The Guardian no relation excessive speed
Rail Accident Investigation Branch
The RAIB also investigated the accident, with data from the tram's on-board event recorder being analysed. The RAIB stated that initial indications suggested that the tram was travelling at a significantly higher speed than permitted. Rail magazine reported that the tram's electro-magnetic track brakes had not been activated. Following the accident, The Guardian reported that on 31 October passengers had made allegations on Facebook of a tram travelling round the curve at excessive speed. The Evening Standard reported an earlier passenger complaint describing the tram as "tipping" on the curve. The driver of the tram involved in the incident of 31 October was not the one involved in the accident on 9 November.The interim report was released a week later on 16 November 2016. At the time of the accident, it was dark and it was raining heavily. There was no evidence of any track defects, or obstructions on the track, that could have contributed to the derailment. Initial investigation did not indicate any malfunction of the tram's braking system. Initial findings were that the tram was travelling at approximately 70 km/h (43 mph) at the time of the accident—far exceeding the speed restriction. The RAIB interim report noted that "a tram approaching the Sandilands Junction area from Lloyd Park at 80 km/h (50 mph) would need to brake at its full service rate of 1.3 m/s² for approximately 180 metres (4.3 ft/s2 for 590 ft) before the speed restriction board in order to be travelling at 20 km/h (12 mph) when the board was reached." The On Tram Data Recorder (OTDR) indicated that some braking had occurred within this distance but only sufficient to reduce the tram's speed from 80 to 70 km/h.A recommendation was made that a further speed limit should be introduced prior to the one for the curve at Sandilands Junction before the line reopened to traffic. The recommendation was accepted and three further speed restrictions were put in place before the line reopened. The report also found that a number of passengers with fatal or serious injuries had been ejected from the tram through broken bodyside and door windows. In November 2016, Rail magazine called for the RAIB to complete its investigation and release the final report "much more rapidly than has become the norm".A second interim report was released on 20 February 2017. In April 2017, it was reported that there had been three cases of speeding on the section of line which included the accident site in the period November 2016 – April 2017. In one case, a tram was reported to be travelling at 64 km/h (40 mph) in a 40 km/h (25 mph) zone. Within the second interim report the RAIB noted that drivers of trams approaching the curve could be expected to sight the curve and the speed restriction sign from 90 metres (300 ft) with full beam headlights and 60 metres (200 ft) with dipped beam headlights. Although the report states that the tram's braking system was not capable of slowing the tram sufficiently between the point where the speed restriction sign became visible and the point at which the speed restriction is enforced, it also says, "There was no sign to indicate to drivers where they should begin to apply the brake for the Sandilands curve; they were expected to know this from their knowledge of the route."In the light of the first interim report the ORR requested that all operators of light rail tramway systems apply a system of stepped speed restrictions where reductions in speed greater than 30 km/h (19 mph) are required by changes in the characteristics of the track.The final report was published on 7 December 2017. Driver error was found to be the cause of the accident, with the most likely scenario being that the driver had a microsleep episode approaching the bend. Fifteen recommendations were made. Key findings of the RAIB investigation were that the tram's windows, which were made of toughened glass, were not strong enough to contain passengers inside the tram. All the fatalities had been ejected through the right side windows. Laminated glass would not have broken, improving the survivability of the accident.  Regulations applying to trams were similar to those applying to buses. If railway regulations had applied, laminated glass would have been fitted. The tram's operators had not considered it possible for a tramcar to overturn. There had been insufficient reporting of previous incidents by drivers, who feared that they would be disciplined rather than such reports being seen as an opportunity to learn a safety lesson (a blame culture rather than a just culture). The system for dealing with complaints from passengers was not fit for purpose. The investigation also found that trams were not as safe as the ORR previously thought, having a higher accident rate than other rail transport and also buses and coaches.An update to the final report was issued on 24 October 2018. The update included the addition of a Transport for London (TfL) audit of Tram Operations Limited's fatigue risk management system, a copy of a letter sent to all UK tram operators and some minor technical corrections. In response to Recommendation 1 of the final report, the Light Rail Safety and Standards Board (LRSSB) was established. The ORR has observer status on the LRSSB.
no relation