CVE-2024-35238: Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)
value: Minder by Stacklok is an open source software supply chain security platform. Minder prior to version 0.0.51 is vulnerable to a denial-of-service (DoS) attack which could allow an attacker to crash the Minder server and deny other users access to it. The root cause of the vulnerability is that Minders sigstore verifier reads an untrusted response entirely into memory without enforcing a limit on the response body. An attacker can exploit this by making Minder make a request to an attacker-controlled endpoint which returns a response with a large body which will crash the Minder server. Specifically, the point of failure is where Minder parses the response from the GitHub attestations endpoint in `getAttestationReply`. Here, Minder makes a request to the `orgs/$owner/attestations/$checksumref` GitHub endpoint (line 285) and then parses the response into the `AttestationReply` (line 295). The way Minder parses the response on line 295 makes it prone to DoS if the response is large enough. Essentially, the response needs to be larger than the machine has available memory.  Version 0.0.51 contains a patch for this issue.

The content that is hosted at the `orgs/$owner/attestations/$checksumref` GitHub attestation endpoint is controlled by users including unauthenticated users to Minders threat model. However, a user will need to configure their own Minder settings to cause Minder to make Minder send a request to fetch the attestations. The user would need to know of a package whose attestations were configured in such a way that they would return a large response when fetching them. As such, the steps needed to carry out this attack would look as such:

1. The attacker adds a package to ghcr.io with attestations that can be fetched via the `orgs/$owner/attestations/$checksumref` GitHub endpoint.
2. The attacker registers on Minder and makes Minder fetch the attestations.
3. Minder fetches attestations and crashes thereby being denied of service.
CWE description: There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified.
Published: 2024-05-27T18:15Z
Repository: https://github.com/stacklok/minder
Language: Go
Files changed: internal/verifier/sigstore/container/container.go
Commit date: 2024-05-20 19:52:50 +0300
Commit message: Merge pull request from GHSA-8fmj-33gw-g7pw

Similarly to other readers, this also limits the size. In this case, it
was set to 10MB, since attestations can get pretty big.

Signed-off-by: Juan Antonio Osorio <ozz@stacklok.com>
Diff: diff --git a/internal/verifier/sigstore/container/container.go b/internal/verifier/sigstore/container/container.go
index f4334deff..27ca2d203 100644
--- a/internal/verifier/sigstore/container/container.go
+++ b/internal/verifier/sigstore/container/container.go
@@ -22,10 +22,11 @@ import (
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"encoding/pem"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/google/go-containerregistry/pkg/authn"
 	"github.com/google/go-containerregistry/pkg/crane"
@@ -47,10 +48,14 @@ import (
 
 var (
 	// ErrProvenanceNotFoundOrIncomplete is returned when there's no provenance info (missing .sig or attestation) or
 	// has incomplete data
 	ErrProvenanceNotFoundOrIncomplete = errors.New("provenance not found or incomplete")
+
+	// MaxAttestationsBytesLimit is the maximum number of bytes we're willing to read from the attestation endpoint
+	// We'll limit this to 10mb for now
+	MaxAttestationsBytesLimit int64 = 10 * 1024 * 1024
 )
 
 const (
 	sigstoreBundleMediaType01 = "application/vnd.dev.sigstore.bundle+json;version=0.1"
 )
@@ -289,12 +294,13 @@ func getAttestationReply(
 		}
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error doing request: %w", err)
 	}
 	defer resp.Body.Close()
 
+	lr := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, MaxAttestationsBytesLimit)
 	var attestationReply AttestationReply
-	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&attestationReply); err != nil {
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(lr).Decode(&attestationReply); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error decoding response: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	return &attestationReply, nil
 }
@@ -444,11 +450,12 @@ func getSimpleSigningLayersFromSignatureManifest(manifestRef string, auth authn.
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error getting signature manifest: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	// Parse the manifest
-	manifest, err := v1.ParseManifest(bytes.NewReader(mf))
+	r := io.LimitReader(bytes.NewReader(mf), MaxAttestationsBytesLimit)
+	manifest, err := v1.ParseManifest(r)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error parsing signature manifest: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	// Loop through its layers and extract the simple signing layers

Vulnerable code: 	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&attestationReply); err != nil {
	manifest, err := v1.ParseManifest(bytes.NewReader(mf))
Fixed code: 	"io"

	// MaxAttestationsBytesLimit is the maximum number of bytes we're willing to read from the attestation endpoint
	// We'll limit this to 10mb for now
	MaxAttestationsBytesLimit int64 = 10 * 1024 * 1024
	lr := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, MaxAttestationsBytesLimit)
	if err := json.NewDecoder(lr).Decode(&attestationReply); err != nil {
	r := io.LimitReader(bytes.NewReader(mf), MaxAttestationsBytesLimit)
	manifest, err := v1.ParseManifest(r)