CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS
IN ARCTIC LAW

Volume 8
2020
University of Lapland
Rovaniemi

Current Developments in Arctic Law
Editors: Kamrul Hossain and Marcin Dymet
Publisher: University of Lapland
Current Developments in Arctic Law is produced in cooperation within UArctic
Thematic Network on Arctic Law© UArctic Thematic Network on Arctic Law
Current Developments in Arctic Law is licensed under the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License

Cover: Zofia Hyjek

ISSN: 2343-3418

Table of Contents

Editors’ Note ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Kamrul Hossain & Marcin Dymet
Restorative Justice in the Arctic: Indigenous Knowledge for Healing Communities................................................................................................................................................................ 3

Heather Sauyaq Jean Gordon & Ranjan Datta
Law Beyond the Human in the Arctic and Outer Space............................................... 16
Elena Cirkovic

Russian Arctic Policy Supporting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Developmentin the Arctic ........................................................................................................................... 20
Elena Gladun & Olga Zakharova
A Note About the Indigenous Peoples’ Registry in the Russian Federation ........... 29
Karolina Sikora
Arctic Implications of a No-Deal Brexit .......................................................................... 35
Stefan Kirchner
Arctic Challenge for Sustainability II: Japan’s New Arctic Flagship Project .......... 40
Juha Saunavaara & Fujio Ohnishi

One of the Finland’s Largest Minings Coming to Forest Sámi Reindeer
Management Area ................................................................................................................ 44Juha Joona
IEffective Business Development in Arctic Russia: How to Make the Arctic Zone
Attractive for Business ........................................................................................................ 48
Pavel Tkach
The Polar Law Symposiums .............................................................................................. 57
Gudmundur Alfredsson
Conference Report of the 13th Polar Law Symposium Special Online Session ..... 60
Mami Furuhata

IIEditors’ Note

including other Thematic Networks of the
University of the Arctic, to organise summer
schools or teaching programs for doctoralandadvanced-level

undergraduate

andCurrent Developments in Arctic Law

graduate students. While the Network(CDAL) is an annual publication of theorganises several seminars and workshops

University of the Arctic's Thematic Network

each year open to students and scholars, iton Law (Network). The Network consists ofregularly joins the host's effort to organiseover 160 scholars interested in the Arctic, notthe annual Polar Law Symposium. Network

only from the standpoint of law but also frommembers schedule scientific sessions inother social science disciplines, such as

renowned international conferences, such as

international relations and political science.

in the International Congress of Arctic Social

Network members belong to education andSciences (ICASS), the UArctic Congress,

research institutions located across the Arctic

and the Arctic Circle Assembly.

and sub-Arctic region. Its activities includeandAs part of the outcomes of the research andoutreach. In recent years, the Network has

network projects and that of the conference

successfully implemented several researchpresentations, each year, the Networkand network projects. To name a few are

members publish high-quality scientific

Food (In)Security in the Arctic, funded bypapers focusing on legal and policy

the Nordic Council of Ministers, the pilot

developments concerning the Arctic. The

project for institutionalizing research-end

publication of the Yearbook of Polar Law

user

security(Brill/Nijhoff) is one of the significant

research, funded by the Council of the Baltic

achievements to which the Network strongly

Sea States, and the Finnish-Japanese Arctic

contributes. Its members serve on theStudies Program, funded by the Department

editorial board and, at the same time, serveof Education in Finland.

asresearch,

education,

cooperationinnetworking,societal

peer-reviewers

for

the

submitted

manuscripts.
In the areas of education and teaching, theNetwork organises guest lectures, in which

The CDAL is another achievement thatwell-known experts deliver speeches on

encourages both junior and senior scholars to

topical issues concerning the Arctic. The

publish their research and academic results.

Network cooperates with related institutions,

Additionally, it publishes policy papers,
1

short notes on Arctic-related research andregion. Juha Saunavaara and Fujio Ohnishi

developments, conference summaries anddescribe

similar contributions. Today, the CDAL is in

Sustainably II (ArCS II) project conducted

its eighth year. Hence, this is our eighth

jointly by Japan's National Institute of Polar

volume. The papers published in the CDAL

Research, the Japan Agency for Marine-

are non-peer-reviewed and include both

Earth Science and Technology and theacademic and non-academic contributions.

Hokkaido University. Juha Joona describes

This volume contains 10 articles covering a

the potential consequences of opening awide range of topics, as follows: Heather

planned phosphate mine in the Kemin-

Sauyaq Jean Gordon and Ranjan Datta

Sompio area in the Finnish Lapland. Pavel

present the concept of restorative justice

Tkach discusses how federal laws of thepractices based on indigenous knowledge.

Russian Federation make the Arctic regions

By giving examples of such practices, themore attractive for business development.

authors reflect on how introducing them can

Gudmundur Alfredsson presents a brief

help with holistic healing of indigenous

history of the Polar Law Symposiums

peoples and communities. Elena Cirkovic

organised so far, as well as their contents andproposes a cosmolegal approach to the legal

outreach. Finally, Mami Furuhata reports onframework of climate change and outer space

the 13th Polar Law Symposium held this year

pollution, in which both human and non-

online.

theArcticChallengeforhuman actors are agents influencing one
another. Elena Gladun and Olga Zakharova

While these contributions are not peer-

examine how the Russian Federation isreviewed, and opinions expressed in thecomplying with the goals of the United

papers are those of the individual authors, we

Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable

sincerely hope that the articles are of interest

Development in the Arctic Region. Karolina

to many of you – our readers. We are grateful

Sikora analyses the influence of the registry

to all the contributors for their insightfulof indigenous peoples in the Russian

thoughts and deliberations, which advances

Federation on the conditions and status of thethis eighth volume of the CDAL one step

indigenous

further in disseminating knowledge on thepeoplesoftheRussianstate of the Arctic world.

Federation's North, Siberia and the Far East.
Stefan Kirchner offers predictions of theKamrul Hossain & Marcin Dymet

potential consequences of a No-Deal Brexit
to international cooperation in the Arctic

December 10, 20202

Restorative Justice in
the Arctic: Indigenous
Knowledge for Healing
Communities∗

considers how we might engage inrelearning by making more room for theholistic healing found within Indigenous
models of restorative justice. We hope
our
paper
providesageneralintroduction to the importance ofIndigenous knowledge for people whowork with Indigenous clients in the
United States (U.S.) and Canadian Arctic
justice systems. Our paper also serves toinform other Indigenous peopleinterested in developing restorative
justice practices in their communities ofwhat is being done in some Canadianand U.S. Arctic communities.

Heather Sauyaq Jean Gordon ∗∗ & Ranjan
Datta ∗∗∗

Introduction
Indigenous people are overrepresented
in the justice systems in both Alaska andCanada, especially when looking at
incarceration rates (Alaska DepartmentofCorrections,
2018;
CanadaDepartment of Justice Research andStatistics Division, 2019). Mainstream
justice systems are focusing on punitive
measures that do not reflect Indigenous
Knowledge and Indigenous approaches
to restorative justice and healing (Pranis,
Stuart, & Wedge, 2003). In this shortpaper, we aim to generate further
understanding of how Indigenous
knowledge is significant and related to
Indigenous restorative justice as a means
to consider how we might resolve
various forms of disputes, meet theneeds of Indigenous peoples andcommunities, and rethink Alaska andCanada’s justice systems. This paper

Turning to Indigenous Knowledge for
Justice and Healing: Restorative
JusticeIndigenous knowledge is dynamic,
holistic, intergenerational, linked toexperience on traditional lands and theintegrity of the knowledge depends on
maintaining the “integrity of the land
itself.” (Battiste 2005, p.8). Indigenous
people have a deep connection between
their traditional knowledge and theirrestorative justice systems such as thepeacemaking circles. In restorative
justice, many Indigenous people rely on

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not reflect the view of the
Administration of Native Americans, The Administration for Children and Families, the Department
of Health and Human Services, or the United States government.
∗∗
Administration for Native Americans, Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C., USA∗∗∗
Canada Research Chair-II in Community Disaster Research at Indigenous Studies at the
Department of Humanities at Mount Royal University, Calgary, Alberta, Canada∗

3communities (Correctional
Canada, 2015).

their sustainable Indigenous Knowledge
to resolve disputes within theircommunities (Lange, & Popova, 2011;
Loukacheva,2012).
Indigenous
knowledge, cultural practices, andtraditional restorative justice systems areinterconnected to develop social control
to maintain harmony in the community,
such harmony being essential tocommunity survival. Indigenous people
in North American societies were andare dynamic cultures that constantly
adapt(ed) to meet their changing
circumstances and address their needs.

Services

Indigenous restorative justice is a
traditional knowledge-based practice.
This process addresses crime in a waythat situates it as an act against an
individual and community, not an act
against a state and its laws (DicksonGilmore & La Prairie, 2007; Melton,2005). In many cases, Indigenous
restorative justice is based on a holistic
philosophy. The unwritten customarylaws and traditions guide these systems
and practices that are learned primarily
by example and through the oralteachings of Indigenous Elders (Melton,2005). It is a healing process that
acknowledges that crime does damage
but posits that judicial systems should bea vehicle for healing, not forpunishment. This justice methodattempts
tounderstandthecircumstances that led to crime
occurring in the first place to identify
and address the cause and impacts
accurately. The Indigenous restorativeknowledge-based justice’s goal becomes
identifying a healing methodology forthe victim, offender, and communitythat helps reduce recidivism andacknowledges the impact of the crime on
the individuals and communities
affected (Correctional Services Canada,2015).

Indigenous
restorative
justiceistypically a healing process based on
Indigenous
disputeresolution
traditions. There is a substantial body ofliterature citing the positive impact ofIndigenous
knowledge-based
restorative justice systems. In thesesystems, parental education was crucial
to teaching and cultivating every child asense of duty and responsibility tomaintain harmony (Dickson-Gilmore &La Prairie, 2007; Melton, 2005). Hewitt’s(2014) study focused on Indigenous
knowledge and laws suggesting thatIndigenous restorative justice is a means
to consider how we might better resolve
various forms of disputes and reinvent
versus revise Canada’s criminal justicesystem. Indigenous people represent
Indigenous spirituality, values, beliefs,
and traditions in inmate programming
facilitates healing for the Indigenous

4

Using Indigenous
Restorative Justice

Knowledge

foroffender to their traditional roots,increase attachment to the land, andimprove traditional skills. Studies(Borrows, 2002; Mills, 2016) suggest thatIndigenous
Knowledge,
values,protocols, and traditions, preserved in
the wisdom of Elders and communities’
practices, need to be considered as asignificant part of restorative justice.
Therefore, many Indigenous people
traditionally believe that restorative
justice is a way of life and a part of thelife process.

Healing is the center of the Indigenous
Knowledge-based restorative justicesystem. For example, a study (Justice
Education Society, 2016) suggests that if
a healing circle is used as the method forjustice, it must include the offender,
Elders, community members, and thevictim if he or she has agreed toparticipate. In this healing process, allparties have the opportunity to discuss
the crime and how it has affected thevictim and the community. Besides, thehealing focuses on the underlying causesof the offence. Together the group will
suggest reconciliatory action for theoffender. In this Indigenous Knowledgebased justice system, victims report
more satisfaction than traditional justiceprocedures (Justice Education Society,2016). Thus, restorative justice practice
becomes an effort to institutionalize apositive problem-solving methodology
aroundahistoricallyculturally
devastating system for both victim andoffender (Hansen, 2009; Hansen et al.,2012; Tribal Law and Policy Institute,2014).

Restorative
ExamplesJusticeintheArctic:CanadaIn Canada, there is a multitude ofrestorative justice practices taking place
due to first Indigenous movements toaddress healing and traditional forms ofjustice and followed by the 1996
amendment to the Canadian Criminal
Code that encouraged communitybased restorative elements (Barnes, 2013;
McCormick, 2001; Canadian Resource
Centre for Victims of Crime, 2011). In
Canada, some forms of restorative
justice are Indigenous, while others arefaith- or community-based, Indigenous
practices include Peacemaking Circles(Indigenous),
Healing
Circles(Indigenous), Sentencing Circles (notalways Indigenous), and AboriginalCourts (also known as First Nations
CourtsorIndigenous
Courts)In the Indigenous Knowledge-based
restorative justice systems, Indigenous
Elders, leaders, and medicine-men playsignificant roles (Hansen, 2009; Hansen
et al., 2012). For instance, Elders often
take offenders out into the bush to hunt,
trap and live off the land in traditional
ways. This is intended to reclaim the5

(Indigenous)(Canadian
Resource
Centre for Victims of Crime, 2011;
Johnson, 2014; Mehl-Madrona, 2014).
Started in 1991, the Indigenous Justice
Program (IJP), formerly known as theAboriginal Justice Strategy, supports
Canadian Indigenous restorative justiceprograms by helping to fund over 100
restorative justice programs serving
over 400 communities (Fleming, 2015).
Indigenous restorative justice resolvesfamily conflicts, builds community
capacity, enforces Indigenous laws, anddevelops sentencing plans. Participants
in IJP funded restorative justiceprograms have lower recidivism rates
than those involved in the mainstream
Canadian justice system and are justover half as likely to re-offend (Canada
Department of Justice Evaluation
Division, 2016). We will now look at
examples of Indigenous restorative
justice in Canada, Circle Healing in the
Hollow Water First Nations Community
in Manitoba and the Tsuu T’ina First
Nation Court in Alberta.

1997a). Incest was not an accepted normby the Ojibwa people and it was a taboo
to have incestual relations (Sivell-Ferri,
1997a). The community came together
and began to talk about the issues they
were having as more and more peoplecame forward disclosing what had
happened to them (Bushie, 1997a). The
community developed a thirteen-step
CHCH process that begins withdisclosure and continues throughconfronting the victimizer, supporting
the family, holding circles with thevictimizer, holding separate circles withthe victim, gradually bringing in thefamily to the victim’s circle, holding asentencing circle, regularly reviewing
sentencing, and ultimately ending theprocess with a cleansing ceremony(Sivell-Ferri, 1997b). The CHCH method
is founded on seven Ojibwe teachings of“honesty, love, courage, truth, wisdom,
humility, and respect” (Sivell-Ferri,
1997b)For an offender to partake in the CHCH
they have to first plead guilty and admit
to the offence and then agree to partakein the circles instead of being sentenced
by a judge (Sivell-Ferri, 1997b). If they dothis, then they are supported through theCircle Healing and “non-blaming
approach.” The first circle is with theoffender and their family, the offendertaking responsibility for their actions
and meeting with their family to admit
what they have done. The second circle
is for the victim and their family to

Healing Circles
The Hollow Water First Nations
Community developed the Hollow
Water First Nations Community Holistic
Circle Healing (CHCH) in 1986 in the
Hollow Water Ojibwa community of theAnishinaabe people in Manitoba,
Canada in response to the high rates ofalcohol abuse that was linked to incest
and sexual assault taking place in thecommunity (Barnes, 2013; Bushie,6

discuss what has happened. Eventually,
the offender, victim, and their families
join one circle and the victim explains to
the offender how they were affected inorder to heal. In the final circle, thesentencing circle, the two families,
victim, and offender, are joined bycommunity members; the offender tells
the community what they have done,
and the community develops sentencing
recommendations for the judge andthese proceedings are reported to thecourt (Bushie, 1997b). This process has
greatly reduced recidivism rates
compared to mainstream justicepractices with a recidivism rate of only 2
percent compared to the mainstream
recidivism rate for sex offenders being 13
percent (Native Counseling Services ofAlberta, 2001).

Bar Association which said that theyneeded the Aboriginal courts due to ahistory of Indigenous nations in Canada
and their cultural method of oral history
being excluded from mainstream justice(Whonnock, 2008). The Aboriginalcourts utilize Aboriginal methods ofdispute resolution that respect andreflect the local Aboriginal culture of thearea. By focusing on restorative justiceinstead of punitive measures, theyemphasize rehabilitating instead of
imprisoning
Indigenous
people(Johnson, 2014). Offenders must be
willing to plead guilty and admit theiroffence to begin the healing restorative
process.
The Tsuu T’ina First Nation are Dene
and live outside Calgary, Alberta(Whonnock, 2008). They began planning
an alternative justice system in 1996,
reviewing other peacemaking dispute
resolution processes such as thePeacemaking Circle used by another
Dene people, the Navajo in the U.S.
(Bryant, 2002). They developed a Court
Proposal in 1998, and the Tsuu T’ina
Peacemaker Court was started on the
Reserve in 2000 (Bryant, 2002; Wang,2019). It works to combine Alberta
Provincial Court and Peacemakerprocesses where the Crown Prosecutor
and Peacemakers are both present in the
courtroom and the judge ultimately
decides if a case will be dealt with in the
court or go to a peacemaking circle. The
Judge is a First Nations Bar member, andAboriginal Courts
Aboriginal Courts began in Canada with
the Tsuu T’ina Peacemaker Court inAlberta in 2000 (Whonnock, 2008). Oneof the reasons the courts were createdincludes addressing the results of theRoyal Commission on Aboriginal
peoples that demonstrated that thecurrent Canadian mainstream justicesystem was not working for the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada as
evidenced by their overrepresentation in
the system and the lack of Aboriginalvalues, cultures, and beliefs in themainstream Canadian justice system(Chartrand, 1995). A second reason forthe courts was given by the Indigenous
7

(Kenaitze Indian Tribe, 2020a; Kenaitze
Indian Tribe, 2020b). Other tribes areapplying for funding to start restorative
justice practices of their own such as the
Outagamie Native Council in Bethel,
Alaska through funding from the Alaska
OfficeofJuvenile
JusticeandDelinquency Prevention which provides
funding for juvenile Healing to Wellness
Courts through the federal Office ofJuvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (The Resource Basket, 2020).
These courts can receive free technicalassistance and training through the
Tribal Law and Policy Institute or the
Rural Community Action Program
Alaska Native Youth Training andTechnical Assistance Project (Tribal Law
and Policy Institute, 2015; The Resource
Basket, 2020). The goal of both the
Healing to Wellness Courts and Circle
Peacemaking programs in Alaska is toutilize culture to heal the offenders andthose harmed by restoring relationships,
healing the community, and getting
people the help they need throughsubstance
abuse
treatment
andcounselling instead of incarcerating
people.

the court has jurisdiction over youth,
criminal, and bylaw offences committed
on the Reserve (Wang, 2019). The goal of
the court is to restore peace between thevictim, offender, and community
utilizing the Tsuu T’ina culture andtraditional values (Whonnock, 2008).
Not only do the proceedings of the court
reflect the local culture through thepeacemaking process and smudging
with sweetgrass or sage, but the court
itself does as well as the courtroom is
circular shaped to reflect a beaver den as
the totem of the Tsuu T’ina is the beaver(Wang, 2019). The chairs and tables of
the court are also in a circle so that all
participants including the judge, Elders,
offender, victims, and family members
face each other in a circle which is very
unlike a conventional courtroom which
elevates the judges who can appear
intimidating. After only its first year inoperation, the court demonstrated lower
recidivism rates than the mainstream
system (Bryant, 2002).
AlaskaIn Alaska, tribes are drawing on their
Indigenous Knowledge to heal theirpeople through Tribal Healing to
Wellness
CourtsandCirclePeacemaking. Some tribes have alreadyestablishedself-funded
restorative
justice practices like the Kenaitze Indian
Tribe who operates a Healing to
Wellness Court for adults, the Henu
Community Wellness Court, and a
Peacemaking Circle, the Ts’iłq’u Circle

Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts
Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts are
the tribal adaptations of the drug courtsthat were started in the U.S. in the 1980s(Tribal Law and Policy Institute, 2014).
As alcoholism was often tied to crimeand incarcerationin Indigenous
communities in the U.S., tribes sought
8

transforming lives through their missionofsupporting“wellnessandrehabilitation for those in need througha cooperative justice program to create asafe and healthy community” (Kenaitze
Indian Tribe, 2020a). The court works
specifically with adult offenders
struggling with drugs and alcohol andseeks to provide participants withresources to heal and achieve sobriety
instead of sending them to jail. Alongwith treating substance abuse issues, thecourt seeks restorative components of
rebuilding relationships with family,
friends, and the community andincreasing self-sufficiency with the goalsof healing the offender to stop
recidivism. The program is guided by
the Kenaitze Traditional Value Wheel
which details the values in the Dena’ina
culture (Kenaitze Indian Tribe, n.d.). The
Henu Court seeks to help participantschange their lives and be on the “Yaghali
Tinitun” – the Good Trail. The court
assists offenders in getting reestablishedinto their communities through holding
them accountable for their offences,providing peer support, offering
culturally relevant behavioral healthtreatment at the Dena’ina Wellness
Center, and encouraging them to pursue
education and employment throughhelping offenders develop a Life Change
Plan (Kenaitze Indian Tribe, 2016).

ways to address the alcoholism and get
people treatment to prevent further
crime in the community (Feldstein,
Venner, & May 2006; Tribal Law and
Policy Institute, 2014). In 1997, the U.S.
Department of Justice through its Drug
Court Program Office developed aprogram to assist Indigenous nations in
the U.S. to develop drug courts. These
courts specifically include Indigenous
culture through 1) developing acommunity-healing
approachthat
addressed both physical and spiritual
healing of the participants andcommunity and 2) utilizing culture andtradition in substance abuse andrehabilitation
treatment(U.S.
Department of Justice, 2003). A study
was done on the recidivism rates of drug
courts, not specific to Tribal Healing to
Wellness Courts, found that drug courts
are effective in reducing recidivism withrecidivism rates reducing from 50
percent to 38 percent with the effects
lasting even up to three years (Mitchell,
Wilson, Eggers, & MacKenzie, 2012).
These are promising results that
continue to inspire Tribes in Alaska todevelop Healing to Wellness Courts.
The Kenaitze Indian Tribe are Dene
people and they established and fundthe Henu Community Wellness Court in
Kenai, Alaska and started taking cases in2017. Unlike traditional court systems
advocating punishment, the Henu
Court’s vision seeks to make thecommunity
healthierthrough

Circle Peacemaking
Peacemaking circles have a history
rooted in Indigenous communities
9relatives or community Elders and arechosen for their leadership, knowledge,
and teaching they can provide.

(Pranis, Stuart, & Wedge, 2003). As seenin this paper, the ideas of meeting in acircle and utilizing peacemakers isprevalent in both Canada and Alaska
and is utilized as a way to promotehealing for the victim, offender, andcommunity instead of instituting
punishment. Circles are specific to thecommunity using them and reflect the
local culture and beliefs of the
Indigenous people engaging in thepractice. Peacemaking circles begin witha prayer, utilize consensus, focus on
healing broken relationships instead of
broken laws, and work to reintegrate
and build trust instead of punishing,
resultinginapologies,
restored
relationships, and healing consequencessuch as going to a culture camp, doing
community service with an Elder, or
beginning treatment for substance abuse(Costello, 1999; Pranis, Stuart, & Wedge,
2003). Peacemaking circles can handle
both juvenile and adult cases, working toresolve issues around drugs and alcohol,
property damage, shoplifting, truancy,
child support and custody, and domestic
issues (Costello, 1999; Mirsky, 2004).
Peacemaking circles can be as small as
six people and as large as sixty,
including the victim, offender, and bothof their families, peacemakers, and othercommunity members such as police,
counsellors, or others interested
the(Costello,1999).
Typically,
peacemaking is not a neutral party
acting as a mediator, they often are
involved in the lives of the parties as

In Kake, Alaska, a T’lingit community,
the local tribe, the Organized Village ofKake, funds and runs a Circle
Peacemaking program (Jarrett &Hyslop, 2014). Circle Peacemaking is a
traditional method of dispute resolution
in the T’lingit culture, and it had fallenout of practice in the community due tomainstream culture introducing thecourt system. As Kake is only accessible
by boat or plane, it was difficult to getlawmakers to come to the community todeal with local issues and thecommunity was having problems withalcohol use and suicide in the 1980s and90s. The community members decided
to address their own issues, and theCircle Peacemaking program wasreintroduced in Kake after community
members met with T’lingit First Nations
community members from Carcross,
Yukon, Canada who utilized Circle
Peacemaking and learned from them
how to set up a program. The Circle
works with the Organized Village ofKake tribal court, local police, and social
services workers to take referrals andwork on healing offenders instead ofprosecuting them (Rieger, 2001). The
Circle is open to all members of thecommunity and works with Natives andnon-Natives. One young community
member who went through the Circle forminor consumption found a surprise in10

how many people attended his circle,
and after everyone spoke he reflected onthat he had been feeling marginalized in
Kake and did not realize that there wereso many people caring about him. These
healing experiences have resulted in
reducing recidivism in Kake with a rateof 28 percent compared to an Alaska
state-wide rate of 66 percent (Fortson &Carbaugh, 2014).

Hyslop, 2014). Additionally, there is alack of evaluation research on restorative
justice practices, and we suggest
measuring the successes of restorative
justice in Indigenous communities andensuring there are resources necessary topermanently institute the practices.

Conclusion
Indigenous
knowledge-based
restorative justice programs are not only
community-initiated and bear little
resemblance to mainstream justicesystems, but also provide opportunitiesonhealing
individuals
andcommunities– including the underlying
harms of ongoing colonization. They
could provide an alternative pathway
for Indigenous people in the justicesystem that could lead to healing insteadof incarceration and punishment.
Indigenous
knowledge
providesvaluable insight into how to better
understand and practice restorative
justice practices with Indigenous people
and the examples we provide from the
U.S. and Canadian Arctic demonstrate
what communities are doing and what
other communities could institute

Recommendations
If a community is interested indeveloping restorative justice practices
based on Indigenous Knowledge, wehave several suggestions: involve local
stakeholders
inallstagesofdevelopment, tailor the program to the
local community and its culture, learn
from
what
other
Indigenous
communities are doing to help guideprogramdevelopment,
recognize
Indigenous
self-determination
andsovereignty and the history of thecommunities experiencing colonization,
develop a working agreement between
mainstream judicial systems andIndigenous systems, access funding
required adequately support the
program, emphasize sustainability of the
program for long-term community
healing, see success as more than justreduced recidivism but community
healing as well, and focus on having
community
based
restorative“practices” instead of worrying about
what “justice” might mean (Jarrett &References:
Alaska Department of Corrections.
(2018). 2018 Offender Profile. Retrieved
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Barnes, B.E. (2013). An Overview of
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Correctional Services Canada. (2015). An
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Canadian Resource Centre for Victims of
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Bryant, M.E. (2002). Tsuu T’ina First
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15

Law Beyond the Human in
the Arctic and Outer Space∗future warming. 1 In July 2020, an
explosion in the Yamal Peninsula above
the Arctic Circle, caused by subterranean
gases, has opened up a massive hole.
Russian scientists found the 50-meter
crater on an expedition. 2 They named it
Crater 17, as 16 similar objects have been
discoveredinSiberia’s
extremenorthwest since the phenomenon was

Elena Cirkovic ∗∗As temperatures continue rise in the
Arctic, the permafrost begins to thaw,
releasing methane (CH4) and othergreenhouse gases (GHGs) into theatmosphere. These emissions accelerate

The Yamal Crater, as seen above, would be miniscule compared to a Yakutia Crater reported
by Russian Scientists. Image source: The Siberian Times via Vasily Bogoyavlensky
The commentary is a shorter version and promotion of Dr. Cirkovic’s paper forthcoming in 2021:
Elena Cirkovic, “The Next Generation of International Law: Space, Ice, and the Cosmolegal Proposal(2021) 21 German Law Journal 2 (forthcoming March 2021).
∗∗
Alexantieri Institute, HELSUS the Faculty of Law, Unversity of Helsinki, currently visiting at the
Arctic Centre with Professor Timo Koivurova
1 Dmitry Yumashev, et al. Climate policy implications of nonlinear decline of Arctic land permafrost andother cryosphere elements 10 NAT.COMMUN.1900 (2019).
2 The local news provided images of the crater:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=q3fQok8iQ94&feature=emb_title∗

16

firstobservedin2014. 3The inaccessibility of the Arctic region
has
limitedmostground-based
observations to places with existing
infrastructure,
which
can
delay
understanding of phenomena such as
the Yamal crater. This is where anotherdomain steps in: the outer spacetechnology has been crucial for themonitoring of climate change. 4

recognizing that everything—including
rocks, polluted air, the oceans —is alive?
Cosmolegality emerges from theories on
post-human legalities that argue for amove beyond the centrality, for law, of
the human subject that acts upon theworld (cosmos), as its object. It proposesthat ‘anything’ that makes a difference toother actors is an agent. The main
hypothesis of the proposal is that theinternational legal response to climatechange on Earth, and anthropogenic
pollution of outer space, requires a new
approach to the law itself.

The orbit has also been subject toenvironmental problems. The increasing
orbital debris poses a risk to functional
satellites. International law has been
unable to respond to this problem
despite various other proposals for
management of space debris. 5

However, the ‘resource rush’ in the
Arctic and outer space (e.g. spacemining) reveals the short-sightedness ofattempts to instrumentalize and colonize
thesespacessidestepping
environmental problems. Both domains
are governed by international regimesthat do not directly respond to themagnitudeoftheongoingenvironmental degradation. The orbital
space also has capacity limits, which is
not determined only by the number ofanthropogenic space objects in a specificorbitalneighborhood,
but
also

These phenomena also demonstrate how
non-human phenomena, like GHGs andorbital debris, are unpredictable anddisruptive agents. They are unintended
results of anthropogenic pollution, andin turn, have the capacity to affect allplanetary life (human and nonhuman). In response, the author has
been proposing a new approach tolawmaking through which the law
would recognize the unpredictability ofhuman/non- human relations: thecosmolegal. What are the implications ofLand in Russia’s Arctic Blows ‘Like a Bottle of Champagne’, The New York Times, September 5, 2020.
Elder, C. D., Thompson, D. R., Thorpe, A. K., Hanke, P., Walter Anthony, K. M., & Miller, C. E.
(2020). Airborne mapping reveals emergent power law of Arctic CH4 emissions. GeophysicalResearch Letters, 47,
5 Elena Cirkovic, “The Next Generation of International Law: Space, Ice, and the Cosmolegal Proposal(2021) 21 German Law Journal 2 (forthcoming March 2021).
3
4

17

Source, NASA at https://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/images/beehives/leo640.jpg

the uncertainty in how these objects will
behave in the future. 6

private, state-commerce nexus ofrelations, should become. 7 The recently
passed Artemis Accords have intensified
these
debatesarguing
that“International space agencies that join
NASA in the Artemis program will do so
by executing bilateral Artemis Accords
agreements, which will describe ashared vision for principles, grounded in
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, to create

The dominant debates in internationallaw as related to the ongoing and future
human activities in outer space havefocused recently on the military andcommercial uses of outer space withinternational lawyers participating in
the delineation of what the public-

For ongoing observations of “space junk” behaviour see for instance Jonathan McDowell (Harvard
Smithsonian Centre for Astrophysics), GCAT: General Catalog of Artificial Space Objects, at
https://planet4589.org/space/gcat/web/cat/index.html
7 Olavo O. Bittencourt Neto et.al (eds) Building Blocks for the Development of an International
Framework for the Governance of Space Resource Activities: A Commentary (2020)
618

a safe and transparent environment
which facilitates exploration, science,and commercial activities for all of
humanity to enjoy.” 8 However, the spaceenvironment question requires aconsideration of its existence beyond
potential utility for the human species.
Much of the Earth system and theextraterrestrial space beyond Earth, areoperating under the laws of physics,
chemistry, or biology, and so on. This
includes human bodies. Viruses, gases,or rocks do not in any way, shape, form,
bend themselves to public policy. The
current legal systems addressing climatechange and outer space are not driven by
the realities of their environments, butby the formalistic and human-focusedstructure of international law.

how human activities affect theenvironment beyond the uppermost
layers of atmosphere and in the Earth’s
orbit, and into the more ‘cosmic’ realm.
Most importantly, it allows for a shift in
the imagination and understanding of
the cosmos, which would not see thehuman, and its laws, as a central actor of
the Earth System and beyond, or as the
apex owner, and manager of its
environment. Rather, human is only oneof the actors of the ‘cosmos’, known andunknown.

The cosmolegal proposal builds
on the hypothesis of profoundinterrelatedness in the Earthsystem. Earth System Science(EES) is the application ofsystems science to Earthsciences and approaches theearth as a self-enclosed system,
which
includesinteracting
physical,chemical,andbiological processes. The Earthsystem approach also allows us
to understand the earth on aplanetary scale. Human-caused
environmental problems are notcontained only on Earth, and forthis reason we need to connect
Arctic Trees, Painting by the Author (Dr. Elena Cirkovic), St. Petersburg, 20188https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/index.html

19

Russian Arctic Policy
Supporting the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable
Development in the Arctic

Sustainable Development Goals in the2030
Agendafor
Sustainable
Development. 1 On January 1, 2016 these
new goals officially came into force. The
new Goals are unique in that they call for
action by all countries, poor, rich andmiddle-income to promote prosperity
while protecting the planet.

Elena Gladun ∗ & Olga Zakharova ∗∗Introduction

Due to the fact that the Arctic is bothfragile and rich in resources the unique
Arctic environment requires special
attention. Being the Arctic state Russia
must adhere to sustainable growth anddevelopment of the Arctic territories.

In 1992, Russia accepted the basic
principles of sustainable development
and made a commitment to follow themby signing international agreements –Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, UN
Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Convention on Biological
Diversity. This involved commitments
to ensure sustainable development
through relevant national policies andlegislation. Over the last three decades,
Russia has taken meaningful steps
towards sustainable development by
issuing environmental strategy andcreating
legal
andregulatory
foundationsforsocio-economic
development
andenvironmental
protection.
Transitioning
towards
sustainable
development,
Russiaparticipatesinallinternational
initiatives based on the principles ofsustainability. In 2015, countries, Russia
included, revised their approaches tosustainability
andadopted17

In 2019-2020 the Russian scholars from
TyumenState
Universities
have
conducted a research with the main
objective to investigate if Russia has
made any meaningful steps towards
sustainable development in the Arctic
concerning new sustainability goals andif any complying rules are incorporated
in Russian arctic-related legislation tocontribute to sustainable development
transition. For this purpose, theresearchers examined several groups ofofficial documents from the perspectiveof SDGs to discover if the federal andregional strategies, laws, regulations andtarget programs make sustainable
development goals applicable in the

Tyumen State University
Tyumen State University
1 UN General Assembly, ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’,
Resolution 70/1, 25 September 2015,
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E
∗

∗∗

20

Russian Arctic 2. The research methods
included the content and legal analysisof legislation and reports; comparative
analysis of relevant documents adopted
in Russia.

dimensions. Moreover, the term“sustainable development” itself is
mentioned in this document just a few
times. But does this mean that Russian
Arctic policy is not following thesustainability approach? The deeper
analysis revealed adherence of theRussian Arctic regulations to thesustainable approach. What was foundout is that the term “sustainable
development” in Russian Arctic policy isused in different contexts: “sustainable
development of indigenous peoples”,“sustainable development of relatedindustries”. With this angle, principles
and rules formulated in the laws andprograms can be considered thedescription of the SDGs compatible for
the Russian Arctic and constitute a
specific domestic roadmap according to
the Arctic priorities for the next 15 years.

The research exemplified that all the
documents were worked out prior to2015 and, on the one hand, it seems as
new sustainable development goals
have had no impact on the Arctic legal
framework. The further finding was thatjust few provisions on sustainable
development can be found in a numberof legal norms regulating the Arctic use
and protection. For example, Federal
program“Socialandeconomicdevelopment of the Arctic zone of theRussian Federation” practically does notaddress the concept of sustainable
development as the integration of
economic, social and environmental

President of the Russian Federation, ‘Strategy for the development of the Arctic zone of the RussianFederation and ensuring national security for the period up to 2020’, 13 February 2009,http://government.ru/info/18360/; President of the Russian Federation, ‘Strategy for the Developmentof the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and ensuring national security for the Period up to 2035’,
26 October 2020, No 645, http://docs.cntd.ru/document/566091182; President of the RussianFederation, ‘Principles of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to2020 and further, 8 September 2008, No 1969, https://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html;
Government of the Russian Federation, ‘Federal Program of the Russian Federation “Socioeconomic
development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020”, 21 April 2014
No. 366, http://government.ru/rugovclassifier/830/events/; President of the Russian Federation,‘Framework of state policy in the field of environmental development of the Russian Federation for
the Period until 2030’, 30 April 2012, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/492; Federal Law,‘On Environmental Protection’, 10 January 2002
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_34823/; President of the Russian Federation,‘Strategy of Ecological Safety of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025’, 19 April 2017 No.
176, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/41879; Government of the Russian Federation, ‘Energy Strategy ofRussia for the period up to 2035’, 9 June 2020 No. 1523-p,
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_354840/; President of the Russian Federation,‘Climate doctrine of the Russian Federation’, 17 December 2009,http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/6365; other environmental and natural resource laws andcodes.
2

21

Results

local communities’ initiatives as well as
operating companies’ incentives are, to acertain degree, relevant to the new SD
goals and applicable with thesustainable approach of the Arctic
development.

Analyzing the Arctic related legislationof the federal and regional level, theauthors have come to the conclusion thatindustrial
development
isthecornerstone of Russia`s Arctic policy.
The primary task of the Russian
government is the exploitation of Arctic
resources. According to the Federal
program“Socialandeconomicdevelopment of the Arctic zone of theRussian Federation” almost two-thirdsof all Arctic projects are directly related
to the development of the mineral
resource base. In the meantime, thecomprehensive analysis reveals that
Arctic related legislation of the federal
and regional level, federal and regionaltarget programs, grassroots and Arctic

The main result of the research was theclassification of 17 SDGs, as they are
addressedintheArcticlegalframeworks, and according to which
they can be grouped in three blocks. The
criteria of grouping were theirapplicability and availability of legal andfinancialmechanisms
for
their
implementation. Thus, the first group is
for the goals which are “muchaddressed, officially implemented with
substantial budgetary provisions andeffective tools provided”. The second

Table 1
Group 1 “SDGs muchaddressed”
Goal 1 “No poverty”
Goal 2 “Food security”
Goal 3 “Good health andwell-being”
Goal 4 “Education and lifelong learning opportunities”
Goal 7 “Energy”

Goal 17 “Global
partnerships”

Group 2 “SDGs declared”
Goal 8 “Decent work andeconomic growth”
Goal 9 “Industry, innovation,and resilient infrastructure”
Goal 12 “Responsible
consumption and production,
recycling”
Goal 13 “Climate action”
Goal 7 “Affordable and clean
energy”
Goal 14 “Sustainable use andconservation of the oceans,seas and marine resources”
Goal 15 “Sustainable use ofterrestrial ecosystems, forests,
lands”

22

Group 3 “SDGs not
responded”
Goal 5 “Gender equality”
Goal 6 “Clean water andsanitation”
Goal 10 “Reducing
inequalities”
Goal 11 “Sustainable cities”
Goal 16 “Justice andinclusive societies at alllevels”

group is for the goals which are“declared as significant for further
implementation but lacking relevant
funding and practical instruments”. The
third group comprises the goals whichare “not responded either by thegovernment or by the public andindustries”. This classification ispresented in Table 1.

Discussion:
implementation
Russian Arctic

Prospectsof SDGsinto support education in the Arctic –“Development of Education in 20132020” 3, the Federal Program “Social andeconomic development of the Arctic
zone of the Russian Federation” 4 which
also comprises section on education. The
core principle of the Arctic education isto provide professional training andretraining,
advancedtrainingofspecialists in the system of secondary
professional and higher education forwork in Arctic conditions. 5oftheThe areas covered by these target
programs are:To illustrate the process of Russia’stransition to sustainable development in
the Arctic within the framework of SDGs
we can describe the specific goals andhow they are reflected in program andregulatory documents. For this paper weselected three goals from eachclassification group.

- social support for vocational education;- development of preschool and general
education;- social support and professional
development of the teaching staff;- compensation system to the teachers
who are the residents of the northern
territories. 6

Goal 4 “Education and Life-Long
Learning Opportunities” (Group 1)

The Arctic regions of Russia concretize
the basic provisions of the federal
programs developing their own policies
andregulatory
frameworks
inaccordance with the regional specifics. In
Murmansk Region, for example, theEducation is, perhaps, the most
discussed issue in the Russian Arctic,
compared only to environmental
security. There are several federal target
programs employing various measures

Government of the Russian Federation,’ Federal program “Development of education in 2013-2020”,
26 December 2017 No. of 1642, http://docs.cntd.ru/document/499091784;
4 Government of the Russian Federation, ‘Federal Program of the Russian Federation “Socioeconomic
development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020”, 21 April 2014
No. 366, http://government.ru/rugovclassifier/830/events/
5 President of the Russian Federation, ‘Principles of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the
Arctic for the period up to 2020 and further, 8 September 2008, No 1969,https://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html
6 Ibid3

23

system of secondary vocational andhigher education is actively changing,
especially the structure of educational
programs bringing them closer to theeconomic needs. A special role isassigned to the system of secondary
vocational education and vocational
training (in 2015-2016 academic year,
16,000 people were trained in 105
educational programs of secondary
vocational education). 7 The idea of theregion is to perform breakthroughtraining for qualified personnel ofcomplicated Arctic projects. For thispurpose, the Center for Arctic
Competences is projected in the region
to provide comprehensive life-longlearning provided for employees ofenterprises operating or ready to work in
Arctic conditions. 8

their parents in the tundra. Theseboarding schools are now beingtransformed into specific centers of
ethno-cultural education, covering all
the territories of traditional residence
and traditional economic activities ofindigenous peoples in Yamal. 10
Most attention in the educational systemin the District is paid to:- teaching native languages- teaching indigenous peoples in placesof traditional residence and nomadicroutes, without separating children fromparents and for maintaining the
traditional way of life.
Still, there is a lack and a big demand in
deeper research and providing morequalitative level of education in thefollowing areas:

The regional target program of the
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District is“Development of Education in 20142020”. 9 Within this one and its several
sub-programs the system of boarding
schools is being introduced. The
primarily objective is to develop new
curricula considering socioculturalfeatures and specific talents andcapabilities of local children living with- prevention and treatment of deerdiseases (anthrax, brucellosis, catarrhal
and pulmonary diseases of calves);- reclamation of land erosion of thetundra;- domestication of reindeer feeding;- restoration and stimulation of reindeer
moss growth with the help ofGovernment of the Russian Federation, ‘Federal Program of the Russian Federation “Socioeconomic
development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020”, 21 April 2014
No. 366, http://government.ru/rugovclassifier/830/events/
8 Ministry of Education and Science of the Murmansk Region, ‘On the establishment of the Center for
Arctic Competencies’, 28 December 2015 No. 2353.
9 Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District Government, ‘Target program “Development of the vocational
education system of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District for 2016-2020”, 28 April 2016 No. 394-P.
10 Department of Education of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District (2015) Education in the
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District: state and development trends, Salekhard.
724biostimulators and water-retaining
polymers (lichenology);

regulatory measures are taken in the
country, for example, the Climate
Doctrine approved in 2009 12 suggests
measures for reducing emissions.
Although not legally binding, theClimate Doctrine became a strong
statement of intent. It sets strategic
guidelines and targets and serves as afoundationfordeveloping
andimplementing climate policy, covering
issues related to climate change and its
consequences. 13 On 31 March 2015, theRussian Federation submitted to theUnited Nations its Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions (INDC),
proposing to reduce its emissions of net
GHG by 25% to 30% below the 1990 levelby 2030.

- processing medical products fromplants growing in the area forprevention and treatment of animals andpeople;- identification and comprehensive
study of sacred, cult places ofindigenous peoples;- encouraging indigenous peoples to doresearch and get focused scientificdegrees.
Goal 13 “Climate Action” (Group 2)
Globalwarminghas
myriadimplications for the Arctic environment,
residents, and nations. Climate change is
one of the most discussed topics in the
Arctic as it is affecting marine
ecosystems and marine life, terrestrial
ecosystems, animals and people who
depend on them. Climate impacts
include effects on access to food andresources; health and wellbeing.
Community cohesion, traditions, andculture are other dimensions ofsustainable development. 11 To respondthe climate issues some policy andHowever,theambitious
goals
announced by the Russian Federation
are not supported by the current federal
legislation. The Climate Doctrine of 2009
and the Comprehensive Plan for the
implementation of the Climate Doctrine
adopted in 2011 do not contain effective
tools to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.
Moreover,theComprehensive Plan is financiallyprovided neither by the federal budget

See, for example, Arctic Resilience Report, ‘The Arctic Council’, 27 March 2017, http://arcticcouncil.org/arr; Bruce Forbes, ‘Land use and climate change on the Yamal Peninsula of north-west
Siberia: some ecological and socio-economic implications’, Polar Research 18 (2): 367-373 (1999).
12 President of the Russian Federation, ‘Climate doctrine of the Russian Federation’, 17 December
2009, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/6365.
13 Michal Nachmany, Sam Fankhauser, Jana Davidova, Nick Kingsmill, Tucker Landesman, Hitomi
Roppongi, Philip Schleifer, Joana Setzer, Amelia Sharman, Stolle C. Singleton, Jayaraj Sundaresan andTerry Townshend (2015) The 2015 Global Climate Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change
Legislation in 99 Countries: Summary for Policy-Makers. London, UK: Grantham Research Instituteon Climate Change and the Environment, GLOBE International.
11

25

nor by regional budgets and extra
budgetary sources. 14 State Policy of theRussian Federation in the Field ofEnvironmental Development for theperiod until 2030 15 declared a number ofglobalenvironmental
problems
associated with the loss of biodiversity,
desertification and other adverse
environmental processes alongside withthe problem of climate change. But thisdocument, on the analogy with the
Climate Doctrine, lacks practicalmeasures and the ways of achieving thetargets are not traced. 16

the ways of achievement of this target
are lacking. 17
Environmental legislation in Russia has
not changed to a big extent in thewording of climate change. A few
articles were supplemented to theFederal Law “On Environmental
Protection”
definingtheozonedepleting substances (Article 1) andsetting the goals of ozone-layer
protection and the powers of federal
authorities in this issue (Article 54). 18
These provisions cannot be consideredsufficient in terms of establishing legal
frameworkforclimatechangemitigation in the country.

The Federal Program “Social andeconomic development of the Arctic
zone of the Russian Federation” sets thegoal to protect vulnerable Arctic objects
and the population from dangerous
impacts of climate change. This goal isassociated with one climate related
result, that is the installation ofequipment for forecasting and assessing
the consequences of global climatechange. Again, practical measures andThere are no climate related initiatives
on the regional level either.
Thus, the perspectives of implementing
Goal 13 in the Arctic are seen inprotectionofvulnerable
Arcticenvironmental and the population fromdangerous impacts of climate changewith the focus on:Ларсен А. Х. и соавт. (2012) Изменение климата и возможности низкоуглеродной энергетикив России. [Larsen A.H., et al. Izmenenie klimata i vozmozhnosti nizkouglerodnoi energetiki v Rossii[Climate change and the possibility of low-carbon energy in Russia]].
15 President of the Russian Federation, ‘Framework of state policy in the field of environmental
development of the Russian Federation for the Period until 2030’, 30 April 2012,
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/492.
16 Elena Gladun, ‘Sustainable Development of the Russian Arctic: Legal Implications’, NISPAcee
Journal of Public Administration and Policy, XII, No. 2 (2019 /2020).
17 Government of the Russian Federation, ‘Federal Program of the Russian Federation “Socioeconomic
development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020”, 21 April 2014
No. 366, http://government.ru/rugovclassifier/830/events/.
18 Federal Law, ‘On Environmental Protection’, 10 January 2002,
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_34823/.
1426

- installation of equipment forforecastingandassessingtheconsequences of global climate change

Conclusion
In the Russian Federation, a gradualtransition to sustainable development isbeing achieved, providing a balanced
solution of socio-economic problems
and environmental issues and natural
resource potential in order to meet theneedsofpresent
andfuturegenerations. 20 Russia welcomes the
adoption of the new 2030 Agenda for
Development and the country’s leaders
stand ready to support the successful
implementationoftheAgenda.
However, basic strategic documents
related to socio-economic development
and environmental protection remainrather declarative and focus on
enumeration of the state’s main
objectives which have yet to be realized,
as they are not supported by any legal
mechanisms. It has also become
apparent that most SDGs are notintegrated into the Arctic related legal
frameworks and poorly adapted for theArctic regions. Meanwhile, large-scaleindustrial projects have been recently
launched in the Russian Arctic regions;and their sustainable development
should be the country’s priority. The
draft bill “On development of the Arctic
zone of the Russian Federation” arebeing considered in the country for- to find effective legal tools and financial
mechanisms for achievement INDC
targets- to develop climate related initiatives on
the regional level.
Goal 11 “Sustainable cities” (Group 3)
Issues of sustainable cities in the Russian
Arctic are mostly an academic
discussion. There is no relevant federal
or regional policy, regulations or target
programs on the issue. However, to date,
all the cities of the Russian Arctic face thechallenge of transformation fromindustrial hubs to locations providing
service, intellectual resources andinnovative decisions for their areas andresidents. 19
Much research is devoted to therenovation of the Arctic cities andrethinking of their role and objectives inthe development of the Russian Arctic.
In these circumstances the focus of statepolicies and regulations should be, firstof all, on introducing effective measures
based on local initiatives.

See, for example, Alexander Sergunin (2019) Russian Arctic Cities’ Sustainable Development
Strategies In Vasilii Erokhin, Tianming Gao and Xiuhua Zhang (ed) Handbook of Research on
International Collaboration, Economic Development, and Sustainability in the Arctic, Chicago: IGI
Global, p. 495-513.
20 President of the Russian Federation, ‘Concept of the Russian Federation’s Transition to Sustainable
Development’, 01 April 1996 No. 440, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/9120.
19

27

3.
Elena
Gladun,‘Sustainable
Development of the Russian Arctic:
Legal Implications’, NISPAcee Journal of
Public Administration and Policy, XII,
No. 2 (2019 /2020).

several years and it’s crucial that thiscore document will contain legal rules
adjacent to SDGs and in this way
improve Arctic related legislation inaccordance with sustainable approach.

4. Michal Nachmany, Sam Fankhauser,
Jana Davidova, Nick Kingsmill, Tucker
Landesman, Hitomi Roppongi, Philip
Schleifer, Joana Setzer, Amelia Sharman,
Stolle C. Singleton, Jayaraj Sundaresan
and Terry Townshend (2015) The 2015
Global Climate Legislation Study: A
Review of Climate Change Legislation in
99 Countries: Summary for PolicyMakers. London, UK: Grantham
Research Institute on Climate Change
andtheEnvironment,
GLOBE
International.

Bibliography
UN General Assembly, ‘Transforming
our world: the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development’, Resolution
70/1,
25
September
2015,
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E
1. Alexander Sergunin (2019) Russian
Arctic Cities’ Sustainable Development
Strategies In Vasilii Erokhin, Tianming
Gao and Xiuhua Zhang (ed) HandbookofResearchonInternational
Collaboration, Economic Development,
and Sustainability in the Arctic, Chicago:
IGI Global, p. 495-513.

5. Ларсен А. Х. и соавт. (2012)Изменение климата и возможности
низкоуглеродной
энергетики
вРоссии. [Larsen A.H., et al. Izmenenie
klimataivozmozhnosti
nizkouglerodnoi energetiki v Rossii[Climate change and the possibility of
low-carbon energy in Russia]]

2. Bruce Forbes, ‘Land use and climatechange on the Yamal Peninsula of northwest Siberia: some ecological and socioeconomic implications’, Polar Research
18 (2): 367-373 (1999).

28

A Note About the Indigenous
Peoples’ Registry in the
Russian Federation

the Federal Law on the Guarantees of theRights of the Indigenous Smallnumbered Peoples (1999), introducing a
registry of individuals certified for theindigenous status. In this paper, I
analyse the amendment and present
threats standing behind the classificationof people in a strict, bureaucraticmanner.

Karolina Sikora ∗Introduction
Shortly before the collapse of the Soviet
Union, when the policy of the so-called‘glasnost’ (liberation) was launched,indigenous peoples of the Russian North
have started to address the need torecognise and define their rights. They
were referring to minority andindigenous rights mechanism created in
the West. The main point of reference
has been the UN working definition ofindigenous peoples included in the
studyon
discrimination
againstindigenous peoples, published by UN
Special Rapporteur Martínez-Cobo in
1986. The Russian legislation, however,has established its autonomous concept
of indigenous peoples, which recognises
only“indigenous
small-numberedpeoples of the North, Siberia and the Far
East”. Moreover, individuals belonging
to small numbered peoples have notbeen registered in any formal way as
status holders. This situation has beenposing challenges when it comes toproving people’s rights, for instance tofish, and hunt as well as eligibility tosocial benefits. In 2020, the RussianParliament adopted the amendment to∗

Arctic Centre, University of Lapland

Indigenous legislation in the RussianFederation
Indigenous small-numbered peoples’
rights have been regulated in Russian
law on two levels: federal and regional(Kryazhkov 2013). The highest legal act,
the Russian Constitution, stipulates
precisely in article 69 that the state “shallguarantee the rights of the indigenous
small peoples according to theuniversally recognized principles andnorms of international law andinternational treaties and agreements[that Russia had ratified]” (RussianFederation 1993). Therefore, those
provisions allow for the superiority ofinternational law, as long as it complies
with the Russian Constitution (article
125 thereof). In practice, however, Russia
overcomes this legal clause by
abstaining from ratifying most of theinternational documents, crucial for theprotection of indigenous rights, like ILO
169 or UNDRIP. Thus, in the prevailingnumber of cases, there is a need to apply

29

fulfil criteria stated in the federal law(Xanthaki 2004).

exclusively Russian legal framework. In
this regard, the second level ofregulations, federal laws regulate
human and civil rights of smallnumbered peoples, determine the usageof traditional lands, and guarantee forthe traditional way of life. However,federal laws are not outright and needfurther concretisation (Fondahl et al.
2020). Often, they do not comply with
the Constitutions, contain legal gaps andlack of implementation mechanisms,
what make them rather of declarative
nature (Kryazhkov 2013). Nevertheless,these are the ones which regulate thelegal status of “small numberedindigenous peoples”.

of
small
numbered
Registry
indigenous peoples of the North,
Siberia and the Far EastIn 1932, the Soviet Union introduced theinternal passports, which had been
issued to every Soviet citizen (Donahoe2011). The documents contained
personal data as well as information
about one’s nationality. The passports
were proof of people’s belonging to theindigenous population and a sign of selfdetermination. When in 2002 documents
had been abolished, individuals lost atool to prove their ethnicity thatconditions additional rights and benefits(Fondahl, Filippova, and Savvinova
2020). Therefore, even though federal
laws declare several rights to indigenous
peoples, they face challenges to executethem. Indigenous hunters, for instance,
have been treated as poachers, andfishermen have been issued fines forcatching fish out of the licenced season
or in an amount exceeding quota(Fondahl, Filippova, and Savvinova
2020).

The Law on Guarantees of the Rights of
the Indigenous Small-numbered Peoples(Russian Federation 1999) in its article 1
states that as indigenous smallnumbered peoples can be recognised
those groups, which inhabit ancestral
lands in the North, Siberia and the Far
East of the Russian Federation, which
kept traditional way of life, which
population does not exceed 50 000
people, and which perceive themselves
as a separate ethnic group. All of thosecriteria need to occur simultaneously,
therefore the number of ethnic groups
eligible for the small-number status islimited, and currently covers 46 groups.
That being so, Russian legislation does
not recognise all indigenous peoples
inhabiting the territory of the State, but
only those particular groups, which

To solve this impasse, in spring 2020
Russian authorities introduced a longnegotiated amendment to the Federal
Law on Guarantees, which establishes
the registry of individuals belonging torecognised small numbered-indigenous
peoples of the Russian Federation
30

(Ledkov 2016). However, indigenous
peoples have not been involved in theprocess of developing the registry, whatshould have taken place according to theFederal Law on Guarantees itself, whichstates that communities shall participate
in matters that affect their interests(Fondahl, Filippova, and Savvinova
2020).

person’s indigeneity. The authorities
may refuse to register a person if theapplicant has not provided all therequired
information(Russian
Federation 2020, point 13). Moreover,
the authorities have a right to clarify
provided information and request for
additional data from federal and local
authorities, as well as from indigenous
peoples’ associations.

According to the new regulation
the unified list is approved by theGovernment of the Russian Federation
upon the request of the federal executive
body responsible for the development
and implementation of the ethnic
policies - namely the Federal Agency for
Ethnic Affairs (Russian Federation 2020).

Possible Threats of the new regulationIn
referencetothepresented
amendment in federal law, I identify
three threats to the rights of indigenous
peoples, which I will discuss in thefollowing paragraphs.

Registration of persons belonging tosmall numbered peoples is carried out
based on information provided byapplicants (Russian Federation 2020). In
order to be registered, an individual is
obliged to submit all together 12 types of
documents, enumerated in the federal
law (point 4 and 5 thereof). Among therequired documents are a proof ofresidency in a territory of traditional
habitation of small-numbered peoples,tax number, pension insurance number,proof of conducting traditional way oflife, information about family ties,
certified
document
containing
information about one’s nationality or a
court decision testifying the applicant’s
belongingtoindigenous
small
numbered peoples or any otherdocument containing information about

The first threat concerns the requirement
to live in the place enlisted as ahabitation area of small numberedindigenous peoples. The history ofindigenous populations in the north of
Russia is marked with different forms of
dislocation. Many indigenous groups
have had a nomadic lifestyle andfollowed the animals’ yearly migration
cycle according to the season. Then,
during the Soviet period, the policy ofsedentarisation of nomadic populations
and displacement took place on an
extremely wide scale, in practiceembracing the whole territory of theRussianNorth(Slezkine1994).
Relocated groups had been settled also
away from the traditional lands, in abigger settlement, what changed in31

involved in those activities will bedisqualified
fromtheregistry.
Indigenous teachers, also native
language teachers, medics, social
workers, librarians, artists and many
more professionals from the so-called
intelligentsia, who are involved inpreservationandspreadingofindigenous cultures are left on themargin (IWIGA 2019). Allowing only
those
individuals
carryingout
traditional activities having access towider benefits will lead to social
injustices and may as well enhance thestereotype of backwardness andprimitivism of the northern indigenous
peoples.

many cases people’s way of life andbrought plenty of social and economic
problems. Nowadays, looking for better
life perspectives, education, job,healthcare, especially the majority ofindigenous women have migrated tourban areas, leaving behind postsocialist life in the outskirts (Khoreva et
al. 2018). Therefore, in the context ofRussian North peoples’ ethnicity is notdefinedbyterritorial
belonging(Shabaev and Istomin 2017; Istomin andShabaev 2016). The requirement statedin the federal amendment will, thus,
exclude those individuals, who decided
to move away from their traditional
habitation areas. Here I would like tofurther notice, that the land that is
inhabited by the indigenous peoples
since the time immemorial, is not
automatically regarded by law as thearea of their traditional habitation.
According to the Federal List of Placesfrom 2009, only certain areas, but not all
qualified for are pointed in the list
(Russian Federation 2009).

The third threat involves a highlybureaucratic procedure of enlisting
individuals in the registry. A thicket of
regulations and required documents islikely to discourage many to go throughthe administrative procedure. Moreover,
not all of the indigenous northerners
have required documents, which makes
the procedure even more unpredictable(Britskaya 2020). Those who have had
the old internal Soviet passport will not
be considerably affected. However, theyounger generations or those who did
not have the passport will have to prove
his or her ethnicity by the court throughdemonstrating archival documents,
church books, parent passports (Zadorin
et al. 2017). Consequently, the law does
not provide a possibility for registering
entire families collectively, which would

The second threat relates to pursuing
traditional economic activities, which
are also categorised by the Russian
Government in the State register of
traditional subsistence activities. The list
consists of 13 types of occupation,
among are: cattle breeding, processing
life stock products, beekeeping, fishing,hunting, agriculture, arts and crafts,
making of traditional dwellings (RussianFederation 2009). Thus, individuals not
32References:

accelerate the process and make it moreforeseeable (IWIGA 2019). The chancethat many will be willing to undergo thecourt proceeding for the purpose of theregistry is rather small. Court’s
procedures are long, expensive andjuridical bodies located far from theperipheries. Additionally, having theexperience of the soviet judicature,people often rightly, are suspicious of
the current regime, associating it
instability, and unpredictability.

Britskaya, Tatyana. 2020. ‘Учти меня,олень!’
Новаягазета,2020.
https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/09/09/87006-uchti-menya-olen.
Donahoe, Brian. 2011. ‘On the Creationof Indigenous Subjects in the RussianFederation’. Citizenship Studies 15 (3–4):
397–417.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2011.56
4803.
Fondahl, Gail, Victoria Filippova,
Antonina Savvinova, and Vyacheslav
Shadrin. 2020. ‘Changing Indigenous
Territorial Rights in the Russian North’.
In Routledge Handbook of Indigenous
Peoples in the Arctic. Routledge.

Conclusions
In Russian settings, followed by theamendment to the Law on Guarantees,
indigenous peoples lost the right toautonomously decide who belongs to acommunity. Instead, this role was takenover by the state in a form of a formal
registry. On one side, the registry
enables individuals belonging to therecognised small numbered peoples
proving their status and benefiting fromwider rights. On the other hand, theregistration procedure as it is shaped
currently narrows the scope of smallnumbered peoples to taiga and tundra
inhabitants pursuing very traditional
economic activities. Consequently, thenumber of people entailed to benefits by
law will decrease leading to further
deterioration of the socio-economic
status of the indigenous peoples.

Fondahl, Gail, Viktoriya Filippova, andAntonina Savvinova. 2020. ‘Introducing
a Registry of Indigenous Persons in
Russia: Rationale and Challenges’.
EspacePopulations
Sociétés.
Space
Populations Societies, no. 2020/1-2 (June).
https://doi.org/10.4000/eps.9582.
Istomin, Kirill V., and Yuri P. Shabaev.
2016. ‘Izhma Komi and Komi-Permiak:
Linguistic Barriers to Geographic andEthnic Identity’. Region 5 (1): 53–74.
IWIGA. 2019. The Indigenous World 2019.
Khoreva, Ol’ga, Roman Konchakov,
Carol
Scott
Leonard,
Aleksandr
Tamitskiy, and Konstantin Zaikov. 2018.
‘Attracting Skilled Labour to the North:
Migration Loss and Policy Implications
across Russia’s Diverse Arctic Regions’.
33PolarRecord54(5–6):
324–38.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S00322474190000
19.

EstablishingtheProcedurefor
Registering Persons Belonging to theIndigenous Minorities”’. 11-FZ.

Kryazhkov,
VladimirA.
2013.
‘Development of Russian Legislation on
Northern Indigenous Peoples’. Arctic
Review4(2).
https://arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic/
article/view/46.

Shabaev, Yuri, and Kirill Istomin. 2017.
‘Territoriality,
Ethnicity,
andAdministrative and Cultural Borders:
The Komi-Izhemtsy (Izvataz) and KomiPermyak as the “Other” Komi
[Territorial’nost’,
Etnichnost’,Administrativnye
iKul’turnye
Granitsy’. Etnograficeskoe Obozrenie 2017
(January): 99–114.

Ledkov, Grigory. 2016. ‘Sekret Uspekha– v Edinstve Nashikh Usiliy’. Zhivaya
Arktika. Mir Korennykh Narodov 33.

Slezkine, Yuri. 1994. Arctic Mirrors:
Russia and the Small Peoples of the North.
ACLS History E-Book Project.

RussianFederation.
1993.
‘The
Constitution of the Russian Federation’.
http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm.

Xanthaki, Alexandra. 2004. ‘Indigenous
Rights in the Russian Federation: The
Rights Case of Numerically Small
Peoples of the Russian North, Siberia,
and Far East’. Human Rights Quarterly 26(February):
74–105.
https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2004.0012.

———. 1999. ‘The Law on Guarantees of
the Rights of the Indigenous SmallNumbered Peoples’.
———. 2009. ‘Order of the Governmentof the Russian Federation of 08.05.2009
N 631-r "On Approval of the List ofPlaces of Traditional Residence andTraditional Economic Activity of the
Indigenous Peoples of the RussianFederation and the List of Types of
Traditional Economic Activities of the
Indigenous Peoples of the RussianFederation’.

Zadorin, Maksim, Olga Klisheva, Ksenia
Vezhlivtseva, and Daria Antufieva. 2017.
Russian Laws on Indigenous Issues:
Guarantees, Communities, Territories of
Traditional Land Use: Translated andCommented.
fi=Lapinyliopisto|en=University of Lapland|.
https://lauda.ulapland.fi/handle/10024/6
2960.

———. 2020. ‘On Amendments to theFederal Law On Guarantees of theRights of the Indigenous Peoples of theRussian Federation “in Terms of34

Arctic Implications of a NoDeal Brexit

agreements concluded by the Union, by
Member States acting on its behalf, or by
the Union and its Member States acting
jointly”. 6
Althoughthecurrent
construction provides the UK withsinglemarketaccess,theUKgovernment has already announced thatit does not intend to continue EEA
membership beyond 31 December 2020.
At this time, it looks increasingly likelythat the current UK government is going
to let the transition period run out
without securing an agreement with theEuropean Union. The withdrawal
agreement between the EU and the UK
only outlined the process towards anagreement concerning the future
relationship between the EU and the UK.
Allowing only eleven months for thecreation of such an agreement seemed
ambitious at best and it appears
questionable
whethertheUKgovernment ever had the intention of
actually using the transition period forthe negotiation of a new agreement. The
UK’s Internal Market Bill is in express

Stefan Kirchner ∗The United Kingdom (UK) has left theEuropean Union (EU) on 31 January
2020. 1 Although the UK and the EU
concluded a Withdrawal Agreement 2(WA), to this date (early October 2020),
no new agreement has been concluded
which would allow the UK access to
Europe’s single market, the European
Economic Area (EEA), of which also
Norway and Iceland are members. 3
Between the end of the UK’s EU
membership and the end of thetransition period on 31 December 2020,
the United Kingdom is a non-EU
member of the EEA as the EEA
Agreement 4 applies to the UK by virtueof Article 129 paragraph 1 WA, 5
according to which, “during thetransition period, the United Kingdom
shall be bound by the obligations
stemming from the international

Arctic Governance Research Group, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland.
European Commission (2020). Brexit - How to get ready for the end of the transition period,
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/uk_withdrawal_en.
2 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland fromtheEuropean Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, Official Journal 2019/C 384 I/01,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2019:384I:FULL&from=EN.
3 EFTA (no year). EEA Agreement, https://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement.
4 Agreement on the European Economic Area, Official Journal 1994 L 1/3, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:21994A0103(01)&from=EN.
5 EFTA (2020). Frequently asked questions on EFTA, the EEA, EFTA membership and Brexit,
https://www.efta.int/About-EFTA/Frequently-asked-questions-EFTA-EEA-EFTA-membership-andBrexit-328676.
6 Article 129 para. 1 WA.
∗
135

violation of the withdrawal agreement
and places UK law over internationallaw, a stunning move away from theclassical position at least in English law 7that “the law of nations is per se part ofthe law of the land”, 8 an idea which isstill reflected the American legal
system, 9 for example in Article VI
sentence 2 of the constitution of theUnited States of America. 10 The EU has
already reacted to the flagrant violationof international law by the UK which theInternal Market Bill poses and it appears
likely that this will remain a source oftension for the foreseeable future. At
least for the timing being, it appears as if
the current British government has not
only decided to in favour of a hard Brexit
and to not use the transition period, butthat it has also abandoned respect forinternational law, including its prime
maxime, pacta sunt servanda. This makes
it significantly more difficult for otherstates to muster the trust necessary forbona fide trade negotiations.

with the European Union. Sweden and
Finland are full members, Greenlandand Faroyar, although not EU members,
are part of the Danish realm and closely
connected to the mainland, which is an
EU member, Norway and Iceland are, as
mentioned, members of the EEA, andCanada has concluded a free trade
agreement with the European Union, theComprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement 11 (CETA), which is at least inpart provisionally in force. 12 While a free
trade agreement between the EU and theUnited States of America might becomea possibility depending on the outcomeof the elections in the United States in
November 2020, the economic relations
between the EU and the RussianFederation are currently put on ice dueto the ongoing war Russia is waging
against Ukraine, which has led tosanctionsandcounter-sanctions
between the West, including the EU, andthe Russian Federation. This has direct
implications for cross-border commerce,
for example between the Finnish regionof Lapland and Russia’s Murmask

The Arctic, especially the European
Arctic, has close economic connections

See Lauterpacht, H. (1939). “Is International Law a Part of the Law of England?”, 25 Transactions of
the Grotius Society, pp. 51-88.
8 Ibid, p. 51.
9 Dickinson, Edwin D. (1952). “Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States”, 101
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, pp. 26-56,
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7912&context=penn_law_review.
10 Available online at https://www.senate.gov/civics/resources/pdf/US_ConstitutionSenate_Publication_103-21.pdf.
11 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Official Journal 2017 L 11/23, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22017A0114(01)&from=EN.
12 CETA has not yet completely entered into force because some member states refused to ratify CETA
as needed. Only the parts for which the EU has the sole competence have entered into force, but so far
only preliminarily.
7

36

oblast. For many people living in theEuropean high north, the EU’s outerborder between Norway and Sweden /Finland, on the other hand, has been
virtually non-existent for generations.
While different regulatory systems
impact daily life across Sápmi, thepersonal and cultural connections acrossborders are often as important or evenmore important than those within acountry. For a long time, European
integration had the practical effect thatborders became less and less relevant,following the model of integration
between the Nordic countries. With
Brexit, not only the threat of a hardborder on the island of Ireland (which
would be in violation of the Good Friday
Agreement 13) but also borders between
Britain and the countries of the(European) Arctic would return.

Kingdom has a long history of engaging
with the Arctic, ranging from
exploration of the icy top of the world
and the exploitation of living marine
resources to scientific research andmodern-day tourism which brings large
numbers of British tourists to theEuropean Arctic during the wintermonths. The economic connections
between the United Kingdom andespecially nearby nations such as
Iceland, Norway and Faroyar are
significant, yet so far the UK only has
managed to conclude a free trade deal
with the latter, or, more precisely, with
Denmark, which is reflected in the titleof the agreement, the Agreement
establishing a Free Trade Agreement
between the United Kingdom of GreatBritain and Northern Ireland and theKingdom of Denmark in respect of the
Faroe Islands. 14 An agreement had beenconcluded with Norway and Iceland, 15
but it never entered into force as it wasseen only as a fallback in the event of ano deal-Brexit. 16 With the entry into forceof the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement,that agreement became moot. 17 What
was not envisaged in the agreement with

With regard to trade negotiations with
Arctic nations, the disregard forinternational law exhibited by thecurrent British government will provide
a significant obstacle. Yet, close
connections to the Arctic are notinsignificant for the UK. The United

Available online athttps://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/northernireland/good-fridayagreement.pdf.
14 Available athttps://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/777022/continuing-the-uks-trade-relationship-with-the-faroe-islands.pdf.
15 UK Government (2020). Agreement on trade in goods between Iceland, Norway and the UK,
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/agreement-on-trade-in-goods-between-iceland-norwayand-the-uk.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
13

37

Norway and Iceland was that a British
government
would
concludea
withdrawal
agreement
withtheEuropean Union and then fail to honor
it. A truly hard Brexit will have negative
economic consequences for both the UK
and the member states of the EEA. It
looks ever more likely that international
trade law rules under the World Trade
Organization (WTO) system will
become relevant between the UK and
Arctic nations.

and economic cooperation, to name justtwo examples.
With regard to the Arctic, Britain’s
disregard for international law raises
questions in how far the United
Kingdom remains a reliable partner forcooperation
becauseinternational
cooperation in the Arctic relies heavily
on the use of international law. NonArctic states which wish to cooperatewith Arctic nations will have to findtheir place within the international legal
framework in order to facilitate such an
engagement - for example through theUnited Nations Convention on the Lawof the Sea, 20 by seeking observer status at
the Arctic Council 21 or through bilateralagreements, such as the recent fisheries
agreement between Norway and the
Abandoning
respectforUK. 22international law as a matter of principle
essentiallyclosesthedoortointernational cooperation. Even serious
political differences have been overcome
to facilitate cooperation in the Arctic, but
always on the basis of international law,even if the norms created under the

While short stays, e.g. for touristic
purposes, will likely be possible visa free
after 31 December 2020, the practicalrealities of travel to europe for UK
citizens will change significantly after
the that date 18 (in addition to, of course,
the impact of the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic on international travel). Even
though the UK was not a party to the
Schengen Agreement, 19 travel between
the continent and the UK was relatively
easy pre-Brexit. While the impact on
tourism might still be limited, although
the travel experience is unlikely to be assmooth as in the past, the lack of a clear
legal regime is likely to impact scientific

See UK Government (2020). Visit Europe from 1 January 2021, https://www.gov.uk/visit-europe-1january-2021.
19 The Schengen acquis - Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic
Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks
at their common borders, Official Journal 2000 L 239/13, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(01)&from=EN.
20 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 United Nations Treaty Series 3.
21 The United Kingdom was one of the first states which gained observer status, together withGermany, the Netherlands and Poland, in 1998.
22 See UK Government (2020). UK and Norway sign historic fisheries agreement,
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-norway-sign-historic-fisheries-agreement.
18

38

auspices of, for example, the Arctic
Council, are of a limited material scope.

and especially the European Union, arewilling to conclude agreements with theUnited Kingdom. Unless the UK
government is able to counteract the
impression that it has no regard forinternational law, a key tool forinternational cooperation in the Arctic, itrisks that Britain is no longer perceived
as a reliable partner. In the long run, thislack of trust might impact British-Arctic
relations more than the absence of free
trade agreements and the need to fallback on WTO rules.

A hard Brexit will impact therelationship between the United
Kingdom in many ways. It will be
detrimental to the economic relationshipbetween the UK and Arctic nations,although the free trade agreement
between the UK and Faroyar and thefisheries agreement between the UK and
Norway might be indicators of how
future developments could look like.
This, however, requires that other states,

39

Arctic Challenge for
Sustainability II: Japan’s
New Arctic Flagship Projectcharacterisedbynationwide
multidisciplinary research projects andplatforms. The Japan Consortium for
Arctic Environmental Research (JCAR)
was established in 2011 as a nationwide
network-basedorganisation.
The
GRENE Arctic Climate Change Research
Project was conducted between 2011 and2016 under the leadership of NIPR as acore institute and the Japan Agency for
Marine-Earth Science and Technology(JAMSTEC) as an associated institute.
The Arctic Challenge for Sustainability(ArCS) succeeded GRENE and lasted
until 2020.

Juha Saunavaara ∗ & Fujio Ohnishi ∗∗Japan’s involvement in the Arctic
scientific cooperation
The origins of Japan’s involvement in
Arctic research date back to the 1950s
and to the establishment of the National
Institute of Polar Research (NIPR) in
1973. These early steps were succeededby the diversification of activities andincreased international cooperation in
the 1990s. A new phase of Japan’s Arctic
engagement emerged in the form of theestablishment of the Ny-Ålesund
research station on Svalbard in 1991 andJapan’s membership in the International
Arctic Science Committee (IASC). Thiswas soon followed by the introduction of
the International Northern Sea Route
Programme (INSROP, initiated by
Norway, Japan and Russia); this was
succeeded by the Japan Northern Sea
Route Programme (JANSROP), which
continued until 2005.1 The most recent
phase, during which Japan has applied
for and been awarded with an observer
status in the Arctic Council, has been

The ArCS project incorporated social
sciences and humanities as a newelement and was administered by NIPR,
JAMSTEC and Hokkaido University,
which established its Arctic ResearchCenter in 2015. The same organisations
have directed the Japan Arctic Research
Network Center (J-ARC Net), which wasestablishedin2016.
Hokkaido
University has also participated actively
in UArctic activities. The ‘Arctic
Challenge for Sustainability II (ArCS II,
June 2020 - March 2025)’ project isfunded by the Ministry of Education,
Culture,Sports,ScienceandTechnology-Japanandisjointly

Hokkaido University Arctic Research Center
Hokkaido University Arctic Research Center
1 More about Japan’s past involvement in Arctic research, see: Tonami, A., & S. Watters (2012). Japan’s
Arctic policy: The sum of many parts. In L. Heininen, H. Exner-Pirot & J. Plouffe (Eds.) Arctic
Yearbook 2012 (pp. 93-103). Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum; Ohnishi, F. (2016). Japan’s
Arctic policy development: From engagement to a strategy. In L. Lunde, J. Yang & I. Stensdal (Eds.).
Asian countries and the Arctic future (pp. 171-182). Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.
∗

∗∗

40

managed by NIPR, JAMSTEC and
Hokkaido University. Aside fromcontinuing research and educational
activities executed during the preceding
projects, ArCS II adds new layers toJapan’s Arctic research, for example, bystrengthening the role of engineeringsciences.

differs from ArCS, wherein theinternational collaborative research was
carried out under the umbrella of eightstudy themes, one of which was the
Arctic Data Archive System (ADS). The
strategic goals of the new project, whichwere identified as the key parameters
contributing to understanding theArctic’s changes and its development
toward the sustainable future, are as
follows: 1) Advanced Observation of
Arctic Environmental Change, 2)Improvement of Weather and Climate

ArCS II objectives and structure
ArCS II consists of four strategic goals
and 11 research programs. Therefore, it

Table 1: ArCS II Research Programs

Field and Principal Investigator
Atmosphere
PI: Makoto Koike (The University of Tokyo)
Ocean
PI: Eiji Watanabe (JAMSTEC)
Cryosphere
PI: Teruo Aoki (NIPR)
Land
PI: Hideki Kobayashi (JAMSTEC)
Teleconnection
PI: Meiji Honda (Niigata University)
Climate Prediction
PI: Hiroyasu Hasumi (The University ofTokyo)
Human Society
PI: Hiroki Takakura (Tohoku University)
Arctic Sea Routes
PI: Akihisa Konno (Kogakuin University)
Coastal Environments
PI: Shin Sugiyama (Hokkaido University)
International Law
PI: Akiho Shibata (Kobe University)
International Relations
PI: Fujio Ohnishi (Hokkaido University)

Title of the Program
Atmospheric Environment and Climate
Forcings in the Arctic
Research and Public Dataset Production on
the Arctic Marine Environment
A Changing Cryosphere in a Rapidly
Warming Arctic: Properties and Processes
Biogeochemical Cycling in the Arctic
Terrestrial Ecosystem, Permafrost andPeriglacial Regions
Teleconnections and the Predictability of
Weather and Climate
Weather and Climate Prediction and Its
Technological Improvement
Human Security, Energy and Food in the
Arctic under Climate Change
Sustainable Arctic Sea Routes in a Rapidly
Changing Environment
Arctic Coastal Change and Its Impact onSociety
Designing Resilient International Legal
Regimes for a Sustainable Arctic and theContribution of Japan
Elucidating the Complex Dynamics of Arctic
Politics and Its Contribution to Japan’s Arctic
Policy41Prediction, 3) Impact of Arctic
Environmental Change on Society and 4)
Legal/Policy Response and Research
Implementation for a Sustainable Arctic.
The achievement of these goals is
expected to lead to a situation where
existing environmental conditions areunderstood accurately, uncertainties canbe reduced, the challenges different
Arctic communities are facing can be
identified,andtheinternationalframework for the implementation ofactions paving the way for thesustainable development can beunderstood and effectively utilized.

of Arctic information is to be performed
through the establishment of the Arctic
Environmental Information website andthe Arctic Sea Ice Information Center. In
addition to the domestic education andoutreach activities, ArCS II supports
Japanese experts’ participation ininternational forums and information
sharing
between academics
andpolicymakers.

International relations and law as a partof the ArCS II project
Those familiar with the ArCS project
may remember that all research related
to social sciences and humanities used to
be gathered based on one theme, entitled‘People and Community’. Under the
new project structure, which reflects thestrategic goals, social scientists andscholars representing humanities haveaffiliated themselves with various
research programs, often also including
natural scientists and researchers with abackground in engineering. While many
cultural anthropologists and economists,
for example, are contributing to theprograms focusing on environmental
change and society, there are two
research programs with a clear emphasisoninternational
relationsandinternational law.

While the individual research programs
introduced in Table 1 form theadministrative structure of the projectand guide the concrete research
activities, they are neither silos nor
entities entirely separate from eachother. By contrast, interdisciplinarity
and cooperation between different
programs are both encouraged andexpected.
In addition to research-related activities,
ArCS II pays special attention to thedevelopment of human resources andthe dissemination of knowledge andinformation acquired through the
project. The practical implementation of
the so-called priority subjects occurs
through the International Research
Exchange Program, the Overseas
Fellowship Program and the Call for
Complementary Research Projects.
Furthermore, the strategic dissemination

The research program ‘Elucidating theComplex Dynamics of Arctic Politics
and Its Contribution to Japan’s Arctic
Policy’ approached Arctic multilevel42

law. The concrete issues to be studied
from the perspective of the international
legal framework include, for example,
international scientific cooperation, thesustainable use of the Arctic Ocean (e.g.,
issues concerning the Northern Sea
Route and the Agreement to Prevent
Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in theCentral Arctic Ocean), the rights ofindigenous peoples and the sustainable
development of the Arctic. Although the
COVID-19 pandemic has exerted a major
impact on the activities performed
during the first year of ArCS II, theactivities of both the IR and internationallaw research programs – which
encompassseminars,publications,policy recommendations and dialogue
with various stakeholders – are based oninternational cooperation.

governance through the lens of statelevel cooperation and conflict, the role ofcorporate actors in Arctic governance,
the political dynamics between the stateand indigenous people, the role of nonstate actors and paradiplomacy, theformation and transformation of Japan’snational awareness of the Arctic, and an
economic analysis of Arctic policy
issues. This research program consists ofsix closely cooperating subgroups, eachof which have overseas partners
contributing to their activities. The Ruleof Law has for years been one of the basic
principles and objectives of Japan’s
Arctic policy. The ‘Designing Resilient
International Legal Regimes for a
Sustainable Arctic and the Contributionof Japan’ research program brings
continuity to the previous activities byapproaching the rapidly changing Arctic
from the perspective of international

43

One of the Finland’s Largest
Minings Coming to Forest
Sámi Reindeer Management
Area ∗

estimated costs of the project are about
one billion euros.
Sokli is located in the area KeminSompio reindeer herding district. The
name ‘Kemin-Sompio’ comes from thenames of the two Forest Sámi Laplandvillages located in the area, Keminkylä
and Sompio.

Juha Joona ∗∗Sokli mining project

The Kemin-Sompio reindeer herding
district is the largest reindeer herding
district in Finland in terms of both areaand number of reindeer (12,000
animals). In some years, the KeminSompio district has produced 10% of thereindeer meat in the entire Finnish
reindeer husbandry area. About 200
people earn a living from reindeer

Since 2007, the Norwegian mining
company YARA has been preparing toopen a phosphate mine in themunicipality of Savukoski, in Finland.
The name of the area is Sokli. If the
project materializes, the mine would be
one of the largest in Finland in terms ofboth area and estimated costs. The

Lapland villages around the middle of the 18th century.

The article is part of JustNorth, a project that has received funding from the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 869327∗∗
Senior Researcher at the Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law in the Arctic
Centre of the University of Lapland∗

44

The legal-historical perspective

husbandry. Some of them are full-time,some part-time reindeer herders.

In modern times there have been no
lawsuits in Finland in which the realestate status of the areas that belonged to
the Lapland villages has been clarified in
more detail. The legal status of reindeer
husbandry has also not been clarified in
more detail in the case law. Unlike in
Sweden and Norway the government
has also been reluctant to clarify thisissue.

The planned mine would be located in
the middle of the pasture area of the
Kemin-Sompio district. The size of themining district is about 6,000 hectares.
The ore would be transported by truck to
the city of Kemijärvi, where it would be
loaded on a train. According to the plan,
heavy traffic would be around nearly
300 cars a day, which would mean avehicle every five minutes, day andnight.

However, the legal-historical status of
the area was sidelined in the so-called
taxed mountain case. This was a decision
taken by the Swedish Supreme Court(SC) in 1981, which dealt in detail with
the Sámi reindeer herder’s legal status.
Although the subject of the lawsuit was
the territory which now belongs toSweden, to the court was submitted
material which was made in the district
courts of Sompio and Keminkylä
Lappvillages, among others. The
decision of the SC states that it can beconcluded from this material that there
has been a tendency in this area inparticular that the Sámi have been
considered to have a similar right to theareas they use as the peasants (Nytt
Juridisk Arkiv 1981: 1 pp. 184 and 196).

The mine's energy production would
use a heating plant that would need up
to 200,000 solid cubic meters of wood per
year. According to the application, thistree would be taken at a distance of 100
km from Sokli, i.e. in practice from thearea of the Kemin-Sompio district.
If the project materializes, the district
will lose much of its pasture area. In
addition, the herding area of the district
would be practically divided into twoparts, which would prevent the reindeer
from moving from one grazing area toanother. Almost all the reindeer in thearea graze on natural pastures
throughout the year. Adding 200,000
solid cubic meters of annual fellings to
the current, already quite significant
fellings, would cause significant damage
to winter feeding of reindeer.

According to the Swedish SC, by the
middle of the 18th century, the Sámi
land status was the strongest in the area
which in present-day is located in
Northern Finland. According to thecourt, this right was comparable to the45peasants' land right, ie. theownership right of that time.

is pending before
Administrative Court.

land

the

SupremeSignificant disadvantage to reindeer
husbandry

Convention on Civil and Political
RightsSection 2.2 of the Finnish Reindeer
Husbandry Act provides for an area
specifically intended for reindeer
husbandry. According to the law, land in
this area may not be used in such a way
as to cause “significant harm” toreindeer husbandry. Sokli is located inthis area.

Almost all the reindeer owners of the
Kemin-Sompio district are descendantsof the forest Sámi who have lived in thearea as the first population group. The
vast majority of the reindeer owners ofthe district consider themselves Sámi
and in their family reindeer husbandry
has been practiced in the area for
hundreds of years.

The matter has been appealed to theSupreme Administrative Court inconnection with both planning andmining permit. In 2017, however, theSupreme Administrative Court ruledthat the mine would not causesignificant harm to reindeer husbandry.
However, such an interpretation of thelaw can rightly be called into question.
According to the preliminary work of
the law, even a single forestry measure,
such as clear-cutting, can exceed thethreshold of significant harm. It is clearthat the current project exceeds several
times that harm, what forestry measure
can cause to the reindeer husbandry.

Finland has ratified the Convention on
Civil and Political Rights. According toarticle 27 of the Convention, persons
belonging to minorities may not be
prohibited from enjoying their culture. It
is well established in Finland thatreindeer husbandry is part of Sámi
culture.
Kemin-Sompio
district’s
reindeerowners have also pointed out in
connection with the processing of theenvironmental permit that the project isin conflict with Article 27. In its defense,
YARA did not comment at all on thispoint. This matter is also pending before
the Supreme Administrative Court.

However, the matter has been appealed
to the Supreme Administrative Court
alsoinconnection
withtheenvironmental permit in 2020. Also, in
this context, it has been pointed out thatthe project is in conflict with section 2.2of the Reindeer Husbandry Act. The case

Conclusions
It appears that in the present case little
account has been taken of the legal46

historical past of the region. The realestate status of the area differs fromwhat it is elsewhere in Finland. It has
also remained unclear to where the
Sámi's strong real estate status has
disappeared.

provided for in any particular law, thisshould be the premise in the case law as
well.
On the other hand, the legal protectionof reindeer husbandry is also provided
for in the current legislation, i.e. section
2.2 of the Reindeer Husbandry Act.
However, it appears that the authorities
have difficulty in applying thisprovision, in accordance with thenormal interpretation of the law.

One starting point could also be that thelegal status of Sámi reindeer herders
cannot differ much from what it is in
Sweden. In Sweden, reindeer herding isunderstood strongly protected land use
right with a civil law basis. As thisstarting point is primarily based on the
joint legislation of Finland and Sweden,
this should also be the starting point in
Finland. Although this matter is not47

Effective Business
Development in Arctic
Russia: How to Make theArctic Zone Attractive for
Business

entrepreneurs who intend to start
commercial activities in the Arctic canmake these regions more attractive and,
consequently, more profitable. But what
can the Arctic provide businesses, otherthan profits from mineral resource
extraction activities, and how can theregion attract business for othercommercial activities? This year, theGovernment and Ministry of Far Eastand the Arctic of the Russian Federation
tried to answer this question, and it
issued Federal Law № 193-FZ on State
Support of Entrepreneurial Activity in
the Arctic Zone of the RussianFederation. We must emphasise that thislegal instrument was not issued as a
response to the COVID-19 outbreak but
was, rather, planned long before thepandemic.

Pavel Tkach ∗The Russian Arctic includes millions ofsquare kilometres of land, sea, and ice
with a huge amount of mineral
resources. For business, the Far North
may be considered a vast place forexperimentation. However, this region
also involves many disadvantages forbusiness, such as its cold temperatures,
remoteness, and logistical difficulties.
During these difficult times, additional
state support for legal entities orPic. 1. Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (from <https://64parallel.ru/obshhestvo/pojmano-vseti/kostomuksha-teper-v-arkticheskoj-zone/>)∗

MA Polar Law candidate, University of Akureyri

48

The state of business in Arctic Russia

economy is sufficiently diversified.
However, while the main goal of a link
between municipalities and businesses
is mutually beneficial to diversify the
economy and gain profit, the link
between municipalities and the mineral
extraction industry aims to provide
comfortable conditions for industry andopportunities to enjoy logistics throughthe Northern Sea Route. Problems in thedevelopment of entrepreneurship in
Russia have regularly become subjects ofdiscussion at the federal level – inministries and departments, in theFederation Council and the State Duma,and at meetings with the president of theRussian Federation. Despite these
discussions, until 2020, state support forentrepreneurial activity in the Arctic
Zone was poor. At the same time, federal
subjects
lookedforwardtoadiversification of the local economies
anddeveloped
variousprojects
supporting local entrepreneurs. For
example, the educational project ‘Youentrepreneur’wasfoundedincooperation with the Russian Federationon the federal level and Arkhangelsk
Oblast on the local level to encourage
young entrepreneurs to implementbusiness activities in the Arctic.
Nevertheless, a lack of state support for
local entrepreneurs was not the only
difficulty facing entrepreneurship in the

To properly begin this section, we must
answer the question: What is Arctic
Russia? Arctic Russia is four federal
subjects of the Russian Federation(namely: Murmansk Oblast, Nenets
Autonomous Okrug, Yamal-Nenets
Autonomous Okrug, and Chukotka) andfive federal subjects, partly represented
by municipal formations (the RepublicofKarelia,
Arkhangelsk
Oblast,Krasnoyarsk Krai, Sakha Republic, andKomi Republic) (Pic. 1). A detailed list of
the territories belonging to the Arctic
Zone of the Russian Federation is set out
in the Decree of the President of theRussian Federation № 296 from 2 May
2014 on Land Territories of the Arctic
Zone of the Russian Federation. 1
The state of business in the Arctic can becharacterised by a strong link between
municipalities,
small-to-medium
businesses, and the mineral extractionindustry. This link can be traced in thenumber of monotowns in Arctic Russia.
For the purpose of this research, amonotown is a city whose economy isdominated by a single industry orcompany. A list of monotowns ismanaged by the Order of theGovernment of Russia № 1398-r from 29
July 2014, and a monotown may be
excluded from the list if its local

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation № 296 on Land Territories of the Arctic Zone of
the Russian Federation (Presidential Executive Office, 2014)<http://static.kremlin.ru/media/acts/files/0001201405050030.pdf> accessed 3 November 2020
(translation by the current author)
149

Russia’s central regionsinterest rates on loans). 2

Arctic. Local entrepreneurs havehighlighted the following difficulties:(including

All of these factors raised a question
about the invention of a distinct packageof state support measures forentrepreneurial activity in the Arctic
within the federal agenda. A response tothis agenda was enacted on 13 July 2020:
Federal Law № 193-FZ on State Supportof Entrepreneurial Activity in the Arctic
Zone of the Russian Federation(hereinafter referred to as ‘Federal
Law’).

1. Harsh natural and climatic conditions
that affect almost all types of economic
and social activities, including theaccelerated wearing of fixed industrial
assets and a need for these assets’frequent replacement.
2. The risks of environmental accidents
and disasters whose elimination in the
Arctic – especially on the sea shelf – is an
unprecedentedly complex and littlestudied matter.
3. Businesses’ dependence, in many
regions of the Arctic, on northerndeliveries (supplies from the central
regions of the country during a limited
period of Arctic sea and river navigation,
including oil, oil products, coal, food,and technical products) and the highcost of these goods’ transportation(including by air) to remote Arctic
territories.
4. The general underdevelopment of all
types of supporting infrastructure forbusiness – such as roads, engineering,and energy.
5. A shortage of many qualified specialists
and insufficient motivation for existing
workers due to a lack of competition in
the local labour market.
6. Arctic businesses’ high dependence onlarge, city-forming corporate structuresand state and municipal support, withinsufficientbankfinancingandunfriendly conditions compared toFederal Law: From the registration
stage to the first profits
Alexander Krutikov, one of the bill’s
authors,
commented
ontheprerequisites for the law’s creation:
This law offers incentives andmechanisms for the economic
development of the Arctic. An
increase in people's householdincome is, first of all, the creation ofhighly
paid
jobs
and
the
construction of new enterprises.
Today, the capital costs of setting up
a new enterprise in the Arctic are 23 times higher than in central Russia,
and no investor will go there.
Moreover, the number of operating
smallbusinessesissteadily

Valeriy Lebedevich, Problems of Small and Medium Business Development in the Arctic Zone of theRussian Federation (Russian Center for Arctic Development, 2017) <http://arcticrf.ru/deyatelnost/issledovaniya/problemyi-razvitiya-malogo-i-srednego-biznesa-v-arkticheskoj-zonerossijskoj-federaczii.html> accessed 4 November 2020 (translation by the current author)
250

declining. We took all the best thatworks and is in demand by businessin the Far East, but it is impossible tocompletely copy its preferential
treatment for the simple reason thatthe costs and risks are higher in the
Arctic. It is proposed to establish
reduced tax rates in the Arctic for theentire duration of the investment
project. In addition, they will
operate not within the support zones
and priority development areas but
throughout the entire territory of the
Arctic Zone of the RussianFederation. 3

main legal framework, Federal Law №
473-FZ on Territories of priority rapidsocio-economic development. But defacto, the Arctic Zone is perceived by theGovernment as one large priority
development area. As a result, theregulation of state support forentrepreneurial activities in the Arctic
Zone is comparable to the regulation ofpriority development areas in the
Russian Federation and adapted, as
mentioned in the previous section, torisks and costs in the Arctic.
The Federal Law on State Support of
Entrepreneurial Activity in the Arctic
Zone of the Russian Federation begins
with the most important definition ofthis legal instrument – the definition of aresident of the Arctic Zone of the RussianFederation. A resident of the Arctic Zone of
the Russian Federation (hereinafter, aresident) is an individual entrepreneur orlegal entity whose state registration was
carried out in the Arctic Zone of theRussian Federation in accordance with
the Russian Federation’s legislation(except for state and municipal unitaryenterprises), which entered into anagreement on the implementation of
investment activities in the Arctic Zoneof the Russian Federation (hereinafter,

This statement shows that businesspractices in the Far East of Russia wereused as the case study during the bill’sdevelopment, and the bill’s basic
concept is the priority development area.
The priority development area is wherea special legal regime has been
establishedtoimplement
entrepreneurial and other activities inorder to attract investments, ensure
accelerated
socioeconomic
development, and create comfortableconditions for the population. 4 De jure,
the Arctic Zone of the RussianFederation is, as a whole, not a priority
development area per regulations of the

Project Office for the Development of the Arctic, It’s Time to Strengthen Support for Small and MediumSized Businesses in the Arctic (porarctic.ru, 30 May 2019) <https://porarctic.ru/blog/2019/05/30/porausilit-podderzhku-malogo-i-srednego-biznesa-v-arktike/> accessed 5 November 2020 (translation by
the current author)
4 Federal Law № 473-FZ on Territories of priority rapid socio-economic development (Official
Internet Portal of Legal Information, 2014)<http://static.kremlin.ru/media/acts/files/0001201412290024.pdf> accessed 5 November 2020
(translation by the current author)
351

an agreement on the implementation of
investment activities) in accordance with
the Federal Law, and which is includedin the Arctic Zone of the RussianFederation’s register of residents. 5 By
this definition, we may conclude thatentering into an agreement on theimplementation of investment activities
grants one status as a resident of the
Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.

Russian Arctic as a place for businessexperiments. 7
3. The total amount of implemented andplanned capital investments cannot beless than 1 million rubles (13,100 USD).
This low limit to planned capital
investments was declared in order toattract small and medium businesses toentrepreneurial activities in the Arctic. 8

After meeting these requirements,
applicants undergo the procedure forregistration as a potential resident of the
Arctic Zone. Article 9, Section 4 of theFederal Law declares that theregistration
proceduremay
beconducted online. To apply for anagreement on the implementation of
investment activities in the Arctic Zone,a prospective resident must follow three
simple steps. First, they must visit the
Arctic Russia website (https://arcticrussia.ru/en/), navigate to the ‘Investor’section, and click on the ‘User Account’
section. Second, they must apply for user
account registration. Within a few hours,
the application will be approved, andthe user will receive their registration
data at their email address. Third, to log
in to their user account, the user mustnavigate to the ‘Services’ section toprepare a required package of
documents, upload them electronically,
and click the ‘Send’ button. The required

Before the administrative procedure ofentering into this agreement, aprospective resident must meet all of thefollowing requirements for legal entities
or entrepreneurs:
1. The state registration of a legal entity or
entrepreneur should be carried out in
the Arctic Zone of the RussianFederation (in one of the municipal
formations included in the Arctic Zone,
or in a federal subject if it is completely
located within the Arctic Zone). 6
2. A legal entity or entrepreneur should
intend to implement a new investment
project in the Arctic Zone or new to theentity or entrepreneur types ofentrepreneurial activities – that is, theentity or entrepreneur must not haveconducted these activities before thedate of their application. Thisrequirement clarifies that the purpose ofthis law is not only to attract investment
but also to increase the value of theFederal Law № 193-FZ on State Support of Entrepreneurial Activity in the Arctic Zone of theRussian Federation (Official Internet Portal of Legal Information, 2020)<http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/45677> accessed 6 November 2020 (translation by the current author)
6 Federal Law (no 5) Article 2.1.2
7 Federal Law (no 5) Article 9.6.1
8 Federal Law (no 5) Article 9.6.3
552

package of documents includes copies ofstatutory documents (for legal entities),a business plan, an extract from the
Unified State Register of Legal Entities
or an extract from the Unified State
Register of Entrepreneurs, and a copy of
the applicant’s certificate of registration
with the tax authority. The application
will be considered within 10 days, and if
a positive response is received, anagreement will be signed within 10 days
from the moment response received. The
agreement is signed by the legal entity or
entrepreneur and the state, represented
by a management company. 9 The
management company concept derives
from the Federal Law on Territories ofpriority
rapidsocio-economic
development, and it refers to thecompany appointed by the Governmentof the Russian Federation to manage
priority development areas. 10 The main
requirement for such a company is thatits controlling stock belongs to the state.

VAT when selling goods placed under
the customs procedure of the Free
Customs Zone (FCZ); income tax fromthe moment the resident’s first profit isreceived; land tax from the moment
resident status is obtained or theownership
of
each
land
plot
commenced; corporate property tax
from the tax period in which theorganisation is included in the Arctic
Zone of the Russian Federation’s register
However,
theseofresidents. 11
preferences do not apply to projects insolidmineralextraction,torepresentative offices (branches) of
foreign entities registered in the Arctic
Zone of Russia in order to implement
investment projects, or to entities with
branches outside the Arctic Zone, which
would contradict to articles 284.4.1.2 and284.4.1 of the Tax Code of RussianFederation, with amendments that will
be enacted on 1 January 2021. 12
Importantly, the tax preferences
mentioned above apply only to taxes
paid into the federal budget; tax rates fortaxes paid into the budgets of federal
subjects are set annually by local tax
authorities. Moreover, the Tax Codedoes not specify the maximum tax rates

The commercial activity of a resident of
the Arctic Zone is accompanied by
preferences which fall into two
categories:
tax
preferencesandadministrative
preferences.
Tax
preferences include a 0% tax rate for:

Federal Law (no 5) Article 10.1
Federal Law (no 4) Article 2.5
11 Tax Code of the Russian Federation № 117-FZ with amendments on 15 October 2020 (Official
Internet Portal of Legal Information, 2020)<http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_28165/> accessed 7 November 2020
(translation by the current author)
12 Rules of the Tax Preferences to the Residents to the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation Will Enter
into Force on 1 January 2021, with Amendments (15 October 2020) to Tax Code of the RussianFederation
9

10

53

for taxes paid into the budgets of federal
subjects, and it only declares thepossibility of reduced tax rates. 13 This
rule enables local tax authorities toreduce tax rates for residents of the
Arctic Zone by only 1%, and tax rates
will thus remain high. On the other
hand, article 284.4.5 (2021) declares thatthe tax rates for taxes paid to the budgetsof federal subjects by the residents ofpriority development zones andresidents of the Free Port of Vladivostok
cannot exceed 5%. We suggest that
adding residents of the Arctic Zone of
the Russian Federation to the ruling of
this article would make tax preferencesmore dependable for entrepreneurs andlegal entities implementing commercial
activities. Administrative preferences
include: no quota on the recruitment offoreign employees; shortened inspection
times (the term for scheduledinspections cannot exceed 15 businessdays); a possibility to apply the freecustoms zone procedure to residents’developed and equipped land plots;
court representation of residents by the
management company; and a possibility
to conclude concession agreements
without tender procedures. 14

make investments, including capital
investments, in the declared amounts
and terms. 15 A violation of theseobligations constitutes a repudiatory
breach of their agreement, and it may
result in termination of the agreement
and revocation of resident status.
Regarding non-contractual obligations,notably, article 28 of the Federal Law
establishes an obligation for residents of
the Arctic Zone to support and cooperatewith Indigenous communities in theirplaces of residence or their traditional
activities, following the principles
approved by the authorised federal
body. The authorised federal bodymonitors compliance by residents of the
Arctic Zone with these principles andpublishes a report on this compliance on
its official website annually, no later thanJuly 1. 16 Nevertheless, a violation of theobligationforcooperation
withIndigenous communities will not lead totermination of the agreement, though it
may cause fines for the resident.
In concluding this section, we reiteratethat tax and administrative preferences
are very attractive and able to makeentrepreneurial activities in the Arctic
financially comfortable. However, tax
preferences
also
entailcertaindrawbacks, such as the inability to use
these preferences in mining projects andby entities with branches outside theIn addition to preferences, residents also
have obligations. Residents’ primaryobligations are to carry out the activities
provided for by the agreement and to
Tax Code (no 12) Article 284.1.8
Federal Law (no 5) Chapter 4
15 Federal Law (n 5) Article 11.3
16 Federal Law (no 5) Article 28.4
13
14

54

Arctic Zone. On the positive side, we
emphasisethattheapplication
procedure may be completed online,
without any additional administrative
burden, and the requirements for the
total amount of implemented andplanned capital investments enables
small and medium businesses toparticipate. Despite these advantages, aforeign company that wishes to registera representative office or branch forcommercial activities in the Arctic will
be unable to avoid an administrative
burden. Before a representative office orbranch of a foreign company applies forstatus as a resident of the Arctic Zone,
they must first undergo the stateregistration process as a legal entity
within the Arctic Zone of Russia. For theother Arctic States, we have emphasised
the legal definition of a resident of the
Arctic Zone as an example of how to
divide business conditions on the
grounds of a location.

special economic zone with a set oftax preferences. The most important
thing is that the principle ischanging: if at the previous stage theState itself invested in the Arctic,
and in not very large amounts, now
we are talking about supporting
investors and providing assistanceto projects in the economic sphere.
We will continue to improve theconditions for commercial activities,
develop the economy of the Arctic
territories because this will help
improve the living conditions ofpeople in the future. 17.
The Government supports this legal
instrument, but how it will apply
practically remains to be seen.

Conclusion
In conclusion to our research, we would
like to link the Federal Law on State
Support of Entrepreneurial Activity in
the Arctic Zone of the RussianFederation and entered into force on 26
October 2020 the Strategy on theDevelopment of the Arctic Zone of theRussian Federation for the period up to2035 (hereinafter, Strategy) and toaddress how the Federal Law will help
achieve the Strategy’s goals.

The Russian Government’s opinion –reflecting the relation of the state to theFederal Law – can be found a statement
by Yuri Trutnev, Deputy Prime Ministerof the Russian Federation:
Significant steps have been taken to
improve the system of public
administration for the developmentof the Arctic region. Almost theentire Russian Arctic is becoming aFirst, Paragraph 4, Subparagraph D of
the Strategy recognises that a major

Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, The Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation
Accepts Its First Residents (minvr.gov.ru, 5 October 2020) <https://minvr.gov.ru/presscenter/news/28229/> accessed 9 November 2020 (translation by the current author)
17

55

problem in the economic developmentof Arctic Russia is the uneven industrial
and economic development of certain
territories in the Arctic Zone and theeconomic focus on extracting natural
resources, with further exports to theindustrialised regions of the RussianFederation and abroad. 18 Unequal tax
preferences for mining projects in theFederal Law clarify that the law’s
foremost goal is diversifying the
economy since, firstly, the mining
industry in Russia is well divided
between Gazprom and Rosneft and,secondly, the Arctic Zone of the RussianFederation is, as a whole, a welldeveloped “mining hub” which lacks
serious problems. Moreover, a focus on
mining and a lack of economic
diversification may lead to an increased
number of monotowns and shrinking
Arctic cities, such as Vorkuta, where– after the collapse of the city’s dominantcoal mining industry – the population
decreased dramatically, from 218,467
people in 1989 to 73,123 people in 2020.

promote the area’s transition to acircular economy. Paragraph 12 of theStrategy declares a list of necessary
measurestoachieveeconomicdevelopment in the Arctic. We think theFederal Law can be considered a general
legal framework for these measures’implementation.
For
example,Subparagraph G declares the necessityof simplifying the procedure of granting
land plots for the purpose of carryingout economic and other activities notprohibited by law, which is implied from
Article 15 of the Federal Law.
Furthermore, based on Paragraph 17,
Subparagraph M of the Strategy, we cansuggest that the preferences declared by
the Federal Law be considered asmeasures to attract not only different
projects but also foreign investments to
the Arctic Zone.
So, can we consider this Federal Law tobe promising? We can find the answer tothis question in statistics. As of 14
November 2020, the Arctic Zone of theRussianFederation
includes14
registered residents, 55 billion rubles(719 million USD) in investments, and2,855 announced new jobs. 19 Thesefigures offer hope that the economy of
the Russian Arctic will diversify and that
Arctic entrepreneurship will rise.

Another achievement of the Federal Law
is its introduction of a special economic
regime in the Arctic Zone. According toParagraph 12, Subparagraph A of theStrategy, the introduction of a special
economic regime in the Arctic Zone may

Strategy of the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation for the Period Up to 2035
(Official Internet Portal of Legal Information, 2020)<http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/J8FhckYOPAQQfxN6Xlt6ti6XzpTVAvQy.pdf>
accessed 10 November 2020 (translation by the current author)
19 https://investarctic.com/en/
18

56

The Polar Law Symposiums

person in autumn 2021, provided theongoing covid-19 pandemic will nolonger be leading to travel restrictions.

Gudmundur Alfredsson ∗In a welcoming message at the openingofthevirtualSymposium(2020polarlawsymposium.org/welcome-message-from-the-convenor-at-theopening-of-13th-pls/), Professor Akiho
Shibata stated as follows: "Despite thecontinuing difficulties around the world
caused by COVID-19, ... the 13th Polar
Law Symposium has successfully
opened entirely online, with a total of
288 registered participants. This is thelargest registration number everachieved in the history of the
Symposium. ... we have 25 uploaded
individual presentations either byslideshows or by video viewing, fiveseminars for on-demand video viewing,
and 13 live events planned with 28 oralinteractive presentations and lectures."

The Polar Law Symposiums are by now
well-established academic events. They
have been held annually in several
countries of the polar regions, both northand south, they have been wellattended, and they have been andcontinue to be in the forefront of law andpolicy debates relating to the Arctic,
Antarctica, and even the Third Pole.
The Symposiums have been convened in
Akureyri (Iceland) five times 2008-10,
2013, and 2016; once in Nuuk
(Greenland) 2011; twice in Rovaniemi(Finland) 2012 and 2017; twice in Hobart(Australia) 2014 and 2019; once inAnchorage and Fairbanks (the USA)
2015; and once in Tromsø (Norway)
2018. 1 Following an initial planningmeeting in 2007, 2 the use of the label'polar law' has multiplied.

The
hundredsofSymposium
participants belong mostly to academic
institutions and NGOs, plus a scatteringof government and IGO representatives.
They stem from Arctic countries,
Australia, New Zealand, and otherStates with economic, political, research

As these lines are written in November
2020, the Polar Cooperation ResearchCentre at the University of Kobe in Japanis conducting the 13th Polar Law
Symposium online. The plan is to holdthe 14th Symposium also in Kobe but in-

Senior Associate, Stefansson Arctic Institute, Akureyri.
For more detailed information about each one of these Symposiums, see "www.polarlaw.is/en/polarlaw-symposium".
2 About the history of early polar law developments in Iceland, see Gudmundur Alfredsson andAgust Thor Arnason, "Fullveldið og heimskautarétturinn" (Sovereignty and Polar Law) in Fullveldi í
99 ár. Safn ritgerða til heiðurs dr. Davíðs Þórs Björgvinssonar (99 Years of Icelandic Sovereignty.
Essays in Honor of Dr. David Thor Björgvinsson), Reykjavík: Hið íslenska bókmenntafélag (The
Icelandic Literary Society), 2017, pp. 267-280.
∗
1

57

Most of the presentations made at the
Symposiums are published in the
Yearbook of Polar Law, which first
appeared in 2009, and since then every
year (www.brill.com/pola). Articles are
subject to blind peer reviews, while
sections with short papers and bookreviews are not reviewed. The editorsin-chief are Gudmundur Alfredsson,
Julia Jabour, Timo Koivurova, andAkiho Shibata. One or more local or
special editors supervise each year's
volume.

and security interests in the polar
regions.
The themes addressed at the Polar Law
Symposiums cover a wide range of polar
law. Interdisciplinary approaches arecommon; the emphasis is not only on
relevant areas of global, regional,
domestic and local laws and related
policies and practices but also on
comparative law and the cultural,
economic, and political considerations
that do or should influence the makingof new laws.

The Yearbook is supplemented by abook series, Studies in Polar Law, also
published by Brill Academic Publishers
inthe
Netherlands(brill.com/view/serial/SPLW?rskey=8W
0zMf&result=1). Three books have so far
appeared: Kamrul Hossain, Jose MiguelRoncero Martin and Anna Petrétei(editors), Human and Societal Security in
the Circumpolar Arctic. Local andIndigenous Communities (2018); Antje
Neumann, Wilderness Protection in Polar
Regions, Arctic Lessons Learnt for the
Regulation and Management of Tourism in
the Antarctic (2020); and Timo Koivurova
and Sanna Kopra (editors), Chinese Policy
and Presence in the Arctic (2020). A new
textbook on polar law is underpreparation and will be edited by
Natalia Loukacheva.

Specific issues discussed at the
Symposiums include the following:
sovereignty and boundary disputes onland and sea, dispute settlement,colonialism, self-determination, selfgovernment, the rights of indigenous
peoples and other human rights, landand natural resources rights, gender,
human security, environmental law,pollution, climate change, the melting
ice, fauna, flora and biodiversity,
sustainable
development,
goodgovernance,
traditional
economic
activities, identity and cultural heritage,education and languages, the law of thesea and maritime law, transport,
tourism, NGOs, the Arctic Council, theWest Nordic Council and other global,
regional and sub-regional IGOs, theAntarctic treaty system, search andrescue, and geopolitics and security.
Undoubtedly, the list of issues will growlonger in the years to come.

As mentioned above, the use of the'polar law' label continues to increase,along with its components of Arctic law
and Antarctic law, and the Symposiums
58

have certainly contributed to thatgrowth. Other publishing houses(Edward Elgar, Routledge, Springer, andothers) and organizations (f.ex. theNordic Council of Ministers) have also
published materials on polar law orclosely related subjects. An open-accessjournal, the Review of Arctic Law and
Politics, is published in Tromsø andeditedbyØyvindRavna(arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic). The
University of the Arctic runs a Thematic

Networkon
ArcticLaw(www.uarctic.org/organization/themati
c-networks/arctic-law/), led by Kamrul
Hossain,
Leena
Heinämäki, andKarolina Sikora. Polar law issues are also
increasingly seen on the agendas of themultitude of global, regional, national,
and local conferences held each year
about the Arctic, Antarctica, and theThird Pole. Further evidence of successis the ever-increasing number of 'polar
law' hits on Google!

Polar Law Symposium 2017, Rovaniemi, Finland59Conference Report of the
13th Polar Law SymposiumSpecial Online Session

flagship research project in the Arctic
region of Japan.
The 13th PLS is the 7th international
symposium for PCRC to host since 2015.
Among the accumulated experiences, it
was the first time to hold a symposium
online. Hosting the online symposium
requires completely different operations
from the physical symposium, bothlogistically and technically. This reportconveys the experience of hosting the13th PLS special online session. 2

Mami Furuhata ∗The 13th Polar Law Symposium (PLS)
special online session was held from
November 9th to 30th 2020. Due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, it became the first
symposium held online in the history of
PLS. The PLS is an annual event and had
been held in various countries such as
Australia, Norway, Finland, U.S.,
Greenland and it was planned to be heldin Kobe-City, Japan. Polar Cooperation
Research Centre (PCRC) of Kobe
University 1 hosted and logisticallysupported this online symposium.

The 13th PLS terminated on November
30th with 354 registered participantsfrom 43 countries and regions. The
Figure 1 shows the country ofparticipants’ affiliation, the countries
with 5 or more participants are shown in
the table. Japan accounts for 70 (20%)
participants. 40 (11%) are participantsfrom U.S., 27 (8%) are from Australia
and 25 (7%) are from China. Figure 2
shows the composition of participants
by regions. 34% of participants are from
European countries, 32% from Asia, 16%from North America, 10% from Oceania
and 6 % from Latin America. Suchdiversity of participants is showing thehigh level of interest in polar researchfrom various regions of the world. And
this large number of participants may
have been possible because it was held
online.

PCRC is the research center belonging to
the Graduate School of International
Cooperation Studies (GSICS) of Kobe
University. It is established in the first ofkind and leading institution in polar
legal and policy studies in Japan,
focusing on the Arctic and Antarctic
international legal and institutional
developments. PCRC is subsidized by
the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology-Japan(MEXT) as one of the executing agencies
of Arctic Challenge for Sustainability II(ArCS II) project which is the national

Assistant Professor, Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University
The web site of PCRC: http://www.research.kobe-u.ac.jp/gsics-pcrc/index.html
2 The 13th PLS web Site: https://2020polarlawsymposium.org/∗
160

Another feature of the online event is thelength of the session. The PLS is usually
three-day event, but this special online
session has been held for 3 weeks. One ofthe practical reasons for prolongation is
the scheduling of seminars. During thesession, 12 live events with 28 oralinteractive
presentations
have
successfully convened by Zoom meetingor webinar system. Unlike gathering at asame conference hall, online participantsfrom all over the world remain in theirrespective time zones. Working hours
for Japan are sleeping hours for people
on the other side of the globe. To
accommodate participation in eachseminar as much as possible, theschedule of seminars was adjusted tohold only one seminar per day.

Figure 1 Country of Participants' Affiliation
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Figure 2 Region of Participants
Middle East
2%
Latin America
6%

Africa0.2%

Oceania10%Europe34%

North America
16%
Asia
32%

EuropeAsia

North America

Oceania61

Latin America

Middle East

Africa

The challenges faced by the Planning
Committee is mainly technical issues
related to system construction of
website. Not only managing the preregistration and entrant to 12 live
seminars and hosting the ZOOM
meetings, all seminars were delivered by
YouTube Live for the people who
missed the pre-registration. There were
580 viewers on YouTube. Almost all
Zoom seminar were recorded anduploaded to the homepage forsubsequent On-demand Video Viewing.
These additional follow-ups of the live
event made participants available three
ways to attend; Zoom, YouTube Liveand On-demand video viewing throughthe PLS website.

The Yearbooks of Polar Law. The
committee had to add technicalprotection to the contents to meet
publishing conditions. The individual
presentations have been embedded tothe dedicated web page with special
processing by the technical expert toprotect from downloading. How easy
would it be if this were just to project on
the screen of the venue without
distributing papers?
It can be said that the 13th PLS provided
as much full service as possible online.
All of these has been a good experiencefor future events under these situations,but one thing cleared was that hosting
online event wouldn’t save the cost oflabor and time in preparation comparedto the physical session.

In addition to these live seminars, 43
individual presentations were uploaded
either by PPT slideshows and/or byvideo recording. Each live seminar andindividual presentation were given the
dedicated web page to upload thematerials and participants could leave
their open comment on the pages. 77
textual comments and replies were
written throughout the symposium. This
personal comment-and-reply function
can be assumed as an alternative to thediscussion over coffee-break of thephysical conference.

It is indeed undeniable that participants
accessing Zoom from their own room allover the world have created relaxing andfriendly atmosphere and solidarity by
sharing time and exchanging theiropinions, but online symposium cannot
be a full substitute for all the value
involved in having a face-to-face
discussion
includinginformalconversation with new colleagues for
network building.
The purpose of the PLS “is to examine,in detail, the implications of thechallenges faced by the Polar Regions forinternational law and policy and to makerecommendations
onappropriate
actions by States, policy makers andother international actors to respond to

Another technical challenge supportingthese various formats of online event
was how to protect the presentation andrecording files. The proceedings andpresentation of PLS will be published in62these emerging and re-emerging
challenges.” 3 To tackle with thesechallenges, following 5 panels are
established on the 13th PLS; 1) Emerging
legal, policy and scientific issues in the
Antarctic, 2) Policy-Law-Science Nexus
in Polar Regions, 3) Emerging Legal
Issues in Protecting the Arctic
Environment, 4) Indigenous Peoples in
the Arctic, 5) Resources Development
and Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic.
The accepted proposals to PLS wereassigned to these 5 panels according to
the theme. Among them, those selected
as oral presentation were presented in
the interactive live seminars convened
by each panel.

possible international and regional legal
approaches and the limits and weaknessof the current legal system on this issue.
Dr. Toyoshima, as a scientist who justcame back from the Arctic cruise on theoceanographic research vessel "Mirai",operated by the Japan Agency for
Marine-Earth Science and Technology(JAMSTEC), reported the current state ofplastic pollution based on the latest
research. She reported that arctic ocean
is the hotspot of microplastics, andmicrofiber concentration in seawater isthe highest in the arctic while fishingtools are the most harmful to the arctic
wildlife.
The discussion was inevitably directedto the need for cooperation between
natural and social scientists. These
dialogue between lawyers and scientists
are symbolic for PLS. A lot of other issue
emerging in the polar regions need forlegal and political control on humanactivities based on the scientific facts andpredictions

One of the highlighted live seminars was
the open lecture on the Arctic plastic
problem: ‘Plastic Arctic’- How does law
deal with the emerging threat of Arctic
plastic pollution? convened by the panelof Emerging Legal Issues in Protecting
the Arctic Environment. The speaker
was Dr. Seita Romppanen, SeniorLecturer in EU and International
Environmental Law at the UEF Centerfor Climate Change, Energy andEnvironmental Law (CCEEL) and thecommentator was Dr. Junko Toyoshima,
Research fellow at Ocean Policy
Research Institute, Sasakawa Peace
Foundation. Dr. Romppanen discussed
about the legal and regulatory
framework of plastic pollution. She
carefully examined and explained the3

The Polar Law Institute;Throughout the symposium, it was
impressive that young legal scholars
wereseeking
applicability
thetraditional international law to theemerging issues in the polar regions by
their analysis and interpretation. The
possible solution would be refined andstrengthened through discussions withresearchers of other fields and otherstake holders just as it was at this63

symposium. In that sense, it is convincedthat the Polar Law Symposium will be anincreasingly important venue forresearchers all over the world to share
their scientific knowledge on diverse
issues in polar regions.

Provisionally, we plan to hold thephysical meeting on 21 to 23 November
at Kobe University Main Campus in
Kobe, Japan. We are hoping thispandemic will be settled down soon andlooking forward to meeting you inperson in Kobe next year.

PCRC will proudly host the 14th Polar
Law Symposium in 2021 as well.

64