The New-York journal, and weekly register (New-York [N.Y.]), 1787-10-18 00:00:00

The New-York Journal, and Weekly Register, EXTRAORDINARY.
Vol. 41.
THURSDAY, October 18, 1787.
Numb. 2137.
From the CHRONICLE OF FREEDOM. Printed at Philadelphia.
MR. OSWALD, As the Independent Gazetteer seems free for the discussion of all public matters, I expect you will give the following a place in your next.
To the FREEMEN of PENNSYLVANIA. Friends, Countrymen, and Fellow Citizens, PERMIT one of yourselves to put you in mind of certain liberties and privileges secured to you by the constitution of this commonwealth, and beg your serious attention to his uninterested opinion upon the plan of federal government submitted to your consideration, before you surrender the great and valuable privileges up forever. Your present frame of government, secures to you a right to hold your houses, papers, and possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants granted without oaths or affirmations first made, affording sufficient foundation for them, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search your houses, or seize your persons or property, not particularly described in such warrant, shall not be granted. Your constitution further provides, "in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the parties have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held sacred." It also provides and declares, "that the people have a right of FREEDOM OF SPEECH, and of WRITING and PUBLISHING their sentiments, therefore the FREEDOM OF THE PRESS OUGHT NOT TO BE RESTRAINED." The constitution of Pennsylvania is yet in existence, as yet you have the right of freedom of speech, and of publishing your sentiments. How long these rights will appertain to you, you yourselves are called upon to say, whether your houses shall continue to be your castles; whether your papers, your persons and your property, are to be held sacred and free from general warrants, you are now to determine, whether the trial by jury is to continue as your birth-right, the freemen of Pennsylvania, nay, of all America, are now called upon to decide.
Without presuming upon my own judgement, I cannot think it an unwarrantable presumption to offer my private opinion, and call upon others for theirs; and if I use my pen with the boldness of a freeman, it is because I know that the liberty of the press yet remains unviolated, and juries yet are judges.
The late Convention have submitted to your consideration a plan of a new federal government. The subject is highly interesting to your future welfare.—Whether it be calculated to promote the great ends of civil society, viz. the happiness and prosperity of the community; it behoves you well to consider, uninfluenced by the authority of names. Instead of that frenzy of enthusiasm, that has actuated the citizens of Pennsylvania, in their approbation of the proposed plan, before it was possible that it could be the result of a rational investigation into its principles; it ought to be dispassionately and deliberately examined, and its own intrinsic merit, the only criterion of your patronage. If ever free and unbiased discussion was proper or necessary, it is on such an occasion.—All the blessings of liberty and the dearest privileges of freemen, are now at stake and dependent on your present conduct. Those who are competent to the task of developing the principles of government, ought to be encouraged to come forward, and thereby the better enable the people to make a proper judgment; for the science of government is so abstruse, that few are able to judge for themselves; without such assistance the people are too apt to yield an implicit assent to the opinions of those characters, whose abilities are held in the highest esteem, and to those in whose integrity and patriotism they can confide; not considering that the love of domination is generally in proportion to talents, abilities, and superior acquirements; and that the men of the greatest purity of intention may be made instruments of despotism in the hands of the artful and designing. If it were not for the stability and attachment which time and habit gives to forms of government, it would be in the power of the enlightened and aspiring few, if they should combine, at any time to destroy the best establishments, and even make the people the instruments of their own subjection.
The late revolution having effaced in a great measure all former habits, and the present institutions are so recent, that there exists not that great reluctance to innovation, so remarkable in old communities, and which accords with reason, for the most comprehensive mind cannot foresee the full operation of material changes on civil polity; it is the genius of the common law to resist innovation.
The wealthy and ambitious, who in every community think they have a right to lord it over their fellow creatures, have availed themselves, very successfully, of this favorable disposition; for the people thus unsettled in their sentiments, have been prepared to accede to any extreme of government; all the distresses and difficulties they experience, proceeding from various causes, have been ascribed to the impotency of the present confederation, and thence they have been led to expect full relief from the adoption of the proposed system of government; and in the other event, immediate ruin and annihilation as a nation. These characters flatter themselves that they have lulled all distrust and jealousy of their new plan, by gaining the concurrence of the two men in whom America has the highest confidence, and now triumphantly exult in the completion of their long-meditated schemes of power and aggrandizement. It would be very
far from insinuating that the two illustrious persons alluded to, have not the welfare of their country at heart; but that the unsuspecting goodness and zeal of the one, has been imposed on, in a subject of which he must be necessarily inexperienced, from his other arduous engagements; and that the weakness and indecision attendant on old age, has been practised on in the other.
I am fearful that the principles of government inculcated in Mr. Adams's treatise, and enforced in the numerous essays and paragraphs in the newspapers, have misled some well designing members of the late Convention.—But it will appear in the sequel, that the construction of the proposed plan of government is infinitely more extravagant.
I have been anxiously expecting that some enlightened patriot would, ere this, have taken up the pen to expose the futility, and counteract the baneful tendency of such principles. Mr. Adams's sine qua non of a good government is three balancing powers, whose repelling qualities are to produce an equilibrium of interests, and thereby promote the happiness of the whole community. He asserts that the administrators of every government, will ever be actuated by views of private interest and ambition, to the prejudice of the public good; that therefore the only effectual method to secure the rights of the people and promote their welfare, is to create an opposition of interests between the members of two distinct bodies, in the exercise of the powers of government, and balanced by those of a third. This hypothesis supposes human wisdom competent to the task of instituting three co-equal orders in government, and a corresponding weight in the community to enable them respectively to exercise their several parts, and whose views and interests should be so distinct as to prevent a coalition of any two of them for the destruction of the third. Mr. Adams, although he has traced the constitution of every form of government that ever existed, as far as history affords materials, has not been able to adduce a single instance of such a government; he indeed says that the British constitution is such in theory, but this is rather a confirmation that his principles are chimerical and not to be reduced to practice. If such an organization of power were practicable, how long would it continue? not a day—for there is so great a disparity in the talents, wisdom, and industry of mankind, that the scale would presently preponderate to one or the other body, and with every accession of power the means of further increase would be greatly extended. The state of society in England is much more favorable to such a scheme of government than that of America.—There they have a powerful hereditary nobility, and real distinctions of rank and intellects; but even there, for want of that perfect equality of power and distinction of interests, in the three orders of government, they exist but in name; the only operative and efficient check, upon the conduct of administration, is the sense of the people at large.
Suppose a government could be formed and supported on such principles, would it answer the great purposes of civil society; if the administrators of every government are actuated by views of private interest and ambition, how is the welfare and happiness of the community to be the result of such jarring adverse interests?
Therefore, as different orders in government will not produce the good of the whole, we must recur to other principles. I believe it will be found that the form of government, which holds those entrusted with power, in the greatest responsibility to their constituents, the best calculated for freemen. A republican, or free government, can only exist where the body of the people are virtuous, and where property is pretty equally divided, in such a government the people are the sovereign, and their sense or opinion is the criterion of every public measure; for when this ceases to be the case, the nature of the government is changed, and an aristocracy, monarchy, or despotism will rise on its ruin. The highest responsibility is to be attained, in a simple structure of government, for the great body of the people never steadily attend to the operations of government, and for want of due information are liable to be imposed on.—If you complicate the plan by various orders, the people will be perplexed and divided in their sentiments about the source of abuses or misconduct, some will impute it to the senate, others to the house of representatives, and so on, that the interposition of the people may be rendered imperfect or perhaps wholly abortive. But if, imitating the constitution of Pennsylvania, you vest all the legislative power in one body of men (separating the executive and judicial) elected for a short period, and necessarily excluded by rotation from permanency, and guarded from precipitancy and surprise by delays imposed on its proceedings, you will create the most perfect responsibility, for then, whenever the people feel a grievance they cannot mistake the authors, and will apply the remedy with certainty and effect, discarding them at the next election. This tie of responsibility will obviate all the dangers apprehended from a single legislature, and will the best secure the rights of the people.
Having premised thus much, I shall now proceed to the examination of the proposed plan of government, and I trust, shall make it appear to the meanest capacity, that it has none of the essential requisites of a free government; that it is neither founded on those balancing restraining powers, recom-
mended by Mr. Adams and attempted in the British constitution, or possessed of that responsibility to its constituents, which, in my opinion, is the only effectual security for the liberties and happiness of the people; but on the contrary, that it is a most daring attempt to establish a despotic aristocracy among freemen, that the world has ever witnessed.
I shall previously consider the extent of the powers intended to be vested in congress, before I examine the construction of the general government.
It will not be controverted that the legislative is the highest delegated power in government and that all others are subordinate to it. The celebrated Montesquieu establishes it as a maxim, that legislation necessarily follows the power of taxation. By sect. 8, of the first article of the proposed plan of government, "the Congress are to have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States." Now what can be more comprehensive than these words; not content by other sections of this plan, to grant all the great executive powers of a confederation, and a STANDING ARMY IN TIME OF PEACE, that grand engine of oppression, and moreover the absolute controul over the commerce of the United States and all external objects of revenue, such as unlimited imposts upon imports, &c.—they are to be vested with every species of internal taxation;—whatever taxes, duties, and excises that they may deem requisite for the general welfare, may be imposed on the citizens of these states, levied by the officers of Congress, distributed through every district in America; and the collection would be enforced by the standing army, however grievous or improper they may be. The Congress may contrive every purpose for which the state legislatures now lay taxes, to be for the general welfare, and thereby seize upon every object of revenue.
The judicial power by 1st section of article 3d shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority; and to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, to controversies to which the United States shall be a party, to controversies between two or more states, between a state and citizens of another state, between citizens of different states, between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.
The judicial power to be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The objects of jurisdiction recited above, are so numerous, and the shades of distinction between civil causes are oftentimes so slight, that it is more than probable that the state judiciaries would be wholly superceded; for in contests about jurisdiction, the federal court, as the most powerful, would ever prevail. Every person acquainted with the history of the courts in England, knows by what ingenious sophisms they have, at different periods, extended the sphere of their jurisdiction over objects out of the line of their institution, and contrary to their very nature; courts of a criminal jurisdiction obtaining cognizance in civil causes.
To put the omnipotency of Congress over the state government and judiciaries out of all doubt, the 6th article ordains, that "this constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
By these sections the all-prevailing power of taxation, and such extensive legislative and judicial powers are vested in the general government, as must in their operation, necessarily absorb the state legislatures and judiciaries; and that such was in the contemplation of the framers of it, will appear from the provision made for such event, in another part of it (but that, fearful of alarming the people by so great an innovation, they have suffered the forms of the separate governments to remain, as a blind.) By section 4th of the 1st article, "the times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the place of choosing senators." The plain construction of which is, that when the state legislatures drop out of sight, from the necessary operation of this government, then Congress are to provide for the election and appointment of representatives and senators.
If the foregoing be a just comment—if the United States are to be melted down into one empire, it becomes you to consider, whether such a government, however constructed, would be eligible in so extended a territory; and whether it would be practicable, consistent with freedom? It is the opinion of the greatest writers, that a very extensive country cannot be governed on democratical principles, on any other plan, than a confederation of a number of small republics, possessing all the powers of internal government, but united in the management of their foreign and general concerns.
It would not be difficult to prove, that any thing short of despotism, could not bind so great a country under one government; and that whatever plan you might, at the first setting out, establish, it would issue in a despotism.
If one general government could be instituted and maintained on principles of freedom, it would not be so competent to attend to the various local concerns and wants, of every particular district; as well as the peculiar governments, who are nearer the scene, and possessed of superior means of information, besides, if the business of the whole union is to be managed by one government, there would not be time: Do we not already see, that the inhabitants in a number of larger states, who are remote from the seat of government, are loudly complaining of the inconveniences and disadvantages they are subjected to, on this account, and that, to enjoy the comforts of local government, they are separating into smaller divisions.
Having taken a review of the powers, I shall now examine the construction of the proposed general government.
Art. 1. sect. 1. "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives." By another section, the president (the principal executive officer) has a conditional controul over their proceedings.
Sect. 2. "The house of representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year, by the people of the several states. The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000 inhabitants."
The senate, the other constituent branch of the legislature, is formed by the legislature of each state appointing two senators, for the term of six years.
The executive power, by Art. 2. sec. 1. is to be vested in a president of the United States of America, elected for four years: sec. 2, gives him "power, by and with the consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law, &c. And by another section he has the absolute power of granting reprieves and pardons for treason, and all other high crimes and misdemeanors, except in cases of impeachment.
The foregoing are the outlines of the plan.
Thus we see, the house of representatives are on the part of the people, to balance the senate, who I suppose will be composed of the better sort, the well born, &c. The number of the representatives (being only one for every 30,000) appears to be too few, either to communicate the requisite information, of the wants, local circumstances and sentiments of so extensive an empire, or to prevent corruption and undue influence, in the exercise of such great powers; the term for which they are to be chosen, too long to preserve a due dependence and accountability to their constituents; and the mode and places of their election not sufficiently ascertained, for as Congress have the controul over both, they may govern the choice, by ordering the representatives of a whole state, to be elected in one place, and that too may be the most inconvenient.
The senate, the great efficient body in this plan of government, is constituted on the most unequal principles. The smallest state in the union has equal weight with the great states of Virginia, Massachusetts, or Pennsylvania.—The senate, besides its legislative functions, has a very considerable share in the executive; none of the principal appointments to office can be made without its advice and consent. The term and mode of its appointment, will lead to permanency; the members are chosen for six years, the mode is under the controul of Congress, and as there is no exclusion by rotation, they may be continued for life, which from their extensive means of influence, would follow of course. The president, who would be a mere pageant of state, unless he coincides with the views of the senate, would either become the head of the aristocratic junto in that body, or its minion; besides, their influence being the most predominant, could the best secure his re-election to office.
And from his power of granting pardons, he might screen from punishment the most treasonable attempts on the liberties of the people, when instigated by the senate.
From this investigation into the organization of this government, it appears that it is devoid of all responsibility or accountability to the great body of the people, and that so far from being a regular balanced government, it would be in practice a permanent ARISTOCRACY.
The framers of it; actuated by the true spirit of such a government, which ever abominates and suppresses all free enquiry and discussion, have made no provision for the liberty of the press, that grand palladium of freedom, and scourge of tyrants; but observed a total silence on that head. It is the opinion of some great writers, that if the liberty of the press, by an institution of religion, or otherwise, could be rendered sacred, even in Turkey, that despotism would fly before it. And it is worthy of remark, that there is no declaration of personal rights, premised in most free constitutions; and that the trial by jury in civil cases is taken away; for what other construction can be put on the following, viz. Art. 2. sect. 2, "In all cases affect-

ing ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases above mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact." It would be a novelty in jurisprudence, as well as evidently improper to allow an appeal from the verdict of a jury, on the matter of fact; therefore it implies, and allows of a dismissal of the jury in civil cases, and especially when it is considered, that jury trial in criminal cases is expressly stipulated for, but not in civil cases.
But our situation is represented to be so critically dreadful, that, however reprehensible and exceptionable the proposed plan of government may be, there is no alternative, between the adoption of it and absolute ruin. My fellow citizens, things are not at that crisis, it is the argument of tyrants; the present distracted state of Europe secures us from injury on that quarter, and as to domestic dissensions, we have not so much to fear from them, as to precipitate us into this form of government, without it is a safe and a proper one. For remember, of all possible evils, that of despotism is the worst and the most to be dreaded.
Besides, it cannot be supposed, that the first essay on so difficult a subject, is so well digested as it ought to be; if the proposed plan, after a mature deliberation, should meet the approbation of the respective states, the matter will end; but if it should be found to be fraught with dangers and inconveniences, a future general convention being in possession of the objections, will be the better enabled to plan a suitable government.
"Who's here so base, that would a bondman be? If any, speak; for him have I offended. Who's here so vile, that will not love his country? If any, speak; for him have I offended."
CENTINEL.
From the New-York Daily Advertiser, of Oct. 1. [On CATO, No. I. in N. Y. Journal.] (Omitted last Week for want of Room.)
THE citizens of the state of New-York have received yesterday, from Cato (an ally of Pompey , no doubt) an introductory discourse on the appearance of the new system for the government of the United States: this, we are told, will be followed by such observations, on the constitution proposed to the union, "as will promote our welfare and be justified by reason and truth." There is, in this preparatory lecture, little that is necessary to be dwelt on just now; and if Cato had not possessed his future investigations, in such terms as wore a questionable shape , they should have passed unheeded.
Cato tells us that he will not directly engage as an advocate , for this new form of government—or as an opponent . Here Cato, without any dispute, acts prudently. It will be wise in him to rest a while; since he has given a preface, which, with small address, can easily be made to work on either side. When the sentiments of the confederated states come to be generally known, it will be time enough to proceed.—Cato will then start fair . A little caution, however, he thinks necessary to be given in the mean time. "Do not" says this prudent censor, in addressing the citizens, "because you admit that something must be done, adopt any thing ." What, in the name of common sense, does this injunction import? I appeal to men of understanding, whether it is not obviously the language of distrust, calculated as far as such a thing can influence, to prejudice the public opinion against the new constitution; and, in effect by a periphrastic mode of speech, recommending the rejection of it?—" Teach , the members of the convention (Cato very modestly goes on) that you are capable of a supervision of their conduct; the same medium that gave you this system, if it is erroneous, while the door is now open, can make amendments, or give you another." O excellent thought, and happily advised! Be clamorous, my friends—be discontented—assert your prerogative—for ever assert the power and Majesty of the people !!—I am not willing to suspect any man's intentions, when they aim at giving information; but when they come abroad, couched in such magisterial terms, I own I feel some indignation. If this demagogue had talents to throw light on the subject of legislation, why did he not offer them when the convention was in session? If they had been judged useful, no doubt they would have been attended to. But is this now a time for such insinuations? Has not the wisdom of America been drawn, as it were, into a focus, and the proffered constitution sent forth with an unanimity, that is unequalled in ancient or modern story? And shall we now wrangle and find fault with that excellent whole , because, perhaps, some of its parts might have been more perfect ?—There is neither virtue nor patriotism in such conduct. Besides, how can Cato say, "That the door is now open to receive any amendments, or to give us another constitution, if required. I believe he has advanced this without proper authority. I am inclined to believe that the door of recommendation is shut and cannot be opened by the same men; that the convention, in one word, is dissolved: if so, we must reject, IN TO TO, or, vice versa ; just take it as it is; and be thankful. I deny the singularity betwixt the present constitution and that of the united netherlands.—Cato would here draw a very melancholy picture, but it want apply. In my humble opinion, it has a much greater affinity with a government, which, in all human probability, will remain when the history of the seven Provinces shall be forgotten.—Cato tells us (what all America knows by this time) that the new constitution comes sanctioned with the approbation of general Washington; and, though he appears to have some reverence for that great patriot chief, yet he very sagaciously observes, that the best and wisest man may err ; and thence asserts, that every man in politics, as well as in religion, ought to judge for himself. This paragraph needs no comment, and, for that reason, I shall not touch it; but, with all deference to Cato's penetration, I would recommend to him, instead of entering into fruitless discussion of what has come from so many clear heads, and good hearts , to join his fellow citizens, and endeavour to reconcile this excellent constitution to the weak, the suspicious, and the interested , who will be chiefly opposed to it; that we may enjoy the blessings of it as soon as possible. I would also advise him to give his vote (as he will probably be one of the electors ) to the American Fabius: it will be more healthy for this country, and this state , that he should be induced to accept of the presidency of the new government, than that he should be solicited again to accept of the command of an army.
solicited again to accept of the command of an army.
Cato, it appears, intends to adventure on perilous ground; it will therefore become him to be cautious on what terms he takes the field. "He advises us to attach ourselves to measures, and not to men." In this instance he advises well; and I heartily recommend to himself , not to forget the force of that important admonition: for Cato, in his future marches, will very probably be followed by
C A T O.
By the UNITED STATES in CONGRESS assembled,
OCTOBER 11, 1787.
THE committee, to whom was referred a report of the board of treasury, and a motion of Mr. Kean, respecting the requisition for 1787, having reported, "That, from the several papers referred to them, it appears that there is wanting, for the services of the year 1787, the payment of one year's interest on the foreign debt, and such part of the principal as becomes due in the year 1788, and the payment of one year's interest on the domestic debt, the sum of 300,009,798 64-90 dollars:
"That of the aforesaid sum, 1,309,391 64-90, is absolutely necessary in specie—that there are considerable sums in specie due from the states, over and above those which are necessary to discharge the existing demands on former requisitions, which sums are nearly equal to the payment of that part of the present requisition that is absolutely necessary in specie; and the objects for which the said sums were called for no longer existing, they may be now appropriated to the purposes of the present requisition; that, in their opinion, many difficulties have arisen from the restrictions made in former requisitions, in the issuing of the indents of interest; the making them receivable only for the year in which they were issued, and then only when accompanied by a certain proportion of specie; and declaring that, after a certain period, they should not be received from the states at the federal treasury; all which have served to check the exertions of the states, and to keep back the specie payments: nor have they had those beneficial effects expected from them, of stopping the issue of indents, where states had not passed legislative acts to call them in, or keeping up their value, and preventing depreciation; but, on the contrary, have opened a new scene of speculation, in transferring the property of a citizen of a state, which has not passed a legislative act, to a citizen of a state which has. In addition to this, the committee observe, that the acts of Congress, empowering the board of treasury to contract for the sale of the western territory, also empowering them to issue indents of interest to the purchasers; so that, to continue such restrictions, would operate only to the injury of a few, and be no public benefit." Whereupon,
Resolved, That for the services of the year 1787, for the payment of one year's interest on the foreign debt, and such part of the principal as becomes due in the year 1788, and for the payment of one year's interest on the domestic debt, it will be necessary, that three millions and nine thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight sixty-four ninetieths dollars, be paid into the treasury of the United States, on or before the first day of July next; to be appropriated to the following purposes, viz.
For the civil department, 124,161. 85 Military department, 176,757. 17 Geographer's department, 9,964. Invalid pensions, 88,000 Contingencies, 19,000 Foreign debt for the payment of interest on the French and Dutch loans, and two instalments of principal on the French loans, becoming due in 1788, 871,622.87 Spanish loan, one year's interest due thereon, 8,700 Debt due to foreign officers, one year's interest thereon, 11,185.55 891,508. 52 Domestic debt, one year's interest thereon, 1,700,407 Making in the whole, doll. 3,009,798. 64
Resolved, That the sums called for in the years 1784, 1785, and 1786, and stated by the board of treasury not now to be necessary, the objects for which they were called for no longer existing, which sums amount to one million two hundred thousand dollars, be now appropriated to the payment of that part of the present requisition, which cannot be discharged but with specie; any thing in former requisitions to the contrary notwithstanding; and shall be applied in conformity with the several appropriations in the preceding part of this report, giving preference according to
the order in which they are stated in the estimate.
Resolved, That one hundred and nine thousand three hundred and ninety-one dollars, sixty-four ninetieths, in the hands of the commissioner on loans in Holland, in aid of the above sum, be appropriated for the discharging the interest due on the foreign debt due in Holland, and to no other purpose whatever.
As 1,700,407 dollars called for, are to be applied to the payment of the interest due on the domestic debt of the United States.
Resolved, That the several States be allowed to discharge the same by indents for interest on loan-office certificates, and upon other certificates of the liquidated debts of the United States, in such manner as they may think most expedient; and to ascertain the evidences of interest due on loan-office certificates, the holders thereof respectively shall be at liberty to carry them to the office from which they issued; and the holders of other certificates of liquidated debts of the United States, to carry the same to the loan-office of that state wherein they are inhabitants, or if foreigners, to any loan-office within the United States, and to have the interest thereon settled and certified to the last day of the year 1786; any thing in the requisitions for the years 1784, 1785, and 1786, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Resolved, That the quotas of the several states of the aforesaid sum of 1,700,407 dollars in indents be as follows:
New-Hampshire, 59,684 Massachusetts, 254,381 Rhode-Island, 36,558 Connecticut, 149,976 New-York, 145,555 New-Jersey, 94,372 Pennsylvania, 232,616 Delaware, 25,506 Maryland, 160,349 Virginia, 290,770 North-Carolina, 123,450 South-Carolina, 108,996 Georgia, 18,194
Which is 1,700,407
That the foregoing requisition, when paid, shall be paid to the credit of the states respectively, on the terms prescribed by the resolve of Congress of the 6th day of October, 1779.
Resolved, That the board of treasury furnish the several loan-officers with indents, to be issued for interest as aforesaid, and also with such checks and instructions as they from time to time shall judge necessary, to prevent counterfeit certificates of debts from obtaining a settlement of interest, and to detect counterfeit evidences of interest, and thereby to avoid receiving them in discharge of taxes; which indents of interest being parted with by the holders of the principal, shall be deemed evidence that he has received satisfaction for the same, and therefore shall be receivable from the bearer in lieu of money in any other state in the union, as well as in the state in which they were issued.
That the state paying such indents of interest into the federal treasury shall have credit therefor, which payment shall be considered as a discharge of the interest on the domestic debt, in the proportion that each state avails itself of the said indents of interest; but no state shall have a right to pay more than its quota, as specified in the existing requisitions of Congress, in the said indents of interest.
Resolved, That the board of treasury be and they are hereby directed to transmit to each state an account of their respective arrears in specie and in indents, to state to them the impediments that the public service has suffered, and the accumulation of foreign and domestic embarrassments that have arisen from their delinquency—to press upon them the absolute necessity of their making payment of their arrears of specie, as it is the only fund on which Congress can rely, for the support of the federal government—and to remind those states which continue particularly delinquent, that they must be considered as responsible for all the evils which will inevitably flow from a disregard to the political obligations by which they are constitutionally bound.
Resolved, That such part of the requisitions of the years 1784, 1785, and 1786, as restricts the receipt at the public treasury of indents of interest without a certain portion of specie—those parts which declare that after a certain day those states which have not paid their quotas shall be held to pay the same in specie—and such part as prevents the receiving of the indents issued in one year, in payment of taxes for another, be, and they are hereby repealed:—And it is hereby declared that the indents issued in 1784, 1785, and 1786, or under the present requisition, shall be indiscriminately received in payment of any state's quota of indents.
For the NEW-YORK JOURNAL. (Omitted last Week for want of Room.)
"To take the character of man, from history, he is a creature capable of any thing, the most infernally cruel and horrid when actuated by interest, or what is more powerful than interest, passion, and not in immediate fear of punishment from his fellow creatures; for, damnation out of sight, who would trust such a mischievous monkey with superfluous power?" Simia quam simias turpissimi bestia nobis? Ovid. The love of power is natural; it is insatiable; it is whetted, not cloyed, by possession. All men possessed of power may be expected to endeavour to prolong it beyond the due time, and to increase it beyond the due bounds; neither of which can be attempted without danger to liberty. Therefore government (by such frail and imperfect creatures as men) is impossible without continual danger to liberty. Yet we find that men in all ages, and nations have shown an astonishing credulity, in their faithless fellow-creatures; they have hoped against hope; they have believed against the light of their own eyes."
BURGH.
THE discussion, heretofore in favour of the requisitions of Congress of the third of February, 1781, and the 18th April, 1783, * for vesting that honorable body with an import of 5 per cent. &c. (and that called for in 1782) † "of one dollar for every hundred acres of land, and a pole tax of one dollar, on all freemen and slaves; and an excise of one eighth of a dollar upon all distilled spirituous liquors," have appeared under the favourable aspect, of a mere regulation, necessary and proper for the satisfaction of the public creditors, and the support of national faith; as if by investing Congress with a revenue, to be collected by officers in their own appointment, and laws of their own making; the public creditors would be the sooner paid, and the national faith the better preserved: but in its progression, it has received another form, we are now soon (perhaps too soon) for we have got into a way of doing business, either in secret or in haste) to be called upon, to change the very principles of our government; contrary to the opinion of the best authors, and to adopt that reported by the Convention, lately assembled at Philadelphia; in which the thirteen states are to be consolidated, so as to become one republic, of upwards of four thousand miles in circumference; Congress invested with legislative and judicial powers, and with it decide whether we shall establish a strong executive; as well as give up an actual for a virtual representation. The Dutch have tried both: by the one they have entirely lost the right of representation; by the other, they have embarrassed themselves with a Stadholder ‡ (a strong executive) whose tyranny within the space of forty years, has become so intolerable, that the inhabitants to get rid of him, are at this day on the brink of ruin.
SIDNEY.
* See the journals of Congress.
† See the circular letters signed Robert Morris, dated the 27th February, and 29th September, 1782.
‡ "Polibius having traced government up to its very origin, explains the principles by which different governments arose to the summit of their power, and grandeur; and proves, that they sunk to ruin, by a more or less rapid progress, in proportion as they receded more or less from the first principles on which they were originally founded."
MONTAGUE.
"When the efficacy of government, goes from where the constitution has placed it, into hands which have no right to it, that state is far gone to ruin."
BURGH.
"Political societies (says the Marquis De Baccaria) have their limits circumscribed, which they cannot exceed without disturbing their economy. An overgrown republic, can only be saved from dissolution, by subdividing it into a number of confederated republics."
"It is natural for a republic (says Montesquieu) to have only a small territory; otherwise it cannot long subsist. In a large republic, there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation: there are trusts too great to be placed in any single subject; he has interest of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy, great, and glorious, by oppressing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country. In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents: in a small one, the interests of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses have a less extent, and of course are less protected."
"The magistrates of a certain city in Holland, so ordered the business, that the people in a general assembly gave up the right of election, since which time, the senators have filled up all in their own body; and this example has been followed by all the other towns in the provinces." See Bower's system of geography, 547—549. 27 universal history 342—343.
‡ "This affair in a manner supercedes the constitution. The stadholder is president of the states of every province, and such is his power, and influence, that he can change the deputies, magistrates, and officers, in every province or city: by this he has the moulding of the assembly of the states general, though he has no voice in it; in short, though he has not the title, he has more real power and authority than some kings." Guthrie 481.
For the NEW-YORK JOURNAL. (Omitted last Week for want of Room.)
HOW comes it, Mr. PRINTER, that the goddess Liberty , lately so much adored in the United States, should now be reprobated under the name of Anarchy ? Suppose that we were to treat this fair Lady Liberty as the Poet advises to treat another lady of much less consequence,
"Be to her faults a little blind, Be to her virtues very kind."
Perhaps this moderation of temper may arrest the haste with which some people would force the new constitution upon us, without suffering amendments to be made or offered, although amendments may be necessary to secure our liberties from weak or wicked rulers.
NEW-YORK, Printed by T. GREENLEAF, Water-Street, No. 25.