Gazette of the United-States. (New-York [N.Y.]), 1789-06-27 00:00:00

Gazette of the United States.
[No. XXII.]
SATURDAY, JUNE 27, 1789.
[Published on Wednesday and Saturday.]
THE TABLET.
No. XXII.
"There are impertinent books as well as impertinent men."
If some persons are prevented from acquiring useful knowledge by their intellectual incapacity; there are others, who possessing talents, fail of important attainments by wearing away their time in trivial studies. A person generally supposes he gives a satisfactory account of employing himself, when he can say he has been engaged in reading. He may however deceive himself as well as others in this respect. It is not more common or more disagreeable to find men deficient in their ideas, from a neglect of books, than it is to observe them bloated with notions that are false or frivolous, by an injudicious choice of authors. An acquaintance of mine, who is celebrated for his literary taste and ingenuity, invited me the other morning to look at his library, which is said to be an excellent one. If novelty gives a claim to merit, my friend deserves great praise for his collection of books; for he certainly has filled his shelves with such performances, as scarce any man but himself would ever think of purchasing. After expatiating upon a variety of authors I had never heard of, and a still greater number I had never read, he told me he had taken immense pains to ascertain every minute circumstance relative to the building of Noah's Ark. No history either sacred or profane, that threw any light upon that interesting subject, had escaped his notice. It is, he said, to be regretted that the particulars of that celebrated work of antiquity are not more generally known. The vast delight he had found in his researches, he assured me, were not to be described. As I considered myself uselessly employed in hearing his descriptions, my readers will make the same remark, if this essay communicates a conversation so unimportant. My friend informed me of many other, what he called, curious discoveries or attainments; and his pride seemed to consist in knowing what none of his acquaintance knew, or had any inclination to know.
The design of reading is not so much to increase the quantity of our knowledge as the propriety and utility of it.—Men of leisure, who have patience of investigation, may perhaps employ themselves in useless enquiries without producing any hurtful effects; indeed they may happen to strike upon some discovery, from which benefit will result. But where such an ardor of curiosity prevails as to push people into researches, from which no practical advantage is derived, it disqualifies them for active pursuits in life.
It should be an established rule with every person who reads, to enquire of himself, when he lays aside his book; firstly, whether he has gained any ideas at all; and secondly, whether they are just and useful. To read, and yet to acquire no ideas, is at any rate a mispence of time; but the mere loss of time is not so pernicious as to catch sentiments that are fallacious or trifling. I will close this number with an extract from a sensible author, who in touching upon this subject makes the following remarks.
"Didymus the grammarian wrote four thousand books; wherein he is much concerned to discover where Homer was born; who was Aeneas's true mother; and whether Anacreon was the greater whore master or drunkard, with other fopperies, that a man would labor to forget if he knew them. Is it not an important question which of the two was first, the mallet or the tongs? Some people are extremely inquisitive to know how many oars Ulysses had; which was first written, the Iliads or the Odysseys; or if they were both done by the same hand. A man is never a jot more learned for this curiosity, but much more troublesome. Am I ever the more just, the more moderate, valiant, or liberal, for knowing that Curious Dentatus was the first that carried elephants in triumph? Teach me my duty to providence, to my neighbor, and to myself; to dispute with Socrates; to doubt with Carneades; to set up my rest with Epicurus; to master my appetite with the Stoics; and to renounce the world with the Cynic. What a deal of business there is, first, to make Homer a philosopher; and secondly, in what classes to range him? One will have him to be a logic, a friend to virtue, and an enemy to pleasure; preferring honesty even to immortality itself: Another makes him an Epicurean; one that loves his quiet, and to spend his time in good company: Some are positive in it, that he was a Peripatetic; and others, that he was a Sceptic. But it is clear, that in being all these things he was not any one of them. These divided opinions do not at all hinder us from agreeing, upon the main, that he was a wise man. Let us therefore apply ourselves to those things that made him so, and even let the rest alone."
SKETCH OF PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS.
In the House of REPRESENTATIVES of the UNITED STATES
THURSDAY, JUNE 18, 1789.
The question. Whether the Secretary of Foreign Affairs should be removable by the President? still under consideration.
Mr. WHITE. This question has occasioned a solemn debate, tho' some gentlemen have considered it so clear or so trivial as to excite their surprise, that it has again been brought before the house. I consider it as the most important question that has been yet considered; the most important that I ever had a voice in discussing or a vote in determining, except that of adopting the constitution itself in the convention of Virginia. I consider the day on which the sense of the house is to be taken on this subject as a memorable day in the annals of America. Sir, I do not consider it is simply whether the power shall be vested in the President, or in the President and Senate. The constitution has determined that point. Nor do I consider the question to be whether officers are to be held during good behaviour, or at the pleasure of those who appoint them. I suppose that on a fair and necessary construction of the constitution, that matter is settled. All arguments tending to show that one or the other mode of appointment or removal, is proper or improper, or that they ought to be dispensed by impeachment, are inapplicable to the present case. But the respectability of the characters who support these arguments entitle them to notice.
I shall proceed, Sir, to enquire, whether we are bound by the constitution, or whether we may grant to others, or allume to ourselves, powers which the constitution has not given in express terms, or by necessary implication? This I conceive to be the question.
It is not contended that the power proposed to be vested in the President is given him in express terms, or that it can be inferred from any particular clause of the constitution. It is sought for from another source, the general nature of executive power; it is on this principle the clause is advocated, or I mistake the gentleman's argument. It was said by the gentleman, who opened the debate in opposition to this amendment, that the constitution having vested the President with a general executive power, thereby all those powers were vested which were not expressly excepted, and therefore he possessed the power of removal. Sir, this is not to be learned in the American governments. Each state has an executive magistrate; but look at his powers and I believe it will not be found that he has, in any one, the right of appointing or removing officers. — In Virginia I know that all the great officers are appointed by the General Assembly. This is generally the fact in other states. If then the doctrine of the gentleman is to be supported by examples, it must be by those brought from beyond the Atlantic.—We must also look for rules, by which the executive power, in the latitude of this principle, may be circumscribed, if indeed it can be limited. Upon this principle, Sir, the same power is given to the legislature—they will possess all powers not expressly excepted. If the President has all executive powers which are not expressly excepted, I do not know that there can be a more arbitrary government. The President, I conceive, will have all the power of a monarch; and the legislature all the powers of the most sovereign legislation. This I take to be a clear and necessary deduction from the principle on which the clause in the bill is founded. The President is limited in the appointment of ambassadors, consuls, judges, and all other officers, and in making treaties. In these he is expressly limited, and no further. Take from him these, and give him all other executive powers, as exercised in a monarchy, and see what they will be. There are also exceptions to the legislative power; such as that they shall not for a time prohibit the importation of slaves; that direct taxes shall not be laid, but in a certain mode; that taxes shall be uniform; that they shall grant no titles of nobility, &c. These are the exceptions to the legislative: Now give them all the powers of the parliament of Great-Britain, and what kind of government will you have? I can not describe it. It appears to me absolute and as extensive as any despotism.
If you go once beyond the boundaries of the constitution where can you draw a line with any precision? and with what safety to liberty can the doctrine of this clause be supported. I understand our system different in its form and spirit from all other governments in the world. It is in part national and partly federal; and though it is more extensive in its powers than most other confederated governments, yet the Congress is not to be compared to national legislatures.—To these, general powers are granted, some with and some without any particular reservations in favour of the body of the people; and to those only will the gentleman's reasonings apply.—Here is no analogy.—This is a government constituted for particular purposes only; and the powers which the people have thought proper to grant are specifically enumerated, and disposed of among the various branches. If these powers are insufficient, or if they are improperly distributed, it is not our fault, nor within our power to remedy.—The people must grant further powers—organize those already granted in a more perfect manner, or suffer from the defect. We can neither enlarge nor modify them.
Sir, this was the ground on which the friends of the government have supported it; it was a false ground, and I venture to say that it would not have been supported on any other. In the State from which I came, if its advocates had not maintained this principle, it would never have been ratified.
Mr. White then read a part of the ratification by Virginia, in support of this assertion.
Sir, said he, how far the establishment of the principle contended for may affect the completion of our Union, I will not undertake to say: I will only remark that the State of North-Carolina has expressed nearly the same sentiments as Virginia, with this difference, that Carolina would not adopt the constitution till it was satisfied of this principle, that we could not by constructive acts enlarge our powers, in order at a future day to destroy the State governments, and with them the liberties of the people.
Sir, I could likewise suggest to gentlemen the local situation of that country. It is contiguous to Kentucky, which united to Carolina, form a territory of amazing extent from the Atlantic to the banks of the Ohio. The people of this tract are in such a situation as that a single spark from this house would kindle a flame which it would be difficult if not impossible to extinguish; and excite such a dread as would render them utterly irreconcilable to our government.
Sir, this is not a vain apprehension, because the opposers of the constitution founded their arguments upon it.—They contended that you would make constructions in your favor, and assume powers not intended to be vested in you by the people. I wish, Sir, my apprehensions may be ill founded, and contradicted by the event. The measure proposed, I acknowledge, is advocated by respectable friends to the Union within these doors, and by many without. But I believe much of this arises from the clause in question conferring the power on a man, whom all the world admires, and who they know will not abuse it. But, Sir, on this occasion I forget who is President; but I do not forget that the worth of precedents are often established in the best of times. We may give the power to a particular man in office, because he will not abuse it; but we cannot take away that power from those who
may succeed him. I do not mean to infer from this, that if the constitution had vested the power in the President, it would be improper he should have it. That is a question which I will not undertake to determine. It is unnecessary; the true question before us being simply a constitutional one.
Without entering into a detail of the evils that may arise, as gentlemen have done on both sides of the House, let us consider whether the greater evil will not arise from our explaining the constitution at this time. Is there any necessity for it? If the constitution has given the power to the President, can he not exercise it without our passing an act on the subject? Will not the clause be useless? If the constitution has not given it to him, shall we go beyond the limits that are set us; in order to extend it to him? I hope not. But it seems to be a doubtful point: Some think he has the power; others not. Then, Sir, I would leave the construction to himself. If it should become necessary to exercise the power, let him do it: The occasion for the exercise of it will be a better comment than any we can give.—It will better explain it to the people, and reconcile them to it more perfectly than any law from the legislature.
If the necessity of the case compel him to exercise the power, even if wrong, the people will acquiesce. I will give you an example, Sir: In Virginia, when the operations of the war required exertions of the chief magistrate, beyond the authority of the law, our late governor Nelson, whose name must be dear to every friend to liberty, was obliged to issue his warrants and impress supplies for the army. Though it was known that he exceeded his authority, his warrants were executed; his country was benefited by this resolute measure, and he himself afterwards indemnified by the legislature. Sir, I do not wish to encourage acts of this kind, but I say it would be better for the executive to assume the exercise of such a power on extraordinary occasions, than for us to delegate to him an extraordinary power to be exercised on all occasions.
Some gentlemen have supposed that the constitution has made no provision for the removal of officers; and they have called it an omitted case, and a defect. They ask, if we may not supply that defect? I answer, no. For if we can make any possible alteration, we may go on and make the constitution just what we please. But as a further answer, I say, it is not an omitted case. For the constitution having directed by whom officers shall be appointed, it does direct also by whom they shall be removed. That doctrine was so well supported by a gentleman yesterday, that I will not repeat. Sir, this must have been in the contemplation of the gentlemen who formed the constitution. Is it probable that they never thought about the manner in which an officer should be displaced? When they provided that the judges should hold their offices during good behaviour, did they not intend that all officers should be held during pleasure? It is not then an omitted case.
Gentlemen have supposed that the President may suspend, and that he has a right to make a temporary appointment, he has also a right to make a temporary removal. I think he has so, as it is correspondent with his power of appointing. But it has been said that if the concurrence of the Senate is necessary, they may refuse to concur when a removal is necessary. Sir, if you are to suppose that the government cannot be executed in its present form, there is no remedy for such a misfortune; but we are not to suppose it.—We are to presume that the Senate will do their duty.—You may go on without end in supposing. You may suppose that the President may not do what is right.—You may even suppose that this House will not do what is right. What is the consequence? Why, our constituents must bear with us till they have an opportunity for a remedy. But shall we, because the Senate may do wrong, give the President a power to act without them. We may as well, Sir, if the Senate refuse to concur in a favorite bill of this House, proceed to pass the law without them. But it has been asked, whether a person in the elevated station of President would probably abuse his trust? I presume he will not; neither do I presume the Senate will.
A gentleman, Sir, in order to get over the objections made to the clause, has recurred to that part of the constitution, which says, that Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President, in the courts of law, or heads of departments, and has inferred that he is to be considered himself the head and center of all those departments. This comes from one whom I always hear with pleasure, on account of his sound reason and perspicuity of expression. But, Sir, I must differ with him. Who are the heads of departments? We have a Secretary for foreign affairs; another of the treasury, &c. Now are not these the principal officers in those departments? If they are, they are the heads. Who are the inferior officers? The chief clerks, and all who may depend upon them. The gentlemen who formed the constitution would not, it seems, give to the President at all events the power of appointing these inferior officers to which that of removal is attached.
Sir, when I set out with saying that the constitution is the precise limit to the deliberations of this body, it may, at first view, appear inconsistent with what I have said respecting constructions. But, Sir, I say that when a thing is granted in general terms, that which in its own nature is attached to it, must go with it, without particular explanation. Without this principle, Congress could not execute the system. To make this clear, the constitution authorises the government to appoint supreme and inferior judges. By natural and necessary construction therefore, the legislature may say, how many judges there shall be; how often and where they shall hold their terms, and what their salaries shall be. These are natural and safe constructions.—But constructions of every other kind are beyond the limits of the constitution.
Sir, I shall trouble the committee no longer. I should not perhaps have troubled them so long; but on a matter of such great importance, one which lies so heavy on my mind, and for which I am so anxiously concerned, I could not avoid expressing my sentiments fully. I am, Sir, strongly impressed with the idea, that the giving powers, which are not within the letter of the constitution, will be to the people a circumstance of alarm and terror. [Daily Ad.]
Mr. PAGE observed, that he had quite different ideas upon the clause in debate from gentlemen who supposed that it would encrease the responsibility of the President.—He conceived that making the heads of departments dependent on him, would in a great measure, destroy that responsibility.—It would encrease the number of his dependants who would all be interested in supporting his administration, whether according to the principles of the constitution or not—and thus he would be hedged in on every side—and what then becomes of his responsibility? The clause of the constitution which provides that officers shall be removed for high crimes and misdemeanors, plainly includes all those officers and crimes which it is contended for, to make the President the sole judge of.—The Senate is the bulwark of the sovereignty of the States.—They ought not only to have a voice in the framing laws, but ought also to see to the execution of those laws.
The retaining this clause in the bill, will excite tenfold clamours for amendments.—It will be considered as making the President an independent monarch.
Mr. SEDGWICK: It is contended, that this question is already settled by the constitution.—That the power which gives, is the only power to take away, is true, if the delegation of power sup-

poses all that which is requisite to the acquisition of the object of the power. It has been contended on one side, but is not conceded on the other; that the power of appointments is not vested in the Senate. That the President is to nominate and appoint is evident. Treaties are to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate—Does the Senate make treaties? But not to recapitulate arguments, it was upon another idea (Mr. Sedgwick observed that) he rose.
The institution of the office to be established by this bill originates in the idea of the incompetency of man. All the powers necessarily devolve upon the President which this officer is to be appointed to execute—hence the reason and propriety of the absolute dependence on, and responsibility of this officer to the President. The executive department is extensive, and naturally divides itself into a variety of different branches—all these branches are, or ought to be amenable to the chief magistrate, hence his responsibility is greatly increased, provided the officers of these several branches are made dependent upon him—but can this responsibility be reasonably or justly expected of him, while the persons executing the duties of these departments are independent of him? The truth is, all these executive officers are as so many auxiliaries of the supreme executive, and therefore their responsibility is naturally resolved into that of the President as constituent parts of it: And without an entire dependence upon him the idea of responsibility in him is weakened and destroyed. In cases of incapacity and disqualification, which perhaps can be known only by long acquaintance and the frequent recurring of evidence, what is to be done? must the President before he shall be relieved from the burden of such an officer, or the public service placed in an eligible situation by displacing unfit and introducing proper characters—I say must the President appear before a court of impeachment? must he be one party and the accused another? Let gentlemen consider what must be the result of such a situation of things.
The responsibility of the Senate is lost in contemplating the difficulty of impeaching the members of a collective body. It has been said, that the judges are the only suitable persons to determine this question; but from the reasoning of others this point is by no means clear: An appeal to the judiciary must be conceded as foreign, and can not engage the serious attention of the committee at the present moment.
Mr. LEE replied to the various objections of Mr. White: He then proceeded to state the merits of the question, and observed, That it is a maxim in government, that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, should be kept separate and distinct as possible. In the formation of the Constitution of the several States, particular attention has been paid to this essential point.
The Constitution under which this House is now sitting, is framed upon the same principle; and it lays with this body to keep those powers in that state of separation: It is of consequence that the people should form just ideas of these distinct powers, and know where they are severally deposited, so that by this means, the public jealousy may at all times receive a proper direction: On this, the liberties of the people depend—that modification of the branches which invests them with the powers peculiar to their original design, is the only way to create that responsibility, without which the government never can be watched and guarded. This responsibility must of necessity rest principally with the executive branch; it is in vain to look for it in the other branches: It is that branch which is naturally resorted to as the centre of this responsibility; it is congenial to the ideas which we connect with the institution of the office of Chief Magistrate; it is implied in the very expression: Now if the ministers of those departments which are created to carry into effect the great executive objects of government, are independent of the President, or are rendered accountable to the joint control of the Senate and the President, it is evident that the idea of responsibility is dissipated, and in a great measure lost—will this be agreeable to the wishes of the people? Upon the whole I cannot see the danger which gentlemen appear to apprehend from that construction of the Constitution which this clause is calculated to give: On the other hand it appears to me perfectly consonant to its spirit and design; and it is the duty of the House to give a decisive opinion on the case.
Mr. BOUNDINOT: I have, Sir, attended with the greatest care to the arguments which have been offered upon both sides of the subject before the committee, and from the whole am convinced, that the efficacy of the government depends on a just decision of this question: I shall always turn my attention to the Constitution; it is our only safe directory: I cannot agree with the gentleman from Virginia, that this Congress cannot with propriety explain and modify the principles of the Constitution; for if this is a fact, we have no business here: Congress has a right to exercise all the powers that are deducible from the Constitution: We are not to be influenced by ratifications, or by the seceding States: I contend that this power is vested in the President, and that it is the duty of this House to declare it: The powers of the respective branches ought to be defined and separated: One great objection to the Constitution is, that the powers are not properly separated.
Mr. BOUNDINOT then repeated the arguments upon appropriating the respective powers, and observed, that officers were appointed and commissioned by the President, and not by the Senate: The officer at the head of the department of Foreign Affairs is to obey the orders of the President, and consequently must be dependent upon him, or else his obedience cannot be commanded: If we forbear by a legislative act to declare that the power of removal is in the President, shall we not leave our great executive departments in confusion, and sow the seeds of jealousy and dissatisfaction among the several branches of government? Gentlemen have proposed as a substitute the power of suspension; but this power will be found as exceptional as the other, and liable to great abuses. The President will be cautious of unnecessary removals; the Senate may refuse to fill the vacancies; what will be the consequence? It is painful to reflect upon the subject in this point of view: The power must then rest with the President; it will be impossible for him to perform the duties of his department without it.
Mr. JACKSON observed, That the decision upon the clause in this bill involves the fate of the other two, the War and Treasury departments; and it is evidently the object of the Bill, to establish the principle in the present instance, before the department of the Treasury is brought forward.
I contend Sir, that the several branches of the Legislature are plainly pointed out in the constitution; and those of the President are particularly enumerated: The heads also of the several departments are enumerated and designated separate; and the President is not considered as the head of the whole: He is to receive their advice and require their opinions in writing—this is the express language of the constitution; If they are then merely parts or appendages of the executive, this provision in the Constitution will be nugatory. I beg leave to differ from gentlemen in regard to constructions—I consider them as dangerous: The Constitution has pointed out these departments—Congress may arrange them; but this is different from construing the system: If we presume to define and construe the Constitution, there is no limits to the business; if one is made, we may go on from alpha to omega. The various branches cannot in the nature of things be so separate and independent as some gentlemen pretend: Let us revert to that excellent writer Publius: He has proved that the Senate are armed with executive power; and on the other hand the President has a share in legislation: Gentlemen have said, that the power contended for is necessary to prevent a misapplication of the public money; but I contend Sir, if we give this power to the President, he will have the liberties of the people in his hands; for if the officers should oppose his measures, however bad, he may displace them at pleasure—and whose hands will the Treasury then fall into? The purse and the sword are paramount to all other considerations: Give a man an uncontrolable dominion over these, and you make him a despot; give him these, and where will be your boasted liberties?
It has been said, that the power being vested in the Senate would be equally dangerous; but I ask, where is the greater danger from
power, in the one, or the many? The Senate is continually reverting to the mass of the people; the state legislatures will be a check upon them. The President has already got the sword—give him the purse with the army and navy, and what is there left? What can he not do? With the command of the public chest, he would always be able to secure his election, and thus perpetuate his political existence. Let us look round us this very moment, and see what strides we are making towards venality and corruption. We already hear the high sounding titles of His Highness, and Most Honorable, which ten years ago would have exalted a man to a station as high as Haman's galiows: These titles have been echoed in the newspapers of Boston, a town which fifteen years since would acknowledge no King but the Lord of Hosts.
Mr. JACKSON further observed, that the principle he had repeatedly advanced, respecting the great departments being pointed out in the constitution specifically, and not as necessarily connected with the President, had not been attended to; he called upon gentlemen to shew the fallacy of this principle: It was clearly in his mind, that it went to shew the unconstitutionality of delegating this power to the President; and he hoped the clause would not be adopted by the committee.
Mr. SCOTT: I have listened with great attention to the debates upon this question, and putting the arguments of some gentlemen together, they amount to just this; the raising a great number of frightful pictures, which at first sight appear very terrific indeed; but when minutely examined, turn out to be the harmless progeny of a disordered imagination: Let us examine one or two of these pictures as a sample of the whole group; that we may judge whether there is such danger in giving this power to the President; and that security which some gentlemen pretend in striking out the clause in the bill.
One of those pictures represents the President grasping the money chest, after having arbitrarily removed the officer whose duty it is to guard the treasury: Then, Sir, in the back ground, we see the President with the army and the navy and the money chest engaging against the liberties of America and reducing the people to abject slavery; so sudden is the alarm, and so terrible the onset, that we are hardly allowed time to say Farewell to Liberty: And all this in consequence of the President's having a power to remove the officer of the treasury.
But, Sir, the fact is, that our money may be in the treasury by millions, and without special appropriation by the legislature, neither the President nor this officer can touch a farthing of it, unless they steal it: This being the case, I see as little safety to the treasury from the independence of this officer, as danger to it, from his dependence on the President.
But the President may come with his army at his back, and seize the money chest: In this case I see but little advantage in the officers independence; for if he should stand in the President's way, I think he will be very apt to take him, and the money too.
From this view of the matter, it appears that gentlemen have been arguing from premises that do not exist, in order that they may draw strong conclusions from them. They have been drawing pictures on a hard wall, to batter them down with their knuckles.
Another of these frightful pictures is raised out of a comparison of the relationship between the President and the people, with that between the Senate and the people, and here we have run deep into the science of calculating kindred, and it seems to be concluded by the supporters of this motion, that the Senate are a much nearer kin to the people than the President; therefore this stranger, the President, must not be intrusted with the removal of officers; but our near kinsmen the Senate.
But the fact is, that the President, above all the officers of government, both from the nature of his appointment and the duties of his office, may justly and truly be denominated THE MAN OF THE PEOPLE, whereas the Senate are the mere representatives of the sovereignties of the several States composing the Union, which sovereignties are the only effectual bar that can ever be raised against the just execution of the federal government, and perhaps a very efficient check to keep the federal government within proper constitutional bounds, and which representatives have (officially) little or nothing to do with the people or their interests. Hence it appears that although this picture is not quite so ludicrous as the other, it is equally an airy phantom, and so of the rest.
Mr. GOODHUE observed, that the great object of the present constitution is to provide those powers, which we suffered so much for the want of, under the old confederation: It is clearly within the meaning and design of the constitution, that all those powers which are necessary to carry the government into execution, should be vested in the several branches; of this description is the power which the clause in this bill declares is vested in the President; and although this power enables him to remove an officer, yet the power of impeachment residing in the Senate, the President cannot continue an officer in his place, without their consent, however great a favorite he may be.
Mr. GERRY observed upon the danger and impropriety of the committee's undertaking to expound the constitution, or to construe its various parts: The clause in the bill has been called a declaration of the sense of the committee on the meaning of the constitution; upon this idea, it ought to be denominated a declaratory act; but he contended that Congress had no power to make a declaratory act.
Mr. SHERMAN: The more I hear the question discussed, the more I think the clause should be struck out: It is said, that the power is vested in the President by the constitution; if so, why should we officiously go to tell the President of it? It appears to me, it would be more proper to leave the matter to his determination according to the constitution: The President is authorised to do every thing necessary to discharge the duties of the executive; but it is considered, that by restricting him from the power of appointing and removing officers at his will and pleasure, the liberties of the people are more effectually secured. The exercise of this power in England has swallowed up all the rights and privileges of the nation, by giving all the power of government in a measure into the hands of the executive branch.
It has been said, that the Senate are considered as a council of advice; But I think they are not considered in the constitution as merely an advisory body; their consent is also necessary in appointments; and they should have the power of dismissal conferred in the President, and are in favor of the clause, suppose that the power should be given him by law: This would be faster. But it appears to me, that the best way will be to leave the constitution to speak for itself, whenever the public exigencies may require it; and not make a declaration, which may involve consequences unfavorable to the freedom and happiness of the people.
Mr. AMES said it was disagreeable to ask the attention of the committee, when their patience was already weary, and their curiosity fated: Still he hoped to be of some use in bringing the various arguments to a point.
If the Constitution has vested this power in any branch, it is agreed to be in the President alone, or in the President with advice of the Senate: But we are warned with great solemnity to forbear this enquiry. It is said to be unnecessary and dangerous. It is as much sworn to exercise lawful powers for the common good. We are as to refrain from assuming powers not given us. We are as responsible for forbearing to act, as for acting. Shall we leave this question to be contended between the President and Senate? It is not disingenuous to say, it is too perplexed, and too important for us to determine, and to throw the burden of it upon the President: After so long debate, a decision must be had. It could not be avoided by striking the words out. That was deciding. We must resolve it for ourselves, as it may never come before the judges.
The executive power is vested in the President. If the Constitution had stopped there, and had not defined any duties, either he would have had no power at all, or he would derive from that general expression, all the powers properly belonging to the executive.
tive. The Senate's power of advice is an exception from the rule. This exception must be construed strictly to reconcile the Constitution with itself: For without the power in question, how can he see that the laws are executed, as he is required to do? It is the ped of the power of his office. He is no longer responsible, or he not only advise secretly, but as their own discretion may direct. They are not answerable. The blame divided among so many will fall upon none.
We are servants, it is true; but we are watchmen—and we should be unfaithful in both characters, if we should so administer the government, as to destroy its great principles, and most essential advantages.
This power seems, therefore, to fall within the lawful limits of the President, to be necessary to control officers, and to preserve to the executive his independence. If gentlemen on the other side should not be satisfied with this construction, a conclusion almost as strong results from their doubts as from their assent: For they must bring more proof of the Senate's power of advising, or admit the power to be in the President alone; unless they prefer rejecting both doctrines, and agree to a dreadful array of objections drawn from the Constitution will avail nothing. The Constitution has not imposed any duty upon the Senate, which this construction in favor of the President will prevent fair or unfair construction, is opposed to it. The argument drawn from the Constitution, rests solely upon this principle, which is not to be found in it, but is said to be reasonable, that the power of removal from office is incident to the power of appointing to office. This is an assumed principle, and if denied, cannot be proved. Certainly it is often not true. But if true, it is not favorable to their doctrine; for the President has expressly the power of nominating and appointing, though he must obtain the consent of the Senate. He is the agent. They may prevent action; but cannot exactly correspond. But suppose that a man deviles to his executor land, to be sold (with the advice of a certain person) on certain conditions: The executor falls with the consent, and upon the conditions required in the will: The conditions are broken. Shall the executor re-enter for the breach of them; or has the person whom he was obliged to advise with in the sale, any power to restrain him? The executor may remove the wrongful possessor from the land, though perhaps by the will he may hold it in trust for some other person's benefit. In this manner the President may remove from office, though, when vacant, he cannot fill it without advice of Senate.
We are told that it is dangerous to adopt constructions, and that what is not expressly given, is retained. Surely it is as improper in this way to confer power upon the Senate, as upon the President. The result is, that if the power is not in the President solely, it is clearly not in the President and Senate. For the very arguments which make the former doubtful, make the latter absurd. Because the question was not free from doubt, he was false in voting for the words in question. If the Senate has not the power, which the arguments on both sides prove with almost equal force, then the President is vested with it, or it is in the disposal of the Legislature.
Certainly we shall not, of choice, confer it on the Senate. For the doubt whether the President is not already entitled to it, is an argument against placing it in any other hands. Besides the Senate is not always sitting—is not responsible. It is out of their line of duty as legislators: They are to try; not accuse offenders: They are not to give orders, but on complaint to judge of the breach of them.
We are warned against betraying liberty: We are told that all power tends to abuse. And yet we cannot avoid trusting it out of our hands. What is intended by this? To the people it is of no importance as it respects their power. They cannot remove bad officers: They can neither gain nor lose power by it. For the question is only which of their servants shall have the power already granted. Wise and worthy as the Senators are, the power in their hands will not only tend to abuse, but cannot tend to any thing else. Many free governments have been subverted. The world has profited by their experience, and agreed upon certain maxims: That all power is a trust; that to prevent abuse it must be distributed into three branches, who must be made independent, and to watch and check one another. If all power is given to the executive, it is a despotism. If the senatorial branch is invested with the executive authority, it is an aristocracy, which of all tyrannies is the worst. As one usurps the powers of the other, or has them conferred upon it, the government will vibrate towards one of these points. These are to watch one another, and the people are to watch them all—and liberty may long be safe. Neglecting or despising these maxims, the ancient commonwealths were destroyed. A voice issues from the earth which hides their ruins, and proclaims to mankind the sacredness of those truths which are at this moment in controversy. It is said that the constitution has in fact blended the legislative and executive powers. This has been an objection against the constitution. If it is true, we should refrain, not extend the evil. But perhaps with the sole power of removal in the President, the check of the Senate in appointments is proper: It is merely a check: It affords the most solid answer to the objection. There is much less objection to the advisory power in appointments than in removals from office. The first may prevent a man's coming into office; but the latter holds him in office. The first is the transaction of an instant: The latter, a permanent thing. It creates a continued connection. It is obvious how this will nurse faction: How much it will promote intrigue to procure protectors, and to felter tools. It is infusing poison into the Constitution. It is an impure, unchaste connection: There is ruin in it: It is tempting the integrity of the Senate with forbidden fruit. It should not be possible for a branch of the legislature to hope for a share of the executive power, which they are bound to watch: For they may be tempted to encroach the executive power, by the hope of partaking in the exercise of it. People are seldom jealous of their own power, and if they may become partners with the executive, will they be suitable watchmen?
Instead of being champions for liberty, they will become conspirators against it. The executive should be so far independent, as to defeat any attempts by either of the legislative branches to usurp his prerogatives. In every possible event, his power should be exclusive of their partnership. But the proposed executive control of the Senate is setting that body above the President. It tends to establish an aristocracy by law; and at the moment of endangering the principles of our free and excellent Government, the people are to be amused with the sound of liberty: For in this lies the danger to liberty: It infuses a principle of mortality into a government, which the lovers of mankind have withiled might last to the end of the world. With a mixture of executive and legislative powers, no government can long remain free. With a corrupt executive, liberty may long be preserved. But with a corrupt legislature, it is impossible. A government so formed, would be the most formidable curse that could befall this country. Probably an enlightened people would foresee and amend the error in season. But if time was allowed for such a compound to produce its natural effects, it would either banish liberty; or the people would be driven to exercise the primary rights of nature, and to destroy a monster which would destroy them. He admired the free principles of the Constitution, and should vote for the clause on account of its conformity to those principles.
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24. The engrossed bill for establishing an executive department to be denominated the department of foreign affairs, which was referred to this day, was again read; and upon the question, shall this bill pass to be enacted? the yeas and nays were called for, when it appeared that there were 29 in the affirmative and 22 in the negative.

The amendments to the impost bill insisted upon by the Senate, were then taken into consideration.
The diminution of the duties on spirits of Jamaica proof, from 15 to 12 cents, and on all other foreign spirits from 12 to 8 cents occasioned some debate; but terminated in not acceding to the amendment of the Senate.
It was then proposed, that the House should request a conference with the Senate upon the subjects of their disagreement: This proposition was adopted, and a committee on the part of the House chosen; which consisted of Mr. BOUDINOT, Mr. FITZSIMONS, and Mr. MADISON.
The House proceeded next to consider the amendments proposed by the Senate to the bill imposing duties on tonnage: These were not acceded to, and the bill was referred to the committee of conference.
The House then in committee of the whole, took into consideration the bill for establishing an executive department to be designated the department of war: This bill after several amendments was agreed to; the committee then rose; and the bill as reported by the chairman was taken up by the House, but without coming to a full decision an adjournment was called for.
THURSDAY, JUNE 25.
Mr. WYNKOOP introduced the petition of Mr. GRIGGS, of Pennsylvania; stating, that he had invented a machine for the more speedy manufacturing of nails; and praying for an exclusive right to the benefit of his invention for a term of years—laid on the table.
The bill for establishing the war department, as reported by the committee of the whole, was taken into consideration, and the several amendments being agreed to—it was voted that the bill as amended should be engrossed, in order for a third reading, and to-morrow was assigned for that purpose.
In committee of the whole on the bill to establish a treasury department.
Mr. TRUMBULL in the chair.
This bill provides, that there shall be the following officers in this department, viz. A Secretary of the Treasury, a Comptroller, an Auditor, a Treasurer, a Register, and an Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, and principal Clerks to the Comptroller and Auditor. Several amendments were proposed and agreed to: But one proposed by Mr. PAGE, viz. To strike out from the second clause these words, "to digest and report plans for the improvement and management of the revenue and the support of the public credit" referring to the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury, brought on an interesting debate, which ended in substituting the word "prepare, for report." The debate continued till three o'clock, when the committee rose, and the House adjourned.
FRIDAY, JUNE 26.
The House met this day pursuant to adjournment, but the committee of conference being assembled, and a great proportion of the members attending their deliberations, it was moved to adjourn till to-morrow, which accordingly took place.
The public will please to take notice, that in our last Gazette there was an error, in asserting that Mr. GERRY was in favor of Mr. CARROL's motion for limiting the duration of the act for establishing a department of foreign affairs. Mr. Gerry had no objection to the object of Mr. Carroll's motion, which he thought might be better attained by a clause providing, "that the secretary of foreign affairs shall be appointed for a term not exceeding years," but he was against the motion itself, because it would put the legislature under the necessity of making a new law for the restoration of the department, whereas the act might continue and the officer be dismissed, when he was no longer useful. Mr. G. also thought the motion had a tendency to invade the rights of the executive; for at the expiration of the act, however necessary it might be to renew it, a party in the house may defeat it, from a dislike to the officer who had been before appointed, and may thus controul the constitutional authority of the executive.
Also, in the last page of this paper, 2d. col. line 42 from bottom, in this sentence, "power and liberty are most complete," instead of which read, "power and liberty are not most complete."
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES.
PARIS, APRIL 5.
The Assembly of the States-General is still fixed for the 27th inst. The members are in general chosen; and notwithstanding the novelty of popular elections, they were conducted with the utmost harmony.
LONDON, APRIL 13.
The war in the northern part of Europe will be carried on with great vigour; and much "bloody work" may be expected this summer.
There are great bets laid, that this country will be involved in a war, from her Prussian and Dutch connections, in less than one year.
His Majesty's health continues sound; his assiduity in business increases, and no dangers are entertained of relapse. The King's physicians are all to be pensioned, by parliament.
A day of general thanksgiving has been ordered on account of his Majesty's recovery.
CHARLESTON, (S. C.) JUNE 2.
Wednesday last came on in the court of general sessions, before the Hon. judge Drayton, the trial of Mr. Wescott, for gouging and maiming Mr. Bowen.
It appeared in evidence, in proof of the prosecution, that Mr. Bowen in passing the defendant, at the door of Mrs. Dewees, in King-street, brushed against his arm, which he considered as an affront, pushed him violently that he fell down, and in getting up struck the defendant with a small whip he held in his hand. Wescott then threw him down again, got upon him, and gouged out one of his eyes. He then took the whip out of his hand and beat him violently with it. Persons who saw the affair interposed, the eye was replaced in its socket, but the light entirely extinguished, and the other one at times much affected by it.
In defence of the defendant, three countrymen were produced. The evidence of one of whom went to prove, that the assault was first begun by the prosecutor; and the other two were of opinion, that the wound was received from some kicks which the defendant gave Bowen when he was down on the ground.
The attorney-general observed to the jury, that this offence was in its nature a capital one, and if the offender had been treated as he ought, for what he had done, his life must have been taken away; and his lenity was by no means owing to any lenity in himself, but from the tender humanity of the aged prosecutor, who prevailed upon him, by repeated solicitations, to lay the indictment in the manner in which he had done.
It was almost unnecessary for him to expatiate on the barbarity of the action—the birds of the air and the savages of the desert employed their talons in the destruction of their prey; but for man, whose mind was endowed with the light of reason, barbarously to take away the sight of one of his own species—for a young man thus to employ his hands upon an aged person, whose years and quiet deportment entitled him to respect, was such a crime that he felt himself extremely sorry in not having gone as far as the law allowed. This indictment was laid for a maim, which, according to the law laid down by judge Blackstone, was punishable by fine and imprisonment, or otherwise, as the court think fit. The measure of punishment did not lie with the jury as they could do was to find him guilty, for which they had very satisfactory grounds, and he did not doubt but that when the court came to pass sentence the punishment inflicted would be of such a nature as to raise in the country a monument of justice
that would deter others from the perpetration of such an unmanly, savage action.
The judge summed up the evidence, and laid down the law upon the occasion.
The jury having retired, brought in a verdict of guilty, and the prisoner will be brought up on adjournment day to receive sentence.
JUNE 9. Yesterday the court of general sessions passed the following sentence on Mr. Wescott, for gouging and maiming Mr. Bowen: That he should stand in the pillory, on the green, near the goal, a quarter of an hour; be imprisoned for four weeks, pay the sum of fifty pounds, and be kept in confinement till the fine is paid.
JUNE 11. On Thursday the 28th ult. in Camden district, a duel with pistol was fought between Mr. Jacob Brown, and Capt. Baker, in which the latter was killed, and the former so badly wounded, that he died in 12 hours.—This duel was fought it is said in a public house, the parties firing at each other across a table; perhaps it terminated as all others should.
PROVIDENCE, JUNE 20.
Extract of a letter from a very respectable Member of Congress, to his friend in this State, dated June 13.
"Most persons here will not believe that your people will be long held in error with respect to their best interests. They consider the speedy accession of your State as a matter of certainty. With that idea, the duty on lime and barley was stricken out of the impost bill. It was thought unnecessary to take any measures to effect a purpose which of itself was so nearly accomplished. The separation of your State is not contemplated as a possible event. It need not be said, how much it would affect the union at large. The means which the government possesses to make the separation undesirable to your people, are equally obvious. Let your merchants, farmers and manufacturers, consider well how much they have prospered in a state of union with their brethren, and what may be expected to ensure the continuance of their prosperity, whenever Congress shall be compelled to resort to those means. Every government must enforce its own revenue laws, and provide for the public safety and tranquillity, as circumstances may require. I do not pretend to say what would be the line of conduct, if your State should finally renounce the union; but let a thinking Rhode-Island man weigh in his own mind, what prudence and justice will require to be done."
"I have not a doubt that your State will finally accede to the union. Nature, compact, interest, the ties of honor, and those of blood, bind us indissolubly together. Of all political curses, the most formidable is disunion; for I do not know another, which would not draw after it. I am shocked to argue upon such a topic. Yet, if it is only probable that some party men intend a separation, it would be very proper to warn your people of the consequences."
"Of all conditions, that of fear and distrust is the most painful. The reason why men submit to bear the burthen of government, is to be mutually safe, and to feel secure. What security against external force can your people have? The sea is open to the fleets of foreign nations, and an imaginary line divides you from your neighbours. Either the States will be friendly, or they will not. If laws and oaths, and the aid of all good men, who will make common cause of any violation of their rights, will not induce you to unite with the States as brethren, on how much worse security will you not trust them as neighbours? Suppose them hostile, encroaching neighbours, what will protect your State? Not its own strength. Will they seek foreign protection? The idea is delusive. No nation in Europe would consent to afford it, and all Europe would not long be able. Would all your property recompense them, if they should? Would a nation of slaves—would armies and fleets respect your liberties, more than your own servants?"
"What is to become of your proportion of the public debt? If that should be adjusted without the voice of your representatives, and prompt payment demanded, would the burthen fall lightly upon your citizens? The taxes on consumable articles will almost imperceptibly relieve the States in the union from the effects of the war."
"Supposing the idea of a separation to be disclaimed, as it will be by every true American, then the people of your State must consider the government as their own. If they are to live under it, and it is clear that they must, prudence will dictate that they should not lose time in acceding to it. The news-papers will show, that almost every debate in Congress has involved the most precious interests of Rhode-Island. The interests of their eastern brethren are inseparably united with their own. The aid of your State in Congress has been needed, and earnestly desired. Surely there is no profit in delay. On the contrary, you endanger your own cause—you may defeat your own wishes."
"The reasons why your State should join the government. The only reason why it should not, is drawn from the supposed tendency of some parts of the constitution. That very reason will be found a very strong one why they should accede to it, and that with all possible expedition. The business of amendments is now before Congress. If your people are in earnest, let them send their representatives to unite with those who are endeavouring to introduce them. They would be very arrogant and uncautious to suppose, that a majority in Congress are not as zealously disposed to guard the freedom of America from violation as the people of Rhode-Island. But if they are the only people who love liberty, and who know how to secure it, the federal constitution, if it is as defective as they pretend, will furnish scope for their talents. Congress is the body in which such people may do good. If they are anxious to improve the government, why absent themselves from New-York? If amendments are not made, who will be less excusable than they? If they object, perhaps the amendments will not be agreed to. The answer is plain, they must live under the government as it is. Surely the chance of their adoption is less, if Rhode-Island should be unrepresented. North-Carolina has even rejected the constitution yet they have called another convention, and will accede beyond question. Why has that State been blind to the very different policy of yours? The example of North-Carolina should be allowed some weight. The confidence that some amendments will be made, has guided them in twice calling a convention. I trust that the discussion of the amendments will be liberally managed, and such as are proper will be inserted. A motion for the purpose has been made, and it will be urged that it was proper to delay the consideration for some time, in order that the States which have been most dissatisfied might be represented. Rhode-Island was particularly alluded to, and it was said to be impracticable for the members of your State to be chosen and sent in a short time. The motion contains a bill of rights, and many explanations which cannot fail to satisfy any reasonable man. Accordingly the business was allowed to subside. You may be assured, however, that it will be resumed as soon as the government is organized, the revenue bill in operation, and the great departments arranged. At present, the House is too closely occupied with those objects to attend to any other. It will not be evaded or delayed a moment, and it is my sincere belief that the amendments will prevail."
"Thus, Sir, the people of your State have the alternative plainly before them. An honorable opportunity presents to join the union. Either they will accede, or they will not. If they accede, the sooner they do it the better. I defy any man to point out, even upon ant federal principles, an advantage that will ensue by delay. There is proof, equal to demonstration, of many disadvantages and dangers that will attend it. On the other hand, if they renounce the union, they prefer danger to safety, poverty to opulence. It is thus that fear makes men blind: to avoid one danger, they often rush upon another; and to escape pain, suffer death."
"An exact account has lately been taken of our navigation, by which it appears that there are now belonging to this port, 8 ships, 33 brigs, 40 sloops, and 20 schooners—total 101 sail, amounting to 9914 tons. These are exclusive of river packets and boats. Of the said vessels more than three quarters are employed in distant voyages, and the whole fishery."
"It may be observed, says a correspondent, that it is out of the power of our merchants to fit one of the above vessels (with a suitable cargo) either for Europe, the East or West-Indies, or even on a whaling voyage, without the assistance of the United States; our own produce and manufactures being insufficient for the purpose."
"Thursday afternoon the Lady and Son of His Excellency the Vice-President of the United States arrived here from Boston, and this day sail for New-York: On their arrival here they were visited by a number of ladies and gentlemen of the town, and yesterday dined with a large company at the house of John Brown Esq. every attention being paid them which the shortness of their stay would admit."
NEW-YORK, JUNE 27, 1789.
The 24th inst. the feast of St. John (the Baptist), was celebrated by the ancient Society of Free Masons in this city, with a degree of magnificence and liberality, highly honorable to the craft: A well adapted discourse was delivered by the Rev. Brother Dr. BEACH, at St. Paul's, to a crowded auditory; and a very handsome collection received for the relief of poor debtors in jail. The procession on this occasion was equal if not superior, in respectability, numbers and appearance, to any ever before seen in America.
ODE to CHARITY.
Composed by brother Low, of Holland Lodge, sung on the above occasion.
RECITATIVE.
From regions of immortal bliss above, Impart thy genial emanations, Love! Soul of our Order! Patron of this day! Inspire our hearts, and prompt the solemn lay.
AIR.
Come, Beauty of th' eternal Sire! Whose Justice we adore, Whose power and wisdom we admire— Thy smile attracts us more!
Faith may command the visual ray, Futurity to scan; And Hope, by Fancy led astray, May picture Heav'n to Man;
But thou, blest CHARITY! can'st give Compassion's thrill divine; From THEE we heav'nly joys derive, For Joy and Heav'n are thine!
CHORUS.
And when Faith and Hope shall fade, When Heaven's portals are display'd: When, with transports vast and new, Things ineffable we view; Then (Religion's source and aim) CHARITY shall fan the flame; Love divine shall be our theme, Love—eternal and supreme! This, this alone our constant Heav'n shall prove— The GOD of Heav'n in everlasting Love!
The world is waiting with anxious expectation to see the operation of the new government: Much is justly expected from the legislature of the United States: The people of America having set an original example by adopting in peace, without force, fraud, or surprize, a Constitution, simple, plain, and competent to their exigencies, a doubt cannot remain, but that all the acts and doings of the legislature, will be such a comment upon its principles, as will give it that complete force and operation, which will crown the wishes of this great people.
The cause of humanity gains ground rapidly among mankind—How absurd the idea that it should ever want a friend among the human race! The abolition of African slavery is a consummation devoutly to be wished—but like other bad habits, it cannot be effected all at once—however, every man who feels the least spark of sensibility glowing in his breast, will never let the subject rest, till a system shall be formed upon a scale however small that shall finally wipe off this foul blot from the annals of civilization.
From various part of the eastward we learn, that there has been the heaviest rains known in the memory of man.
A motion was made and obtained in the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, the present session, to appoint a committee to receive proposals from the creditors of government, of the conditions on which they will relinquish their demands, in case sufficient funds are provided for a punctual discharge of the interest annually; and the Treasurer was appointed for the purpose.
The government of Rhode-Island has prohibited the exportation of grain from that State.
Last Thursday arrived in this city, in the Hancock Packet, Capt. Brown, via Newport, THE LADY and SON of His Excellency the Vice-President of the United States.
The publick exceedingly regret the accident by which the Hon. Mr. Huger, member from South-Carolina, was thrown out of his carriage on Thursday last, and unfortunately had one of his legs fractured in a very dangerous manner.
ARRIVALS. NEW-YORK.
 Wednesday, Brig Lucretia Stray, St. Domingo, 19 days.  Schooner Tom, Herring, Edenton, N. C. 6 days.  Schooner Thomas, Jones, Frederickburgh, Vir. 5 days.  Sloop Nancy, Ventee, Norfolk, 3 days.  Sloop Nancy, Coffinger, Norfolk, 5 days.  Sloop Caty, Daffwood, Peterburgh, Vir. 4 days.  Thursday, Schooner Sally, Morgan, York-Town, Vir. 5 days.  Schooner Kitty, Mead, Charleston, 6 days.  Schooner Eagle, Coffin, Halifax, 12 days.  Sloop Hancock, Brown, Rhode-Island, 4 days.  Sloop Pagy, Cahoon, Rhode-Island, 4 day.  Friday, Ship Launta, Docket, Newfoundland, 15 days.  Brig Christian Benedicta, Euk Glad, Leghorn, 8 days.  Brig —, Mosley, York-Town, Vir. 9 days.  Sloop Triall, Barnard, Port au Prince, 19 days.  Sloop Polly, Timson, Portsmouth, Vir. 7 days. 
PRICE CURRENT.—NEW-YORK.
JUNE 27, 1789.
 Jamaica Spirits, - - - 5/6.  Antigua Rum, - - - 5/-  St. Croix, do. - - - 4/8.  Country, do. - - 2/8. a 2/10.  Molasses, - - - 2/3.  Brandy, - - 5/6. a 5/9.  Geneva, - - - 5/3.  Do. in cases, - - - 29/.  Muscovado Sugar, - - 56/. a 72/.  Loaf, do. - - - 4/3.  Lump, do. - - - 1/3.  Pepper, - - - 2/8.  Pimento, - - 1/9. a 2/.  Chocolate, - - - 1/2.  Cocoa, - - 75/. a 80/.  Coffee, - - 1/8. a 1/9.  Indigo, (Carolina) - - 4/. a 6/.  Rice, - - 23/. a 24/.  Superfine Flour, - - - 45/.  Common do. - - 42/6. a 43/.  Rye do. - - 26/. a 27/.  Indian Meal, - - - 18/.  Rye, - - 4/9. pr. bu/h.  Corn, (Southern) - - - 4/.  Do. (Northern,) - - 4/3. a 4/6.  Beef, first quality, - - 48/. a 50/.  — Second quality, - - - 41/6.  Pork, first quality, - - - 81/6.  — Second quality, - - - 76/6.  Lard, - - - 8d. pr. lb.  Butter, - - 7d. a 8d.  Hams, - - 6d. a 7d. 

The RIGHT CONSTITUTION of a COMMON-WEALTH EXAMINED.
[Continued from No. XX.]
Nedham had forgotten the example of Cassius, which would have been equally apposite to prove a simple aristocracy a bad government, and equally improper to prove that the people in their supreme assemblies, successively chosen, are the best keepers of their liberty. It is also equally proper to prove the contrary, and to shew that such a simple democracy is as dangerous as a simple aristocracy. These examples all show that the natural principles of the English constitution were constantly at work among the Roman people: That nature herself was constantly calling out for two masters to controul the senate, one in a king or single person possessed of the executive power, and the other in an equal representation of the people possessed of a negative on all the laws, and especially on the disposal of the public money. As these examples are great illustrations of our argument, and illustrious proofs of the superior excellence of the American constitutions, we will examine the story of Cassius before we come to that of the decemvirs.
The first notice that is taken of Cassius is in the year 252, when he was consul, gained considerable advantages over the Sabines, and received the honor of a triumph. In 256 he was chosen by Lartius the first dictator, General of the horse, and commanded a division of the army with success against the Latines. In the year 261, when disputes ran so high between patricians and plebeians, that no candidate appeared for the consulship, and several refused, the vessel was in such a storm that nobody would accept the helm. The people who remained in the city at last nominated Posthumius Cominius, A. R. 261, and Spurius Cassius, who were believed equally agreeable to plebeians and patricians. The first thing they did was to propose the affair of the debts to the Senate: a violent opposition ensued, headed by Appius, who constantly insisted that all the favor shown the populace only made them the more insolent, and that nothing but inflexible severity could reduce them to their duty. The young Senators all blindly adopted this opinion: nothing passed, in several tumultuous assemblies, but alterations and mutual reproaches. The ancient Senators were all inclined to peace. Agrippa, who had observed a sagacious medium, neither flattering the pride of the great, nor favoring the licence of the people, being one of the new senators whom Brutus had chosen after the expulsion of Tarquin, supported the opinion that the good of the State required the re-establishment of concord among the citizens. Sent by the Senate on a committee to treat with the people retired to the sacred mountain, he spoke his celebrated fable of the Belly and the Members. The people at this conference, which was in 261, insisted, that as, by the creation of dictators with unlimited authority, the law, which admitted, appeals to the people from the decrees of any magistrate whatever, was eluded, and in a manner made void, tribunes should be created, a new species of magistrates, whose sole duty should be the conservation of their rights. The affair of Coriolanus happened in this interval between the first consulate of Sp. Cassius in 261, and the second in 268; in which, probably, he had acted in favor of the people in establishing the tribunate, and in defending them against Coriolanus, Appius Claudius, and the other oligarchic Senators. This year, 268, he marched against the Volsci and Hernici, who made peace, and the consul obtained the honor of a triumph.
Cassius, after his triumph, represented to the Senate, that "the people merited some reward for the services they had rendered the commonwealth, for defending the public liberty, and subjecting new countries to the Roman power: that the lands acquired by their arms belonged to the public, though some patricians had appropriated them to themselves: that an equitable distribution of these lands would enable the poor plebeians to bring up children for the benefit of the commonwealth; and that such a division alone could establish that equality which ought to subsist between the citizens of the same State." He associated in this privilege the Latines settled at Rome, who had obtained the freedom of the city.—Tum primum lex Agraria promulgata est. Liv. l. ii. 41. This law, which had at least a great appearance of equity, would have relieved the misery of the people, and no doubt rendered Cassius popular. (To be continued.)
SKETCH OF THE POLITICAL STATE OF AMERICA.
[Continued from No. XX.]
AS the circumstance of having two of the American States still continue in their refusal to join in union with the others, is a matter of speculation, and engages much of the public mind, it may not be amiss, at this time, to make a few general observations on this subject; in which it will appear, that strong natural and political reasons oppose their present disunion, and both must for-
cibly operate to effect their future junction: We proceed to examine some of the causes resulting from both these principles—and it may from the former be fairly argued, that nature has evidently designed these States, at least for many years to come, to be one united nation, and with her unerring hand, pointed out innumerable blessings to be derived to the inhabitants of this Western World from such an union: For their encouragement to persevere in completing this noble fabric as a Temple to the Goddess of Liberty—a relief from the scourge of tyranny—the ill directed zeal of superstition and bigotry—and an asylum to the oppressed of all mankind: The reciprocal wants of men arising from local situation and other circumstances, are here provided for by the kind author of nature, in giving to America a participation of the various climates of the world: Here a brother's arm, nerved by the bracing zephyrs of the West, shall be extended to the aid of a brother enfeebled by the scorching beams of a vertical sun—Here the riches, which a fertile soil and favorable climate give to the sons of the South, shall be wasted by their hardy brethren of the North, to every part of the globe—The blood, become almost stagnant by the chilling frost of northern latitudes, shall be forced from the heart by the generous juice of the southern grape—The industrious worm, wrapt in his little orb, shall (unfolded by the genial ray of a tropical sun) expand his silken wings over the fair daughters of Columbia—while the fleecy tribe shall willingly yield their snow white vestment to cloath the arm by which they are cherished and protected.
Having viewed some of the natural, we proceed to notice some of the political ties, which ought to cement this Continent in one firm, efficient union: The first of which arises from the propriety of observing that maxim, so essential to the support of any government, and more especially a republican, that the minority should ever quietly submit to be governed by the majority: However, in objection to this, some fine-spun arguments have been sophistically urged to prove, that each individual State possesses within itself all the sovereignty of a distinct nation; but such ideal, chimerical assertions, cannot make an impression on the mind deeper than the surface of the paper which contains them. What do we mean by sovereignty, but the deposit of supreme power: Can there be thirteen deposits of supreme power existing at the same time, directed to similar ends, and for the same purposes: Shall the language of the several States to the general government still be what McFingal has heretofore well described it,
"You shall be Viceroys it is true; But we'll be Viceroys over you."
No—rather let our united language in future, run thus:
"We'll be a nation, it is true, And for that end, the means pursue."
It is certain, without practising on this principle, we can never claim that character. Of what avail will be the possession of sovereignty in each State, without the ability to support it! The madman sees in the watry mirror a crown dazzling with diamonds, and plunging to grasp the fancied object, perishes in the attempt. Who doubts of the natural independency of every son of Adam; but who will contend that both his power and liberty are most compleat under the operation of a good government.
These States, in that united act by which they abjured the British government, not only pledged themselves to each other for every possible risque in their contest to be rid of usurpation and tyranny; but also their joint exertions to raise a future government, calculated to secure their freedom and happiness—and no one of them has now a right to recede from the original contract, or oppose those measures which a majority of their fellow citizens have deemed as necessary to effect this valuable purpose; nor is their conduct in dissenting from the union to be justified on any principle of government—having a tendency to bring on their country greater evils than those it has been contending to avoid—the horrors of a civil war. The States alluded to are indebted to the others for their joint efforts in emancipating them from a foreign yoke: They have a part of the expence incurred by the war to discharge—for which justice cannot withhold her claims: Many more reasons could be urged to shew the impropriety and ill tendency of their present defections—but it is yet to be hoped, that the passions of men, their little views, and mistaken interests, will not be suffered to frustrate the benevolent design of Heaven, marked by every circumstance of our natural situation, and so often exemplified in our progress towards the rank and character of a nation.
AMERICANUS.
MR. FENNO,
I HAVE with much attention considered the observations handed to the public, through the channel of your paper, by Americanus; and am under the necessity of subscribing to his opinion, in favor of a secretary for domestic affairs; not from any regular train of reasoning which he has used, or deductions which he has drawn in support of this department, but from the duties he has assigned to his secretary: two very essential ones, he
has however omitted.—These are the discovery of the perpetual motion, and the longitude. The first of these, is in my humble opinion of the utmost importance to the United States, particularly in the article of manufactures, so necessary to our existence. I apprehend little reasoning will be sufficient to establish this point. It is generally agreed that motion, is necessary in almost every branch of manufactures, and perhaps some ingenious philosopher, may yet find it requisite in every branch. At present this motion is generally produced by men; but this source must shortly fail from the intatuation, and madness, which has taken hold of our labourers for emigrating into the western country: now when this shall happen, I humbly conceive Sir, that the perpetual motion will be absolutely necessary to supply this defect.
Americanus's last paragraph is a very extraordinary piece of composition: I have studied it with the utmost care, and with the express design of subscribing to his opinions relative to the western territory, as well as to the duties of his domestic secretary; but Sir, his opinions are so involved by words, without any direct conclusion, that it was with difficulty I could find what he was driving at. In the beginning he tells us, that he has his "doubts of the principle, which in a degree leads to the necessity of such an establishment," as a land-office for the western territory. Why this, or any other writer, should have his "doubts" on the subject, is truly astonishing. The "principle," or rather principles, which lead us directly to "such an establishment," as the pointers do to the north pole, are first, the country: secondly, the military bounties: thirdly, the sales already made by the United States of part of the territory: fourthly, the right that people have to settle their own lands, and fifthly, the right that a person has to go from one place to another, whether on foot, on horse-back, or in a waggon.
Americanus, views "any encouragement to emigrate in the present state of our population, as building up the interior part of this country, at the expence of the atlantic settlements." If by disposing of that country, "the atlantic settlements" pay their public debt, the case will be directly reversed; "the atlantic settlements" will get clear of their debt, at the expence of the western territory.—What he means by "producing an undue proportion of certain interests," would require a commentator with all the abilities of Julius Scaliger, to unravel.—This writer grants, that if "the spirit of emigration cannot be well stopped, or greatly checked, that it will be doubtless most politic to methodise the settlement of the western country." The emigration cannot possibly be checked while the inhabitants of "the atlantic States," find it their interest to remove. The manufacturers will reside where they can be the most advantageously employed—the same may be said of any other class of citizens in the United States; and no ACT, without it is sufficiently energetic to alter the nature of things, can possibly take away such a right in this country; and any attempt, to produce such an effect, can only have a tendency, to shew the imbecility of government when directed to improper objects.
The great popular objection to settling the western country, is the loss of our mechanics.—This objection is founded in mere speculation, and can only have weight from experience; and however plausible at present, will lose its force if the western country should be more favorable to manufactures, than "the atlantic settlements."
When it becomes the interest of the people to manufacture, they will attend to it whether east, or west of the Allegany Mountains; and when it is not, no laws nor regulations, can compel them to it.
A. E.
THE NATIONAL MONTIOR.—No. X.
Nothing will conduce more to strengthen, confirm, and perpetuate the Union of these States, than a more perfect acquaintance with the temper, genius, manners, laws, customs, and habits of each other.
AMONG the happy effects of the late war, may be reckoned the eradication from the minds of our citizens, of many deep rooted prejudices, which prevented that mutual respect for the characters of the several States, so honorable and beneficial to the general interest of the whole. That intercourse which necessarily arose from the circumstance of marching the eastern and northern troops through the middle States, to fight the battles of their country in the South, and so vice versa, was productive of lasting and salutary consequences: Thousands by this means were made acquainted with the geography of the country—its immense extent—its produce—its improvements—its worth, and shewed them what they fought for: The planters were taught to admire the hardihood, the independence and bravery of their northern brethren; and while they contemplated their stern republican virtues, they imbibed the same spirit of enterprise, and acknowledged the wisdom of those institutions, which existed in the eastern States, and which contributed so essentially to produce an enlightened race of heroes in the yeomanry of the country. On the other hand the force of those republican principles, which inspired the majority of the citizens of the southern States, was no less an object of pleasing contemplation: These principles were paramount in their operation to all local habits and customs: They burst the barriers of an education friendly to domestic servitude, and produced a glorious emulation in the cause of universal liberty. The war likewise produced a great variety of political, commercial, friendly, and conjugal connections—the benign influences of which are continually expanding, and are among the happiest concomitants of peace—and there is no doubt, have contributed greatly to the production of that uniformity of sentiment which has led to the present happy prospects of this great republic. If the casual and transient acquaintance of our citizens in a time of war, has contributed to these events—what may not be expected from a mutual exchange of sentiments, and an harmonious intercourse for the best of purposes in a time of peace?
(The subject to be continued.)