Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance ANGOLA Produced and supported by: BIMGO CDI simon (d) ENTERCARCO InterManager WIMEG OCIME |GP&| 28: SIGITIO
Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security off the Coast of West Africa including the Gulf of Guinea
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Legal Notice
BMP WA has been developed purely as guidance to be used at the user's own risk. No responsibility is accepted by the Authors, their Members or by any person, firm, corporation or organisation for the accuracy of any information in BMP WA or any omission from BMP WA or for any consequence whatsoever resulting directly or indirectly from applying or relying upon guidance contained in BMP WA even if caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care.
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Understand the threat • Maritime threats are dynamic. • Obtaining current threat information is critical for risk assessment and decision making.
Conduct risk assessments
• Companies must conduct risk assessments. • Identify ship protection measures.
Implement ship protection measures
• Harden the ship. • Brief and train the crew. • Enhanced lookout. • Follow Flag State, insurance and military guidance.
Report
• Register and report to MDAT-GoG. • Report incidents and suspicious activity. • Send distress signal when attacked.
Cooperate
• Cooperate with other shipping and military forces. • Cooperate with law enforcement to preserve evidence. • Cooperate with welfare providers.
The maritime security situation off the West Coast of Africa is complex and dynamic. BMP – West Africa (WA) has been produced to help ships and seafarers avoid becoming the victims of maritime security incidents in these waters. This publication aims to help ships plan their voyage and to detect, avoid, deter, delay and report attacks. Experience has shown that application of the recommendations in this publication makes a significant difference to the safety of seafarers. The BMP contained in this publication mitigate the risk from piracy and armed robbery. However, differences in attack methods from other threats may require other forms of mitigation. The consequences of not adopting effective security measures can be severe. Some pirates have subjected crew to violence and other ill treatment and extended periods of captivity. Other attacks have demonstrated an intent to damage ships, seize the cargo and endanger life. Other maritime crime in the region, such as the trafficking of firearms, humans and narcotics, migrant smuggling and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, can contribute to insecurity. The Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade-Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG) ( https://gog-mdat.org/home ) website should be consulted for advice. See annex A for contact details. Nothing in this BMP detracts from the Master's overriding authority and responsibility to protect their crew, ship and cargo. This BMP complements piracy guidance in the latest International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Resolutions and Circulars ( www.imo.org ).
Geographical area
This Guidance introduces recommended practices and procedures for vessels operating in the Voluntary Reporting Area as depicted on UKHO Chart Q6114 and SHOM Chart 8801CSD. Attacks on ships and seafarers have taken place throughout the region but most predominantly in the eastern part of the Gulf of Guinea. Threats are dynamic; information should be sought from the organisations listed in annex A
Voluntary Reporting Area
The MDAT-GoG Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) is identified on maritime security charts such as UKHO Q6114 & SHOM Chart 8801CSD. Ships entering and operating within the VRA are encouraged to register with the MDAT-GoG as registration establishes direct contact between the reporting ship and MDAT-GoG.
Joint War Committee listed area
The insurance community lists an area of perceived enhanced risk in the region. Ships entering the area would need to notify their insurers and additional insurance premiums may apply. The Joint War Committee (JWC) comprises underwriting representatives from both Lloyd's and the International Underwriting Association representing the interests of those who write marine hull war business in the London market. The geographic limits of the JWC listed area can be found on their website: www.lmalloyds.com/lma/jointwar
The complex range of maritime security issues off the coast of West Africa creates direct and indirect threats to the safety of seafarers. For this reason, it is important that all maritime crime is addressed. This Guidance focuses on maritime crime that causes a direct threat to seafarers, armed (and unarmed) robbery, including cargo theft, hijacking of vessels and kidnapping. The likelihood of attack further offshore is higher during the inter-monsoon season (September-March). Attacks can take place at any time – day or night. However, more seafarers have been kidnapped during the hours of darkness.
Attacks on Vessels
Attacks occur close to shore, in rivers and in ports; however, attacks have been reported over 200Nm from the coast. Attacks on vessels vary significantly in their form. Attacks for theft may involve just a few individuals. However, an attack on a vessel where the intention is the kidnapping of seafarers and/or offloading cargo from tankers may involve a large number of heavily armed individuals. Different types of vessels are used during attacks, these include fast small craft, fishing vessels and small merchant vessels. Whilst most attacks on ships at anchor off ports occur at night, many of the attacks further out to sea occur during the day or night. Ships at anchor, drifting or conducting ship-to-ship (STS) operations are particularly vulnerable. Attacks against vessels underway may occur when proceeding at slow speed and occasionally involve some form of deception to force the vessel to stop. If a mother ship is used it will carry pirates, stores, fuel and attack skiffs to enable attackers to operate over a much larger area. Attackers may use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) during attacks; the bridge and accommodation tend to be the main targets for these weapons. Attackers may use long lightweight ladders, knotted climbing ropes or long hooked poles to climb up the side of the ship. Once onboard they will make their way to the bridge to try to take control of the ship. When on the bridge they will demand the ship slows/stops to enable others to board. The objective of an attack varies. Kidnap for ransom is widespread. These kidnappings have ranged from one seafarer to the entire crew of a ship. Seafarers are held in distressful, unsanitary conditions lacking adequate medical support, which has resulted in sickness and sometimes death. Cases of armed robbery at sea involve the theft of cargo, valuables and the destruction of navigation and communication equipment; sometimes they are opportunistic but are carefully planned. A hijack will typically last several days whilst the vessel is moved around outside the jurisdiction of the coastal states. During this time the vessel may be moved to a number of rendezvous points to enable STS transfers of cargo. Experience has shown the crew of a vessel targeted for armed robbery at sea or cargo theft are likely to be treated badly by perpetrators during an attack. Injuries are common and any resistance shown to the attackers may lead to an escalation of violence. The capability of military and law enforcement forces to respond to incidents of armed robbery at sea, hijacking and kidnapping in the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) is improving, but remains limited. Only a few countries provide or allow Secure Anchorage Areas (SAA), Security Escort Vessels (SEV) and or Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) for merchant vessels within their EEZ and/or territorial waters. Other maritime security concerns are outlined at annex E.

Threat assessment
The threat assessment must include all regional maritime security threats. As part of every ship risk assessment prior to transit through the VRA the latest regional threat advice can be obtained from the Interregional Coordination Centre, MDAT-GoG, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC) and commercial providers. A threat is formed of capability, intent and opportunity. Capability means attackers have the physical means to conduct an attack. Intent is demonstrated by continued attacks or by good intelligence. Opportunity is what is mitigated by the company, ship and crew through application of the measures described in this Guidance. In addition to the information provided in this Guidance, supplementary information about the characteristics of the specific threat or new tactics, and regional background factors may be sought from regional reporting centres and organisations as listed in annex A. If one side of the triangle is removed, then risk is minimised. The company/Master cannot influence either capability or intent, therefore BMP measures focus on minimising the opportunity.
Risk assessment
Risk assessment is an integral part of voyage planning within a safety management system. The risk assessment should identify measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery, which will mean combining statutory regulations with supplementary measures. Further guidance on risk assessments can be found at www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org The risk assessment must consider but may not be limited to: • The threat assessment and geographical areas of increased risk. • Requirements of the Flag State, company, charterers and insurers. • Secure Anchorage Areas (SAA), Security Escort Vessels (SEV) and or Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs). • The ship's characteristics, vulnerabilities and inherent capabilities, including citadel and/ or safe muster points to withstand the threat (freeboard, speed, general arrangement, etc). • The ship's and company's procedures (drills, watch rosters, chain of command, decision making processes, etc). • Background factors shaping the situation, e.g. traffic patterns and local patterns of life, including fishing vessel activity. • Cooperation with military. All voyages in this region require thorough advanced planning using all available information. The maritime threats are dynamic, and it is therefore essential that a detailed threat and risk assessment is completed for each voyage and activity within the region.

Company planning
Together with the following, the output of the risk assessment will help develop the ship's voyage plan: • Regular review of the threat and risk assessments. Plans should be updated as necessary. • Review of the Ship Security Assessment (SSA), Ship Security Plan (SSP) and Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP). • Guidance to the Master about the recommended route and any rendezvous requirements. • Due diligence of companies providing security services. • Guidance on using a SAA, SEV and any transfer to terminal security. • Company mandated Ship Protection Measures (SPM). • Companies should consider using hidden position transmitting devices as hijackers will often attempt to disable all visible communication and tracking devices and aerials straight away. • Review of company manning requirements. Consider disembarking of non- essential crew and families prior to sailing to areas of high security risk. • Crew training plans.
Information security
To avoid critical voyage information falling into the wrong hands, the following is advised: • Communications with external parties should be kept to a minimum, with close attention paid to organising rendezvous points and waiting positions. • Minimise the use of VHF and use email or a secure satellite telephone instead. Where possible, only answer known or legitimate callers on the VHF and keep voyage critical information to a minimum. • Email correspondence to agents, charterers and chandlers should be controlled and information within the email kept concise, containing the minimum that is contractually required. • Reminding crew of the dangers of posting voyage related information on social media.
STS Operations
• Review the threat assessment and security measures for the location of STS operations.
Offshore Terminals
• Review the threat assessment and security measures for the location of Offshore Terminals.
Prior to entering the Voluntary Reporting Area • Obtain the latest threat information. • Check the latest NAVAREA warnings, alerts and the Inmarsat SafetyNet broadcasts. • Implement VRA vessel registration and reporting requirements as highlighted in section 6 and annex D. • If security services are used, confirm arrangements with the Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC). • If used, rendezvous position and communication plan for Security Escort Vessels. • Contingency plans if security services do not arrive or cannot meet operational requirements. • Confirm propulsion can operate at full speed. • Implement security measures in accordance with the Ship Security Plan (SSP).
Brief crew and conduct drills
Crews should be made aware of the threat, risk and consequences along with available resources to cope. Good practice guides can be found at https://www.seafarerswelfare. org/resources The crew should be fully briefed on the preparations and drills should be conducted with the Ship Protection Measures (SPM) in place. The plan should be reviewed, and all crew briefed on their duties, including familiarity with the alarm that signals an attack, an all-clear situation and the appropriate response to each. The drills should test: • The SPM, including testing the security of all access points. • Lock down conditions, including crew safety considerations. • The bridge team's security knowledge and crew awareness. • The crew's understanding of required action in the event of an attack.
On entering the VRA
• Submit ship reports as highlighted in section 6 and annex D. • Update and monitor latest threat information. • Ensure all access points are limited and controlled. • Minimise the use of VHF and use email or a secure satellite telephone instead. Where possible, only answer known or legitimate callers on the VHF and keep ship, crew, cargo and voyage-critical information to a minimum.
Other considerations
• Prepare and test an emergency communication plan. Masters are advised to prepare an emergency communication plan, to include all essential emergency contact numbers (see annex A) and prepared messages, which should be at hand or permanently displayed near all external communications stations including safe muster point and/or the citadel. Communication devices and the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) should be tested. • Define the ship's Automatic Identification System (AIS) policy. It is recommended that AIS should remain switched on throughout passages in the VRA to ensure reporting centres and militaries can track the ship but restrict the data to ship's identity, position, course, speed, navigational status and safety related information. • Reschedule planned maintenance on voyage critical equipment for transit through areas identified in the risk assessment and have all equipment ready in the event of attack.
Location and Time at Anchor
• Keep time at anchor to a minimum. • Anchor watch to be maintained. • Avoid setting patterns. • Consider use of "secure anchorage areas" operated by some countries in the region. More information is contained in local Notice to Mariners or Admiralty Charts. • Vessels are most vulnerable when stopped in the water, drifting, at anchor or carrying out STS transfer, Single Buoy Mooring (SBM) operations or slowing down for pilot transfer.
Coordinated Arrival
Many vessels wait offshore and transit at high speed to arrive at any rendezvous point 'Just in Time' including STS and/or Offshore Terminals. Some vessels tender a virtual Notice of Readiness (NOR) whilst staying safely offshore, and both are accepted practice for many vessels operating in the GoG.
Planning considerations for vessels permanently operating inside the VRA
Marine operations in the GoG region are diverse, covering many areas of activity including: • Offshore supply. •   Diving & RoV Support. • MODU/MOU. • Pipe laying. • Fishing vessels. • Passenger vessels and ferries. • Recreation craft. In general, maritime security considerations for vessels permanently operating in the region are not dissimilar to those for vessels visiting the region, its ports and harbours. There is no set pattern to the location of attacks against vessels based and operating in the region, but it should be assumed criminals are aware of the regular transit routes to offshore installations, STS and ship waiting areas, fishing grounds and scheduled ferry routes.
This section highlights proven SPM that provide layered protection. The BMP is based on regional experience of attacks and will continue to evolve as methods change. When considering SPM it is important to recognise that ships may be subject to attack whilst underway or stationary. Ships are especially vulnerable when at anchor or when carrying out STS or SBM operations. A Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP) can ensure vessels are prepared for operations in areas of increased threat and ought to be considered as part of voyage preparation. The requirement for a VHP should be defined within the company management procedures for security. The Company Security Officer (CSO) should be responsible for the plan, with the Master and Ship Security Officer (SSO) reviewing the contents before transit or operation within known security risk areas. The implementation of SPM will be identified during the voyage planning process and clearly marked on the VHP. Companies may wish to consider making further alterations to the ship beyond the scope of this BMP, and/or providing additional equipment and/or personnel as a means of further reducing the risk of attack.
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The Master should implement the following actions to assist in raising vigilance on board: • Provide additional, fully briefed lookouts. • Maintain an all-round lookout from an elevated position. During STS operations there is a tendency for members of the crew to be looking "in" not "out". • Enhanced vigilance may be required for exposed fender and mooring stations where SPM have been removed. • Consider shorter rotation of the watch period to maximise alertness of the lookouts. • Maintain sufficient binoculars for the enhanced bridge team, preferably anti-glare. • Consider the use of thermal imagery optics and night vision aids as they provide a reliable all-weather, day and night surveillance capability. • Maintain a careful radar watch and monitor all navigational safety warnings and communications, particularly VHF and GMDSS alerts. • Consider placing well-constructed dummies at strategic locations around the ship to give the impression of greater numbers of crew on watch. • Consider using CCTV and fixed search lights for better monitoring. Fixed search lights can deter approaches from the stern. • Consider mounting anti-piracy mirrors on the bridge wings to make looking aft easier. • The accommodation and pilot ladders, if rigged, should be kept at main deck level and lowered when required only. • When in port: — Access to the vessel must be controlled. - Regular security rounds should be conducted. • Ensure the crew, especially those assigned to Security Duties are well rested. A proper lookout is the most effective method of ship protection. It can help identify a suspicious approach or attack early on, which allows defences to be deployed.
Manoeuvring
The Master and Officers should practice manoeuvring the ship to ensure familiarity with the ship's handling characteristics. The Master should also practice avoidance manoeuvres while maintaining the best possible speed. Experience has shown that such action can defeat even a lengthy and determined attack as the effect of hydrostatic pressure between vessels can have a better defensive impact than speed.
Alarms
The ship's alarms inform the crew that an attack is underway and warn the attacker that the ship is aware and is reacting. In addition, continuous sounding of the ship's whistle may distract the attackers. It is important that: • The alarms are distinctive to avoid confusion. • Crew members are familiar with each alarm, especially those warning of an attack and indicating ‘all clear’. • All alarms are backed up by an announcement over the accommodation and deck PA system, where fitted. • Drills are carried out to ensure that the alarm is heard throughout the ship. The drill will confirm the time necessary for all crew to move to a position of safety.
Physical barriers
Physical barriers are intended to make it as difficult as possible for attackers to gain access to ships by increasing the difficulty of the climb. When planning the placement of barriers, special consideration should be given to ships with sunken poop decks.
Razor wire
Razor wire creates an effective barrier only if properly rigged and secured. The quality of razor wire varies considerably and lower quality razor wire is less effective. The following is recommended: • Use a high tensile concertina razor wire with coil diameters of 730mm or 980mm. This is difficult to cut with hand tools. • Use a double roll. If this is not possible, place a single high-quality roll outboard of the ship's structure. • Secure razor wire to the ship properly, to prevent attackers pulling the wire off. For example, attach at least every third wire ring to ship’s railings and rig a steel cable through its core. • Use personal protective equipment and wire hooks to move and install razor wire. •   Obtain razor wire in short sections, e.g. 10m, so that it is easier and safer to move. • Keep razor wire clear of mooring fairleads when at terminals so that it does not interfere with mooring operations or chafe mooring ropes.
Other physical barriers
Other barriers have proven effective – from hanging swinging obstacles over the gunwales to specifically designed overhanging protection that prevents boarding by climbing over the ship's rails.
Water spray and foam monitors
• The use of water spray and/or foam monitors is effective in deterring or delaying any attempt to illegally board a ship. The use of water can make it difficult for an unauthorised boat to remain alongside and makes it significantly more difficult to climb aboard. • It is recommended hoses and foam monitors (delivering water) are fixed in position to cover likely access routes and are remotely operated. Manual activation is not recommended as this may place the operator in an exposed position. • Improved water coverage may be achieved by using fire hoses in jet mode and using baffle plates fixed a short distance in front of the nozzle. • Water cannons deliver water in a vertical sweeping arc and protect a greater part of the hull. • Water spray rails with spray nozzles produce a water curtain covering larger areas. • Foam can be used, but it must be in addition to a ship's standard firefighting equipment stock. Foam is disorientating and very slippery. • The use of all available fire and general service pumps may be required to ensure all defences operate efficiently. • Additional power may be required when using pumps; the supporting systems should be ready for immediate use. • Practice, observation and drills are required to ensure the equipment provides effective coverage of vulnerable areas.
Enhanced bridge protection
The bridge is usually the focal point of an attack. In some situations, attackers direct their weapon fire at the bridge to intimidate the ship’s crew to slow or stop the ship. If pirates board the ship, they usually make for the bridge to enable them to take control. The following enhancements may be considered: • Bridge windows are laminated but further protection against flying glass can be provided by the application of blast resistant film. •   Fabricated metal (steel/aluminium) plates for the side and rear bridge windows and the bridge wing door windows, which can be quickly secured in place in the event of an attack, can greatly reduce the risk of injury from fragmentation. • Chain link fencing can be used to reduce the effects of an RPG. • Sandbags can provide additional protection on the bridge wings. They should be regularly checked to ensure that they have not degraded. • The vulnerability of bridge doors should be considered. Any physical barrier should not impede access to life saving appliances.
Control of access to accommodation
and machinery spaces
It is important to control access routes to the accommodation and machinery spaces to deter or delay entry. Effort must be directed at denying access to these spaces. • Escape routes must remain accessible to seafarers in the event of an emergency. • Where the door or hatch is located on an escape route from a manned compartment, it is essential that it can be opened from the inside. Where the door or hatch is locked, it is essential that a means of opening the door from the inside is available. • Doors and hatches providing access to the bridge, accommodation and machinery spaces should be properly secured to prevent them being opened from the outside. • Once doors and hatches are secured, a designated and limited number are used for security patrols and routine access. The use of these doors or hatches should be controlled by the Officer of the Watch. • Block external stairs or remove ladders on the accommodation block to prevent use and to restrict external access to the bridge. • Doors and hatches that must be closed for watertight integrity should be fully dogged down in addition to any locks. Where possible, additional securing mechanisms, such as wire strops, may be used. • Removable barriers should be used around pilot boarding points so that a ship does not need to de-rig large areas prior to arrival at ports. • Pirates have been known to gain access through portholes and windows. The fitting of steel bars to portholes and windows will prevent this. • Procedures for controlling access to accommodation, machinery spaces and storerooms should be briefed to the crew. • The attackers must be denied access to ship propulsion.
Safe muster points and/or citadels
The company risk assessment and planning process should identify the location of a safe muster point and/or a citadel within a ship. Experience shows these safe areas are effective.
Safe muster points
A safe muster point is: •  A designated area chosen to provide maximum physical protection to the crew and will be identified during the planning process. • An area where crew not required on the bridge or the engine room control room will muster if the ship is under threat. • A short-term safe haven, which will provide protection should the attackers commence firing weapons.
Citadels
A citadel is a designated area where, in the event of imminent boarding, all crew may seek protection. A citadel is designed and constructed to resist forced entry. The use of a citadel cannot guarantee a military or law enforcement response. Well-constructed citadels with reliable communications (ideally satellite phone and VHF) must be supplied with food, water and sanitation. Control of propulsion and steering can offer effective protection during an attack. If citadels are used, they must complement, not replace, all other SPM. The use of the citadel must be drilled and include a lockdown plan and procedures should define the conditions and supporting logistics for its use. It is important to note that military forces are likely to apply the following criteria before boarding a ship: • All the crew must be accounted for and confirmed in the citadel. • Two-way communication with the citadel.
Citadel Management
The decision to send the crew to the citadel rests with the Master of the vessel. When considering the use of a citadel in the Gulf of Guinea it is important to consider how and when the crew exit the citadel and regain control of the vessel once the perpetrators have left. Experience has shown rescue forces are unlikely to arrive before the perpetrators have left the vessel or may not arrive at all.
Planning Considerations
• If military or law enforcement do not respond to an incident, is a plan in place for exiting the citadel? • To aid situational awareness on the vessel: — A CCTV feed in the citadel can provide awareness of activity on the vessel. — Transmit the vessel's CCTV feed to Company HQ who can monitor and advise when safe to leave the citadel. Ensure contact details for company, Flag State and MDAT-GoG are available in the l citadel.
The Master should decide when to use the citadel.
Other measures
Closed circuit television
Once an attack is underway it may be difficult to assess whether the attackers have gained access to the ship. The use of closed circuit television (CCTV) coverage allows a degree of monitoring of the progress of the attack from a less exposed position. Some companies can monitor and record the CCTV from ashore, which will be of value when provided to the military. The following should be considered: • CCTV cameras for coverage of vulnerable areas, particularly the poop deck and bridge. • CCTV monitors located on the bridge and at the safe muster point/citadel. • CCTV footage may provide useful evidence after an attack and should be retained.
Lighting
• Lighting is important. The ability to turn off all internal accommodation lights to deter pirates from entering or disorientate those who may already have entered. The following is recommended:
Underway
• At night, only navigation lights should be exhibited and remain on at all times. • If fitted, search lights should be ready for immediate use. • Once attackers have been identified or an attack commences, over side lighting, if fitted, should be switched on. This will dazzle the attackers and help the ship's crew to see them.
At anchor
• At anchor, lights should be left on as well-lit ships are less vulnerable to attack. • Over side lighting should be kept on at all times during hours of darkness.
Deny the use of ship’s tools and equipment
It is important to secure ship's tools or equipment that may be used to gain entry to the ship. Tools and equipment that may be of use to attackers should be stored in a secure location.
Protection of equipment stored on the upper deck
• Consideration should be given to providing ballistic protection to protect gas cylinders or containers of flammable liquids. • Excess gas cylinders should be stored in a secure location or, if possible, landed prior to transit.
Ship-to-Ship operations
• For vessels involved in STS operations, attackers have boarded via the Yokohama fenders. When rigging or tending fenders, razor wire may well interfere with operational requirements. • The use of a chain link fence, particularly if topped with razor wire, attached to the ship's side rails and supplemented by stanchions in the vicinity of the Yokohama fenders provides an effective deterrent to potential boarders. Care must be taken at the interface between the chain link fence and razor wire to ensure that the best possible protection is assured. • The use of gratings, (particularly Glass Reinforced Plastic gratings for ease of fitting) may be secured in way of open panama or roller fairleads which will further deter any potential boarding. • An additional deterrent in the vicinity of Yokohama fenders, and ship's fairleads could be the use of water spray. • The hawse pipe should be properly secured to prevent unauthorised access. Use of the anchor wash may also provide a deterrent. • The main engines should be kept at immediate notice so the Master has the option of getting underway in the event of an incident. • Crew engaged in security duties should not be given other responsibilities.
Floating (Production) Storage & Offloading (F(P)SO) – Security Measures
F(P)SOs and vessels supporting offshore facilities are vulnerable.
F(P)SO Maritime Safety Zone
Procedures for establishing a vessel safety zone surrounding the F(P)SO that is monitored and continuously controlled for unauthorised vessel entry should be in place. These procedures should include communication checkpoints, means for vessel identification/ validation prior approval for entry. UNCLOS article 60.5 should be referenced. Preferably, all vessels approaching within 2NM are monitored and then communicated with/challenged/ validated prior to entering in 1NM of the Safety Zone. There should be means to continuously monitor and detect vessels approaching the F(P)SO's Safety Zone. These may include: • A proper radar watch. • 360 degree CCTV coverage of F(P)SO surroundings with thermal imaging target detection/alarming for night time surveillance. • Dedicated security vessel(s) for continuous patrol and surveillance.
F(P)SO Security Plan
The Security Plan should include: • Management roles, responsibilities and clearly defined actions taken for threat level and escalation. • Compliance with measures to enhance maritime security as detailed in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 (as amended) and Parts A/B of the ISPS Code. F(P)SOs not required to comply with the SOLAS and ISPS Code requirements should still consider them when developing security plans.
F(P)SO Access Control
Procedures for controlling access should be established and should consider: • Induction/familiarisation briefing. • Designation and marking of areas restricted to authorised personnel. • System for monitoring physical control and access barriers. • Identity verification of F(P)SO personnel, contractors, vessel staff and visitors. • Personnel safety and security requirement briefings.
F(P)SO Perimeter Detection Systems
Perimeter and access points from the water such as boat landings and stair towers, as well as vulnerable areas such as mooring chain fairleads, tanker hawser and marine hose connections and riser porches should be equipped with threat detection and deterrent equipment such as: • 360 degree perimeter lighting. • CCTV coverage with thermal imaging target detection/alarming. • Electronic motion detection with visual and audible alarm. • Depending on threat level – dedicated security person(s) posted to monitor and detect threats by sight and or through threat detection equipment. • Search lighting (spotlights) capable of scanning 365 degrees of F(P)SO's surrounding waters. Spot light control can be locally but preferably controlled remotely.
F(P)SO Barriers
Perimeter
Vulnerable access points should be equipped with physical hard barriers such as: • Security fencing and hard bars. • Razor or concertina wire.
Accommodation, Control Room and
Machinery Spaces
Hard barriers for access points including port holes/window glass may include: • Doors without windows being internally secured. • Personnel access points being limited to single point of entry and secured during night time operations. • All windows/port holes secured to prevent access if glass can be broken. • All cargo and machinery hatches locked internally and easy to unlock in an emergency.
F(P)SO Citadel
F(P)SOs should have a centralised, hardened safe haven (citadel). The citadel should be: • A hardened room that prevents penetration by small firearms and forceful entry. • Big enough to safely accommodate all personnel on board. • Free of dangerous fire suppression systems (CO2). • Equipped with internal and external communications. • Supplied with water, medical and toilet facilities. • Able to access security CCTV and F(P)SO Emergency Shut Down and emergency systems controls.
Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC)
PMSCs may offer security services and the provision of Security Escort Vessels (SEVs). BMP does not recommend or endorse the general use of a PMSC or the use of SEVs. This is a decision taken by individual ship operators after carrying out a thorough risk assessment and in conjunction with permissions from the ship's Flag State, the hull and cargo insurance, P&I club and any littoral states. Any decision to engage the services of a PMSC should consider: • Coastal state legislation and law enforcement practices. • The threat and risk environment. • The output of the company risk assessment. • Voyage plan requirements. • Type of operations, e.g. seismic survey or cable laying. • Levels of protection provided by navies, coastguards and maritime police.
Security Escort Vessels
BMP does not recommend or endorse the general use of SEVs to accompany merchant ships; this is a decision taken by individual ship operators. A contract for the provision of SEVs must: • Not prejudice the ship's insurance cover arrangements. • Ensure the PMSC has insurance policies that are current and compliant with the requirements of the contract. • Ensure the PMSC can legally operate the SEV in accordance with coastal state law. • Ensure the SEV is fit for purpose. Experience has shown some providers operate substandard SEVs. Therefore, any decision to engage the services of SEVs should consider the guidance above for PMSC as well ensuring the vessel operator: • Has a robust quality assurance programme; • A robust maintenance programme and; • A record of inspection. Companies should check the credentials and licences/ permits of the PMSC.
Operating with Security Escort Vessels
• The escort plan, RV position and communication arrangements should be agreed in advance. • Planning should consider that SEVs may have operating restrictions. • Regular communication should be maintained. • The SEV will be positioned to defend the vessel at all times and be reactive to intercept any approaching suspicious craft. • Authorisation to use force rests with the military detachment onboard the SEV. • The Master/Bridge Crew can aid the SEV with early detection and warning. • SEV should not enter any designated oil terminal exclusion zone.
All ships using the VRA are strongly encouraged to inform MDAT-GoG of their movement as this is essential to improve military situational awareness and their ability to respond. Once ships have commenced their passage it is important this reporting continues and the guidelines in this section and annex D are adopted to ensure common understanding.
MDAT-GoG
MDAT-GoG acts as the primary point of contact for merchant ships and their CSOs, providing liaison with military forces in the region. MDAT-GoG administers the Voluntary Reporting Scheme, under which merchant ships are encouraged to send regular reports. These include: 1. Initial report (upon entering the VRA). 2. Daily reports (update on ship's position, course and speed). 3. Final reports (upon departure from VRA or arrival in port). 4. Reports of suspicious/irregular activity (when necessary). MDAT-GoG is able to communicate with ships and CSOs directly, in order to disseminate Warnings and Advisories of incidents within the region: • Warnings: Simple messages describing that an incident has occurred in a Lat/Long and with a time. This is normally accompanied by direct MDAT-GoG to-ship telephone calls to all ships within a nominated radius of the incident to give ships the earliest possible alert. • Advisories: This is the next tier of alerts to ships, normally of sightings/ reports that are relevant within the region. MDAT-GoG offers regular information to ships on its website https://gog-mdat.org/home and in a weekly report summarising the previous week's activity. MDAT-GoG can offer Masters and CSOs the opportunity to conduct drills and exercises to support their passage planning in the region. Companies interested in this can make contact on a dedicated exercise line; +33 298 221302. Ships and their operators should submit vessel position reporting forms to MDAT-GoG.
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The role of the seafarer in improving maritime safety and security in the
region
Although some of the maritime threats and crimes committed do not directly endanger seafarers, there is the opportunity for them to contribute to maritime security. Experience has shown that maritime security cannot be improved by the actions of law enforcement agencies and militaries alone; seafarers operating in the region can help. Masters are encouraged to report suspicious activity and provide as much detail as possible. If it is possible to do so without compromising safety, photographs, video and radar plot data of suspicious activity are of enormous value to the responsible authorities. If there is any doubt as to whether the activity is suspicious, ships are encouraged to report.
Reporting suspicious activity to MDAT-GoG
MDAT-GoG and the Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC) can advise on the types of activity of interest to the regional maritime community. A guide to help identify suspicious activity is in annex C and the suspicious/irregular activity report is in annex D. Often, seafarers do not report suspicious activity as they may be concerned observations could lead to further investigations by Port States and possible delay to the ship. Suspicious activity/attack reports should be sent to MDAT-GoG at the earliest opportunity, to allow assistance to be sought. MDAT-GoG will forward information received in an anonymised form to the most appropriate agency empowered to act. While suspicious activity may appear inconsequential, when added to other reports it may be extremely valuable.
Reporting specific vessel sightings and/or activity as requested to
MDAT-GoG
MDAT-GoG may seek the assistance of vessels reporting to the centre to try to locate specific ships. These are usually vessels that cannot be found on electronic systems such as AIS. Sometimes the request for information will come directly from MDAT-GoG when, for example, a vessel may have been hijacked and its whereabouts unknown. On other occasions MDAT-GoG may be requested to assist in locating a vessel or seek further information on a vessel by INTERPOL, when an INTERPOL "Purple Notice" has been issued. When MDAT-GoG is seeking further information on a vessel it will contact vessels reporting to it in the VRA for support.

General
A ship may come under attack with little or no warning. Effective lookouts, both visual and radar, will help to ensure early detection.
Mother ships
Mother ships have been used in the GoG acting as a base to launch and resupply pirate skiff operations. Mother ships can vary in vessel type and have included offshore supply vessels, fishing vessels or other smaller merchant vessels. Caution must be taken when detecting merchant ships drifting in the area.
Piracy or armed robbery attacks
Pirates carrying weapons do not usually open fire until they are very close to the ship, e.g. within two cables. Use whatever time is available, no matter how short, to activate any additional protective measures and plans. This will make it clear to the attackers that they have been seen, the ship is prepared and will resist attempts to board. In the event of a suspicious approach, or if in any doubt, call MDAT-GoG without delay.
Approach stage
Effective lookouts, using all available means, will aid in the early identification of an approaching threat. The nature and intention of the suspicious vessel will only become apparent as it approaches. In all cases, the following steps should be taken: • Sound the emergency alarm and make an attack announcement, in accordance with the ship's emergency communication plan. • Make a mayday call on VHF Ch. 16. Send a distress message via the Digital Selective Calling (DSC) system and Inmarsat-C, as applicable. • Activate the SSAS. • If not already at full speed, increase to maximum to open the distance. • Steer a straight course to achieve maximum speed quickly. • Initiate the ship's emergency procedures. • Activate the emergency communication plan. Report the attack immediately to MDAT-GoG by telephone +33 298 228888 and email watchkeepers@mdat-gog.org • Ensure the AIS is switched on. • Activate water spray. • Ensure that all external doors and, where possible, internal public rooms and cabins are fully secured. • All crew not required on the bridge or in the engine room should muster at the safe muster point or citadel as instructed by the Master. • When sea and navigational conditions allow, consider altering course to increase an approaching skiff's exposure to wind/waves. • Sound the ship's whistle/foghorn continuously to demonstrate to any potential attacker that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it. • Check Vessel Data Recorder (VDR) is recording and the data saved.
Attack stage
As the attackers get close to the ship, the following steps should be taken: • Reconfirm all ship's crew are in the safe muster point or citadel as instructed by the Master. • Report the attack immediately to MDAT-GoG +33 298 228888 by telephone. • As the attackers close in on the ship, Masters should commence small alterations of helm whilst maintaining speed to deter skiffs from lying alongside the ship in preparation for a boarding attempt. These manoeuvres will create additional wash to impede the operation of the skiffs. • Large amounts of helm are not recommended, as these are likely to significantly reduce a ship's speed. • SEV if present, will conduct themselves as governed by their rules of engagement.
Actions on illegal boarding
If the ship is boarded, the following actions should be taken: • Take all way off the ship and then stop the engines. • Muster the crew in the citadel or safe muster point. • Use all available means to establish communications from the citadel with MDAT-GoG and company to confirm all crew are accounted for and in the citadel or safe muster point. • Stay in the citadel until conditions force you to leave or as advised by the military or company. •   If any member of the crew is captured it should be considered that the attackers have full control of the ship.
lf control of the ship is lost
All movement should be calm, slow and very deliberate. Crew members should keep their hands visible always and comply fully. This will greatly reduce the risk of violence. Experience has shown that the pirates will be aggressive, highly agitated and possibly under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Kidnap and ransom
One reason for attacking a ship off West Africa is to remove the crew ashore for ransom. Each company or organisation should have measures in place to cover the eventualities of kidnap. The following principles serve as guidelines to surviving a kidnapping.
In the event of military intervention
On receipt of information involving an attack or attempted attack on a vessel or offshore platform, the MDAT-GoG/Regional reporting Centres/IMB PRC will immediately inform all relevant regional and national Maritime Operation Centres who may respond if the incident is within their area of jurisdiction and authority. Reporting Centres do not have inherent response capability or the ability or mandate to coordinate any response activity, especially inside a nation's territorial waters. This is the responsibility of the national authority with jurisdiction in the area. On the high seas, activities may be coordinated by national authorities. For this reason, reporting any suspicious/attempted or actual approach/attacks immediately to MDAT-GoG/Regional reporting Centres/IMB PRC, using all available means, is important. Advance warning of military or law enforcement intervention may be difficult without detection and may add pressure on the crew. If the onset of military or law enforcement action is suspected, the following should be considered: Brief and prepare the ship's crew to cooperate fully during any military action onboard and instruct the crew as follows: DO keep low to the deck and cover head with both hands.
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DO NOT make movements that could be interpreted as aggressive. DO NOT take photographs. DO NOT get involved in activity with military forces unless specifically instructed to.
Post incident actions and reporting
A difficult period may follow an attack, as companies, Master and crew recover from the ordeal. It is important that seafarers receive timely and proper medical assessments and care, both physical and mental, following an attack or hostage situation. Companies should have emergency management plans in place to manage the effects of an attack from any of the identified threats on one of their ships. These plans should include the management of a long, drawn-out hostage negotiation situation, including support for the families of the kidnapped crew. To give the investigating authorities the best chance of apprehending the perpetrators, it is important that evidence is preserved in the correct manner. Companies, Masters and crew should refer to IMO Guidelines on Preservation and Collection of Evidence A28/Res. 1091 and other industry guidance. Following any attack or suspicious activity, and after initial reporting of the event, it is vital that a detailed report is completed. A copy of the report should be sent to the company, the Flag State and appropriate authorities. It is important that any report is detailed and comprehensive. This will assist with full analysis and trends in threat activity. Without supporting evidence, including witness statements from those affected by the incident, suspects are unlikely to be prosecuted.
Protection of evidence
The collection and protection of evidence is critical.
The Master and crew can protect a crime scene until the nominated law enforcement agency arrives by following these basic principles: • Preserve the crime scene and all evidence if possible. • Avoid contaminating or interfering with all possible evidence – if in doubt, do not touch and leave items in place. • Do not clean up the area, including hosing it down. Do not throw anything away, no matter how unimportant it may seem. • Take initial statements from the crew. • Take photographs of the crime scene from multiple viewpoints. • Protect VDR for future evidence. • Make a list of items taken (e.g. mobile phones with numbers). • Facilitate access to the crime scene and relevant documentation for law enforcement authorities. • Make crew available for interview by law enforcement authorities.
Investigation
The quality of the evidence provided and the availability of the crew to testify will significantly help any investigation or prosecution that follows. Following any attack or incident, the investigating authority will be determined by external factors including: • Flag State. • Ownership. • Crew nationality.
Thorough investigation using all available
evidence is critical.
The lead law enforcement agency will talk to the Master and crew to understand the sequence and circumstances of the event. In a post hostage situation, law enforcement authorities may ask to conduct post-release crew debriefs and to collect evidence for investigations and prosecutions following captivity.
Seafarers should always be treated with respect and as
victims of crime.
Advice
INTERPOL has a secure website to provide support to ship operators who have had their ships hijacked. INTERPOL's Maritime Task Force can assist in taking the appropriate steps to preserve the integrity of the evidence left behind at the crime scene. INTERPOL has a Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC) that supports any of the 188 member countries faced with a crisis or requiring urgent operational assistance. The CCC operates in all four of INTERPOL's official languages (English, French, Spanish and Arabic) and is staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. It is recommended that ship operators contact INTERPOL as soon as possible and certainly within three days of a hijacking of their ship. INTERPOL may also be consulted to discuss recommended practices for the preservation of evidence that could be useful to law enforcement agents pursuing an investigation. Contact details are: os-ccc@interpol.int; +33 472 44 7676.
Seafarer welfare
Seafarers and their families often have difficulty in expressing the need for assistance or even recognising that they need assistance following exposure to a security threat. The company should monitor the health, both physical and mental, of those exposed to piracy and other maritime security threats and, if necessary, provide independent support and other assistance, as may be appropriate. There are a range of humanitarian programmes aimed at assisting seafarers and their families affected by piracy or maritime crime, including the International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network and The Mission to Seafarers. See www.seafarerswelfare.org and www.missiontoseafarers.org After care of seafarers suffering violent attack is important and should not be neglected. Annex A
Emergency contacts MDAT-GoG
International Maritime Bureau (IMB)

Useful contacts
INTERPOL Command and Coordination Centre

Yaoundé Principal Centres

ANGOLA
Luanda Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC)

LIBERIA
Monrovia Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination
countries - Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire.
MOROCCO
Rabat Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC)
Rabat covers the territorial waters of Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea Bissau, Gambia and Cape Verde
NIGERIA
Lagos Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (RMRCC)/C4l Centre
The RMRCC Lagos covers nine countries (Benin, Cameroon, Republic of Cango, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, São Tomé & Principe and Togo). The RMRCC is collocated with the Nigerian Deep Blue Project C4I Centre.
SOUTH AFRICA
Cape Town Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC)
International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network (ISWAN)

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Maritime security charts contain safety-critical information to assist bridge crews in the planning of safe passages through high risk areas. All information has been gathered by the UK Hydrographic Office (UKHO) ensuring each chart has the most accurate, up-to-date and verified information available. The Security Chart for West Africa is the latest version of UKHO Chart Q6114 or SHOM Chart 8801CSD. Each maritime security chart includes: • Information about dangers to the security of navigation. This information, when used alongside official navigational charts, can help to ensure the safety of ships, crew and cargo. • General security advice, self-protective measures, security procedures and regional contacts, as well as routeing and reporting requirements implemented by military or security forces.
Yaoundé Code of Conduct (CoC)
The Yaoundé CoC is an agreement between nations from West and Central Africa with an intention to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of transnational organised crime in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, and other illegal activities.
Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Safety & Security Space
The Economic Community, ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC agreed on a MoU to implement the regional maritime strategy within the Central and African common maritime space. This agreement created a number of Maritime Zones covering the overseen by an Interregional Coordination Centre in Cameroon responsible for cooperation, coordination, pooling, and interoperability of community assets.
It is important to have a common understanding when reporting attacks and suspicious activity. The following are guidelines to assist in assessing what is an attack or what constitutes suspicious activity:
Attacks
• The use of violence against the ship, its crew or cargo, or any attempt to use violence. • Unauthorised attempts to board the ship where the Master suspects the persons are pirates or other unauthorised persons. • If weapons are fired. • An actual boarding, whether successful in gaining control of the ship or not. • Attempts to overcome the SPM using: — Ladders — Grappling hooks or other boarding equipment
Suspicious activity
• The number of crew onboard an approaching skiff relative to its size. • The Closest Point of Approach. • The existence of unusual and non-fishing equipment onboard, e.g. ladders, climbing hooks or large amounts of fuel. • One vessel towing multiple skiffs or has skiffs onboard. • The type of vessel is unusual for the current location. • Small boats operating at high speed. • If a vessel appears unmanned. • The vessel is not transmitting on AIS. • Skiffs operating far from the coast. • Vessels fishing outside of normal fishing zones. • Windows of vessel covered or blanked out. • Skiffs rafted up. • No lights during hours of darkness. • Skiffs with two or more outboard motors. • Skiffs stopped in the water, no evidence of fishing. • Packages hanging outboard of a vessel. • Excessive communications antennas. This is not an exhaustive list. Other events, activity and vessels may be deemed suspicious by the Master of a merchant ship having due regard to their own seagoing experiences within the region and information shared amongst the maritime community. If in doubt, contact MDAT-GoG & REPORT!

MDAT-GoG vessel position reporting forms
Once a ship has transmitted an initial report on entering the VRA, MDAT-GoG will request daily reports be transmitted. Upon reaching port/anchorage or upon exiting the VRA, MDAT-GoG will request a final report. The following forms are provided below and can be requested by email to watchkeepers@mdat-gog.org • Initial report. • Daily report. • Final report. • Suspicious/irregular activity report. •   Follow Up Report.
*Preferred time for transmitting the daily report is 1200UTC. *Other important information could be change of destination or ETA etc.
MDAT-GoG suspicious/irregular activity report
Note: Where possible include any imagery to aid military appreciation. Threats to Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea are complex and often result in harm to seafarers. Masters are encouraged to report any signs of suspicious activity.
Follow-up report to MDAT-GoG and IMB PRC
Following any attack or suspicious activity, it is vital that a detailed report of the event is provided to MDAT-GoG and the IMB. The appropriate and relevant information from an incident will be used to support INTERPOL and regional law enforcement investigations. General Details

Details of Attackers (if applicable)
Further Details

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing IUU fishing is a significant problem in West Africa. Illegal catches have a detrimental effect on economic development and fish stocks. IUU threatens to contaminate the supply chain and potentially prevent the legitimate export of products to the international market. IUU fishing in the VRA involves extensive use of fraudulently issued licenses, as well as blatant unlicensed fishing and illegal trans-shipping between purse seiners and reefers at sea. It is important for the mariner to understand how the fishing vessels that have been involved in criminal activity directly affect seafarers on other vessels. Fishing vessels have, on a number of occasions, been used to facilitate attacks on other vessels. It is also recognised that fishing vessels are occasionally used in smuggling activities and have been involved in the receipt of stolen bunker fuel by at sea STS. For mariners to understand what suspicious fishing vessel activity is, it is important to be familiar with normal fishing activity. More information on normal fishing activity is available on the MDAT-GoG website.
Trafficking in narcotics
Trafficking of narcotics refers to the global illicit trade of illegal drugs. Maritime routes through the waters off Africa's western seaboard are used as a staging post to traffic cocaine and heroin between the sites of production to the main consumer markets. West Africa is regarded as an important waypoint for traffickers because of inconsistent law enforcement and the increasing production of illegal drugs within the region itself. Narcotics transiting the VRA are often transported without the knowledge of the ship's owner, operator or Master on internationally trading vessels, in sealed containers that are supposed to be carrying legitimate cargo. Container vessels may unknowingly transport cocaine from producers in South America to Western and Southern Africa, from there it is transported to consumers in Europe. Recent seizures of heroin at port and at sea in West Africa are indicative of the growing use of maritime trafficking routes between production sites in Central and South-East Asia and markets in North America. While transshipment of some narcotics has been reduced by successful intervention and legal action, the movement of large quantities of cocaine gives authorities cause for concern with an increase in quantities seized from shipping containers in West Africa. Illegal drugs are also moved by much smaller vessels for transshipment or cross decking to other craft for onward conveyance. The responsibility to disrupt drug trafficking operations in West Africa rests with law enforcement in the region. The shipping industry can support interdiction efforts by remaining alert to and reporting suspicious activity to the MDAT-GoG who are able to inform the appropriate authorities.
Human smuggling, trafficking and Stowaways
The smuggling and trafficking of persons are distinct crimes, but closely linked. Human or migrant smuggling involves the illegal movement of willing and thus complicit persons over an international border. Trafficking of persons does not necessarily involve the crossing of an international border and, unlike human smuggling, involves an element of force, coercion or fraud; people being trafficked are the victims, rather than complicit in the crime. Should a person be smuggled into a country they can become a victim of trafficking through subsequent exploitation. The trafficking or smuggling of illegal migrants along maritime routes often involves the use of unsafe and crowded vessels, which drastically increases the risk of an incident at sea. Guidance from the IMO is that the shipping industry should be ready to provide all possible assistance to persons in distress at sea, so that they can be rescued and receive fair treatment once safely ashore. This principle is enshrined in international law.
This guidance for vessels engaged in fishing has been provided by the following national fishing industry associations: • OPAGAC – Organizacion de Productores Asociados de Grandes Atuneros Congeladores. • ANABAC – Asociacion Nacional de Armadores de Buques Atuneros Congeladores.
Recommendations to vessels in fishing zones
• Do not start fishing operations when the radar indicates the presence of unidentified boats. • If polyester skiffs of a type typically used by pirates are sighted, move away from them at full speed, sailing into the wind and sea to make their navigation more difficult. • Avoid stopping at night. Be alert and maintain bridge, deck and engine- room watch. • During fishing operations, when the vessel is more vulnerable, be alert and maintain radar watch to give maximum notice to your crew and the state authorities if an attack is in progress. • While navigating at night, use only the mandatory navigation and safety lights to prevent the glow of lighting attracting pirates, who are sometimes in boats without radar and are waiting. • If the vessel is drifting while fishing at night, keep guard at the bridge on deck and in the engine room. Use only mandatory navigation and safety lights. • The engine must be ready for an immediate start-up. • Keep away from unidentified ships. • Use VHF as little as possible to avoid being heard by pirates and to make location more difficult. • Activate the AIS when maritime patrol aircraft are operating in the area to facilitate identification and tracking.
Identification
• Managers are strongly recommended to register their fishing vessels with MDAT- GoG for the whole period of activity off the West Coast of Africa. This should include communicating a full list of the crewmen on board and their vessels' intentions, if possible. • Carry out training prior to passage or fishing operations in the area. • Whenever fishing vessels are equipped with Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) devices, their manager should provide MDAT-GoG with access to VMS data. • Fishing vessels should always identify themselves upon request from aircraft or ships from any international or national anti-piracy operation. • Military, merchant and fishing vessels should respond without delay to any identification request made by a fishing vessel being approached (to facilitate early action to make escape possible, especially if the vessel is fishing).
In case of attack
• In case of an attack or sighting a suspicious craft, warn the authorities (MDAT-GoG, CRESMAC and CRESMAO) and the rest of the fleet. • Communicate the contact details of the second Master of the vessel (who is on land) whose knowledge of the vessel could contribute to the success of a military intervention. • Recommendations only for Purse Seiners: Evacuate all crew from the deck and the crow’s nest. l — If pirates have taken control of the vessel and the purse seine is spread out, encourage the pirates to allow the nets to be recovered. If recovery of the purse seine is allowed, follow the instructions for its stowage and explain the functioning of the gear to avoid misunderstanding.
Leisure craft should make early contact in advance with the naval/military authorities to determine if the VRA area is safe to transit; regional activity has indicated attacks occur on both large and small vessels. Transit close to areas of conflict should be avoided. Close contact should be maintained with MDAT-GoG throughout any voyage. See the International Sailing Federation ( www.sailing.org ) for the most up-to-date information.

Definitions
The following terms/definitions to categorise attacks and suspicious incidents that are reported from shipping inside the VRA may be useful and ensures the consistent identification of patterns and trends. Armed robbery The Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, highlights armed robbery against ships consists of: • Any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea. • Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above. Hijack A hijack is where attackers have boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will. Hijackers will not always have the same motive (armed robbery, cargo theft or kidnapping). Illegal boarding An illegal boarding is where attackers have boarded a ship but HAVE NOT taken control. Command remains with the Master. The most obvious example of this is the citadel scenario. Maritime Safety Zone A safety zone is an area extending out from any part of an offshore oil and gas installation (typically 500m) and is established automatically around all installations which project above the sea at any state of the tide. These safety zones are 500m radius from a central point. Piracy This is defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (article 101). However, for the purposes of these BMP, it is important to provide clear, practical, working guidance to the industry to enable accurate and consistent assessment of suspicious activity and piracy attacks. The following may assist in assessing a piracy attack. A piracy attack may include but is not limited to: • The use of violence against the ship or its personnel, or any attempt to use violence. • Attempt(s) to illegally board the ship where the Master suspects the persons are pirates. • An actual boarding, whether successful in gaining control of the ship or not. • Attempts to overcome the SPM by the use of: — Ladders.
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Grappling hooks. l l Weapons deliberately used against or at the ship. Suspicious or aggressive approach Action taken by another craft may be deemed suspicious if any of the following occur (the list is not exhaustive): • A definite course alteration towards a ship associated with a rapid increase in speed by the suspected craft, which cannot be accounted for by the prevailing conditions. • Small craft sailing on the same course and speed for an uncommon period and distance, not in keeping with normal fishing or other circumstances prevailing in the area. • Sudden changes in course towards the ship and aggressive behaviour.
UNCLOS 60.5
The breadth of the safety zones shall be determined by the coastal State, taking into account applicable international standards. Such zones shall be designed to ensure that they are reasonably related to the nature and function of the artificial islands, installations or structures, and shall not exceed a distance of 500 metres around them, measured from each point of their outer edge, except as authorized by generally accepted international standards or as recommended by the competent international organization. Due notice shall be given of the extent of safety zones.
UNCLOS 101
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
BMP WA Signatories
BIMCO
BIMCO is the world's largest international shipping association, with around 2,000 members in more than 120 countries, representing 56% of the world's tonnage. Its global membership includes shipowners, operators, managers, brokers and agents. A non-profit organisation, BIMCO's mission is to be at the forefront of global developments in shipping, providing expert knowledge and practical advice to safeguard and add value to its members' businesses. www.bimco.org
CDI
The Chemical Distribution Institute ( CDI ) was established in 1994 as a not for profit Foundation and provides ship and terminal inspection data in an electronic report format to its members. The main objectives of CDI are to continuously improve the safety and quality performance of chemical marine transportation and storage; Through cooperation with industry and centres of education, drive the development of industry best practice in marine transportation and storage of chemical products; To provide information and advice on industry best practice and international legislation for marine transportation and storage of chemical products; To provide chemical companies with cost effective systems for risk assessment, thus assisting their commitment to Responsible Care and the Code of Distribution Management Practice. www.cdi.org.uk
Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) is the world's largest cruise industry trade association, providing a unified voice and leading authority of the global cruise community. CLIA supports policies and practices that foster a safe, secure, healthy and sustainable cruise ship environment for the more than 25 million passengers who cruise annually and is dedicated to promote the cruise travel experience. The organisation's mission is to be the unified global organisation that helps its members succeed by advocating, educating and promoting for the common interests of the cruise community. www.cruising.org ICS The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) is the international trade association for merchant ship operators. ICS represents the collective views of the international industry from different nations, sectors and trades. ICS membership comprises national shipowners' associations representing over 80% of the world's merchant fleet. A major focus of ICS activity is the IMO, the United Nations agency with responsibility for the safety of life at sea and the protection of the marine environment. ICS is heavily involved in a wide variety of areas including any technical, legal and operational matters affecting merchant ships. ICS is unique in that it represents the global interests of all the different trades in the industry: bulk carrier, tanker, container, and passenger ship operators www.ics-shipping.org
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The International Federation of Shipmasters' Associations (IFSMA) was formed in 1974 by Eight National Shipmasters' Associations to unite the World's serving Shipmasters into a single professional co-ordinated body. It is a non-profit making apolitical organisation dedicated solely to the interest of the serving Shipmaster. The Federation is formed of around 11,000 Shipmasters from sixty Countries either through their National Associations or as Individual Members. In 1975, IFSMA was granted Consultative Status as a non- governmental organisation at IMO which enables the Federation to represent the views and protect the interests of the serving Shipmasters. www.ifsma.org
IGP&l Clubs
Thirteen principal underwriting associations "the Clubs" comprise the International Group of P&I Clubs (IGP&I). They provide liability cover (protection and indemnity) for approximately 90% of the world's ocean-going tonnage. The Clubs are mutual insurance associations providing cover for their members against third party liabilities relating to the use and operation of ships, including loss of life, pollution by oil and hazardous substances, wreck removal, collision and damage to property. Clubs also provide services to their members on claims handling, legal issues and loss prevention, and often play a leading role in coordinating the response to, and management of, maritime casualties. www.igpandi.org
The International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) is a leading trade association representing the vast majority of contractors and the associated supply chain in the offshore marine construction industry worldwide. It has a membership of 800 companies including contractors, suppliers, oil & gas companies, marine renewable energy companies and numerous non- governmental organisations (NGOs). www.imca-int.com INTERCARGO
INTERCARGO
The International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO) is representing the interests of quality dry cargo shipowners. INTERCARGO convened for the first time in 1980 in London and has been participating with consultative status at the IMO since 1993. INTERCARGO provides the forum where dry bulk shipowners, managers and operators are informed about, discuss and share concerns on key topics and regulatory challenges, especially in relation to safety, the environment and operational excellence. The Association takes forward its Members' positions to the IMO, as well as to other shipping and international industry fora, having free and fair competition as a principle. INTERCARGO is committed to safety and quality in ship operations, with a focus on operational efficiency and the protection of the marine environment. www.intercargo.org
InterManager is the international trade association for the ship management industry established in 1991. It is the voice of ship management and the only organisation dedicated to representing the ship management and crew management industry. In today's global shipping industry InterManager works for the needs of like-minded companies in the ship and crew management sector, who all have the welfare of seafarers at their heats. InterManager acts as a forum to share best practices and bring about positive change. An internationally-recognised organisation, InterManager represents its members at international level, lobbying on their behalf to ensure their views are taken into account within the worldwide maritime industry. www.intermanager.org
IMEC
The International Maritime Employers' Council Ltd (IMEC) is the only international employers' organisation dedicated to maritime industrial relations. With offices in the UK and the Philippines, IMEC has a membership of over 235 shipowners and managers, covering some 8,000 ships with CBAs, which IMEC negotiates on behalf of its members within the International Bargaining Forum (IBF). IMEC is also heavily involved in maritime training. The IMEC Enhanced cadet programme in the Philippines currently has over 700 young people under training. www.imec.org.uk ITF The International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) is an international trade union federation of transport workers' unions. Any independent trade union with members in the transport industry is eligible for membership of the ITF. The ITF has been helping seafarers since 1896 and today represents the interests of seafarers worldwide, of whom over 880,000 are members of ITF affiliated unions. The ITF is working to improve conditions for seafarers of all nationalities and to ensure adequate regulation of the shipping industry to protect the interests and rights of the workers. The ITF helps crews regardless of their nationality or the flag of their ship. www.itfseafarers.org www.itfglobal.org
INTERTANKO
INTERTANKO is the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, a forum where the industry meets, policies are discussed and best practices developed. INTERTANKO has been the voice of independent tanker owners since 1970, ensuring that the liquid energy that keeps the world turning is shipped safely, responsibly and competitively. www.intertanko.com
The International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA) was formed in 1987 to represent the interests of the specialised chemical/parcel tanker fleet and has since developed into an established representative body for ship owners operating IMO classified chemical/parcel tankers, being recognised as a focal point through which regulatory authorities and trade organisations may liaise with such owners. IPTA was granted consultative status as a Non- Governmental Organisation to the IMO in 1997 and is wholly supportive of the IMO as the only body to introduce and monitor compliance with international maritime legislation. www.ipta.org.uk
ISWAN
The International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network (ISWAN) is an international NGO and UK registered charity set up to promote the welfare of seafarers worldwide. It is a membership organisation with ship owners, unions and welfare organisation as members. ISWAN works with a range of bodies including Pandl Clubs, shipping companies, ports, and governments. Its focus is the wellbeing of the 1.5 million seafarers around the world. ISWAN supports seafarers and their families who are affected by piracy and its 24 hour multilingual helpline, SeafarerHelp, is free for seafarers to call from anywhere in the world. www.seafarerswelfare.org
The Joint Hull and Joint War Committees comprise elected underwriting representatives from both the Lloyd's and IUA company markets, representing the interests of those who write marine hull and war business in the London market. Both sets of underwriters are impacted by piracy issues and support the mitigation of the exposures they face through the owners' use of BMP. The actions of owners and charterers will inform underwriters' approach to risk and coverage.
The Mission to Seafarers
The Mission to Seafarers is the largest provider of port-based welfare services, providing 200 port chaplains and 121 seafarers' centres across 50 countries. In addition to its services of free Wi-Fi, respite and transportation, all chaplains are trained in post-trauma counselling and are able to provide immediate support post attack or release, as well as connect with relevant professional services in a seafarer's home country. The Mission to Seafarers runs family support networks in the Philippines, Myanmar, Ukraine and India offering access to education, training and medical and legal services. The Mission to Seafarers is pleased to support the creation of BMP5 and the associated resources and commends their use to all maritime personnel. www.missiontoseafarers.org
The Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) is a voluntary association of oil companies with an interest in the shipment and terminalling of crude oil, oil products, petrochemicals and gas. OCIMF focuses exclusively on preventing harm to people and the environment by promoting best practice in the design, construction and operation of tankers, barges and offshore vessels and their interfaces with terminals. www.ocimf.org
Sailors’ Society
Sailors' Society is the world's oldest maritime welfare organisation caring for seafarers and their families across the globe. The charity works in ports across 30 countries and has projects ranging from medical centres to building boats to get children safely to school. Its renowned Crisis Response Network helping victims of trauma at sea is run across Asia, Europe and Africa with plans to extend further. Trained chaplains offer 24-hour support to victims of piracy, kidnapping and natural disasters and come alongside survivors and loved ones with psychological and financial help for as long as needed. www.sailors-society.org
The Society for International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO) is the international body established for the exchange of technical information and experience, between members of the industry, to enhance the safety and operational reliability of gas tankers and terminals. To this end the Society publishes studies, and produces information papers and works of reference, for the guidance of industry members. It maintains working relationships with other industry bodies, governmental and intergovernmental agencies, including the IMO, to better promote the safety and integrity of gas transportation and storage schemes. www.sigtto.org
WSC
The World Shipping Council (WSC) is the trade association that represents the international liner shipping industry. WSC's member lines operate containerships, roll- on/roll-off vessels, and car carrier vessels that account for approximately 90 percent of the global liner vessel capacity. Collectively, these services transport about 60 percent of the value of global seaborne trade, or more than US$ 4 trillion worth of goods annually. WSC's goal is to provide a coordinated voice for the liner shipping industry in its work with policymakers and other industry groups to develop actionable solutions for some of the world's most challenging transportation problems. WSC serves as a non- governmental organisation at the IMO. www.worldshipping.org CISMAR CISMAR is the Integrated Maritime Security Center of Brazil. It aims to contribute to the safety of maritime traffic of interest to Brazil, meet commitments related to Naval Control of Maritime Traffic and the Naval Doctrine Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping assumed by the country, in addition to increasing maritime situational awareness. Contact: Email: cismar-secom@marinha.mil.br Telephone: +55 21 2104 6353/6337 Website: https://www.marinha.mil.br/cismar/
IFC
FORMATION FUSION CENTRE The Information Fusion Centre (IFC), based in Singapore, serves as the regional Maritime Security (MARSEC) information-sharing hub covering most of the Indo-Pacific region. With an integrated team comprising International Liaison Officers (ILOs) from more than 19 navies and coast guard; and personnel from the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), the IFC facilitates MARSEC information sharing and collaboration between its partners to cue operational responses. Its linkages with more than 90 Operational Centres (OPCENs) from navies, enforcement and maritime agencies in more than 40 countries, as well as linkages with the shipping industry, provide IFC with maritime situational awareness and enables collaboration beyond its Area of Interest. The IFC collates and analyses MARSEC information to produce accurate, timely and actionable products, which enables its partners to respond to MARSEC incidents in good time. It also provides practical and useful information on MARSEC trends, incidents and best practices to the shipping industry. Contacts Email: ifc_do@defence.gov.sg Telephone: +65 9626 8965 (hotline), +65 6594 5728 (office) Website: https://www.ifc.org.sg Established in 1992, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC) is an independent, non- governmental and not-for-profit organisation which provides the shipping industry with a free 24-hour service to report any piracy or armed robbery attack occurring anywhere in the world. As a trusted point of contact for shipmasters and ship owners, all reported attacks are immediately relayed to the most relevant government response agency seeking their support to render assistance to the ship in distress. Inmarsat Safetynet broadcasts to ships and alerts to CSOs via email are also sent out which help alert other seafarers and save lives at sea. www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre
INTERPOL
INTERPOL has a dedicated unit for maritime piracy that works with the police, navy and private sector in member countries, and can provide support to ship operators who have had their ships hijacked. INTERPOL's Maritime Security sub-Directorate (MTS) can be consulted on the recommended practices and action to be taken to help preserve the integrity of any evidence left behind following a pirate attack that could be useful to law enforcement agents pursuing an investigation. MTS can be contacted on tel +33 472 44 72 33 or via email dlMTSOPSupport@interpol.int during business hours (GMT 08H00 – 17H00). Outside of normal business hours, contact can be made via INTERPOL's Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC). The CCC is staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and supports INTERPOL's 190 member countries faced with a crisis situation or requiring urgent operational assistance. The CCC operates in all four of Interpol's official languages (English, French, Spanish and Arabic). Contact details are: tel +33 472 44 7676; email os-ccc@interpol.int. It is recommended that ship operators contact INTERPOL within three days of a hijacking of their ship.
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Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG) is a cooperation centre between the Royal Navy (UKMTO) and the French Navy (MICA-Center) in support of the Yaoundé Process. This centre has been in operation since June 2016. The primary output from the MDAT-GoG is to contribute by maintaining coherent maritime situational awareness in the central and western African Maritime areas, with the ability to inform and support industry. It contributes to the safety and security of the Mariner in the regional maritime domain.
NIMASA
The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) is committed to the enthronement of global best practices in the provision of maritime services in Nigeria. Our areas of focus include effective Maritime Safety Administration, Maritime Labour Regulation, Marine Pollution Prevention and Control, Search and Rescue, Cabotage enforcement, Shipping Development and Ship Registration, Training and Certification of Seafarers, and Maritime Capacity Development. Using modern tools that guarantee efficiency and effectiveness, we are determined to develop indigenous capacity and eliminate all hindrance.
ICC-Gulf of Guinea-Yaoundé
The Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) is the coordination and information- sharing structure which connects the Regional Maritime Security Centre for Central Africa (CRESMAC) and the Regional Maritime Security Centre for Western Africa (CRESMAO).