The Pennsylvania packet, or, The general advertiser — Lancaster, Pa.;Philadelphia, Pa., 1779-06-03 00:00:00, page 2

"We thought it necessary to mention these matters,
and shall now proceed to confider the terms you offer as
your " final proposal." As to thote comprehended un
der the heads of articles ift and 2d, " there will beno ob
jection on our part to theexchange of the convention troops
before others prisoners in our hands, upon equitable con
ditions, and the officers may b@ accounted for according to
the American rank they held at the time of capture, pro
vided the flipulation be reciprocal, and rank at the time
of capture be observed as a governing principle Upon
this occasion however, as we are entirely ignorant of the
relative Rate of prisoners in other quarters, and indeed
have no official or particular information refpeHiog them,
we can only comprehend in the exchange ^nich may be
agreed on, the prisoners in your hands, who were the ori
ginal objects of Sir Henry Clinton's proposition to Gene
ral Wafliington If tnere are others in y ur possession, pro
per fubjefts of military capture, they wili be exch mged of
course, as soon as it is known. But we cannot agree to the
mode you have proposed.—
'" Fixing the exchange of the convention troops upon a
fanciful arrangement in order of battle, and making the
release of each of your officers, Brigadiers included, insepar
able from that of their regiments;
" Reserving for the exchange of your Brigadiers and
Field-officers, such of our officers, your prisoners, as are
of equal rank ; and of consequence from your proposed
mode of exchange by regiments, excluding from relief some
of our Brigadiers and Field officers, as long as there shall
remain unexchanged any regiments of yours in our hands,
having officers of similar rank .•
“ Withholding the exchange of your firft Major Gene
tal till after the release of one fourth part of the conven
tion army—of General Burgoyne till after that of the half
—and of the second Major-General till after that of three
fourths ; and of consequence compelling us to purchase
with privates a number of officers ^ your hands, whose
teleafe might have been effected by the exchange of those
general officers:
“ Depriving us of the full benefit we ought to receive
from theexchange of General Burgoyne, by estimating
him only 00 the footing of a common Lieutenant General,
and thereby retaining in your hands a greater number of
our officers to be redeemed with ? iva^s :
"Confining the exchange of your superior officers where
equality will not apply, to equivalents to be taken from the
ranks nearest their own, and of consequence postponing
the enlargement of all our Colonels at least, we having no
fu@h officers of yours in oer hands; till the periods of ex
change you have assigned for your two Major-Generals
and General Burgoyne:
" Excluding us from the right cf applying, according
to circumstances and convenience, the surplus in our pos
session, alter the exchange you suppose of privates for pri
vates ; and refirtHing their application to the relief of our
nioft inferior officers only -a measure tending to embar
rass the liberati >n of our superior officers, and precluding
priority of capture from any preference in relief, which is
undoubtedly an equitable principle, where equality of rank
does not interfere.—And although officers for officers of
equal rank nd adequ te proportions of inferior for superi
or are certainly good rules for exchange, yet upon the
present ©ccafion, they are so fettered down by your firfl
and fixed principle of exchanging by regiments, that at
best they can have but a very confined and partial opera
tion.
“ These are the natural and obvious cenfequences of
the mode of exchange you propose, which, in its opera
tion on the principles of your tariff, would give you a large
accession of privates, and contribute to the relief of only a
part cf our officers.
'' No objection will be made on eur part to the settle
ment of the balance of prisoners on every ex hange, ac
cording to die number of lawful captives, actually resto
red an either fide. And although we are willing to ex
change your officers who are absent on parole, we can
not perceive the justice or propriety of confining it to re
gimental officers in exclusion of General Burgoyne : for if
the former may "be exchanged amongfi the firft on the
footing of being already restored," so ought the latter,
being in the fame predicament, absent from the army and
in England.
" 3d, All present and future prisoners in your hands
belonging to the United States, would have been com
prehended within the benefits or a general cartel ; ut as
your positive refiridion with refpe& to the settlement of
accounts, and th? essential deficiency of powers, have de
seated all expectations of success on that point; and as
we have no khdwledge of the relative Bate of prisoners
in other quarters, nor, indeed, any official or particular
information refpeaing the;ii- -the present exchange c<n
only include such prisoners in your hands, as were the
original objects of Sir Henry Clinton's proposition to Ge
neral Wafhin; ton. Should there be others in your ,of
feffion, proper fabjeHs of military capture, they will be
exchanged of course as soon as the faR is known, and their
number ascertained.
" 4th, We view every violation of parole with the ut
most abhorrence and agree fully in opinion, that all un
der this description should be sent back without delay.
Where this cannot be efFeHed, they ought to be account
ed for in regular turn; but we think a preference in ex
change would operate as a reward by annexing benefit to
mifeondud, as well as injure those who have preserved
their honor. We are happy to find however, from the
information of our Cornmiffary, that a great part of those
comprehended under this description, were either net offi
cers at all, or effected their escape properly.
“ sth, The Congress having already decided on the ca
pitulation of the Cedars, that claim is inadmissible and any
difeuffion unnecessary.
“ 6th, It was your original proposal that Serjeants should
berated equal to two privates : this we think to high an
estimation, althougn in the present exchange it would be
advantageous to us. We are however of opinion they ought
to be rated fometning higher than privates, as was sug
gested by you And here you will permit us to observe,
that althoug 1 we objected to your setting a higher value
upon fubaiteras than was fix d between Franceand England
last war, which you had exceeded by two thirds, yet we
never did propose, nor indeed, can we ever consent, con
sidering the circumstances of our country, that an estima
tion of subalterns should be rated at tae number of pri
vates mentioned under this article. We cannot tut remark
the merit wnicb is assumed, by a pretended willingness to
accommodate your interest to ours, and contenting with
seeming difficulty to depreciate the Serjeants, although
that depreciation would be highly advantageous to you
and injurious to us, as yoc ihave few if any of ours in your
hands and we many of yours.
" 7th, If either party from motives of generous confi
dence, and to accelerate relief, should at any time dispos
sess themselves of a portion of the prisoners in their hands,
without obtaining an equivalent at the time, the party re
ceiving, we should suppose, would account without scru
ple for all, who should be fubjeds of military capture and
military exchange, by returning a like number as soon as
circumstances, and a regard to the order of their capture,
with refpe& to others, would permit. But it would be
necessary previous to such release, that notice should be
given to the adverse party of fu h intended delivery, that
proper officers might be appointed to receive the prisoners.
" tilth, Periodical exchanges would be mutually advan
tageous, and their efiablifhment is much to be desired;
but as they mus f depend upon certain equitable conditi
ons, which ought tube regulated by permanent engage
ments, to which neither your powers nor inftrußions are
adapted as has been already shewn, they mult be the # re
sult of ®ccafional correspondences, founded on principles
of juflice to the parties and humanity to the prisoners.
Toe name of the instrument can have no operation on the
stipulations contained in it, and whether it is called a
" general cartel" or not, their validity would depend up
on the competency of your powers, and could not acquire
any additional strength from the diminution of those on
our part. Your claims of officers and soldiers for the ex
change of citizens taken when not in arms, under which
description are all militia not in military service, cannot
be admitted; even their capture is totally ineonfiftent
with the practice of civilized war.
“ We cannot agree to the proportions in your tariff.
The relative value between officers and men is stated at
too high a rate, and even that rate is difpreportionate.
Inferior officers, of which class those in your hands chiefly
consist, are eftirnated at a much higher proportion, than
those of superior rank, the balance of those being in our
favour,"
We have now given your Excellency a full date of our
proceedings under the commission with which you were
pleased to honor us ; and though we have not been able to
accomplish the humane and benevolent purposes you had
in view ; yet we trust, the reasons we have assigned for
the failure will folly juftify us to the States, to your Ex
cellency, and to out unfortunate prisoners themselves.
WILLIAM DAVIES.
ROBERT H. HARRISON.
( Copy)
In CONGRESS, May 10th, 1779.
Rfelved, That Congress approve of the conduct of
Colonels Davies and Harrison in the course of their con
ferences with the British Coramiffioners on the fubje& of
a cartel for the mutual exchange of prisoners.
Qrdered, That the report of Colonels Davies and Har
rison to the Commander in Chief of their conferences
aforefaid be publiflied.
Refolded, That copies of the said report be transmitted
to the American prisoners with the enemy, and that it be,
and hereby is earnestly recommended to them to persevere
in enduring their captivity with the magnanimity and pa
tience by which they have hitherto been distinguished,
and that they be assured of the constant endeavours of
Congress to render their situation as convenient as the
nature of things will admit.
Published by order of Congress,
CHARLES THOMSON, Secretary.
PHILADELPHIA.
The following performance is taken from Rivington's
Gazette, but may, notwithstanding, poffibl, be genuine.
We give it to our readers to fliew that the virtue, good
sense, and fortitude of the people of America, will enable
them to bear any difeuffion of the important fubjed to
whieh it relates, and, we doubt not, animate them to vi
gorous exertions to remove the difficulties it occasions.
If it has this happy effect, we may compare ourfelues to
able chymifts, who can extraft medicine from the most
poisonous drugs, or a fkilful gardiner, who can make even
a dunghill contribute to health and nourishment.
' Edenton, (North-Carolina) January &b, 1778.
Memoir in answer to the Observations of M. de la
FcRE, on the Bills of Congress, &c.
SINCE the beginning &f the present commotions on
this Continent, the (peculators in Europe, and parti
cularly those of France, have concluded, that on no part
©f the globe a commercial intercourse could be established
with so much facility and advantage as in America. The
difficulty of obtaining remittances in return was forefeen
by some, but the success of a few firft expeditions, and the
brilliant profits of their tales, dissipated every prudent re
flection, and it was entered into with a want of reserve,
which could only be juftified by a perfea knowledge of
thecountry. The eagerness with which the firfl adven
turers pursued their advantages, naturally produced a
succession of imitators, whose only information, however
necessary, was the simple teflimony of Americans deeply
interested to represent every thing in the most attraHing
light. Cargoes in abundance were sent over, without re
flexing upon the unavoidable hazard incurred in a coun
try where every thing, even to the government itfelf, was
new, and of course still in that uncertainty which attends
a slate of infancy. Numerous were those who yielded to
this delusion, and who, provided they reached any part
of this fancied land of promise, believed every object was
acquired. Experience has since difeovered the contrary,
but the immense profits that appear to arise from felling
at 700, 800, and even at 1000 per cent still continue to
encourage the hopes and to appease the anxiety of those
who are too remote to difeern plainly the danger.
It was believed at firft that the only cause of the depre
ciation of the paper currency in America was the dread of
an unfortunate end toa war, unsupported and without fo
reign protection against an enemy, warlike, powerful and
full of resources. It was expected that the declaration of
protection from France, and the appearance of a formida
ble squadron on the coast, as it assured independence with
eut, would revive confidence within. It has happened
that these circumstances, looked up to with desire, have
failed in their effects, and that they have only produced
a more perfect detention of the deepness of the wound and
the error of former judgments. It now became obvious
that the source of the evil was in the money itfelf, and
that its excessive multiplication produced a daily decrease
of its value, and in consequence of this difeovery, the
distrust ofthe people was increased, and the most hurtful
fnock given to foreign trade. In effect, the produce of
te country fiuce this period has more than doubled its
price, while by an unaccountable capriciousness the im
ported merchandize has either continued at the fame or
funk to an inferior value. In France this evil was only
known in part when the adventurers to America became
anxious to secure their capital flock and their new profits
by converting them into Bills of Congress, whih would
at least produce a certain interest till a proper opportunity
of favourable remittance ; a specious measure, which might
be called prudent, were the affairs of America in any de
gree of flability. However, I cannot but think the ideas
formed on this fubjed are neither very exact nor very just,
and to rectify them, as well as to reply to the observations
written by M. de la Fere to M: ffieurs Rouiitrac and Co.
this memoir is intended.
The desire of furaifhing supplies for the war without
burdening the people or encreafing the number of bills in
circulation, the hope of recovering the credit of their cur
rency which already began to decline, and of deriving
affiance from those whole large personal property was
laying useless by them, were undoubtedly the motives
which induced the Congress to determine upon borrowing
a sum of money from the people. In the year 1777 a re
solve was published for that purpose, offices were opened
in every province, and Commissioners appointed to receive
the loans, and to return to the lenders , bills on which the
value received was acknowledged; a promise to pay it
again was made, and the interest they should bear till the
timeof payment declared. These bills were called Loan
Office Tickets or Certificates, and the annual inter-.ft
they bore at firft, was no more than four per cent, soon
after they were railed to fix per cent, and about the month
of August or September in the fame year, the Congress
declared they would annually pay the interest in bills of
exchange upon Messrs. Franklin, Deane, and Lee, their
Agents at Paris, at the rate of five livres for one dollar.
At firft the lowness of an interefi at four per cent, did not
succeed, and they were not generally received till the in
terest was railed to fix and made payable in France.
Whether the Congress have d (covered how weak is the
assistance they derive from this measure, or whether they
fear to impoverish themselves by paying the interests 12
France,* this business has been either fuipended or laid
since the last summer, and we hear no more of the Loan-
Office. For some time after their emission, these bills
circulated as freely as ready money, but their credit soon
began to fink, and the interest already due was required
to be deducted before they were received in trade. I have
afterwards seen 5 per cent, of the principal, besides the
whole interest, parted with in order to convert the remain
der into ready money; at length they were refufed entire
ly. It might be thought the advantages of an interest
payable in France, would counterbalance every inconve
nience and confer reputation on these bills; but at present
so totally is the confidence of the people destroyed, that
every thing is become the obje& of doubt. And the Con
tinental Bills, as they are called, the smallness of whose
relpedive value assists to procure a speedy and general cir
culation, are prefered to the Loan Qffi.e Certificates,
troublesome in their negotiation and uncertain in their ef
feds. The proportionate value, which the principal of a
Loan-Office bill will bear, at the end of the three years at
which it becomes payable, to the sum originally lent, may
be conjectured from the rapid decline if the paper money,
which fell half its value twice in the course of one year;
so that at the end of twelve months, four dollars purchased
no more than one at the beginning. And it is evident
that the payment of the interest as well as the restoration
of the principal, should be made in the fame denomination
in which the money was lent: if the pri» ipa! was lent in
the money of France, the interefi must be paid in the fame
money, or in an equal proportion of American currency.
The difficulty of calculation may be lessened by considering
tee dollar at 5 livres of France. In the Loan-Office Bills
the dollar alone is mentioned without noticing the relative
difference of its value in different States.
It now remains to answer three queflions in the Me
moir, of which the firft refpe&s " the circulation and
manner of negotiating the contrails of Congress" or th®
Loan-Office Bills. To which it may be briefly replied,
that the circulation of them in this place, long uncertain,
is now totally at an end. In the second it is asked, < What
proportion of ready money is exchanged for them ?"
f Continental money alone is exchanged for them. By
" ready money" specie is probably fignified, which it
would be extremely difficult to furnif4 in return, and
which, those who were in possession of it, would exchange
with extreme reluctance: the particular money of each
province is entirely refufed.
The third question is, “ Whether there is a paper cur
rency in America, upon what principles it is founded,
and whether the Congress receive it in the place of coin ?"
There is not only a paper currency, but the present cir
culation consists entirely of paper. Gold and silver are no
longer considered a medium for the exchange of merchan
dize; they are become merchandize themselves; of which
the quantity is so small and the price so high, that I have
known 7 or 8 paper dollars given for one silver dollar. X
This currency the Congress of necessity, notwithstanding
its depreciation, receives and pays at the fame rates as
gold and silver, and that the value of gold and Continental
money is equal, they formally declare upon every bill.
Unfortunately this declaration is by no means assented to,
and the more it is repeated, the lets it is believed.
To conclude this detail I shall make some short observa
tions on the slate of affairs in this place, and on the trade
to America in general.
* 7 befe intereJis are promijed te te paid annually. 1 have
made every enquiry, whether any bills of exchange have been
delivered by Congress for this purpose, but without effect.
Perhaps they intend to pay off the principal and accumulated
inte?efl together. So much is certain, that of right they
ought to pay them off in this manner : But when they will
be paid is not equally certain.
f It is necessary to observe, that without the addition of
the epithet hard, the word money in America dignifies no more
than certain pieces of paper in circulation, and however
fngular it may appear, it is become a very familiar ex
prefion there.
X These articles of merchandize are now raised mueb high
er •, twenty paper dollars being given for one silver dollar.