The Mirrour — Concord, N.H., 1793-08-19 00:00:00, page 4

On Miss FANNY CARELESS.
CARELESS b, name, and careless b, na
ture,
Careless offbape, and careless offeature,
Careless in dress, and careless in air,
Careless in riding, in coach or in chair,
Careless of love, and careless of hate,
Careless if crooked, and careless iffrait,
Careless at table, and careless in bed,
Careless if maiden, and careless if wed,
Careless at Church, and careless at play, %
Careless if company go or they flay,
Carelejs if Strephon jhews any desire,
Careless of what all the feces admire.
E'en careless at tea, & midnight's chit chat,
1 carelefs,foe's careless for this or for that :
Careless of all love or wit can propose,
She's careless so careless, there's nobody knows.
0! bow could Ilove thee, tbou dear care
less thing !
(0 ! bappy, thrice happy, I'd envy no king ! )
Where you carefulfor once to return meyour
love,
[Continued from the frft Page.]
As one State may sue another State in
this court, it is plain that no degradation
to a State is thought to accompany her
appearance in this court: it is not there
fore to an appearance in this court that
the objedion points. To what does it
point? It points to an appearance at the
suit of one or more citizens.
But why it mould be more incompati
ble, that all the people ofa State should
be sued by one citizen than by one hun
dred thousand, I cannot preceive—the
proems in both cases being alike—and
the consequences of the judgments alike.
WHEN the Irijh Parliamentary
Commissioners were lately in London,
one of them being in a large compa
ny at the Duke of Portland's, was
fed by a priggifo Peer, who/e
spouse has not been celebrated for a
Lucretia, " whether the Irijh, when
they come to London, were not gener
ally remarked for making belli ?"—
66 Yes, m, lord," answered the Com
missioner, my Countrymen, when they
come to England, not only male bulls,
but a great number of other horned
creatures." d
A LONDON rider, returning
home from a long journey ver,
much fatigued went to sap al night
without performing some duties,
which his wife thought it neceffar,
and indispensable for him to go
through. The next morning, on go
% into the kitchen befaw bis boots
burning upon the fre, and his spurs
broke. Upon inquiring into the cause,
bis wife replied. Why my dear
what occa(ioq ,ave- you for boots
or spurs when you have left off rid
ing. °
Pd care not bow careless to others you prove.
I then should be careless bow carelefiyou were,
Andthe more carelejs you, fill the less I should
care.
XJ YMPHS I bate who lean and pale.
Borrow art, if naturefail;'
Brijk and air, let berbe,
She's the girl admired by me!
Sway'd b, envy,fway'd by pride,
Which the gems of beaut, hide,
Fair as Venus tbo'fa be,
She's not form'd tbe girlfor me !
She whose voice ^d'wit can dart
Tranjports, thrilling thro' the heart,
Free from pride,from envy free.
She's the girl admir'd b, me !
Who with negligence of art,
Performs the fprightl, dancer's part ;
Young and blooming, blithe and free,
She's the girl admir'd by me !
Nor praais'dfmile, nor borrow'd grace,
Should lend a luftre to her face, .
By nature let her painted be,
She's the girl admir'd b, me .'
Iffalje, fee ne'er shall break my rest,
I'll tear her from my wounded breast ;
And another fair as foe,
Shall be found the girl for me. ,
THE PIERRIDES.
HILARITY.
ASONG.
Prior to the date of the Constitution,
the people had not any national tribunal
to which they could resort for justice—
The distribution ofjuftice was then con
fined to State judicatories, in whose insti
tution and organization the people of she
other States had no participation, and
over whom they had not the least con
troul. There was then no General Court
of appellate jurifdidion, by whom the er
rors of State Courts, affeding either the
nation at large or the citizens of any oth
er State, could be revised and correct
ed. Each State was obliged to acquiesce
in the measure ofjuftice which another
State might yield to her, or to her citi
zens ; —and that even in cases where Sate
considerations were not always favourable
to the most exaC tmeafure—there was
danger that from this source animofiti^
would in time result ; —and as the transi
tion from animosities to hostilities was
frequent in the hiftory of independent
States, a common tribunal for the termi
nation of controversies became desirable,
Nor con I observe any greater inconveni
ence in the one case than in the oth
er, except what may arise from the feel
ings of those who may regard a lefler
number in an inferior light.
But if any reliance be made on this
inferiority as an objection, at least one
half of its force is done away by this faa,
viz. that it is conceded that a State may
appear in this court as plaintiff against
a single citizen as defendant ; and the
truth is, that the State of Georgia is at
this moment prosecuting an action in this
court against two citizens of Southcaro
lina.
from motives both ofjuftice and of policy.
Prior also to that period, the United
States had, by taking a place among the
nations of the earth, became amenable to
the laws of nations ; and it was their in
terest as well as their duty to provide,
that those laws should be refpeded and
obeyed—in their national character and
capacity, the United States were respon
sible to foreign nations for the condud of
each State, and of the citizens of each
State, relative to the laws of nations, and
the performance of treaties ; and there
the inexpediency of referring all such
questions to State Courts, and particu
larly to the courts of delinquent States,
became apparent. While s// the States
were bound to prote& each, and the citi
zens of each, it was highly proper and rea
sonable, that they should be in capacity,
not only to cause justice to be done to
each, and the citizens of each ; but also
Let us now proceed to inquire wheth
er Georgia has not, by being a party to
the national compact, consented to be
suable by individual citizens' of another
State.
to cause justice to be done by each, and
the citizens of each ; and that, not by
violence and force, but in a stable, sedate,
and regular course of judicial procedure.
These were among the evils against
which it was proper for the nation; that
is, the people of all the United States, to
provide by a national judiciary, to be in
stituted by the whole nation, and to be
responsible to the whole nation.•
Let us now turn to the Constitution.
The only remnant of objection there
fore that remains is, that the State is not
bound to appear and answer as a defendant
at the suit of an individual ; but why it is
unreasonable that she should be so bound,
is hard to conjecture—that rule is said to
be a bad one, which does not work both
ways—the citizens of Georgia are con
tent with a right of suing citizens of oth
er States ; but are not content that cit
izens of other States should have a right
to sue them.
The people therein declare, that their
design in efiablifhing it, comprehended
fix objects.'..
I. To form a more perfect union.
2. To eftablilh justice.
3. To ensure domestic tranquility.
4. To provide for the common defence.
5. To promote the general welfare.
6. To secure the bleifings of liberty t?
themselves and their posterity.
It would be pleasing and ufeful to con
fider and trace the relations which each
of these objeds bears to the others ; and
to shew that they gplle&ivel, comprise
every thing requisite, with the blessing of
Divine Providence, to render a people
prosperous and happy—on the present
This inquiry naturally leads our atten
tion, ...
i. To the design of the Constitution.
z. To the letter and express declara
tion in it. -
occasion such disquisitions would be un
seasonable, because foreign to the jubje&
immediately under confideratiori.
It may be asked, what is the precise
sense and latitude in which the words " to
eftabltlh juftice,"' as here used, are to be
understood ? The answer to this quest
ion will result from the provisions made
in the constitution on this head. —They
are fpecified in the second fe&ion of the
third article, where it is ordained, that
8. To controversies between a State
and citizens of another State —because in
case a State (that is all the citizens of it)
has demands against some citizens of an
other State, it is better that she should
prosecute their demands in a national
court, than in a court of the State to
which those citizens belong—the danger
of irritation and criminations arising from
apprehensions and suspicions of partiali
ty, being thereby obviated.
Because, in cases where some citizens
of one State have demands against all the
citizens of another State, the cause of lib
erty and the rights of men forbid, that
the latter should be the sole judges of the
2. To all cases arising under the laws
of the United States —because as such
laws, constitutionally made, are obliga
tory on each State, the measure of obliga
tion and obedience ought not to be decid
ed and fixed by the party from whom
they are due, but by a tribunal deriving
authority from both the parties.
3. To all cases arising under treaties
made by their authority—because, as
treaties are compads made by, and obli
gatory on, the whole nation, their opera
tion ought not to be affected or regulated
by the local laws or courts of a part of the
nation.
I. To all cases arising under this Con
stitution—because the meaning, con
ftrudion and operation of a compad
ought always to be ascertained by all the
parties, or by authority derived from
them all ; and not by one of the parties,
or by authority derived only from one of
them.
4. To all cases affeding ambassadors,
or other publick ministers and confuls—
becaufe, as these are officers of foreign na
tions, whom this nation are bound to pro
ted and treat according to the laws of na
tions, cases affeding them ought only to
be cognizable by national authority.
5. To all cases of admiralty and mari
time jurifdidion—becaufe as the seas are
the joint property of nations, whose rights
and privileges relative thereto, are regu
lated by the law of nations and treaties,
such cases necessarily belong to national
jurifdiaion.'
6. To controversies to which the Unit
ed States shall be a party —because, in cas
es in which the whole people are interest
ed, it would not be equal or wife to let any
one State decide and measure out the jus
tice due to the others.
7. To controversies between two or
more States—because domestic tranquil
ity requires, that the contentions of States
should be peaceably terminated by a com
mon judicatory ; and because, in a free
country justice ought not to depend on
the will of either of the litigants.
the judicial power of the United States
shall extend to ten description of cases,
viz.
justice due to the former ; and true re
publican government requires that free
and equal citizens should have free, fair,
and equal justice.
9. To controversies between citizens
of the fame State, claiming lands under
grants of different States —because, as the
rights of the two States to grant the land,
are drawn into question, neither of the
two States ought to decide the contro
versy.
10. To controversies between a State,
or the citizens thereof ; and foreign
States, citizens or fubjefts—becaufe, as
every nation is responsible for the conduct
of its citizens towards other nations ; all
questions touching the justice due to for
eign nations or people, ought to be ascer
tained by, and depended on national au
thority.
Even this cursory view of the judicial
powers of the United States, leaves the
mind ftr'ongly impressed with the im
portance of them to the preservation of
the tranquility, the equal sovereignty,
and the equal rights of the people.
The question now before us renders it
necessary to pay particular attention to
that part of the 2d fedion which extends
the judicial power '' To controversies be
twetn a State, and citizens of another State."
It is contended, that this ought to be con-
ftrued to reach! none of these controver
sies excepting those in which a state may
be plaintiff- The ordinary rules for con
ftruaion will easily decide whether those
words are to be understood in that limited
sense. ."
This extension of power is remedial, be
cause it is fa fettle controversies. It is
therefore to he construed liberally. It is
politic, wife and goo,d, that, not only the
controversies in which a State is plaintiff,
but also those in which a State is defend
ant, should be fettled — both cases there,
fore are within the reason of the remedy ;
and ought to be so adjudged, unless the
obvious, plain and literal sense of the
words forbid it.
If we attend to the words, we find them
to be express, positive, free from ambigu
ity, and without room for such implied
exceptions—" The judicial power of the
United States shall extend to controversies be
tween a State and citizens of another State."
If the; Constitution really meant to ex-
tend these powers only to those controver
sies in which a State might be plaintiff, to
the exclusion of those in which citizens
had demands against a State, it is incon
ceivable that it should have attempted to
convey that meaning in words, not only
so imcompetent, but also so repugnant to
it—if it meant to exclude a certain class
of these Controversies, why were they not
exprtffly excepted ? On the contrary, not
even an intimation of such intention ap
pears in any part of the Constitution.
It cannot be pretended, that where cit
izens urge & infill upon demands against
a state, which the State refufes to admit
and comply with, that there is no contro
vert between them. If it is a controversy
between them, then it clearly falls not
only within the fpjrit, but the very words
of the Conftituti&—What is it to the
cause of justice, and now can it affeft the
definition of theword controvert, whether
the demands which cause the dispute, are
made bya State against citizens of another
State, or by the latter against the former ?
When power is thus extended to a contro
verjy, it necessarily, as to all judicial pur
poses, is also extended to those, between
whom it subsists. @
The exception contended for, would
contradid and do violence to the great
and leading principles of a tree and equal
national government,one of the great ob
jects of which is, to ensure justice to al!—
to the few against the many, as well as to
the many against the few. It would be
strange, indeed; that the joint and equal
sovereigns of this country should, in the
very Constitution by which they profeff
ed to eftablijh justice, so far deviate from
the plain path of equality and impartiali
ty, as td give to the colleaive citizens of
one Sate, a right of suing individual citi
zens of another State, and yet deny to
those citizens a right offuing them.
We find the fame general and compre
hensive manner of expressing the fame
ideas, in a subsequent clause ; in which
the Constitution ordains, that " in all
cases affeding ambassadors, other pub
lick ministers and consuls, and those in
which a State shall be a party, the supreme
court shall have original jurifdiftion."-l
Did it mean here party-plaintiff ? If that
only was meant, it would have been ealy
to have found words to express it—words
are to be understood in their ordinary and
common acceptation, and the word party
being in common usage, applicable both
to plaintiffand defendant, we cannot limit
it to one of them in the present case.
We find the Legislature of the United
States expressing themselves in the like
general and comprehensive manner ; they
freak in the 1316 fedion of the judicial
aft, of controversies where a State is a
party, andtis they do not impliedly or ex
pressly apply thaf term to either of the lit-
igants, in particular, we are to under
stand them as fpaking of both. In the
fame fe&ion they distinguish the cases
where ambassadors are plaintiffs, from
those in which ambassadors are defendants,
and make different provisions refpeding
those cases ; and it is not unnatural to
suppose, that they would in like-manber
have distinguished between cases where a
State was plaintiff, and where a State
was defendant, if they had intended to
make any difference between them ; or
if they had apprehended that the Consti
tution had made any difference between
them.-
For Sate, at this Office, RAWSON's
Compendium of Military Duty.
Ufeful to Military Gentlemen.
[To be continued.]