The national intelligencer and Washington advertiser. (Washington City [D.C.]), 1802-02-22 00:00:00

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, AND WASHINGTON ADVERTISER.
Vol. II.
WASHINGTON CITY, PRINTED BY SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH, PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE.
No. CCII.
FIVE DOLLS. PER ANN.
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 23d, 1802.
PAID IN ADVANCE.
National Intelligencer.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
TUESDAY, February 16, 1802.
Debate on the bill received from the Senate, entitled "An Act to repeal certain acts respecting the organisation of the courts of the U. States."
MR. HENDERSON.
I should not rise to offer my opinion on the great question now before the committee, were I not placed in a situation different from that in which I have been since I have had the honor of a seat in this house. The legislature of the state of North Carolina, one of whose representatives I am on this floor, have been proper to instruct their senators, and to recommend to their representatives in congress, to use their exertions to procure a repeal of the law passed the last session of congress for the more convenient organization of the courts of the United States; and as the bill on your table has for its object the repeal of this law, and as I shall probably vote against its passage, a decent respect for the opinions of those who have framed and sent forward those resolutions, demand that I should give the reasons which influence my conduct.
And here, Sir, I cannot forbear lamenting extremely that I should unfortunately be placed in a situation, where the highest obligations of duty compel me to act in opposition to the wishes of that community to which I immediately belong. It is certainly of great importance that as public functionaries we should not only discharge those trusts committed to us with fidelity, and for the general good, but in such a manner as to give satisfaction to those for whom we are acting.
And if I know the feelings of my own heart, I declare, that next to the consciousness of having performed my duty with uprightness, is the knowledge that in the discharge of this duty I meet the approbation of my fellow men. But, Sir, if this approbation is only to be obtained by the unconditional surrender of my understanding, and the violation of my oath, I hope I shall be excused if I do not make this sacrifice at the altar of public opinion. Indeed, Sir, were I disposed to forego my own opinion and adopt that of the legislature of my state—were I inclined to say thy will be done and not mine, I should still demand of them an absolution from the oath which I have lately taken to support the constitution of the United States. As long as that oath is binding on me, I see an insuperable objection to my acting in conformity to their wishes.
I will further remark, Sir, that I am not a little surprised that, that august body should have undertaken to decide on a question not necessarily before them without having an opportunity of hearing the arguments which may be used here either on one side or the other. I will not permit myself for a moment to believe the measure originated in a want of confidence in those who represent the state and the people in this assembly. And yet, if that confidence exists, the reasons for this procedure do not immediately present themselves to the mind.
I hope, Sir, it will not be understood that I mean to cast the most distant shade of disrespect on that body. I feel too great a respect for the legislature of my native state to be guilty of such an attempt. No doubt but they were influenced by the purest and the most correct understanding. It does not follow by any means, that because my weak and feeble mind cannot discover perfect propriety in the conduct of men, that therefore it does not exist. Having premised thus much Mr. Chairman, I will proceed to an examination of the question under consideration. It has been usual to divide it into two parts: first, the expediency; and secondly, the authority of congress to pass the bill on the table. This is a natural and correct division; but I shall invert the order of considering the question, and first examine our power to act, before we consider the expediency of action. And if after a calm and candid review of the constitution, it
would be found that we are prohibited from passing the bill, there will be no necessity for inquiring into the expediency of repealing the law passed last session of congress for organizing our courts of justice. The relative merits of the old and a new judiciary system will be entirely out of view. For I am confident that there is not a member of this body who would wish to pass the bill on your table,
if in doing it we must violate the sacred charter under which we are now assembled.
The people of America have ordained and established that the powers of government shall be vested in three great departments—the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial. They have said that there shall be an house of representatives, the members of which shall be chosen by the people of the several states, every second year. Though this house is composed of members chosen by the people immediately; though they can have no other interest than the great community from which they were sent; though they must return to the common mass in the short period of two years, yet enlightened America did not see proper to entrust the power of making laws to this body alone; they knew that the history of man and the experience of ages bore testimony against the safety of committing this high power to any one assembly not checked by some other body.
They have therefore erected another branch of the legislature, called the senate, the members of which are not to be elected by the people immediately, but by the sovereignities of the several states: they are to be chosen for six years and not for two, and the qualification requisite to entitle those to a seat is different from that of a member of this House. To these bodies are given the power of initiating all laws, but after a bill has passed both of these Houses, before it becomes of binding obligation on the nation, it must be approved of by the President; it is a dead letter until life is given by the executive. The President is elected not by the people, not by the legislatures of the several states, not by either House of congress, but by electors chosen by the people. He is to hold his office during four years; this is the second great department of the government. It will be easily discovered from this cursory view of our constitution, the caution and jealousy with which the people have conferred the power of making laws, of commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong. But, Sir, after this law was made, after its authoritative mandate was acknowledged by the nation; it became necessary to establish some tribunal to judge of the extent and obligation of this law. The people did not see proper to entrust this power of judging of the meaning of their laws either to the legislative, or to the executive, because they all participated in the making of these laws; and experience had shown, that it is essential for the preservation of liberty, that the judicial and legislative authorities should be kept separate and distinct. They therefore, enacted a third department, called the judicial, and said that "the judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall at stated times receive for their services, a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." It is admitted, I understand by all parties, by every description of persons, that these words, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, are intended as a limitation of power. The question is, what power is this to be limited and checked? I answer, that all and every power which would have had the authority of impairing the tenure by which the judges hold their offices, (if these words were not inserted) is checked and limited by these words; whether that power should be found to reside in congress, or in the executive. The words are broad and extensive in their signification; and can only be satisfied by being construed to control the legislative as well as the executive power. But gentlemen contend, that they must be confined to limiting the power of the President. I ask gentlemen, what is there in the constitution to prove their signification to this end alone? When you erect a court and fill it with a judge, & tell him in plain simple language, that he shall hold his office during good behaviour, or as long as he shall behave well; what I beseech you, Sir, will any man whose mind is not bewildered in the mazes of modern metaphysics infer from the declaration? Certainly that the office will not be taken from him until he misbehaves; nor that he will be taken from the office, during his good behaviour. Under this impression he enters upon his duty, performing it with the most perfect satisfaction to all persons who have business before him; and the legislature without whispering a complaint, abolishes the office and there-
by turns out the judge. The judge is told this is no violation of the compact, although you have behaved well, although we have promised, that as long as you did behave well, you should continue in office; yet, there is now no further necessity for your services, and you may retire. These words, 'during good behaviour,' are intended to prevent the President from dismissing you from office, and not the legislature from destroying your office. Do you suppose, Sir, that there is a man of common understanding in the nation whose mind is not alive to the influence of party spirit, that would yield his assent to this reasoning? I hope and believe, there is not. But, Sir, how is it proved that the President would have had the power of removing the judges from their office, if these words, 'during good behaviour' had not been inserted in the constitution? Is there any words in that instrument which give the President expressly the power of removing any officer at pleasure? If there are—I call upon gentlemen to point them out. It does not result from the fashionable axiom, that the power which can create, can destroy. The President can nominate, but he can appoint to office only by the advice and consent of the senate. Therefore, it would follow, if the power of displacing results from that of creating; that the senate should participate in displacing as well as creating officers. But however this may be, it is certainly a mere constructive power which he has exercised, because the legislature have from motives of expediency acknowledged, that he had it. If the constitution does not necessarily give the President the right of removing officers at pleasure, and if that right depend upon legislative act or constructions, where would have been the necessity for inserting these emphatic words as a check and limitation of executive power, where without them the President has no such power. You are taking great pains to control a power which does not exist. The persons who framed our constitution, knew that a power of removal in ordinary cases must exist somewhere. They took care therefore, that in whatever hands it might fall, the language of the constitution respecting the tenure of the office of a judge should be co-extensive with the whole power of removal, whether it should reside in one or in more hands.
But, Sir, these words, during good behaviour, are familiar to the American people; when the political bands which united us with Great-Britain were burst asunder, and we assumed among the nations of the earth an independent station, most, if not all the states introduced these words into their constitutions. They were deemed essential, and a meaning has been stamped upon them which it is not in the power of this house to change. Let us for a moment examine some of the state constitutions and see what signification must of necessity be given to these words. I will first advert to the constitution of North-Carolina, as being one with which I am best acquainted. In that instrument it is said "that the General Assembly shall, by joint ballot of both houses, appoint judges of the supreme court of law and equity, judges of admiralty and an attorney-general, who shall be commissioned by the Governor; and hold their offices during good behaviour." I ask gentlemen what power is intended here to be limited and checked by the words "shall hold their offices during good behaviour?" Not the executive, for it is well known that the Governor of that state cannot appoint even a constable. It could not be the meaning of that constitution to check his power of removal, for that of appointment is not any where given to him. Then these words must mean that the legislature should not have the power of removing the judges from office as long as they behaved well. If you do not give this signification to the words they are of no importance, and might as well have been left out of the instrument. I hope the feelings of the people of North-Carolina will not be hurt, and their understandings insulted by telling us that the meaning of the words may be satisfied by construing them to extend to a prohibition of the legislature displacing the judges and proceeding to the election of others without those displaced being guilty of misbehaviour. If this is correct, what security, Sir, have the people then for the independence of their judges? The constitution has told them that they should be judged by men who, during the time they behaved well should continue in office, or what is the same thing, should hold them during good behaviour. But they are now informed that this was intended to operate as a check upon the legislature's dis-
placing them by selecting others to fill their offices when they had not misbehaved, but not to prevent their passing a law repealing that act by which the appointment to office was made; or in other words, our assembly are expressly forbidden to impair the tenure by which our judges hold their offices, as long as they behave well; but they can repeal the law, and the judges are out of office, though they may be the most virtuous, upright and able men in the country, and have discharged their duties faithfully. Are the gentlemen on this floor from N. Carolina prepared to give this construction to that constitution? Are they prepared to tell their constituents that the provisions of their constitution may be thus evaded, and the whole power of government, legislative, executive and judicial be concentrated in the general assembly, and absolute despotism imposed upon them? If they are not I conjure them to pause before they give their vote for the passage of the bill on the table. I will further observe, Mr. Chairman, that words of the same import with those I have quoted from the constitution of North-Carolina, are to be found in the Virginia and South-Carolina constitutions, in neither of which states hath the Governor the right of appointing judges. In Virginia, Sir, the judges of the supreme court, in 1792, declared that the assembly of that state had not the power of imposing chancery duties on the district judge, and in delivering their opinions, defended at large on the independence of the judiciary, and said that the assembly could not annul the office of a judge, which was secured to him by the constitution. If this is a true exposition of the constitution of that state, I ask gentlemen by what authority they now attempt to impose a different meaning on the same words, when found in the constitution of the United States? Are we to suppose that the whole people of America were less regardful of their rights, less solicitous for independent judges, than the people of a particular state? And unless this is conceded the doctrine of gentlemen who advocate the passage of this bill must be incorrect.
But it has been said that the powers of each congress are equal, and that a subsequent legislature can repeal the acts of a former. And as this law was passed by the last congress, we have the same power to repeal it which they had to enact it. This objection is more plausible than solid. It is not contended by us that legislatures who are not limited in their powers, have not the same authority. The question is not what omnipotent assemblies can do, but what we can do under a constitution defining and limiting with accuracy, the extent and boundaries of our authority. The very section in the constitution, sect. 3, art. 1, which I have read, is a proof against the power of every congress to repeal the acts of their predecessors. In the latter part of the 8th section it is provided that the judges shall receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. I suppose that it will not be contended that we can diminish this compensation during the continuance of the office, and yet the salary was fixed and ascertained by a former congress; the same observations may be made with respect to compensation to the President, which can neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected. It is not competent for this congress to vary the compensation to him which has been fixed by a prior legislature. It is clearly seen upon a little investigation that the position which gentlemen take is too extensive; and leads immediately to a destruction of the constitution. It does away all check and makes the legislature omnipotent. It has been asked that if a corrupt and unprincipled congress should make an army of judges, have not a subsequent congress the right of repealing the law establishing this monstrous judicial system. I answer, that they have not, the same mode of reasoning which attempts to prove this right from an abuse of power, will also prove that you may lessen the compensation of your judges. May not equal oppression be imposed upon the people, by giving your judges exorbitant salaries, as by increasing their numbers? May not the same corrupt and unprincipled motive which would lead men to the raising an army of judges, lead them to squander the public money; and may they not instead giving their judges 2000 dollars a year, give them 200,000? And yet, Sir, if these were to take place, I know of no authority under the constitution to lessen this exorbitant compensation. The government of our country is predicated upon a reasonable confidence in those who ad-
minister our public affairs. They must have the power of acting for the public welfare, and this would never have been given them if the possible abuse of this power were a sufficient reason for withholding it. I will take the liberty of observing further, that this part of the constitution, which forbids lessening the compensation to the judges during their continuance in office, furnishes a strong argument that it was the intention of the people to place their judges out of the control of the legislature as long as they behaved well; that they did mean to render them independent of the legislature to a certain extent is obvious; inasmuch as they inhibit the power of reducing their salaries. For it is evident, that if they could take from them their compensation, they might drive them from office, and the consequence would have been, that our judges would have felt all that dependence which results from a consciousness that another body has the power of diminishing their comforts. I ask gentlemen if the framers of this constitution intended to give Congress the power of abolishing the office of a judge, by repealing the law which created the office, and thereby displace the judge? Where could have been the propriety of forbidding his salary to be diminished during his continuance in office?
Is it possible to suppose that they were more anxious to secure that independence which results from permanency of compensation, than that which results from permanency of the office itself. That they should have been altogether regardless of the power which Congress was to have over the office, but limit with the utmost strictness their power of diminishing the salary, when the office itself upon which the salary depends was to be at the mercy of Congress. I believe that such folly cannot with justice be attributed to those great men who gave existence to this instrument.
Again, Sir, the construction which gentlemen on the other side of the House contend for, tends to the concentration of legislative and executive powers in the same hands. If Congress, who have the power of making laws, can also displace their judges by repealing that which creates the offices they fill, the irresistible consequence is, that whatever law is passed the judges must carry into execution, or they will be turned out of office. It is of little importance to the people of this country whether Congress sit in judgment upon their laws themselves, or whether they sit in judgment upon those who are appointed for that purpose. It amounts to the same despotism—they in fact judge the extent and obligations of their own statutes, by having those in their power who are placed on the sacred seat of justice. Whatever the legislature declares to be law must be obeyed. The constitutional check which the judges were to be on the legislature is completely done away. They may pass ex post facto laws; bills of attainder, suspending the writ of habeas corpus in time of peace; and the judge who dares to question their authority is to be hurled from his seat. All the ramparts which the constitution has erected around the liberties of the people, are prostrated at one blow by the passage of this law. The monstrous and unheard of doctrine which has been lately advanced, that the judges have not the right of declaring unconstitutional laws void, will be put into practice by the adoption of this measure. New offences may be created by law. Associations and combinations may be declared treason, & the enlightened and appalled citizen may in vain seek refuge in the independence of your courts. In vain may he hold out the constitution and deny the authority of Congress to pass a law of such undefined signification; and call upon the judges to protect him; he will be told that the opinion of Congress now is, that we have no right to judge of their authority; this will be the consequence of concentrating judicial and legislative power in the same hands. It is the very definition of tyranny, and wherever you find it the people are slaves, whether they call their government a monarchy, republic or democracy.
Mr. Chairman, I see, or think I see, in this attempt, that spirit of innovation which has prostrated before it a great part of the old world—Every institution which the wisdom and experience of ages had reared up for the benefit of man. A spirit which has rode in the whirlwind, and directed the storm to the destruction of the fairest portion of Europe, which has swept before it every vestige of law, religion, morality, and rational government, which has brought twenty millions of people at the feet of one man, and compelled them to look

refuge from their complicated miseries in the calm of despotism. It is against the influence of this tremendous spirit, that I will to raise my voice and exert my powers weak and feeble as they are. I fear, Sir, on the 7th of December it made its appearance within these walls clothed in a gigantic body, impetuous for action. I fear it has already begun to exert its all-devouring energy. Have you a judiciary system extending over this immense country, matured by the wisdom of your ablest and best men? It must be destroyed. Have you taxes which have been laid since the commencement of the government, and is the irritation consequent upon the laying of taxes worn off? Are they paid exclusively by the wealthy and the luxurious part of the community; and are they pledged for the payment of the public debt? They must be abolished. Have you a mint establishment which is not only essentially necessary to protect the country against the influx of base foreign metals, but is a fair distribution of sovereign power? It must be abolished. Have you laws which require foreign creditors to come to your country to go through a probatiorary state, by which their habits, their morals and propensities may be known, before they are admitted to all the rights of native Americans? They must be repealed and our shores crowded with the outcasts of foreign, lest oppressed humanity then should find no asylum on this globe!
Mr. Chairman, If the doctrine contended for by gentlemen on the other side of the House, should become the settled construction of the constitution, and enlightened America acquiesce with that construction, I declare for myself, and for myself alone, I would not leave a high nor had a tear, over its total desolation. The wound you are about to give it will be mortal; it may languish out a miserable existence for a few years, but it will surely die. It will neither serve to protect its friends nor defend itself from the omnipotent energies of its enemies. Better at once to bury it, and with it all our hopes.
Mr. R. WILLIAMS said he could not believe it necessary in the discussion of this question, which he acknowledged to be important, to reply to the remarks of his colleague on the danger of a destruction of the constitution if this bill passed; nor could he believe there existed any analogy between our situation and that of countries in a revolutionary state. Nor could he see the connection between this subject, and the repeal of the internal taxes, the diminution of the army, or the abolition of the mint. He should, therefore, take the liberty of placing all these considerations aside as having no real relation to the subject.
My colleague has commenced his remarks with deplored that the legislature of North-Carolina should give instructions on a subject on which they cannot possess so much necessary information as is required for a correct decision. In this regret he could not agree with his colleague. He believed they had all the information requisite for a correct judgment. If this subject is so all-important, if it involves a great constitutional question, how can we presume the legislature of a state which must be deeply interested in it, to be ignorant of its merits? How will the doctrine of the gentleman, which attaches so much importance to the petitions on your table apply? Will he pretend to say the legislature of that state is less informed than citizens who occupy but a small section of the country?
In considering this question, his colleague had gone on the ground of constitutionality. In his arguments he has formed a chain of reasoning merely, on the abuse of power. He would agree with him that it was impossible to devise any system of government from which effects may not follow that shall be pernicious. But is this any good reason against giving effect to a reasonable constitutional power? Is it fair to say, because the legislature have the power of abolishing the office of a judge, that therefore they will turn every judge out of office. This was to suppose that we were lost as to the principles of government, and ripe for a revolution.
That there must be some place where the true meaning of the constitution must be determined, all would agree. Where then is it? In what department? The people have constituted two departments of authority, the executive and legislative, emanating directly from the people; and have directed them to form another, further removed from the people. Are we then to be told there is more safety in confiding this important power to the last department, so far removed from the people, than in departments flowing directly from the people, responsible to and returning at short intervals into the mass of the people.
Agreeably to our constitution a judge may be impeached. But if the doctrine contended for on the opposite side prevails, how is this salutary part of the constitution to operate? Suppose a law to pass, directing the mode of trial, or a law to pass, prescribing any duties to a judge. He is to decide whether it is constitutional or not. If it is disagreeable to him, he declares it unconstitutional; and he says he is sworn to support the constitution. If he has this right, how-
ever he may err, he commits no crime. How then can he be impeached?
But my colleague says this is turning the judges out of their offices. But I do not see it in this point of view. I believe the natural consequence of our construction is that the judge shall hold the office while it exists, and so long as he behaves well, independent of any legislative or executive control.
But the appointment of a judge is said to form a contract. Between it and a contract I can see no analogy. There must be two parties to a contract. I will ask whether a judge is to be considered as a party, at the time when the law passed, before there are any courts established, and which are only contemplated to be established.
Again—For whose interest were these offices created. Not for the interest of the individual officers, but the people. If then the passage of the law sprang from a regard to the interest and convenience of the people, ought not its continuance to depend upon the same interest and convenience?
To make the judge independent in the tenure of his office, while it remains, and to protect his salary from diminution, is sufficient, and it is making him as independent as judges ever have been in the country to which gentlemen are so apt to refer for whatever is worthy of imitation. In England, the judiciary is said to form the strongest pillar of the government, and the greatest security of the people; and yet are they independent of the legislature? Are they not easily removable on the address of the two houses, while here they can only be removed on the conviction of a crime.
If this doctrine is to extend to the length gentlemen contend, then is the sovereignty of the government to be swallowed up in the vortex of the judiciary. Whatever the other departments of the government may do, they can undo. You may pass a law; but they can annul it. Will not the people be attuned to hear that their laws depend upon the will of the judges, who are themselves independent of all law?
My colleague has made use of an expression, made before, but which I hoped would not have been repeated in this house. He says the judges were intended to guard the people from their worst of enemies, from themselves. Are the people to be told, that they are so lost to a sense of their own interests, so ignorant and regardless of them, that they must take fifteen or twenty men to guard them from themselves. Is it possible that any man can attempt to make this people believe they are themselves their greatest enemies.
I will agree that there are times when checks and balances are useful. Legislative bodies may occasionally in a gust of passion, pass improper laws. But, because in a solitary instance we may pass such laws, shall we pass all authority into the hands of a few men, who, gentlemen say, know none of these passions, who are calm, cool, and wise men, who know no interests of their own, but are totally absorbed in that of the people. Suppose in our construction we should err, the evil can last no longer than two, at most six years, which are the durations of our office. The people will then dismiss us. But how can the judge be checked, or the evils be committed be remedied? No way but by a recurrence to revolutionary principles.
But my colleague has read the constitution of North-Carolina, which says that the judges shall be chosen by the joint ballot of the two houses, and shall hold their offices during good behaviour. And he says this limitation cannot extend to the executive, because the executive has no agency in the appointment. It must, therefore, he contends prohibit the legislature from repealing the law which creates the office of judge. But was it not possible for the gentleman to conceive that the legislature might, were it not for the constitution, have laid a judge shall be removed, and passed a law to that effect. Without this constitutional provision, what would prohibit the legislature from sweeping off all their judges, and voting in new ones.
After making these remarks on the constitutionality of the measure, I will ask what preference this law, which it is now proposed to repeal, has over the previous system? Does it pay more regard to the convenience of the people? I believe that under it only four states are divided; in all the others, the districts remain as before; and suitors, witnesses and jurors have to attend at the same places, and under all the inconveniences they before experienced; with this difference that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is brought down to 400 instead of 500 dollars.
If I believed, with my colleague, that a repeal of this law would give a death blow to the constitution, I would be the last man to vote for it. But believing as I do, on the contrary, that the doctrine now contended for would destroy the vital principles of the constitution, by submitting the entire sovereignty of the nation to judiciary control, and that the only way of resisting this doctrine is to repeal the law, I vote most cheerfully for its repeal.
Mr. HEMPHILL said he would claim the attention of the committee a short time upon the important question now
before them; that his task would principally be to arrange arguments which he had already heard or seen.
He would say but very little as to the expediency of passing the bill on the table, he would not go into a minute comparison of the two judicial systems; but should content himself with submitting a few general observations. The alleged nullity of the law passed the 13th of February 1801, relied principally upon document No. 8, which accompanied the President's Message. That document contains a list of all suits at common law, suits in chancery, criminal prosecutions, and admiralty causes, which have been commenced in any of the federal courts of the United States, from May 1789, to April 1801; it appears that within the time included 876 causes have been instituted, and of that number 1537 are now depending, in the enumeration the state of Maryland is omitted, and probably with the addition of causes in that state, the aggregate number would be 9,000, and the causes now depending about 1600. With a list of 1600 causes undecided, and an annual increase of 7 or 800, it is possible with no other assistance than would be received from the district judges, that six men could perform all this business of business in its original and final stages, to be transacted at so many different and distant places, in a country extending 1600 miles; and that the causes could be decided with that dispatch which the public good requires. What every one would suppose to be the natural consequence of such a system has been witnessed by the gentlemen of the bar in the eastern part of Pennsylvania; who have deliberately and anxiously declared to you, that in their opinion a renewal of the late system would be attended with great public inconvenience, and that without advertising to the casualties of weather or indisposition, its inevitable consequences were embarrassment, uncertainty, and delay.
Sixteen judges were appointed at an expense of 32,000 dollars, 3000 dollars of which will be saved on the first vacancy in the Supreme Court, and when we are about calculating the expense, we should deduct the savings which the new system will certainly make; it must be acknowledged that many of the parties and witnesses will not have to far to attend court; it must be acknowledged that the causes would be sooner decided than under the old system; the unbusiness will rather increase than diminish. Omitting the admiralty causes there will be about 1500 undecided causes remaining, and of course 3000 suitors, and if only one witness to a cause, there will be 4,500 people in motion, attending court; from the two causes which I have mentioned there will necessarily be a considerable saving; some eliminate might be made, and this saving will in some measure be equalised, as no person knows how soon he will be a party or a witness. It is for the trifling difference between this saving and the salaries of a few judges, that the liberty of the people is to be endangered—and if I am not mistaken a gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Giles) when the Apportionment Bill was before the house declared that the expense of the civil list was a trifling thing, a mere speck on the pages of expenditure, and that it was the expense of maintaining armies and fleets that we should guard against.
The expense of the augmented representation in this house will be nearly if not quite equal to the salaries of the judges. I think I may with great safety appeal to the people and ask them which expense will be most to their advantage.
Before I enter into the discussion of the main question, I beg leave, Mr. Chairman, to make a few preliminary remarks. The first is, as to the salaries of the judges of the district courts of Kentucky and Tennessee, which were increased by a law, which must be acknowledged to be so far constitutional. Can you repeal the law generally, and thereby diminish the compensation of the judges? I do not mean to contend that the office of a judge is to out-live the constitution. Every officer is removable by a change of that part of the constitution on which his office depends; if by any event the constitution should be entirely dissolved, all the officers will revert to the common mass, and the people must again begin to build up a new government. It has been said that our constitution exhibits the absurdity of an office without an officer; quasi a judge, entitled to his salary without any duty to perform, and the strange phenomenon of an officer not amenable to your laws, to your constitution, or to the people. These observations amount to nothing; they are taking that as a data given, which is the only thing to be proven; for the sole question is, can an office be taken away from a judge? I think no person will seriously contend that the framers of the constitution ever intended that a man should be entitled to his salary, when he was not in the possession of his office; indeed the words in the constitution do not embrace the extent of the proposition; the words are, during his continuance in office.
In regard to the main question, Mr. Chairman, I will in the first place read the 5th and 10th amendments to the constitution.
IX. The enumeration, in the constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others, retained by the people.
X. The powers, not delegated to the United States, by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.
The question is between the people of the United States and their rulers. In behalf of the people it is contended, that the power you are about to exercise does not belong to you, but that it was relevant to the people at the formation of the constitution; the rulers say no, the power belongs to us, and we can and will exercise it, whenever we deem it expedient. I submit it to the consideration of this honourable committee, if in such a case there should be a reasonable doubt whether it will not be most delicate and safe to let that doubt operate in favour of the people. We are not here, Sir, clothed with the full power of the American people, we are here in a circumscribed sphere, exercising a limited power. The people are the original fountain of all power; we only possess a part of their power. Bearing constantly this view of the subject in our minds, many questions may be readily answered. As, when it is asked, is the creature greater than its God? cannot he who makes, destroy? has not one legislature as much power as another? As to the two first, the idea is correct, when applied to the original power; it is correct or incorrect when applied to a limited power, according to the words and meaning of the instrument giving that power; the instrument giving power to congress has inhibited the power, which has a right to create, from destroying, as in the case of the salary of the President & the compensation of the judges; the president & senate also have the power to appoint judges, but not to remove them; and the question is, does not the instrument giving power to congress restrain them from taking away the office of a judge, as in the above instances, giving a power to create and not to destroy. As to the question, has not one legislature as much power as another? I answer yes; both deriving their power from the same instrument must be precisely the same; but this proves nothing until it is shown that any legislature can take away the office of a judge. Many other ideas advanced on this subject are predicated upon the supposed abuse of power, and strike at the very existence of written constitutions, and tend to shew the impracticability of being governed under them. Suppose one legislature was to create a million of judges, who is to correct this evil? Is it possible, it is asked, that another legislature should not have power instantly to correct this shameful abuse of the people's rights? Suppose, on the other hand, that a legislature, previous to a President's election, should raise his salary to a million a year, will it be contended that the next legislature, agreeably to the constitution, could decrease the salary? It will not; and why not have the power in one case as well as in the other? There are many cases under our constitution, where the people have run the risk of the abuse of power, and have retained the power of correction in their own hands; and what is the plain remedy for an evil in the present case, if it should exist? If the number of your judges is a little too great, declare that vacancies shall not be filled—if they become corrupted, impeach them; if by any uncommon event in the circumstances of the country, or the wickedness of a legislature, the number should be extravagantly great and useless, put them down by changing that part of the constitution. And this, Sir, is not a monstrosity difficult thing. We have already had amendments to the constitution, when the emergency was not great. If an evil should grow out of any part of the constitution, it can easily be removed by the hands of the people constitutionally raised; the judges are secure and not within the reach of a raging party, yet they must always remain within the reach of the cool reflection of the nation, and if the people will not agree to make this change, it will be a proof that the evil does not exist, and the great order of things ought not to be changed for mere imaginary complaints.
If congress, in coming here, and carrying with them the sentiments of the people, and as their immediate representatives can do every thing which may appear to them for the good of the people, under every change of circumstances; a written constitution would be useless. Upon this principle the senate is unnecessary. The gentleman from North-Carolina, (Mr. Henderson) has properly dilated upon this view of the subject; our constitution is founded upon different principles and such ideas ought not to govern in putting a construction on it. The people have retained power to themselves, and have said to the legislature, thus far you shall go and no farther. There are certain cases, wherein you shall not be the judges of what will or will not be for our advantage. We have fixed the principle, and have taken the responsibility upon ourselves; on this reserved ground you are not to walk;—One of the great and leading principles agreed upon by
the people, we contend, was the independence of the judges. They calculated that the great good flowing from this principle would far outweigh any apprehension of the abuse of this power in giving birth to too many or improper judges. If, Mr. Chairman, I have perfectly comprehended the arguments of our opponents they all converge to one or other of two points: 1st. That the words in the constitution refer exclusively to the executive, and are meant to render the judges independent of him only; the second point, which is rather a subordinate one, operating in support of the first, is that the office of judge is created by law and not by the constitution, that it is a creature of the law, whose life and death is to proceed from the same hand—I will proceed to examine these two points, giving my hearty assent to the acknowledgement of our opponents, that it is dangerous to the liberties of the people to legislate upon constructive powers.
As to the first point, I would ask on what part of the constitution is this opinion founded, where is it expressed; if there had been an express provision, that the executive might remove officers at pleasure, there would be some weight in the argument, though far from being conclusive, that this clause was intended to prevent him from exercising a power in regard to the judges, which he was allowed to exercise as to all other officers. When nothing of this appears on the face of the constitution, how can you infer it, for the purpose of making one implication assist you in making another; you make words, which are general, apply to a part; by implication you say, that the power that has a right to create has a right to destroy, if not prohibited; by this rule the executive can remove all officers of his own appointment, by the same rule of implication congress can abolish all offices of their own creating, if there is no restriction; in this way the executive and congress have each of them the office in their power, the executive can remove the man, congress can remove the office, then comes in a general clause of restriction including both the man and the office, and to whom is it to refer? If words are the signs of ideas, to both most inevitably, and besides as a proof that it does not refer exclusively to the executive, he is not named in the section; yet congress are named, and acts to be done by congress run all through it. In the first section of the 3d Art. it is declared, that 'a judge shall hold his office during good behaviour;' the office is an object of legislative creation, and the thing thus to be created by the legislature, the judge is to hold for a certain time. If the object is to prevent the executive from taking away the office, leaving the office, a correct expression of that intention would have been, that the judges shall not be removed from office, and these words are used in the affirmative, when the officer and the office are to be separated, and the office left. [Here Mr. Hemphill read from the constitution 3d Sec. 1 Art. N. 7—1 Sec. 2d Art. N. 6, and 4th Sec. 2d Art.] But when the office and the officer are inseparable for a certain time, different words are used. The President shall hold his office during the term of four years;—the judge shall hold his office during good behaviour—the tenure of office in each case is included in the same words.
As to the other point that it is an office created by law, and not by the constitution, and therefore may be removed by a law, let this principle be fairly tested by the constitution itself, and not from any thing out of it. I aver that in every instance where the constitution has spoken of the continuance of any one thing, although the creation of the particular object is optional with congress, yet the moment they give it existence it is out of their power, and must continue during the time mentioned in the constitution. Apply this principle first to the salary of the executive and judges. The salaries are created by law, and when created their continuance is fixed by the constitution. Apply the principle to the members of this House. When the bill fixing the ratio of representation was before us, could we have fixed a ratio decreasing the present number of representatives and have made the law take effect immediately, and thereby disqualify members now on the floor from taking their seats next session, when they had been elected for two years? Yet their right to seats here was created by a law, which was discretionary as to the number. Apply the principle to the senators. New States may be admitted by congress into the Union; yet when the new State shall have been admitted, and two senators chosen in consequence of the law, can congress repeal the law, dismember the Union in part, and turn out the senators? The right of citizenship also is acquired by a law, yet when strangers have become members of your nation, in virtue of a law, can congress repeal that law, and thereby disfranchise a part of her citizens; yet in both these cases it might be said, that they were the throes of a dying administration to provide for its friends. The law at a fixing the permanent seat of government agreeably to the constitution lets us to afford an analogous case, and I q ret-

tion if it could be repealed, unless words mean any thing, and then congress can do anything.
To come to a right understanding of the constitution, it will be necessary to enquire what was the generally received opinion about the time the constitution was adopted—I have ever understood, that there was no difference of opinion on this point; that the general opinion was, that the words in the constitution rendered the judges independent of both the other branches of government. This appears from the debates in the convention in Virginia to have been their opinion—it appears also from the strongest implication to have been the opinion of the Author of the Notes on Virginia. If we can receive no aid from any of these sources, we must take up the constitution, and apply to it the general rules for the interpretation of solemn instruments of writing. If in this instrument we find one express and positive provision, it must have its full force, unless we find another provision equally positive, and so inconsistent that one or the other must give way. In the constitution we find these words, "the judges both of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behaviour," without any other condition or qualification; take these words detached from any other part of the constitution, and I ask do they not contain an express and positive provision? If so, what part of the constitution is so inconsistent as to change the nature of this provision from a positive into a conditional one, and in substance to add these words, viz. "on this condition that congress permit the office so long to remain." It is laid in the 8th Sec. of the 1. Art. that "congress shall have power to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court." This power was necessary to be given, otherwise the tribunals could not have been constituted, and when constituted the duration of the office is limited in another part of the constitution; and any implied power therein contained cannot be inconsistent with an express provision; for a mere implication is never to take preference of a positive provision. The other words, relied upon, are contained in the 1st. Sec. of the 3d Art. What is the meaning of the words from time to time ? They are used but in three other parts of the constitution, and when used they do not convey the idea of undoing what may be done. Indeed they are used in cases where it is impracticable to undo what shall have been done. [Mr. Lempeth here read 5th Sec. 1st. Art. No. 3, 9th Sec. 1st. Art. No. 6, and 3d Sec. 2d Art.] What do these words mean in that part of the constitution under discussion? The supreme court had been mentioned in 2d and 3d Art; the supreme court, which implies that there should be but one. They were not used to give congress power to constitute inferior courts, for that power had been previously given, and if the inferior courts, together with the offices of the judges, are as is contended, subjects of ordinary legislation, these words were unnecessary to enlarge the powers of congress on them, for on all subjects of ordinary legislation congress have an unquestionable right to enact and repeal at pleasure. It is not laid in the 8th Sec. 1st Art. that Congress shall have power to borrow money from time to time, to regulate commerce from time to time; or to establish post-offices and post-roads, from time to time; yet no body doubts that Congress have a right to make, and repeal laws on these subjects, when it may appear expedient; and the same power would have extended to the clause giving power to constitute inferior tribunals, if there had been no restriction in any other part of the constitution. As these words are unnecessary to give the power contended for, they must have some other meaning. The plain meaning is this, that these words, together with the first part of the section, were not used to give a power to constitute courts, for that power had been previously given; they were merely introduced to dispose of the judiciary power, and to declare where it should reside; "the judiciary power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," meaning the power before given, which was discretionary as to number; the clause in the 8th sect. of the 1st article is brought here into view, and in the very next sentence the offices are positively fixed and limited. Here then is an express and positive provision, uncontradicted by any express declaration or by any violent implication. It is laid, that there are words of negation used as to the compensation of the judges, and why not to the offices? If the words had been—and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation during their continuance in office—with any man in his senses say that the compensation could be taken away during that continuance? yet although the compensation could not be taken away, it might be lessened, and the words of negation were to prevent that diminution; but as the legal signification of an office could not be lessened, the words there would have been surplusage.
But, Mr. Chairman, it is probable that the framers of the constitution ever intended to invest Congress with a power to destroy the office of a judge in a ruling country like this, where all the various sources of litigation are daily increasing? They forefaw that new judges would be wanted from time to time, but they never could have pictured to themselves a necessity of dispensing with the old judges.—If we were framing a constitution this moment, if we had any regard for the independency of the judges, would we invest Congress with a power to remove them, or take away the offices? We could calculate with a reasonable certainty, that if there should at any time be a necessity for their appointment, there would always in this country be a necessity for their continuance; and we could trust this power to one legislature as confidentially as to another. If the framers of the constitution could have entertained any suspicion that a legislature in 1801 would create useless judges for party purposes, with equal propriety they might have supposed that a legislature in 1802 would destroy useful judges for party purposes.—But the independency of the judicial department was the object.—This was an invaluable principle, and not more liable to abuse than any other principle fixed by the constitution, and there was no principle so necessary to be settled as the independency of the judges. If we are to argue from the abuse of power, what is there to prevent Congress from admitting into the union more new states than would be for the advantage of the nation; the late administration, with the consent of the legislature of Massachusetts, might have created the province of Maine into 15 or 20 states; the fact is, if there is a necessity for a new state at the time of its admission into the union, the probability is, that there will always be a necessity.—So if there is a necessity for a judge at the time of his appointment, the probability is that there will always be a necessity, and the legislature giving birth to the one or the other, are the constitutional judges of that necessity, and no other legislature has a right to interfere. My opinion is that the framers of the constitution intended that the judges should be independent of both the other branches of government; that they have spoken plainly and unequivocally; and that the moment the judge is appointed the office is ingrafted in, and becomes a part of the constitution, and cannot be taken away without impairing the constitution itself. With regard, Mr. Chairman, to the distinction that is taken between the supreme and inferior courts, for my own part I cannot see any force in the argument. Any notion of common candour must acknowledge, when he reads the first section and second section of the 3d art. that there is as imperative an injunction to establish some inferior courts as there is to establish one supreme court. It is laid that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, and of course there must be inferior courts from which the appeals are to be made, and the duration of office in both courts is contained in the same sentence and words; and it is absurd to suppose that the framers of the constitution affixed a double meaning to these words—the reasons urged against our construction, apply as well to the supreme court as to the inferior courts—a dying administration could provide for its friends by increasing the number of judges in the supreme court with as much facility as by creating inferior tribunals. But, Sir, if congress have the power contended for, there is not a judge on the supreme bench who is not completely in their power. The constitution does not say how many judges there shall be, so that you may remove all but one, or you may pass a law placing six new judges on the bench by the side of the present judges, and then for the good of the people, conclude that twelve judges are unnecessary, and repeal the law which created the first six judges; and the imperative words in the constitution will be complied with; the supreme court being always in existence. I see nothing in the constitution which prohibits congress from changing the name of an inferior court, if by the same act the office with all its appurtenances to it is some where preserved. And that congress have a right to transfer some of the duties of the judges from one tribunal to another is clear and evident; it is incident to the power of constituting new tribunals; for when a new court is created, some of the business which would have been cognizable in the old court, must be transferred to the new tribunal. It was this kind of power that congress exercised in passing the law last session; but they did not touch the office, which consists in certain powers, jurisdiction, and authority, conferred on a particular person, requiring of him certain duties, which may be exercised in a court bearing a different name from that of the judge. Under the old system the district judges sit in the circuit courts, the supreme judges sit in the circuit courts—and under the old system the district judges of Kentucky and Tennessee had the powers cognizable in a circuit court, with some exception as to appeals, and writ of error—and the 24th section of the law of 13th February, 1801, which abolished the two district courts, transferred the constituent parts of the offices,
to wit, all the power, authority and jurisdiction of the said courts into the circuit courts, and by the 7th section of the same law, the district judges of Tennessee and Kentucky, with a circuit judge, are to hold the circuit courts, and in the same section it is expressly declared, that when the offices of the district judges, in the districts of Kentucky and Tennessee respectively, shall become vacant , such vacancies shall be supplied by the appointment of two additional circuit judges, which appointment of course must be made in the usual way. And in the 3d section of the same law, congress have virtually acknowledged their want of power to take away the office of a judge, they have provided that after the next vacancy in the supreme court, it shall consist of five justices only. And as to the additional salaries of the district judges, they will be presumed to be equal to the additional duties, until a complaint is made, and then the fact must be ascertained. This law then, Mr. Chairman, which expressly recognizes the judges, which expressly continues his duties, and which expressly continues his salary, is likened to a law which destroys the office of a judge, takes away his duty, takes away his salary, and leaves his commission on a blank piece of paper; and this is the rock on which gentlemen stand, when they triumphantly ask were we the guardians of the constitution when the first law was passed?  Mr. Chairman, ingenuity has been exhausted in contriving cases wherein it is said our construction will not hold good. It is asked if in the case of a war a whole state should be ceded, if the offices of judges would remain? Certainly not; but here the provision in the constitution would not be complied with, the whole strength of the nation would not be sufficient to protect it, yet it would be a case of necessity, calamity or war, which no constitution can provide against—and in the case, part, the most important part of the constitution would not be complied with, which guarantees to each state in the union a republican form of government; yet in that event the people of the ceded state might become the slaves of a tyrant.  But, Mr. Chairman, a doctrine new and dangerous has begun to unfold itself. It is laid that the judiciary is a subordinate and not a co-ordinate branch of the government, that the judges have no right to declare a law to be unconstitutional; that no such power is given to that branch in the constitution. Why, Sir, it is no where declared that congress have a right to exercise their judgment, or to consider the expediency of a measure; the judiciary from the nature of their institution are to judge of the law and what is the law: the constitution is paramount and supreme: the judge is bound by his oath to support it; the legislature have a right to exercise their judgment as to the constitutionality of a law on its passage; but the judiciary decide at last, and their decision is final. This doctrine is admitted in the debates of the convention of Virginia—in the case of Vanhorne, lessee vs. Dorrance , judge Paterson has expressed the same opinion when he could have had no view to this question. "I hold it to be a position equally clear," said Loudoun, "that in such a case, it will be the duty of the court, to adhere to the constitution and to declare the act null and void. It is an important principle, which in the discussion of questions of this kind, ought never to be lost sight of, that the judiciary in this country is not a subordinate, but a co-ordinate branch of the government." The chief magistrate of Pennsylvania has recently expressed the same sentiments, and the correctness of his legal opinions will not be called in question by any party, in assigning his reasons for not approving a law: He says, "And I cannot from a confidence in the legal knowledge, integrity, and fortitude of my former brethren in the supreme court, risk my character in a judicial decision on this question, when I do not foresee any advantage to be derived to my country from a possibility of success."  But, Sir, if it is once established that the judiciary is a subordinate and dependent branch of the government, I acknowledge that they have no right to judge of the constitutionality of a law, or if they have the power, they will be afraid to exercise it. Upon this principle where will an influential partisan and an insignificant individual meet to adjust their claims in this house, or in a tribunal under the influence of this house? Where will the powerful state of Virginia and the state of Delaware meet upon terms of equality, in this house, or in a tribunal under the immediate control of this house? Where could the federal administration of justice in this country be deposited with more safety than where it is? Entrenched as our judges are, they can do but little harm, but much good; from their situation they can have no temptation to make inroads upon the rights of the people; there is no such thing as judicial patronage; they can appoint no officers, collect no money, raise no armies, raise no fleets. They have nothing but their virtue and talents to recommend them to the people. If it is within the power of human contrivance to select a spot,
where the streams of justice will flow pure and uncontaminated, it is in a tribunal of independent judges.  The three grand branches of our government are well arranged. The President has his proportionate weight in the judiciary, by appointing the judges, when they are appointed they are independent; and in this situation are to guard the legislature from making encroachments on the liberties of the people. The legislature in turn have a check on them by bringing them to trial and punishment, if they should become corrupted; this trial is to commence in this house, which will always be a repository of a sufficiency of passion and spirit to commence the impeachment if there is a reasonable cause—the trial is to be ended in the Senate, where the members, from their permanency, will be likely to be cool, and not convicted, unless they are guilty. Thus the parts are interwoven operating as checks and controls on each other; but once cut the ligament, and perhaps the dreadful consequences have not been too highly coloured. The effect may not be immediate, but let the principle be practised upon by two or three changes of administration, and it will become as much a matter of course to remove the judges, as the heads of department, and in bad times, the judges would be no better than a sword in the hands of a party to put out of the way great and obnoxious characters for pretended treasons.  The independency of the judges was a great point gained by the people of England. While the tenures of office depended on the nod of the crown, they supported the arbitrary measures of the king; in one instance they decided that the king had a right to levy ship money, without the consent of Parliament or people; and many an instance might be brought to the recollection of this honourable committee, where they determined, through fear and not from judgment. It is laid they are not independent of Parliament. Why, Sir, nothing is independent of Parliament; and there is not the same necessity there. There being no written constitution in England, the judiciary forms no check upon Parliament—and besides, our government is not a copy of the British government; and this is not the only solitary instance, where we have outstripped, as it is called, our too favorite prototype. There is not a leading feature in the constitution that bears testimony of any servile imitation; it is our opponents who wish to tell our constitution by the principles of the British government; it is they who wish that a construction be put upon the constitution by congress, which shall be considered as the constitution itself; and are unwilling that there should be any check to oppose it; and of course every construction put on it by the different legislatures will exhibit the appearance of a new constitution, a constitution to be tossed and blown about by every political breeze. The powers of congress will be equal to the powers of the English Parliament, transcendent, splendid and without controul! I little expected that such lordly power would be grasped at by our plain Republicans, who have no ambitious desires, and who with rulers to be contented with humble prerogatives.  Mr. Chairman, when I reflect upon the intrinsic nature of the question, I am confounded and amazed—it is vast indeed—from a dread of its terrible consequences. Yet in its nature it consists in the open denial of the obvious meaning of a few words in the constitution—we repeat the words, gentlemen deny their plain sense—We read "That the judges both of the supreme and inferior court shall hold their offices during good behaviour." Our opponents say that these words do not mean "that the judges of both the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behaviour." the meaning of these words is entirely different; it is in fact the reverse; they do not infringe our power; they refer to the executive; although the office to be holden is not of executive creation, and he can neither make it or destroy it; the thing to be holden during good behaviour is an object of legislative creation. Certainly our opponents cannot drive us off the firm ground on which we stand, and tell us that these words are not in the constitution. They are, and how are they to be gotten rid of? No other way under heaven, Mr. Chairman, than by a bold and arbitrary assertion that they do not bear their natural meaning; that they do not bear the same meaning which they bear in another part of the constitution. The people have said that a judge shall hold his office until a certain event shall happen—the rulers say no, we will shorten the period, and this is not breaking the constitution; or, in other words, the people have said that a judge shall hold his office during good behaviour; the rulers say, the meaning of that is, that the office can be taken away at any moment. Why, Sir, what part of the constitution will hold gentlemen, what words are in it that are strong enough, and what meaning cannot be as easily distorted and perverted? We have a right to our seats here for two years if we do not behave disorderly; yet it might as well be said that the meaning
of that is, that two thirds can expel the other third at any moment notwithstanding their good behavior. Our opponents complain of the want of power—that their power would be too much cramped and restrained from its natural freedom by our controul. Why, Sir, that is the object of a written constitution, to place objects out of the reach of legislative power. It is its great and grand design.  I ask pardon of the committee for detaining them so long. I ascribe no wicked motives to our opponents. I have the charity to believe that their motives are good and virtuous; yet I am confident that through a mistaken zeal for the good of the people, they are going too far, and are destroying the constitution of our country.
[To be continued.]  WASHINGTON CITY.  MONDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1802  DE WITT CLINTON, is chosen Senator of the U. States, in the room of general Armstrong resigned. He had 32 votes; and Mr. Clarkson 45. Mr. Clinton is, and ever has been, an unequivocal republican.  DIED—Samuel Phillips, Lt. Governor of Massachusetts.  As no business of importance was transacted in Congress on Friday and Saturday, other than the discussion on the judiciary bill, from the Senate, we omit for the present the minutes of those days, to give way, for the commencement, of this important debate, the whole of which will be presented with the greatest attainable correctness and promptness.  On Friday Mr. Bayard occupied the whole of the day, without concluding his remarks, which he closed on Saturday about 3 o'clock; when Mr. Randolph spoke till nearly 5 o'clock; when the House adjourned to Tuesday, on the intimation of the Speaker, that a day would be required to have a ventilator put up.  To induce the House to adjourn that day, Mr. Bayard stated that Monday was the birth day of Washington.
[By Authority.]  AN ACT, Extending the privilege of franking and receiving letters, free of postage, to any person admitted, or to be admitted, to take a seat in Congress, as a delegate; and providing compensation for such delegate.  BE it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That any person admitted, or who may hereafter be admitted to take a seat in Congress, as a delegate, shall enjoy the privilege of sending and receiving letters, free of postage, on the same terms, and under the same restrictions, as are provided for the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives of the United States, by the act, entitled, "An Act to establish the post-office of the United States;" and that every such delegate so admitted to a seat, be, and he is hereby authorized to receive, free of postage, under the said restrictions, any letters directed to him, and which shall have arrived at the seat of government prior to the passage of this act: And that every such delegate shall receive for his travelling expenses and attendance in Congress, the same compensation as is or may be allowed, by law, to the members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, to be certified and paid in the same manner.  NATHL. MACON, Speaker of the House of Representatives. A. BURR, Vice-President of the United States, and President of the Senate.  APPROVED, Feb. 18. 1802. TH: JEFFERSON, President of the United States.
NOTICE.  THE Creditors of Mr. William Baily are requested to meet at Mr. Semmes's Tavern George Town on Thursday the 18th March next at 5 o'clock, in the afternoon. They are particularly requested to make known, at that time, the amount of their claims.  WALTER MACKALL, Trustee. Feb. 22.
Public Auction.  Will positively be sold at the ferry on the premises, on Monday the 15th of March next, on terms that will then be made known. ALL that tract of land, known by the name of Blue Plains, containing near 500 acres, on which Mr. William Bayly now lives. This property has been so frequently advertised and described, that it is supposed useless particularly to describe it; suffice it to say, it combines more advantages than any tract of its size in the United States. A good and indisputable title will be made upon receipt of the purchase money.  WALTER MACKALL, Trustee. Feb 22, 1802.

Public Auction.
By virtue of an order from the Orphan's court of Prince George county, will be exposed to Public Sale for cash, on the 24th day of March next, at the dwelling of Richard Lamar, in said county.
All the property of Mary Lamar, deceased; consisting of twelve negroes, among which are women, girls, and boys—Also a variety of household furniture.
All persons indebted to the said estate are desired to make payment immediately; and those that have claims against the same, are required to exhibit them properly authenticated, before the first day of May next, to the subscriber.
JOHN LAMAR, Adm'r.
Feb. 19. 1802.
TO RENT.
LOT No. 3, square 233, on which is erected a commodious dwelling house for a small family, kitchen, stables, &c. This will be rented for a term of years, with liberty to build a store on the fourth west corner, to defray the expenses of which a certain portion of the rent may be allowed annually. Possession may be had the 1st of April next.
I have also to rent Lots fronting on the market square, Lots No. 1, and 21, joining the Hotel Spring, lot No. 1, in square 347, joining Wayland and Groff's Printing Office, 28 feet front, 1 ining Stoll's Hotel, lot No. 2, in square 705, near the Eastern Branch. I will sell lot No. 8, in square 238, joining a lot where a Mr. Clancy built a handsome frame house; for this I will take carpenter's work, if some lumber is found—I will also sell for a term of years, then to be free, two Negro Girls, one about 16, and the other about 9 years old.
JAMES R. DERMOTT.
Feb. 19. 1802.
NOTICE.
Will be offered for sale by Auction, on the 18th day of March next, on the premises, one moiety or half part of an excellent frame house in the City of Washington, on Pennsylvania Avenue, between the Seven Buildings and George-Town.
At present occupied by Mr. Watkins, and adjoining the brick house in which Mr. Amariah Frost lives. One half part of the lot will be sold with the house, and Jacob R. Rhodes's title to the same will be conveyed to the highest bidder. This property is taken by virtue of two writs of fieri facias to me directed, issued out of the circuit court of the United States, for the district of Columbia, sitting in the county of Washington, Frederick Betz, against Hugh Boyd, Jacob R. Rhodes, and George Haywood. Terms of sale cash—Time of sale 11 o'clock. A.M.
DANIEL C. BRENT, Marshal.
Feb. 19. 1802.
GEORGE WALKER,
REQUETS those who may have any claims against him, that have not yet come to his knowledge, to bring them in for immediate settlement; and informs those who are indebted to him, that no longer indulgence than the 15th of next month will be given.
He has yet remaining on hand for sale, six hundred and thirty six of the very best of the lots a sing from the tract of land of which he was fee simple proprietor before the City of Washington was laid out; and which lots are situated on the Eastern Branch near to where the bridge is about to be built; extending from thence over the high ground on each side of the Post Road, north east of the Capitol.
The receiving clerk's office here, will show the title to be good. He will let for a reasonable rent, about 80 acres of land, included at the north end of his plantation, and within ten minutes walk of the Capitol; containing a large barn and two good stables, two large orchards of choice fruit, a new garden, two good springs, and the use of an excellent well at water convenient, with a small dwelling house which will be erected in a few weeks hence. This place is well calculated for gardening, a dairy and a livery stable.
He also wishes to let a two story frame house calculated for a store, on square No. 728. And will sell or let, a barn 50 feet by 25, on square No. 919, East Capitol Street.
Washington, Feb. 17. 1802.
LAND FOR SALE.
FOR sale about 4500 acres of land belonging to the estate of Judge Mercer, deceased, and situated in the county of Loudoun, on the waters of Goose Creek, about 40 miles from Alexandria and the Federal City. A large portion of this tract is meadow ground, of good quality, and the soil of the high land is well adapted to every species of produce usually cultivated on land similarly situated in the upper country. Such portion of it as remains uncleared, affords an extensive and excellent range for stock of every kind. On one part of this land is one of the most valuable mill seats in the state. The supply of water is inexhaustible, and the mill could be erected immediately on the side of the public road leading from Winchester to Alexandria. It is computed that the number of wagons almost constantly travelling along this road, amount to at least 5 or 600. So that a ready market might always be had here, for a very considerable quantity of grain and hay.
It is deemed unnecessary to describe more particularly the many advantages of this tract of land, as it is expected that all persons disposed to purchase, will first view the premises. To accommodate purchasers the whole tract will be divided into lots of 4 or 500 acres each, with as much wood and meadow land to every lot as circumstances will admit. And it is believed that the whole 4500 acres may be so laid off into farms of the above-mentioned size, as to leave in each as much wood and meadow land as would be desired.
The price and time of payment will be made known by the subscribers. Letters directed to John T. Brooke, Fredericksburg, or to James M. Garnett, Laytons, will be answered without delay.
JOHN T. BROOKE, } Adm'rs JAMES M. GARNETT, }
Feb. 8. 1802.
In Council, Annapolis, Feb. 8, 1802.
Ordered, That the act to alter such parts of the constitution and form of government as relate to voters, and the qualifications of voters, passed at the last session of the general assembly of this state be published twice in each week, for the space of three months, successively, in the Maryland Gazette, at Annapolis; the federal Gazette, at Baltimore; the Museum, at George-Town; the National Intelligencer; the paper at Easton; Bargess's paper, at Frederick-town, and in the Washington Spy.
By order, NINIAN PINKNEY, Clk.
An ACT to alter such parts of the constitution and form of government as relate to voters, and qualifications of voters.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland, That every free white male citizen of this state, and no other, above twenty-one years of age, having resided twelve months in the county next preceding the election at which he offers to vote, and every free white male citizen of this state above twenty-one years of age, and having obtained a residence of twelve months next preceding the election in the city of Baltimore or the city of Annapolis, and at which he offers to vote, shall have a right of suffrage, and shall vote by ballot in the election of such county or city, or either of them, for delegates to the general assembly, elections of the senate, and sheriffs.
And be it enacted, That all & every part of the constitution and form of government of this state repugnant thereto, or inconsistent with, the provisions of this act, shall be and the same are hereby abrogated, annulled and made void.
And be it enacted, That if this act shall be confirmed by the general assembly, after the next election of delegates, in the first session after such new election, as the constitution and form of government, and the alteration of the said constitution contained therein shall be considered as a part, and shall constitute and be valid as a part, of the said constitution and form of government, to all intents and purposes, any thing therein contained to the contrary notwithstanding.
February 19, 1802. 2aw.3m.
COMMISSIONERS' OFFICE, Washington, Jan. 26, 1802
ORDERED, By the Board that the following Proclamation be published thrice a week for three weeks successively, in the City and George-Town newspapers.
THOMAS MUNROE, Clk. Com.
BY THE PRESIDENT, OF THE UNITED STATES.
WHEREAS by the first article of the terms and conditions declared by the President of the United States on the 17th October 1791, for regulating the materials, manner of buildings, and improvements on the lots in the City of Washington, it is provided, That the outer and party walls of all houses in the said City, shall be built of brick or stone; and by the third article of the same terms and conditions, it is declared that the wall of no house shall be higher than forty feet to the roof in any part of the city, nor shall any be lower than thirty-five feet on any of the Avenues; And whereas the above recited articles were found to impede the settlement in the city, of mechanics and others whose circumstances did not admit of erecting houses authorised by the said regulations, for which cause the operation of the said articles has been suspended by several acts of the Presidents of the United States from the 5th day of June 1796, to the 1st January 1802, and the beneficial effects arising from such suspensions having been experienced; it is deemed proper to revive the same with the exception hereafter mentioned—WHEREFORE, I, THOMAS JEFFERSON, President of the United States, Do declare that the first and third articles above recited shall be, and the same are, hereby suspended until the first day of January 1803, and that all houses which shall be erected in the said City of Washington previous to the said 1st day of January 1803, conformable in other respects to the regulations aforesaid, shall be considered as lawfully erected; except that no wooden house covering more than three hundred and twenty square feet, or higher than twelve feet from the sill to the eves, shall be erected, nor shall such house be placed within twenty-four feet of any brick or stone house.
GIVEN under my hand this twenty-third day of January, in the year 1802.
TH: JEFFERSON.
Jan. 29, 1802.
FOR SALE.
A superb Curriole with plated Harness. A pair of young, handsome and fleet PONIES, and a capital saddle horse, who never was in harness. Enquire of the Printer.
Dec. 18. eptf
FOR SALE.
THE subscriber is authorised to sell a tract of land containing four hundred acres, lying in Prince George county, on Oxen Run, adjoining the district of Columbia, and about two miles from the City of Washington, with a good road to that part of the Eastern Branch over which a bridge is to be built. This land is healthy and abounds with springs of excellent water.
There are between twenty and thirty acres of meadow ground, with a fine stream through it, which may be prepared for Timothy at a small expense, and at least two hundred acres in wood and timber. The wood itself will more than pay for the land. The cleared land, except a small part indeed, is of an excellent quality, and has on it a large tobacco house, and several houses suitable for the accommodation of labourers. This land has on it some elegant situations for country seats, commanding a view of the river and the city. If this land be not sold at private sale, before the 10th day of March next (and if it be, timely notice will be given) it will on that day, if fair, if not, the best fair day thereafter be sold to the highest bidder on the premises. The greater part of the purchase money will be required down; a credit of three months will be given on the balance, the purchaser securing the punctual payment of the balance at the expiration of that time. Persons disposed to make a private purchase, may know the terms by application to Wm. Cooke, of Baltimore-Town, of Mr. James F. Leitch of Manchester, Virginia, Mr. John Addison of Georgetown, near the City of Washington, or to the subscriber in the city of Washington.
PHILIP T. BAKER, Attorney for J. Addison.
Jan. 13, 1802. epts
For 6666 dolls. & 66 cts.
AT EASY PAYMENTS.
The subscriber offers for sale a Tract of land on Acquia Creek, in the county of Stafford, containing about 500 acres, two-fifths of which is woodland, lying chiefly on the water. This tract possesses the following improvements and advantages—A two story framed dwelling house and the usual out-houses; orchards of apples, peaches, pears, cherries &c. a falling garden neatly laid out, several springs of excellent water, and a well at the door. The dwelling house is situated on an eminence commanding a most delightful and extensive prospect of the Potomac (from whence it is distant about two miles) for thirty or forty miles; and of the Aquia from its confluence with that river to the head of tide water at Woodstock—a prospect perhaps equalled by few in the U. States. The tract abounds with valuable quarries of free stone of every quality. Some of them contiguous to deep water, and nearer the Potomac than any that are now in operation no said Creek. For one acre, containing a free stone quarry three miles further from the Potomac, the proprietor has refused 3000 guineas, and eleven acres adjoining the said acre, were sold for 6000 dollars. There are also two valuable marl pits, several fishing shores for rock, shad and herring, and plenty of wild fowl in season. It is believed by good judges, that the timber on the land, and fire wood, if cut ready for market, would command a greater sum than is asked for the whole premises. Wood may be conveyed to the City of Washington with a fair wind in two tides, the distance being not more than 40 or 45 miles. This land, supposing the timber to be entirely taken off, would in the course of seven or eight years start up thick with cedar, locust and pine. It would be a great acquisition to a grazier, the soil being admirably adapted to the culture of grass.—Apply to the subscriber near Acquia.
V. PEYTON.
Tan. 15. 1802. rawzm
IN COUNCIL,
Annapolis, January 20, 1802.
ORDERED, That the resolution of the last session of the assembly respecting the debts of the state, be published in the Maryland Gazette, at Annapolis; the Federal Gazette, the American, and the Telegraph, at Baltimore; the Museum, at George-Town; the National Intelligencer; Bargess's Gazette, Hager's-Town, and the paper at Easton, three times in each week for the space of three weeks successively for information; and all defendant debtors are notified, that unless they make satisfactory payments to the treasurer of the Western or Eastern shore (as the case may be) on or before the tenth day of March next, suits will be commenced against them indiscriminately.
By order, NINIAN PINKNEY, Clerk.
BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES.
December 31. 1801.
Resolved, That the Governor be and he is hereby authorised, by and with the advice and consent of the council, to direct suits to be commenced against such of the debtors to the state as he may think proper, and appoint an attorney or attorneys to any particular suit or suits so directed to be brought: Provided, That all debts due to the state shall be paid to the treasurer of the Western or Eastern shore, and to no other person or persons whatsoever.
Resolved, That on the application of the governor to the treasurer of the Western shore, it shall be the duty of the said treasurer, and he is hereby required, to furnish the governor with correct statements of the debts due to the state.
By order, WM. HARWOOD, Clerk.
BY THE SENATE.
December 31, 1801.
Read the first time and ordered to lie on the table.
By order, JOHN B. DUCKETT, Clerk
BY THE SENATE.
December 31, 1801.
Read the second time and assented to.
By order, JOHN B. DUCKETT, Clerk.
Feb. 12, 1802. ep3w
COALS, hickory and oak wood, all of a superior quality, to be sold low for cash, at Redmond and Garrett Barry's new wharf, also 12 cases of hollow glass, and 14 liquor travelling cases.
Jan. 27, 1802. epzm
The Subscriber
RESPECTFULLY informs the public, that he has removed from George-Town to the Fountain Inn, near Rhodes's City Tavern. Where he is furnished with a good hostler, carriage house, and stabling for eighteen horses, and every thing in his line to render the accommodation of travellers agreeable.—The strictest attention will be paid by
CHARLES ROGERS.
N. B. Ten or fifteen gentlemen can get board and lodging on moderate terms. Dec. 23. eptf
NOTICE.
COMMITTED to the Jail of Washington County, in the District of Columbia, as a Runaway, a Negro Woman named CHARLOTTE, about nineteen years of age, five feet four or five inches high. She says she is the property of Lewis St. John, near Battle Town, Frederick county, Virginia.
The owner is requested to come and pay Charges and take her away.
DANIEL C. BRENT, Marshal of the District of Columbia.
Feb. 5, 1802.
Partnership Dissolved.
DOUGHTY & KING have this day by mutual consent dissolved their partnership, it is therefore requested that all persons indebted to the said FIRM will make payment to William Doughty, who is appointed to settle their accounts, and that those having any claim will make application as above.
N. B. James C. King continues the Lumber business on his wharf near the Rock Creek Bridge. Feb. 3. eptf
THOMAS CARPENTER, TAYLOR,
SOLICITS a continuation of that generous encouragement which he has experienced from the Ladies and Gentlemen of this City and its vicinity. Having procured an elegant assortment of cloths, cassimeres, twansdowns, &c. and engaged workmen of superior talents. His unremitted attention shall be given to merit patronage.
Capitol Hill, next house east of Mrs. Finch's boarding house, and Pennsylvania Avenue between the President's square and Seven Buildings. Dec. 7. 1801. eptf
Valuable property for Sale.
ON Tuesday the 23rd of February next, will be offered to sale to the highest bidder, at Tonniciuff's Tavern at 4 o'clock in the evening, a two story BRICK HOUSE, with 2 rooms and a passage on each floor; situate on Lot No. 10, in square 728, in the City of Washington, on East Capitol Street. The terms will be made known on the day of sale, by
SAMUEL TYLER. Jan. 25, 1801. rawat
CHARLES VARDEN,
Merchant Taylor, from Philadelphia,
GRATEFULLY acknowledges the favors conferred on him by the gentlemen of this City, and flatters himself that the general satisfaction he has already given will merit a continuation of the same. He has also received a handsome assortment of goods from Philadelphia, consisting of
Best superfine cloths, cassimeres, Swansdown, Toylenettes, Velverets, Fancy Cords, Coatings, Flannels, &c.
N.B. Regimentals, Naval Uniforms, and Ladies' Habits, made in the neatest and most fashionable manner, and at the shortest notice—Washington City, New-Jersey Avenue, next to Mr. Rapine's book store. Dec. 16, 1801. eptf
Marshal's Sale.
By virtue of two writs of Venditioni Exponas issued out of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, for the county of Washington, to me directed, will be sold at Rhodes's Tavern on Tuesday the 23rd of this month,
ALL the right, title, and interest of William King, to a brick house and appurtenances on Lot No. 13, in sq. No. 104, in the City of Washington, to satisfy debts due Thomas K. Beale, adm'r. of Joseph Clarke, for the use of Stephen Wilson's administrators. The sale to commence at 11 o'clock, P.M. Terms of sale ready money.
DANIEL C. BRENT, Marshal of the District of Columbia. Feb. 1, 1802. epts
Mrs. PICK,
Takes the liberty to inform the ladies of George-Town and City of Washington, and its vicinity, that she has this day opened at Mr. Kirtz's, opposite the Union Tavern, an elegant assortment of MILLINERY, consisting of,
Velvet bonnets, caps, shawls, embroidery, dresses, handkerchiefs, artificial flowers, plumes, trimmings both gold and silver, bugie spangles, facks, muffs, belts and tassels, straw bonnets, cassimere shawls and bonnets, gold and silver thread, wigs and frizzettes, perfume of all kinds, &c. &c. and other articles too numerous to mention; which she will sell on moderate terms. Dec. 23. eptf
To Rent,
And possession given immediately, A TWO STORY BRICK HOUSE, North front of the President's House, CONTAINING TWO Parlours and four Bed-rooms, with Garden, &c. It is convenient to the Public offices, and may be had furnished or unfurnished, with or without board, on reasonable terms, to an agreeable tenant. Enquire of the Printer, or on the premises. Also,
Wanted Employment,
For a YOUNG MAN, who would engage as an assistant in a store, having kept one of his own, of course accustomed to it. Would act as Steward and superintend a plantation, or the like—would make himself useful in any situation.—Enquire of the Printer hereof. November 25. 3rawtf
Michael Roberts,
Has just received from Europe and Philadelphia, and now offers for sale at his store, High-Street, George-Town, a large supply of best
STATIONARY,
And other articles in his line, among which are:
PAPER, Atlas, Imperial, Superroyal, Medium, Demy, Folio post, Fool's Cap, and hot press'd gilt wove, and plain 4to post of a superior quality. Blank books, parchment, printers ink, quills, ready made pens, sealing wax, and wafers. Fowling pieces and pistols. Swords, sword knots, epaulets and military articles of every description. Plated ware and fine cutlery. Perfumery and dressing apparatus. Morocco skins, and cork soles. Buckskin pantaloons and breeches. Coach lamps, gig springs, and plated harness. Drum battle doors, back gammon tables, cribbage boxes, billiard balls, dice, playing cards and chessmen, whips and canes; beaver hats, umbrellas, travelling trunks, and an assortment of hard ware, upholsterers ware, &c. &c. Also for sale at the above store, by
Edgar Patterson,
Madeira and Sherry wines, bed French brandy, and Cherry Bounce; Imperial and hyson teas, loaf sugar, cheese, liquor cakes, demijohns &c. &c. Feb. 12, 1802. eptf
ROBERT CHERRY,
Near the Sugar House, New-Jersey Avenue, has just received (in addition to his former stock) over the Sloop Harmony, captain Elwood, from Philadelphia.
A GENERAL assortment of groceries and liquors, viz. Pennington's loaf and lump sugar, Havannah white, Jamaica and St. Croix brown do. hyson, young hyson, hyson skin, souchong, and bohea teas, coffee, pepper, allspice, nutmegs, and cloves; hair powder, plain and scented, box and keg raisins, mould and dip candles, white and brown soap, Dixon's best mustard, dried mackerel, and herring in barrels, dried codfish, &c. Cognac brandy, Holland gin, Jamaica and Antigua rum, Madeira and Lisbon wine, with other articles, all of a good quality.
Also a trunk of Swansdown, glass in boxes, 12 by 10 and 8 by 6, which he will sell low for cash, or barter for first quality tobacco.—The above articles have been laid in at a falling market, and shall sell the same at very reduced prices for cash.
He returns his sincere thanks to his friends and the public, for the encouragement he has already met with since his residence here, and hopes for a continuance of their favours, which will be thankfully acknowledged. January 9, 1802. eptf
For sale, or to be rented.
A House and lot on the Capitol Hill—the lot is 20 feet 2 inches on Delaware Avenue, and about 190 feet deep extending back to a 30 feet Alley. The House is a handsome well furnished convenient three story brick house, containing 2 sealed garrets, 5 chambers, 2 parlours—kitchen with a pantry and cellar.
It is directly opposite to the Buildings of WASHINGTON, occupied by Gen. Dearebarn, near adjoining to a number of houses belonging to Mr. Carroll, rented to Mr. Dalton and others. From its vicinity to the Capitol, it is well calculated for a private family; or a person attached to the offices of the Federal Legislature.—Adjoining is a lot of about 40 feet front on same Avenue, and running same depth back, (the whole under a good post and rail fence) which, if required would be sold at same time. Repeated, the Tenant may have the use of the whole of the lot, which would make an excellent garden, having a South and Eastern exposure, as long as convenient to the proprietor. This property would be sold a Bargain for satisfactory payments, or well situate property in Philadelphia would be taken in exchange.
Apply to Benjamin Durd, New Jersey Avenue or to the Editor of the National Intelligencer or to Karrick and Percival, Philadelphia. Nov. 21. tf.
FOR SALE.
A TRACT of land containing 2,500 acres lying immediately on the river Potomac, in the county of Northumberland, Virginia, late the residence of PRESLEY THORNION, Esq. Seventeen hundred acres of which are of the most valuable kind of low grounds on the river; between three and four hundred acres heavily timbered, the remainder is wavy high land extremely productive. The soil of this tract is equal to any in the state for cultivation of corn, wheat, tobacco, timothy, and small grain of all kinds. On this tract are a large commodious two story brick mansion house and two offices, a large brick stable, a valuable barn, cow house and many other out-houses, all in good repair. The orchards and garden contain a variety of valuable fruit trees, and the waters abound with excellent fish and oysters. It is situated about a day's sail from Alexandria, Baltimore or Norfolk—There are two good mill seats for grist, or saw-mills on this estate, and plenty of cedar and chestnut timber, exclusive of the heavy timber, which if faved up into scantling will command a price in the City of Washington, nearly equal to the value of the land. The terms will be made easy to the purchaser or purchasers, and the tract will be divided into two or more plantations if necessary.—Apply to
RICHARD PETERS, junr. No. 85, Walnut-street Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Nov. 11. eptf
NEW STORE.
THE Subscribers most respectfully inform the Public in general, and their friends in particular, that they have just opened a handsome assortment of
Dry Goods,
SUITABLE FOR THE SEASON, On the Pennsylvania Avenue, between the President's Square and the Seven Buildings, which they purpose to sell low for cash.
ALSO,
A few casks of Cut Nails. SHARPLESS & SMITH. November 25. eptf