Temporal asymmetries in inferring unobserved past and future events

Domain: earth_science
Published: 2024-10-01
Editorial outcome: minor_revision

Abstract
Unlike temporally symmetric inferences about simple sequences, inferences about our own lives are asymmetric: we are better able to infer the past than the future, since we remember our past but not our future. Here we explore whether there are asymmetries in inferences about the unobserved pasts and futures of other people’s lives. In two experiments (analyses of the replication experiment were pre-registered), our participants view segments of two character-driven television dramas and write out what they think happens just before or after each just-watched segment. Participants are better at inferring unseen past (versus future) events. This asymmetry is driven by participants’ reliance on characters’ conversational references in the narrative, which tend to favor the past. This tendency is also replicated in a large-scale analysis of conversational references in natural conversations. Our work reveals a temporal asymmetry in how observations of other people’s behaviors can inform inferences about the past and future.

Introduction
What we experience in the current moment tells us about now – but what does it tell us about the past or future? And does the current moment tell us, as human observers, more about the past or about the future? One way of examining these questions is to consider highly simplified scenarios that are artificially constructed in the laboratory (e.g., 1). At one extreme, for deterministic sequences with known rules, knowing the current state provides the observer with sufficient information to exactly reconstruct the entire past and future history of the stimulus. At an other extreme, for purely random sequences, observing the current state provides no information about the past or future.

Sequences generated by stochastic processes fall somewhere between these two extremes. For Markov processes, where each state is solely dependent on the immediately preceding state, Shannon entropy may be used to quantify the uncertainty of the past and future states, given the present state. Cover (1994) 2 showed that, for any stationary process (i.e., processes in equilibrium), Markov or otherwise, the present state provides equal information (i.e., mutual information) about past and future states (also see 3,4). Further, there is some evidence that humans are similarly adept at inferring the most likely previous and next items in sequences governed by stochastic Markov processes 5.

Deterministic, random, and probabilistic sequences (in equilibrium) are all symmetric: the present state of these sequences is equally informative about past versus future states. In contrast, our subjective experience in everyday life is that we know more about our own past than our future (e.g., 6). We have memories of our past that we carry with us into the present moment, but we do not have memories of our yet-to-be-experienced future. This temporal asymmetry imposes an “arrow of time” on our subjective experience, known as the psychological arrow of time (e.g., 7).

Although the psychological arrow of time implies that we should be better able to infer our past than our future, how generally does this temporal asymmetry hold? And does the asymmetry hold only for our own experiences (due to our memories), or is the asymmetry a general property of any real-life event sequence? In real-world situations (and narratives) where we are equally ignorant of the past and future, as for other people’s lives where we lack memories of the relevant past, are our inferences about the past and future symmetric or asymmetric? For example, imagine that you are meeting a stranger for the first time. At the moment of your meeting, you lack both memories of their past and knowledge about what they might do in the future. After that first encounter with the stranger, would you be able to more accurately or easily form inferences about what had happened in their past (retrodiction) or what will happen in their future (prediction; Fig. 1)? Or suppose you started watching a movie partway through. Again, you would enter the moment of watching without memories of prior parts of the movie. Given your observations in the present, would your guesses about what had happened before you started watching be more (or less) accurate than your guesses about what will happen next? In general, when the past and future are both unobserved, are we better at inferring the past or the future in real-world settings? Narrative stimuli, such as stories and movies, can provide a useful test bed for exploring several of these questions.

Although narratives are unlikely to be confused with one’s own experiences, narratives mirror some of the structure of real-world experiences. Character behaviors and interactions are often designed in a way that helps the audience connect with or relate to the characters. Events in narratives also unfold in ways that are intended to build rapport or engagement with the audience. This might be accomplished by having events follow a believable structure that is reminiscent of real-world experiences, or by designing the audience’s experiences in ways that communicate clear “rules” or “features” that help to immerse the audience in the narrative’s universe. The characters in a realistic narrative can also be written to behave in ways reminiscent of real-world people. These same aspects of narratives that authors use to drive engagement with events and characters can lead narratives to replicate some core aspects of real-world experiences that are typically lost or overlooked in traditional sequence learning paradigms. Narratives can drive the audience to build situation models 8,9 of the narrative’s universe or to form a theory of mind and make predictions about the characters 10,11. Events in narratives may unfold in a consistent or logical way, but they also exhibit complex and meaningful interactions across events reminiscent of real-world experiences (but not necessarily the simple sequences traditionally used in the statistical learning literature).

One key difference between simple artificial sequences and more naturalistic (real or narrative) sequences is that naturalistic sequences often incorporate other people. Despite the past and future being equally unknown to the observer prior to the current moment, other people and realistic characters in narratives, have their own psychological arrows of time. Specifically, they have memories of their own pasts. Other people’s asymmetric knowledge about their own pasts and futures might affect their behaviors (e.g., conversations). In turn, this might provide time-asymmetric clues that favor the past (e.g., other people might talk more about their own pasts than their futures; 12). If observers leverage these clues from other people’s asymmetric knowledge, then observers should also be better at inferring the past (versus the future) of other people’s lives. Alternatively, inferences about other people’s lives may be more like inferences about artificial statistical sequences (e.g., perhaps solely relying on statistical regularities like event schemas, scripts, or situation models; 8,9,13–15). If so, then the accuracy of inferences about the past and the future of others’ lives should be approximately equal.

We note that the aforementioned authors make no specific claims about temporal symmetries or asymmetries. Rather, we claim that statistical regularities might imply symmetry (e.g., if you are on step n of an unfolding schema, this suggests you may have just completed step n−1 and that you may next encounter step n+1).

Here, we designed a naturalistic paradigm for exposing participants to scenarios where the past and future were equally unobserved. We asked our participants to watch a series of movie segments drawn from a character-driven dramatic television show. Across the conditions and trials in the experiment, participants made free-form text responses to either retrodict what had happened in the previous segment, predict what would happen in the next segment, or recall what happened in the just-watched segment. We used manual annotations and sentence-level natural language processing models to characterize participants’ responses. To foreshadow our results, we find that participants are overall better at retrodicting the past than predicting the future. This asymmetry appears to be driven by two main factors. First, characters more often refer to past events than future (e.g., planned) events, and these references are leveraged by participants to make inferences. Second, associations and dependencies between temporally adjacent events enable participants to form estimates about nearby events (e.g., a past or future event referenced in an observed conversation). We also ran a replication study with pre-registered analyses to show that these findings generalize to another television show and group of participants. Finally, we ran a large-scale analysis using natural language processing to estimate the prevalence of references to past and future events in hundreds of millions of dialogs drawn from television shows, popular movies, novels, and written and spoken natural conversations. Taken together, our work reveals a temporal asymmetry in how observations of other humans’ behaviors inform us about the past versus the future.

Results
Participants in our main experiment (n=36) watched segments from two storylines, drawn from the CBS television show “Why Women Kill”. Each storyline comprised 11 segments (mean duration: 2.05 min; range: 0.97–3.87 min, Supplementary Table S1). We asked participants to use free-form (typed) text responses to retrodict what had happened in the segment prior to a just-watched segment, predict what would happen in the next segment, or recall what they had just watched (Fig. 2, Task design). We referred to the to-be-retrodicted, to-be-predicted, or to-be-recalled segment as the target segment for each response. We systematically varied whether participants watched the segments in forward or reverse chronological order, and how many segments they had seen prior to making a response (see Task design and procedure). We also ran a replication study with a similar design, where participants (n=37) watched segments from the Netflix television show “The Chair”, comprising 13 segments (mean duration: 1.97 min; range: 0.58–4.30 min, Supplementary Table S2). The analyses of the replication experiment were pre-registered, although the replication experiment itself was not pre-registered (some of the data were collected before pre-registration).

We asked participants in our main experiment to generate four types of responses after watching each video segment: uncued responses, character-cued responses, updated responses and recalls (Fig. 2, Data overview). To generate uncued responses, we asked participants to either retrodict (uncued retrodiction; u-R) what happened shortly before or predict (uncued prediction; u-P) what happened shortly after the just-watched segment. To generate character-cued responses, we asked participants to retrodict (character-cued retrodiction; c-R) or predict (character-cued prediction; c-P) what came before or after the just-watched segment, but we provided additional information to the participant about which character(s) would be present in the target (to-be-retrodicted or to-be-predicted) segment. We hypothesized that character-cued responses should be more accurate than uncued responses, to the extent that participants incorporate the character information we provided to them into their retrodictions and predictions. To generate updated responses, we asked participants to watch an additional segment that came just prior to or just after the target segment and then to update their retrodiction (c-RP) or prediction (c-PR) about the target segment. The updated retrodiction/prediction conditions were intended to test the hypothesis that access to more information leads to better retrodiction/prediction performance. However, because this hypothesis is not directly related to the main questions about temporal symmetry we examined in this paper, we do not report on these updated responses in this manuscript. Finally, we also asked participants to recall what happened in the just-watched segment. We labeled these responses according to which other segments participants had watched prior to the just-watched target. Retrodiction-matched recall (re(R)) responses were made during the retrodiction sequences (B1 and B2; Fig. 2), whereas prediction-matched recall (re(P)) responses were made during the prediction sequences (A1 and A2; Fig. 2). Whereas retrodiction and prediction responses reflect what participants estimate they would remember after watching the (inferred) target segment, recall responses provide a benchmark for comparison by measuring what they actually remember about the target segment. Our replication experiment (Supplementary Fig. S1) used a similar design but did not have participants generate recall responses.

We used two general approaches to assess the quality of participants’ responses (see Response analyses, Text embeddings of participants’ responses, Fig. 3A). One approach entailed manually annotating events in the video and counting the number of matched events in participants’ responses. We identified a total of 117 unique events reflected across the 22 video segments in our main experiment (range: 3–9 per segment), and a total of 71 events across the 13 segments in our replication experiment (range 1–16; see Video annotation, Supplementary Tables S1, S2). We assigned one “point” to each of these video events. We also identified a number of additional events (main experiment: 23; replication experiment: 17) in participants’ responses that were either summaries of several events or that were partial matches to the manually identified video events. We assigned 0.5 points to each of these additional events. This point system enabled us to compute the numbers and proportions (hit rates) of correctly retrodicted, predicted, and recalled events contained in each response.

Our second approach entailed using a natural language processing model 16 to embed annotations and responses in a 512-dimensional feature space. This approach was designed to capture conceptual overlap between responses that were not necessarily tied to specific annotated events. To quantify this conceptual overlap, we computed the similarities between the embeddings of different sets of responses. We constructed two measures, precision and convergence, to characterize different aspects of participants’ responses. First, we defined precision as the median cosine similarity between the embedding vector of a participant’s retrodiction or prediction response to a target segment, and the embedding vectors for all other participants’ recalls of the target segment (main experiment), or the similarity between that response’s vector and the embedding vector for an online plot synopsis (obtained via Screen Spy; www.screenspy.com/the-chair-season-1-episode-1) of the target segment (replication experiment). In this way, precision is intended to capture the degree to which participants’ inferences about the target segment reflected the actual content in that segment. Next, we defined convergence as the mean cosine similarity between the embedding of a participant’s retrodiction, prediction, or recall of a target segment and the embeddings of all other participants’ responses (of the same type) to the same segment. In this way, convergence is intended to capture the degree of similarity across participants’ responses of a given type, to the given target segment. We analyzed the data using generalized linear mixed models, with participant and stimulus (e.g., target segment) identities as crossed random effects (see Statistical analysis).

No evidence that retrodiction and prediction performance on target events exhibit temporal asymmetry
First, we sought to validate the main effect of response type (i.e., uncued responses, character-cued responses, and recalls), irrespective of the temporal direction (retrodiction versus prediction). Across these three types of responses, participants have access to increasing amounts of information about the target segment. Therefore, across these response types, we hypothesized that participants’ responses should become both more accurate and more convergent across individuals. Consistent with this hypothesis, participants’ character-cued retrodictions and predictions were associated with higher target event hit rates than uncued retrodictions and predictions in our main experiment (odds ratio (OR): 2.65, Z=4.24, p<0.001, 95% confidence interval (CI): 1.69 to 4.16; Fig. 3B). These character-cued responses were also more precise (b=0.13, t(18.1)=9.43, p<0.001, CI: 0.10 to 0.16; Fig. 3C) and convergent across individuals (b=0.11, t(18.6)=6.21, p<0.001, CI: 0.07 to 0.15; Fig. 3D). Relative to character-cued responses, participants’ recalls showed higher target event hit rates (OR=21.83, Z=10.61, p<0.001, CI: 12.35 to 38.59) and were more convergent across individuals (b=0.20, t(19.4)=9.10, p<0.001, CI: 0.16 to 0.25). These results are consistent with the common-sense notion that access to more information about a target segment yields better performance (i.e., higher hit rates, precision, and convergence across individuals). These findings also held for our replication experiment (target event hit rates of character-cued vs. uncued responses: OR: 18.63, Z=4.26, p<0.001, CI: 4.85 to 71.58, Fig. 3E; precisions of character-cued vs. uncued responses: b=0.26, t(11.70)=9.87, p<0.001, CI: 0.20 to 0.31, Fig. 3F; convergence of character-cued vs. uncued responses: b=0.25, t(11.98)=8.93, p<0.001, CI: 0.19 to 0.31, Fig. 3G).

Next, we carried out a series of analyses specifically aimed at characterizing temporal direction effects—i.e., the relative quality of retrodictions versus predictions across different types of responses. We hoped that these analyses might provide insights into our central question about whether inferences about the past and future are equally accurate. Across both uncued and character-cued responses in our main experiment (Fig. 2), retrodictions had numerically higher hit rates than predictions (Fig. 3B). However, these differences were only statistically significant for character-cued responses (uncued responses: OR=1.17, Z=0.35, p=0.729, CI: 0.47 to 2.92; character-cued responses: OR=1.93, Z=2.15, p=0.032, CI: 1.06 to 3.52). We observed a similar pattern of results for the precisions of participants’ responses (Fig. 3C). Specifically, their responses tended to be numerically more precise for retrodictions versus predictions, but the differences were only statistically significant for character-cued responses (uncued responses: b=0.03, t(20.9)=1.09, p=0.287, CI: −0.03 to 0.10; character-cued responses: b=0.06, t(20.8)=3.01, p=0.007, CI: 0.02 to 0.11). We also consistently observed numerically higher convergence across participants for retrodictions versus predictions (Fig. 3D), but neither of these differences was statistically significant (uncued responses: b=0.03, t(17.9)=0.75, p=0.464, CI: -0.05 to 0.11; character-cued responses: b=0.04, t(17.4)=1.46, p=0.163, CI: -0.02 to 0.09). In our replication experiment, as in our main experiment, most of these differences were not statistically significant (target event hit rates for uncued responses: OR=0.11, Z=−1.92, p=0.054, CI: 0.01 to 1.04; target event hit rates for character-cued responses: OR=1.42, Z=0.62, p=0.533, CI: 0.47 to 4.23, Fig. 3E; precision for uncued response: b=−0.06, t(15.86)=−1.85, p=0.083, CI: −0.12 to 0.01; precision for character-cued responses: b=−0.04, t(25.02)=−2.28, p=0.032, CI: -0.08 to 0.00, Fig. 3F; convergence for uncued responses: b=−0.03, t(12.15)=−0.55, p=0.592, CI: −0.13 to 0.07; convergence for character-cued responses: b=−0.05, t(13.68)=−1.78, p=0.097, CI: −0.11 to 0.01, Fig. 3G). Taken together, our results from both experiments suggest that when we focus our analyses solely on the target segments, there is no statistical evidence that there are asymmetries in participants’ inferences about the past and future.

Retrodiction and prediction performance on events across temporal distances exhibit temporal asymmetry
The above analyses were focused solely on the target segment (i.e., retrodiction of segment n after watching segments (n+1)…N, or prediction of segment n after watching segments 1…(n−1)). We wondered whether participants’ responses might also contain information about more temporally distant events beyond the target segment. In order to carry out this analysis properly, we reasoned that participants might reference past or future events that were implied to have occurred offscreen but not explicitly shown on screen. For example, a character in location A during one scene might appear in location B during the immediately following scene. Although it wasn’t shown on screen, we can infer that the character traveled between locations A and B sometime between the time intervals separating the scenes 17. In all, we manually identified a set of 74 implicit offscreen events in our main experiment’s stimuli that were implied to have occurred given what was (explicitly) depicted on screen (Fig. 4A), plus one additional partial event and one additional summary event. We applied the same procedure to our replication experiment’s stimuli and identified 66 implicit offscreen events, plus two additional partial events and one additional summary event. We defined the just-watched segment as having a lag of 0. We assigned the target segment of a participant’s retrodiction or prediction (i.e., the immediately preceding or proceeding segment) a lag of −1 or +1, respectively. The segment following the next was assigned a lag of +2, and so on. We tagged offscreen events using half steps. For example, an offscreen event that occurred after the prior segment but before the just-watched segment would be assigned a lag of −0.5.

Because there is no “ground truth” number of offscreen events, we could not compute the hit rates for offscreen events. Instead, we counted up the absolute number of retrodicted or predicted events as a function of lag. In other words, given that the participant had just watched segment i, we asked how many events from segment i+lag they retrodicted or predicted, on average, given that they were aiming to retrodict or predict events at lags of ±1. We also counted the number of unmatched events in participants’ responses that did not correspond to any events in the relevant segments of the narrative. We focused specifically on uncued retrodictions and predictions, which we hypothesized would provide the cleanest characterizations of participants’ initial estimates of the unobserved past and future (i.e., without potential biases introduced by additional character information, as in the character-cued responses).

There were no statistically significant differences in the total (combining matched and unmatched) numbers of uncued retrodicted versus predicted events (main experiment: Ratio=1.05, Z=0.75, p=0.454, CI: 0.93 to 1.18; Fig. 4B; replication experiment: Ratio=0.93, Z=−0.67, p=0.502, CI: 0.75 to 1.15; Fig. 4D; for results from the character-cued conditions, see Supplementary Figs. S4, S5). However, when we categorized events in participants’ responses as either matched (to an event with any lag) or unmatched, we found that there were more matched events in retrodictions than in predictions (main experiment: Ratio=1.61, Z=2.80, p=0.005, CI: 1.15 to 2.25; Fig. 4B; replication experiment: Ratio=4.00, Z=4.33, p<0.001, CI: 2.14 to 7.50; Fig. 4D). We also observed that there were fewer unmatched events (i.e., events that did not correspond to any explicit or implicit event in the story) in retrodictions than in predictions (main experiment: Ratio=0.34, Z=−5.05, p<0.001, CI: 0.23 to 0.52; replication experiment: Ratio=0.52, Z=−4.30, p<0.001, CI: 0.39 to 0.70), suggesting that participants did not hit more events in their retrodictions solely because they made more guesses when retrodicting than predicting. We then separate matched events according to their lags. Consistent with the hit rates results reported above, the numbers of uncued retrodicted and predicted target (lag=±1) events were not statistically significantly different (main experiment: Ratio=0.92, Z=−0.15, p=0.879, CI: 0.30 to 2.84; Fig. 4B; replication experiment: Ratio=0.44, Z=−1.38, p=0.169, CI: 0.14 to 1.41; Fig. 4D). However, when retrodicting, participants in both experiments mentioned events with lag<−1 more often than participants predicted events with lag>1; main experiment: Ratio=9.10, Z=3.80, p<0.001, CI: 2.92 to 28.39; Fig. 4B, C; replication experiment: Ratio=7.98, Z=5.50, p<0.001, CI: 3.81 to 16.74; Fig. 4D, E). We did not find any statistically significant differences in the numbers of offscreen events immediately before or after the just-watched segment in our main experiment (lag=±0.5; main experiment: Ratio=0.75, Z=−0.36, p=0.715, CI: 0.15 to 3.59), but participants in our replication experiment responded with more prior (versus future) immediately adjacent offscreen events (Ratio=26.46, Z=2.45, p=0.014, CI: 1.93 to 362.29). This retrodiction advantage in the numbers of matched events held when controlling for absolute lag in our main experiment (Ratio=34.31, Z=3.28, p=0.001, CI: 4.16 to 283.20), although it did not hold up in our replication experiment (Ratio >9999, Z=0.00, p=0.997), as participants in the replication experiment almost never referenced offscreen events in their predictions. The retrodiction advantage also held for onscreen events alone in our main experiment (Ratio=47.54, Z=3.74, p<0.001, CI: 6.27 to 360.60), but not statistically significant in our replication experiment (Ratio=3.86, Z=1.86, p=0.063, CI: 0.93 to 15.98), nor for offscreen events alone (main experiment: Ratio=24.76, Z=1.71, p=0.087, CI: 0.63 to 975.27; replication experiment: Ratio >9999, Z=0.00, p=0.997). Again, one reason for the statistically non-significant effects in our replication experiment may be the lack of any offscreen event responses in participants’ predictions. Taken together, these analyses show that participants retrodict past events with higher accuracy than they predict future events.

The temporal bias in conversational references drives participants’ asymmetric retrodiction and prediction performance
What might be driving participants to retrodict further and more accurately into the unobserved past, compared with their predictions of the unobserved future? By inspecting the video content, we noticed that characters frequently referenced both past events and (planned or predicted) future events in their spoken conversations, which might provide clues about past and future events. We wondered whether participants’ responses might be influenced by characters’ conversational references. Across all of the characters’ conversations, and across all of the video segments from our main experiment, we manually identified a total of 82 references to past or future events (i.e., that occurred on screen or offscreen before or after the events depicted in the current segment; Figs. 5A and Supplementary Fig. S6A, also see Reference coding). Characters in our main experiment’s stimulus tended to reference the past (52 references) more than the future (30 references), consistent with previous work 12. References to the past were also skewed to more temporally distant events compared with references to the future (Figs. 5B and Supplementary Fig. S6B). These asymmetries also held for characters in the replication experiment’s stimulus (46 past references versus 7 future references, Supplementary Figs. S8A, S7B). These observations indicate that the characters in the stimuli display a “preference” for the past (versus future) in their conversations. Might this asymmetry be driving the asymmetries in participants’ retrodictions versus predictions?

Controlling for temporal distance (lag), past and future events that story characters referenced in their conversations were associated with higher hit rates than unreferenced events in our main experiment (uncued retrodiction: OR=12.70, Z=10.94, p<0.001, CI: 8.06 to 20.03; uncued prediction: OR=8.29, Z=6.83, p<0.001, CI: 4.52 to 15.20; Fig. 5E). In our replication study this result held for past events (uncued retrodiction: OR=5.57, Z=5.88, p<0.001, CI: 3.14 to 9.89) but not for future events (uncued prediction: OR=1.54, Z=0.22, p=0.827, CI: 0.03 to 73.36; Supplementary Fig. S8D). The failure to replicate the “prediction” result appeared to follow from the fact that references to future events in characters’ conversations were very rare in our replication experiment’s stimulus. These findings suggest that participants’ responses are at least partially influenced by the characters’ conversations. To estimate the contributions of characters’ references on hit rates, we computed the difference in hit rates between all events (which comprised both referenced and unreferenced events) and unreferenced events, as a function of lag. These differences exhibited a temporal asymmetry in favor of retrodiction (Fig. 5C and Supplementary Fig. S8B). This indicates that the asymmetries in participants’ retrodictions versus predictions are also at least partially influenced by the characters’ conversations. However, these temporal asymmetries in participants’ retrodictions and predictions persisted even for events that characters never referenced in their conversations in both our main experiment (hit rates of uncued retrodicted versus predicted unreferenced events: OR=2.00, Z=2.40, p=0.016, CI: 1.14 to 3.51; Fig. 5D) and replication experiment (OR=3.67, Z=2.61, p=0.009, CI: 1.38 to 9.74; Supplementary Fig. S8C). When we further separated the unreferenced events into onscreen events and offscreen events, we found that these asymmetries held only for the onscreen events in our main experiment (onscreen: OR=2.65, Z=2.59, p=0.010, CI: 1.27 to 5.54; offscreen: OR=1.50, Z=0.91, p=0.361, CI: 0.63 to 3.62), and only for offscreen events in our replication experiment (onscreen: OR=0.97, Z=−0.06, p=0.950, CI: 0.37 to 2.57; offscreen: OR=13.88, Z=3.06, p=0.002, CI: 2.58 to 74.81). Taken together, these analyses suggest that asymmetries in the number of references characters make to past and future events partially explain why participants tend to retrodict the past better than they predict the future.

Reference-adjacent events also contribute to the temporal asymmetry
If characters’ direct references cannot fully account for the temporal asymmetry in retrodicting the unobserved past versus predicting the unobserved future, what other factors might explain this phenomenon? The results above indicate that characters’ references to specific unobserved events in the past or future boost participants’ estimates of these events. But might characters’ references have other effects on participants’ responses beyond the referenced events? For example, real-world experiences and events in realistic narratives are often characterized by temporal autocorrelations (i.e., what is “happening now” will likely relate to what happens “a moment from now,” and so on). Real-world experiences and realistic narratives are also often structured into “schemas” whereby experiences unfold according to a predictable pattern or formula that characterizes a particular situation, such as going to a restaurant or catching a flight at the airport 15. If there are associations or temporal dependencies between temporally nearby events in the television shows participants watched, participants might be able to pick up on these patterns in forming their responses. This would be reflected in an inference “boost” for events that were nearby in time to events that characters referred to in their conversations, in addition to the referenced events themselves (Fig. 6A).

Because characters tended to refer to past events more often than future events, the proportions of unreferenced events that were adjacent to referenced events should show a similar temporal asymmetry in favor of the past. We tested this intuition by computing the proportions of unreferenced events in the stimuli that were temporally adjacent to past or future events referenced by the characters during a given segment. Here, we defined “temporally adjacent” as any event within an absolute lag of one relative to a referenced onscreen event, or within an absolute lag of 0.5 to a referenced offscreen event. We also defined “remaining" events as unreferenced events that were not temporally adjacent to any referenced events. In our main experiment we observed higher proportions of unreferenced past than future events that were temporally adjacent to referenced events (Fig. 6B). Further, these reference-adjacent events had higher hit rates than remaining events after controlling for absolute lag (uncued retrodiction: OR=7.15, Z=2.40, p=0.016, CI: 1.44 to 35.58; uncued prediction: OR=3.11, Z=2.30, p=0.022, CI: 1.18 to 8.21; Fig. 6E). To estimate the contributions of reference adjacency on hit rates, we computed the differences in hit rates between unreferenced events (which comprised both reference-adjacent and remaining events) and remaining events, as a function of lag. These differences exhibited a temporal asymmetry in favor of retrodiction (Fig. 6C). This suggests that reference-adjacent events also contribute to participants’ retrodiction advantage. This reference-adjacency effect did not hold in our replication experiment (uncued retrodiction: OR=6.46, Z=1.58, p=0.113, CI: 0.64 to 65.04; uncued prediction: OR=0.002, Z=0.007, p=0.995, CI: <0.001 to >9999; Supplementary Fig. S9D, B). Upon further examination of the stimulus we used in our replication experiment, along with participants’ responses, we noticed that the television episode appears to comprise several interleaved storylines (Supplementary Fig. S10A). This meant that what we had originally labeled as “reference-adjacent” events (based solely on the temporal order in the episode) did not necessarily correspond to the chronological order in the story. For example, if (across successive segments) the narrative focuses on character A at time t in segment n, then we reasoned that watching segment n might not provide much insight into what would happen in segment n+1. However, watching segment n could provide clues about what would happen to character A at time t+1, which might have been shown later on in the episode. We then corrected the reference-adjacency labels in the replication experiment stimuli to correspond to individual storylines, rather than solely with respect to the episode segment orders. This correction was not pre-registered. With this correction, we recovered the reference adjacent effect for uncued retrodiction (OR=7.55, Z=2.93, p=0.003, CI: 1.95 to 29.20; Supplementary Fig. S10E, C). We did not find a significant reference adjacent effect in uncued prediction (OR=1176.66, Z=0.04, p=0.972, CI: <0.001 to >9999), again likely due to the limited number of future references in the narrative. The remaining events did not exhibit a statistically significant temporal asymmetry (main experiment: OR=0.75, Z=0.33, p=0.739, CI: 0.14 to 4.08; Fig. 6D; replication experiment: OR=889.48, Z=0.03, p=0.973, CI: <0.001 to >9999; Supplementary Fig. S10D). These results suggest that temporal adjacency can also partially account for participants’ retrodiction advantages.

Effects of references on retrodiction and prediction performance are directed
The preceding analyses show that when characters reference past or future events, those referenced events and other events that are temporally adjacent to the referenced events are more likely to be retrodicted and predicted. In other words, referring to a past or future event in conversation leads to a “boost” in that event’s hit rate. We wondered whether this boost was bi-directional. In particular: when a character refers (during a referring event) to another event (i.e., the referenced event), does this boost only the referenced event’s hit rate, or does the referring event also receive a boost? We labeled each event as a “referring event,” a “referenced event,” or an “other event” (i.e., not referring or referenced; Fig. 7A, B). We limited our analysis to references to onscreen (explicit) events. Consistent with our analysis of the proportions of referenced events (Fig. 5B and Supplementary Fig. S8A), the proportions of referring events exhibited a forward temporal asymmetry (Fig. 7C and Supplementary Fig. S11A). Controlling for absolute lag, we found that referring events were associated with lower hit rates than referenced events in our main experiment (uncued retrodiction: OR=0.02, Z=−4.12, p<0.001, CI: 0.00 to 0.11; uncued prediction: OR=0.04, Z=−4.80, p<0.001, CI: 0.01 to 0.15; Fig. 7D) and had no statistically significant differences in hit rates compared with other events (uncued retrodiction: OR=0.37, Z=−1.07, p=0.284, CI: 0.06 to 2.28; uncued prediction: OR=2.33, Z=1.53, p=0.127, CI: 0.79 to 6.87). In our replication experiment, because there were very few referenced events during prediction, which also resulted in limited referring events during retrodiction, we had insufficient data to reliably compare between referenced, referring, and other events (all ps>0.998; Supplementary Fig. S11). Taken together, this indicates that only referenced events received a hit rate boost (relative to other events), suggesting that the retrodictive and predictive benefits of references are directed (i.e., asymmetric).

Large-scale analysis of conversational data replicates the temporal bias in conversational references
The above analyses show that participants leveraged characters’ references to make inferences about the past and the future, and the retrodiction advantage could be attributed to the fact that characters in the television shows we used as stimuli in our main experiment and replication experiment refer more often to the past than to the future. But how universal is this pattern? For example, were the television shows we happened to select for our experiments representative of television shows more generally? Or perhaps narratives created for entertainment purposes tend to have biases towards the past in order to keep the stories engaging and unpredictable. To better understand temporal biases in conversations, we carried out a large-scale analysis using extracted conversation data from 12 datasets, comprising over 17 million documents. The data comprised transcripts from television shows and popular films, novels, and spoken and written utterances from natural conversations. These datasets were chosen partly for convenience, and partly to sample from a variety of different types of conversations. Nine of the datasets we examined were from ConvoKit (https://convokit.cornell.edu/documentation/datasets.html; 18). Using the category labels proposed by ref. 19, the conversations we analyzed included “constrained,” “scripted,” and “spontaneous” human-human conversations. A summary of the data we analyzed, including brief descriptions of each dataset, may be found in Supplementary Table S3. We used natural language processing to identify references to past or future events in each conversation (see Large-scale analysis of conversational data).

In all, across all of the datasets we examined in our analysis, we identified a total of 24,040,006 references to past or future events. A total of 13,471,984 (56.04%) of these were references to past events, and the remaining 10,568,022 (43.96%) were references to future events. For each dataset, we tested whether the proportion of references to past events was higher than that of references to future events. In 11 of the 12 datasets, there were higher proportions of references to past events than future events (all ps<0.001). In one dataset, “Persuasion for Good,” which comprised natural conversations between pairs of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers wherein one participant tried to convince the other participant to donate to a charity in the future, references to the future were significantly more common than references to the past (χ2(1)=422.31, p<0.001). This latter example provided a nice sanity check for verifying that our general approach was not itself biased in favor of the past, e.g., even in conversations that were actually biased towards the future.

We used a meta-analysis-like approach to test if there were reliably more references to past events than to future events across all of the datasets (Fig. 8). For each dataset, we used as our effect size the Past/Future ratio, defined as the proportion of references to past events (in all sentences) divided by the proportion of references to future events (commonly known as the “risk ratio”). In this way, effect sizes greater than 1 reflect a bias toward the past, whereas effect sizes of less than 1 reflect a bias toward the future. We fit a random-effects model to the log-transformed ratios. For the 12 datasets we included in this analysis, the observed ratios ranged from 0.76 to 2.09, with the majority of estimates being greater than one (92%). The estimated average ratio based on the random-effects model was μ=1.44 (95% CI: 1.23 to 1.69). Therefore, the average outcome differed significantly from zero (z=4.57, p<0.001). According to Cook’s distances, none of the studies could be considered to be overly influential. Taken together, the results from our analysis indicate that people tend to refer to the past more than they refer to the future, across a wide variety of situations (including in both fictional and real conversations). Although (as in the Persuasion for Good dataset) there may be specific exceptions to this bias, it seems that a bias in favor of the past is a common element of many (and perhaps even most) human-human conversations.

Methods
All protocols (main experiment, replication experiment, and large-scale analysis) were approved by the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at Dartmouth College. Participants gave written consent to enroll in the two experiments.

Participants
Main experiment. A total of 36 participants (25 female, mean age 21.47 years, range 19–50 years) were recruited from the Dartmouth College community for our main experiment. No statistical method was used to predetermine the sample size. We had no a priori hypotheses about gender differences in this study, thus we did not conduct any gender-based analysis. All participants had self-reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, hearing, and memory, and had not watched any episodes of “Why Women Kill” before the experiment. Participants received course credit or monetary compensation for their time. Two participants completed only the first half of the study and one participant’s data from the second half of their testing session was lost due to a technical error. All available data were used in the analyses.

Replication experiment. A total of 37 participants (21 female, mean age 22.24 years, range 19–30 years) were recruited from the Dartmouth College community for our replication experiment. No statistical method was used to predetermine the sample size. All participants had self-reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, hearing, and memory, and had not watched any episodes of “The Chair” before the experiment. Participants received monetary compensation for their time. For two participants, one segment was not played due to a technical error, resulting in four unregistered trials. All available data were used in the analyses. Analyses of the replication experiment were pre-registered on May 24th, 2023 (https://aspredicted.org/8e4ad.pdf). Some of the data were collected before pre-registration.

Stimuli
Main experiment. The stimuli used in our main experiment were segments of the CBS television series “Why Women Kill” Season 1. The TV series contained three distinct storylines depicting three women’s marital relationships. The three storylines, which took place in the 1960s, 1980s, and 2019, were shown in an interleaved fashion in the original episodes. The first 11 segments from the 1960s and 1980s storylines, across the first and second episodes, were used in our study. Segments were divided based on major scene cuts, which primarily corresponded to storyline shifts in the original episodes. The mean length of the segments was 2.05 min (range 0.97–3.87 min). We chose this TV series based on its strictly linear storytelling (within each storyline) and its realistic settings where most events depict everyday life. The plots were focused on the main characters (Beth in storyline 1 and Simone in storyline 2), who were present in all the segments in the corresponding storylines.

Replication experiment. The stimuli used in our replication experiment were segments of the first episode of the Netflix television show “The Chair”, Season 1. The TV series depicts the life of a professor who is the English department chair at a major university. The first episode was used in our study and was divided into 13 segments. Segments were divided based on major scene cuts and were minimally edited. The mean length of the segments was 1.97 min (range 0.58–4.30 min). We chose this TV series based on its strictly linear storytelling and its realistic settings where most events depicted everyday life on a college campus.

Task design and procedure
Main experiment. Our experimental paradigm was divided into two testing sessions. In each session, participants performed a sequence of tasks on segments from one storyline (Fig. 2). For each storyline, there were four different task sequences: two forward chronological order sequences and two backward chronological order sequences. Participants completed one task sequence in forward chronological order for one storyline, and one in backward chronological order for the other storyline. The order of the two sessions (forward chronological order sequence first or backward chronological order sequence first), and the pairing of task sequences with storylines, were counterbalanced across participants. The experiments were not randomized. The Investigators were not blinded to allocation during experiments and outcome assessment.

Tasks in each sequence alternated between watching, recall, and retrodiction or prediction, with the specific order of tasks differing across the four sequences. For example, in sequence A1, participants first watched segment 1, followed by an immediate recall of segment 1. Then they predicted what would happen in segment 2 (first uncued and then character-cued). Participants then watched segment 3 and recalled segment 3. After that, participants guessed what happened in segment 2 again, which we termed “updated prediction”. Then they watched segment 2, recalled segment 2, and so on, as depicted in Fig. 2. This procedure was repeated to cover all possible segments. We also note several edge cases at the start and end of the narrative sequences. Since no segments precede the first segment, participants could never make “prediction” responses with the first segment as their target. For analogous reasons, participants never made “retrodiction” responses with the last segment as their target. Another edge case occurred in task sequences B2 and A2 (Fig. 2). In the A1 and A2 sequences, participants experience the narrative in the original (forward) order, predicting one segment ahead along the way. In the B1 and B2 sequences, participants experience the narrative in the reverse order, retrodicting one segment ahead along the way. However, because A2 and B2 are offset from A1 and B1 by one segment, the initial A2 responses are retrodictions, and the initial B2 responses are predictions (i.e., they conflict with the temporal directions of the remaining responses in those conditions). We, therefore, excluded from our analysis those initial retrodiction responses from the A2 condition and the initial prediction responses from the B2 condition.

Before watching each segment, participants were given the following task instructions. After watching the video, participants were instructed to type their responses (retrodiction, prediction, or recall) in 1–4 sentences. Participants were also asked to specify the characters’ names in their responses, i.e., avoiding the use of characters’ pronouns. For the recall task, the names of the characters in the recall segment were displayed, and participants were asked to summarize the major plot points in the present tense. For the retrodiction and prediction tasks, participants were instructed to retrodict or predict the major plot points of the segment (also in the present tense), as though they had watched the segment and were writing a plot synopsis. They were also instructed to avoid speculation words (e.g., “I think Beth will...”). For the uncued retrodiction and prediction tasks, participants made retrodictions or predictions without any cues provided, so they had to guess which of the characters would be present in the segment. For character-cued retrodictions and predictions, the characters in the target segment were revealed on the screen, alongside participants’ previous responses. Participants were instructed to include or incorporate those characters into their character-cued responses if their previous responses did not contain all the characters provided. They were also told that the characters were not necessarily listed in their order of appearance in the segment and that only the main characters would be given. Also, the characters given did not necessarily interact with each other in that segment, and they could appear in successive events in that segment. If participants’ previous responses included all the characters given, then they could directly proceed to the next task without updating their responses. For each retrodiction and prediction, participants were asked to generate at least one, and not more than three, responses that constituted “the sorts of things [the participant would] expect to have remembered if [they] had watched the [target] segment.” They were asked to generate multiple responses only if those additional responses were (in their judgment) of equal likelihood to occur. On average, participants in our main experiment generated 1.08 responses per prompt; therefore, we chose to consider only participants’ first (“most probable” or “most important”) responses to each prompt. Each response (including recall) was followed by a confidence rating on a 1–5 point scale. However, these confidence data were not analyzed in the present study.

Before their first testing session, participants were given a practice session, where they watched the first segment of storyline 3, followed by a recall trial, an uncued prediction trial, and a character-cued prediction trial. Participants’ responses were checked by the experimenter to ensure compliance with the instructions. To provide participants with sufficient background information about the storyline (especially for the backward chronological sequences), at the beginning of each session, participants were shown the time, location, and the main characters (with pictures) of the storyline. The first session was approximately 1.5 hours long, and the second session was approximately 1 hour long. We allowed participants, at their own discretion and convenience, to sign up for two consecutive testing time slots (i.e., with their testing sessions occurring in immediate succession) or for testing sessions on two different days. The mean inter-session interval was 0.73 days (range: 0–4 days). The experiment was conducted in a sound- and light-attenuated testing room. Videos were displayed using a 27-inch iMac desktop computer (resolution: 5120×2880), and sound was presented using the iMac’s built-in speakers. The experiment was implemented using jsPsych 60 and JATOS 61.

Replication experiment. The design and procedure of the replication experiment were similar to the main experiment, other than the following differences. In the replication experiment, we used only one storyline, and therefore, participants performed only one task sequence (either chronological or backward chronological), in one session (Supplementary Fig. S1). Tasks alternated between watching, and retrodiction or prediction. Some segments contained multiple scenes with different characters. For these segments, characters for each scene were shown in the cued conditions, and participants were asked to guess what would happen in each scene between these characters. For each retrodiction and prediction, participants were asked to generate only one response. No confidence ratings were collected. No practice sessions were provided. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were shown the main characters (with pictures) in the TV show. The experiment was ~1 hour long and was implemented using Qualtrics.

Video annotation
Main experiment. Events in the first 11 segments of the two storylines were identified by the first author (X.X.), corresponding to major plot points (total: 117; mean: 5.32 per segment; range 3–9). In addition, 74 offscreen events were identified. Of these 74 offscreen events, 43 events were identified from references in conversations during onscreen events. Another 16 events were identified based on the characters’ implied movements and travels. For example, if in segment 1 character A was in place A and in segment 2 she was in place B, then the transit from place A to B for character A would be identified as an offscreen event. The remaining 15 offscreen events were identified based on logical inferences. For example, if a photograph was shown in an onscreen event (but not the act of the photograph being taken), then the action that someone took the photograph would be identified as an offscreen event. Offscreen events always occur between two contiguous segments, or before the first segment. The purpose of identifying offscreen events was to match participants’ responses to video events; thus, our identification of these offscreen events was not intended to be exhaustive.

Replication experiment. Events in the 13 segments were identified by the authors (X.X. and X.Z.), corresponding to major plot points (total: 71; mean: 5.46 per segment; range 1–14). In addition, 66 offscreen events were identified. Of these 66 offscreen events, 47 events were identified from references in conversations during onscreen events. Another one event was identified based on the characters’ implied movements and travels. The remaining 18 offscreen events were identified based on logical inferences.

Response analyses
Participants’ retrodiction, prediction, and recall responses were minimally processed to correct obvious typos (e.g., in characters’ names) and remove speculation descriptions (e.g., “I predict that...”). We discarded a small number (main experiment: n=20, replication experiment: n=6) of character-cued responses that did not contain references to all cued characters, along with one additional response due to the participant’s misunderstanding of the task instructions during that trial in the main experiment. We carried out our analyses on the remaining 1781 retrodiction, prediction, and recall responses in the main experiment, and 878 retrodiction and prediction responses in the replication experiment.

All responses were manually coded and matched to events from the video annotations. Retrodiction and prediction responses were coded by two coders (main experiment: X.X. and Z.Z.; replication experiment: X.X. and X.Z.). Recall responses were coded by one coder (X.X.). While many responses were clearly identifiable as either matching specific storyline events or not matching any storyline events, several ambiguous cases arose. First, some responses combined or summarized over several (distinct) storyline events. Second, some responses lacked any specific detail (e.g., “character A and B talk” without describing the specific topic(s) of conversation or providing other relevant details). Based on participants’ responses, in addition to the original 117 onscreen events and 74 offscreen events in the main experiment’s stimulus, we added 25 new events (23 onscreen, 2 offscreen) that either summarized several events or partially matched the annotated events. In our replication study, in addition to the original 71 onscreen events and 66 offscreen events, we added 20 new events (17 onscreen, 3 offscreen). Whereas the original events were each assigned a value of one point, we assigned these additional events a half point. This point system enabled us to directly match events in participants’ responses to the annotated events. In our analyses of retrodictions, predictions, and recalls, we added up the number of points earned for each response to estimate participants’ event hit rates.

We coded only the first retrodiction or prediction response in each trial. For these responses, we also only considered storyline events that were in the same temporal direction as the target segment. For example, if a participant was asked to retrodict what happened in segment n, only events from segments 1…n were considered in our analysis. When coding recall responses, we considered only events from the target segment. We also retroactively added events to the annotations that were mentioned by participants that matched events in future episodes of the TV show. We also identified and counted unmatched events in participants’ responses (i.e., events that did not match any annotated events).

The television episode used in the replication study contained several interleaved storylines, which led to some deviations that were specified in our pre-registered analyses. Specifically, for our tests comparing the numbers of hits for different types of events, we additionally ran linear mixed-effect models with the type of events having two levels: matched or unmatched. This analysis was not pre-registered, but we thought that this categorization of events (matched and unmatched) would make the results clearer. For our tests of the proportions of events hit for three reference types (referenced, reference-adjacent, and remaining), we corrected the “reference-adjacent” label to correspond to individual storylines. This correction was not pre-registered.

Resolving ambiguities and estimating inter-rater reliability. We used Jaccard similarity to quantify the inter-rater reliabilities of the annotations, defined as the size of the intersection divided by the size of the union of the two coders’ event labels for participants’ responses. The Jaccard similarities were calculated for each experiment (across all trials in the uncued and cued conditions), and unmatched event labels were excluded. We observed a Jaccard similarity of 0.42 for both the main and replication experiments.

This low inter-rater reliability appeared to follow from difficulties related to setting criteria for determining whether a given response counted as a “hit” for a specific event. Whereas we had initially expected that manually matching up participants’ responses with events in the narrative would be obvious, empirically, we found substantial ambiguities in this process. As one example, during one scene in our replication experiment’s stimulus, the main character (Ji-Yoon) chaired a meeting for her department. One participant made a retrodiction response, “Ji-Yoon chaired a department meeting,” and another participant wrote “All faculty had a meeting.” If a given rater’s “match” criteria included specifically mentioning that Ji-Yoon was leading the meeting, only the first participant’s response would count as a “hit” for this event. However, a more lenient scorer might consider both responses to be “hits.” After reviewing the scores across raters and discussing each scene on a case-by-case basis, the raters decided to re-score the responses using strict criteria (e.g., in the above example, only the first participant’s response would be counted as a hit).

Another pattern we observed was that participants’ guesses sometimes contained some events that actually happened (or would happen) alongside other incorrect events or details. For example, in another scene in our replication experiment’s stimulus, one character (Dafna) gives another character (Bill) a ride in her car. One participant predicted that “Dafna bails Bill out and drives him back to Pembroke or helps him sober up.” In one sense, if incorrect or extraneous details are ignored, this response would be considered a “hit” because the participant mentions that Dafna gives Bill a ride. However, if incorrect or extraneous details are factored into the scoring procedure (for example, Dafna never bails Bill out, nor does she help Bill sober up), the same response would be considered a miss. After reviewing the scores across raters and discussing each scene on a case-by-case basis, the raters decided to re-score the responses using the former “ignore incorrect or extraneous details” approach.

The raters repeated this general process of developing scoring criteria, comparing and discussing differences, and re-scoring the responses following those discussions until consensus was reached about every response in both experiments (i.e., Jaccard similarities of 1).

Text embeddings of participants’ responses. To estimate the semantic similarities between pairs of responses, we first transformed each response into a 512-dimensional vector (embedding) using the Universal Sentence Encoder (Transformer USE, 16). We defined “similarity” as the cosine of the angle formed by the responses’ vectors. Following 62, we defined the “precision” of participants’ responses as the median similarity between that response’s vector and the embedding vectors for all other participants’ recalls of the target segment (main experiment), or the similarity between that response’s vector and the embedding vector for the plot synopsis of the target segment (replication experiment). We defined the “convergence” of a given response as the mean similarity between that response’s vector and all other participants’ responses of the same type to the corresponding segment, in the same condition. To compute these median or mean similarities, we first applied the Fisher z-transformation to the similarity values, then took the median or mean of the z-transformed similarities, and finally applied the inverse z-transformation to obtain the precision or convergence score.

To test the validity and reliability of the USE embeddings, we performed a classification analysis of recall responses using a leave-one-out approach. For each recall response, we calculated its semantic similarity with all other recall responses for the same storyline. We took the segment with the highest median semantic similarity (to the recall response) as the “predicted” segment. Across all responses, the predicted segments matched the true recalled segments’ labels 98.6% of the time (1088 out of 1103 predictions; chance level: 9%). We note that this validation analysis could only be carried out with data from our main experiment since we did not collect recall responses in our replication experiment.

Reference coding
Two coders (main experiment: X.X. and Z.Z.; replication experiment: X.X. and X.Z.) identified character dialogs in the narrative that referred to past events or future (onscreen or offscreen) events. Only references to events that occurred in a different segment were included in this tagging procedure. For each reference, the source (referring) segment and the referred event number were recorded. A total of 82 references were identified in the main experiment stimulus, and 53 were identified in the replication experiment stimulus. Of these references in the main experiment, 30 referred to onscreen events, and 52 referred to offscreen events. In the replication experiment, 13 referred to onscreen events, and 40 referred to offscreen events. For these referenced events, their corresponding summary events or partial events were also labeled as referenced. In instances where the coders disagreed about a given tag, disagreements were resolved through discussions between the two coders. In our analyses, each storyline event was coded according to whether or not it had been referenced in the segment(s) that the participant had viewed thus far in the experiment.

In principle, a given event could receive multiple labels. For example, during event A, a character might speak about another event, B, during which a reference to a third event (C) was made. In this scenario, event B could be both a “referring event” (B → C) and a referenced event (A → B). In practice, however, this scenario was quite rare, accounting for only one out of a total of 30 onscreen events in our main experiment and one out of 13 onscreen events in our replication experiment.

Statistical analysis
We used (generalized) linear mixed models to analyze the hit rates and numbers of events retrodicted, predicted, and recalled, as well as the precisions and convergences of participants’ responses. Our models were implemented in R using the afex package. We carried out comparisons or contrasts and extracted p-values, using the emmeans package. Participants and stimuli (e.g., segment identity) were modeled as crossed random effects (as specified below). Random effects were selected as the maximal structure that allowed model convergence. All of our statistical tests were two-sided, and the alpha level was set to 0.05.

For our tests of the target event hit rates across four levels (uncued, character-cued, updated, and recall; Fig. 3B, E), we fit a generalized linear mixed model with a binomial link function:

cbind(thp, ttp − thp) ~ direction * level * seg_cnt * storyline + (direction * level | target) + (direction * level * seg_cnt | participant)

where for analyses of our main experiment, thp was the number of points hit for the target segment, ttp was the total number of points for the target segment (from its annotations), direction was either retrodiction or prediction, level had four levels (uncued, character-cued, updated, and recall), seg_cnt represented the number of segments in the storyline that had been watched (1–10, centered), storyline had two levels (1 or 2), and target had 22 levels according to the identity of the target segment. For our analyses of our replication experiment, the level had two levels (uncued and character-cued), seg_cnt ranged from 1–12, the storyline parameter was omitted since there was only a single storyline, and the target had 13 levels according to the identity of the target segment. In the replication experiment, we did not include random slopes of direction effect in the participant level in all analyses, as participants either made retrodictions or predictions (i.e., participants and tasks were nested).

For our tests of precision and convergence (Fig. 3C, D, F, and G), we fit linear mixed models using the same formula. To test the effect of direction (retrodiction or prediction) on target event hit rates, precision, and convergence, we fit a (generalized) linear mixed model separately for each of the three levels (uncued, character-cued, and recall).

For our tests comparing the numbers of hits for different types of events (Fig. 4B and Supplementary Fig. S6), we fit generalized linear mixed models using the same formula, but with a Poisson link function. For these models, we manually doubled the point counts to ensure that half points were mapped onto integers, ensuring compatibility with the Poisson link function.

For our analyses of the number of events hit, controlling for lag (Fig. 4C), we fit a generalized linear mixed model with a Poisson link function:

hp_lag ~ direction * full_stp * lag * storyline + (direction | base_seg) + (1 | base_seg_pair) + (direction * full_stp * lag * storyline | participant)

where hp_lag is the number of “points” earned (for each lag) in each trial (again, we manually doubled the point counts to ensure that half points were mapped onto integers, for compatibility with the Poisson link function), full_stp denoted whether the given events (of the given lag) were onscreen (i.e., full step) or offscreen (i.e., half step), lag denotes the (centered) absolute lag, base_seg denotes the identity of the just-watched segment (main experiment: 22 levels; replication experiment: 13 levels), and base_seg_pair denotes the pairing of the just-watched segment and the segment at each lag (main experiment: 440 levels; replication experiment: 324 levels).

For our analyses of the proportions of events hit for referenced versus unreferenced events (Fig. 5D, E and Supplementary Fig. S7), we fit a generalized linear model with a binomial link function:

cbind(hp_lag, tp_lag − hp_lag) ~ direction * reference * full_stp + lag + (direction | base_seg) + (1 | base_seg_pair) + (direction * reference * full_stp + lag | participant)

where hp_lag denotes the number of earned hit points for each reference type (referenced or unreferenced) at each lag, tp_lag denotes the total number of possible hit points for each reference type at each lag, and the other variables adhered to the same notation used in the above formulas.

For our tests of the proportions of events hit for all three reference types (referenced, reference-adjacent, and remaining: Fig. 6D, E and Supplementary Figs. S9, S10; or referenced, referring, and other: Fig. 7D and Supplementary Fig. S11), we fit a generalized linear mixed model using the same formula as above, but with three (rather than two) reference levels.

Several of our analyses entailed comparing the relative hit rates or probabilities of two different conditions or outcomes. We used the emmeans package to compute the odds ratios given the generalized linear mixed models we fit for the given analysis. These odds ratios reflect the odds (calculated as p / (1−p), where p is the probability that the outcome occurs) of a particular outcome (e.g., making a response about a particular event) given a scenario (e.g., the event occurred prior to the just-watched segment) divided by the odds of the outcome occurring in the alternative scenario (e.g., the event occurred after the just-watched segment).

Large-scale analysis of conversational data
At a high level, the goal of our analysis of conversational data was to predict in-text references to past and future events. Manually identifying these references is labor and time-intensive, so it is impractical to scale up manual tagging to millions of documents. Instead, we defined a set of heuristics for predicting when text is referring to real or hypothetical past or future events. Our approach comprised four main steps.

First, we used the nltk package 63 to segment each document into individual sentences. Each sentence was processed independently of the others. Second, we handled contractions using the contractions package (e.g., “we’ll” was split into “we will,” and so on). Third, we defined two sets of “keywords” (words and phrases) that tended to be indicative of referring to the past (Tab. S6) or future (Tab. S7). We used ChatGPT 64 to generate each list, with exactly 50 templates per list, using the following prompt:

I’m designing a heuristic algorithm for identifying references (in text) to past and future events. Part of the algorithm will involve looking for specific keywords or phrases that suggest that the text is referring to something that happened (or will happen) in the past and/or future. Could you help me generate a list of 50 keywords or phrases to include in each list (one list for identifying references to the past and a second list for identifying references to the future)? I’d like to be able to paste the lists you generate into two plain text documents with one row per keyword or phrase, and no other content. Please output the lists as a “code” block (enclosed by “‘...”’).

Fourth, we used part-of-speech tagging (again, using the nltk package) to look for verbs or verb phrases that were in past or future tenses. After the words were tagged with their predicted parts of speech, we used regular expressions (applied to the sequences of tags) to label each verb or verb phrase with a human-readable verb form (e.g., “future perfect continuous passive,” “conditional perfect continuous passive,” and so on). The regular expressions we used to generate these labels are shown in the Supplementary Table S4, and the part of speech tags are defined in the Supplementary Table S5.

We treated each keyword match (of past or future keywords) as a “reference” (to a past or future event, respectively). We also tracked whether any past or future verb forms were detected. We then tallied up the numbers of past and/or future references across sentences within the given document, counting (up to) one past reference and one future reference per sentence.

In designing the above approach, we used the transcript of “The Chair”, Episode 1 to “debug” the automatically derived tense tags. We began by spot-checking randomly selected sentences from the episode’s transcript, tweaking the algorithm as needed to catch tricky edge cases. Once we began to see good performance on the excerpted sentences, we applied the approach to the full episode transcript. We verified that the automated procedure accurately recovered the approximate relative numbers of past versus future “references” that we identified by hand. Next, we applied the automated tagging procedure to the other episodes of “The Chair”. We found that our approach appeared to generalize to those episodes as well, as compared with manually derived labels. Finally, after computing automated tags for the other datasets, we carried out a final set of “spot checks” on randomly excerpted utterances from each dataset to verify that the automated tags were behaving as expected.

In general, our automated tagging procedure tended to overcount the number of references (Supplementary Fig. S12A). From manually examining hundreds of example tags, we noticed that our automated tagging procedure often counts the “same” references multiple times when the reference is extended across multiple sentences. Specifically, the manually generated tags sought to identify references to specific events that occurred or were implied to occur in other parts of the narrative. In contrast, as a heuristic, we designed the automated tagging procedure to identify uses of the past or future tense as a proxy for references to past or future events. Individual conversations often contain multiple references to a given (past or future) event. Whereas the manually generated tags counted these as “single” references, our automated tagging procedure had no means of differentiating between several references to the same event versus the same number of references to different events. This leads the automated tagging procedure to overestimate the number of distinct events being referenced. These overestimates tended to be biased towards future references (Supplementary Fig. S12B, C). Therefore, the ratios of past to future references we estimated automatically appeared to systematically underestimate the true ratio. Nevertheless, underestimating the Past/Future reference ratio does not change our conclusion that past references are more common than future references in human-human conversations.

Peer review rounds
[{"round": 1, "reviewer_comments": {"reviewer_1": "The authors present data from one laboratory experiment assessing the capacity for participants to\npredict what might have happened before or what might happen after a given segment a television\nshow storyline. Among other things, the authors report that participants were better at predicting\nwhat might have occurred leading up to a segment than what might occur after a segment and\nsuggest that the tendency for past information to be mentioned in conversation and its proximity\nto the present may help to account for this pattern of data. The authors argue that these findings\nmay help us to better understand how we understand other people.\nThis is a well-written paper that uses a sophisticated experimental paradigm to study prediction\nabout the past and future under controlled settings. While I believe the data are interesting, my\nprimary concern is that it is not clear whether the data are generalizable beyond the very specific\ncontext that is tested in this study. First, the conclusions that the authors draw are based on a\nsingle experiment with a relatively small sample (for which no justification is given). Second, the\nauthors use story lines from one television show, and it is not clear whether these findings\ngeneralize to other experimental stimuli. Finally, the rationale as to how this paradigm might\ninform real world interactions is somewhat weak. The authors provide examples of meeting\nsomeone for the very first time and watching a movie starting somewhere at its midpoint. These\nsituations are rare compared to the many different circumstances in which people are constantly\nmaking predictions about others in terms of their past and/or future (e.g., thinking about the past\nand future of familiar others). The study also fails to consider the possibility that people may\nsimply refrain from making predictions about others if they do not have any relevant information\navailable to them.\nAgain, I believe this is a very clever paradigm and the data are interesting, but it is not clear that\nthey tell us much about how we make predictions about others in the real world. Moreover, the\nreported findings simply need to be replicated and extended across different participant samples\nand experimental stimuli to convince the reader as to their reliability.\nMinor points:\nWhereas the authors very clearly explained the procedure in the body of the manuscript, I found\nFig. 2 somewhat confusing.\nThe methods are repeated in some detail in the results section. This is fine, but the initial part of\nthe results and the methods are rather repetitive.\nThe authors do not report interrater reliability where coding included two coders.", "reviewer_2": "In this paper, Xu, Zhu, and Manning report on a study examining temporal asymmetries when\ninferring unobserved events in the past and the future. In the study, participants watched\nsegments of a television series (Why Women Kill), and performed several task conditions\nalternating between viewing, recall, and either retrodiction or prediction of an unviewed event.\nAdditional task conditions divided trials into uncued and character-cued prediction or retrodiction.\nA final condition was an “updated prediction” in which participants attempted to guess what\nhappened in a given event having been provided both the preceding event (which was used to\npredict initially) and following event (which presumably led to a clearer prediction of the unseen\nmiddle event). The study produced several findings. First, hit rate (i.e., proportion of correctly\nretrodicted, predicted, or recalled events) were better for character-cued than uncued retrodiction\nor prediction, and more importantly, hit rates were higher and transcripts more precise for\nretrodiction than prediction. Second, participants showed a greater propensity to retrodict to\ndistant (i.e., lag greater than 1 event away from the cued event) past events than to predict to\ndistant future events. Third, the stimulus itself seemed to drive these effects to some extent. That\nis, the characters in the show made more reference to past events than future events, which\nseems to have driven the bias toward retrodiction to some extent in the behavioral data. Fourth,\nevents near these references by characters in the show seemed to drive higher hit rates. Fifth, this\nhit rate applied to the event being referenced, but not the referring event (i.e., the event from\nwhich the reference originated rather than the one targeted by the reference).\nOverall, I found this to be an interesting paper targeting a very interesting topic. Given the\nassociation between episodic memory and future thinking, it is interesting to see an investigation\ninto the potential biases in directionality that may mediate such an apparently shared resource.\nNonetheless, I have a number of issues with the paper in its current form, which I list below (in no\nparticular order):\n1. The introduction is very light on discussion of highly relevant work in the field on memory in\nboth basic and more naturalistic experiments, particularly temporal influences on memory, and\ntemporal biases in memory. Consequently, I think that there is a rather weak representation of\nrelevant works being cited here. I found the introduction to be entertaining to read, to be clear,\nbut it felt more based on speculation and commonsense notions of how things should or might\nwork than built on a foundation of empirical evidence that led to specific questions. I think this\ncould stand to be sharpened\n2. Relatedly, I did not feel that the analyses in the paper built on one another in a satisfying way.\nThe initial analyses in Figure 3 made a lot of sense given the introductory lead-in and the\nmotivation for designing the experiment, and the data described in Figure 4 seemed to logically\nfollow from that initial set of comparisons. But after this point, things stopped flowing for me.\nThere did not seem to be a lot of logic stringing these analyses together. Rather, it felt as if the\nauthors collated a set of interesting analyses without really guiding the reader through why that\nanalysis was important, how it built on the prior findings, or why it really needed to happen in the\ngrander scheme of things. Though this is only one example, on Line 297, the authors write: “If\nthere are associations and ependencies between temporally adjacent events, might characters’\nreferences to specific events also boost participants’ estimates of other events that were\ntemporally adjacent to the referenced events?” At the time of reading, I completely missed the\nlogic underlying the move toward this prediction. (As an aside, this is also a bit convoluted a\nsentence.) To be clear, the findings are interesting and make better sense in the larger scope of\nthe paper once I had time to step back and digest it all. However, in my initial read-through, I lost\nfocus of the overall “point” and rather felt like I was being led down a garden path of exploratory\nanalyses. I have to recommend tightening up the logic throughout the paper.\n3. At the top of Page 5, the authors cite Radvansky and Copeland, Zwaan and Radvansky, Bower\net al., and Ranganath and Ritchey’s work in reference inferences about other people’s lives in\nterms of event schemas, scripts, or situation models. They assert that “the accuracy of inferences\nabout the past and the future of others’ lives should be approximately equal” on the basis of these\ncited works. I actually am not sure if the cited authors would make any claims about the\ndirectionality of inferences into the past or future, or a lack thereof. In fact, I actually doubt there\nwould be any such claim of an “approximately equal” distribution on the part of several of these\nindividuals.\n4. I am a bit unclear on the tagging of implicit events in half-step lags, and exactly how the\nspecifics of this choice were implemented. Was it determined that offscreen events must have\ncome between onscreen events? That is, if a cued event has a target segment of lag -2, and there\nis an intervening segment of lag -1, did the experimenters decide that some event that must have\ntaken place between -2 and -1 must be lag -1.5? This seems reasonable, but it is not explained\nclearly. However, if this is the case, it does raise the question of how confidently the\nexperimenters could determine between which of two specific events an offscreen event falls. I\nwould like to see more clarification on this.\n5. I did not find that Figure 5, Panel E was explained very clearly. Perhaps more importantly,\nthough, it is quite difficult to see the key data (i.e., the colored sliver at the far left of the gray\nbar) in these plots. I am not really sure what to recommend to the authors that would “improve”\nthe plot, but it really is not a great viewing experience for the reader.\n6. I am assuming that Figure 8 is comprised of data from the prior analyses just collated into a\nplot, but this isn't clear. If it is hypothetical, this should be specified.\n7. A larger issue I have with these data is that I am led to question the generalizability of the bias\ntoward retrodiction due to the stimulus itself. One of the major analyses in this paper shows that\nthe stimulus itself (i.e., references made by the characters) directs the viewer more toward the\npast than toward the future (Fig. 5). Further, these references seem to directly influence\nparticipants’ behavior in the experiment (Fig. 6). How, then, can we be at all confident that the\n“psychological arrow of time” directs us toward the past in a general sense, and not simply as a\nmatter of cueing in this particular experiment? The results of this study seem pretty unsurprising\ngiven the aforementioned bias toward the stimulus itself referencing the past, which leads me to\nwonder why we would expect any other result here. At the very least, I think that this is a major\nenough complication with generalizability that the broader statements made throughout the paper\nsuch as “an underlying knowledge asymmetry in favor of the past” should perhaps be dialed back\na bit. To be fair, the authors lay out a nice logical story for why past knowledge should exceed\nfuture knowledge in the introduction. However, there are in my view pretty major complications\nwith the stimulus itself that limit one’s ability to make strong statements on the back of the data,\nand perhaps even lead to questions about the impact or importance of the findings in the absence\nof a more temporally-agnostic stimulus.\n8. Although the discussion is certainly the place for speculation, it felt very speculative. In\nparticular, there were mentions of the “’thermodynamic’ arrow of time” and “detective and forensic\nscience” which, while interesting, are not as relevant as psychological and neuroscientific\nphenomena that could be discussed here. In line with my first comment about the introduction,\nthis section was an interesting read, but it unfortunately felt shallow in terms of relating to and\nciting relevant literature.\n9. A very minor nitpick, but it would be nice to include a quick rundown of odds ratios, at least in\nthe methods section. This is certainly an appropriate way of analyzing these data, but I find it\nlikely that a number of prospective readers might not immediately grasp what was being evaluated\nhere.", "reviewer_3": "Since the time of Ebbinghaus, memory research has largely focused on carefully controlled lists of\nstimuli. One of the important phenomena this work has revealed is the contiguity effect, the\nfinding that, all else equal, memory for an event brings to mind memory for nearby stimuli. Over\nroughly the last decade or so, there has been a movement to study human memory under more\nnaturalistic circumstances. Much of this work has relied on participants experiencing narratives,\nsuch as radio shows or oral story-telling or, as in this study, television programs. Because the\nstudy materials are so different, it is difficult to assess the source of differences between\nlaboratory memory studies and studies using narrative material. After all, narratives often have a\nrich structure with layers of semantic meanings and emotional and cultural shadings. It is difficult\nto measure these variables from narratives and thus difficult to understand their separate and\ncooperative effects. The present study presents an ingenious method to estimate the\nconnectedness of the narrative. One might say that this study measures the contiguity effect in\nthe complete absence of memory for the study materials.\nParticipants are presented with brief clips from an unfamiliar television program and asked to\npredict events that will follow the clip and retrodict events that preceded the clip. In this way it is\npossible to trace out something analogous to a contiguity effect that is solely attributable to the\nparticipants' expectations about the statistical structure of the narrative. The primary result is\nthat, whereas the contiguity effect in laboratory memory experiments is typically asymmetric\nfavoring memory in the forward direction, the ability to predict unobserved events from a narrative\nis asymmetric in the backward direction. On its face, this result is not only inconsistent with the\ncontiguity effect from laboratory memory experiments, but also from laboratory experiments that\ndirectly evaluate participants' abilities to estimate the past and the future from Markov sequences\nof stimuli. Jones & Pashler (2007) observed no evidence for an asymmetry, in either direction,\nwhen participants were asked to judge the stimulus that followed or preceded a cue stimulus.\nSo what accounts for the counterintuitive result in the present study. The authors argue that the\nfact that in the narrative, characters talk about past events more frequently than future events.\nThis at least partially accounts for the backward asymmetry, which seems to at least be reduced\nfor events that were not referenced. Moreover, the authors argue that references enhance the\nability to predict events surrounding the referenced events. For instance, if a character at work\nmentions that they shoveled their driveway that morning, one might guess that it snowed in the\nnight and that they drove to work.\nIn summary, this paper is methodologically innovative and tackles a problem that is of importance\nin the study of human memory. The analyses are careful and sound. Like many studies that use\ncultural artifacts as study materials, it is unclear how well this generalizes to actual real world\nexperiences, or even other cultural artifacts. Narratives are crafted to be unpredictable; a\ntelevision show that is too predictable is boring. However, for the narrative in this study at least, it\nseems that asymmetry in the ability to infer events in time was at least to some extent\nattributable to the memory conveyed by the characters in the program.\nOne might ask if temporal inference of events is asymmetric for narratives that do not explicitly\nconvey information about the past or the future (assuming the Jones & Pashler results are the last\nword on genuinely Markov processes). Even those without characters describing past events.\nSimple statistical structures may yield asymmetric predictions from a normative model. For\ninstance, suppose that a stimulus Y happens with relatively high probability according to a Poisson\nprocess. The stimulus train is assembled such that every once in a while, Y is preceded by X at\nprecisely 1 second. That is P(Y presented 1 s in the future | X presented now) = 1, whereas P(X\nwas presented 1 s in the past | Y presented now) is very small. Similarly, taking into account the\nimprecision of temporal memory predictions that can be formed from the sequence\nX Y Z\nare asymmetric. Starting from Y, the time of X is more uncertain than the time of Z, simply\nbecause of our ability to resolve temporal intervals.", "reviewer_4": "The authors report evidence that people are better able to retrodict other people's pasts than\npredict other people's future. Past work has shown similar effects for people's own personal\nexperience, but this is the first work to show that the effects extend to how we understand other\npeople and their experiences. The authors further showed that the temporal asymmetry in\ncharacter retrodictions/predictions was related to (i) characters’ tendencies to refer to past events\nmore than future events in their ongoing conversations, and (ii) associations between temporally\nproximal events. There is a lot to like about this paper: the results are compelling, the\nexperimental design is creative, and it is a novel finding. There are a few concerns that if\naddressed in a revision would strengthen the manuscript and make it better suited for publication.\n1. Television writers presumably spend a good chunk of time trying to write scripts that viewers\ncannot easily predict. When as a viewer you can easily predict what happens next in a show, it's\nless entertaining--people frequently complain about shows that are \"too predictable.\"\nSimultaneously, tv writers want to make the story easy to remember so people can jump in and\nout, or remember what happened in the last episode so they can enjoy the next episode a week\nlater. This all makes me wonder if the temporal asymmetries observed here generalize to other\nscenarios that are not scripted and not-predesigned to be more or less predictable vs.\nretrodictable. If the authors were able to replicate their results with footage of people in\nunscripted, everyday conversations, that would very compelling. Or at the very least, this would\nbe good to address as a limitation in the discussion section.\n2. Is it possible to dive even deeper into the features of the story that are better retrodicted than\npredicted? Is it interpersonal events that are best retrodicted? Characters' internal\nthoughts/feelings/beliefs? Key narrative transition points? Something else? The authors note that\nit is partly what characters say about the past, but it would be interesting if the effect is driven by\ncertain content communicated.\n3. A replication would also allow the authors to potentially test some questions about the\npsychological processes driving the effect. In social cognition research, a common finding is that\npeople \"use the self\" to simulate other people (see some relevant citations below). And, they use\nthis strategy more for people they believe are similar to themselves. Given that your findings\nparallel how people's retrodictions/predictions about themselves work, it seems possible that this\n\"simulation from self\" strategy is at work here (particularly if analyses related to the question\nabove suggest retrodiction/prediction for \"invisible mental states\" correspond with this temporal\nasymmetry). If a large online study was run (either with the same stimuli reported here or\ndifferent stimuli that's unscripted), you could also ask participants how similar they feel to each\ncharacter and test whether that modulates the results. Alternatively, if the authors do not want to\nrun such a study, the simulation from self strategy could be proposed or discussed in the\ndiscussion.\nTamir, D. I., & Mitchell, J. P. (2013). Anchoring and adjustment during social inferences. Journal of\nExperimental Psychology: General, 142(1), 151.\nMeyer, M. L., Zhao, Z., & Tamir, D. I. (2019). Simulating other people changes the self. Journal of\nExperimental Psychology: General, 148(11), 1898."}, "author_response": "Reviewer#1(RemarkstotheAuthor):\nTheauthorspresentdatafromonelaboratoryexperimentassessingthecapacityforparticipantstopredict\nwhatmighthavehappenedbeforeorwhatmighthappenafteragivensegmentatelevisionshowstoryline.\nAmongotherthings,theauthorsreportthatparticipantswerebe eratpredictingwhatmighthave\noccurredleadinguptoasegmentthanwhatmightoccurafterasegmentandsuggestthatthetendency\nforpastinformationtobementionedinconversationanditsproximitytothepresentmayhelptoaccount\nforthispa ernofdata.Theauthorsarguethatthesefindingsmayhelpustobe erunderstandhowwe\nunderstandotherpeople.\nWegenerallyagreewiththereviewer’ssummaryhere. However,wedowishtoclarifythat\nourmajorclaimisnotthatmentionsofpastorfutureeventshelpusbe erunderstandother\npeople,butratherweclaimthatthesereferenceshelpustogaininsightsintoothertimes\n(beyond“now”). Thereissomeoverlapbetweenwhatwemeanbyother“times”versus\nother“people,”sinceinoursetupthemostinterestinginsightsaregainedaboutother\npeople’s(e.g.,characters’)experiences(atmomentsbeforeorafterajust-watchedvideo\nsegment).\nThisisawell-wri enpaperthatusesasophisticatedexperimentalparadigmtostudypredictionaboutthe\npastandfutureundercontrolledse ings.WhileIbelievethedataareinteresting,myprimaryconcernis\nthatitisnotclearwhetherthedataaregeneralizablebeyondtheveryspecificcontextthatistestedinthis\nstudy.First,theconclusionsthattheauthorsdrawarebasedonasingleexperimentwitharelatively\nsmallsample(forwhichnojustificationisgiven).Second,theauthorsusestorylinesfromonetelevision\nshow,anditisnotclearwhetherthesefindingsgeneralizetootherexperimentalstimuli.Finally,the\nrationaleastohowthisparadigmmightinformrealworldinteractionsissomewhatweak.Theauthors\nprovideexamplesofmeetingsomeonefortheveryfirsttimeandwatchingamoviestartingsomewhereat\nitsmidpoint.Thesesituationsarerarecomparedtothemanydifferentcircumstancesinwhichpeopleare\nconstantlymakingpredictionsaboutothersintermsoftheirpastand/orfuture(e.g.,thinkingaboutthe\npastandfutureoffamiliarothers).Thestudyalsofailstoconsiderthepossibilitythatpeoplemaysimply\nrefrainfrommakingpredictionsaboutothersiftheydonothaveanyrelevantinformationavailableto\nthem.\nAgain,Ibelievethisisaverycleverparadigmandthedataareinteresting,butitisnotclearthattheytell\nusmuchabouthowwemakepredictionsaboutothersintherealworld.Moreover,thereportedfindings\nsimplyneedtobereplicatedandextendedacrossdifferentparticipantsamplesandexperimentalstimulito\nconvincethereaderastotheirreliability.\nInouroriginalstudy"}]

Decision letter