CVE-2024-36116: Insufficient Information (NVD-CWE-noinfo)
value: Reposilite is an open source, lightweight and easy-to-use repository manager for Maven based artifacts in JVM ecosystem. Reposilite provides support for JavaDocs files, which are archives that contain documentation for artifacts. Specifically, JavadocEndpoints.kt controller allows to expand the javadoc archive into the server's file system and return its content. The problem is in the way how the archives are expanded, specifically how the new filename is created. The `file.name` taken from the archive can contain path traversal characters, such as '/../../../anything.txt', so the resulting extraction path can be outside the target directory. If the archive is taken from an untrusted source, such as Maven Central or JitPack for example, an attacker can craft a special archive to overwrite any local file on Reposilite instance. This could lead to remote code execution, for example by placing a new plugin into the '$workspace$/plugins' directory. Alternatively, an attacker can overwrite the content of any other package. Note that the attacker can use its own malicious package from Maven Central to overwrite any other package on Reposilite. Reposilite has addressed this issue in version 3.5.12. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. This issue was discovered and reported by the GitHub Security lab and is also tracked as GHSL-2024-073.
CWE description: There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified.
Published: 2024-06-19T18:15Z
Repository: https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite
Language: Kotlin
Files changed: reposilite-backend/src/main/kotlin/com/reposilite/javadocs/JavadocContainerService.kt
Commit date: 2024-05-03 18:05:21 +0200
Commit message: GHSA-frvj-cfq4-3228 Skip potentially malicious files in javadoc archives

Diff: diff --git a/reposilite-backend/src/main/kotlin/com/reposilite/javadocs/JavadocContainerService.kt b/reposilite-backend/src/main/kotlin/com/reposilite/javadocs/JavadocContainerService.kt
index 94f7f9523..05143bf2e 100644
--- a/reposilite-backend/src/main/kotlin/com/reposilite/javadocs/JavadocContainerService.kt
+++ b/reposilite-backend/src/main/kotlin/com/reposilite/javadocs/JavadocContainerService.kt
@@ -6,35 +6,37 @@ import com.reposilite.maven.api.LookupRequest
 import com.reposilite.shared.ErrorResponse
 import com.reposilite.shared.badRequest
 import com.reposilite.shared.badRequestError
 import com.reposilite.shared.errorResponse
 import com.reposilite.shared.notFound
+import com.reposilite.status.FailureFacade
 import com.reposilite.storage.api.FileType.FILE
 import com.reposilite.storage.api.Location
+import com.reposilite.storage.api.toLocation
 import com.reposilite.storage.getSimpleName
 import com.reposilite.token.AccessTokenIdentifier
 import io.javalin.http.HttpStatus.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
-import panda.std.Result
-import panda.std.asSuccess
 import java.io.FileOutputStream
 import java.io.InputStream
 import java.io.OutputStream
 import java.nio.file.Files
 import java.nio.file.Path
-import java.nio.file.Paths
 import java.util.jar.JarFile
 import kotlin.io.path.outputStream
+import panda.std.Result
+import panda.std.asSuccess
 
 private const val INDEX_FILE = "index.html"
 
 internal class JavadocContainer(
     val javadocContainerPath: Path,
     val javadocContainerIndex: Path,
     val javadocUnpackPath: Path
 )
 
 internal class JavadocContainerService(
+    private val failureFacade: FailureFacade,
     private val mavenFacade: MavenFacade,
     private val javadocFolder: Path
 ) {
 
     fun loadContainer(accessToken: AccessTokenIdentifier?, repository: Repository, gav: Location): Result<JavadocContainer, ErrorResponse> {
@@ -114,28 +116,43 @@ internal class JavadocContainerService(
     private fun unpackJavadocJar(jarPath: Path, javadocUnpackPath: Path): Result<Unit, ErrorResponse> =
         when {
             !jarPath.getSimpleName().contains("javadoc.jar") -> badRequestError("Invalid javadoc jar! Name must contain: 'javadoc.jar'")
             Files.isDirectory(jarPath) -> badRequestError("JavaDoc jar path has to be a file!")
             !Files.isDirectory(javadocUnpackPath) -> badRequestError("Destination must be a directory!")
-
             else -> jarPath.toAbsolutePath().toString()
                 .let { JarFile(it) }
                 .use { jarFile ->
                     if (!hasIndex(jarFile)) {
                         return errorResponse(INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "Invalid javadoc.jar given for extraction")
                     }
 
-                    jarFile.entries().asSequence().forEach { file ->
-                        if (file.isDirectory) {
-                            return@forEach
+                    jarFile
+                        .entries()
+                        .asSequence()
+                        .forEach { file ->
+                            if (file.isDirectory) {
+                                return@forEach
+                            }
+
+                            // GHSA-frvj-cfq4-3228: treat archive file name as external path that can be malicious
+                            val processedArchiveFileLocation = file.name.toLocation()
+
+                            processedArchiveFileLocation
+                                .toPath()
+                                .map { javadocUnpackPath.resolve(it) }
+                                .peek {
+                                    it.parent?.also { parent -> Files.createDirectories(parent) }
+                                    jarFile.getInputStream(file).copyToAndClose(it.outputStream())
+                                }
+                                .onError {
+                                    failureFacade.throwException(
+                                        "Malicious resource path detected: $processedArchiveFileLocation in $jarPath",
+                                        IllegalArgumentException("Malicious resource path detected: $it")
+                                    )
+                                }
                         }
-
-                        val path = Paths.get(javadocUnpackPath.toString() + "/" + file.name)
-
-                        path.parent?.also { parent -> Files.createDirectories(parent) }
-                        jarFile.getInputStream(file).copyToAndClose(path.outputStream())
-                    }.asSuccess<Unit, ErrorResponse>()
+                        .asSuccess<Unit, ErrorResponse>()
                 }
                 .also { Files.deleteIfExists(jarPath) }
         }
 
     private fun createDocIndexHtml(container: JavadocContainer) {

Vulnerable code: import panda.std.Result
import panda.std.asSuccess
import java.nio.file.Paths

                    jarFile.entries().asSequence().forEach { file ->
                        if (file.isDirectory) {
                            return@forEach

                        val path = Paths.get(javadocUnpackPath.toString() + "/" + file.name)

                        path.parent?.also { parent -> Files.createDirectories(parent) }
                        jarFile.getInputStream(file).copyToAndClose(path.outputStream())
                    }.asSuccess<Unit, ErrorResponse>()
Fixed code: import com.reposilite.status.FailureFacade
import com.reposilite.storage.api.toLocation
import panda.std.Result
import panda.std.asSuccess
    private val failureFacade: FailureFacade,
                    jarFile
                        .entries()
                        .asSequence()
                        .forEach { file ->
                            if (file.isDirectory) {
                                return@forEach
                            }

                            // GHSA-frvj-cfq4-3228: treat archive file name as external path that can be malicious
                            val processedArchiveFileLocation = file.name.toLocation()

                            processedArchiveFileLocation
                                .toPath()
                                .map { javadocUnpackPath.resolve(it) }
                                .peek {
                                    it.parent?.also { parent -> Files.createDirectories(parent) }
                                    jarFile.getInputStream(file).copyToAndClose(it.outputStream())
                                }
                                .onError {
                                    failureFacade.throwException(
                                        "Malicious resource path detected: $processedArchiveFileLocation in $jarPath",
                                        IllegalArgumentException("Malicious resource path detected: $it")
                                    )
                                }
                        .asSuccess<Unit, ErrorResponse>()