Gazette of the United-States. (New-York [N.Y.]), 1789-09-02 00:00:00

Gazette of the United States.
[No. XLI.]
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1789.
[Published on Wednesday and Saturday.]
THE TABLET.—No. XLI.
I am happy to be relieved from writing an essay for this number, by presenting my readers with the following speculation, put into my hands by a friend.
"It would be strange if men agreed in their ideas about titles, when there is no other subject of equal importance in which they do not disagree."
THE subject of addressing the President by a title has afforded ample materials for argument and conjecture. The question is not, however, whether by a legislative act a title shall be conferred on him, but whether the two Houses, or either of them, shall address him by any other style than that of President. Titles are supposed to be derived from courtesy and common usage: and in this form of the question the right of the two Houses to address him by a title, is exactly on a footing with that of any other individuals: But is the usage a proper and safe one?
Though the public curiosity in relation to this question has considerably abated, I infer from many late publications that it is not wholly extinct. The readers of the Gazette will not be much instructed, possibly, however, they may be amused, by an account of a conversation between two violent disputants on this point; I happened to be present, and will communicate the substance of their arguments.
The anti-title champion said, "that addressing by a title is anti-republican. A public officer, however elevated, is merely the servant of the people, and a title tends to make him a bad one. For it creates in the people false ideas of the officer, and stimulates the ambition and vanity of the officer: The progress is natural to the usurpation of the powers which are supposed to belong to the title. The people will be prepared by this mimicry of royalty for servitude, and the magistrate for usurpation.—Independently of the ill tendency of the usage, there is more simplicity and true dignity in forbearing, than giving a title.—The language of adulation has been strained till it has lost its meaning, and nothing makes the ridicule of it supportable, but the antiquity of the practice. It is applied to the little states which never had power, or have lost it. The titles of some of the German Princes are a burlesque upon dignity. High titles will require great salaries. The people will be more alarmed by this piece of arrogance than by measures of national policy which would affect their property and confer substantial strength on the government. The national authority is feeble and in no condition to try experiments upon the temper of the people. No title can be applied which will not be laughed at. The practice has descended to us from the Goths and other barbarous nations; and as this government is founded on reasoning and reflection, and rests for support on the good sense of a people the most enlightened in the world, it cannot be deemed necessary to address the President by a title.—Let the tyrants of Asia work upon cowardice and ignorance by the enchantment of sound."
The advocate of titles replied, "That the ancient republics did not depend on good sense alone;—They did more than we propose to do. A chief magistrate is but a man, and not always more respectable than many others. These wise and jealous defenders of liberty were not willing to trust the execution of the laws to one who could command no more veneration than those who were bound to obey them. They omitted no means to create a veneration for his official character. His person was declared sacred. Oaths and imprecations were added, and many of the rites of religion. He was attended by lictors, and with all the pomp of royalty: Yet at the end of the year this mighty consul retired to private life."
The State constitutions have actually given titles of higher import than any now in contemplation for the President. The people have not feared, nor suffered the loss of liberty in consequence.
We have no pretensions to the mock humility we have assumed. There is real arrogance in it. The nations of Europe will not expect us to teach them how to treat their supreme magistrates.
Are the people dishonored and degraded by addressing their President by a title or style of office? The reverse is true.
In a monarchy, the King is said to be the fountain of honor. The secret contempt of many for republican government, influences their opposition to any title derived from the people. We have been fond enough of titles, and long used to them, though not to such as are of popular extraction. A King, who is more than a lord, may create a peer; But for the people, who individually have no rank, collectively to bestow it, is offensive to the pride of those who despise everything which proceeds from their inferiors, and seems to the people themselves an awkward exercise of their prerogative. They are called, and really are, the fountain of power. Why is it less proper to call the people the fountain of honor? In a republic, the laws reign. The laws, then, must be made respectable: The office of administering them must be made so too. Over and above the influence of talents, men are honored for their power or wealth. A people which will not give money, nor trust power, may effect the same purpose by titles. The weaker the government, the more need of their aid. They are cheaper than money, and safer than the sword, and probably have more effect than both in gaining the respect of the rising generation. Nor let us fear danger from this. If, with a founding title, no real power is given, the man who wears it will not become dangerous to liberty. He is rather disarmed by it: Like the peacock, encumbered with his tail, he will be beaten by every dunghill cock. If, without a title, great power is given, the danger is the greater. Power is a serpent, they tell us, whose bite is deadly. Give him a rattle and the heedless passenger will have warning. The silent snake in the grass is more to be dreaded.
It is as proper to guard a republic against the contempt of its members, as the ambition of its officers. I would have the people free, and while they are so, I would have them respect themselves and their government; and believe that their free suffrages can make a man as honorable as a bit of parchment with a King's signet."
I was called upon to decide the controversy—and though I declined it, I was at length compelled to assume the judge.—
I declared that the utility of titles appeared to me to be very much exaggerated. A government really well balanced and well administered would not be despised if they should be refused. Nor, while elections continue to be free, will titles supply men in power with money to corrupt, and armies to crush the defenders of liberty.—Time will decide whether they are useful at all, and in what degree.
It would be difficult to say what title should be applied. Ridicule on one side and jealousy on the other, form a dangerous strait, through which those must pass who would import a title. It is probable that any which may be chosen will be a jest to one half the world, and a scare-crow to the other.
A M I C U S.
EXTRACTS.
"IN a free, well balanced government, how impotent must all warlike enterprizes prove, that are not sanctioned by the people in their representative assembly! Without money, the sinew of war, the designs of an encroaching ambitious Executive must prove abortive.—A free representation of the people, which retains in its hands this GRAND MOMENTUM of the constitution, is a never failing bulwark to freedom."
"No people could be more tenacious of their freedom than the Swedes, till Gustavus the son of Eric ascended the throne—His manners were so amiable, his virtues so conspicuous, his government so just, and he made so popular a use of his powers, that his subjects never thought they could commit enough into his hands—But what was the consequence? His successors made his power a precedent for their own, without attending to the precedent of his administration.—This instance shews in the strongest point of view, how necessary, and how important a well defined constitution is to a free people."
A CORRESPONDENT observes, that "The first magistrate of our nation, when he gives a letter of Credence to the King of France, must give him the title of His Most Christian Majesty, with a long string of others: But when the King of France gives an Ambassador a Letter of Credence to the first magistrate of our nation, he must call him Le Sieur George Washington, President of the United States.—An American Credence to Holland must be directed to Their High Mightinesses The Lords The States General of the United Netherlands: But a Dutch Credence must be directed, Tot-de Heer George Washington, President of the United States."
"Our Credences to Spain must be directed to His Most Catholic Majesty: Spanish Credences to America, must be directed to El Señor George Washington, President of the United States." This is American patriotism and national pride, is it?
American Credences to England must be directed to His Most Excellent or His Most Sacred Majesty, —British Credences to us, must be directed to Mr. George Washington, President of the United States.
This distinction must be known not only at courts, but by the nations—by the officers, soldiers and seamen of their armies and navies.
How many drubbings must you give them before they will respect Mr. as much as Majesty.
If titular distinctions have any influence, at all, upon human ears, methinks these are somewhat humiliating to the brave, daring and intrepid sons of American liberty.
That we can chastise all the nations of the earth if they affront us, to be sure cannot be doubted: But what shall we do with the debts and taxes, that will become necessary to this purpose?—Most men who hate honors, love money.
O.
NEW-YORK, SEPTEMBER 2, 1789.
SKETCH OF PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS.
In the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES of the UNITED STATES,
SATURDAY, AUGUST 29, 1789.
A MESSAGE was received from the senate with the bill to provide for the registering vessels, and to regulate the coasting trade—returned with the concurrence of the senate in the last amendments proposed by the house.
The engrossed bill for establishing the salaries of the executive officers was read a third time, a motion was made for its recommittal, which was lost—The ayes and noes being called for by Mr. LIVERMORE, on the question, Shall this bill pass? are as follows—
AYES.
Messrs. Ames, Baldwin, Benson, Boudinot, Brown, Cadwallader, Gale, Goodhue, Griffin, Hartley, Heister, Jackson, Laurence, Lee, Matthews, Moore, Scott, Sedgwick, Sherman, Silvester, Smith, (M.) Smith, (S. C.) Sturges, Trumbull, Tucker, Wadsworth, Wynkoop.—27.
NOES.
Messrs. Coles, Floyd, Foster, Gerry, Grout, Hathorne, Livermore, Parker, Partridge, Van Ranselaer, Schureman, Seney, Sinnickson, Stone, Sumpter, Thatcher.—16.
The bill for suspending the operation of a clause in the collection law was read, and ordered to be engrossed for a third reading on Monday.
Mr. BOUDINOT presented a petition from the inhabitants of the County of Middlesex, New-Jersey, respecting a clause in the judicial bill now pending in the house, read and laid on the table.
In committee of the whole house, on the bill for establishing judicial Courts—Mr. BOUDINOT in the chair.
The third section was again under consideration.—The motion for striking out the whole clause was renewed by Mr. LIVERMORE.—The fate of this clause, said he, will determine the fate of the whole bill.—The greatest objection that I have to it, is, that it establishes two distinct systems of judicial proceedings in the United States.—He then stated certain cases in which there would be such clashings and interferences as would be attended with great difficulties—Suppose, said he, a person is in the custody of a State officer, and is at the same moment taken hold of by an officer of the federal court, what is to be done—is the man to be divided? This system may open a door to collusions in cases of debt—by having prisoners under pretences of arrest by the federal authority, violently forced from the hands of State officers.—If these difficulties can be got over, I shall think more favorably of the bill; but I do not see how they can be possibly—We have supported the Union for fourteen years without such courts.—The same or equal abilities may be found—justice may be as well administered as heretofore—I know of no complaints of any great consequence that have existed.—Some cases of capture have been carried to the court of appeals, but they have been very few.—He then adverted to the institution of courts of admiralty in favor of establishing which, he said, the expence will not be by a fiftieth part so much, and the advantage will be ten thousand times as great.
Mr. SMITH (S. C.) As much will depend on the determination of this question, it is necessary it should be well considered by all the committee.—It will not be easy to alter this system when once established: The judges are to hold their commissions during good behaviour, and after they are appointed, they are only removeable by impeachment; consequently this system must be a permanent one; the committee will not therefore determine, that there shall be district courts, until they have reflected seriously on the consequences attending their vote.
After this point is settled, the next which occurs is the extent of jurisdiction, to be annexed to this court. This question is as important as the former; for it will be no less difficult than

improper to enlarge or curtail the jurisdiction of a court already established. With respect to the first point, it seems generally conceded that there ought to be a district court of some sort. The constitution indeed recognizes such a court, because it speaks of "such inferior courts as the Congress shall establish," and because it gives to the supreme court only appellate jurisdiction in most cases of a federal nature. But some gentlemen are of opinion that the district court should be altogether confined to admiralty causes; while others deem it expedient that it should be intrusted with a more enlarged jurisdiction: and should in addition to admiralty causes, take cognizance of all causes of seizure on land, all breaches of impost laws, of offences committed on the high seas, and causes in which foreigners or citizens of other states are parties. The committee are now to decide between these two opinions: After mature reflection, I am inclined to favour the latter. What are the objections advanced against it? A gentleman from New-Hampshire has observed, that such an establishment will be unnecessary, expensive and disagreeable to our constituents. Justice, he observed, could as well be administered in the state as in the district courts, and should the state courts betray any symptoms of partiality, their adjudications would be subject to revision in the federal supreme court, which in his opinion afforded sufficient security. If the state courts are to take cognizance of those causes which by the constitution are declared to belong to the judicial courts of the United States, an appeal must lie in every case to the latter, otherwise the judicial authority of the Union might be altogether eluded. To deny such an appeal would be to frustrate the most important objects of the federal government, and would obstruct its operations. The necessity of uniformity in the decisions of the federal courts is obvious; to assimilate the principles of national decisions, and collect them, as it were into one focus, appeals from all the state courts to the supreme court would be indispensable; It is however much to be apprehended that this constant controul of the supreme federal court over the adjudication of the state Courts would disatisfy the people, and weaken the importance and authority of the state judges; nay more, it would lessen their respectability in the eyes of the people, even in causes which properly appertain to the state jurisdictions; because the people being accustomed to see their decrees overhauled and annulled by a superior tribunal, would soon learn to form an irreverent opinion of their importance and abilities. It appears therefore expedient to separate, as much as possible, the state from the federal jurisdiction, to draw a broad line of distinction, to assign clearly to each its precise limits, and to prevent a clashing or interference between them. The expence is suggested as an objection to this system.—It is admitted by the gentleman who makes it, that it is proper to have district courts of admiralty; these courts must of necessity have jurisdiction of offences committed on the high seas. Now the establishment of such a court will induce nearly all the expence that will be requisite; the extension of the system to the length I have stated will occasion a very trifling increase of the expence, and if the latter plan should be found, after due consideration to be more conducive to the happiness and welfare of our constituents than the other, a small increase of the expence ought to be no impediment to the attainment of so valuable an object. There can be no reason why our constituents should be displeased with this arrangement; the district judge will be elected from among the citizens of the state where he is to exercise his functions and will feel every inducement to promote the happiness and protect the liberties of his fellow-citizens—he will be more independent than the state judges, holding his commission during good behaviour, and not being influenced by the fear of a diminution of his salary.—Trial by jury will be secured in all cases, wherein it is provided in the state courts. Should the district judge be under any bias, it is reasonable to suppose it would be rather in favour of his fellow-citizens, than in favour of foreigners or the United States. By restricting the state courts to few causes of federal jurisdiction, the number of appeals will be diminished, because every cause tried in those courts will for the reasons before mentioned be subject to appeal, whereas the jurisdiction of the district court will be final in many cases. In as much, therefore, as those appeals are grievous to the citizens, which lie from a court within their own state to the supreme court at the seat of government, and at a great distance, they will consequently be benefited by an exemption from them. In the bill as sent from the Senate, the jurisdiction of the district courts is not so extensive as to occasion any just alarm; it is in my opinion rather too confined, and does not embrace objects enough. It would be difficult to take from that court any of its jurisdiction without materially injuring the whole judicial system, except the clause relating to consuls and vice consuls, which appears to me to be improperly annexed to the district court, and which I shall move to strike out when we come to that part of the bill. But to what objects does the
district courts extend? To admiralty causes and trials for piracy and offences committed on the high seas: Gentlemen have conceded that the district courts shall have jurisdiction of these cases. To offences against the United States: It is very proper that a court of the United States should try offences committed against the United States.—Every nation on earth punishes by its own courts offences against its laws. To seizures on land for breaches of the revenue laws: This power will not be censured: it would be false to distrust the collection of the revenue of the United States to the state judicatures. The disinclination of the judges to carry the law into effect, their disapprobation of a certain duty, the rules of the court or other obvious causes might delay or frustrate the collection of the revenue, and embarrass the national government. From this view it appears that the district court is not clothed with any authority of which the state courts are stripped, but is barely provided with that authority which arises out of the establishment of a national government; and which is indispensably necessary for its support. Can the state courts at this moment take cognizance of offences committed on the high seas? If they do, it is under an act of Congress, giving them jurisdiction, and in such cases the judge of the admiralty is associated with two common law judges; this tribunal becomes then a federal court for the particular occasion, because it is established by Congress. The state courts have no jurisdiction of causes arising from a national impost law, because no such law has heretofore existed. Where then is the ground of uneasiness suggested by gentlemen? The foregoing observations must persuade them that their alarms have been premature. But it is said there must be court-houses, judges, marshals, clerks, constables, goals and gibbets—that these establishments will induce a heavy and unnecessary burthen, and have a tendency to create disgust in the people. I readily agree with the gentleman that there are in every community some individuals who will see with pain every new institution in the shape of a constable, goal or gibbet: and who think that law and courts are an abridgement of their liberty; but I should be very sorry to concur with him that this is a prevailing opinion: I think better of our constituents, and am persuaded they are sensible that these institutions are necessary for the protection of their lives and property; and grow out of the very nature of a federal government. Care indeed should be taken to prevent their being grievous and oppressive: But as long as there are in the world knaves and rogues, and monsters under the form of men, preying upon the honest and innocent, so long will courts and all their concomitants be wanted to redress the wrongs of the latter, and repress the depredations of the former. But let me ask the gentleman whether a court of admiralty, and a court for the trial of offences on the high seas, which he agrees ought to be established, will not require all these institutions; viz. court-houses, clerks, sheriffs, &c? There can be no doubt of it. The extension of the jurisdiction of the district court as far as I think it necessary will not occasion any one article of expence or any one institution which will not be necessary on the gentleman's plan. To suppose that there will be a clashing of jurisdiction between the state and district courts on all occasions, by having a double set of officers, is to suppose that the states will take a pleasure in thwarting the federal government: It is a supposition not warranted by the disposition of our fellow-citizens, who, finding that these establishments are created for their benefit and protection, will rather promote than obstruct them: It is a supposition equally opposed to the power of direct taxation, and to the establishment of state and county courts, which exist in the several states and are productive of no such inconvenience. These several courts will have their limits defined, and will move within their respective orbits without any danger of deviation. Besides, I am not persuaded that there will be a necessity for having separate court-houses and goals: Those already provided in the several states will be made use of by the district courts. I remember when the court for the trial of piracy under the authority of Congress, was held in Charleston, the judges set in the court-house, the prisoners were confined in the goal, were under the custody of the constables and were executed by the orders of the sheriff of the district of Charleston. All these were state institutions, and yet the court was a federal court.
There is another important consideration; that is, how far the constitution stands in the way of this motion: It is declared by that instrument that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme and in such inferior courts as Congress shall from time to time establish: Here is no discretion then in Congress to vest the judicial power of the United States in any other tribunal than in the supreme court and the inferior courts of the United States: It is further declared that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases of a particular description—How is that power to be administered? Undoubtedly by the tribunals of the United States: If the judicial power of the United States extends to those specified cases, it follows indisputably that the tribunals of the United States must likewise extend to them.—What is the object of the motion? To assign the jurisdiction of some of these very cases to the state courts, to judges, who in many instances hold their places for a limited period, whereas the constitution, for the greater security of the citizen, and to insure the independence of the federal judges, has expressly declared that they shall hold their commissions during good behaviour;—to judges who are exposed every year to a diminution of salary by the state legislatures, whereas the constitution to remove from the federal judges all dependence on the legislative or the executive, has protected them from any diminution of their compensation. Whether the inexpediency or the unconstitutionality of the motion be considered, there are more than sufficient reasons to oppose it. The district court is necessary, if we intend to adhere to the spirit of the constitution, and to carry the government into effect. At the same time, I shall cheerfully assist in organizing this court in that mode which will prevent its being grievous or oppressive, and will render it conducive to the protection and happiness of our constituents.
Mr. JACKSON: I rise, Sir, on what I conceive the most important subject, which has yet come before this house: It is what I have long considered, and with difficulty have decided, but on mature consideration, am impressed with the same sentiments with the gentleman from New-Hampshire. It must be admitted, that society was formed before the rules which governed that society, and therefore the laws and rules were formed merely for the convenience of that society. In fact the convenience of the people is, or ought to be the first privilege of every government; and the people have a right to expect it. Our present constitution has set out with this declaration, "We the People," in its preamble; and therefore in the system before us, every attention of the Legislature ought to be drawn to this point. Sir, I apprehend that the system before us is not framed, or calculated for that purpose; but seems rather intended to destroy some of the most valuable, and important privileges of the citizens. I do not wish to diminish from the powers in the federal judiciary, which may be necessary and commensurate to the carrying the government fully into execution; but I consider the system unnecessary, vexatious, and expensive, and calculated to destroy the harmony and confidence of the people.
The gentleman from South-Carolina has objected to the motion for striking out the clause, for several reasons: The first he brings forward is, "that in several of the States the Judges are limited in their appointments, that inferior jurisdictions are required by the Constitution, and that the State judges are not vested with permanent salaries." Sir, those arguments fall to the ground on referring to the Constitution: The Constitution does not absolutely require inferior jurisdictions: It says, that "the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts, as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The word may is not positive, and it remains with Congress to determine what inferior jurisdictions are necessary, and what they will ordain and establish, for if they chuse, or think no inferior jurisdictions necessary, there is no obligation to establish them. It then remains with the Legislature of the Union to
examine the necessity or expediency of those courts only. Sir, on the subject of expediency, I for my part, cannot see it, for I am of opinion that the State courts will answer every judiciary purpose.
The gentleman from South-Carolina has again advanced "that if district and circuit courts are not adopted, the harmony of the United States and people will be at stake, and that the system will be more vexatious by a series of appeals." Sir, I do not agree with this doctrine. I hold that the harmony of the people, their liberties and properties will be more secure under the legal paths of their ancestors, under their modes of trial, and known methods of decision. They have heretofore been accustomed to receive justice at their own doors in a simple form. The system before the house has a round of courts, appellate from one to the other, and the poor man that is engaged with a rich opponent, will be harassed in the most cruel manner; and although the sum be limited for appeal, yet, Sir, the poor individual may have a legal right to a sum superior to the limit on, say above a certain amount of dollars, and not possess fortune sufficient to carry on his law suit: He must sink under the oppression of his richer neighbor. I am clearly of opinion that the people would much rather have but one appeal, from the State courts, immediately to the supreme court of the continent. An admiralty jurisdiction I will grant may be necessary for the trial of maritime affairs, and matters relative to the revenue, to which object I would cheerfully enlarge it, and I think, Sir, for the present it will be far more eligible. The gentleman has likewise advanced that the expence would be as great without, as with the inferior jurisdiction. I must beg leave to differ from him, and to declare that it will be in the proportion of three to one: for although the clerk and marshal of the district courts are the officers proposed for the circuit courts, yet, Sir, there will arise a train of inferior officers, consequently attendant on those officers and courts, exclusive of jurors, witnesses, &c. He has likewise advanced that it is necessary to prevent confusion: Sir, the line of distinction will be much easier preserved in the present state of the department, for many of the reasons pointed out by the gentleman from New-Hampshire, exclusive of the difficulty of new rules, &c. But, Sir, we are told it is necessary that every government should have the power of executing its own laws: This argument must likewise tumble when we find that the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States, are by the Constitution itself, made the supreme law of the land. Sir, are not the judges of the different States bound by oath to support that supreme law? Will they not recollect those oaths, and be liable to punishment by your act which has obliged them to take that oath, if they do not respect it as such? assuredly they will—it is part of the compact formed with the States; but, Sir, does there not remain the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court to control them, and bring them to their reason? Can they not reverse, or confirm the State decrees as they may find them right or wrong? Thus then does this last argument fall to the ground.
Sir: That the system is vexatious can be easily proved, and is too obvious. An offender is dragged from his home, his friends, and connections, to a distant spot, where he is deprived of every advantage of former character, of relations, and acquaintance: The right of trial by a jury of the vicinage is done away, and perhaps he is carried to a place where popular clamor for the moment might decide against him; or if allowed a trial by vicinage, or his neighbors, it is equally vexatious to drag them two or three hundred miles from their homes, with evidences to try, and give testimony, at a distant place; every thing is to be dreaded from it. Sir, this is contrary to our wonted customs, and we need not revert to the history of Britain, after the conquest, to view what struggles against innovations of this nature that nation made. The monkish clergy joined with the Kings to oppress the people, establish civil law, and get the legal power into their own hands: The people took the alarm, and with the nobility contested the point, which was never finally settled until the great charter of John, which it was one of the causes of producing, and which fixed the ecclesiastical bounds. I would ask if our modes of trial must not be as dear to our fellow-citizens as to them, and if the same considerations may not reasonably be expected? I am afraid, Sir, that they will be found so. Is it proper we should be so suspicious of the State Judges? I cannot for my part consider human nature so depraved, as to suppose that with an oath to observe the supreme law of the land, the State Judges would not obey it. It becomes us in my opinion, as a wise legislature, to take up and execute the least exceptionable and milder mode first: there is no requisition—no necessity from the Constitution: If we find on experiment, (and the house generally admit our laws at present experimental) that sufficient attention is not paid, and that our government requires for its existence a more energetic mode, I pledge myself to agree to any inferior jurisdictions which may be thought necessary for that purpose; but I never can consent to oppress my fellow-citizens without experiment and absolute necessity.
Mr. BENSON observed, that if the clause is struck out of the bill, it will involve an abandonment of judicial proceedings on the part of the United States altogether, except in cases of appeals. The difficulties which may arise in this case, are not justly chargeable to the bill itself, they are owing entirely to the constitution—for that is express, that the general government shall exercise all judicial powers: This Legislature therefore, have it not at their option to establish judicial courts, or not: The words of the system, are plain and full; and the institution of the courts, arise out of the very nature of the government: How far the operation of this power may extend, it is not for us to determine: Whether it will interfere with the State judicatures is a matter that must be the result of experiment—Some gentlemen suppose it will, and it may be that it will involve the assumption of the whole judicial power; but still the clause does nothing more than take up the letter and spirit of the constitution.
Mr. SEDGWICK observed, that the gentleman will find as great difficulties to arise upon his plan, as upon that proposed in the bill—and this is obvious—we are so circumstanced that two distinct independent powers of judicial proceedings do exist; and I do not see how we shall get rid of the difficulty, if it is one, till there shall be a change in the constitution. I did not suppose that at this day, it was a question whether this government is to exercise all the powers of a government, or not? I did conceive that such an idea had no existence in any gentleman's mind—but Sir, what does the present motion import? Its consequences go to disestablish government of a power, without which its authority is but a shadow. It is necessary to the completion of any system of government, that it should possess every power necessary to carry its laws and ordinances into execution. But by the gentleman's idea, it is to be left to the determination of an authority, which independently of this legislature, whether the laws of the union shall be executed or no.—Mr. SEDGWICK then touched upon the difficulties that would arise from giving the state courts cognizance of federal questions—He also adverted to the conduct of the state legislatures, (the creators of state courts and judges) in respect to infractions and violations of contracts, &c. by which the United States had been humbled from the pinnacle of glory, to the lowest state of degradation. Under the impression of these considerations, said he, can it be supposed that this government can exist with any degree of reputation, and dignity without the power of establishing its own tribunals, and instituting its own judicial proceedings? It appears to me as necessary that they should possess this power, as that they should be United in order to their existence as a nation.
Mr. AMES: The remarks which gentlemen have made on the importance of this question will be of some use in deciding it. The judicial power is in fact highly important to the government, and to the people: To the government because by this means, its laws are peaceably carried into execution. We know by experience what a wretched system that is which is divested of this power. We see the difference between a treaty which independent nations make, and which cannot be enforced without war, and a law which is the will of the society. A refractory individual is made
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TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 1.
A message from the senate with a bill providing for the punishment of certain crimes. Also the bill for allowing compensations to the members of the house and senate, and their respective officers; in which the senate has concurred, with amendments.
Upon motion, the report of the committee of elections, on the election of members for the state of New-Jersey, was taken up for a second reading.
This brought on a variety of observations and propositions; but no determinate principle of discussing the subject being readily agreed to, and several motions being made and withdrawn,
Mr. VINING proposed, in substance, the following resolution: viz- Resolved, That the facts reported by the committee of elections, and the documents therein referred to, respecting the election of the members from the state of New-Jersey, are not sufficient to support the prayer of the petition for setting aside said election.
Several members spoke upon the proposition; but an adjournment being called for prevented a decision.
European Accounts, by the late arrivals.
LONDON, MAY 7.
The debates on the intended motion for the abolition of the slave trade, promise to be of the most interesting kind. The report of the Privy Council, which has been printed for the use of the members of the House of Commons, is the most voluminous ever seen, if we except the report some years ago on India affairs. It is a very large folio closely printed, and nearly one fourth of it tables of calculations. The pains, however, that has been taken, correspond with the great importance of the subject—too important to be hurried by a mistaken humanity, excited by the recital of facts either ill founded, or long ago done away.
HERMANSTANDT, MAY 20. One of our spies has had the address to procure a passport from Prince Moutor Jeni, by means thereof he had an opportunity of traversing the whole of Wallachia. According to his report there are 40,000 Turks and Tartars in the neighborhood of Grind, on the shore of Jalomiza.
BUDA, MAY 30. On the 5th inst. three divisions of the Hussars of Græven arrived at the camp between Carlstadt and Thurn; they were the next day followed by a battalion of Colonel de Nadefty. The 9th, two other divisions of the Græven Hussars joined the camp—the centinels extend as far as Saluin and Rakovisa. There are fifty pieces of cannon in the village of Schweza.
FRANKFORT, JUNE 9. The main body of the Prussian army is exceedingly numerous: Its right wing covers Selistria, and its left extends as far as Orsova. It is estimated that the Turkish infantry amount to 169,000 men, and the cavalry 200,000.
The grand Ottoman army assembled near Widin, appears disposed to enter Wallachia,
PARIS, JUNE 25. The National assembly continue their sittings sometimes till three or four in the morning.
Paris is full of alarms, joy, misery and rejoicings!
LONDON, JUNE 30. We may consider Bender as now in the hands of the Russians. General Kamineky, to whom the siege of it was committed, has conducted it in such a manner, that it was in his power to take possession of it whenever he pleased after the first three weeks. But by a singular instance of self-denial, he was resolved to wait the arrival of Prince Potemkin, that he might have the honour of completing the conquest of this important fortress.
The Poles have a new cause of complaint against Russia. The Empress had promised them, that no more of her troops should enter the territory of the Republic; and she even declined the permission offered by the Diet to let 500 Russians pass at a time through the territories of Poland, lying between Russia and Turkey.
But notwithstanding this promise on the part of the Empress, a whole army of Russians lately marched through Polish Ukraine, to make head against the Seraskier, who gives out that he is going to cross the Danube to succour Bender, and recover Oczakow.
How this step of the Empress will be relished by the Court of Berlin we know not; but we fear that the consequence of this step will be felt in Great Britain.
Extract of a letter from Abo, Sweden, May 29.
Last night a courier passed through this place on his way to Stockholm, from the frontiers with the news of an action having taken place between the Russians and the Swedes, in which the former had 500 men killed on the spot, the Swedes lost only 19. A baggage magazine belonging to the Russians was burnt."
ARRIVALS. NEW-YORK.
Saturday, Packet Jean Jacques, Lewis le Grand, Bourdeaux. Brig Peggy, Mulboland, Bristol, 53 days. Brig Betley, Sinclair, Hull, 49 days. Sunday, Brig Princess Ann, Richardson, Aberdeen, 66 days. Monday, Brig Commerce, Tyrre, Barcelona. Tuesday, Schooner Nancy, Tatem, St. Croix.
NEW-YORK, SEPTEMBER 2.
Monday 3 o'clock P. M. the Hon. Major General LINCOLN, the Hon. CYRUS GRIFFIN, and Col. DAVID HUMPHREYS, Commissioners Plenipotentiary from the United States for treating with the southern nations of Indians, sailed from this city for Georgia.
NONTOWERA a chief of the Cherokee nation is a passenger with the commissioners.
Every movement in this business has been marked with the most decided promptitude and dispatch. The bill providing for the supplies is short and comprehensive.—as soon as it was compleated the appointments were made. Two days constant and close application were given by the President and Senate in conferring upon, and arranging this important business.—Gen. LINCOLN received notice of his appointment on Tuesday evening of last week, and sat out the next morning for this city—he arrived here late on Saturday evening, and on Monday the commissioners failed. This is doing business—thus is the public service expedited, and the public money saved by a wise, an industrious, and patriotic Supreme Executive.
The Most Hon. WILLIAM FEW, Senator of the United States took passage with the commissioners for Georgia.
Of all the curses that can befall a free people there is none pregnant with more fatal consequences than to have it become unpopular to support the government and administration which the people have established. LIBERTY, disgusted with so vile a principle, and finding no rest for the sole of her foot among a restless fickle and factious generation, takes her flight never to return.
The old enemies of our federal honour and happiness are reviving from that torpidity into which they were chilled by the majesty of the union, which led to the adoption of the new government. A few scouting parties have been popping their sport pieces at several minutiae of the administration, just by way of trial. Some honest people have heard the distant whizzing, and have supposed danger was near; but let them be on their guard and prepare for more serious alarms. The overthrow of the constitution is yet a darling object with many; and if the administration can be enfeebled by essential restrictions, or rendered odious by lies and defamation, it will not be the fault of some persons, if we are not disappointed of peace, law, freedom and government, after all our exertions to secure them under the new constitution.
Extract of a letter from Fredericksburg, August 29.
"Mrs. WASHINGTON, the Mother of our PRESIDENT, died this afternoon."
From Norfolk, we learn that seven Sailors have lately been apprehended there, charged with having committed PIRACY!—The only Particulars related, are—that they belonged to a Vessel from Port-au-Prince bound to some Port of America—that on their coming within Sight of Land, they formed a Design to plunder the Vessel, under a Supposition that there was a large sum of Money on Board—that to effect this, they murdered the Captain, Mate, and Cook; plundered the Vessel of what Money they could find, sunk her, and came on Shore in the Boat. The Story they related respecting the Vessel which they had left, appearing rather suspicious, they were apprehended, and one of them turned Evidence against the rest—so that there is no Doubt of their having committed the above inhuman act.
A List of His Most Christian Majesty's Ships now lying at the Mouth of York River.
   Ships' Names. Guns. Commanders.     L'Illustre, 74 Le Vicomte de Penteves Gien, Chef d'Escadre.   La Leopard, 74 Marquis de la Galissonier.   L'Andromache, 40 M. Sufannet.   La Sensible, 40 M. de Brache.   L'Active, 32 M. de Traverfac.  
The above Squadron was to sail for Boston on Thursday last.
OF DEBTS.
"OWE NO MAN ANY THING."
"One must sometimes bear the reproach of selfishness, in order to pay a debt, or to keep out of it: The contempt which attends avarice, and the tendency of the present age to charity, and expensive living, render this difficult—Hence young persons are apt to go to greater expence than they know they ought, and commit one error, in order to avoid the imputation of another."
"Distinguish between apparent and real approbation—between that which is ill, and that which is well founded—between a temporary and a permanent one."
"The fiew of wealth and liberality procures apparent approbation: Outward respect and flattery, are the reward of ostentatious entertainments, but indicate no solid respect: The wife disapprove of excess in appearance, and sit uneasy at a feast which they know has cost more than the giver can afford."
"A reputation founded on conduct which we ourselves know to be wrong, yields little satisfaction but one that is well founded, is always accompanied with self-approbation: If it should be denied for a time, the consciousness of meriting it, and the hope of justice, will more than balance its temporary suspension."
"At death, a man's character is fixed: Some have been accounted selfish and contracted as long as they lived, and it appeared at last that their object was not to hoard, but to render to all their due. This should teach us to beware of imputing avarice to those who in all probability are only laboring to be just."
"A person who transgresses the bounds of economy to obtain a character, loses it at death.—Acts of benevolence with other men's money, will leave a stigma upon the memory, which a sense of injury will perpetuate from generation to generation."
to feel the weight of the whole community. A government which may make, but not enforce laws, cannot last long, nor do much good. By this power too, the people are gainers. The administration of justice is the very performance of the social bargain on the part of government. It is the reward of their toil—the equivalent for what they surrender. They have to plant, to water, to manure the tree, and this is the fruit of it. The argument therefore, a priori , is strong against the motion, for while it weakens the government it defrauds the people. We live in a time of innovation; but until miracles shall become more common than ordinary events, and surprise us less than the usual course of nature, I shall think it a wonderful felicity of invention to propose the expedient of hiring out our judicial power, and employing courts not amenable to our laws, instead of instituting them ourselves as the constitution requires. We might as properly negotiate and align over our legislative as our judicial power; and it is not more strange to get the laws made for this body than after their passage to get them interpreted and executed by those, whom we do not appoint, and cannot controul. The field of debate is wide. The time for consideration has been so ample, and that remaining for debate is so short, that I will not enter fully into it. The gentleman from South-Carolina (Mr. SMITH) has very ably proved the inexpediency of the motion. I will confine myself to another point, and if I can establish it, it will narrow the discussion.
The branches of the judicial power of the United States, are, the admiralty jurisdiction, the criminal jurisdiction, cognizance of certain common law causes, and of such as may be given by the statutes of Congress. The Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance of it, are the supreme law of the land. They prescribe a rule of action for individuals. If it is disputed whether an action is right or wrong, reference must be had to this rule; and whether the action is compared with the rule of action in a State or federal court, it is equally out of the power of the judges to say that right is wrong, and wrong right: If a man is restrained of his liberty and sues in a State court, the defendant shews, that he was a marshal and served a precept according to a law of the United States, he must be cleared; otherwise the law of the United States would not be the supreme law of the land. But there is a substantial difference between the jurisdiction of the court, and the rules of decision.
In the latter case, the court has only to enquire into the facts and the rules of action prescribed to individuals: In the former, they do not enquire how, but what they may try. The jurisdiction of the court is the depositum of a trust. The supreme power in a state is the fountain of justice. Such streams are derived from this fountain to the courts, as the legislature may positively enact. The judges as servants of the public, can do that only for which they are employed. The constitution has provided how this trust shall be designated. The judges must be named by their christian and sir names, commissioned during good behavior, and have salaries. Causes of exclusive federal cognizance cannot be tried otherwise, nor can the judicial power of the United States be otherwise exercised. The state courts are not supposed to be deprived, by the constitution, of the jurisdiction which they exercised before over many causes which may be tried now in the national courts. The suitors will have their choice of courts. But who shall try a crime against a law of the United States, or a new created action? Here a jurisdiction is made de novo . A trust is to be exercised, and this can be done only by persons appointed as judges in the manner before mentioned: The will of the society is expressed and is disobeyed, and who shall interpret and enforce that will, but the persons invested with authority from the same society? The State judges are to judge according to the law of the State, and the common law. The law of the United States is a rule to them but not an authority for them. It controuls their decisions, but cannot enlarge their powers. Suppose an action brought on a statute declaring a forfeiture equal to the whole of the goods against him who shall unload without a permit: Before the law was made, no court had jurisdiction. Can a State court sustain such an action? They may as properly assume admiralty jurisdiction, or sustain actions for forfeitures of the British revenue acts. I mean no disrespect to the State courts. In some of the States I know the judges are highly worthy of trust; they are safeguards to government, and ornaments of human nature. But whence would they get the power of trying the supposed action? The States under whom they sit, and to whom alone they are amenable never gave them any such power to give, and this government never gave them any. We may command individuals: But what right have we to require the servants of the States to serve us. Nay, Sir, it is not only true that they cannot decide this cause, if we neglect to make provision by creating proper tribunals for the decision, but they will not be authorized to do it even if we pass an act declaring that they shall be invested with power: For they must be individually commissioned and salaried to have it constitutionally, and then they will not have it as the States judges. If we may empower one State court, suppose the supreme court, we may empower all, or any, even the justices of the peace. This will appear more monstrous, if we consider the trial of crimes. A statute creates an offence. Shall any justice of the peace be directed to summon a jury to try for treason or piracy? It is true the government will not direct a thing so wickedly absurd to be done. But who will believe government may lawfully do it? It would be tedious to pursue this subject, or even the ideas connected with it very far. The nature of the subject renders it difficult to be even perspicuous without being prolix. My wish is to establish this conclusion, that offences against statutes of the United States, and actions the cognizance whereof is created de novo , are exclusively of federal jurisdiction; that no persons can act as judges to try them, except such as may be commissioned, agreeably to the constitutions. That for the trial of such offences and causes tribunals must be created. These with the admiralty jurisdiction which it is agreed must be provided for, constitute the principal powers of the district courts. If we must pay judges, we may as well employ them. The remnants of jurisdiction which may be taken away, are scarcely worth transferring to the State courts, and may as well be exercised by our own.
Several other gentlemen spoke; but the committee rose without coming to a vote upon the motion, and the house adjourned.
(This debate to be continued.)
MONDAY, AUGUST 31.
The engrossed bill to suspend the operation of a clause in the collection law was read a third time.
Mr. BLAND informed the house that the towns of Petersburg and Richmond laboured under the same difficulties, and had similar grievances to complain of, with the inhabitants of George-Town and Alexandria—he moved therefore that this bill should be re-committed for the purpose of adding a clause to relieve those places. It was accordingly voted that the bill be re-committed to a committee of the whole.
A memorial from HUGH WILLIAMSON, in behalf of the trading interest of North-Carolina, representing the hardships that state suffers, by reason of the alien tonnage duty being levied upon their vessels in the states under the new government.
This memorial with that from the commanders of the packets from Rhode-Island and Providence, were referred to a committee of the whole house.
The committee appointed for the purpose, reported that they had examined the enrolled bill for registering vessels, and to regulate the coasting trade—and found the same correct. The speaker then affixed his signature to the same.
In committee of the whole, upon the bill for establishing judicial courts—Mr. BOUNDNOT in the chair—the third section under consideration.—The debate was very long this day; and after 3 o'clock the motion for striking out the clause was negative by a large majority.
Adjourned.

THE RIGHT CONSTITUTION of a COMMON-WEALTH EXAMINED,
(Continued from our last.)
TARQUIN , by his ambassadors, solicited at least the restoration of his property. Brutus opposed it. Collatinus, the other consul, advocated the demand of his royal banished cousin. The senate was divided: The question was referred to the people assembled by centuries. The two consuls zealously supported their different opinions. Collatinus prevailed by one vote. Tarquin's ambassadors rejoice and intrigue. A conspiracy was formed, in which a great part of the young nobility was concerned: two of the Vitellii, sons of Collatinus's sister, and brothers of Brutus's wife; two of the Aquilii, sons of another sister of Collatinus, as well as two of Brutus's sons, were engaged in it. When the conspiracy was discovered, Brutus alone was inexorable. Collatinus endeavored to save his nephews. —Collatinus, as the husband of Lucretia, appears to have been actuated by resentment against the person of Tarquin, but not to have been very hearty in the expulsion of the family, or the abolition of monarchy. His warmly contending for the restitution of Tarquin's effects, and his aversion to the condemnation of the conspirators, completed his ruin with Brutus. He assembled the people, and was sorry that the Roman people did not think their liberties safe while they saw the name and blood of Tarquin not only safe in Rome, but vested with sovereign power, and a dangerous obstacle to liberty. Collatinus was amazed at such a speech, and prepared to defend himself against this attack; but finding his father-in-law Spurius Lucretius join Brutus, and other principal men, in persuading him, and fearing that he should be forced into banishment, with the confiscation of his estate, he abdicated the consulship, and retired to Lavinium: but he carried all his effects with him, and twenty talents, or £. 3,875 sterling, to which Brutus added five talents more, a most enormous sum, if we consider the universal poverty of that age, and the high value of money.—Is it possible to find, in this character and conduct of Collatinus, such disinterested and magnanimous virtue as our author speaks of? Is this an example to prove that disinterested virtue was frequent in that state? He must have been dead to every manly feeling, if he had not resented the rape and death of his wife. He did not retire but to avoid banishment; nor was he contented without his whole estate, and a splendid addition to it: So that there is scarcely a character or anecdote in history less to our author's purpose in any point of view.
There is an extravagance in many popular writers in favor of republican governments, which injures much oftener than it serves the cause of liberty. Such is that of our author, when he cites the example of Regulus. Let us first remember, however, that Regulus was a patrician and a senator, and that he was appointed to his command, and continued in it, by the senate; and therefore, instead of being an example in honour of a simple or a representative democracy, it operates in favor of an aristocracy, or at most it favors a mixed government, in which an aristocracy has full one third part. Regulus had been in a course of victory, which the senate would not interrupt, and therefore continued him in the command of the army. He wrote to the senate to complain of it. The glory of it to himself, the advantage to the public, was not reward enough to him. He demanded a successor; and what was his reason? A thief had stolen his tools of husbandry used in manuring; his tenant was dead, and his presence was absolutely necessary to prevent his wife and children from starving. Is it possible to read this without laughter and indignation; laughter at the folly of that government which made so poor a provision for its generals, and indignation at the sordid avarice of that senate and people, who could require a threat of resignation from the conqueror of Carthage to induce them to provide for his wife and children. The senate decreed that his field should be cultivated at the public expence, that his working tools should be replaced, and his wife and children provided for. Then, indeed, Regulus's aversion to the service was removed: To such sordid condescensions to the prejudices and meanness of the stingy and envious parts of the community are such exalted souls as that of Regulus obliged sometimes to submit; the eternal panegyrics of Republican writers, as they call themselves, will never reconcile mankind to any thing so ridiculous and contemptible. The labourer is worthy of his hire: he who labours for the public should live by the public, as much as he who preaches the gospel should live by the gospel; and these maxims of equity are approved by all the generous part of mankind. And people whose heads are turned with contracted notions of a contrary nature, will forever be the dupes of the designing; for where you will find a single Regulus, you will find ten thousand Cæsars.
(To be continued)
FOREIGN MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES.
LONDON, MAY 15.
It is expected Mr. Neckar will be very hard run in the Assembly of the States. The nobility of Paris have shown great skill and intrigue in the choice of their deputies, to the States-general. It can scarcely be believed, though it is a fact, that they have chosen Mons. D'Elpremenil as their first representative, in preference to the prince of the blood and the first nobility in the kingdom.—This gentleman not long since, declared in parliament, that he was the enemy of M. Neckar, and said, Let his friends withhold their votes from me, since I will never cease till I unmask him.
The opinion of the city of Paris may be judged of from this election.
In the mean time, Paris swarms with periodical publications in opposition to government, and the king has found it necessary, notwithstanding the declaration in M. Neckar's speech, that the liberty of the press should be allowed, to publish an ordinance for their suppression, as well as notice to all booksellers who shall sell them, on the penalty of forfeiture of their estates.
JUNE 3. Yesterday morning advices were received from Hamburg, confirming the intelligence, that Admiral Wrangell has put to sea from Carlscroon, with thirty men of war, great part of which were line of battle ships, from 66 to 100 guns. The Admiral was proceeding up the Baltic, towards the coast of Finland, in order to make a cruise in such a situation as to block up the port of Revel, and to prevent the squadron from Confradt forming a junction with the Russian fleet, in the harbour of Copenhagen: In such case, one engagement may settle the state of this year's campaign by sea.
Extract of a letter from Madrid, June 1.
"The Hon. W. EDEN, commercial negotiator from London, having finished the system of commerce which is about to take place between Spain and England, left this city last week, and is gone from hence to London. All restrictions on the commerce between the two nations will be removed, and a plan of trade settled. No articles have yet appeared, but they are expected to be nearly similar to those with France."
The benevolent and philanthropic Mr. HOWARD is preparing to leave his native country on a three year's tour. One year he purposes to spend in Egypt. Should this truly valuable member of society live to return, and that he may must be the sincere wish of every good man, his great work on Lazarettos will be enriched by an appendix, in which the history of the plague will make a conspicuous figure.
It is now pretty clear to every discerning mind that nothing decisive will be done in the slave-trade this session, several days having been already taken up in examining a few witnesses when such a multitude remained behind. The reports before the privy council too, now printed for the use of the members, are all so contradictory—so much the effect of interest, of passion, of hearsay, &c. that it would be next to drawing lots for justice to come to a ready conclusion either way. It is to be hoped, however, some temporary measures will be adopted, and that the tried effects of those measures, with a clearer view of the general question will enable Parliament to effect that reform next session, which will do credit to the legislature of Great-Britain.
FRANCE JUNE 8.
The payments at the Hotel de Ville are begun for the last six months of 1788, as Mr. NECKAR had mentioned in his speech. It is wonderful how government keep up their credit, when the finances are so very low. It is true that the half-yearly dividend has been due these five or six months, but it is likewise too true that when Cardinal LOMENEY, Archbishop of Sens, quitted the administration, not half a million of livres were found the treasury. It is a guardian angel; it is the director general; it is a Neckar, who nobis defundit vivum per membra vigorem , exclaimed enthusiastically, the commons !
JUNE 21. At the moment when France thought herself happy in the establishment of her RIGHTS and LIBERTIES, every thing is again thrown into confusion.
On Friday the national assembly (that is to say, that part of the states, late called the commons) had finally voted the provisional grant of taxes, till the end of the sessions; the consolidation of the national debt; a loan for the immediate payment of the arrears due from government: and considerable sums of money to be forthwith sent into the provinces for the relief of the poor;—at the same time the clergy had determined to join the third estate on the next day, Saturday.
In the morning, at three o'clock, an officer with sixty men was posted at the door of the assembly room, to prevent the entrance of the deputies; and at nine o'clock the heralds proclaimed a suspension of the meeting till Monday, when his majesty would go to the house, to receive them.
The president and several members arriving at their usual hour, and finding the doors shut against them, remained some time in the street, but at length adjourned to the Tennis-court, and there held their assembly till late in the evening, when they separately took the following oath:
"WE SOLEMNLY SWEAR NEVER TO SEPARATE FROM THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, BUT TO UNITE OURSELVES IN EVERY PLACE, WHEREVER CIRCUMSTANCES MAY REQUIRE, UNTIL THE CONSTITUTION IS ESTABLISHED ON A SOLID FOUNDATION."
"RESOLVED, That this determination shall be printed and sent to the different provinces."
At the same time Monsieur De Gocies, on the part of the inhabitants of St. Domingo, put the
colonies under the protection of the national assembly, and declared that henceforward they would call themselves Colonies Nationales.
All Paris is in the greatest consternation, and the court under the utmost embarrassment; the intention of the king in going the house, is kept a profound secret; and the people are the more alarmed, as they see no reason why any secret should be made, if his design was favorable; on the other hand, the firmness of the assembly, in their proceedings of yesterday, has evidently put the court party under the greatest dilemma; for this evening at six o'clock, no orders are yet given for his majesty's equipage, nor any notice sent to the officers who should attend him. The general report is, that the king will not go to the house to-morrow, and that a counter-proclamation will be on the breaking up of the council.
Every day brings fresh accounts of the distress of the country, for want of bread. In the neighbourhood of Senlis, Soissons, Chantilly, &c. it is credibly affirmed, that the bakers will not be able to furnish a single loaf at any price, after Wednesday. To Paris, Versailles, Marli, &c. not a cart load of flour is brought without the protection of a guard.
LONDON, JUNE 29.
Received at ten o'clock last night, by express, from VERSAILLES.
La Seance Royale, which we formerly announced, took place on Tuesday last, at which time the king abolished all the arrets entered into by the tiers etat. Each order of the assembly went separately to their respective chambers, the tiers etat remaining in their own.—After the king's departure, they voted in their own capacity, a confirmation of the arrets which they had just agreed to, notwithstanding the king had commanded them to be abolished.—They then severally took an oath, not to consider themselves as dissolved, although the king had issued his orders for that purpose!
Immediately after this, Mons. Neckar, the minister of finance , went up to the king, and entreated permission to resign the seals of his office. This was peremptorily refused by the sovereign. On going out of the palace, he was embraced by the assembly of the tiers etat, and conducted by them in a shew of triumph and adoration to his official apartments.
This proves a strange revolution in politics—and, if the phrase can be allowable, we will add, an usurpation of liberty in the very heart of the late despotic capital of France.
Twelve months ago, files of musketeers, with drawn bayonets, were placed in, and surrounded the courts of justice and houses of parliament in Paris. At this moment the third and inferior state of the kingdom is bidding defiance to arbitrary power, and the decrees of their sovereign. This may be considered as a critical epoch in the history of nations, and France in particular; whilst famine is hastening to the very gates of the capital.
Liberty will have another feather in her cap. The seraphic contagion was caught from Britain,—it crossed the Atlantic to North America—from whence the flame has been communicated to France.
JULY 2. We are assured from respectable authority, that the great controverted question in France has received its final determination. The two superior orders have yielded to the commons, in consequence of a letter from the king. On Saturday last, the three orders met and formed a house; none of the clergy dissenting, and of the nobles only forty five; so that every thing now is peace and concord without doors.
PRICE CURRENT.—NEW-YORK.
 Jamaica Spirits, 5/.  Antigua Rum, 4/6. a 4/9.  St. Croix, do. 4/5. a 4/6.  Country, do. 2/10.  Molasses, 9/2. a 2/0.  Brandy, 5/9.  Geneva, 5/9.  Do. in cases, 28/ a 29/.  Muscovado Sugar, 56/ a 72/.  Loaf, do. 17 1/2 a 1/3.  Lump, do. 1/18.  Pepper, 9/0. a 2/10.  Pimento, 1/9. a 2/.  Chocolate, 1/2.  Cocoa, 7/5. a 8/.  Coffee, 1/8. a 1/9.  Indigo, (Carolina) 4/5. a 6/.  Rice, 22/6. a 23/.  Superfine Flour, 45/.  Common do. 40/.  Rye do. 24/ a 25/.  Indian Meal, 18/.  Rye, 4/3. pr. bush.  Corn, (Southern) 3/9. a 4/.  Do. (Northern,) 4/3. a 4/6.  Beef, first quality, 48/ a 59/.  — Second quality, 43/6.  Pork, first quality, 81/6.  — Second quality, 76/6.  Hams, 7/.  Carolina Tobacco, 34/3. pr. lb.  Virginia 4/. 5/. 
Published by JOHN FENNO, No. 9, MAIDEN-LANE, near the Usque-Market , NEW-YORK.—[3 dol. pr. an.]