The New-Jersey gazette — Burlington [N.J.], 1779-05-12 00:00:00, page 1

[No. VII.]
Mr. Collins,
AS civil government is like a great ma
chine, composed of several mechani
cal powers, great Ikill, judgment and
prudence is requisite, both in forming
and putting together so many different
parts, in order to make it move regu
lar, and in regulating and guiding the whole, so as to
obtain the end intended by it. The machine of state
is its fundamental constitution, and the working of
it is the exercise of civil government.
This is generally distinguished into three different
kinds ; Monarchy, in which the supreme power is
lodgedin one person; AriJlocracy, where the govern
ment is lodged in a Council or Senate composed of
persons of noble birth,riches and wealth ; Democracy,
where it is in the hands of the people. The two last
are comprehended under the term Republick or Com
monwealth. —I shall not enter upon a discussion of the
question, Which of these three is to be preferred ?
Caprice, intereß and prejudices h^ve, in all ages,
influenced men in their determinations on this fub
je&. The monarchy we once lived under without
murmuring, we have, for fufficient reasons, discarded,
and adopted a republican government. I only ob
serve, that this is undoubtedly the best calculated, if
well conducted, to promote the happiness of our civil
fcciety. I apprehend, however, that there are two ex
tremes in republican governments, which it behoves us
carefully to avoid. The one is, that noble birth, or
wealthand richer, should be confideredas an hereditary
tiße to the government of the republic. Wisdom and
virtue, the two necessary qualifications of good
civil rulers, are no hereditary endowments of human
nature. The very titles of honour and wealth ex
pose such to the danger of oppressing others for their
support. Was it necessary, I could prove these asser
tions by incontestable arguments. The other ex
treme is,, that the government be managed by the pro
„iifcuous multitude-of the community, as in lome of the
States of anient Greece. The many imperfections
incident to human nature, will ever prevent the majo
rity of every nation to be fitly qualified to manage
civil government. Comparatively few are fit to direct
the great machine of state. The multitude, though
koneft, yet from many natural defeats, are generally
in the execution of government, violent, changeable
and liable to many fatal errors.—The happy medium
is, where the people at large have the sole power of
annually electing such officers of state as are to be
entrufled with the most invaluable rights, liberties and
properties of the people, and the appointment of the
executive authority under their proper controul. —Ame-
rica enjoys an opportunity, which no other nation
ever had, and that is that of coolly and deliberately
forming constitutions for their civil government,
without fear of offending a powerful nobility, or
dreading the displeasure of a military despot. —Thus
have the civil constitution of the thirteen United States
been formed, and according as this important bulinefs
has been committed to men of full, integrity and pru
dence, they have succeeded.
I have carefully perused the Constitution of New-
Jersey, and compared it with some cf the other Rates,
and I humbly conceive the compilers have happily
hit upon the requisite medium. Give me leave, my
felloe-citizens, to show this in a few particulars, for
some reasons! have in view. Our Legislature is annual
ly to be appointed on a fixed day, only by thefa voices
of the people. And in order to give the community
an opportunity of improving by the wisdom and learn
ing (which are generally on the fide of the rich and
wealthy) without exposing them to danger. This
legislature is divided into two branches ; the most
learned and rich being thus generally chosen in the
Council, will not have that opportunity by fubtilty
and sophistry, to mislead the more unlearned, though
honeß, in the Assembly, to betray the common m
tereft to their private emolument, they would have,
were they mixed with them in one body. All money
matters and impeachments for mal-adminiftration,
are for that reason, committed to the Assembly. —
Because the duty of civil officers is to execute the
laws upon the fubjedts, and mostly upon their neigh
bours and acquaintances, it is evident what tendency
it would have to relax the molt wholesome and neces
sary laws, in case those magistrates were to be elected
by these their neighbours: Therefore their appoint
ment is committed to the joint body of the people's
Representatives. These hold their cominifiions on
good behaviour, during certain fixed periods, at the
expiration of which, they may be renewed or not, as
their merit shall require. The different periods are
suited to the necessary trials. This gives a continual
check on mal-adminiftration, and a spur to a proper
NEW-JERSEY GAZETTE.
[Vol. ll.]
WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 1779.
difeharge of duty. Though prejudices, derived from
our former very different constitution, may urge
reasons in favour of judges being independent, both
as to their offices and salaries, yet their conciutions
will by no means hold good in our present constitu
tions. I acknowledge they ought to be independent
of the individuals whole cases they are to judge ;
but hence does not follow that they ought to be in
dependent of the community at large, whose interest
they are bound to promote, by an impartial distri
bution of justice. As a farther precaution, it pro
hibits all persons from holding offices of profit in the
State from a feat in the Aflemby, the branch to which
the care bf the public money is committed. I with
it had been more explicitly prohibited that judges
should have any feat in our Leg illative Council ; be
cause judges of the laws ought to have no hand in
framing them.
Such constitutions, formed by persons appointed
and empowered by the people for that purpose, being
published and generally approved by the community,
become sacred and inviolate. No Legislature ought
to presume to alter cr amend one (ingle article in
them : And any bill enacted contrary to the constitu
tion, I humbly conceive to be 110 law. For the con
stitution is, as it were, the chartered right both by
which the, enjoy and exercise their power, and the
people hold their rights, privileges, liberties and pro
perties. Thus, if our Legislature should permit one
member to take a feat in the House of Assembly,
who at the fame time holds an office of profit within
the State, I doubt whether any law enacted while
such member holds his feat, is binding upon the fub
jedts; because they thereby counteract the very autho
rity by which they enjoy their Legislative capacity, and
undermine the ver, barrier of the people's fafet,.
And if they lawfully may do it in one initance, they
may in a thousand. At what a precarious tenure
then should we hold our most sacred rights and pri-°
vileges ? Defeats in constitutions may be altered and
amended, but it must be done by the original power
of the people.
Having premised these remarks, I beg leave humbly
to address myfelf to the Honourable our Legillature.
Gentlemen, this machine of state is given unto you
by your constituents, not to amend and new form it,
but to prelerve it inviolate, and purluant to it, pro
mote as much as poflible the interest and happiness
of this people. Permit me to remind you on this
occa'fion, of a leading principle in good policy, that
is, that the Legislature of a state be particularly care
ful to support and encourage those principally em
ployed in the flaple commodities for trade, on which
the well-being and prosperity of the whole chiefly de
pends. Trade is as it were the life and foul of civil
society ; and this depends upon the Raple commodi
ties of the nation. Hollanders are called the carriers
of Europe ; they chiefly fublilt and inrich themlelves
by their Slipping. Therefore Shipbuilding, and the
railing of lailors, is principally promoted among them.
The Engliih trade much depends upon their manu
fa&ures ; therefore these have always been chief in
the view of their Legislature. America is so particu
larly lituated, that her only staple for trade is the
produce of the husbandman. 1 feel confident that
in proportion as these are encouraged and supported,
so will the wealth and happiness of America increase.
And that from the moment these should be neglected
or oppressed, directly the reverse will immediately
ensue. From a full persuasion that you are sensible of
this, I beg your attention to two important matters.
I. The main fiibjed of some of my former num
bers. If you will take the trouble to peruse them with
attention, and properly exercise your own judgment,
I think you must be sensible of a two-fold evil, which
threatens this most ufeful class of men among us.
The sirs tis, that in case the whole of the basely
depreciated money is chiefly to be made good by taxes
on husbandry, that this will be great injustice and an
intolerable oppreflioii upon them; which will inevit
ably ruin some and difeoura+e others.
2. What influei ce such an event would probably
have upon the fundamental part of our molt happy
constitution. I have before observed, that if so greet
an over-balance of wealth was caji into the scale of the
rich, it would in all probability prove the means of fab
verting it. I would here humbly offer a hint of an ad
ditional danger of this sort.—ls you recollect that this
state is a member of an extended empire, you must be
sensible that any prevailing party in the Supreme Coun
cil must have great influence, either beneficial or de
trimental, upon the particuar members. The Ipirit
of the different constitutions on this continent will
point out to you what you have particularly to guard
against. That of ours, with some others, is truly
democratical ; That of some borders upon Arfocracy.
T H E
Hence you will find the latter always favour plans
calculated for the advantage of the rich and wealthy.
The former such as have a tendency to benefit the
commonalty. In perusing the New-York constitution
it appears evident to me that the powers of govern
ment are thrown into the hands of the rich and wealthy
in the two cities. The manifef tconduct of the mer
chants and traders among us, have fully Ihewed
throughout the course of this contest, what kind of
patriots and governors the body of them are, worthy
individuals excepted. From thence, I apprehend, has
proceeded the maugreing of the constitution, such as
it is, in favour of those citizens, by appointing metn-<
bers for the city and counties under the jurisdiction
of the enemy, without any election of proper consti
tuents, both in Assembly and Senate. It appears
highly probable to me, that men, who,have thus, car
ried their point against the commonalty in their own
state, being delegated to the august Council of the
empire, will endeavour to favour every scheme which
may have the fame tendency in the other states.—He
that is in any degree acquainted with the government
of nations, will be convinced that riches and wealth
ever lay human nature under the strongest temptations
to grasp at the reins of government ; ^and, when ob
tained, to lord it over the honest commonalty in so
ciety.—Hence I would almost venture to assert, that
if you enquire of your delegates you will become sen
sible that individuals in the Supreme Council of this
empire have al^dy difeovered symptoms gs such am
bitious designs. I would therefore most humbly and
earnestly entreat you to bend your minds upon, and
earnestly exert yourselves for, the preferva+ion and pro-'
motion of that political happiness of the community at
large, for which they have contended at the expence of so
much labour, treasure and blood. I would hence fub
mitafew particulars to your most (erious consideration.
I. Whether the delegates of the different states in
Congress, being men of like passions as others, -and
under such powerful temptations, ought not to=be
narrowly and Strictly wafcheahy their refpedive con
stituents, in all the transactions ft th'efr Ration?
2. Whether the delegates are not, or at leak ought
not to be, responsible to their refpedive constituents
fur the application of the many millions of public
money the expences of the empire require ?
3. Whether you are fußicieiitly sensible that proper
meafurcs have been pursued, throughout the couife
cf this war, to fatisfy the Legislatures of the different
Rates in the union, on this head?
4. Whether, while the confederacy of the several
Rates is forming, you confider it as fafe and prudent
to give to fifty or forty representatives (if even we lup
pofe them all the most virtuous) an unkmitted power
to raise or grant and apply any sum or sums of money,
with which the different Legislatures are to have no
farther concerns than to be informed of, and furnilh
their refpedive quotas?
5. Whether your constituents have not some reasons
to fufped that too little attention has been paid
during the confufions and convulsions of this unna
tural war, to these important matters of state ? And
in case of former neglect, whether that does not now
claim a double degree of attention to matters of such
moment ?
6. If there should be any foundation for the reports,
that some members of Congress dare presume to in
sinuate their atheistical blafpliemy, even in the august
Council; and that it is common for such, together
with others, to be engaged in gaming, balls and as
semblies—Whether such conduct is to be considered
as consistent with that dignity and majesty, which is
necessarily required in the representative body of so
extensive an empire, and best fits such members for
that ciofe attention and deep penetration which the
many intricate and important concerns of a nation
involved in a calamitous war, demand; and is best
calculated to procure the continuation of the kind
interpolation of Providence in our favour?
7. Whether the base depreciation of our currency,
so evidently pregnant with ruin to thousands, does
not demand the most dftntereJled care and concern of
the representatives of a free people, in order to pre
vent, as much as possible, its dangerous effeds to the
prejudice of the community?
8. In case a loan Should be procured from Europe,
Whether the greatest prudence and precaution ought
not to be used to make such a loan answer Gme va
luable purpose for the common advantage of the na
tion, and not for the private emolument of individual: ?
Permit me, Gentlemen, to offer you a few hints in
explanation of the last case.—l take it for granted that
such a lp^n is intended to be procured for some im
portant advantage to the comni&r. and not to en
able merchants and traders the impure.
[For the remainder fee the fourth paged]
[Numb. 75.]