Oracle post — Portsmouth, N.H., 1804-01-31 00:00:00, page 1

6r ALL THE DISPOSITIONS AND HABITS
WHICH LEAD TO POLITICAL PROSPERITY,
RELIGION and MORALITY ARE INDISPENSA
BLE SUPPORTS. Washingtons Legacy.
MORALIST.
"No one can exail in things to vbi,b bis talents are net adept
" ed, nor is there fared, one out if all the myriads of &A0
"nature, wfo cannot excel in fometbing,, '"Mild?,
"——There is a variety no lets &tehfive and
beautiful, in the mtelleaual and moral world, thin
in the natural. God has seen fit to befte woh dif
ferent individuals, different kinds and degrees of
mental and corporeal endowments. The frnti
ments and chara aers of men are originated varied
and formed, by innumerable circumflances, which
appear to be merely accidental.— From different at
lociations, employments, and habits, w'meh are all
hp.i^u^F^^Crch a, world as this, men uectffa
r*frily derive sum. peculiarity id their modes of think
ing, reasoning and juding. Perhaps if the differ
ences, oppositions and inequalities," 'he intellec.
foal system were destroyed, it would have no more
beauty to an eye that could take it in at one view,
kthan this eataty would, if all those varieties which
now render it io charming, were levelled down and
blended in one common furface. The beneficent
Creator has bestowed different kinds and degreesof
talents on his creatures, that they miijht aft feel
their mutual connexion and dependence ; that the
mtelleaual universe might exhibit a complete
whole, in nothing deficient, nor redundant, difplay
fag an endless succession of harmonies, neither fa
tigueing the mind with too much uniformity, Hr
perplexing it with too much variety."
^..'.. JJ '.uA" !'■'.■- .';?!!!!!*■ im
Mr. Tracy's Speech
g In the Senate of the United States,
Friday, December 2, 1804.
In Debate on the motion for altering the clatife of toe
Conflitution, dejignating the mode of chofyg the
/ / President and Vice-Prefidenfi
f —o
[continued.]
AND it is added, that thus there was imminent
danger of a person being imposed upon the U.
States as chief magistrate, who was not originally
intended for that high office, and that civil war
mufl have been the consequence. And, as is common
, in such cases, the picture is filled, in the back
'tfound, with brother railing his murderous hand
against brother, father against son, and with an if
iliaing group of eteccteras : and to avoid a repeti,,
tion of this tremendous ciifs, as it is called, the pre
sent resolution, it is said, must pass.
°:3^'Z^^^"" *'"" n T^ r ^^'^^
we examine the duties aligned by the constitution
to the several agents concerned. The duty of the
decors is precisely defined, They are each to bring
-forward two candidates fully qualified for President,
,ecaule they cannot know at the time of giving
^heir ballots, upon which the choice will fall. The
jircumflance of two having a majority, and both
feeing equal in number of votes, is an expression of
/the public will, through the only conflitutional ur
/ gari,^ which, in this case, the public will can be
/ expressed, that both had the requisite qualifications.
The public will, then, was fa this instance clearly
and unequivocally expreffid, by a constitutional,
and a Numerical majority, that ball candidates
I; were worthy of the office ; bht here the expression
"; of the public will ceased, and which of these two
Should be the Prefiderit, was now to be decided by
another conftitution^ organ, that is, by the house
kof representatives voting by Rates.
I , The framers of the constitution so intended, and
the people Who adopted it hgve so ordained, that
their tyh in this cale ffiould be exprefftd by a ma
jority of the ftaies, aaing by their reprrfoation in
, the hpufe of representatives. This tight of felea
ioo, is a right complete in itfelf, to be exercised by
taele feconti eleatrts; uninfluenced by any extra
neous tonfideratiOT, and governed only by their
, own sense ptyroprirty add ro&rtude. The opinion
of the people h^d been exprefled, by the electors,
but it ,only reached a certain point, and then was
totally fileot as to which of the two thoyld be Pre
sident, and their lente upon this point could only
Ibe colleaed, through tneir constitutional organ, the
house of reprefematives, voting by states. Any in.
terferenCe of the firft eleaors, or ofan individual or
individuals, must be informal and improper. The
advice of fenfire and camfid men, as in every other
case, might be ufefril ; but could have no binding
force winterer. * The firft deems had no right to
choose a' Vice-Prefidenh To claim it was over
. stepping their duty, and arrogating, to tbemfelves a
' power, not given, n^ meant to be given to them
by the conftittition.
If there is any thing in this whole tranfeaion,
which has the most d'tflant appearance of a breach
pf'duty, it was In the ele&ors, by attempting to de
signate, and by fxercifing the important office of an
(ledor, under the influence of improper motives ;
that js, by officioufly artem^ing to decide the quef.
tion, which of the two perlons was proper for Vice-
President, which they were constitutionally incom
potent to decide. By this condha they attempted
to breakdown an important guard provided by the
constitution, abd improperly to r%(e them (elves
from its obligations, which made it their duty to
(feled two men qualified to be President. But if
there can be a shadow of reason in this claim of the
electors, to designate under the present cenftitu
tional regulations, of which, to doubt, Items to be
so heinous, what necessity can there be for thi, a
mendment ? The objed of the amendment, or cer
tainly its chief objea is to establish the defigpating
principle ; but why this, if it can already be effe&ed
by the Ample mode of placing one name firft on the
ballot, which ft so easy to be doge, limit caA
freely be avoided ? And if dope, by, the dQ&rinc
Vol. XIV.]
of gentlemen, it is so far binding on the house of
representatives that if they even doubt, they are
damned ?',
The faa certainly was, that at the lift eteaion,
the great states brought forward the two candidates ;
they were both of the fame political feotimenrs,
- this, they had a conftitutibnal right to do; but it
now seems that their language to the small flares
was; "because you will not give up your gonftitu
tibnal rights to ps, and let us go on and designate,
we will stir up a civil waynd lay the blame toyoh.
And of this improper condua of ours we will take
1 the advantage, and obtain an iteration of th- con
stitution, rfhich will hereafter gratify us in every re
fpe&.' Ageniteman from Maryland (Mr. &nithj)
has said, that he heard, though he couf not prove
it, that the federal majority at the tune of the last
ete&ion, contemplated making a law, authorizing
or appointing tone perfen to ad as Prehdent, in
case fy choice had been made ty chetea tft^^
prefermheV .I wait ikfy, sci mro%? rf't-^
government, aqd know nothing of fifth a prejpa,
it might have been so, but fuppgling it was, what
then ? Why fays the gentleman, the person thus ap
pointed could not have kept his head on his fliotrld
ers 24 hours ; and this would have made a civil war.
If the majority new should contemplate a merfure,
which the conftnution does not authorize, as it
clearly did not authorize the measure fulpeaed by
the gentleman, though he cannot prove it; the best
thing in the world for them to do, would be to give
it np, without any attempt to effea it, as it seems
the federal majority did. But what argument all
this can afford in favor of the amendment, or why
it was mentioned, in this debate, is beyond my com
prevention. In the result of the last election, the
great Rates and the ruling political party, were cer
tainly gratified, and there does not appear the teaft
reasonable ground of complaint againti the final!
States; in the use of their constitutional rights on the
nccafion. All support therefore to the amendment,
drawn from that tranfa&ion, must fail.
I have said, that the article fixing the mode of e
leAing a chief magitirate Was, from its nature, at.
tended with many difficulties. A more stria m
quity into the constitutional mode, nd a compan
ion ofit, in fame other and more particular points,
with the propped alteration, .will be ufeful in form
ing an opinion of their relative merits.„
As the constitution stands, each ekaor is to
write the names, of two persons on a piece of paper,
calted a ballot. Either of the two persons thus vo
ted for may be the President, and the §le&or cannot
know which ; this affords the most powerful in
ducement to vote for two, both of whom are quali
fied for the very important office. For it is not on
ly uncertain upon whom the choice will fill at fcft,
bat the one remaining, will certainly be President,
upon any contingency which (hall remove or in
capcitate the firft. The convention fecm to have
. feWteda mode offtceedin, ^ *m4 Atopic, the
least liable to accident, and the best calculated to
insure the main object, that is, that both should be
really worthy of the trust. If one candidate wishes
%>,make in'.ereft with the eledorty as each must vote
so. two, it will be impossible for bribery or intrigue
to succeed ; for, without corrupting the whole or
certainly many more than half, be may be defeated
by tile other candidate on the ballot. This is, per.
hq>s, the most effectual bar to intrigue, that was
ever contrived ; for, unlefc till, or a gre^t propor
tion of the eledors are corrupted, an extreme case of
depravity not probable in any country, intrigue can
have no affurapce of success. The danger and dif
ficulty, which muff always attend foch an impor
tant eft&ion, as that of chief magistrate of the U
mted States, was meant to be avoided, by diminifh
in^ the chances of its frequent recurrence. So tv,o
persons are placed in a condition to aA as Prelideht
in iucceffion, to prevent both the evils, of a vacan
cy, and of a recurrence of choice more frequently
than cnee in four years. And it seems merely in
cidental to this second perfom to be called Vice
rr^dent, and neither the firft nor second descrip
tion of eledors canhave any right to vote for him
as fiich, indeed he can have no existence till the firft
charter is designated and then seems to be dilcov
ered, not eleaed% The Senate, in case of an equal
number of votes for two or more remaining .per
fQns, after the President is eleaed, are vested With
]authority to choose a Vice. President, for as such he
iis to pretide over this body, and tris body therefore
seems to be the only constitutional organ to defig
n'ate him. Both 0e bther delcripripns of ekam
have nothing to do with such a charader nr office ;
but are Confined to ad with a fugle reference to
the chara&er and office of President , and are trusted
with no power to give anv opinion of the chara&er
or qualifications ofa Vice-President; And it is re
markable, that there are no appropriate qualifica
tions made necessary by the conititution, far a
Vice-President ; but every qualification has refer
ence to President. There i$ ano her important fea
ture in this part of the constitution. It was known
by the convention, that in this country, in common
with all ,others, where there is freedom of opinion
and of speech, there would be parties. They like
wise knew, that the intolerance of the major, or rul
ing led and politicalparty, Wasficquently exercised
jupon the minor party ; add that the rights of the
minority ought to be protested to them.
As well then, tofecure the rights of the minori
!ty, as to check the intolerance of the majority they
placed the majority in jeopardy, if they should at
tempt at grasping all the benefits of £ Frelident and
Vice-Prefident>itbin tbemfelves, to the total cxclu
fion of the minority.,.'
i This very case which happened st the hfteleai&h
was contemplated, in which the majority attempted
j-totally to exclude the minority fromlay participa
tio^ T™.»£^4F °f 'be constitution to such
I majorities is, "take care that you aim not at too
much, for if you do, it is put into the power of the
minority to check you, and by a judicious difptf
tion df their few votes, determine the choice of
Prefideht." To avoid this event the majority will
;probably be cautious in the exercise of power; and
i thus the rights, the proper weight tad influence of
ORACLE POST.
TUESDAY, January 31, 1804.
a minority are tecured a°ainft jhe condud of the
majority, which is certainly liable to be intolerant
Mid opprffive. In this refped the spirit of the
confl'uunon is, political moderation. And it is
clear to my mind, that the experience of the last
eltrbm has 'aught a less n to all majorities, which
will io future completely secure ihcm frofe again
incurring a similar risk. I recoiled well, that it
was rhongiff probable, When the electoral votes
were yjven, that Mr. Burr would have a vote or #
two, in tome of the euftern Rates. If he had re--
cetved but,le, he would have been by an dedoral
choice, the constitutional President. If the mgur
hy* tenure have the powers of recoHeajon, hey
will udoubtedly avoid the evil, if it is one, which
hap,Wied at the last eleaiow, with fuck unfailing
cffitfcfo that there will be no need of the remedy
pro, fed by the amendment, ,But the majority
fay,if ^b votes are so scattered for one candidate
^fy,> 14lBiqilPX^ Mother will tie inct
CTS, &o that is, toe minority will && a Vice-
President. The language of the constitution to
them, is agiin, "that this was meant as a fecutify'
,for the minority against the majority.” But the
majority exclaim against both these provisions, as
very unreasonable indeed . "what," fay they, "arc
minorities to govern majorities ?" The answer of
the constitution is "no, but th^ir due weight and in
fluence fliall be secured to them, and tie danger of
your intolerance guarded against” For the secu
rity of small ftatts and minorities, there is, in the
constitution a mixture of the federative wit% the
popular principles. And as it is well known that,
when popular majorities alone prevail, and exercise
power uncontrolled by constitutional checks, the
giinorities, who generally possess their proportion of
integrity and virtue, are overwhelmed, and liberty
itfeif, by the fame means, destroyed ; so it is in
kiddnefs to both parties, to the country and to hu
manity, that these wholefomc checks are constitu
tionally provided. Had the majority, or the great
fetes, been willing, fairly to have fobmitted to the
contutional checks in the last election, no evil could
have happened. And it is remarkable that the con
dilution completely proteds them, as long as they
obey its precepts, in the creation of which they had
an agency, and to which they have Solemnly agreed.
To prove that I am corred in these ideas, I not on
ly refer to the constitution but to the secretary of
fate (Mr. Madison). In the Virginia debates, vol.
I. Parle 96, he f a y% "But on a candid examination
of hiftory, we shall find that turbulence, vi<>h nee
ann „bufe of power, by the majerii, trampling on tfe
rights if tie minority, have produced futons arid
coemptions which, in republics, have more fre
quently thin any other caule produced despotism.
If we go over the whole hiftory of ancient and mod
ern republics, we shall find their deftrudion to have
untruly resulted from those causes. If we confid
er the peculiar situation of the United States,^d
CT±* =f% ;efydica 01 that diverlity of sentiment,
which parades it) inhabitants, we fliall find great
danger th* the fame emits may terminate here, in
the fame ftal effeds, which they produced in those
republics. This danger ought to be wifely guard,
ed again# Perhaps, in the prog^efs of this difeuf
fion it wilhppeaf, that the only possible remedy for
thole evil^and means of preftrving and proteaing
the prineijes of repu blicancifm., will be found in
that very hftem, which is now exclaimed against as
the parentof oppression.", :.
Mr. Prudent, it has often been said by the dis.
ceroing aid judicious of this and other countries,
that our cmflitution, for its brevity, its cop preheq-
Gvenefs, i| perspicuity, and the political Ykill con
tained in fy was the best ftaie paper extant. I be
lieve all tils, and even more is a tribute jufily due to
its merits ,nd I am persuaded that the article which
fixes a mde for the choice of a chief migiftrate;
Rands mot prominent among its excellencies.
Let us row, fir, examine and compare the Merits
of the am,dment with a Ipecial reference to this
last view vt have taken of theconftitutional provi
4°". 4 §
The amendment authorizes the elearirs to vote
for a Present, and for a Vice-President by fpecific
defignatitt. Is ambition in your country ? Here
isa direaand inviting object for its operations.
Is the integrity of your electors available ? Yoh
place it here in the most encouraging attitude for an
assault. 4 fear of deteaich, and a sense of fliame,
upon the exposure of ah improper adion, has been,
perhaps,# better security againff political errors or
crimes, than all the moral virtues united, when the
temptation has been attended frith an impossibility
of deteaion. An intrigue with an elector, can be
carried cm without much danger of deteaion; but
when yopr election is carried into the house of re
presentatives, betides the ordinary weight of charac
ter in favor of the members of that house, a detec
tion of an intrigue with a candidate is alnwft cer
raim It will be recolleaed, that it the last deacon,
two or three members held the choice p^rf &ly in
their own hands. If I mistake not, three gentle
men, that is, a member from New-JerfrtWmtm
beg from Vermont, and ohe from cither Maryland,
Delaware, OrTehiieffee,could have given a Proficient
to the United slates. The particular gectlroen
mentioned were above fufpiciou of briber, ; but in
addition tathis circumfiance; if They had in the con
test, gone over, from improper motives, or under
the influe,ice of bribery, a detection wascertain.
This will remain forever, the criterion, as it re
fpeas the relative danger of intrigue and bribery, in
the two modes of choice. And the amendment is
avowedly intended to fecurc a choice b, ektriors,
and to prevent a resort to the house; becattfe fays
the geiideman from Virginia (Mr. Taylor,) "If,w
permit the election to go into the noufa there, are
imall dates, and minorities,and all the evils of a diet
ekaiuri ;" meaning; that corruption must be the
coofrqmtnee. But he fays, "hit there be a divided
eleaiun, by the electors, meeting by states separate
ly, and yoi r feffen the teadency to corruption."
Ibis may look plaudit in theory, but 1 think
praaice will Ihow its fallacy.
It may Winter for the electors to meet by
ftktes,- titan for allto Ife'together, fc this can
never prove that they are less liable to corrup
tion than die house of representative ; which is
the only point in question.
™'felling the Vice-President as
proposed 0, d.e amendment, pot only invites am
bition to an unchecked operation ; but exposes
us to the fele&on ofalefs important, 4nd more
unfit perlon than the constitutional provision. In
addition to bis importance in the government
, artflag from his incidental succession to the chief
- magistracy, the Vice President is ek officio, Presi
dent of the Senate knd gives a dirtfl influence
to the Rate from which he is chosen, of a third
vote in this body is all cases of equal division,
which are usually the cases of most importance. -
Besides, his influence as presiding officer is, per
haps, more than equal to the right ofa vote. It
becomes therefore peculiarly important to the
small ftatc&and to taUfy4ti&ty^itg<^=**rf ~=
in this hod% pat only that fair iu,.uence in the
election sf Vice President liquid not be diminish
ed'; but that no measure be adopted, which may
tend to bellow the office upon aft tin worthy char
acter. By the proposed amendment, this char
acter mull necessarily become % Tore of make
weight, and flepptng-ftone for the Presidency.—
,As in recruiting for an array, a man, a&ive, and
of a particular cast of character, but not very
proper for a commander in chief, is employed
to obtain recruits, ^nd upon condition that he
obtains a given number, is to be rewarded
with a ferj^ant's warrant ;fo in this cafe,the man.
who cm procure a given number of votes for
Pretident, will fee encouraged to hope for the
Vice-Trefidency ; arid where will such charac
ters be fought after? In Delaware or Rhode-1-
Band ? No tir, but in the great Rates ; there the
recruiting talents will be put in operation, because
the number of recruits, or votes, will be fufficienc
to test his active and recruiting merits. And
thus the office of Vice Prudent will be sent to
market, with hardly a possible chance 10 meet an.
honest purchaser., r ,
v I have already remarked upon the alteration
made by the Seriate, in the reflation palled bf
the house of reprefenratiyes, changing the num
ber five to three. But one addition made this
morning, deserves attention ; I mean that which
authorizes the Vice President to administer the
government, in case neither the firft nor the second
constitutional electors e#e& a choice of President.
„ This is a new principle, and its operation is.
more uncertain, than that of any other part of
the proposed amendment. /Sewing it in one
point of light, it may be thought to confer a new
power upon the Senate ; that of giving a Presi
dent to the union. And it is &d, 'that this
part will recompense jhe small Rates, who have
the afcendenc) in the Senate, for the injury in
flifted by the other parts of the amendment. If
it be true, that the lad part restores all which the:
former parts have taken away from us, it is in
conceivable, why any man can with to pals a re
solution, the parts of which thus mutually dettro,
each other. It is possible, that by the force of in
trigue & fadion, the electors may be induced to
'fcatter their votes for both President & vice-presi
dent, in such a manner; as to present several can
didates to the 'houfe for President, and two or
more, to the enate for Pice-Pref&nt. In which
case the enate might immediately choose or fe
left 2 Vice-Prydenf. -In this state of things^
there is an opportunity afforded for an int/Que,
of a very extensive and alarming nature. I The
Senate, I mean a majority of them, might < ifh
that the man whom they had elected Pice Pre^
}Jident should administer the government ; arid
if the house could be prevented from agreeing,
their wishes would be gratified. The facility.
of preventing over that of producing a choice is
Very obvious.
A bold address may be made to any member
of the house, without wounding his pride, or of-
I fending has moralty, to adhere to his candidate)
j and not change his vate so as to effeft a choice.
I He can be told that there is no danger of leaving
I the United dates without a President, as there is
one already chosen to his hand by the senate f%
I this person may be more the object of his withes
than any of the other candidates, his favorite ex
cepted. [^ thil,pr®cefs the seriate may give a
Prefiden&td the United stated . But if the pro
babiiy of such a parcels an * futh an event is in-
Created by rhe amendment olthis tiiorning,it certain.i
ly cannot greatly recommend ir. For rtiyfelf, I with
for no alteration in the constitution, not ec, ^^ -
operation were dircdly in favor of the small dates,
more especially; if such a favor is tube derived
1 through a fort of double conspiracy of intrigue ; in
the firft place to operate on the eledors, and then }
on the house of reptefentatiees. It seems to mb 1
that the small Rates bad better betouteoted to en
joy tite rights now fecur^fc.9 them by the constitu
tion, which they can l^nefily do, rather thin fubrait
„to a deprivation of thdi rights, for the lake of dfc
toffy obtaining a reiteration ofihem. We mas
charitably and fafety conclude that the majority do
hot intend,by this part of the am^ndment,to expofc
the country to such a feene of iniquity. And the
uncertainty of its operations, atone, ^ id thy mind;
a Efficient ground for rejeaiaL However the op
eration of this part of the amendment may appear
in theory, as to other points; it seems to me, that in
; one point all c^ft ag ree arid tha +ls,when the house
lof representatives know that the United states wty
: bedeft withoutan executive magift'Mcjn case the,
do not agree; thi, awful relponlibdity, will Ipeak
: in a voice tOo loiid for the bar^i^od of party ten#
I tirtly to nifregard. Arid may I not foggeft, with
■out giving office, that the operation of this yet,
' refpohfibility, has been proved, nt leall in feme de
e greejn the proceedings of itie lift prcGderitial ctec
/ If this last mentioned security be worth ptefetv
x ing, it followsof c9utfe, tbit the part of theamend.
^=^re^
[No. 16.