CVE-2013-4162: Resource Management Errors (CWE-399)
value: The udp_v6_push_pending_frames function in net/ipv6/udp.c in the IPv6 implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.10.3 makes an incorrect function call for pending data, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) via a crafted application that uses the UDP_CORK option in a setsockopt system call.
CWE description: Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources.
Published: 2013-07-29T13:59Z
Repository: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
Language: C
Files changed: include/net/udp.h, net/ipv4/udp.c, net/ipv6/udp.c
Commit date: 2013-07-02 12:44:18 -0700
Commit message: ipv6: call udp_push_pending_frames when uncorking a socket with AF_INET pending data

We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):

skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>]  [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8  EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS:  00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
 ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
 ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
 ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
 [<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
 [<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
 [<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
 [<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
 [<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
 [<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
 [<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
 [<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
 [<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
 [<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP  [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
 RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>

This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.

This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.

(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)

Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Diff: diff --git a/include/net/udp.h b/include/net/udp.h
index b30a71a51839a7..74c10ec5e74fa1 100644
--- a/include/net/udp.h
+++ b/include/net/udp.h
@@ -179,10 +179,11 @@ extern int udp_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum,
 			int (*saddr_cmp)(const struct sock *,
 					 const struct sock *));
 extern void udp_err(struct sk_buff *, u32);
 extern int udp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
 			    struct msghdr *msg, size_t len);
+extern int udp_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk);
 extern void udp_flush_pending_frames(struct sock *sk);
 extern int udp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb);
 extern int udp_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, unsigned long arg);
 extern int udp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags);
 extern unsigned int udp_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
index 959502afd8d9fd..6b270e53c207a2 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -798,11 +798,11 @@ static int udp_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi4 *fl4)
 }
 
 /*
  * Push out all pending data as one UDP datagram. Socket is locked.
  */
-static int udp_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
+int udp_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct udp_sock  *up = udp_sk(sk);
 	struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
 	struct flowi4 *fl4 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip4;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
@@ -817,10 +817,11 @@ static int udp_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
 out:
 	up->len = 0;
 	up->pending = 0;
 	return err;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_push_pending_frames);
 
 int udp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 		size_t len)
 {
 	struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
index f77e34c5a0e20f..b6f31437a1f80a 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
@@ -957,15 +957,20 @@ static int udp_v6_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	struct udphdr *uh;
 	struct udp_sock  *up = udp_sk(sk);
 	struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
-	struct flowi6 *fl6 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip6;
+	struct flowi6 *fl6;
 	int err = 0;
 	int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
 	__wsum csum = 0;
 
+	if (up->pending == AF_INET)
+		return udp_push_pending_frames(sk);
+
+	fl6 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip6;
+
 	/* Grab the skbuff where UDP header space exists. */
 	if ((skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL)
 		goto out;
 
 	/*

Vulnerable code: static int udp_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
	struct flowi6 *fl6 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip6;
Fixed code: extern int udp_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk);
int udp_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_push_pending_frames);
	struct flowi6 *fl6;
	if (up->pending == AF_INET)
		return udp_push_pending_frames(sk);

	fl6 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip6;