The Connecticut courant, and the weekly intelligencer — Hartford [Conn.], 1780-06-27 00:00:00, page 2

The C RISI S,
Number IX.
HA D America pursued her advanfa
ges with half the spirit she refilled
her misfortunes, she would, before now,
have been a conquering and a peaceful
people ; but lulled in the lap of fcft tran
quillity, (he refled cn her hopes, and ad
versity only has convulfcd her into action.
Whether fubtilty or sincerity, at the close
of the last year, induced the enemy to an
appearance for peace, is a point not me
terial to know ; it is fufficient that we fee
the effects it had on our politics, and that
we sternly rife to resent the delusion.
The war, on the part of America, has
been a war of natural feelings. Brave in
distress ; serene in conquest ; drowfey
when at rest ; and in every situation ge
nerously disposed to peace. A dangercus
calm, and the most heightened zeal, have,
as circumflances varied, succeeded each
other. Every passion, but that of difpair,
has been called to a tour of duty; and so
mistaken has been the enemy cf.our abi
lities and disposition, that when she sup
posed us conquered, we rose the conque
rors. The extensiveness of the United
States, and the variety of their resources ;
the universality of their cause, the quick
operation of their feelings, and the simi
larity of their sentiments, have, in every
trying situation, produced a famething,
which, favoured by Providence, and pur
sued with ardour, has accomplished in an
instant the business of a campaign. We
have never deliberately fought victory,
but (hatched it ; and bravely undone in
an hour, the plotted operations of a sea
son.
The reported fate cf Charleftewn, like
the misfortunes of seventy fix, has at last
called forth a spirit, and kindled up a
flame, which perhaps no other event could
have produced. If the enemy has circu
lated a falfehood, they have unwisely ag
gravated us into life, and if they have
told us a truth, they have unintentionally
done us a service. We were returning
with folded arms from the fatigues of
war, and thinking and fitting leisurely
down to enjoy repose. The dependence
that has been but upon Charleftown threw
a drowsiness over America. We looked
on the bufihefs done—the conflict over---
the matter fettled---or that all which re
mained unfinifhed would follow of itfelf.
In this state of dangerous relax, exposed
to the poisonous infufions of the enemy,
and having no common danger to attract
our attention, we were extinguishing by
stages the ardour we began with, and fur
re dering by peace meals the virtue that
defended us.
Afflding as the loss of Charleftown may
be, yet if it universally rouse us from the
slumber of a twelve months past, and re
new in us the spirit cf former days, it will
pr duce an advantage more important
than its loss. America ever is what she
thinks herfelf to be. Governed by senti
ment, and acting her own mind, she be
comes the Vi&or or the victim.
It is not the conquest of towns, nor
the accidental capture cf garrisons, that
ean reduce a country so extensive as this.
The fufferings of one part can ever be re
leived by the exertions of another, and
there is no situation the enemy can be in,
that does not afford to us the fame ad
vantages she fecks herfelf. By deviding
her force, she leaves every post attackable.
It is a mode of war that carries with it a
confeffion of weakness, and gees on the
principle cf distress, rather than conquest.
The dechne of the enemy is visible not
only in their operations, but in theirplans;
Charleftown originally made but a secon
dary object in the fyflem cf attack, and it
is now became their principal one,becaufe
they have not been able to succeed else
where. It would have carried a cowardly
appearance in Europe had they formed
their grand expedition in seventy fix,
against a part of the Continent where their
was no army, or not a fufficient one to
oppose them ; but failirg year after year
in their attempts here, and to the eastward
and northward, they deserted their firft
capital design, and prudently contenting
themselves with what they can get, give
a flourish of honour to conceal disgrace.
But this peace meal work is net con
quering the Continent. It is a disgrace
in them to attempt it, and in us to fuffer
it. It is now full time to put an end to a
war of aggravations, which, cn one fide,
has a possible object, and on the other,
has every inducement which honour, inte
rest, fafety and happiness, can infpfre. If
we fuffer them much longer to remain
among us, we shall become as bad as them
selves. An affoclation cf vices will reduce
us more than the sword. A nation har
dened in the practice cf iniquity knows
better how to profit by it, than a young
country newly corrupted We are nota
match for them in the line of advantageous
guilt,nor they with us on the principle we
bravely set out with. Our firft days were
our days of honour. They have marked
the character of America wherever the
story of her wars are told ; and convinced
of this, we have nothing to do, but wife
ly and unitedly to tread the well known
track.
The progress of a war is often as ru
inous to individuals, as the issue of it is
to a nation ; and it is not only necessary
that our forces be such, that we be con
querors in the end, but that by timely ex
ertions we be secure in the interim. The
present campaign will afford an oppor
tunity which has never presented it
felf before, and the preparations for it
are equally necessary, whether Charlef
town stand or fall. Suppose the firft, it
is in that case only a failure of the enemy,
not a defeat. All the conquest a besieged
town can hope for i-, not to be conquer
ed; and compelling an enemy to raise
the siege, is to the besieged a victory.
But there must be a probability amount
ing almost to certainty, that would jufti
fy a garrison marching out to attack a re
treat. Therefore should Charleftown not
be taken, and the enemy abandon the
siege, every other part of the Continent
should prepare to meet them ; and on the
contrary, should it be taken, the fame pre
parations are necessary, to balance the
loft, and put ourselves in a condition to
co-operate with our allies, immediately
on their arrival.
We are not fighting our battles alone,
as we were in seventy fix. England,
from a malicious disposition to America,
has not only not declared war against
France and Spain, but, the better to pro
secute her passions here, has afforded those
powers no military object, and avoids
them, to distress us. She will fuffer her
Weft-India Islands to be overrun by
France, and her southern settlements ta
ken by Spain, rather than quit the obje&
that gratifies revenge. This conduct, on
the part of Britain, has pointed out the
propriety of France fending a naval and
land force to co-operate with-America on
the spot. Their arrival cannot be very
diflant, nor the ravages cf the enemy
long. In the mean time the part neces
sary to us needs no illustration. The
recruiting she army, and procuring the
lupphes, are the two things needful, and
a capture of either cf the enemy's divi
sions will reficre to America peace and
plenty.
At a crisis, big, like the present, with
expectation and event, the whole coun
try is called to unanimity and exertion.
Not an ability ought now to deep, that
can produce but a mite to the general
good, nor even a whTper to pas s that mi
niates against it. The receffiy of the
cae and the importance cf the confe
querces, adn it no delay from a friend,
no apology fr m an enemy. To spare
now, woJd be the hegft of extrava
gance. and to confuit prelent eate, would
sacrifice it, perhapsfoi ever.
America, r'ch in patriotism and pro
duce, can want nerf er men nor supplies,
when a serious neceffitv cads them forth.
Ihe flow operation of taxes, owin > to
the extenfivenels of collection, and their
depreciated vaiue before they arrived in
the treasury, have, in many instances,
thrown a burthen upon Government
which has been artfully interpreted by
the enemy into a general decline thro'out
the country. Yet this, inconvenient as
it may at firft appear, is not only reme
diable, but may be turned to an immedi
ate advantage ; for it makes no real dif
ference, whether a certain number of
men, or company of militia (and in this
country every man is a militia man) are
directed by law to fend a recruit at their
own expence, cr'whether a tax is laid on
them for that purpose, and the men hired
by government afterwards. The firft,
if there is any d fference, is both cheapest
and best, because it saves the expence
which would attend collecting it as a tax,
and brings the nan sooner into the field
than the modes of recruiting formerly
vied : And on this principle, a law has
been pafftd in this State for recruiting
two ruea from each company of militia,
which will add upwards of a thousand
to the force of the country.
But the flame, which has broke forth
in this City since the report from New-
Ycrk of the loss cf Charleftown, not on
ly does honour to the place, but, like the
blaze of seventy fix, will kindle into ac
tion the scattered /parks thro'out America.
--- Fhe valour cf a country may be learned
by the bravery of its soldiery, and the ge
ral cast of its inhabitants, but confidence
cf success best difeovered by the active
measures pursued by men of property ;
and when the spirit of enterprize becomes
so universal, as to a& at once on all ranks
cf n eh, a var n ay then and net till then,
be filled truly popular.