The Federal mirror — Concord, N.H., 1796-03-29 00:00:00, page 1

RATIONAL FEDERALISM.
HARPER'S ADDRESS.
An ADDRESS from Robert Goodlob
HarPEiti Member of Congress, from
Southcarolina, to his Constituents ; con
taining his Reasons for approving of the
1 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navi
gation, with Greatbritain,^
[continued.]
JF toifchiefs of this kind tally lot^
= ed in this treaty, i# it conceivable
that they could escape & Prefi3eot's
/knowledge and attention ? He has
° hitherto, been considered at prudent
and cautious. He had the best pos
sible meant of information on this
(object He was apprised of every
;ht f p t^*' w " taken, knew the whole
'"courfe of the negotiation, and under
stood well the substance of the treaty
before it was concluded. t He had
the instrument in his possession from
the time of its arrival in this country,
early in March, until he finally ratifi
ed it some time in July. During this
whole period it was under his conside
ration, aided by the advice of every
man in the United States, whom he
thought it necessary to, consult, fur
nished with all the information, from
every quarter, that was requisite for
enlightening ralguiding hit own un
derstanding, he at length decided.—
And is no refpe& due to such a deci
r fion? Iconfefs, fellow citizens, I can
not think fb. 1 Were I disposed to dif
fer fromit, I Should still imagine that
with such an authority opposed to me,
I might probably be in the wrong,
l Should hold it necessary, befoul;
pronounced positively that this deci
hon was wicked or foolifh, toafk my
,felf whether I had given more evi,
deuces of wisdom, virtue and patriof
ifm, thao Geo." Washington ; wheth
er l had passed through more or se
verer trials /whether I had possessed
more ample means of information on
this fubjed than he, or bestowed on it
a longer,, a more mature examination ?
And finally, ' whether 1 ought, on a
short investigation of my own, or a
still Shorter one of others, to rejed this
decision, Supported bythe talents and
knowledge of two thirds of the Sen
ate, by those qualities of Mr. Jay,
which have gained him such high and
repeated testimonies of public confi
dence, and by the prudence, the found
;difcretion, the knowledge, and the cri
ed patriotism of Major Pinckney ?
These considerations inclined me to
think favorably of the treaty, before
I had given it that attentive and tho
rough consideration which ought "to
^ precede every decision on important
public measures. But I knew that it
%fojny duty to bow implicitly to no;
•(authority, however weighty, but to
judge and ad for myfelf. I knew
that you bid feot meto form opipf
- ions of my own, not to adopt those
^pf other perrons, however refpe&al&
I therefore resolved to spare no paint
for undemanding the fubje&, and
forming a right judgment about it.
For this purpose, I converted, as
far as I had opportunity, both with
the friends of the treaty, and its op-1
Ut all their
[VOLUME IV.]
@ffs@^
co NCO RD, TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 1796.
torea^wmz^^ a^zmr^r• ape=^#^a^
thing that was written in favor of it
and against it. I gained all the in
formation in my power, and from the
most refpeclable sources, refpeaing
those branches of our commerce which
jtaffeas. I took the treaty itfelf with
me on my journey, at well a, the pub-,
licatiom receding it, which from
time to time appeared, ^faithfully
and repeatedly studied it, recurred to
it on every occ^fion, and carefully
compared it with our other treaties,
/with the laws of nations, and with
our own conOicution.
From the time when the treaty was
published, till the preftot moment,
more than five months, this has been
my chief occupation.'
:The result, fellow citizens, of this
examination, which I am bold to de
clare has been a faithful, a laborious,
and an impartial one, is a firm and
complete perfudion, that the treaty,
ficuated as we were, was proper and
expedient; that, to use the words of
Major Pinckney, " as little has been
conceded by the United States, and
as much gained for them as, all cir
cumstances considered, could be ex
pededl That the business has been
concluded more beneficially for us
than there was reason to hope could
be obtained by negociatian, some
months before ; and that it places us
so a more advantageous fixation than
we should have been inby becoming
parties to the war."
The case between us and Great
britain, at the time when Mr. Jay
was sent, flood thus ;
^We charged Greatbritain with hav
•ing, greatly to our detriment, retained
the wefternpofts,which the was bound
by the treaty of peace to give up;
with having carried away from New
york, at the evacuation of it, a great
number of negroes, the property of
American citizens, contrary to the ex
press stipulations of that treaty ; and
with havioggiven orders, during the
present war, for the capture of a great
number of our vessels, contrary to the
law of nations and the rights of neu
trality.
Greatbritain, on her part, alledged,
that we had committed the firft in
faaion of treaty of peace, by permit
ting legal impediments to the recove
ry of British debts, contrary to the
fourth article, and that ffie retained
the posts as a pledge for our perform
ance of that article ; she denied that
the negroes carried away from New
york were American property at the
time of signing the treaty, having
been made lawful prize by her army
during the war. And as to the cap
tures made on us in the present war,
she pretended that they were author
ized by the law of nations. ;
Id this Rate of things there were
;but three possible courses for us to
take. First, To submit quietly to the
continuation and repetition ohbe in
juries. Secondly, To pursue redraft'
by measures of comptofion : Orthird
% To seek it by measures of negoti
ation.
To remain at we were, to fit down
quietly under the injuries of which we
cotnDiM<M : would have been not
Itf^ife a in <1: extreme • for experi
BY RUSSELL AND DAVIS, CONCORD, NEWHAMPSHIRE.,
|||^||l■■lft WMR^f^^^il■lW■^^
ence proves, that among nations as :
well as individuals, to submit tamely;
to injuries is to invite a repetition ofj
them % and our government muftl
have relinquished all claim to the re-;
fpe& of foreigners and the confidence|
of its own citizens, had it Suffered im- |
portant parts of our territory ro bel
withheld, and extensive depredations!
to be made on our property, Without
taking any fiepi to affect and vindi
cate its rights. To seek effedual and
honorable redress then, in some mode
or other, was clearly indifpenfable,—
The choice was between measures of
compulQoa and measures of negotia
tion'
Compulsory measures were of four
kinds: First, war-^fecondly, com
mercial reftriaion,—thirdly, prohibit ,
tion of iatercourfe—and fourthly, fe-1
queftration of debtsand flock in our|
banks and funds.
War had but few open advocates, ;
and probably not a very great num
ber of tecret ones. The public re
sentment was at one period inflamed
to such a degree by the depredations
of the British, that great numbers felt
ftrciqgly disposed to the most hostile
measures ; but when they reflected
on the slate of total umpreparation $
which we were, without a frigate at
sea, or a regiment on foot, more than
was necessary for the Indian war, our
harbors unfortified. Our arsenals and
magazines unfurnished, and five hun
dred thouted tons of (hipping afloat
with cargoes of immense value: when
they receded on the uncertain event
of war, and the certain mischiefs by
which it is attended ; the immense
ex penre, the vast accumulation of
debt, the increase of taxation, the de
ftru^ion of property, the suspension
of industry, the loss of revenue, and
the total derangement (ft our finances;
when they maturely weighed all these
con fiderations, they regarded war as
the grea:eft of evils, to be submitted
to only in the last report, only when
every other expedient had been fairly
tried without fuccefi.
The case, however, was different
with refped to commercial restric
tions. They found Support in the
firft talents and reputation of our
country, and became a favorite obje&
with very considerable numbers. If
was conceived that by laying heavy
burdens on the British commerce, on
their Slipping in our ports and their
commodities in cur country, their
government might be broughi^b
temper more amicable or more just
towards us, might be compelled to
make us reparation for the past, and
co refrain from future injuries. But
it was observed, on the other fide,
that these reftridions would probably
widen the breach between us and Bri
tain, ioftead of closing it, would ir
ritate rachec than heal the wound ;
would provoke them to further ads
of injustice, not entice them to a con-<
dud more equitable and friendly :—^
that the reftridions would be hurtful ;j
to ourfefra X well at the British, end
perhaps to an eqoil, or even , greater 1
degree % that they would probably 1
lay on our committee coon q
tionr, ,l,ereoy wc 1 ।
owomri in a war of commercial reftric- I।
[number 179.]
teto_rtCT,rt
tions with them, in which it might
happen that they would hold out
loogeft. In fine, it was considered,
that this mode of compulsion would
be attended by great and certain in
conveniences, that its foccefs would
be very doubifi-', and that, if unlock
cefiful, it could not fail to prove
highly mifchievoui—^The plan of
commercial reftridtioos was therefore
rejected.
It was next proposed to fofpend all
commercial intercourse with Great- 1
britain, to receive none of her com.
modities in our ports and to fend her
none of our own. The Supporters of
this plan (uppofed our commerce to
be of such importance to Greatbritain,
that sooner than lose it, even for a
time, she would come to our own
terms. But "ere again it was obje&-
ed, that the inconveniences of this
measure were great and certain, its
success doubtful; that it would injure
us extremely, as well as the British ;
that they could, and in all probability
would do without cur commerce,quite
as long as we Should find it conveni
ent co do without theirs ; and that if
their government Shcud happen to
be obflinate, an event extremely pro
bable, considering its arrogance and
pride, we Should be obliged at last to
give up the measure, and recur to
other means, after having uselessly
embarrassed our trade and deranged
one of its most considerable branches.
These propositions therefore of a
commercial war, of restrictions and
prohibitions as means of compulsion,
were rejeded, and, as it appears tb
me, upon unanswerable reasons.
The lass compulsory expedient pro
posed was sequestration. Debts to a
very great amount ere known to be
due in our country to the fubje&s of
Greatbritain ; and they are supposed
also to puffed property to a conside
rable extent in our banks and public
funds. It was supposed that by Seiz
ing on these debts and this property,
and fobje&ing them to sequestration,
we might so enzbarrafi the British
government, as speedily to bring it
to terms ; or at any rate, that the se
questered effect would serve as a
fund, out of which our losses, by her
violent ads might be indemnified.
But it was objeded, in the firft
ptyctythat to infringe the Security of
private property would be a very un
wise measure, as it refpeaed ourselves:
that it would greatly lessen the confi
dence reposed at present by foreigners
in the good faith of our government;
prevent the extension, if not put an
end to the existence, of that commeri
cial credit by which the want of capi
tal in this young country, has hitherto
been Supplied, and such immense ad
vantages given to dur commerce, cur
agriculture, and our infant manufac
tures ; and that in proportion as debts
were left secure, ill that we borrowed:
or bought on credit must be borrow
ed at a higher interest or bought ata„
greater price, the injuries arifirg from
„hich would fo<» be rooch^:
than those for which these meafure#
were intended is a remedy,
'lt was urged to the second place,
htf ° ta measure as the fe-
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