Gazette of the United-States. (New-York [N.Y.]), 1789-07-01 00:00:00

Gazette of the United States.
[No. XXIII.]
WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1789.
[Published on Wednesday and Saturday.]
THE TABLET.—No. XXIII.
"A course of rigorous self-denial in youth may prove inimical to the happiness of old age."
In an excellent discourse which I heard a few Sundays ago, the preacher exhibited, in a striking point of light, the propensity of mankind to sacrifice their prospects of future happiness to the love of present gratification. As I seldom wish to call in question the propriety of religious admonitions; and as, on this occasion, the illustrations were peculiarly pointed and forcible, I might have proceeded to the end of life, under the full conviction that such sentiments were just and reasonable, had not some doubts been excited by the following letter, I lately received from a friend. The reader must be informed, that this acquaintance of mine retired a few years ago into the country, with a view of softening the asperities of life by relaxation and indulgence. He had long been engaged in business, with much care and assiduity, that he might put himself in circumstances to enjoy leisure and amusement. But it happened that his ardour to acquire property had produced such habits of diligence and activity, that he is utterly at a loss, how to occupy his mind, in the tranquil scenes of so calm a retreat. Removed from the anxiety and exercise of vigorous pursuits, he cannot change his feelings with his situation. In the early periods of life, he had solaced himself with the expectations of finding exquisite delight, in devoting his declining years to retirement, which might be alternately employed in contemplation or diversions. But unfortunately he did not consult the principles of human nature. No man can suddenly relinquish a course of old habits, without subjecting himself to a tedious interval, before he can form new ones. By destroying his accustomed sources of happiness, bad as they may be, he cannot readily adopt others that are not worse. The letter, to which I allude, thus describes the situation of my correspondent.
"L——, May 10, 1789."
"DEAR SIR, Your congratulations are pleasing, as they demonstrate your good will and friendship; but they are painful, in convincing me that you can with my happiness more easily than I can realize it. If any felicity can be derived from being happy in your imagination, while in my own I am miserable, you congratulate me with propriety."
"You will ask, and with great reason, why I am not happy; and you will even wonder to hear me complain, when at the same time, I assure you that I have not a wish ungratified. Still however I am as unhappy a being as exists. It is not disappointed ambition; it is not an unsatisfied temper of avarice; it is not perverse or disgraceful conduct in my family; it is not pain or infirmity of body; it is not a reluctance to leave this world, or the dread of appearing in another, that disturbs my tranquility. No! None of these causes operate in my disquietude. My infelicity only results from disappointed hopes. I have formed expectations of happiness which I shall never realize. My anticipations were vain and fallacious, because they amused me with prospects that were contrary to the natural disposition of things. The mind that has accustomed itself to reject present gratification, for the sake of enjoying that which is future, loses by this means the relish for any enjoyment at all. I am in possession of every ingredient to gratify my wishes, that I ever hoped or anticipated. They are far however from producing the effect I intended."
"In short, my past habits are at variance with my present plans and prospects. We are so much the slaves of custom, that whatever mode of life we have long pursued, cannot be suddenly altered, without striking a dangerous blow upon our happiness. In vain had I flattered myself, that this elegant retreat would be a delightful substitute for the bustle and watchfulness of an anxious employment. The disagreeable incidents of my former occupations, have all escaped my memory; while the pleasing circumstances are heightened by the contrast of my present situation. I would not regard what noise or tumult I could hear, if it would serve to wear away my tedious, vacant hours, in this insipid place of solitude. Every charm, I had figured to myself from this retirement, has fled from my imagination. When I awoke in the morning, I cannot form schemes to amuse me half through the day; and before night, I am tempted to believe that nature has changed her laws, and that the planets do not move with their wonted celerity. Thus, my friend, have my hopes been defeated; as those of every other person must be, who expects that liberal enjoyments can afford contentment, after a long and rigid exercise of business and parsimony. The moral world will no sooner change its laws than the natural."
[This letter to be concluded in our next number.]
SKETCH OF PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS.
In the House of REPRESENTATIVES of the UNITED STATES
[FRIDAY, JUNE 19.]
Continuation of the debate on the question, Whether the Secretary of the department of foreign affairs, shall be removable by the President?
Mr. JACKSON: I am well aware Sir, how irksome it must be to have another member rise upon this question; but when I consider that the liberties of this country may be suspended upon the decision, I feel it my duty to trespass once more on the patience of the committee: I shall make but a few remarks.—Mr. Jackson then adverted to the arguments which had been so strenuously urged to prove the division, and distinction of the powers of the several branches, and added, I deny Sir, that there ever was a government in which the powers were not blended in a greater or less degree.—Shall we find it in Rome, Carthage, or in any of the ancient governments? Let us turn our eyes to Britain , or the other powers of Europe —there we find that the will of the executive gives law to the legislature—Let us look into our constitution, there we see the executive has a qualified legislative power—his signature is required to complete the acts of government—he may adjourn the House from time to time—Will gentlemen still contend that the executive power is distinct? Will they explain away these truths? I call upon gentlemen to shew the necessity of delegating this power; it cannot be maintained upon any principle, but that of rendering the President completely independent of all controul by the legislature. Gentlemen have come forward with their specres.—The western territory was one, and molasses was another of those frightful images; but now there is nothing to alarm our apprehensions—all is perfectly safe—I wish that gentlemen were more consistent with themselves.—Let us again revert to ancient history— Carthage lost her liberties by taking power from one branch to confer it upon another, and the accumulation of power in one particular branch has swallowed up the liberties of most of the ancient republics.—It has never yet been proved, that the power which appoints, is not the power to remove.—I think the constitution has settled this question.
The President has already the sword; there will be a time when America will have an army—I do not confine my remarks to the present period—Let us look forward, when a different character from that which now presides, may be in the chair—The pure strings will be in his hands, and these with an army at his command, will enable him to lay prostrate the liberties of America—this is no spectre; experience of past ages confirms the observation, that a wise people, will never let their liberties lye at the meer will and pleasure of any man. Some gentlemen say there is no danger, as the President is chosen from the mass of the people—others deny this—how shall we reconcile these opposing opinions?
I call upon gentlemen to shew that there is no check upon the President provided in the constitution.
The celebrated Mr. Wilson, is of opinion, that the Senate is designed as this check. This sentiment is confirmed by other writers of reputation: Sir, I shall add nothing further, but my assent to the motion for striking out the clause.
Mr. BALDWIN: I have felt, Sir, an unusual anxiety during the debate upon this question, as I consider a proper decision upon it, or amount tantamount consequence to the government.
The main objection to the clause is, that we shall violate the Constitution, by giving this power to the President—we have been reminded of our oaths, and with great solemnity warned against this violation; but in my opinion, gentlemen should alter their mode of expression, and say, that their constructions of the Constitution will be violated.
The principle ground of opposition to the Constitution, as I am authorised from the best information to say, was the association of the President with the Senate: Shall we not do away this objection, by drawing a line of separation as far as lies in our power?
It has repeatedly been said, that the power that appoints should be the only power to remove; but I deny the consequence; it does not follow: the judges only are to be removed by the Senate; the power of removal does not, and ought not to exist in the power that appoints.
This principle is not pursued by the Senate itself in the Judiciary Bill; there the power that appoints the inferior officers of the Federal Courts has not the power of displacing those officers.
If this had been the sense of the Convention who framed the Constitution, the clause, "to be removed in like manner," would have been added.
The maxim among the wisest legislators is, that the respective branches should not be blended any further, than is necessary to carry their separate powers into more complete operation.
If experience should point out the necessity of uniting these powers, it may be done; but what is the consequence apprehended from the exercise of this power? Why, gentlemen are afraid that the President may turn out a worthy man! It is his life, says the gentleman from New-Hampshire.
But the President cannot keep in an unworthy officer; he may be impeached by this House: This is an effectual check.
If the Constitution had provided for every contingency, instead of being contained in a sheet of paper, it would have swelled to a folio volume.
But the President may turn out so many, that the Senate will find it difficult to procure officers.
It should be remembered, that if a misunderstanding should arise between the President, and the head of a department, it is necessary that he should be removed; but every thing we hold dear is to be prostrated by the power of the President!
He is however to be elected every four years, and the jealousy of this people is ever alive to catch at every defect, and we always have the power of impeachment in our hands; but as it is a doubtful clause, as observed by the gentleman from Connecticut, we ought not to meddle with it: This is a bad sentiment in its operation: The great division of the Committee proves it is a doubtful question! We then are the disinterested branch: The President and Senate are the parties: It rests with us to decide: The Senate will receive with pleasure our decision on this question: We are fellow laborers: We are all trying to raise a noble structure upon the same foundation. I do not wish we should leave this question. I wish this Bill may go up with our full determination—the Senate will receive it with candour. The Judiciary is the constitutional judge of our laws, and they will decide upon this, and I think they will consider themselves obliged by our decision. It would be a criminal pusillanimity to retreat from this decision.
Mr. SYLVESTER: In yesterday's debate, Sir, we had the sublime, the marvellous and the pathetic—monsters with heads, and monsters without heads. It has been said, that we have no right to give a construction of the constitution; if to decide this question is contrary to the constitution, and can be made to appear so, I shall be against it; but if it is doubtful, it is our duty to give an opinion: If there is nothing contrary to the constitution, the question is, how we shall decide?
By virtue of the constitution, the executive power is vested in the President—the constitution is explicit as to appointments, and by that the power of the President is eclipsed—We have a right to create such officers by the constitution—If we have this right, we certainly have a right to modify the laws for their removal; and have a right consequently to delegate that power; and where can
it be deposited with greater security? But it is said that the Senate must concur in the removal—this is matter of opinion as to the expediency of the power residing in the President; it is to be considered, that this is an high officer; it may be necessary for an immediate discharge, but in order to an impeachment, the vote of this House must be obtained; this would require time, and if officers are not to be removed but by impeachment, they have an inheritance in their office.
The present is the time for us to decide this important question; we are free and unbiased; any errors may be rectified by the judges; that the President should have the power to appoint, and not to displace, would in my opinion, defeat his power to carry the constitution, so far as lays with him, into operation.
Mr. STONE: I consider, Sir, that the decision of this question will give a leading feature to the administration of the government.
The people, Sir, have adopted this constitution because they thought that it would more effectually secure their liberties—all the amendments which have been proposed, go to a more perfect establishment of their rights.
Our object should be to carry the constitution into execution upon its true principles; without considering whether there is too much power here, or too little there. It is not an indifferent thing (as has been asserted) that because there is a certain quantum of power to be exercised, how that power is appropriated. I cannot think that the associated powers of the President and the Senate, is so monstrous as some gentlemen have supposed; the association constantly takes place: In cases of treaty, this association is requisite—what injury is apprehended? If there is that danger predicted by gentlemen, we are in a hazardous situation?
The constitution has designated a balance, the President is to appoint; the Senate to approve; it remains to carry this balance throughout. This proposed delegation of power destroys the balance, for the President may defeat by removals these joint appointments.
As I respect the constitution, I would distribute the powers as nearly as possible as the constitution has done.
The separation of the powers maintained by some, is not a principle in the constitution—it is contended by writers on government, that the powers in general should be separated, and properly; but in the present case, there is an exception, and we ought to follow that exception, step by step.
Go through the constitution, and you do not find, that the President has a single power to appoint—The convention may have done wrong; but they did not think it safe to trust even the appointment of inferior officers but by law—It is said that the power of removal is in the President, and we cannot take it from him—this must be by implication; I never was fond of implications. Here Mr. Stone dilated upon the absurdity and danger of implications, and then proceeded: In all the departments, there are officers to be appointed, there is the army, the navy, the mint; who is to have the power of making all these appointments? It is said, that the President is the executive, and may discharge all these officers by himself, what follows? In absolute governments there is no doubt about implications; they always suppose that the monarch is unrestrained. The executive contended for must be defined, and then there will be no difficulty about implications. I think there are good reasons to be given why the Senate should have a voice in appointments and removals—in some views the President is more responsible than the Senate—the Senate are the watchful guardians of the constitution—the electors of the President cannot be this guard, they are ignorant of the President, who think it derogatory to his dignity, to institute an enquiry into the conduct of an officer below him. We seem to forget the confidence we ought to have in the constitution—Do you place more confidence in the President than in the heads of departments, and the Senate together?
We have expended our time, blood and treasure to very little purpose, if we do not think that liberty and safety constitute the real dignity of human nature. I think there is more real dignity of soul in a common peasant of America, than in a prime minister of Europe. Mr. Stone added several other observations, and concluded with approving the motion for striking out the clause.
Mr. VINING: I join with every gentleman in the idea of the very great importance of this subject, as it respects the constitution and the future operations of the government.
It has been sufficiently demonstrated by gentlemen, that the executive and legislative powers should be separated: But it has been asked, where does the government exist, whose powers are not blended? To answer this question fully would lead us into too extensive a field—but granting that in most countries this division of power is but faintly defined, yet in Great-Britain, where the science has been carried to the greatest perfection, hitherto known, and where the idea of checks is a leading feature in the system, there the powers are no farther blended than is necessary.
I am pleased with the great concern which gentlemen discover for liberty—upon the same principle I contend for the necessity of the clause. What has been the consequence of encroachments upon the executive in other countries? Anarchy, confusion, and the loss of that liberty which is now said to be at stake. The shortness of the time for which the President is elected is a sufficient preventative from abuse of power; but will you in order to prevent him from doing harm, deprive him of the power to do good? No instances can be adduced from history to prove the infringement of the executive—but on the contrary the weakening of the executive by taking away such powers as are requisite, has constantly been followed by anarchy and despotism.
It has been said, that it is cruel, to take away an office without an impeachment, a trial, &c. but the delays of impeachments will render removals almost impracticable: Besides let us reflect upon the train of disagreeable, and perhaps fatal consequences to the government, which may arise from an adherence to this mode. Suppose there should be parties in the Senate; and they will exist: How easy will it be to support an unworthy officer in his place, through the agency of such a party in the Senate; where decisions will be made by ballot, and where every man's vote will be a secret: What cabals and undue influence will be the consequence! In what a situation will this place our chief magistrate? Will this be agreeable to the spirit of the constitution? I think not. Let us remember that this government, like HERCULES, rose from the cradle—let us avail ourselves of the practice, the wisdom and experience of former ages, and of other countries, and bring it to maturity.
The Senators—the representatives of the sovereignties of the States, are not chosen by men specially appointed for that purpose; but the President is chosen by electors who are chosen immediately by the people for that express design—hence the Senate is an improper body to interfere with the executive.
The powers of the Legislature ought to be commensurate to the objects of legislation: It is conceded that this act is a proper legislative act; but except it can be carried into complete operation upon the principles of the constitution, it is a nullity.]
[The Debate upon this subject was extended to a greater length than any which preceded it—some observations were added to those which we have given, by several other gentlemen, when the question was determined, as mentioned in sketches of the proceedings of 19th inst. in No. 20. of our paper.]

[THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 1789.]
Debate upon the Bill for establishing the TREASURY DEPARTMENT.
Mr. PAGE moved that these words "Who shall digest and report plans for the improvement and management of the revenue, and for the support of public credit" should be struck out of the second clause of the bill: He added some observations to show the impropriety of any man's being empowered to digest plans of revenue or any other for the House: it was true, he said, that some such officer as this did originate such plans and digest in other countries, but then it must be remembered, that in England particularly, the minister was always a member of that House, where money bills originated; and that from thence he derived the right to interfere with, and bring forward his propositions upon the subject of revenue; but he hoped this House would never permit the head of any department to carve out work for them, and introduce an undue influence in the representative body.
Mr. BENSON observed, that except this clause is retained in the bill, we shall have no plans at all; the person who is to fill this office, whoever he may be, has no power by the clause, to carry any thing into effect, he can only propose. The concurrence of the House, the Senate and the President, are necessary to give efficacy to his plans: Should this clause be struck out, it effectually defeats the whole design of the bill.
Mr. GOODHUE: This motion, Sir, I think is carrying jealousy to a very extraordinary length indeed; that we should be afraid to receive information from any person who is not a member of this House: this is as much as to say, that we will not receive any light from without these doors upon the subject of finance: The Secretary of the treasury, is the only person from whom we can receive that information in all its extent, which this House will peculiarly want.
Mr. PAGE replied, It is the duty of the members of this House, to inform themselves upon this, and every other subject; a committee of finance may be appointed, who can report the necessary plans, and then the business will originate where it ought.
I would ask, whether it is not evident, that an officer of this description, will have an undue influence and bias upon the minds of the members, by having the power to introduce measures into the House? Let the Secretary form his plans, and let them be introduced by a member; but I never will agree that an officer, who is not a member, shall be admitted into this House with his propositions, to advocate, urge and enforce them upon us: It will be found at last, that the House has but the name of legislation, and the power of originating money bills will be transferred to the Secretary, and like the parliaments of France, we shall be called together to exercise only the power of registering edicts; this may be called jealousy, but I conceive it is the true language of the constitution. I wish for an energetic government; but I wish for a permanent one; and I will never consent to measures in the infancy of the government, which will weaken that efficiency by alarming my constituents, by giving up any constitutional powers.
Mr. AMES: The gentleman last speaking, appears to be apprehensive of an infraction of the forms of the House: This deserves consideration; but this is not the question immediately before us. I conceive there are two principles which present themselves to guide the committee: The one, that the powers of this officer be useful and efficient; and the other, that they should be safe. The first enquiry then is, Whether this power will tend to general utility. If the Secretary is to be presumed to have the best knowledge of the finances of the country; and if this House is desirous of acting upon the best information, it seems to follow logically, that he is to be consulted; and the best mode will be, to derive the information from him personally. It will not be denied, that it will come within his province to have more accurate ideas upon this subject, than others who have no particular concern in it.
From the nature of his employment, he must be supposed to have a full and comprehensive knowledge of the state of the funds of the United States—the demands that will be made upon them, and the best mode of conducting them: He will be charged to acquire this knowledge.
The nature of finance are of such a nature, that they never can have justice done them by public assemblies: This is a misfortune, which appears indefeasibly attached to their very formation. The interests of finance are so intricate, so complicated, and so difficult to arrange, and the opinions of members so various and opposite, that one man may gain more knowledge by one hour's research, than a popular assembly by an investigation for years.
The knowledge of a financier will be very desirable: Our finances, compared with those of all other countries, are in a chaotic state: I wish to let in a little sunshine upon them; and I cannot but flatter myself, that such an office will be established, as will put them in such a situation, as that we shall not be ashamed of them.
With respect to the danger apprehended, I cannot conceive from whence it is to arise: It is said, that his opinion will have an undue influence; but can he make that to be true, which is not true? Can he report untruths, which the House cannot detect? Truth may come in opportunely; it may destroy a favorite hypothesis—this truth we may want: What means of public influence can he possess over the members? I can conceive of none; and it is impossible that in a public communication, he can have more improper an influence, as he may derive from out door intrigue, and private conversation: It is therefore more safe to receive his communications publicly, than to give them to individual members: It will establish a legislative control over this officer, to call upon him to bring the details of his duty upon the floor of the House: It is a most effectual way of making him responsible; and will operate as a powerful check; and this is the reason, why the prime minister of Britain is obliged to appear on the floor of the House of Commons. In addition to this, the people are hereby made acquainted with the state of their money concerns.
Mr. Ames concluded, by saying, that he hoped that gentlemen would review their reasons for striking out the words, and not let an unreasonable jealousy defeat the most salutary regulations.
Mr. LIVERMORE: Mr. Chairman, I am for striking out the words in the clause: I suppose that no person has a right to make propositions to the representative body, who is not a member of this House: This would introduce a dangerous influence; this will make the members careless and indifferent about an attention to this necessary and important part of their duty: The power to originate money bills is a sacred deposit, that ought not to be alienated or violated: Giving the Secretary this right will make him the source from whence all systems of Finance and plans of Revenue will proceed. The Congress, I remember, under the old Confederation, had an Ordinance similar to this bill, and it was then proper, as they had the power of removal; but we shall not have this power, according to what has passed, and therefore I give my assent to the motion for striking out those words.
Mr. SAGGWICK: Sir, it does appear to me, that if we intend to realize the object of this bill, these words must not be struck out: A consideration of the different plans of revenue in the several States, renders it highly necessary to have an officer of this kind: The methods that will be used to defeat the Revenue, renders it necessary that there should be an officer vested with sufficient powers to guard it: I cannot but think that the jealousy which anticipates an undue influence, is not well founded: The independence of this House will always be superior to an undue control of the Executive: If the plans which may be proposed, were always of necessity to be adopted, there would be some weight in the objection; but when the plans are introduced into this House, our various ideas will cause much time to be expended, before a current will be formed, in which the general opinion will set. I do think it next to an impossibility, that a popular assembly, composed of so many different members from different States, can be competent to form a good system of Revenue. It is a subject which requires the closest application, the longest study, and
the most comprehensive view of things, to render a person properly adequate to it. We shall always find amazing delay in waiting to collect the opinion of individuals, upon so various a subject. I hope, therefore, the words will compose part of the bill.
Mr. BOUDINOT: Jealousy, Sir, is valuable under a proper direction; but there is danger of carrying it too far: Let us consider whether to realize the object before us, the power of the Secretary ought not to extend thus far: We are referred to individuals for information—this is, I conceive, giving up the point. One of the grand principles of the Constitution is the responsibility of officers: now if secret intelligence is obtained from this officer, and introduced here, it will destroy that responsibility, and will be pernicious and dangerous to the liberties of the United States: We have seen the incompetency of plans upon these principles in the individual States. This secret information opens the doors to the greatest impositions and abuses. It is therefore necessary that we should have an officer, on whom we may officially call for this information.
It has been said, that the Committee of the whole is the proper source of enquiry: This, Sir, I can by no means accede to. The Members when they come together, are under the controul of local prejudices, and must be naturally ignorant of many things necessary to be known, in order to form a wise decision. Enormous expense is continually accruing while this knowledge is acquiring. It will require some person to be continually employed in this business; his time, his attention, and talents, must all be devoted: The subject will be a science, and his knowledge will be absolutely necessary: I hope, Sir, the amendment will not take place.
Mr. HARTLEY was in favor of the motion for striking out the words: The doctrine of the gentleman last speaking, proved too much: That one person should have more knowledge of the Finances than all others, goes to supercede the necessity of legislation. The clause in the bill appears to me too strong. I am willing that the House should draw information from this officer; but that he should have a right to obtrude his sentiments here at pleasure, is a measure productive of a dangerous influence, and will be introducing an officer into the government, unknown to the Constitution.
Mr. GERRY observed, that if the doctrine which he had heard was established, [referring to the Secretary] it ought to be extended to all the other officers, and that they ought to be distinguished by a ribbon, or some other badge, which none of the members of the House should have a right to wear. He said that the power contended for by some gentlemen, necessarily included the idea of originating money bills: What is this officer to do? Why, he is to digest and report plans for the improvement of the Revenue: Now if this does not comprize the power of originating money bills, I do not know what does: This will be investing the President with a most alarming power. Gentlemen have dwelt much on responsibility; but what is the responsibility of this officer? Does it mean that he should be responsible for a deficiency in the Revenue? Could he be responsible for the effects of a measure which he had only proposed? Is he to be impeached for an error in judgment? This would be unprecedented: For what then should we give him such an enormous power? By some doctrines which have been advanced, it should seem as if a gentleman would lose his reputation by opposing this omnipotent officer; for these same arguments being used, which are now brought forward, when a plan of Revenue shall be brought in by the Secretary, the members will be told, that they are not competent to judge of finances; that they came together with local views, and without any general knowledge; that the system proposed by the Secretary is the result of great study and observation, and it is not proper to oppose it. This will preclude examination, and give an undue influence, and from being told that it is his duty officially to bring in bills, they will be told it is his duty officially to pass them: The doctrine comes to this point, That it is impossible there should be any responsibility in a collective body, and is to be found only in an individual: Authorise this officer to originate money bills, and what becomes of that most essential clause of the Constitution which vests the legislative power in the House? This would be an alarming circumstance, and would raise a clamor among the people.
Mr. Gerry added a few more observations, and concluded by saying, he hoped the power would not be vested in any man whatever, to palm his plans upon the representative body.
Mr. LAURANCE: When this subject was under consideration before, there was no difficulty Sir, about giving the power; all the difficulty then rose from the impossibility of finding a competent character to exercise the power: It was then contended with great zeal, that boards ought to have the preference: Since then, it seems that a wonderful discovery has been made, and every member of the House is found to possess this knowledge; and we are all competent to forming systems of finance and revenue. I rejoice at this discovery! but if gentlemen are competent to form systems of revenue, they certainly will be capable of judging of them; they will be able to detect the fallacy of a sentiment, and will possess sufficient sagacity to discover the impolicy of measures that may be proposed: From whence then is the dangerous influence of this officer to arise, when all are competent to detecting his machinations? Gentlemen appear to confound terms. To propose, is not to decide: He is not to decide for us: This information is to be under the controul of the legislature: Will giving a power to recommend, be giving a power to determine? They are certainly distinct, and have no connection, and yet, gentlemen talk of delegating a power to originate money bills. I can conceive of no danger: When we have made it the business of a man to acquire this knowledge, it will be valuable. Is it probable that we can ever derive the necessary information from the members, who are not stationary, who are continually coming and going? It has been a misfortune to the United States, that an individual has not been entrusted with this power: Many of the States, separately, have suffered from the same cause; and it is owing to this, that the finances of the country are now in such a state of derangement. Take away this power, and all the rest is mechanical; genius, abilities and judgment, are entirely out of the question.
Every member of this House, has a right to propose a bill; but it cannot be said with propriety, that a bill is originated, till it has been matured and made a subject of discussion, by the assent of the House.
Mr. GERRY observed, that if there was a person in the United States, competent to this duty, he had not heard of him: the House (said he) has however determined that they will have such an officer: Sir, I would ask whether the information of this House would not be superior to that of any individual whatever? If such powers are mentioned now, as are proposed to be given this officer, what may we not expect after he is established? I would ask, is a power to digest plans, merely giving information? this is a wonderful discovery indeed! No Sir, an influence will follow, and if we give any person a power to influence the determinations of this House, do we not far depart from the constitution? He then adverted to what Mr. Laurance said respecting the originating bills, which if he understood the gentleman, (he said) was saying that a bill could be originated, and not originated, at the same moment.
Mr. VINING observed, that this officer would be an auxiliary to the executive, when he reports his plans: they will be before the House for their rejection or approbation: he could see no difficulty in the business whatever.
Mr. JACKSON was in favor of the motion, for striking out the words: He said, the other parts of the bill are sufficient: This officer cannot be a check upon the President, as the President has the power of removal. I am willing this officer should have power to digest plans, but never to report them, unless called for.
Mr. FITZSIMONS moved, that the word report, should be struck out, and the word prepare inserted.
Mr. MADISON said, he could not conceive where the danger lay that some gentlemen apprehended: The words objected to, are similar to those used in an ordinance passed by Congress, in
1782, in a subsequent ordinance to establish a treasury board; the same persons are annexed to that board, as belonging to the office of finance, so that this power now exists in the treasury board, so far as that has an existence. There is a possibility that the power may carry some influence, but let us compare this with the danger that will accrue from the want of this power. In my opinion, there is more danger of a bad administration, from the want of this power, than can result from all the influence which the Secretary can create; more has resulted from the want of this officer, than from all other causes. The gentleman (Mr. Gerry) asks what is meant by responsibility? I answer, we shall establish a responsibility? There will be a responsibility in point of reputation; a responsibility to the public opinion. Men of talents and distinction, pay a great regard to public opinion and the discharge of public duties, for which their reputation is pledged: they will take care to perform well: This officer upon this principle, will take a great interest in all laws that may pass respecting the revenue, and the duties of his department.
The communications from the President will always be accompanied with allusions to revenue, if the doctrine is true that to make propositions is to originate: the President may be said to originate money bills: If the principle of the gentlemen is admitted, the House will be abridged of the right.
Mr. PAGE said, as to the argument derived from the proceedings of the late Congress—it is well known, they had no power, and the States accordingly rejected their doings. The President, he observed, is a representative, and therefore may claim the right of making propositions: With respect to the clause, a plan to be well digested, must be well supported: This will bring this officer into the House, and thus an influence will be created, which will finally destroy both House and Senate too.
Mr. TUCKER supposed, that the amendment of Mr. Fitzsimons, would amount to the same thing as the other; as to prepare would be nugatory, without report was made in consequence: He was therefore against it. I would ask, Sir, (said he) why this principle, should not be inserted in the other two bills for establishing executive departments? Why should not the Secretary for foreign affairs be called upon by the branches to which he is particularly attached, to digest plans for carrying the business of the department into execution? It would be affirmative to them, and so of the war department: Why then is this House to be considered as not qualified to do their duty? but must have plans digested and reported for us? If we are not competent to our duty, why do we sit here? If this principle is to be adopted, we shall divest ourselves of all power and authority whatever: We shall eventually place ourselves under a master: We shall become more and more careless and inattentive to the business of revenue: We shall more and more confide in the judgment of the officer, supposing his systems are uniform, till we become intirely ignorant of the state of our finances.
Mr. SHERMAN: It appears to me, that this clause is one of the most important in the bill: What is the duty here enjoined? It is to devise methods for the best arrangement of the revenue: This requires great thought, reflection, and calculation.—Let us refer to France: They had a financier who was displaced; but their affairs got plunged into such difficulties, that they have been obliged to recal and restore him. This department is pointed out in the constitution, and the President may require the advice of the officer. And though it lays with the legislature to form laws for the raising of the revenue; yet they will want the information, that the secretary may lay it before them, and it will lay with the House whether to adopt it or not. There will be no other obligation than what arises from the reason and nature of things: The more light and information there is, the better will the legislature be enabled to do their duty: What is every body's business, is nobody's business. The gentleman (Mr. Gerry), says there is no person qualified: I agree with him: And there never will be, except this office is established. We have men, whom experience will make equal to any in the world.
Mr. MADISON said, I am of opinion that the duty should be particularly enjoined: I do not fear his influence: I am more afraid of our own ignorance; of our instability and misinformation. The advantage of a single man of abilities, will be superior to that of having an hundred such men to perform the same duty. Upon the principle of some gentlemen, we must shut our doors, and not accept even the reports of committees; it lays with the House to receive or reject these plans: If the officer should be disposed to obtrude such as are unimportant upon the House, the Speaker may be directed to keep them out of sight, or other methods may be devised.
SATURDAY, JUNE 27.
The engrossed bill to establish an executive department, to be denominated the Department of War, was read a third time, and passed the House.
Mr. BOUDINOT of the committee appointed to confer with a committee of the Senate, on the subject of amendments to the Impost and Tonnage Bills, which amendments had been disagreed to by the House, reported, That the committees had held a conference, and had agreed to recommend an accommodation on some of the points in dispute.
Respecting the Impost Bill, the following amendments were then taken into consideration and agreed to.
To reduce the duty on Rum, of Jamaica proof, from 15 to 10 cents, pr. gallon.
The discriminating clause, laying a less duty on Rum imported from States or Kingdoms in treaty with the United States, to be struck out; and the duty on all Spirits, below Jamaica proof, reduced from 12 to 8 cents.
To reduce the duty on Beer, Ale, Porter, or Cyder, imported in casks, from 8 to 5 cents.
To reduce the duty on Beer, Ale, Porter, or Cyder, imported in bottles, from 25 to 20 cents.
To reduce the duty on coal from 3 to 2 cents. Respecting the Tonnage Bill, the following amendments were agreed to.
That instead of wholly excluding foreign ships from the coasting trade, they might be employed in it under certain restrictions.
That all ships built within the United States, and afterwards the property of foreigners, should not pay more than 30 cents pr. ton.
The House then took up the next amendment of the Senate to strike out the discriminating clause. This gave rise to some conversation, when, on the question to strike out the clause, the house divided: Ayes 25: Nays 26. Adjourned.
MONDAY, JUNE 29.
The committee to whom was referred the bill to regulate the collection of the revenue, reported a new bill, which was read, and referred to a committee of the whole, to be taken into consideration to-morrow.
A message was received from the Senate, informing, that they had acceded to the amendments last proposed by the House to the bill, laying an impost on goods, wares and merchandise, imported into the United States: The Secretary then delivered in the bill. [This bill has passed both Houses.]
Mr. PARKER introduced a petition from William Finney, of Virginia, which was read and laid on the table.
Upon motion of Mr. THATCHER, it was voted that 100 copies of the collection bill be printed for the accommodation of the members.
Mr. SCOTT moved that the report of the committee upon the state of the unappropriated lands, should now be taken up: This motion was seconded, but upon being put, passed in the negative.
In committee of the whole—
On the bill for establishing the Treasury department. Several alterations and amendments were made to the bill, but the discussion was not finished this day.
Mr. BURKE gave notice, that he should propose an additional clause, to prohibit any of the officers in this department, from being either directly, or indirectly concerned in trade, or commerce. Adjourned.

TUESDAY, JUNE 30, 1789. In committee of the whole, on the bill for establishing the Treasury department: several amendments were proposed to this bill, and adopted; among others, That the Treasurer should on the day of every session of Congress, lay before the House, copies of all accounts settled with the Comptroller, also the state of the Treasury.
The discussion of this bill being finished by the committee, Mr. BURKE introduced his additional clause, which provides that none of the officers in this department, shall be concerned, either directly, or indirectly, in trade or commerce, under loss of their places, and other heavy penalties: This amendment occasioned some conversation, when Mr. BURKE withdrew it for the present. The committee then rose, and the Chairman made his report. The Speaker having resumed the Chair, the House took up the bill as amended, and accepted the same, with some further alterations.
Mr. SCHUREMAN asked leave of absence till the beginning of next week, which was granted. The House then adjourned till to-morrow.
STOCKHOLM, March 12.
Major Morian, who had been sent in the capacity of a courier into Finland, returned here the 7th inst. We are assured he has brought advices, that the army in that province has consented to the act of union and surety resolved on by the orders of the clergy, citizens and peasants, and part of the nobility.
HAMBURGH, April 7,
Letters from Stockholm of the 27 of March inform us, that the equestrian order still refuses to consent to the act of union and guarantee, but has joined the other three orders in presenting an address of thanks to the King, which was sent to his Majesty by a deputation from the four estates.
PARIS, April 16.
A deputation, it is said, is arrived from the French American colonies, to demand a discessal of their rights, by the Etats Generaux. This deputation consists of thirty two-members, who will be reduced to a more convenient number.
LONDON, April 22.
The merchants of this city have received upwards of 50,000l. from their correspondents in New-York the week past.
A loan of eight millions of livres has been opened at Genoa, for the service of the King of Sweden at an interest of four and a half per cent. to be repaid in eight years, begining from the year 1800.
By private letters from Smyrna we learn, that, instigated by the Porte, the Tartars of the Crimea have risen up in rebellion against their Russian masters. They have cut in pieces several detachments of her Imperial Majesty's forces. The number and audacity of the rebels increase daily, and there is every reason to believe, that the Russians will be forced to abandon the Crimea. At a meeting of the States General of France, no person can be represented by proxy.
Every Nobleman of 25 years of age, and an inhabitant of Paris, has a right to vote for an elector to that city.
The University of Paris sends four Members to the States.
The election began on Monday last, and to prevent any outrages or tumults, the guards about the town are treble in number.
A gentleman who arrived on Monday from the Continent says, that when he left the Hague last Tuesday, they were in hourly expectation of hearing that the Emperor was dead. As that is a place of the first political information, it may be supposed that the Emperor is really in a very critical situation.
So extensive are the revenues of some Polish noblemen, that Count Potocki, Grand Master of the Artillery, and Commander in Chief in the Ukraine, will alone pay to Government, as his share of the 10 per cent. on his lands, the annual subsidy of 30,000 florins.
There never was known in the history of France such tumults as have arisen within the last few weeks, throughout almost all the Provinces. We may suppose, that from the frenzy which has seized the people, that the scarcity of grain must have been nearly equal to a famine, or that there has been gross neglect in the inferior offices of government.
All hopes of peace between their Imperial Majesties and the Porte, are entirely dissipated; on the contrary, every thing announces a bloody campaign, from the preparations that are making by each of the contending powers.
The Turk is assembling his forces; and the city of Constantinople, as well as all its environs, swarm with troops, which are continually joining the armies of the Grand Vizier, and of the Pacha de Romelle; nevertheless, our letters say, that among that immense multitude, there are very few cavalry. The Emperor of Germany, on the other hand, is very diligent. His army assembled in the Banuat, to oppose that of the Grand Vizier, will consist of 48 battalions, and of the same number of squadrons, besides Hussars. The corps of Prince Hohenlohe, and Prince Saxe Cobourg, are already on their march, the first from Transylvania, the second from Moldavia, intending to penetrate into Wallachia, in order to act in concert with the Russians.
ERRATUM. The following error, which escaped notice in a number of our papers of this date, our readers will please to correct, viz. in last col. last page, 66 lines from the top, "£.90" instead of which, read £.90,000.
AN ODE
For INDEPENDENCE, JULY 4th. 1789.
By DANIEL GEORGE.
'TIS done!—the edict past, by Heav'n decreed, And Hancock's name confirms the glorious deed.
On this auspicious morn Was INDEPENDENCE born:
Propitious day!
Hail! the United States! of blest America!
CHORUS.
Fly, swift-wing'd Fame,
The news proclaim:
From shore to shore,
Let cannons roar;
And joyful voices shout COLUMBIA's name.
See haughty Britain, fending hosts of foes, With vengeance arm'd, our freedom to oppose;
But WASHINGTON the Great,
Dispell'd impending fate,
And spurn'd each plan:
Americans, combine to hail the god-like man!
CHORUS.
Fly, swift-wing'd Fame, &c.
Let Saratoga's crimson plains declare
The deeds of GATES, that "thunderbolt of war:"
His trophies grac'd the field:
He made whole armies yield—
A veteran band:
In vain did Burgoyne strive his valor to withstand.
CHORUS.
Fly, swift-wing'd Fame, &c.
Now York-Town's heights attract our wond'ring eyes,
Where loud artill'ry rends the lofty skies:
There WASHINGTON commands,
With Gallia's chosen bands,
A war-like train;
Like Homer's conquering Gods, they thunder o'er the plain.
CHORUS.
Fly, swift-wing'd Fame, &c.
Pale terror marches on, with solemn stride;
Cornwallis trembles, Britain's boasted pride:
He, and his armed hosts,
Surrender all their posts
To WASHINGTON,
The friend of Liberty—Columbia's favourite son.
CHORUS.
Fly, swift-wing'd Fame, &c.
Now from Mount-Vernon's peaceful shades again
The Hero comes, with thousands in his train:
'Tis WASHINGTON the Great
Mult hail the chair of state,
Columbia cries;
Each tongue the glorious name re-echoes to the skies.
CHORUS.
Fly, swift-wing'd Fame, &c.
Now shall the useful arts of Peace prevail,
And Commerce flourish, favor'd by each gale;
Discord, forever ceale!
Let Liberty, and Peace
And Justice reign;
For WASHINGTON protects the scientific train,
CHORUS.
Fly, swift-wing'd Fame, &c.
Portland, (Massachusetts) June, 1789.
NEW-YORK, JULY 1, 1789.
Extract of a letter from Providence, (Rhode-Island) dated June 16, 1789.
"To obviate the difficulties that have occurred to you, and which indeed have been an objection with the majority to the repealing the tender laws, the minority would readily fall in with making an installment act, also to allow the paper to continue a tender for all executions, and would even be willing to enter so far into a compromise, as to put it upon the same footing with gold and silver, that is to say, a tender should not cancel the debt, but the interest should cease from the time such tender was made; but they declare they will not repeal, or make any alteration in the present law, till such time as all the State notes are carried into the treasury and cancelled; and they hold out to the people at large, the moment they break in upon the present system they will be ruined, and that by their continuing firm, they will bring the others to terms: From this you will judge we have little or nothing to expect from our present rulers, as at the rising of each session they hold up the idea to the minority, that something shall be done at the next to satisfy them in either repealing or suspending the tender, or calling a convention; but when met in their nocturnal convention, it is always determined to continue in their iniquitous measures."
"We are informed, that the members of Congress are in general pleased with our new revenue act, and look upon it as a favorable symptom of federalism; but I can assure you this is not the case, and it is done with a view to amuse the people, and continue themselves in office a little longer, with the hopes it will be in their power to oppress the federalists, and embarrass the new government, which they are determined to do as much as possible; and unless Congress will adopt some decisive measures, there is little or no prospect of their calling a convention, as you may observe by their conduct in the last session, which rose last Saturday, without altering the tender or giving any encouragement for calling a convention; They are adjourned till next October, when there will be a new choice."
"From the above statement of facts, you may judge, as we have nothing to hope from our present rulers, so we have nothing to dread from their resentment, were we to withdraw ourselves and claim the protection of the new government."
Extract of a letter from Ringwood, (in England) dated March 30, 1789.
"This day se'nnight, I was inspecting a patent mill for making blocks for shipping; and a flour mill adjoining to it, both belonging to the same proprietors. The works are large, and, what is singular, not a cog is fixed in any one of the wheels, which are all turned by rubbing one against the other, alias, by friction."
"We are apprehensive, that the rage of the belligerent powers on the continent will at length draw Great Britain into a war: If so, it will be good policy in America to observe a strict neutrality, and succeed the Dutch in milking the cow."
"The present poor prospect as to a future harvest, and the quantity of wheat that has been exported, has induced parliament to prepare a bill to prevent exportation for a certain period, which will probably pass into an act, specially should the war be likely not only to continue but spread. Many Europeans, in different places, will certainly be fed this year with American wheat and flour, if you have enough and to spare. The average price of wheat, best, middling, and the most inferior, at the Corn Exchange, London, was, on the 21st ult. five shillings and nine-pence halfpenny sterling, per bushel, and has been rising since."
One of the most important topics of political conversation, at the present hour, is the refractory opposition of the State of Rhode Island against joining the general government. In whatever light the subject is viewed, no reasonable man can find any apology for such obstinacy and perverseness. Perhaps no part of the United States is so illly situated to maintain a separate independence. The hour is approaching when Congress will be under the necessity of some kind of interference; and though we entertain the most exalted ideas of the justice and moderation of that illustrious body, we still believe they will not quietly suffer the Revenue to be defeated by the iniquitous conduct of a State, which they can so easily controul.
It is with pleasure we inform our readers, that for several days past the business of Congress has progressed in such a degree, that several very important bills have arrived nearly to completion. The public expectation, which has been so long awake, will soon be gratified with the arrangements that are to put our government into respectable operation. When the various and complicated objects are examined, which were necessary to be brought into view, the liberal temper of our countrymen will readily acquiesce in the delays that have happened; and it must afford great satisfaction to all patriotic men, that the public impatience hath not manifested itself, considering the ardor of hopes they entertained of advantages from the origination of the executive departments. We indulge the pleasing anticipation, that the President may soon commence his appointments, and that our affairs will be put into a state of prosperity and dignity.
If men contemplated the advantage and happiness that resulted from industry, we should find that the public regulations would prevent idleness by instituting modes of employment for citizens of all ages, and descriptions. The establishment of such manufactures as can employ children, and infirm, aged people, will produce the greatest utility. It would snatch many a vicious youth from the paths of perdition, and make them useful and virtuous. Perhaps no circumstance marks so much the defective state of society in this country as to behold such numbers of inhabitants unemployed, merely for the want of suitable objects about which they can be engaged. Humanity no less than patriotism calls for legislative attention, as well as for the efforts of monied men, to bring about a reformation in this respect, and to invent and adopt methods for giving employment and bread to the idle and indigent of every possible denomination.
Frequent allusions are made to the period, when the people of the United States shall realize the importance, dignity, and security of an independent nation: The prospect only of this event has excited more respectful ideas of the union, than all the partial, temporary, regulating commercial systems of the individual States put together; and if we have magnanimity as a people, to carry into prompt execution, those acts and regulations, which will receive the fiat of our National Legislature, we shall evince that we merit the station, to which, by the favor of Heaven, we are exalted.
To inspire the people with confidence in the new government, it seems necessary that those who are destined to administer it, should discover this confidence in the first instance: This can be done in no way so effectually, as by a firm and decisive avowal of principles congenial to the spirit of the Constitution, and bringing those principles into view by enacting laws, which shall have a prompt, independent, and energetic operation.
"If we may judge from their writings and their conduct, the French seem determined to regain a part, at least, of that liberty which their forefathers enjoyed in so much plenitude as to be distinguished by the appellation of the Franks. There is a time when old fashions, even in politics, become new again!"
The Procession of the King of Great Britain on the 24th April, to St. Paul's Church, to return thanks for his recovery, was the most splendid exhibition ever beheld in London.
The most agreeable part of the late Procession in London, was five thousand six hundred children, belonging to the Charity Schools. A noble specimen of humanity and benevolence!
A Bill has passed the House of Commons to allow the importation of grain from the United States into Canada.
ARRIVALS. NEW-YORK.
 Saturday, Schooner Hercules, Comeran, Kingston, 21 days.  Sloop Two Friends, Hopkins, Edenton, 7 days.  Sloop Peggy, Shaw, Oxford, Maryland, 5 days.  Sloop Nenus, Morgett, Norfolk, Vir. 5 days.  Brig Friendship, Paddock, Liverpool, 70 days.  Brig Trinity, Moore, London, 63 days.  Sunday, Ship Paragon, Nichols, Liverpool, 70 days.  Schooner Sally, Patterson, Shelburne, 14 days.  Schooner Charming Polly, Bowen, Aux Cayes.  Sloop Dolphin, Burnett, Baltimore, 7 days.  Sloop N. Y. Packet, Baily, Philadelphia, 5 days.  Sloop Mary, —, St. Augustine, 8 days.  Sloop General Green, Godfrey, Baltimore, 7 days.  Sloop Sally, Hall, Charleston, 8 days.  Sloop Virginia Packet, Andrews, Rhode-Island.  Sloop Two Friends, Chapple, Alexandria. 8 days. 

The RIGHT CONSTITUTION of a COMMON-WEALTH EXAMINED.
Continued from our last.
The Romans never granted peace to their enemies until they had taken some of their territory from them. Part of such conquests were sold to defray the expence of the war: another portion was distributed among the poor plebeians. Some cantons were farmed out for the public: rapacious patricians, solely intent upon enriching themselves, took possession of some; and these lands, unjustly usurped by the rich, Cassius was for having distributed anew in favor of the plebeians.
The aristocratical pride, avarice, and ambition were all incensed, and the senators greatly alarmed. The people discovered symptoms that they begun to think themselves of the same species with their rulers: and one patrician of consular dignity dared to encourage them in such presumptuous and aspiring thoughts.
Some device or other must be invented to dupe the people, and ruin their leader: Virginus the consul soon hit upon an expedient. Rabuleius the tribune asked him in assembly, what he thought of this law? He answered, he would willingly consent that the lands should be distributed among the Roman people, provided the Latines had no share; divide et impera. This distinction without the least appearance of equity, was addressed simply to the popular hatred between the Romans and Latines, and the bait was greedily swallowed. The people were highly pleased with the consul, and began to despise Cassius, and to suspect him of ambition to be king. He continued his friendly intentions towards the people, and proposed in senate to reimburse, as it was but just, out of the public treasury, the money which the poorer citizens had paid for the corn of which Gelo, king of Syracuse, had made the common-wealth a present during the scarcity. But even this was now represented by the senate, and suspected by the people, to be only soliciting popular favour; and although the people felt every hour the necessity of a king to protect them against the tyranny of the senate, yet they had been gulled by patrician artifice into an oath against kings, and although they felt the want of such a magistrate, they had not sense enough to see it. The Agrarian laws was opposed in senate by Appius and Sempronius, and evaded by the appointment of ten commissioners to survey the lands.
The next year Cassius was cited before the people, and accused by the quæstors of having taken secret measures for opening a way to the sovereignty; of having provided arms, and received money from the Latines and Hernici; and of having made a very great party among the most robust of their youth, who were continually seen in his train.
The people heard the quæstors, but gave no attention to Cassius's answer and defence. No consideration for his children, his relations, and friends, who appeared in great numbers to support him; no remembrance of his great actions, by which he had raised himself to the first dignities; nor three consulships and two triumphs, which had rendered him very illustrious, could delay his condemnation; so unpardonable a crime with the Romans was the slightest suspicion of aspiring at regal power! so ignorant, so unjust, so ungrateful, and so stupid were that very body of plebeians, who were continually suffering the cruel tyranny of patricians, and continually soliciting protectors against it! Without regarding any moderation or proportion, the blind tools of the hatred and vengeance of their enemies, they condemned Cassius to die, and the quæstors instantly carried him to the Tarpeian rock, which fronted the forum, and threw him down, in the presence of the whole people. His house was demolished, and his estate sold, to purchase a statue to Ceres; and the faction of the great grew more powerful and haughty, and rose in their contempt for the plebeians, who lost courage in proportion, and soon reproached themselves with injustice, as well as imprudence in the condemnation of the zealous defender of their interests. They found themselves cheated in all things. The consuls neither executed the senate's decree for distributing the lands, nor were the ten commissioners elected. They complained, with great truth, that the senate did not act with sincerity; and accused the tribunes of the last year of betraying their interests. The tribunes of this year warmly demanded the execution of the decree: to elude which a new war was invented. The patricians preserved their aristocratical tyranny for many centuries, by keeping up continually some quarrel with foreigners, and by frequently creating dictators. The patricians, in the assemblies by centuries, had an immense advantage over the plebeians. The consuls were here chosen by the patricians, as Cassius and Manlius were murdered by assemblies in centuries. In 270 Cæso Fabius, one of Cassius's accusers was chosen consul, though very unpopular. In 271 the other of Cassius's accusers was chosen consul.
In these contests the steadiness of the patricians is as remarkable as the inconstancy of the plebeians; the sagacity of the former as obvious as the stupidity of the latter; and the cruelty of the former as conspicuous as the ingratitude of the latter. Prejudice, passion, and superstition, appear to have altogether governed the plebeians, without the least appearance of their being rational creatures, or moral agents; such was their total ignorance of arts and letters, all the little advantages of education which then existed being monopolized by the patricians. The aristocracy appears in precisely the same character, in all these anecdotes, as we before saw it in Venice, Poland, Bern and elsewhere. The same indispensable necessity appears in all of them, in order to preserve even the appearance of equity and liberty, to give the patricians a master in the first executive magistrate, and another master in a house of commons:—I say, master; for each of the three branches must be, in its turn, both master and servant, governing and being governed by turns.
To understand how the people were duped upon these occasions, and particularly how Manlius was condemned to death, we must recollect that the tribunes cited him before the people, not in their curiæ, but centuries. The centuries were formed on an artful idea, to make power accompany wealth. The people were divided into classes, according to the proportion of their fortunes: each class was divided into centuries; but the number of centuries in the different classes was so unequal, that those of the first, or richest class, made a majority of the whole, and when the centuries of this class were unanimous they decided the question. By this institution the rich were masters of the legislature.
 State of the Classes and Centuries.    Class. Roman Valuation. Sterling £. s. No of Centuries.     1 100,000 322 18 98   2 75,000 242 3 21   3 50,000 161 9 21   4 25,000 80 14 21   5 11,000 35 10 31   6 — — — 1   Total 193 from 98 sub.   95   Majority of the first class 3  
So that by citing Manlius before the people by centuries, the senate were sure of a vote for his destruction, and the people had not sense to see it, or spirit to alter it.
Nedham thus far appears to reason fairly and conclusively, when he adduces the examples of Melius and Manlius, and he might have added Cassius, to prove that the people are ever in danger of losing their liberty, and indeed he might have advanced that they never have any liberty, while they are governed by one senate. But these examples do not prove what he alludes them to prove, viz. that the people, in their supreme assemblies, successively chosen, are the best keepers of their liberty; because such an assembly is subject to every danger of a standing hereditary senate; and more, the first vote divides it into two parties, and the majority is omnipotent, and the minority defenceless. He should have adduced these examples to prove the necessity of separating the executive, legislative, and judicial, and of dividing the legislature into three branches, making the executive one of them, and independent of the other two. This is the only scientific government; the only plan which takes into consideration all the principles in nature, and provides for all cases that occur. He is equally right, and equally wrong, in the application of his other examples. "The people," says he, "were sometimes in danger of a surprise by a grandee cabinet or junto, as that upstart tyranny of the decemviri, where ten men made a shift to enslave the Senate as well as the people." It is no wonder that Cassius, Melius, and Manlius, were sacrificed to the passions of the senate, for until the year of Rome 300, the Romans had no certain laws; so that the consuls and senators, acting as judges, were absolute abitters of the fate of the citizens. Terentillus, a tribune, had proposed an ordinance that laws should be instituted, as rules of right, both in public and private affairs. The senate had eluded and postponed, by various artifices, the law of Terentillus until this year, 300, when the tribunes solicited the execution of it with great spirit; and the senate, weary of contention, or apprehensive of greater danger, at length decreed, "That ambassadors should be sent to Athens, and to the Greek cities in Italy, to collect such laws as they should find most conformable to the constitution of the Roman commonwealth; and that at their return the consuls should deliberate with the senate upon the choice of legislators, of the power to be confided to them, and the time they were to continue in office." Sp. Posthumius, Servius Sulpicius, and A. Manlius, three persons of consular dignity, were appointed deputies. Three gallies were prepared by the public, of a magnificence that might do honor to the Roman people.
To be continued.
SKETCH OF THE POLITICAL STATE OF AMERICA.
THE common observation, that many hands make light work, but illy applies to the affairs of government; and the advantages to be derived from simplifying the great concerns of a nation, by placing them in separate departments, and at the head of each, one man, competent to the duties of his station, not only obtrude themselves on the mind by a general reflection on the subject, but are supported by the example and practice of all other nations.—I will quote two instances from the two first in Europe—France and England. A well informed writer upon the commercial interest of England, says, "that frequent complaints were for a long while made as to the bulk and form of the British customs, while their apparent confused state seemed to baffle all attempts for reform, and that it was to the liberality, not less than the perseverance of the House of Peers, that the public were at last indebted, in 1696, for the establishment of the Inspector General of the imports and exports, and for the custom-house Ledger, which contains the particulars and value of both; and therefore formed the most useful record in regard to trade, that any country possesses." And the great financier of France, Mr. Neckar, observes on the perplexed state in which he found the fiscal legislation of that country, as follows: "This strange arrangement of our customs," says he, "has absolutely supported itself by its own defects, the multiplicity of particular cases, the accumulation of rules, the confusion of principles, in short all that antique contexture wove into so many knots has continually prevented the idea of an immense enterprize where attempts have been made to proceed to a reform by studying details:—But when I took a contrary method, and by making myself master of the whole collectively by reflection; and by taking pains to discern the principal decisions, and the elements as well as the interests of each, the whole affair became simplified." But I query whether a subject like this committed to several hands, possessing various opinions and drawing in different directions, would not have thereby become still more entangled and confused!—America has it in her power to correct many errors, which for want of example before them, other nations have been led into. It is for her, by making proper arrangements in the early part of the administration of the national government, to avoid much future confusion.—Let her seek "multa in parvo," rather than "parvum in multis."
Among those arrangements which claim attention may be well placed the Post-Office, which may be made an important vehicle of information through this extensive country; and produce a valuable income to the public—however it may now answer the former purpose, I think but little benefit arises in the latter view. In England so early as 1711 to 1714 the average nett produce of the Post-Office, was about £.90, and though I will not pretend to calculate the probable amount which ours may be made to nett—there remains no doubt, that the circulation resulting from the extension of trade, the progress of agriculture and manufactures, and the general concerns of the nation, will give an opportunity of deriving a considerable revenue from this source: Towards which, the postage may be raised, and all letters not official or on special public service made subject to charge: And as every measure which will tend to relieve the internal trade of these States from embarrassment, to assimilate the ideas, manners and customs of the inhabitants, and render more easy their general intercourse with each other, will be for national advantage—the affixing of one equal value to our currency, and a general standard for weights and measures through the union, is a subject which government must esteem of importance in producing this valuable consequence.
AMERICANUS.
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