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ZAWCHC 7**

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* * *

##  Kabula and Another v Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs and Others
(23123/23) [2025] ZAWCHC 7 (16 January 2025)

**Download original files** [![](/images/pdficon_small.gif)PDF format](/za/cases/ZAWCHC/2025/7.pdf) [![](/images/word_logo.gif)RTF format](/za/cases/ZAWCHC/2025/7.rtf) |   
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**SAFLII Note:** Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have
been redacted from this document in compliance with the law and [SAFLII
Policy](http://www.saflii.org/content/terms-use)  
---  
  


**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA**

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA**

**(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)**

**Case No.: 23123/23**



In the application between:



**TSHIMABALANGA KABULA
**First Applicant



**MUDIAYI SYLVIE CIBIDI**
Second Applicant



and



**THE STANDING COMMITTEE
**First Respondent

**FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS**



**THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE                                        **Second
Respondent

**DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS**



**THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS                                        **Third
Respondent



_Heard: 16 September 2024_

_Delivered: Electronically on 16 January 2025      _



**JUDGMENT**



_**MTHIMUNYE AJ**_ :



_**Introduction**_



[1]       The first applicant seeks an order for the review and setting aside
of a decision of the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs ("The SCRA") which
is the first respondent, to withdraw the applicant's refugee status in terms
of section 5(1)(e) and 36 of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 ("the Act").

  

[2]       The first applicant in his notice of motion sought an order in the
following terms:



"_1\. The First Respondent 's decision to withdraw the First Applicant's
refugee status in terms of section 36 of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 (the
Act) is reviewed and set aside;_



_2\. The Second Respondent 's failure to make a decision on the Second
Applicant's application in terms of [section
29(2)](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ia2002138/index.html#s29) of
the [Immigration Act 13 of
2002](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ia2002138/) within a
reasonable or lawful time is reviewed and set aside;_



_3\. The Second Respondent is directed to take a decision on the Second
Applicant 's application and to deliver such decision to the Applicant's
within thirty (30) days from the date of this Court's order;_



_4\. Condonation is granted for the late filing of the application for the
relief sought in paragraph 1 above in terms of section 9 of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 ( "PAJA");_



_5\. The costs of this application are to be paid by the Respondents, jointly
and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved; and_



_6\. Further and/or alternative relief. " _



[4]        As stated in prayer 4 of the Notice of Motions, the applicants also
seek condonation for instituting the proceedings outside the 180-day period
provided for by the Promotion of Access to Administration Justice Act 3 of
2000 ("PAJA") and for the late filing of their replying affidavit.



[5]        At the commencement of the proceedings, the first and second
applicant initially sought orders as stated in prayers 2 and 3 above,
compelling the second respondent ("the DG") to make a decision in respect of
their application in terms of [section
29(2)](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ia2002138/index.html#s29) of
the [Immigration Act 13 of
2002](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ia2002138/), in which the
second respondent delayed or failed to make a decision within a reasonable
time. However, this issue has been resolved by mutual agreement, as documented
in the order issued on 7 February 2024. Therefore, no further attention from
this court is required.



**Issue to be determined  **



[6]        The critical question that this court is enjoined to consider is
whether SCRA's decision to withdraw the first applicant's refugee status
should be reviewed and set aside as unlawful and unconstitutional. Before I
can consider this question, I deem it expedient to set forth the background
facts underpinning the reasons that fortify my conclusion.



**Background**



[7]        The first applicant is Mr "Tshimbalanga Kabula" ("Kabula") an adult
male, a medical doctor by profession, is married to the second applicant who
is also a medical doctor. He studied for his medical degree at Kinshasa, but
never permanently resided there. After completing his studies, he returned to
his parents place of origin, South Kivu in the eastern DRC to work at the
hospital with his mother and brother.



[8]        Kabula fled from the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC")
allegedly due to him being in conflict with the DRC government. In refusing
the governments instructions to either neglect or actively cause the death of
rebels who attended the hospital where he was stationed he was victimised by
the military authorities in the DRC. His father was subsequently murdered by
the military and both his mother and brother burnt to death. After being
detained by the government without trial Kabula managed to flee to the
Republic of South Africa ("South Africa") where he was subsequently granted
asylum in 2012 after which his refugee status was repeatedly renewed.



[9]        Having resided in South Africa for about 6 years, the first
applicant applied for certification of his refugee status in terms of section
27(c) of the Act which would entitle him to remain indefinitely in South
Africa.



[10]      In January 2019 the chairperson of the SCRA, Mr Karl Sloth-Nielsen
handed a letter to Kabula informing him of the SCRA's intention to withdraw
his refugee status. Kabula was further informed that he could file
representations within six months to convince the SCRA to change its decision
in respect of the certification application. Notwithstanding the
representations filed by Kabula the SCRA on 3 February 2023, nearly 2 years
after Kabula filed his representations refused to grant the certification and
decided to withdraw Kabula's refugee status on the ground that the
circumstances which justified the granting of the refugee status no longer
existed. SCRA explained that the area where the first applicant resided in the
DRC before applying for asylum had not experienced violence in the last ten
years. Therefore, the first applicant would no longer be at risk if he
returned to Kinshasa in the DRC.



[11]      In June 2023 Kabula's attorney was contacted by the second
respondent to arrange an interview of the second applicant regarding her
application to the Director-General in which she sought the upliftment of her
prohibition in terms of section 29(2) of the Act. Kabula at that stage
believed that he could still have refugee status via his wife, the second
applicant in terms of section 3(c) of the Act which provides that "_[s]ubject
to Chapter 3, a person qualifies for refugee status for the purposes of this
Act if that person … is a spouse or dependant of a person contemplated in
paragraph (a) or (b). _



[12]      However despite numerous emails sent to the second respondent's
officials regarding the application of the second applicant no response was
received from the second respondent. Finally giving up hope in November 2023
of receiving any further engagement from the second respondent regarding the
second applicant's interview and upliftment application, Kabula realised his
error in not launching this application, and proceeded to launch his PAJA
review application in December 2023.



**Grounds of Review**



[13]      The first applicant's grounds for review are that:

           

            13.1    The decision by the SCRA violates the maxim audi alteram partem in that the SCRA issued a withdrawal decision without affording the first applicant any prior notice of or hearing concerning the SCRA's decision to withdraw the first applicant's refugee status.

           

            13.2    The SCRA failed to consider the first applicant's representations in respect of his certification application.



            13.3    The SCRA erred in its decision in finding that the first applicant is from Kinshasa.



            13.4    The SCRA failed to give adequate reasons for its decisions.



            13.5    The SCRA was wrong in concluding that it was safe for the first applicant to return to the DRC.



            13.6    The SCRA failed to have regard to the fact that the first applicant has a claim to refugee status via his wife, in terms of section 3(c) of the Act.



            13.7    The SCRA failed to apply section 5(2) of the Act, which states:



            "Subsection (1)(e) does not apply to a refugee who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution to avail himself or herself of the protection of the country of nationality."



**The Law applicable in this case**



[14]      Section 3 of the Act provides as follows:



_"_3 Refugee Status__



_Subject to chapter 3, a person qualifies for refugee status for the purpose
of this Act if that person-_



_a)          owing to a well-founded fear of being prosecuted by reason of his
or her race, tribe, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of
a particular social group, is outside the country of his or her nationality
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of
that country, or not having a nationality and being outside the country of his
or her former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling
to return to it, or_

            _[Para.(a) substituted by_ __s.4__ _of_ __Act 33 of 2008__ _(wef 1 January 2020).]_



_b)          Owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or
events seriously disturbing or disrupting public order in either a part or the
whole of his or her place of habitual residence in order to seek refugee
elsewhere; or_

                        _[Para.(b) substituted by_ __s.4__ _of_ __Act 33 of 2008__ _(wef 1 January 2020).]_



_c)          Is dependant of a person contemplated in paragraph (a) or (b)"_

            _[Para.(c) substituted by_ __s.4__ _of_ __Act 33 of 2008__ _(wef 1 January 2020).]_



Section 3 came into effect on 1 January 2020 but is virtually identical to the
section quoted above which was amended by [section
4](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/raa2008179/index.html#s4) of the
[Refugees Amendment Act 33 of
2008](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/raa2008179/).  



[15]      Section 5 of the Act provides for cessation of refugee status as
follows:



"_5          Cessation of the refugee status_



            _(1)        A person ceases to qualify for refugee status for the purposes of this Act if-_

_a)          he or she voluntarily re-avails himself or herself in the
prescribed circumstances of the protection of the country of his or her
nationality, or_



_b)        having lost his or her nationality, he or she by some voluntary and
formal act re-acquires it, or _



_c)          he or she becomes a citizen of the Republic or acquires the
nationality of some other country and enjoys the protection of the country of
his or her new nationality; or _



_d)          he or she voluntarily re-establishes himself or herself in the
country which he or she left; or outside of which he or she remained owing to
fear of persecution, or returns to visit such country; or _



_e)          he or she can no longer continue to refuse to avail himself or
herself of the protection of the country of his or her nationality because the
circumstances in connection with which he or she has been recognised as a
refugee have ceased to exist and no other circumstances have arisen which
justify his or her continued recognition as a refugee._



_2.          Subsection (1)(e) does not apply to a refugee who is able to
invoke compelling reasons arising out of a previous prosecution for refusing
to avail himself or herself of the protection of the country of nationality._



_3.          The refugee status of a person who ceases to qualify for it in
terms of subsection (1) may be withdrawn in terms of section 36."_



[16]      The Act also provides for the withdrawal of the refugee status under
the following circumstances:



"_Section 36 withdrawal of refugee status_



_Subject to the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act,
2000 (Act 3 of 2000), and after consideration of all the relevant facts, the
Standing Committee may withdraw a person's refugee status if --_



            _(a)        such person has been recognised as a refugee due to fraud, forgery, or false or misleading information of a material or substantial nature in relation to the application;-_



_(b)         such person has been recognised as a refugee due to an error,
omission or oversight; or_



_(c)         such person ceases to qualify for refugee status in terms of
section 5._



_[2]         The Standing Committee must, in the prescribed manner, inform
each affected person contemplated in subsection (1) of its intention to
withdraw his or her status as a refugee, as well as the reasons for the
withdrawal and such person may, within the prescribed period, make written
submission with regard thereto: Provided that no such notice is required if
the withdrawal is requested by the refugee concerned._



_(3)        In the event that the Minister has issued an order to cease the
recognition of refugee status in respect of a category of refugees, the
Standing Committee must implement such resolution by withdrawing the refugee
status of such category as a whole by notice in the Gazette._



_(4)        A person whose refugee status is withdrawn in terms of subsection
(1) or (3) must be dealt with as an illegal foreigner in terms of [section
32](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ia2002138/index.html#s32) of the
[Immigration Act._ ](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ia2002138/) [
](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ia2002138/) [
](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ia2002138/) [ _[S 36 subs by[s
29](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ia2002138/index.html#s29) of Act
33 of 2008 wef 1 January 2020, am by s 11 of Act 12 of 2011 wef 1 January
2020, subs by s27 of Act 11 of 2017 wef 1 January 2020.]  _   **The principle
of non-refoulment**   [17]      The Constitutional Court in _**Saidi and
Others vs Minister of Home Affairs and Others**_ __**[2018 (4) SA 333](/cgi-
bin/LawCite?cit=2018%20%284%29%20SA%20333 "View LawCiteRecord")
(CC)**___****__para 28_ , endorsed the protection of genuine refugees when
said:   "_The paramount importance of protecting genuine refugees from
expulsion is highlighted in the introduction of the Refugee Convention, which
says:_   '_The principle of non-refoulement is do fundamental that no
reservations or derogations may be made to it. It provides that no one shall
expel or return ( 'refouler') a refugee against his or her will in any manner
whatsoever, to a territory, where he or she fears threats to life or freedom."
_   [18]      [Section
2](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ra199899/index.html#s2) of the
[Refugees Act lies](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ra199899/) in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Universal Declaration"), which
guarantees refugees the right to seek and to enjoy asylum in other countries
from persecution. Section 2 of the Act further provides that notwithstanding
any provision of the Act or any other law, no person may be refused entry into
the Republic of South Africa, expelled, extradited or returned to any other
country or be the subject to any similar measure, if as a result of such
measure, such person would be compelled to return to or remain in a country
where he or she may face any risks or dangers envisaged by the refugee
definitions under the 1951 and 1961 OAU ("Organisation of African Unity")
conventions.   [19]      In _**Minister of Home Affairs and Others v
Watchenuka and Another**_ __**[[2003] ZASCA
142](http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2003/142.html "View Case"); [[2004]
1 All SA 21](/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2004%5d%201%20All%20SA%2021 "View
LawCiteRecord")**__ _**(SCA)**__at para 2_ the Supreme Court of Appeal stated
that the South African [Refugees Act
'was](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ra199899/) enacted to give
effect to South Africa's international obligations to receive refugees in
accordance with standards and principles established in international law',
and that section 2 of the Act , that sets out the principle of non-refoulment,
exemplifies how the Act gives effect to such international obligations.
[20]      In _**Adbi and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others**_
__**[[2011] ZASCA 2](/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2011%5d%20ZASCA%202 "View
LawCiteRecord"), [2011 (3) SA 37](/cgi-
bin/LawCite?cit=2011%20%283%29%20SA%2037 "View LawCiteRecord") **___**(SCA)**_
, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the appellants would face a real risk
of suffering physical harm if they were forced to return to Somalia. The Court
observed that it was obvious that no effective guarantee could be given to
them against persecution or subjection to some form of torture, or inhuman
degrading treatment if they were compelled to re-enter Somalia. Similarly, in
this matter before me I find that there is no effective guarantee that the
first applicant by returning to Kinshasa (DRC) would not be persecuted or be
subjected to torture or human degrading violations. As stated in the
representations made by the first applicant to the SCRA he was declared a
wanted person in his country and had to flee from the DRC for his own safety
or face death in the event of being captured by the government soldiers.
**Condonation**   [21]      Section 7(1)(b) of PAJA stipulates that a review
application must be instituted without reasonable delay and not later than 180
days after the applicant became aware of the administrative action sought to
be set aside.   [22]      The first applicant became aware of the decision
during August 2023 yet this application was only issued during December 2023.
The explanation proffered for the three-month delay is that the matter was
complicated in that both the first and second applicants sought two distinct
forms of review. The first applicant sought to review the withdrawal decision
whereas the second applicant sought to review the unlawful delay of her
application to the Director-General.   [23]      In addition, in June 2023,
the applicants' attorneys were contacted by the Department of Home Affairs to
arrange an interview of the second applicant and this led to reasonable
inference that the second applicant's matter might be resolved amicably and
litigation was placed on hold pending the outcome of the interview. However,
this interview never materialised, which resulted in the legal representatives
of the applicants launching this application during December 2023.     [24]
It is trite that in instances where there has been a significant delay
regarding non-compliance with section 7 (1)(b) of PAJA a full explanation such
as an inability to file a review application timeously where an applicant has
been represented at all material times by legal representatives is not
adequate.    [25]      In _**Madinda vs Minister of Safety and Security**_
__**[[2008] ZASCA 34](http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2008/34.html "View
Case"); [2008 (4) SA 312](/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=2008%20%284%29%20SA%20312 "View
LawCiteRecord")**__ _**(SCA),**_ the Supreme Court of Appeal said:
"_Condonation is not to be had merely for the asking. A full detailed and
accurate account of the causes of the delay and their effects must be
furnished so as to enable the court to understand clearly the reasons and
assess the responsibility. It must be obvious that, if the non-compliance is
time related, then the date, duration and extent of any obstacle on which
reliance is placed, must be spelled out. "   _   [26]      In terms of Rule
27(3) of the Uniform Rules of Court, the court may, on good cause shown,
condone any non-compliance with the Rules. This discretion may be exercised
judicially on consideration of the facts of each case and subject to the
requirement that the shows good cause for the default and the other party not
suffering any prejudice.    [27]      The Constitutional Court **in City of
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality In re: Unlawful Occupiers 1 Argyle Street
and Others v Rohlandt Holdings CC and Others** _**[[2024] ZACC 10](/cgi-
bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2024%5d%20ZACC%2010 "View LawCiteRecord"),**_ held that a
court will consider the following factors in deciding whether the granting of
condonation is in the interests of justice:   "_the nature of the relief
sought, the extent and cause of the delay, the effect of the delay on the
administration of justice and other litigants; the reasonableness of the
explanation for the delay; the importance of the issue to be raised in the
intended appeal; and the prospect of success. It is crucial to reiterate that
both Brummer_ _11  __and Van Wyk_ _12_ _emphasise that the ultimate
determination of what is in the interests of justice must reflect due regards
to all the relevant factors but it is not necessarily limited to those
mentioned above. The particular circumstances of each case will determine
which of those factors are relevant. " _   [28]      Applying these criteria,
I am satisfied that the threshold set by the SCRA has been met by the
applicants. A full explanation for the gap in time from when the applicant
became aware of the SCRA's decision and when the application has been launched
by their legal representative is fully contained in the founding papers and
the supporting affidavits of the applicant's legal representatives. In
addition, the relief sought by the first applicant raise not only an important
issue but public interest dictates that matter be heard. Furthermore, it also
not only deals with the first applicant's constitutional rights but for
reasons that will become apparent, the first applicant prospect of success is
strong. For these reasons and weighing the competing considerations, I find
that it will be in the interests of justice to condone the late filing of the
review application   [29]      I now turn to consider the first applicant's
application on the merits.    **Analysis**   [30]      It is disputed that the
first applicant was granted an opportunity to make representations to the SCRA
after it had already made its final decision which had been brought before
this court for review.   [31]      The decision which was made after the said
submissions is encapsulated in the letter to the first applicant from the SCRA
dated 3 February 2023 contained in the Rule 53 bundle which states as follows:
"_The Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs decided that it intended to
withdraw your refugee status and you were notified of its decision in a letter
dated 15 November 2018. You were afforded opportunity to make representation
with regards thereto in terms of Section 36(2) of the Refugees Act, 1998 (Act
130 of 1998) which you did. Based on your representations the Standing
Committee decided to withdraw your refugee status.   _   _The committee
considered the above mentioned submissions and decided to withdraw your
refugee status in terms of section 36 read with section 5(1)(e) and 5(3) of
the said Act. The committee decided that you are no longer a refugee as the
circumstances through which you were recognized as a refugee have ceased to
exist and no other circumstances have arisen which justifies your recognition
as a refugee._   _The circumstances with which you relied on when you applied
for asylum have ceased to exist. You are from Kinshasa contrary to the
representation arguing that you are from Eastern DRC. You will not be at risk
if you return to your country of origin Kinshasa in DRC. "_   [32]      What
the SCRA says is in contradiction to the applicant's submission in paragraphs
101, 102 and 103 in the founding affidavit,    "_101.    As explained above,
no one in my family is from Kinshasa. Both my parents, and through them my
extended family, are from the eastern DRC: specifically South Kivu and the
Kasai Oriental province.   _   _102.     It was only when I graduated and
began my medical studies that I moved to Kinshasa, where I resided at the
university residence. I was there solely for the duration of my studies._
_103.     Kinshasa was never my home. I did not begin my career there, or buy
property, or make any investments or commitments that a person makes when
putting down roots and building a home."   _   [33]      The quoted submission
indicates not only in that submission but at all material times, the first
applicant who is from the eastern DRC, specifically South Kivu and the Kasai
Oriental province where he was born as indicated on the marriage certificate
at page 76 of record, did not mislead the South African government at the time
when he applied for refugee status in 2012. The fact that the submission made
by the first applicant that he only resided at the university residence in
Kinshasa while studying there is not disputed by the respondents in their
answering papers. The first respondent merely states that this a new set of
facts introduced by the first applicant in his founding papers, but fails to
elaborate as to how he comes to that conclusion.    [34]      The respondent's
stance is that the decision is not reviewable because the first applicant was
given an opportunity to make representations whereupon the submissions he made
were based on new, incorrect facts in the matter. They however do not dispute
that in his representations, the first applicant clearly sets out his
historical background and origin. In addition, that the first applicant also
sets out the terror and fear that he experienced while helping to medically
treat rebels in the DRC resulting his life being in danger from the government
and that he is still fearing persecution on return to his country of origin.
[35]      The Refugee Status Determination Officer (RSDO) in her report at
page 49 of the Rule 53 record, from the onset in 2012 found that there was a
real risk that the first applicant would suffer persecution in the future if
he were to return to his country of origin. Further, she found that the first
applicant had discharged the burden of proof that his life was in danger
according to his country's information. No report to the contrary was
subsequently filed by the RSDO to show that the first applicant's
circumstances have changed to substantiate the decision taken by the SCRA in
withdrawing the first applicant's refugee status.   [36]      This court is
called upon to review the proceedings that took place before the SCRA and what
is contained within the Rule 53 record.  It is apparent that the first
applicant was honest in his application. The application form clearly shows
that the first applicant honestly indicated that his place of birth was the
DRC and that his residency during the last ten years when he applied for
asylum was 5[…] K[…] street, Kindale, Kinshasa and 1[…] M[…] street, Alberton,
Johannesburg.    [37]      During his interview with the RSDO he stated that
his place of birth was Mbujimai. Based on all the information he had supplied
during his interview the RSDO found that the first applicant had discharged
the burden of proof and subsequently his asylum application was approved.
[38]      The Rule 53 record suggests that the respondent made an erroneous
decision by failing to adequately consider the representations, the
applicant's prior applications, and the reports from the Refugee Status
Determination Officer (RSDO) prior to the withdrawal of the first applicant's
refugee status. The assertion that the circumstances under which the first
applicant was recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, without a
comprehensive explanation, is not only illogical but also unconstitutional.
There is a lack of satisfactory reasoning regarding the basis for this
conclusion, and the respondent has not provided any documentation
demonstrating consultation with the RSDO to establish a full understanding of
whether the first applicant's safety would be assured upon returning to his
country of origin.   [39]      More importantly, the explanation for the
withdrawal of the first applicant's refugee status, him being from Kinshasa is
unsubstantiated in that upon the first applicant's initial application
attached to the Rule 53 record the applicant has always been from the DRC, its
capital being Kinshasa. In his original application form at page 21 and 24 of
the Rule 53 record the first applicant has at all time indicated that he is
from the Capital City of Kinshasa.    [40]      In my view, when the decision
was made to withdraw the applicant's refugee status, there was no other report
filed contrary to the one submitted by the RSDO which led the RSDO to conclude
that the applicant's life was at risk. As a result, there is basis in law, or
in fact, for the SCRA to come to a different conclusion as such a conclusion
is not supported by any report or objective facts.  Given all these
considerations, I am of the view that the applicant's application must
succeed.    [41]      In the result, I make the following order:   41.1    The
application to review and set aside the first respondent's decision to
withdraw the first applicant's refugee status in terms of [section
36](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ra199899/index.html#s36) of the
[Refugees Act 130 of
1998](http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ra199899/) is granted.   41.2
The decision to withdraw the first applicant's refugee status is referred back
to the SCRA for proper re-consideration.   41.3    Each party shall pay its
own costs.       **MTHIMUNYE AJ** **JUDGE OF HIGH COURT**     Counsel for the
Applicants:            Adv D Simonz   Counsel for the Respondent:         Adv
P Mhlana   Attorneys for the Applicants: De Saude Darbandi Attorneys Inc
Attorneys for the Respondent: State Attorneys   Argument took place on 29
August 2024  Date of judgment: 16 January 2025  

* * *