By Patrick Butchard
26 January 2022

International Regulation ofSpace

Summary
1
Star laws: The frontier of space
2 International Law in space
3 Regulating access to space
4 Monitoring the use of space: Registration of space objects
5 Space debris and liability
6 Initiatives for further regulation of spacecommonslibrary.parliament.uk

Number 9432

International Regulation of Space

Contributing Authors
Claire Mills, International Affairs and Defence Section
Image Credits
Adobe Stock 230251957 space image – Ireland, United Kingdom andScandinavia on a moonlit night under an aurora by elen31 – Adobe Stock(stock.adobe.com). Adobe Stock License. / image cropped.
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International Regulation of Space

Contents
Summary

4

1

Star laws: The frontier of space7

1.1

Where does space law begin?

7

1.2

Air law vs space law – Is the boundary of space important?

8

1.3

Geostationary orbits

11

2International Law in space

13

2.1

Sources of space law

13

2.2

General principles in space

15

2.3

Law and the militarisation of space

15

2.4

Resolutions on legal principles on space

17

3

Regulating access to space

19

3.1

Role of the International Telecommunication Union

19

3.2

Satellite constellations

22

4

Monitoring the use of space: Registration of space objects

23

4.1

Definition of space objects

24

5Space debris and liability

27

5.1

Responsibility vs liability

27

5.2

The problem of space debris

29

6Initiatives for further regulation of space

34

6.1

Initiatives at the United Nations

34

6.2

Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space Treaty

38

3

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Space

SummaryThis briefing provides an overview of the international legal framework thatapplies to outer space. With an ever-increasing use of space for both militaryand commercial purposes, the need to take stock of the existing rules andidentify the gaps in regulation is higher than ever before.
The main legal issues for space law today include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

The definition and delimitation of space, including the question of where
space begins in law.
The application of international law and other specific legal regimes inspace.
The regulation of access to space, through the regulation of radio
frequency use and orbital slots.
The legal monitoring of how space is used and what objects are launched
into space, through a regime requiring the registration of space objects.
The issue of liability in space, and the increasing problem of spacedebris.
Initiatives to further enhance the international regulation of space, andclose the gaps in the current system.

Where does space law begin?
One of the still hotly-debated topics in international law is the exact definitionand delimitation of space.
According to international law, states retain sovereignty over the airspace
above their territory – subject to certain aviation laws such as the 1944
Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention). Article 1of the Chicago Convention makes this clear by providing that every state hascomplete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
This exclusive sovereignty does not extend to space, because according to
Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty, outer space is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by
any other means.
But where does sovereignty over airspace stop, and outer space begin? The
exact legal boundary of space is not defined in international law. The practiceof states may indicate some options for the boundary of space, but thesehave not always been consistent.
There is also debate about the use of geostationary orbits – orbits where
satellites remain in a fixed point in the sky – because they are a scarce

4

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International Regulation of Space

resource, and need to be shared equitably among all states large and small,regardless of their current space capabilities.

International law and space
General international law principles apply in space. But there have been
several treaties and conventions adopted to specifically address and regulate
the exploration and use of space internationally.
The Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty provides the basic framework on international
space law, covering legal foundations such as the peaceful use of space,
the freedom of exploration of space, and the basic responsibility andliability of state for launching space objects.
The Rescue Agreement
The Rescue agreement provides that states shall take all possible steps
to rescue and assist astronauts in distress and promptly return them tothe launching state. It also provides that states shall, on request, provide
assistance to launching states in recovering space objects that return toEarth outside the territory of the launching state.
The Liability Convention
This Convention provides for absolute liability on the part of a launchingstate to pay compensation for damage caused by its space objects on
the surface of the Earth or to aircraft. It also makes launching states
liable for damage in space, based on a fault of that state. The
Convention also details provisions of the settlement of disputes.
The Registration Convention
This Convention lays down the rules applicable for the registration of
space objects, and the open and free access of these registers.
The Moon Agreement
This Agreement expands on the Outer Space Treaty specifically regarding
the Moon and other celestial bodies. It provides that those bodies should
be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, that their environments should
not be disrupted, and that the UN should be informed about any station
established on those bodies. The Agreement also provides that the Moon
and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind.
Other conventions that are relevant to the regulation of space include thoseestablishing international organisations or institutions with functions relevant
to outer space. It is not the purpose for this paper to include all of these here,
but these treaties are monitored by the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs,
which supervises the status of those agreements and the parties to them.

5

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International Regulation of Space

Adapting space law for the future
As discussed in the Library Briefing Paper on the Militarisation of Space,achieving a consensus on regulation has been a challenge for theinternational community for a long time. As many analysts have noted, there
is a perceived preference, on all sides, for regulation that promotes freedomof their own action, while curtailing the activities and aspirations of others.
Support for arms control in space is often seen as contradictory to the actions
and rhetoric of the states with leading space capabilities, such as the US,
China, and Russia.
In December 2021, the UN General Assembly adopted some notable
Resolutions on outer space, as it has done each year. This includes one
Resolution drafted and championed by the UK to take stock of existing
international, legal and other normative frameworks concerning threatsarising from state behaviours with respect to outer space, and to encourage
responsible behaviours in space.
At the Conference on Disarmament, Russia and China have been pushing for alegally-binding treaty on preventing an arms race in space since 2008, withan updated draft treaty proposed in 2014. As evidenced through the voting ofGeneral Assembly Resolution 76/23, the US, the UK and other aligned states
do not support this initiative. It remains to be seen whether any progress will
be made on this initiative, as the stalemate on developing the treaty seems topersist.

6

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International Regulation of Space

1

Star laws: The frontier of space

1.1

Where does space law begin?

The Kármán line
(100km / 62 miles) isused by theFederation
AéronautiqueInternationale (FAI)
when recognising
the achievement of
becoming anastronaut. But the
US use an altitude of
50 miles / around80km forrecognisingastronautspaceflight.

According to international law, states retain sovereignty over the airspace
above their territory – subject to certain aviation laws such as the 1944
Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention). Article 1of the Chicago Convention makes this clear by providing that every state hascomplete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
This exclusive sovereignty does not exist in space, because according to
Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty: 1
ARTICLE II: Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, isnot subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means ofuse or occupation, or by any other means.
But where does sovereignty over airspace stop, and outer space begin? The
exact legal boundary of space is not defined in international law. The practiceof states may indicate some options for the boundary of space, but thesehave not always been consistent.
The most widely accepted boundary of space is the Kármán line – a point
above the Earth originally defined by Hungarian physicist Theodore von
Kármán, as the altitude where traditional aircraft can no longer effectively
fly. 2 Von Kármán’s theory has been used widely to suggest an altitude of
100km (or 62 miles) for the edge of space. 3
The Kármán line (100km) is used by the Federation AéronautiqueInternationale (FAI) when recognising the achievement of becoming anastronaut. 4 But the US military Space Force, US civilian agency NASA, and the

1

2

3
4

7

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, (Adopted on 13 December 1966 in UN General
Assembly Resolution 2222 (XXI), opened for signature 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October1967).
Although Kármán’s theory and calculation is used today, Kármán never formally published the workon this idea, but the theory was followed up in research by others such as US lawyer Andrew G
Haley. See for further background, Eric Betz, ‘The Kármán Line: Where does space begin?’,Astronomy [online], 5 March 2021, (accessed 5 January 2022).
Ibid.
FAI Astronautic Records Commission (ICARE), “100KM Altitude Boundary for Astronautics”, Last
update: 21 June 2004, (accessed 5 January 2022).

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International Regulation of Space

Federal Aviation Administration use an altitude of 50 miles / around 80km fortheir respective programmes recognising astronaut spaceflight. 5
Recent research by Astrophysicist Jonathan McDowell, of the HarvardSmithsonian Center for Astrophysics, reconsidered the history andcalculations behind the original Kármán line and suggested that an altitudeof 80km (or 50 miles) is a more appropriate line for the ‘edge of space’. 6
In light of this and other research, the FAI released a statement in 2018suggesting that these recently published analyses presented “a compellingscientific case for reduction in this altitude from 100km to 80km.” 7 At the timeof writing, no formal change seems to have been made to the FAI’s Sporting
Code detailing the requirements for human spaceflight. 8
For now, the exact legal boundary of space remains unresolved, with thedelimitation and definition of ‘outer space’ still on the agenda of the Legal
Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (COPUOS) since 1967. 9

1.2

Air law vs space law – Is the boundary of
space important?
The boundary of space may become increasingly important because air law(governing the airspace and air transit through airspace) and space law(governing conduct in Outer Space) have some important differences in theirrules. Legal issues of liability, aircraft control, innocent passage throughairspace or overflight, all depend on whether an aircraft or spacecraft is inouter space or not.
These differences have been outlined in detail (PDF) in an academic reportsubmitted to the UN COPUOS by the Space Safety Law & Regulation
Committee of the International Association for the Advancement of Space
Safety (IAASS). 10 One key difference outlined in this report is the fact that a

5

6

7
8
9

10

8

See, for example, Federal Aviation Administration, “FAA Ends Commercial Space Astronaut Wings
Program, Will Recognize Individuals Reaching Space on Website”, 10 December 2021, (accessed 5
January 2022).
Jonathan C.McDowell, “The edge of space: Revisiting the Karman Line”, (2018) 151 Acta Astronautica
668-677.
FAI, “Statement About the Karman Line”, 20 November 2018.
FAI Sporting Code – Section 8: Astronautic Records (Edition 2009) (opens PDF), 31 August 2017.
UN COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, “Historical summary on the consideration of the question on thedefinition and delimitation of outer space”, (18 January 2002) UN Doc A/AC.105/769; and UN
COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, “Historical summary on the consideration of the question on thedefinition and delimitation of outer space”, (3 February 2020) UN Doc A/AC.105/769/Add.1.
Paul Stephen Dempsey and Maria Manoli, “Suborbital flights and the delimitation of air space vis-àvis outer space: functionalism, spatialism and state sovereignty”, 29 March 2018, UN Doc
A/AC.105/C.2/2018/CRP.9 (Link opens PDF).

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International Regulation of Space

right of innocent passage through territorial airspace for ascending ordescending space objects has not been established under international law. 11
This means that any state who seeks to launch an object to space, and needs
to fly through the sovereign airspace of another state, is subject to air law
rather than space law before the object reaches outer space, and as theobject or spacecraft descends back to Earth. While the International Air
Services Transit Agreement does provide for some freedom of overflight, thisdoes not have universal acceptance. 12
The IAASS report also succinctly outlines the key differences and similarities
between air law and space law:

Main Differences between air law and space law
Regimes
Air Law

Space Law

Applies to “air space”

Applies to “outer space”

Applies to “aircraft”

Applies to “space objects”

States enjoy “complete andexclusive sovereignty” over theirterritorial air space

State sovereignty over outerspace is prohibited

Imposes liability on the airline,or the aircraft operator

Imposes liability and oversight
responsibility upon the state

Requires states to certify andregister aircraft

Creates an international
registration regime

Requires states to regulate
safety, navigation, and security

No universal safety, navigationor security standards

Requires States to regulate noiseand emissions

Environmental standards arefound in guidelines and nonbinding commitments

Source: Paul Stephen Dempsey and Maria Manoli, “Suborbital flights and thedelimitation of air space vis-à-vis outer space: functionalism, spatialism and statesovereignty”, 29 March 2018, UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/2018/CRP.9 (Link opens PDF), p
10.

11
12

9

Ibid, at 22.
Jae Woon Lee, “Revisiting Freedom of Overflight in International Air Law: Minimum Multilateralism
in International Air Transport”, 38(4) Air and Space Law 351.

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International Regulation of Space

Key terms
Space tourism:
Private companies
offering space flights forleisure. E.g. Virgin
Galactic and Blue Origin

The different approaches to these issues in air law vs space law have become
more important to be aware of in recent years because of several
advancements in space operations internationally, including space tourism
flights, increasing numbers of ‘suborbital’ flights, and developments in theability of land-locked states to launch their own space objects.
The US has previously opposed any definition or delimitation of outer space ininternational law, believing there to be no real issues without a set boundary.
In 2001, the US told COPUOS that:
Our position continues to be that defining or delimiting outer space is notnecessary. No legal or practical problems have arisen in the absence ofsuch a definition. On the contrary, the differing legal regimes applicablein respect of airspace and outer space have operated well in theirrespective spheres. The lack of a definition or delimitation of outer space
has not impeded the development of activities in either sphere. 13

Suborbital flights:
Spaceflight in which thespacecraft reaches outerspace but does not reachan altitude or speed toenter Earth’s orbit.

Land-locked
states:States with only landboarders with otherstates, making
spaceflight from theirterritory may enter theairspace of a

The US argued that if any practical problems do arise, then any definition of
the boundary of space is limited by the state of technology at that time. The
US pointed to advances in aircraft technology allowing increased altitudes ofsustained flight, and advancements in spacecraft that have lowered theheight of orbital flight, urging that “the Legal Subcommittee should not takeon this issue until practical problems have been identified so as to make it
absolutely necessary to do so.” 14
While the US noted these advancements in technology as a reason not todefine the edge of space, experts have pointed to these advancements as areason for requiring legal certainty. 15 In the UK’s 2010 submission to COPUOS,
the representative said that the UK:neighbouring state.

… anticipate that the development of space transportation systems
functioning seamlessly between airspace and outer space, relying on lift
to fly through the air for part of their flight profile, will create
uncertainties about the legal regime applicable to them. In particular,
the distinct liability regimes applicable to each may be conflicting. 16
On the other hand, the IAASS has indicated that even with a defined boundaryof space at 100km / 62 miles, this would not resolve some of the problems
raised by the differences between air law and space law, especially for

13

14
15

16

10

US Department of State (2009-2017), “U.S. Statement, Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space
And The Character And Utilization Of The Geostationary Orbit, Legal Subcommittee of the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at its 40th Session in Vienna from April”,
Archived Content (accessed 5 January 2022). The author has not found any clear public US
statement on this position since.
Ibid.
Paul Stephen Dempsey and Maria Manoli, “Suborbital flights and the delimitation of air space vis-àvis outer space: functionalism, spatialism and state sovereignty”, 29 March 2018, UN Doc
A/AC.105/C.2/2018/CRP.9 (Link opens PDF), 24-25.
UN COPUOS, “Questions on the definition and delimitation of outer space: replies from Member
States”, 9 December 2010, UN Doc A/AC.105/889/Add.8.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Spacesmaller and land-locked states. 17 This is because, the IAASS argues, thesestates would have issues with launching space missions or suborbitaltransportation, because this could mean that these missions would be at thediscretion of any state whose airspace the spacecraft may fly through. 18
For this, and other reasons, the IAASS and other experts suggest alternative
ways of regulating the overlapping issues between sovereign airspace andspace. This alternative suggestion includes arguments to regulate ‘near
space’ 19 in international law. During the last session in COPUOS, however,some states did express the view that no “grey zone” between airspace andouter space should be established, including for the benefit of suborbital
flights. 20

1.3
Geostationary
Orbit: Whensatellites are placed
into an orbit above
the equator where
they effectively
remain above thesame place above
the Earth.

Geostationary orbits
Another disagreement over the boundaries of space law is over the use ofgeostationary orbits. Geostationary orbits are orbits that allow a satellite toremain in a fixed point above the Earth. Such an orbit is only possible above
the equator, at a height of 22,236 miles (35,786 km). There are therefore only
a limited number of satellites that can be in such an orbit, especially when
the safety of other satellites and the need to avoid radio interference isconsidered.
Some equatorial states have previously claimed geostationary orbits to bepart of their national resources, and claimed that their sovereignty extends tosuch orbits. Because a satellite would remain above that state permanently,
those states claim to have exclusive control over any satellites placed above
their state in such an orbit.
In 1976, the equatorial states of Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia,
Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo), agreed
the Bogotá Declaration on geostationary orbits. 21 In this Declaration, thestates claimed the following:
•
•
•

17
18
19

20

21

11

That geostationary orbit is a ‘physical fact’ of the Earth because of its
exclusive dependence on Earth’s gravity;
That, because of this, geostationary orbit must not be considered partof Outer Space;
That these orbits are a scarce natural resource;

Ibid, 24.
Ibid, 24-25.
This would be the regulation of operations or missions that take place above commercial airspace
but below a set ‘Outer Space’.
UN COPUOS, Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its sixtieth session, held in Vienna from 31 May to
11 June 2021, (24 June 2021) UN Doc A/AC.105/1243, para 73.
The text of the Declaration has been reproduced by the Japanese Space Agency, JAXA: Declarationof the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, 3 December 1976, (accessed 5 January 2022).

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Space•

That the segments of geostationary orbit above these states are part of
the territory of those Equatorial states and their nationalsovereignty.

The starkest arguments from this declaration is that geostationary orbits are
not part of Outer Space, and the states’ claims of national sovereignty overthose orbits. The declaration argues that there is “no valid or satisfactory
definition of outer space” which may be advanced to support the argumentthat the geostationary orbit is part of outer space. 22
The response of the international community to this Declaration is covered indetail in academic research from that time. 23 In general, the Declaration waslargely rejected in the international community, and is not considered toreflect international law. 24
Some states and authors also suggest that this attempted claim ofsovereignty is clearly incompatible with Article 2 of the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty which clearly states that outer space “is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by
any other means.” 25
These claims over geostationary orbits do not seem to have been repeated in
the same way by Equatorial states since, but some states have still called forequitable access to the orbit as a natural resource. 26
The use of geostationary orbits has been a regular issue on the agenda of the
UN COPUOS, where the Legal Subcommittee of that body has the mandate toconsider ways and means to ensure the rational and equitable use of thegeostationary orbit without prejudice to the role of the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU). 27 The role of the ITU in ensuring the safety
and equality of orbits is set out further below.

22
23

24
25

26

27

12

Ibid.
See, for example, Stephen Gorove, “The Geostationary Orbit: Issues of Law and Policy”, 73(3)American Journal of International Law 444.
Ibid.
See, for example, US Department of State (2009-2017), “U.S. Statement, Definition and Delimitationof Outer Space And The Character And Utilization Of The Geostationary Orbit, Legal Subcommitteeof the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at its 40th Session in Vienna
from April”, Archived Content (accessed 5 January 2022).
UN COPUOS, Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its sixtieth session, held in Vienna from 31 May to
11 June 2021, (24 June 2021) UN Doc A/AC.105/1243, para 79-84.
Ibid.

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International Regulation of Space

2

International Law in space

2.1

Sources of space law
As outlined below, general international law principles apply in space.
However there have been several treaties and conventions adopted to
specifically address and regulate the exploration and use of spaceinternationally.
•

The Outer Space Treaty 28
The Outer Space Treaty provides the basic framework on
international space law, covering legal foundations such as thepeaceful use of space, the freedom of exploration of space, and thebasic responsibility and liability of states for launching space
objects.

•

The Rescue Agreement 29
The Rescue agreement provides that states shall take all possible
steps to rescue and assist astronauts in distress and promptly
return them to the launching state. It also provides that states shall,on request, provide assistance to launching states in recovering
space objects that return to Earth outside the territory of thelaunching state.

•

The Liability Convention 30
This Convention provides for absolute liability on the part of a‘launching state’ to pay compensation for damage caused by its
space objects on the surface of the Earth, or to aircraft. It also
makes launching states liable for damage in space, based on a fault

28

29

30

13

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, (Adopted on 13 December 1966 in UN General
Assembly Resolution 2222 (XXI), opened for signature 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October1967).
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space (adopted in UNGA Res 2345 (XXII), opened for signature on 22 April 1968,
entered into force on 3 December 1968).
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (adopted in UNGA
Resolution 2777 (XXVI), opened for signature on 29 March 1972, entered into force on 1 September1972) 961 UNTS 187.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Spaceof that state. The Convention also details provisions of thesettlement of disputes.
•

The Registration Convention 31
This Convention lays down the rules applicable for the registration of
space objects, and the open and free access of these registers.

•

The Moon Agreement 32
This Agreement expands on the Outer Space Treaty specificallyregarding the Moon and other celestial bodies. It provides thatthose bodies should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, that
their environments should not be disrupted, and that the UN should
be informed about any station established on those bodies. The
Agreement also provides that the Moon and its natural resources
are the common heritage of mankind.

Other conventions that are relevant to the regulation of space include thoseestablishing international organisations or institutions with functions relevant
to outer space. It is not the purpose for this paper to include all of these here,
but these treaties are overseen by the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, whomonitors the status of those agreements and the parties to them. 33

31

32

33

14

Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, (adopted in UNGA Res 3235
(XXIX), opened for signature on 14 January 1975, entered into force on 15 September 1975), 1023
UNTS 15.
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, (adopted 5
December 1979 in UNGA Res 34/68, entered into force 11 July 1984).
UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, Status of International Agreements relating to Activities in Outer
Space, accessed 5 January 2022.

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International Regulation of Space

2.2

General principles in spaceOnce an object crosses the boundary of space, most general customary rules

A customary rule of of international law apply. The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1721
international law is (XVI) in 1961, which stated two general principles:a rule that may or•International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to
may not be in aouter space and celestial bodies;treaty, and is based • Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all
on two elements:
States in conformity with international law and are not subject tonational appropriation.
the consistentpractice of states
This was later reiterated in Articles II and III of the Outer Space Treaty: 34(state practice) andtheir belief that such • ARTICLE II: Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, bypractices amount tomeans of use or occupation, or by any other means.
a legal obligation or • ARTICLE III: States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and otherright (opinio juris).

celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including theCharter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international
peace and security and promoting international co-operation andunderstanding.

2.3

Law and the militarisation of space
The growing militarisation of space has been covered in detail in the Library
Briefing Paper on the Militarisation of Space. 35
In terms of the rules applicable to the militarisation of space, the generalprinciples outlined above mean that any customary international law
principles that apply to the use of force and use of weapons on Earth would
also apply in space, including the general prohibition of force in internationallaw (in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter) and principles of international
humanitarian law.
While these principles may prevent unprovoked or illegal military action fromspace, or in space, between states, they do not provide for the complete
demilitarisation of space altogether. The right of self-defence in Article 51 of
the UN Charter may well apply in space too.

34

35

15

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, (Adopted on 13 December 1966 in UN General
Assembly Resolution 2222 (XXI), opened for signature 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October1967).
Commons Library Research Briefing CBP-9261, The militarisation of space, 14 June 2021.

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International Regulation of Space

There are also regulations for space law concerning militarisation of specificparts of space and the use of specific weapons. For example, Article IV of theOuter Space Treaty provides that the moon and other celestial bodies shall
only be used exclusively for peaceful purposes:
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to
the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of militarybases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons
and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be
forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any
other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any
equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon andother celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.
The treaty does not define what is meant by ‘peaceful purposes’. This wasclarified in part by Article III of the Moon Agreement, 36 which prohibits threats
or uses of force from the moon, and the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit
around the moon:
1. The moon shall be used by all States Parties exclusively for peacefulpurposes.
2. Any threat or use of force or any other hostile act or threat of hostile acton the moon is prohibited. It is likewise prohibited to use the moon inorder to commit any such act or to engage in any such threat in relation
to the earth, the moon, spacecraft, the personnel of spacecraft or manmade space objects.
3. States Parties shall not place in orbit around or other trajectory to or
around the moon objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds ofweapons of mass destruction or place or use such weapons on or in themoon.
4. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, thetesting of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on
the moon shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientificresearch or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The
use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration anduse of the moon shall also not be prohibited.
However, there are only 18 parties to the Moon Agreement, and these notably
exclude the UK, the US, Russia, and China.
But when it comes to placing weapons or military equipment into orbit aroundthe earth, the restrictions on militarisation are limited. Article IV of the Outer
Space Treaty Provides:

36

16

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, (adopted 5
December 1979 in UNGA Res 34/68, entered into force 11 July 1984).

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of SpaceStates Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around theearth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds ofweapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or
station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.
This means that currently only nuclear weapons must not be placed into orbit
around the earth. Space law still covers the general prohibition of force fromsatellites in orbit, but it does not seem to prohibit the placing of otherweapons and military equipment into orbit.

2.4

Resolutions on legal principles on space
As well as the treaties and principles of international law, the international
community has on occasion adopted Resolutions within the UN General
Assembly outlining key principles relevant to outer space. These include:•

The Declaration of Legal Principles 37–•

Broadcasting Principles 38–

Remote Sensing:
the use of satellite
technology tomonitor and detectoccurrences on the
Earth surface or
atmosphere. Can
include the taking of
high-resolution
pictures, or use ofadvanced sensing
technology.

–

–
•

–

38

39

17

Details principles on international direct television broadcasting bysatellite, including on international cooperation, state
responsibility, and copyright.
Also covers and encourages promoting the free dissemination andmutual exchange of information and knowledge in cultural andscientific fields; assisting in educational, social and economic
development, particularly in the developing countries; andenhancing the qualities of life of all peoples.
Upholds sovereignty, and due respect to the political and cultural
integrity of states.

Remote Sensing Principles 39–

37

Outlining that existing general principles of international law andcustomary international law apply in outer space.

Outlines that remote sensing activities shall be carried out for the
benefit and in the interests of all countries.
Promotes international cooperation and data sharing, whereappropriate.

UNGA Res 1962(XVIII), Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, 13 December 1963.
UNGA Res37/92, The Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites forInternational Direct Television Broadcasting, 10 December 1982.
UNGA Res 41/65, The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, 3
December 1986.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Space––•

Nuclear Power Sources Principles 40
–
–

•

41

18

Details principles applicable to activities involving the use of nuclear
power sources in outer space.
Includes, primarily, that the use of nuclear power sources in outerspace shall be restricted to those space missions which cannot be
operated by non-nuclear energy sources in a reasonable way.

The Benefits Declaration 41–

40

Promotes the protection of the Earth’s environment, the detection
and monitoring of natural disasters, and the needs of developing
countries in this regard.
Does not cover military / dual use remote sensing technology.

Provides for principles that the exploration of space shall be carriedout for the benefit and in the interest of all States, irrespective of
their degree of economic, social or scientific and technologicaldevelopment, and shall be the province of all mankind. Particular
account should be taken of the needs of developing countries.

UNGA Res 47/68, The Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, 14
December 1992.
UNGA Res 51/122, The Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs ofDeveloping Countries, 13 December 1996.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Space3

Regulating access to space

3.1

Role of the International Telecommunication
Union
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has a role in controlling andregulating the use of radio communication and orbits for satellites around theEarth. The ITU Constitution sets out that the regulation ofradiocommunications should “ensure the rational, equitable, efficient andeconomical use of the radio-frequency spectrum by all radiocommunication
services, including those using the geostationary-satellite or other satellite
orbits”. 42 In doing so, the ITU must bear in mind “the particular concerns ofdeveloping countries.”
Article 44 of the ITU Constitution goes further to oblige Member States toprioritise use of radio frequencies and spectrum to be used to “the minimum
essential” to provide the necessary services, and apply technical advances inthese technologies as soon as possible. Article 44 also requires Member
States to keep in mind the following:••••That radio frequencies and any associated orbits, including thegeostationary-satellite orbit, are limited natural resources;
That these resources must be used rationally, efficiently, andeconomically;
That this be done so that groups of countries may have equitable accessto these orbits and frequencies;That the special needs of developing countries and the geographicalsituations of particular countries be taken into account. 43

The ITU governs these technical aspects though the Radio Regulations, which
provide the rules and procedures for allocating and utilising certain radio
frequencies and orbits in space, and maintaining a record of the assigned
frequencies on the Master International Frequency Register (MIFR). 44
Planned and existing satellite orbits are included on the Space Network List
(SNL).

42
43
44

19

ITU Constitution, Article 12(1).
ITU Constitution, Article 44.
A document on the ITU website provides an overview of the Regulatory Framework for satellites: ITU,
“ITU Radio Regulatory Framework for Space Services”, undated (accessed 5 January 2021), (linkopens PDF); see also, Joanne Wheeler, “The Space Law Review: International Telecommunication
Union and Access to Spectrum”, The Law Reviews, 9 December 2021.

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International Regulation of Space

Geostationary
satellites arelargely the main
orbit andfrequencies used bynational
telecommunication
and broadcasting
operators.

In the 1985 and 1989 meetings of the ITU’s Radiocommunications Conference,a series of changes did reserve, for every state internationally, frequencies
and the right to predetermined geostationary orbit slots. 45 This planning
procedure has been set out by the ITU:
The progressive exploitation of the orbit/frequency resources and theresulting likelihood of congestion of the geostationary-satellite orbit
prompted ITU Member countries to consider more and more seriously thequestion of equitable access in respect of the orbit/spectrum resources.
This resulted in the establishment (and introduction into the ITU
regulatory regime) of frequency/orbital position plans in which a certain
amount of frequency spectrum is set aside for future use by all countries,
particularly those which are not in a position, at present, to make use of
these resources. These plans, in which each country has a predetermined
GSO orbital position associated with the free use, at any time, of a certain
amount of frequency spectrum, together with the associated procedures,
guarantee for each country equitable access to the spectrum/orbit
resources, thereby safeguarding their basic rights. Such plans govern aconsiderable part of the frequency bands available for the spacecommunication services. 46
However, the majority of ITU’s allocations are still made largely on a firstcome, first served basis, 47 subject to requirements of coordination andadvance notification depending on the circumstances. 48 Some states andacademics have pointed out that this could undermine the strive for equitable
access to space for developing states because larger states will be able toaccess these resources more quickly than states without their own spacecapabilities. 49 Indeed, the previous approach of the ITU was cited by
Equatorial states in the Bogotá Declaration as a reason for seeking their own
sovereignty over geostationary orbits. 50
Domestic operators must apply for frequency and orbital allocations throughtheir respective national administrator, such as OFCOM in the UK. 51

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

20

The number of orbital positions allocated depends on the type of satellite system, and the size of thestate concerned. See, ITU, Space Plans, (accessed 5 January 2022).
ITU, “ITU Radio Regulatory Framework for Space Services”, undated (accessed 5 January 2021), p2,(link opens PDF).
See, for example, Chloe Billing, “There’s a parking crisis in space – and you should be worried aboutit”, The Conversation [online], 29 September 2017; ITU, “ITU Radio Regulatory Framework for Space
Services”, undated (accessed 5 January 2021), p4, (link opens PDF).
Coordination is a requirement to enter negotiations with the national administrations concerned.
See further, Joanne Wheeler, “The Space Law Review: International Telecommunication Union andAccess to Spectrum”, The Law Reviews, 9 December 2021.
Njeri Purity, “Spectrum & Orbital Slotting – A case for African Countries”, Space in Africa [online], 3
December 2020; Iulia-Diana Galeriu, “‘Paper Satellites’ and the Free Use of Outer Space”, GlobaLex,
April 2018.
Reproduced by the Japanese Space Agency, JAXA: Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial
Countries, 3 December 1976, (accessed 5 January 2022).
OFCOM, Satellite filings (accessed 5 January 2022).

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International Regulation of Space

The ITU framework explicitly excludes military radio installations under
Article 48, and therefore also military satellites, subject to the limitation thatthese installations must, so far as possible, observe the ITU’s rules on giving
assistance in case of distress and on measures to be taken to prevent harmfulinterference. 52

Paper satellites: The Tonga example
The practice of allocating ‘paper satellites’ is where an application for orbital
positions is made purely to reserve those orbits without any real intention to
use them.
In 1990, the Tongan Government applied for 16 geostationary orbital positions
with the ITU and, after reducing its request, was allocated 6 positions in
1991. 53 Tonga did not have any real plan to actually launch satellites of its
own, and instead allowed a private company to rent slots to a US-based
company, and auctioned off the remaining slots for $2 million per year. 54
The actions of the Tongan government came under heavy criticism from somestates. For example, Colombia argued that Tonga was undermining theprinciples underlying the ITU’s regulations at that time, and that this was “atransparent attempt to secure as many orbital slots as possible to trade as acommodity for pecuniary gain.” 55 Intelsat, 56 an international organisation at
the time, claimed that Tonga’s conduct was tantamount to “financial
speculation in the geostationary orbit,” in violation of the ITU regulations. 57
Tonga insisted the government acted within the rules. 58
The ITU reviewed its internal processes for allotting orbital slots in 19951997, 59 and has made a number of changes to try to tackle the problem of‘paper satellites’. 60 One notable substantive change to the rules came when
52

53

54
55

56

57

58
59
60

21

ITU Constitution, Article 48: “Member States retain their entire freedom with regard to military radio
installations.”
This incident is covered in detail in: Jannat C. Thompson, “Space for Rent: The International
Telecommunications Union, Space Law, and Orbit/Spectrum Leasing”, (1996) 62(1) Journal of Air
Law and Commerce 279.
Ibid, p280-281.
As quoted in: Jannat C. Thompson, “Space for Rent: The International Telecommunications Union,
Space Law, and Orbit/Spectrum Leasing”, (1996) 62(1) Journal of Air Law and Commerce 279, p281282.
Intelsat was, at the time, a treaty-based international organisation (the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organisation) until it was privatised in 2001: see, Greg Wood, “Satellite
service set for privatisation”, BBC News [online], 19 July 2001.
As quoted in: Jannat C. Thompson, “Space for Rent: The International Telecommunications Union,
Space Law, and Orbit/Spectrum Leasing”, (1996) 62(1) Journal of Air Law and Commerce 279, p281.
Ibid.
Ibid, p282-283.
See further: Iulia-Diana Galeriu, “‘Paper Satellites’ and the Free Use of Outer Space”, GlobaLex,
April 2018.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Spacethe 2019 ITU World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-19) adopted a new
regulatory approach to satellite constellations (see below).

3.2

Satellite constellations
Because of the need to preserve the limited number of geostationary orbitalslots, some states and private operators have developed satellite networks
that can operate at either Medium Earth Orbit, or Low Earth Orbit. Thisessentially means that the satellites will not remain in a fixed point above theEarth, but will move through the sky on their orbits. To maintain constantcontact with the satellite network from the ground, this would require
multiple satellites (a constellation) to be launched to maintain continuous
contact or coverage.
These types of satellite networks are currently being used, for example, toprovide global internet coverage from a network of satellites. Examples
include: SpaceX’s Starlink, OneWeb, and Amazon’s Project Kuiper.
But the use of potentially thousands of satellites to provide such services alsomeans that numbers of available orbital slots are reducing. Some experts
have therefore raised the question as to how these constellations fit within thecurrent regulatory framework. 61
The 2019 ITU World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-19) adopted a
new regulatory approach to satellite constellations. Under this approach, thesatellite constellation must be deployed within set timeframes and phases,
and if the operators fail to launch enough satellites by these milestones, thenthey will have more limited rights for utilising the relevant radio spectrum /orbits. 62 The ITU says that this approach to satellite constellations will:
•
•

61

62
63

22

help ensure that ITU's Master International Frequency Register (MIFR)
reasonably reflects the actual deployment of such satellite systems;
help to prevent ‘spectrum warehousing’, i.e. determine which applicants
are actually using the spectrum and orbital slots they request. 63

See, for example, Damian M. Bielicki, “Legal Aspects of Satellite Constellations”, (2020) 45(3) Air
and Space Law 245.
Ibid, p255.
ITU Press Release, “ITU World Radiocommunication Conference adopts new regulatory procedures
for non-geostationary satellites”, 20 November 2019.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Space

4

Monitoring the use of space:
Registration of space objects

Apart from the regulation and allocation of orbital slots and frequencies by
the ITU, international law also requires the registration of all objects
launched into space.
Initially, UN General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) in 1961 called upon states
launching objects into orbit or beyond to register these launches with the UN
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. It also requested the UN
Secretary General to maintain a public register of such launches. 64
Eventually, after some years of discussion between states, the Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the Registration
Convention) was adopted by the General Assembly in November 1974. 65 As ofJanuary 2022, the Convention had 71 states parties. 66
Under the Convention, a ‘launching state’ must maintain a registry of space
objects that it launches. This state must then provide the UN
SecretaryGeneral with specific information about the space object as soon aspracticable. 67 The launching state must also inform the Secretary General
about any space object that leaves its orbit of the Earth. 68
A ‘launching state’ is:••A state which launches or procures the launching of a space object;
A state from whose territory or facility a space object is launched. 69

If there is more than one launching state then, according to Article II, theyshall jointly determine which one of them shall register the object. This
determination does not affect, and is without prejudice to, agreements
between those states as to the jurisdiction and control over the space object
and its personnel. This is to be read in light of Article VIII of the Outer Space
Treaty which provides that the state of registry “shall retain jurisdiction and

64

65

66
67
68
69

23

UNGA Res 1721 (XVI), International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 20 December
1961, Section B.
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, (adopted in UNGA Res 3235
(XXIX), opened for signature on 14 January 1975, entered into force on 15 September 1975), 1023
UNTS 15.
Ibid, UNTS Record.
Registration Convention, Article IV.
Registration Convention, Article II(2).
Registration Convention, Article I.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Space

control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer spaceor on a celestial body.”
Space objects are then maintained on a public and open access register, theUN Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space, responsibility for which the
UN Secretary General delegated to the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs. 70 The
Outer Space Objects Index is a tool that provides access to this register, andalso includes objects that have not yet been registered with the United
Nations. 71
The UK maintains a national registry of space objects where the UK has taken
the role of the ‘launching state’, as required by the Registration Convention
and also s.7 of the Outer Space Act 1986. 72
The Registration Convention does not yet have universal acceptance by states– but the main states who could be considered ‘launching states’ are parties
to the Convention. Some states who do have space activities, but are notparties to the Registration Convention, have still submitted information toregister their space objects based on the initial General Assembly Resolution
1721 (XVI) from 1961. 73
A more recent study on the effectiveness of the Registration Convention notedthat satellites are usually registered within one to two years of launch, butthere have been over 100 examples of space objects that have beenregistered after a delay of 10 years or longer. 74 This study argues:
The combination of late and infrequent submission, and long delays
within the UN system before public accessibility, must be seen as
seriously compromising the effectiveness of the Convention. In the era of
the Internet, "as soon as practicable" should be a matter of hours or days,
not months or years. 75

4.1

Definition of space objects
The only definition provided for ‘space object’ in Article I of the Registration
Convention is that a ‘space object’ includes “component parts of a space
object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.”
Importantly, the Convention makes no distinction between space objects
launched for space exploration, and space objects launched for military
purposes. According to the broad wording of the Convention, all space
70
71
72
73

74
75

24

UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, UN Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space.
UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, Outer Space Objects Index.
UK Space Agency, UK Registry of Space Objects, accessed 5 January 2022.
Ram S. Jakhu, Bhupendra Jasani, Jonathan McDowell, “Critical issues related to registration of
space objects and transparency of space activities”, (2017) 143 Acta Astronautica 406.
Ibid, p409 (p10 in deposited document).
Ibid, p410 (p10 in deposited document).

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Spaceobjects should be registered, and include information as to the ‘generalfunction’ of the object (Article IV(1)(e)).
This particular requirement seems to be the most abused obligation under theConvention, because research has revealed that military and intelligencesatellites are rarely acknowledged as such. 77

Practice of registration of military and intelligencesatellites 78“States have often
provided very vague
or sometimes
misleading
information, which
may conceal or
obfuscate the real,actual or main
purpose of thespace object.” 76

Some states have registered satellites that are reported to have military or
intelligence-gathering purposes, but the purpose given when registering theobject does not always acknowledge this.
For example, a US satellite launched in August 2013 was reportedly a militaryreconnaissance satellite, and the registered purpose of this satellite by the US
was “spacecraft engaged in practical applications and uses of spacetechnology such as weather or communications.” 79 The registration of US
satellites that are classified or secret also seem to have a pattern of being
registered with their initial orbital parameters, rather than the actual orbitthat the satellites eventually use – one example, took 24 years for the US to
acknowledge its existence, and was registered without the orbital information
as required. 80 Some space objects were also registered by the US as ‘spacedebris’, but were observed by experts to be capable of manoeuvring. 81
Russia tends to register its military or intelligence satellites as “Intended for
assignments on behalf of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation.”
One notable example includes the Cosmos-2542 / Kosmos-2542 satellite,
which is again registered as a Russian Ministry of Defence satellite. Thissatellite has been reported by the MIT Technology Review as closely
shadowing a US spy satellite, at less than 186 miles (300 km) apart, with someexperts speculating that it could be trying to determine the aperture andresolution of the cameras on the US satellite, and possibly even the computer
processing on the US satellite. 82

76
77
78

79
80
81
82

25

Ibid, p412 (p16 in deposited document).
Ibid, p411 (p14 in deposited document).
This information is based upon research in: Ram S. Jakhu, Bhupendra Jasani, Jonathan McDowell,“Critical issues related to registration of space objects and transparency of space activities”, (2017)
143 Acta Astronautica 406.
Ibid.
Ibid, p411 (p16 in deposited document).
Ibid, p411 (p14 in deposited document).
Neel V. Patel, “A Russian satellite is probably stalking a US spy satellite in orbit”, MIT Technology
Review [online], 3 February 2020.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of SpaceIn some other examples, Chine has registered suspected intelligence satellites
as simply for “remote sensing”, 83 while France openly registered its ElectronicIntelligence Satellite (ELISA) as a “listening system microsatellite”. 84

Small and very small satellites
Increasingly, launching states have sent payloads of very small satellites into
space. Small satellites – also called mini, nano, pico, or femto satellites
depending on their size – can be as small as only a few centimetres wide, andas light as 100-200g. 85 The challenge with these satellites is not only the factthat they can be difficult to track because they are so small, but also thedanger they could pose to larger satellites if not properly planned andmonitored. Each small satellite could also be considered an individual ‘space
object’ for the purposes of the Registration Convention.
In 2015, the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs and the International
Telecommunication Union jointly released guidance on the registration andmanagement of such small satellites. 86

Registration of satellite constellations
Similarly, for ‘satellite constellations’ as outlined above, Bielicki notes thatthe practice of states in registering these constellations has been
inconsistent. 87 Some states have registered each satellite in the constellationindividually, whereas others have simply registered the cluster jointly. 88
The UN General Assembly had addressed the issue of joint launches of space
objects in Resolution 62/101, where it recommended that in cases of joint
launches of space objects, each space object should be registered separately
and space objects should be included in the appropriate registry of the state
responsible for the operation of the space object under article VI of the Outer
Space Treaty. 89

83

84

85

86

87

88
89

26

See, for example, Chine, Note verbale dated 19 May 2014 from the Permanent Mission of China to theUnited Nations (Vienna) addressed to the Secretary-General, 15 July 2014, UN Doc ST/SG/SER.E/714.
See, for example, France, Note verbale dated 28 February 2012 from the Permanent Mission ofFrance to the United Nations (Vienna) addressed to the Secretary-General, 26 July 2012, UN Doc
ST/SG/SER.E/643.
Ram S. Jakhu, Bhupendra Jasani, Jonathan McDowell, “Critical issues related to registration of
space objects and transparency of space activities”, (2017) 143 Acta Astronautica 406, p413 (p19 indeposited document).
UN COPUOS, Guidance on Space Object Registration and Frequency Management for Small and Very
Small Satellites, 13 April 2015, UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/2015/CRP.17.
Damian M. Bielicki, “Legal Aspects of Satellite Constellations”, (2020) 45(3) Air and Space Law 245,
p.254.
Ibid.
UNGA Res 62/101, Recommendations on enhancing the practice of States and international
intergovernmental organizations in registering space object, 10 January 2008, UN Doc
A/RES/62/101, para 3(c).

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Space

5

Space debris and liability

5.1

Responsibility vs liability

Key terms

International law provides two avenues for holding a state to account forwrongful acts committed in, or from, space, or damage caused by alaunching state’s space objects.

State
Responsibility
The international legal
framework fordetermining when a stateis legally responsible for

One avenue is via international responsibility – the general internationalrules outlining when states will be legally responsible for internationallywrongful acts.
Another avenue is via rules of liability – specific rules providing for those whowill be liable for damages caused by a space object.

acts. Includes the rights

Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty provides for the international
responsibility of states in outer space, with the following rules:

and remedies available•

internationally wrongfulfor injured states toinvoke responsibility.

Internationallywrongful acts
Defined in international•••law as a breach of aninternational obligation.

States bear international responsibility for national activities in outerspace, whether such activities are carried out by governmental agencies
or by non-governmental entities.
States are also responsible for assuring that national activities arecarried out in conformity with the treaty.
The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including themoon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorisation andcontinuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.
When activities are carried out in outer space by an internationalorganisation, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall beborne both by the international organisation and by the member statesof that organisation.

On the other hand, the Outer Space Treaty also provides for liability in Article
VII, where it states that each launching state is “internationally liable fordamage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical
persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air or in outerspace, including the moon and other celestial bodies.”
Liability for damage by space objects has been further regulated in the
Liability Convention of 1972. 90 In this Convention, Article II stipulates:

90

27

Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Adopted in UNGA
Resolution 2777 (XXVI), opened for signature on 29 March 1972, entered into force on 1 September1972) 961 UNTS 187.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of SpaceA launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation fordamage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or toaircraft flight.
This absolute liability applies to damage caused either on earth, or toaircraft not in outer space. The term ‘launching state’ has the same
meaning as in the Registration Convention. Under Article I of the Liability
Convention, a ‘launching state’ is:••A state which launches or procures the launching of a space object;
A state from whose territory or facility a space object is launched.

For damage caused beyond earth, in outer space, Article III provides thatliability is not absolute, but is based on fault – only if the damage is due tothe state’s fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible.
The key difference between responsibility and liability is that responsibility isbased on the national activities of a state in outer space, whereas liability isbased on damage caused by a space object of a launching state. 91
While liability provides the need for compensation to be paid to the party who
has suffered damaged by a space object, the general principles ofinternational responsibility provide a number of consequences and remedies
available for an internationally wrongful act. These consequences have beenoutlined in detail in the Library Briefing Paper on the Principles ofInternational Law, and include:•••

An obligation to cease the act;
An obligation to offer guarantees of non-repetition, if appropriate;
The following remedies, where appropriate in each situation:
–
–
–
–

91

92

28

Restitution: to re-establish the situation that existed before thebreach, so long as this is not impossible or disproportionate;
Compensation: to pay compensation for financially assessabledamage;Satisfaction: an acknowledgement of the breach, an apology, or
another appropriate alternative to the satisfaction of the victim
state or party.
Countermeasures: a legal right of the victim state or party to takeaction that may normally be illegal in order to induce thewrongdoing state to adhere to its obligations. This usually includes
the use of sanctions, but comes with a number of safeguards toprevent the abuse of this avenue. 92

Damian M. Bielicki, “Legal Aspects of Satellite Constellations”, (2020) 45(3) Air and Space Law 245,
p250-251.
Commons Library Research Briefing CBP-9010, Principles of International Law: a brief guide, 21
September 2020.

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International Regulation of Space

Liability example: USSR Cosmos 954 debris overCanadaKosmos 954 / Cosmos 954 was a Soviet nuclear reconnaissance satellite,
powered by a nuclear reactor working on enriched uranium. On 24 January
1978 the satellite decayed out of orbit, and entered Earth’s atmosphere,
spreading radioactive debris across Canadian territory.
Canada initially claimed $6 million (CAD) compensation from the Soviet
Union. It based its claim on the Liability Convention, and also the generalprinciples of international law.
But the incident did not ultimately go through the dispute settlement process
outlined in the Liability Convention. Eventually, Canada and the Soviet Union
settled the claim, with the Soviet Union agreeing compensation of $3 million(CAD).
Source: Canada, Settlement of Claim between Canada and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics for Damage Caused by "Cosmos 954" (Released on 2 April ,1981), as reproduced by the Japanese Space Agency, JAXA.

One of the future challenges for the regulation of liability in space is theincreasing use of suborbital flights – often used by private companies offering
space flights for leisure, for example Virgin Galactic and Blue Origin.
Depending on the definitive legal boundary of space, as outlined above, someof these suborbital flights may actually never reach ‘outer space’, andtherefore would fall under the liability rules of air law, rather than spacelaw. 93
This is important because in air law, depending on the circumstances, liability
can be on the airline, or the aircraft operator, whereas space law places
liability for damage on the state. 94

5.2

The problem of space debris
Space debris refers to the growing problem of debris in space, orbiting the
Earth, and creating hazards for functioning satellites and other equipment inouter space. The UK Space Agency estimates that there are 900,000 pieces ofspace debris including old satellites, spent rocket bodies and even tools

93

94

29

See further on this issue, Paul Stephen Dempsey and Maria Manoli, “Suborbital flights and thedelimitation of air space vis-à-vis outer space: functionalism, spatialism and state sovereignty”, 29
March 2018, UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/2018/CRP.9 (Link opens PDF).
Ibid, p4-10.

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International Regulation of Space

dropped by astronauts orbiting Earth. 95 One of the biggest dangers is thatspace debris could cause the so-called Kessler Syndrome, a phenomenon
where space debris would continue to collide with existing space objects andcause more and more debris, to the extent that even launching new satellites
could be dangerous. 96
The responsibility and liability regime above creates a system that allows forstates to be held to account where their national activities in space, or the
space objects they launch, result in space debris that causes damage orother wrongful acts that could give rise to the responsibility of a state. This, ofcourse, relies on the state responsible for this space debris being known. But
there is no international legal regime preventing the creation of such spacedebris in the first place, or creating any safety mechanisms to help prevent
this. 97
The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), anintergovernmental forum of national and international space agencies,
initially produced Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines in 2002, revised in 2020
and 2021, aimed at “limiting the generation of space debris in theenvironment.” 98 This was followed by the 2007 UN COPUOS Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines, which were based on the technical content and thebasic definitions of the IADC guidelines. 99 This further led to the developmentof other national and international standards to prevent space debris. 100
The UN COPUOS Legal Subcommittee has had the “legal mechanisms relatingto space debris” as an item on its agenda, where states exchange views on
the international legal framework and space debris. In the 2021 session of theLegal Subcommittee, some states expressed the view that there was a needfor a rules-based international system for addressing the space debris
problem. 101 States supporting international regulation also argued that:having binding guidance at the international level would bringpredictability, create conditions for tackling global problems in a
coherent manner and ensure the uniform development of space law. 102

95

96
97

98
99

100

101

102

30

UK Space Agency, “UK working with global partners to clear up dangerous space debris”, 26
October 2021.
Mike Wall, “Kessler Syndrome and the space debris problem”, Space [online], 15 November 2021.
See, for example, Timiebi Aganaba, “If a satellite falls on your house, space law protects you – butthere are no legal penalties for leaving junk in orbit”, The Conversation [online], 17 May 2021.
IADS, IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, June 2021, Doc IADC-02-01 Rev. 3, p.
UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on thePeaceful Uses of Outer Space, 2010. (Link opens PDF)
See, for example, European Space Agency, Mitigating space debris generation, accessed 5 January2022; see further, HC Deb 14 July 2021 vol 699 c176WH.
UN COPUOS, Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its sixtieth session, held in Vienna from 31 May to
11 June 2021, (24 June 2021) UN Doc A/AC.105/1243, para 151.
Ibid.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Space

Further gaps in the current legal regime were also discussed by delegations
at the Legal Subcommittee, 103 with some highlighting the need for regulating
issues such as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The legal definition of space debris.
The legal status of space debris fragments.
The role of the state of registry.
Jurisdiction and control over the space objects to be declared as spacedebris.
Procedures in the case of unregistered debris objects.
Modalities for the identification, tracking and characterization of spacedebris objects, as well as for sharing relevant information.
Clear obligations for space debris mitigation, remediation and on-orbit
maintenance activities.
Conditions and modalities under which disposal and maintenance
operations may be lawfully carried out; and technical standards forcarrying out remediation or maintenance work. 104

One delegation further suggested that states should develop rules on:
•
•

•
•

103

104
105

31

A legal definition of space debris as a subcategory of space objects.
Determining the legal status of space debris fragments not registered inany national register or in the Register of Objects Launched into Outer
Space.
Harmonizing international and national law on the regulation of property
rights in relation to space objects, not only spacecraft.
Coordinating international procedures for identifying space debris
objects and their trajectory characteristics and for assessing the safetyof removing such objects from orbit. 105

The summaries and reports of the Legal Subcommittee do not specify which states hold these
positions or views.
Ibid, para 165-166.
Ibid, para 167.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of SpaceSpace Debris: Missle strikes against satellites
The issue of space debris has more recently gained international attention
following Russia’s missile test against one of its own satellites in November
2021.
As part of an ASAT (anti-satellite) missile test, Russia struck the Soviet-era
Cosmos 1408 / Kosmos 1408 satellite, 106 creating a field of debris so large anddangerous, the astronauts on board the International Space Station wereforced to take shelter as a precaution. 107 While Russia dismissed concerns ofspace debris, the strike against the satellite created over 1,500 pieces oftrackable debris, with some estimates indicating that some of the debris willremain in orbit well into the 2040s. 108
The US called the strike reckless and irresponsible, and warned that it could
threaten vital technology in space. 109 UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said
that the strike “shows a complete disregard for the security, safety andsustainability of space.” 110 He also warned that the debris “will remain in orbit
putting satellites and human spaceflight at risk for years to come.” 111
But this was not the first time a state struck one of its own satellites andcreated potentially dangerous debris. In 2007 China launched an ASAT missile
against its own weather satellite. Reports suggested that the impact left morethan 100,000 pieces of debris orbiting the planet, according to NASA’s
estimates, with 2,600 of them more than 4 inches across. 112 Other reportssuggested 1,600 pieces of debris could be tracked orbiting the Earth. 113 The US
and UK criticised China’s launch at the time. 114
In 2008, the US confirmed that it had launched a strike against “a falling andpotentially dangerous defense intelligence satellite” that had a “1,000 poundtank of toxic hydrazine fuel.” The US suggested that the strike created 80

106
107

108

109

110

111
112
113

114

32

“Russian anti-satellite missile test draws condemnation”, BBC News [online], 16 November 2021.
Kuan-Wei Chen, Bayar Goswami, and Ram S. Jakhu, “Russia’s attack on its own satellite is recklessand endangers us all”, The Conversation [online], 18 November 2021.
Ibid. See also, Erin Pobjie, “The Threat from Outer Space: Russia Tests Kinetic DA-ASAT Weapon”,
Just Security [online], 23 November 2021.
US Department of State, “Russia Conducts Destructive Anti-Satellite Missile Test”, 15 November
2021.
Costas Pitas, “UK says Russian anti-satellite missile test shows disregard for space security”,
Reuters [online], 15 November 2021; see also, UK Space Agency, Athene Gadsby, “Russia ASAT Test:
UK Space Agency response and analysis of the debris”, 24 November 2021.
Ibid.
“Pentagon confident satellite's toxic fuel destroyed”, CNN [online], 21 February 2008.
Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Knew of China’s Missile Test, but Kept Silent”, The New
York Times [online], 23 April 2007.
Ibid; see also, James Randerson and Mark Tran, “China accuses US of double standards oversatellite strike”, The Guardian [online], 21 February 2008.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Space

pieces of detectable debris. 115 China accused the US of double standards after
this incident. 116
In March 2019, India became only the fourth country to successfully test a
direct ascent ASAT missile. 117 After reaching low earth orbit, it successfullyintercepted an Indian satellite that had been launched earlier in 2019. The
test provoked international concern, but Indian Prime Minister, Narendra
Modi, hailed the test as an “unprecedented achievement”, confirming thatIndia has “established itself as a space power”. 118

115
116

117
118

33

US Air Force, “AEDC-tested Navy Standard Missile destroys errant satellite”, 22 February 2008.
James Randerson and Mark Tran, “China accuses US of double standards over satellite strike”, The
Guardian [online], 21 February 2008.
“Modi hails India as military space power after anti-satellite missile test”, Reuters, 27 March 2019.
Ibid.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Space

6

Initiatives for further regulation of
space

6.1

Initiatives at the United Nations
As discussed in the Library Briefing Paper on the Militarisation of Space, 119
achieving a consensus on regulation has been a challenge for theinternational community for a long time. The world’s leading space powers,
such as the US, China, and Russia, have their own interpretation of whatregulation should look like and what it should achieve. As many analysts havenoted, there is a perceived preference, on all sides, for regulation that
promotes freedom of their own action, while curtailing the activities andaspirations of others. Support for arms control in space is often seen as
contradictory to the actions and rhetoric of the leading states.
In December 2021, the UN General Assembly adopted a number of notable
Resolutions on outer space, as it has done each year, including one
Resolution drafted and championed by the UK. These Resolutions weredebated and developed in the Assembly’s First Committee (on Disarmament),
and the same voting patterns of previous years became clear, as outlined in
the First Committee’s Report. 120

UNGA Resolution 76/22 - Prevention of an arms race inouter space
UNGA Resolution 76/22 121 was adopted by the Assembly without a vote. The
Resolution called upon all states to contribute to the objective of the peacefuluse of outer space and the prevention of an arms race, further calling onstates to refrain from actions contrary to that objective. The Resolution also
invites the Conference on Disarmament to establish a working group on thisissue, and for states to cooperate with this initiative by informing the body ofany progress states are making in their own bilateral or multilateralnegotiations. 122

119
120

121
122

34

Commons Library Research Briefing CBP-9261, The militarisation of space, 14 June 2021.
For an overview, see, UNGA First Committee, “Prevention of an arms race in outer space: Report of
the First Committee”, 12 November 2021, UN Doc A/76/442.
UNGA Res 76/22, 6 December 2021, UN Doc A/RES/76/22.
For a summary, see: UN, “Adopting 55 First Committee Texts, General Assembly Addresses Myriad
Security Threats, Urging Joint Action to Advance Stalled Denuclearization, Disarmament Efforts”, 6
December 2021, GA/12392.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Space

UNGA Resolution 76/23 - No first placement of weaponsin outer space
The Assembly’s Resolution 76/23 123 was divisive, with several votes taking
place on elements within the Resolution. 124 One point of contention was aparagraph where the General Assembly welcomed the draft treaty introducedby China and Russia at the Conference on Disarmament in 2008, and its
updated version in 2014. This was adopted by a recorded vote of 123 in favour
to 48 against, with four abstentions – those states voting against thestatement included the US, the UK, and France.
The Resolution as a whole was adopted by a recorded vote of 130 in favour to
35 against, with 20 abstentions. The Resolution itself urged an earlycommencement of substantive work based on the updated draft treaty
introduced by China and Russia. 125

UNGA Resolution 76/230 - Further practical measures
for the prevention of an arms race in outer space
Another divisive initiative was Resolution 76/230. 126 Once again, there weresome votes on particular elements of the Resolution. 127
The Resolution itself did a number of things, including:
•

•

•
•

123
124

125
126
127

35

Declaring that the exclusion of outer space from the sphere of the arms
race and the preservation of outer space for peaceful purposes should
become a mandatory norm of state policy and a generally recognised
international obligation;
Calling on states to take urgent measures to prevent for all time theplacement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force inouter space, from space against Earth and from Earth against objects inouter space;
Calling on states to adopt legally binding multilateral agreements;
Urging the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate an international
legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outerspace, including on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outerspace and of the threat or use of force in outer space.

UNGA Res 76/23, 6 December 2021, A/RES/76/23.
For a summary, see: UN, “Adopting 55 First Committee Texts, General Assembly Addresses Myriad
Security Threats, Urging Joint Action to Advance Stalled Denuclearization, Disarmament Efforts”, 6
December 2021, GA/12392.
See below on the China-Russia proposed treaty.
UNGA Res 76/230, 24 December 2021, UN Doc A/RES/76/230.
For a summary, see: UN, “Approving $3.12 Billion Programme Budget, General Assembly Adopts 26
Resolutions, 2 Decisions, as Main Part of Seventy-Sixth Session Concludes”, 24 December 2021,
GA/12398.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Space

The General Assembly adopted this Resolution by a vote of 114 in favour tonine against (Australia, Canada, France, Israel, Japan, Marshall Islands,
Ukraine, United Kingdom and the United States), with 44 abstentions.

UK-sponsored UNGA Resolution 76/231 - Reducing
space threats through norms, rules and principles of
responsible behaviours
The final resolution was a UK-sponsored initiative to reconfigure how
discussions on the principles relating to outer space are approached.
Resolution 76/231, 128 however, did not have unanimous support. 129
The Resolution decided to convene, from 2022, an open-ended working group
to take stock of existing international, legal and other normative frameworks
concerning threats arising from state behaviours with respect to outer space.
This working group will consider current and future threats by states to spacesystems. The Resolution further decided that this working group will makerecommendations on possible norms, rules and principles of responsible
behaviours relating to threats by states to space systems
The Resolution also called upon all states to conduct their activities in the
exploration and use of outer space in conformity with international law,
including the Charter of the United Nations, and urged Member States to takethis into account when formulating their space policies. It encouraged thosestates that have not yet become parties to the international treaties
governing the exploration and use of outer space, to consider ratifying or
acceding to those treaties in accordance with their national law, as well as
incorporating them into their national legislation.
The Assembly adopted the Resolution by a vote of 150 in favour toeight against (China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran,
Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria and Venezuela) with seven abstentions(Armenia, Belarus, Central African Republic, India, Israel, Pakistan andTajikistan). 130
The UK ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Conference on
Disarmament, Aidan Liddle, described the UK’s initiative in an official blog
post in January 2022:
This resolution builds on the UN Secretary-General’s report commissionedby the 2021 resolution, by establishing an Open-Ended Working Group of

128
129

130

36

UNGA Res 76/231, 24 December 2021, UN Doc A/RES/76/231.
For a summary, see: UN, “Approving $3.12 Billion Programme Budget, General Assembly Adopts 26
Resolutions, 2 Decisions, as Main Part of Seventy-Sixth Session Concludes”, 24 December 2021,
GA/12398.
Ibid.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Space

all UN Member States to examine the question further. The OEWG willmeet in four sessions over two years in Geneva, starting in February. 131
Previously, Ambassador Liddle had outlined four main ideas underpinning the
UK’s approach to this, and a previous UK-sponsored Resolution:
First, that we need a broader discussion of outer space security that looks
at the whole range of threats emanating from States (as opposed tohazards inherent in the space environment, which are the business of theCommittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Vienna). Second, that
we need to consider space systems in their totality – the elements inspace and on the ground, and the data links between them. Third, thatconsidering behaviours, rather than weapons, might break the deadlock.
And fourth, that we need a more inclusive, more organic process,recognising that the security of space systems affects all states. The
resolution called on Member States to consider how a behaviour-based
approach could help reduce threats to space systems and prevent anarms race in outer space, and submit their views to the UN SecretaryGeneral, who will compile a report to be considered at the next First
Committee in October. 132
Liddle also stressed that there was appetite in the UN to continue thisapproach and, “Whether that’s a legally binding instrument or somethingelse is entirely open, and supporting this approach doesn’t mean giving up
supporting proposals for legally binding treaties.” 133
The UK’s National Space Strategy repeated the preference for ‘responsible
state behaviours’ when it said:
Government will lead work with international partners at the United
Nations to establish the framework for internationally recognised
responsible space behaviours that would increase the security of spacesystems. Building on the successful 2020 UK-led resolution at the United
Nations General Assembly and subsequent UN Secretary General report,
we will run a further resolution to set up a UN working group to discuss
the building blocks and details of responsible space behaviours. We will
support global stability through arms-control and non-proliferation
regimes and will work with allies to deter hostile activity against spacesystems including the use of weapons in space. Space sustainability andspace security must be considered alongside each other, so the UK will
work coherently across the United Nations Committee on the PeacefulUses of Outer Space, the Disarmament Commission, and the Conference
on Disarmament. Government will meet the challenges of an increasingly
contested and congested environment in space through targeted androbust diplomacy. 134

131
132
133
134

37

UK FCDO, Aidan Liddle, “Disarmament blog: looking back and forwards”, 11 January 2022.
UK, FCDO, Aidan Liddle, “Responsible behaviours in outer space: towards UNGA 76”, 8 June 2021.
Ibid.
UK Ministry of Defence, National Space Strategy, 27 September 2021.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Space

Indeed, the UK also seems to have the support from the US in this, after the
new Biden Administration appears to have dropped the US’s long-standing
opposition to developing international law in space. One of the US’s statedobjectives in its Defense Space Strategy 2020 is to “uphold internationallyaccepted standards of responsible behaviour as a good steward of space…”
and to “align with allies and partners to develop and promote standards andnorms of appropriate behaviour in space to reduce the potential for
miscalculations”. 135

6.2

Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space
TreatyAt the Conference on Disarmament, Russia and China have been pushing for alegally-binding treaty on preventing an arms race in space since 2008, withan updated draft treaty proposed in 2014. 136 The proposals, in short, attempt
to prohibit states from:••••

Placing any weapons in outer space.
Resorting to the threat or use of force against outer space objects ofstates.
Engaging in outer space activities, as part of international cooperation,
inconsistent with the subject matter and the purpose of the treaty.
Assisting or inciting others to do the same.

While some experts believe this would prevent even ground-based antisatellite launches against a state’s own satellites, 137 others disagree and readthe treaty more narrowly. 138 In any case, the treaty still excludes the inherent
right of self-defence for states under Article 51 of the UN Charter, whichallows necessary and proportionate force in response to an armed attack,and so the treaty does not completely exclude the use of weapons in space
altogether.
As evidenced through the voting of General Assembly Resolution 76/23,
outlined above, the US, the UK and other aligned states do not support thisinitiative. It remains to be seen whether any progress will continue on thisinitiative, but for now the stalemate on developing the treaty seems topersist.

135

136

137

138

38

US, Department of Defence, Defence Space Strategy Summary, June 2020, at 2, 4, and 8. (Link
opens PDF)
For background, see: NTI, “PAROS Treaty: Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS)
Treaty”, accessed 5 January 2022.
Kuan-Wei Chen, Bayar Goswami, and Ram S. Jakhu, “Russia’s attack on its own satellite is recklessand endangers us all”, The Conversation [online], 18 November 2021.
Erin Pobjie, “The Threat from Outer Space: Russia Tests Kinetic DA-ASAT Weapon”, Just Security[online], 23 November 2021.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

International Regulation of Space

Further Reading
Library Briefings••

Commons Library Research Briefing CBP-9261, The militarisation of
space, 14 June 2021.
Commons Library Research Briefing CBP-9010, Principles of International
Law: a brief guide, 21 September 2020.

Other Sources
•

•

•
•
•
•

39

Paul Stephen Dempsey and Maria Manoli, “Suborbital flights and thedelimitation of air space vis-à-vis outer space: functionalism, spatialism
and state sovereignty”, 29 March 2018, UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/2018/CRP.9(Link opens PDF).
Jae Woon Lee, “Revisiting Freedom of Overflight in International Air Law:
Minimum Multilateralism in International Air Transport”, (2013) 38(4) Air
and Space Law 351
Stephen Gorove, “The Geostationary Orbit: Issues of Law and Policy”,(1979) 73(3) American Journal of International Law 444
Chloe Billing, “There’s a parking crisis in space – and you should be
worried about it”, The Conversation [online], 29 September 2017
Damian M. Bielicki, “Legal Aspects of Satellite Constellations”, (2020)45(3) Air and Space Law 245
Ram S. Jakhu, Bhupendra Jasani, Jonathan McDowell, “Critical issues
related to registration of space objects and transparency of space
activities”, (2017) 143 Acta Astronautica 406

Commons Library Research Briefing, 26 January 2022

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