The Wheeling repository — Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.], 1808-01-07 00:00:00, page 3

Ration as he could obtain, and from
those sources which are most likely to
yield it correct and satisfactory. He
had accordingly taken frequent occasion
to inquire of intelligent merchants; men
who had the greatest stake in the de
fence ol our cities ; practical seamen,
men who were skilled in naval tactics,
and ol maritime knowledge. And al
though his inquiries had been very ge
neral, in many places in the northern
and middle states, particularly in Bos
ton, New-York and Philadelphia, he
cud not recollect ever to have heard an
individual give an op.nion, that gun
boats Were a species of harbour defence
upon which much reliance ought to be
placed ; and certainly never any one,
who deemed that it could ever be expe
dient to make them the principal part
ol our force, such as is proposed by the
present bill. That th-.y were a power
which sometimes might be useful, and
therefore not wholly to be omitted in a
ny extensive system of defence, was a
gited on all hands ; but when they wrere
proposed in such numbers as to absorb
appropriations which were wanted fora
higher species of defence, they became
a serious cause of apprehension to the
friends ol an effectual protection of our
harbours.
Lnm-boats might often he of no in
considerable use in rivers, in shallows,
anil in land-locked bays. But in deep
Uut' i liar.'ouvs, where the shores were
bold, and where the sea had full access,
the\ were oi limited efficacy; and com
paraiiv. lv tin y might lie s *irl to be of
none at ail ; becau e the time when an
eneiw\ woul i s< ket in attack such har
bours, w'us iii._ very time in which they
would be uselers. An enemy, knowing
the nature ol yom I, 1 nsive forte -would
always choose a brisk and leading wind,
wnh an high sea. At such times gun
boat.-, it was not donii il, w ere of no ef
ficacy ; l) hg almost lev. 1 with the w a
ter, the 1 roe ol the hall was lost, or it
was turned irom its direction, bv the
waves.
I>ut anoth rand nrv s imjiortant objec
tion to tin m was, that they v.e:v abhor
r~ d by seamen, who regarded t .em with
utter contempt. Men accustomed to
sufficient ship roo n, could not brook
being confined, like poultry for a sacri
fice, w ith scai celv room enough to turn
or to stretch themselves. A vei v re
spectable and eminent merchant in N.
York had assured him, that it was im
fosaible to gn seamen to supply the
present number of gun-boats In that
harbour ; that they were disgusted with
the little accommodation they afforded;
that in cases of storm or exposure they
were the most comfortless places ima
ginable, giving their seamen no retreat
but a wretched hold, into which they
must creep, where they could not
straighten themselves, but must get,like
dogs, upon their haunches.
On water, the chief reliance must al
ways be on those accustomed to that
element. If these are dissatisfied, they
soon communicate their discontent to
the landsmen and militia serving on
board. Indeed how is it possible that
these will not detest a service at which
the hardy sons of the sea repine ? Be
sides, so many men as must be employ
ed,stowed together in such a small space
as the decks of these gun-boats offer, are
sure marks for musketry; and wherever
they can be got within reach of small
arms, their danger and exposure is ex
treme. I know there is an answer to
this. “ It is a part of the skill of these
boats, (it is said) to keep at a distance,
and out of the reach of the enemy’s fire,
by retiring as he advances.” This brave
scheme forms one capital objection to the
whole system, considered as a general
and principal portion of our defence.—
Its tendency is to make men cowards.
It teaches them to seek for safety, not in
meeting the enemy, but in running" a
■wny. The principle of every other mi
litary system, oi which I have ever
heard, is to make men fearless of dan
gfr—ardent to meet the enemy—to lose
the s nse of personal hazard in the zeal
of conflict, if I may nse the expression ;
to close in with death, and by dauntles
ness frown him out of his terrors. In
no other way can the natural fears of
man be surmounted. But this scheme
of seeking safety in flight, is of all others
he most direct means to encourage
cowardice. It was not therefore with
out some regret, that he heard his ho
nourable colleague dwell with such up
patent satisfaction on the great advan
tage, which these boats gave, of getting
out of harm’s way, and annoying the e
nemy from shallows, and concealed be
hind points of land—retreating as the
enemy advanced Hi began to fear lest
it might be thought that this was their
way of fighting in the northern states,
and that such were the calculations their
warriors would make when the encmv
should come. But, sir, the soil in whicK
l 1’ltLiJLEs spring, yields not ratri who<
will seek safety in flight, or who will
hide themselves -when danger approaches.
No, sir ; they will meet the enemy at
the harbour’s mouth. Their bodies will
be their country’s bulwarks. They will
engage at close quarters, and if you will
not give them decks of your own to fight
upon, they will find means to fight on
those of the enemy.
The effect produced by gun-boats, is
said to be at long shot,' with ships of
war, beyond the reach of whose metal
they are to be placed, and to whom also
their small size presents no object. But
in making these calculations, gentlemen
forget there was such a thing as board
ing and attacking with boats, and that
unless these gun-boats were in their na
ture strong enough to cope with the
boats of ships of war, they must retire
from the reach of the boats, or fall a sa
crifice. A gentleman, formerly an offi
cer in the American navy, who had ve
ry lately returned from the West-Indies,
had assured him that every thirty gun
frigate upon the Jamaica station carried
four boats, capable of carrying forty
men, with nn eighteen pound caronade
in the bow of each. His colleague talk
ed of filteen men to a gun-boat. Whv
if they should have forty, they would
each have to cope with two or three
times their number, with musketry, at
close quarters, and in a situation which,
all agree, is most inauspicious for such
a contest.
Gentlemen say Oreat Britain is so
powerful on the ocean, that we cannot
cope with her in frigates and heavy
ships, and so we must have nothing but
gun-boats. But will gentlemen please
to recollect, that it with the greater ns«
val instruments in our hands we cannot
cope with her, certainly we cannot wuh
the less. If she is to contend with a
gun-boat power, will she not br.ng into
action a power competent to contend
with gun-boats f The omnipotence of
the British navy, on which so many gen
tlemen rest their arguments against na
val preparations, if it prove any thing,
is as conclusive against gun-boats, as a
gainst frigates and line of battle ships.
It was not his intention to have made
any observations on the importance and
n cessity of a navy in a war with anv
European nation, with which we might
oe engaged. But as other gentlemen
had referred to that subject, he would
make some brief suggestions on that
head. He considered, that war once de
clared, and a navy was inevitable. Did