Research Briefing
11 September 2024
By Library specialists

Israel-Hamas conflict: UK
response October 2023 to July
2024

Summary
1
Events in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories since 7
October
2 UK Government and opposition statements (to 5 July 2024)
3 Parliamentary votes in the UK
4 UK Government actions

commonslibrary.parliament.uk

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

Contents
1
Events in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories since 7
October9

1.1

Initial Hamas attacks against Israel

91.2

Israeli military actions in Gaza

10

1.3

Humanitarian situation and access

12

1.4

Situation in the West Bank

15

1.5

Pauses in fighting

16

1.6

Governing post-conflict Gaza

18

2

UK Government and opposition statements (to 5 July 2024)

23

2.1

Three UK priorities

23

2.2

Position on a ceasefire and Rafah offensive

24

2.3

Two-state solution and post-conflict Gaza

28

2.4

Israeli settler violence

31

2.5

International humanitarian law

32

2.6

Role of international courts

33

2.7

UK arms sales to Israel

37

2.8

Reports of sexual violence

39

2.9

Forced displacement of Palestinians

40

2.10 Palestinian visa scheme

41

2.11 Reports of potential deployment of UK forces42

2.12 British nationals in Gaza

44

3

Parliamentary votes in the UK

45

3.1

SNP opposition day, February 2024

45

3.2

King’s Speech debates, November 2023

46

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

3.3

Welsh Parliament/Senedd Cymru, 2023

46

3.4

Scottish Parliament motion, 2023

47

4UK Government actions

48

4.1

UK diplomatic activity

48

4.2

Deployment of UK military forces

49

4.3

UK humanitarian aid

50

4.4 UK support for Lebanon

51

4.5

New UK sanctions and visa restrictions

51

4.6

How has the UK voted at the UN?

53

4.7

Funding to combat antisemitism and anti-Muslim incidents

55

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

Summary
On 7 October 2023 the Palestinian group Hamas, officially designated aterrorist group by many countries including Israel, the United States, theEuropean Union and the United Kingdom, commenced an armed assault
against Israel. It launched several thousand rockets into Israel and conductedattacks in border areas, killing around 1,200 civilians and taking 253
hostages, as part of what it called “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood”.
In response, in October Israel conducted air strikes against Hamas in Gazaand launched a ground attack to “destroy Hamas’ governing and militarycapabilities and to bring the hostages home”. Hamas also continued to firerockets into Israel. On 24 June, the Israeli Prime Minister said that the“intense phase” of fighting in Gaza would end “very soon”.
This briefing provides information on the UK response from 7 October 2023 to
5 July 2024 (when a new UK Government took office), including activity at the
UN and statements from the government and opposition parties. The
Commons Library research briefing, 2023/24 Israel-Hamas conflict: US, UN,
EU and regional response details the international response to the conflict,including actions at the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justiceand International Criminal Court, and violence in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.

Ongoing hostilities and casualties
Fighting has been centred on southern Gaza and the Rafah crossing into
Egypt, where in May 2024 Israel announced it would conduct “limited”
operations against Hamas. It ordered the evacuation of more than 100,000
Palestinians from the eastern Rafah. An estimated 950,000 had left by July.
The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees estimated 1.7 million
people in Gaza (77% of its 2.2 million population) were displaced (to July).
Citing Israeli authorities, the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health andPalestinian civil defense, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA) says that from 7 October to 3 July 2024, more than 1,200
Israelis and foreign nationals were reported killed and 5,432 injured. At least
37,953 Palestinians were reported killed, a further 10,000 were missing or
under rubble, and about 87,266 injured across Gaza and Israel.
There were also ongoing hostilities between Israel and Iran-aligned Hezbollah(also a proscribed terrorist group in the UK) in Lebanon and northern Israel.
Other Iran-supported groups such as the Houthis in Yemen and Shia militias in5

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

Iraq and Syria have launched attacks on civilian shipping and against US andIsraeli targets.
On 13 April 2024 Iran launched its first direct attack on Israel. It said this wasin retaliation for an attack on its consulate in Syria, launching 330 drones andmissiles (of which 99% were intercepted).

Pauses in fighting and ceasefire proposals
From 24 November to 1 December, a pause took place to enable the release of
hostages. Before the pause began, Israel said it would last no longer than 10days and that fighting would then resume. The pause enabled the release of
110 hostages from Gaza and 240 Palestinian prisoners from Israel.
UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2728, passed in March 2024, whichcalled for an immediate ceasefire and release of hostages during Ramadan,
and which the UK supported, was not implemented. Israel criticized theresolution for failing to condemn Hamas and argued it gave Hamas “hopethat international pressure will force a ceasefire without the release of ourhostages”. The Palestinian Authority called for an immediate ceasefire.
On 10 June the UNSC passed a resolution introduced by the United States for athree-stage plan to end the conflict, backed by Israel. Its first stage includes
the release of many hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners in Israel,
an increase in aid, and withdrawal of Israeli forces from populated areas ofGaza. The UNSC called on Hamas and Israel to implement the agreement.
Israel said it remained committed to destroying Hamas in Gaza.

UK response (7 October 2023 to 5 July 2024)
Government advice for British nationals•

Any British nationals in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories
and Lebanon should register their presence with the UK Government. It
advised that all British nationals should leave Lebanon.

•

UK visa holders in Gaza who hold valid permission to enter or remain in
the UK for more than six months and have a spouse/partner or a childaged 17 or under in the UK can contact the UK for assistance to leave.

•

There were no exit routes for foreign nationals to leave Gaza. The UK
Government was working on alternatives with Israel, Egypt, and Jordan.

Military, diplomatic and humanitarian actions•

6

The UK Government deployed military assets to promote de-escalationand conduct surveillance activities. The government had not provided“lethal or military equipment” to Israel since 7 October.

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024•

UK military assets supported the defence of Israel against Iran in April.
The UK participated in Operation Prosperity Guardian to protect Red Sea
shipping from Houthi attacks and conducted four air strikes against thegroup alongside the United States from January to May 2024.

•

UK ministers met with countries in the region to discuss de-escalation. In
February 2024, then Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron said Iran must be“held accountable” for the actions of its proxy groups in the region.

•

In 2023/24, the UK provided over £100 million in aid to the Occupied
Palestinian Territories. None was directed via Hamas. In January 2024
the government said it would not announce future funding plans for
UNRWA before the completion of two UN reports into the agency
following allegations some of its staff were involved in the Hamas assaultof 7 October. Other political parties called for funding to be restored: see
the research briefing, UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Government and opposition statements on the conflict•Hamas: Prime Minister Rishi Sunak condemned the 7 October assault byHamas as a “pogrom” and said Hamas must release all hostages
unconditionally. He said Hamas can no longer be allowed to rule Gaza.

•

A major Israeli offensive in Rafah: In April Deputy Foreign Secretary
Andrew Mitchell said that “given the number of civilians” then in Rafah, it
was “not easy to see how such an offensive could be compliant withinternational humanitarian law in the current circumstances”. Labour
and the SNP opposed major actions in Rafah.

•International law: The government said it expected all parties to theconflict to comply and minimise civilian casualties. It raised theprotection of civilians “on every occasion” when meeting Israeli officials.
In March, the then Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Alicia Kearns,
raised concerns that Israel (as well as Hamas) was not compliant.
Former Attorney General Suella Braverman argued Israel was compliant.

•International Court of Justice: South Africa has brought a case against
Israel at the ICJ. In January, March, and May 2024, the ICJ issued
preliminary orders issued that called on Israel to increase aid into Gaza
and to minimise civilian casualties (among other measures). The UK
Government said it considered bringing the case “unhelpful”. It said
some of the preliminary orders, such as Hamas releasing hostages andfor more aid to enter Gaza, were things the UK had been calling for.

•

International Criminal Court (ICC): In May the ICC prosecutor applied tothe court’s judges for warrants against three Hamas leaders and two
Israeli government ministers (Mr Netanyahu and the defence minister).
The full press release details allegations against the specific individuals.
The UK has submitted a request to determine the ICC’s jurisdiction overIsraeli nationals. Prime Minister Sunak described the application as“deeply unhelpful” and said that there was “no moral equivalence”

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

between Israel and Hamas. Then shadow Foreign Secretary David
Lammy said that the UK should respect any ICC decision.
•Arms exports: The government said arms exports were kept under review
and assessed against the UK’s arms exports criteria, which include
ending a licence if there is a “clear risk” it might be used to “commit or
facilitate” a serious violation of international humanitarian law. The SNP
and Liberal Democrats called for UK arms to be suspended. In March2024 the Labour Party called for the government’s legal advice to bereleased and for UK arms not to be used in a Rafah offensive.

•

Displacement of Palestinians: In January 2024 the UK said there should
be no “forced displacement” from Gaza and that “Gaza is Occupied
Palestinian Territory and will be part of a future Palestinian state”.

•

Israeli settler violence: The UK condemned the violence in the West Bank.
In February and May, it announced visa restrictions against “extremist
Israeli settlers”. Mr Netanyahu has condemned the violence.

•

Post-conflict Gaza: Priorities for the UK included establishing a “credible
and irreversible pathway towards a two-state solution” and reforms to
the Palestinian Authority. In April the government said ensuring Hamas is
not in control of Gaza was “essential and unavoidable” for peace.

•Two-state solution: The government supported “a Palestinian state […]alongside a safe and secure Israel”. In January, it said it would recognisea Palestinian state when judged to “best serve the objective of peace”.

Statements on a ceasefire•

In December, the government announced it would support a “sustainableceasefire” as a pathway to a “sustainable peace”. Such a ceasefire
includes the release of hostages, aid delivery, and for Hamas to nolonger pose a threat to Israel. It argued a ceasefire otherwise was“implausible” as it requires both sides to agree.

•

In March 2024, the UK voted in favour of a UN Security Council resolution
for a ceasefire and release of hostages during Ramadan and in June for
the American resolution on a three-stage plan to end the conflict.

•

The government also supported more temporary “humanitarian pauses”
for the delivery of aid and the release of hostages.

•

In February 2024, the Labour Party called for an “immediatehumanitarian ceasefire”, having previously called for a “sustainableceasefire” and humanitarian pauses. The SNP called for an immediateceasefire. The Liberal Democrats supported an “immediate bilateralceasefire”.

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1

Events in Israel and the Occupied
Palestinian Territories since 7 OctoberThis is a summary of events from 7 October 2023 to 5 July 2024. It is notintended to provide detailed information on fast-moving events. Further
reading and resources on the conflict are provided at the end of this section.
During active conflicts, statistics and reports on specific events can bedifficult to verify. This is because journalists, researchers and civil society
organisations face challenges accessing conflict zones.
The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) publishes
updates on casualties. More information on how these figures are reported
and the challenges involved is provided in BBC Verify articles, How the deadare counted in Gaza (16 November 2023) and Why is the UN citing lower death
toll for women and children? (16 May 2024) and a Reuters article, How many
Palestinians have died in Gaza? Death toll explained (9 December 2023).

1.1

Initial Hamas attacks against Israel
On 7 October 2023, the Palestinian group Hamas, officially designated aterrorist organisation by the governments of Israel, the United States andUnited Kingdom, commenced an armed assault against Israel. 1
The group launched several thousand rockets into Israel, conducted attacks
in border areas, killing around 1,200 civilians, and took a reported 253
hostages, as part of what it called “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood”. 2
Hamas spokesperson Mohammed Deif, the commander-in-chief of the Izz adDin al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas’ military wing), said the attack against Israel
was “in response to the continued Israeli crimes against the Palestinian
people and violations at the Al-Aqsa Mosque”. 3
In response to the assault, on 8 October Israel’s security cabinet declared war
on Hamas and said it would launch “significant military activities” against it. 4

1

2

3
4

9

UK: Home Office, Islamist terrorist group Hamas banned in the UK, 26 November 2021 and HM
Treasury, Current list of designated persons: Counter terrorism (international), 16 June 2022, pp3-4
How Hamas duped Israel as it planned devastating attack, Reuters, 10 October 2023; Netanyahu
touts ‘initiative’ to free hostages in Gaza as pressure mounts, CNN, 22 January 2024
Security Council Report, The Middle East[…] emergency closed consultation, 7 October 2023
Security Council confirms Israel at war […], Times of Israel, 8 October 2023

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has condemned violence “onboth sides”. 5
The Palestinian Authority has had limited authority over Gaza following the2006 victory by Hamas in parliamentary elections. In 2007, fighting between
Hamas and Fatah (the majority party of the Palestinian Authority) resulted inHamas taking control of Gaza. 6

1.2

Israeli military actions in Gaza
Israeli Government statements on the conflict
Israel’s Government says it is seeking to secure the release of the hostages,
and to ensure “Gaza will never again serve as a launch pad for terrorism”. Itsays it is not seeking to occupy Gaza or to permanently displace its populationand is committed to conducting its operations in line with international law. 7
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has set out three aims for Israel in
Gaza: to destroy Hamas, to demilitarize Gaza (with Israel retaining security
responsibility), and to “deradicalize” Palestinian society (referring to achange in Palestinian leadership and the curriculum taught in schools). 8
In November 2023, Mr Netanyahu said that Israel had “not been successful” inminimising civilian casualties and said this was due to Hamas “doing
everything to keep them in harm’s way” (the UK and US Governments also
state Hamas embeds itself in the civilian population and uses “humanshields”). 9 Israel has also committed to “flood” Gaza with aid. 10
On 9 October 2023 Israel said it had recovered most of the Israeli territory
initially taken by Hamas.11
On 11 October 2023, Israel formed a cross-government war cabinet under theleadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. 12 In June, the cabinet wasdissolved. This followed the resignation of Benny Gantz, who had been in
opposition but had served as Minister without Portfolio since October. Mr

5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12

10

Palestinian President Abbas condemns violence against civilians, Reuters, 12 October 2023
A guide to Palestinian and other anti-Israeli factions, Foreign Policy, 10 October 2023
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hamas-Israel conflict 2023; FAQs (PDF), 6 December 2023
Benjamin Netanyahu: Our three prerequisites for peace, Wall Street Journal, 25 December 2023
Netanyahu says Israel “not successful” in minimizing civilian […], Sky News, 17 November 2023; PQ
4863 [Gaza: Israel]; 6 December 2023; US State Department, Press availability, 30 November 2023
Gallant says Israel plans to “flood Gaza with aid”, Times of Israel, 10 April 2024
A timeline of the surprise attack by Hamas on Israel, ABC News, updated 18 October 2023
Israel’s Netanyahu, Gantz reach deal to form emergency government, Al-Monitor, 11 October 2023

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

Gantz had said he would resign from the cabinet if the Prime Minister did notlay out a post-war plan for Gaza, including for civilian control, by early June. 13
On 28 October, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) commenced a groundoffensive in Gaza. The Israeli Government said it aims to “destroy Hamas’
governing and military capabilities and to bring the hostages home”. 14
From 7 October to 10 June, the IDF estimated that more than 19,000 unguided
rockets were launched by Hamas and other groups, mostly from Gaza. 15
The Israeli Government contests the casualty figures released by the Hamascontrolled Ministry of Health and cited by UNOCHA. In May, the government
said the IDF had killed 14,000 terrorists and 16,000 civilians since 7 October. 16
In advance of the 28 October offensive, the Israeli Government told civilians toevacuate northern Gaza. 17 This action drew criticism from the UN Secretary
General, who called the evacuation order “dangerous and deeply troubling”
and for Israel to grant “unimpeded access for humanitarian aid” to Gaza. 18
On 8 January, the IDF said it had “completed the dismantling” of the Hamas
command structure in northern Gaza (though some fighting continues, and in
July the IDF instructed civilians to leave Gaza city). 19
On 6 May 2024, Israel announced it had launched “limited” military
operations in the Rafah governorate and ordered 100,000 civilians to leave. A
day later, it announced it had taken control of the Gaza side of the Rafah
crossing into Egypt. 20 Rafah is the only crossing point for civilians to leave
Gaza and a major point for delivery of aid. This crossing remains closed toaid, and Egypt has said it will not support its reopening unless there is
Palestinian control of the Gaza side. 21 Israel estimates that between 5,000
and 8,000 Hamas fighters are in Rafah, along with the hostages taken on 7
October. 22
On 20 May, the IDF estimated that 950,000 Palestinians had left Rafah forother parts of Gaza, and that between 350,000 and 400,000 remained. 23
Governments of the UK, United States, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia are among
those to warn against a major Israeli offensive in Rafah (see section 2, for the

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23

11

Israeli war cabinet minister Benny Gantz quits emergency government, BBC News, 9 June 2024
Israel launches Gaza war’s second phase with ground operation[…], Reuters, 28 October 2023
Over 19,000 rockets fired into Israel since start of war […], Times of Israel, 10 June 2024
Israel publishes new civilian death toll in Gaza, Voice of America, 21 May 2024
Palestinians flee northern Gaza after Israel orders 1 million to evacuate […], AP, 13 October 2023
UN, Why Israel must reconsider its Gaza evacuation order, 13 October 2023
Hamas command in northern Gaza destroyed, Israel says, BBC News, 7 January 2024; Israel military
tells Gaza city resident to leave, BBC News, 10 July 2024
Gaza: Israel takes Rafah crossing as truce talks continue, BBC News, 7 May 2024
Egypt refuses to reopen Rafah crossing while Israel controls [...], The National News, 16 May 2024
Israel’s troops take control of Rafah border crossing in Gaza, Bloomberg, 7 May 2024
IDF estimates 950,000 Gazans have evacuated from Rafah […], Times of Israel, 20 May 20254

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

UK). 24 The Egyptian Government opposes any movement of Palestinian
refugees into Egypt from Gaza, including on a temporary basis.25
On 31 May, President Biden said that Hamas was “no longer capable ofcarrying out another October 7”, which had been “Israel’s main objective” inthe conflict. He said that as the threat to Israel’s security had been
diminished, it was possible to move toward a three-stage resolution to theconflict (see below, section 1.5, for details). 26 Israeli and American officials
estimated in May that the number of Hamas fighters had been reduced frombetween 20,000 to 25,000 before the conflict to between 9,000 and 12,000. 27
On 24 June, Mr Netanyahu said that the “intense phase” of fighting in Gaza
would end “very soon” but the conflict would not end while Hamas remains incontrol of parts of Gaza. 28 His national security adviser also said the conflict
could continue until at least the end of 2024. 29

1.3

Humanitarian situation and access
Situation reports and famine warnings by UN agencies
Gaza is heavily dependent on Israeli energy and water. 30 On 9 October,
Defence Minister Yoav Gallant had said there would be a “total siege”, with noelectricity, water, food, or fuel, though these goods have subsequently been
allowed to enter.31 From November 2023, Israel has allowed in limited
amounts of fuel to support the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian
Refugees (UNRWA). The agency said a lack of fuel had hindered its work. 32
In July, Israel said it had begun work to connect the Israeli electricity grid witha water desalination plant in Gaza. This was reportedly the first time Israel
has connected Gaza to its electricity since the start of the conflict. 33
UN agencies have reported fighting, military operations, or air strikes in andaround hospitals, schools, and places of shelter in Gaza. Around 77% ofGaza’s 2.2 million population were displaced within the strip (as of June). 34
In June 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) reported
a “high risk” of famine across the whole of Gaza if the conflict continues and
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

32
33
34

12

Netanyahu insists on Rafah offensive as warnings mount, BBC News, 11 February 2024
UN warns of ‘slaughter’, BBC News, 14 February 2024
White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East, 31 May 2024
Diminished Hamas switches to full insurgent mode, Reuters, 6 June 2024
Netanyahu says war in Gaza is winding down […], The Telegraph, 24 June 2024
Fighting in Gaza will continue for at least another seven months, Jerusalem Post, 29 May 2024
Unicef, The Gaza Strip. The humanitarian impact of 15 years of blockade, June 2022
Defence Minister announces ‘complete siege’ of Gaza […], Times of Israel, 9 October 2023; UN says
fuel shortages will halt Gaza aid operations within a day, CNN, 26 October 2023
Israel to allow some fuel into Gaza after US push-officials, Reuters, 18 November 2023
Israel connecting Gaza to electricity grid, BBC Monitoring, 3 July 2024
UNRWA, Gaza and the West Bank, including east Jerusalem: situation report 116, 26 June 2024

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

aid access is restricted. It reported that 495,000 people were in phase 5 offood insecurity (classed as “catastrophe/famine” in the IPC’s food insecurity
scale (PDF). It said 96% of the population of Gaza (2.15 million) faced “highlevels of acute food insecurity” through to September 2024. 35
In May, the director of the World Food Programme said that there was a “fullblown famine” in northern Gaza. 36 Israel argued that the IPC report had
methodological weaknesses and says it places no limits on the amount of aid,
including food, that can enter Gaza. 37
In April, the World Bank and UN issued an interim assessment of damage inGaza, covering the period from 7 October to 31 January 2024. It estimatedthat around 84% of health facilities and 57% of water, sanitation and hygiene
infrastructure had been damaged or destroyed. 38 In June 2024, theInternational Labour Organization estimated that gross domestic product inGaza contracted by 84% since 7 October and unemployment risen to 79%. 39
In January 2024, alongside other donors including the EU and US, the UK
suspended its aid to UNRWA in response to reports that “several” of its staff
were involved in the 7 October Hamas assault. 40
The first of two UN investigations reported in April 2024, and the European
Union, among others, has now restored its funding. Section 2 of the Commons
Library research briefing, UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip: FAQs,
provides more information and the international response.

Humanitarian access to Gaza
There are five main crossing points into Gaza: Rafah, “Gate 96”, West Erez,and Erez crossings, which are primarily used for people. The fifth maincrossing, Kerem Shalom, is used to transmit goods between Israel and Gaza:•

Rafah crossing: Egypt has restricted movement at Rafah since Hamas
took control of Gaza in 2007. Access to the crossing was initially limited
after 7 October 2023, though the Egyptian Government said the crossing
was not officially closed but became inoperable due to the Israeli air
strikes on the Gaza side. 41 On 18 October Israel agreed to Rafah’s
reopening for humanitarian aid only.42
Since the Israeli offensive in Rafah in May, the crossing has been closed. 43

35
36
37

38
39
40
41
42
43

13

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, Gaza: Acute food insecurity situation, 25 June 2024
The UN says there’s a “full blown famine” in northern Gaza […], AP, 6 May 2024
“Multiple factual flaws”: Israel contests UN-backed report […], Times of Israel, 30 March 2024;
Israeli Government, Swords of Iron: Humanitarian efforts, updated 7 May 2024
World Bank and UN, Interim damage assessment: Gaza, 2 April 2024, pp10, 12, 15, 17International Labour Organization, Impact of the war in Gaza […], bulletin no 4, 7 June 2024
Commons Library research briefing, UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip: FAQs, section 2.5
Gaza aid arrives at border crossing but no plan for delivery yet, Reuters, 17 October 2023
Israel will let Egypt deliver some aid to Gaza […], AP, 18 October 2023
Aid to Gaza choked off as border crossings closed, VOA, 7 May 2024

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024•

Kerem Shalom: On 17 December, Kerem Shalom was opened to aid.44 UN
Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Martin Griffiths
described it as “the only crossing” able to “process a sufficiently large
number of [aid] trucks”. 45•

Erez crossing: Israel says the first deliveries took place through thecrossing on 11 April. It can handle up to fifty trucks per day.46 On 12 May,
Israel said it had opened an additional crossing at western Erez. 47•“Gate 96”: In March, this crossing in northern Gaza was opened to aid. 48

In addition to these crossings, Israel agreed to open its port at Ashdod tohumanitarian aid from mid-April. 49 The UK also supported the US-ledconstruction of a temporary pier off Gaza. This was completed in early May
and allows up to 150 trucks a day to enter Gaza with aid. It closed in July. 50
The pause from 24 November to 1 December allowed an increased amount of
aid to be delivered (see below for the information on the pause). However, theUN, UK and others continue to report that insufficient humanitarian supplies
are currently being delivered into Gaza. 51 Israel has pledged to support anincrease in deliveries. 52
In June the UNOCHA said access constraints, fighting, food insecurity anddeteriorating health issues had made it difficult to deliver aid across Gaza.
The closure of the Rafah crossing since the Israeli offensive and “challenges inretrieving field in Kerem Shalom”, it said, were leading to “major fuelshortages”, affecting water, sanitation, health, and other facilities. 53
Section 1.3 of the Commons Library briefing, UK aid to the West Bank andGaza Strip, provides information on the UK assessment on access andchanges it wants Israel to implement to increase the delivery of aid.

44
45
46

47
48
49
50

51

52

53

14

Aid enters Gaza through Israel’s Kerem Shalom crossing […], Reuters, 17 December 2023
UNOCHA, Briefing to the Security Council on the situation in the Middle East, 30 October 2023
Israeli military says first aid trucks entered Gaza […], Reuters, 12 April 2024; Is Israel meetingpromise to let more aid into Gaza?, BBC News, 12 April 2024
Gaza war: UN hopes for new Western Erez aid crossing, BBC News, 13 May 2024
Gate 96, the new crossing where aid struggles to get in, BBC News, 25 March 2024
Humanitarian aid enters Gaza Strip via Ashdod [...], Times of Israel, 17 April 2024
Ministry of Defence, Royal Navy ship joints international effort […], 26 April 2024; US Defense
Department, Aid to flow to Gaza via land route […], 18 July 2024
Blinken urges Israel to increase humanitarian aid to Gaza, Axios, 29 April 2024; Foreign,
Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), Israel must act now to let aid through and save
lives in Gaza, 12 January 2024; UN, Senior coordinator for Gaza aid tells Security Council, 24 April
2024
UNOCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel, 6 May 2024, Gallant: We’ll flood Gaza with far
more than 500 trucks of aid per day, The Jerusalem Post, 10 April 2024
UN, Aid constraints and health issues persist […], 28 June 2024; UNRWA, Situation report 115, 26
June 2024

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

1.4

Situation in the West Bank
Violence is ongoing in the West Bank. UNOCHA reports that 2023 was the“deadliest year” for Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank since it began
recording casualties in 2005 (with 36 Israeli and 506 Palestinian deaths). 54
In 2024, UNOCHA report ongoing search-and-arrest operations by the IDF,
and confrontations and demonstrations, resulting in deaths and injuries. 55
In February 2024, the US said the West Bank has seen “unprecedented levelsof violence by Israeli extremist settlers targeting Palestinians” and “violence
by Palestinian extremist militants against Israeli civilians”. 56 UNOCHA statesthat in 2023 there were 1,229 incidents involving Israeli settlers in the West
Bank, including East Jerusalem, that resulted in damage or Palestiniancasualties. This was the highest total since it began collecting data in 2006. 57
UNOCHA also states that from 7 October 2023 to 24 June, 536 Palestinians
were killed in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. This included 519 byIsraeli forces, ten by settlers, and seven where it remains unknown. It says itrecorded 1,108 settler attacks. During the same period, UNOCHA reported 12
Israelis (seven soldiers and five settlers) were killed by Palestinians. Attacks
by Palestinians from the West Bank in Israel also killed eight Israelis as well
as four of the Palestinian perpetrators. 58
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has condemned settler violencebut said “accusations against the settlement movement [are] baseless” andare unrepresentative of settlers. The UK has called on the Israeli Government
to “take immediate and concrete steps” against violence by settlers (seesection 4.5). 59
In March 2024, the Israeli Government also approved plans for new
settlements in the West Bank, the first approved since June 2023. 60
In response to the decisions of Norway, Spain, Ireland, and Slovenia torecognise a Palestinian state in June 2024, Israel also said it would take steps
to “strengthen settlement” in the West Bank. 61 On 28 June, the Israeli security
cabinet legalised five outposts (settlements) in the West Bank and cancelledsome exit visas for Palestinian Authority officials (among other measures). 62

54
55
56
57
58
59
60

61
62

15

UNOCHA, Hostilities in Gaza Strip and Israel, flash update 80, 30 December 2023
UNOCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel, flash update 111, 5 February 2024
US DoS, Department press briefing, 1 February 2024
UNOCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel, flash update 94, 16 January 2024
UNOCHA, Humanitarian situation update 183, West Bank, 28 June 2024
PM pans West Bank attacks by “handful of extremists”, Times of Israel, 9 November 2023
Israel approves plans for 3,400 new homes […], BBC News, 6 March 2024, Israel unveils big WestBank land seizure […], France 24, 22 March 2024
Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, Announcement, 17 June 2024
Security cabinet okay legalising 5 outposts, Times of Israel, 28 June 2024

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

The Palestinian Authority criticised the settlement legalisation as a“deliberate sabotage” to implementing a two-state solution. 63
The US has said Israeli settlements in the West Bank are “inconsistent” withinternational law.64 The UK Government criticised the March and Juneannouncements and reiterated its position that settlements are “illegal underinternational law” and that settlement expansion should be halted.65

What has the Palestinian Authority said on the conflict?
The Palestinian Authority, led by Mahmoud Abbas, is based in the West Bank.
It is dominated by Fatah, and has not governed Gaza since 2007, when Hamas
took control after winning the 2006 Palestinian elections and expelled Fatah
following fighting with the group in 2007. 66
Following the Hamas assault of 7 October 2023, President Abbas said he“reject[s] the practices of killing civilians or abusing them on both sides
because they contravene morals, religion and international law”. He also said
the Palestinian Authority “renounce[s] violence” as a means to “achieve ournational goals”. 67 The Authority has continued to call for a ceasefire, and forPalestinian statehood to be recognised, including at the United Nations. 68
The UK and United States support a role for the Palestinian Authority ingoverning post-conflict Gaza (see below, section 1.6) but expect it to carry out
reforms.

1.5

Pauses in fighting
Announcement of “tactical, local pauses”
On 9 November, the White House said Israel would begin four-hour pauses in
its military operations in northern Gaza. The Israeli Defence Forces said theseare “tactical, local pauses” for the delivery of humanitarian aid and do notconstitute a ceasefire. 69 Mr Netanyahu said Israel would not agree to aceasefire until hostages are released.70

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

16

Palestinians condemn Israel’s plan to legalise West Bank settlements, BBC Monitoring, 29 June 2024
Blinken reverses Trump-era policy on Israeli settlements, Axios, 23 February 2024
PQ 15936 [Israeli settlements], 1 March 2024; FCDO, Five outposts to be legalised […], 30 June 2024
Council on Foreign Relations, Who governs the Palestinians?, 19 March 2024
President Abbas discuses with King of Jordan […], WAFA, 12 October 2023
Granting Palestine full membership in the UN […], WAFA, 18 April 2024
Israeli army says allowing “humanitarian pauses” in Gaza, BBC Monitoring, 9 November 2023
Israel open to ‘tactical little pauses’ to let aid into Gaza, Netanyahu says, Politico, 7 November 2023

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

In June, the IDF announced they would hold a daily “tactical pause” infighting along a southern Gaza road to facilitate the delivery of aid from
Kerem Shalom. It said this was additional to other humanitarian efforts andpauses it had implemented and is in response to provisional orders issued by
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Some Israeli government ministers
criticised the announcement. The defence minister approved the move. 71

November 2023 pause for the release of hostages
Following mediation by Qatar and Egypt, a pause in fighting took place from24 November to 1 December 2023 to allow for the release of hostages inexchange for Palestinian prisoners in Israel. Hamas released 105 hostages
from Gaza and Israel released 240 Palestinians from Israeli prisons. 72
The number of hostages who are alive is uncertain. According to the WallStreet Journal, as of 20 June unnamed US officials said that of an estimated116 people still held captive, 66 were thought to have died (an additional four
people were taken hostage in 2014 and 2015 also remain captive).73
Before the November 2023 pause, the Israeli Government said it would last no
longer than ten days from the date of release of the first hostage. 74 Whenfighting resumed, the government said it was committed to “releasing the
hostages, eliminating Hamas and ensuring Gaza never again constitutes athreat” to Israel. 75 The agreement allowed more fuel and humanitarian aid
into Gaza: on the first day of the pause, the UN said the “biggest
humanitarian convoy” since 7 October had been delivered to the UNRWA’s
reception point in Gaza. 76

No ceasefire during Ramadan 2024
Following the UN Security Council vote in March 2024 on Resolution 2728
demanding a ceasefire during the month of Ramadan and the immediate
release of all hostages held by Hamas, the Israeli Government said its military
actions will continue. No pause in fighting took place. 77

Proposed three-stage resolution, May/June 2024
On 31 May, President Biden announced a three-phase agreement, which hesaid Israel had proposed and Qatar had passed to Hamas. Stage 1 would
allow for the release of some hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners,a full ceasefire, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from populated areas of
71
72

73

74
75
76
77

17

Israel’s plan for ‘tactical pause’ for aid raises questions […], CNN, 17 June 2024
Gaza truce extension faltered over terms of prisoner-hostage exchange, New York Times, 1
December 2023
Families of hostages in Gaza are desperate for news […], Wall Street Journal, 20 June 2024; Hamas
hostages: Stories of the people taken from Israel, BBC News, 8 June 2024
Cabinet decision on hostage deal published […], Times of Israel, 22 November 2023
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Prime Minister’s Office, 1 December 2023
UN, UN delivers more aid into Gaza on first day of humanitarian pause, 24 November 2023
UN, Security council passes resolution demanding ‘an immediate ceasefire’, 25 March 2024

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

Gaza; the exchange of all remaining hostages, complete Israeli withdrawal
from Gaza, and the “cessation of hostilities permanently” (stage 2); and aplan for reconstruction of Gaza (stage 3). 78
The plan was supported by the UN Security Council in June, which called on
Israel and Hamas to implement it. Hamas said it was ready for negotiations
and Mr Netanyahu said he was open to a “partial pause” to enable therelease of hostages. Members of his government have said they will resign if
the conflict ends without the defeat of Hamas. 79
To date, the plan has not been implemented. Section 2.2 of the Commons
Library research briefing, 2023/24 Israel-Hamas conflict: US, UN, EU andregional response, has information on the UN resolution and response.
Previously, Hamas has been requesting a permanent ceasefire, the fullwithdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza and the return of displaced
Palestinians. 80 In February, Mr Netanyahu described these conditions as“delusional” and said that Israeli forces must remain to secure the release of
hostages and destroy Hamas. 81
Israel has been opposed to any agreement that allows Hamas to retain
control of Gaza and continue to threaten its security. 82

1.6

Governing post-conflict Gaza
Statements by Israeli Government and Parliament
The Israeli Government, alongside governments such as those of the US andUK, state that Hamas cannot play any role in the government of post-conflict
Gaza. 83 In February 2024, Mr Netanyahu proposed a discussion plan to theIsraeli security cabinet on post-conflict Gaza. Reports suggest it included:•

Civilian management of Gaza by “local representatives” not affiliatedwith Hamas. The Palestinian Authority is not mentioned in the plan.

•

The closure of UNRWA and its replacement by other aid groups.

•

The demilitarisation of Gaza, save for weapons “necessary to maintainpublic order”, after which reconstruction will be carried out by countries“acceptable to Israel”.

White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East, 31 May 2024
Hamas accepts UN ceasefire resolution, ready to negotiate over details [...], Reuters, 11 June 2024;
Israeli ministers threaten to quit […], BBC News, 2 June 2024; PM says open to partial pause an
hostages deal […], Times of Israel, 24 June 2024
80
Hamas sticking to ceasefire conditions including Israeli Gaza pullout, Reuters, 4 April 2024
81
Netanyahu calls Hamas ceasefire proposal ‘delusional’, Reuters, 7 February 2024
82
“Sustainable calm” proposals splits Israel and Hamas, BBC News, 7 May 2024
83
Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, Statement by PM Netanyahu, 21 January 2024
78

79

18

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024•

An Israeli presence on the Gaza–Egypt border to prevent smuggling andthe creation of a border security zone on Israel’s border with Gaza. 84

Mr Netanyahu’s discussion plan followed four principles announced byIsrael’s Defence Minister, Yoav Gallant, in January. This plan also included
Israeli security control of Gaza and Egyptian-coordinated control of the Rafah
crossing. Mr Gallant said there would be no Israeli settlements established inGaza. However, some Israeli ministers have called for this and for the“voluntary emigration” of Palestinians from Gaza – a statement condemnedby the US and UK Governments, among others. 85
On 9 June, Minister without Portfolio Benny Gantz resigned from Israel’s war
cabinet. Previously in opposition, he joined the war cabinet shortly after 7
October. He had called on the Israeli Government to commit to a six-point
plan, including recovering the hostages taken from Israel, demilitarisingGaza, creating a civilian governance structure for post-conflict Gaza, andadvancing the normalisation of Israel-Saudi relations. 86 Mr Netanyahu
criticised the proposal as meaning “an end to the war and defeat for Israel”
and reiterated his opposition to the Palestinian Authority governing Gaza.87
In February 2024, both the Israeli Cabinet and Knesset (Parliament) approved
statements opposing unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state without
negotiation. The cabinet argued this would be an “unprecedent prize forterrorism and prevent any future peace agreement”. 88

Statements and actions of the Palestinian Authority
and Arab Gulf states
The Palestinian Authority has rejected the discussion plan put forward to theIsraeli security cabinet as “continuing Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian
territories and preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state”. 89 The
Authority has also said it is willing to govern in Gaza but not without a“political solution for the West Bank”. 90
In March 2024 the Palestinian Authority’s President Abbas appointed a new
Prime Minister, Mohammed Mustafa, and cabinet.91 Both the US and UK
welcomed the Prime Minister’s appointment and called for “credible and far-

84

85

86
87
88

89
90
91

19

No reconstruction in Gaza without demilitarisation, Axios, 22 February 2024; US Institute for Peace,
Plan for Gaza’s future highlights the challenges that lie ahead, 29 February 2024; Netanyahu
presents plan for post-war Gaza, BBC Monitoring, 23 February 2024
Israeli defence minister outlines plans for post-war Gaza, BBC Monitoring, 5 January 2024; US, UK,
France blast Israeli conference on Gaza resettlement, Times of Israel, 30 January 2024
Gantz sets 8 June deadline for PM to make postwar plan […], Times of Israel, 19 January 2024
Netanyahu: Gantz’s ultimatum abandons hostages […], Times of Israel, 18 May 2024
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PM Netanyahu’s remarks at the start of a government meeting, 18
February 2024 and Israel opposes ‘unilateral’ imposition, Reuters, 18 February 2024; Knesset votes
resoundingly […], Times of Israel, 22 February 2024
Palestinians reject Netanyahu’s plan for post-war Gaza, BBC Monitoring, 24 February 2024
Palestinian PM: We will not run Gaza without solution for West Bank, The Guardian, 29 October 2023
Palestinian Authority announces a new cabinet […], AP, 28 March 2024

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

reaching reforms”. 92 Both governments support a role for the Authority inGaza, subject to it making reforms. Hamas has criticised Mr Mustafa’s
appointment. 93
As set out in section 2.4 of the Commons Library on the 2023/24 Israel-Hamas
conflict: UN, US, EU and international response, the Palestinian Authority has
also sought to advance full Palestinian membership of the UN: the US vetoeda Security Council resolution to this effect in April. The UK abstained.
Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have said they will
not fund Gaza’s reconstruction until sufficient progress is made on a twostate solution. 94

Further resources on the situation in Gaza
The Commons Library briefing, 2023/24 Israel-Hamas conflict: UN, US, EU, andregional response provides more on the international response and activities ininternational organisations including the UN Security Council, International
Court of Justice and International Criminal Court.
Humanitarian situation, aid and maps•

UN Works and Relief Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), Gaza
emergency.

•

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA),
Occupied Palestinian Territories.

•

Commons Library research briefing, UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza
Strip: FAQs. Value and monitoring of UK aid, and the role of UNRWA.

•

Institute for the Study of War, Israel’s military operation in Gaza•

Financial Times, The Israel-Hamas war in maps: Latest updates

Fact checking services
Fact-checking services are monitoring video and other media. These include:•

BBC Verify. Reporting includes on the Al-Ahli Arab hospital explosion and
Israeli attacks in southern Gaza•

Channel 4 FactCheck. Reporting includes the Hamas attacks on civilians

92

93
94

20

Palestinian president appoints long-time adviser as prime minister, BBC News, 15 March 2024; HC
Deb, 26 March 2024, c1394; HC Deb, 12 March 2024, c139
Hamas criticises new Palestinian appointment, BBC Monitoring, 19 March 2024
Gulf states press for two-state roadmap, The Guardian, 13 December 2023

Commons Library Research Briefing, 11 September 2024

Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024•

Bellingcat. Netherlands-based investigative group. Reporting includes
Israeli strikes on Jabalia refugee camp targeted at Hamas•

Airwars. UK-based not for profit that assesses civilian harm incidents
alongside known sources, including in the 2023/24 conflict, using its
published methodology of recording and assessment

Background and analysis on the outlook for the Israel-Hamas conflict•Council on Foreign Relations, What is Hamas?, October 2023.

•

Washington Institute, The Israel-Hamas war 2023: FAQs, October 2023•

Center for Strategic and International Studies, The War in Gaza and thedeath of the two-state solution, 11 October 2023•

Washington Institute, How to keep Hamas from bouncing back, 9 January
2024•

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), In Gaza’s shadow: The Middle East in
2024, 10 January 2024•

RUSI, Gaza: The false allure of the Gallant plan, 23 January 2024•

RUSI, Israel and the West’s future reputational problem, 31 January 2024•

Carnegie Endowment, Governing Gaza after the war: Israeli debates andPalestinian debates, February 2024•

Middle East Institute, What is needed to end the war in Gaza?, 4 April 2024•

Italian Institute for International Political Studies, Will Israel and Hamas
ever find common ground for a deal?, 10 May 2024•

Chatham House, A Gaza ceasefire rests on preventing a full-scale Israeli
offensive in Rafah, 16 May 2024•

International Crisis Group, A Gaza ceasefire, 7 June 2024•

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, Q&A: Gaza’s global aftershocks,
11 July 2024

The West Bank and the Palestinian Authority•

Italian Institute for International Political Studies, The “other” wide of thewar: West Bank violence escalating, 23 November 2023•

International Crisis Group, With all eyes on Gaza, Israel tightens its grip on
the West Bank, 24 November 2023

21

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024•

Chatham House, Why the time is now for a Palestinian national unity
government, 28 November 2023•

Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Why an interim constitution could help
Palestine, 8 April 2024•

Washington Institute, West Bank economics are key to stabilising thePalestinian Authority—or forcing its collapse, 31 May 2024•

Foreign Affairs, Why Palestinian unity matters, 20 June 2024•

International Crisis Group, Meltdown looms for the West Bank’s financial
lifelines, 27 June 2024

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

2

UK Government and opposition
statements (to 5 July 2024)

Prime Minister Rishi Sunak delivered two statements to the Commons on theconflict, on 16 October and 23 October 2023. On 16 October, the Prime Minister
described the attack by Hamas against Israel as a “pogrom”. He said:•

The attack was a “fundamental challenge to any idea of co-existence”
which he described as “essential” to peace and stability in the region.

•

Israel had an “absolute” right to defend itself and secure the release of
hostages, in line with international humanitarian law.

•

The UK would call upon Israel to take “every possible precaution to avoid
harming civilians”. 95

For a full list of parliamentary proceedings on the Israel-Hamas conflict, see
the House of Commons Library research briefing, Israel and the Occupied
Palestinian Territories: A parliamentary reading list, 2020-July 2024, 2024.

2.1

Three UK priorities
On 16 October Prime Minister Sunak said the UK response had three elements:•

Working to prevent further escalation and threats against Israel throughdeploying UK forces to monitor and provide regional surveillance (seesection 4.2). He said the UK would not intervene militarily in Gaza.

•

Increasing humanitarian aid for the Occupied Palestinian Territories andcalling for humanitarian access to Gaza (see section 4.3).

•

Working diplomatically to support stability in the region, including for a
two-state solution (see section 4.1 for diplomatic contact). 96

95
96

23

HC Deb, 16 October 2023, cc24-5
HC Deb, 16 October 2023, cc24-5

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

2.2

Position on a ceasefire and Rafah offensive
Vote at the UN Security Council (UNSC) for a threestage resolution to the conflict in June 2024
In June 2024 the UK voted in favour of a UNSC resolution calling on Israel andHamas to implement a three-stage resolution to the conflict. Stage one
includes the release of some hostages in exchange for some Palestinian
prisoners held in Israel, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from populated areasof Gaza, and a “full, immediate and complete” ceasefire.97
Earlier in 2024, in March, the UK Government had backed a binding UNSC
Resolution which demanded an immediate ceasefire during the month of
Ramadan and the immediate release of hostages by Hamas (see section 4.6).
The government said its support for the resolution was in line with its previous
statements for an “immediate, sustained humanitarian pause” to enable therelease of hostages and delivery of aid, leading to a “sustainable ceasefire”. 98
Its position remained that Hamas cannot control of Gaza after the conflict. 99

Opposition to a full Israeli Rafah offensive
In an April 2024 statement issued by the G7 (Canada, the US, UK, Germany,
France, Japan, Italy, and the European Union), the UK set out its opposition toa “full scale” Israeli offensive in Gaza and called for civilians to be protected:
We reiterate our opposition to a full scale military operation in Rafah thatwould have catastrophic consequences on the civilian population. We reiterate
our call for a credible and actionable plan to protect the civilian population
there and address their humanitarian needs. We are deeply concerned by theinternal displacement within Gaza and the risk of forcible displacement from
Gaza. 100

Speaking in the Commons on 30 April, Deputy Foreign Secretary Andrew
Mitchell said that:
Given the number of civilians sheltering in Rafah, it is not easy to see how suchan offensive could be compliant with international humanitarian law in thecurrent circumstances. 101

Earlier in April, the Foreign Secretary said the UK was discussing a “plan B” inthe event of fighting in Rafah, focused on the delivery of aid:

UN, Security Council adopts US resolution calling for “immediate, full and complete ceasefire”, 10
June 2024
98
HL Deb, 26 March 2024, c610; FCDO, Humanitarian situation in Gaza: the UK government’s response,
last updated 8 April 2024
99
FCDO, UNSC adopts resolution on proposed ceasefire […], 10 June 2024
100
FCDO, G7 Foreign Minister’s meeting communiqué, 19 April 2024 ‘conflict in Gaza’101
HC Deb, 30 April 2024, c141
97

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

We have a very clear plan A for how we bring this conflict to an end: we have a
temporary pause; we turn that into a sustainable ceasefire; we see Hamas
leaders removed from Gaza; we see the terrorist infrastructure taken
down. That is the way to have a political process that brings the war to an
end.
But we have to be aware if that doesn’t work, we have to think about what isplan B, what can humanitarian and other organizations do to make sure that if
there is a conflict in Rafah, that people can achieve safety, they can get food,they can get water, they can get medicine, and people are kept safe. 102

Following the statement of President Biden that the US would halt theprovision of certain munitions to Israel if it carried out a major offensive inRafah (see above, section 1—one shipment to date has been paused), on 9
May the Foreign Secretary, Lord Cameron, said there was a “fundamental
difference” between the British and American situations:
The US is a massive state supplier of weapons to Israel. We do not have a UK
Government supply of weapons to Israel, we have a number of licences, and I
think our defence exports to Israel are responsible for significantly less than 1%of their total. That is a big difference. 103

In response to what Israel described as a “limited” operation in eastern
Rafah, on 7 May 2024 the Deputy Foreign Secretary said:
our position has been consistent. We are deeply concerned about the prospectof a military incursion, given the number of civilians who are sheltering there
and the importance of that entry point for aid. Entry points for humanitarianaid, including Kerem Shalom, must be reopened quickly to allow aid in. Israel
must facilitate immediate, uninterrupted humanitarian access in the south,
especially the entry of fuel, and ensure the protection of civilians and safe
passage for those who wish to leave Rafah. As yet, we have not seen a credible
plan to protect civilians. 104

He also said that Israel’s “rightful aim of defeating Hamas will not be
achieved by allowing a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza”. 105 He also
reiterated that “Israel has the right to self-defence and to take proportionate
action to recover hostages”. 106
When Israeli Defence Forces captured the Rafah crossing between Gaza andEgypt in May 2024, the UK Government called for the crossing’s reopening toallow in aid (the crossing remains closed—see above, section 1). 107

102
103
104
105
106
107

25

US Department of State, Secretary Antony Blinken and UK Foreign Secretary, 9 April 2024
The UK system of arms exports to Israel not the same as US […], Reuters, 9 May 2024
HC Deb, 7 May 2024, c443
HC Deb, 7 May 2024, c450
HC Deb, 7 May 2024, c452
FCDO, We urge Israel to let humanitarian aid enter Gaza […], 25 May 2024

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

Statements on a “sustained humanitarian pause”
The government has opposed calls for an “immediate ceasefire”, arguing
instead that the ceasefire should be a “sustainable one. 108
In December 2023, the Prime Minister said “a ceasefire is clearly not going tolast if hostages are still being held […] and if Hamas, whose stated aim is todestroy Israel, are still able to operate […]”. He said a sustainable ceasefire
would first require the release of hostages and more aid into Gaza. 109
In the same month, Deputy Foreign Secretary Andrew Mitchell also noted in
responses to parliamentary questions on the government’s position on aceasefire that Hamas wants to “repeat what happened on 7 October” andIsrael has “an absolute right of self-defence to go after the people who
perpetrated those terrible events” on 7 October. 110
He also said that “a ceasefire is wholly implausible”, saying that “Hamas
would not agree to one” and that “we have to have two sides that are willingto sign up to a ceasefire and there is absolutely no suggestion, at any point,that either of them will”. 111
The Deputy Foreign Secretary also said it was “much more sensible to try to
get these humanitarian pauses, where we have seen some success […]”. 112

Support for further humanitarian pauses in fighting
The government has backed pauses to allow for aid to be delivered, therelease of hostages and for British nationals and others to leave Gaza. 113
Following the pause in fighting which began on 24 November 2023, theMinister for the Middle East, Lord Ahmad, told the UN Security Council that it“should not be a one-off”, and should be built on. 114

Position of other UK parties on a ceasefire and Rafah
Labour Party
In February 2024 Keir Starmer called for an “immediate humanitarianceasefire”.115 He has also backed the Government’s call for a “sustainable

Lord Cameron and Annalena Baerbock, Why the UK and Germany back a sustainable ceasefire, The
Times, 16 December 2023
109
Liaison Committee, Oral evidence: Work of the Prime Minister, HC 419, 19 December 2023, Q18
110
HC Deb, 19 December 2023, c1246
111
HC Deb, 11 December 2023, cc615-17
112
HC Deb, 11 December 2023, cc615-17
113
HC Deb, 25 October 2023, c827
114
UN, World must not look away from the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza […], 29 November 22023
115
Labour calls for ‘immediate humanitarian ceasefire’ in Gaza, The Guardian, 20 February 2024
108

26

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

ceasefire”, arguing it would act as a “a foot-in-the-door” to wider politicaltalks, including on a two-state solution. 116
In January 2024, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, said a“humanitarian truce is needed now” and it should lead to a “sustainableceasefire”.117 Labour also backed the proposal for a three-stage resolution to
the conflict, agreed to at the UN Security Council in June (see above). 118
On 7 May, on Israel’s Rafah operation, Mr Lammy said:
Labour has been clear for months that we oppose an offensive in Rafah, whichrisks catastrophic consequences. The United States has said that it would be adisaster, the European Union has said that the world must prevent it, and theUnited Nations Security Council has called for an immediate ceasefire.
Benjamin Netanyahu is ignoring the warnings of Israel’s allies and partners,
the United Kingdom included. 119

On 12 May, the Shadow Paymaster General, Jonathan Ashworth said he did
not want British-made weapons or components to be used in an offensive inRafah and UK arms to Israel that could be used in Rafah should be paused.
He said it was not unprecedented for the UK to suspend arms sales. 120
Scottish National Party
In November 2023, the SNP Leader in the Commons, Stephen Flynn, called foran “immediate ceasefire”. 121
In January 2024, First Minister Humza Yousaf renewed the SNP’s call for aceasefire and for the UK Government “to demand an end to ‘indiscriminate
attacks’” in Gaza. 122
SNP Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Brendan O’Hara has said the UK should beready to impose sanctions against Israel and ban arm sales to it if Israel
conducts its offensive. 123
Liberal Democrats
In November 2023, Liberal Democrat Leader Sir Ed Davey called for a“immediate bilateral ceasefire” between Israel and Hamas as a “steptowards peace”. 124 The Liberal Democrat Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, Layla

116
117
118
119
120
121
122

123
124

27

Rishi Sunak piles pressure on Israel […], The Independent, 18 December 2023
HC Deb, 8 January 2024, c24
David Lammy X/Twitter, UK Labour welcomes the UNSC passing the ceasefire […], 10 June 2024
HC Deb, 7 May 2024, c444
Labour expresses concern over Rafah offensive and UK arms, ITN, 12 May 2024
SNP, We want peace—the UK Government is failing to co-operate […], 14 November 2023
Scottish Government, First Minister urges UK to hold the Government of Israel to account, 5 January2024
HC Deb, 26 March 2024, c1397
Liberal Democrats, An immediate bilateral ceasefire in Israel and Gaza, 12 November 2023

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

Moran, said an offensive in Rafah would be “devastating” and called on the
Government to stop the offensive.125

2.3

Two-state solution and post-conflict Gaza
UK Government position
It is the long-standing position of successive UK Governments to support a
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with a “safe and secure
Israel living alongside a viable and sovereign Palestinian state; based on 1967
borders with agreed land swaps”. 126 On 23 October 2023, Mr Sunak said:
The truth is that, in recent years, energy has moved into other avenues such as
the Abraham accords and normalisation talks with Saudi Arabia. We support
those steps absolutely and believe that they can bolster wider efforts, but wemust never lose sight of how essential the two-state solution is. We will workwith our international partners to bring renewed energy and creativity to thateffort. It will rely on establishing more effective governance for Palestinian
territories in Gaza and the West Bank. It will also mean challenging actions
that undercut legitimate aspirations for Palestinian statehood. 127

Statements by Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron in 2024
On 29 January 2024 the BBC reported that Foreign Secretary Lord Cameronsuggested the UK could bring forward the moment when it recognises a
Palestinian state, from being part of a final peace agreement to earlier, as
part of the negotiations themselves. 128 In comments to the media he said:
What we’ve always said is we believe in a two-state solution […] as part ofthat, Britain, along with other countries, would recognise Palestine as acountry and recognise Palestine at the United Nations and what I’m saying is[…] that can’t come at the start of the process but it doesn’t have to be at thevery end of the process. It could be something we consider as this […] advanceto solution becomes more real. 129

He has also reiterated that a two-state solution is not possible while theleadership of Hamas remains in Gaza. 130
On 30 January 2024, the Deputy Foreign Secretary, Andrew Mitchell,reiterated that “there is no change” in policy and that the UK “will recognise a
Palestinian state at a time when it best serves the objective of peace. Bilateral
recognition alone cannot end the occupation”. 131

125
126
127
128
129
130
131

28

Layla Moran MP on Twitter/X, “A military offensive in Rafah […]”, 9 February 2024
UK Government response to e-petition, formally recognise the state of Palestine, 8 June 2021
HC Deb, 23 October 2023, c592.
UK considering recognising Palestinian state, Lord Cameron says, BBC News, 29 January 2024
Guardian on YouTube, David Cameron, UK could recognise a Palestinian state […], 2 February 2024
HC Deb, 12 March 2024, c914
HC Deb, 30 January 2024, cc705, 706

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

The Deputy Foreign Secretary said that both Israel and the Palestinian
Authority must take steps to support a two-state solution:
The Palestinian Authority (PA) has an important long-term role to play. We
already provide technical and practical support to the PA, and will work with
our allies to continue this, and do more. But the Palestinian Authority also
must take much needed steps on reform, including setting out a pathway to
democratic progress. And just as the PA must act, so must Israel, which means
releasing frozen funds, halting settlement expansion and holding to accountthose responsible for extremist settler violence. 132

He also said among the UK’s priorities for post-conflict Gaza was a “politicalhorizon” towards a two-state solution and a new Palestinian government:[…] a political horizon that provides a credible and irreversible pathway
towards a two-state solution; forming a new Palestinian government for theWest Bank and Gaza, accompanied by an international support package;
removing Hamas’s capacity to launch attacks against Israel; the release of all
Israeli hostages; and key Hamas leaders agreeing to leave Gaza.133

The government has also said that Gaza “will be part of a future Palestinianstate” and rejected suggestions that Palestinians be relocated:
Gaza is Occupied Palestinian Territory and will be part of a future Palestinianstate. The UK firmly rejects any suggestion of the resettlement of Palestinians
outside of Gaza. We share the concerns of our allies and partners that Gazans
should not be subject to forcible displacement or relocation from Gaza. 134

UK abstention on Palestinian membership of the UN
On 18 April 2024, the UN Security Council voted on a resolution recommendingthat the “State of Palestine be admitted to membership in the United
Nations”. The US vetoed the resolution, meaning it did not pass.
The UK and Switzerland abstained on the resolution, with all other members
voting in favour (including China, France, and Russia). 135 The UK
representative to the UN Security Council, Dame Barbara Woodward, said the
UK abstained because “we must keep our focus on securing an immediate
pause in order to get aid in and hostages out” and work towards asustainable ceasefire. 136
Section 2.4 of the Commons Library research briefing, 2023/24 Israel-Hamas
conflict: UN, US, EU and regional response provides more on the vote.

132
133
134
135
136

29

PQ 13351 [Israel: Palestinians], 16 February 2024
HC Deb, 29 January 2024, c620
FCDO, UK statement on the situation in Gaza, 3 January 2024
UN, Security Council fails to recommend full UN membership for State of Palestine, 18 April 2024
FCDO, We must start by fixing the immediate crisis in Gaza, 19 April 2024

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

Position of other UK parties on a two-state solution
Labour Party
The Shadow Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, has said a new UK special
envoy on the Middle East should be appointed to “recharge” negotiations on
a two-state solution, as a well as a “Western and Arab-led vehicle”
established to lead reconstruction and future talks on a two-state solution. 137
Mr Lammy has said a Labour government “will strive to recognise Palestine asa sovereign state, as part of efforts to contribute to securing a negotiatedtwo-state solution”. 138 Keir Starmer has said statehood “is not in the gift of aneighbour [Israel]. It is the inalienable right of the Palestinian people”. 139
Shadow Minister for the Middle East, Wayne David, has confirmed this is a
shift from the position under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership, arguing unilateralnegotiation of a Palestinian state by the UK would “count for very little”. 140
Scottish National Party
In November 2023 then First Minister Humza Yousaf called for the UK torecognise a Palestinian state as a means to “break, once and for all, thepolitical impasse” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 141 He argued that “it is
only with full recognition of Palestine, […] that we can truly move forward on
a two-state solution”. 142 First Minister, John Swinney, said the SNP would
bring forward a vote in the UK Parliament after the July general election if the
UK Government does not recognise a Palestinian state. 143
In the Commons, SNP Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Brendan O’Hara said
statehood is an “inalienable right, not a privilege conferred by others”. 144
Liberal Democrats
The Liberal Democrats have called for an immediate bilateral ceasefire to“point the way to two-states” and “provide space for a political solution”. 145
Its Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, Layla Moran, has presented a Private
Member’s Bill on UK recognition of a Palestinian state (see Palestinian
Statehood (Recognition) Bill 2023-24), arguing UK recognition would

137

138
139

140
141
142
143
144
145

30

David Lammy MP, Labour will work for a Palestinian state, The Guardian, 4 November 2023; David
Lammy, Labour will oppose expulsion of Palestinians […], The Guardian, 9 December 2023
David Lammy MP, Labour will work for a Palestinian state, 4 November 2023
Labour Party, Keir Starmer’s speech on the international situation […] , 31 October 2023; Labour
Party, Change: 2024 manifesto (PDF), pp124-5
Keir Starmer drops Corbyn-era policy […], The Jewish Chronicle, 15 January 2024
Scottish Government, Gaza and Israel: First Minister letter to UK Government, 21 November 2023
Scottish Government, Scottish Parliament votes for immediate […] ceasefire, 21 November 2023
SNP will force vote on Palestinian statehood, John Swinney says, The National, 28 May 2024
HC Deb, 30 January 2024, c704
Liberal Democrats, Israel-Gaza conflict, 13 November 2023

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

encourage other countries, including the United States, to act. 146 The party
says there should be “immediate recognition” of a Palestinian state.147

2.4

Israeli settler violence
The UK Government has condemned the violence by some Israeli settlers in
the West Bank. In December 2023, it said it would introduce restrictions on
perpetrators’ ability to enter the UK (see below, section 4.5).
In November 2023, the Minister for the Americas and the Caribbean, David
Rutley, said the government condemned violence against settlers by
Palestinians and that Israel must hold those responsible to account:
Our position is clear: we strongly condemn any incidence of violence against
settlers by Palestinians. Reports of Palestinian civilians being murdered bysettlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) are appalling. Israel
must take tangible steps to grip settler violence, and to hold those responsible
accountable. The Prime Minister and the former Foreign Secretary [James
Cleverly] have raised this with Prime Minister Netanyahu and [Israeli] Foreign
Minister Cohen, and we have also stressed the importance of the Israeli
security forces providing appropriate protection to the Palestinian civilian
population. 148

The UK issued a joint statement in December 2023 with the European Union
and 13 other states “call[ing] on Israel to take immediate and concrete steps
to tackle record high settler violence”. 149
It issued a similar statement with G7 states (the UK, US, Canada, Japan,
Germany, France, Italy, and the European Union) in April 2024. 150
In December 2023, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, also called
for “entry bans” on those engaged in “attacks [by Israeli settlers], serious
criminal activity or fostering hatred” in the West Bank. 151
In February 2024, Liberal Democrat Leader Sir Ed Davey said the UK should
impose sanctions on two Israeli ministers (finance minister Bezalel Smotrichand Itamar Ben-Gvir, the national security minister) for their support for
further Israeli settlements in the West Bank. 152

146
147
148
149
150
151
152

31

HC Deb, 17 March 2023, c1159
Liberal Democrats, For a fair deal: manifesto 2024, ‘international affairs’
PQ 892 [West Bank: violence], 20 November 2023
FCDO, Joint statement on West Bank settler violence, 15 December 2023
FCDO, G7 Foreign Minister’s meeting communiqué, 19 April 2024 ‘conflict in Gaza’
David Lammy MP, Labour will oppose expulsion of Palestinians […], The Guardian, 9 December 2023
UK should impose sanctions on two far-right Israeli ministers, says Ed Davey, The Guardian, 29
February 2024

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

2.5International humanitarian law
The UK Government supports Israel’s right to self-defence and to take military
action against Hamas in line with international humanitarian law. In
November 2023, Deputy Foreign Secretary Andrew Mitchell said:[…] The terrorists [Hamas] continue to launch rockets relentlessly at Israeli
homes and families. Their stated aim, repeated publicly in recent weeks, is thedestruction of the Israeli state and the eradication of its people. That is why
the [UK] Government unequivocally support Israel’s right to defend itself.
However, we have also repeatedly stressed that Israel must take every
precaution to minimise civilian casualties in line with international
humanitarian law. We continue to press Israel to ensure that its campaign istargeted against Hamas leaders, militants and military infrastructure. […]All parties to a conflict must ensure that their actions are proportionate andnecessary, affording innocent civilians the protection that is their right underinternational law. [...]. 153

In February 2024, Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron also said that Israel mustalso ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza:
Israel must obey international humanitarian law. Let us be clear: not only doesthat involve what the IDF does in terms of the way it prosecutes this war but, asIsrael is the occupying power in Gaza, it has to make sure that humanitarian
aid—food, water and shelter—is available to people in Gaza. If Israel does not
do that, it would be a breach of international humanitarian law as well. 154

The Foreign Secretary also said that the UK regularly raises international law
with the Israeli Government:
What we have done on every occasion of talking, whether to the Israeli Prime
Minister or President, or to Minister Dermer or Minister Gantz, […] is always
make the point that of course we believe Israel has a right to defend itself andto deal with the Hamas threat, but it has to do so within international
humanitarian law and it should try to avoid civilian casualties. We are veryclear that they needed to do better in the south than they did in the north. 155

As stated above, in section 2.2, the Deputy Foreign Secretary said in April
2024 that he considers it “not easy to see how such an offensive [by Israel inRafah given the number of displaced civilians] could be compliant withinternational humanitarian law in the current circumstances. 156

153
154
155
156

32

HC Deb, 8 November 2023, cc138-9
HL Deb, 13 February 2024, c141
Foreign Affairs Committee, Oral evidence, HC 325, 9 January 2024, Q625
HC Deb, 30 April 2024, c141

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

Statements by other parliamentarians
In December 2023, the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Alicia Kearns,
argued that Israeli actions in Gaza had “gone past self-defence” and that
“international law had been broken” by Israel (as well as by Hamas).157
In March 2024, the Chair said she believed that the Foreign Office hadreceived official legal advice concluding Israel is not demonstrating acommitment to international humanitarian law. In response, a Foreign Officespokesperson said government advice is “confidential” and it keeps thesituation under review. 158
In December 2023 former Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace, also argued that
“Israel’s original legal authority of self-defence is being undermined by its
own actions” in Gaza, including through “collective punishment and forced
movement of civilians”. 159
In February 2024, the Labour Shadow Secretary of State for Heath, Wes
Streeting, also argued that Israel’s actions were “beyond self-defence”. 160
Shadow Foreign Secretary David Lammy has called on the government topublish its advice on Israel’s adherence to international humanitarian law.
The government says there is a longstanding practice that such advice isconfidential. 161

2.6

Role of international courts
International Criminal Court (ICC)
The ICC is an international court (PDF) dedicated to prosecuting individuals
for “the most serious crimes of international concern”. It is a court of lastresort, complementing, but not replacing, local criminal courts. 162
As set out in section 3.1 of the Commons Library research briefing, 2023/24
Israel-Hamas conflict: UN, US, EU and regional response, the Palestinian
Authority subscribed to the court in 2015, and in 2021 the ICC launched aninvestigation into the situation in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.
Israel is not a member and rejects the ICC’s jurisdiction.

Israel has gone beyond self-defence in Gaza, Tory MP […] says, BBC News, 18 December 2023
UK government lawyers say Israel is breaking international law, The Guardian, 30 March 2024
159
Ben Wallace MP, Netanyahu’s tactics are weakening Israel, The Telegraph, 17 December 2023
160
Israel’s actions in Gaza have gone ‘beyond reasonable self defence’, The Independent, 19 February
2024
161
HC Deb, 26 March 2024, cc1395-6
162
Commons Library research briefing, Recent developments at the ICC, January 2021
157

158

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

The ICC investigation continues and in November 2023, the Chief Prosecutor of
the ICC, Karim Khan, said his office has “jurisdiction over current events in
Gaza and in the West Bank”. 163
The ICC’s jurisdiction is challenged by Israel, the United States, and the UK
Government. 164
In April 2024, Mr Mitchell confirmed the government’s position on the ICC’s
jurisdiction over the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories:
We do not think that the ICC has that jurisdiction, as was set out in the letter[by the former Prime Minister of April 2021], but it is a matter for the ICC
ultimately to reach a determination on that. 165

In the 2021 letter mentioned, then Prime Minister Boris Johnson said that while
the UK Government respects the court’s independence, it did “not accept that
the ICC has jurisdiction in this instance, given that Israel is not a party to the
Statute of Rome and Palestine is not a sovereign state”. 166
In response to parliamentary questions on whether the UK would share any
footage from its surveillance drones over Gaza (see section 4.2) with the ICC,Mr Mitchell said on 12 December that if evidence relating to international
humanitarian law was available it would be put before the “relevant
authority”:[…] it is not just Government but many different organisations that are seeking
to identify what is happening on the ground, and the extent to whichinternational humanitarian law is being abided with. Any such evidence willundoubtedly be put before the relevant authority—the courts that he [theMember] mentioned [the ICC], specifically—if such evidence is available. 167

On 4 December, the Minister for Europe and Central Asia, Leo Docherty, had
said the UK was not “at this stage” in a position to provide evidence to the ICC
on possible breaches of international humanitarian law, but that theGovernment will “continue to take note” of its work. 168
Application for warrants issued by ICC prosecutor, May 2024
In May 2024 the prosecutor of the ICC, Karim Khan, announced he would
apply to the court’s judges to issue warrants for the arrest of three Hamas
and two Israeli leaders. 169

Karim Khan in the Guardian, We are witnessing a pandemic of inhumanity: To halt the spread, wemust cling to the law, 10 November 2023
164
See Commons Library research briefing, 2023/24 Israel-Hamas conflict: UN, US, EU and regional
response, section 3
165
HC Deb, 30 April 2024, c138
166
Boris Johnson condemns ICC Palestine investigation as an “attack on Israel”, The Independent, 14
April 2021
167
HC Deb, 12 December 2023, c725, see also HC Deb, 5 December 2023, c216
168
HC Deb, 4 December 2023, c34
169This section from ICC, Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan [...], 20 May 2024
163

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

The two Israeli leaders were the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the
Defence Minister, Yoav Gallant. Mr Khan said he had “reasonable grounds” tobelieve that they “bore criminal responsibility for several war crimes andcrimes against humanity” in the 2023/24 conflict.
The full ICC press release details allegations against the specific individuals.
No decision on the application has been made.
After the request for warrants was issued, on 22 May 2024 Prime Minister Rishi
Sunak said that it was a “deeply unhelpful development” and that there is “nomoral equivalence” between Israel and Hamas:
when it comes to the ICC, this is a deeply unhelpful development, which ofcourse is still subject to a final decision. There is no moral equivalence
between a democratically elected Government exercising their lawful right toself-defence and the actions of a terrorist group, and the actions of the ICC doabsolutely nothing to get a pause in the fighting, or to get the hostages out or
aid in. 170

Speaking in the Lords, Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron also reiterated thegovernment’s position that it does not believe the ICC has jurisdiction and it
was “unhelpful” to negotiations for the release of hostages and ceasefire:
I do not believe for one moment that seeking these warrants will help get the
hostages out, help get aid in, or help deliver a sustainable ceasefire. As wehave said from the outset, because Israel is not a signatory to the Rome
statute, and because Palestine is not yet recognised as a state, we do not thinkthat the court has jurisdiction in this area.
I would go beyond that and say that, frankly, this is mistaken in terms of
position, timing and effect. To draw a moral equivalence between the Hamas
leadership and the democratically elected leader of Israel is just plain wrong.
It is not just Britain saying that; countries all over Europe and the world aresaying that. 171

In response to a question on how the government would ensure any breachesof the law in the conflict could be prosecuted if the UK does not believe the
ICC has jurisdiction, in May 2024 Deputy Foreign Secretary Andrew Mitchellsaid that it was “premature” to respond until the ICC had made its decision
about the warrant application. 172
On 10 June, the UK applied to the ICC to file an observation on whether the
court can exercise jurisdiction over Israeli nationals in the context of the
1990s Oslo Accords. The accords, signed between Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization, established the Palestinian Authority andgovernance arrangements over the Occupied Palestinian Territories (among
other elements). The UK submission noted that in a previous ICC case, thecourt had left a ruling on the interpretation of the Accords on Palestinianjurisdiction over Israeli nationals for a later stage. In response to the
HC Deb, 22 May 2024, c872
HL Deb, 22 May 2024, c945
172
HC Deb, 20 May 2024, c658
170
171

35

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

submission, the ICC said it will consider the request on its merits, and the UK
has a deadline of 12 July to submit written observations (later extended to 26
July). 173
On 20 May, Shadow Foreign Secretary David Lammy said Labour’s position
was that warrant decisions are matters for the ICC and that the UK, as an ICC
member, has a legal obligation to implement them (if issued):
Labour’s position is that the ICC chief prosecutor’s decision to apply for arrest
warrants is an independent matter for the Court and the prosecutor. […]Labour believes that the ICC’s independence must be upheld and respected,
and that it is right that the conduct of all parties is addressed by the Court [..]
Labour believes the UK and all parties to the Rome statute have a legal
obligation to comply with orders and warrants issued by the ICC. Democracies
that believe in the rule of law must submit themselves to it.[…]Labour supports the ICC as a cornerstone of the international legal system.
That support applies regardless of the Court’s focus, whether it is in Ukraine,
Sudan, Syria or Gaza. 174

Mr Lammy reiterated his position on 23 June, saying a Labour government“will comply” with any ICC warrants issued. 175
Both the Scottish National Party and Liberal Democrats have said the UK
should support the actions of the ICC. 176
For further information on the application and the Israeli, American andEuropean response, see section 3 of the Commons Library research briefing
2023/24 Israel-Hamas conflict: UN, US, EU and regional response.

The role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)The ICJ is the UN’s highest court and in January 2024 it issued a preliminary
order on Israel’s actions in Gaza in response to a case brought by South
Africa. Section 2.7 of the Commons Library research briefing, 2023/24 IsraelHamas conflict: UN, US, EU and regional response provides background on
the preliminary orders.
The UK Government argued South Africa’s case, brought under the 1948
Genocide Convention, is “provocative” and “not helpful in the goal of

ICC allows the UK to submit arguments on jurisdiction over Israel, Reuters, 27 June 2024; ICC,
Situation in the state of Palestine, pre-trial chamber I, No. ICC-01/18 (PDF), 27 June 2024
174
HC Deb, 20 May 2024, c657
175
Labour would comply with ICC arrest order for Netanyahu, Lammy reiterates, Guardian, 23 June
2024
176
HC Deb, 20 May 2024, cc649, 659
173

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

achieving a sustainable ceasefire”. It says Israel’s actions in Gaza “cannot be
described as genocide”.177 However, it says the ICJ ruling is “binding”. 178
Speaking in the Commons in January 2024, the Deputy Foreign Secretary
Andrew Mitchell said some of the court’s provisional measures were steps thegovernment had already raised, such as increased aid, the immediate releaseof hostages, and for all parties to be bound by international humanitarianlaw. 179 At the UN, the government reiterated its position that it is “for courts,
not governments, to determine genocide”.180
Labour’s Shadow Foreign Secretary said Israel “must now comply with theorders in [the] ruling in full” and that the orders “align closely” with theparty’s previous calls for a humanitarian truce and sustainable ceasefire. 181
The SNP’s Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, Brendan O’Hara, also called on the
UK Government to ensure Israel complies with court’s provisional measures. 182

2.7

UK arms sales to Israel
Value of UK arms sales to Israel
In May 2024 the Minister for Industry and Economic Security, Alan Mak, told
the Commons Business and Trade Committee that in 2022 the UK granted
licences for defence exports worth £42 million to Israel. This was 0.15% of the
UK’s total export licenses in 2022 and less than 1% of Israel’s defence imports.
He said the figures remained similar in the 12 months to June 2023 (£41
million) and that this was the “ballpark [yearly] average” since 2008. 183
Government statistics in June covering 7 October to 31 December 2023 statethat the value of UK-approved defence licenses to Israel was £860,000,
compared to £20 million in the same period in 2022. 184

UK arms licencing criteria
All arms exports are assessed against the UK’s strategic export licensing
criteria. There are eight criteria, detailed in sections 2 to 10 of the Commons
Library research briefing, UK amends its criteria for arms exports. These
include respecting human rights, determining if the provision of arms would

FCDO, ICJ interim ruling on South Africa vs Israel, 27 January 2024
PQ 14354 [Gaza: Israel], 21 February 2024
179
HC Deb, 29 January 2024, c621
180
FCDO, We continue to work intensively with the UN and partners […], 31 January 2024
181
Israel must comply with ‘profoundly serious ICJ ruling [...], The Independent, 26 January 2024
182
SNP urges Cameron to be on ‘right side of history’, ITV News, 28 January 2024
183
Business and Trade Committee, Oral evidence: UK arms exports to Israel, HC 690, 21 May 2024, Q46
184
UK approval of arms exports to Israel plunged at start of Gaza war, Reuters, 18 June 2024; Export
Control Joint Unit, Strategic export controls: licensing statistics, 13 June 2024
177

178

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

undermine peace and security, and whether provision would undermine UK
national security or that of allied countries.
The Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron has said all UK export licences, including
those to Israel, are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the licensing
criteria and are kept under review. 185
Data released in June 2024 covering licences between 7 October 2023 and 31
May 2024 states that 108 military and non-military licences were issued forexports to Israel. A total of 345 licences to sell arms to Israel exist (including
those issued before 7 October). No licences were rejected or revoked in thisperiod.186
Speaking on 12 May, the Foreign Secretary also said to “announce today that
we will change our approach to arms exports, it would make Hamas stronger
and make a hostage deal less likely”. He also cited the April 2024 attack on
Israel by Iran as a further reason to not end arms sales to Israel. 187
More information can be found in the Commons Library research briefing, UK
arms exports to Israel, July 2024.

Israeli military operations in Rafah and UK arms sales
As set out above, section 2.2, the G7, including the UK, are opposed to amajor Israeli offensive in Rafah. The government did not define what would
constitute such an offensive. On 21 May Deputy Foreign Secretary Andrew
Mitchell said the following in response to questions from the CommonsBusiness and Trade Committee on Israeli adherence with international
humanitarian law and the arms export criteria, in the context of the Rafah
military operations:
Mr Mitchell: They [the Israelis] have given a warning that 400,000[Palestinians] should go [from Rafah]; 800,000 have chosen to go. But that ofitself would not lead us to make a change in the assessment [on international
humanitarian law and arms exports]. It is important to recognise that there isa very robust legal process here [on arms exports].
The issue we are asked to adjudge is: does Israel have commitment, capability
and compliance under the lines of paragraph (c) of criterion two? [To not granta licence if it determines there is a clear risk that the items might be used tocommit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law.]
When we look at it, we take account of humanitarian issues, issues to do withdetainees and the military conduct of the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces]. We are
not required to say that Israel has a clean bill of health. While we do not
publish or comment on legal advice, we always act in a way that is consistent

185
186
187

38

Foreign Secretary to Foreign Affairs Committee, 15 April 2024 (PDF), p1-2
Department for Business and Trade, Export control licencing data: 31 May 2024, 11 June 2024
UK ban on selling arms to Israel would strengthen Hamas, BBC News, 12 May 2024

Commons Library Research Briefing, 11 September 2024

Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024with it. That is the judgment we then deliver to the House and to thisCommittee. 188

Statements by other parliamentarians
In April 2024 shadow Foreign Secretary David Lammy called for thegovernment to release its legal advice on arms sales. 189 As described above,
section 2.2, Labour has also said that UK arms should not be used by Israel inRafah.
In December 2023, SNP Defence Spokesperson, Martin Docherty-Hughes,
argued the UK should “cease extending arms licences to the state of Israel
and to immediately halt the export of weapons or components” to thecountry. 190 In April 2024, Liberal Democrat Leader Sir Ed Davey also argued
that arms sales to Israel should be suspended. 191

2.8

Reports of sexual violence
In February 2024, the Israeli Association of Rape Crisis Centers published areport on “systematic, targeted sexual abuse” by Hamas on 7 October. 192
In March 2024, the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflictalso said that there are “reasonable grounds to believe that conflict-related
sexual violence occurred at several locations […] during the 7 October 2023
attacks [by Hamas]” and that there is “clear and convincing evidence” thatsome of the hostages taken [to Gaza] have also been subject to conflictrelated sexual violence. 193
Hamas denies the reports of sexual violence. 194
On 15 December the UK Middle of the Middle East, Lord Ahmad, expressed“serious concern” and called for a full investigation. 195
The UN Security Council held a session on sexual violence in conflict in Israel
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in March 2024, following the mission
report by the UN Secretary General’s special representative on conflictBusiness and Trade Committee, Oral evidence: UK arms exports to Israel, HC 690, 21 May 2024, Qs
70-3
189David Lammy says he has “serious concerns” about Israel’s actions in Gaza, The Guardian, 7 April
2024
190
HC Deb, 12 December 2023, c226WH; Scottish Government, Letter to Lord Ahmad, 12 April 2024
191
Lib Dems call on government to suspend arms sales to Israel, Sky News, 3 April 2024
192
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ARCCI submits first reporting regarding Hamas October 7 attack
to the UN, 21 February 2024
193
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on sexual violence in conflict, Official
visit of the Office [….] to Israel and the Occupied West Bank (PDF), 4 March 2024, p21-22
194
Hamas ‘rejects occupation’s lies on rape cases’ […], BBC Monitoring, 4 December 2023
195
FCDO, Reports of sexual violence perpetrated by Hamas, 15 December 2023
188

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

related sexual violence. 196 In the session, Middle East Minister Lord Ahmad
said that:
I refer to the report [cited above] and note with deep concern the findings of
SRSG [UN Special Representative of the Secretary General] Patten, including“reasonable grounds” to believe that sexual violence occurred in Israel on 7
October and the existence of, and I quote, “clear and convincing” informationthat sexual violence has been committed against hostages.
Mr President, it is deeply disturbing to know that “such violence may beongoing against those still in captivity” a direct quote from the report. We
continue to call an immediate, safe and unconditional release of all hostages.
And to work through every channel to secure an immediate stop in the fighting,then progress towards a sustainable ceasefire […]I am also deeply shocked by the very concerning reports, referenced in the
SRSG report and also by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
of sexual violence perpetrated by Israeli forces against Palestinian detaineesof which we’ve just heard [from others in the session], who have been arrested
and held by Israel.
These reports, as we’ve heard, are being investigated. I therefore call on Israel
to take immediate measures to prevent conflict-related sexual violence, toabide by international humanitarian law, and to ensure thoroughinvestigations into these reports, and ultimately for perpetrators to be held toaccount.
Mr President let me be absolutely clear – we the United Kingdom condemn
conflict-related sexual violence unequivocally, wherever it occurs, and stand insolidarity with all victims and survivors. 197

2.9

Forced displacement of Palestinians
Israel’s evacuation order for parts of GazaIn response to a question on Israel’s evacuation order for northern Gaza, in
October 2023 the Prime Minister said: “Israel is attempting to minimise theimpact on civilians by asking people to leave northern Gaza”. 198
Minister David Rutley said those displaced “should only return home only
when it is safe to do so and in a dignified and voluntary manner”. 199
In response to the potential Israeli offensive in Rafah, on 13 February Lord
Cameron said “it is not possible” for displaced Palestinians to “move again”:

UN, Civilians in Israel and Palestine “cannot be abandoned” […], 11 March 2024
FCDO, The UK is deeply concerned by Special Representative Patten’s findings […], 11 March 2024
198
HC Deb, 16 October 2023, c29
199
PQ 3409 [Gaza: Internally displaced people], 6 December 2023
196
197

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

They cannot go north because they would be going back to homes that havebeen destroyed. They cannot go south because that would involve going into
Egypt, which none of us wants to see and the Egyptians do not want. 200

Statements by some Israeli ministers on encouraging
voluntary emigration of Palestinians from Gaza
In January 2024, the UK Minister for the Middle East Lord Ahmad criticised as“inflammatory” remarks by two Israeli ministers advocating the resettlementof Palestinians outside Gaza. 201 The UK reiterated its position that “Gaza is
Occupied Palestinian Territory and will be part of a future Palestinianstate”. 202
The government has also said “any forced displacement [from Gaza] isincompatible with [a two-state solution], and the Prime Minister and former
Foreign Secretary have raised this with [their] Israeli counterparts”. 203 The UK
has also raised the issue at the UN Security Council. 204
The Prime Minister said the UK “recognis[es] that there must be no forcible
displacement from Gaza” into Egypt and other states. 205
In response to a January conference held in Jerusalem attended by some
Israeli ministers calling for the establishment of Israeli settlement in Gaza, theUK Government reiterated its position that “settlements are illegal [and] no
Palestinian should be threatened with forcible displacement or relocation”. 206

2.10

Palestinian visa scheme
In response to an e-petition calling for the government to introduce a
Palestinian visa scheme on the model of that for Ukraine which would allow
Palestinians affected by the conflict to enter the UK, the government said it
had no plans to introduce such a scheme. 207
A debate in the House of Commons was held on 13 May 2024.
In December 2023, the government said those with immediate family
members could apply to enter the UK under existing visa routes:

HL Deb, 13 February 2024, c141
Lord Ahmad on X/Twitter, Gaza is occupied Palestinian Territory […], 3 January 2024
202
FCDO, UK statement on situation in Gaza, 3 January 2024
203
PQ 1693 [Gaza: Palestinians], 21 November 2023
204
FCDO, Gazans should not be subject to forcible displacement […], 12 January 2024
205
PMO, PM meeting with Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, 1 December 2023
206
FCDO, ‘Settlements bring security” conference in Jerusalem, 30 January 2024
207
E-petition, Create a Palestinian family visa scheme for Palestinian people affected by war, closed 18
April 2024
200
201

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

There are currently no plans to introduce bespoke arrangements for people
arriving from the region who do not hold permission to come to the UK. Thatmeans that immediate family members of British citizens, and those settled in
the UK, who wish to come and live in the UK and do not have a current UK visa
can apply under one of the existing family visa routes. Individuals who meetthese criteria should apply for a visa to enable them to enter the UK in thenormal way. Fee waivers are available to those who can not afford theapplication fee, and exceptional circumstances may be taken into accountwhere certain requirements are not met. 208

The Scottish Government has called on the UK Government to introduce aresettlement scheme, arguing the existing scheme has challenges include
submitting biometric data in Gaza and the exclusion of close relatives. 209
In April, the Home Office restated its position that it has no plans to introduce
a separate route for Palestinians and stressed it is working with the FCDO tosupport British nationals with dependents in Gaza to help them leave.210

2.11

Reports of potential deployment of UK forces
On 5 December 2023 the Secretary of State for Defence, Grant Shapps, said
there would be no deployment of UK forces in Israel or the Occupied
Palestinian Territories (including in the period following the conflict). He said
any military action by UK forces would be in defence of British citizens andBritish interests. 211
In May 2024, the United States completed the construction of a temporary
pier off the coast of Gaza to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid into
Gaza. The pier reportedly will enable up to two million meals (or 150 trucks) to
be delivered a day. 212 The UK sent RFA Cardigan Bay to provide
accommodation for US personnel while they construct the pier. 213
While the US has built the pier, it says it would not use American personnel totransport the goods from the ships into Gaza. In an official briefing, US
officials stated that a “third party” would drive the trucks down the pier andthat the party is “not a defence contractor party” but those “of anothernation”. US officials said they would let “that nation […] speak forthemselves”. 214

E-petition, Create a Palestinian family visa scheme for Palestinian people affected by war, closed 18
April 2024
209
Scottish Government, Call to establish safe routes for people fleeing Gaza, 12 April 2024
210
HC Deb, 15 April 2024, c14
211
HC Deb, 5 December 2023, cc218, 219
212
US Department of Defence, Temporary pier in Gaza […], 29 April 2024
213
Ministry of Defence, Royal navy ship joins international effort […], 26 April 2024
214
US Department of Defence, Senior official holds a background briefing, 25 April 2024
208

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On 28 April, the BBC reported that “the UK is understood to be consideringtasking British troops” with this role, though stressed no decision has beenmade. The report noted the IDF has committed to provide security. 215
On 29 April the Shadow Secretary of State for Defence, John Healey, asked theGovernment to ensure that if UK troops were deployed that Parliament would“have a say”. 216 Minister for the Armed Forces Leo Docherty said that he would“not comment on media leaks and speculation”. He also said:•

Publicising operational activity in advance “could undermine theeffectiveness of operations and risk the lives of armed forces personnel”.

•

UK support to the pier had included the deployment of RFA Cardigan Bay
and analysis by the UK Hydrographic office.

•

The Government was “clear about the current remit” for UK involvement,with RFA Cardigan Bay to provide living support for US troops involved in
the construction of the pier. 217

SNP Spokesperson, Dave Doogan, said any “risk calculation [on UK
deployment] must command more robust analysis, rigour and humanitarian
ambition”. 218 Liberal Democrat spokesperson Richard Foord said there should
be a debate and vote on any deployment, citing concerns of “mission creep” if
UK forces conducting aid work are attacked by Hamas or others. 219
Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, Sir Julian Lewis, said it
would be “far better” to have neighbouring Arab states perform the role. 220
Following the media reports of April 2024, Hamas said that “any armed
solider on the land of Gaza is an enemy of the Palestinian people”. 221 The
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinian (a sanctioned group in the UK)
has also said any forces deployed “will be treated as occupation forces andwill be legitimate targets for the resistance”. 222
The pier was closed in July 2024. 223

UK forces may be deployed on the ground in Gaza, BBC News, 28 April 2024
For parliament’s role, see the Commons Library briefing Military action: Parliament’s role217
HC Deb, 29 April 2024, cc27-28
218
HC Deb, 29 April 2024, c29
219
HC Deb, 29 April 2024, c31
220
HC Deb, 29 April 2024, c30
221
Hamas says it will halt truce talks if Israel enters Rafah, BBC Monitoring, 2 May 2024
222
Palestinian militant group warns UK against sending troops to Gaza, BBC Monitoring, 28 April 2024;
HM Treasury, Financial sanctions targets, updated 30 April 2024, organisation 23
223
US Naval Institute News, Pentagon announces end to Gaza pier operation, 17 July 2024
215

216

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

2.12

British nationals in Gaza
Hostages
The UK Government has not confirmed the number of British nationals held
hostage in Gaza. Previously, on 7 November 2023 the Justice Secretary said
the Government believed there were three British nationals held hostage. 224
In May the government said that “British nationals and others with strong UK
links” were among the remaining hostages being held in Gaza. 225 In the samemonth, Hamas said British-Israeli hostage Nadav Popplewell, had died. 226
On 11 December 2023, Foreign Office Minister Leo Docherty confirmed 15
British nationals had been killed since 7 October. 227

Aid Central Kitchen workers
On 1 April 2024, seven aid workers (three of whom were British) were killed in
an Israeli air strike in Gaza while distributing aid. The UK Government
summoned the Israeli ambassador in response, “condemned” the attack, andcalled for the “immediate” creation of a deconfliction mechanism(‘deconfliction’ generally refers to processes to reduce mistaken casualties inmilitary operations, such against humanitarian personnel). 228
The Israeli Government said it was a “grave mistake” and launched aninvestigation, and it has suspended two officers. 229
In May 2024, Deputy Foreign Secretary Andrew Mitchell said:
we are carefully reviewing the initial findings of Israel's investigations into thekilling of World Central Kitchen aid workers and welcome the suspension of
two officers as a first step. Their inquiry so far has highlighted failures indeconfliction processes and the unacceptable conduct of the IDF personnel
involved. This must never happen again. 230

In April, Mr Sunak also spoke to Mr Netanyahu, stating he was “appalled” by
the killing of aid workers and demanded a “thorough and transparent
independent investigation” into the events. 231

Three British hostages are still in Gaza, says Justice secretary, The Telegraph, 7 November 2023
FCDO, A successful negotiation is the best route to get all the hostages returned, 16 May 2024
226
Hamas claims British-Israeli hostages Nadav Popplewell has died, The Telegraph, 11 May 2024
227
HC Deb, 11 December 2023, c225WH
228
FCDO, FCDO summons Israeli ambassador over death of aid workers, 2 April 2024
229
Israel urged to publish full report on worker deaths, BBC News, 6 April 2024; Israel acknowledges
killing 7 aid charity workers […], Times of Israel, 2 April 2024
230
PQ 24458 [Gaza: Aid workers], 8 May 2024
231
PMO, PM call with Prime Minister Netanyahu, 2 April 2024
224
225

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

3

Parliamentary votes in the UK

3.1

SNP opposition day, February 2024
On their opposition day debate on 21 February 2024, the SNP tabled a motion
calling for an immediate ceasefire and the immediate release of all hostages
by Hamas. The full motion can be read in Hansard, at column 724. A numberof amendments, including one from the Government and one from Labour
were tabled to the motion. 232
On an opposition day, in accordance with Standing Order No 31(2)(a), if a
Government amendment is moved, the Opposition motion is decided on first.
If that motion is voted down, the Government amendment is then decided on.
This process ensures that the House of Commons has an opportunity to voteon the opposition proposal before considering the Government alternative.
The Speaker said he would “exceptionally” allow both the Official Opposition(Labour) amendment and the Government amendment to be considered. 233
The Speaker said “proceeding in this way will allow a vote to take place,potentially, on the proposals from each of the three main parties”. 234
During the debate, Penny Mordaunt, the Leader of the House of Commons,said that the Government would “play no further part in the decision thisHouse takes on today’s proceedings”, following the Speaker’s decision, andwould not move its amendment.235
There was no opportunity to vote on the SNP motion as originally proposed
because the question on Labour’s amendment to it was put first and agreed.
The House then agreed the main question, as amended, condemning Hamas,calling for the immediate release of hostages and immediate ceasefire, andfor no Israeli ground offensive to take place. 236 The full resolution can be readin Hansard, at columns 804 to 805.
For more information on the proceedings, see the Institute for Government,
Party political game-playing over Gaza conflict brings parliament into

232
233
234

235
236

45

House of Commons, Order Paper, 21 February 2024 (see Amendments (a) and (b))
For the full statement, see HC Deb 21 February 2024 c723
The Speaker also noted that the Clerk of the House had placed a letter in the Library regarding theconvention governed by Standing Order 31 and the decision to allow an Official Opposition
spokesperson to speak and move an amendment before a Government minister in response to an
SNP spokesperson moving their Opposition day motion (see Dep2024-0193)
HC Deb, 21 February 2024, cc795-796
HC Deb, 21 February 2024, c805

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

disrepute, 21 February 2024 and Hansard Society, What was the problem withHouse of Commons standing orders in the Gaza debate?, 27 February 2024.

3.2

King’s Speech debates, November 2023
On 15 November, the Commons voted on two amendments to the Motion for
the Loyal Address (The King’s Speech debates) made by Labour and the SNP
on the conflict between Israel and Hamas. Neither amendment passed.237
Labour’s amendment (r) welcomed the announcement of temporary
humanitarian pauses but called for them to be extended as a “necessary step
to an enduring cessation of fighting as soon as possible”. It was defeated by
290 votes to 183. 238 The full amendment can be read in Hansard for 15
November 2023, at column 674.
The SNP’s amendment (h) called on the Government to “join with theinternational community in urgently pressing all parties to agree to an
immediate ceasefire”. It was defeated by 293 votes to 125. 239 The amendment
can be read in full in Hansard for 15 November 2023, at columns 755 to 757.
Responding for the Government, the Minister for Policing, Chris Philp said:
Hamas have said that they intend to destroy Israel, and that they would once
again perpetrate atrocities like those committed on 7 October. They continue
to hold hostages [...] and they continue to fire rockets into Israel. To ask Israel
to cease firing unilaterally would not be fair or just. 240

3.3

Welsh Parliament/Senedd Cymru, 2023
On 8 November 2023 the Welsh Parliament voted in favour (24 to 19 votes) of a
Plaid Cymru motion on the conflict. The motion condemned the 7 OctoberHamas attack, demanded the release of hostages, for international
humanitarian law to be upheld, and for an immediate ceasefire.
The Senedd’s webpage for 8 November 2023 plenary sessions has the fullmotion for the debate and a record of the proceedings .

237
238
239
240

46

HC Deb, 15 November 2023, cc674-764
HC Deb, 15 November 2023, cc755-57
HC Deb, 15 November 2023, cc757-761
HC Deb, 15 November 2023, c753

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

3.4

Scottish Parliament motion, 2023
On 21 November 2023, the Parliament supported a SNP Government motion by
90 votes to 28 condemning the 7 October Hamas attack, demanding theunconditional release of hostages, the upholding of international
humanitarian law, and for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire. 241
The full motion is available on the Scottish Parliament’s website, The situationin the Middle East, S6011342, 21 November 2023 and the full debate in the
Parliament’s Official report for 21 November 2023.

241

47

Scottish Parliament, The situation in the Middle East, S6M-11342, 21 November 2023

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4

UK Government actions

UK military action against the Houthis and Iran
In January, February and May 2024, UK forces conducted strikes against the
Houthis in Yemen in response to their attacks on ships in the Red Sea. RAF
aircraft also shot down drones and missiles against Israel launched by Iran.
For more on UK military action and sanctions, see the Commons Library
research briefings Houthis in the Red Sea 2024 and Israel-Iran April 2024. The
briefing, UK forces in the Middle East (2020), provides background.

4.1

UK diplomatic activity
UK Government ministers have met with leaders and ministers of Israel,
Turkey, Jordan, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian Authority,
Qatar, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, and the Arab League.242
In 2024, Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron has been seeking to build a “contact
group” between the US, UK, “key” European Union, Gulf and Arab countries
and Turkey to “build momentum towards a lasting solution” to the conflict. 243

UK Prime Minister’s contact with Israeli Prime MinisterOn 8 October 2023 the UK Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, spoke with Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. 244 Mr Sunak said the UK would “continue toprovide [support to Israel]—whether that’s diplomatic, intelligence or
security support—as they need”. 245 Mr Sunak has reiterated Israel’s right todefend itself against Hamas:
Hamas can never again be able to perpetrate atrocities against the Israeli
people. Noting that Hamas has enmeshed itself in the civilian population in

For sources, see section 6 of the Commons Library briefing, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian
Territories: A parliamentary reading list (2020-24), July 2024
243
FCDO, Foreign Secretary returns to the Middle East, 30 January 2024
244
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), PM call with Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel, 8 October 2023
245
Sunak says UK is “poised” to offer Israel military help if required, The Guardian, 9 October 2023
242

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Gaza, the Prime Minister said it was important to take all possible measures toprotect ordinary Palestinians and facilitate humanitarian aid. 246

The Prime Minister has also raised Israeli settler violence in the West Bank
directly with Mr Netanyahu and the “need to allow more aid into Gaza [and]to take all possible measures to minimise civilian casualties”. 247

Prime Minister’s contact with Palestinian Authority
Mr Sunak has met with the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.
They discussed avoiding further escalation and ensuring calm in the West
Bank, the UK’s support for the Palestinian Authority in trying to secure peaceand security, and humanitarian support for Gaza. 248

Foreign Secretary contact with IranIn February, Lord Cameron said Iran would be “held accountable” for its“proxies” in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere and that he had had a “robust
conversation” with Iran’s foreign minister on this point. 249 Previous UK-Iranconversations on de-escalation took place in November and December. 250

4.2

Deployment of UK military forces
On 13 October 2023, the UK Government announced it would deploy some UK
military assets to the eastern Mediterranean to “support Israel, reinforce
regional stability and prevent escalation.” Assets deployed are: 251•

12 maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft, to patrol against thepotential transfer of weapons to terrorist groups.

•

A Royal Navy task group to deliver humanitarian aid. It includes aircraft,
helicopters, royal marines, and two ships (RFA Lyme Bay and RFA
Angus).

•

An additional destroyer, HMS Diamond, to support Operation Kipion (theUK’s existing maritime presence in the Gulf and Indian Ocean).252 HMS
Richmond and HMS Duncan have been deployed as relief. 253

PMO, Call with […] Netanyahu, 13 October 2023; Meeting with the Prime Minister, 19 October 2023
HC Deb, 7 November 2023, c17
248
PMO, Meeting with the President […] of the Palestinian Authority, 20 October 2023
249
Cameron: Iran will be held ‘accountable’, BBC News, 4 February 2024
250
Lord Cameron on X/Twitter, Spoke to Amir-Abdollahian today about Houthi attacks […], 31
December 2023; FCDO, Foreign Secretary’s call with Iranian Foreign Minister, 3 November 2023
251
PQ 48 [Military aircraft: Mediterranean region], 12 November 2023
252
Ministry of Defence, Defence Secretary sends Royal Navy destroyer east of Suez, 30 November 2023
253
Royal Navy, HMS Richmond takes over from HMS Diamond, 6 February 2024; Ministry of Defence,
HMS Duncan deploys to the Red Sea to protect shipping routes, 27 May 2024
246
247

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024•

2,500 military personnel (up 1,000 since 7 October). 254 Some have been
deployed to Tel Aviv, Beirut, and Jordan to protect British citizens. 255•

In 2024, the UK deployed RFA Cardigan Bay to provide accommodation
for US personnel while they construct a pier to increase humanitarian aid
into Gaza (see above, section 2.11). 256

From 5 December, the UK Government extended existing unarmed
surveillance flights over the eastern Mediterranean to include Gaza. Theseflights are tasked solely with locating hostages. Announcing the action, theDefence Secretary said that “only information relating to hostage rescue will
be passed to the relevant authorities responsible for hostage rescue”. 257

UK military and other aid to Israel
In December, the Ministry of Defence said that, during the current conflict, it
would provide Israel with “only defensive [military] matériel, or matériel thatmight help with the recovery of hostages”. 258
In response to parliamentary questions, the government says that, to 25 April,
it has provided no lethal or other military equipment to Israel. It has provided
some life-saving medical supplies, including defibrillators. 259
No government financial support has been provided to Israel during theconflict. Israel is ineligible to receive aid from the UK’s aid budget underinternationally agreed aid rules because it is a high-income economy. 260

4.3

UK humanitarian aid
The Commons Library research briefing, UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza
Strip: FAQs, provides more on UK aid to the Occupied Palestinian Territories,
the suspension of funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian
Refugees (UNRWA), and aid access.
The FCDO, Gaza: what you can do to help, provides advice for individuals andcompanies making safe donations to support the humanitarian response.

Ministry of Defence, Defence Secretary visits Israel and OPTs […], 7 December 2023
HC Deb, 20 November 2023, c4
256
Ministry of Defence, Royal navy ship joins international effort […], 26 April 2024
257
HCWS90 [Israel and Gaza], 5 December 2023; HC Deb, 5 December 2023, c221
258
HC Deb, 5 December 2023, c219
259
PQ 5416 [Israel: Military aid], 11 December 2023; PQ 23050 [Israel: Military aid], 25 April 2024
260
OECD, Development Assistance Committee: List of Official Development Assistance recipients
254
255

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

The UK Government says it has provided over £100 million in aid during2023/24 to the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It has also appointed ahumanitarian coordinator to support aid delivery.261
The new funding will provide essential items and services such as food, water,and emergency shelter. It will be spent via “trusted partners”, such as UN
agencies. The government says the UK provides no funding to Hamas. 262
In 2024/25, the UK has announced £10 million in financial aid to thePalestinian Authority via the World Bank. This will fund public sector salaries
and services. The UK will also provide £5 million in technical assistance tosupport anti-corruption efforts and other reforms by the Authority. 263

4.4

UK support for Lebanon
Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron said the UK’s strategy in Lebanon was to“work with the Americans and French principally, because they have hugeinterests, expertise and commitments there” (Lebanon was a French
protectorate), though he met the Lebanese Prime Minister twice when in
office. 264
The UK supports the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The LAF supports the UN
Mission in Lebanon. This upholds Lebanon’s territorial integrity and acts as acounterbalance to Iran-aligned Hezbollah (Hezbollah has fought in Syria in
support of President Assad and launched direct attacks against Israel).
Since 2009, the UK has provided £100 million to the LAF and £804 million inaid (2010 to 2021), primarily to support Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Visiting
Lebanon in February 2024, Lord Cameron reaffirmed UK support for the LAF
and announced £10 million in aid for UN agencies. 265

4.5

New UK sanctions and visa restrictions
Sanctions against Hamas and others
Before October 2023, the UK applied sanctions against Hamas and other Iranaligned groups in the Middle East, such as Hezbollah. 266 UK sanctions include
travel bans, asset freezes and arms embargoes. New sanctions include:

Commons Library research briefing, UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip: FAQs, section 1.3
PMO, UK announces £10m humanitarian aid for civilians in OPTs, 16 October 2023
263
FCDO, UK contributes financial aid to the OPTs, 11 June 2024
264
Foreign Affairs Committee, Oral evidence, HC325, 9 January 2024, Q274
265
Commons Library, Lebanon: Introductory country profile and FCDO, Lebanon’s stability and security
are paramount, 3 February 2024
266
Commons Library, Iran’s influence in the Middle East, section 3.2
261

262

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024•

14 November 2023: Four members of Hamas and two financers. 267•

13 December: Sanctions against leaders and financers of Hamas andPalestinian Islamic Jihad. 268•

14 December: Designations of seven individuals, including the Hamas
representative to Iran and members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps. 269•

22 January 2024: Five individuals and one entity involved in arranging
finance for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 270•

27 March 2024: Two financers for a Hamas-supporting media network. 271

Proscribing Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist group
In January 2024, the Home Secretary announced that under the Terrorism Act
2002 that Hizb ut-Tahrir, an armed Islamist group based in Lebanon which
operates in 32 countries and praised the Hamas assault of 7 October, would
be proscribed as a terrorist group. 272
For information on the Act and the effects of proscription, see the Commons
Library briefing, Proscribed Terrorist Organisations.

Visa restrictions against Israeli settlers
In December Lord Cameron announced the UK would ban those responsible
for settler violence in the West Bank from entering the UK. He called on Israel
to “hold the preparators accountable”. 273
In February, the UK imposed travel and financial restrictions against fourindividuals involved in West Bank violence. 274
A further four individuals were sanctioned in May, and two groups: Hilltop
Youth and Lehava.275

FCDO, The UK sanctions list; FCDO, UK and US hit Hamas leadership with targeted sanctions, 14
November 2023
268
FCDO, UK and US target Hamas with new sanctions to isolate terror group, 13 December 2023
269
FCDO, New Iranian sanction regime comes into force, 14 December 2023
270
FCDO, UK, US and Australia sanction key figures in Hamas’ financial network, 22 January 2024
271
HM Treasury, New sanctions on persons linked to Hamas supporting media network, 27 March 2024
272
Home Office, Home Secretary declares Hizb ut-Tahrir as terrorists, 15 January 2024
273
UK Foreign Secretary announces ban on ‘extremist Israeli settlers’, BBC News, 14 December 2023
274
FCDO, UK sanctions extremist settlers in the West Bank, 12 February 2024
275
FCDO, UK sanctions extremist groups and individuals for settler violence, 3 May 2024
267

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UK sanctions against Iran and proscription of IRGC
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was established as acounterweight to Iran’s regular armed forces following the Iranian revolutionof 1979 that overthrew the last Shah. In addition to personnel in Iran, it exerts
wider influence in the region by providing money, technology, and training.276
The UK sanctions the entirety of the IRGC under its nuclear sanctions, meaning
it applies asset freezes and travel bans. The Leader of the Liberal Democrats,
Sir Ed Davey, Alicia Kearns, and other MPs have called upon the Government
to proscribe the IRGC as a terrorist group. This would create offences in the
UK for being a member, among other things. 277
In December 2023, Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron said Iran must be sent “anincredibly clear message that this escalation will not be tolerated”. However,he said proscription of the IRGC as a terrorist organisation was “notsomething that either the intelligence agencies or the police are calling for”
and that the UK can sanction IRGC members. 278
For more information on the UK debates on proscription, see section 2.4 of theCommons Library research briefing, Iran’s influence in the Middle East.

4.6

How has the UK voted at the UN?
UN Security Council (UNSC)The UK has not used its veto at the UNSC since 1989, and not on an issue
relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the 1956 Suez Crisis. 279
In 2023 and 2024 UNSC disagreements centred on whether a resolution should
support a humanitarian “ceasefire” or “pause” and if it should condemn theactions of Hamas on 7 October. 280 In 2023 the UK said it wanted a “balanced
text” which condemned Hamas and re-affirmed Israel’s right to self-defence,the protection of civilians and the delivery of aid.281
Since October 2023, the UNSC has passed four resolutions on the conflict:•

UNSC Resolution 2735, 10 June 2024. The full text of the resolution can befound on the UN Library site. It noted a proposed three-stage resolution

Commons Library, Iran’s influence in the Middle East, p8
HC Deb, 6 July 2023, c1001; HC Deb, 16 October 2023, cc28-9278David Cameron: when Rishi asked me to do this job […], The Telegraph, 23 December 2023
279
UN Library, UNSC meetings and outcomes tables: Vetoes
280
See next paragraph for sources on these debates
281
UN, Deadlock deepens as Security Council rejects competing resolutions […], 25 October 2023
276
277

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

to the conflict and urged Israel and Hamas to accept it. The UK voted
yes. 282•

UNSC Resolution 2728, 25 March 2024. The full text of the resolution canbe found on the UN Library site. It “demands” an immediate ceasefire forthe month of Ramadan by all parties and the unconditional and
immediate release of all hostages. The UK voted yes. 283•

UNSC Resolution 2720, 22 December 2023. The full text of the resolution
can be found on the UN Library site. It “demanded” humanitarian aid to
Gaza be increased. The UK voted yes.284•

UNSC Resolution 2712, 15 November 2023. The resolution’s full text can befound on the UN Library site. The UNSC said it called for the urgent
creation of humanitarian corridors and for the immediate andunconditional release of all hostages. The UK abstained. 285

For more detail on these resolutions and the seven votes at the Security
Council on resolutions that did not pass, see sections 2.2 and 2.6 of theCommons Library research briefing 2023/24 Israel-Hamas conflict: UN, US, EU
and regional response. This includes information on US, Israeli andPalestinian Authority reaction to the resolutions.

UN General Assembly (UNGA)
All members of the UN make up the UNGA. UNGA votes are non-binding.
There have been two votes at the UN General Assembly on the conflict since
October 2023, both in 2023.
The UK abstained in both votes. In both cases it argued that the resolution
should have condemned Hamas: 286•

27 October 2023: UNGA voted 121 to 14 (with 44 abstentions) for an“immediate, durable and sustained humanitarian truce leading to a
cessation of hostilities”. The resolution called for all parties to“immediately and fully comply” with obligations under international law,for Hamas to release its hostages and for Israel to rescind the order forcivilians to evacuate northern Gaza. 287•

12 December 2023: UNGA backed a resolution “demanding” the releaseof hostages, an immediate humanitarian ceasefire, and for all parties tocomply with international humanitarian law. A total of 153 states voted in

282

FCDO, UNSC adopts resolution on proposed ceasefire and hostage deal, 10 June 2024
FCDO, The UK has long called for an immediate humanitarian pause, 25 March 2024
FCDO, The UK supports Security Council resolution 2720 on aid to Gaza, 22 December 2023
FCDO, It is right the Security Council calls for a humanitarian pause in Gaza […], 15 November 2023
FCDO, Condemning Hamas’ terrorism should not be controversial, 27 October 2023 and PQ HL1172[Gaza: Ceasefires], 29 December 2023
UN, GA adopts resolution calling for “humanitarian truce”, 27 October 2023

283
284
285
286

287

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Israel-Hamas conflict: UK response October 2023 to July 2024

favour, 10 voted against (including the US and Israel) and 23 abstained(including the UK and Germany). 288
Section 2.3 of the Commons Library research briefing, 2023/24 Israel-Hamas
conflict: UN, US, EU and regional response provides more on these debates,
including statements by the Palestinian Authority and Israeli Government.

4.7

Funding to combat antisemitism and antiMuslim incidents
Following reports of a rise in antisemitic offenses in the UK, in October 2023
the Prime Minister announced £3 million in funding for the Community Security
Trust (CST) for Jewish community buildings, synagogues, and schools. 289 The
CST is a UK charity that protects Jews from antisemitism and other threats.
Total Government support for the CST totalled £18 million in 2023. In February
2024, the Prime Minister said the UK would commit £18 million to the CST
every year for the next four years. 290
The Chancellor also announced up to a further £7 million for organisations
such as the Holocaust Memorial Trust to address antisemitism over the next
three years, including in schools and universities. 291
Before the conflict, in June 2023 the Government announced £24.5 million in
2023/24 to protect mosques and Muslim faith schools under the Protective
Security for Mosques Scheme. Available funding for the scheme has been
increased 20% since the June announcement.292 The Government has also
provided £6 million to TELL MAMA since 2012 (an organisation that supports
victims of Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim hate). 293

UN, UNGA votes by large majority for immediate humanitarian ceasefire, 12 December 2023
HC Deb, 16 October 2023, c23
290
PMO, PM speech at the CST annual dinner, 28 February 2024
291
HM Treasury, Autumn statement 2023, 22 November 2023, p32
292
PQ 3471 [Racial discrimination], 28 November 2023
293
PQ 10239 [Islamophobia], 23 January 2024
288

289

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Commons Library Research Briefing, 11 September 2024

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