POLICY BRIEF
Displaced learners in Japan:
student evacuees and policy
liminality
Genocide, environmental crises and armed struggles in the last ten
years have resulted in the highest ever recorded number of displaced
people worldwide: over 100 million (UN News, 2022). Waves of displaced learners – a broad grouping including people with refugee,
asylee and a variety of temporary protected statuses – have led toa suite of relevant services in Higher Education Institutions (HEIs).
These initiatives include evaluation of credentials and prior learning,bridging and pathway programmes providing language training, mentorship programmes, legal clinics and so on (e.g. Hartley et al., 2018;
Sontag, 2019).
This brief considers HEI support for displaced learners in Japan, a
topic lacking comprehensive data. We analyse how international officers in Japanese HEIs describe the enrolment of displaced learners
and support for them. This work draws on an expansive understanding of security as discussed by Rothschild (1995) among others, andmoves beyond a construction of security as relevant to nation states
to consider people’s economic, social and political security.

Issue 2023/21
December 2023
Authors

David Green, Nagoya University Graduate School of Law; Lisa Unangst, Empire State University;
Eriko Tomita, independent researcher;Refugee resettlement in Japan
While Japan is a major funder of the supranationalarchitecture supporting refugees, refugee resettlement in Japan lags far behind most other countries:
it was the fourth highest donor to the United Nations
High Commission for Refugees in 2022 (UNHCR
Global Focus, 2022), yet in 2020 the country only
recognised 47 refugees (Human Rights Watch,2022). Here we briefly discuss the extant policy
framework and identify ways in which displaced
people experience policy liminality (Unangst & deWit, 2021). By policy liminality, we mean learners
being “positioned between [policy] discourses rather than being centred within a cohesive suite of federal, state, and institutional-level policy initiatives”(Unangst et al., 2022, p. 44). Policy liminality may
be perceived (reported) by learners and, as we argue here, it may also be identified by policy actors
such as university administrators closely connectedto the development and implementation of policy.
Dean and Nagashima (2007) argue that Japan “didnot become a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol
until 1981 … [and it was] not until the mid-1970s,
when Indo-Chinese refugees began to arrive on its
shores, [that Japan had] to face the issue of refugees” (p. 482). In comparison with other OECD
states, Flowers (2008) observes minimal civil society involvement in Japan, especially before 1989,
and somewhat antagonistic relations with the Ministry of Justice. This circumstance has inhibited further development of policy at the nexus between migration and protection. Refugee status was granted
to 330 cases among 3,544 applications for asylum
between 1982 and 2004 and “although it became
possible to grant a form of humanitarian status after
1991, this has happened in only 284 cases” (Deanand Nagashima, 2007, p. 482). Tarumoto (2019),
among others, connects constrictive policy to an
exclusionary ethnonationalist construction of Japanese identity. The public perception of immigration
also remains largely negative (e.g. Green, 2017).
How does the process of obtaining protection in
Japan seem from the perspective of an applicant?
According to the Japan Association for Refugees(JAR) in 2017, key challenges include interpretationof ‘persecution’ being extremely narrow and typical-

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Robert Schuman Centre | December 2023

ly limited to threats to a person’s life or personal
freedom. All the relevant documents are only available in Japanese, neutral interpreters may not be
available for interviews, and rejected applicants are
not given an explanation of why they were rejected(JAR, 2017).
Recent efforts to increase the foreign population
have taken place quietly and largely away from thepublic eye (Green, 2021). The admission of displaced learners could represent a similar attempt by
the government to quietly admit refugees through adifferent means. Rather than directly changing thestrict refugee admission criteria, admitting refugees
as ‘displaced learners’ or ‘evacuees’ may achieve
similar humanitarian aims but be more palatable tothe public.

Displacement, internationalisation
and Japanese HEIs
How can we understand the alignment of Japan’sinternationalisation policy with its refugee policy?
Internationalisation here refers to – as Knight (2003)
defines it – “the process of integrating international,
intercultural or global dimensions into the purpose,functions, or delivery of postsecondary education”(p. 2). There is a history of coordinated internationalisation practices in Japanese HEIs, with clear
government directives promoting internationalisation since the 1980s (Burgess et al., 2010). Billionsof yen have been invested in degree courses offered in English; the Japan Exchange and Teaching
Programme welcomes international teachers; andvarious excellence schemes including the 2014 Top
Global University Project have been implemented.
Furthermore, internationalisation policies “may belargely driven by the economic or political desire tocompete globally, rather than by the desire to respond to changing economic and population realities such as Japan’s rapidly aging and diversifying
society” (Nonaka & Phillips, 2017; p. 15).
Japanese HEIs are free to develop tailored admissions policies and procedures, although all universities require students to take and pass an entrance
examination as a prerequisite for admission (Kuroda, 2020). Japanese HEIs comprise “777 universities divided into national (86), local public (91), andprivate (600) institutions” (Yonezawa, 2017; p. 376).

University sizes and focuses can vary considerably,with former ‘imperial’ universities representing themain public institutions typically hosting the largest
numbers of international students. There is likewisea large range of private universities, with some
HEIs, such as Waseda and Keio universities, being
elite institutions which admit relatively larger numbers of international students.
Limited engagement with displaced learners isevident among Japanese HEIs. Some of this engagement takes place in initiatives spearheaded byvarious non-profit groups. For example, the Syrian
Scholars Initiative was a scholarship programme
developed by a foundation associated with the International Christian University in collaboration with
the JAR to support Syrian students escaping conflict. This effort admitted only six students to Japan
in 2016, and according to a 2017 JAR report, thesecond iteration of the programme garnered 1091
applicants with the aim of admitting eight (JAR,2017). Similarly, the Japanese Initiative for the future of Syrian Refugees, operated by the JapaneseInternational Cooperative Agency in collaboration
with the UNHCR, aimed to admit up to 150 master’slevel Syrian students over five years.
Recently, the Japanese government began admitting Ukrainian nationals in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. As of
March 2023, Japan had admitted a total of 2,211
Ukrainian nationals since the onset of the conflict(MOJ, 2023). Data on the exact numbers of displaced students among the Ukrainian evacuees
are not readily available, but listings published by
the Japan Student Services Organization show 52
Japanese universities hosting approximately 200
displaced Ukrainian students, and another 66 Japanese language schools hosting approximately 250
Ukrainians as of March 2023 (JASSO, 2023).

Methodology
We conducted in-depth interviews with individuals
charged with assisting international students inpublic and private HEIs. Eight interviews were conducted in total. These spanned four private universities, three public universities and the Pathways
Japan NGO. The interview subjects and their affiliations are kept confidential in order to allow admin-

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Displaced learners in Japan: student evacuees and policy liminality

istrators to freely express their opinions. Pathways
Japan had no objections to being named directly.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in-person and online between December 2022 and January 2023. They were conducted in either English or
Japanese at the discretion of the interview subject.
To organise and analyse the interviews, transcriptsof them were subjected to thematic analysis (Saldaña 2013, p. 175).

Results
Displaced learner support
When discussing university support, we narrow ourterminology and refer specifically to ‘student evacuees’ as this is the term used by the HEI-based
interview participants. Student evacuees are students admitted to Japanese HEIs who could makea credible case to be considered asylum seekers or
refugees.
There are clear differences between public andprivate universities regarding support for student
evacuees. All the private universities represented
in our study are members of the Japan Educational
Pathways Network, a group of 18 universities operating in tandem with the Pathways Japan NGO,
whereas the public universities sampled acted independently of any organisation. That is, the public
universities showed very little pooling of information
or resources.
Our interviews reflect the fact that university admission processes highly prioritise some connection with Japan, and in particular familiarity with theJapanese language. If applicants’ Japanese proficiency is low a high level of English is required, andall the universities expected that their student evacuees would work hard to improve their Japanese
during the initial period of admission. University
administrators uniformly reported positive feelings
about hosting student evacuees, such as “I am happy to be able to provide these opportunities to them.
They are all very good students” (Public-4) and “I’ve
told them I’ve worked with thousands of students,
but I think this has been the most meaningful andimpactful project that I’ve worked on in my career.
I’m happy that I’ve been able to help them” (Private-1).

Admissions
All the universities sampled initially admitted
Ukrainian evacuees as non-matriculated students
for up to one year. One difference between the
public and private universities was the possibilityof extending the students’ stay. One public university, for example, only admitted Ukrainian evacuees coming from universities with which they had
an exchange agreement. Much like a typical study
abroad programme, the Ukrainian students could
receive credits for their courses in Japan and were
expected to leave Japan after their one-year stay.
Private universities, in contrast, demonstrated more
willingness to extend stays. After an initial six month
to one year period, student evacuees seeking tocontinue their study could on passing an entrance
exam be admitted as matriculated degree candidates and continue to receive identical financial
benefits for the duration of their studies.

Visa status
All the student evacuees were admitted to Japan on
short-term visas without recognition of refugee status. The students are referred to as ‘evacuees’ (hinanmin), rather than ‘refugees’ (nanmin) (Takahara,2022). This is an important distinction, as ‘refugee’implies long-term potentially permanent residence
in Japan while ‘evacuee’ denotes a short-term stay.
The benefits also differ. While recognised refugees
are entitled to permanent residence in Japan, canbring their immediate families with them, participate
in government-sponsored language and cultural
instruction and obtain vocational support (Akashi,2021), student evacuees are entitled to none ofthese benefits.
According to the study participants, after entering
Japan almost all the evacuees changed their status to a ‘designated activities’ visa, rather than astudent visa. ‘Designated activities’ is used in several different contexts, including as a work visa forhighly skilled professionals, a stopgap measure foruniversity graduates engaged in paid internships
and for individuals on a working holiday in Japan(MOFA, 2015). A designated activities visa is usually issued for a period of six to twelve months withthe possibility of renewal.

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Robert Schuman Centre | December 2023

According to the interview participants, designatedactivities status has both advantages and disadvantages, including offering greater flexibility regarding
part-time study. The main disadvantage is the shortperiod of validity and the attendant uncertainty. Discussion of the designated activities visa also revealed that it has been applied differently to Syrian
and Afghan evacuees. The participants noted thatUkrainians were encouraged by the immigration
agency to maintain their designated activities visa,
while Syrians and Afghans were discouraged fromusing it. Syrians and Afghans are asked to keep either a student or work visa, and are only permitted
to obtain a designated activities visa as a stopgap
measure, for example if they graduate from a Japanese university and are trying to find a job. If Syrians and Afghans apply for a designated activities
visa, the processing time is reportedly around six
months, with a heavy burden of proof. Ukrainians,on the other hand, are reportedly able to obtain adesignated activities visa in a matter of hours withlittle apparent difficulty.
One administrator (Private-1) believes that thedifferential treatment of Ukrainians is a conscious
government decision. Being victims of international aggression, Ukrainians are given preferential
treatment. Another administrator was more direct(Private-2) and attributed favourable treatment of
Ukrainians to racial preferences on the part of theJapanese public. In this view the Japanese government has a distinct racial bias, probably because
of ingrained racist tendencies in Japanese society.
As the international literature reflects the racist migration and education policies to which displaced
learners are subjected (e.g. Villegas & Aberman,2019), Japan seems to be implicated alongside other economically developed countries, and this issue
must be investigated further.

Public and private funding
According to our respondents, there is not muchvariation in funding packages for student evacuees
between public and private universities. All the universities sampled provide Ukrainian evacuees withfree tuition and housing, and a monthly stipend of
60,000 to 80,000 yen a month. Travel expenses toJapan are usually covered as well. All the universities bear some amount of the burden of housingand educating student evacuees, although there aresome differences in how funds are obtained. One ofthe private universities we studied exclusively utilised its own internal budget (Private-3), one underwrote evacuees’ costs with its own budget and donations from its alumni association (Private-2) andanother had a more layered approach, securing
additional funding from the local government, froma corporate sponsorship and through the Nippon
Foundation (Private-1), a philanthropic organisationthat has been donating funds to universities hosting
Ukrainian evacuees (Kageyama, 2023).
In contrast, public university staff members indicated a much higher level of instability in funding
and their universities were more likely to utilise donations to underwrite the cost of hosting student
evacuees. Three of the public universities created specific ‘Ukrainian disaster relief funds’ to solicit donations aimed only at supporting Ukrainianevacuees, but all relevant staff members observedthat long-term financial support for evacuees is an
ongoing challenge. One public university official
explicitly stated that despite the donations funding
packages for evacuees could only be guaranteed
for one year (Public-4). Moreover, only one of the
HEIs received additional support from the local government and none received financial support fromother organisations.

Discussion and conclusion
Although our participants have a positive attitude to
student evacuees, there are usually no more than
three evacuees at any given institution. This is anextremely low number in a comparative transnational context. While the number of evacuees has
gradually grown and appears likely to continue expanding, limited financial resources, a lack of staff
training and minimal government support could impede the stability of HEI interventions in the coming
months and years. Greater collaboration with local
and national governments, civil society and among
HEIs themselves could potentially help universities
overcome their resource constraints. One challenge for government and university administrators
is to extend the momentum and positive sentiment
regarding Ukrainian evacuees to other nationalities
and admit comparable numbers of displaced learners, contesting exclusionary policies. This would

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Displaced learners in Japan: student evacuees and policy liminality

offer an opportunity for HEIs to (re)consider theirraison d’être.
Japan has one of the lowest rates of refugee admissions in the world, typically approving less than
1% of asylum applications a year, yet a side door
for students displaced from conflict areas appears
to be slowly opening in Japan. Future researchshould query government priorities regarding displaced learners and examine more expansively
how HEIs address displacement. There are also
policy considerations. The Japanese government
and public must contend with the question of what
exactly humanitarian protection entails. Should displaced learners in Japan be considered refugees?
Should they be admitted on a short-term basis under the responsibility of universities, which is not
the predominant model in economically developed
settings? Are displaced learners coming to Japan
refugees by another name, or do they represent a
new category of temporary precarious humanitarian protection?

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RSC | Policy Brief | Issue 2023/21 | December 2023

doi:10.2870/59033
ISBN:978-92-9466-491-4
ISSN:2467-4540
QM-AX-23-021-EN-N