Dynamic ‘might’ and correct belief

ABSTRACTVeltman's test semantics and developments thereof reject the canon about semantic contents and attitude ascriptions in favor of dynamic alternatives. According to these theories the semantic content of a sentence is not a proposition, but a context change potential (CCP). Similarly, beliefs are not taken to be relations between agents and propositions, but agents and CCPs. These deviations from the canon come at the cost of an elegant explanation about the correctness of belief. Standardly, it is taken that the content of a belief is correct just in case the content of that belief is true. The proponent of the test semantics cannot appeal to this explanation since they hold that certain contents, namely epistemically modalized contents, do not express propositions, and are neither true nor false. After motivating the need for an account of the correctness of belief within the dynamic framework, I argue that the few extant accounts in the literature are unsatisfactory. A novel account is proposed that avoids the problems of competing views.KEYWORDS: Epistemic modalsdynamic semanticsdisagreementdoxastic norms Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See Williams (Citation1973) for the earliest instance of this slogan.2 See Groenendijk and Stokhof (Citation1991b), van der Does, Groeneveld, and Veltman (Citation1997), Beaver (Citation2001), Aloni (Citation2001), Gillies (Citation2004), von Fintel and Gillies (Citation2007), Dever (Citation2013), Yalcin (Citation2012, Citation2015), Willer (Citation2013) and Lennertz (Citation2019) among others, for developments and applications of the test semantics. For influential dynamic accounts that do not directly concern epistemic modals, see Kamp (Citation1981), Heim (Citation1983) and Groenendijk and Stokhof (Citation1991a). See Goldstein (Citation2019) for an update semantics where not all instances of the epistemic modal operator perform a test.3 This differentiates dynamic semantics from several other popular theories, including contextualism and relativism, since both theories still take meaning to be truth-conditional.4 Henceforth, I shall use normative terms like ‘wrong’, ‘incorrect’, etc. interchangeably.5 Appeal to correctness judgments that motivate disagreement can be found in MacFarlane (Citation2011), Willer (Citation2013) and Lennertz (Citation2019).6 Here, and henceforth, the modal auxiliary ‘might’ is to be interpreted epistemically.7 See Kratzer (Citation1977, Citation1981) for characterizations of contextualism.8 Several variations of this scenario exist. This version is structurally identical to the one from Lennertz (Citation2019) which characterizes disagreement as a relation between two believing agents that holds in virtue of their belief states. Upon this construal, disagreement is treated as a state, rather than an action, and disagreements need not manifest directly in conversation. For variants of the puzzle, see Egan, Weatherson, and Hawthorne (Citation2005), Willer (Citation2013) and MacFarlane (Citation2011, Citation2014). See Huvenes (Citation2017) for more on disagreement as a state.9 See von Fintel and Gillies (Citation2011) for a defense of contextualism. See Lennertz (Citation2020) and Yalcin (Citation2015) for responses. Also see Plunkett and Sundell (Citation2013).10 See MacFarlane (Citation2011) and Lennertz (Citation2019).11 See MacFarlane (Citation2011), Lennertz (Citation2019) and Willer (Citation2013).12 The following formulation is equivalent to the one from Lennertz (Citation2019) which is inspired by Veltman (Citation1996).13 Mustφ=def¬Might¬φ. On such an interpretation, Must is strong. While there are reasons to reject the strength of English ‘must’ (see Karttunen (Citation1972)), many working in the test semantics take ‘must’ to be strong, so I shall follow suit. See von Fintel and Gillies (Citation2007), Willer (Citation2013), and Lennertz (Citation2019) for such implementations. See von Fintel and Gillies (Citation2007, Citation2010) for arguments in favor of this position.14 Veltman (Citation1996) calls this notion of entailment ⊩2.15 Notably, not all formulas of the form Mightφ fail to be distributive. For instance, when the Might operator takes wide scope over a contradiction, e.g. Might(p∧¬p), the formula will be distributive. As Mandelkern (Citation2020) observes, however, not every formula of the form φ∧¬φ is a contradiction within the test semantics.16 I will occasionally say of some propositional content that that content is true (or false). This is bit of shorthand to say that the content expresses a proposition that is true (or false).17 Instances of this can be found in Heim (Citation1992), Yalcin (Citation2011), Yalcin (Citation2012), Willer (Citation2013) and Lennertz (Citation2019) among others.18 Perhaps most notably, the test semantics predicts the infelicity of embedded epistemic contradictions. See von Fintel and Gillies (Citation2007) and Willer (Citation2013, Citation2015) for details. See Yalcin (Citation2007) for a thorough characterization of the problem of epistemic contradiction.19 Contextualists may not accept this characterization of their view. See, most famously, Kratzer (Citation1977, Citation1981) for thorough explication of the position. See DeRose (Citation1991) for a detailed account of contextualism concerning epistemic modals in particular.20 I oversimplify a bit here, as contextualists have argued that the contextually relevant state of information that the modal is sensitive to may include the information of agents other than the speaker/believer. Proponents of the disagreement challenge respond to this by proposing eavesdropper cases. Such cases are, allegedly, modal disagreements where the presence of the disagreeing agent is not known by the speaking/believing agent, and allegedly, no contextually supplied body of information is plausible. For examples of eavesdropper cases, see MacFarlane (Citation2011) and Khoo (Citation2015). The challenges I offer below do not require eavesdropper cases (though the solution I provide can explain them) so for simplicity, I avoid eavesdroppers in this discussion.21 Note that this distinction is not restricted to dynamic accounts and is equally applicable to static accounts. For instance, Wedgewood's thesis clearly concerns correctness in believing, and does not concern correctness to believe.22 Lennertz (Citation2019), for instance, appeals to the difference between being wrong to believe and being wrong in believing but does not provide an account of precisely what it is to be wrong in believing within the test framework.23 The only state that supports both φ and Might¬φ is ∅, which is not truthful.24 I alter Willer's quote by exchanging Holmes and Watson with Willer's example subjects, Alex and Mary.25 We can often reject things that we do not judge to be incorrect.26 This should also make clear that potential variations of evidential correctness will similarly fail to answer the challenge. So long as such proposals are sensitive to evidence, they will be formative accounts of correctness, rather than accounts of the correctness of content.27 This argument does not amount to a wholesale rejection of evidential correctness. It may well be a perfectly appropriate formative norm. My contention is that evidential correctness cannot be the kind of correctness operative in modal disagreements.28 Here and henceforth, I characterize contents in terms of formulas as opposed to updates, but this choice is purely practical, and nothing hangs on it. Definitions concerning content can be easily altered to instead appeal to updates rather than formula.29 This definition appeals to a locally idealized knower with access to the relevant facts. Those with concerns about the work that relevance plays may appeal to an absolutely idealized knower who knows all of the facts. What follows is equally applicable to both characterizations, so the distinction is not emphasized.30 Put another way, when it comes to our propositional beliefs, we tend to think of ourselves as locally idealized agents, since we think our own propositional beliefs to be true. We can be mistaken, however, about what an idealized agent would believe. This also aligns nicely with the observation made by Willer and others that agents tend to test ‘might’ beliefs ‘against their own perspective’ (Willer Citation2013, 87).31 The same agent will also believe Might p and Might¬p.32 If we interpret strong correctness as suggested in footnote 27, then it is equivalent to Wedgewood's truth norm in frameworks that are propositional.33 Some content φ is indecisive with respect to some proposition [[ψ]]⇔ the only states that can sustain update with that content are states that include at least one world w s.t. w∈[[ψ]] and at least one world w′ s.t w′∈[[¬ψ]]. Thus, Might p∧Might¬p is indecisive with respect to [[p]].34 This is because many Might updates are not persistent.35 Data gathered in Khoo (Citation2015) suggests that speakers are sensitive to this distinction, or one very much like it, insofar as experimental subjects are inclined to judge ‘might’ beliefs with false prejacents as wrong, but not false.36 We might be inclined to separate two normative notions for doxastic action: one that drives us to believe correctly, and one that deters us from believing incorrectly, as recommended in James (Citation1896). We may further place these norms in a hierarchy where one trumps the other. For example, If we prefer correct beliefs more strongly than we disprefer incorrect ones, one would be disposed to guess, perhaps in runaway fashion, because this would yield a net positive. To avoid rampant guessing, we may instead choose to flip the order of the hierarchy, and make incorrect beliefs more undesirable than correct beliefs are desirable. One would expect this to prevent rampant guessing, since the negative cost of getting it wrong outweighs the positive cost of getting it right. In a propositional framework, this is exactly what you'll get, making the more conservative hierarchy of the preferences the better option. This fails within the current framework, however, since it is the pressure to avoid incorrectness which motivates guessing. Thus, within the current framework either ordering of the norms will yield a guess, so hierarchies like these will not avoid the puzzle.37 Importantly, strong correctness is a content norm, and other prudential and formative norms may ultimately prevent a guess, all things considered. However, pressure to guess simply should never arise from a norm that concerns content. While we should expect tensions between various different epistemic norms, norms governing content should not have this kind of internal tension.38 The latter applies to many, but perhaps not all agents who have not considered p. For Willer, considering something to be a relevant alternative is a matter of disposition (Willer Citation2013, 50). This, in principle, leaves open the possibility for an agent who has never considered p to be disposed to take p seriously, upon consideration.39 A proposition [[φ]] is contingent ⇔[[φ]]≠W and [[φ]]≠∅.40 I define correctness at the agential level and the content level. One may also, or instead, choose to define it at the belief level. The difference is trivial since correctness is ultimately decided by the content.41 This formulation is equivalent to the one mentioned in footnote 30.42 Interestingly, locative correctness is not a special case of informational correctness. Suppose that @∈[[p]] and @∉[[q]]. p∧Might q is locatively correct, but informationally incorrect.43 Certain ‘might’ beliefs that are the product of indecision may still be faulty, e.g. suppose that Watson has overwhelming evidence in favor of ¬m, but remains recalcitrantly undecided. While Watson may be at fault, this fault is a product of his failure to respond to evidence. Thus, the norm that determines this fault is formative, informational correctness plays no role in determining this fault.44 These suggestions about fault are merely intended to demonstrate how this proposal fits with intuitions about fault often articulated in the literature. The proposal can be adopted in their absence, should one have differing opinions about how fault is allocated.45 Notably, the vignettes in Khoo (Citation2015) are designed such that the evidence available to the characters in the vignettes appear to support the ‘might’ beliefs of the agents that inhabit them. Nonetheless, subjects were still inclined to judge them to be incorrect. This further supports the claim that the normative judgments operative in modal disagreements do not concern formative correctness, but correctness of content.46 One might instead say that locatively incorrect agents are wrong in the same way as merely informationally incorrect ones, only worse. Either conception works.47 Importantly, one needn't take my comments about fault on board in order to make this distinction.48 Some may object that asking a question does not presuppose that the inquirer is undecided, but instead presuppose that the answer is not established in the common ground. I am sympathetic, but this is no objection to my proposal. If this is indeed the case, then questions do not presuppose ignorance on the part of the hearer, and there is no puzzle to be explained. Still. questions at least seem to suggest that the speaker is undecided. In such cases, Holmes can instead respond to (4a) with ‘You're wrong if you think he might be’,49 See Cappelen and Hawthorne (Citation2005) for explication of the differences between construal of disagreement as a state versus disagreement as an action.