The Pennsylvania evening post — Philadelphia, Pa., 1776-03-16 00:00:00, page 1

Q^"^ THAT is meant by government ?—A. Nothing
/ more ° r ' e '> than those persons to whom the
WW society has agreed to entrust the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers ?
Q What is the legislative ?—A. Those persons who are
appointed to make laws.
Q What is the executive ?—A. Those men who are au
thorized to execute the laws.
Q What is the judicial ?—A. Such as are empowered to
hear and determine disputes concerning the conftrudion of
laws, the certainty of fads, and the right execution of laws.
Q Is it not a difficult thing to make a government ?—A.
No. It is as easy as for a carpenter to build a house, or a
whitefmith to make a smoke jack.
Q How would you frame a model ?—A. Let the people
.of a colony choose a large representation of themselves.—Let
the representatives choose by ballot twelve, sixteen, twenty
four, or thirty-fix men, for a Council.—Then let the House
and Council by joint ballot choose a Governor. —Here is
your legislative completed in a trice.—You may let your Go
vernor have a negative, if you choose him annually, or you may
make him only primus inter pares in the Council, or you may
give him a calling voice, in case of an equal division among the
Counfellors—as you like belt—So you may choose your Go
vernor annually, triennially, or septennially, as you like belt
—So you may your Counfellors.
Q Where would you lodge the executive ?—A. I would
strip it of the absurd, ridiculous, and pernicious prerogatives,
which have been annext to it, in feme parts of the world., —
The remainder should be left with the Governor, by and
with the advice and consent of Council, any seven or nine of
whom should be a quorum, to advise the Governor, in the
exercise of the executive power, as a Privy Council.
Q Out of which part of the machine should the judicial
power grow ?—A. The Governor by and with, and not with
out the advice and consent of the Council, should have the
nomination and appointment of all Judges and Justices—-or
if you choose to have yopr government more popular, they
may be chosen by joint ballot of both Houses, or by the bal
lot of one House concurred by the other, so that the nega
tive of each branch may be preferred.
Q How would you constitute the Great Officers of State ?
—A. The Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary, Commissary,
Attorney and Solicitor General, should be chosen by joint
ballot of both Houses, you may give the Governor a nega
tive upon the choice or not as you please—l should think it
better, not.
Q How ftiall Sheriffs, Coroners, Cor.ftables, Ac. be made ?
—A. By theGovernor, with consent of Council, by the bal
lot of one House, concurred by the other—by joint ballot of
both—consented to by the Governor or not, as you pleafe—
or by the ballot of the freeholders of counties, towns, or
other diftrids, as you please.
Q Should your Judges and Judices be appointed annually ?
Or how ?—A. The regularity, order, rectitude, and utility
of your legislative ano executive both depend upon an up
right, inflexible, and fkilfuf adminiftratior. of justice.—Your
The PENNS Y LYA NTA EVENING POST.
Vol. ll.]
Price only Pico Coffers.
SATURDAY, MARCH 16, 1776.
Published every Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday Evenings.
135
judges therefore should be independant—they should leal
upon no man or body of men—They should be accountable
only to God, their own conferences, and the legislative.
—They should hold their commissions during good behavi
our.—lf accused of mifbehaviour by the Representatives of
the people, before the Governor and Council they should
have an opportunity to defend themselves.—ls the charge is
supported, and they found guilty, they should be dismissed from
their offices and fubjeft to such other pains, penalties and
disabilities as shall be thought proper, and these ought to be
severe.—-Their salaries ought to be comfortable and decent
only, not splendid, and should be established by law.
Q Would you approve this as a permanent model ?—A.
No. This is an easy transition from anarchy to order—But
I would not have it last — a proper plan should be digested,
as soon as there is time for it, to have the Governor and
Council chosen by the people at large, that they may not be
dependent on the few individuals who compose an House of
Representatives.—But this is a work of time easily accom
plished however, when we get out of the war.
Q Why would you have your government so mixed ?—A.
Because the experience of ages has proved that mixed go
vernments are the bed.
Q Simplicity is amiable and convenient in most things,
why not in government?
A. Human nature is such, that it renders simple govern
ments deftrudive, and makes it neceflary to place one power
over against another to ballance its weight, to set one order of
men over against another to watch their motions, that their
appetites, prejudices, pafficms # , and imaginations may not
hurry.them over the line of their duty. That the deceitful
nefs of the human heart may not betray it imperceptibly in
to measures injurious to the public interest.
Q Have not the belt governments been simple ?—A. No.
Simple monarchy is always tyranny, simple ariffocracy is so
too ; and simple democracy in, a large community is imprac-^
ticable. Such a thing never existed, but one, and that is the
democracy of St. Marino, in Italy, confiding only'of a hun
dred families, inhabiting a beautiful 11. tie meadow surrounded
by impenetreable rocks and mountains— This handful of
people meet and make laws, meet to execute them, and
meet to decide all dispute^—But this could not be done if they
had only one thousand families and ten miles of territory.
Q Were not the Republics of Greece, Italy, and Car
thage, simple ?—A. No. They were all mixed —and most
of them loft their liberties because they were not properly
mixed. Rome was enslaved for want of a mediating p,wer
between the senate and the people, which should have been a
check upon both.
Q Would not a single ATembly, together and by its Com
mittees, aufwer all the purposes very' well ?—A. No. An
Assembly of mei)is liable to all the impNeftions of an indivi
dual—liable to be milled by prejudices, pafions, wild fancies,
and fickle humours,
Q. Has not experience fheivn that our colonial conventi
ons do very well ?—A. No. Nature arid necessity has com
pelled them univerfeliy to appoint Councils of Safety.—
[Num. 180.