Teaching &amp; Learning Guide for: “On the Semantics of Artifactual Kind Terms”

Artifacts shape our life-world in several significant ways: We rarely (if ever) find ourselves in a situation in which no artifact is around. Most of the time, we are surrounded by a vast number of these objects, such as tables, chairs, pencils, coffee cups, computers, books, paintings, cars, houses, and so on. We use them to communicate, bridge distances, express ourselves, preserve memories and knowledge, gain aesthetic experiences, simplify everyday activities such as cooking and cleaning, as shelters and for protection, but also as weapons and means of destruction. We depend on them to save lives, connect with people at the other end of the world, quickly gather information, and find our way around parts of the world yet unknown to us. Surprisingly, despite artifacts' impact on our lives, their philosophical investigation is still at its early stages. That this is so may depend, to a certain extent, on the fact that they have not been considered as ontologically relevant as the natural objects, namely, as things that exist independently of us, such as tigers, lakes, minerals, and so on. Probably for similar reasons, the semantics of terms for artifacts and artifactual kinds have also not attracted much attention. Yet, given their impact on our lives, it seems crucial to pay attention to why we name artifacts the way we do and whether and how we should keep applying some terms for artifacts to the same objects or cluster of objects (kind). This course is dedicated to giving a general overview of the ongoing debate about the semantics of artifactual kind terms (i.e., terms like ‘chair,’ ‘table,’ ‘pencil,’ etc.), focusing on their differences or similarities with the natural kind terms (e.g., ‘water,’ ‘gold,’ ‘tiger,’ etc.). The debate originated from Hilary Putnam's suggestion of extending the scope of his direct referentialist theory about natural kind terms to artifactual kind ones (cf. 1975). Putnam's direct referentialism holds that reference is determined by the nature of the referents of the terms at stake, independent of whether we know or will ever know what this nature is. A brief overview of the main metaphysical difference between natural objects and artifacts will be given to better grasp the point of the debate. Putnam, H. (1975). “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, in Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 215-271. This article is the one that gave rise to the debate about the semantics of artifactual kind terms. Putnam proposes here his celebrated direct referentialist theory for natural kind terms. He then suggests extending it to artifactual kind terms, based on their similarities with the former kind of terms. Carrara, M. & Mingardo, D. (2013). “Artifact Categorization. Trends and problems,” The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4, 351–373. This is a survey article on artifact categorization. A general question like (G) How do we categorize artifacts? can be subject to three different readings: ontological, epistemic, and semantic. The different answers to three different readings of (G) are analyzed in the paper. Marconi, D. (2013). “Pencils Have a Point: Against General Externalism About Artifactual Words,” The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4, 497-513. This article gives a reasoned overview of the debate highlighting the key points and problems of the main arguments advanced in favor and against the extension of direct referentialism to artifactual kind terms. It does so while also providing a new classification of artifactual kind terms. Olivero, I. (2018). “Putnam on Artifactual Kind Terms,” The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 9, 197-212. This article tackles the debate from a new angle by directly criticizing Putnam's argument in support of the extension of his direct referential theory to artifactual kind terms. The paper also gives a brief overview of the main direct referentialist accounts, which are criticized on similar lines. Olivero, I. & Cararra, M. (2021). “On the Semantics of Artifactual Kind Terms,” Philosophy Compass, 16 (11), 1-13. This article provides a general but thorough and reasoned overview of the debate at stake, pointing out trends and problems associated with each proposed account. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/artifact/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rigid-designators/#DirRef VIDEO 1 Watch my Powtoon: On the semantics of artifactual kind terms https://www.powtoon.com/ws/cThXdMg0uka/1/m What are artifacts and artifactual kinds? How do they differ from natural objects and natural kinds? During this week, it will be analyzed what artifacts and artifactual kinds are. The differences between these and the natural kinds will be highlighted. We will examine texts by Dipert (1993), Elder (2004), Hilpinen (1992), and Koslicki (2008). Dipert, R. (1993). Artifacts, art works and agency. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Elder, C.L. (2004). Real natures and familiar objects. Cambridge: MIT Press. Hilpinen, R. (1992), “Artifacts and Works of Art”, Theoria, 58(1), 58–82. Koslicki, K. (2008), “Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms”, Philosophy Compass, Vol.3/4, 789- 802. What is a direct referentialist theory? How does a direct referentialist theory differ from a descriptivist account? How are these theories generally applied to natural or artifactual kind terms? During this week, we will introduce the main theories of reference that have been concerned with natural and artifactual kind terms. To do so, we will discuss the most celebrated text in that respect, i.e., Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975). Kripke, S. (1980), Naming and Necessity, Blackwell, Oxford (lesson III). Putnam, H. (1975). “The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’” in Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 215-271. Do descriptivist accounts govern artifactual kind terms' reference? Trends and Problems. This week, we will examine the arguments that have been advanced to criticize Putnam’s suggestion (cf. 1975) of extending direct referentialism to artifactual kind terms. We will analyze the arguments of Schwartz (1978, 1980, 1983) and Thomasson (2003, 2007a). Schwartz, S. (1978). “Putnam on Artifacts,” Philosophical Review, 87, 566-574. Schwartz, S. (1980). “Natural Kinds and Nominal Kinds,” Mind, 89, 182-195. Schwartz, S. (1983). “Reply to Kornblith and Nelson,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 21, 475-479. Thomasson, A. L. (2003). “Realism and Human Kinds,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67, 580-609. Thomasson, A. L. (2007a). “Artifacts and Human Concepts,” in E. Margolis and S. Laurence (eds.), Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and Their Representation, Oxford University Press, New York, 52-73. Do direct referentialist theories determine artifactual kind terms' reference? Trends and Problems. During this week, we will analyze the arguments put forward to defend that artifactual kind terms have a direct reference. We will discuss the arguments by Kornblith (1980, 2007), Nelson (1982), and Putman (1982). Kornblith, H. (1980). “Referring to Artifacts,” Philosophical Review, 89, 109-114. Kornblith, H. (2007). “How to Refer to Artifacts,” in E. Margolis and S. Laurence (eds.), Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and Their Representation, Oxford University Press, New York, 138-149. Nelson, J. (1982). “Schwartz on Reference,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 20, 359-365. Putman, D. (1982), “Natural kinds and human artifacts,” Mind, 91, 418-419. Can the problems of the mentioned theories (direct and descriptivist) be overcome? This week, we will discuss the recent responses and discussions around the debate at stake. In this respect, we will introduce the texts by Thomasson (2014), Marconi (2013, 2019), and Olivero (2018, 2019). Marconi, D. (2013). “Pencils Have a Point: Against General Externalism About Artifactual Words,” The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4, 497-513. Thomasson, A. L. (2014). “Public Artifacts, Intentions, and Norms”, in M. Franssen et al., Artifact Kinds. Ontology and the Human-Made World, Springer, Dordrecht, 45-62. Marconi, D. (2019), “Externalism about Artifactual Words and the Taxonomy of Artifacts,” Grazer Philosophishe Studien, 96, 130-153. Olivero, I. (2019). “Function is Not Enough: An Externalist Defeat for Artifactual and Social Kind Terms,” Grazer Philosophishe Studien, 96, 105-129. What can we conclude from the discussed debate? Olivero, I. & Cararra, M. (2021). “On the Semantics of Artifactual Kind Terms,” Philosophy Compass, 16 (11), 1-13. To introduce some crucial questions about the distinction or continuity between the natural and the artifactual realms. To introduce some relevant points about the distinction between the semantics of natural vis à vis artifactual kind terms. To learn how to reflect critically on some of the main issues about the semantics of artifactual kind terms and, in general, the semantics of general terms. To develop strategies to argue about the main issues discussed. What are the primary differences between artifactual and natural kinds? What is a direct referentialist theory? What are the main reasons advanced to support that artifactual kind terms have descriptivist reference? How can one defend that direct referentialism applies to artifactual kind terms? What are the main recent accounts on the matter, and what do they defend? Groups activities and presentations may be an efficient way to bring the debate alive. Each student or small group of students can be given one determined account and be required to defend it in a presentation prepared ad hoc. Questions from the rest of the audience will help to guide the debate. Also, a few focal paragraphs can be distributed among students who will be asked to criticize them. Quizzes about quotations from the discussed authors can be a further good method for interactively helping students memorize the main topics. Ad hoc presentations of students' own views on the topic may bring up relevant discussions, contribute to the debate, guide the students towards more active thinking on this philosophical issue, and develop their argumentative skills. Open Access Funding provided by Politecnico di Milano within the CRUI-CARE Agreement.