The national intelligencer and Washington advertiser. (Washington City [D.C.]), 1802-02-24 00:00:00

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER,
AND WASHINGTON ADVERTISER.
Vol. II.
WASHINGTON CITY, PRINTED BY SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH, PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE.
No. CCLIII.
FIVE DOLLS. PER ANN.
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24th, 1802.
PAID IN ADVANCE.
National Intelligencer.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
WEDNESDAY, FEB. 17, 1802.
DEBATE
On the bill received from the Senate, entitled "An Act to repeal certain acts respecting the organisation of the courts of the United States."
Mr. THOMPSON—I find the opinions entertained, so extremely adverse to the sentiments yesterday expressed on this subject by the honorable gentleman from North-Carolina (Mr. Henderson) who opened this debate, and the honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Hemphill) whose great ingenuity I feel pleasure in acknowledging, that I feel myself compelled to offer to the consideration of the committee a few observations in reply to the arguments used by those gentlemen. But, Mr. Chairman, whilst I pay the tribute of my respect to the eloquence and ability which the gentleman from North-Carolina has displayed in the discussion of this subject, I must say that the honorable gentleman to pardon me when I declare myself unable to follow him, when soaring on fancy's airy pinion, he transported as across the Atlantic, and presented to our view, in the most vivid colours which language can portray, the spirit of innovation sweeping morality and good order from the earth. Nor will I pretend, Sir, that my humble genius will enable me to pursue him, when he forced this same spirit of innovation to mount the whirlwind and lash on the storm. But, Sir, with such talents as I am endowed with, I have no objection to going into the consideration of the question before the committee, and pursuing the order which the gentleman has had the goodness to suggest, as the most natural into which the subject can be divided—that is 1st—The power of the legislature to pass, and 2dly, The expediency under the existing state of things of passing the bill now upon your table.
Under these two heads I will endeavor to meet, as far as I shall be able to recollect them, the most impressive arguments which have been used by the gentlemen, and I will beg leave in the first place to call the attention of the committee to the 3d section of the 1st article of the constitution, which has been very slightly touched on by the gentleman from North-Carolina, and which has been attended to, with much ingenuity by the gentleman from Pennsylvania. By this section the legislative powers of congress are defined. Congress shall have power, says the constitution, to levy taxes, to borrow money, to coin money, and, among a variety of other powers, "To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court." It is an axiom in politics that an ordaining power always embraces a repealing power; if congress have a right to constitute courts, they have the right to modify and to annul the courts so constituted; this, like various others, is merely a discretionary power to be exercised, or not exercised, as congress shall find conducive to the public welfare; the granting a power does not oblige the exercise of that power: neither does the exercise of power make the laws resulting from that constitutional exercise of power, unchangeable and irrepealable. The same constitution, giving this power, gives various other powers as I have already shown; yet it has never been contended, that the laws passed under these conceded powers are irrepealable. Still, by a parity of reason, and with a reference to this particular section of the constitution, if the laws relating to the judiciary establishment of the United States are irrepealable, so must the various laws passed under these granted powers, relating to your revenue, to your army, to your navy, to your mint, be irrepealable. But every gentleman knows that laws resulting from these powers have been passed, have been modified, and have been repealed; and so likewise has the law establishing the judiciary system. Without carrying you through the tedious detail of the 26 or 27 laws, which have been passed upon this subject, it will be quite sufficient for my purpose to notice the law of the last session of congress; the 27th section of which begins with these words: "And be it further enacted, that the circuit court of the United States here established shall cease and be abolished."
affirmed." We travel not then in a wilderness, Mr. Chairman, untrodden by human footsteps; our immediate predecessors, it appears to me, are the pioneers who point out to us the path we should pursue for the benefit of our constituents: They have not only abolished the circuit courts, but reorganized the whole system—they have constituted new courts and new judges, and they have lessened the duties of the judges of the supreme courts. To say that a subsequent legislature have not a right to repeal a law of a precedent legislature is to proclaim such precedent legislature infallible. That they are more just, more wise, more competent to the exercise of their functions, than any legislature which shall follow them. It is a contradiction of the progress of knowledge, and of the improvements which may result from experience—it is a denial of the utility of frequent elections; because that legislature which had attained the acme of perfection ought to be permanent and unchangeable. The law however of the last session, which I have just now cited, having modified the courts of the United States, concedes the power of modification to be in the legislature. But, Sir, even this concession, such as it is, is now by the arguments of gentlemen, so clogged with appendages, so qualified by expostulations, that whilst with one breath the power of modification is admitted, with the very next that power is denied, is rendered useless; for, says the gentleman from North-Carolina, a department of the government has been created, called the judiciary, not holding their offices during pleasure, but during good behaviour, and whatever power attempts to deprive them of their offices violates the constitution. It is admitted then that congress have power to modify the law; but it is denied that they have power to abolish the offices of the judges.
Let us then enquire, Mr. Chairman, by what tenure the judges hold their offices—"The judges both of the supreme and inferior court, shall hold their offices during good behaviour." Const. Art. 3, Sec. 1. The gentleman from North-Carolina enquires, if they have been guilty of any misdemeanor. How then are we to break down this constitutional rampart, with which they are entrenched? How, (to use the gentleman's own expression) are the judges to be hurled from their offices? There is no gentleman, Mr. Chairman, within these walls, who would more sincerely wish the judiciary to possess a due and proper independence than myself; but although I do not admit the right of the legislature to hurl these judges from their offices, yet, I must contend and shall ever contend for the right which congress possesses to abolish an office, or in other words to repeal a law creating an office, whenever it shall be plainly proved to them that such an office is unnecessary and oppressive. They may hold their offices during good behaviour, if their offices exist; but most certainly the moment the office is legally destroyed, that is, the moment the law establishing the office is repealed, there must be an end of the tenure. Those sages, who formed the constitution, Mr. Chairman, never contemplated a privileged order of men in that society for whose happiness they formed that instrument. The exposition, which is now given to it, is very different indeed from that which was intended by them. I have read and have heard, Sir, that this is a government of experiment. That in the annals of nations it has no likeness—No prototype—The effects of this particular department of the government were not better understood than the effects of the other departments of the government—it was to be tested by experience, the touchstone of truth; if one system in its operation did not answer the expectation of the legislature, ample room was allowed for the introduction of some other, and for the abolition of the former; hence come the expressions "from time to time ordain and establish"—What says the constitution? "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and such inferior courts, as congress shall from time to time ordain and establish." Congress may then or congress may not from time to time ordain and establish courts. But if they establish courts, so likewise may they abolish courts. Into what a variety of absurdities shall we be plunged, if we reject this reasonable interpretation? The right to modify the law being conceded, but not the right to deprive the judges of their offices, our country would exhibit a spectacle which it never has yet and I hope never will exhibit—officers without offices—judges without courts—A privileged order
out of the reach of the constitution, (for being deprived of their offices they can not be impeached) drawing money from the treasury and rendering no services for their salaries. Is this the meaning of that constitution which declares, that "the judges during their continuance in office shall receive a compensation for their services—a compensation?" But suppose, Mr. Chairman, they perform no service—Suppose there be no service for them to perform, what then is to be their compensation? Will the judge say to the legislature, encrease my duties, make them proportionate to my salary, and I will perform them? Not so Mr. Chairman—an increase of salary is never objected to; a diminution of duty is never objected to; but if duties are encreased, salaries must also be encreased. If I understand the word compensation, it signifies something given for a something performed. But if there be no duty performed (and if there be no office there can be no duty) then there ought to be no compensation. In the English language there is such a word as sinecure. This is a word, Mr. Chairman, which as yet we do not practically understand. This is a word abhorrent to the spirit of our constitution. Yet, Sir, if the construction of the constitution, which is now contended for, be admitted, this will be a word which we shall soon practically feel, and practically understand. We shall have a set of men receiving the public treasures not in consideration of public services, but without any services whatever being performed; or in other words, we shall lay the foundation of a sinecure system, the consequences of which will be incalculable, and the effects of which will be indefinably destructive.
But, Mr. Chairman, I will show you a precedent and a recent one too, where the legislature put a different construction upon the constitution; I will show you a precedent where a federal congress, our immediate predecessors, did not hesitate to exercise the powers we contend for; by the 27th Sec. of the law of the last session, which I have had occasion before to advert to, the circuit courts are abolished. Then that congress not only thought themselves justifiable in touching the judges of the inferior courts, but of the supreme court likewise; for you will find that the same law which constituted the supreme court, allotted to the judges of that court, particular and express duties or offices, that is, to perform the duties of a judge of the supreme court, as is in that law defined, and to perform the duties of judges of the circuit court as is likewise defined in that law; and in abolishing the circuit courts, half the office of the judges of the supreme court were abolished.
Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, that congress had as great a right to abolish the whole office as half the office; but whether that was an infringement of the constitution, or whether it would be an infringement of the constitution to abolish the office of a judge of the supreme court, I will not now detain you to enquire, because it appears to bear but little upon the immediate subject before us, it not being the intention of the bill, as I understand it, to interfere with the offices of the judges of the supreme court, further than to restore them to that form, that rightful, that constitutional ground, on which they stood previously to the passage of the law of the last session, and to all the duties and emoluments of which I most sincerely wish to see them restored.
But, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania has informed us, it is acknowledged that the law of the last session is constitutional; in this I can by no means agree with that gentleman. There is one section in that law, Sir, which in my humble opinion is a flagrant violation of the constitution. By the 24th section of that law the district courts of Kentucky and Tennessee are abolished. Had our predecessors stopped at this point, we should have no cause on this day to charge them with a violation of their charter, they would have done no more in principle than we now contend we have a right to do. But they went further—they usurped a power in my opinion, not given them by the constitution, they usurped a power exclusively vested in the president and senate. By the 7th section of the same law, the judges of the district courts of Kentucky and Tennessee, are appointed circuit judges in fact, not indeed in name, but in reality the duties of circuit judges of the sixth circuit are assigned them. The district courts of Kentucky and Tennessee are abolished, and I wish to be informed if they are not circuit judges to all intents and purposes, and I with further to be informed, if they are not circuit judges appointed by the legislature, and
in direct violation of that article of the constitution, which has, in the most express terms, vested this power in the president and senate. Sir, did I apprehend the gentleman from Pennsylvania aright, when I understood him to say, the name of a judge does not define or constitute the duty of a judge?
This is indeed a melancholy exemplification. Shall I be told that by the law they are filled district judges? How long, Mr. Chairman, are we to be imposed on by found, how long are we to be entangled with the cobwebs of sophistry. But, Sir, the gentleman from North Carolina, has warned us, solemnly warned us, against a violation of the constitution. Was that gentleman a member of this house, when the law which I have just been speaking of, passed? I perceive by your journals that he was—why then, Sir, were not these sensations, which he now experiences with such exquisite sensibility, awakened? Why were they not awakened a year ago, when he might perhaps have prevented an actual violation of the constitution? I ask the honorable gentleman, Sir, when with a sacrilegious hand this vital wound was inflicted on the constitution, if he raised no plaintive cry of spare, oh! spare the constitution of my country? Yesterday, Sir, the gentleman informed us if the bill on your table should pass he would leave no sigh, he would drop no tear over the expiring constitution. When that law passed, did he leave no sigh, did he drop no tear? Oh, no Sir, very different was the course which was then pursued. With cool, with cruel deliberation, the devoted victim was immolated, and the blood which issued from the gaping wound will forever stain the pages of your statute book.
Mr. Chairman, the expediency of the law now under consideration, and the propriety of adopting a measure of this nature, at the present time, have been fully and so satisfactorily discussed in the senate, not many days ago, that to this point I shall apply but few observations. Coming from a state where justice is administered with promptness and frugality, I confess that the stupendous fabric of the federal judiciary excites my astonishment. I had, Sir, supposed, that the document, which has been furnished by the executive, would be a full and complete answer to any thing that could be said on this division of the subject; but, Sir, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, has informed us that if the undecided causes of the state of Maryland were added, the aggregate number of depending causes in the courts of the United States would probably amount to sixteen hundred, and he enquires if it is practicable for the courts, after the repeal of the law of the last session, to determine this number of causes, scattered over the United States. Sir, when I cast my eyes across the Potomack, and call to my recollection the system of jurisprudence established in my country, I cannot hesitate a moment in giving him an affirmative answer.
I have not, Mr. Chairman, nor was it possible for me to procure, documents from the district courts of my state to shew to the committee the number of suits which are depending in them. But, Sir, when I reflect how often I have seen a venerable citizen of that state, respectable for his great learning, respectable for his irreproachable life, and respectable for his years, (being aged I believe full seventy) who is judge of the high court of chancery there, devoting his days and his nights to the avocations of his office, in the plain garb of a common citizen, dispensing justice and satisfaction to the multitude of citizens whose causes are tried before his tribunal; when I reflect on the number of decisions which are made in his court in the course of a year; and when I overlook a document which I have now in my possession from the clerk of that court, and which I shall presently offer to the view of this committee, I can have no difficulty in pronouncing the sincere opinion which I entertain that he performs more duty, and perhaps with greater ability, than the whole judicial corps of the United States. [Read the document from the clerk of the high court of chancery of Virginia.]
And what, Mr. Chairman, is the compensation which this venerable citizen receives? Fifteen hundred dollars—no more—compare this with the sum which supports and decorates the fair composite column, which we are informed is one of the strong pillars of our government; and to touch which we are told will occasion the beautiful fabric to tumble in the dust. Have we not state courts diffused in abundance over every commonwealth composing this union? are they not competent to the decision of all cases of controversy between citizen and
citizen? Is not the jurisdiction of the federal court extremely limited from the true and genuine construction of the constitution? Where then was the necessity of the law of the last session which ramified and encreased these courts? But, Sir, the honorable gentleman from North-Carolina has found another use for them; he has told us "the people, when they established this constitution did not delegate the power of legislation to the house of representatives alone.—They established the senate as a check upon the house of representatives, knowing the violent impulses which often actuate popular assemblies, they gave the President too the power to negative laws.—When a law had passed these various branches of the government, it became necessary to erect a third department, called the judiciary, not holding their offices during pleasure but during "good behaviour." Did I comprehend the argument of gentlemen when I supposed it went to the establishment of this department, as a check upon the legislature, & did I comprehend the argument of the gentleman from Pennsylvania when he cited judge Pateron's charge, which I have not seen, but from which, as he read, I noted these words "I hold it to be the duty of the court in such case, to declare the law null & void." If I have not misunderstood the gentleman, I confess my eyes are now opened. I begin to feel some of those apprehensions which have been so strongly talked about, and which heretofore I have not been accustomed to experience. Not, Sir, from a fear of usurpation of power on the part of the legislature—for they are biennially responsible to their constituents for the sacred observance of the charter of their rights; not, Sir, from a fear of usurpation of power on the part of the executive, for the term of his service is limited to four years, and therefore he is liable to lose his office in case of an infringement of the constitution on his part; but from a desire which I fear this check-department of the government has to grasp at all power. Give the judiciary this check upon the legislature, allow them the power to declare your laws null and void, allow the common law, a system extending to all persons and to all things, to be attached to the constitution, as I understand it is contended; and in vain have the people placed you upon this floor to legislate; your laws will be nullified, your proceedings will be checked. As long as the office exists the judge holds it during good behaviour; he is then independent. Being independent, and not having that degree of responsibility attached to his office which is attached to the legislature or to the executive, the powers granted by the constitution are to be strictly construed; nothing is to be basted to implication; nothing to construction; the letter is to determine the extent of their power, and I conceive it never was intended they should transcend it.—I have, Sir, looked into the constitution with a scrutinizing eye, to discern, if possible, whence these pretensions are derived. There are but two clauses of the constitution, which can even give a pretence for the power which is contended for. The first is as follows, "The judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority."—To declare a law null and void is certainly not such a case, either in law or equity, arising under the constitution, as was contemplated to be embraced by the paragraph I have cited. It will be in vain to say, that without such a construction the constitution cannot be satisfied. I am not now to learn that there are two descriptions of cases which will be fully sufficient to satisfy the terms there expressed, in their utmost extent, as where cases shall arise between citizens of different states, or between citizens and foreigners which are to be decided either by state laws or by foreign laws; or where cases shall arise between citizens of the same state in consequence of an unconstitutional exercise of power on the part of the state, in emitting and making bills of credit a lawful tender. The other clause of the constitution is as follows: "This constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, &c. shall be the supreme law of the land and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby."—This, certainly, from the words with which it concludes was intended as an instruction or direction to the judges of the state courts; and if they were transposed perhaps would more fully communicate the intention of their framers, reading in this form, "the judges in any state shall be bound by this constitution, &c." Is there any reasonable person, Sir, after this explanation, will say that by
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(Continued from last page) rate disadvantages, we doubtless have the power of repealing. The constitution in giving powers to congress says, they shall have power to "provide for the common defence, and general welfare of the United States." In another place it says, "Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry into effect the foregoing powers." Those powers are to provide for the general welfare. Now we think, to provide for the general welfare, we ought to make a law declaring the late judiciary law repealed. Again it has often been said, that our government depends very much on the opinion of the people. This government is divided into three distinct departments. A late ruling party finding their power about to be wrested from their hands by the people who elect the representatives and the states who elect the senators, in the last moments of power passes a law by which they completely take hold of one entire branch of our government, and fill it with men whose politics are at war with the people—there a majority does not rule—the minority in defiance of the majority hold one branch. I ask, if this is compatible with general opinion, or the settled principles of our government. The honorable member from Pennsylvania, Mr. Hemphill, in his argument, puts me in mind of the boy who fights his shadow; he raised arguments for us and then combated them—the man who runs by himself is sure to win, so the gentleman was sure to triumph, because he took for us the weakest ground, and for himself the strongest. Thus you read his speech will suppose the arguments he combated had been advanced on this floor, but the fact is otherwise, he was the third who spoke, and all who hear me know that the ground he took and called ours, was not occupied by any of us. Is this a fair and candid manner of acting? He tells us that besides the judiciary laws there are other laws that congress cannot repeal—That a state is admitted into the Union by law, and that there is no power can repeal that law—that a man is admitted to citizenship by law, and no repeal of that law can affect the citizen. The reason is obvious. If a law admits a state into the Union, and the state comes in according to the provisions of the law—the law having had its effect, having discharged its functions, it becomes dead and cannot be repealed. But if congress should now say the N. W. Territory should, in the year 1806, be admitted into the Union as a state, at any time before the law takes effect, the repeal is in the power of congress—the same may be said as to citizenship. I found my opinion of the expediency of repealing the judiciary law, on another reason in addition to that of the courts being unnecessary, I mean the power they declare they have in the language of judge Paterson to "declare a law null and void." Never can I subscribe to that opinion. Never can I believe the judiciary paramount to both branches of the legislature—if it is, I have yet to learn it—there is an end to legislation—a knave or a fool can make void your best and most wholesome laws. In the present state of things how will it affect us. The minority possessing one department of government, completely frustrates the views of the other two, and governs the nation against the will of the people and the legislative and executive power. I am willing to admit the judiciary to be co-ordinate with the legislature in this respect, to wit—that judges thinking a law unconstitutional are not bound to execute it: but not to declare it null and void. That power rests alone with the legislature. But we are told this judiciary is necessary to check this house and the senate, and to protect the people against their worst enemies. This is laying to the people you are incapable of governing yourselves—your representatives are incapable of doing it—it is in the judiciary alone you find a safe deposit for your liberties; and saying also that the judiciary is the vials of the nation, wherein all power, all safety dwells—that the legislature is subordinate thereto, and a mere nominal thing, a shadow without substance—its acts perfectly within the control of the judiciary. I tremble at such ideas. The sooner we put men out of power who we find determined to act in this manner the better; by doing so we preserve the power of the legislature, and save our nation from the ravages of an uncontrolled judiciary. Mr. BACON.—In this bill two important enquiries are involved. 1. Is it consistent with the constitution? 2. Is it expedient to repeal those acts? Before I proceed to speak directly to either of these questions, I must take the liberty to advert to an important observation made yesterday, by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Hemphill.) In his very decent and ingenious speech with which he then favored the committee, he gave an explanation of the terms Office, and Court. Indeed very much depends, as I conceive, on fixing accurate ideas to these particular terms. Until this is done, that part of the constitution which applies to the present subject, must remain in a great measure unintelligible, to me at least. Fixing the true meaning of these terms will I conceive, go far towards solving any doubt that may exist relative to the constitutionality of the present bill. This idea, there is reason to believe, did not escape the discerning mind of that worthy gentleman, when he observed that "Office confers in certain power, jurisdiction, and authority, conferred on a per-
son, requiring certain duties. The Court, the name of the institution wherein that office is to be exercised. The name of the court may be changed, and also the place where it is held, and the office to be exercised in another place." These were the words which he used. I fully accede to his explanation of the term Office, but very much doubt the correctness of his explanation of the term Court, as it is used in the constitution. And I am not certain but that the question of Constitutionality will very much depend upon the idea that is affixed to this identical term. I believe the term Court, as it is used in that instrument, means something more than a mere name—Although I will not undertake to give an authoritative and perfectly accurate explanation of the term, yet I may venture to say, that, as used in the constitution, and in the law proposed to be repealed, it seems to convey the idea of an institution ordained and established for the legal administration of justice—Those things termed courts in the Constitution, are vested with power, and are to exercise jurisdiction, original and appellate. These are attributes which, to my mind, indicate something more than what is merely nominal. I have considered Courts as being composed of persons vested with power jurisdiction and authority, and of whom certain duties are required, that is, as being composed, or consisting of officers, particularly of judges. And I am apprehensive that it would be not less difficult to conceive of a court, in the meaning of the Constitution, as existing without officers, than it would to conceive of a legislature without legislators, or of an officer without an office. If this is not a true, and the only explanation of the term Court, as used in the constitution, and in the act referred to in the present bill, I shall wish to hear it otherwise explained. If the explanation is just, I believe it will be found in the sequel of debate to go far towards a determination of the question relative to the constitutionality of the bill now under consideration. I will now, Sir, proceed to speak directly to the subject of the bill; and will consider in the first place, the constitutionality of repealing the acts therein referred to. If it should be found to be unconstitutional to repeal those acts, no consideration of expediency ought to have the least weight. As to the mere unconstitutionality of the measure, I am apprehensive this will be found not to be a question of vast intricacy and inextricable doubt, unless we are disposed to make it such. There are some things relating to this question, and which may tend in some measure to illustrate the subject about which there can be no reasonable doubt. It will probably be admitted that the constitution does not require the legislature to furnish business sufficient to employ the time and talents of all the judges, of all the courts of the United States, let their number be ever so great. It will probably be also admitted that the legislature are not restricted by the constitution from amending and altering the laws from time to time, as may, on the one hand, tend to diminish, and on the other, to increase the business to be transacted in our judiciary courts respectively, nor they restricted from transferring business from one judiciary court to another. And if the legislature may, by way of transfer, or otherwise, diminish, or withdraw one part of the business from a judiciary court, they may on the same general principles withdraw another, unless specially restricted by the constitution. Consequently, they may, if they see fit, withdraw the whole in the same way. All this, it is believed, will not only be readily admitted; but that precedents, for the actual exercise of the power of the legislature which is here mentioned, are abundantly furnished in the act itself which it is proposed to repeal. And a better authority, in this particular case, cannot possibly exist than what is furnished by this act. It is an authority which, as it applies to this particular case, is not inferior to the constitution itself. It is an authority which can neither be explained away, nor misunderstood. It may with propriety be said, that in this particular case, it is an authority in favor omnium; it is indeed equal to all others; because, if I am not mistaken, it absolutely and unequivocally determines the question relative to the constitutionality of the present bill. I should be willing for myself, to rest the issue entirely on this ground. This is the principal ground that I shall take. By sec. 20, of this law, the powers in general which, by the state law, were vested in the former circuit courts, are transferred from those courts to the circuit courts which are established by the present law. By sec. 20, it is expressly provided that "All actions, suits, process, pleadings, and other proceedings, of what nature or kind soever, depending or existing in any of the present circuit courts of the United States, or in any of the present district courts of the United States, acting as circuit courts, shall be, and hereby are, continued over to the circuit courts established by this act." By sec. 10, it is provided that the circuit courts established by this act shall have cognizance of a great number of causes which were not in like manner cognizable before the former circuit courts, viz. "of all actions cognizable by the judicial authority of the United States, where the matter in dispute is between four and five hundred dollars." By the 24th sec. it is "enacted that the District Courts of the United States, in and for the districts of Tennessee and Kentucky" in particular, "shall be, and hereby are abolished." By the 27th sec. "it is further enacted," generally, "That the circuit courts of the United States, heretofore established, shall cease and be abolished." Here we have a precedent for abolishing, by a single legislative act, all the judicial courts of a certain description throughout the United States. In short, Sir, the present circuit courts are not only vested with powers different from the former circuit courts, but they are composed of different men; and that, while the former judges of these courts are still living—during their good behaviour, and without their resignation, impeachment, or conviction. All former circuit courts are, by the law in question, ipso facto, abolished. If the circuit courts established by the law in question are constitutional courts, as I take for granted they are, then the former circuit courts do not now exist. If, as some gentlemen contend, it is a violation of the constitution for the legislature to abolish a judicial court, the law itself which it is in contemplation to repeal, must be an unconstitutional law. And I should not suppose it to be a violation of the constitution for the legislature to repeal an unconstitutional law.
The act in question, by which the late circuit courts were abolished and the present circuit courts established, either is, or is not, a constitutional act. If it is a constitutional act, then it was not a violation of the Constitution for the last Congress to pass it. And if it was not a violation of the constitution for the last Congress to pass the act by which they abolished the circuit courts which then were, & they established those which now are; it cannot be any more a violation of the constitution for the present Congress, by repealing that act, to abolish the circuit courts which now are, and to establish new ones. If on the contrary, the act in question is an unconstitutional act, I should suppose, that of itself was a sufficient reason for repealing it, and that the constitution, instead of forbidding, demands a repeal of it. So that, whether it is, or is not, a constitutional act, the result must be the same—to repeal it cannot be a violation of the constitution. I am not disposed to play upon terms, nor would I knowingly descend to a strain of mere metaphysical quibbling on this serious and important subject—I may be mistaken—But I feel as if the argument was not only rational but absolutely conclusive. If it is fallacious, let it be fairly met, and the fallacy will easily be detected. The sentiments which I now express, are not the curious thoughts of a moment, which have occurred on the spur of the occasion. Whether right or wrong, they are the result of serious and mature reflection. If they are not founded, if they are not salutary, if they are not predicated on those principles of the constitution which are to be considered as immovable by any authority short of that by which they were first established, let them be rejected with all that abhorrence which the tongue of man can express, or the human mind conceive. For, I readily admit, that the effects resulting from a violation of the constitution by the legislature, are not less, but, if possible, infinitely more to be dreaded than what any gentleman has described. Questions of this nature, Sir, are not to be determined by mere popular declamation, by a flood of metaphors, nor yet, by the less attractive force of opprobrious terms. It is ardently to be desired that nothing of this kind may ever be suffered to tarnish the deliberations of this house. The subject before us is such as merits the most impartial, candid, firm, and liberal attention. And such, I hope, it will receive.—Admitting that the law in question was passed "in a gust of passion"—"at a midnight hour"—and even with views hostile to the equal rights of a free people; still it ought to be met, if met at all, on principle: directly the reverse of all these. Otherwise the remedy applied may prove to be infinitely worse than the disorder itself of which we complain. It ought, I think, to be agreed by all, that the judges both of the supreme, and of "such inferior courts, as congress may from time to time ordain, and establish," shall hold their offices during good behaviour ; because this is expressly provided for in the constitution. But, Sir, I conceive, that to abolish an office and to remove an officer from an office while that office exists, are in the meaning of the constitution, as well as in common speech, distinct acts; however one of those acts may affect the other. To justify a distinction of this kind, I need only to refer again to the act proposed to be repealed. I that an act for removing from office a number of judges, who by the constitution, are entitled to hold their offices during good behaviour ? If it is, I will agree with gentlemen on the other side, that it is an unconstitutional act: and I shall expect, that for this reason alone, if there was no other, they will agree with me, that it ought to be repealed . And not only so, but that it is the indispensable duty of the legislature to repeal it, and to restore those courts which have been thus wantonly abolished, together with the judges who have been thus unconstitutionally removed from office. But even without the aid of the act in question, I believe the distinction between removing an officer and abolishing an office, will be found to be a real and obvious one. Congress are undoubtedly vested with constitutional power to repeal the act for laying and collecting internal taxes; and in doing this, to abolish all the offices, that have been instituted for that purpose. But it will not be pretended, that congress have power, by a legislative act, either to appoint to, or remove from office, a single officer in that department. A power then to abolish an office, and a power to remove an officer from office, are in their nature distinct powers. Admitting therefore, as I readily do, that congress are not, in the meaning of the constitution, vested with power to remove an officer from office (whether judiciary or executive it matters not), it will by no means follow, that they have not power to repeal the law instituting that office. Should a resolution be brought forward for repealing the law laying duties of excise on bills &c.; would any gentleman who might be opposed to such a resolution, venture to ground his opposition on the unconstitutionality of the measure, from this consideration, that it would in effect, abolish three-fourths of the offices in the revenue department of the government, and in this indirect way , deprive a host of officers of the offices which the constitution has placed as much without the power and control of the legislature, as it has those of the judiciary department? Sir, I believe not. The argument however would be neither more nor less conclusive in one case than in the other. It is urged within doors and without, that to repeal the law, would be no other than an indirect way of removing judicial officers from office, and of destroying that legal tenure by which they hold their offices. This argument, if such it may be called,
and if I understand it, takes for granted the principal, if not the only matter in dispute, viz. That every judicial officer has such a tenure in his office, as puts the office itself entirely beyond the power and influence of the legislature; so that when the legislature have, by their own legislative act, once instituted such an office, they can never afterwards abolish, or touch that office without violating the constitution under which they act. This, Sir, is a doctrine abhorrent from the principles of all free governments—it is abhorrent from what has been demonstrated, as I conceive to be consonant to the principles of the constitution of the United States—it is abhorrent from the sense and uniform practice of the legislature, ever since our government was established—it is more especially abhorrent from the express provisions of the act itself, the repeal of which is now in contemplation. But, Sir, permit me to ask, what would be the consequence of adopting the sentiments of our opponents? Would not this be a cunning and indirect way of tying up the hands of the legislature, and of restricting that body in the exercise of those powers which the constitution has vested them with for the satisfaction and welfare of the community at large? Would it not be a cunning and indirect way of fixing an immovable and intolerable burden on the honest and industrious citizens of the United States, for the private emolument of court favorites, and idle sycophants, and useless ceremonies? And would conduct like this in representatives evince a becoming and sacred regard to the spirit of the constitution, and to the trust reposed in them by their constituents? Or, would it not rather furnish a melancholy instance of the betrayal of both? Let candor, let common sense, let solid learning, let sound policy decide these solemn queries. A decision grounded on all, or on any one of these principles, is such as we will to abide. And I mean not to suggest a doubt, but that our opponents are equally disposed to abide the same impartial test. By what I have now said, I mean no more than to express that clear conviction which exists in my own mind, that the principle for which our opponents contend has a natural and direct tendency to such a state of things as I have mentioned; however pure their views may be who contend for it. Whether the judges will be entitled to retain their offices and to receive their salaries, provided the act should be repealed, is, as I conceive, a question entirely distinct from that which is now before the committee. It may perhaps hereafter be made a question, either before the legislature, or before a judicial court. Whenever this shall happen, then will be the proper time to consider it. If from a fair and candid examination of the subject, it appears, as I think it does, that there is nothing in the constitution which, in the least degree, militates against the repeal of the acts, then the only question which remains to be considered is, whether it is expedient to repeal them? With respect to this question, I will not go into a minute discussion of it. I will only observe in general, that from the documents which we are furnished with, and from the present situation and state of the nation in general, it does not appear necessary to retain all the courts which by that law have been constituted. It does not appear but that, to say the least, the business of these courts may be transacted equally well by a less number. And as it is in itself, not only imprudent, but unjust, to lay unnecessary burdens on our constituents for the private advantage of individuals—as this would have a natural and most direct tendency to weaken the government by destroying the confidence of the citizens in it, and alienating their affections from it, I am for myself, fully convinced, that these laws ought to be repealed, and, with my present views of the subject, I shall give my vote accordingly; although I confess I am not entirely satisfied with the act proposed to be revived. And I will here take occasion to say, I should for myself, wish to add two or three more judges to the supreme court, and to strike out of that act the sum of five hundred dollars, and insert a much larger sum. Perhaps something like this may take place, either as an amendment to the present bill, or at some future day. If such an amendment might be obtained, I should be much better pleased with it than I am at present. Mr. T. MORRIS.—I did rather myself when the honourable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Thompson) detailed to this committee the mode of administering justice in the state which he represents, that he would also have added, what the decisions and opinions of the courts of that state have been, on questions analogous to those which we are called upon to decide. But, Sir, since that honourable gentleman has thought proper to refer to his own state as far only as arguments drawn from thence could answer his purpose, and has not communicated information which might have been adduced from the same quarter and much more applicable to the present question, I hope that it will not be deemed presumptuous in
me to do it. There is not, Sir, a state in the union where the independence of the judiciary has been more highly valued than in Virginia. There is no part of America where a commission during good behaviour has been construed to confer a more independent official tenure on a judge than in the state to which I have alluded. The construction, Sir, which my friends and myself are now contending for, is more fully and completely established by the opinions and decisions of the Virginia judges than it is by those of any other part of the union. And, Sir, if I am entitled to form an opinion from the evidence I hold in my hand of the decisions which have at different times been made by the judges of that state, if I am permitted to draw any conclusion from the universal acquiescence which they have met with from its citizens, I must believe, that if a bill similar to the one before us was introduced into the Virginia assembly that so far from meeting with the countenance of that body it would be scouted out of it with indignation. Having made these observations I must intreat the patience of the committee, while I read the opinions to which I have alluded. [Here Mr. Randolph asked from what book these opinions were quoted.] Mr. Morris replied from a "Friend to the Constitution," and added, that he believed that they were published with a view to this question, that they had been the subject of much examination and conversation, but that he had never heard their authenticity doubted. Mr. Morris then read the following extracts: "The constitution of Virginia declares, that "both houses of assembly shall, by joint ballot, appoint judges of the supreme court of appeals, and general court, judges in chancery, judges of admiralty, secretary and attorney-general, and continue in office during good behaviour ." The supreme court of appeals in Virginia consisted of the judges of the court of chancery, general court, and court of admiralty, who were by law declared to constitute a court of appeals. The legislature found the system inconvenient and determined to change it. "In 1787, this subject was taken up by the legislature; a system of circuit courts was adopted, and it was enacted that the judges of the court of appeals should perform the duty of circuit judges. This law the judges refused to execute as unconstitutional, and agreed unanimously, Edmund Pendleton, George Wythe, John Blair, Paul Carrington, Peter Lyons, William Fleming, Henry Tazewell, Richard Cary, James Henry and John Tyler being present, on a remonstrance, from which will be extracted such parts as are deemed applicable to the present enquiry." "In deciding the act the judges declare that the constitution and the act are in opposition and cannot exist together; and that the former must control the operation of the latter." "The propriety and necessity of the independence of the judges is evident in reason and the nature of the office; since they are to decide between government and the people, as well as between contending citizens; and if they be dependent on either, corrupt influence may be apprehended, sacrificing the innocent to popular prejudices, and subjecting the poor to oppression and persecution by the rich. And this applies more forcibly to exclude dependence on the legislature, a branch of whom in cases of impeachment is itself a party." "The people, continues the court of appeals, have in their form of government "declared that the judges should hold their offices during good behaviour . Their dependence would have been rendered complete by fixing the quantum of their salaries." "On a subsequent occasion a contest not very different in principle arose in the same state between the legislative and judicial departments, in which the point in controversy was again yielded by the legislature." "In 1794, it was enacted that the judges of the district courts, who are also judges of the general court, should so far exercise chancery jurisdictions as to grant injunctions to their own judgments, and decree finally, in cases of an equitable nature which originated by way of injunction." "It will be recollected that by the constitution of Virginia, the two houses of assembly, "by joint ballot appoint judges of the supreme court of appeals and general court, judges in chancery, &c." "Under the act just stated, an application was made to the district court at Dumfries for an injunction, which was referred to the general court, and on solemn consideration, was unanimously rejected on the principles that the law was unconstitutional. In giving their opinions some of the judges stated reasons entirely applicable to the subject we are now considering." "Judge Roane observed—"Though a judge is interested privately in preserving his independence, yet it is the right of the people which should govern him; who in their sovereign character have provided that the judges should be independent: so that in fact, it is a contras-

very between the legislature and the people, tho' perhaps the judges may be privately interested. "If there can be judges in chancery who have no commission during good behavior, their tenure in office is absolutely at the will of the legislature, and they consequently are not independent. The people of Virginia intended that the judiciary should be independent of the other departments; they are to judge where the legislature is a party, and therefore should be independent of it: otherwise they might judge corruptly in order to please the legislature, and be consequently continued in office. It is an acknowledged principle in all countries that no man shall be judge in his own cause; but it is nearly the same thing where the tribunal of justice is under the influence of a party. If the legislature can transfer from constitutional to legislative courts all judicial powers, these dependent tribunals, being the creatures of the legislature itself, will not dare to oppose an unconstitutional law."
Judge Tyler. "The constitution says that judges in chancery shall be appointed by joint ballot of both houses of assembly and commissioned by the governor during good behavior;—and for the most valuable purposes—to secure the independence of the judiciary. Contrary to this express direction, which admits of no doubt, implication or nice construction, that bare to political freedom, the legislature has made the appointment by an act mandatory to the judges, leaving them not at liberty to accept or refuse the office conferred, which is a right every citizen enjoys in every other case—a right too sacred to be yielded to any power on earth; but were I willing to do it as relates to myself, as a judge I ought not, because it would frustrate that important object before mentioned, intended by the constitution to be kept sacred for the will and best of purposes; to wit, that justice and the law be done to all manner of persons without fear or reward. For how would the right of individuals stand when brought in conflict with the public, or even an influential character, if the judges may be removed from office by the same power who appointed them, to wit, by a statute appointment as in this case, and by a statute disapproval as was the case in the court of appeals.—Might not danger be apprehended from this source when future times shall be more corrupt?" "Let me now compare the law with the constitution in another point; that of the want of a commission during good behavior, and the reasons will fully or forcibly apply.—When I receive the commission, I see the ground on which I stand—I see that my own integrity is that ground, and no opinions but such as are derived from bare motives can be sufficient to remove me from office—no which case whenever an appeal is made to me by an injured citizen, I will do him justice as far as my mental powers will enable me to discover it, without any apprehensions of an unjust attack." "Judge Tucker, in a very elaborate opinion, which will do credit to his talents so long as it shall be read; thus expresses himself. "The independence of the judiciary results from the tenure of their office which the constitution declares shall be during good behavior. The offices which they are to fill must therefore be permanent as the constitution itself, and not liable to be discontinued or annihilated by any other branch of the government. Hence the constitution has provided that the judiciary departments should be arranged in such a manner as not to be subject to legislative control. The court of appeals, court of chancery, and general courts, are tribunals expressly required by it; and in these courts the judiciary power is either immediately or ultimately vested." "These courts can neither be annihilated nor discontinued by any legislative act, nor can the judges of them be removed from their office for any cause except a breach of their good behavior." "But if the legislature might at any time discontinue or annihilate either of these courts, it is plain that their tenure of office might be changed, since a judge, without any breach of good behavior, might, in effect be removed from office by annihilating or discontinuing the office itself." Mr. Morris then proceeded; I have stated these opinions at full length because I conceive that they determine every principle that we are contending for. We find, Sir, the ablest judges who have graced the benches of Virginia, deliberately declaring acts of the legislature of that state unconstitutional. We find them contending for and maintaining their independence against all legislative attempts to lessen or destroy it. We find them claiming this independence from the words of a constitution, which declares that they shall be commissioned during good behavior. We find also that in a contest on this subject between the legislature and the judiciary that the latter prevailed, from whence we have a right to infer that the public sentiment was with the judges. Why then, Mr. Chairman, are most of the gentlemen who represent that state, anxious to divest the general government of a privilege so highly valued in
their own state. Is the independence of the national judiciary of less importance than that of Virginia? I trust it is not. A state judiciary according to the opinion of the Virginia judges has to protect a citizen against the government as well as to decide between citizen and citizen. What have the national tribunals to do? Why, Sir, they have not only to protect a citizen against a state government, not only to protect him also against the general government, but, Sir, they may even be called upon to decide between a state and the general government. These are the great purposes for which your constitution has vested your judiciary with powers dependent of the other departments of the government, that it may effectually interpose between the means of your citizens and secure them against the oppression either of an arbitrary legislature or a tyrannical executive.
Sir, previous to the commitment of this bill, when an incidental question arose on it in the house an honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) spoke of the present as a very favorable moment for us to determine this great constitutional question. An honorable gentleman from Kentucky has this day expressed the same sentiment. Sir, I cannot agree with either of those honorable gentlemen. I believe that this is at all moments the most unfortunate for such a determination. I believe so because such have been the fatal effects of executive persecution, that it has wrought up party spirit to its highest pitch of irritation (here there was a cry of order from different parts of the house.)
Mr. Morris observed that he did not mean to say anything that was disorderly, but that having occasion to allude to the present state of irritation of the public mind he could not help attributing it to what he believed to be the true cause of it. Mr. Morris then proceeded—Sir, I am incapable of attributing to a majority of this house, a settled determination of violating the constitution of their country, but I do believe that if they act from the impulse of the present moment, that valuable instrument will be sacrificed at the altar of resentment. And how can this belief be resisted when you hear so respectable a gentleman as the honorable member from Kentucky so far get the better of his usual discretion as to permit himself to say in his place that with the public sentiment judges and all other officers ought to be changed, and that he would vote for the bill because in no other way can the judges be driven from their posts. Sir, such a sentiment expressed on the floor of this house is of itself convincing that gentlemen are not in a state of mind to examine this subject coolly and dispassionately, and therefore I must repeat again that it is the most unfortunate of all moments for its discussion.
THURSDAY, February 18, 1802. Mr. STANLEY. Mr. Chairman, the impression I feel of the importance of the question at present before us, would alone induce me to assign the reasons of the vote which I shall give; but, Sir, I am urged by another strong reason, to justify that vote. The legislature of the state of North-Carolina, a part of which I have the honour to represent, has thought proper to recommend to her representatives on this floor, to use their endeavors to effect the measure contemplated by the bill on your table for the repeal of the act of the last congress, entitled "an act for the more convenient organization of the courts of the United States." Holding myself responsible to my constituents for the vote which I shall give on this as on every other question, I cannot admit the right of any other authority, however respectable, to control or in any manner to influence my conduct. The high respect I feel, and which is justly due to the honorable body which has made this recommendation, has induced me to review with deliberation and caution, the opinion I had formed, and though it is painful to differ from those whom I esteem, yet my duty to my constituents compels me to do so in this instance. I owe also a duty to myself to give no vote which my conscience and my understanding do not approve.
Every measure which is brought under the consideration of a legislature must first be tested by its expediency. Unhappily in the present instance another question arises—its constitutionality. I will endeavour concisely to examine the subject on both those points. And first, as to the expediency of the measure. In order to form a correct estimate, between the present judiciary system of the courts of the United States, and that for which it was substituted, it is proper to take a comparative view of both.
Under the former system there were six judges of the supreme court of the United States, who held two sessions of the supreme court in each year at the seat of government. Those judges also held in each state a circuit court, two terms in each year, in which the judge of the district was associated with the circuit judge. The organization of the district courts having jurisdiction principally of matters affecting the revenue and admiralty causes, not being connected with the present question, need not be examined. From the errors of this system resulted, 1st, a delay of justice. The
judges bound to hold courts in succession at remote parts of the continent were continually travelling—from the variety of accidents to which travellers are subjected in this country, from the condition of roads and overflowing of rivers, it frequently happened that the judges failed in their attempts to get to the courts, or arrived so late that little business was done. Suits, jurors, and witnesses were subjected to the trouble and expense of attending courts without the accomplishment of their business. Hence resulted a delay of justice. In the state to which I belong, during the few years excellence of the former system, this was the case frequently.
Another great evil resulting from that system was, its tendency to lessen the character and respectability of the federal bench. Those best acquainted with the profession of the law will most readily admit, that even a life of patient study is unequal to the complete attainment of principles and rules; and that much labour and industry are necessary to preserve that which is gained. Consequently that extent of legal knowledge, correctness of judgment and respectability of character, which should delineate the persons qualified for this important trust were seldom to be found, but in men far advanced in years. Men possessing the valuable qualifications, not inured to labour, are seldom equal to the fatigue of their duty; or if at the time of appointment, fast approaching to the infirmities of age, were not to be expected to relinquish the enjoyments of private life for an office which, however honourable, subjected them to the fatigue of a day-labourer. The office with its emoluments was, as it were, offered to the lowest bidder. And men best qualified to honour the bench were driven from it. True it is, men have been found eminently uniting virtue and talents, who have accepted the office under all its distressing circumstances, but we owe this rather to their patriotism than to the advantages of the situation. Let it also be remembered that in some instances, gentlemen who would have adorned the seat of justice of any country, were compelled to relinquish their seats, and in others refused to accept the appointment.
Another error of that system was, that the judges of the supreme court, the court in the last resort, before whom the errors of the inferior circuit courts were to be corrected, were the same men who presided in those circuit courts.
With great deference for the opinions of gentlemen who prefer that system, I pronounce my opinion, that its errors were radical; that those who justly estimated the importance to our interest and national character, of a speedy and correct administration of justice, ought to have desired a change. The present system has happily obviated these errors. The states are divided into six circuits, in each state is appointed one judge, called a circuit judge; the judges of the states composing a circuit, ride together into the states of their circuit and together hold the court. The much smaller distance which those judges have to travel than the circuit judges under the former system, secures their due attendance, a portion of their time is left them to study & reflection, & the same persons presiding at successive terms an uniformity of decision is preserved. The six former judges hold the supreme court, with original constitutional jurisdiction in matters of the utmost national importance, and appellate jurisdiction in certain cases where the sum in dispute is 2000 dollars, they are also the court in which the errors of the circuit court are examined and corrected.
If, Sir, the organization of the circuit courts could have been improved by a system preferable to the present, it is my misfortune not yet to have heard of it. I will now, Sir, examine the objections which are urged against the present system, and the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Davis) must pardon me, if in doing so I notice some not yet advanced on this floor; which though he be pleased to term "shadows" have yet been imposed on the American people for substance.
The honorable member from Virginia, Mr. Thompson, has charged this system with a great increase of expense.—What, Sir, is the amount of this increase of expense? The estimate from the Treasury Department informs us that the salaries of the judges created under the act of last Congress, and the addition made to the salaries of the judges of Tennessee, Kentucky and N. W. Territory, amount to 22,000 dollars.—Some contingent expenses are necessary, which cannot be estimated at more than 8,000 dollars; making together the sum of 30,000 dollars; a sum which, when compared with the magnitude of the object, or the vast revenue and resources of the country, becomes an atom, the dust of the balance. But, Sir, permit me to ask, when was it discovered that the people of America were so lordly as to consider their gold their chief good? I had believed, Sir, they justly estimated it the instrument by which their good might be promoted.—When we took the field for independence, did any cool calculator estimate the cost? Is our republican government, founded on and guaranteeing the equal rights of man, preferred because of its cheapness? No, Sir, with the honest pride of an American I reply, they act from
noble motives.—If the purpose on which the money is bestowed be necessary, the people ought to submit to the expense; for an improvement in so valuable an institution as the judiciary, by which the weak and the poor are protected against the great and the opulent, the people will submit to it.
The President has laid before us a document exhibiting the business which has been decided in the federal courts, with a statement of what was pending when this document was taken. I shall say nothing further of the errors which have been detected in this document, than that I do not attribute them to the executive; as he received it I presume he submitted it to us. But, Sir, I cannot but express my admiration of the novelty, if not the solidity of the argument, founded on this document, that courts are necessary and useful in proportion to the quantity of business before them. Can gentlemen believe that because at the time of taking these statements there was less business than there had been before, that therefore litigation would decline; that nothing would exist but peace and good will among men? If this is not believed, if commerce will continue and passion rule us, so long will there be litigation, so long will there be a necessity for courts; their existence will be beneficial though without business; they shew to the citizens and to the world, that we are prepared to punish crimes and administer justice; and it becomes our duty to establish that system which shall best promote the great objects of a speedy and correct administration of justice.—The argument drawn from this document is fallacious on another ground; the paucity of suits is owing not to the want of litigation on questions within federal jurisdiction, but because of the erroneous organization of the courts under the former system; suits were driven into the state courts.
The same honorable member from Virginia has told us the former courts were sufficient; and to establish his point has adduced evidence from that respectable state the ancient dominion; the gentleman tells us, that in that state one venerable man has the whole extensive chancery jurisdiction of the state, the docket of which contains 2600 causes.—Without enquiring what portion of this multitude of business the judge is able to perform.
I do not hesitate to say, the fact can have no weight in establishing the gentleman's argument. We did not complain Sir, that under the former system the judges had too extensive a jurisdiction, nor that there was a multitude of causes; but that the discharge of their duty however limited their jurisdiction, however few the causes, compelled them to a perpetual travelling, leaving them no time for study, and subjecting the courts to delay, though their jurisdiction had been limited to one species of action only, and the business in court reduced to a single cause, the labour and uncertainty of travelling from N. Hampshire to Georgia was still the same.
It is objected against the act proposed to be repealed, that a dangerous patronage is created by it for the President. I shall pass over what I consider an inconsistency in this objection coming from gentlemen who profess that implicit confidence is due to the man chosen by the people, who, in his appointments, speaks not less the voice of the people than the voice of God, and examine the weight of the objection. If this apprehended patronage means the power of appointing the judiciary, that power is given by the constitution, and is the same whether the powers of the judiciary be vested in 6 or in 16 judges. If it fear an undue control over the people in favour of the executive, through the judiciary, make the judges as independent as we contend they are & ought to be, & they are placed beyond the necessity of descending to the practice of improper means to preserve executive favour.
We have been told Sir, that it is necessary the judges should ride into the states to gain a knowledge of the laws by which, in many cases, they are to decide. Until this occasion I have never heard, that the laws of a country could only be acquired in the atmosphere of that country where they are in force. Nine tenths of the decisions in our state courts and federal courts turn on questions of common law; yet, has it ever been suggested that an American judge was incompetent to decide on common law questions, because he had not studied in England? No Sir, the knowledge in both cases may be acquired in the closets. To these observations permit me to add, that the remonstrances from the bar of Philadelphia, composed of gentlemen no less celebrated for their respectability of their private than of their professional character, who on this occasion, so interesting to the welfare of their country, have sacrificed their political prejudices, strongly expressing their decided preference of the present system to the former, is to my mind conclusive that it ought to be preferred. I am therefore of opinion that it is inexpedient to pass the present repealing bill; and so long as my opinion is supported by the respectable authority I have just alluded to, and opposed only by the objections which I have noticed, I shall feel satisfied that opinion is correct. [To be continued.]
WASHINGTON CITY.
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1802.
As unauthorised assertions have been made on the floor of Congress, respecting the opinions of an eminent legal and political character of Pennsylvania, on the constitutionality of the bill at present before the Legislature on the subject of the Judiciary, we deem it a duty to publish the following Extract of a letter, from that character to his friend in this City. And at the same time that the publication renders justice to him, it will shew the little respect which ought to be attached to the ascription of certain opinions to other characters.
Lancaster, Feb. 6th, 1802.
"The vote of the Senate of the United States on the question for repealing the late judiciary law, accords with my sentiments, as it seems to have been contrived and executed rather to serve the interest of a few, zealous partisans than the people at large. That a legislature have the power, at a subsequent session, to repeal any act passed before, cannot admit of much doubt in a reflecting mind. The same power that can create, can assuredly annihilate, where there is no constitutional impediment. An office may be abolished, when it shall be deemed mischievous or unnecessary; tho' the officer may not otherwise be removable but after a conviction of some misdemeanor; and when there is no existing office there cannot be an officer to execute it—both are nonentities."
In the House of Representatives the discussion of the bill from the Senate on the judiciary was yesterday continued. Mr. Puger spoke again, & Mr. Macon for the bill.
When at 3 o'clock a motion was made, that the committee rise, and ask leave to sit again.
Mr. Gregg said he hoped the committee would not rise. He said it must be evident to every gentleman that the subject was exhausted; and other business of importance claimed the attention of the house.
Messrs. Goddard, Bacon and Nicholson supported the rising of the committee. The motion to rise was carried. —Yeas, 60.
A. J. Dallas has resigned his office of Recorder of the city of Philadelphia.
OFFICIAL.
Applications for commissions for private armed vessels, under the act entitled "an act for the protection of the commerce and seamen of the United States, against the Tripolitan cruisers," must be directed to the Secretary of the Navy. And the names of the gentlemen who will become sureties in the bond, the name of the vessel for which a commission is required, her tonnage, number of guns, and number of men, must be set forth, and a certificate from the Customs-house officer, that such vessel is American property, must also be produced.
VALUABLE LAND for SALE.
FOR sale about 4500 acres of land belonging to the estate of Judge Mercer, deceased, and situated in the county of Loudon, on the waters of Goose Creek, about 40 miles from Alexandria and the Federal City. A large portion of this tract is meadow ground, of good quality, and the soil of the high land is well adapted to every species of produce usually cultivated on land similarly situated in the upper country. Such portion of it as remains uncleared, affords an extensive and excellent range for stock of every kind. On one part of this land is one of the most valuable mills in the state. The supply of water is inexhaustible, and the mill could be erected immediately on the side of the public road leading from Winchester to Alexandria. It is computed that the number of wagons almost constantly travelling along this road, amount to at least 5 or 600. So that a ready market might always be had here, for a very considerable quantity of grain and hay.
It is deemed unnecessary to describe more particularly the many advantages of this tract of land, as it is expected that all persons disposed to purchase, will first view the premises. To accommodate purchasers the whole tract will be divided into lots of 4 or 500 acres each, with as much wood and meadow land to every lot as circumstances will admit. And it is believed that the whole 4500 acres may be so laid off into farms of the above-mentioned size, as to leave in each as much wood and meadow land as would be desired.
The price and time of payment will be made known by the subscribers. Letters directed to John T. Brooke, Fredericksburg, or to James M. Garnett, Laytons, will be answered without delay.
JOHN T. BROOKE, } Adm'rs JAMES M. GARNETT, } Feb. 8, 1802. epst
For Sale or Rent,
Two three story brick houses in Alexandria, completely finished, on King and Columbia, street, with sundry valuable property near the same, possession whereof may be had immediately. The situation for the flour and grocery business is equal to any in Alexandria. For terms apply to Henry Thomas Moore, Alexandria, or to the subscriber. NICHOLAS VOSS.

(Continued from first page.) either or by both of these clauses a power is given to your judiciary to declare your laws null and void? They may, to be sure, for a while impede the passage of a law, by a decision against its constitutionality; yet notwithstanding, the law is in force; is not nullified, and will be acted upon whenever there is a change of opinion. The legislative, executive and judicial departments should be kept separate and distinct. This I agree to, it has become an axiom in politics that they should. Yet, I enquire, will this be the case, if you allow to the judiciary the power to annul your laws, and concede that the common law is attached to the constitution? I am persuaded you thereby concentrate all power in one department. The common law is the constitution; and the court may, if they please, declare it void.
But I have not heard it explained whether the common law simply, without statutory amendments—or the common law with statutory amendments—or with what statutory amendments is to be attached to the constitution? I believe it is intended they have a right to apply such parts of it as are applicable to the constitution. The common law extends to all persons and all things. The judges have the right of adopting this law, or such parts as they deem applicable; they can annul your laws. If these powers are really contended for on the part of the judiciary, and if these powers should ever be conceded, they would without doubt possess an unlimited and uncontrollable power of legislation. I am free for my own part to declare, that I had rather live under the government of a leviathan, than such a government of judges. And if these powers are really contended for I feel no hesitation in informing you, Mr. Chairman, that this is the tree where despotism lies concealed. And this too is the auspicious moment, when those branches should be pruned away, which of late have vegetated with extraordinary luxuriance. But, sir, nurture it with your treasure, stop not its ramifications, and suffer me seriously to enquire what will be the consequence? It will overshadow your extensive republic; your soil will become too sterile for the plant of liberty; your atmosphere will be contaminated with its poisonous effluvia, and your soaring eagle will fall dead at its root.
Mr. DAVIS.—Mr. Chairman, I beg leave to be indulged with a few remarks on this subject, which I shall submit with great deference, being sensible of my incompetency to illustrate a subject of such immense importance: but as I am to give a vote, the reasons that govern that vote I think it my duty to express. I rejoice that we are called upon to decide this great national question at a time when the public mind is calm and tranquil, when uninfluenced by extrinsic circumstances, we can settle a principle of such great magnitude to our country.
I did hope we should have taken up this subject with cool deliberation, and I have to lament that the honorable gentleman from North-Carolina (Mr. Henderson) who opened the debate, instead of appealing to our sober reflections, founded the trump of alarm.—That honorable member told us we were about to prostrate the constitution. If this really be the case, the sound of danger is proper, and we, who are about to do it, must expect to answer it to our country and to generations yet unborn. But above all, we must expect to answer for it in a day of awful reckoning. The honorable member told us "That the spirit that had rode on a whirlwind and directed the storm—the spirit that had brought twenty millions of people to bow to a single despot, had entered this house on the 7th day of December last, and with gigantic strides was bearing down all before it." When the honorable member spoke of this tremendous spirit, I was at a loss how to understand him. I thought he alluded to a spirit that a few years ago threatened to humble my parent state in dust and ashes, because her citizens refused to sing praises to the late administration and own its superior wisdom and patriotism. But when the gentleman spoke of twenty millions of people I found he alluded to the French nation. On a subject where the interest of the United States is alone concerned, and which furnishes matter for the most brilliant or diffusive genius, I wonder that gentlemen will not confine themselves to America, and not seek for occurrences among the Trans-Atlantic nations. But I ask that honorable member if he is now prepared to degrade that spirit so much approved by the great Washington of America that in addressing a late minister of that nation he spoke the following words—"To call your nation brave is but to pronounce common fame. Wonderful people! Is he prepared to degrade a spirit that resisted the union of kings and emperors against an infant republic. This as well as other remarks are foreign to the subject but deserve to be considered. The hon. member then told us that every thing that bore the majesty of the people was about to be destroyed. The excise, he says, pledged to pay the national debt is to be repealed. Has that honorable member forgotten the agitations that this ex-
cise law cost the public—he has forgotten that the prison of Philadelphia was filled with those who resisted the law—he has forgotten, that citizen was armed against citizen, and state against state to enforce this law, and that it was carried into execution at the point of the bayonet—Does that gentleman think the majesty of the people consists in holding the law in one hand, and the sword in the other, and ruling the nation with a rod of iron. The mint, he says, is to be knocked down. Surely he does not remember that it cost us twenty-one thousand dollars per annum, and renders us no service—Does he think, the majesty of the people consists in useless expensive establishments, from which no good has, or ever will result.
The gentleman then reads the constitution, and tells us the acceptance of the office of judge, is a contract between the government and the individual who undertakes the office, the words on which he relies are "the judges of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their office during good behaviour," hence he infers, that the government is obliged to continue the office to the judge as long as he behaves well, whether it has any thing for him to do or not, and to take the office from him, is a violation of the contract and constitution. Let me examine this principle and see to what it leads. If it be a contract, it is equally binding on the judge and government—If the words, "shall hold his office during good behaviour" means, that the government shall continue the office during that time; it must also mean, that the judge shall fill the office during that time, and that he cannot resign without first misbehaving—which is not correct, because we know that judges have resigned, and have been removed by more eligible appointments, neither of which could be done, if the principle be a found one; for then the contract operates unequally as the government is bound to continue an office and the judge is at liberty to vacate when he pleases. If, therefore, 'tis a contract between the judge and government, to make it equal, the government should have the right to abolish the office when it thought it inexpedient, and the judge the right to vacate it when he thought proper, and this I hold to be the proper ground. But I make a material distinction between removing a judge from office and abolishing the office—the first implies guilt, the latter that the office is useless and abolishing it imports no blame to the judge. The office is created by act of law—the appointment to fill it is by constitutional authority—to remove a judge without proper complaint would be wrong, but to abolish an office created by law, when found useless or inexpedient, would be proper. The gentleman reads further, "And shall receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." 'Tis worthy of remark that the word compensation is not annexed to the word office, but is attached to the word services. This evinces to my mind that the compensation is for services to be performed by the judges, and not for holding the office. Thus when we abolish the office we leave no services for him to perform; but he retains his commission which we have no power to wrest from him, and the latter words go to prove it, "shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." The word compensation being attached to the word service to complete the right to compensation; there must be an office of judge, and services rendered in that office. When this law we are about to repeal passed, this seems to have been the opinion of those who passed it. For by a legislative act they abolished the district courts in Tennessee and Kentucky, and created circuit courts in their stead, and directed the judges of the district courts to perform circuit court services. Where, let me ask, is the difference between abolishing courts and a former majority doing it? This I take to be the only difference, we abolish courts and do not order the judges to do services in other courts. The last Congress abolished courts and then seized the power conferred by the constitution to the President and Senate, namely, the appointment of judges in certain newly created courts. But it is said the law of last session is admitted to be constitutional, and that we have no power to repeal it. Look at the second section of this law, and compare it with the constitution and no candid man will declare it constitutional. The original jurisdiction given by that section to the judges of the supreme court exceeds those intended by the constitution. [Here Mr. Davis read the law and constitution.] Besides this I think there is an intrusion of the constitution in the 27th section, as well as in that part which relates to the judges of Tennessee and Kentucky before alluded to. As to the right of repealing, I cannot hesitate, because I believe this congress possesses equal power with the former, and that the power of making and repealing laws, are at all times vested in the legislature. If this be not the case, we lose the benefit of experience, the only faithful guide to human concerns. Most of our statutes are experimentally adopted, and when we find that they operate
(Continued on second page.)
Public Auction.
Will positively be sold at the ferry on the premises, on Monday the 18th of March next, on terms that will then be made known. ALL that tract of land, known by the name of Blue Plains, containing near 500 acres, on which Mr. William Bayly now lives. This property has been so frequently advertised and described, that it is supposed useless particularly to describe it; suffice it to say, it contains more advantages than any tract of its size in the United States. A good and indisputable title will be made upon receipt of the purchase money.
WALTER MACKALL, Trustee.
Feb. 22, 1802. 2aw3w
Public Auction.
By virtue of an order from the Orphan's court of Prince George county, will be exposed to Public Sale, for cash, on the 24th day of March next, at the dwelling of Richard Lamar, in said county.
ALL the property of Mary Lamar, deceased; consisting of twelve negroes, among which are women, girls, and boys—Also a variety of household furniture.
All persons indebted to the said estate are desired to make payment immediately; and those that have claims against the same, are requested to exhibit them properly authenticated, before the first day of May next, to the subscriber.
JOHN LAMAR, Adm'r.
Feb. 19, 1802. ep3w
NOTICE.
Will be offered for sale by Auction, on the 18th day of March next, on the premises, one moiety or half part of an excellent frame house in the City of Washington, on Pennsylvania Avenue, between the Seven Buildings and George-Town.
At present occupied by Mr. Watkins, and adjoining the brick house in which Mr. Amarrah Frost lives. One half part of the lot will be sold with the house, and Jacob R. Rhodes' title to the same will be conveyed to the highest bidder. This property is taken by virtue of two writs of fieri facias to me directed, issued out of the circuit court of the United States, for the district of Columbia, sitting in the county of Washington, Frederick Betz, against Hugh Boyd, Jacob R. Rhodes, and George Hywood—Terms of sale cash—time of sale 11 o'clock. A. M.
DANIEL C. BRENT, Marshal.
Feb. 19, 1802. ept
GEORGE WALKER,
REQUESTS those who may have any claims against him, that have not yet come to his knowledge, to bring them in for immediate settlement; and informs those who are indebted to him, that no longer indulgence after the 15th of next month will be given.
He has yet remaining on hand for sale, six hundred and thirty-six of the very best of the lots arising from the tract of land of which he was sole proprietor before the City of Washington was laid out; and which lots are situated on the Eastern Branch near to where the bridge is about to be built; extending from thence over the high ground on each side of the Potomac Road, north east of the Capitol.
The recording clerk's office here, will show the title to be good.
He will let for a reasonable rent, about 80 acres of land, inclosed at the north end of his plantation, and within ten minutes walk of the Capitol; containing a large barn and two good stables, two large orchards of choice fruit, a new garden, two good springs, and the use of an excellent well at water convenient, with a small dwelling house which will be credited in a few weeks hence. This place is well calculated for gardening, a dairy and a livery stable.
He also wishes to let a two story frame house calculated for a store, on square No. 723. And will sell or let, a barn 50 feet by 25, on square No. 919, East Capitol Street.
Washington, Feb. 17, 1802. ept
FOR SALE.
THE subscriber is authorised to sell a tract of land containing four hundred acres, lying in Prince George county, on Oxen Run, adjoining the district of Columbia, and about two miles from the City of Washington, with a good road to that part of the Eastern Branch over which a bridge is to be built. This land is healthy and abounds with springs of excellent water.
There are between twenty and thirty acres of meadow ground, with a fine stream through it, which may be prepared for Timothy at a small expense, and at least two hundred acres in wood and timber. The wood itself will more than pay for the land. The cleared land, except a small part indeed, is of an excellent quality, and has on it a large tobacco house, and several houses suitable for the accommodation of labourers. This land has on it some elegant situations for country seats, commanding a view of the river and the city. If this land be not sold at private sale, before the 18th day of March next (and if it be, timely notice will be given) it will on that day, if fair, if not, the first fair day thereafter be sold to the highest bidder on the premises. The greater part of the purchase money will be required down; a credit of three months will be given on the balance, the purchaser securing the punctilious payment of the balance at the expiration of that time. Persons disposed to make a private purchase, may know the terms by application to Wm. Cooke, of Baltimore Town, or Mr. James F. Leslie of Manchester, Virginia, Mr. John Addison at Geesborough, near the City of Washington, or to the subscriber in the city of Washington.
PHILIP T. BAKER, Attorney for J. Addison.
Jan. 18, 1802. ept
COALS, hickory and oak wood, all of a superior quality, to be sold low for cash, at Redmond and Garrett Barry's new wharf. Also 12 cases of hollow glass, and 14 liquor travelling cases.
Jan. 27, 1802. eptm
FOR SALE.
A superb Curiole with plated Harness. ALSO a pair of young, handsome and fleet PONIES, and a capital saddle horse, who never was in harness. Enquire of the Printer.
Dec. 18. eptf
For Sale,
Or to To Let, on Ground Rent for ever, FIFTY LOTS, SITUATE between the President's House and Capitol.—The titles to which is indisputable.
ISAAC POLOCK.
Dec. 16. eptf
NOTICE.
THE Creditors of Mr. William Bayly are requested to meet at Mr. Semmes's Tavern George Town on Thursday the 18th March next at 5 o'clock, in the afternoon.—They are particularly requested to make known, at that time, the amount of their claims.
WALTER MACKALL, Trustee.
Feb. 22. ep3t
The Subscriber
RESPECTFULLY informs the public, that he has removed from George-Town to the Fountain Inn, near Rhodes's City Tavern. Where he is furnished with a good hostler, carriage house, and stabling for eighteen horses, and every thing in his line to render the accommodation of travellers agreeable.—The strictest attention will be paid by
CHARLES ROGERS.
N. B. Ten or fifteen gentlemen can get board and lodging on moderate terms.
Dec. 23. eptf
NOTICE.
COMMITTED to the Jail of Washington County, in the District of Columbia, as a Runaway, a Negro Woman named CHARLOTTE, about nineteen years of age, five feet four or five inches high. She says she is the property of Lewis St. John, near Battle Town, Frederick county, Virginia.
The owner is requested to come and pay Charges and take her away.
DANIEL C. BRENT,
Marshal of the District of Columbia.
Feb. 5, 1802.
THOMAS CARPENTER TAYLOR,
SOLICITS a continuation of that generous encouragement which he has experienced from the Ladies and Gentlemen of this City and its vicinity. Having procured an elegant assortment of cloths, cashmeres, swansdown, &c. and engaged workmen of superior talents. His unremitting attention shall be given to merit patronage.
Capitol Hill, next house east of Mrs. Finch's boarding house, and Pennsylvania Avenue between the President's square and Seven Buildings.
Dec. 7, 1801. eptf
CHARLES VARDEN,
Merchant Taylor, from Philadelphia,
GRATEFULLY acknowledges the favors conferred on him by the gentlemen of this City, and flatters himself that the general satisfaction he has already given will merit a continuation of the same. He has also received a handsome assortment of goods from Philadelphia, consisting of,
Best superfine cloths, Cashmeres, Swansdown, Toylentines, Velverettes, Fancy Cords, Coatings, Flannels, &c.
N.B. Regimentals, Naval Uniforms, and Ladies Habits, made in the neatest and most fashionable manner, and at the shortest notice—Washington City, New-Jersey Avenue, next to Mr. Rapine's book store.
Dec. 16, 1801. eptf
To Rent,
And possession given immediately,
A TWO STORY
BRICK HOUSE,
North front of the President's House,
CONTAINING
TWO Parlours and four Bed-rooms, with Garden, &c. It is convenient to the Public offices, and may be had furnished or unfurnished, with or without board, on reasonable terms, to an agreeable tenant. Enquire of the Printer, or on the premises. Also,
Wanted Employment,
For a YOUNG MAN, who would engage as an assistant in a store, having kept one of his own, of course accustomed to it. Would act as Steward and superintend a plantation, or the like—would make himself useful in any situation—Enquire of the Printer hereof.
November 25. 2aw3w
Michael Roberts,
Has just received from Europe and Philadelphia, and now offers for sale at his store, High-Street, George Town, a large supply of best
STATIONARY,
And other articles in his line, among which are:
PAPER, Atlas, Imperial, Superroyal, Medium, Demy, Folio post, Fools Cap, and hot press'd gilt wove, and plain 4to post of a superior quality. Blank books, parchment, printers ink, quills, ready made pens, sealing wax, and wafers. Powlings, pipes and pistols. Swords, sword knots, epaulets and military articles of every description. Plated ware and fine cutlery. Perfumery and dressing apparatus. Morocco skins, bent and cork soles. Buckskin pantaloons and breeches. Clock lamps, gig springs, and plated harness. Drum battle doors, back gammon tables, cribbage boxes, billiard balls, dice, playing cards and chessmen, whips and canes; beaver hats, umbrellas, travelling trunks, and an assortment of hard ware, upholsterers ware, &c. &c.
Also for sale at the above store, by
Edgar Patterson,
Madeira and Sherry wines, best French brandy, and Cherry Bounce; Imperial and hyson teas, loaf sugar, cheese, liquor cases demijohns &c. &c.
Feb. 12, 1802. ep6t
ROBERT CHERRY,
Near the Sugar House, New-Jersey Avenue, has just received (in addition to his former stock) per the sloop Harmony, captain Elwood, from Philadelphia.
A GENERAL assortment of groceries and liquors, viz. Pennington's loaf and lump sugar, Savannah white, Jamaica and St. Croix brown do. hyson, young hyson, hyson skin, souchong, and behea teas, coffee, pepper, allspice, nutmegs, and cloves; hair powder, plain and scented, box and keg raisins, mould and dipp candles, white and brown soap, Daxon's best mustard, tinned, mackerel, and herring in barrels, dried codfish, &c.
Cognac brandy, Holland gin, Jamaica and Antigua rum, Madeira and Lisbon wine, with other articles, all of a good quality.
Also a trunk of swansdown, lads in boxes, 12 by 10 and 8 by 6, which he will sell low for cash, or barter for first quality tobacco.
The above articles have been laid in at a falling market, and shall sell the same at very reduced prices for cash.
He returns his sincere thanks to his friends and the public, for the encouragement he has already met with since his residence here, and hopes for a continuance of their favours, which will be thankfully acknowledged.
January 9, 1802. eptf
BOLTING CLOTHS.
A GENERAL ASSORTMENT
OF
BOLTING CLOTHS
Of the best qualities and latest importations, are kept for sale by OLIVER EVANS, at the corner of Market and Ninth streets, Philadelphia, and
By OLIVER EVANS, With BOHN and SLINGLUFF, at the corner of Market and Howard streets, Baltimore, Also, with DEAN & GARDNER, Union street, Alexandria.
The book entitled the YOUNG MILL-WRIGHT and MILLER'S GUIDE, may also be had at the above places.
Jan. 29, 1802. ep4w&ep4w
TO THE MERCHANTS
Of George-Town and Alexandria.
A GENTLEMAN of experience in business intends going to the West Indies the ensuing Spring, and will have leisure to transact any commission business that may be confided to his care.
His credentials will be unexceptionable.—Any gentleman wishing further information, will be attended to by addressing a line to A. Z. and left in the care of the Editor of the National Intelligencer.
Jan. 29, 1802. 2aw4w
District of Columbia.
Washington County, to wit:
THIS IS TO GIVE NOTICE,
THAT the subscribers of Washington county, in the District of Columbia, have obtained from the Orphan's Court of Washington County, in the said district, Letters of administration on the personal estate of Jasper De Carnap, late of Washington county deceased; all persons having claims against the said deceased, are hereby warned to exhibit the same, with the vouchers thereof to the subscribers, at or before the 15th day of August next; they may otherwise by law be excluded from all benefit of the said estate.—Given under our hands this 12th day of February 1802.
ELIZABETH DE CARNAP,
Administratrix.
HENRY INGLE, Administrator,
Of Jasper De Carnap, deceased.
Feb. 15, 1802. 1aw2M
For sale, or to be rented.
A House and lot on the Capitol Hill—the lot is 20 feet 2 inches on Delaware Avenue, and about 190 feet deep extending back to a 30 feet Alley. The House is a handsome well finished convenient three story brick house, containing 2 sealed garrets, 5 chambers, 2 parlours—kitchen with a pantry and cellar.
It is directly opposite to the Buildings of WASHINGTON, occupied by Gen. Dearborn, near adjoining to a number of houses belonging to Mr. Carroll, rented to Mr. Dalton and others from its vicinity to the Capitol, it is well calculated for a private family; or a person attached to the offices of the Federal Legislature.—Adjoining is a lot of about 40 feet front on some Avenue, and running same depth back (the whole under a good post and rail fence) which, if required would be sold at same time. If rented, the Tenant may have the use of the whole or the lot, which would make an excellent garden, having a South and Eastern exposure, as long as convenient to the proprietor. This property would be sold a Bargain for satisfactory payments, or well situated property in Philadelphia would be taken in exchange.
Apply to Benjamin Eurch, New Jersey Avenue or to the Editor of the National Intelligencer—or to Karrick and Percival, Philadelphia.
Nov. 21. ept
FOR SALE.
A TRACT of land containing 2,500 acres lying immediately on the river Potomac, in the county of Northumberland, Virginia, late the residence of PRESLEY THORNION, Esq. Seventeen hundred acres of which are of the most valuable kind of low grounds on the river; between three and four hundred acres heavily timbered, the remainder is swain high land extremely productive. The soil of this tract is equal to any in the state for cultivation of corn, wheat, tobacco, timothy, and small grain of all kinds. On this tract are a large commodious two story brick mansion house and two offices, a large brick stable, a valuable barn, cow house and many other out-houses, all in good repair. The orchards and garden contain a variety of valuable fruit trees, and the waters abound with excellent fish and oysters. It is situated about a day's sail from Alexandria, Baltimore or Norfolk—There are two good mill seats for grist, or saw-mills on this estate, and plenty of cedar and chesnut timber, exclusive of the heavy timber, which if sawed up into scantling will command a price in the City of Washington, nearly equal to the value of the land.
The terms will be made easy to the purchaser, or purchasers, and the tract will be divided into two or more plantations if necessary.—Apply to
RICHARD PETERS, junr.
No. 83, Walnut-street Philadelphia.
Philadelphia, Nov. 11. eptf