Battle of Krasnoi

Battle of Krasnoi
The Battle of Krasnoi (at Krasny or Krasnoe) unfolded from 15 to 18 November 1812 marking a critical episode in Napoleon's arduous retreat from Moscow. Over the course of six skirmishes the Russian forces under field marshal Kutuzov inflicted significant blows upon the remnants of the , already severely weakened by attrition warfare. These confrontations, though not escalated into full-scale battles, led to substantial losses for the French due to their depleted weapons and horses.
Throughout the four days of combat, Napoleon attempted to rush his troops, stretched out in a 30-mile march, past the parallel-positioned Russian forces along the high road. Despite the Russian army's superiority in horse and manpower, Kutuzov hesitated to launch a full offensive, according to Mikhail Pokrovsky fearing the risks associated with facing Napoleon head-on. Instead, he hoped that hunger, cold and decay in discipline would ultimately wear down the French forces. This strategy, however, led him in a nearly perpendicular course, placing him amidst of the separated French corps.
On 17 November a pivotal moment occurred when the French Imperial Guard executed an aggressive feint. This maneuver prompted Kutuzov to delay what could have been a decisive final assault, leading him to seek support from both his left and right flanks. This strategic decision allowed Napoleon to successfully withdraw Davout and his corps but it also led to his immediate retreat before the Russians could capture Krasny or block his escape route. Kutusow opted not to commit his entire force against his adversary but instead chose to pursue the French relentlessly, employing both large and small detachments to continually harass and weaken the French army.
The decision to divide into columns proved catastrophic, resulting in heavy defeats for the corps of Eugene, Davout and Ney throughout the four days of relentless combat. The Russians captured a significant number of prisoners, including several generals and 300 officers, while the was forced to abandon most of its remaining artillery and baggage train.
Overall, the Battle of Krasnoi inflicted devastating losses upon the French forces, amplifying their already continuous losses during their perilous retreat. Despite the valiant efforts of the Imperial Guard, the confrontation left the French military in dire straits and without supply and food, further weakening their already battered army.
The forces converge on Krasny
Napoleon retreats from Smolensk
Consisting of 100,000 combat-ready yet undersupplied troops, the Grande Armée, departed Moscow on 18 October, aiming to secure winter quarters via an alternative route to Kaluga. Following the loss at the Battle of Maloyaroslavets Kutuzov compelled Napoleon to shift northward, retracing the same ravaged path he had aimed to avoid. Smolensk, situated approximately to the west, was the nearest French supply depot. Despite fair weather, the three-week march to Smolensk proved disastrous, subjecting the to challenges like traversing a sparsely populated area with continuous forest, abandoned villages, grappling with demoralization, disciplinary breakdowns, hunger, extensive loss of horses and crucial supplies, as well as persistent harassment from Cossacks and partisans who made it impossible to forage. While sources are not definitive, it's estimated that he arrived with as few as 32,000, perhaps 50,000 men. The situation worsened with the advent of an early and harsh "Russian Winter", commencing on 5/7 November.
By 8/9 November, when the French reached Smolensk, the strategic situation in Russia had turned decisively against Napoleon. Merely 40% (37,000) of the remaining was still combat-ready. Concurrent losses on other fronts further exacerbated their dire circumstances. Encircled by encroaching Russian armies that imperiled their retreat, Napoleon recognized the untenability of his position at Smolensk. Consequently, the new strategic goal became leading the westward into winter quarters, targeting the area of the extensive French supply depot of Minsk.
Having lost contact with Kutuzov over the past two weeks, Napoleon mistakenly assumed that the Russian army had suffered equally due to harsh conditions. Underestimating the potential for a Kutuzov-led offensive, Napoleon made the tactical blunder of resuming his retreat. He dispatched the individual corps of the from Smolensk on four successive days, starting on Friday 13 November with the Polish Corps under Zajączek, who replaced the wounded Poniatowski. Next came the Westphalians. Napoleon left on the 14th, preceded by Mortier with the Legion of the Vistula and Claparède who departed with the captures treasures and baggage wagons; Beauharnais left on the next day, Davout on the 16th, and Ney on the 17th. This resulted in a fragmented column of disconnected corps, spanning , ill-prepared for a significant battle. As the soldiers, including the sick and wounded, improvised unconventional methods to withstand the cold, the scene resembled a disordered carnival procession.
A blizzard struck on 14 November, bringing heavy snowfall of approximately 1.5 meters (5 feet) and a temperature plummet to -21 °R (= -25°C or -14°F). This led to further casualties among men, horses, and the abandonment of artillery. Ostermann-Tolstoy, part of Miloradovich's avant-guard, shelled Napoleon and his guards, but the assault was repelled. While Miloradovich desired to attack, he was not granted permission by Kutuzov. Meanwhile, Claparède and the Vistula-legion arrived at Krasny since August occupied by a small French battalion. They were expelled by Ozharovsky's flying column.
In the afternoon of 15 November, Napoleon himself arrived at Krasny accompanied by his 12,000-strong Imperial Guard. His plan was to await the arrival of the troops of Eugène, Davout and Ney over the next several days before recommencing the retreat. In the intervening space between and around these French corps, nearly 40,000 disintegrated troops formed mobs of unarmed, disorganized stragglers.
Kutuzov's southern march
During the same period, the main Russian army under Kutuzov followed the French on a parallel southern road. This route passed through Medyn and Yelnya, the latter became a significant center for the partisan movement. Unlike the , the main Russian army approached Krasny in a much less weakened state, but still had to contend with the same, extreme weather conditions. Kutuzov promoted an easy retreat for the French army and initially forbade his generals to cut off their retreat. General Bennigsen, who disagreed, was sent to Riga.
Due to outdated intelligence reports, Kutuzov somehow believed that only one-third of the French army had passed from Smolensk to Krasny with the remainder of Napoleon's forces marching much farther to the north or still at Smolensk. On this basis, Kutuzov accepted a plan proposed by his staff officer, Colonel Toll, to march on Krasny to destroy what was believed to be an isolated Napoleon.
The Russian position at Krasny began forming on 15 November, when the 3,500-strong flying advance guard of Adam Ozharovsky took possession of the town, located in the Pale of Settlement, and destroyed shops and stock before the French arrived. On the same day, the 18,000 troops of Miloradovich established a strong position, across the high road about before Krasny. This movement effectively separated Eugene, Davoust, and Ney from the Emperor. On 16 November Kutuzov's 35,000-strong main force slowly approached from the south, and halted 5 km from the main road to Krasny. Another 20,000 Cossack irregulars, operating mostly in small bands, supplemented the main army by harassing the French at all points along the long road to Krasny.
In total, Kutuzov commanded a force of 50,000 to 60,000 regular troops, which included a substantial cavalry unit and around 50/200 cannon, some transported on sledges. Kutuzov's forces were organized into two columns. The larger contingent, under the leadership of General Tormasov, formed the left flank and maneuvered around Krasny so Napoleon could not withdraw. Meanwhile, the second column, led by Golitsyn and Stroganov, held the army's center and launched an attack on Krasny. Miloradovich's position anchored the Russian right flank, controlling a vital road to Krasny. This road required the French army to cross a stream within a gully. Despite Miloradovich's pivotal role, he left his strategic position to aid Golitsyn against the Young Guard. Consequently, Davout managed to successfully cross the Losvinka brook, albeit at the cost of his rearguard's sacrifice.
15 November: the rout of Ozharovsky
Outside Smolensk, leaving the floodplain of the Dniepr, there is a steep slope passing into a long descent, slightly undulating until Krasny. The rear of the Imperial Guard was harassed by the Cossacks of Orlov-Denisov, who captured 1,300 soldiers, 400 carts and 1,000 horses. Near Merlino, around noon, the Imperial Guard, marched past Miloradovich's troops, who were positioned left of the road, backed by a forest. Impressed by the order and composure of the elite guardsmen, Miloradovich had orders from Kutuzov not to attack the flanks, and settled instead for bombarding the French at extreme range. The Russian cannon fire inflicted little damage on the large corps of Guards which continued moving toward Krasny.
As Napoleon and the Imperial Old Guard approached, it was fired upon by Ozharovsky and Russian infantry and artillery. A surprised army did not expect that they had been overtaken and could be attacked from the front. The eyewitness description of this encounter by the partisan leader Davidov, which eloquently portrays the comportment of the Old Guard, forming a "fortress-like square", has become one of the most often quoted in the histories of the 1812 war:
Before dusk, Napoleon entered Krasny. He planned to remain so that Eugene, Davout and Ney could catch up with him. However, part of this small town was set on fire after the Old Guard took shelter in the monastery, barns and houses. The streets were filled with soldiers and there was not much to eat or drink; as there was not enough room the Young Guard camped east, outside the town without any shelter against the cold. To keep the men busy Napoleon decided to force the withdrawal of Ozharovsky's Cossacks from the Losvinka.
Recognizing that Ozharovsky's position was dangerously isolated from Kutuzov's main army, Napoleon dispatched the Young Guard under General Claparède on a surprise attack against the Russian encampment, which was not protected by pickets. The operation against their center was first entrusted to General Rapp, but at the last moment, he was replaced with General Roguet; the Guardsmen were divided into three columns. Shortly after midnight, it was two o'clock when the movement began on Ozharovsky's force. They began a silent advance although the snow was up to their knees. (The Old Guard stayed behind and did not fight.) The Young Guard (under Delaborde) launched a counterattack and drove Ozharovski's detachment back from the brook. In the ensuing combat, the Russians were taken by surprise during their sleep and, despite their fierce resistance, were routed. As many as half of Ozharovsky's troops were killed with bayonets or captured, and the remainder threw their weapons in a pond and fled. Lacking cavalry, Roguet was unable to pursue Ozharovsky's remaining troops. According to sergeant Bourgogne:
Golitzin therefore decided to await Miloradovich's co-operation before pressing his advance.
16 November: the defeat of Eugène
Miloradovich attacks
Near Krasny Mikhail Miloradovich put up a barrier next to and across the road, by a detachment of infantry, light cavalry and half of the Russian artillery. On a beautiful plateau according to Roguet.
On 16 November, the situation took a turn for the worse for the French. Kutuzov's forces closed in on the main road. He succeeded to cut off Eugène de Beauharnais and his IV corps from the rest of the army but refrained from launching an attack on the rear. In contrast, Miloradovich's troops dealt a severe blow to Prince Eugène who refused to surrender. In this skirmish, his Italian Corps lost one-third of its original strength, along with its baggage train and artillery at the Losvinka. Reduced to only 3,500 combatants, without any cannons or supplies, Eugène was left with no choice but to wait until nightfall and then find an alternate route around the Russian forces. Eugène fooled the Russian general by attacking his army on the left flank but managed to escape with part of his soldiers to the right. This escape was partly due to Kutuzov's decision to prevent the skirmish from escalating into a full-scale battle, much to the surprise of both Russian and French forces.
Kutuzov at Zhuli
Earlier that day, Kutuzov's main army finally arrived within of Krasny, taking up positions around the hamlets of Novoselye and Zhuli. Despite being in a favorable position to attack the French, Kutuzov hesitated. He opted for a day of rest for his troops, delaying any decisive action.
In the evening, Kutuzov faced pressure from the disagreeing junior generals, especially Wilson, urging him to launch a decisive attack against Napoleon. However, he remained cautious and only planned for an offensive. He forbade his commanders from executing it until daylight. The Russian battle plan involved a three-pronged attack on Krasny: Miloradovich was to hold his strategic position on the hill, blocking the advance of Davout and Ney. The main army would split into two groups: Golitsyn would lead 15,000 troops and halt on the right bank of the Losvinka, in full sight of Krasny, while Tormasov commanded 20,000 troops tasked with encircling Krasny and cutting off the French retreat route to Orsha. Ozharovsky's flying column, weakened after their defeat by the Young Guard, would operate independently west of Krasny. The remnants of Eugène's Westphalian Corps were incapable of taking any part in the action, when they arrived late in the evening. Napoleon ordered it to defile on the road to Orsha as Krasny was full with soldiers.
However, at some point, Kutuzov received information from prisoners (quartermaster Puybusque and his son) that Napoleon intended to remain in Krasny and wait for Ney and not withdraw as Kutuzov had anticipated upon the arrival of Davout. This revelation caused Kutuzov to reconsider the planned offensive after Ozharovsky's defeat, as reported by Nafziger and Gourgaud.
17 November: Napoleon's bold maneuver
Peril for Davout
The day began at 3:00 a.m. when Davout's I Corps set out towards Krasny upon receiving troubling reports of Eugene's defeat the previous day. Originally, Davout had intended to wait for Ney's III Corps, which was still at Smolensk, to catch up. However, sensing a relatively clear path, he approached the Losvinka brook around nine in the morning.
Unfortunately, Miloradovich, with Kutuzov's permission, initiated a sudden and intense artillery barrage on Davout's corps. This unexpected attack instilled panic among the French troops, resulting to a hasty retreat from the road and leaving the rear guard (33rd Regiment) on the verge of annihilation. Davout's corps suffered severe casualties, with only 4,000 men remaining.
An intriguing, though poorly documented incident occurred near the Losvinka when the rear end of the I Corps baggage train, including Davout's jammed carriages, fell into the hands of the Cossacks. Among the items seized by the Russians were Davout's war chest, numerous maps depicting the Middle East, Central Asia, and India, his Marshal baton and an item of significance in the peace negotiations with Tsar Alexander, Some sources even mention a substantial sum of (forged) money as part of the haul. The exact location of this incident, whether it occurred east of Krasny in the morning or west of Krasny in the afternoon, remains unclear.
Napoleon Bold move: Ordering the Guard's Advance
Napoleon, fully aware of the grave danger confronting the Grande Armée, faced a critical decision. Waiting for Ney in Krasny was no longer a viable option; any determined attack by Kutuzov could spell disaster for the entire army. Furthermore, the starving French troops urgently needed to reach their closest supply source, west at Orsha, before the Russians could capture the town.
In this critical moment, Napoleon's "sense of initiative" resurfaced, marking the first time in weeks. As Caulaincourt's described it: "This turn of events, which upset all the Emperor's calculations... would have overwhelmed any other general. But the Emperor was stronger than adversity, and became the more stubborn as danger seemed more imminent."
Before daylight broke, Napoleon prepared his Imperial Guard for an bold feint against Golitsyn, hoping that this unexpected maneuver would dissuade the Russians from launching an assault on Davout. The Guardsmen were organized into attack columns, and the remaining artillery of the Grande Armée was readied for combat. Napoleon's strategy aimed to delay the Russians long enough to gather the forces of Davout and Ney, allowing the retreat to resume before Kutuzov could launch an attack or attempt to outflank him on the route to Orsha.
The Imperial Guard demonstrates its strength
At 2:00 a.m., four regiments of the Imperial Guards departed from Krasny to secure the terrain immediately to the east and southeast of the town. This marked a significant moment as Napoleon deployed the Old Guard, consisting of 5,000 exceptionally tall and well-trained men, to confront the Cossacks who had blocked the road near the Losvinka. Napoleon himself chose the role of a general leading the Young Guards, relinquishing his position as the supreme commander of the army.
The Guardsmen found themselves facing Russian infantry columns, bolstered by imposing artillery batteries commanded by Golitsyn and Stroganov. As Ségur poetically put it: "Russian battalions and batteries barred the horizon on all three sides—in front, on our right, and behind us"
Kutuzov, lacking comprehensive information, reacted hesitantly to Napoleon's presence and audacious maneuver with the Imperial Guard. He ordered Milodarovich to assist, delayed Tormasov and eventually abandoned the planned offensive, despite the Russians' clear numerical advantage.
At some time Milodarovich moved south to reinforce Golitsyn against the Young Guards. When Miloradovich left his commanding position on the hill to join the battle, he left behind a small detachment. This allowed Davout to successfully fight his way through and enter Krasny. The Guard's audacious feint rescued Davout's corps from potential annihilation.
Action at the Losvinka brook
At nine in the morning, Davout's rear guard, the 33rd regiment, formed a defensive square at the Losvinka. It was on this particular day that limited close-quarters combat unfolded during the morning and early afternoon. The Young Guard initiated an attack to provide cover for Davout's crossing of the Losvinka further north.
Uvarovo, located just a half-hour's walk from Krasny, was initially held by two battalions of Golitsyn's infantry, serving as a fragile forward outpost ahead of the main Russian army. However, the Russians were eventually forced to withdraw from Uvarovo. Stroganov responded with a devastating artillery barrage that inflicted heavy casualties on the Young Guardsmen.
Kutuzov ordered Miloradovich to reposition his forces, linking up with Golitsyn's lines and concentrating their strength behind Golitsyn's position. This maneuver prevented Miloradovich from completing the destruction of Davout's troops.
As Davout's troops continued their westward movement, they were relentlessly harassed by Cossacks, and Russian artillery under Stroganov pounded Davout's corps with grapeshot, causing devastating casualties. Although Davout's personal baggage train suffered significant losses, a considerable number of his infantrymen managed to rally in Krasny. Once Davout and Mortier established communication, Napoleon initiated his retreat upon Lyady with the Old Guard. However, the Dutch 3rd Regiment Grenadiers and Red Lancers were left to support Mortier and engage the Russians.
The rearguard of Davout's corps, consisting of the chasseurs from the Dutch 33rd Regiment, faced relentles attacks from Cossacks, cuirassiers, and infantry, becoming encircled and running low on ammunition. The regiment formed defensive squares and successfully repelled the initial attacks. However, during the third Russian assault, they became trapped leading to the demise of the entire regiment, with only 75 men surviving. This loss marked the end of the battle of Krasnoi as noted by Clausewitz.
Around 11:00 a.m., Napoleon received alarming intelligence reports indicating that Tormasov's troops were preparing to march west of Krasny. This, forced Napoleon to reconsider his initial plan of keeping Kutuzov occupied until Ney's III Corps could reach Krasny. The risk of being encircled and defeated by Kutuzov's forces was too great. Napoleon made a crucial decision to order the Old Guard to fall back on Krasny and follow him in a westward march towards Lyady. Meanwhile, the exhausted Young Guard would hold their ground at the Losvinka. Napoleon's choice was not an easy one, as described in the words of Segur:
The Young Guard's ability to withstand the Russian onslaught was rapidly deteriorating, and Mortier wisely ordered a retreat before the remaining troops were surrounded and annihilated. With precision, the Guardsmen executed an about face and marched back to Krasny, enduring a final devastating barrage of Russian cannon fire as they retreated at 2:00 p.m. The toll was staggering, with only 3,000 survivors remaining from the Young Guard's original 6,000 troops. Throughout most of the day, the Russians kept a safe distance from the Guard, beyond the range of French muskets and bayonets, opting to pound the Young Guard with cannon fire from a distance. This day, 17 November, might be remembered as the bloodiest in the Young Guard's history. The many wounded soldiers were left behind and perished in the snow.
The retreat of the Young Guard did not end upon their return to Krasny. Mortier and Davout, vigilant of the possibility of Kutuzov launching an attack, joined the hurried procession of troops, crowds, and wagons heading towards Lyady. Only a feeble rearguard, led by General Friederichs, remained to hold Krasny.
Napoleon's retreat
Before noon, Napoleon, accompanied by the stalwart Old Guard, followed by the remnants of the I Corps, commenced their westward departure from Krasny. The road leading to Lyady quickly became congested with soldiers and their cumbersome wagons. Alongside them, a multitude of civilians, fugitives, and stragglers preceded the retreating French troops.
Just outside Krasny, Davout's forces fell into an ambush set by the small detachments of Ozharovsky and Rosen dealing a severe blow to his rearguard.. According to Buturlin they allowed Napoleon to pass but Davout was cut off. Chaos ensued, with exploding grapeshot, overturned wagons, carriages careening uncontrollably, and panicked mobs of fugitives. Nevertheless, the Red Lancers under Colbert and Latour-Maubourg managed to force the Russians aside. A large corps of Spanish voltigeurs (Old Guard) was ordered to attack. The Guard's strategic maneuver was intensified by Napoleon's personal presence, but it came at a cost as he burnt his chancery and archive.
After marching for about an hour, he gathered the Old Guard and formed them into a square. Dismounting, because the road was too slippery for the horses, Napoleon addressed them: "Grenadiers of my Guard, you bear witness to the disarray of my army." With his birch walking stick in hand, Napoleon placed himself at the forefront of his Old Guard. Although the temperature rose, it did not stop snowing.
Kutuzov delays the pursuit
Despite the Russian eagerness to pursue the retreating French and launch an assault on Krasny, Kutuzov exercised caution, resulting in several hours of delay.
At 2:00 p.m., confident that the French were in full retreat and not preparing to resist, Kutuzov finally gave the green light to Tormasov to execute his westward enveloping movement. Tormasov established a defensive position across a wide valley and obstructed the bridge at Dobraya. However, by the time Tormasov reached his intended location, it was too late in the afternoon to encircle and crush Davout's corps. According to Dutch officer Van Dedem, a part of the Grande Armee was granted free passage to Orsha, leaving the entire army surprised by the Russians' unexpected complacency.
Around 3:00 p.m., Golitsyn's troops launched a powerful assault on Krasny, and Friederichs' rearguard yielded to the intense pressure and withdrew from the town. By nightfall, Golitsyn's troops had seized control of the town and its environs. The enemy solidified its position at the hilltop and awaited for Ney, whom Napoleon was reluctantly forced to abandon to its fate. Ney was considered as an easy prey by the Russian generals.
18 November: the decimation of Ney's III Corps
Ney's III Corps was designated as the rearguard, initially slated to depart Smolensk by 17 November. However, Ney's attempt to destroy the rampart, and a considerable number of caissons seemed to yield limited success due to the rainy weather. He departed Smolensk with approximately 6 guns, 6,000 troops and a squadron of 300 horses. Around 3:00 p.m. on 18 November, Ney's Corps set out from Korytnya, aiming for Krasny where Miloradovich had positioned his troops atop a hill, overlooking the gully containing the Losvinka stream. On this day, thawing conditions, thick fog, and light rain resulted in the dreaded rasputitsa, creating treacherous icy surfaces as the evening advanced. Unaware of the 's departure from Krasny, Ney remained oblivious to the impending danger near the gully. Around 3:00 p.m., Ney's advance guard appeared at the Losvinka and briefly managed to reach the top before being repelled to the other side of ravine. In Ney's perspective, Davout still lingered behind Miloradovich's columns within Krasny, further influencing his decisions. Disregarding a Russian offer for an honorable surrender, Ney courageously aimed to force his way through the combined enemy forces. Although the determined French soldiers breached the initial Russian infantry lines, the third line proved impenetrable. At a crucial juncture, Nikolay Raevsky launched a fierce counterattack. Ney's troops found themselves surrounded atop the hill, causing immense disorder and leading many to surrender. The pivotal moment was narrated by the English General (in Russian service) Sir Robert Wilson:
Ney suffered more than half of his forces' losses, with nearly all the cavalry and all but two artillery pieces vanishing. The devastating defeat of the III Corps prompted Miloradovich to offer Ney another opportunity for an honorable surrender. In the early evening, Ney chose to withdraw with his remaining 3,000 troops. Following the advise of colonel Pelet he maneuvered around the Russian forces at Mankovo, tracing the Losvinka's path for several hours. By 9 p.m., they reached the desolate Syrokorene, located about 13 km north. There, they encountered a reserve of red beets, which they prepared for sustenance. At some point during the night, Ney learned of the impending threat. Amidst the darkness, he opted for a daring crossing of the Dnieper, purportedly between the remote hamlets of Alekseyevka, Varechki or Gusino. These spots boasted shallow river points but nearly vertical slopes. Sappers employed logs and planks to create makeshift crossings over the ice. One by one, but not without significant losses, they managed, leaving two guns, part of the detachment and wounded who could not continue. Ney's men enduring the crossing on all fours, with the elements and the Cossacks reduced their ranks to a mere 800 or 900 resolute soldiers.
In the ensuing two days, Ney's valiant band defended against Cossack assaults as they traversed 90 km westward along the river, navigating swamps and forests in their search for the French army. Ney maintained his defiance, rejecting surrender as Platov's thousands of Cossacks pursued them halfway the river's right bank. The morale of the French soldiers shattered, with surrender becoming a contemplation for some. Escaping Miloradovitch, only to face capture by Hetman Platov, seemed an ironic twist. The French army was yet to reach the borders of the Russian Empire. On 20 November, at three in the morning, Ney and Beauharnais were reunited near Orsha, an event that revitalized the demoralized French troops, offering an emotional uplift akin to a triumphant victory. Ney's unwavering courage earned him the moniker "Bravest of the Brave" from Napoleon himself.
Summary of results
Krasnoi's portrayal in historical literature offers contrasting perspectives. Older, more traditional texts focus solely on the Imperial Guard's actions on November 17th, presenting the encounter as a French victory. These accounts even go so far as to suggest a major combat and a Russian retreat. Chandler's account echoes this older Francophilic summary of the battle. On the other hand, the latest narratives of the event by Riehn, Cate, and Smith view it as an incomplete Russian triumph over the . Napoleon made a great mistake, because the enemy was not following upon his rear, but moving along a lateral road. Kutuzov had cut off Napoleon and wiped out Davout.
The overall French losses in the Krasny skirmishes are estimated to range between 6,000, 13,000 and 15,000 killed; 1,200 wounded were treated by Larrey, with an additional 26,000 captured by the Russians. Almost all of the French prisoners were stragglers. Many of these captives were transported to Tambov and Smolensk. The French also forfeited about 230 artillery pieces, half of which were abandoned, along with a significant portion of their supply train and cavalry. Russian casualties, in contrast, are estimated at no more than 5,000 killed and wounded. Adam Zamoyski, following Buturlin is another opinion: between Maloyaroslavets and Krasny, Kutuzov had lost 30,000 men, and as many again had fallen behind, leaving him with only 26,500 available for action.
For a couple of days, French soldiers faced dire scarcity of sustenance and endured temperatures ranging from -12 to -25°C (-13 °F), along with strong winds, an abondance of snow and the discomfort of wet feet during thaw. The staff received delayed reports, and their orders either arrived too late or failed to reach them altogether.
According to Minard's map, around 24,000 men reached Orsha. The Vth corps comprising 5,150 men joined forces with 1,200 soldiers of the VIIIth corps under Junot, successfully reaching Orsha on 16 November. It is believed Napoleon entered Orsha with 6,000 guards, the remnants of 35,000, Eugene with 1,800 troops, the remains of 42,000 and Davout with 4,000, the remains of 70,000! Napoleon's reunion with Ney, along with what was left of the III provided a glimmer of hope to rebuild his army around which to rally for the forthcoming Battle of Berezina and the War of the Sixth Coalition.
Krasny unquestionably stands as a Russian victory, albeit a notably unsatisfactory one.Tsar Alexander I expressed disappointment in Kutuzov for not completely annihilating the remaining French forces. Yet, due to Kutuzov's considerable popularity with the Russian aristocracy, Alexander bestowed upon him the victory title of Prince of Smolensk for his achievements in this battle.
The reasons behind Kutuzov's decision not to obliterate the last vestiges of the French troops during the offensive remain unclear. General , Russian military historian, suggested Kutuzov's reluctance to jeopardize the lives of his exhausted and frostbitten troops. Mikhnevich cited Kutuzov's own words, "All that [the French army] will collapse without me". General Robert Wilson, the British liaison officer attached to the Russian Army, documented Kutuzov's late 1812 statement,
In popular culture
Participants
Louise Fusil
Louise Fusil, a French singer and actress, who was living in Russia for six years and returned with François Joseph Lefebvre, commanding the Old Guard, wrote:
At Krasny Fusil picked up an infant, left by its mother twice and took it to France. It is unclear what happened to Madame Aurore de Bursay, the leader of the French Theatre in Moscow. She sat in her theatre costume on top of a cannon.
Dominique Jean Larrey
The French surgeon Dominique Jean Larrey wrote:
Literature
Leo Tolstoy references the battle in his War and Peace. Throughout the novel, but particularly in this section, Tolstoy defends Kutuzov's actions, arguing that he was less interested in the glory of routing Napoleon than in saving Russian soldiers and allowing the French to continue destroying themselves with a swift retreat.
In the "Epilogue," Tolstoy offers his thoughts on the historical events depicted in the novel and discusses his philosophy of history. The second part of the epilogue contains Tolstoy's critique of all existing forms of mainstream history. He shares his perspective on the limitations of traditional historiography and questions the prevailing notion that history is solely shaped by the actions of great individuals. Instead, Tolstoy emphasizes the role of collective actions and the interconnectedness of various societal forces in shaping historical events.
Paintings
Battle painters were busy catching the frequent acts of war during this campaign.
Covering Krasny, Jan Hoynck van Papendrecht pictured the last fight of the Dutch 3rd Regiment of the Garde impériale – of over 1000 men, only a few dozens were left when the Second Battle of Krasnoi was over.
Peter von Hess rendered both battles, with summer colours in August and a grey winter atmosphere in November.
Jean-Antoine-Siméon Fort focused on the troops of the French general Ricard.
Jean-Charles Langlois, painter and soldier, captured the gloomy struggle against the enemy and the elements. The battle's final hours also attracted attention:
Adolphe Yvon showed Marshal Ney in rearguard action at the Losvinka, protecting the back of the advanced Napoleon Bonaparte, and, to the edification of his opponents,
Napoleon's hasty flight was visualized by Thomas Sutherland, likewise by John Masey Wright who added "disgraceful" to the title.
Field Marshal Kutuzov was portrayed posthumously in 1813 in a serene pose by R.M. Volkov.
Nikolay Samokish depicted a skirmish at close range in engraving technique.
Anniversaries
At the 100-year anniversary of the battle, Russian pride in the achievement was still strong. Memorials were erected at Borodino, Smolensk and Krasny, and Sytin's Military Encyclopedia from 1913 included an illustrated article about the "Battle of Krasnoi"
with two sketches of the troop formations and copies of Peter von Hess' battle paintings. Around 1931 the monument at Krasny was demolished, but reerected in 2012?
In 2012, celebrating the 200th anniversary of the successful Battle of Krasnoi, the Moscow Mint issued a currency (5 rubles) with a special coinage.
See also
First Battle of Krasnoi
Moscow 1812: Napoleon's Fatal March
Notes
References
Sources
in English
Napoleon's Russian Campaign of 1812, Edward Foord, Boston, Little Brown and Company,
Russia Against Napoleon, Dominic Lieven, Penguin Books,
With Napoleon in Russia, Caulaincourt, William Morrow and Company, New York,
Napoleon in Russia: A Concise History of 1812, Digby Smith, Pen & Sword Military,
The War of the Two Emperors, Curtis Cate, Random House, New York,
Narrative of Events during the Invasion of Russia by Napoleon Bonaparte, and the Retreat of the French Army, 1812, Sir Robert Wilson, Elibron Classics,
Moscow 1812: Napoleon's Fatal March, Adam Zamoyski, HarperCollins,
The Fox of the North: The Life of Kutusov, General of War and Peace, Roger Parkinson, David McKay Company,
Napoleon 1812, Nigel Nicolson, Harper & Row,
The Napoleonic Wars, The Rise and Fall of an Empire, Gregory Fremont-Barnes & Todd Fisher, Osprey Publishing,
The Greenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Source, Digby Smith, Greenhill Books,
The Campaigns of Napoleon, David Chandler, The MacMillan Company,
Napoleon's Invasion of Russia 1812, Eugene Tarle, Oxford University Press,
Napoleon's Russian Campaign, Philippe-Paul de Segur, Time-Life Books,
1812 Napoleon's Russian Campaign, Richard K. Riehn, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
Napoleon in Russia, Alan Palmer, Carrol & Graf Publishers,
In the Service of the Tsar Against Napoleon, by Denis Davydov, Greenhill Books,
Atlas of World Military History, Brooks, Richard (editor). London: HarperCollins, 2000.
Beyond Smolensk by Peter Hicks
in French
Mémoires militaires et historiques pour servir à l'histoire de la guerre depuis 1792 jusqu'en 1815 inclusivement, Band 5, Chapter XLVIII, p. 86-105 by Jean Baptiste Louis baron de Crossard (1829)
Histoire de la campagne de Russie en 1812 par Alexandre Furcy Guesdon (1829)
Relation circonstanciée de la campagne de Russie... par Eugène Labaume (1814)
La Grande Armée de 1812, organisation à l'entrée en campagne par François Houdecek
"Campagne et captivité en Russie, extraits des mémoires inédits du géneral-major H.P. Everts, traduits par M.E. Jordens" Carnet de la Sabretache, 1901, p. 698
Memoirs of sergeant Bourgogne (1853), p. 110-115
D. Buturlin (1824) Histoire militaire de la campagne de Russie en 1812, p. 217
Mémoires du général Rapp (1823)
Manuscript of 1812 by Baron Fain (1827)
External links
Satellite map of Krasny
Komandirovka has good photos of many villages in the Krasninsky district
Cadastral map of the area around Krasny
During the Patriotic War of 1812 the second battle by Krasnoye village was fought
The Battle of Krasnoi. The Hermitage continues to present battle paintings by Peter von Hess
The Life of Napoleon Buonaparte, Emperor of the French. By the Author of "Waverley," (Sir Walter Scott) Abridged by an American gentleman (1827)
The Anatomy Of Glory; Napoleon And His Guard, A Study In Leadership by Commandant Henri Lachouque
Campagne de Russie de 1812
Battles of the French invasion of Russia
Battles of the Napoleonic Wars
Battles inscribed on the Arc de Triomphe
Battles involving France
Battles involving Russia
Conflicts in 1812
November 1812 events
1812 in the Russian Empire
History of Smolensk Oblast
Smolensk Governorate