Government Incentives
and US Competitivenessin Semiconductor
Manufacturing
September 2020
By Antonio Varas, Raj Varadarajan, Jimmy Goodrich, and Falan YinugBoston Consulting Group partners with leaders
in business and society to tackle their mostimportant challenges and capture their greatest
opportunities. BCG was the pioneer in businessstrategy when it was founded in 1963. Today, we
help clients with total transformation—inspiring
complex change, enabling organizations to grow,building competitive advantage, and drivingbottom-line impact.
To succeed, organizations must blend digital andhuman capabilities. Our diverse, global teams
bring deep industry and functional expertiseand a range of perspectives to spark change.
BCG delivers solutions through leading-edge
management consulting along with technology
and design, corporate and digital ventures—and business purpose. We work in a uniquely
collaborative model across the firm andthroughout all levels of the client organization,
generating results that allow our clients to thrive.

The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA)
is the voice of the semiconductor industry in theUS, one of America’s top export industries anda key driver of America’s economic strength,
national security, and global competitiveness.
The semiconductor industry directly employs
nearly a quarter of a million workers in the US,
and US semiconductor company sales totaled$193 billion in 2019. SIA members accountfor nearly 95 percent of all US semiconductor
industry sales. Through this coalition, SIA seeks
to strengthen leadership of semiconductor
manufacturing, design, and research by working
with policymakers and key industry stakeholders
to encourage policies that fuel innovation, propelbusiness, and drive international competition.

Contents
01	Executive Summary

21	The Opportunity to Change theTrajectory in the Next Decade03	Introduction
25
05	Current US Position in
Semiconductor Manufacturing

11	Why It Matters

14	Understanding US Competitiveness vs. Global Alternative
Locations

Turning the Tide for US
Semiconductor Manufacturing

Executive SummaryThe semiconductor industry is critical to economic
competitiveness and national security in an era ofdigital transformation, artificial intelligence, and 5G
communications. The US semiconductor industry has long
been the global semiconductor leader, consistently accounting for 45% to 50% of global revenues. But the US
share of semiconductor manufacturing capacity, which was
37% back in 1990, has dropped to 12%. Moreover, only 6%of the new global capacity in development will be locatedin the US. In contrast, it is projected that during the next
decade China will add about 40% of the new capacity andbecome the largest semiconductor manufacturing locationin the world.
This trend could have significant repercussions. With areduced, shrinking manufacturing footprint, the US semiconductor industry would be challenged to stay at theforefront of further advances in manufacturing-processing
technology, architectures, and materials critical for developing the next generations of semiconductors that will
make artificial intelligence or quantum computing possible. Furthermore, because 75% of the global capacity isalready concentrated in East Asia, maintaining domestic
manufacturing capabilities is essential to ensure the US
semiconductor industry has a highly resilient, geographically diversified supply chain. This is particularly critical for
semiconductors used in US advanced defense systems.
The US ranks high in factors that are key when selecting
where to locate front-end fabrication facilities (fabs), suchas synergy with existing footprints and ecosystems, access1

to skilled talent, and protection of intellectual property. But
the ten-year total cost of ownership of a new fab located in
the US is approximately 30% higher than in Taiwan, South
Korea, or Singapore, and 37% to 50% higher than in China—an enormous gap considering that the ten-year cost of astate-of-the-art fab, including both initial investment andannual operating costs, ranges between $10 billion and$40 billion, depending on the type of product. As much as
40% to 70% of that cost differential is directly attributable
to government incentives.
Global manufacturing capacity is forecasted to increase by
more than 50% from 2020 to 2030, presenting a market
opportunity for the US to attract a higher share of the new
future fabs. According to our analysis, a $20 billion to $50
billion federal-government program of additional grants
and tax incentives for new state-of-the-art fabs built in thenext decade would be effective in reversing the last 30
years’ declining trend in US semiconductor
manufacturing.
Depending on the size of the program, the US could potentially double or triple its participation in the new additional
semiconductor manufacturing capacity that still needs tobe developed globally to meet the expected growth inmarket demand, achieving a 14% to 24% share, as
opposed to just the status quo’s 6%. (See the Exhibit“Potential Impact of New Government Incentives on US
Semiconduc-tor Manufacturing Position.”)

GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND US COMPETITIVENESS IN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING

Exhibit - Potential Impact of New Government Incentives on US
Semiconductor Manufacturing Position
2020–2030 FORECAST
Scenarios of new
government incentives

2010–2020
ACTUALS

Status quo

10%

6%

14%

24%

Excluding China

12%

12%

24%

41%

US global ranking by share of new capacity (out of 7 regions)

#5

#5

#3

#2

Excluding China

#4

#4

#2

#1

9

9

14

19

Trend vs. 2010–2020:

Share of new addressable capacity captured by the US

No. of new fabs built in the US

$20B program$50B program

Sources: VLSI Research; Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International (SEMI), second-quarter 2020 update; BCG analysis.
1

Assumed to apply to new incremental capacity built in the US in the next ten years.

Addressable capacity refers to the new capacity that the industry needs to add to serve the expected growth in demand, and that is not yet in development (remains available).
2

3
Normalized to an average fab size of about 75,000 wafers per month (wpm) for comparison purposes, in line with the average fab size used in the
2020–2030 forecasts. The actual number of fabs built in the US in 2010–2020 was 19 (excluding experimental and very small units), with an average
size of about 40,000 wpm.

Such government investment would mark an inflection
point in establishing the US as a highly attractive location
for semiconductor manufacturing. For example, we estimate that a $50 billion incentive program would enable
the construction of 19 advanced fabs in the US over the
next ten years, doubling the number expected if no action
is taken and increasing the capacity located in the US by
57%. These new fabs would be commercially viable andhave sufficient capacity to cover the demand from the US
defense and aerospace industry. In addition, they could
create about 70,000 direct jobs, significantly expanding the
US talent pool of highly skilled semiconductor manufacturing technicians; foster the development of local high-techclusters; and contribute to improving the US trade balancein goods.

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Together with continued leadership in R&D, strengthening
its capabilities in manufacturing would position the US
semiconductor industry to lead the way in the new innovation frontiers of materials, architectures, and fabrication
processes that will power the critical advancements incomputing and electronics for the next decades.

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Introduction

3

S

emiconductors are critical for economic competitiveness and national security. Innovation in semiconductors is foundational in developing advances to drive
the global economy into the era of digital transformation,
artificial intelligence (AI), and 5G communications. Revolutionary applications—such as augmented- or virtual-reality
experiences, the Internet of Things, Industry 4.0 systems,
and self-driving vehicles—are on their way to becomingcommercial realities.

GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND US COMPETITIVENESS IN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING

Modern defense capabilities also rely on sophisticatedelectronics systems powered by advanced semiconductor
components. The defense modernization priorities laid out
in the 2018 US National Defense Strategy include microelectronics, 5G, and quantum science as strategic areas
requiring US investment. Other priority areas such as
cybersecurity, AI, autonomous systems, and advanced
imaging equipment also rely heavily on advanced semiconductors. As digitally connected electronic systems become
increasingly crucial for managing advanced weapons systems and critical infrastructure, the availability of trusted
semiconductor suppliers that can deliver economically
viable, reliable, and secure components will become evenmore pressing for national security.
The semiconductor industry’s strategic importance fortechnology leadership and national security is causing
many countries to look at their positions across the semiconductor value chain. The US has been the long-standing
global leader in semiconductors, with a 45% to 50% shareof worldwide revenues in the last 30 years. However, significant focus is now being placed on the eroding US share insemiconductor manufacturing, which currently stands at
12% of the global installed capacity.1
The ongoing geopolitical frictions between the US andChina, as well as the disruptions caused by the COVID-19
pandemic, have also raised questions about the potential
vulnerabilities in the global supply chain of US semiconductor companies, particularly because a large portion of
the manufacturing activity is concentrated in East Asia. In
recent years, a number of programs related to the US
Department of Defense, such as the Trusted and Assured
Microelectronics initiative, have been launched in an attempt to secure the manufacturing layer of the value chain
used for domestic supply. The May 2020 announcement by
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC),
the largest dedicated semiconductor foundry company inthe world, of plans to build an advanced logic fab in Arizona has been portrayed as an initial step toward expanding
state-of-the-art semiconductor manufacturing capacity in
the US.

The significant increase in global manufacturing capacity
required from 2020 to 2030 to serve the expected growth insemiconductor demand provides a market opportunity for
the US to attract more of the new fabs. In this report we
study the case for expanding the semiconductor manufacturing footprint in the US. We look first at the current US
position and trends to determine how the share of global
manufacturing capacity located in the US could evolve if
there were no changes to the status quo, and the potential
implications for the US semiconductor industry.
To understand the root causes behind the steady decline in
US global manufacturing share over the years, we haveanalyzed the differences in the total cost of building andoperating three types of fabs in the US and in other alternative locations. In particular, we have researched the levelof government incentives typically offered in each country.
Our analysis shows that as much as 40% to 70% of thehigher cost for US-based fabs is directly attributable tomuch lower incentives than those currently provided in
China, Taiwan, Singapore, and other countries with a significant semiconductor manufacturing footprint.
We have developed an analytical model to evaluate possible changes to the current trajectory of the US share of
global manufacturing capacity. Although this report does
not offer policy recommendations, we lay out what additional government incentive programs would be needed if
the US were to set a goal of capturing a significant share of
the new future capacity and reverse the last 30 years’steady decline in domestic manufacturing. Looking ahead,
we see this becomes particularly critical because closer
R&D collaboration between design and manufacturing isneeded to develop innovations in architecture and materials that could sustain the continuous leaps in performanceand cost in future semiconductor generations on which thetechnology sector and advanced defense systems rely.

1. This includes all fabs located in US territory, both those owned by firms headquartered in the US and those owned by foreign firms.

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Current US
T
Position in
Semiconductor
Manufacturing

he US invented the integrated circuit and has long
been the global leader in semiconductors. US companies consistently account for 45% to 50% of total
worldwide sales. A strong position across the value chain
has contributed to this standing. US firms command a
combined market share above 50% in electronic design
automation tools (EDA), intellectual property cores (coreIP), integrated circuit design, and manufacturing equipment. In contrast, the US share of semiconductor manufacturing capacity, which was 37% in 1990, now stands atjust 12%. (See Exhibit 1.) The US share of manufacturing
capacity remains strong in discrete, analog, and optoelectronics products (30%). In fact, the US is still the global
manufacturing leader in specific segments such as compound semiconductors and radio frequency and bulk
acoustic wave (BAW) filters, although that status too is now
being challenged by new investments in Asia. However, theUS share is much lower in memory (4%) and logic (12%)—the fastest-growing segments forecasted to drive 90% of
the growth in capacity in the next decade.

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GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND US COMPETITIVENESS IN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING

Exhibit 1 - US Share of Manufacturing Is Low Relative to Rest of Semiconductor Value Chain and Other Strategic Industries
US share across the semiconductor value chain,2018 (%)

Comparison of US share of manufacturing value added,
across industries, 2019 (%)

85

EDA

49

AerospaceCore IP

52

Medicalequipment

25

Manuf.
equipment

50

Pharmaceuticals

23

Materials

12

Manufacturing1

12

OSAT

19

Petrochemicals
DAO
30
Logic:
12
Memory: 4

12

Semiconductors<58

ICT hardware

Develop &commerc.2

Consumerelectronics

48

3

US share of global
consumption: 34%

Sources: For semiconductor value chain: BCG analysis based on market data from Gartner, Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), VLSI Research, SEMI, and company financials. For US share of manufacturing value added: BCG analysis of macroeconomic data from Oxford Economics.
Note: DAO = Discrete, analog, and optoelectronics; EDA = electronic design automation tools; ICT = information and communications technology;
OSAT = outsourced semiconductor assembly and test.
1

Share of global installed capacity located in the US, regardless of company HQ location.

2 Share of total semiconductor sales (fabless plus integrated device manufacturers).

The decline in the US share of semiconductor manufacturing is consistent with the general trend observed in US
manufacturing across industries. The overall US share of
global manufacturing value added has decreased from
25% to 30% in the 1990s to 17% in 2018.2 But the current
12% share in semiconductor manufacturing is well below
what the US has in other strategic industries, such as
aerospace (49% of global manufacturing performed in theUS), medical equipment and pharmaceuticals (about 25%),and petrochemicals (around 20%). Among the industries
relying on advanced manufacturing, only in the morelabor-intensive sectors—consumer electronics (3%), computers and networking hardware (8%)—is the US sharelower than in semiconductor manufacturing.

Unlike several other industries, the US semiconductor
industry has not undergone a significant wave of restructuring involving shutdowns and offshoring of US-based
manufacturing facilities. On the contrary, during the last 30
years the manufacturing capacity in the US has grown at a
7% cumulative annual rate. Global capacity, however, has
increased at 11% annually in the same period. The rise in
the US’s installed capacity has been outpaced by that ofseveral Asian countries: Taiwan, Korea, and China havebeen investing heavily to become manufacturing powerhouses. (See Exhibit 2.)

2. Based on data from United Nations National Accounts, cited by Levinson, “U.S. Manufacturing in International Perspective,” Congressional
Research Service, February 2018.

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Exhibit 2 - Growth in US Installed Capacity Has Been Outpaced by AsianCountries
Global manufacturing capacity by location (%)
100

80

19

3

8

7

22

11

15

13
60

44

22
15

17

40

0

15

13

37
1990

21

18

24
20

22

22%

19
1995

2000

9

13
2005

2010

12
2015

2020E

Global capacity 10Y CAGR (%)

+20.2

+9.6

+4.9

US capacity 10Y CAGR (%)

+12.8

+5.0

+4.0

2025F
Status quo
forecast

6

Others24

China (mainland)

21

Taiwan19

South Korea

13

Japan

8
10

EuropeUS

2030F

1990–2020

+4.6

+11.4

+3.0

+7.2

Sources: VLSI Research projection; SEMI second-quarter 2020 update; BCG analysis.
Note: All values shown in 8” equivalents; excludes capacity below 5 kwpm or less than 8”.
1.

Includes Israel, Singapore, and the rest of the world.

Government policies have been a major factor in this strong
growth in Asia. These countries have placed a strategic focus
on semiconductors and supported the development of theirdomestic manufacturing industry with favorable grants, tax
credits, and other government incentives that make theeconomics in their territories more attractive.
In parallel, the semiconductor industry has seen the rise of
the “fabless” model. Many US firms adopted this businessmodel that allowed them to focus on semiconductor design and commercialization while relying on foreign-contract manufacturing partners (otherwise known as dedicated or pure-play “foundries”). These partners have access tolower costs and more attractive government incentives inother countries. They also have the ability to lower the riskon their massive capital investments across a broad pool7of global customers. Dedicated foundries account for 38%
of global manufacturing capacity, of which only 7% is located in the US. In contrast, the US share of the capacity
owned by the world's integrated device manufacturers(IDMs)—which design and manufacture their products intheir own fabs, and therefore can realize synergies by
locating both activi-ties in the same place—is significantly
higher, 14%.
The US share of global manufacturing capacity is expected
to decline even further. Current data regarding planned
fab construction indicates that only 6% of the new capacity
already in development and expected to start operationsin the next five years will be located in the US. This issignifi-cantly below the current US share of global installedca-pacity (12%) as well as the portion of new global
capacity that the US added from 2010 to 2020 (10%).

GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND US COMPETITIVENESS IN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURINGWe estimate that, without action, the US share in manufacturing will decrease to 10% by 2030. In contrast, Chinaplans to add about 40% of the global new capacity, and it
could emerge as the global leader in installed semiconductor manufacturing capacity, reaching 24% of the world’s
total capacity in 2030— roughly equivalent to the share of
the global demand for semiconductors coming from
Chinese device makers. (See the sidebar “China’s Efforts
in Pursuit of Semiconductor Manufacturing SelfSufficiency.”) Although China may remain a generation or
two behind in manufacturing-process technology even in
2030, its ex-panded manufacturing base will likely
accelerate its learn-ing curve to close that gap.

Furthermore, there are very significant synergies in building new semiconductor manufacturing capacity within
existing clusters. In fact, semiconductor companies regard
this as one of the most important factors to consider whenselecting the location of a new fab.3 It creates a self-reinforcing dynamic that will lead to additional declines in the
US manufacturing share over time—and further expansionof China’s share plus that of other already well-establishedfab locations in Asia. Ultimately, without significant changes in the current conditions, it will become increasingly
difficult for the US to retain any robust domestic capabilities in semiconductor manufacturing.

3. Based on a BCG survey of Semiconductor Industry Association member companies with manufacturing activity, June 2020.

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8China’s Efforts in Pursuit of Semiconductor Manufacturing Self-Sufficiency
China’s Ambition
Semiconductor manufacturing has long been a priority, but
it gained further urgency in 2014–2015 with the Made in
China 2025 plan and the goal of increasing self-sufficiency
in semiconductors.

Government Policies
A broad set of policy levers exists both centrally and locally:
1. Investment incentives (land, grants, tax credits…)• In China, incentives can make up 30%-40% of a new
fab’s total cost of ownership, well above that in othercountries.

9• They are available for both domestic and multinationalfirms, but the best terms often require some technology
transfer.
2. Additional support not typically found in other countries• Equipment is leased at preferential rates.
• Firms have access to credit and loans at below-market
rates.
• The state directly invests equity in domestic companies(which historically have delivered below-market returns).
The OECD estimates that the total amount of government
support to the top four Chinese semiconductor manufacturing companies in 2014–2018 exceeded 20%--30% of
their revenues. (See the exhibit “Rapid Growth in China’s
Share of the Global Semiconductor Manufacturing
Capacity.”)

GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND US COMPETITIVENESS IN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURINGRapid Growth in China’s Share of the Global Semiconductor
Manufacturing Capacity• 75% of capacity currently located in China is owned bymultinationals …
• … but domestic ﬁrms are expected to install 60%+ of the new
future capacity

24%• Typically ~4 years behind in leading node transitions, e.g., juststarted production at 14 nm in Q4'19

15%

30–42%

11%

Actual share of the newcapacity already indevelopment

21%

18%
2%

In line with size of China's
semiconductor demand(= self-suﬃciency)1%

1990–2000

2000–20102010–2020

China's share of global installed capacity at the end of the period

2020–2030F

China's share of new capacity additions during the period

Sources: China market data from SEMI, IC Insights, and VLSI Research; OECD; BCG analysis.

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10Why It MattersThe sustained decline in the US share of the global
manufacturing capacity could have significant repercussions for the US semiconductor industry.

Sustaining Leadership in Semiconductor Innovation for the Long Run
Manufacturing accounts for 45% of the value added andabout 20% to 25% of the total R&D investment of the
global semiconductor industry. Manufacturing is at thecenter of the industry’s relentless pace of advancement.
(See Exhibit 3.) Over the last five decades, the continuous
advancement in semiconductor manufacturing throughprocess-node scaling (commonly referred to as Moore’sLaw) has delivered staggering improvements in semiconductor performance and cost: the number of transistors
per wafer has increased by a factor of almost 10 million,
yielding a 100,000-fold gain in processor speed and a cost
reduction of more than 45% per year for comparable performance. The blazing speed of this technological improvement has enabled the transition from mainframes in the
1980s to smartphones in the 2010s, a driving force of
productivity and economic growth.

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GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND US COMPETITIVENESS IN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING

Exhibit 3 - Advances in Semiconductor Manufacturing Have
Driven Dramatic Improvements in Chip Performance and Cost
Evolution in manufacturing-process node

No. of transistors per microprocessor, performance and cost

Log (nm)Log (index)

10,00010,00018 years

CAGR

Clock speed (Hz) +28%

100
+41%

800
1,000

No. oftransistors

15 years

90

100

0.001
15 years
0.00001

7

10$ Cost pertransistor/Hz
–46%

1
1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

Sources: Intel; Singularity.com; Wikipedia; BCG analysis.

Established research has documented the negative impactof geographic disaggregation of manufacturing from R&D
in industries where product design and manufacturing
processes are strongly interlinked.4 In semiconductors, thesuccess of the fabless business model requires collaboration between the design company and its foundry partners,
but geographic proximity has not been a requirement.
However, the semiconductor industry is pursuing new
breakthroughs in chip architectures and materials to sustain the pace of improvement in performance and the costrequired to make new critical technologies, such as AI or
quantum computing, possible. Progress in these new frontiers is dependent on increasing R&D collaboration between design and manufacturing.5 Given the US semiconductor industry’s leading position in the basic sciences,integrated circuit design, and production equipment,
strengthening its capabilities in manufacturing could
position it to lead the way in these areas of innovation thatwill create the new technology paradigms for the future.
The ability for the US to remain at the forefront of suchinnovation provides a significant strategic advantage indefining the timing, standards, and business models forsemiconductor manufacturing, thereby driving the pace ofinnovation across the value chain, from manufacturing
equipment and tools to design.

Securing Supply-Chain Resiliency
Maintaining robust domestic manufacturing capabilities isalso essential to ensure that the US semiconductor industry has a highly resilient supply chain. Approximately 75%of the world’s capacity to manufacture semiconductors isconcentrated in East Asia, and that number is expected tocontinue rising, fueled by strong cluster effects. Chinaalone is projected to host roughly 25% of the total global
manufacturing capacity by 2030. Taiwan currently accounts
for 47% of the global capacity in the leading and advanced
nodes (10 nanometers or below) used for advanced logic
devices such as high-performance processors that powersmartphones or data centers. In memory, which accounts
for about 30% of the total semiconductor demand, South
Korea has more than 40% of the global capacity. As the
COVID-19 crisis has shown, high concentration in one
country or region makes a global supply chain vulnerable
to disruptions such as natural disasters, pandemics, or
geopolitical conflicts. Given the strategic nature of thesemiconductor industry for the US economy and national
security, bolstering supply-chain resiliency through geographic diversification is imperative.

4. See Fuchs and Kirchain, “Design for Location? The Impact of Manufacturing Offshore on Technology Competitiveness in the Optoelectronics
Industry,” Management Science, December 2010, and Branstetter et al, “Does Offshoring Manufacturing Harm Innovation in the Home Country?
Evidence from Taiwan and China,” working paper, October 2017.
5. For a recent discussion of these new technology frontiers for the semiconductor industry, see Shalf, “The Future of Computing Beyond Moore’sLaw,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, January 2020.

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Additional Benefits for the US Economy
Having a stronger semiconductor manufacturing footprintin the US could also bring additional benefits to the US
economy:• Development of local high-tech clusters that createhigh-quality jobs and economic prosperity. A new
fab of standard scale requires 3,000 to 6,000 employees
to operate it, depending on the specific product andtechnology. This direct job creation typically generates amultiplier effect for the local economy, and over time it
can also help attract other companies in the value chainthat look to benefit from cluster effects such as tight-er
collaboration within the semiconductor ecosystem,
access to the local talent pool, established supporting
infrastructure, and so forth. The US already has a vibrantset of semiconductor manufacturing clusters, such as
those around the cities of Dallas and Austin (both inTexas), Portland (Oregon), and Phoenix (Arizona).

Realizing cluster effects along the value chain and reinforcing the resiliency of its global supply chain are of great
importance for the sustained competitiveness of the US
semiconductor industry. This is not to say that the US
should aggressively re-shore semiconductor manufacturing
capacity in pursuit of a broad “self-sufficiency” objective.
The semiconductor industry is inherently global, because
countries and regions have distinct comparative advantages for different activities across the value chain. This characteristic gives US and foreign firms access to the best
capabilities at the lowest economic cost so they can fuelthe “virtuous cycle” of innovation behind the industry’s
technology breakthroughs.6 Furthermore, just as a highconcentration of manufacturing in East Asia creates supply-chain vulnerabilities, so would locating within US borders all the capacity needed to serve the US market.

• Improvement of US trade balance in goods. The US
has a very significant trade surplus in semiconductors,
over $8 billion in 2019. Having more fabs located in the
US could expand this surplus by increasing exports ofsemiconductor products designed and manufactured in
the US—either to end customers or to the overseas
facilities of outsourced semiconductor assembly and test
(OSAT) vendors to finalize the production process withpackaging and testing.

6. See “The Virtuous Circle Enabling US Semiconductor Leadership” in the BCG report How Restrictions to Trade with China Could End US Leadership in
Semiconductors, 2020.

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GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND US COMPETITIVENESS IN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING

Understanding US
Competitiveness vs.
Global Alternative
Locations

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he decline of the US share of global semiconductor
manufacturing capacity is not a matter of lacking
technical capabilities. In fact, the US has a 28% shareof the global capacity in leading and advanced nodes (10nanometers or below), significantly above its overall 12%
share across all manufacturing-process nodes. US companies are global leaders in R&D for manufacturing-process
technology across all segments (logic, memory, and analog), along with fab software, equipment, and process-control tools. Eight of the top 20 global companies involved insemiconductor manufacturing (including both IDMs andfoundries), which together account for more than 80% of
the current global capacity, already have manufacturing
operations in the US. Semiconductor manufacturers employ approximately 180,000 workers in the US and operatefabs in 18 US states.

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Then why do companies choose to build fabs outside the
US? We have leveraged our experience in the semiconductor industry, discussions with industry leaders, and a surveyof US semiconductor companies involved in manufacturing to identify the key criteria companies apply to decide
where to build new capacity, as well as the relative positionof the US versus other alternative locations. (See Exhibit 4.)

The US ranks very favorably in three of the five most important factors: synergies with an existing footprint, accessto talent, and protection for intellectual property andassets. However, the US is perceived to be significantly
behind alternative locations in the two other key factors
identified—labor costs and government incentives.

Exhibit 4 - Though Rated High in Three Fab Location Criteria,
US not Competitive in Fab Economics
FACTORS CRITICAL FOR SELECTING FAB LOCATION
Importance of the factor

Synergies withecosystem / footprint

Very important but
US not competitive

Higherimportance

Very important andUS is competitive

Access to talent

Labor costs

Security of IP / assets

Government incentives
Less important

Capital expenditure

Lower
importanceEase of doing businessSupporting infrastructure
Geopolitical considerations
US worse than other countries

US competitivenessvs. country median

US better than other countries

Source: BCG survey of SIA members, question C2: What are your most important decision criteria for choosing a fab location?
Note: Exhibit does not show other factors that were not selected as important by survey respondents.

COMPARISON OF INDIVIDUAL RATINGS IN TOP FIVE CRITERIA FOR FAB LOCATION SELECTION
Key decision criteria
US strength

Synergies with footprint / ecosystem
Access to talent
Labor costs
Increasing
importance

Government incentives

US deﬁcit

Security of IP / assets
Increasing attractiveness
1

2

3

4

5
Average ratingSouth Korea

China (mainland)

TaiwanSingapore

US

Source: SIA member survey data, question G1: Please rate the following countries for each of your key decision factors for locating a fab (N = 6).
1

Scale of 1–5: 5 = Highly attractive, 1 = Not at all attractive.

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GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND US COMPETITIVENESS IN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING

Indeed, the US is not currently a cost-competitive location
for semiconductor manufacturing. Semiconductor fabs
require enormous investments. In fact, with ahigher-than-20% ratio of capital expenditure over revenues
for the overall industry in 2019, the semiconductor industry
is at par with power and utilities as the most capital-intensive sector in the entire economy.7

To quantify the cost differential between the US and otherregions, we have benchmarked the total cost of ownership(TCO)8 over a ten-year period for three representative types
of fabs illustrative of the new capacity that will be built infrom 2020 to 2030.9 (See Exhibit 5.)

Exhibit 5 - Three Representative Types of Fabs to Benchmark Total Cost of
Ownership Across Locations
ADVANCED LOGICADVANCED MEMORYADVANCED ANALOG

Type of semiconductor products

Processors for mobile
phones, AI systems, andsupercomputers

Advanced flash storage
for mobile phones, PCs,and data centers

Power electronics forelectric vehicles, aircraft,
and renewable energy

Manufacturing technology• 12-inch wafer size
• 5 nm node• 3D NAND, 128 layers• 12-inch wafer size
• 20 nm node

• 12-inch wafer size
• 65 nm node

Capacity (wafers per month)

35,000100,000

40,000No. of employees~3,000~6,000~3,000Capital investment ($ billion)

~20

~20

~5

Sources: SIA; BCG analysis.

7. Semiconductor capital intensity was calculated as aggregated capital expenditure, reported in 2019 by 68 of the largest semiconductor companies
across design, IDMs, foundries, and OSAT over 2019’s total global semiconductor market size, based on Gartner data. Data from other industries
has been taken from the Damodaran Online database (New York University’s Stern School of Business), as of January 2020.
8. TCO is calculated as capital expenditures plus cash operational expenses over a ten-year period, minus incentives.
9. These three specific types of advanced fabs selected for the analysis are representative examples, but they do not account for all the newcapacity to be built in the next decade. Many other semiconductor product lines, such as DRAM memory, insulated-gate bipolar transistors, image
sensors or radio frequency filters, are forecasted to experience significant demand growth between 2020 and 2030, and will also require additional
manufacturing capacity.
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As Exhibit 6 shows, a state-of-the-art semiconductor fab ofstandard capacity requires roughly between $5 billion (foran advanced analog fab) and $20 billion (for advanced logic
and memory fabs) of capital expenditure (including land,building, and equipment). This is significantly higher than,for example, the estimated cost of a next-generation aircraft carrier ($13 billion) or a new nuclear power plant ($4billion to $8 billion). In addition to the up-front capital
expenditure, we calculate that the ongoing cash operating
expenses (labor, utilities, and so on) amount to approximately $0.6 billion to $2.0 billion per year. Therefore, thetotal gross TCO of a new fab—without considering government incentives—over a ten-year period can reach a staggering $11 billion to $15 billion (for advanced analog) and$30 billion to $40 billion (for advanced logic or memory).

Given the size of these numbers, incentives provided bygovernments are fundamental to supporting the investments required and have become a regular part of thebusiness case for new fab investments. Government incentives typically reduce up-front capital expenditure on land,
construction, and equipment, but they can also extend torecurrent operating expenses such as labor costs. In total,
we estimate that government incentives can offset between 15% and 40% of the gross TCO (before incentives) of
a new fab, depending on the country.

Exhibit 6 - Government Incentives Have Material Impact on Fab Economics
Estimated 10-year TCO1 of a new state-of-the-art fab ($B, average across regions)
ADVANCED LOGIC% Incentives overCapex + Opex

ADVANCED MEMORYADVANCED ANALOG

14–33%

18

16–38%

26–32
10

18–25
20

20

6–13

12–25%

8

5–11(Observed range
across countries
evaluated)

Capex

Opex

Incentives

5
TCO

Capex

Opex

Incentives

TCO

Capex

10–12
1–3

Opex

Incentives

TCO

Source: BCG analysis.
TCO includes capital expenditure (upfront land, construction, and equipment) plus ten years of operating expenses (labor, utilities, materials, taxes).
The average is of estimated values across analyzed countries (US, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, Singapore, and Germany).

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GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND US COMPETITIVENESS IN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING

For each type of fab considered, we have analyzed the
up-front capital expenditure, annual operating costs, andgovernment incentives in different countries. According toour analysis, across all three types of fabs the TCO for a
US-based fab is approximately 25% to 30% higher than theequivalent fab located in Taiwan or Singapore. (See Exhibit
7.) China, which provides very high government incentives
on top of its structurally lower wages, appears to be evenmore cost competitive. In the US, the TCO is roughly 50%
higher than in China, even not counting additional advantages in financing costs provided by China through accessto credit and equity below the cost of capital, which a
recent study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) found to be very
substantial.10

Exhibit 7 - TCO of US-Based Fabs Is 25%–50% Higher than in Other
Locations
GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES DIRECTLY ACCOUNT FOR 40%–70% OF US TCO GAP
Estimated 10-year TCO1 of reference fabs by location (US indexed to 100)
ADVANCED LOGICADVANCED MEMORY

+29%

+27%

101

China

54%

(tech sharing)

45%

68

China

63%

GermanyChina(tech sharing)

China

45%

(standard)

73

66

Singapore

70%

73(standard)

79

S. Korea

China

67%

Japan

China

71%

100

+20%

US

99

63

65%

(standard)

+47%

81

Taiwan72(tech sharing)78

S. KoreaUS

78% of TCO
gap dueto gov.
incentives

100

+23%

US

100

ADVANCED ANALOG

35%

42%

Source: BCG analysis.
1

TCO includes capital expenditure (upfront land, construction, and equipment) plus ten years of operating expenses (labor, utilities, materials, taxes).

A wider range of incentives, including equipment leaseback with advantageous terms, is available to multinational firms that choose to enter into
technology-sharing arrangements in China.
2

10. See “Measuring Distortions in International Markets: The Semiconductor Value Chain,” Organization for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD), 2019.

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Several factors explain this significant gap in TCO:

semiconductor manufacturing champions and so serve
to support the domestic semiconductor industry. But inmany cases they are also available to multinational companies. The US can be competitive on taxation in somecases because of an effective tax rate that is significantly
lower than the nominal corporate tax rate, as well as
substantial reductions in state and local taxes in somelocations. However, these state and local government
incentives fall significantly short of the grants and direct
cash incentives provided by other national governments.

• Government incentives, a major factor. US incentives are on the lower end of the range, significantly
below those available in Asian countries with an existing large semiconductor manufacturing footprint. (SeeExhibit 8.) Depending on the type of fab and the country
in question, these incentives make up 40% to 70% of
the cost advantage other countries have over the US. In
some cases, the incentives are prioritized for national

Exhibit 8 - Comparison of Government Incentives Across Locations
US
(%)

Japan
(%)

S. Korea(%)

Taiwan(%)

Singapore Asia avg.
(%)(%)

China
(%)

Germany(%)

Israel
(%)

Land

50

75

100

50

100

85

100

100

75

Construction and facilities

10

10

45

45

25

33

65

35

45

Equipment

6

10

20

25

30

20

35

5

30

5

5

5

5

15

7

33

7

5

Corporate tax

–

–

60

–

35

30

75

–

74

State tax

100

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

Property tax

100

100

100

–

–

60

–

–

–

Overall

10–15

~15

25–30

25–30

25–30

~25

30–40

10–15

~30

Capex reductions

Opex reductions
Labor and beneﬁts
Tax reductions

Source: BCG analysis.
Note: Incentives are on the first ten years of operation. All countries also include a 100% reduction on equipment-import costs and a 5% R&D writeoff and deferral; not exhaustive.
1

Based on a best-case scenario with current incentives and recent agreements.

2 Excluding China.
3 Mainland China.
4 The effective tax rate is considered separately from generally available incentives and is based on current statutes.

19

GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND US COMPETITIVENESS IN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING• Natural disadvantages in factor costs. Approximately
15% to 40% of the difference in TCO between the US
and alternative locations is due to structural disadvantages in the cost of two factors: labor and utilities.
Median wages in manufacturing are higher in the US
than in other countries, and the US labor costs for fab
construction and for operation are 40% above those in
Singapore and Taiwan, and up to twice as high as in China. Differences in utility costs between the US and othercountries are less significant but can still be nearly 25%
higher in the US than in China.
• Capital expenditures. These account for 15% to 20%of the US disadvantage in TCO. About half of the capital
expenditure in a new fab goes to manufacturing equipment provided by a small set of highly specialized global
suppliers, and therefore is expected to be similar acrossregions. Construction cost, which accounts for 20% to
40% of the capital expenditures, varies more significantly.

In addition, some countries further promote their domestic
semiconductor-industry ecosystems by building the supporting infrastructure around fab locations at no cost to
the semiconductor producer. China bestows particularlycomprehensive benefits in this regard, typically including
housing, telecommunications, and the infrastructure for
utilities and logistics.11 Similarly, other Asian countries—
such as Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea—also provide
infrastructure support, often by way of special economic
zones and science parks. In Taiwan, for instance, in addition to providing access to land, electricity, and water,science parks also allot space for other supply-chain companies to integrate into a larger manufacturing ecosystem.
Likewise, South Korea’s government cooperates beyond
utilities and infrastructure to identify and provide convenient locations, simplified or expedited procedures, andeased regulations.

11. See “China’s Innovation Prowess Lies Not in One Valley but in Many Hubs,” South China Morning Post, August 12, 2017, and “Measuring
Distortions in International Markets: The Semiconductor Value Chain,” OECD, 2019.

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The Opportunity E
to Change theTrajectory in the
Next Decade

xpanding the domestic manufacturing footprint isextremely important for the US semiconductor industry and, given the strategic nature of semiconductors
as enablers of technology advancements, is essential topromote overall US economic competitiveness and national security.
Global demand for semiconductors is forecasted to grow ata cumulative average annual rate of 5% over the next
decade, driven by large-scale adoption of new technologies,
including AI, Internet of Things, edge computing, 5G, andelectric and increasingly autonomous vehicles. Manufacturing capacity is expected to increase correspondingly by
56% from the current installed base, or approximately an
addition of 10 million wpm by 2030. As of June 2020, about
50% of that new capacity to be added worldwide from 2020
to 2030 was not yet in development or planned. (See Exhibit 9.) This “white space,” or addressable portion of theincremental capacity needs, presents an opportunity for
the US to attract a higher share of the new future builds,
above the 6% that it has achieved in the new capacity
already in development or planning stages.

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GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND US COMPETITIVENESS IN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING

Exhibit 9 - Strong Expected Increase in Global Capacity Presents Growth
Opportunity for US
Breakdown of projected incremental 2020–2030 global capacity by development status (M wpm)
Addressable
white space

29.7

5.4
1.2

Not
addressable

3.7
0.5

5.4
3.4
19.0

1.4
0.6

7.2

Europe Others
US
Japan

8.1
Korea

6
8
15

6 4
Share bycountry(%)

42 China

Taiwan2020

In development% New
capacity still
addressable

11.7

Memory

+63

26

13.2

Logic

+63

71

4.8

DAO

+31

47

+57

50

(mainland)

19

3.7

% Capacity
increase
2020–2030

Additional needs

2030

Sources: BCG analysis based on market forecasts from SEMI, VLSI, and Gartner; input from SIA members; BCG project experience.
“In development” includes any status between “groundbreaking” and “production” plus “planned or announced” (verbal or public confirmation of
intentions to build).

1

2
Estimated additional incremental capacity needed to meet projected 2030 demand, but without concrete announcement from any company or
country.
3

Discrete, analog, and optoelectronics.

Realizing this market opportunity requires making the USa more attractive location for semiconductor manufacturing by bringing the TCO of a fab in the US closer to that ofalternative locations. Because the US presents clear
strengths in other criteria that are important for fab location—such as synergy with the existing footprint and therest of the ecosystem, access to a skilled talent pool, andprotection of intellectual property—full cost parity may not
be required to entice semiconductor companies to build alarger portion of their new capacity in the US. In addition,
the evolving geopolitical context also makes broader geographic diversification of the manufacturing footprint
more appealing to both US and foreign semiconductor
companies.
Making the economics of new US-based fabs more compelling involves closing the gap in government incentives,
which are directly responsible for 40% to 70% of the higher

BOSTON CONSULTING GROUPX

TCO in the US, according to our analysis. New government
incentives may also help offset all or part of the observed
structural US disadvantage in construction and operationalcosts.
To evaluate potential changes to the current trajectory of
the US share of global manufacturing capacity, we havedeveloped an analytical model that breaks down the forecasted total new global capacity by product type and country. We have then used our estimates of the economics ofdifferent fabs across countries to create a “merit order”
based on TCO. Given the US strength in other key selection
criteria for fab location, we assume that the TCO of a
US-based fab would need to come down from its current
level of 25% to 30% above Taiwan, Singapore, or South
Korea to just 5% to 10% above—rather than full cost parity—to make the US an attractive location for a new fab.

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22

For that to happen, a new US government incentive program will have to be put in place. We define this new incentive program as a fund (for example, a grant, a tax
credit program, or both) with a fixed total amount, available for incremental new capacity built in the US from2021 to 2030.12 We assume that existing US state and local
incentives remain in place and apply to any incremental
new capacity built in the US (that is, they are set on a “perfab” basis and not capped at a given total amount).
How much of the still-addressable new global capacity the
US may be able to attract depends on the size of the new
US incentive program considered. We have modeled boththe status quo and two possible scenarios for additional
US incentives. Exhibit 10 shows the expected outcomes foreach scenario.
• Status quo. We assume that with no changes to theexisting incentives, the observed 6% share of the US in
the projects already in development is a good indicatorof what portion of the additional addressable new capacity the US may be able to attract. This would be below
the 10% share of the new global capacity that the US
installed in the past decade. As a result, the US share of
global manufacturing would further decline from 12% in2020 to 10% in 2030.

• Scenario 1—New $20 billion government incentive program. Based on our modeling, we expect the
US to attract a total of 14 new fabs, five more than in
the status quo, capturing 14% of the new addressable
capacity. The US would become the third-largest location
for building new capacity, surpassed only by mainland
China and Taiwan. As a result, the US would be able tosustain its current 12% share of the global installed capacity in 2030, averting the loss of two percentage points
expected with the status quo.
• Scenario 2—New $50 billion government incentive
program. According to our model, such a program could
make the US the top destination for new semiconductor capacity aside from China. We estimate that the US
would be able to attract a total of 19 fabs, ten more thanin the status quo. This represents a 24% share of theaddressable new capacity entering the market in thenext decade—a major lift from the 10% of 2010 to 2020
and the 6% share with the status quo. It would resultin an increase in the US share of the global installedcapacity from 12% in 2020 to 13% to 14% in 2030—a
major improvement over the 10% share predicted in thestatus quo.

Exhibit 10 - Potential Impact of New Incentive Programon US Manufacturing Position
US share of new additional global
semiconductor manufacturing capacity (%)

24

Share of whitespace captured
by US (%)

US ranking
by whitespace share

No. of new
fabs to buildin the US2

US shareof 2030
capacity (%)$50B program1

24%

2

19

~13–14%$20B program1

14%

3

14

~12%

Status quo

6%

5

9

~10%

10
With additional
government
incentives

10
6

8
6

2010–2020

In development(not addressable)

White space(still addressable)

2020–2030 forecast

Trend vs. 2010–2020:

Sources: VLSI Research; SEMI second-quarter 2020 update; BCG analysis.
1

Assumed to apply to new incremental capacity built in the US in the next ten years.

Normalized to an average fab size of about 75,000 wpm, in line with the average fab size used in the 2020–2030 forecasts, for comparison purposes.
According to SEMI data, the actual number of fabs built in the US in 2010–2020 was 19 (excluding experimental and very small units), with an average size of around 40,000 wpm.
2

12. In our model, we assume that the new additional incentives would apply only to the incremental capacity on top of what would be built in thestatus quo scenario (that is, “capacity that otherwise would not have been built in the US”). In practice, this means that only certain types of fabs
using advanced technology may qualify for the new incentives.

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GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND US COMPETITIVENESS IN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING

The new government incentives would turn the US into an
attractive location for new fabs, with competitive economics. These potential incentives would mark a real inflection
point and would reverse the sustained erosion in US sharethat has been a historical trend over the last 30 years. The
US would be reestablished as a competitive location for
semiconductor manufacturing, well positioned to continue
increasing its participation in the global expansion of
capacity over the decades beyond 2030.
Moreover, the expected expansion in US manufacturing
capacity that a new government incentive program would
enable could bring significant benefits for the competitiveness of US technology, supply-chain resiliency, and national security. The number of fabs built in the US over the
next decade could jump from just nine in the status quo to
19 with a $50 billion incentive program. These new USbased fabs would bring state-of-the-art manufacturing
technology and sufficient capacity to cover semiconductor
demand from the US defense and aerospace industries. In
addition, we estimate that these 19 new fabs could create
about 70,000 direct jobs, significantly increasing the US
talent pool of skilled semiconductor manufacturing technicians and strengthening US capabilities in advanced manufacturing-process technology.

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Finally, these government incentives, and the constructionof this new capacity in the US, would not introduce distortions into the global semiconductor market. Such incentives are nondiscriminatory and are available for new
incremental projects put forward by companies. A programof this nature does not aim to pick winners or direct market outcomes through government ownership of capacity
or manufacturing companies. Furthermore, the commercial viability of the potential new fabs is also supported by
the fact that the US also already has in place all the key
enablers: semiconductor manufacturing know-how, talent,
supporting infrastructure, a thriving semiconductor ecosystem across the value chain, and global market access. This
minimizes the risk of creating global overcapacity, something clearly not in the interest of the US semiconductor
industry.

THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION

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Turning theT
Tide for US
Semiconductor
Manufacturing

he strategic nature of the semiconductor industry fortechnology leadership and national security raises
questions about the steady decline in the share of
the global semiconductor manufacturing capacity locatedin the US over the last 30 years. The ongoing geopolitical
frictions between the US and China are intensifying thisconcern. Already, 75% of the world’s semiconductor manufacturing capacity is concentrated in East Asia, and China
is investing aggressively to emerge as the largest global
manufacturing powerhouse in 2030.

25

GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND US COMPETITIVENESS IN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING

Given the strong increase expected in global capacity tomeet the growth in semiconductor demand from 2020 to2030, the next ten years present a market opportunity for
the US to stop the decline and even possibly expand its
manufacturing share. The US already has comparative
strengths in some key criteria used to select fab locations,such as synergies with its existing footprint and ecosystem,skilled talent, and protection of intellectual property, but it
is not competitive in cost. Although the purpose of thisreport is not to offer policy recommendations, our analysis
suggests that expanding the limited state-level government
incentives currently in place with a new targeted $20 billion to $50 billion federal program over ten years could
bring US incentives in line with those offered by Taiwan,
South Korea, or Singapore and reestablish the US as
an attractive location for advanced semiconductor
manufacturing.
The window to reverse the historical trend and grow the US
semiconductor manufacturing footprint is rapidly closing,though. First, 50% of the new capacity required to serve theglobal demand in the next ten years is already in development and therefore likely no longer addressable. In addition, the current manufacturing powerhouses—particularly
Taiwan and South Korea, but increasingly also China andrising lower-scale locations such as Singapore and Israel—benefit from important cluster effects that naturally favor
construction of new capacity in the existing manufacturing
sites, creating a virtuous circle that makes it increasingly
harder for countries like the US with smaller, shrinking
footprints to even maintain their global share.

It is important to note that although leveling the playing
field in government incentives for US-based fabs is necessary in order to expand the US share in manufacturing,
there are also other important structural enablers for a
thriving semiconductor manufacturing sector where government support may be beneficial. Fundamental research inmaterials and manufacturing sciences is essential for thefoundations of innovation, and government support hashistorically proved effective in this area. Similarly, anothersignificant way government can encourage domestic manufacturing may be by supporting training to ensure the US
can have a robust talent pool of production engineers,
operators capable of working with highly sophisticatedcomputer-controlled equipment, and skilled technicians.
Finally, although the US position in manufacturing is attracting strong interest from policymakers, the strength of
the US semiconductor industry also requires a continued
commitment to maintaining US R&D leadership andensuring access to global markets.13 A strong US semiconductor industry, well integrated into the global technology
supply chain, is vital to develop the advances that will
make the new era of digital transformation and AI possible.
As with the mobile revolution in the past decade, the massive benefits of such breakthroughs will reach consumers
and enterprises in all countries, not just in the US.

13. See the Semiconductor Industry Association report Sparking Innovation, June 2020.

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About the Authors

Antonio Varas is a senior partner and managing director
in the Silicon Valley office of Boston Consulting Group andis a core member of its Technology, Media & Telecommunications practice. You may contact him by email at varas.
antonio@bcg.com.

Jimmy Goodrich is Vice President, Global Policy at the
Semiconductor Industry Association. You may contact him
by email at jgoodrich@semiconductors.org.

Raj Varadarajan is a senior partner and managing director in the firm’s Dallas office and leads its Global Advantage practice in North America. You may contact him byemail at varadarajan.raj@bcg.com.

Falan Yinug is Director, Industry Statistics and Economic
Policy at the Semiconductor Industry Association. You
may contact him by email at fyinug@semiconductors.org.

Acknowledgments

For Further Contact

This report would not have been possible without thecontributions of our BCG colleagues Gaurav Tembey,
Charles Yang-Flint, Ray Loa, Andy Zhou, Jesus Guardado,
Sohini Kar, and Yeonsoo Lee.

27If you would like to discuss this report, please contact theauthors.

GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND US COMPETITIVENESS IN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING

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