The Mirror — Concord, N.H., 1799-02-11 00:00:00, page 1

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Printed and publijbed every Monday morning, by MOSES DAVIS, in CONCORD, Newhampshire.
l^ffi '
LIBERTY of SPEECH, and
of the PRESS.
—-„_—=■« —
CO I" ^ & 10 re entire th: folding
Charge of %so ADD: son, to th Grand
furies of P^nfohuama, @1 bam omitted
jome matters 0/ little confluence. It is a
rich fyfflitute for the variety foil, given
anfa'be bead of the Sentimental Medley
—lt is worth a folio of Poetry ;— better
tea volume ts Anecdotes.---" It is a
plain, centre, and impartial Commentary
tide Law of th United States, fomin
wed the Sedition Bill, 'which bat been
male the cau/e of so much clamour and libel
to abuftof tbt Government. It is , able
ana learned expedition fool true Liberty
of Speech and of the Press ; containing
an ample refutation of all the obedient to
the L^us which have recently been snaked
by Congrty ; and clearly illufrating the
Rights of the Citizen, and the nectary re
ftrainte 00 he licentioufoefs. It is the
Council of Wifton and Patriotijm,)peak
ing from Experience." — It ought to be read
in every family— Let it never be forgotten,
till time shall be no more. Any farther com
ments are unnee fory. Read, & admire]
A Charge to the Grand Juries of the
County Courts of the Fifth Circuit of
the s+ite n f Pennsylvania.
by ALEXANDER ADDISON,
President of those Courts.
Gentlemen of the Jury,
IT is of the utmost importance to
a free people, that the just limits of their
Sights be well afeertained and preferred :
torliberty without limit is licentiousness ;
and licentiousness is the worst kind of ty
ranny, a tyranny of all.,—To preserve
ourselves against this, and maintain true
liberty, a line must be drawn between
©he rightsf each ; so well marked, as
that it be known by all, & so 'veil guard
ed, is that it cannot be passed by any
faith impunity. Thus every man will
be free ; for every man may exercise his
rights to the extent of their juftlimits,
and cannot go beyond those limits and
encroach on the tights of others. My
right to enjoy implies that no man fhali
-disturb my enjoyment. And it is no re
straint on my liberty, that in the exer
cise of my rights, I am refrained from
infringing the rights of others. The
rule is, So uJe.your own rights as not to in
jure those of others. Invafon of the rights
of others is tyranny, and if this invasion
may be made by every one, it is tyranny
of the worst kind, for in proportion to
the number of oppressors will be the de
sire and opportunity of oppreflion. $ The
true friend of liberty, therefore, is he
who will let such strong limits round the
rights of every man, that, in the exercise
of them, no man can interrupt the rights
of any other. And they are not friends
of liberty, but promoters of licentious
ness, tyranny, and oppreflijn, Who con
tend, that every man ought to have an
unlimited exercise of his own rights,
without any regard to the rights of oth
ers. I can have no right to injury the
rights of another ; and if I claim this, I
am a tyrant and oppressor.
Reputation, charades, good name or
opinion is a kind of property or pofcffien,
which every mao, who h, honestly ac
quired it, hasaright to enjoy. Like any
other possession or property,it cannot be
taken away from us, but by our own
a&s. The mafewho invades the reputa
tion invades the right of another. And
not only individuals, but more especially
men in public station, branches or depart
ments of the Government, the whole ad
ministration, and the principles, consti
tution, or system of Government, and the
principles of system of public religion and
morals, have a right, for the fake of the
benefits we receive from them, to reputa
tion, good name and opinion; and the
invasion of the repetition of either of
thofais an invasion of right, a lessening
of ourcomfort and motives to duty.
Butman is endowed with faculties of
communicating sentiments, of inveftigat
ioi z principles, and of forming opinions
and judgments. The exercise of those
faculties is a source of pitafure and in
©fe 9fßolt.
CONCO R fi, MO N D AY, February ii, 1799.
ftruaion, A knowledge, and a jadg-1
meat of principles, of fxasiand of char-I
afters, may be ufeful for the improve
ment of our minds, and the legislation of
cur condua. The exercise of those fac
ulties of opinion, rescuing,judgment,
and communication, is part of our na
tural right. But the principles of liber
ty require, that this -right, like all other
rights, be limited, so that it never infringe
the right of reputation. It must not re
prefect a foiemn truth or exercise of re
ligion as falfe or ridiculous, an establish
ed and ufeful principle or form of our
Government as odious and detestable ;
a regular or salutary ad or motive of the
administration as unlawful, pernicious,
or dishonest ; oran upright man as cor
rupt. For this would be exercising our
right of opinion or communication, so as
to infringe the right of reputation, and
be violating the principles of liberty and
natural right-
The principles of liberty, therefore,
-the rights of man, require, that our right
of communicating information, as to
fads and opinions, be so restrained, as
not to infringe the right of reputation.
Unless it be so restrained, there is no lib
erty ; forthere is no just eijyment of
our rights. And if every man's right of
communication be unrestrained, every
man's right of reputation is unguarded;
and there is, in this refpea, universal li
centiousness, and each man is at the
mercy of every man ; most precarious
and oppressive of all states. Therefore
the freeft Governments, which have the
most regarded and cultivated the prici
pies of liberty, as they have so described
and limited other rights, that none
should infringe any other, have been
careful so to define and limit the rights of
refutation, and of communication of
fetoiments, that the right of either should
not infringe that of the other. # '
We communicate cur, sentiments by
words spoken, written, or printed, or by
pictures or other figos. The restraints
laid on the exercise of this rignt, so as it
may not infringe the right of reputation,
differ, according to the way in which the
right of communication is exercised. If
the right of reputation of a private citi
zen be infringed by words spoken, no in
didment williie for this injury, which is
only a ground for a civil action tb recov
er damages.—" In fore cenjeientia?," Jays
a learned Author, before the tribunal of
conscience, ' it is no excuse, that the
slanderous words are true ; for if 2 man
have been guilty of any thing which the
law prohibits, he is liable to answer for
it, in a legal way ; but it can answer no
good purpose for a private person to ac
cuse him thereof ; there is a degree of
cruelty in so doing, and it must create ill
blood. Yet the law does, in compassion
to man's infirmities, allow it to be ajuf
tification in an adion, for words spoken,
that they are true." But when slander
ous words are spoken of the constitution,
or administration, or any of its ads or of
ficers, they areground for ah indidment
—as a misdemeanor, or breach of the
duty of a citizen. The reason of this is
evident: for, as for an injury affcaing an
individual, the remedy is by aaiou, so
for an injury affecting the public, the
remedy is by indidment.
With refpea to libels, or Bander ex
pressed by words written or printed, or
by piaures or other figus, and infringing
the right of reputation : " they have,"
fays the fame author, " at all times, and
with good reason, been puaifhed in a
more exemplary manner than flandgrpus
words; for having a greater tendency to
provoke men to breaches of the peace,
quarrels and murders, they are of much
more dangerous consequence to society.
Words which are frequently the <£& of
. a sudden goft of pafiion may soon ^buri
ed in oblivion. But libels, besides that
the author is adnated by more deliberate
malice, are for the most part so lifting,
as to befcarce ever forgiven.". For this
. reason, a libel aff^ing the reputation of
even a private citizen, is restrained by
being considered as a public ffence; and
fubjea to an indi&ment. But whether,
on thetrial of fug indiament, the truth
of the libel may be given in evidence,
will depend on the nature of the libel.
Justice Blackstone defines libels, ^ tak- I
co intheir largest sense to be writings, 1
pianos or the like, of an immoral or it
legal tern'ency, and io a m'?re particular
fenfe,apy me!trims defamations of any
person, ane efycciafy a migiftrate, made
public §^^iier printing signs, or pic
tyics, in order to provoke him to wrath
or „pflfe bim to public hatred, contempt'
oi ridicule. It is immaterial, with ref
pa to ne effe ice of a libel, whether the
ma?er" of it be hue ,or falfe ; fioce the
provocation, and hot the falfity, is the
thing to he punifh&l criminally. There
fore in a criminal prosecution, the ten
dency, which all libels have to create an
imosities, and to difturft the public peace,
is the. whole that the law confiders."
The conftitutiOT of our State provides,
" That the Printing presses (hall be free
to every person who undertakes to exam
ine the proceeding , of the legislature, or
any branch of Government :—and no
law frail ever be made to restrain the
right thereof. The free communication
ot thoughts and opinions is one of the
invaluable rights,©! man, and every citi
zen may freely speak, write, and print in
any fubjeß; being responsible for the a
buse ot that liberty. In prosecutions
for the publication ot papers investigat
ing the official condua of officers, or
men in a public capacity, or where the
matter published is proper for publicin
formation, the truth thereof may be giv
en in evidence. —And in all iadiaments
for libels, the jury ihall have a right to
determine the law and the f^ds, under
the diredion of the court as in other caf
es.''
From this ftaternent of the law respec
ting libels, the following dedudions seem
evident. (
1. This right of free communication
of thoughtsand opinions is, like all oth
er rights, limited by responsibility for
itsacefe; and laws to punish its abuse,
are not, in a conft^utional or just sense,
restraints on the liberty of the press.
z. The general rule is, that, in indi&-
ments for libels, truth cannot be given
in evidence
3 I This rule is excluded only from the
cates mentioned in this fedion of the con
stitution, and remains yet applicable to
all other cases.
4. It is only so far as the paper charg
ed as a libel investigates the official con
dud of officers, or men in a public capa
city, or where the matter published is
proper for public information, that the
truth thereof can be given in evidence.
In all other cases, truth i^nojuftification
—for it is the provocation which consti
tutes the essence.
5. As grand juries hear evidence only
in behalf of the p+ofecuti®n, and in in
didments for libels, as in other cases, the
jury determine the law and the fads un
der the diredion of the court (that is,
conforming to this direction in point of
law, have a right to give a general ver
dia) the grand jury, generally speaking,
cannot ascertain whether the libellous
matter be true or not ; but, if the mak
ing or publishing of the libel be proved,
they will find the bill, and on the trial
before the traverse jury, the court will
direct; whether evidence of thflmth be
admissible or not, and whether the mat
ter be libellous or not ; and, under the
oiredion of the court, the traverse jury
will Determine the lawand the fa&s. If
a traverse jury Should determine that a
paper is a libel, which is not, and convid
a man who has committed no offence,
the court has a control over their verdid,
by granting a new trial, or arresting
judgment. But if the jury determine
that a libel is no libel, and acquit a mad
isally guilty of an offence, the court has
nocontrol over thi> verdid, for a man ac
quitted of ©criminal charge can never be
tried againon the fame charge.
- Such feerias to be the state of the ri|ht
'of communication of thoughts and opin
ions, according to the law of Pennfylva;
nia. Any thing may be spoken in terms
of decency proper to the fubjed, of the
Government, an officer, or an individu
al, provided the fpe&r can prove it to
be true. But all truths are not ufeful
or proper for publication, therefore all
truths are not tc be written, printed, arid
so uttered or published. And therct >re,
except in the case of papers ih,effig<ring
the official conduct of officers, or men in
s public capacity, or where the matter
pub!:fcd h proper for public informa
tion, if any man write, print, urter, or
publish a libel, he may be indicted, con
victed, and punished, whether the libel
lous matter be true or Act.
,Congrefi, in its last session, has puffed
a law, enacting, that if any person, fh^ll
unlawfully combine .sober, with in
tent to oppose any measure of the Gov
ernment of the United States, or impede
the operation of any law of the United
States,or to prevent any person holding
any office Under the Government cf the
United States from performing his duty ;
or shall, with such intent, advise or at
tempt to procure any infurreQion, rioi,
unlawful assembly or combination ; they
shall be deemed guilty of a high n^fde
meanor, and be punilhed by a fine, not
exceeding five thousand dollars, and by
fmprifonmeot, for not less than fix
months, nor more than five years; arid
may further be holden to furems for
good behaviour. Audit further enacts,
that if any person shall write, print, ut
ter or publish, or shall cause or procure
to be written, printed, uttered, or pub
lished, or shall knowiagly.aid in writing,
printing, uttering, or publishing, any
falfe, scandalous, and malicious writing
against the Government of the United
States, or either house of Congress, or
the President of the Unitea States/ with
intent to defame the faio Government,
or either house of Coogrefs, or the Presi
dent, or to bring them, or either of them,
into contempt or disrepute ; or to excite
against them or either of them, the hat
red ot the people of the United States ,
or to excite unlawful combinations there
in, for opposing or refilling any law of
the United States, or any act of the Fref
kh%t of & tiu^d States, done in pur
loanee ot any such law, or of the powers
vested in him by the constitution of the
United States ; or to oppose or defeat ti
ny such law or acts ; or to aid, encour
age, or abet any hostile designs of any
foreign nation against the United States,
their people or Government ; —fuch per
son shall be punished by a fine, not ex
ceeding two thousand dollars, and imprif
oument, not exceeding two years.
This a&, which seems to be b<o known
by the name of the Sedition Bill, provides,
" That if any person shall be pfofecuted
under it, for writing or publishing any
libel, it shall be lawful for him, on the
trial of the cause, to give in evidence, the
truth of the matter contained in the pub
lication, charged as a libel. And the
jury who shall try the cause, shall have a
right to determine the law and the fact,
under the direction of the court, as io
other cases." This clause, clearly bor
rowed from the section already quoted of
the constitution of Pennsylvania, con
firms, so far as concurrent expressions of
different perf®ns on the fame (object can,
the construction which I put on that fee
tion, that the time for giving in evidence
the truth of the libellous matter is at the
trial of the cause by the traverfejury.
No law seems to have been rtlifted in
Congress with more vehemence and pas
sion, by those who opposed all the raea
fores adopted as measures of defence a
gainst the hostile spirit of France. And,
out of doors, it has been attacked with
fallen rancour, as a deathwound to the
pregrefs of that detestable system of flan,
der, which has been pursued with such
malignant industry, and calami, pus suc
cess, against every mesfure of the admin
istration. And vet Grange as it may
seem. this law does not create any new
offence; for every thing forbidden by it
appears to me to have beeh, before, an
offence at cofomon law. The combina
tions and attempts therein forbidden are
mifdemfanors Any writing of an im
moral or illegal tendency is a libel. And
flinderous words spoken of the Govern,
ment, of its acts or authority, are pun
iftiabe by indictment.
It rohy he said then, why was this law
made ? Several reasons may be given for
tlt is no uncommon thing for a tegif
lature to make an act declaratory of the
[ N ^ 328].