Sanctions during the Venezuelan crisis

Sanctions during the Venezuelan crisis
During the crisis in Venezuela, governments of the United States, the European Union (E.U.), Canada, Mexico, Panama and Switzerland applied individual sanctions against people associated with the administration of Nicolás Maduro. The sanctions were in response to repression during the 2014 Venezuelan protests and the 2017 Venezuelan protests, and activities during the 2017 Venezuelan Constituent Assembly election and the 2018 Venezuelan presidential election. Sanctions were placed on current and former government officials, including members of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) and the 2017 Constituent National Assembly (ANC), members of the military and security forces, and private individuals accused of being involved in human rights abuses, corruption, degradation in the rule of law and repression of democracy.
Beginning in January 2019, during the Venezuelan presidential crisis, after applying sanctions first to individuals, the U.S. applied additional economic sanctions in the petroleum, gold, mining, food and banking industries in an effort to hasten Maduro's removal. Through April 2019, the U.S. sanctioned more than 150 companies, vessels and individuals, in addition to revoking visas of 718 individuals associated with Maduro. By September 2019, the Center for Strategic and International Studies said 119 Venezuelans had been sanctioned by the U.S. and several other countries. Companies in the petroleum sector evaded the PDVSA sanctions to continue oil shipments.
The administration of Joe Biden revisited the policy of US sanctions and its humanitarian effects when he entered office. In October 2023, the Biden administration partially released some U.S. sanctions on the oil, gas and gold industries in exchange for the promise of the release of prisoners and free 2024 elections.
United States
Through April 2019, the U.S. has sanctioned more than 150 companies, vessels and individuals, in addition to revoking visas of 718 individuals associated with Maduro.
History and legislation
The U.S. has been concerned about Venezuelan narcotics trafficking since 2005 and its lack of cooperation in combatting terrorism since 2006. The U.S. has used sanctions as a policy tool for at least a decade to combat terrorism-related activity as well as narcotics and human trafficking, corruption and human rights violations, according to the Congressional Research Service. In 2008, Executive Order (EO) 13224 aimed to reduce terrorist funding in Venezuela via sanctions, and the United States Department of the Treasury has used the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act) to sanction at least 22 Venezuelans, including several current and former government officials.
Prior to the crisis in Venezuela, in 2010 the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three current or former Venezuelan government officials, saying there was evidence they had materially helped the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the illegal drug trade. The order "freezes any assets the designated entities and individuals may have under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibits U.S. persons from conducting financial or commercial transactions involving those assets". Hugo Carvajal, former director of Venezuela's military intelligence (DGIM); Henry Rangel Silva, director National Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services (DISIP); and Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, former Minister of the Interior, were sanctioned. Carvajal was arrested in Spain on 12 April 2019 based on a U.S. arrest warrant for the 2011 charges; the U.S. asked Spain to extradite Carvajal.
In 2011, four allies of Hugo Chávez, including a general, two politicians, and an intelligence official, were sanctioned for allegedly helping FARC obtain weapons and smuggle drugs.
U.S. President Barack Obama signed the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, a U.S. Act imposing sanctions on Venezuelan individuals held responsible by the U.S. for human rights violations during the 2014 Venezuelan protests, in December of that year. The Act was extended in 2016 to expire on 31 December 2019. On 2 February 2015, the United States Department of State imposed visa restrictions on current and former Venezuelan officials that were allegedly linked to presumed human rights abuses and political corruption. The visa restrictions also included family members. Obama issued Executive Order 13692 in March 2015, which blocks assets or imposes travel bans on those "involved in or responsible for the erosion of human rights guarantees, persecution of political opponents, curtailment of press freedoms, use of violence and human rights violations and abuses in response to antigovernment protests, and arbitrary arrest and detention of antigovernment protestors, as well as significant public corruption by senior government officials in the country."
During the administration of President Donald Trump, sanctions were increased towards Venezuela in regime change efforts to oust Maduro. United States National Security Advisor John R. Bolton outlined the policies towards Venezuela in a November 2018 speech, describing Venezuela as part of a troika of tyranny, along with Cuba and Nicaragua. The U.S. condemned actions of the governments of the three Latin American nations and maintained both broad and targeted sanctions against their leadership. Into 2020, Trump expressed that he believed that the removal of Maduro from office was occurring too slowly and that incremental processes, such as sanctions, did not provide results; he began to consider military options, including a naval blockade.
When Joe Biden took office, his administration reviewed how sanctions affected Venezuela. As of November 2022, the Biden administration had not imposed any sanctions on Venezuela and the Associated Press reported that some companies may be flouting the sanctions imposed by the Trump administration.
On individuals
As of 27 March 2018, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) said 78 Venezuelans associated with Maduro had been sanctioned by different countries. Under EO 13692, the Obama administration sanctioned 7 individuals, and the Trump administration had sanctioned 73 as of 8 March 2019. By September 2019, the Center for Strategic and International Studies said 119 Venezuelans had been sanctioned by the U.S. and several other countries. As of 7 August 2023, the Congressional Research Service said the U.S. maintained sanctions on more than 110 individuals.
2015
Obama issued a presidential order on 9 March 2015 declaring Venezuela a "threat to its national security" and ordered the U.S. Treasury Department to freeze property and assets of seven Venezuelan officials. The U.S. held the seven individuals sanctioned responsible for repression and at least 43 deaths during demonstrations and human rights abuses including "persecution of political opponents, restrictions on press freedom ... and arbitrary arrests". Among those sanctioned were Antonio Benavides Torres, commander in the Venezuelan armed forces and former leader of the Venezuelan National Guard, and SEBIN directors Manuel Bernal Martínez and Gustavo González López.
2017
Tareck El Aissami, Vice President of Economy and Minister for National Industry and Production, and his frontman Samark Lopez Bello were named in February under the Kingpin Act as significant international narcotics traffickers. Five U.S. companies in Florida and an airplane registered in the U.S. were also blocked.
The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Maikel Moreno and seven members of the Venezuelan Supreme Justice Tribunal (TSJ) in May for usurping the functions of the Venezuelan National Assembly and permitting Maduro to govern by decree.
In July, thirteen senior officials of the Venezuelan government associated with the 2017 Venezuelan Constituent Assembly elections were sanctioned for what the U.S. labeled as their role in undermining democracy and human rights. Those sanctioned included Elías Jaua, Presidential Commission for the ANC and Minister of Education; Tibisay Lucena, President of the Maduro-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE); Néstor Reverol, Minister of Interior and former Commander General of Venezuelan National Guard (GNB), indicted in 2016 by U.S. for drug conspiracy; Tarek William Saab, Ombudsman and President of Moral Council; and Iris Varela ANC member and Prisons Minister.
The U.S. State Department condemned the Venezuelan Constituent Assembly election and refused to recognize it. The day after the election, the U.S. sanctioned Maduro, stating that the election "aspires illegitimately to usurp the constitutional role of the democratically elected National Assembly, rewrite the constitution, and impose an authoritarian regime". Maduro became the fourth head of state to be sanctioned by the U.S. government after Bashar al-Assad of Syria, Kim Jong-un of North Korea and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Maduro fired back at the sanctions during his victory speech saying "I don't obey imperial orders. I'm against the Ku Klux Klan that governs the White House, and I'm proud to feel that way."
The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned eight officials associated with the 2017 Constituent National Assembly (ANC) in August, for participating in "anti-democratic actions pursuant to Executive Order 13692" by facilitating the "illegitimate Constituent Assembly to further entrench [Maduro's] dictatorship". The individuals sanctioned included Francisco Ameliach and Adán Chávez, the brother of Hugo Chávez.
In November, ten more government officials were added to OFAC's list of Venezuelans sanctioned after the regional elections; the U.S. Treasury Department described the individuals as being "associated with undermining electoral processes, media censorship, or corruption in government-administered food programs in Venezuela". Among those sanctioned was Minister Freddy Bernal, who heads the Local Committees for Supply and Production (CLAP) program, and was previously named in 2011 as a drug trafficker under the Kingpin Act for aiding the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
2018
The U.S. Treasury Department said on 5 January that corruption and repression continued in Venezuela and four senior military officers were sanctioned. Four more current or former officials were added to the sanctioned list in March 2018.
Just before the May 2018 Venezuelan presidential election, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned four Venezuelans and three companies it said were involved in corruption and money laundering. Individuals sanctioned included Diosdado Cabello, Chavismo's number two person and President of the ANC, his wife, Marleny Contreras Hernández de Cabello, who was also the Tourism Minister, and his brother José David Cabello Rondón, the president of Venezuela's tax authority, SENIAT. The Florida companies, owned or controlled by sanctioned front man Rafael Sarria in Florida were: SAI Advisors Inc., Noor Plantation Investments LLC, and 11420 Corp. Fourteen other properties owned or controlled by Sarria in Florida and New York were also sanctioned. The U.S. Treasury Department said the Cabello brothers had "approved a money laundering scheme based on illicit financial activities targeting the Venezuelan state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA)."
The U.S. Treasury Department seized a private jet and imposed sanctions on Maduro's inner circle in September. Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores, and Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, and her brother Jorge Rodríguez, Minister of Communications, were sanctioned. Agencia Vehiculos Especiales Rurales y Urbanos, C.A. (AVERUCA, C.A.), Quiana Trading Limited (Quiana Trading), and Panazeate SL were sanctioned as companies owned or controlled in the U.S., British Virgin Islands, and Spain by sanctioned parties.
2019
The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned seven individuals on 8 January 2019, who they said were benefitting from a corrupt currency exchange scheme. Alejandro Jose Andrade Cedeño, a former national Treasurer, "was sentenced by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida on November 27, 2018, to 10 years in prison for accepting over $1 billion in bribes for his role" in the scheme. OFAC also sanctioned five other individuals and 23 companies, including Venezuelan private TV network Globovisión and other companies owned or controlled by Raúl Gorrín and Gustavo Perdomo.
On 15 February 2019, officials of Maduro's security and intelligence were sanctioned for helping suppress democracy; the head of state-run PDVSA was also sanctioned. The U.S. Treasury Department said the security officials were responsible for torture, human rights abuses, and extrajudicial killings.
During the February 2019 shipping of humanitarian aid to Venezuela, U.S. Vice-president Mike Pence announced new U.S. sanctions against four Venezuelan state governors, who the U.S. said had furthered the humanitarian crisis by participating in the blocking of aid; the governors of the United Socialist Party representing Zulia, Apure, Vargas and Carabobo states were blacklisted. On 1 March, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned six more military and security forces individuals, including members of FAES (Fuerzas de Acciones Especiales), a special police force. The U.S. said these individuals helped obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid to Venezuela on the Colombian and Brazilian borders.
The U.S. sanctioned Minerven, Venezuela's state-run mining company, and its president, Adrian Antonio Perdomo in March 2019; the U.S. Treasury department said that the Venezuelan military grants access to criminal organizations in exchange for money.
On 17 April 2019, the U.S. Treasury added sanctions to the Central Bank of Venezuela and one of its directors, Iliana Ruzza. Directors Simon Alejandro Zerpa Delgado and William Antonio Contreras were already sanctioned. Bolton said the sanction was "aimed at restricting U.S. transactions with the bank and cutting off the bank's access to U.S. currency", as a warning to Russia and others. United States Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin stated that the sanction was to prevent the Central Bank "from being used as a tool of the illegitimate Maduro regime" Maduro said the sanctions were "totally illegal" and that "Central banks around the world are sacred, all countries respect them. ... To me the empire looks crazy, desperate."
On 26 April 2019, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Maduro's foreign minister Jorge Arreaza and Judge Carol Padilla, which it accused of exploiting the U.S. financial system to support Maduro. The U.S. State Department issued a statement describing Arreaza as being "at the forefront" of the Maduro administration attempts "to thwart the democratic aspirations of the Venezuelan people", and Padilla as the judge involved in the detention of Roberto Marrero, who was Juan Guaidó's top aide.
Following the Venezuelan uprising on 30 April 2019, the U.S. removed sanctions against former SEBIN chief Manuel Cristopher Figuera, who broke ranks with Maduro. The U.S. Treasury Department press release said the action demonstrated that sanctions could be removed from those who help "restore democratic order" in Venezuela.
On 27 June 2019, the U.S. sanctioned two former Venezuelan government officials Luis Alfredo Motta Domínguez and Eustiquio Jose Lugo Gomez, who, it said, were engaging in significant corruption and fraud. The Miami U.S. attorney's office stated that Motta was indicted on seven counts of money laundering and one count of money laundering conspiracy, after awarding US$60 million in contracts to three Florida-based companies in return for bribes. In April, Maduro dismissed Motta as Electricity Minister after a series of March blackouts.
President Maduro's son, Nicolás Maduro Guerra, was sanctioned on 28 June 2019 for being a current or former official of the Government of Venezuela, as well as being a member of Venezuela's Constituent Assembly. The U.S. Treasury Department accused him of maintaining a stranglehold on the economy and suppressing the people of Venezuela.
Following the death of Venezuelan navy captain Rafael Acosta Arévalo on 29 June, the U.S. sanctioned Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar (DGCIM) on 11 July 2019, accusing the defense agency of being responsible for his death. On 19 July 2019, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence announced new sanctions on DGCIM officials who, he said, were responsible for repressing and torturing Venezuelans. Pence said the UN had reported that there were nearly 7,000 "killings by [the] Maduro regime in the last 18 months".
Five politicians and security officials, who had earlier been sanctioned by the E.U. or Canada, were also sanctioned by the U.S. on 5 November 2019 for corruption and violence during opposition protests; those individuals are Remigio Ceballos Ichaso from the armed forces, Nestor Neptali Blanco Hurtado from the National Guard, Secretary General of the National Defense Council Jose Adelino Ornelas Ferreira, Pedro Miguel Carreno Escobar from the ANC, and Carlos Alberto Calderon Chirinos in intelligence.
2020
The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned seven individuals for their involvement in the January disputed internal parliamentary elections of the National Assembly. The election was disrupted and resulted in two claims for the Presidency of the National Assembly: one by legislator Luis Parra, later supported by Maduro, and one by the incumbent Guaidó. According to U.S. Secretary of Treasury Mnuchin, the U.S. blacklisted the Venezuelan lawmakers "who, at the bidding of Maduro, attempted to block the democratic process in Venezuela". Those sanctioned included the members of Parra's appointed board of directors and his supporters: Franklyn Duarte, José Gregorio Noriega José Brito and Parra himself.
On 22 September 2020, five more individuals were sanctioned for what the U.S. Treasury described as supporting, manipulating and rigging the upcoming 2020 Venezuelan parliamentary elections. The new sanctions applied to Miguel Ponente, Guillermo Luces, José Bernabé Gutiérrez, Chaim Bucaran and Williams Benavides.
Guillermo Carlos San Agustin and Marcos Javier Machado Requena were sanctioned on 18 December 2020, along with the company Ex-Cle Soluciones Biometricas CA, for providing services for the 2020 Venezuelan parliamentary election, which the U.S. alleges were fraudulent; Maduro responded that the sanctions were "stupid", saying that a third of eligible voters had participated.
OFAC sanctioned the president and board chairman, Didier Casimiro, of Rosneft on 18 February 2020, for supporting Maduro's government by operating in the oil sector.
On 26 March 2020, the U.S. State Department offered a $15 million reward on Nicolás Maduro, and $10 million each on Diosdado Cabello, Hugo Carvajal, Clíver Alcalá Cordones and Tareck El Aissami, for information to bring those individuals to justice for drug trafficking and narco-terrorism.
Brothers Santiago Jose Moron Hernandez and Ricardo Jose Moron Hernandez, active in the gold mining sector and friends of Maduro's son, were sanctioned on 23 July 2020 for their alleged role in a "financial mechanism of an illicit gold scheme", according to Reuters.
On industries
Trump issued EO 13850 on 1 November 2018 to block the assets of anyone involved in corruption in the gold sector, or "any other sector of the economy as determined in the future by the Secretary of the Treasury". Mnuchin announced on 28 January 2019 that EO 13850 applied to the petroleum sector.
Three additional Executive Orders have been applied in the areas of Venezuelan sanctions. EO 13808, issued on 27 July 2017, prohibits the Venezuelan government from accessing U.S. financial markets, allowing for "exceptions to minimize the impact on the Venezuelan people and U.S. economic interests. The sanctions restricted the Venezuelan government's access to US debt and equity markets." This includes the state-run oil company, PDVSA. Issued in 2018, EO 13827 prohibited the use of Venezuelan digital currency, and EO 13835 prohibited the purchase of Venezuelan debt.
Petroleum
Trump imposed economic sanctions in August 2017 that affected Venezuela's petroleum industry by prohibiting the trading of Venezuelan bonds in U.S. markets. The New York Times said that loopholes in the sanctions would permit "financing of most commercial trade, including the export of American light crude oil to Venezuela for mixing with its heavy crude, and financing for humanitarian services to the Venezuelan people", and quoted analysts who said the sanctions would not be a "lethal blow". The White House saw the measures as a way to "protect the United States financial system from complicity in Venezuela's corruption and in the impoverishment of the Venezuelan people" without disallowing humanitarian aid while preventing the "fire sale" of Venezuelan assets.
On 28 January 2019, the U.S. imposed sanctions on the Venezuelan state-owned oil and natural gas company, PDVSA, to pressure Maduro to resign during the 2019 Venezuelan presidential crisis. The sanctions prevented PDVSA from being paid for petroleum exports to the U.Ss, froze $7 billion of PDVSA's U.S. assets and prevented U.S. firms from exporting naphtha to Venezuela. Bolton estimated the expected loss to the Venezuelan economy at more than $11 billion in 2019.
In February 2019, Maduro ordered PDVSA to move its European office to Moscow to protect PDVSA's overseas assets from U.S. sanctions. The Russian state-run oil company Rosneft had supplied naphtha to Venezuela and continued to purchase Venezuelan petroleum, which it said was through contracts that were in place prior to the U.S. sanctions. Exports of Venezuela's heavy crude oil depend on diluents that were imported from the U.S. before sanctions; Rosneft chartered a ship to load thinners from Malta and deliver them to Venezuela on 22 March, and arranged for shipping of Venezuelan crude oil to be processed in India. Other companies including India's Reliance Industries Limited, Spain's Repsol, and commodity trading companies Trafigura and Vitol continued to supply Venezuela's oil industry as of 11 April 2019. On 17 April, Reuters reported that Repsol was in discussion with the Trump administration and had suspended its swaps with PDVSA.
On 18 February 2020, OFAC sanctioned Rosneft's Swiss-incorporated company (Rosneft Trading S.A.) for supporting Maduro's government by operating in the oil sector. Rosneft had been previously sanctioned by the Obama administration on 16 July 2014 for the ongoing Ukrainian crisis, annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Kremlin, and the Russian interference in Ukraine. On 12 March 2020, a Swiss subsidiary of Rosneft, TNK Trading International S.A., was blacklisted for helping Rosneft evade sanctions; U.S. Treasury stated that TNK bought 14 million barrels of Venezuelan crude in one month.
The Venezuelan National Assembly had been looking at ways to access Venezuela's overseas cash and facilities. PDVSA's US subsidiary Citgo announced in February 2019 that it would formally cut ties with PDVSA to comply with U.S. sanctions on Venezuela, and halted payments to PDVSA. Guaidó and the National Assembly appointed a new Citgo board of directors under Chairperson Luisa Palacios. The National Assembly authorized Guaidó's appointment of a new ad hoc board of PDVSA, Citgo, Pdvsa Holding Inc, Citgo Holding Inc. and Citgo Petroleum Corporation. Although control of PDVSA assets in Venezuela remained with Maduro, Guaidó named a new PDVSA board. With Citgo under the control of Guaidó's administration, the U.S. Treasury Department extended its license to operate in spite of sanctions.
Stating it was a "sign of the growing dependence of Venezuela's cash-strapped government on Russia", Reuters reported on 18 April 2019 that the Maduro administration was bypassing the sanctions by funneling cash from petroleum sales through Russia's Rosneft. Reliance denied reports that it was in violation of U.S. sanctions and stated that its purchases of Venezuelan oil through Rosneft had the approval of the U.S. State Department. April oil exports were steady at a million barrels daily, "partially due to inventory drains", with most shipments to buyers from India and China. Production in April was eight percent higher than it was in March, during the 2019 Venezuelan blackouts. Even with sanctions, shipments to Cuba were unchanged.
Beginning in late 2019, the US asked foreign firms not to send gasoline to Venezuela as part of the sanctions on PDVSA.
Cuban oil shipments
The U.S. Treasury sanctioned two companies on 5 April 2019 that had shipped Venezuelan oil to Cuba; the U.S. said Cuban personnel and advisors help the Maduro government maintain power; the companies were Liberia-based Ballito Bay Shipping Inc., the owner of the Despina Andrianna, and the Greek company ProPer In Management Inc., the operator of the vessel that was used for an oil shipment to Cuba. Another 34 ships that are owned by PDVSA were also added to the sanction list. The U.S. sanctioned nine ships and four more shipping companies on 12 April 2019: Liberian companies Jennifer Navigation Ltd., Large Range Ltd. and Lima Shipping Corp.; and Italian PB Tankers. An unnamed U.S. senior official told Bloomberg that these companies and vessels account for as much as half of the 50,000 barrels daily of oil that "Venezuela sends to Cuba in exchange for the social, intelligence and strategic support Havana provides Maduro". Cuba denies any influence on Venezuela's military and—along with Russia, China, Turkey and Iran—is determined to defend Maduro according to Bloomberg.
In response to the arrest of National Assembly members, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned on 10 May 2019 two shipping companies, and two ships, that transported oil from Venezuela to Cuba between late 2018 and March 2019. Both ships sanctioned carried Panama flags: the tanker Ocean Elegance was owned by Monsoon Navigation Corporation, and Leon Dias by Serenity Martitime Limited.
Sanctions on PB Tankers S.P.A. were lifted in July 2019, and on Lima Shipping Corporation and Serenity Maritime Limited in September 2019.
The Cuban state-run oil import and export company, Cubametales, was sanctioned on 3 July 2019 by OFAC; a Treasury press release said it had facilitated oil imports to Cuba from Venezuela in exchange for defense support, intelligence, and security assistance. Cuba continued to receive shipments, and our more companies facilitating oil shipments from Venezuela to Cuba were sanctioned in September. One company based in Cypress (Caroil Transport Marine Ltd) and three Panamanian companies (Trocana World Inc, Tovase Development Corp and Bluelane Overseas SA) were sanctioned, along with four ships owned by those companies. In November, the Cuban company Corporacion Panamericana SA was blacklisted for helping Cubametales evade sanctions.
Petrocaribe
Through Petrocaribe, Caribbean countries including Haiti and Jamaica had been able to finance 40% of their Venezuelan crude oil purchases over 25 years at 1% interest; Cuba received free oil in exchange for medical services. Reuters said, "The Caribbean region has long relied on oil and gas from Venezuela, which offered cheap financing through a program called Petrocaribe, though shipments have declined in recent years because of production problems at Venezuela's state-owned oil company PDVSA." Research by the journalism group Connectas said that Venezuela had spent $28 billion worth of oil to buy support from 14 Caribbean countries; according to the Connectas study the social benefits that were intended for the countries of Petrocaribe were not realized, which they say was ignored by the Venezuelan government because Petrocaribe countries were intended to protect Venezuela's sovereignty in international organizations like the UN and OAS.
Several leaders of Caribbean countries supporting Maduro criticized the US sanctions, saying their support for Maduro was based on principles, not oil, and that sanctions were affecting their countries' supply, debt payments, and the region's stability. The director of the Latin America and Caribbean Energy Program at the University of Texas at Austin, Jorge Piñón, said the supply cuts to these Caribbean countries were not due to the sanctions, but the mismanagement of PDVSA. When Chávez was elected, Venezuela was producing 3.5 million barrels per day of crude oil; as of March 2019, production is about 1 million barrels per day, and Piñón says these countries should have seen the problems coming. Gaston Browne, Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda, and others criticized the US intent in the region, saying that "Washington should provide more aid to these nations and not spend billions on useless wars". With the Venezuelan crisis dividing Caribbean countries, those countries that did not recognize Maduro were invited to meet with Trump in March 2019. Following the meeting, Trump promised more investment to the countries supporting Guaidó (Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica and Saint Lucia), although "the White House did not specifically tie the carrot of investment to that support".
Gold mining
Venezuela's third-largest export (after crude oil and refined petroleum products) in 2019 was gold. The country's gold production is controlled by the military and is mined under dangerous conditions. The World Gold Council reported in January 2019 that Venezuela's foreign-held gold reserves had fallen by 69% to US$8.4 billion during Maduro's presidency, but that it was hard to track where the gold was going. Central Bank gold holdings decreased in November 2018 from US$6.1 billion to US$5.5 billion; the last independent observer to access the vault where gold is stored was Francisco Rodríguez, who saw an estimated US$15 billion in 2014. Reuters reported that 20 tons were removed from the vaults in 2018, and 23 tons of mined gold were taken to Istanbul, Turkey. In the first nine months of 2018, Venezuela's gold exports to Turkey rose from zero in the previous year to US$900 million.
On 1 November 2018 Trump signed an executive order to "ban US persons from dealing with entities and individuals involved with 'corrupt or deceptive' gold sales from Venezuela".
In mid-February 2019, National Assembly legislator Angel Alvarado said that about eight tons of gold had been taken from the vault while the head of the Central Bank was abroad. In March, Ugandan investigators were looking into recent gold imports, and reported that 7.4 tonnes of gold worth over US$300 million could have been smuggled into that country.
The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Minerven, Venezuela's state-run mining company, in March 2019.
Government sources said another eight tonnes of gold was taken out of the Central Bank in the first week of April 2019; the government source said that there were 100 tonnes left. The gold was removed while the bank was not fully operational because of the 2019 Venezuelan blackouts and minimal staff was present; the destination of the gold was not known. According to Bloomberg, the Central Bank sold 9.5 tonnes of gold on 10 May and 3 more tonnes some days later. Reuters estimated in March 2020 that there were about 90 tonnes of gold left in the country, compared to 129 tonnes at the start of 2019.
Banking and finance
US President Trump signed an order on 19 March 2018 that prohibited people in the US from making any type of transaction with digital currency emitted by or in the name of the government of Venezuela as of 9 January 2018, referencing the Petro token. He said the crypto-currency had been designed in February 2018 to "circumvent US sanctions" and access international financing.
On 11 March 2019, the U.S. sanctioned the Russian bank Evrofinance Mosnarbank, a joint venture of Russian and Venezuelan state-owned companies. The U.S. Treasury Department said the Moscow-based bank was an economic lifeline for Maduro's administration.
After the detention of Guaidó's chief of staff, Roberto Marrero, in March 2019, the US Treasury Department responded by placing sanctions on the Venezuelan bank BANDES and its subsidiaries. Univision stated this action "put 'the entire banking sector' on notice" that Venezuelan financial transactions could be sanctioned. China Development Bank had paid billions of dollars through BANDES to the Venezuelan government in exchange for crude oil as of March 2019; the sanctions would make it difficult for Venezuela to restructure its US$20 billion debt with China. U.S. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin said that BANDES had become a way for Maduro administration "insiders" to "move funds abroad in an attempt to prop up Maduro", circumventing the purpose of the bank to help the Venezuelan people.
The U.S. Treasury added sanctions to the Central Bank of Venezuela on 17 April 2019. Mnuchin stated that the sanction would "inhibit most Central Bank activities undertaken" by the Maduro administration, but "ensure that regular debit and credit card transactions can proceed and personal remittances and humanitarian assistance continue unabated". The new sanctions closed some loopholes that allowed for continued financing of the government; the Central Bank had been able to obtain loans without seeking approval from the National Assembly, and sold gold to the central banks of other countries. By interrupting the foreign exchange handled by the Central Bank, PDVSA purchases of production supplies were impacted.
The Venezuelan banking sanctions caused a rippled effect in that the New York Federal Reserve decided to restrict opening of new accounts in Puerto Rico's offshore banking industry, and planned tighter restrictions in that area.
CLAP food subsidy program
On 25 July 2019, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on 10 people and 13 companies (from Colombia, Hong Kong (China), Mexico, Panama, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and the U.S.) involved in a Venezuelan food subsidy program called CLAP, which included Maduro's stepsons and a Colombian businessman Alex Saab. Saab sold food to Venezuela for more than USD 200 million in a negotiation signed by Maduro through a registered company in Hong Kong. On 23 August 2017, the Venezuelan attorney general, Luisa Ortega Díaz, had named Saab as the owner of the Mexican firm Group Grand Limited, along with Colombian businessmen Álvaro Pulido and Rodolfo Reyes, and "presumably President Nicolás Maduro" that sold food to the CLAP.
According to Mnuchin, corruption in the "CLAP program has allowed Maduro and his family members to steal from the Venezuelan people" by using "food as a form of social control, to reward political supporters and punish opponents, all the while pocketing hundreds of millions of dollars through a number of fraudulent schemes." The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida charged Saab and another Colombian businessman with money laundering related to a 2011–2015 scheme to pay bribes to take advantage of Venezuela's government-set exchange rate.
After a multilateral meeting between over a dozen European and Latin American countries, U.S. Treasury Department officials had stated in April 2018 that they had collaborated with Colombian officials to investigate corrupt import programs of the Maduro administration including CLAP. They stated that Venezuelan officials pocketed 70% of the proceeds allocated for importation programs destined to alleviate hunger in Venezuela. Treasury officials said they sought to seize the proceeds that were being funneled into the accounts of corrupt Venezuelan officials and hold them for a future government in Venezuela.
An April 2019 communication from the U.S. State Department highlighted the 2017 National Assembly investigation finding that the government paid US$42 for food boxes that cost under US$13, and that "Maduro's inner circle kept the difference, which totaled more than $200 million dollars in at least one case", adding that food boxes were "distributed in exchange for votes". On 17 September 2019, the U.S. Treasury Department expanded further sanctions on 16 entities (from Colombia, Italy and Panama) and 3 individuals, accusing them of helping the Venezuelan government to profit from food import and distribution.
Airline
OFAC added state airline Conviasa and its fleet of 40 aircraft (including presidential aircraft) to the Specially Designated Nationals ("SDN") list on 7 February 2020, making it unlikely that Conviasa would be able to source replacement parts for its Boeing B737 aircraft. U.S. citizens were prohibited from flying on Conviasa's domestic and international flights. To the extent that other countries abide by OFAC policy, those countries (Brazil, France and the United Kingdom) would refuse to sell Conviasa replacement parts for Embraer and Airbus aircraft, prohibit its nationals from flying Conviasa, and cancel Conviasa-serviced routes to their respective countries (Panama, Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador).
2023 partial release
In October, the Biden administration eased some sanctions based on a 2023 Venezuela election agreement signed in Barbados between the Maduro government and opposition parties; an agreement was negotiated in which five people classified as political prisoners (including Juan Requesens) were released in exchange for the U.S. partially removing sanctions on the oil, gas and gold industries. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated Maduro would have another month to release Americans and remove bans on candidates for the 2024 presidential elections; the proposal did not address the ban on Maria Corina Machado, but anonymous sources said the U.S. would reverse the release of sanctions "unless Maduro lifts the bans and frees wrongfully detained Americans".
Canada
Canada sanctioned 40 Venezuelan officials, including Maduro, in September 2017. The sanctions were for behaviors that undermined democracy after at least 125 people were killed in the 2017 protests and "in response to the government of Venezuela's deepening descent into dictatorship". Canadians were banned from transactions with the 40 individuals, whose Canadian assets were frozen. The Canadian government held that Maduro played a "key role in the political and economic crisis"; its sanctions targeted his cabinet, military officials, and the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and Electoral Council. Chrystia Freeland, Foreign Minister, said the sanctions were intended to pressure Maduro to "restore constitutional order and respect the democratic rights of the Venezuelan people".
The Canadian regulations of the Special Economic Measures Act prohibited dealings with listed persons subject to some exceptions.
November 2017
On 23 November 2017, Canada added sanctions under the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, stating the individuals were "responsible for, or complicit in, gross violations of internationally recognized human rights" and had "committed acts of significant corruption, or both." Three of the 19 individuals added to the Canadian list had already been sanctioned in September (Maduro, Tareck El Aissami and Gustavo González López), bringing to 56 the number of individuals sanctioned by Canada as of 2017.
May 2018
Responding to the 2018 presidential elections, Canada sanctioned 14 more Venezuelans. Canada's Special Economic Measures (Venezuela) Regulations were amended on 30 May 2018 to account for the "economic, political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela" that the Canadian statement said "moves [Venezuela] ever closer to full dictatorship". The government sanctioned Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores, and 13 other members of the ANC and TSJ.
April 2019
In April 2019, Canada announced sanctions on 43 more individuals. The government statement said that high-ranking officials were sanctioned for "anti-democratic actions, particularly relating to the repression and persecution of the members of the interim government, censorship, and excessive use of force against civil society, undermining the independence of the judiciary and other democratic institutions." Foreign Minister Freeland stated that the "Maduro dictatorship" was responsible for the crisis.
The newly sanctioned Venezuelans included Jorge Arreaza, Maduro's Minister of Foreign Affairs.
European Union
In 2017, the E.U. approved an embargo on arms and material, adding Venezuela along with North Korea and Syria, to countries where European companies cannot sell material that may be used for repression. In 2018, those sanctions were continued for another year because of "human rights violations and undermining of democracy and the rule of law under President Nicolás Maduro".
The E.U. sanctioned seven Venezuela officials on 18 January 2018, stating they were responsible for deteriorating democracy in the country: Diosdado Cabello, Néstor Reverol (Interior Minister), Gustavo González López (Head of Intelligence), Antonio Benavides Torres (National Guard Commander), Tibisay Lucena (Head of Electoral Council), Maikel Moreno (Supreme Court President), and Tarek William Saab (Attorney General). The sanctioned individuals were prohibited from entering the nations of the EU, and their assets were frozen. Cabello, known as number two in Chavismo, had not been sanctioned by the U.S. when the E.U. sanctioned him.
The Venezuelan government appealed the sanctions in the European General Court (EGC) in February 2018; the EGC dismissed the appeal on 20 September 2019.
On 25 June 2018, the E.U. sanctioned another eleven officials in response to the May 2018 Venezuelan presidential election, which it described as "neither free nor fair". The additional sanctions brought the total to 18 Venezuelans sanctioned in European nations. The sanctioned individuals included Tareck El Aissami (Vice President of Economy and Minister for Industry and Production, formerly SEBIN); Freddy Bernal (Head of Local Committees for Supply and Production and SEBIN commissioner); Elías Jaua (Minister of Education and former head of Presidential Commission for the ANC); and Delcy Rodríguez (Vice President).
Voice of America reported in April 2019 tension between the U.S. and the E.U. over increasing sanctions; E.U. nations were reluctant to apply sanctions to a nation, despite evidence that Russia's aid was propping up Maduro, but were still considering tougher sanctions on individuals in his government. Spain was still receiving Venezuelan oil in repayment for debt as of 10 April 2019 and many Spanish companies still operated in Venezuela.
In June 2019, the Associated Press reported that the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands were considering imposing sanctions on Maduro and several top officials for the crackdown on political opponents following the 30 April uprising. However, E.U. member states were divided over the timing of any action for fear of derailing a negotiated exit to the country's crisis.
The E.U. sanctioned seven intelligence and security officials in September 2019, taking what Reuters described as a more "severe tone" against torture and bringing to 25 the number of individuals sanctioned by the E.U. Those sanctioned were Alexander Enrique Granko Arteaga, Nestor Blanco Hurtado, Rafael Ramon Blanco Marrero, Carlos Calderon, Alexis Enrique Escalona Marrero, Rafael Antonio Franco Quintero and Hannover Esteban Guerrero Mijares.
The E.U. sanctioned eleven individuals on 29 June 2020.
Disavowing the December 2020 Venezuelan parliamentary election, on 22 February 2021, the E.U. sanctioned 19 officials of the Maduro administration for what they characterized as violations of fundamental human rights and democratic principles.
In November 2022, the E.U. extended its Venezuelan sanctions through 14 November 2023.
Other
Panama
On 27 March 2018, Panama sanctioned 55 public officials and 16 businesses that operate in Panama, related to the family of Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores. Panama thus become the first country in Latin America to sanction the Maduro administration, joining the U.S., Canada, the E.U. and Switzerland. The sanctioned businesses had members of the Malpica-Flores family on their boards of directors.
The sanctions imposed by Panama triggered a diplomatic crisis between the two countries, which ended on 26 April 2018, when Maduro and Panamanian President Juan Carlos Varela agreed to restore diplomatic relations.
Switzerland
Switzerland implemented sanctions against Venezuela on 28 March 2018, freezing the assets of seven ministers and high officials due to human rights violations and deteriorating rule of law and democracy. The sanctions mimicked those of the E.U., expressing concern over individual freedoms, illegitimate elections, and separation of powers.
On 10 July 2018, Switzerland imposed sanctions against the eleven Venezuelans that were sanctioned by the E.U. in June 2018.
The Swiss sanctioned eleven more individuals in on 7 July 2020 for human rights violations.
Mexico
The Mexican Senate froze the assets of officials of the Maduro administration in April 2018 and prohibited them (Antonio Benavides Torres, Delcy Rodríguez, Diosdado Cabello, Maikel Moreno, Néstor Reverol, Tarek William Saab, and Tibisay Lucena) from entering Mexico.
In July 2019, the Mexican Ministry of Finance froze bank accounts of 19 companies related to the sale of low quality and over-priced food to the Venezuelan government's CLAP program and opened an investigation relating to money laundering after detecting "irregularities of more than 150 million dollars".
Curaçao
On 21 June 2019, Curaçao announced a gold import and transit ban on Venezuela. According to prime minister Eugene Rhuggenaath, criminal investigations indicated drug smuggling and money laundering were associated with the Venezuelan gold trade.
United Kingdom
After its exit from the E.U., the United Kingdom continued to issue sanctions aligned with the E.U. In July 2021 the U.K. issued a series of sanctions that included Colombian businessman Alex Saab, and the freezing of assets and travel bans. Álvaro Enrique Pulido, his associate, was also sanctioned—–both for "exploiting two of Venezuela's public programs that were established to provide poor Venezuelans with affordable food and housing", stating that the men had inflated prices for personal enrichment, causing "more suffering to Venezuelans who were already in poverty".
Entry bans
Lima Group
After Maduro's second inauguration on 7 January 2019, the Lima Group (except Mexico) announced its member countries would follow Peru's decision to ban the entry of people linked with Maduro's administration.
Colombia
Colombia did not directly sanction Venezuelans, rather banned figures close to Maduro from entering the country. Christian Krüger Sarmiento, director of Colombia Migration, announced in January 2019 that the Colombian government maintained a list of people banned from entering Colombia or subject to expulsion. The initial list had 200 people with a "close relationship and support for the Nicolás Maduro regime", but Krüger said it could change. The list—which was not disclosed in its entirely—was headed by Maduro, his wife Flores, Cabello, and Delcy Rodríguez and encompassed Venezuela's military leadership. The decision to ban collaborators of the Maduro administration from entering Colombia came after the Lima Group disavowed Maduro as the legitimate president of Venezuela.
The head of a company commissioned by the Maduro administration, Monómeros Colombovenezolanos, was not allowed to enter Colombia, nor was , a Venezuelan singer seeking entry for a performance. Maduro's cousin, Argimiro Maduro Morán, and family were turned back when they sought refuge in Colombia during the 2019 Venezuelan blackouts. In March, Édgar Alejandro Lugo Pereira—an active military person who works for Venezuela's Foreign Ministry—was detained and expelled; he was carrying US$14,000 and 20 passports.
Gustavo Petro ordered in September 2022 that Colombia's travel bans be removed.
Evasion
Minister of Industries and National Production Tareck El Aissami announced in October 2018 in response to U.S. sanctions that all foreign exchange government auctions would be quoted in euros, Chinese yuan and other hard currencies instead of U.S. dollars. He said the government would open bank accounts in Europe and Asia as potential workarounds to financial sanctions and that Venezuela's banking sector would be able to participate in currency auctions three times a week, adding that the government would sell some 2 billion euros amid a rebound in oil prices.
In January 2020, despite the entry ban imposed by the E.U., Maduro Vice President Delcy Rodríguez met in the guest area of the Madrid–Barajas Airport with Spain's minister José Luis Ábalos from the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party.
Following a five-year investigation of 30 Swiss banks for alleged corruption, as of 2021, five had been reprimanded by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority for laundering money linked to PDVSA, allowing "corrupt members of the Venezuelan government" to evade sanctions and transfer money to Switzerland.
Some ships' captains and owners sympathetic to Venezuela turned off their transponder locations to avoid the U.S. sanctions and deliver oil to Russia, China, and India, creating an environmental risk of ship collisions. As of 2020, Mexico defied the U.S. sanctions by allowing fuel shipments, and in spite of sanctions on both Iran and Venezuela, Iran sent five oil tankers to Venezuela.
Venezuela continued to send money and ship petroleum products to ally countries after sanctions were issued. In April 2022, it sent fuel oil and diesel to Cuba, and paid Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' debt with Petrocaribe, estimated to have been around $189 million dollars. In August 2023, Petróleos de Venezuela increased fuel shipments to Cuba, from 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil, fuel oil, gasoline and diesel blends to 65,000 barrels.
Following an investigation by the F.B.I. of trading involving Mexican companies, in January 2021, the U.S. sanctioned a network comprising three people, fourteen companies and six ships for evading sanctions on Venezuelan petroleum products; the individuals, shipping crude mainly to Asia, were Alessandro Bazzoni, Francisco D'Agostino and Philipp Apikian; the companies were Elemento Ltd and Swissoil Trading SA, and other companies owned by the three individuals. Maduro government officials called the sanctions a "new, desperate aggression" by Trump, and stated that the "revolutionary government [was] still standing today". Six months earlier, three Mexicans, eight Mexican-based companies and two ships were sanctioned; the individuals were Olga Maria Zepeda, Veronica Esparza and Joaquin Leal Jimenez and the companies were Libre Abordo and Schlager Business Group, and others owned by Zepeda or Leal. The companies received at least 30 million barrels of crude. A Libre Abordo spokesperson told Reuters they were exchanging crude for humanitarian aid and should not have been sanctioned; Reuters reported the food in exchange for crude was never delivered. Arreaza stated that the U.S. wanted to see that the "Venezuelan people are left without food, medicine or gasoline".
Reactions
Maduro and his administration have stated that the U.S. is responsible for its economic collapse. Maduro's Foreign Minister Arreaza said in 2019 that economic sanctions had cost the Venezuelan economy US$30 billion; a 2020 WOLA report agreed with that figure. Reporting on Arreaza's statement, the Associated Press said that Maduro was blocking aid on the premise that "Venezuelans are not beggars". After the 2020 U.S. sanctions on Luis Parra, Arreaza stated that the U.S. sanctions were undermining democratic institutions.
Guaidó stated in May 2019 that the sanctions had weakened a network of Cuban spies that he said operated in Venezuela. After the announcement of regional elections in 2021, Guaidó announced a "national salvation agreement" and proposed negotiation with Maduro with a schedule for free and fair elections and international support and observers, in exchange for lifting international sanctions.
Economists and news reports state that the crisis began, and shortages and high inflation existed in Venezuela, before the sanctions, and that sanctions prior to 2019 targeted Maduro and Chavismo "elites" while having little impact on average Venezuelans. The Washington Post stated in April 2019 that "the deprivation long predates recently imposed US sanctions". The Wall Street Journal said in January 2019 that economists place the blame for Venezuela's economy shrinking by half on policies of the Maduro administration, "including widespread nationalizations, out-of-control spending that sparked inflation, price controls that led to shortages, and widespread graft and mismanagement".
As the humanitarian crisis deepened and expanded, the Trump administration levied more serious economic sanctions; some economists, scholars and non-governmental organizations opined that the 2019 sanctions worsened the economic crisis, and limited income sources and public spending, reminding that most of Venezuela's food and medicine is imported. In July 2019, Jean Galbraith wrote in the American Journal of International Law that despite promises from the United States that ordinary citizens were not to be targeted by sanctions, the economy of Venezuela was damaged by sanctions. In 2022, Marc Becker wrote that the sanctions were enacted in a regime change effort designed by the United States to affect the military and public so that they would become desperate and remove Maduro through a coup. In 2023, Al Jazeera wrote that the sanctions had affected citizens.
Reuters stated that falling oil prices in 2020 during the COVID-19 recession, alongside the sanctions, contributed to fuel shortages in the country. A Transparencia Venezuela 2020 report stated that sanctions did damage the economy while also noting an "institutional, political, economic, social and environmental crisis" had "characterized Venezuela for more than a decade", caused by authoritarian administration; other reports also cited government mismanagement as factors in the decline.
In March 2019, Michelle Bachelet, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated after a five-person delegation visited Venezuela that the government had not acknowledged or addressed the dramatically deteriorating conditions, and she was concerned that although the serious, long-standing crisis pre-dated the early sanctions, the new sanctions could worsen the situation. Alena Douhan, United Nations special rapporteur, visited Venezuela in early 2021; 66 Venezuelan NGOs asked her to consider the harmful impact of sanctions in the context of years of repression, corruption and economic mismanagement. In her preliminary report, Douhan said that the economic pressure against Venezuela worsened the crisis, but that Venezuela's economic decline "began in 2014 with the fall in oil prices" and that "mismanagement and corruption had also contributed". She asked the U.S., U.K. and Portugal to release an estimated $6 billion in frozen Venezuelan foreign assets. The government welcomed the report, while the opposition accused her of "playing into the hands of the regime". Douhan's report was criticized, and some NGOs manifested on social media with the hashtag "#Lacrisisfueprimero" (The crisis came first).
Impact on food, medicine and health
The Lancet journal editors noted in 2019 that Maduro had used food as a political weapon and resisted humanitarian aid, and that the U.S. had reacted with sanctions that they said resulted in collateral food and medicine shortages. The editors called for the involvement of non-governmental entities to provide distribution of food and medicine, and for the Venezuelan government to allow them to do so, and stated that the UN Human Rights Council considers economic sanctions a violation of human rights.
A 2019 joint report published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health stated that most sanctions were focused on abusive officials involved in corruption, did not target the economy, and that the 2017 sanctions allowed exceptions for food and medicine. Consulting firm ANOVA Policy Research stated in 2021 that the sanctions were linked to a decrease in monthly oil production, and increases in monthly food and medicine imports; it found no evidence of negative effects on food and medicine imports, but wrote that the economic data did not account for price controls on imported products being abandoned in 2017. In 2018, Susana Raffalli had stated that 36% of Venezuelan children had stunted growth prior to sanctions; she cited the PDVAL affair (tons of imported food supplies found rotten during Hugo Chávez's government) as an example of food shortages before sanctions.
An April 2019 report by Mark Weisbrot and Jeffrey Sachs claimed that a 31% rise in deaths between 2017 and 2018 was due to the 2017 sanctions, and that 40,000 people in Venezuela may have died as a result; Weisbrot stated that he "could not prove those excess deaths were the result of sanctions, but said the increase ran parallel to the imposition of the measures and an attendant fall in oil production". The report's findings and methodology were described as invalid and disputed by other economists and accounts, who stated that most of the decline pre-dated the sanctions and that the methodology was flawed, speculative or conjecture. Ricardo Hausmann and Frank Muci published a rebuttal in Americas Quarterly, stating that the analysis took Colombia as a counterfactual for Venezuela, when Colombia and Venezuela are "radically different in other dimensions". They argued that oil production trends between the two nations were different in the decade before sanctions and that a month after the 2017 sanctions, Maduro replaced the PDVSA president with an inexperienced military general who restructured the oil entity, worsening its performance.
Public perception
Polling in 2023 by Datanalisis found that 74% of Venezuelans do not support sanctions, 30% attribute Venezuela's problems to the sanctions, and half of Venezuelans agree with the sanctions on some administration officials. The director of Datanalisis stated that most Venezuelans recognize the government's blame for the sanctions, but have moved away from supporting them because their objectives have not been achieved and have worsened the lives of citizens. A poll by DatinCorp conducted among Venezuelans in 2019 found that 68% believed that the sanctions have affected their quality of life.
Persons sanctioned
Legend: G – Government officials; S – Active or retired military or security officials; O – Other;
Person no longer sanctioned
Entities sanctioned
Legend: A – Aircraft; C – Company; G – Governmental organization/state institution; S – Ship; Entity no longer sanctioned
See also
Cartel of the Suns
International sanctions during the Russo-Ukrainian War
International sanctions during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
International sanctions against Iran
International sanctions during apartheid
United States embargoes
Notes
References
Bibliography
External links
2010s in politics
Crisis in Venezuela
Foreign relations of Venezuela
International reactions to the crisis in Venezuela
Venezuela
Political history of Venezuela
Venezuelan presidential crisis
Venezuela–European Union relations