2024
January
24th
No. R23-10
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Middle East Analysis Report No.R23-10

In 2023, the Middle East continued to experience a variety of political
upheavals and clashes, which have had a major impact both within and outside
the region. The Middle East Institute of Japan has reviewed the year 2023 andcompiled the following summary of the Middle East region for your perusal.
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Review of the Situation in the Middle East in 2023 and Future
OutlookMiddle East Institute of Japan
1. Overview: Reorganization of the regional order and the impact of the Gaza
crisisMilitary clashes between Israel and Gaza have continued after Hamas(officially known as the Islamic Resistance Movement), the effective ruling force
in the Palestinian Gaza Strip, launched a large-scale attack on Israel on October
7, 2023; this has led to widespread tensions in the region, including theintensified activities of Islamic extremists and militia groups in Yemen, Iraq,
Syria, and Lebanon. Israel’s violent attacks on the Gaza Strip have led to great
human suffering and physical harm. As a result, criticism against Israel has
intensified not only in Middle Eastern countries but also at the citizen level inWestern countries. What other governments in the Middle East fear is that
protests against Israel in their own countries will lead to criticism of their own
governments and evolve into a widespread movement demanding regimechange and transformation, further exacerbated by ongoing social issues suchas poverty and unemployment. For this reason, each country has refrained frommaking statements in support of Gaza, partly out of consideration for1

Middle East Institute of Japan, Middle East Analysis Report, January 24, 2024, No. R23-10

international public opinion, but they continue to express strong criticism of
Israel.
Israel aimed to destroy Hamas and sought to expand its sphere of
influence by invading northern Gaza Strip. In the process, the U.S. asked the
Netanyahu government about its prospects of governing Gaza after thedestruction of Hamas. However, the answer did not seem to have met U.S.
expectations. In response to this, on November 18, U.S. President Biden referred
to a “Two-State Solution” in a post in a domestic newspaper, emphasizing it as
the only solution to the Palestinian issue. Over the past decade, attention of the
Middle Easten governments has been focused on Iran’s nuclear program andIslamic extremists, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
Additionally, there has been a notable trend of increased cooperation between
Israel and Arab countries. At the same time, interest in the Palestinian issue
was declining at regional and international levels. With the so-called Gaza crisis
since October 7, the Palestinian issue has once again emerged as an importantmatter for countries to address. As part of this effort, the “Two-State Solution,”
which the Japanese government has officially supported, has once again
attracted global attention.
It is important to note that the current situation has arisen due to thedeadlock of the “Two-State Solution” and lack of support from countries such as
Iran for this approach. Therefore, the revival of the concept will not immediately
stabilize the region; it will require groundwork to move closer to its realization.
In this context, the recent progress in compromises among Middle Easterncountries is one of the few positive factors. Symbolic events in 2023, such as therestoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, theresumption of Bahrain-Qatar relations, Syria’s return to the Arab League, andthe appointment of ambassadors between Egypt and Turkey for the first time ina decade, highlight this progress.
The severing of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, theblockade of Qatar, the suspension of Syria’s membership in the Arab League,and the conflict between Egypt and Turkey are all consequences of the disunity
among countries in the region that emerged during the Arab Spring in late 2010,
as well as the responses to the subsequent rise of Islamic extremism. In recent
years, there has been a concerted effort among Middle Eastern countries toalleviate tensions from the past decade. The major earthquakes in Turkey and
Syria in February, along with the civil war in Sudan that commenced in April,2

Middle East Institute of Japan, Middle East Analysis Report, January 24, 2024, No. R23-10

also presented an opportunity to enhance cooperation among countries in theregion.
One factor contributing to this situation is the diminishing influence of
the U.S., a trend that has been widely acknowledged. Specifically, the U.S.
strategy of redirecting its military attention from the Middle East to Asia has
instigated a shift in dynamics within the region. This shift has led to a concerted
effort among Middle Eastern countries to enhance their security cooperation,
signaling a departure from reliance on the U.S. for security guarantees. This
trend is underscored by the reintegration of Iran, Syria, and Turkey into theregional fold, despite their historically strained relationships with the U.S.
These developments have also resulted in the diversification of eachcountry’s intra-regional diplomacy. The first aspect was the strengthening ofrelations with China, Russia, and other countries that compete with the U.S.
China and Russia played intermediary roles in the restoration of diplomatic
relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as Syria’s reintegration into
the Arab League (and the subsequent restoration of relations with Arabcountries). When Russia initiated its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022,
many countries in the Middle East declared themselves “neutral,” a stance thatwas criticized by Western countries as being “pro-Russian.” These positions
remained unchanged in 2023, with the Russian side actively seeking
opportunities to expand its influence in the Middle East region.
The subsequent endeavors focused on fostering positive relations withemerging economies, known as the Global South. Specifically, Saudi Arabia andthe UAE are enhancing their diplomatic efforts through various cooperative
frameworks, including BRICS, ASEAN, African Union (AU), and Association of
Caribbean States (ACS). This development highlights how Middle Easterncountries are adapting to the emergence of a distinct “international community”
that differs from those traditionally led by Western countries like the G7.
In other words, while every country is actively transitioning toward a
new order, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a longstanding issue from the oldorder, remains unresolved. Since the coalition government took power in
December 2022, Israel has continued to escalate tensions in the West Bank, led
by ministers from the religious right. In response, neighboring Arab countries
have issued statements criticizing the situation but have not taken effective
action. It has been reported that Saudi Arabia is working toward normalizing
diplomatic relations with Israel through U.S. mediation and assigned its first3

Middle East Institute of Japan, Middle East Analysis Report, January 24, 2024, No. R23-10

representative in Palestine in August. With this compromise as a catalyst, thekey question is whether each country can align their goals and allocate
responsibilities toward resolving the Palestinian issue.
In the energy market, prices initially increased following the IsraelHamas clashes, driven by concerns regarding instability in the Middle East andpotential impacts on energy infrastructure and shipping. However, the overall
impact was limited and short-term, as the global economic downturn led to arebalancing of supply and demand in the market.
Nevertheless, if militia groups escalate their activities, posing greater
geopolitical risks to infrastructure and shipping, and if the conflict intensifies in
the future, there is a possibility of a significant rise in energy prices that could
impact the global economy, including Japan. It is essential to monitor the
progress of the fighting, U.S. sanctions against Iran in response to Iranian
involvement, and Russia’s collaboration with OPEC closely.

2. Notable trends
The following is a discussion of notable trends and future outlook in
Middle Eastern countries.
(1) Iran: The surrounding situation has improved due to the diversification of
diplomatic efforts
In 2023, the Raisi government in Iran achieved diplomatic success andimproved the country’s regional and international standing. Domestically, theIranian regime faced challenges following ongoing hijab protests since fall 2022.
In terms of foreign relations, tensions with Israel escalated in the region as
uranium enrichment continued, sparking suspicions that the drones used by
Russia in Ukraine were produced in Iran, drawing attention from the West.
Essentially, Iran found itself under pressure from all sides early in 2023.
Despite this, the normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia in March,
the first in seven years, created a more favorable environment for Iran.
Subsequently, Iran officially joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in
July and it was announced in August that Iran would officially became part ofthe BRICS countries from 2024. Through these actions, Iran managed to breakfree from regional and international isolation, signaling a shift in the existing4

Middle East Institute of Japan, Middle East Analysis Report, January 24, 2024, No. R23-10

Western-dominated international order.
Furthermore, a significant attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7th
further altered the narrative in the Middle East, moving away from the isolationof Iran that had been progressing since the Abraham Accords in September 2020.
Both Arab countries and Iran found common ground on the issue of anti-Israel
sentiments, aligning interests in a manner beneficial to Iran. Under thesecircumstances, the “Axis of Resistance” spearheaded by Iran intensified its
offensive against Israeli and U.S. authorities, prompting the need for thoroughcaution and consideration of potential retaliatory measures.
(2) Afghanistan: Western involvement declines while China’s presence increases
In 2023, Afghanistan remained under the effective control of the Taliban
throughout the vast majority of the country. In April, the Taliban issued aproclamation banning Afghan women from working for the United Nations
within the nation. In response to this development, an international meeting
was convened on May 1st and 2nd at the invitation of UN Secretary-General
Guterres to discuss potential countermeasures, however, no tangible action was
taken. One of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of external efforts was that theleader, Haibatullah Akhundzada, was in hiding. Economically, the country
continued to be impacted by the plague and an earthquake that struck thewestern province of Herat in October in addition to the unemployment of the
youth.
In terms of external relations, China’s presence was increasingly evident.
On April 12th, China officially announced its position on the Afghanistan issue,
clarifying its commitment to the nation. China’s new ambassador presented
credentials to the Taliban in September, and the Taliban’s new Chinese
ambassador reciprocated by presenting credentials to the Chinese government
in December, signifying a state of “de facto recognition.” This marked a notable
shift from the stance of Western countries, which were alarmed by the Taliban’s
exclusive grip on power and its infringement of women’s rights. With Westernengagement dwindling, China emerged to fill the void. Russia also asserted its
presence by hosting an international meeting.
Conversely, relations with Pakistan significantly deteriorated startingin November, when the Pakistani government deported numerous Afghan
migrants and refugees. The outcome of any potential agreement between these5Middle East Institute of Japan, Middle East Analysis Report, January 24, 2024, No. R23-10

two nations will play a crucial role in shaping Afghanistan’s future foreign policy.
(3) Turkey: Erdoğan’s victory in the presidential election and his efforts toenhance relations with regional countries
In 2023, a significant seismic event struck the southeast on February 7,
coinciding with double elections - presidential and parliamentary - as well as thecelebration of the country’s 100th founding anniversary. Originally slated for
June, the double elections took place on May 14, a month earlier than planned.
The political atmosphere was charged with mounting criticism toward thegovernment for its sluggish response to the earthquake aftermath, coupled withserious economic challenges, leading to widespread anticipation of a possible
change in leadership.
In response to these circumstances, the six primary opposition parties
joined forces in a coalition aimed at unseating Erdoğan. However, the coalition,
consisting of parties with diverging ideologies, faltered due to their inability tonominate a unified candidate promptly or present clear and viable policies.
Consequently, the ruling party secured a parliamentary majority, and thepresidential race culminated in Erdoğan’s victory after a run-off election. On
June 3, President Erdoğan introduced his new cabinet, seeking to address thepressing economic issues by reinstating Mefmet Şimşek as the Minister ofTreasury and Finance. Şimşek, esteemed for his financial acumen, hadpreviously served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance from 2009
to 2018.
To bolster diplomatic ties, President Erdoğan appointed ambassadors tocountries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf statesthat had developed positive relations with Turkey since 2022. Additionally,ambassadors were dispatched to Israel and Egypt to strengthen regional
partnerships. However, relations with Israel soured dramatically following theoutbreak of the Gaza crisis on October 7, 2023, showing no signs of improvement.
(4) Syria: No breakthrough in the conflict
Overall, since 2011, the country has failed to seize the opportunity torecover from the conflict. The various damages that ensued, along with socialand economic decline, have become increasingly apparent. Syrian territory has
been occupied by Islamic extremists, such as the Hayʼat Tahrir ash-Sham,6

Middle East Institute of Japan, Middle East Analysis Report, January 24, 2024, No. R23-10

Kurdish nationalist forces, Turkey, and the U.S., while Israeli attacks on Syria
have persisted. Progress in dealing with and repatriating Islamic State
members detained by Kurdish nationalist forces has also been stagnant.
Despite suffering significant damage from an earthquake in February,effective aid has not been forthcoming due to entrenched political stances
stemming from the Syrian conflict. Although the earthquake led to improved
relations between Syria and Arab countries, resulting in Syria’s reinstatementin the Arab League in May, economic sanctions imposed by Western countries
have remained unchanged, with little tangible impact from the diplomaticdevelopments. President Assad’s visit to China in September appeared to signal
China’s expanding influence in the Middle East, yet its actual impact on Syrian
politics and diplomacy was largely symbolic.
Meanwhile, escalating fighting in Palestine since October has further
fueled the war in Syria, with tensions escalating through a series of attacks on
U.S. military bases within Syrian territory, as well as attacks by U.S. and Israeli
forces on Syrian soil.
(5) GCC: The bright and dark sides of improved relations
The trend toward improving relations between the countries in theregion, which began around 2021, continued until 2023. There were several
symbolic events during this period, including the agreement to restore
diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March, the resumptionof relations between Bahrain and Qatar in April (based on the Al-Ula
declaration of January 2021), and the support for Syria’s return to the Arab
League in May (along with the improvement of relations between Saudi Arabia
and the UAE with Syria around this time). It is noteworthy that during thisprocess, China and Russia increased their presence in the Middle East by acting
as mediators. This indicates that countries have a keen interest in
strengthening ties with extra-regional powers that compete with the U.S. in aninternational order different from that led by the West.
This shift was particularly evident among the GCC countries, as
demonstrated by the GCC-Central Asia Summit in July and the invitations
extended to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Iran to the BRICS Summit inAugust (with their formal inclusion in January 2024). At the same time, Israel
and Arab countries continued to foster closer relations, with Saudi Arabia
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Middle East Institute of Japan, Middle East Analysis Report, January 24, 2024, No. R23-10

initiating full-fledged negotiations with Israel on the normalization of
diplomatic relations starting from April. However, this might have been one of
the motivations behind the Hamas offensive against Israel in October, leading
to a subsequent war in Gaza that prompted Saudi Arabia to “freeze” negotiations
with Israel.
Neighboring countries, particularly Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia,
strongly criticized Israel and stood in support of Palestine, partly due todomestic public opinion. Bahrain, despite having diplomatic relations with
Israel, recalled its ambassador for security reasons, and the Israeli ambassador
to Bahrain also returned to the country in early November. The UAE, which also
maintains diplomatic ties with Israel, refrained from taking a clear politicalstance as COP28 approached at the end of November; it did not recall the Israeliambassador and actively avoided references to the Gaza war.
(6) Israel-Palestine: Background and intentions of the war on Gaza
The Netanyahu government, which began its sixth term at the end of2022, caused a significant controversy not only in Israel but also in Palestine.
On the domestic front, the introduction of a proposed judicial reform in January
greatly reduced the power of the Supreme Court over the government, leading
to widespread criticism that it could weaken democracy. Internationally,
Finance Minister Smotrich and National Security Minister Ben-Gvir, both fromthe right-wing religious party that was instrumental in forming the coalition
government, engaged in provocative actions in the West Bank, exacerbating thesecurity situation in the region.
The attack on October 7 allowed Hamas, based in the Gaza Strip, toassert its presence by launching direct attacks on Israel, further highlighting
the Palestinian Authority’s administrative shortcomings. While Hamas isunlikely to achieve a military victory over Israel in the ongoing Gaza-Israel
conflict, the group’s political victory may be within reach if it can securerecognition as a key player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from neighboring
countries and the international community, as well as hinder Israel’s efforts tobuild relationships with Arab nations.
Conversely, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose
popularity declined during the Gaza war, remained unwavering in his aim todismantle Hamas to maintain power. As tensions from the Gaza-Israel conflict8

Middle East Institute of Japan, Middle East Analysis Report, January 24, 2024, No. R23-10

spilled over into Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, the prospect of de-escalation
through diplomatic negotiations became increasingly challenging.
(7) Iraq: Relations with neighboring countries
The country faced numerous challenges, including internal conflicts
between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government,
widespread corruption and the subsequent efforts to recover stolen assets, anddiplomatic relations with neighboring countries like Iran, Turkey, and Kuwait.
The political gridlock resulting from disagreements over budget allocations andnatural resource management between the federal government and theKurdistan Regional Government has become deeply entrenched in the current
administration. Despite ongoing efforts, exposing governmental corruption andreclaiming misappropriated funds have proven to be significant but
unsuccessful endeavors for successive administrations.
Water and natural resource management, as well as the presence ofKurdish military forces, have emerged as common points of contention in Iraq’s
diplomatic engagements with Iran and Turkey. Both Iran and Turkey haveconducted military operations within Iraqi borders under the pretext oftargeting Kurdish opposition forces. In an effort to bolster security cooperation
with Iran, Kurdish strongholds along the border region between the two nations
were dismantled in September. Additionally, the decreasing river flows
originating from Turkey and Iran have raised concerns for numerous years,
exacerbating drought conditions in provinces like al-Muthanna.
In a recent development, Iraq’s Supreme Court deemed the agreementwith Kuwait regarding shipping activities in Abdullah Bay, situated at themouth of the Persian Gulf, as unconstitutional, resulting in a backlash within
the country. This longstanding issue has its roots in the Gulf War and highlights
broader challenges within Iraq’s political system, as well as social and economic
development woes.
(8) Tunisia: President rejects financial aid, leading to illegal immigration
concerns
In a recent development, the President of Tunisia has declined financial
assistance, causing repercussions in the realm of illegal immigration.
In April, President Kais Saied announced his intention to reject a new9

Middle East Institute of Japan, Middle East Analysis Report, January 24, 2024, No. R23-10

loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that was being negotiated.
Tunisia had agreed to receive a new $1.9 billion loan from the IMF at the staff
level in October 2022. However, President Saied began to show difficulty withthe economic reforms that were a condition of the loan. The concern was thatsubsidy cuts would harm the middle-class and low-income groups. President
Saied also rejected EU financial aid in October. The EU and Tunisia had agreed
in July on large-scale financial assistance on the condition that Tunisia would
actively cooperate in combating illegal immigration, which is a priority issue forboth countries. However, most of the EU’s financial aid was contingent on
Tunisia’s economic reforms, as was case with the IMF. President Said therefore
reacted to the EU's assessment that his economic measures were inadequate,
leading to a growing confrontation with the EU. Meanwhile, people from subSaharan Africa are streaming from Tunisia to Italy. If the Saied government
does not crack down on recruitment agencies and tighten border controls, thenumber of illegal migrants entering Europe could continue to rise.
(9) Yemen: End of civil war exacerbated by Gaza conflict
When the ceasefire expired in October 2022, Yemen once again founditself embroiled in conflict between Ansarullah (the Houthis) in northern Sana’a,and the unity government led by the Presidential Council in Aden in the south.
Despite the resumption of hostilities, there was a period of relative calmfollowing the ceasefire, creating a sense that an end to the war in Yemen waswithin reach. Negotiations between Yemeni and Saudi delegations occurred in
Sana’a in April and in Riyadh in September 2023, with all parties showing
optimism about reaching a peaceful resolution. Defense Minister Khalid bin
Salman, representing the Saudi side in the Riyadh negotiations, expressed
support for finding a peaceful solution.
However, the outbreak of war in the Gaza Strip in October had adetrimental effect on the situation. Ansarullah declared their support for Hamas
by launching rockets and other weapons at Israeli forces, despite theunlikelihood of causing significant damage. Although it was unlikely that
Ansarullah would dramatically alter the course of the conflict in Gaza, theiractions such as disrupting maritime traffic by attacking commercial vessels
bound for Israel in November and December contributed to regional instability.
This development effectively derailed the imminent end to the war in Yemen,10Middle East Institute of Japan, Middle East Analysis Report, January 24, 2024, No. R23-10

pushing it further out of reach.
(10) Libya: Massive floods in the east, the negative effects of “one country, twogovernments”
In September, eastern Libya was struck by a storm from theMediterranean, causing devastating flooding in the city of Derna as damscollapsed. Approximately a quarter of the city was left in ruins, with the death
toll and number of missing persons exceeding 20,000. The ongoing conflict in
Libya, which has resulted in a divided governance structure since the summerof 2014, exacerbated the situation. The eastern region is governed by the“Government in the East,” distinct from the internationally recognized
Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli. With limited disaster
response capabilities and facing recognition challenges, the eastern government
was slow to seek assistance from the international community.
Despite offers of aid to the UN-recognized GNU, there were delays indeploying rescue teams and delivering aid to areas outside of the GNU control.
The prolonged conflict in Libya, fueled by competing interests between local andforeign actors, has impeded effective disaster relief efforts.
(11) Algeria: Appointment of a new Prime Minister in anticipation of the nextpresidential election
In November, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune appointed Nadir
Larbaoui, chief of staff to the presidency, as the new Prime Minister. Thisdecision was believed to be aimed at garnering support for the upcoming
presidential election and advancing Western Sahara policies. With the economic
challenges brought on by COVID-19 now under control, President Tebboune has
begun filling key decision-making positions in his administration with loyalists
in order to achieve his political objective of re-election.
During his time as the Permanent Representative to the United Nations,the new Prime Minister Larbaoui emphasized the significance of the Western
Sahara territorial issue to the international community. Algeria has maintained
a confrontational stance with Morocco over the Western Sahara conflict,evidenced by diplomatic relations being severed in August 2021 and gas supplies
being suspended as of November 2021. It is expected that Prime Minister
Larbaoui’s appointment will lead to increased involvement by the Tebboune
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Middle East Institute of Japan, Middle East Analysis Report, January 24, 2024, No. R23-10

government in this issue.
Should President Tebboune choose to run in the upcoming presidential
election, it is likely that he will be re-elected due to his strong relationships withthe military, which holds considerable influence over political affairs, as well as
the quelling of anti-government protests that escalated in 2019, and the absenceof a formidable opponent. However, there are growing concerns about President
Tebboune’s health, as he will be turning 78 this year, and whether he will be able
to fulfill his five-year term starting in 2024.
(12) Egypt: Stagnation in energy cooperation with Israel
Natural gas trends in Egypt and Israel have been significantly impacted
by the deteriorating situation in Gaza. In early October, the U.S. oil company
Chevron suspended natural gas exports to Egypt through the East
Mediterranean Gas (EMG) pipeline connecting Israel and Egypt. Additionally,
the Tamar gas field off the coast of Israel ceased production due to security
concerns.
By mid-November, Israeli gas production and transportation had
resumed. However, as a result of the decline in Israeli gas imports and the risingdemand for domestic gas, Egypt experienced a shortage of gas supply. This
shortage led to constraints in industrial gas distribution and power outages incertain regions, while also making it impossible to secure gas for export.
Consequently, Egypt’s status as a gas supplier is gradually being threatened.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Europe sought
to reduce its energy dependence on Russia. Egypt, located across theMediterranean, was expected to serve as one of the alternative sources of energy
for Europe. However, if conflicts in Gaza continue to hinder the development ofIsraeli gas fields, the resumption of Egyptian gas exports will be further delayed.
As a result, the opportunity to increase gas revenues in the medium to long term
will be lost.
(13) Lebanon: Confusion becoming the norm
A political vacuum emerged when the presidency became vacant in
October 2022, as minimal progress was made in discussions and coordination
among various factions to elect a successor. The election of a president, alongwith political and administrative reforms, is seen as a prerequisite for Western12Middle East Institute of Japan, Middle East Analysis Report, January 24, 2024, No. R23-10

economic assistance to Lebanon. International loans and economic aid fromother nations to assist Lebanon in overcoming the economic crisis since late 2019
have also been stalled. This situation has been exacerbated by the influx of
Syrian refugees, further deepening the economic turmoil. Adding to thechallenges, ongoing confrontations between groups such as Hezbollah and theIsraeli military persisted following the conflict in Palestine that began in
October. The hostilities took an unusual turn with Palestinian groups in
Lebanon conducting cross-border operations, alongside artillery exchanges andbombardments across the border. Concerned that the escalation of violence could
entangle Lebanon in a broader regional conflict, countries within and outside
the Middle East have called for calm. With nearly half a million Palestinian
refugees residing in Lebanon, pre-existing security issues in refugee camps likeAin al-Hilweh have deteriorated. The long-standing Palestinian refugee crisishas been largely overlooked internationally, and without significant attention toaddress this, finding a lasting resolution to the conflicts and tensions will provechallenging.
(14) Jordan: A sense of crisis regarding the situation in GazaWith the escalation of the Israeli military campaign in Gaza,
demonstrations of solidarity with Palestine have increased in Jordan. In
response to an explosion at Al-Ahli Hospital in Gaza, protesters in Amman
sought to target the Israeli embassy but were thwarted by security forces. The
Jordanian government has taken a firm stance against Israel, unequivocallycondemning its assault on the Gaza Strip and recalling its ambassador. In lightof these developments, Jordan has opted to review its water and electricity
exchange agreement with Israel.
At the same time, there has been hesitation on the part of the Jordanian
government to accept more Palestinian refugees. This reluctance stems fromconcerns that the deteriorating situation in Gaza could spill over into the WestBank and trigger a surge in Palestinian refugee influx into Jordan. The country
already hosts a significant number of Palestinian refugees, with the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) estimating
the population to exceed 2 million. The growing number of refugees count has
strained Jordanian public services and further strained its financial stability.

13Middle East Institute of Japan, Middle East Analysis Report, January 24, 2024, No. R23-10(15) Morocco: Shaky relations with Israel
Morocco normalized relations with Israel in December 2020 and hassince been working to strengthen ties across various sectors. In June, Israel
participated for the first time in the joint Moroccan-American “African Lion”
military exercise for the first time. The peak of the growing relationship between
Morocco and Israel came in July when Israel recognized Morocco’s sovereignty
over the disputed region of Western Sahara. However, continued Israeli attacks
on Palestinians prompted Morocco to halt its efforts to enhance bilateral
cooperation with Israel. In July, Morocco called off the scheduled second
ministerial meeting of the Negev Summit, which was supposed to take place inMorocco, and strongly condemned Israeli military actions amid the escalating
situation in the Gaza Strip in October. This decision stemmed from concernsthat a pro-Israeli stance by the Moroccan government could spark significant
pro-Palestinian demonstrations in the country and lead to explicit criticism of
the king, who holds considerable authority over foreign policy decisions.
Meanwhile, in November, a town in Western Sahara was attacked by thePolisario Front, a group advocating for the independence of the region, resulting
in civilian casualties. If this group continues to target residential areas inWestern Sahara, Morocco is likely to prioritize its own security interests andcontinue to foster military ties with Israel.
(END)

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