He would readily acknowledge that gun-boats would be of great use in defending certain portions of the territory. At the mouth of the Mississippi they might be peculiarly so; for there no troops could be landed—no batteries erected, nor could vessels of heavy burthen pass up, there being no more than two and a half fathoms water on the bar at its mouth. They would also be useful in narrow rivers—at long shot, especially where the shot could have the whole range of the vessel's deck—on coasts abounding in shoals, and in narrow passages. He therefore felt it his duty to vote for as great an amount of this kind of armament as was judged necessary for the defence of that portion of the country where they promised to be efficacious. But when they passed north of the Hudson, did gentlemen then talk of gun-boats for defence? They must have forgotten for what these things were intended. To be useful, they must be navigated by skilful officers, and skilful seamen; but no skill was ever acquired on board of gun-boats.—Men must go elsewhere to acquire skill.—Their real use was as an auxiliary force of subordinate character; and in this character, with the aid of other naval armaments, they would be useful.
When your officers and soldiers behaved so gallantly before Tripoli, did those men live in gun-boats, or did they reside on board of vessels of larger force, and only act occasionally on board gun-boats? Did gentlemen talk of that affair proving the utility of gun-boats? Tripoli had gun-boats, and why did they not defend the place? Ask the superior skill and bravery of your officers and seamen. Gun-boats were useful in that affair, merely as they served to bring brave men in close conflict with their enemy.
With respect to the use of gun-boats, we have been reminded of the result of a contest between the Russians and Turks in the year 1788. In that case, the victory of the Russians over the Turks did not principally arise from the superiority of gun-boats over ships of the line and frigates. It was a victory of science and refinement over ignorance and barbarism. What has been styled the Liman Sea is a Marshy Lake near the mouth of the ancient Boristhenes, now called the Nieper. As far as I have been able to ascertain the fact, that lake, in its greatest breadth, is not so broad as the narrowest part of the Chesapeake Bay between the Capes and the Potomac. Below the confluence, with the Nieper, of the river Bog, anciently called the Hypatis, there is a considerable expanse of water, which is variously denominated. It is sometimes called
the Liman, a Russian term, which denotes a Marshy Lake—sometimes the bay of Kinburn—sometimes the estuary of the Nieper. The navigation is difficult at all times, and it is particularly dangerous to bad seamen, from the number of shoals, the narrowness of channels, and the variety of currents. The Turks, although long in possession of it, were ignorant as to that navigation. The Russian flotilla had a commander of distinguished gallantry and skill, with experienced seamen, veteran soldiers, and a tremendous artillery.
It was not from choice that the Russians used gun-boats rather than large vessels against the Turks. The Russian fleet of large ships could not be sent round from the Baltic through the straits of Gibraltar and up the Mediterranean, as early as was desired for securing the Russian fortress of Kinburn. Gallies, gun-boats, and various descriptions of light vessels were prepared on the Nieper. The fortress of Kinburn stood on the left bank of the Nieper, near its entrance into the Black sea. And the Russian flotilla was stationed near the shore in an advantageous position where they were in a great measure covered by the cannon of the fortress.
The Turks had ships of the line, frigates, and smaller vessels; and were commanded by the captain Pacha or high admiral Hassan Ali, who had distinguished himself against some revolting beys and mamelukes in Egypt, where impetuous valor principally decided the contest. But the Turkish Commander, although successful against the Egyptian rebels, could not prevail against the Prince of Nassau, who commanded the Russians.
One great object of the Turkish fleet was the fortress of Kinburn, which was particularly important to the Russians for holding possession of the Crimea or Tauric Chersoness, so much regarded by the Russian government.
There were three engagements between the Turks and Russians in the bay of Kinburn. In the first instance, the Turkish commander employed his smaller vessels, amounting to 57, for attacking the prince of Nassau with 27 sail. The Turkish assailants were repulsed.
Afterwards Hassan Ali, impatient of defeat, entered the Liman with his principal fleet, regardless of the shallowness of the navigation; but in the mean time, the prince of Nassau had received a reinforcement of 22 vessels with one gun each. A Turkish ship of the line was soon aground, assailed on all sides, and blown up. A similar fate attended the admiral's ship of the captain Pacha. Ignorance of the navigation, inferiority in seamanship, want of skill in the management of artillery, exposed the Turks, with their impetuosity and ideas of fatalism, to be defeated by the superior skill and management on the part of the Russians.
The next morning, several more of the Turkish ships were found stranded; and a battle ensued, which continued for more than four hours. The Turks were defeated, and their commander, immediately after the action, abandoned the enterprize and sailed from the Nieper.
In voting for the bill on the table, he would not be understood to say, that he thought other means of defence unnecessary. He disclaimed the idea. Gun-boats would be found altogether useless in the northern waters, and he could not for a moment suppose the people solicitous for a mode of defence which must, upon experiment, prove altogether nugatory. As to their safety, he was not disposed to say much on the subject. It might however be recollected, that a number of these boats, not exceeding ten, had sailed for the Mediterranean in the most favorable season of the year & that one of them was lost. This was not a very strong proof of their safety.
The opinion of naval gentlemen had been introduced to show the efficacy of gun-boats. What was the opinion of captain Decatur on this subject? In his letter to the Secretary of the Navy, he expresses his hope, that if any other kind of naval force was employed, he would not be kept on board a gun-boat. This was as strong language as an officer of
honor and sensibility could use to his government, and was sufficient to show that he had but little confidence in the efficacy of gun-boats.
He wished he could see some additional mode of defence proposed. Gentlemen had told them they would meet it fairly when it was proposed. He preferred having a view of the whole system of defence at once—not, however, that he doubted the candor of gentlemen.
MR. NICHOLAS said, this bill was objected to yesterday because the system which it was intended to embrace would not afford protection to commerce. It appeared upon the very face of the bill that it was not intended to accomplish the protection of commerce. To day the bill was objected to because gun-boats alone were not an adequate mode of defence. Had it ever been said that they were? For himself, Mr. N. said that if this was all the preparation they intended to make, no man would scout the idea with more indignation than himself. Was there any man who believed that they were so lost to a sense of duty as to rest the defence of the nation on gun-boats alone? No man could believe it.
The gentleman from Connecticut, and other gentlemen who had spoken on the subject, had acknowledged that they considered gun-boats in some situations as a valuable—peculiarly valuable species of defensive force. An attempt had also been made to convert this into a local question. Was it so? If it was, when his residence was known, and the situation of the great bulk of the state of which he was a representative, no man would believe that he should vote for it on local considerations.
There was one observation on the nature of this means of defence which Mr. N. had not heard made. He considered gun-boats as a mode of defence, of which the United States could immediately possess themselves; ships of war might be years on the stocks: gun-boats might be built immediately in every port of the United States; it was impossible to say how long it might take to procure ships of war and make them ready for service.
From what Mr. N. had heard, he believed that gun-boats would be an effectual defence for the port of Boston. The gentlemen from New-York, who were so much alive to the safety of their city, had not requested that they might not have gun-boats for the defence of that city. No gentleman had disclaimed gun-boats for their defence; but had said that they were not alone an effectual defence.
Complaints had been made that the President of the U. S. had not recommended to the House the adoption of particular measures. Had the President attempted to direct the Congress of the U. S. whither to turn their attention, it would have been rung thro' the union that they were mere scribblers appointed to register his edicts. Mr. N. would not undertake to say what was most proper for the President to have done, but he would say, that it was more respectful to the nation and to the House that they should be left with a certain discretion, and to act on a certain responsibility. In our present situation, the constitution had placed the power of making provision for defence, not in the Executive but in the representatives of the nation. Did it become the President of the U. S. to recommend to them to make war or to take war measures? When the President of the U. S. had given to Congress all the information which he possessed, he had done his duty; and they ought not to hesitate a moment in providing means of defence. He thought he had understood the gentleman from Connecticut to say, that no measures had been recommended by the President, except gun-boats, and therefore he should vote for them. Mr. N. said he had looked at the message from the President of the U. S. and could not see that there was any express recommendation of that measure, more than of raising an army, or any other defensive preparation.
Mr. N. believed the gentleman from Connecticut had said that there were no dispatches before the House relative to our differences with [Mr. Dana explained that those were not his words; he had said, the House were not in possession of a copy of any dispatches relative to the affair between the Chesapeake and the Leopard.] Mr. N. said he presumed he had misunderstood the gentleman: on that subject, however, Mr. N. was about to have said, that from any publications which had been seen in this country, all the papers which were in possession of the executive had been before them; because they had seen the documents re-
lated to the negotiation throughout to its conclusion.
Mr. Thomas said, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Dana) had stated that the President had recommended gun-boats, and that this was the only means of defence, which he had recommended, and he referred to a message of the President sent to that House at the last session to prove the truth of this position. Mr. T. said he wished the Clerk to read the first paragraph of that message; it would completely contradict the assertion of that gentleman. Mr. T. said the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Elliot) had also hung the most of his speech upon the same position.
The Clerk then read the following paragraph from the message alluded to:
"Under present circumstances, and governed by the intentions of the legislature, as manifested by their annual appropriations of money for the purposes of defence, it has been concluded to combine, 1st: land batteries, furnished with heavy cannon and mortars, and established on all the points around the place favorable for preventing vessels from lying before it; 2d: moveable artillery, which may be carried, as occasion may require, to points unprovided with fixed batteries; 3d: floating batteries; and 4th: gun-boats, which may oppose an enemy at his entrance, and co-operate with the batteries for his expulsion."
Mr. Dana said that gentlemen seemed very anxious to disprove the fact that the President had recommended gun-boats. The reason why Mr. D. voted for them was, that the President of the United States had recommended them, and relied upon them chiefly for defence, and because it was the first defensive measure for which money had been called for.
Mr. Dana did not say that the President did not give them as much information as he ought, or that he did not give them as much direction or leave them as much discretion as was necessary. Mr. D. said he spoke merely of the limited information, and few recommendations given to the House. He considered the President as commander in chief, and because he had recommended this measure, with such a broad view of the whole ground as he must have, possessed of all the means of information, with the assistance of all the talents of the heads of departments, Mr. D. was called upon to vote for this bill. Mr. D. did not say whether the recommendation had been made at this session or any other; he only meant that the general course of proceeding implied an approbation of that mode. What was the tenor of the whole course of communication between this House and the Navy department, or with the Executive? Whether weakly or wisely, Mr. D. said was not the question, but what was the fact as to official communication? With all their opportunities of knowledge and information which the Executive officers must possess, it was their opinion that gun-boats formed an eligible part of a permanent system of defence; and this would influence Mr. D.'s vote on this occasion.
Mr. Wilbour said the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Elliot) had told the House that the state of Rhode Island did not want such defence as gun-boats would afford. Mr. W. said he would inform the gentleman that he had the honor to represent that state in part, and that he should vote for this bill, because he believed gun-boats were the only floating defence proper to be erected.
Mr. Cook said he was not opposed to gun-boats, he voted for an increase of their number at the last session; he was now in favor of increasing the number, and should vote for this bill, though he had rather a smaller number had been authorized, to allow a greater proportion of other modes of defence. He was only opposed to them when considered as of themselves forming an entire system of defence; when proposed only as part of a system in which he was in favor of them. He would meet gentlemen who were in favor of the gun-boat system, and vote for as many as should be necessary for the protection of the southern waters, and would vote for the whole number proposed by the bill in that point of view, hoping they would be as well disposed to accommodate him when other modes of defence came under consideration.
Mr. Randolph hoped, before this question was decided, that they should understand something about it. He had been waiting with great impatience for some information on the subject; and after all the debate which had taken place, he was now just as well informed as when he first arrived at the House. He hoped the gentleman who had introduced the bill, or some other gentleman, would inform them to what extent the appropriation in the bill would diminish the regular expense of our naval establishment? He merely wished for information.
Mr. Burwell said, he had not intended to address the House upon this subject, but as his colleague had called on some member of the committee before whom this bill had
(Continued on last page.)

she was mistress of the world. Her former policy had led to the peace of 1763, which, humiliating as it was, had conceded any that she had then a right to expect. The same course was now recommended to America, that she should launch into the water, and fight her enemy on her own terms. If able to contend on that element it would be time enough to prepare for it, when they had provided for the land; but in the name of heaven (said Mr. R.) let us take care of terra firma first.
When he rose to speak he had not intended to say half as much as he had done. Although he should give his solitary and inefficient vote against the measure, he should feel extremely happy if the experiment should prove that his objections to it were groundless, and that it should surpass the most sanguine expectations of its utility; as he should rejoice to find himself mistaken in any case in which the result should redound to the welfare of his country.
Mr. Quincy said he had not intended to have taken any part in this discussion; but as his colleague had stated that the people of the Northern states were favorable to this mode of defence, he should say a few words on the question. He would state what was the opinion of American merchants and seamen who were acquainted with this and other naval armaments, not only in Boston, but in New-York and Philadelphia. He had endeavored to obtain correct information on the subject from the proper sources; and he had not yet seen the man of experience in naval affairs, who thought that these should constitute a principal part of defence, or who expressed a higher opinion of their efficacy, than that they might be useful in some places. The mode in which they were to be erected too, in great numbers, and to so great an expense as to exclude other means of defence, that excited the apprehensions of those opposed to them.
Mr. Q. said, he could state from as high authority as that quoted by his colleague, that seamen abhorred and contemned these boats; that it would not be possible in New-York to man 60 gun boats, and that seamen would rather go and fight with muskets in merchants ships than serve in gun-boats. And why? Because there was not room in them for seamen to sit upright; they were obliged to sit like dogs upon their haunches. He did not know this by actual experiment; but he had it from authority on which he could rely, that seamen could not be procured to man these boats. It had been said that they might get militia to go on board: Mr. Q. said, if seamen would not serve, surely militia would not stand it. Another reason against the use of gun-boats was, that the men confined on them in narrow decks were exposed so much to the fire of musketry; if ever they came within musket shot of their opponent, they were exposed to great danger.
The way to make seamen look danger in the face, was to bring them to close quarters with the enemy, not to suffer them to fight and run, fight and run again. Mr. Q. was surprised to hear his colleague dwell with so much satisfaction on the argument that these boats could get into shoal water and behind points of land. He was afraid this might be thought to be the spirit of the Northern people: the soil in which Providence sprang, did not produce men who would hide themselves when danger came; they would meet the enemy wherever he should come; they would fight at close quarters, and if the nation would not give them decks of their own on which to fight, they would find a way to fight on those of the enemy.
The misfortune of this system in the mind of Mr. Q. was this: that the men whose spirit would induce them to serve their country, detested these boats. If men could consent to cop themselves in these cages like hogs, fattening for the knife, their blood was so milk white, so thin, that they were not worthy of the honorable trust of defending their country.
A great argument in favor of these boats had been urged, that they could attack at long shot, and with heavier metal than frigates, at the same time presenting but a small mark to their opponent. Would not the enemy, said Mr. Q. understand your machine as well as you do? If they know that you have nothing but gun-boats, will they not bring against you other force than ships of war? A gentleman formerly in our navy, but lately from Jamaica, had assured him that every ship on that station carried four boats capable of carrying an 18 pound carronade each. Talk of fifteen men to each boat! If they came within reach of a ship, they would have 160 muskets at once opposed to them, and it would be a very unequal contest; they would be obliged to keep a respectable distance from any ship. It had been said that the navy of Great Britain was
so powerful, that the United States could never erect a navy sufficiently powerful to cope with it: if this were correct, the argument operated just as much against gun-boats as against frigates or ships of the line.
It had not been his intention to have made any observations on the other mode of defence, by a navy; but since others had discussed the subject, he deemed it his duty to make a few observations. Did gentlemen seriously believe, that the country could exist one year in war without a navy? Shut up their seamen in port, and the clamors of the country would oblige the government to commence a naval establishment; and in two or three years of war, a navy would spring up—but of what kind? A navy of haste, constructed of ill-seasoned timber, and erected under all the inconveniences of war.
One observation he would make to correct the error of opinions entertained by southern and western gentlemen on this subject. Considering the nation in its national character, in the character in which all defensive measures must be adopted, he would ask those gentlemen if a navy was not a most important agent, not only for the protection of commerce at sea, but for maintaining a communication upon our shores? There was no knowing when the bolt of war would fall, or where it would first strike. A navy would bring in the shortest time possible the strength of the north to the assistance of the people in the south; it was as a bond of union that Mr. Q. thought the United States should have a navy. In case of a war, in what way could the communication between the western and eastern ports be kept up but by means of a naval force? Such a force, and such an one only, could keep open the Mississippi.
There had been an objection raised to a navy that it would be impossible to protect our commerce in every ocean. This, said Mr. Q. is going upon the ground that we cannot trust ourselves; that power when we have it must be abused; but we must trust ourselves, and not refuse to fulfil a beneficial purpose, because we might go too far.
If our navy when erected was confined, as he contended it ought to be, to the defence of our ports and shores, it would give it a great advantage over an opposing navy—over ships coming immediately across the Atlantic; as ours would be contiguous to a friendly shore, and would procure men and supplies whenever necessary, while the enemy is weakened by a long voyage, and at the same time on an hostile shore.
Under this view he considered a navy as necessary for the defence of the country, and the erection of a navy would ultimately prevail. He had not gone into the subject as thoroughly as he could wish, as he spoke on the spur of the occasion.
The House then adjourned.
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 11.
Mr. Rhea (T.) said, before the question was taken on the passage of this bill, he wished to make a few observations. Had the bill been positive in its provisions, he should have doubted whether to have given it the additional weight of his vote; but the bill being only an authority given to the executive to erect a particular means of defence, and having full confidence that any money appropriated in this manner would be employed for the advantage of the nation in general, he felt inclined to give his vote in favor of it. The first question which presented itself was, whether protection was necessary or not; and if this question had been properly considered, it would have remedied a great many objections which had been made to the bill. It seemed to be the general opinion that something should be done; one gentleman said they were at war, one represented them as on the eve of a war, another that they were neither at peace or war, but every one contemplated our situation as somewhat dangerous. If then they assumed the position that protection was necessary, it was easy to discover who were to be protected—the people of the United States and their possessions; and under this general head could be brought into view all that need be considered on the present occasion. A question now arose, by what means this protection was to be afforded? The answer to this would embrace every principle of defence which had been proposed to the House by bill, resolution, or in any other way; and in answer to the objection that every particular part of defence was not brought into view at once, it might be answered that it would require considerable time and long discussion to digest the whole great system of defence, as parts of which one gentleman wished a large army, one fortification, one navy, and one gun-boats; but the measure proposed by the bill should be now determined, as it was proper immediately to commence the work of defence. A reason had been urged against this bill, that in contem-
plating any particular mode of defence they should adapt it to a general system, and to such an extent as would be proportionable to the resources of the nation. Mr. R. conceived that the resources of the country would be sufficient to carry into effect not only the measure proposed by this bill, but every other part of a system which it might be necessary to adopt.
Mr. R. would not trespass on the time of the House as he only wished to connect the reasons from which he should give his vote in favor of the bill.
(Debate to be continued.)
MONDAY, JANUARY 4.
Mr. Porter presented a memorial from sundry merchants of the city of Philadelphia, stating that several vessels in that port had already received their cargoes and taken out clearances at the time of the passage of the law laying an embargo, and praying that such vessels, some of which had already departed the port of Philadelphia, and were detained in the river, be excepted from the general embargo; which was read, and a motion having been made to refer it to the committee of Commerce and Manufactures.
Mr. Newton said he was not one who would ever object to the right of petitioning in decent and respectful terms; and should always be in favor of the reference of any petition, when the House were not in possession of such information immediately relating to the subject, as would enable them to decide without a reference. But where was the necessity for referring this petition? The House had passed a law laying an embargo; the ink in which it was traced was scarcely cold, when a petition was presented from a portion of merchants to allow these vessels to depart. Had the House passed the law with deliberation or not? If they had, it became their duty to support it. If they referred this petition, what might be the consequence? An opinion might go abroad, that they wavered in opinion on the propriety of carrying into effect their own law; and if they granted the prayer of the petitioners, the same indulgence must be extended to all in the same situation. There was no port in the U. S. where vessels had not been loaded at the time of the passage of the embargo law, & yet had been stopped in consequence of that law. And what did the petitioners state? That their vessels were loaded and from the operation of the embargo law were prevented from going. What was the object contemplated by the passage of that act? To keep the vessels and property of the citizens of the U. S. within their own jurisdiction. If this petition were to be referred, it would seem as if the House deliberated on the repeal of that law, and would encourage other petitions of the same nature. He hoped a reference would be refused, and that the petition should lie on the table.
Mr. Porter hoped the petition would be referred. What injury could arise from allowing the petition to take the usual course? The House was not pledged to any thing by consenting to the reference. They could reject or adopt the report or modify it. If they turned a deaf ear to applications that were made to them by the people; if the practice obtained of rejecting petitions without deigning to consider their subject matter, what, he asked, became of the right secured to every citizen by the constitution of petitioning the government? Was it not rendering the right a mere nullity? The gentleman from Virginia had said that it would be proper not to refer this petition, as by so doing it would discourage others from petitioning the legislature on the same subject. If the House were not disposed to grant relief to these petitioners, he thought even in that case it would be better to have a report stating the reasons of their refusal. This would be more satisfactory to the people than the mode pointed out by the gentleman. The case of the petitioners was peculiarly hard. They had obtained regular clearances from the custom house before they received notice of the embargo, and had incurred considerable expenses in preparing for the voyage. He was also informed that a great part of the property would be almost a total loss to the shippers if it did not reach a market early in the spring.
Mr. Milnor said it would be observed, that the petitioners stated that they had actually cleared out their vessels before the embargo was notified. In clearing out their vessels previous to the interdiction of embargo, they had complied with every provision of the laws of the U. S. so far as respected things under their control; they had not contravened any law of the United States, had done no act which should subject them to penalty or to loss. Now it seemed to
Mr. M. to be a question, whether vessels could of right be detained when cleared out previous to an embargo? He did not mean to say that they could not; but he thought it might be a subject of enquiry, whether a law having that operation, was not ex post facto . This petition, couched in decent language, related to a subject in which the interests of these people were deeply involved; they were in a situation peculiarly severe, having not only slipped property of a perishable nature on board their vessels, but engaged the captains and crews for voyages; they must also be at a great and unavoidable expense in addition, because, he understood, they could not get clear of the maintenance and pay of these seamen during the whole continuance of the embargo; those vessels, which though loaded had not cleared out, were not subject to the same inconveniences, because they were not burthened with the great expense of supporting their seamen. Mr. M. was not now prepared to say that he should be in favor of an exemption in favor of those vessels which had thus cleared out, but thought it a subject which ought to be enquired into. The gentleman from Virginia had told the House if they passed a law, it should be carried into effect. True it was that they should enforce it as far as it was equitable; but if, as was stated, this was a peculiar case, and the petitioners endured much more than their portion of inconvenience, it was worthy of enquiry, whether no method could be taken to avoid inflicting on them that distress which must overtake them if the law was rigidly enforced. He hoped the petition would be considered in the usual way, by reference. As to the impression going abroad that they were deliberating on the repeal of that law, there could be no weight in that idea. The committee to whom this should be referred might give solid and sufficient reason for continuing that provision of the law, or for granting the particular prayer of the petition.
Mr. Cook always was and always should be in favor of referring petitions from respectable persons clothed in decent language. The embargo law, of a provision in which these merchants complain, was well known to have been passed with great dispatch, if not in a hurry; and that part which provides that vessels already cleared out should be subject to it, was a part which had escaped his particular attention on his passage; it appeared to him in this particular to be of the nature of an ex post facto law. He hoped the petitioners might have a hearing, and that the facts would be submitted to a committee for investigation.
Mr. Newton to exclude debate, withdrew his opposition to the reference.
Mr. Burwell moved to refer this petition to a select committee, that it might be enquired into, and that the merchants of the United States might be given to understand that the House would pursue that course which would enforce the continuance of the embargo. He thought that by a reference to a select committee such a report might be obtained as would evince to the nation the propriety of adopting the measure and the reasons in its favor.
Mr. Taylor said he had not on any occasion allowed himself the liberty of treating with disrespect petitions from any portion of the people; and in this case he should adhere to the line which he had marked out for his conduct. And lest it might be conceived from his voting in favor of a reference of this petition, that he participated in the sentiments of the petitioners, he deemed it proper to say that it was from principle alone that he should vote for considering it; and he must be permitted to declare that the petitioners themselves might be charged with as base motives as those from the same city who had been refused a reference of a petition on a former occasion during this session. He thought they might be charged with being induced by foreign influence, to endeavor to paralyze every measure for the good of their country, or might be supposed to be among the acquaintances of Cobbet in America—so taken up with their idol Mammon, with their zeal after profit, that they cared not what became of the country if their coffers were filled. He would compare the conduct of the merchants of the city of Charleston whose petition was scouted the other day, with that of these men, who might either be called the votaries of Mammon or by a worse name.
Mr. Smith saw no objection to the reference of this petition. He supposed that the hardships under which those persons labored, whose vessels were already loaded at the passage of the law were very great. Under these considerations he thought it would be proper to commit the petition because it would require a particular
report to be made upon it. When he said this, he was well convinced that general policy would not warrant the granting the prayer of the petitioners; he thought however, that the memorial should be referred.
Mr. Dana thought, if gentlemen so much respected the right to petition, they ought not to deprecate the insertion of all principles which did not exactly concur with their own opinion. If they made it a rule to reject all petitions not conformable to their own decisions, they rendered null and destroyed one of the great ends of petitioning, for it was when they were aggrieved only, that the people wished to petition; such conduct would in effect be saying "We will not regard any petition whatever." He thought therefore the petition ought to be referred on general principle. Could gentlemen fear the answer which a reference of the petition might produce from the committee? Could they dread a comparison between the reasoning contained in the petition, and that which a report unfavorable to it might contain? The general rule of reference ought to be regarded, more especially of petitions on great public questions. Independently of this general principle he thought there were special reasons for a reference of this petition: the case of vessels which were cleared out, and had on board all their cargo as well as papers, when the law passed, and which had been detained in bays or rivers by adverse winds, was peculiarly rigorous. Vessels had been cleared out of Philadelphia, having on board foreign merchandise about to be exported; these vessels had proceeded on their voyage, but had been arrested in their progress, and brought back, by the operation of the embargo law. What was their situation? They would have to reland their goods at a loss of 3 and an half per cent. of drawback; and if they wished to export them six months hence, they must pay another 3 1-2 per cent. upon them, because they had gone down the bay of Delaware previous to the passage of the law, and had been brought back. Whether the Secretary of the Treasury possessed the power to remedy this defect, he did not know; but he believed he did. He wished the petition, however to be referred to a select committee, to examine whether or not in particular cases the law laying an embargo operated more rigorously than was required by the general policy of the measure.
Mr. Porter merely rose to say that he held in his hand a certificate of the collector of Philadelphia verifying the facts stated in the petition which was read.
The Yeas and Nays being required on the question of reference.
Mr. Crowninshield said he understood the petitioners to pray that vessels cleared out previous to passing the law laying an embargo, should be permitted to proceed to sea. It appeared to him that they asked what could not well be granted. This case did not apply to Philadelphia or Delaware alone, but to Baltimore and the Chesapeake, and to every port in the country. He had no doubt that there were several hundred vessels cleared out to foreign ports previous to the laying an embargo, and which were by it prevented from sailing. Should they be permitted from that circumstance merely to be exempt from the general embargo? He thought not. However his own interest or wishes might dispose him to this permission, he could not consistently grant their prayer. But was he the more opposed to a reference of the petition? By no means. He believed the petitioners had always a right to petition, and he should uniformly vote for a reference of their petitions, when couched in decent and respectful language. But at the same time he should vote for a reference of the petition, he must say that he did not see any reason why these vessels should be permitted to depart. The House had said that they would prohibit vessels from departing, whether cleared out or not. The law would operate severely on these persons; he knew it would, but it would also operate severely on others. Those vessels would suffer great inconvenience which had goods on board, although they had not cleared out. He was in favor of a reference, in order to obtain any additional light that might be thrown on the subject, not as some gentlemen were, with a view to favor the prayer of the memorial. If gentlemen thought the embargo was wrong, let them submit a proposition to repeal it; he was prepared to meet it on fair grounds.
Mr. Smith said the question now was, whether the petition should be referred to the committee of commerce and manufactures. A proposition had been made to refer it to another committee. He hoped the House would not deviate from the common rule; for if any subject was proper to be referred to the Commi-

tee of Commerce and Manufactures, it was this.
The question of reference was then decided by Yeas and Nays as follows:
YEAS.—Messrs. Alexander, W. Alston, Bacon, Bard, Barker, Bibb, Blackledge, Blount, Boyle, Brown, Calhoun, G. W. Campbell, Carlton, Champion, Chandler, Chittenden, Clopton, Cook, Crowninshield, Cutts, Dana, Davenport, Dawson, Doane, Druell, Ely, Findley, Fisk, Franklin, Gardner, Gardner, Gray, Green, Harris, Heister, Helms, Hoge, Holland, Holmes, Isley, Jenkins, Johnson, Kenan, Kirkpatrick, Knight, Lambert, Lewis, Livermore, Macon, Manion, M'Creery, Milner, N. R. Moore, T. Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Mosely, Mumford, Newton, Nicholas, Pitkin, Porter, Pugh, Quincy, Randolph, Rea of Pen, Rhea of Ten. J. Richards, M. Richards, Riker, Russell, Seaver, Sineit, Smilie, S. Smith, Southard, Stanford, Stedman, Storer, Sturges, Swart, Taylor, Thomas, Thompson, Upham, Van Allen, Van Dyke, Van Rensselaer, Wharton, White, Wilson, Witherell.—91.
NAYS.—Messrs. Burwell, Butler, M. Clay, Desha, Howard, Lloyd, Love, Nelson, Sawyer, Sloan, J. K. Smith, Trigg, Troup, Van Home, M. Williams, Winn.—16.
Mr. Bacon presented a memorial from the governor, by the direction of the legislature of Massachusetts, praying Congress to consider or compromise claims of certain citizens of that state and others to lands formerly granted by the state of Georgia and afterwards ceded by that state to the United States, (the Yazoo claim); specifically praying "that their claims be satisfied by an equitable compromise, or settled according to known principles by an impartial tribunal." A motion being made by Mr. Bacon to refer it to the committee of claims.
Mr. Dill moved that it be rejected; but the Speaker declaring a motion for reference to have precedence, Mr. Bibb called for the Yeas and Nays on its reference.
Mr. Marion moved that it be referred to a committee of the whole; which latter motion was agreed to, 71 to 37, after a debate of three hours, which shall be commenced in our next.
The motion for reference of this petition was supported by Messrs. Smilie, Livermore, W. Alston, Holland, Bacon, Elliot, Chandler, Marion, Quincy, Macon, Crowninshield, and Cook; and opposed by Messrs. Bibb, Troup, Nelson, Randolph, and Alexander.
A question being made as to the day on which it should be taken up. The first Monday of June next was named and disagreed to, 51 to 38. The first Monday in May was negatived, by Yeas and Nays, 56 to 41. This day was named, but the most distant day took preference of course. The second Monday in February was agreed to, 55 to 45.
Mr. Randolph called for the consideration of a motion made by him a few days ago and postponed till this day—(relative to General Wilkinson.) A motion for adjournment took precedence of this, and was carried—Ayes 63.
Mr. Crowninshield presented the memorial of Jonathan Grout, praying that some person may be authorised on the part of the U. S. to treat with him respecting the erection of telegraphs; which was referred to a select committee consisting of Messrs. Crowninshield, Nicholas, Findley, Thomas and Troup.
TUESDAY, JAN. 5. The House were this day wholly engaged in the discussion of the resolution offered by Mr. Randolph on Thursday last, in relation to General Wilkinson.
The question at the last consideration was on its reference. It had been then moved to refer it to a select committee, with power to send for persons, papers, &c. and a motion made to amend this motion by striking out the words in italic was then under consideration and of course was first taken into consideration this day.
The motion for striking out these words was supported by Messrs. Lyon, Campbell, Milnor, Holland, Sloan, Dana, Fisk and Alston, and opposed by Messrs. Stanford, Gardner, and Elliot; and was carried, by yeas and nays, 72 to 38.
The question was then taken on the reference of the resolution, and negatived, only one or two rising in favor of it. The question then recurring on the original resolution, Messrs. Burwell, Troup and Quincy supported, and Messrs. Blackledge, Milnor, Campbell, and Gardner opposed it; when Mr. Bibb said it was now a late hour (half past four) and several gentlemen who would wish to express their opinions had not yet had an opportunity; he therefore moved to adjourn. Carried, 60 to 43.
The debate on this day will be commenced in our next.
WASHINGTON CITY.
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6.
The SENATE have assigned tomorrow for considering the report in the case of John Smith.
We some time since, to guard against misconception, deemed it our duty, in noticing an article in the National Public Ledger, relative to a French seaman who had deserted from the Patriot, to observe that admitting the facts to be correctly stated in that print, we presumed that but little difficulty could arise in adjusting the grounds of difference, from the established usage of our government in like cases, which has been on a demand for deserters on board of a national vessel, where it is satisfactorily shown that they are not American citizens, to order their DISCHARGE.
The Ledger, in honoring this article with a republication, was pleased to pronounce it jesuitical in manner, and without foundation in truth. Accustomed to respect the comparatively decent and even urbane language of this print, we were not a little surprised to perceive in it such a flagrant dereliction of decorum. And how, forsooth, did the Editor attempt to establish the charge of a destitution of truth? By the assertion that our government has in no instance surrendered a British deserter. Thus confounding the terms discharge and surrender, which, it must be obvious to the meanest capacity, convey distinct and even opposite ideas. The little respect we felt for an understanding that could surrender itself to such a confusion of ideas we imagined would be best manifested by silence.
The United States Gazette went still further. With characteristic arrogance and folly it observed—"of all the wicked and atrocious falsehoods, which our duty compels us from time to time to expose, the following is one of the most impudent." [Referring to the article in the Nat. Intel.] In the malignant aspersions of the Editor against the administration he falls into the same egregious folly with the Public Ledger, dexterously substituting the word surrender for the word discharge, and thus enjoying a great, though imaginary, triumph.
Now, reader, what think you of the following article, taken verbatim from the Public Ledger of the 28th ult. the very paper that so rashly pronounced the article in the Nat. Intel. unfounded in truth.
"We understand, from very respectable authority that orders have been recently issued to all naval commanders in the service of the U. S. directing that they are to discharge from under their respective commands all foreign seamen, which they shall be satisfied are deserters from any foreign service. It is, we presume, in consequence of these orders that two men have been discharged from the Chesapeake within a few days past, one a British seaman, and the other the French seaman who was particularly noticed by us a short time since.
"We are happy to perceive that our government is sensible that the employment of deserters from foreign service is wrong, and although this order cannot remedy the mischief which has happened, it may be the means of preventing future mischief.
"It is true the present order does not authorize the delivery of the seamen to the officer demanding them, it however goes far enough as relates to the conduct of the American officer. The delivery of deserters to the nation they belong to, is a matter of special negotiation, or legislative authority. In this state, it would be in the teeth of a positive penal statute."
Here is a complete verification, from the mouth of an adversary, of the justness of our statement. The regard to truth, which induced the Editor to make this statement, should likewise have dictated to him the justice of retracting the unfounded imputation cast on the article in the National Intelligencer. We can scarcely flatter ourselves that this notice will receive any attention from federal editors, or that they who have rashly pronounced without knowledge will have the candor to acknowledge their error when detected, as this does not appear, in their opinion, to form any part of their duty. It will, however, be an evidence to our readers of an observance on our part of that truth, which it ever has been and ever shall be our highest ambition not to violate.
A late London Morning Chronicle, after asserting the right of England to resort to a measure of retaliation on France, which shall prohibit neutrals from carrying the productions of her colonies, says—
"Upon the question of right, there-
fore, we have no sort of doubt. We are entitled to apply toward America the law which she accepts from France. But in this, as in every thing, we are at liberty to waive the privilege, which strict law confers upon us, and to compare the benefits of enforcing the remedy with the disadvantages of winking at the injustice. The question is one of general policy. It is not what we are to concede to the Americans, but what good effects we are to procure for ourselves, and what inconveniences we can inflict upon our enemies, that we ought principally to consider. If by interdicting all commercial intercourse with them through foreigners, we could force them to discontinue the war, or to feed our resources by purchasing whatever they want from our emporium, there could be no dispute. But this way of stating the question is begging it. The point to be considered is, would this consequence follow? We very much fear it would not, and that the interdiction of neutral trade would be felt most by ourselves. To suppose that the French, who have suffered all sorts of violent disorders, who have seen their Kings and Queens, and Princes murdered, who have seen their property confiscated and dissipated, and their children hurried away to the armies, without the least question of the right of the quarrel, should rebel, or even murmur, at the dearness, or the want of sugar and coffee, is an idea so despicably foolish and absurd, that those who can even venture to hint at it, are not worth arguing with. We may be quite sure, that Bonaparte can very easily compel the very limited number of those who consume such commodities to renounce them, and in a land where wine and bread, and all the real necessaries of life abound, how can any body expect insurrections from the disappointed consumers of coffee and sugar? The truth is, and we ought to know it, such privations, if they are privations, will never be felt but by the few shippers and brokers of the commercial towns, now accustomed to ruin and decay. And to this class Bonaparte, with all his anxiety for ships, colonies, and commerce, never listened for one moment. Would to Heaven he had, "errorem hostibus illam!" The vast mass of the French people, those who swell Bonaparte's armies, never think of foreign luxuries. To them, all foreign commerce is of no consequence; and perhaps the event will shew, that it is not of half the consequence to any nation that has been supposed. The spirit of activity which commerce has excited, has been too much confounded with mere buying and selling. If by any other cause an equal degree of activity, spirit, and intelligence can be procured, trade may be dispensed with.
"If then the interdiction of commerce did not greatly distress France, and we believe it will distress France very little, may we not, by the grand measures of retaliation, happen to distress chiefly ourselves? Even we, who are particularly inclined to hold that commerce is a good subject, but a bad sovereign, and who think that in war it ought to be infinitely subordinate to military objects, cannot think it advantageous to sacrifice commerce without any military object whatever. Our commerce and manufactures have been much turned to the supply of foreign markets; surely then if by abolishing neutral trade we render it more difficult, nay, almost impossible, to supply those markets, it appears to us that we principally punish ourselves in stopping the channels which circulate our produce. We have strength indeed to do the boasted feat, but it is the strength of blind Sampson, who brought down the edifice upon himself in his zeal to destroy his enemies."
"There are some regulations, however, which perhaps may be carried into effect with some success at least, even without the sweeping interdiction proposed. There is no doubt that the Spanish and the French sugar colonies have prospered greatly of late, and to the Americans chiefly they owe the advantage; for the sale of their produce has wonderfully promoted their agriculture. If these colonies can be blockaded, let it be done; for it is not reasonable that enemies' colonies should enjoy the advantages of peace through the intervention of neutrals, while our colonies suffer the evils of war in being restricted to the intercourse of their mother country. But in this evil, such as it is, perhaps the interest of the colonies of France and Spain, and that of the mother countries, might be distinguished, inasmuch as it is proved that the suspension of colonial monopoly is almost always beneficial to the colonies. But while the French and Spanish colonies thrive through neutral intercourse, it is not perfectly true or fair to ar-
gue that the mother countries obtain all the advantages of the relaxation. That certainly is not the case. The French and Spanish colonies at present are but nominally French. They can dispose of their produce to the best advantage, and they do so without any restriction to a French or Spanish market, or to a French and Spanish supply. It ought to be considered, then, that any regulation against the carrying of the French and Spanish colonial trade would rather hurt the colonies than the mother country, and therefore all the arguments about reducing France by such pressure, are in this, as in every other respect, ridiculous."
"The whole of the rest of Europe & N. America, derive benefit, as well as France and Spain, from the cultivation of their colonies; but at present the advantages of the mother country are not those generally supposed. They are chiefly those of sharing along with all other nations that chuse to buy their produce at a cheap rate. The capital which cultivates the French and Spanish colonies, we are strongly inclined to think, is not an European, but a colonial capital, growing out of their own prosperity, and by no means a capital chiefly owing, like ours, to mortgagees and merchants at home. The total suspension of the export of the French colonies therefore would not ruin many merchants and capitalists in France and Spain, as is generally imagined. The only effect to France and Spain would be to cut off the supply of colonial produce, and would but in a limited degree intercept the return of capital. This is not generally understood here, as our colonies stand on so different a footing. But if this view be just, any great pressure on France and Spain by cutting off their colonial trade is not to be mentioned."
"The interdiction of neutrals from colonial intercourse, supposing it pretty successful, then would leave, it is thought, the whole market for our own produce, now so much reduced by the competition of that of our enemies. On this point however, we ought to consider the consequence of preventing all neutral carriage, as well as to the vent of our manufactures in general, as of our colonial produce in particular. If the same demand for sugar, &c. were to continue after the French and Spanish produce ceased to come to market, then to be sure our produce must greatly rise in price. But upon the supposition of those vigorous measures of retaliation being adopted, would the market for our sugar, or for any sugar, be the same? Is it to be imagined, that we should immediately be called upon to supply the void caused by the want of the supply from Guadalupe and Cuba? On the contrary, would not such measures only render the prohibition of colonial produce from England more strict, and would not the foreign market, limited, as it would become, be supplied, if at all, by the smuggling from the enemy's colonies? The beneficial effects of all these restrictions is assumed upon this ground, that all which is now consumed upon the Continent would be supplied from English produce alone. Even this is but problematical at the best—while, by a sweeping measure of interdiction, as to neutral commerce, we must injure the whole of foreign trade, without doing much, or any service, to the West India planters."
"We do not, therefore, consider this question as at all involving any concessions to neutrals, or any abandonment of naval claims. Let our naval rights, when really important, be maintained, unimpaired, both for our interest and for honor, but when we speak of distressing our enemies, we ought to reflect a little what we are about, and, in attempting to injure them be careful not to maim and disable ourselves."
Extract of a letter, dated, Norfolk, January 1.
Mr. Rose, the English Minister, who arrived, in the Station on the 26th ult. still continues in Hampton Roads. It is said and generally believed, that there arrived in Lynnhaven bay seven frigates or ships of the line yesterday, perhaps to give weight to his negotiations. There seems to be more than "a speck of war in the Horizon."
FOR SALE. A neat FRANK HOUSE at the Navy Yard near the Gate in a pleasant situation—For terms apply to WILLIAM PROUT. January 6—3t
The Subscriber has just received on consignment, One Cask, containing 100 Prime PHILADELPHIA BEANS, And One Half doz. u. barrels sound CRANBERRIES, which he will dispose of on reasonable terms. JOHN OTT, Register. Georgetown, Jan. 6—2t 3/4
WASHINGTON DANCING ASSEMBLY.
IN consequence of the last postponement, the next Assembly will be on Thursday the 14th inst. and be continued every fortnight thereafter, through the Season. By order of the MANAGERS. January 6—3t
Washington, Jan. 4, 1823. WE the subscribers agree to a BREAD agreeable to the weight, this day published by the Mayor at the following price:
The single loaf at 7 cents. The double loaf at 14 cents. Peter Miller, George Burns, James Friend. January 6—3t
DOCTOR LANCASTER.
INFORMS the Public, that he has commenced the practice of Medicine, in which line of business he offers his services to the Citizens of Washington and its vicinity—He hopes from the experience of several years practice, & punctilious attendance, to give entire satisfaction to all who may honor him with their confidence. He has taken a house on the Pennsylvania avenue, adjoining the house formerly occupied by Dr. BENSON. January 6—3t
HOOP AND GELTY.
HAVE for sale at their store George Town, the following articles just received from Philadelphia, by the Schooner C. Rains, capt. HAND, jun. viz. 30 kegs butter, 20 barrels, New Town, Pippin Apples; 10 do. buck wheat flour, 10 do. Cranberries, and 10 do. shell bark hickory nuts. Also a small assortment of very elegant Loading Glasses, Watters, Trays, polished steel Spoons and Tongs, with cut and brass heads, &c. &c. January 6—4t
A MAP of the TERRITORY of ORLEANS.
Just received and for Sale at J. March's book store, Georgetown, A new and accurate Map of the Territory of Orleans, including West Florida and part of the Mississippi Territory, By B. LAFON. Price on Canvas and rolls is 3 dollars. And in sheets 5 dollars. Likewise English, German, and Pocket ALMANACS for 1808, by the gross, doz. or single. January 6—4t
CONSOLATION.
Those who wish to grow rich without much trouble may be furnished with the means by early application at J. March's bookstore, Georgetown, or of G. & R. Wall's, Baltimore, where fortune is now turning round her thousands and ten thousands to throw into the laps of the fortunate adventurers. Take notice that she has 30,000 dollars, 15,000 dollars, and three 10,000 dollars, to bestow on the fortunate adventurers, either of which sums may be procured by 12 dollars which is the present price of tickets at either of the above places. * * * Pickets warranted undrawn. * * * A regular list of drawings, will be regularly received every night at J. MARCH'S, Bookstore G. Georgetown, January 6—3t
NOTICE.
A GREAT BARGAIN.
INTENDING as soon as possible to remove to the state of Tennessee, I will sell for cash as great a bargain as has been known in this part of the country for 50 years past—That elegant estate called ABBINGTON, beautifully situated on the Potomac river, directly opposite the city of Washington;—containing about 460 acres, and now leased for a term of years to the Messrs. Wises for 360 dolls. per annum, with stipulated improvements to be made to some extent, which, with the building, &c. are to be returned at the expiration of their lease in good order. An early applicant may be assured that he may have an opportunity of vesting his money to great advantage, both for himself and his posterity, as it will be sold a sacrifice in proportion to what it was thought to be its real value before the lease was given, but it will be thus sold, in order to enable the subscriber to remove to Tennessee. She has other lands in the district of Columbia, two miles from George Town, to be exchanged for good lands in Tennessee. For terms, &c. application to be made to Baldwin Dade, Esq. Alexandria, in whose possession the title papers are lodged, and who is legally authorized to contract and convey all or any part of these lands. B. DADE, for Catharine P. Alexander. January 6—1 w3
FOR SALE.
10,000 ACRES of LAND Situate on Elk River in Randolph county state of Virginia. A large portion of this land is fertile, of excellent quality, and is adapted to the growth of grain, grass and pasturage—it abounds with fine timber, large poplar, ash, sugar tree, &c. & is well watered. Birch river runs through it and affords many mill seats. Elk is a beautiful smooth deep river emptying into the Kenhawa, and Ohio, and may be navigated with large boats at any time, in the spring and fall, at ab units with every line of fresh common to the Ohio. The whole or a part will be sold at a very reduced price for cash or exchanged for property in or near the city of Washington. For particulars apply to JOSEPH WHEATON, Com. Merchant & Broker, Washington City, Jan. 6—2m

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been discussed, for explanations, he would candidly state his own views as to the policy of naval armaments by the U. S. If the U. S. should be involved in a war with G. Britain in defence of just rights and essential interests, he had never contemplated the creation of a naval force to protect our commerce on the ocean against that nation; he thought the fruitless efforts of France, Spain and the northern powers to resist the navy of England afforded an instructive lesson to this nation, and plainly pointed out what was its policy; we should, said he, confine our efforts to objects which we could accomplish, the first of which would be to give complete protection to our ports and harbors, to points most vulnerable by the enemy, and the property of our people most accessible to his naval expeditions, and most tempting by its value to his rapacity. They should be prepared to expel the enemy the moment he touched our ground; this policy would be consistent with our resources, for it should be recollected the instant the war commenced, our revenue, derived entirely from imports and duties, would nearly cease, and could only be supplied by internal taxes, which existing circumstances would render almost impossible to collect; because the produce of the country from which money must be raised would be of little value; a naval war with G. Britain at a time when our revenue was ruined, would at its termination leave the nation encumbered with a debt which they should steadily avoid contracting. Mr. B. said, he felt no desire to see this country in possession of a navy sufficient to combat with that power; the whole U. S. if sold at public auction, admitting that there were bidders able to purchase, would not defray the expense of erecting and maintaining the enormous establishment; he verily believed the possession of a navy would ere this have involved us in war with England, who would have treated us as she has Denmark, and taken possession of it in an "amiable way." It was by different means, we should operate upon G. Britain and bring her to terms of justice; it would be by annoying her commerce with our privateers, expelling her from the continent, and seizing on her Canadian possessions, holding them as guarantees for indemnity, at a future pacification; by withholding provisions from her colonies in the West Indies, and raw materials from her manufacturers in Europe, and by forbidding the consumption of her manufactures in this country, their most profitable market. He was very much misinformed if this mode of attack would not prove more effectual than contending with a navy which had baffled the world, and swept from sea the commerce and ships of every nation; if this system did not answer, he readily confessed, we were unable to cope with a nation whose naval resources were infinitely beyond those of our infant country. It would require all the patriotism of the people to sustain the privations of a war with England; he had no idea that the country would be invaded, or its safety endangered, and he therefore felt confident the nation would submit to inconveniences, though great, much less than the calamities of war waged in any other form.
Mr. B. said, gentlemen in discussing this subject had ridiculed gun-boats, and relied upon large ships to protect our ports and harbors; let us suppose, said he, that there were four 44 gun ships, or a larger number, lying in the port of New York; of what avail would they be in defending the towns of the U. S.? While they were pinnioned in port, what would prevent the British from laying every town on the sea coast under contribution? Any naval force the U. S. could build, would be useless so long as England could bring a greater force against it. It appeared to him that gun-boats were preferable to ships of the line, for the protection of our harbors, because they might be moved, and collected without danger, at a given point, to co-operate with one another. They can always pass between the shore and the anchorage ground of a squadron, and escape to the place of destination, secure on our shallow coast so inaccessible to ships of force. Mr. B. said, all gentlemen who had spoken upon this subject seemed impressed with the propriety of using gun-boats as auxiliary to land batteries in defence of our ports and harbors. The only question then was the number adequate to that object.
He was in favor of the number proposed by the bill, because some of our most skillful naval officers who had been consulted, and who had devoted much thought upon the subject, believed this number was requisite to preserve our seaport towns from conflagration, and enforce effectually the laws in our own ports. He offered this reason as an answer to the gentleman from New Hampshire, (Mr. Gardner) who had demanded why he adhered to the particular number in the bill.
As to the origin of gun-boats he could not speak with much confidence; but it was well known they had been used by all the nations in Europe. The French, Spanish, Dutch, Italians, and the Barbary powers, had all found them excellent floating batteries, capable of opposing the most formidable resistance to an approaching squadron. England herself, with her present navy has at least 300 gun-boats, employed for the protection of her ports and harbors. He said he was pleased with the gentleman from N. Carolina (Mr. Sawyer) who spoke yesterday, and had then shown the particular advantages of gun-boats, he would not again recapitulate them, as the House, he was convinced, had given them their just
weight. Their introduction into the U. S. has been in consequence of the recommendation of Commodore Rodgers and the officers of our navy, who had served in the Mediterranean, and witnessed their efficacy as engines of defence.
It had been objected to gun-boats that they cost too much in building. Mr. B. said the present price of each was 5,000 dollars, a sum considerably less than their cost when first contracted for. If the House judged from the frigates which had been built they might reasonably suppose the price would be more reduced as the workmen became more experienced, and the materials, for constructing, are brought in greater abundance to market. But, it should be taken into view, that those gun-boats already constructed were larger and more costly than necessary; they were good sea-boats. It had been proper to build them fit for sea, because having only a few, it was frequently necessary to concentrate them at a particular point. The number being now augmented, and enough assigned for each harbor, the necessity for constructing them at the present price ceased. Mr. B. said he had been informed, that the gun-boats used by the Spaniards were much smaller and cheaper than those belonging to the U. S.
Another objection had been made to the expense of maintaining them in service. The sum necessary for this purpose was estimated by the Secretary of the Navy at 11,000 dollars annually, upon the supposition they should have their full complement of men on board during the whole year. Mr. B. said this sum would never be requisite, since it was well known not more than eight men would be employed except while in actual service; the expense therefore could not exceed one third of the annual estimate.
In the building and repairs of gun-boats, they would be found upon calculation precisely equal to the same number of guns, in frigates and ships of the line. The only inequality of expense was in their manning. Mr. B. said he was authorised to state that the committee were about devising a plan by which the gun-boats could be manned in the different sea ports by requisitions of the seamen and others in port, whenever their services may be required. This would obviate the necessity of their being constantly manned. If gentlemen would examine the places at which they are to be stationed, they would find, their population respectively would be quite sufficient for this purpose; at Norfolk for example there are to be 60, and certainly from a population of 12 or 14,000 inhabitants, men could at all times be procured. In the same manner at N. York and other places. Gentlemen dislike the manner in which they were stationed, and laughed at the idea of one or two boats defending a port. Mr. B. said they were not to be permanently fixed at any place, but to be removed as occasion might require, those on the Potomac for instance, though assigned to specific points, would be concentrated, to suit emergencies; and thus the whole could be used in defence of a place to which the smallest number had been assigned.
Some gentlemen who had spoken appeared to place great reliance on large ships of war, to defend our towns and harbors. Had the capture of Copenhagen been forgotten? It had been yesterday remarked that the Danish fleet did not protect it, though there were in port at the time of the assault 18 ships of the line, besides frigates and smaller vessels. In the year 1762, Mr. B. said, the British attacked the Havana; it was taken, together with 12 sail of the line, although defended by the strongest fortress in the world. The fact was, so far from yielding protection, ships of war could only be themselves secured by the most impregnable fortifications. Yet the House was pressed to build ships of the line when it was evident they would fall into the hands of the British, increase the navy of our enemy, and serve as an inducement to commit aggressions on our country.
Mr. B. observed he had listened with astonishment to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Dana) whose speech was partly in favor, and partly against the bill. He had told the House that this was the only measure of defence upon which the nation was to rely for protection. Did he not know that there were bills before the House to erect fortifications, to increase the military establishment, and to arm the militia? Did he not know that 100,000 men had been put in requisition by the executive? Had the gentleman forgotten his own proposition laid on the table yesterday, which he then called a measure of defence, to enable the merchants to arm and convoy their vessels for mutual security?
Mr. B. said he would appeal to the House, if this mode of discussion was candid. But the gentleman had given them a long argument to prove that gun-boats are useless and unnecessary, notwithstanding he intended to vote for them. So far from imitating that gentleman, if he thought them unfit for the purpose of defence, Mr. B. said he would not only oppose the present bill, but he would vote against any number, which should be proposed. Mr. B. said he would conclude his remarks after noticing one observation which had been repeatedly urged to the House. It was regarding the source from which gun-boats had been recommended. It was the constitutional duty of the executive to call the attention of the legislature to this or any other mode of defence deemed necessary; he readily agreed it would be highly improper to adopt it merely because it had been thus recommended, but it would be equally so to oppose it for the same reason, without
regard to the intrinsic merit of the plan, which consideration should alone influence the House who were bound to consult the public good.
Mr. UPHAM said, since so great a number was necessary for effectual defence, he should vote for it; he should rather too large a number should be built, than a number that would prove too small. He was of opinion with the gentleman from Connecticut, that, as these had been recommended by the executive, they should be authorized. He was also in favor of this bill on another ground; because he hoped that gentlemen who were in favor of gun-boats would be liberal in their appropriation for fortifications and batteries, when they came under consideration; and because many gentlemen, while in favor of gun-boats had given the House to understand, and others had insinuated that when the subject came properly before the House, they should vote for frigates. He hoped, at this perilous crisis, when the nation was on the eve of a war, that they should seriously prepare for it, and agree to combine a certain number of gun-boats with sufficient fortifications for effectual protection. How much money was in the treasury Mr. U. did not know, but he hoped they would now magnanimously prepare for war; there was money in the country and men too; he was not desirous of critically enquiring how many dollars could be spent at this time without too much exhausting the treasury; and as gentlemen appeared to be disposed to make war speeches, he hoped, when they heard the small still voice of the question for a liberal sum of money for defensive operations, they would vote affirmatively on it without hesitation.
Mr. U. thought, before this could become a great nation at home or abroad, that they should have a large navy; there could be no such thing as taking a commanding ground without a navy. It might not be necessary while our vessels continued within our own shoal waters; but the moment they left our rivers a navy was necessary. What signified the safety of an individual within his own house, if when he left it, he was at the mercy of any one who chose to assault him? The U. S. had as much right to travel over the globe as any other nation; but they were not independent till they had a navy to defend themselves wherever they choose to go. This nation must depend upon itself; an individual might as well in civil society depend upon the use of moral law upon individuals, as one nation could depend upon the justice and forbearance of another; he believed "the original sin and depravity of our nature" required every nation to erect a defence of this kind; one nation would receive respect from another so long as she could command it and no longer. Perhaps this was not the time suddenly to erect such a navy; but they might proceed gradually, from year to year, till a navy sufficiently large was erected.
However, as he proposed when he began not to take up much of their time, he would not trespass upon it farther. He should vote for this bill, not because he was in love with this particular species of defence, though it might be a necessary part of a system; but as they might have no other, and it was necessary to have some, upon the whole view of the subject, he should vote for the bill.
Mr. VAN DYKE should not have risen on this occasion, had not the yeas and nays been called; but he felt it his duty to state the reasons on which he should give his vote. He had listened with much attention to acquire that correct information on the subject which would have enabled him to discharge the duty which he owed to his constituents; but he found that he should at last be compelled to give his vote without that information which he was solicitous to obtain. He had not been able to ascertain whether it was the wish of the Executive decidedly expressed that such a bill as this should be passed; he had perused with much attention the message of the President of the U. S. delivered to Congress, submitted to the House before he took his seat on the floor, and when he examined that part of it relative to gun-boats, he could not find a decided opinion on this subject expressed.
It might not be improper for him here to remark that dispatches from abroad had now been received; and he had hoped, before they should have been called upon to give their vote upon this bill, that they should have been able to ascertain what was the opinion of the executive. It was probable that some gentlemen in the House, to whom the avenues of executive information were more open than to him, might be able to say what that opinion was; but searching as did, he had not been able to discover it. Perhaps he should not be wrong in voting for this as an executive measure, because he saw an honorable gentleman acting so strenuously on this occasion, to whom he had been told gentlemen might look up for information of the executive wishes. His own opinion originally had been, and now was, that such a system of defence should be adopted as the state of the nation should require.
The House had been told by some gentlemen that the nation was actually in a state of war; by others, that if not in a state of war, in such a situation that war was inevitable. The single question therefore now before the House was what was to be done in such a situation! Should they sit still there till it pleased the Executive department to come forward and tell them what they should do, or should they do that which they believed to be right. He was inclined to the latter course, to the discharge of his duty to the best of his ability; he
knew that some mode of defence must be resorted to. He observed that there were on the files of the House several propositions for various defensive measures. But it was the opinion of gentlemen who had more opportunities than himself for acquiring correct information, that this was the most expeditions mode of defence; he should therefore consider it as an auxiliary mode of defence, and which the Executive thought most proper now to be adopted.
If he erred in sanctioning this measure by his vote, he should err on the right side, because it was a measure intended to place his country in a state of defence. He was not convinced that this would ever alone be that efficient defence which the country would require; he therefore had thought fit to express the grounds on which he voted.
Mr. RANDOLPH said that before this question was taken he begged to be indulged with stating as succinctly as he could the reasons which did not induce, but compelled him to vote against it. He was sorry that his colleague (Mr. Barwell) who had undertaken to answer the question propounded by him had totally mistaken its meaning and object. He thought an explicit answer to it of material importance to a correct decision of that before the House. He had asked to what extent the appropriation proposed to be made for these boats would diminish the expense of the regular naval establishment?
[Mr. BLOUNT explained, that the committee of aggressions were appointed to consider on the means for the protection of our ports and harbors, and did not enquire into the propriety of an augmentation of the naval force, or even the employment of that which the U. S. now possessed. They had considered gun-boats and batteries as necessary for the defence of our ports and harbors, and had reported accordingly, without enquiring into the diminution or increase of the present naval expenses. That subject had been referred to another committee; and if gentlemen would turn to the report of the committee of aggressions, they would see that the measure at present contemplated was a part of a system. He could assure the gentleman from Virginia that the committee went into no enquiry to ascertain whether gun-boats would diminish the ordinary expenses of the navy department or not; it was not their duty, neither were they at liberty to do it.]
Mr. R. regretted that he should be called upon to give his vote upon a measure concerning which in itself, and as affecting the establishment with which it was necessarily connected, of which it was an appendage, he was totally in the dark. This was not dumb legislation, but it was worse, it was blind legislation. Instead of having before them something like an exposition of the nature of this armament, some history or demonstration of its effects, some responsible person to take upon himself the consequences if it should fail, and fail he feared it would—they were called upon to vote in a state of profound ignorance by those, whose information upon this subject at least, was equally confined with their own. If the U. S. were in a situation different from that in which he deemed them to be—he might be induced to give up his opposition to this measure, and venture upon it merely by way of experiment, provided that he had something like a connected account of the machinery of this system. But this was no time to make ducks and drakes of their dollars, to waste them in mill-pond projects of childish amusement. It was a time when every spare shilling should be applied to objects of undisputed utility, and not to matters of mere speculation. And it was because he wished to see the sinews of war—arms & money—in possession of the U. S. and to retain them there, that he was unwilling to join in the call to pipe all hands upon deck to start the whole treasury of the U. S. into the holds of these frail and perishable barks. He did, upon his soul, believe that if the bill upon their table passed, they might whistle for thearming of the militia and might give up all thought of seeing the country placed in a respectable posture of defence, within and without, from danger of whatsoever kind. It was for this, and he trusted in God there was in that House but one sentiment—to save the Republic—that he should vote against the measure. He should despise himself if he could vote against it from any other motive than a conviction of its public utility. He wished to see the nation armed, protected by a competent force—not so precarious and perishable in its nature—not a provision of sugar and salt, but of men and iron.
The chief argument of his colleague (Mr. Burwell) who supported the bill was that the estimates of the expense of these boats were overcharged. He thought the experience of that gentleman in public life, though not so long as that of some others in the House, nor so long as Mr. R. hoped it would be, had yet been long enough to convince him that no reliance could be placed in the expectation of finding a naval estimate overcharged. If they were guided by past, and he might almost say uniform experience, they ought to calculate upon an excess of actual expense of fifty or sixty per cent. at least, beyond the estimate.
The same gentleman had said, if Mr. R. understood him correctly, if not he wished to be corrected, that gun-boats had been tried in Europe and found a sufficient defence for ports and harbors there. But would any man compare the basons of Boulogne or Havre, scooped out by human hands, not bigger than an egg shell in comparison, with the capacious bays and broad estuaries of this great continent? Did the gentleman know that the boats of which he spoke were first chained to each other
and then chained to the shore, and that but for these last nings the enemy would long since have carried them all off? Was this the sort of protection now contemplated? Was it proposed to haul the gun-boats up into the Albany slip at New York, or at the county wharf at Norfolk, and chain them to the land? Why not plant the cannon on the wharf at once and save the expense of the boats?
Mr. R. said, there was a case which stared them in the face, and which, to his surprise, no gentleman had appeared to notice in the manner it deserved. This was the precise case of Algesiras, about which they had heard so much. Would any man contend that the passage of the Gut of Gibraltar was more easy than that of the Capes of Virginia—that it was wider? Or that the Chesapeake itself was less fitted for the action of ships of war than the straits? And yet had they ever heard of an attempt made by these gun-boats to stop a single British ship of war passing in or out of those straits? And why had they not? Because they were incompetent to the object. During this long and bloody war the gun-boats of Algesiras had never dared to contest the passage of the straits with the enemy's ships of the line. He wished therefore to know whether this force was to protect the Chesapeake, the Hison and other great waters of the U. S. or whether they were to be drawn up above Craney Island. Gentlemen had said that they wished to put the government in possession of a force which would enable it to expel from our waters the ships of a foreign nation, which might contumaciously refuse obedience to our proclamations and laws. Have we not now, said Mr. R. a case precisely in point, demonstrating the insufficiency of gun-boats to accomplish such an object. We had now seventy of these boats. A small British squadron had anchored within our waters—a proclamation had been issued commanding them to retire. In defiance of its authority they persisted in remaining within our jurisdiction. And yet these seventy gun-boats together with the whole naval force of the union, even with Decatur at their head, were deemed insufficient to enforce the proclamation—and these ships yet rode triumphant. It was found that with all the navy of the U. S. and all their gun-boats into the bargain they could not maintain their authority within their own jurisdiction, and yet they were called upon to build more—something in the style of the physician in the comedy, who prescribes bleeding, and although at every operation the patient is visibly worse, has no resource but in a repetition of it. Sir, if 70 gun-boats are insufficient to expel the squadron now lying in Lynn Haven bay, it is not 700 that will afford a shadow of defence for the long line of your sea coast. Mr. R. said that if, as appeared to be the case, the old navy of the U. S. was to be abandoned (he did not mention this as an objection) why not convert them into gun-boats, or block ships mentioned by a gentleman from New York. But in answer to this he supposed his colleague (Mr. Burwell) would tell him (and he would listen to him with pleasure) of the famous attack upon the Havana, in which the strongest fortress perhaps in the world, and 12 ships of the line, was unable to cope with the forces under Lord Albemarle. If the gentleman's case proved anything, it proved that all systems of defence were good for nothing. If a narrow passage, such as that leading into the Havana, protected by the tremendous batteries of the Morro castle and a powerful fleet, could not be defended against the British navy, how could they expect to shut up a great bay, 21 miles across with a few gun-boats, or even to guard the narrows at New York. At the Havana and at Carthagena, the Bocca Chica, as it was emphatically called, permitted but a single ship to pass at a time, and yet the entrance into both places had been forced and the first captured. His friend from Virginia would find it not less idle to attempt to contest the Chesapeake with these boats against ships of the line, than to extend naval protection to our commerce in the Indian ocean, which he had justly derided as a chimera.
Mr. R. recollected, not verbatim, but substantially, an expression of that minister, whose character as a man and as a politician he held in higher reverence than any other upon record—the first, the great William Pitt. In the memorable war which he had directed against the whole house of Bourbon, with a glory that never has been equalled and never can be surpassed, that wonderful man with a modesty peculiar to great greatness ascribed the success of his enterprises, not to his own merit, but to the circumstance, that France, instead of confining herself to the continent of Europe, where her strength lay, had attempted the attack or defence of distant possessions—thus giving her enemy a prise upon her, of which otherwise she could not have availed herself. In meeting Great Britain upon the ocean France laid bare her only vulnerable point, and was vanquished not more by the sagacity and prowess of her enemy, than by her own want of foresight. She had since seen her error—and what was the consequence? Abandoning her old system, and maintaining herself on her own element, the natural theatre of her power, she had become mistress of continental Europe, and perhaps whilst he was then speaking
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