国際仏教学大学院大学研究紀要第 21 号 (平成29年) Journal of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies Vol. XXI, 2017 Reshaping Timelessness: Paradigm Shifts in the Interpretation of Buddhist Meditation Florin Deleanu

Florin Deleanu
Meditation is a timeless practice and experience. This is what gurus, pundits, and enthusiasts have been telling us for decades. 1 And our Zeitgeist — so heavily in-formed by New Age presuppositions — has fallen in love with the appraisal. We have granted meditation a privileged locus in our mental landscape viewing it as a 'singularity' where (trans-) psychological forces work in different, even mysterious, ways. Deep contemplative experiences and the philosophical conclusions which they yield are beyond history. Or are they?... This paper irreverently argues for a different view. Meditation is, I believe, as historical and as prone to interpretative fiddling as any other human act and product. How do I know it? I'm not a meditation enthusiast, let alone a guru or a pundit, but I have a better source of knowledge: the Buddhist sources themselves, though admittedly not in a straightforward manner. In spite of the much-favoured strategy of preaching ad hominem , epitomised by the ideal of skilful means ( upāya ), as well as of the inclusivistic approach seen in numerous Buddhist sources, it cannot be denied that there are countless statements about the Teaching, practice included, made sub specie aeternitatis. 2 — 376 —
So if it's not the primary sources per se which deny the changeless, timeless nature of meditation, how do I know it? To be more precise, my conclusions are the result of an analysis based upon a philologico-historical methodology and historicist premises. Does such an analysis ensure a more 'objective' understanding of the subject? Since I adopt it, I obviously believe so. Whoops! This already smells of circular judgement.... The problem of proof is beyond the scope of this paper, but I shall frankly admit that to a (hopefully tolerable) degree, circularity is present in this as in many (most?) other judgements. I also admit that the philologico-historical methodology cannot ensure the same objectivity as mathematical truths, not even guarantee the uniformity of conclusions. My findings will therefore be unavoidably contaminated by a dose a subjectivity.  Hopefully, it is not such as large as the dose of subjectivity in judgements relying on personal experience, feelings, unchecked hearsay, and (worst!) wishful thinking. This said, what does my philologico-historical approach reveal? Similarly named or described contemplative techniques and states are not necessarily construed and evaluated identically. Different texts confront us with different definitions, interpretations, even technical advice for what superficially appear to be similar practices. 3 From a historicist perspective, this hardly comes as a surprise. Texts, sacred or profane, are authored and redacted by flesh-and-blood human beings. No matter how skilled in meditation, how versed in contemplative psychology they may have been, these people lived and expressed their conclusions under the constraints of their age (as actually everyone else, including scientists, empirical — 375一philosophers, and historians). When the divergences in the theory and praxis of meditation are wide enough, we can speak of paradigm shifts. In this paper, I identify and focus on four such paradigm shifts in the history of Yogācāra Buddhism. 4 I shall call them (1) 'subsumption', (2) 'inversion', (3) 'augmentation', and (4) 'substitution'.
l. Subsumption
Imagine for a moment you are a meditation devotee somewhere in Northern India around the middle of the 3rd century C.E. As luck (or rather karma) would have it, you will encounter a Buddhist contemplative thoroughly versed in spiritual cultivation ( yoginā yogajñena ). After being enquired about your motivation and judged to be well beyond the regular monastic dabbler, you will be encouraged to focus on the benefits of the meditative training. 'Very well, good Sir! ( sadhu, sādhu, bhadramukha )', the master will say, 'whilst [ordinary people] are shackled to passion, aversion, and bewilderment, thou wishest to break these [very] shackles'. Our kind-hearted expert will thereupon instruct you on five points ( pañcasu sthāneṣu ), to wit, guarding and accumulating the requisites necessary for meditation ( samādhisaṃbhārarakṣopacaya ), solitude ( prā- vivekya), mental focusing ( cittaikāgratā ), purification from hindrances (āvaraṇaviśuddhi), and cultivation of contemplation ( maṇaskārabhāvaṇā ). The last point includes five basic techniques, i.e. meditating upon the impure ( aśubhā ), friendliness ( maitrī ), dependent origination ( idaṃpraty- ayatāpratītyasamuṭpāda), analysis of elements ( dhātuprabheda ), and — 374 — mindfulness of breathing ( ānāpānasmṛti ). The master will assign you one of these methods depending on the defilement dominating your psychological profile. To boost your training, he may also initiate you into practice of the four absorptions ( dhyāna ) and four immaterial attainments ( ārūpyasamā- patti). Many familiar with early Yogācāra sources will have recognised that this fictional scenario is based upon the 3 rd century treatise Śrāvakabhūmi.5 And in one form or another, most of the techniques above are traceable to canonical sources and later became adopted as basic meditative recipes in many Buddhist traditions. 6 Details aside, we can assume that this must have been how a neophyte was trained in the early ascetic communities. Kindly indulge me a little longer with our imaginary Dharma trip and try to picture yourself putting every drop of energy into the meditative methods you learned under the Śrāvakabhūmi master. And do it year after year in the wilderness, far away from the madness of civilisation
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(monasteries, included…). One day you will decide to check out the results of your arduous training and return to the benevolent Śrāvakabhūmi master. But alack, much to your chagrin, impermanence took its toll and he has passed away. The only meditation studio (as well as the latest rage) in the ascetic community follows a new 'curriculum': the Bodhisattvabhūmi. 7 Since it looks pretty close to what you have been practising, you decide to give it a go. But your first meditation session will be a bombshell! You'll be stunned to learn that you got it wrong! The only consolation may be that you're not the first one. Generation after generation of contemplatives who have followed the traditional paradigm have committed the same error. But don't worry! The Bodhisattvabhūmi master will teach you how to fix the mistake: The path of (preliminary) practice 8 shall be correctly followed in order to eliminate this [i.e. ideation ( saṃjñā )]. Through thine understanding ( buddhi ) which carefully ( su ² ) investigates ( vicārita ° ) all objects of knowledge and by [keeping in mind] the ideation that all
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Reshaping Timelessness (Deleanu)
[other] ideations of phenomena ( dharma ) are adventitious, 9 thou shalt thus repeatedly remove all ideations [conducive to] the proliferation ( prapañca ) of any phenomena whatsoever 10 and shalt consistently dwell on the thing [-in-itself] by means of a non-conceptualising ( nirvikalpa °) mental state which functions by grasping only the object without characteristics ( nirnimitta °). Thou shalt thus attain [a state of] mental focus [which stems] from the lineage of the pure contemplation of the Tathāgata Supreme Cognition. Thou shalt not relinquish ( mā riñciṣyasi ) this mental orientation ( manasikāra ) [even] when practising meditation upon the impure. [Likewise,] thou shalt not relinquish this very mental orientation [even] when practising meditation upon friendliness, dependent origination, analy- sis of elements, mindfulness of breathing, the first absorption [and so on] up to the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation [as well as] the bodhisattva's countless meditations, supernatural faculties, con- templations, and attainments. 11 (tasyā vibhavāya prayogamārgaḥ samyak parigṛhīto bhaviṣyati. sa tvam evaṃ sarvajñeyasuvicāritayā buddhyāl² sarvadharmasaṃjñāsv āgaṃtukasaṃjñāyā sarvadharmesu sarvaprapañcasamjñām apanīyāpanīya nirvikalpena13 cetasā nirnimittenārthamātragrahanapravrttenāsmin14 vastuni bahulam vihara. evam 6
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te tathāgatajñānaviśuddhisamādhigotrāc15 cittasyaikāgratā16 pratilabdhā bha- visyati. sa tvaṃ saced aśubhāṃ manasikaroṣi, etaṃ 17 manasikāraṃ mā riñcisyasi. sacen maitrim idampratyayatāpratītyasamutpādaṃ dhātuprabhedaṃ ānābānasmrtim prathamam dhyānam vistarena yāvan naivasamjñānā- samj- ñāyatanam18 apramāṇabodhisattvadhyānābhijñāsamādhisamāpattīr manasikar- osi, etam eva manasikāram mā riñcisyasī.)19 And if you think this is a brand-new development, the Bodhisattvabhūmi master will stun you again. This — he will stress — is a timeless recipe set hesitations. True, if we adopt strict Päninian rules, etam is the correct reading. Neither Vedic Skt. nor Pänininan Skt. admit of ena at the beginning of a sentence (see Wackernagel and Debrunner [1954] 1987, Vol. III, 523–526; PW I 1097–8, s.v.; MW 232, s.v.; Speijer [1886] 1988, 205; Gotō 2013, 71), but in the less strict varieties of the language, such as Epic Skt. ( 'un language à pureté amoindrie, ouvert aux facilités qui entraine l'exercise d'un idiom populaire', Renou 1956, 104), the restriction can be ignored, albeit often for metrical reasons (as Hopkins said, 'metre surpasses grammar')  – see Oberlies 2003, 109. And in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit (at least, some texts: e.g. Aṣṭa-pp), the rule no longer holds good (Edgerton [1953] 1985, Vol. I, 117, §§ 21.48–49). If the BoBh occurrence discussed is a Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit vestige (or lowbrow/non-Šiṣṭa Sanskrit), then the emendation is not necessary. The issue is, however, further complicated by the fact that at the end of the passage above, we see etam eva manasikāraṃ , which in spite of its different syntactic structure, pleads for the emendation to etam. A definitive conclusion will be possible only after a thorough investigation into the use of the pronoun in the manuscript witnesses of the BoBh in particular and Buddhist literature (especially full- and quasi-Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit) in general.
Reshaping Timelessness (Deleanu)
forth by the past, present, and future Tathāgatas for the benefit of the novice bodhisattva ( bodhisattvam ādikarmikam ). 20 As for your Śrāva- kayāna past, don't fret about it! 'Even the followers of the Disciples' Vehicle who practise by means of this mental orientation will quickly become more proficient in supernatural faculties and reach the realisation of [the essence of] phenomena' ( śrāvako 'pi cānena manaskāreṇa prayujyamaṇaḥ kṣiṭ- rābhijñataraḥ syād dharmābhisamayāya […]).21 From a historicist perspective — pace the Bodhisattvabhūmi author(s) — we have here a paradigm shift in the interpretation as well as practice of meditation. Traditional techniques become subsumed under a new model of praxis tailored to suit a new philosophical agenda. Meditating on the impure, etc. is not altered in its main framework, let alone discarded. But all perceptive data yielded by these traditional exercises are now governed by a higher perceptive filter categorising them as 'adventitious' and prodding cognition into a 'non-conceptual mental state' which gives access to the thing-in-itself ( vastumātra ), the epistemic and soteriologic ideal of the Bodhisattvabhūmi.22
2. Inversion 23
Another interpretative strategy is the reversed evaluation of what appear
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to be similar meditative experiences. One example is provided by a Śrāvakabhūmi passage detailing the so-called supramundane path ( lokot- taramārga). This arduous spiritual process includes a step where the yogi must focus on the mind itself as the object of meditation. In the peculiar terminology used the text, this is part of the contemplation leading to [/characterised by] conviction ( ādhimokṣiko manaskāraḥ ). 24 In order to eliminate the existential conceit or notion of a Self ( asmimāna ), which prevents the mind from staying firmly riveted to the ultimate goal of Nirvāṇa, the contemplative turns his/her concentration towards mind itself. He/she 25 gradually gains direct insight into the fact that the mind, too, is impermanent, conducive to suffering, empty, and no (n)-Self. 26 Eventually, as the Self-notion is discarded ( asmimānaṃ prahāya), the yogi reaches a trance-like state in which the mind appears to have no object ( anālambana ), to have ceased ( vigata ) altogether into complete calmness ( prasānta ).²ﾌ
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But this is only a temporary experience. Neither the vanishing of the object nor the complete calmness are ever-lasting. There are, however, some people — the Śrāvakabhūmi adds — who are slow-witted ( manda °), deluded ( momūha °), and conceited ( abhimāna ) enough to take this state to be the very realisation ( abhisamaya ) of the Four Noble Truths.28 Wrong! — the text warns us. The first actual insight into the Noble Truths — the Śrāvakabhūmi continues — occurs after the emergence from this trance. This is a moment of non-conceptual ( nirvikalpa ) cognition based on direct perception ( pratyakṣajīāna ) which brings into full effect the certain knowledge ( niścayajñāna ) associated with the highest spiritual realisation (abhisamaya). 29 The Śrāvakabhūmi doesn't tell us who the slow-witted are, but a similarly 'deluded' interpretation of an apparently kindred state is advocated by … no other than the Viniscayasamgrahani. The latter, needless to say (at least for specialists), is part of the same encyclopaedic treatise Yogācārabhūmi which includes the Śrāvakabhūmi itself. In tune with the mūla-text upon which it glosses and elaborates, 30 the Vinis- cayasaṃgrahaṇī holds that the bodhisattva's practice must aim at the — 367 — eradication of the conceptual knowledge ( vikalpa ) and its replacement with correct knowledge ( samyagjñāna ) giving access to the Supreme Reality ( tathatā ). 31 As imperfectly as words can approximate this trans- linguistic Reality, here is the Viniscayasamgrahani definition of it: What is the pure Essence of Phenomena ( dharmadhātu )? 32 It is the Supreme Reality ( tathatā ) [attained] through the cultivation ( bhāva- nā) of the correct knowledge ( samyagjñāna ) which has eliminated all images of appearances (nimitta). (chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa gang zhe na | yang dag pa'i shes pa bsgom pa la brien nas mtshan ma thams cad bsal33 bas de bzhin nyid gang yin pa ste |}34 In the Viniścayasamgrahanī, nimitta refers to the world of appearances, i.e. the diversity of phenomena conceptually constructed ( vikalpita ) by ordinary sentient beings. 35 The experience of Supreme Reality seems to
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imply the complete lack of mental images or, in other words, the absence of discrete cognitive objects ( anālambana ), which sounds similar to the state described in the Śrāvakabhūmi passage cited above. This comes as no surprise for a Mahāyāna text. The Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā had long ago declared the samādhi leading to the realisation of the sameness of all phenomena ( sarvadharmasamatā ) to be the 'king of contemplations' (samādhirāja). 36 It is, however, striking that (what later became) two sections of the same text give different evaluations to a more or less similar contemplative experience. For the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī, the undifferentiated, objectless experience is identified with the realisation of the Supreme Reality while the Śrāvakabhūmi considers it a preliminary (albeit important) step preparing the yogi for the actual insight into the Noble Truths. The Viniscayasamgrahanī also speaks of the discernment of the Four Truths, but this is a phase subsequent to the objectless experience of the Supreme Reality. Answering an opponent who points out that the realisation of the Four Truths preached by the Buddha implies conceptual discernment (Skt. * parivitarkayati; 37 Tib. yongs su rtog par byed ; Ch.分別), i.e. reflective
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mode of cognition accompanied by objects/characteristics ( * sanimitta, mtshan ma dang bcas par 'gyur,有相), the Viniscayasaṃgrahaṇī argues: The pure cognition, both mundane and supramundane, regarding the [Four Noble] Truths is achieved through the power of cognition without mental images ( * animittajñāna; mtshan ma med pa'i shes pa;無相智). Thanks to this [power], the afflictions ( kleśa ) are [also] eliminated. Therefore, the cognition without mental images — which is the cause of the cognition regarding the [Truth of] Suffering, etc. as well as of the elimination of the afflictions — 38 is figuratively designated ( * upacāra; nye bar gdags pa;假説) as the cognition regarding the [Truth of] Suffering, etc. [like] in cases of naming the result for [/instead of] the cause.39 Hence, there is no error [as assumed by the opponent]. (bden pa rnams la 'jig rten pa dang 'jig rten las 'das pa'i shes pa rnam par dag pa ni mtshan ma med pa'i shes pa'i dbang gis byung ba yin pa'i phyir | de nyid kyis nyon mongs rnam par spangs pas na mtshan ma med pa'i shes pa sdug bsngal la sogs pa’i shes pa’i rgyur gyur pa nyon mongs pa spong bar byed pa gang yin pa de nyid la rgyu la 'bras bu gdags pa byas nas sdug bsngal la sogs pa shes par 40 nye bar gdags pas nyes pa med do ||)41
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Reshaping Timelessness (Deleanu)
In the Viniscayasamgrahanī, the objectless cognition is the actual experience of Awakening while the reflective cognition of the Four Truths, often presupposed by the traditional approach, is derived from it. Roughly speaking, this is an inversion of the place and importance given to more or less similar meditative experiences. 42
3. Augmentation
The passage I have chosen to illustrate the augmentative strategy represents a milestone in the history of Buddhist philosophy. It is probably the earliest attested statement of the representation-only ( vijñaptimātra- tā) doctrine, which marks the birth of the Yogācara-Vijñānavāda as a distinct philosophical school. The so-called vijñaptimātra(tā) passage43 occurs in the Maitreya Chapter ( * Maitreyaparivarta ) of the Samdhinirmo- canasūtra, a text most probably compiled in first half of the 4 th century.44 The entire chapter is dedicated to the path of spiritual cultivation, basically framed upon the practice of tranquillity ( śamatha ) and insight ( vipaśyanā ). But let us first take a look at an earlier passage which may have paved the way for the birth of the vijñaptimātratā Weltanschauung. It is found in the Śrāvakabhūmi where it is introduced as a citation from a canonical text.
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The Śrāvakabhŭmi calls it the Muktakasūtra, but in modern Buddhist studies, it is often referred to as the Revatasūtra (after the Buddha's interlocutor's name). 45 Speaking of the objects visualised in meditation, the Muktakasūtra/Revatasūtra describes them as follows: He [i.e. the contemplative] does not see the [visualised] object itself in a non-mediated, direct manner 46 but generates a replica or image [which is] nothing but cognition, nothing but visualisation, nothing but recollection. 47 (sa na tad eva jñeyaṃ vastu samavahitaṃ48 saṃmukhībhūtaṃ paśyaṭi, api tu tatpratirupakam asyotpadyate tatpratibhāsaṃ νā, jñānamātraṃ νā, darśanamāt- raṃ vā, pratismṛtamātraṃ 49 vā.)50 The vijñaptimātratā thesis in the Samdhinirmocanasūtra is likewise pronounced in a context discussing the nature of the visualised objects in the vipasyanā practice. Vipasyanā is defined as a reflective process which,
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benefiting from the calmness brought by śamatha meditation, can be directed at images perceived in inner concentration ( adhyātmasamādhigo- carapratibimba, nang du ting nge 'dzin gyi spod yul gzugs brnyan,内三摩地所行影像).51 These images as well as the cognitive objects ( jñeyārthɑ, shes bya'i don,所知義)52 which they represent become the focus of the yog's examination ( vicaya, rnam par 'byed pa,思擇), intense examination (pravicaya, rab tu rnam par 'byed pa,最極思擇), thorough inspection (parivitarka, yong su rtog pa,周温尋思). 53 It is at this juncture that the nature of the images meditated upon in vipaśyanā becomes an issue. Asked by Bodhisattva Maitreya whether these images are different from the contemplating mind, the Buddha declares them to be 'non-different' ( abhinna, tha dad pa ma yin,無異). These images are, he says, representation-only ( vijñaptimātra, rnam par rig pa tsam;唯[…]識).54 But what makes the Samdhinirmocanasūtra special is the fact that the scope of definition is expended to all cognitive acts: I declare that the consciousness ( vijñāna ) 55 is constituted ( prabhāvita ) — 361 — by mere representation [/appearance]( vijñaptimātra ) of [/as] the cognitive object [/support](ālambana).56 (Skt. * tadālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṃ  vijñānaṃ  (iti)(ahaṃ) vadāmi.57 Tib. rnam par shes pa ni58 dmigs pa dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba yin no 59 zhes ngas bshad do ‖ P Ngu 29b1; D Ca 27a4; sTog Na 38b2; Lamotte ed. 91.4-5, § 7; Dunhuang MS: Hakamaya 2008, 122.28-29. Ch.我説:識所縁唯ሬ⁰識所現故。T 16.698b2)61 The Buddha goes on explaining that 'the inherent ( prakrtistha ) 62 mental The Sanskrit reconstruction follows — or rather sums up — Schmithausen 2014, 395, 397–8, et passim. The philological and historical problems connected to the so-called vijñaptimātra(tā) passage are brilliantly addressed in Schmithausen 1984 (for conclusions regarding the Skt. reconstruction, see p. 437: * ālambanavijñapti- mātraprabhāvitaṃ vijñānaṃ 'consciousness is characterised by [the fact that its] object is nothing but representation') and Schmithausen 2014, 387–505 (see also 507f. for the meaning of prabhāvita ). The latter monograph offers an extensive and superbly argued discussion of other reconstructions and latest interpretations. 58 Lamotte ed.: pa'i. Lamotte ed. contains no note accounting for this reading. It might be an emendation on the basis of Xuanzang's rendering (and/or other sources?), but nothing is said to this effect either. 59 D adds: ‖ (i.e. double shad). 60 Song ed. [宋, in Taishō sigla], Old Song ed. [宮, in Taishō sigla]:惟. 61 In Xuanzang's rendering, the sentence is rather differently worded: 'I declare that [this is] because改the object [/support] of consciousness is only a manifestation所現of the consciousness.
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images ( cittabimba ) of the appearances ( abhāsa ) of visible forms ( rūpa ), etc. [perceived by] sentient beings ( sattva ) ' 63 are not different ( abhinna, tha dad pa ma yin,無異) from the mind. The fools ( bāla, byis pa,愚夫) however, unware of the fact that these mental images are nothing but representation ( vijñaptimātra, rnam par rig pa tsam ;唯[…]識), fall into trap of distorted cognition ( viparyastacittatā, phyin ci log tu sems;作韻倒解). The contemplative must, of course, fully comprehend and eventually transcend the epistemic mechanism of the vijñaptimātratā . By 'yoking together' (yuganaddha, zung du 'jug pa,和合倶韓) the insight and tranquillity into a single act of mental one-pointedness ( cittaikāgratā, sems rtse gcig pa nyid;心一境性), the yogi reaches a state in which: he realises that these images ( pratibimba ) which pertain to the occur in Buddhist literature. Rang bzhin du gnas pa (or rang bzhin gyis gnas pa) rendering prakrtistha is, on the other hand, well-attested in Buddhist, especially Yogăcăra, sources: e.g. BoBh-W 3.2; 331.12; 401.7; MSA 11.12; etc. Chandra 1994, s.v., also registers rang bzhin du gnas pa as equivalent to prakṛtistha on the basis of the Pravrajyāvastu. (The testimony of Chandra [1959] 1971, s.v., can be dismissed as hypothetical since it records the compound on the basis of the same Samdhinirmoca- nasūtra passage under discussion here). Prakṛtistha (literally, naturally/spontan- eously abiding') means 'inherent', 'original', 'innate' (as well as 'abiding in the original state', 'genuine', etc., though the latter semantic ramifications are not relevant here).
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domain of concentration ( samādhigocara ) are nothing but representa- tion ( vijñaptimātra ), and having realised this, he contemplates [/focuses upon]( manaskaroti ) the Supreme Reality ( tathatā ). (Tib.: ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan de la 'di ni rnam par rig pa tsam yin no zhes bya bar rtogs te | de rtogs nas de bzhin nyid du yid la byed pa gang pa yin pa'o ‖ Lamotte ed. 92.11-13, § 9. Ch.:謂通達三摩地所行64影像唯是其識，或通達此已復思推如性。T 16.698b23-24) Whether this amounts to a variety of idealism which denies categorically the existence of objects exterior to the mind remains an issue of (often bitterly fought) controversy. I cannot enter into details here, but no matter what interpretation we adopt, its importance for our discussion does not change. The Srāvakabhūmi describes the nature of the visualised objects as a mere cognitive act (jñānamātra) within the limited experience of meditation. The Samdhinirmocanasūtra, on the other hand, enlarges the scope to all objects of knowledge. Whatever we perceive is representation- only ( vijñaptimātra ), all 'objects' we see or hear are ultimately of the essence and reducible to the mind.
4. Substitution
The fourth interpretative strategy refers to a process of semantic transplant widely seen throughout Buddhist history, meditation being only one of its areas of application. It involves investing establised technical terms with new meanings. 65 — 358 —
Reshaping Timelessness (Deleanu)
Here we shall examine how the Sarvāstivādin five-step model of the spiritual path was adopted in Yogācāra Buddhism with a complete revamping of its semantic content. Let's first have a brief look at the description of the Sarvāstivādin path to Arhatship in the Abhidharmakośa. (1) After fulfilling the fundamental requirements of developing the resolution ( pranidhāna ) to attain Nirvāna 66 and leading a holy life in accordance with the ethical code of the monastic Order, 67 (2) the practioner embarks upon the preparatory path ( prayogamār- ga). 68 This step consists in three distinct phases: (a) basic meditative training, i.e. cultivation of the impure 69 and/or mindfulness of breathing. 70 (b) the four applications of mindfulness, practised in a manner similar to the descriptions in canonical sources; 71 and (c) the wholesome roots ( kuśalamūla ) conducive to insight ( nirvedhabhāgīya ) into the Noble Truths, which continue the four applications of mindfulness, 72 laying the 20
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emphasis on the contemplation of the Four Noble Truths in sixteen aspects. 73 (3) The third step, called the 'path of vision' ( darsanamārga ), 74 is described as the 'realisation ( abhisamaya )[leading to the] insight into the Truths [effected] by non-contaminated wisdom'. 75 This realisation will, however, stamp out only the proclivities ( anuśaya ) related to such intellectual defilements ( kleśa ) as wrong views ( dṛṣṭi ) concerning the existence of a self, etc. (4) The subtler defilements stemming from emotional attachments like lust ( rāga ) and hatred ( pratigha ) or from our fundamental ignorance ( avidyā ) can only be abandoned at the next level named the 'path of cultivation' ( bhāvanāmārga ).76 This is a long, arduous process of meditation on the Noble Truths which gradually eradicates all traces, no matter how subtle, of latent proclivities. (5) The culmination of this process is known as the 'path requiring no more training' ( aśaikṣamārga ), which is the moment and state of Arhatship, of Awakening to the Truth and Liberation from the cycle of rebirth.77 The five-step paradigm of spiritual progression was also adopted in Yogācāra Buddhism but not without semantic substitutions. The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra is probably the earliest Yogācāra text which makes use of it. Verses ( śloka ) 6–10 and their prose commentary ( bhāṣya ) 78 in the Chapter on Reality ( Tattvādhikāra ) sketch out what will
Reshaping Timelessness (Deleanu)
become the basic model of the Yogācāra spiritual ladder. In spite of a terminology which is identical to Sarvāstivādin and Sautrāntika texts, the content of each step is construed in a different manner. Let us have a look at one example:79 The second stanza [sets forth] the abiding ( avasthāna ) in [the realisation that] the manifestation of the [cognitive objects] is mind- only ( cittamātra ), [realisation achieved after] having comprehended that the objects are nothing but mental verbalisation. This is the bodhisattva's station of [cultivating the wholesome factors] leading to the penetration [of the Truth] ( nirvedhabhāgīyāvasthā ). From this point on, as [the yogi] reaches direct perception ( pratyakṣa ) into the Essence of Phenomena ( dharmadhātu ), [he] becomes dissociated from the characteristic of the [cognitive] subject-object ( grāhya- grāhaka) duality. 80 This is the station of the path of vision
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(darśanamārgāvasthā). (dvitiyena manojalpamātrān arthān viditvā tadābhāse cittamātre 'vasthānam. iyaṃ bodhisattvasya nirvedhabhāgīyāvasthā. tataḥ pareṇa dharmadhātoḥ pratyaksato gamane dvayalaksanena viyukto grākyagrākakalaksanena. iyam darśana- mārgāvasthā.) 81 The direct perception into the Essence of Phenomena is then explained as abiding in the realisation that even mind-only does not exist since without a cognised object there can be no cognising subject ( cittamātrasya nāstitvāvagamanaṃ grāhyābhāve grāhakābhāvāt).82 And the station of the path of cultivation ( bhāvanāmārgāvasthā ), which also is equated to the transformation of the basis of existence ( āśrayaparivartana ), consists in the attainment of the undifferentiated state ( samatā ) of Reality by means of non-conceptual cognition ( avikalpajñāna).83 Similar structural categories are thus revamped to accommodate new philosophical ideals and praxis paradigms. The largely reflective medita- tion directed at the internalisation of the Four Truths in the traditional approach is replaced with contemplative practices aiming at the non- conceptual cognition of the undifferentiated Supreme Reality and resting upon the idealist presupposition that the objects of ordinary perception are nothing by mind. 84
Epilogue
History: In or Beyond?
The fact that Buddhism has found various ways to interpret and redesign its meditative repertoire is not a weakness. It attests to flexibility and openness to diversity, an attitude which is often seen in its inclusivistic approach. In the case of Yogācāra Buddhism, for instance, we see the spirit of inclusivism in the encyclopaedic Yogācārabhūmi treatise which embraces various meditative traditions. A similar attitude is also displayed by Kumārajīva (ca 339–409)85 in his anthology dedicated to contemplative practice known as the Zuochan sanmei jing坐禪三昧經or The Scripture on the Concentration of Sitting Meditation (* Dhyānasamādhisūtra?). 86 It is true that the inclusivistic approach is rarely, if ever, impartial. Quite often it reflects hierarchic patterns. Kumārajīva's Zuochan sanmei jing symptoma- tically states that 'those whose wisdom regarding [the essence of] phenomena [/essential factors of reality] ( dharma ) is shallow are called Arhats, those [whose wisdom] is intermediate are called Solitary Buddhas ( pratyekabuddha ), and those [whose wisdom] is profound are called Buddhas'（於諸法中,智慧淺入名阿羅漢。中入名辟支佛。深入名佛。T 15. 281a7-8). And a similar view is professed by countless Mahāyāna sources.
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In spite of its hierarchical partiality, this inclusivistic paradigm strikes a chord with our modern Zeitgeist. This degree of openness and flexibility should not, however, be confused with an understanding of history similar to modern secular views. Whatever particular form they may take, the latter are usually based upon historicist presuppositions. Historicism 87 itself has been formulated in different ways, but the mainstream understanding is best described by the following definition given by Thornhill (1998): Historicism defined as 'the affirmation that life and reality are history alone' by Benedetto Croce ( [History as the Story of Liberty] 1938:65), […] is an insistence on the historicity of all knowledge and cognition […]. It is intended as a critique of the normative, allegedly anti- historical, epistemologies of Enlightenment thought, expressly Kant. […][One of its main assumptions is] that the truth-content of cognition is dependent not on categorical logic, but upon its situatedness in, and constant attentiveness to, history. This is not the way traditional Buddhism understands the relation between history and Truth, including the teachings and practices leading to it. Does then Buddhism totally lack a historical perspective on the way teachings and practices are transmitted? There seem to be only two traditional models attempting a more or less 'historical' approach to doctrinal change. 88 The first one is the periodisation of the Buddha's — 352 — missionary activity. This was one of the most convenient and prolific hermeneutical tools accounting for the plurality (often of a contradictory nature) of the Buddhist teachings and scriptures. The paradigmatic scriptural model is provided by the Samdhinirmocanasūtra.89 The text proclaims that the Buddha turned the Dharma-Wheel (chos kyi 'khor lo […] rab tu bskor), i.e. expounded the basic tenets, three times, each revealing a deeper layer of Truth. 90 The first time, he taught the Four Noble Truths for the benefit of the Śrāvakayāna followers. The second time, he set forth the doctrines of emptiness of no intrinsic essence, no arising, no passing away, etc. for the sake of Mahāyāna followers. The revelation, however, was made in statements whose ultimate meaning requires to be determined ( * neyārtha; drang ba'i don ). It was at the third turning of the Dharma-Wheel that he taught the definitive meaning (* nītārtha, nges pa'i don) of emptiness, sense which is (of course!) conveyed by the Samdhinirmocanasūtra.91 The second 'historical' approach is the idea that the teaching ( śāsana ) of each Buddha is doomed to a cycle of deterioration. Typically, it starts with a period when the True Dharma (saddharma, dam pa'i chos,正法) thrives during the lifetime of a Buddha. After the Buddha passes into the parintrvāṇa , the teaching loses its former vigour entering the period of the 'semblance Dharma' (saddharmapratirūpaka, dam pa'i chos kyi gzugs brnyan;像法). Finally, the True Teaching enters its latter days
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experiencing increasing decay and finally annihilation ( saddharmavipralo- pa, dam pa’i chos rab tu rnam pa ’jig pa,末法).92 Both approaches are, however, a far cry from the way secular historians look at the doctrinal and textual change. They could at best be described as 'quasi-historical' attempts which do not rest upon historicist presupposi- tions. This does not mean that they do not function within the traditional Buddhist paradigm. And my discussion here is not meant to deny the right of existence of this paradigm in the modern world. I only wish to highlight its peculiar nature. To my (historicist) mind, the only problematic issue is the attempt to combine the traditional and modern paradigms in an unsystematic, inconsistent way, to talk about the timelessness of a subject while professing to examine its 'history' or presenting it as satisfying empirical criteria. I hope this paper does not muddle paradigms and criteria. It is, once again, based upon historicist premises and attempts to tackle meditation as described in primary sources from a philologico-historical viewpoint. The conclusion yielded by this attempt is that meditation is as firmly anchored in historicity as any other mental state. Far from being an ahistorical black- box, it is a permeable process subject to a wide range of factors from personal psychological profiles to large cultural paradigms. This in itself is not a flaw or weakness but it does not guarantee claims that contemplative states are 'pure' or 'beyond history'.
Addendum I
We shall look here only at just a handful of sources stating the timelessness and universality of the Buddhist Teaching, praxis included. They come from different ages and traditions attesting to the centrality of the motif throughout Buddhist history. The idea is already found in the early Canon. According to a famous stanza in the Saṃyuttanikāya , the Buddhas of the past, present, and future dwelled, dwell, and will dwell in as well as revere the True Dharma ( saddhamma ). And the scripture concludes, 'this is the Universal Norm of [all] the Buddhas' ( esā buddhānaṃ dhammatā ).93 Similarly, the fact that all conditioned phenomena ( sankhārā ) are impermanent ( aniccā ), begetting suffering ( dukkhā ), and no (n)-Self ( anattā ), 94 remains a [universal] principle ( dhātu ), the lasting nature ( ṭhitatā ) of the truth ( dhamma ), the fixed course ( niyāmatā ) of the truth (dhamma) whether Tathāgatas arise or not.95 In the Saddharmapundarīkasūtra , the Truth ( dharma ) [of the Single Vehicle ( ekayāna )] revealed by the Buddhas is likewise described as having a lasting nature ( dharmasthitim ), fixed course ( dharmaniyāma- tāṃ), and unshakable, eternal stability in the world ( nityasthitāṃ loki imāṃ akampyām).96
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Key practices leading to the supreme Truth can also appear qualified as universal or uniquely superior. In such cases, the implication is that they function beyond historical limitations or personal peculiarities. In the Samdhinirmocanasūtra , the Buddha ends his exposition of the tranquillity-insight ( śamathavipaśyanā 1L観) practice by declaring it to be the perfect and pure path of spiritual cultivation ( * yogamārga, rnal  'byor kyi lam ;瑜伽道) which was taught by the Buddhas of the past and will be taught by the Buddhas of the future.97 In the Lankāvatārasūtra , the yogi who succeeds in abandoning all mental images [/constructs] ( nimitta ) and reaches an imageless state ( nirābhā- saṃ […] bhavet ) 98 is blessed by the Buddhas coming from all lands. 99 The sutra also refers to its doctrines and practices as representing the teachings of the Buddhas of the past, present, and future.100 In the Compendium of the Essence (Skt. * Hrdayaniksepa ;101 Tib. Snying知知真董相30
Reshaping Timelessness (Deleanu)
po nges par bsdu ba), the Mādhyamika-cum-Tāntrika master Atīṣa (982- 1054) gives a succinct description of the bodhisattva path which he declares to be 'the essence preached by the Buddhas of the three periods [i.e. the past, present, and future]' ( dus gsum sangs rgyas kyis gsung pa'i | snying po […]'.102 To change the cultural landscape, similar ideas are also seen in Dōgen's道元（1200-1253)  works.  In  his  (symptomatically  entitled)  Universal Recommendation of the Method of Sitting Meditation普鞄坐禪儀, the Japanese Zen master tells that all accomplished practioners, whether of our cosmic realm or others, whether from India or China, equally have the Buddha-seal and have devoted themselves only to the zazen practice唯務打坐. 103 The latter is identical with the shikan taza只管打坐or 'single- minded meditation', the paramount means and goal in Dōgen's teachings. And in the (substantially different) redaction of the same work,104 Dōgen declares that basically there are no differences in the Buddha's teachings, whether it is in this or other cosmic realms (凡其自界他方佛法本無異法。 T 82.2a21-22).
Addendum II
The five basic techniques of meditation discussed in Section 1 was a popular combinatory formula found in many Northern schools of Indian Buddhism, first and foremost, in Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and Yogā- cāra. 105 They will become even more popular in East Asian Buddhism, where they are mainly known as 'the five contemplations for stilling the
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mind'五停心観106 Let us look again at the set in the Śrāvakabhūmi, which is one of the earliest sources attesting the combinatory formula, adding the recom- mended categories of practioners for each meditation. This suggests that the neophytes were not supposed to master the entire set. It rather appears that they were taught only one particular technique in accordance to the dominant proclivity affecting each individual's psyche. 107 (1) Meditation on impurity ( aśubhā )不淨観, recommended for meditators dominated by sensual passion [/lust]( rāgacarita )食欲. (2) Meditation on friendliness ( maitri )慈悲観, for meditators dominated by hatred (dvesacarita) 職志(3) Meditation on dependent origination ( idampratyayatāpratītyasamutpā- da)因縁観, for meditators dominated by bewilderment ( mohacarita)思疑(4) Analysis of the elements [of existence]( dhātuprabheda )界分別観, 108 for meditators dominated by arrogance ( mānacarita )我慢(我見). (5) Mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasmṛti)数息観,109 for meditators dominated by restless thoughts ( vitarkacarita )散亂心. This is not, however, the only combinatory and terminological formula. There are other patterns, too, one of them being 'the five types of meditation'五門禪.110 The latter consists of the same members as the set
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32 above with one exception. It replaces the analysis of the elements (dhātuprabheda) with the Buddha recollection ( buddhānusmṛti )念佛観,111 which is recommended to meditators equally等分afflicted by lust, hatred, bewilderment, and restless thoughts.112
Addendum III
Qualifying Yogācāra Buddhism as 'idealistic' will surely make (quite?) a few learned eyebrows rise. The academic community is far from having achieved consensus on the proper terminology describing the philosophy of the school. A growing number of scholars in the West (e.g. Lusthaus 2002) as well as the East (e.g. Shiba 2003) argue that Yogācāra is far closer to phenomenology. My understanding of the classical Yogācāra philosophy 113 (intrinsically 'method', rather than 'gate'. I adopt the former but if the latter meaning was intended, the translation should be 'the five meditations [serving as] gateway [to the path toward the Awakening]'. Cf. the term avatāramukha 'gateways for the entrance [to the path]' in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (BoBh-W 110.21-22 and 25). The latter compound is translated into Chinese by Xuanzang as恵入門(T 31.504b). Note, however, that the Bodhisattvabhūmi does not use the numeral 'five' although
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linked to my labelling it 'idealism') is along the same lines advocated by the excellent study of Birgit Kellner and John Taber (2014)(also containing a survey of the scholarly discussions on the subject). As for the term 'idealism', I follow the definition given by the British philosopher Timothy L.S. Sprigge (1998): Idealism is now usually understood in philosophy as the view that mind is the most basic reality and that the physical world exists only as an appearance to or expression of mind, or as somehow mental in its inner essence. However, a philosophy which makes the physical world dependent upon mind is usually also called idealist even if it postulates some further hidden, more basic reality behind the mental and physical scenes (for example, Kant's things-in-themselves). The classical Yogācāra philosophy seems to match the definition, albeit in a unique way. The problem underlying a lexeme like 'idealism' is that it denotes a wide genus whose semantic sphere includes numerous species and subspecies. The 'Yogācāra species' of idealism is not completely identical with the Platonic idealism or Berkeley's idealist philosophy. Actually, depending on the semantic scale at which you set your judgements, you may also say that they represent different philosophies. But when looking from a more encompassing perspective, they can be seen
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as sharing enough similarities to come under the definition above. There is, hence, no harm in comparing and finding similarities between Yogācāra and phenomenology. And I believe that some points of similitude exist such as, for instance, those between the non-conceptual forms of Yogācāra meditation and the phenomenological ideal of epoché. But there are also other areas in which their approach is quite different. Overemphasising the similarities in an attempt to accommodate Yogacara under a phenomenological umbrella is a Procrustean approach. But even if the phenomenological reading of Yogācāra were correct, it would not change my label of 'idealist'. To my mind, the unwarranted (almost mystical) belief in intuitive knowledge seen in phenomenology (especially in its Husserlian and Heideggerian varieties) is a type of idealism. What further complicates our understanding and labelling the Yogācāra philosophy is that its tenets are often stated in relation to spiritual and soteriological ideals (like most other Buddhist schools, for that matter). Actually, the very term 'representation-only' ( vijñaptimātratā or vijñapti- mātratva) is used with a double, if closely connected, meaning. At one level, it is a convenient, if not perfect, description of the reality as seen by ordinary people ( prthagjana ). the objects which they perceive as external to the mind are merely products of their wrong representation. In this sense, vijñaptimātratā is an epistemological/ontological descriptor. But on a higher, spiritual level, this descriptor is itself incorrect and non-functioning = non-existent. At this higher semantic dimension, the vijñaptimātratā becomes the platform for its own denial. Verses 25 to 30 in Vasubandhu's Vijñaptimātrātāsiddhi make this abundantly clear. 114 Equally revealing is the discussion of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra in Section 4 above. I would therefore suggest that the term 'self-deconstructing subjective idealism' might work as a species descriptor for the classical Yogācāra philosophy.
ABBREVIATIONS
Citations of and references to Pali sources are done according to the following model: SN III 174.3 stands for Samyuttanikāya , volume III, page 174, line 3. (For Pali sources, whose titles have been abbreviated according to the widely accepted conventions detailed in the Epilegomena to Vol. I of A Critical Pāli Dictionary , I refer to the PTS editions.) Citations of and references to Sanskrit sources are done according to the following model: AKBh 351.12 stands for the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya , page 351, line 12. Alternatively, I refer to the verse rather than to the page. Thus, AKBh ch. VI ver. 17 b-c stands for the Abhidharmakośabhāsya , chapter VI, verse ( kārikā ) 17, second and third quarter. Citations of and references to Tibetan translations are done according to the following model: D Wi 111a1 stands for the sDe-dge Canon , volume Wi (i.e. traditional Tibetan numeration), folio 111, recto, line 1. Citations of and references to Chinese translations are done according to the following model: T 30.527b16 stands for the Taishō Canon , volume 30, page 527, segment b (middle segment), column 16. AbhSam = Abhidharmasamuccaya  (see Pradhan 1950) AbhSamBh = Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya (see Tatia 1976) AKBh: Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (see Pradhan 1975) AstaPp-V: Astasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā (see Vaidya 1960) AstaPp-W: Astasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā (see Wogihara 1932-1935) BHS: Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit BoBh-D: Bodhisattvabhūmi (see Dutt 1978) BoBh-W  Bodhisattvabhŭmi (Wogihara [1936] 1971) 36 Reshaping Timelessness (Deleanu) C: Co-ne edition of the bsTan 'gyur Ch.: Chinese translation D: sDe-dge edition of the Tibetan Canon (see Takasaki et al. 1980) DaBh-K: Daśabhūmikasūtra (see Kondō 1936) DaBh-R: Dasabhumikasutra (see Rahder 1926) G: Golden edition of the bsTan 'gyur MBh: Mahābhārata MSA: Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (see Lévi 1907) MW: Monier-Williams [1899] 1986. N: sNar-thang edition of the bsTan 'gyur P: Peking edition of the Tibetan Canon (see Suzuki 1955-1961) PW: Böhtlingk and Roth [1855-1875] 1990. Skt.: Sanskrit original ŚrBh-MS: Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript (see Taishō University and China Library of Nationalities facsimile edition 1994) ŚrBh-Sh: Śrāvakabhūmi  (see Shukla 1973) ŚrBh-TG II (see Shōmon ji Kenkyū-kai 2007) ŚrBh-TG # 22: Śrāvakabhūmi (see Shōmon ji Kenkyū-kai [ = Taishō Group of Research on the Śrāvakabhūmi] 2008) sTog: sTog pa Palace edition of the Tibetan Canon T: Taishō Canon (see Takakusu and Watanabe [1922-1933] 1991) Tib.: Tibetan translation VinSam-Ch: Chinese translation of the Viniscayasaṃgrahaṇī in T = Taishō Canon VinSam-K: Viniscayasaṃgrahaṇī (see Kramer 2005) VinSam-Ta: Viniscayasamgrahani (see Takahashi 2005)
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