The Pennsylvania evening post — Philadelphia, Pa., 1776-10-22 00:00:00, page 2

p H ILA DELP Ft lA, Odober 22.
At a meeting of a large and refpe&able number of the citi
zens of Philadelphia, in the state house yard last night and
this morning, Col. John Ba, ard in the chair, the, fol
lowing Resolutions were agreed to by a great majority, and
affectionately recommended to their fellow citizens in every
part of the state of Pennsylvania.
Referred 1. 'f' HA 1' the late Convention was called for
the express purpole of forming a new go
vernment in this state, on the auth rity of the people only,
with po^eralio to appoint Delegates in Congrcfs, and a Coun
cil of Safety.
2. That the said Convention assumed and exercised powers
with which they were not intruded by the people.
;, That in the Constitution formed by the said Convention,
the Christian religion is no[ treated with proper refpeft.
4. That the said Constitution unnecessarily deviates from
all resemblance to the former government of this date, to
which the people have been accustomed.
5. That it is the feme of this meeting, that the people did
not deiire such Grange innovations, but only that the kingly,
parliamentary, and proprietary powers should be totally abo
iifhed, and such alterations made as would thereby be ren
dered necessary, so that a well formed government might be
eflabdfhed solely on the authority of the people. .
6. That the said Constitution differs not only unnecessarily
from that to which the people have been accustomed, but in
many important articles from every government that has lately
been efabhfhed in America on the authority of the people—
from the sentiments of the Honorable the Continental Congress
refpetling government —and fremthofe of the most distinguish.
e d authois, who have deliberately considered that fubjcd.§
§ The said constitution differs from others lately formed in
these particulars: dft, It erfablifhes only a single legislative
body. 2dly, It renders the judicial dependant on that single
legislative body, who may remove any judge from his office,
without trial, for any thing they please to call “ mifbeha#
viour." jdJy, It renders the executive dependant cn that
single legislative body ; by whom alone the executive officers
are to be paid for their services; and by whom, from the great
difpro portion between the numbersof the Assembly anti Coun
cil, the President and Vice-President must always be annually
chcfen; besides, that every officer, executive or judicial, may.
be impeached by the Assembly, before fix of the Council thus
dependant on the Assembly, and be tried and condemned.)
dthiy, It ere&s no Court of Appeals, more necessary here than,
in feme other States, as our Supreme Court may try causes in.
the firft instance, and finally determine them, so that there is.
no mode fettled for corroding their errors^
The said constitution differs from the sentiments of the Ho
norable Congress, in rendering every Judge in the State in
tirely dependant on the single legislative body. For in the.
firft petition to the King of Great-Britain, the Congress in.
enumerating “ grievances," fay “ the Judges of courts of
common law have been made entirely dependant on one partof
the legislature for their salaries as well as the duration of their,
cemmiffions." Agan f the said constitution differs from the*
sentiments of the Honorable Congress, in not having " fepa-.
rated and distributed powers into different hands for checks,
one upon am the!;" for in their address to the inhabitants cf
Canada, mentoring government and the detestable frame
established fcr that province by a late flatute, they fay
" he several powers being Separated and distributed into
different hands lor checks, one upon another, is the only ef
fectual inode ever invented by the wit of men, to promote
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theif freedom and prosperity." But here is no “ distribution
of power into different hands, that " one may check another."
On the contrary, the executive and judicial powers are made,
unduly dependant on a single legislative body, the Assembly :
So that in truth the legislative, executive and judicial powers
may be' said to be united in one body, the Assembly, though
there is a semblance, on a flight view, of their being separated.
Indeed, the resemblance between the said constitution and the
artful, but destructive one," established by the statute before
mentioned, is so great, that the following words of the Con
gress suit the one as well as the other, only changing the word
'' Minifler" for.the word Assembly." " Here is indeed, an
appearance of the several powers being separated, &c." as be
fore. But examine the specious devices and you will find
it, to use an expression of Holy Writ, “ a whited fepulchre."
The legislative, executive and judicial powers are all moved
by the nods of a Minister."
If any reasonable man could possibly entertain a doubt, con
cerning the meaning of the Congress, in tiling the words be
fore quoted, that meaning will be clearly explained by the
several constitutions lately formed on this continent with the
advice and assistance of those very gentlemen in their respec
tive States, who, as members of Congress, used the before,
quoted words, and mull have known their own meaning.
How widely the said constitution differs from the sentiments,
of the most diilinguifhed writers on the fubjeft of government,
will appear by the following quotations from two authors cf
so high a reputation among civilized nations, that it is need
fefs to add any others.
The Baron de Montesquieu, “ whose name" (the Congrefs'
declare) all Europe reveres, fays—The political liberty of the,
fubjetl is a tranquillity of mind, arising from the opinion
each perlon has of his fafety. In order to have this liberty,
it is requisite the government be to constituted, as one man
net I not be afraid of another. When the,egiflative and exe
cutive powers are united in the fame person, or in the fame
body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because appre
hensions may arise, leaf! the fame Monarch or Semite should,
ena& tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical man
ner, Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be
not separated from the legislative and executive powers."
There would be an end of every thing, were the fame men or
the fame body, whether of the nobles, or the people, to ex
ercise those three powers, that ofenatiing laws, that of ex
ecuting the public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes
or differences of individuals." The learned Baron then pro
ceeds with a long and much admired chapter on the English
constitution, wherein he,greatly commends its distribution of
legislative power into several branches, &c. which cannot be
inserted in the corapafs of these notes.
Mr. Addison, the itrenuous and undaunted advocate for
virtue, piety, liberty and,juft government, even in a corrupt
age (and tho' conversant in court's) fays—“ If there be but
one body of legislators it is no better t an a tyranny ; if
'there are only two, there will want a casting vo>ce, and one
of them mull at length be swallowed up by disputes and con
ten ion, that would necessarily arise between them. Four
would have the fame inconveniencies as two, and a greater
number would carafe too much confufio.)."
f lit, N t eftablilhing a Court of Appeals.—zdly, Not
afeertaining the number oF Judges in the Common Pleas and
Orphan's Courts, —whether the fame persons are to be Judges
in both courts and in the sessions, as usual heretofore, —or
7. That several regulations essential to the welfare of the
community are omitted in the said Conftitution.f