2 022
Jan. 6
No.R21-11
The Middle East Institute of Japan is a non-profit, public interest incorporated foundation
funded by the dues of its individual and corporate members.

[Members Only]

Middle East Analysis Report
In 2021, the Middle East had experienced various political upheavals andclashes, significantly impacting the region and beyond. The Middle East
Institute of Japan has compiled the following overview to provide a general
picture of the Middle Eastern region in 2021.
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A Retrospective of the Middle East Situation in 2021
Middle East Institute of Japan
1. Overview
In 2020, the world was at the mercy of COVID-19. However, in 2021, vaccination
was used to control the spread of the virus and resume economic activities. The
governments of Middle Eastern countries have led the promotion of vaccination,and countries such as Israel had most of their population vaccinated against
COVID-19. Countries with limited national financial resources or large
populations received vaccine doses under the COVAX framework or byimporting inexpensive vaccines from China and Russia. In the summer of 2021,
Middle Eastern countries began to ease restrictions on economic activities andthe entry or exit to their jurisdiction on the premise of vaccination. However, thespread of new variants may again result in the tightening of the restrictions on
economic activities and travel. Therefore, vaccines should be supplied to all
countries worldwide as soon as possible and in equal terms to ensure that global
economic activities will continue despite the threat of COVID-19.
Aside from the pandemic, another major change in the Middle East was
the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan and its establishment of an “interim1Middle East Institute of Japan

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government.” As the Biden administration followed the Doha agreement, thewithdrawal of US troops became the default course of action. Subsequently,
Taliban stepped up its military offensive in various parts of Afghanistan, seizing
control of Kabul in August. Its previous government had collapsed when thenPresident Ghani fled the country. Currently, the international community faces
the challenge of how to deal with the Taliban “regime.” Many countries arehesitant to recognize it as a legitimate diplomatic partner because it has seized
power through illegal means of force and aims to govern in a way that could
result in human rights abuses. Simultaneously, however, we cannot stand by
and watch the humanitarian crisis as a result of the outflow of refugees,
paralysis of administrative functions, threat of depletion of the national treasury,
soaring prices, and arrival of a severe winter. Foreign countries are holding
informal talks with senior Taliban officials to explore ways to avert ahumanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.
There are fears that the resurgence of Taliban will transform Afghanistan
into a seedbed of Islamic extremism. This is because the Taliban is an Islamic
extremist group that seeks to rule in accordance with Islamic law (Sharia) andhas had a close relationship with al-Qaeda (AQ). However, as it wants to berecognized by other countries as a member of the international community, it
may change its relationship with Islamic extremist groups. Meanwhile, theIslamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which is in conflict with the Taliban,
will likely continue to attack it. Nevertheless, being overwhelmingly
disadvantaged in terms of military power, it is unlikely to surpass the Taliban.
A third important change is the clear decline in commitment to the Middle
East by the US. Unlike the Trump administration, the Biden administration,
which came into power in January, has clarified that it will not tolerate humanrights abuses or undemocratic governance. Although this was expected to leadto friction between the US and Middle Eastern countries, the country’s
relationship with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey did not deteriorate. This isbecause US diplomacy has shifted completely to Asia, especially China. Likewise,no new normalization agreement between Israel and Arab countries had beenannounced, although the Biden administration said it would support any
progress in normalizing relations (the Abraham Accords). As for IsraeliPalestinian relations, it was expected that peace negotiations based on the twostate solution would resume under the Biden administration. However, there2Middle East Institute of Japan

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was no initiative from the US to resume. Talks with Iran to return to the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) began in April but were suspended dueto the presidential election in Iran. They resumed at the end of November.
Nevertheless, Iraq and Syria will become the focus of attention going
forward in light of the declining commitment of the US to the Middle East. In
July, the Biden administration had announced a complete withdrawal of US
troops by the end of December from Iraq. Although most Iraqis supported US
troops’ withdrawal, it cannot be denied that it may lead to an increase in attacks
by Islamic State (IS) fighters in Iraq. As for Syria, the United Arab Emirates(UAE), Jordan, Egypt, and other countries have begun to explore normalization
with the Assad regime because the balance of power following the civil war has
been determined to favor government forces. This is also likely because theywant to promote the reconstruction and stability of Syria and the entire region
by promoting political, economic, and security cooperation with the Assadregime. However, the Biden administration is not willing to support suchnormalization or lifting its sanctions unless there is a political solution to the
Syrian civil war. It will be interesting to see whether the attempts by Arabcountries to stabilize Syria will make progress in the absence of US initiatives
to find a political solution to the Syrian civil war.
A fourth major change is a trend of easing intra-regional conflicts andpromoting cooperation. First, notably, two major regional rivalries—Iran vs theGulf Arab States and pro-Muslim Brotherhood camp (Qatar, Turkey) vs antiMuslim Brotherhood camp (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Bahrain)—have been
improved. These confrontations adversely affected the trade and investment in
the countries involved and increased military tensions in the Persian Gulf and
Libya. As such, the improved relations were actually welcome change in all
countries. Moreover, Iran and Saudi Arabia have begun their direct ministeriallevel talks on dealing with the war in Yemen. When Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain,
and Egypt restored diplomatic relations with Qatar under the al-Ula agreementin January, they have also resumed ministerial-level talks and economic
cooperation. Turkey and Egypt—bitterly divided over the Muslim Brotherhood,
conflict in Libya, and gas development in the Eastern Mediterranean—have
held deputy foreign minister-level talks to improve their relations. Meanwhile,
Israel, UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco are promoting political and economic
cooperation based on 2020 agreements to normalize their relations. However,3Middle East Institute of Japan

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tensions between Iran and Israel persist. Depending on the outcomes of thenegotiations between the US and Iran on their nuclear agreement, Israel may
take military action against Iran.
Finally, there is Japan’s response to the situation in the Middle East. In
August, then-Foreign Minister Motegi visited Egypt, Palestine, Israel, Jordan,
Turkey, Iran, and Qatar. It was an important opportunity to explain to theMiddle Eastern countries’ leaders Japan’s position on their conflicts and its goalof promoting a free international order. During the visit—after the attack on
Gaza—Motegi told Israel, Palestine, and Arab countries that Japan still
supports peace in the Middle East based on the two-state solution. Additionally,
the fact that the Middle East leaders understood Japan’s vision of aninternational order based on the rule of law—“a free and open Indo-Pacific.” This
was a significant achievement given the current deepening of political andeconomic relations between Middle Eastern countries and China. Maintaining
safe and open shipping lanes in the Indo-Pacific to the Persian Gulf, Red Sea,and Suez Canal is crucial to Japan’s international trade policy. Japan hopes tocontinue to explain the principles and economic benefits of its diplomacy to
Middle Eastern countries. As for the Taliban “regime” in Afghanistan, we needto accept that it effectively controls the entire country, although it adheres toideologies incompatible with human rights principles shared by theinternational community. This is not the same as recognizing the Taliban“regime.” For the international community to deal with the country’s worsening
economy and serious humanitarian crisis, it is necessary to explore ways toprovide humanitarian aid while encouraging Taliban leaders to adhere to
universal values such as respect for basic human rights.

2. Noteworthy Changes(1) Afghanistan: The end of the longest war in US history and the Taliban’s
return to power
The overall picture of the current situation was that the Taliban could gain theupper hand after the Doha agreement was signed. Meanwhile, the Afghan
government, which lost the backing of the US, was forced into a disadvantageoussituation. US President Joseph Biden, who took office on January 20, extended
the original deadline of US troops’ withdrawal from May 1 to September 11 (later4

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changed to the end of August). In response, the Taliban launched an onslaught
in rural areas in May, and by August 15, they had seized control over the capital
city of Kabul. When Kabul was surrounded, President Ghani fled the country,
and the Afghan government effectively collapsed. The US troops’ withdrawal
was completed at midnight of August 30, bringing to an end the longest war in
US history. For western countries, as well as Japan, that have supported
democratic state-building in Afghanistan, 2021 will go down in history as theyear when their efforts had failed.
The original purpose of the US military intervention was to clean up AQ,
which was responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Therefore, the focus will be onwhether Afghanistan will once again become a seedbed of terrorism in the future.
It will also be important to see whether the restored Taliban can govern withpeople’s support while cooperating with other countries, as it will be crucial forthe stability of both the country and the region.
(2) Iran: Conservative hardliners rise with the change of regime to President
Raisi
Severe military and economic pressure from the former Trump administration
led to the rise of conservative hardliners in Iran. In the presidential election heldin June, conservative hardliner Raisi (then Chief Justice) was elected. However,conservative moderate President Rouhani, who had already served two terms
for a total of eight years, was not allowed to be elected for a third term. Anotherconservative hardliner was also nominated for the vacant position of Chief
Justice, leading to all three heads of power being occupied by conservative
hardliners. Supreme Leader Khamenei has adopted a two-pronged strategy of
expressing his desire to return to the JCPOA, which the US had left, while
simultaneously pursuing the nullification of sanctions. As part of this effort, theIran-China 25-Year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement was signed on
March 27. At its September 17 Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), it formally approved Iran’s membership, and the proximity
between the two countries became clear.
Against this backdrop, the progress of the US-Iran indirect talks, whichbegan in Vienna on April 6, will be closely watched. On April 13, Iran declared
an increase in uranium enrichment to 60% and continued to take suchcountermeasures against the US violation of the JCPOA. However, contrary to5

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the Iranian explanation, other JCPOA participant countries have continued toaccuse Iran of violating it. With the “accident” at the Natanz Nuclear Facility on
April 11 and the friction over the suspension of International Atomic Energy
Agency inspections, the major issue is whether the US will return to the JCPOA
or Iran will fully comply with it.
(3) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Confirmation of the strengthening ofsolidarity through the al-Ula agreement
On January 5, after the GCC summit in Saudi Arabia (also attended by
Egyptian Foreign Minister Shukry and US Senior Advisor to President
Kushner), a decision was made to restore Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, andEgypt’s diplomatic relations with Qatar, which were cut in 2017. It is often
pointed out that this was realized as part of former US President Trump’s
legacy-building efforts. However, in the first place, it was undesirable for these
Gulf countries at that time to continue their restrictions on human trafficking
and logistics. Additionally, considering the peace negotiations in Afghanistanthat were already underway between the US and Qatar at the time, the “Qatar
blockade” was not a positive factor in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt’s
relationship with the US. After the restoration of such diplomatic relations, thecountries have begun active exchanges, using this to overcome the economic
stagnation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. As for the ongoing turmoil in thesurrounding regions, such as Iran’s nuclear talks, the Afghan regime’s collapse,
Sudan’s military coup, and the Ethiopian civil war, the removal of the logic thathindered solidarity among the GCC countries is a positive sign, even considering
its wider impact.
(4) Turkey: Domestic and international political changes and the continued fallof the Turkish liraAs for domestic politics, the battle between the ruling and opposition parties
intensified in anticipation of the presidential and parliamentary elections,which were scheduled to be held in 2023, the centenary of the country’s founding.
In February, President Erdoğan asked all political parties, except the Peoples’
Democratic Party (which was pro-Kurdish), to submit a draft new constitution.
A major point of contention in the draft is whether the term “secularism”—thecountry’s national motto since its founding—will be included. Further, many
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problems have surfaced since the country adopted the presidential system. The
executive presidential system introduced in 2018 grants strong executive power
to the president and tends to reflect Erdoğan’s personal policy wishes. A notable
example of this can be seen in the economy as the central bank lowered theofficial interest rate for three consecutive months starting in September 2021.
This is likely due to the strong intentions of President Erdoğan, who has
disapproved of his interests. Since the interest rate was lowered, the lira has hit
new lows every day and fallen by approximately 45% (as of November 23, 2021),
which is an extraordinary situation. On December 20, President Erdoğan
announced a policy to compensate for exchange losses to stop the depreciation of
the lira. Consequently, the lira surged, but he did not say exactly how he would
conduct such compensation. Hence, future developments will be closely watched.
Under these circumstances, the main opposition parties—the Republican
People’s Party and the Good Party—are advocating for a return to aparliamentary system, arguing that politics is dysfunctional under the current
one. Opposition parties are calling for the election to be held ahead of schedule.
If the economy, which is presently in serious trouble, does not turn around, there
is a possibility of a change of administration.
As for diplomacy, there have been efforts to improve relations withneighboring countries, which marks a change from the hard-line stance it had
taken until 2020. In April, United Nations (UN)-led informal talks were heldwith Greece—with which Turkey has been disputing over the development ofgas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean—to resolve the Cyprus problem.
Unofficial talks at the deputy foreign minister-level were also held twice, in May
and September, to improve relations with Egypt, which had been severed forapproximately seven years. Regarding relations with the US, Turkey has showna willingness to compromise, partly because the new Biden administration
expresses commitment to international cooperation. In particular, as a solution
to the issue of delivery of F-35 fighter jets, Turkey requested to purchase F-16
fighter jets from the US. Although the Biden administration has shown apositive attitude, the US Congress’ opposition to the Erdoğan administration isstrong, and it will be interesting to see whether a conclusion can be reachedregarding this matter.

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Middle East Analysis Report January 6, 202 2 No.R21-11(5) Syria: Moves to normalize relations with Arab countries
The Syrian civil war has been in a stalemate with government dominance since
2018. Aside from the northern part of the country—effectively controlled by theTahrir al-Sham (whose members are Islamic extremists), the Turkish military,
Kurdish forces, and al-Tanf on the Iraqi border, where US troops are stationed—
the Assad regime has regained control of most of the country. Fighting has also
almost ended, except in the north. Nevertheless, there has been no progress inconstitutional reform and forming a new government through free elections.
President Bashar al-Assad was re-elected in May. However, western countries
have denied the legitimacy of the presidential election, claiming that it was held
without the UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which provides for a politicalsolution.
Nonetheless, the surrounding Arab countries, focusing on the reality of theAssad regime’s return to power, have begun to improve their relations with theregime to stabilize the situation in the region. Jordan, the UAE, and Egypt havesupported Syria’s return to the Arab League and began ministerial-level talks
with it. Additionally, it seems that Egypt-led negotiations are underway for
Syria’s return to the Arab League Summit in March 2022. The future of therelationship between the West, which does not recognize the legitimacy of theAssad regime, and Arab countries, which want Syria to return to the Arab world,
will be closely watched.
(6) Iraq: Domestic and international issues following the first year of Kadhimi’s
administration
Now in its second year, Prime Minister Kadhimi’s administration has continued
its all-round diplomatic stance toward reconstruction and began to play a keyrole in regional stability, including serving as a mediator in talks between Iranand Saudi Arabia. Although there is a conflict of interest with Turkey over water
allocation in the Tigris River basin, relations are reportedly better than they
were in late 2020, when military confrontations continued in the north. However,there was some noticeable domestic instability. The power shortage in thesummer and the subsequent water shortage have exposed the weakness of theinfrastructure environment. Moreover, Shiite militia forces demanding the early
withdrawal of US troops from the country also became active. Additionally, the“economic war” (i.e., destruction of power transmission towers) by IS added to8

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the power shortage. In the parliamentary elections held in October, the Sadrists,
who are considered to have anti-US credential, gained more seats in theparliament. They will have the casting vote to nominate the next leader andform the cabinet. There is considerable interest from neighboring countries to
see the kind of lineup the new government will have after its inauguration in
2022.
(7) Israel: Birth of the Bennett administration
After the general elections in March (the fourth in two years), an eight-party
coalition cabinet with Naftali Bennett as prime minister was formed in June,bringing to an end 12 years of Netanyahu’s cabinet. This was the result of theright, left, and Arab parties joining forces in an anti-Netanyahu effort to address
his privatization of political power and Republican bias in the country’s US
relations. However, disagreements within the coalition continue over theconstruction of settlements and policies concerning Palestine.
As for the Israel-Palestine relations, they had their first military clash inseven years. In May, Hamas and other Gaza militants engaged Israeli forces for
11 days as a result of a clash between Palestinians and far-right Jews over theeviction trial of Palestinian families living in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of
East Jerusalem. Peace negotiations are not expected to resume, partly due tothe resurgence of military conflicts and the Biden administration’s focus on its
relations with China.
On the diplomatic front, the Bennett administration is adamantly opposedto the US’s return to the JCPOA. To counter Iran’s regional influence, Israel
questioned Iranian military interests in Syria and attacked Iranian vessels near
the Persian Gulf coast. However, progress has been made in opening embassies
and economic cooperation agreements with Bahrain, the UAE, and Morocco,with which normalization agreements were signed in 2020.
(8) Tunisia: President Saied’s power grab
On July 25, President Saied applied Article 80 of the Constitution (whichpertains to special presidential power during emergencies) to seize executive
power, dismiss the prime minister, suspend the parliament, and strip all
members of parliament of their immunity. This was due to the growing social
unrest, as protests against Mechichi’s cabinet became increasingly active in9

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various parts of the country because of its worsening COVID-19 situation anddeteriorating economy. Some demonstrators have become rioters. Subsequently,
on August 23, President Saied extended the period of such measures indefinitely.
On September 22, he decided to suspend some provisions of the 2014
Constitution, exercise his legislative power through presidential decrees, abolisha judicial body (a provisional commission to review the constitutionality of draftlaws), and seize full power. He intended to start a dialogue with the people in
January 2022 to strengthen his presidential authority. Tunisia is the only
country that experienced the Arab Spring in 2011 to have successfullytransitioned to democracy. However, it is now reverting to an authoritarianregime like Egypt.
(9) Lebanon: Politicization of the Beirut Port explosion investigation andensuing economic crisis
In September, a cabinet headed by former Prime Minister Najib Miqati wasformed for the first time, filling the political vacuum that had existed since thesummer of 2020. Although the new cabinet pledged to fight corruption andengage in political and economic reforms, sectarian conflicts have continued,
adding to the country’s overall turmoil. In October, the Shiite Hezbollah andAmal movements called for the dismissal of a judge who is in charge ofinvestigating the Beirut Port explosion because politicians belonging to theirfaction had been indicted in connection with the incident. They also exchanged
gunfire in downtown Beirut with Lebanese Forces supporters who opposed said
judge’s removal. Furthermore, the confrontation between domestic Shiites andGulf States, and between domestic Shiites and other forces, over a statement by
the Minister of Information criticizing the Saudi intervention in the war in
Yemen, has led to a diplomatic crisis and a coalition cabinet crisis.
These conflicts have prevented political and economic reforms from taking
place. The Lebanese economy is in its worst condition in its history. The currency
dropped to 25,000 Lebanese pounds to the dollar for a time (the official rate was
1,507 pounds), prices soared due to subsidy cuts, and fuel shortages caused
blackouts throughout the country. It is estimated that the poverty rate has risen
to 82%. If parliamentary elections are held in this state in the spring of 2022,
the elections will merely become a place of political confrontation, and theeconomic collapse will be unstoppable.
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Middle East Analysis Report January 6, 202 2 No.R21-11(10) Yemen: Stalled war and implications of Saudi-Iranian talks
The war in Yemen is in a stalemate. This is because of the discord within thenational unity government established under the Riyadh agreement (conflict ofinterest between the interim government and the Southern Transitional
Council) and the advancement of the rival National Salvation Government(Ansar allah, commonly called the Houthis) in the Marib and Shabwah
provinces. Based on the Riyadh agreement, Saudi Arabia sought to shift its
position in the war in Yemen from an aggressor to an arbitrator. However, theunity government has repeatedly broken apart, with no prospect that it will beable to eliminate the National Salvation Government militarily. Therefore,
Saudi Arabia has proposed new peace negotiations between the unity
government and the National Salvation Government, but the former is notparticularly keen on this idea. While Saudi Arabia rushes to achieve results as
an “arbitrator,” the unity government (especially the interim government)
believes that peace negotiations will work against its own faction. Owing to theintentions of these various forces, the past year in Yemen has been a time ofsuffering and hardship for its civilian population (according to the UNHCR, asof October 2021, approximately 66% of the population needs humanitarianassistance).
(11) Libya: Stationing of foreign troops and foreign mercenaries
In the Second Libyan Civil War, the country’s forces, which were divided intoeast and west, engaged in repeated battles since 2014 with the support of othercountries. The political process toward resolution of the conflict has progressedin the last few years, with the ceasefire agreement of October 2020 bringing thefighting between them to a halt and the inauguration of the provisional
government, the Government of National Unity (GNU), in March 2021. However,no solution has been reached on the problem of stationing of foreign troops andmercenaries, which could lead to renewed armed conflict. Turkey is unlikely toagree to the withdrawal of its troops any time soon as they have been stationed
in the country based on a request for deployment from the previous UNapproved government, the Government of National Accord. As for Russia, it does
not recognize the presence of Russian regular forces in Libya, claiming that
Wagner—the company that sent the fighters to Libya—is a private militarycompany with no chain of command with the Russian government. With the11Middle East Institute of Japan

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confusion caused by the postponement of the presidential election that wasscheduled for December 24 and the resolution of the stationing issue, Libya is
unlikely to stabilize as both sides in the conflict are likely to oppose thestationing of foreign troops on each other’s territory.
(12) Algeria: Breaking off relations with Morocco, rising military tensions
On August 24, Algeria announced that it was breaking off its relations with
Morocco, citing its hostile acts. Relations between the two countries havecontinued to deteriorate since the previous year due to tensions in Western
Sahara, allegations of surveillance of Algerian officials via the Israeli-madePegasus spyware, and a reference by Morocco’s permanent UN representative
to the right of self-determination for Berbers living in Kabylia. Subsequently,
Algeria suspended the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline, which runs through a
Moroccan territory, at the end of October to increase pressure on Morocco. It alsobanned Moroccan aircraft from flying over Algerian airspace. Amid the growing
tensions between the two countries, on November 1, Algerian President
Tebboune announced that an Algerian truck traveling in the Western Sahara
region was bombed by Moroccan forces, killing three Algerian civilians. He hassuggested retaliation, and there are fears of military conflict between the twocountries.
(13) Egypt: Political, economic, and security stability
The al-Sisi administration has maintained political, economic, and security
stability. Anti-government activities and terrorist attacks in the Sinai Peninsula
have decreased, and the state of emergency was lifted for the entire country in
October. Although the COVID-19 pandemic lowered the country’s economic
growth rate to 3.3% in 2021, positive economic growth has been maintained.
Meanwhile, there was active regional diplomacy on the diplomatic front.
In the Israeli-Gaza military conflict in May, the two sides reached a ceasefire
agreement through Egypt’s mediation. Regarding the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam (GERD), which is feared to reduce the volume of water in the
Nile, the Egyptian government criticized Ethiopia for unilaterally starting tostore water in the dam. Further, it went on a diplomatic tour to explain such anissue to other countries to gain international support for Egypt. Political andeconomic relations with Qatar were revived after the al-Ula agreement in12

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January. In November, President al-Sisi and Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al
Thani had a conversation at COP26. Deputy foreign minister-level talks were
held with Turkey in May and September, and measures to improve relations
have been discussed. Egypt has a particular problem with the Turkish militarypresence in Libya. Once this is resolved, there will likely be real signs ofrelational improvements.
(End)13