The New-England chronicle — Boston [Mass.], 1776-09-05 00:00:00, page 1

THE
NEW-ENGLAND CHRONICLE.
Gentlemen,
Conscious of an uptight denga, to
promote, and perpetuate the liberties of
the State ; and that Ihave givenyou no just oc
casion to fufpe& my patrioufm, while I have had
the happiness of residing among you ; I pro
mise myfe'f that you will hear with candour
what I have now to offer.
The peculiarity of the times hath made it ne
cessary to alter the Forms of Government in al
most every Colony upon the Continent, and hath
afforded an opportunity of moulding them so as
to favour the original rights of human nature.
In some theft rights are more fully and better
fecu ed than in others ; this we may ascribe to
the diff rent manners and usages of the inhabi
tants which mid! be consulted, that so confufion
may be prevented, and invincible prejudices be
gratified 'is your felicity to have enjoyed
from the beginning, a Foinr of Government,
that contained the leading principles of liberty §
so that you want not, in this important crisis of
America, to eftabliSh a Form absolutely and en
tirely new, but to have the present corrected and
improved in order to its being perfect Your
Legislature always consisted of more than one
Branch : and it is of the highest consequence,
that it Should continue to do so. A Gentleman
(to whom you are under great obligations, arid
whose name, was I to mention it, would meet
with universal refpe&) in a letter to his friend,
containing Thoughts on Government, printed
at Philadelphia, thus expresses himfelf, from
pagethe l oth to the 14th, " A Representation of
the People in one Assembly being obtained, a
question arises, whether all. the Powers of Go
vernment, legislative, executive and judicial,
Shall be left in this body ? I think a People can
not be long free, nor ever happen, whose Go
vernment is in one Assembly. My reafens for.
this opinion are as follow. 1. Afagle Assem
bly is liable to all the vices, follies and frailties
of an individual.—Subject to fits of humour,
flirts of pafflon, flights of enthusiasm, partiali
ties of prejudice, and consequently productive
of hasty rcfults and abfutd judgments ; and all
these errors ought to be corrected and defe&s
Supplied by some -controlling power. 2. A Jin
gle Assembly is apt to be avaricious, and in time
will not scruple to exempt itfelf from burthens
which it will lay, without compunction, on its
constituents. 3. A Jingle Assembly is apt to
grow ambitious, and after a time will not hesi
tate to vote itfelf perpetual. This was one fault
of the long parliament ; but more remarkably
of Holland, whose Assembly firft voted them
selves from annual to septennial, then for life,
and after a course of years, that all vacancies
happening by death, or oiherwife,fjould beflled
by themselves, without any application to consti
tuents at all. 4. A representative Assembly
although extremely well qualified, and absolute
ly necessary as a Branch of the Legislature, is
unfit to exercise the executive power, for want
of two essential properties, secrecy and dispatch.
5. A representative Assembly is hill less quali
fied for the judicial power ; because it is too
numerous, too flow, and too little (killed in the
laws. 6. Because a Jingle Assembly, possessed
of all the powers of Government, would make
arbitrary laws for their own interest, execute
all laws arbitrarily for their own interest, and
adjudge all controversies ih their own favour.
'' But shall the whole power of Legislation
rest in one Assembly? Most of the foregoing
reasons apply equally to prove that the legisla
tive power ought to be more complex —to which
we may add, that if the legislative power is
wholly in one Assembly, and the executive in
another, or in a Single person, these two powers
^1 oppefe and encroach upon each other, un-
BOSTON: Printed by °P OWARS and WILLIS, at their Office opposite the new Court-House, Queen-Street.
For the NEW-ENGLAND CHRONICLE.
To the Inhabitants of— he Massachusetts-
Bay.
(Vol. IX.)
THURSDAY, September 5, 1776.
New Jersey have agreed, that the Government
of that Province Should be veiled in a Governor,
legislative Council, and General Assembly: but
Legislation is confined to the Council and As
sembly unitedly, and the Governor has no fur
ther concern therein, other than as constant
President of the Council, and having a calling
vote in their proceedings.
The rest of the Colonies, that had their Forms
of Government to fettle, have not yet agreed
upon, or published the fame. However, it is
extremely probable, that they will in general
determine upon having more than a single Branch
for the Legislature. Could I fuppole that this
Colony would consent to set aside the Council,
and to entrust an Assembly with the Sole power
of legislating, I Should dread the consequences
—»ot for myfelf as an individual, for having
been already tranfplapted, I am not strongly
rooted to a particular Spot, and can easily remove
to a free foil wherever to be met with. I Should
dread the consequences on^ccount of the pub
lick ; for such Assembly would loon give us, as
great a cause for. complaining as ever the British
Legislature has done, would be full as arbitrary
and tyrannical, and far more dangerous, from
their being in the midst of us, instead of three
thousand miles distant. We are fighting against
a tyranny without us, let us guard against a ty
ranny within us ; or the only difference in our
case will be, that instead of being devoured by
aliens, we shall be devoured one of another.
Gentlemen, let us retain a Council as an essen
tial Branch of the Legislature, that so our laws
by being fubjeft to the revif.il of that Board may
be the more matured for publick service ; and
till the contest Shall end in war, and the whole
power, legislative and executive, be usurped by
the frroßgeft."
The wisdom of the Continent, so far as it can
be collected from the Forms that have been al
ready established, hath given it in favour of a
complex Legislature, against its consisting of one
Branch only. From his Excellency Archibald
Bullock's Speech to the Provincial Congress of
Georgia; it seems that the whole Legislature rest
ed in that one representative Body; but no pub
lication, that I have been able to get the fight
of, has informed us, whether the Georgians
have yet agreed upon and fixed their Form of
Government, It may be only the original tem
porary expedient continued. South-Carolina
was the firft that resolved upon a fixt Plan, and
concluded, that the legislative authority Should
be hefted in the President and Commander in
chief, the General Assembly arid legislative
Council. Ido not object to the Legislature's
consisting of more than two Branches, though
these, well modelled, might fuffice, but to a sin
gle person's making the third Branch. The
Author of that celebrated pamphlet, Common
Sense, judiciously observed in that, or one ofhis
letters signed Forester, that it was too much for
any one man whatsoever to be entrusted with
the power of negativing the acts of two -large
legifiating Bodies. I have not his words, can
only give you his meaning, wliicli is so level to
the underftandihg of every mortal, that when
once mentioned, it's a wonder that it is not uni
versally assented to. The abilities and" good
qualities of a Rutledge may prevent the South-
Carolinian's finding a fpeedydifadvantage from
their having invested the President with so gre^t
a power ; but whilemen are fallible, Changeable
and mortal, the rights of a People Should not
depend upon the abilities and good qualities of
a President ; no, not for a year.
The Virginians, in their Plan of Government,
declare—" The legislative Department shall be
formed of t:7O distinct Branches, who, together,
shall be a compleat Legislature. They shall
meet once, or oftener, every year, and shall be
called the General Assembly of Virginia One
of these shall be called the House of Delegates.
The other shall be called the Senate."
that so Should the Assembly fall into the vites,
follies, and frailties of individuals,hey may have
the assistance of the Council to recover them,
before they have rendered themselves ridicu
lous, or have thrown the State into a convul
sion. But while lam arguing for the conti
nuance of a Council, as one Branch of the Le
gislature, I would not be thought to approve of
its continuing upori the usual footing. It
Should upon no one account whatsoever have a
vote in its own election ; and I am glad to find
that that abfurdit, is more attended to than
formerly. It Should also be so independent of
the House, as that its members may be in no
wife under any undue influence from that.
The Council hath only the name of a separate
Branch of the Legislature, unless they are en
tirely free to a& their own judgments. Where
in one Branch sways the other to go against its
own opinion, it therein engrosses the whole
power. It is upon this principle that the King
of Great-Britain is absolute ; for though he
doth not a& without the parliament, by places,
penfioris, honours and promises, he obtains the
fanflion of the parliament for doing as he
pleases. The ancient Form is preserved; but
the Spirit of the Constitution is evaporated.
Whether it would be best that the choice of the
Council Should remain with the House, or be
taken up by the Publick, who are the fountain
of all civil power and may resume the exercise
of it, as oft,as they judge necessary or expedi
ent, lamat a loss to determine. But however
chofrv, the Board Should certainly be consider
ed as much the Rprefentatives of the People as
the House. In South -Carolina the General
Assembly choose the Legislative Council, la
Virginia the Electors at large choose the Senate
(or Council) voting for them at the fame time
that they vote for the House of Delegates. 'Tis
after the some manner in the Jerseys. The
Senate orCouncil of Virginia consists of twenty
four Members, which are changed by rotation,
Six new ones being chosen annually, in the room
of fix that go out, till the whole are changed.
And it is so fettled that the fame individuals can
not be rechofen, till they have been out of the
Senate four years ; but then after the firft ro
tation ^abfill continue in as long. When
Connfflrre chosen by the People annually,
and can be"difplaced, or rather pa ffed by, at
pleasure, it seems unnecefary to infft upon a
change; but it may be prudent for the Electors
to make it once in awhile, that so the legislative
power may not continue almost invariably
among a certain set. Should the Council pe
chosen by the House, then I apprehend a fettled
change by rotation becomes requisite ; and it
might be effected after some filch manner as the
following. Let us suppose the number of the
Council thirty. Let it be agreed, that none of
these shall Serve more than three years succes
sively, while they depend solely upon the
annual ele&ion of the House for serving lon
ger than the firft ; and that ten of them
Shall be dropt every year to make room for
the admission of new ones. After the
Council hath been chosen, let the House imme
diately determine upon the ten who shall not
be eligible on the following election. By this
means the people, if they approve of it, will
have the opportunity of concluding upon re
turning them tl\e next year to the House, and
of enjoying their assistance among the Repre
fentauves : and they themselves will be under
no temptation to deviate from their own senti
ments or to alter their own opiniop, that they
may secure an election the ensuing year. Iter
no one that is thus declared ineligible, and so
left out, be eligible again till he has been out of
the Council as long as he was successively in it.
This mode of rotation is nearly the fame with
what was proposed by a writer in the New-
York paper some months Since : and I have
used his expressions wherein they would Serve.
(Numb. 410.)