The national intelligencer and Washington advertiser. (Washington City [D.C.]), 1802-01-11 00:00:00

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, AND WASHINGTON ADVERTISER.
Vol. II.
WASHINGTON CITY, PRINTED BY SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH, PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE.
No. CLXXXIV.
FIVE DOLLS. PER ANN.
MONDAY, JANUARY 11th, 1802.
PAID IN ADVANCE.
National Intelligencer.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
TUESDAY, JAN. 5, 1802.
DEBATE.
On the Apportionment Bill, on a motion made by Mr. Bayard to strike out 33, and insert 30,000.
[Concluded]
Mr. BAYARD said he should beg the indulgence, before the question was taken, of a few observations in reply to the arguments of the gentlemen opposed to him. The peculiar interest in the subject which attached to his State would apologize for the trouble he had given the Committee. It had been said that Delaware ought to be satisfied, that if she had ground to complain of the want of a complete representation on this floor, the equality she enjoyed in the Senate and her weight in the election of President, were juster grounds of umbrage to the larger States. He was surprised at such an intimation.
The Constitution had settled the political proportions of the States, and each one had a right to insist upon the full advantages which justly belonged to it on constitutional grounds. Delaware was satisfied with the Constitution; but it was not to be expected she would yield a pretension she could rightfully claim.
In the present instance, what was insisted on he could demonstrate to be equitable.
It was only asked that the State should be represented in the proportion she was taxed, in the proportion she supported the common burthens of the Union.
In the apportionment of the direct tax lately levied upon the United States, the quota of Delaware relative to Virginia was as 1 to 11, relative to Pennsylvania as 1 to 7. The apportionment of representation upon the ratio adopted by the present Bill was in relation to Virginia as 1 to 22, and in relation to Pennsylvania as 1 to 18.
He would appeal to the candour of the House, if it could be just that the proportion of taxation should be double the proportion of representation. The Constitution had connected them, and evidently contemplated their proceeding in the same progression.
He could not help indulging a hope, that neither the apathy nor the interests of the larger States would induce them to oppose the justice of a case which was so glaring.
He would add on this head, that the white population of Virginia in relation to Delaware, did not exceed the proportion of 9 to 1; and he did not believe that a greater proportion was paid by Virginia of the taxes derived from excises and the duties upon imports, which composed the principle pecuniary burthen of the United States.
In the militia requisitions, Delaware stood in relation to Virginia as 1 to 10, in relation to Pennsylvania as 1 to 9. In short turning his views to every object, he could discover no equality between the burthens supported and the representation allowed to Delaware by the present Bill. On the contrary, the ratio of her burthens was in all cases double, and in many more than double that of her representation.
Some gentlemen had asserted that it was indifferent to what part of the nation the unrepresented fraction belonged, whether to a small or to a large State. If, said Mr. B. we had interests as a nation only, and not as States, the assertion might be correct. But was he to be told whether it was the same thing to Virginia, whether she had 22 or 23 members, as it was to Delaware whether she had one or two? With a view to every State consideration the loss of a member to Delaware was equal to the loss of 11 to Virginia. Suppose Virginia to have 22 representatives, Delaware two, and the other States in their several proportions, and a general agreement is made to strike off one-half of the representation. The loss to Delaware would be one member, to Virginia eleven, and the other States in proportion.
Mr. B. said, he might console himself and comfort his constituents, if it were practicable, and gentlemen were disposed to equalize the ratio of taxation with that of representation. But of this he
had no hope, either as a thing feasible under the Constitution, or as a thing to which the House would be ever brought to consent. He had no other resource, than to rely that the magnanimity of the larger States, would protect from injustice and oppression their smallest and weakest sister.
Mr. B. said, he was not governed in the opinion he had adopted in relation to the ratio by the consideration solely of State interest. His great object was to augment the members of the representative branch of the government. He believed that the strength of the National Government existed in that House, and that by increasing the members of this House, its weight and strength were augmented. He confessed it to be his object, to make the general government so strong as to be able with equal certainty to control the largest as the smallest States. It was now able to govern the small States, but if one of the largest should deny and resist the authority of the Union, he doubted the ability of the government to enforce obedience to its laws. He had occasionally advocated an increase of executive authority. He had then been charged with views unfriendly to republicanism. He was now contending for an increase of the weight of the popular branch of the government.
He was actuated by the same motive, which had always induced him to give his support to the executive. His uniform object had been and would continue to be, to maintain the independence of the general government, and to render it efficient enough to curb the ambition and to repress the dominating spirit which was inseparable from the large States. His voice had never been to vary the relative powers of the executive and representative branches; but generally by increasing the strength to confirm the stability of the government. An opportunity now presented itself of promoting the same object by augmenting the weight of the popular branch; he embraced it with more zeal than he had ever felt in the support of executive prerogative. He rejoiced in an occasion which enabled him to manifest, that the true object of his views was not inimical to the equal rights and constitutional liberties of his country.
He was firmly convinced that the House of Representatives was, and necessarily would be the main pillar of the general government. While this branch retained the attachment and possessed the confidence of the nation, the government would endure; but if any State could succeed in weakening the affections of the people from this House and transferring their confidence exclusively to the States, the government would perish.
He wished to enlarge the field of action and employment under this government. So small a number occupy the ground upon the floor of this House, that the talents and ambition of the mass of men aspiring to distinction are directed to State objects, and seeking the aggrandizement of the States, eventually become hostile to the general government. The representation of the country was too sparse, it was not sufficiently united and bound to the bosom of the nation.
The same sympathy and confidence did not subsist between a representative and constituent when widely separated. Under the State governments, the representatives proceeded from every neighbourhood. They were well known, connected by common interests and friendship, and thence enjoyed the entire confidence of their constituents. Whereas a representative in this House is known by name only to the greater number of those who elect him.
This evil will always remain, but it may be diminished. A gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) expressed his apprehensions, that by augmenting the members of this House, the splendour of the State Legislatures would be obscured, and they might ultimately dwindle into insignificance. Mr. B. said, that it was certainly strange, that when Virginia alone had a House of representatives composed of 190 members, such an apprehension should be expressed, when it was proposed to allow to all the United States only 156. In her State legislature Virginia would have 190 Members, when her representation here would consist only of twenty four.
It had been intimated that he was unfriendly to the State governments. He declared the intimation to be without the smallest foundation. On the contrary his principles and conduct demonstrated his attachment to those
governments. The safety of the State governments reposed upon the strength of the general government. The Constitution expressly guarantees the integrity of the States. He could conceive of no motive which could lead to the abolition of the State governments. Suppose them abolished, what advantage would the inhabitants of a small State derive. They are melted down into a national mass, but they acquire nothing which they did not enjoy before, nor any thing which every one does not enjoy in common with them. The intimation supposes some greater advantage, or greater honor in living in a large State than in a small one. Of any such thing, he was not in the smallest degree sensible. He felt the same satisfaction, and was quite as proud to represent the State of Delaware, as he could be to represent a district of Virginia. If the case were otherwise, and he could feel any little pride in saying he belonged to a large State, it was a feeling which a trifling change of place might gratify. But, (said Mr. B.) the people of the small States have as great a stake in their governments as those of the large.
Upon those governments depend their peculiar laws, their moral and religious institutions, which have fashioned their manners, and habits, and sentiments, and opinions. It is impossible to imagine that the people of any State, would be willing to see the system of rights & obligations, of wrongs and remedies, belonging to private life, which has been hallowed and consecrated by antiquity and usage, liable to be broken down by the powers of a general government.
Is this supposed too to be the project of Eastern gentlemen? For his part he was infinitely more apprehensive, that the disposition of the Eastern people was to separate, rather than politically to amalgamate themselves with the Southern.
Taking an opposite view of the subject, Mr. B. said, he could discover motives, which might lead the aspiring men of large States, to seek the depreciation of the general government. The general government removed, they flood like the lofty oaks among the brambles of the forest.
All experience had shewn political bodies, equally with individuals, stimulated or impelled by the passion of aggrandizement. It was possible for the great states to see an interest in the depression or dissolution of the federal union; but it was impossible for the small states to derive an advantage from the abolition of the state authorities. The danger therefore to be apprehended was a dissolution of the union by the large states, and not a consolidation by the small.
It had been denied by a gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) that this house represented the people of the United States; and asserted that we are to be considered on this floor as the representatives of the people of the states. By this he understood that the representation of each state were to be considered as representing only the people of their own state. This doctrine he considered as repugnant to the nature of the government, and tending to efface its leading feature. The gentleman had recourse, for the support of his position, to the words of the constitution which declare, that the representatives should be chosen "by the people of the several states."
In fact, by the laws of the several states, and particularly of Virginia, the representatives were chosen in districts, and if there was any thing in the gentleman's argument, the members from that state ought not to be severally considered representatives of the state, but of the particular districts for which they were chosen.
Mr. B. here quoted the provisions on the same subject of the constitutions of Virginia, N. Carolina and Pennsylvania, and remarked that the expressions more strongly confirmed the election of the members of the state legislatures, to persons residing in the several counties, and observed that there would be the same propriety in contending that the members of the state legislatures were not to be considered as representatives of the whole state, but each of the respective county by which he was chosen.
Much had been said about consolidation, with little attention to the subject to which the term was applied. Nobody could deny that the general government was a consolidated government, to the extent of its powers. The states remained unconsolidated, but the powers delegated to the general government were consolidated. Within the sphere of its
power there was the same unity of action as in the state governments. The government was created for national purposes & was constructed on national principles. Its powers are limited, but in the exercise of its powers it acts as a national and not as a federative body. Mr. B. here read the letter of General Washington to the President of the old Congress, announcing the adoption of the constitution, and particularly remarked on the following: "In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in view, that which appears to us the general interest of every true American, the consolidation of our union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity and safety, perhaps our national existence."
The sentiments of the letter maintained the doctrines for which he contended. It was the source of peculiar gratification to have the support of an authority which once commanded universal respect, and for which his own reverence had not in the smallest degree abated.
Mr. B. said he had been reproached with a wish to encroach the power of the government; that failing to encroach the power of one branch, as a last resort an attempt was now made to encroach that of another. Nothing could be more unfounded than this charge. The measure he proposed added nothing to the powers of any branch of the government. It was simply to encroach the number of hands, in which the existing power was to be deposited. The point of difference between him and the gentleman opposed to him, was that he was desirous of committing the powers of the government to a greater and they to a smaller number. He wished to multiply the representatives of the people; they to diminish. Whether the house consisted of 100 or of 150 members the powers of the government remained the same, though probably a power exercised by 150 would be more likely to be attended with effect than if supported only by 100.
Mr. B. concluded with a brief recapitulation and application of the general points of the argument.
Mr. MITCHELL said he hoped the motion would not prevail. He wished the interests, the rights and even the feelings of the people of America to be fairly and fully represented. But he was by no means persuaded that this desirable object would be in any sensible degree promoted by the motion before the committee. The bill contemplates the establishment of the ratio of representation, which the citizens of the United States shall have in this branch of the National legislature. Various ideas had been entertained and stated concerning the nature and object of this legislature. It had been urged by one gentleman that states only were represented here. It had been contended by another that the members of this House, though chosen by states, ought to be totally detached from state-influence. He believed neither of these conclusions were justly correct. His own opinion was that the federal constitution was an institution for which there was no example in history. In vain was any government like it looked for among the republics of ancient Greece. The Achaean league was indeed a noble tho' inefficient attempt at something of the kind. In modern Italy, warfare and contention had generally kept the republics at variance, and the struggles between the rival powers of Genoa and Venice, had manifested to us a spirit abroad as the Athenians and Florentines had shewn at home. Even among the Swiss and the Grisons, there was a confederation of states, and not a Representation of them in a general council. The cantons of Helvetia were a mere confederacy of republics, that is, a league together of distinct and independent sovereignties, by compacts and treaties for the safety of the contracting parties. But there was no general council of the nation. In the United Netherlands, some approach towards a form of government had been made, yet the system was immature and imperfectly elaborated.
In America the organization of the political system was widely different. Here different colonies had been settled and provinces conquered under European governments. They grew and prospered as dependants upon a transatlantic sovereign. In process of time, oppression threatened them with her iron rod, and they declared with one voice, they would be free. Instantly each colony and province was erected into a free and independent commonwealth. The pressure of external foes forced them all to combine in a common cause. A sense of impending danger made it necessary for all those newly-erected sovereignties to associate for the purposes of
general defence. They bound themselves by an article of agreement for that great purpose, and associated themselves as well as they could. But the coalition was too lax and incoherent to endure long. As soon as peace was made, and the fleets and armies of the enemy were withdrawn, the Congress, was found to be nerveless and without power.
Another attempt was made to ameliorate the plan of the general government. And the result of that effort, is the present happy and unexampled constitution under which we are assembled; a form of policy, without parallel in the annals of nations. For here, the commonwealths of America, referring to themselves the right of sovereignty as to local, individual, and internal affairs of each, send representatives to this House, to deliberate upon the more extended, general and exterior matters which are interesting to them all. It is only in relation to this latter object that the establishment and powers of the House of Representatives ought to be contemplated. And this object was particularly defined in the constitution of the United States. So far as power was given by that Magna Charta of our liberties and no farther, did the legislative powers of this body extend. The great regulations by which the security of our reputation, our property, and our lives were guaranteed, rested chiefly with the state legislatures; and he was happy he had left all those invaluable rights provided for, and well preserved at home. For the regulation of the principal part of territorial and local concerns, involving the right of individuals and the relation of these to things, as well as the modes of preventing and punishing crimes. He was perfectly satisfied that the requisite power and wisdom resided in the respective states; and there it ought to reside. How then is this House constituted? By the states, whose qualified inhabitants chose representatives. For what object is it constituted? To deliberate upon those general questions merely, which are expressed in the constitution, and are truly of a federal, universal or national nature.
He considered such a government as of a new and peculiar constitution. It had been called by some federal; he questioned the correctness of that term, as both the word federal and confederated, if regard was had to their etymology and derivation, meant a connection of independent states by treaties. By others it had been termed a sort of consolidation, as respected a number of great and leading objects. He believed that there might be some hesitation at admitting either of these terms. It was certainly not a confederacy of states; and it was no less evident it was not a consolidation. This peculiar government for which, as far as his recollection went, there hardly existed an appropriate name, seemed to him a kind of political partnership, where each of the parties concerned, besides a separate interest, has a joint interest in the common stock.
Now, these conjoint interests are so blended and mingled together, that in the important points of general welfare and common defence, there is a community extending to the whole; and to analogous in the predominating benefits to be derived from this organization, that on the great outlines of the subject, there is a remarkable similitude of sentiment. From the limited extent of the constitutional powers of this House, a very small Representation, (that of thirty thousand) had been thought sufficient by the framers of the constitution. And from the community of interest in the greater part of the subjects delegated to them by the states, there would be seldom a difference about principles, but the variations, whatever they were, would exist, in the modes and forms of doing things.
Considering how comparatively few things this house had to attend to, he thought that ratio a large one. At the close of the former census, a preceding Congress had thought so. They even determined to lessen it, by declaring that 1 for every 33,000 was enough. He believed the interests and liberties of the citizens were sufficiently secured at that ratio. If he had any reason to doubt this, he would consent to enlarge the number to the utmost of the limits of the constitution. But ten years experience had shewn that the representation had been not only equal, but adequate. He had not heard of complaints abroad upon this subject. He believed the citizens were satisfied with it. He thought that public opinion and public confidence had been so long accustomed to the ratio of 33,000 to one representative, that it was

at least useless, it possibly might be inju- rious to change it.
Judging upon the matter on principle, he considered 30,000 for 1 as a large allowance; and now aided by experience, he was convinced 1 to 33,000 was not too small. He had stated to the house, in a former debate, his opinion on a too numerous legislative body. He should not repeat what he then had advanced; but only observe that in an excessive representation there certainly would be more expense and less dispatch in business. As to the state of New-York, whence he had the honor to come, there had been lately a strong expression of the sense of the citizens on this subject. In a convention lately held for the purpose, it was ordained that the ratio of representation should be lessened in the branches of the legislature.
Much had been said concerning the large fraction in the state of Delaware. This was to him a matter of secondary importance. This fraction and all other fractions would be virtually represented in the proposed ratio, as well as in any other that could be proposed. The peculiar and exquisite manner in which that house was constituted, gave every one of its members an interest in the whole of the national concerns before them. And it was the privilege, and the duty of a member from New-York, to consult the welfare of Maine and Tennessee; and of the members from those states to consult for the good of all the other states.
This community of interest he contended went so far, that even in the case of laying a direct tax, that house could not without violating the constitution, cause Delaware to pay more of it than her rateable proportion. The census gave the number of her inhabitants, and beyond the amount of her population, it was not in the power of Congress to make her pay. And this rule would be inviolably regarded, even if her representative should by sickness or any unavoidable accident be prevented from attending in his place.
Great apprehensions had been expressed of the overbearing disposition of the larger states. He believed nothing had been advanced during the session so chimerical. The fears about rapacity, selfishness and dominion were visionary. When New-York, a strong and powerful state, surrendered her import, and poured her wealth into the national treasury, was that rapacity? In this magnanimous act was there any thing that looked like selfishness? Was the delivery of the key into the hand of the nation, a grasping for dominion? No. There was nothing like it; nor was there any probability that such proceedings would ever happen. The smaller states were the most benefitted by the ratification of the present constitution. They were accordingly the first to adopt it. And they had uniformly found it a system, not of oppression, but of protection, and that protection would never, with his consent, be withdrawn from them.
In the course of his remarks, Mr. Mitchell animadverted on the proposition made some time since in the state of Delaware, to abolish the sovereignty of that state, and to merge in that of an adjoining state.
Mr. Bayard said that he would furnish the house with some information respecting the proposition alluded to by the gentleman from New-York. The proposition had been made. He would inform the house by whom it had been made, and what were the motives of those who made it. It had been made by a set of men once called jacobins, then democrats, and who now called themselves republicans. It had been opposed by the federalists, who, having most strength, frustrated it. It had been the desire and effort of the former description of men to get all the offices of the state into their hands, in which having failed, they wished to be annexed to Pennsylvania, where democratic principles held sway.
Mr. Van Ness. After the great display of talents and abilities which we have had upon this subject, it is not to be expected that I shall rise to detain you more than a moment or two. I have attended, Sir, with great deference and respect to all the gentlemen who have been up before me. I have heard an eloquent discussion, extremely entertaining and improving, but which being rather too much confined to abstract principles, I think has not been in all its parts immediately applicable to the question before us.
Gentlemen, Sir, surely deserve credit for their candor at least, who avow their motives to be local prepossessions or partialities. Considerations of this kind, particular attachments appear indeed too operative in the present case; but, Sir, I think, and I believe the sentiment is common to a majority of my colleagues, that we ought not to be wholly actuated by such motives. We have heard much upon the question, whether we are the representatives of the states (or of the people of the different states) or whether we are the representatives of the whole people of the United States? I must confess, Sir, that the moment I enter this house I consider myself as bound by general obligations towards the whole nation. My obligations and duties extend to all the United States, and in an act of national legislation, I do not feel myself
justified in consulting the particular and more immediate interest of any individual state as contradicting with that of the others. No arrangement, tending in its result to general benefit or advantage, ought to be varied or rejected merely upon the ground of partial inconvenience to any particular state. This doctrine favors too much of that narrowness, of that contracted illiberality which ought never to govern the mind of the legislature. He should take extensive views of his subject, and be influenced only by a liberal policy.
Our government is, after all, but a government of experiment. We have opened a new road to ourselves, and are travelling on in it without knowing to a certainty what dangers may await us by the way. We should therefore, Sir, proceed,
"With cautious steps and slow." We have been in number as low as 65. We have increased to 106. We now propose to rise to 141 (at 33,000) that is to considerably more than a duplication in about 13 or 14 years. Is not this, Sir, advancing with pretty rapid strides? We all acknowledge we must stop somewhere.
There is a certain point, Sir, that point where security and convenience for the transaction of public business meet, which we must not pass; if we do we may find it difficult and embarrassing to recede. The constitution of human nature is such that we are all gratified with the enjoyment and exercise of power. Tell the people you shall choose a certain number of representatives; and if, upon experiment, it is found too large, you will find it difficult to diminish. We may hesitate ourselves; we may not be disposed to lessen our chances of re-election. The people will hesitate to relinquish or abridge their right. And, Sir, if once we have plunged ourselves into the dilemma of too numerous a representation, all the dreadful evils incident to such a state, and which in a particular instance, excites the sensibility of some gentlemen, may be produced before a preventative can be adopted.
I confess, Sir, I am one of those who, though differing in this particular from some gentlemen on this side of the house, whose opinions I highly respect, believe that an encrease of members in a public body to a certain extent, will encrease the confidence of the community in that body. I do not mean, Sir, such an encrease as would exceed the line that I have before marked out, and which would expose the body alternately to ridicule and contempt, and to the dangerous operation of those licentious and ungovernable passions which frequently rage in society; but a moderate, reasonable augmentation, such an one as is calculated and adapted to secure the advantages incident to a wholesome deliberative assembly. I say, Sir, in this case an encrease of members will generally encrease confidence; and that confidence will be attended with a correspondent augmentation of powers, since the representative body will have a greater influence over the physical force of the community. It certainly, Sir, appears to me that we ought to be extremely careful how we encrease this power in the general government. I believe, Sir, with many others, that the influence of that government has been bearing very hard upon the state governments. I believe, Sir, whatever was the theory, that the practice for sometime has tended to the substantial reduction of the state governments. I believe this, Sir, has been the policy (and perhaps consistently with their principles) of some who have borne a conspicuous part in the administration of our government; but, Sir, I flatter myself the doctrine is exploded. In this view, Sir, that is with respect to the state governments, I do not wish to see our own powers too much encreased in the augmented numbers of this house.
I do not wish to see the state governments, which I regard indeed as the pillars on which the fabric of our liberty rests, drawn within and swallowed up by the vortex of federal power and influence. In another view, Sir, I do not wish to see the powers of this house imprudently enlarged by too rapid an encrease of members. The established theory of our constitution I admire—I adore it—I believe the arrangement and distribution of power among the several branches of the government is in the main salutary and correct. The equilibrium is well established, and may continue whilst we are careful not to add too great a weight to either branch. But, Sir, give this house too decided a preponderance, by means of its numbers, encreased public confidence, and its consequent increased strength—and you hazard all. We have seen melancholy instances, Sir, of public evils resulting from struggles for power between different branches of the same political establishment. When by accident, intrigue, or other circumstances, the physical power of a people has been more peculiarly and completely attached or devoted to one of those branches, we have frequently beheld it, conscious of this advantage, and under the influence of the most dangerous passions, sweep everything before it that opposed the gratification of those passions. I need not particularise. The history of every country that has ever enjoyed even a tem-
blance of liberty; where there has been even a pretended division or distribution of powers, will furnish us with cases. I do therefore, Sir, feel a strong regard, a strong solicitude for the preservation and permanent firmness of the other branches of the present government, whilst I am augmenting the numbers, confidence and power of this house. We are at present, and by a moderate progression will continue, a sufficient counterbalance to the other branches. If we practise upon the pure principles of the constitution, I am persuaded it is so.
But, Sir, it is said by some gentlemen that the difference for which we contend is trifling; neither on the score of economy or any other, can it be material, &c. I confess, Sir, the number of fifteen abstractedly, is not very large—but is not the addition of thirty-five members (which will be the encrease according to the ratio of 33,000) a considerable one. It is not large when compared to the whole number of members. Will not this satisfy the country? When our population was three millions our representation on this floor consisted of 65 members. When our population was near four millions, our number of representatives here was 106, and so continued until the present day. When our population, Sir, appears to be five millions, shall we call for 156, in direct violation of the principle heretofore established, instead of 141, which will be the number afforded by the divisor of 33,000, and which is the number we ask for.
I repeat, Sir, we must rest somewhere. We cannot long proceed at this rapid rate of increase in direct proportion to our population. And it appears more reasonable, more politic, gradually to lessen our proportional increase, until we arrive by a moderate progression, at an ultimum, than to proceed in full career, and with an intemperate zeal for increase; and thus presently do violence to the habits and expectations of the country, by a sudden, an abrupt discontinuance.
I would therefore, Sir, prefer even a larger ratio than 33,000 to 30,000, but this not appearing desirable to any part of the house, I shall adhere to that number, which appears to me most proper and consistent, of any that has been under consideration. As I have before said, Sir, I respect the feelings and sentiments of the public upon every occasion, particularly upon the present, when we are upon a subject more interesting to them than any other object of legislation. They are generally right, Sir, taking necessarily a strong interest in public affairs, after having bestowed due deliberation and reflection upon a subject, they arrive at the truth. This remark applies, Sir, to an enlightened country, a country like our own. I consider their opinions as unequivocally expressed in the first instance by our constitution, which directs that the number of representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000, even at the period of its formation, when our population was so much inferior to the present, clearly implying that even in that state of our population this ratio was full low enough, and of course that as the population advanced the ratio or divisor ought to be increased: By the law of Congress passed very soon afterwards, and after the taking of the first census, which pursuing this principle raised the ratio to 33,000, by the recommendation of Congress (two thirds of both houses concurring) of an article, by way of amendment to the constitution, regulating, in effect, the ratio by the population. Here indeed some gentlemen triumphantly exclaim, "but that recommended article was rejected. It was not adopted by three fourths of the states." Those gentlemen, however, Sir, should recollect that it was not rejected on account of its principle. It contained, probably through the inadvertence of its framers, a proposition which was inconsistent and contradictory in itself. By the terms of it, after the number of representatives should have amounted to two hundred the proportion was to have been so regulated that there were not to be less than two hundred members, nor more than 1 for every 30,000; whereas it might have happened from the state of population, that taking the ratio (the least possible according to the proposed article) the number of members would have fallen short of 200. Here then, Sir, in the same breath it was proposed that the number of members should not be less, and that it might be less than 200. To this intrinsic defect in the form, and not to the radical principle out of which it had grown, the proposed amendment owed its rejection. Notwithstanding all this imperfection of form, and perhaps substance, in which it was submitted, a number of states, though not indeed three-fourths assented to it; and the concurrent evidence of the public sentiment in favor of the principle which I contend for, is the satisfaction of the country with the practice under that principle. I would indeed prefer a moderate encrease of the ratio, as the most reasonable arrangement; but since that seems not to be desirable by any part of this house, I shall adhere to 33,000; for to descend from that, appeared upon the ground of general prin-
ciple, to be reversing the order of things, and to be in direct hostility to every idea of propriety.
The examples of particular states, Sir, have been cited in favor of the more numerous representation; but, I presume it will be recollected that from the difference between the objects of state and those of federal legislation, a correspondent difference may be proper in the relative proportion of representation. The one embraces the minute and particular interests of the different districts and parts of the individual states; the other objects of a more general nature. In the one case, therefore, a more intimate local knowledge is requisite than in the other; and this is to be obtained only by a more numerous representation. In the state, however, Sir, which I have the honor to represent, after an experience of 24 years, and upon the most mature deliberation they have lately reduced their limitation to 150 members, in the popular branch, their present number consisting of a few more than 100. In the most important eastern state, indeed one of the most important in the union, although they have a right to elect a number considerably larger than here contended for, still I believe that right, from political inconveniences, has frequently remained unexercised. And here, Sir, permit me to add, if I am mistaken the gentleman from that state will correct me, that the internal arrangement or apportionment of the representatives from the different towns in that state, is observed the very principle for which we now contend, that is an encrease of ratio in some proportion to the encrease of population or electors; and, Sir, I think 60 members, whatever may be the whole eligible number which particular emergencies may draw forth, is a quorum to proceed to business. The same principle, that is, a proportionate encrease of ratio is adopted, I think, in New-Hampshire. All the other states, Sir, perhaps one or two excepted, are below even our present number, in this popular branch; many of them very inferior indeed.
It has been strenuously urged and insisted upon, Sir, that every precaution ought to be taken to prevent a combination of the larger states against the smaller. That the former would always feel a strong disposition to oppress, and finally to crush the other. But, Sir, are not those fears chimerical? How are they warranted by experience in similar cases? Why most of the small states or nations in the world, are brought into existence, and afterwards supported and reared by the jealousies and enmities of the large ones, towards each other. They are not jealous of the weak, but of the strong; and neither of them will voluntarily suffer a powerful rival, to accumulate a degree of strength dangerous to herself. Hence, Sir, has for a long time proceeded the safety of most of the small states in the world—I might instance among others Holland and Switzerland in Europe—I might call the attention of this house to our own political history. And has not even the State of Delaware discovered in her sister states the most friendly, the most conceding disposition, on all important occasions? They will acknowledge the fact. Now and then, indeed, a solitary instance of a foolish division occurs: but Sir, they are rare—Ambition—Rapacity, those very passions that move the plunderers to the measure, generally produce a difference about a division of the spoil.
The gentleman from Delaware, Sir, contends that he is the representative of all the United States; and still the moment he views the fraction likely to remain to that State, his feelings seem to whisper to him "you are the representative only of Delaware;" for, if that gentleman will for a moment examine the general result to all the small states in case of the division of 30,000, he will find that the aggregate fraction is larger than in the case of 33,000, and not smaller as some gentlemen have erroneously stated. Gentlemen are very fearful indeed, Sir, that the four larger States will obtain a majority of votes on this floor. What, Sir, are the gentlemen republicans? Do they pretend that the people ought to be represented, and a majority of them so represented ought not to govern; & are they not willing to allow, if a majority of the constitutional Electors of the country are found within any particular states or parts of the Union, that they should also have a majority on this floor? This Sir, is proceeding upon the true principles of representation which I presume they are not ready to contest. The majority of population is unquestionably contained in those states: but, Sir, the danger is idle. Among other reasons we need not now repeat the disproportionate weight which the small states have in the choice of the other branch of the Legislature and of the Executive.
Something, Sir, has been said about economy. That the difference in expense would be trifling &c. This opinion comes, in one instance particularly, from a respectable quarter: But, Sir, when I reflect that, besides the additional consumption of time which must necessarily result, there will be a saving in the course of ten years of between two and three hundred thousand dollars in the immediate pay of the members, I cannot
think it lightly of it. I think, Sir, it would make a respectable item in a list of retrenchments. I would not, indeed, sacrifice to this object any important advantages of a representative government; but there is no danger of such a consequence.
The gentleman from Delaware, in adverting to a struggle which some time since took place in his state respecting a surrender of their sovereignty, acknowledged the fact, but very unnecessarily went on to tell us that the attempt was made by those who were formerly called Jacobins, afterwards Democrats, and who now call themselves Republicans. It is a little extraordinary, Sir, I confess, and only to be accounted for by local circumstances unknown to us, that they should have had to contend in a struggle of this kind with a set of people formerly called Federalists; afterwards Aristocrats; and now called Royalists. The opposition of this latter class cannot have been consistent with their usual principles—principles which after full experience have met with the public reprobation.
General S. Smith, Mr. Lowndes, and Mr. Van Rensselaer followed Mr. Bayard, in favor of the ratio of 33,000.
The question was then taken on striking out "33,000," and lost—Ayes 42—Noes 48.
THURSDAY, Jan 8, 1802. Motion made by Dr. Leib and amended at the instance of Mr. Huger, as follows, under consideration: "Stenographers shall be admitted, and the Speaker shall assign such places to them on the floor, as shall not interfere with the convenience of the House."
Dr. Leib prefaced his motion by observing, that in the standing rules proposed, no provision appeared to be made for the admission of Stenographers. They had heretofore been subject to the will of the Speaker. However great his respect for the present Speaker, he was of opinion, that they should not depend for their accommodation upon the will of any man; and he thought it became the House on this occasion to establish a precedent which would place those who took the debates above the caprice of any individual.
The motion was opposed by Messrs. Griswold, Rutledge, Varnum, Hemphill, T. Morris, Eustis, Dana, Elmer, and Goddard; and supported by Messrs. Leib, S. Smith, Nicholson, Claiborne, Smilie, Holland, and Sprigg.
Mr. Huger opposed the original motion of Dr. Leib, but supported the motion as amended by himself.
The opponents of the motion declared, that it did not relate to substance, but merely to form; that it was allow'd on all hands that the debates should be taken, and that Stenographers should consequently be admitted. But the single question was how, and under what authority, they should be admitted. They remarked, that they had heretofore been admitted by the Speaker, under whose direction they had remained; that the Speaker was the only proper authority under whose direction they ought still to remain; that as the preservation of order and decorum rested with him, the Stenographers, as well as other persons, should be permitted by him to enter the House, and be by him excluded, whenever in his opinion the order and a respect for the House required it. That in case Stenographers deported themselves in a disrespectful manner, or grossly misinterpreted the ideas of members, the Speaker was the only person who could effectually cure the evil; that there had been, and might again be, instances of such misconduct; that in one case, a Stenographer had entered the House in a state of intoxication, in another case, a speech of a gentleman from South Carolina, had been perversely misrepresented, and the Stenographer had refused to correct his errors, for which he had been expelled the House; and that in another case, the Speaker considering himself as misrepresented, had expelled the Stenographer.
Among the opponents of the motion, a great diversity of opinion prevailed; Mr. Eustis, Gen. Varnum, and Mr. Elmer, objected to it, merely on the ground that it was improper to come to any solemn decision, which was the less necessary as the Stenographers already occupied convenient seats, from which there was no probability of their being excluded by the Speaker.
Those who supported the motion, considered its decision as involving an important point; a point no less important, than whether the debates of that House should be taken with accuracy, and published without fear or partiality. They averred it as a fact, that owing to the unwarrantable conduct of the Speaker, this had heretofore at many periods not been the case. The public had sought information without being able to get it. It was true, that a Stenographer had been expelled for publishing a speech of a gentleman from South Carolina; but it was, not for misrepresenting that speech, but for faithfully publishing it; and in the other case alluded to, a Stenographer had been expelled by the Speaker, for stating with correctness what the Speaker had himself said. These were alarming facts, not to be forgotten, and which

claimed the interposition of the House. If Stenographers should be guilty of indecorum, they could still, this rule notwithstanding, be expelled the House. It was acknowledged that the gentleman, who at present filled the chair, was entitled to the full confidence of the House, but it was dangerous to vest arbitrary power in the hands of any man, and it was peculiarly proper to provide in fair, for foul weather; and it was added, that though the proposed rule would not be obligatory upon a future House, yet it would form a precedent, which they might see fit to respect.
On the motion of Mr. Rutledge to amend the motion so as to read—"Stenographers may be admitted under the direction of the Speaker, who shall assign to them such places on the floor, as shall not interfere with the convenience of the House; the yeas and nays were, yeas 27—nays 31.
On the adoption of the additional rule, they were yeas 47—nays 28; as follows:
YEAS.—Messrs. Allison, Archer, Bailey, Bilton, Brown, Butler, Claiborne, Clay, Clifton, Condit, Cotts, T. T. Davis, Elmore, Gregg, Hanna, J. Heister, Helm, Hoge, Holland, Holmes, Huger, Jackson, Jones, Leib, Milledge, S. L. Mitchell, Moore, New, Newton, J. H. Nicholson, Smilie, R. Smith, J. Smith, of New-York, J. Smith, of Virg. S. Smith, Southard, Sprigg, Stanford, Stanley, Stanton, Stewart, Taliaferro, Thomas, P. R. Thompson, A. Trigg, J. Trigg, L. V. Horne—47.
NAYS.—Messrs. Bacon, Campbell, S. W. Dasa, Davenport, Elmer, Foster, Goddard, Griffield, Grove, D. Heister, Lowndes, Mattoon, L. R. Morris, T. Morris, Mott, Perkins, Plater, Read, Rutledge, Shepard, J. C. Smith, Jos. Smith, Stratton, Tenney, Tillinghast, Wadsworth, Walker, Williams—28.
WASHINGTON CITY.
MONDAY, JANUARY 11, 1802.
The Debate in the Senate, which we this day commence, will be read with the deepest attention by our readers. It will be our effort to do justice to the Speakers.
Never, perhaps, was expectation more completely satisfied than by the Speech of Mr. Breckenridge. We pronounce it a Chef-d'œuvre in parliamentary oratory. For conciseness, for comprehensiveness, for dignity, for appropriate language, and for sound inference, it may claim competition with the ablest similar performances extant. It is the text which will regulate the debate.
The President on Wednesday sent into the Senate a list of all the temporary appointments to office, which he has made during the recess, and now proposed, for permanent appointment.
A gentleman who has examined it accurately, gives us the following analysis of it, which may be relied on. The list itself shall be given, as soon as permitted to be made public.
17 Cases of resignation, declining to accept, promotion, or of death.
2 Of expiration of their commissions, not re-appointed.
21 Of vacancies left unfilled by the former administration, mostly confirmations, &c.
21 Of what have been called midnight appointments, to wit: made in the last days or hours of Mr. Adams's being in office.
6 Of restoration to offices, which they had held before.
12 Of removal for misconduct, or revolutionary Toryism.
3 Of Marshals, 1 Attorney—Removed, and republicans substituted, as a protection for republican citizens against the federalism of the courts.
5 Of removals, to give to those, who have been systematically excluded, some share in the administration of the government.
2 Of removals on grounds of special propriety.
90 In all.
Between 40 and 50 justices of the peace, had been nominated on the 2d of March 1801, for the ten miles square. They were reduced by the President to 30, of whom 25 were of those nominated by Mr. Adams, and 5 added to them.
The House of Representatives were on Friday occupied in unimportant business. Our desire to finish the debate on the Appointment Bill, to make way for the interesting debate in the Senate, has induced us to postpone till our next, a notice of the proceedings of that day.
The Subscriber RESPECTFULLY informs the public, that he has removed from George-Town to the fountain in, near Rhodes's City Tavern. Where he is furnished with a good boiler, carriage house, and a stable for fifteen horses, and every thing in his line to render the accommodation of travellers agreeable. The strictest attention will be paid by CHARLES ROGERS.
N. B. Ten or fifteen gentlemen can get board and lodging on moderate terms Dec. 23.
National Intelligencer. SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.
FRIDAY, JAN. 8, 1802.
JUDICIARY ESTABLISHMENT.
Mr. BRECKENRIDGE. It will be expected of me, I presume, Sir, as I introduced the resolution now under consideration, to assign my reasons for wishing a repeal of this law. This I shall do; and shall endeavour to shew,
1. That the law is unnecessary and improper, and was so at its passage; and 2. That the Courts and Judges created by it, can and ought to be abolished.
1st. That the act under consideration, was unnecessary and improper, is to my mind, no difficult task to prove. No increase of courts or judges could be necessary or justifiable, unless the existing courts and judges were incompetent to the prompt and proper discharge of the duties assigned to them. To hold out a shew of litigation, when in fact little exists, must be impolitic; and to multiply expensive systems, and create hosts of expensive officers, without having experienced an actual necessity for them, must be a wanton waste of the public treasure.
The document before us shews, that at the passage of this act, the existing courts, not only from their number, but from the suits depending before them, were fully competent to a speedy decision of those suits. It shews, that on the 15th day of June last, there were depending in all the Circuit Courts, (that of Maryland only excepted, whose docket we have not been furnished with,) 1539 suits. It shews that 8276 suits of every description have come before those courts, in 10 years and upwards. From this it appears, that the annual average amount of suits has been about 800.
But sundry contingent things have conspired to swell the circuit court dockets. In Maryland, Virginia, and in all the southern and south-western states, a great number of suits have been brought by British creditors: this species of controversy is nearly at an end.
In Pennsylvania, the docket has been swelled by prosecutions in consequence of the Western insurrection, by the disturbances in Bucks, and Northampton counties; and by the Sedition Act. These I find amount in this State to 240 suits.
In Kentucky, non-resident land claimants have gone into the Federal Court from a temporary convenience; because, until within a year or two past, there existed no court of general jurisdiction co-extensive with the whole State. I find too, that of the six hundred and odd suits which have been commenced there, 196 of them have been prosecutions under the laws of the United States.
In most of the States there have been prosecutions under the Sedition Act. This source of litigation is nearly for ever dried up. And lastly in all the States a number of suits have arisen under the Excise law; which source of controversy, will, I hope, before this session terminates, be also dried up.
But this same document discloses another important fact; which is, that nevertheless all these untoward and temporary sources of federal adjudication, the suits in those courts are decreasing; for from the dockets exhibited (except Kentucky, and Tennessee, whose suits are lumped up in the aggregate) it appears, that in 1799 there were 1274; and in 1800 there were 687 suits commenced; shewing a decrease of 587 suits.
Could it be necessary then to increase courts when suits were decreasing? Could it be necessary to multiply judges, when their duties were diminishing? And will it not be justified therefore in affirming, that the law was unnecessary, & that Congress acted under a mistaken impression, when they multiplied courts and judges at a time when litigation was actually decreasing.
But, Sir, the decrease of business goes a small way in fixing my opinion on this subject. I am inclined to think, that so far from there having been a necessity at this time for an increase of courts and judges; that the time never will arrive, when America will stand in need of 38 federal judges. Look Sir, at your Constitution, and see the judicial power there assigned to federal courts, and seriously ask yourself, can there be fairly extracted from those powers subjects of litigation sufficient for 6 supreme and 32 inferior court judges? To me it appears impossible.
The judicial powers given to the federal courts were never intended by the Constitution to embrace, exclusively, subjects of litigation, which could with propriety be left with the State courts. Their jurisdiction was intended principally to extend to great national and foreign concerns. Except cases arising under the laws of the United States, I do not at present recollect, but three or four kinds in which their power extends
to subjects of litigation, in which private persons only are concerned. And can it be possible, that with a jurisdiction embracing so small a portion of private litigation, in great part of which the State courts might, and ought, to participate, that we can stand in need of 38 judges; and expend in judiciary regulations the annual sum of 137,200 dollars?
No other country, whose regulations I have any knowledge of, furnishes an example of a system so prodigal and extensive. In England, whose courts are the boast, and said to be the security of the rights of the nation, every man knows, there are but 12 judges and 3 principal courts. These courts embrace in their original or appellate jurisdiction almost the whole circle of human concerns.
The King's bench and Common Pleas, which consist of 4 judges each, entertain all the common law suits of 40s. and upwards, originating among 9 millions of the most commercial people in the world. They moreover revise the proceedings of not only all the petty courts of record in the kingdom, even down to the courts of Piepoudre; but also of the court of King's bench in Ireland; and these supreme courts, after centuries of experiment, are found to be fully competent to all the business of the kingdom.
I will now inquire into the power of Congress, to put down these additional courts and judges.
1st. As to the Courts.—Congress are empowered by the Constitution "from time to time, to ordain and establish inferior courts." The act now under consideration, is a legislative construction of this clause in the Constitution, that Congress may abolish as well as create these judicial officers; because, it does expressly in the 27th section of the act, abolish the then existing inferior courts, for the purpose of making way for the present. This construction I contend is correct; but it is equally pertinent to my object, whether it be, or be not. If it be correct, then the present inferior courts may be abolished as constitutionally as the last; if it be not, then the law for abolishing the former courts, and establishing the present, was unconstitutional and consequently legislative.
But independent of this legislative construction on which I do not found my opinion, nor mean to rely my argument, there is little doubt indeed, in my mind, as to the power of Congress on this law. The 1st. section of the 3d art. vests the judicial power of the United States in one supreme court and such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time, ordain and establish. By this clause Congress may from time to time establish inferior courts; but it is clearly a discretionary power, and they may not establish them. The language of the Constitution is very different when regulations are not left discretionary. For example—"The trial, says the Constitution, of all crimes, (except in cases of impeachment) shall be by jury: Representatives and direct taxes shall be applied according to numbers. All revenue bills shall originate in the House of Representatives, &c." It would therefore in my view be a perversion not only of language, but of intellect, to say, that altho' Congress may from time to time establish inferior courts, yet when established, that they shall not be abolished by a subsequent Congress possessing equal powers. It would be a paradox in legislation.
2d. As to the Judges.—The judiciary department is so constructed as to be sufficiently secured against the improper influence of either the executive or legislative departments. The courts are organized and established by the legislature, and the executive creates the judges. Being thus organized, the constitution affords the proper checks to secure their honesty and independence in office. It declares they shall not be removed from office during good behavior; nor their salaries diminished during their continuance in office. From this it results, that a judge, after his appointment, is totally out of the power of the President, and his salary secured against legislative diminution, during his continuance in office. The first of these checks, which protects a judge in his office during good behaviour, applies to the President only, who would otherwise have possessed the power of removing him like all other officers at pleasure; and the other check forbidding a diminution of their salaries, applies to the legislature only. They are two separate and distinct checks, furnished by the constitution against two distinct departments of the government; and they are the only ones which are or ought to have been furnished on the subject.
But because the constitution declares that a judge shall hold his office during good behavior, can it be tortured to mean, that he shall hold his office after it is abolished? Can it mean, that his tenure should be limited by behaving well in an office, which did not exist? Can it mean that an office may exist although its duties are extinct? Can it mean, in short, that the shadow, to wit, the judge, can remain, when the substance, to wit, the office, is removed? It must have intended all these absurdities, or it must admit a construction which will avoid them.
That construction obviously is, that a judge should hold an existing office, so long as he did his duty in that office; and not that he should hold an office that did not exist, and perform duties not provided by law. Had the construction which I contend against been contemplated by those who framed the constitution, it would have been necessary to have declared explicitly, that judges should hold their offices and salaries during good behavior.
Such a construction is not only irreconcilable with reason and propriety, but is repugnant to the principles of the constitution. It is a principle of our constitution, as well as of common honesty, that no man shall receive public money, but in consideration of public services. Sinecure offices therefore are not permitted by our laws or constitution. By this construction, complete sinecure offices will be created; hosts of constitutional pensioners will be settled on us, and we cannot calculate how long. This is really creating a new species of public debt; not like any other of our debts, we cannot discharge the principal at any fixed time. It is worse than the deferred stock; for on that you pay an annual interest only, and the principal is redeemable at a given period. But here, you pay an annual principal, and that principal irredeemable except by the will of Providence. It may suit countries where public debts are considered as public blessings; for in this way a people might soon become superlatively blessed indeed.
Let me not be told, Sir, that the salaries in the present case, are inconsiderable and ought not to be withheld; and that the doctrine is not a dangerous one. I answer, it is the principle I contend against; and if it is heterodox for one dollar, it is equally so for a million. But I contend the principle, if once admitted, may be extended to destructive lengths. Suppose it should hereafter happen, that those in power should combine to provide handsomely for their friends, could any way so plain, easy and effectual present itself, as by creating courts, and filling them with those friends? Might not 60 as well as 16, with salaries of twenty thousand, instead of two thousand dollars, be provided for in this way?
The thing I trust will not happen. It is presuming a high degree of corruption; but it might happen under the construction contended for; as the constitution presumes corruption may happen in any department of the government, by the checks it has furnished against it; and as this construction does open a wide door for corruption, it is but fair reasoning to shew the dangers which may grow out of it; for in the construction of all instruments, that which will lead to inconvenience, mischief or absurdity ought to be avoided. This doctrine has another difficulty to reconcile:—After the law is repealed, they are either judges or they are not. If they are judges, they can be impeached; but for what? For malfeasance in office only. How, I would ask, can they be impeached for malfeasance in office, when their offices are abolished? They are not officers, but still they are intitled to the emoluments annexed to an office. Although they are judges, they cannot be guilty of malfeasance, because they have no office. They are only quasi judges so far as regards the duties, but real judges so far as regards the salary. It must be the salary then, and not the duties which constitute a judge.—For my part, I do not know under what class of things to range them, or what name to give them. They are unacknowledged by the letter, spirit or genius of our constitution, and are to me non-descripts.
There is another difficulty under this construction still to encounter, and which also grows out of the constitution.—By the constitution, a new state may be formed by the junction of two or more states, with their assent and that of Congress. If this doctrine, once a judge and always a judge be correct, what would you do in such an event, with the district judges of the states who formed that junction? Both would be unnecessary, & you would have in a single state, two judges of equal and concurrent jurisdiction; or one a real judge with an office, and another a quasi judge without an office. The States also forming such junction, would be equally embarrassed with their State judges; for the same construction would be equally applicable to them.
Upon this construction also, an infallibility is predicated, which it would be arrogance in any human institution to assume, and which goes to cut up legislation by the roots. We should be debarred from that, which is indulged to us from a higher source, and on subjects of higher concern than legislation, I mean a retraction from, and correction of our errors. On all other subjects of legislation we are allowed it seems to change our minds, except on judicial subjects, which of all others is the most complex and difficult. I appeal to our own Statute book to prove this difficulty; for in 10 years Congress have passed no less than 26 laws on this subject.
I conceive for, that the tenure by which a judge holds his office, is evidently bottomed on the idea of securing his honesty and independence, whilst exercising his office. The idea was introduced in England, to counteract the influence of the crown over the judges; but if the construction now contended for shall
prevail; we shall in one instance imitate of this our favorite prototype enslave them; by establishing, what they have not, a judiciary; for there, their judges are removable by a joint vote of Lords and Commons. Here ours are not removable, except for malfeasance in office; which malfeasance could not be committed, as they would have no office.
Upon the whole, as all courts under any free government must be created with an eye to the administration of justice only; and not with any regard to the advancement or emolument of individual men; as we have undeniable evidence before us, that the creation of the courts now under consideration was totally unnecessary; and as no government can, I apprehend, seriously deny that this legislature has a right to repeal a law enacted by a preceding one; we will, in any event, discharge our duty by repealing this law; and thereby doing all in our power to correct the evil. If the judges are intitled to their salaries, under the constitution, our repeal will not affect them; and they will no doubt resort to their proper remedy: for where there is a constitutional right, there must be a remedy.
Mr. Brackenridge was followed by Messrs. Cooke, and Wright, in favor of the motion; and Messrs. J. Madison, and Morris against it. Their Speeches in our next.
Senate adjourned to Monday, when the Debate will be resumed.
Wants a Place, A gentleman's own man, or as Steward and Butler is capable of filling any of the above situations, and can be well recommended. Any lady or gentleman having occasion for a person of the above description, will please to address a line to E. M. at the post Office, Washington City, which will be strictly attended to, Jan. 15. 1802. ept
Fifty Dollars Reward. PANAWAY on Saturday night the 26th of last month, a Mulatto named CYRUS, about 21 or 22 years of age, five feet six or seven inches high, with dark bushy hair. He has served an apprenticeship with a millwright, and is a good workman. He stole from Popes Creek, the estate of Daniel McCarty, Esq. in the county of Wexmoreland, a small horse, horse, a neat light saddle, not much worn, made by James Smock, Fredericksburg, and a fine bridle, with a variety of wearing apparel. He has for wife a maid belonging to general Lee of Stratford, and it is conjectured he will endeavor to secrete himself in the neighbourhood of the City of Washington, in expectation of meeting with his wife. Whoever will apprehend the said slave and deliver him to me, shall receive the sum of fifty dollars; and I will also give a further reward of ten dollars to any one who may restore the horse and saddle. JOHN ROSE. Virga Leeds, Jan. 11, 1802. wpt
By virtue of a decree of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in the county of Washington, in chancery sitting, in the case of George Walker complainant, against Overton Carr, defendant,
WILL BE SOLD, To the highest bidder, for ready money at Tunnicliff's tavern, in the City of Washington, on MONDAY the eighth day of February next, the following Squares and lots, or so much thereof as will satisfy the decree aforesaid, viz. Squares, 864 & 865, lots 1 2 3 8 9 10 11 in sq. 864, squares 891 913, lots 2 3 10 11 12 13 14 15 and 20 in square 93, lots 3 4 5 6 7 13 14 15 16 and 17 in square 964, lots 2 3 6 7 20 21 and 24 in square 1 77, lots 2 3 and 4 in square north east of square 1065, lots 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 in square 1042, lots 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 and 18 in square 1043, lots 21 22 and 23 in square 1042, lots 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 and 18 in square 1047, lots 1 2 6 7 and 8 in square 943, square 890, lots 1 2 3 7 8 9 15 16 17 and 18 in square 1067. The sale will commence at 11 o'clock, and will continue from day to day until the whole of this property or so much thereof as will comply with the requisites of the aforementioned decree. PHILIP T. BAKER, Trustee. Jan. 8, 1802. ept
DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP. THE partnership of CHARLES VARDEN and THOMAS CARPENTER, did by mutual consent dissolve on the 21st day of November last. It is requested that all persons indebted to the said firm will settle their accounts; and that all to whom the said firm is indebted will present the same for payment, either to CHARLES VARDEN, or THOMAS CARPENTER. City of Washington, Capitol Hill, Dec. 4. ept
NOTICE. THIS is to give notice, That the subscriber has obtained from the orphans court of Washington County, in the District of Columbia, letters of administration on the personal estate of James Robinson, late of the county of Washington deceased, all persons having claims against the said deceased, are hereby warned to exhibit the same, with the vouchers thereof, to the subscriber, at or before the first day of June next; they may otherwise be excluded from all benefit of the said estate. Given under my hand this 24th day of December in the year 1801. LEWIN TALBERT, Administrator. December 28, 1801. ept
THOMAS CARPENTER, TAYLOR, SOLICITS a continuation of that generous encouragement which he has experienced from the Ladies and Gentlemen of this City and its vicinity. Having procured an elegant assortment of clothes, calicoes, gowns, &c. and engaged workmen of superior talents. His unremitted attention shall be given to merit patronage. Capitol Hill, next house east of Mrs. Finch's boarding house, and Pennsylvania Avenue between the President's square and Seven Buildings. Dec. 7, 1801. ept

PROPOSALS,
For carrying the MAILS of the UNITED STATES on the following Post-roads , will be received at the General Post-Office , in Washington City , until the 30th day of January next , inclusive.
31. From Richmond by Hanover-town, Elliott's and Dunkirk, to Tappahannock, once a week. Leave Richmond every Wednesday at 2 P M and arrive at Tappahannock on Thursday by 6 P M. Leave Tappahannock every Tuesday at 6 A M and arrive at Richmond on Wednesday by 10 A M.
32. From Richmond by Hopkin's, Powhatan c. h. Carterville, New Canton, Buckingham c. h. Bent Creek, Lynchburg, New London, and Liberty, to Fincastle, once a week. Leave Richmond every Wednesday at 2 P M. arrive at Powhatan on Thursday by 9 A M and arrive at Fincastle the next Saturday by 6 P M. Returning —Leave Fincastle every Saturday at 10 P M and arrive at Powhatan c. h. on Tuesday by 3 P M. Leave it at 4 P M and arrive at Richmond the next Wednesday by 10 A M.
33. From Liberty by Rockymount to Martinville or Henry c. h. once a week. Leave Liberty every Monday at 6 A M and arrive at Martinville on Tuesday at 11 A M. Returning —Leave Martinville every Tuesday by 1 P M, and arrive at Liberty on Wednesday by 7 P M.
34. From Powhatan c. h. by Cumberland c. h. Farmville, Prince Edward c. h. Charlotte c. h. and Halifax c. h. once a week. Leave Powhatan c. h. every Thursday at 10 A M and arrive at Halifax c. h. the next Saturday by 4 P M. Returning —Leave Halifax c. h. every Saturday at 3 P M and arrive at Powhatan c. h. the next Tuesday by 3 P M.
35. From Halifax c. h. by Pittsylvania c. h. Henry c. h. Patrick c. h. and Germanton to Salem N. C. once in two weeks. Leave Halifax every other Monday at 6 A M and arrive at Salem the next Friday by 6 P M. Returning —Leave Salem every other Tuesday at 6 A M and arrive at Halifax c. h. the next Saturday by 6 P M.
36. From Harrisville by Hickford to Halifax N.C. twice a week. Leave Harrisville every Wednesday and Saturday at 5 A M and arrive at Halifax by 6 P M. Returning —Leave Halifax Tuesday and Friday at 5 A M and arrive at Harrisville by 6 P M.
37. From Smithfield by Jerusalems, the Cross Keys, Goldsboro, Bruntwick c. h. Geesbridge, St. Tamany's and Mecklenburg c. h. to Marshallville, and thence by Christianville, Lunenburg c. h. Edenton, Goldsboro—Hicks'ford, the Cross Keys and Jerusalems, to Smithfield, once a week. Leave Smithfield every Thursday at 10 A M and arrive at Goldsboro on Saturday by 10 A M. Leave Goldsboro, at half past 10 A M and arrive at Mecklenburg c. h. on Sunday noon, and return to Smithfield on Wednesday by 7 P M.
NORTH-CAROLINA.
38. From Norfolk Va. by Kempville, Va. N.W. River Bridge, Va. Tulls Creek, Indian town, Jonesburg, Elizabeth City, Nixonton, and Hertford, to Edenton, once a week. Leave Norfolk every Friday at 3 P M and arrive at Edenton the next Tuesday by 10 A M. Returning —Leave Edenton every Tuesday at 2 P M and arrive at Norfolk the next Friday by 10 A M.
39. From Suffolk, Va. by Edenton, Plymouth, and Washington, to Newbern, twice a week. Leave Suffolk every Monday and Friday at 1 P M and arrive at Edenton on Tuesday and Saturday at 1 P M. Leave Edenton at 2 P M and arrive at Plymouth on Wednesday and Sunday by 6 A M. Leave Plymouth at half past 6 A M and arrive at Washington by 6 P M. Leave Washington at 7 M P and arrive at Newbern on Thursday and Monday by 4 P M. Returning —Leave Newbern every Friday and Tuesday at 5 A M and arrive at Washington by 5 P M. Leave Washington by 6 P M and arrive at Plymouth on Saturday and Wednesday by 4 P M. Leave Plymouth at half past 4 P M and arrive at Edenton on Sunday & Thursday by 9 A M. Leave Edenton at half past 9 A M and arrive at Suffolk on Monday and Friday at 9 A M.
40. From Halifax by Northampton c. h. Princeton, Murfreesboro', Winton, Coleraine, Pitch Landing and Windsor, to Edenton, once a week. Leave Halifax every Monday at 7 A M and arrive at Edenton on Wednesday by 1 P M. Leave Edenton every Wednesday at 4 P M and arrive at Halifax on Saturday by 10 A M.
41. From Halifax by Scotland, Hogton, Williamston and Daily's, to Plymouth once a week. Leave Halifax every Monday at 2 P M. and arrive at Plymouth on Thursday by 10 A M. Returning —Leave Plymouth every Thursday at 2 P M. and arrive at Halifax the next Monday by 10 A M.
42. From Halifax to Tarboro' once a week. Leave Tarboro' every Saturday at 6 P M. and arrive at Halifax on Monday by 6 A M. Leave Halifax every Monday at 9 A M. and arrive at Tarboro' by 4 P M.
43. From Halifax by Jonesville, Warrenton, Williamsboro' and Oxford, to
Hillsboro' once a week. Leave Halifax every Sunday at 10 A M, arrive at Warrenton by 7 P M. Leave Warrenton on Monday at 5 A M, and arrive at Hillsboro' on Tuesday by 3 P M. Returning —Leave Hillsboro' every Thursday at 9 A M, and arrive at Halifax on Saturday by 6 A M.
44. From Louisburg by Nash c. h. Tarboro' and Greenville, to Washington once a week. Leave Louisburg Saturday at 8 P M, arrive at Tarboro' on Monday by 4 P M. Leave Tarboro' at 5 P M, and arrive at Washington on Tuesday by 7 P M. Returning —Leave Washington every Wednesday at 8 A M, arrive at Tarboro' on Thursday by 9 A M, and arrive at Washington on Friday by 5 P M.
45. From Raleigh by Smithfield, Waynesboro, Green c. h. and Kinston, to Newbern once a week. Leave Raleigh every Tuesday at 8 A M, and arrive at Newbern on Friday by 10 A M. Returning —Leave Newbern every Friday at 2 P M, and arrive at Raleigh on Monday by 5 P M.
46. From Raleigh by Haywoodboro', Chatham c. h. Chapel Hill, Hillsboro', Orange c. h. Martinville, Salem and Lexington, to Salisbury once a week. Leave Raleigh every Tuesday at 5 A M, arrive at Hillsboro' on Tuesday by 7 P M. Leave Hillsboro' on Wednesday by 4 A M, and arrive at Salem on Thursday by 3 P M. Leave Salem at 4 P M, and arrive at Salisbury on Friday by 10 A M. Returning —Leave Salisbury every Friday at 2 P M, arrive at Salem on Saturday by 8 A M. Leave Salem at 9 A M, arrive at Hillsboro' on Sunday by 7 P M. Leave Hillsboro' on Monday at 3 A M, and arrive at Raleigh by 4 P M.
47. From Hillsboro' by Mount Tizah, Person c. h. Leesburg, Catwell c. h. Lenox Castle and Rockingham c. h. to Germanton once a week. Leave Hillsboro' every Wednesday at 6 A M, and arrive at Germanton the next Friday by 6 P M. Leave Germanton every Sunday at 6 A M, and arrive at Hillsboro' the next Tuesday by 6 P M.
48. From Salem by Bethania, Mount Airy, Grayson c. h. and Austinville, to Englishville one a week. Leave Salem every Saturday at 9 A M, arrive at Englishville on Monday 2 P M. Returning —Leave Englishville on Tuesday 10 A M, and arrive at Salem on Thursday by 3 P M.
49. From Salem by Bethania, Huntville, Rockford, Wilkes and Morgan, to Rutherfordton once a week. Leave Salem every Saturday at noon, and arrive at Rutherfordton the next Tuesday by 7 P M. Returning —Leave Rutherfordton every Wednesday at 7 A M, and arrive at Salem the next Saturday by 9 A M.
50. From Salisbury by Stateville, Charlotte and Lancaster, S. C. to Camden, S. C. and from thence by Lancaster, Charlotte and Cabarrus c. h. to Salisbury once a week. Leave Salisbury every Friday at 2 P M, and arrive at Camden the next Monday by 7 P M. Returning —Leave Camden every Tuesday at 6 A M, and arrive at Salisbury on Friday by 10 A M.
51. From Newbern by Trenton and Richland, to Wilmington once a week. Leave Newbern every Tuesday at 5 A M, and arrive at Wilmington on Thursday by 10 A M. Returning —Leave Wilmington every Thursday at 2 P M, and arrive at Newbern on Monday at 4 P M.
52. From Fayetteville by Elizabethtown to Wilmington, and from thence by South Washington, Sarecto and Sampson c. h. to Fayetteville once a week. Leave Fayetteville every Monday at 4 P M, and arrive at Wilmington on Wednesday by 7 P M. Returning —Leave Wilmington every Thursday at noon, and arrive at Fayetteville on Saturday by 8 P M.
53. From Fayetteville by Anderfile to Wilmington once a week. Leave Fayetteville every Friday at 6 A M, and arrive at Wilmington on Saturday by 6 P M. Returning —Leave Wilmington every Monday at 7 A M, and arrive at Fayetteville on Tuesday by 7 P M.
54. From Fayetteville by Moore c. h. Carthage and Randolph c. h. to Salisbury, and from thence by Tindallville, Anson c. h. and Richmond c. h. to Fayetteville once a week. Leave Fayetteville every Tuesday at 8 A M, and arrive at Salisbury the next Friday by 10 A M. Leave Salisbury every Friday at 2 P M, and arrive at Fayetteville the next Monday by 5 P M.
55. From Lumberton by Elizabethtown to Anderfile once a week. Leave Anderfile every Thursday by 5 A M, and arrive at Lumberton by 5 P M. Returning —Leave Lumberton every Friday by 6 A M, and arrive at Anderfile by 7 P M.
IN KENTUCKY.
56. From Orrville, T. by Powell's valley, T. Richmond and Jessamine c. h. to Lexington once a week. Leave Orrville every Friday at 2 P M, arrive at Richmond the next Monday by noon, and at Lexington by 6 P M. Returning —Leave Lexington every Tuesday by 6 A M, arrive at Richmond by noon, and at Orrville, T. the next Friday by 10 A M.
IN TENNESSEE.
57. From Orrville by Knoxville by
Kingston or South-West-Point, Fort Blount, Dixon's Springs and Craig's farm to Nashville once a week. Leave Orrville every Friday at 2 P. M. and arrive at Knoxville on Saturday by 1 P.M.—Leave Knoxville on Sunday by 6 A. M. and arrive at Nashville on Friday by 10 A. M.— Returning , leave Nashville every Friday at 2 P. M. arrive at Knoxville the next Wednesday by 7 P. M.—Leave Knoxville on Thursday by 11 A. M. and arrive at Orrville on Friday by 10 A. M.
58. From Sullivan c. h. by Jonesboro, Greeneville, Cheeks Cross-roads and Danbridge to Knoxville once a week.—Leave Sullivan c. h. every Thursday noon and arrive at Knoxville the next Monday by 5 A. M.—Leave Knoxville every Monday at 9 A. M. and arrive at Sullivan c. h. on Thursday by 10 A. M.
IN SOUTH CAROLINA.
59. From Columbia by Winnsboro, Chester c. h. York c. h. Pinckneyville, Union c. h. Spartanburg, Greenville c. h. Pickensville, Laurens c. h. Reedy, Shoal river and Newburg c. h. to Columbia once a week.—Leave Columbia every Monday, at 9 A. M. arrive at York c. h. on Wednesday by 8 A. M.—Leave York c. h. at 9 A. M. arrive at Pickensville the next Thursday by 4 P. M.—Leave Pickensville at 5 P. M. and arrive at Columbia on Sunday by 6 P. M.
60. From Columbia by Orangeburg to Charleston once a week.—Leave Columbia every Monday at 10 A. M. and arrive at Charleston on Thursday by 10 A. M.— Returning , Leave Charleston every Thursday at 2 P. M. arrive at Columbia on Sunday by noon.
61. From Edgefield c. h. by South-ampton, Cambridge, Abbeville c. h. and Pendleton c. h. to Pikenfile once a week.—Leave Edgefield c. h. every Wednesday at 10 A. M. and arrive at Pikenfile on Friday by 6 P. M.— Returning , leave Pikenfile every Saturday at 8 A. M. and arrive at Edgefield c. h. the next Monday by 4 P. M.
62. From Augusta G. by the Upper 3 runs, Steele Creek, Lower 3 runs and Black Swamp to Coosawatchie once a week.—Leave Coosawatchie every Wednesday at 8 A. M. and arrive at Augusta on Thursday at 5 P. M.— Returning , Leave Augusta every Friday at 8 A. M. and arrive at Coosawatchie on Saturday by 6 P. M.
IN GEORGIA.
63. From Augusta by Little River, Lincoln c. h. Petersburg, Elberton, Franklin c. h. and Gilbert to Clarkboro, once a week.—Leave Augusta every Monday at 8 A. M. and arrive at Clarkboro the next Thursday by 10 A. M.— Returning , Leave Clarkboro every Thursday at 2 P. M. and arrive at Augusta on Sunday by 7 P. M.
64. From Augusta by Columbia c. h. Washington, Greensboro, Richardsonville, Sparta, Georgetown and Warrenton to Louisville one a week.—Leave Augusta every Monday at 2 P. M. and arrive at Louisville the next Thursday by 5 P. M.—Leave Louisville every Friday at 6 A. M. and arrive at Augusta on Monday by 10 A. M.
NOTES.
Note I. The postmaster General may expedite the mails and alter the times of arrival and departure at any time during the continuance of the contracts, he previously stipulating an adequate compensation for any extra expense that may be occasioned thereby.
Note II. Fifteen minutes shall be allowed for opening and closing the mail at all offices where no particular time is specified.
Note III. For every thirty minutes delay (unavoidable accidents excepted) in arriving after the times prescribed in any contracts, the contractor shall forfeit one dollar; and if the delay continue until the departure of any depending mail, whereby the mails destined for such depending mail lose a trip, an additional forfeiture of five dollars shall be incurred.
Note IV. Newspapers as well as letters are to be sent in the mails: and if any person, making proposals, desires to carry newspapers other than those conveyed in the mail, for his own emolument, he must state in his proposals, for what sum he will carry it with that emolument and for what sum without that emolument.
Note V. Should any person making proposals, desire an alteration of the times of arrival and departure above specified, he must state in his proposals, the alterations desired, and the difference they will make in the terms of his contract.
Note 6. Persons making proposals are desired to state their prices by the year. Those who contract will receive their pay quarterly, in the month of August, November, February and May, one month after the expiration of each quarter.
Note 7. The contracts for the above routes are to be in operation on the first day of April next, and to continue in force for one year from that time excepting such routes as have a particular note respecting the continuance of the contract.
GIDEON GRANGER,
Post-Master General. GENERAL POST-OFFICE, WASHINGTON CITY, Dec. 7, 1801.
Mrs. PICK,
Takes the liberty to inform the ladies of George-Town and City of Washington, and its vicinity, that she has this day opened at Mr. Kirtz's, opposite the Union Tavern, an elegant assortment of MILLINERY, consisting of,
Velvet bonnets, caps, shawls, embroidery, dresses, handkerchiefs, artificial flowers, plumes, trimmings both gold and silver, bugle spangles, facks, muffs, belts and tassels, straw bonnets, calimere shawls and bonnets, gold and silver thread, wigs and frizes, perfume of all kinds, &c. &c. and other articles too numerous to mention; which she will sell on moderate terms.
Dec. 23. epit
To be sold, let, or leased.
A VERY convenient two-story brick house on the north of, and very near to the Capitol, at the corner of B and First streets. The square at the corner of which it stands has been improved in the course of the last summer, with a number of buildings erected by D. Carroll, Esq. and others—Terms may be known on application to Mr. Joseph Hodgson, between the Six and Seven Buildings, Washington; or to the subscriber in Baltimore.
MATTHEW BROWN.
Dec. 23. code
JOHN BYRNE,
At his wholesale and retail Wine, Spirits and grocery Store, in Prince, near Water-street, Alexandria.
Offers for sale at very moderate prices,
London particular Madeira } do do Teneriffe } Wines. Choice Lisbon, Port and Malaga } (Cognac brandy, Holland gin, old Jamaica spirits, anniseed cordials, fine teas, coffee, chocolate, loaf, lump, and brown sugars, nutmegs, mustard, pepper, Florence oil, raisins, starch, molasses, coals, &c. &c.
A small assortment of tea-trays, waiters, brass-cooks, and Dutch ovens; with excellent Irish linen and dowlas sheeting by the piece.
The quality and prices of the above are peculiarly calculated to recommend them to the keepers of boarding houses, and to give satisfaction to such gentlemen as may wish to provide their own wines, &c.
Alexandria, Dec. 21, 1801. ep2w
NOTICE.
ALL persons having claims against the estate of JASPER DE CARNAP, late of the City of Washington, deceased, are desired to exhibit their accounts for settlement, and those who are indebted are earnestly requested to discharge the same without delay.
ELIZABETH DE CARNAP, Administratrix.
HENRY INGLE, Administrator. Dec. 11, 1801. ep8w
The Rev. Mr. McCormick,
RESPECTFULLY informs the citizens of Washington, that he purposed opening SCHOOL, in his house, South B Street near the Capitol, on the first Monday in January next, if due encouragement be given.—His terms may be known by application to him at his present residence, New-Jersey Avenue.
Dec. 18. ep6t
T. BRUFF, Dentist,
INVENTOR and PATENTEE of the peculiar extracting instruments, is at Mr. Semmes's George-Town, and offers his service to the ladies and gentlemen of the district, in the different branches of his profession, but most particularly in that so essential to the health and preservation of the teeth and gums. To cleanse the teeth is one thing, and to restore them to their natural elegance with perfect safety and without pain, is another—If strangers would enquire of the safety of his performances, they cannot easily go amiss for information, as to great a portion of the inhabitants have experienced the benefit. He will attend ladies at their residence and gentlemen also if they prefer it. He has genuine tooth-powder, and will warrant its safety, and its efficacy in polishing the teeth and hardening the gums. He intends shortly to remove his family to the district, and requests the future patronage of the inhabitants.
Dec. 28. cop5t
JOHN GOULDING,
Broker and Commission Merchant, RESPECTFULLY offers his services to his friends, to the friends of his friends and to the public. He proposes to do business in this line, for the sale, purchase and transfer of real and personal property of every description; the barter and exchange of lots, houses, &c. for merchandise, and vice versa.
He has just received and for sale, madeira, port, Lisbon, claret and Malaga wine, shrub, brandy, gin, and cherry brandy, raisins, currants, figs, almonds, capers, olives, anchovies, citron, corks, &c. Philadelphia porter, loaf sugar, and shoes of all sizes, particularly Ladies morocco, kid and spangled shoes. All which are for sale on reasonable terms, for cash, flour or tobacco; and again begs leave to solicit his friends, the friends of his friends and the public, to give him an opportunity, by partaking of their favors, to gratify them, in more respects than one.
George-Town, next the } Post Office, Dec. 18, 1801. epim
Charlotte Hall School,
SCHOOL will open on the 8th day of January next. The trustees at their quarterly meeting, held on the 30th of November, having taken into consideration the great increase of the School, and thinking that the moral conduct, and improvement of the pupils might be best promoted by the residence of the principal in the family, have induced him to undertake this duty; therefore the Rev. GEORGE RALPH, with proper assistants, will receive boarders, at Charlotte Hall, on the terms heretofore established, by the trustees, viz.
Board, lodging, and washing, 27 10 0
Or, by furnishing bedding, 25 per annum.
The payments, as usual, will be expected to be made quarterly, and in advance.
Signed by order,
NEALE H. SHAW, Reg. Cool Springs, Dec. 28, 1801. 22w4w
Boarding House.
E. Gardner, at No. 6, of the Seven Buildings, will accommodate gentlemen with boarding and lodging on moderate terms.
Dec. 28, 1801. ep7t
For Sale or Rent,
Two three story brick houses in Alexandria, completely finished, on King and Columbia, street, with sundry valuable property near the same, possession whereof may be had immediately. The situation for the flour and grocery business is equal to any in Alexandria.
For terms apply to Henry Thomas Moore, Alexandria, or to the subscriber.
NICHOLAS POSS.
FOR SALE,
A Servant about twenty-five or twenty-six years of age, who has been accustomed to serve as BUTLER, in a Gentleman's family, for 10 or 12 years. He is also an attentive body Servant. Apply to the subscriber, at Stelle's Hotel.
SKELTON JONES.
Washington Dec. 14, 1801. ep3w
TO LET,
During the Session of Congress, or longer,
A HANDSOME two story brick house with the liberty of a large garden, an excellent kitchen, with a pump of good water in the same, a good eight foot stable and coach house, with every other convenience; situate in the New-Jersey Avenue. Enquire on the premises, of
JOHN FOWNES,
Who has lately laid in a general assortment of dry goods, such as superfine broad cloths, calimeres, coumings, woollens of all kinds, linens, mullins, stockings, hats, &c. Likewise all kinds of groceries. He returns his sincere thanks to his friends and the public, for the encouragement he has already met with since his residence here and hopes for a continuance of their favor which will be gratefully acknowledged.
Dec. 30, 1801. ep3t
GEORGE BROWN,
Has recently at his store opposite to the house lately occupied by capt. Burch, New-Jersey Avenue,
A handsome Assortment of DRY GOODS, Suitable to the present season.—Earthen Queens, and Glass Ware—Also
Groceries and Liquors,
Among which are the following articles—Loaf and brown Sugars, teas, coffee, pepper, mustard, nutmegs, box raisins, figs, for shell almonds, oranges, lemons, Cranberries, Holland gin, and spirits, &c.
The above goods are laid in on such terms as will enable him to sell low for cash—He keeps a regular supply of the best superfine flour from the back-country.
Dec. 11, 1801. ep6w
TO BE SOLD AT
PUBLIC SALE,
At the Union Tavern in George-Town, at 5 o'clock in the evening on the fourth Thursday, viz. 28th of January next,
THE brick house formerly occupied as a Tavern by Mr. Semmes, on a credit of six, nine, and twelve months. Negotiable notes, with approved endorser, payable at the bank of Columbia or Alexandria, to be given at the time of sale. An unquestionable title will be made, and the papers laid before the purchasers. Any person desirous of purchasing this very desirable and valuable property at private sale in the mean time, may know the terms by applying to either of the subscribers.
PHILIP B. KEY,
WILLIAM THORNTON.
Dec. 23, 1801. cpts
NOTICE
For locating the Canada and Nova-Scotia Refugee Lands.
WHEREAS said lands are to be located on the 12th instant, the subscriber begs leave to acquaint his friends and the public in general, that he has employed a gentleman residing in the country near said lands, to explore them, they having been explored by half sections, and all the minutes transmitted to him here, describing the soil, timber, situation, &c.
Will be ready to make the locations on the day appointed.—Any person wishing to have their lands located, can have it done on reasonable terms, by applying at the Washington City Tavern, near the Treasury Office, to
PETER MILLS.
Washington, January 2, 1802. 4t.
ROBBERY!!
Five hundred Dollars
REWARD.
GENERAL POST-OFFICE,
December 18, 1801.
WHEREAS I have received information that the Northern Mail, which was dispatched from the post office at Charleson, S. C. on Wednesday evening the 2d instant, was forcibly taken from the post rider near the ten mile house, by four persons whom he believes to be negroes but who may have been white persons disguised: And whereas I have been informed that several gentlemen had forwarded by said mail sundry Bank notes and bills of exchange to a considerable amount, I do hereby offer a reward of FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS, to be paid to any person or persons, who will apprehend or give information that may lead to conviction of, or either of the villains concerned in this daring robbery, so that they may be brought to punishment.
The Postmaster at Charleson, having offered a similar reward, this is not to be considered as accumulative but confirmatory of his act.
GIDEON GRANGER,
Postmaster-General.
Dec. 21, 1801. ep3w