标题: Microsoft .NET Framework EncoderParameter - Integer Overflow (MS12-025) EDB-ID: 18777 CVE: 2012-0163 类型: DOS 平台: WINDOWS 发布日期: 2012-04-24 漏洞利用脚本: ------------------------------------------------------------------------
.NET Framework EncoderParameter integer overflow vulnerability
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Yorick Koster, September 2011

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Abstract
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An integer overflow vulnerability has been discovered in the
EncoderParameter class of the .NET Framework. Exploiting this
vulnerability results in an overflown integer that is used to allocate a
buffer on the heap. After the incorrect allocation, one or more
user-supplied buffers are copied in the new buffer, resulting in a
corruption of the heap.

By exploiting this vulnerability, it is possible for an application
running with Partial Trust permissions to to break from the CLR sandbox
and run arbitrary code with Full Trust permissions.

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Affected versions
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It has been verified that this vulnerability exists in the .NET
Framework versions 2.0, 3.0, 3.5 & 4. Earlier versions of the .NET
Framework may or may not be vulnerable as well as the affected class is
also available the .NET Framework versions 1.0 & 1.1.

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See also
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- MS12-025 [2]: Vulnerability in .NET Framework Could Allow Remote Code
Execution (2671605)
- KB2671605 [3] MS12-025: Vulnerabilities in the .NET Framework could
allow remote code execution: April 10, 2012
- SSD: [4] SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure program
- MS12-025 [5]: IKVM.NET Weblog

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Fix
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This issue was resolved with the release of MS12-025 [6]. It appears the
fix was part of a security push for System.Drawing.dll.

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Introduction
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The EncoderParameter class (System.Drawing.Imaging.EncoderParameter [7])
is used to pass a value, or an array of values, to an image encoder
(GDI+). An image encoder can be used to translate an Image or Bitmap
object to a particular file format, for example GIF, JPEG or PNG.

EncoderParameter is implemented in the System.Drawing.dll Assembly,
which is located in the Global Assembly Cache [8] (GAC). Consequently,
the Assembly is trusted by the .NET Framework and therefore this
Assembly will run with Full Trust permissions. In addition, the Assembly
is compiled with the AllowPartiallyTrustedCallers [9] attribute, which
allows it to be called from Assemblies running with Partial Trust
permissions.

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Integer overflow
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The EncoderParameter class contains various constructor methods. All of
these constructors allocate memory on the heap. The size of the
allocated buffer depends on the constructor's parameters. After
allocation, the values of these constructor parameters are copied into
the new buffer. For example the constructor EncoderParameter(Encoder,
Int64) accepts a 64-bit (8-byte) long value, thus 8 bytes are allocated
on the heap after which the value of the long parameter is copied into
this heap buffer. The heap buffer is freed by calling the Dispose()
method. This method is also called when the EncoderParameter object is
destroyed.

Some constructor methods accept one or more arrays. For these methods,
the number of allocated bytes is the size of one array member multiplied
by the number of members in the array. These methods do not check
whether the resulting integer value (used for heap allocation)
overflows. In some cases it is possible to trigger an integer overflow
resulting in the allocation of a buffer that is too small for the
supplied constructor parameters. Not all methods are exploitable as an
overly long array is required to trigger an integer overflow. The .NET
Framework limits the number of array members.

One constructor method (EncoderParameter(Encoder, Int32[], Int32[],
Int32[], Int32[])) appears to be very suitable for exploiting this
vulnerability. The implementation of this method is listed below.

public EncoderParameter(Encoder encoder,
                int[] numerator1, int[] denominator1,
                int[] numerator2, int[] denominator2)
{
        this.parameterGuid = encoder.Guid;
        if (numerator1.Length != denominator1.Length ||
                numerator1.Length != denominator2.Length ||
                denominator1.Length != denominator2.Length)
        {
                throw SafeNativeMethods.Gdip.StatusException(2);
        }
        else
        {
                this.parameterValueType = 8;
                this.numberOfValues = numerator1.Length;
                int num = Marshal.SizeOf(typeof (int));
                this.parameterValue = Marshal.AllocHGlobal(this.numberOfValues * 4 *
num);
                if (this.parameterValue == IntPtr.Zero)
                {
                        throw SafeNativeMethods.Gdip.StatusException(3);
                }
                else
                {
                        for (int index = 0; index < this.numberOfValues; ++index)
                        {
                                Marshal.WriteInt32(EncoderParameter.Add(this.parameterValue,
                                        4 * index * num), numerator1[index]);
                                Marshal.WriteInt32(EncoderParameter.Add(this.parameterValue,
                                        (4 * index + 1) * num), denominator1[index]);
                                Marshal.WriteInt32(EncoderParameter.Add(this.parameterValue,
                                        (4 * index + 2) * num), numerator2[index]);
                                Marshal.WriteInt32(EncoderParameter.Add(this.parameterValue,
                                        (4 * index + 3) * num), denominator2[index]);
                        }
                        GC.KeepAlive((object) this);
                }
        }
}

This constructor method is interesting for two reasons. First of all,
the method accepts four integer arrays. The number of bytes that will be
allocated is the number of members in the numerator1 array multiplied
by 16 (four times the size of a 32-bit integer). Supplying an array
containing 268,435,456 integer values is enough to trigger the overflow.
Doing so results in the allocation of a 0-byte buffer. The following
proof of concept code can be used to trigger this vulnerability:

using System;
using System.Drawing.Imaging;

namespace EncoderParameterCrash
{
        static class Crash
        {
                [STAThread]
                static void Main()
                {
                        int[] largeArray = new int[0x10000000];
                        EncoderParameter crash = new EncoderParameter(Encoder.Quality,
                                largeArray, largeArray, largeArray, largeArray);
                }
        }
}

Running this code will cause the application to crash as it tries to
write beyond a heap boundary:

The program '[2696] EncoderParameterCrash.vshost.exe: Managed' has
exited with code -1073741819 (0xc0000005).

As demonstrated in the proof of concept, copying four large integer
arrays into a heap buffer causes the program to crash. The proof of
concept will try to write 4GB of data onto the heap. Since heap segments
are a lot smaller than that, copying this amount of data will fail
early in the process. This will cause Windows to terminate the program.

All constructor methods that handle two or more arrays always check if
all supplied arrays are of the same length. As such, in order to trigger
the integer overflow arrays must at least contain 268,435,456 members.
This makes exploitation of this issue difficult.

However, the listed constructor method contains a programming mistake.
When validating the length of the supplied arrays, the method fails to
check the length of the numerator2 parameter. Instead it checks
numerator1 twice. The correct check should be numerator2.Length !=
denominator2.Length instead of numerator1.Length != denominator2.Length.
This is the second reason why this method is interesting - from an
attacker's point of view. Due to the missing check, it is possible
to use the numerator2 parameter to control how much data is copied into
the heap buffer. Supplying a small(er) array as numerator2 parameter
will cause an IndexOutOfRangeException exception to be thrown;
prematurely ending the while loop. Since the exception is thrown by the
.NET Framework, this exception can be handled by the application thus
preventing the application from crashing.

Both ingredients provide for an exploitable heap corruption as attackers
control how much data is allocated on the heap and also how much data
is copied into the allocated buffer. It was possible to successfully
exploit this issue on the following Windows versions:

- Windows XP Professional SP3 32-bit (with 4GB RAM)
- Windows Vista Home Premium SP2 32-bit
- Windows Vista Business SP2 32-bit and 64-bit
- Windows 7 Home Premium SP1 64-bit
- Windows 7 Professional SP1 64-bit
- Windows 7 Enterprise SP1 32-bit and 64-bit

By exploiting this vulnerability, it is possible for an application
running with Partial Trust permissions to to break from the CLR sandbox
[10] (CAS) and run arbitrary code with Full Trust permissions. Examples
of Partial Trusted applications include, ClickOnce, XAML Browser
Applications (XBAP), ASP.NET (eg, shared hosting) & SilverLight. It
must be noted that the affected class is not available for SilverLight
applications.

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Limitations
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As noted above, this issue cannot be exploited using a SilverLight
application.

With the release of MS11-044 [11], Microsoft changed the way ClickOnce
& XBAP applications are started. In particular, whenever such an
application is started from the Internet security zone, a dialog is
always shown even if the application does not request elevated
permissions. Previously the application would just start. See also:
http://blogs.msdn.com/b/clrteam/archive/2011/06/06/changes-coming-to-clickonce-applications-running-in-the-internet-zone.aspx

(It is possible to display a green icon in the dialog by code signing
the manifests. When the manifests aren't signed, a red icon is
displayed).

The dialog is not shown for applications launched from the intranet
security zone. In this case the application will start immediately - as
long as it does not request elevated permissions. The intranet zone is
only available when it has been enabled on the target system. This is
common for corporate networks, but less common for home users.

Finally, with the release of Internet Explorer 9 Microsoft chose to
disable XBAP applications in the Internet security zone. See also:
http://blogs.msdn.com/b/ieinternals/archive/2011/03/09/internet-explorer-9-xbap-disabled-in-the-internet-zone.aspx

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Windows XP
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A special note must be made for Windows XP. It seems that Windows XP is
a bit picky when handling large arrays. In a lot of cases,
OutOfMemoryException exceptions will be thrown when trying to exploit
this issue. Successful exploitation has been achieved on a 32-bit
Windows XP system with 4GB of RAM.

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References
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[1] http://www.akitasecurity.nl/advisory.html?id=AK20110801
[2] http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-025
[3] http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2671605
[4] http://www.beyondsecurity.com/ssd.html
[5] 
http://weblog.ikvm.net/PermaLink.aspx?guid=b3525cd1-8788-4d6d-b299-4722ddebad94
[6] http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-025
[7] 
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/system.drawing.imaging.encoderparameter.aspx
[8] http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/yf1d93sz%28v=VS.100%29.aspx
[9] 
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/system.security.allowpartiallytrustedcallersattribute.aspx
[10] http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/ee677170.aspx
[11] http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms11-044

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-- 
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Akita Software Security (Kvk 37144957)
http://www.akitasecurity.nl/
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Key fingerprint = 5FC0 F50C 8B3A 4A61 7A1F  2BFF 5482 D26E D890 5A65
http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x5482D26ED8905A65 URL: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/18777