Effects of the 2023 Israel–Hamas war

Effects of the 2023 Israel–Hamas war
The outbreak of the 2023 Israel–Hamas war led to an increased dislike of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the government from Israeli citizens due to a perceived failure of leadership on the issue, with increased calls for Netanyahu's resignation.
Global attention on Hamas had implications for countries like Turkey and Qatar, which have strong ties with Hamas, and the United States was actively working with Qatar to secure the release of hostages.
Hamas's actions had a significant impact on diplomatic efforts, potentially derailing a US-brokered deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The New York Times noted that the prospects of Israeli and Saudi normalization seemed less likely due to concerns about the situation's escalation and Palestinian rights. Additionally, there were speculations that Iran might have been trying to disrupt relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. On 14 October, Saudi Arabia suspended talks on the possible normalization of relations with Israel.
Various leaders and experts speculated about the potential for the conflict to expand, and even lead to a war between Israel and Iran, with Iranian officials expressing a willingness to intervene if Israel continues military operations or launches a ground invasion against Gaza, further indicating the possibility of region-wide escalation of the conflict.
Ukraine expressed concerns that Russia might exploit the Israel–Hamas conflict to diminish international support for Ukraine, while Russia portrayed it as a Western policy failure. Russian president Vladimir Putin characterized the conflict as an example of the failure of United States policy in the Middle East and suggested it would affect Western support for Ukraine, potentially impacting Russia's relations with Israel.
The United States launched new sanctions to try and cut off Iranian network funding Hamas.
Background
The initial attacks by Hamas in the 2023 Israel–Hamas war marked a notable escalation in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, standing out for the scale and reach of both rocket fire and incursions within Israel from the Gaza border. This was a significant departure from prior conflicts, which typically followed a phased progression with a gradual escalation of tensions. It has been compared to the 1941 Attack on Pearl Harbor, the 1968 Tet Offensive, 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 2001 September 11 attacks, and the 2003 Ramadan Offensive. Like the Tet Offensive, Hamas's attack came on the morning of a holiday, seemed to be "everywhere at once", and demonstrated capabilities not thought possible in a guerrilla force.
Palestinian factions
According to Daniel Byman and Alexander Palmer, the attack showcased the decline of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the rise of Hamas as a power center in Palestinian politics. They predicted the PLO's further decline if the status quo held. Laith Alajlouni wrote that the immediate effect of the Hamas offensive was to unite Hamas and PLO. However it may soon lead to conflict between them, possibly leading the PLO losing control of the security situation in the West Bank, if more militant groups there begin to launch their own independent attacks.
With global attention on Hamas, Emile Hokayem wrote that Turkey and Qatar, which have privileged relations with Hamas, may be accused of overly indulging Hamas and being tarnished by association. However, on 13 October, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated in a joint press conference with Qatari Prime Minister and foreign minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani that the US was "working intensively" with the Gulf state in order to secure the hostages and expressed his gratitude "for the urgency that Qatar is bringing to this effort."
Netanyahu government
Amit Segal, chief political commentator for Israel's Channel 12, said that the conflict would test Benjamin Netanyahu's survival as prime minister, noting that past wars had toppled the governments of several of his predecessors such as that of Golda Meir following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Menachem Begin following the 1982 Lebanon War, and Ehud Olmert following the 2006 Lebanon War. Prior to the formation of an emergency unity government on 11 October, Politico described the then-potential move as Netanyahu's opportunity to correct his course and save his political legacy. Citing the Israeli intelligence failure, which some observers attributed to the incumbent government focusing more on internal dissent, the judicial reform, and efforts to deepen Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories, some commentators criticized Netanyahu for putting aside the PLO and propping up Hamas, and described him as a liability.
Political journalist Peter Beaumont described the attack as "an intelligence failure for the ages" on the part of the Israeli government. The Jewish News Syndicate deemed it a "failure of imagination". A BBC report on the intelligence failure noted that "it must have taken extraordinary levels of operational security by Hamas." US officials expressed shock at how Israeli intelligence appeared to be unaware of any preparations by Hamas. Israeli officials later anonymously reported to Axios that the IDF and Shin Bet had detected abnormal movements by Hamas the day before the attack, but decided to wait for additional intelligence before raising the military's alert level. They also did not inform political leaders of the intelligence reports.
Sources in Hamas and Israel's military establishment told Reuters the attack was the culmination of a years-long campaign by Hamas to deceive Israel into thinking that the group was primarily interested in economic and governance issues instead of fighting. An IDF colonel anonymously told Middle East Eye that intelligence units had detected Hamas training activities but misjudged their intent; they assessed these would be used in a series of separate attacks, rather than a large combined one.
Amir Avivi, former deputy commander of the IDF's Gaza Division, told the Financial Times it was "a failure that is no smaller than the Yom Kippur War." Yaakov Amidror, a former National Security Advisor to Netanyahu, said the attack proved their intelligence abilities in Gaza "were no good". An unnamed Egyptian intelligence official told the Associated Press that "[Egypt] warned them an explosion of the situation is coming, and very soon, and it would be big. But they underestimated such warnings." This story was corroborated by Michael McCaul, Chairman of the US House Foreign Relations Committee, who said the warnings were made three days before the attack.
On 11 October, Ynet reported that Egypt's Director of the General Intelligence Directorate, Abbas Kamel, made a personal phone call to Netanyahu ten days prior to the initial attack warning that individuals in Gaza were expected to do "something unusual, a terrible operation." Former MI6 chief Sir Alex Younger voiced his opinion that Hamas fighters were able to carry out their attack due to "institutional complacency" in Israel. Netanyahu described the reports as "absolutely false" and "fake news".
The outbreak of war led to increased dislike of Netanyahu and the government from Israeli citizens due to a perceived failure of leadership on the issue, with increased calls for Netanyahu's resignation. A poll showed that 56% of Israelis believed that Netanyahu must resign after the conflict, with 86% of respondents holding the country's leadership responsible for the security failings that led to the surprise attack. As of October 21, Netanyahu had failed to apologize or take responsibility for his government's failure.
Israeli–Saudi Arabian normalization
In an analysis by The Times of Israel, the newspaper wrote that "Hamas has violently shifted the world's eyes back to the Palestinians and dealt a severe blow to the momentum for securing a landmark US-brokered deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia." The New York Times reported that the prospects of Israeli and Saudi normalization appeared dimmer, citing Saudi Arabia's statement that the country had repeatedly warned "of the dangers of the explosion of the situation as a result of the continued occupation, the deprivation of the Palestinian people and their legitimate rights and the repetition of systemic provocations against its sanctities."
Andreas Kluth wrote in his Bloomberg News column that Hamas "torched Biden's deal to remake the Middle East", arguing that the deal that was being discussed between Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States would have left Palestinians in the cold, so the group decided to "blow the whole thing up." He added that, viewed from Gaza, things were only going to get worse, considering that Netanyahu's coalition partners opposed a two-state solution for the conflict. He suggested they would prefer to annex the entirety of the West Bank, even at the expense of turning Israel into an apartheid state, something critics have long claimed as Israel's goal.
Speculation arose that Iran was trying to sabotage relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, with former head of research for Shin Bet Neomi Neumann saying the attack could have been timed in part due to Iran's hopes to scuttle efforts to normalize relations between Israel and its Sunni rival. On 9 October, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanaani denied claims of Tehran's involvement in Hamas's attack. On 12 October, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman discussed the Israel-Gaza situation with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. On 13 October, Saudi Arabia criticized Israel for the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza and the attacks on "defenceless civilians". On 14 October, Saudi Arabia suspended talks on the possible normalization of relations with Israel. On October 27, Saudi Arabia warned the United States that an invasion of Gaza by Israel would be "catastrophic for the Middle East"
Regional escalation
Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, speculated the war would spread to Jerusalem and the West Bank. Hashim Safi Al Din, Head of Hezbollah's Executive Council, threatened to join the conflict. Max Abrahms, a political scientist at Northeastern University, opined that the conflict could escalate into a war between Israel and Iran. During a meeting with UN diplomat Tor Wennesland on 14 October, Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian asserted that Iran will intervene in the war if Israel continues its military operations or launches a ground invasion against Gaza.
On 16 October, Iran threatened "pre-emptive" attacks against Israel, indicating further region-wide escalation of the war. Iranian foreign minister stated: "The possibility of pre-emptive action by the resistance front is expected in the coming hours... All options are open and we cannot be indifferent to the war crimes committed against the people of Gaza."
Russo-Ukrainian War
Ukraine asserted that Russia would attempt to exploit the Israel-Hamas conflict to reduce international support for Ukraine, while Russia called it a Western policy failure. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Russia of seeking to precipitate conflict in the Middle East to "undermine world unity, increase discord and contradictions, and thus help Russia destroy freedom in Europe."
Russian president Vladimir Putin declared the war "a clear example of the failure of United States policy in the Middle East", adding that Washington had consistently failed to take into account the fundamental interests of Palestinians. Russian commentators characterized the war as a military and intelligence failure of the West, predicting it would sap Western support for Ukraine. The New York Times stated that Russia's relations with Israel were deteriorating, driven in part by Western support for Ukraine and Iran's continued support for Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Bloomberg columnist Andreas Kluth wrote that some Trump-supporting Republican legislators supported aid for Israel but opposed it for Ukraine. Politico wrote that it was a foregone conclusion that the war would divert US attention from Ukraine.
See also
Casualties of the 2023 Israel–Hamas war
International reactions to the 2023 Israel–Hamas war
Timeline of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in 2023
Outline of the 2023 Israel–Hamas war
References
2023 Israel–Hamas war
2023