The constitutionalist — Exeter, N.H., 1810-09-03 00:00:00, page 2

power that « neither doubts nor hes
itates" to " take part" in its quarrels.
Had war taken place between the
United States and Spain, and had
France furnished to Spain the aux
iliary force stipulated by treaty, this
would not, by the principles of the law
of nations, have produced a war be
tween the United States and France.
Besides, the troops were" to be em
ployed solely in Europe, or in defence
of the colonies which the contract
ing power possess in the Gulf of Mex
ico." To a war defensive on the part
of the United States, or offensive else
where than in Europe or the Gulf of
Mexico, the stpulation would not be
applicable. Knowing, as Administra
tion did, that this article ofalliance ex
isted, and that its terms would admit
of no more than one construction,
why did it ask the French Govern
ment what would be its course in case
of a war between us and Spain ? Be
cause it wished to acsertain whether
France would stop at the point in
dicated by the treaty, or would in
fact, acting upon the principle that
there was " no Spain," make the war
her own. /Having ascertained—if in
deed it can be said to have ascertained
what it well knew already—that France
would make war upon us if we made
war upon Spain, and having ascertain
ed also that France wanted money,
Administration determined to buy off,
as one would say in common life, by
paying eight millions of dollars for a
boundary to that country for which
it had paid fifteen millions without a
boundary. This is the long and short
of the whole business. The statement,
therefore, that this threat on the part
of France, accompanied with a gen
teel hint that money would be accept
able, influenced Administration to
abandon the idea of honourably main
taining our rights against that power,
(remember there is no Spain) influ
enced^ to succumb to that power in
a most mean and base manner, and
influenced it to conceal the state of
our foreign relations from The People,
remains uncontradicted. Had France
said, " If you go to war with Spain
we shall do no more than furnish her,
agreeably to treaty, with 18000 infan
try, 6000 cavalry, and a proportion
able train of artillery," as little of a
soldier as the Commander in Chief of
our Armies and Navies was, it is per
haps but common charity to believe
that he would have contented himself
with giving up all our claims for Span
ish and French spoliations, and with
relinquishing West Florida and the im
mence region between the Colorado &
the Rio Bravo, which countries he
claimed as a part of Louisiana, in order
to obtain a boundary for the " string
of land" that^ould then be left to us.
Will any man now doubt that Ad
ministration acted under the influence
of a fear of France ?'
Administration has tacitly admitted
(it could not possibly have denied)' the
whole of the facts stated in No. VII.
It has admitted that it had known for
years that France managed all the con
cerns of Spain ; that Thomas Jefferson
had been informed by his agents abroad
that it was the policy of France to
reserve Spain forevents ; that he false
ly stated to Congress that it was the
policy of Spain to reserve herself for
events ; thatour Ministers had offered
to relinquish all our claims for Spanish
and French spoliations ; that, in as
serting that France waQ disposed to
effect asettlement between us & Spain,
he was either guilty of asserting another
gross falsehood, or of intimating to
Congressinamost artfull butmost mean
manner, that money must be paid to
France, as her terms were " analo
gous" to those (pecuniary) terms
which our Minister had already pro
posed ; and that he resorted to means,
superlatively base and wicked, to pro
—cure an appropriation, which was to
be concealed from the people, of the
money thus to be paid to France. Not
a little gratified, however, with an op
portunity to argue this case against
the Administration, the writer will
give it liberty to Amend its Plea;
APPENDIX—^o.%
Vattel, Book iii. chap. &
Os the Enemy's Allies; Societies of
War, Auxiliaries, and Subsidies.
§ 78. We have sufficiently spoken
of treaties in general, that here we shall
touch on this subject only in its par
ticular relations to war. Treaties re
lating to war are of several kinds, and
vary in their objects and clauses, accor
ding to the will of those who make
them. Besides applying to them all
that we have said of treaties in general
(Book ii. chap. 12 &c.) they ma, also
foe divided into treaties real and person
al equal and unequal, &c. But also
thsoe which relate to their particular
object, war, have their specific differ
ences. ]
$79 Under ,this relation, alliances
for war are divided in general into
defensive alliances and offensive alli-
In the former a nation engages
only to defend Its ally in case he be
attacked : in the latter a nation joins
with him for attacking and for jointly
carrying the war into another. Some
alliances are both offensive and defen
sive, and an alliance is seldom offensive
without being also defensive. But it
is very usual for alliances to be purely
defensive: and these are in general the
most natural and lawful. It would be
too tedious, and even of little use, to
go through the detail of all the variety
in these alliances. Some are made with
out restriction towards and against all :
in other certain states are excepted : a
third are formed nominally, against
such or such a nation.
§ 80- But a difference of great im
portance to be observed, especially in
defensive alliances, is that between an
intimate and complete alliance, in
which we engage to make the cause
common, and another in which we
promise only a settled succour ; the al
liance making a common cause is a
society of war. Every one acts with
his whole force ; all the allies become
principals in the war; they have the
same friends and the same enemies:
but an alliance of this nature is more
especially termed a society of war when
it is offensive.
§ 81. When ^sovereign, without di
rectly taking part in the war made by
another sovereign, sends him only suc
cour of troops or ships ; these are cal
led auxiliaries. The auxiliary troops
serve the prince to whom they are sent,
according to their sovereign's orders.
If given purely and simply without
restriction, they are to serve equally
on the offensive or defensive; and in
the conduct of the several operations
they are to obey the prince to whose
assistance they come ;Yet this prince
has not the free and intire disposal of
them, as of his own subjects ; they
are granted him only for his own wars,
and he has no right to transfer them as
auxiliaries to a third power.
§ 83. For judging of the morality
of these sereral treaties of alliances,
of the lawfulness of them according to
the law of the nations. This must be
laid down as an incontestible principle ;
It is lawful and commendable to suc
cour and assist, every way, a nation
making a just war ; and even this as
sistance is the duty of every nation,
which can give % without being want
ing to itself: Bui he who makes an
unjust war is not to be assisted in
any manner. There is nothing in this
which is not demonstrated by all that
we have said of the common duties of
nations towards each other (Book ii.
ch. 1.) Tosupport right when we are
able, is always commendable but to as
sist an unjust party is to partake of
his guilt, it is being no less unjust than
himself.
§ 86. As it is allowable only in a
just war to send succours, or to make
alliances; so every allinace, every so
ciety of war, every treaty of succours,
previously made in time of peace, when
no particular war is intended necessa
rialy and of itself includes this tacit
clause, that the treaty shall take place
only in a just war. On any other
footing the alliance could not be validly
contracted.
§ 88. When alliances have thus been
previously contracted, the cases in
which a nation is to act, in consequence
of the alliance, and in which the force
of the engagements consists, are no oc
casion to be determined. This is what
is called casus foederis, or case of the
alliance. It consists in the concur
rence of the circumstances : for which
the treaty has been made, whether those
circumstances be expressly specified or
"tacitly supposed. Whatever has been
promised in the treaty of alliance is
due to the casus foederis, and not
otherwise.
§ 89. As the most solemn treaties
cannot oblige persons to favour an un
just quarrel [Sect. 86.] the casus foe
deris never takes place in a war mani
festly unjust.
§95. An engagement which may
draw on°a war is of great moment : it
concerns the very safety of the state.
He who in an alliance promises a sub
sidy or a body of auxiliaries, sometimes
thinks that he risks only a sum of
money, ora certain number of soldiers ;
whereas he often exposes himself to war
and all its calamities. The nation a
gainst which he furnishes succours will
look on him as their enemy, and should
the fate of their arms prove favorable,
they will carry the war into his coun
try. But it remains to see whether
such a thing can be done justly,and on
what occasions. Some authors* de
cide in general, that whoever joins our
enemy, or assists him against us with
money, troops, or in any other manner
Iwhatever, becomes thereby our enemy,
and gives us a right of making war a
>gainst him. A cruel decision, and de
• structive of the tranquility of nations !
. It cannot be supported by principles,
and happily the practice of Europe is
§ directly the reverse.
>§ 101. But if a defensive alliance has
- not been made particularly against me,
3 nor concluded at the time when I was
openly declaring for war, or had alrea
dy begun it, and if the allies have only
stipulated in it, that each of them shall
furnish a stated succour to him who shalj
be attacked ; I cannot require that they
should neglect to fulfil a solemn treaty,
which they had an unquestionable right
to conclude without any injury to me.
The succours furnished to my enemy
are the payment of a debt; they do
me no wrong in discharging it, and
consequently give me no just cause to
make war on them. [Sect. 26.] Neith
er can I say that my safety obliges me
to attack them, for I should thereby
increase the number of my enemies,
and instead of a slender succour which
'they furnished against me, should draw
on myself all the united force of those
But it is not thus with those nations
which assist my enemy in a defensive
war; I cannot consider them as his as
sociates [Sect 101.] If lam entitled
to complain of their furnishing him
with succours, this is a new difference
between me and them, I may expostu
late with them, and on not receiving
satisfaction, prosecute my right, and
make war upon them. But in this case
there must be a previous declaration.
[Sect. 51.] The instance of Manlius,
who made war on the Galatians for
having furnished succours to Antiochus,
is not to the point.—Grotiust cen
sures the Roman general for begin
ning the war without a declaration.
The Galatians in furnishing troops
for an offensive war against the Ro
mans had declared themselves enemies
to Rome. Indeed as a peace had been
made with Antiochus, it seems as if
Manlius should not have fallen on the
Galatians till orders came from Rome,
and then if this expedition was con
sidered as a fresh war, it was not only
to be declared, but satisfaction should
have been asked, before proceeding
to hostilities. [Sect. 51.] But the
finishing hand was not yet put to the
treaty with the king of Syria, and it
concerned only him, without any men
tion of his adherents. Therefore Man
lius undertook the expedition against
the Galatians as a consequence or re
mainder of the war with Antiochus.
This is what he himself very well ob
serves in his speech to the Senate, ± and
he even adds, that his first measure was
to try whether he could bring the Gal
atians to resonable terms. Grotius
more appositely cites the example of
Ulysses and his companions, blaming
them for attacking, without any de
claration of war, the Ciconians, who
during the siege of Troy sent succours
to Priam.ll
NOTES.
* See Wolf, Jus Gentium Sect. 730,
736.
+ Lib. ITT. chap. iii. Sect. 10, de
jure belli et pacis.,
* Tit. Liv. Lib. XXXVnt.
II Grotius übi supra, Not. 3. r
POSTSCRIPT.
Appendix No. LIT. Which is to ac
company Letter No. XI, will contain
some unexampled, unparalleled, and
most eccentrick, as well as humiliating,
propositions, which were made by
President Jefferson to the government
of France (pretended!, to Spain) five
or six years ago, and which are as yet
known only to the members of the Ex
ecutive and Legislative Departments of
the United States, and to a very few
individuals in Europe. In the course
of these letters we shall detail most of
the propositions which Jefferson from
time to time made to France. That
artful man has concealed, even from
Congress, the secret propositions which
the French Emperor made to him, and
which one of his subaltern leaders^ in
§ 102. The real associates of my
enemy being my enemies, I have against
them the same rights as against the prin
cipal enemy. [Sect. 95.] And as they
declare themselves such; as they first
take arms against me; I make war
upon them without any declaration :
it is sufficiently declared by their own
act. This is especially the case of those
who in any manner whatever concur
to make an offensive war against me,
and it is likewise the case of all those
whom we have mentioned in Sect. 96.
97. 98. 99. 100.
and even troops, and France never
complained against these proceedings
till those troops marched into Alsatia
to attack their frontiers. Switzerland,
in virtue of its alliances with France,
furnishes that crown with a large body
of troops, and notwithstanding lives in
peace with all Europe.
It is happy for Europe that herein a
grees with the true principles. A prince
seldom takes upon him to complain of
succours furnished for the defence of
nations. Therefore it is only the aux
iliaries sent by them who arc my ene
mies. These are actually joined to my
enemies, and fight against me. The
contrary principles tend to multiply
wars, and spread them without mea-
an ally, promised by former treaties, by
treaties not made against him. In the
last war the united provinces furnished
the Queen of Hungary with Subsidies,
sure to the common ruin of nations.
In the latter end of February, 1809,
just before the adjournment of Con
gress, Mr. Jefferson (then President)
sent a message to the Senate, informing
them of his having, in the month of
August preceding, commissioned Wil
liam Short as minister plenipotentiary
to the court of St. Petersburg—and
nominated him for that office. Con
gress had then been in session several
months, and from day to day employ
ed in discussing, our foreign relations,
without any knowledge, or even inti
mation, of Mr. Short's mission. The
Senate unanimously rejected the nomi
nation.
What authority had President Jef
ferson to appoint, commission and
send off a minister to Russia, where
the United States had never before
that time had a minister ? By the Con
stitution, the President is authorised
" to nominate, and by and with the
the consent of the Senate, to appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers &
consuls, judges of the supreme court,
and all other officers of the U. States,
whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by law." —" The Presi
dent shall have power to fill up all va
cancies that may happen during the re
cess of the Senate, by granting com
missions which shall expire at the end
of the next session." It is very certain
that the appointment of M'r. Short was
not made by virtue of the power con
tained in the latter clause above quot
ed, for as no ambassador had ever been
appointed from the United States to
Russia, no vacancy could have hap
pened; and the power given by this
part of the Constitution extends only
to the case of a vacancy happening
when the Senate is not in session. It
is true that Mr. Jefferson, during his
presidency, contrived to render the
Constitution void on the subject of ap
pointments to office, by removing mul
titudes officers, and thus making vacan
cies, and then filling them up.—The
word " happening" does not naturally
suit the case of a removal bypresiden
tial authority. But if he had been
disposed to give the Constitution a fair
construction, he would not have made
all the vacancies happen by removing
the officers during the recess ; he would
have taken the opportunity when the
Senate was in session. In the present
case, however, he made not only the
officer, but the office. Congress had
made no provision at all for a mission
to Petersburg, and the appointment of
Mr. Short was clearly an unconstitu
tional exercise of power, which no oth
er president would have dared to ven
ture upon. This is not only the ob
vious and true constuction of the con
stitution, but it is believed it has also
been the practical construction of it.
Neither Washington nor Adams ever
claimed or exercised the power of cre
ating new diplomatic missions and le
gations to whatever courts they pleas
ed.
The mission of Mr. Short is the first
of the sort on record; and we hope
and trust it will be the last. In virtue
of his spuriousappointment and com
mission, he went, not to St. Peters
burg, but to France, the great centre
of our foreign correspondence and
diplomatic affairs. By the laws of
the United States, an ambassador reg
ularly appointed to a foreign court,
is entitled to a salary not exceeding
nine thousand dollars a year, and an
outfit not exceeding the amount of a
year's salary. This salary, and this
outfit, cannot be lawfully paid out of
the treasury of the United States to
any but an ambassador legally and
constitutionally appointed. The fol
lowing documents will serve to shew
that a considerable sum of the people's
money had been, before that time paid
to Mr. Short, in consequence of his
being thus.irregularly and unconstita
ally sent on this mission. How much
more he may have obtained since, is
not yet known.
4J “ REPORT.
" The Secretary of the Treasury, in
obedience to the resolution of the.
House of Representatives ofthe ^d
inst. respectfully ^'
one of his few honest moments, declar
ed he had no doubt were " infamous."
But strange as it may seem! Good
Fortune will so haveit, that we have got
a very strong grasp upon a perfect clue
to them, and we will' not let go her
hold. We shall also, “in process of
of time," give a sketch of the history
and true 1 character of the secret treaty
between Spain and France, upon which
Administration affect to repose as upon
a solid ground of defence; and perhaps
of other secret treaties. The public
are convinced that we do not trifle with
them. We are continually receiving
new information, and shall be able to
afford interesting "Letters upon French
influence," for a number of years.
Science of draining Money front the
From the Connecticut Mirror.
TREAS UR Y.
Upon discovering by this Report,
that the business of this sort is trans
acted "in conformity with instruc
tions received from the Department
of State, application was made by the
Committee of Ways and Means to that
department, for the necessary informa
tion, and the following answer to that
application was received from Mr.
Robert Smith, Secretary of State.
Department of State April 30, 1810-
" Sir—l had the honor to receive
your letter of the 28th inst. covering;
a Report of the Secretary of the treas
ury, on a resolution of the House of
Representatives of the 23d inst. relative
to advances of public money to Wm.
Short, and stating that the committee
of Ways and Means had directed you
to ask for such information as may be
in possession of the department of State
relative thereto, and particularly, by
what authority the same has been paid
to him. In reply to this inquiry, I
have the honor to inform you, that the
late President of the United State, dur
ing the recess of Congress, commis
sioned Mr. Short as minister plenipo
tentiary to the court of Petersburg,
that Mr. Short proceeded to Europe
on his mission in October 1808, that
as is usual on such occasions, a credit,
(by letter dated September 24th) wa&
opened for him by the department of
State, with the bankers of the United
States, at Amsterdam, and that he has,
in virtue of this credit, according to
his statement, drawn twenty thousand,
two hundred and seventy one Francs.
I have the honor to be, with great re.
spect, your most obedient servant,
(Signed). R. SMITH.
Willis Alston, Esq.
This sum, by Mr. Gallatin's Report,
amounts to three thousand, nine
HUNDRED, AND SEVENTY EIGHT DOL
LARS, AND FORTY CENTS. If Mr.
Short was legally entitled to this, or iu
:deed any sum, in virtue of this appoint
ment, we see not why he was not legal
ly entitled to 18000 dollars, that is 9000
dollars for his outfit, and 9000 dollars
for a year's salary. If he was not en
titled to any thing, here is a disposition
of nearly four thousand dollars of the
publicmoney, by Mr. Jefferson, with*
^opt any provision by law, and directly
in the face of the Constitution.
3
" And, that the disbursements made
by the said bankers out of that fund,
being always made in conformity with
the instructions they may receive from
the department of state, no evidence ex
ists in the treasury department of the
particular authority or authorities, un
der which the payments above-mention
ed were made.
All which is respectfully submitted.
ALBERT GALLATIN.<
Treasury Department,
April 25th. 1810."
Extract from the account of the bank
ers of the United States at Amster
dam, entitled “ The department of
State of the United States of Amer
ica," dated June 30, 1809.
1809.
March 16. To draft of Hot
tinger and Co.
dated Paris, 6
Feb. 35d date,
Frs. 5,125 92 paid to Wm. Short,
39 08 their commiss. &c.
Frs. 5,165 00 ats9 3-8 G 5.2,555 12
29. Do. of the same,
dated 22d do.
35 d date.
Frs. 5,000 paid to the same,
35 their commiss. &c.
" That it appears by the accounts
of the bankers of the United States,
at Amsterdam, aq extract whereof is
hereunto annexed, that he did, between
the 16th day of March, and the 30th
day of June, 1809, receive from the
said bankers 9946 guilders, equal to
3978 dollars 40 cents, which payments
were made out of the sums remitted to
them for the purpose of defraying the
expenses incident to the intercourse
with foreign nations.
May 17. Do. of the same,
dated April 10,'
35 d date,
Frs. 5,000 paid to the same,
35 their commiss.&c.
June 1. Do. of the same,
dated April 23,
35 d date,
Frs. 5,000 paid to the same,
35 their commiss.&c.
REPORTS,
''That William Short has not re
ceived from the treasury any sum of
money whatever, for outfit or com
pensation as minister or agent from the
United States to the Court of St. Pe
tersburg.
Frs. 5,035 at 58 7-3 2,470 16
Frs. 5,035 at 58 5-8 2,459 16
Frs. 5,035 at 58 5.8 2,459 16
Gs. 9,946 00