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WAR SECRETS IN
THE ETHER
Parts I and II- By
Wilhelm F. Flicke

Translated by
Ray W. Pettengill:NOl'ICE: Tlli& ~981i1HI:8Rt 99RtaiRs iRfePf.RatieR ai:eetiRg the B&tiaB&l aeiesse af the

National Security Agency
Washington, 25 D. C.

1953)eclassified and approved for release bv NSA on 01-29-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352

ftl!18'fi7l G'fEiB§8~~~1ty IA£QI~t19A

WAR SF.CRETS IN THE ETHER

Parts I and II

By

Wilhelm F. Flieke

Translated by
Ray W- Pettengillr\

M'O':t'I:e!s!his doetrment e~e:iMI il'lferftle'l;iea e:ffeei;i:rtg '4;h:e fl&:'M::e!le:lge£eA&e e£ tl:l.e UR:iteEi s:to"es u:bthiR -4;he meen:il'lg ef 'bhe El.e:pienage

nawe, 'fi'ble 18, g.s.e., Seetiene 793, 79h and 'fitle 5o, g.s.e.,

Seeti:efte h:6, h6a and h6b. Ite tzanaudssiou w Lhe zaoelation of its
eeR:keA:t;s iA a:Flf" manBeF '4;e aR llftati:'4;lieriJJeEi pereeft is pi eh±hited b:7 law.

National Security Agency
Washington 25, D.C.

1953

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·e

To the Inquisitive Reader:
The manuscript entitled "Kriegsgeh~imnisse 1m Aether" come· to the attention or American authorities in Germany by accide.nt.

All rights to the book wore pUl~chased tor a curious reason andiicril, sane five y-ears 'later, the National Security Agency finds
II

itaelt custodian of this property.

This translation is iss,J.ed,b;r request, in the belief that the document will interest otheragencies.

/

No attempt has been made to veri!)" the author's statemtmts.

• Mf. Flicke says that his manuscript covering "-.he history ot theftercept

service down to World War•II was lost and had to be/ reconstructe~ largel,y from memory'.
I

This reconstruction, in two

parts, constitutes the present volume.

Part III .. bound eepar&L8-q, covers World War II and was written partl,y, from memo:ry,
part]J" from notes made under trying conditions.

Readers who

chance to have more adequate inf'onnation on this or that point
will, therefore, make due all.owa.nce for 8XlY' dubious statm~ent.

This brings up the question or the author's qualifications
and b~ckground.

Mr. Flicke began his inteW.gence career in the"Arendt Serv-ice" during World War I; from 1919 to 19.39 he worked
in what was eventua.l.q known as "OKW/Chi", where he developed theevaluation section; in 19.39 - apparentl,y after getting into hot
water by" his opposition to the Nazi Part;r - he was sent to set up'\

the first intercept station of' OKW/Chi at Tennenlohe, fran there :iii

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he wnt to Li,bourne,, ~ latEtr to taut as te~cal direr;tor ot.·'~~',~he station!. in Se~rnb_er 1944 he -,as 1ira.llef'er:red to "Funk:a.l»rehr"(radio counterhlw~no~) in Ziru~,. where he bocwn.e aoquaint.od.
•

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~t-h th9 ~;t'k againsj- f9:reign ~en~s and ~isa.na.

Fran the toro.
acing it is evident that. Mr. Fllclte oaw Dl4lJf of the truits of

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Ger.man 9r.ypt~sis,.rand that he htmselt participated aotivel7
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.,t

+n most other aspects o( the 'WQ;rk qc, deEJc:dP&a•
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On~ other tacto:r. mq be 9onstq,red.
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FU,cko aqa that in 1934

General Fe~ebel 1 ~en he~ o~ the intero~Ft service, commissioned
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llim to wri~~ a hist~~ ot thar "~rtf.!:ce; this ~oou.nta for hia copious
notes.

Po~~ibq one -~ot~ve .fqr <:<Xy-P,l!ttina. tqe book was his lO'Jlf~

who we.e one ot the victims or~evotion to the memoq of Fe:p.giebel,
~:

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the pur~e tollow:l.ng 2Q Juq .~?44•.

"War ~~reteP11f• ~~:r" at~e~Pft& ~~ove.r la.rp ••gments ot

Jimta ancl ~~c~. On ~~ eapi~e ~ide ·tt ~ttords an interesting'I Qhe.ck ~ the "Handb~ ot Sp~es" bf A. A. Foot.eJ as a revelation of
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German .opposition. to N!-tio~ Soc~ it l.aoke ~ ot the dramatier
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qualities ot
Gisevius' - "Tot.be
Bitter End"; nevert.hel.ese,
tho reader
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~grant t.hat
it is &;,sniti<!fllt.
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The 'l'rana;J.ator •

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TABLE OF COWfENTS

Pa.go

To 'l:.bo Inqul"itivo Readeriii

Tablo of Contentsv

Preface [proparod for a prospective publisher]vii

Form10rd of the Author

xi

Part. I•The B~ginnings of the Intercept Service].

Tannenberg

7

The German and Austrian Intercept Sorvice in the
East at the Beginning of World Wa~ I

24

After the Battle of Tanncnberg

27

The Intercept Service in the West and th~"Miracle of the Harne"

41

Tho Deciphering of Cryptograms

48

The Direction Finding Service

53

Pol1Ps and Penkalas

56

The West

61

The Second Half of the War in the East80

The Zimln.erma.nn Telegra."Us

85

The Intercept Service at Sea

ll.5

The Italo-Austrian War

12.3

A Second "Zimmennann"l37

The "Judgement of God" and its Explanation

141

The Intercept Service in the Balkans

151

Brest-Litovsk

15.3

Compiegne

159
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Pa.1t. II
Page.

The German Interc€pt Service
after the End of World War
I
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The Winiker Ca.se169.

The Work of the German In~rcept Service '1920 - l92S

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175

The Observation,, of Maneuvers

191

The Intercept Service of other European Countries

201'

Some Remarks on the Technique of the Intercept Service

207

The Chances for
the Intercept Service,,211

The 11Forschungsamt"•'

219

The Formis Ca~e233

The Thllo Case

2.39

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The Development of the German Intercept Service&I}.d of its Con:tro1 Station after January 19.33

247

The "Intercept Comppniesn

253

The Literat~e on the Intercept Service

257

The Armament of Europe after 19.33 as revealed b,r theIntercept Service

261

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Hitler and CzechoslQvakia

269

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RESTRICTEDPREFACE
The nuthor of the book is a ecientiot who over a r~riod or
twcnty-n:f.nc years had opport-unity to t;ain deep :fnaiijht into .:lspecial branch of the secret service of all Europcoo countrico;
this branch is known as 11 intercept service" to only a srniJ.ll rartof the public.
Since the invention of technical means of communic~tions -such as the telephone, telegraph, and teleprinter -- tho worL~
has been spanned by a mighty network -- partly visible, partly
invisible -- over which messages of all types aro spoe~~d almost
without interruption.

Since tho invention of radiotel4~gra.pey the

ether has been filled with radiograms whose content extends toall realms or public and private life and gives a reflection ofhuman existence on our planet.
On the other hand, all these radiograms act like a magic
motor in shaping the life of mankind.

Whoever follows thisexchange of information in the ether (and in part over wii-e lines)
knows the course of events in the past, present, and near future
as no one else can and has a chance to look into things in a 11ra.yof which the outsider can have no conception.
The present book draws on this source.

It can offer only atiny fraction of what that source has yielded in the cour~e or thelast thirty years.

But even this small section will show mankind ·in what fateful fashion the interception of radiotelegraphY and ofother technical means of communication has influenced the'coUl·se of
events.

vii

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Th~ contents of this book fSll into three periods of time:1.

The period from the inception of the intercept service
to the end of World War I;

2.

The period between the two World Wars;

3. The period from the summer of 1939 to the end or World
1 War

II.

Part I is pure~ historicai in character.

It is consideredhere. in ' order to give a basis for an understanding of the intercept
service, and to assure to the treatment of the material a certain
degree of completeness.
Part II throws light on the development of the intercept
service, 1ri European countries, especia.J.:cy' in Germ.a.ny, and is
calcula~ed

to give .many a hint regarding the events leading u~

to World War II.
Part III, the largest section, shows the decisive role of radio
espionage in all its branches during World War n.

It reduces theevents at the fronts to a position of second.ary importance whencompared with the invisible, qynamic force of radio espionage inthis mightiest of all wars.

Here for the first time the most secretmatters of the warring states are brought into the light of publicity.
This is done in order that the world lilB1' know what went on behind the•scenes, and so dispel many an illusion which might tend to give thiswar a semblance of romanticism.
In this third section the present work aims to show to the world,•
and in particular to the German people, the incredibl;r frivol""usJ casual.

unscrupulous manner in which Hitler not merely began the \iar but -what i~ worse -- continued it contrary to all laws of reason and humanit~;

after every chance that it might be decided in his favor had long sinceviii

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Vo.niohcr.l.

This boolt is intended to help eive the peoples the truth;
it is intended as a warnine, and so to serve the cause or peace.

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RESTRICTEDFOREWORD

The Second \vorld War has conte to an end; it ended a~ it necessarily must.

An infinite amount can be written about this war, theevents leading up to it, and about the domination o£ the National
Socialist system in Germany and ita effects abroad.

Many things

will be eA~lained eventually; many will forever remain veiled in
darkness.

This book is intended as a contribution to historicalresearch.

An attempt will also be made to air many a secret, tofurnish an explanation for some things 11hich seem inexplicable.
This work is intended to illuminate eventa of the past thirty
years from a point of view from which this has never yet been done
and could not be done:

namely, :from the point of view of the so-called intercept service, i.e., the interception o£ radiotelegraphY
and all other technical means of communication and the deciphermentof cryptograms.

The book originated in the main during World War II,

but its beginnings go back much further.

Origina.lly it was intended

to be a trHistory of the Intercept Service and or Illegal Decipherment."

The first part, embracing th~ period from 190S to 1939, wascompleted in 1940.

It was lost in consequence of the war.

Hence,

only a reconstruction in rough for.m from memory is possible.
This work will destroy many an illusion.

----

The period of thegreat generals, in whose hands armies became chess pieces, is past.
In place ;,f armies moved about with happy daring has come the w8.r

machine which operates with precision.

The man at the helm canIIIguide it 1 to be sure, well or badly -- according to his abili.ty .~xi

RESTRICTEDBut the operation is so complicated that he is not in a position tokeep his eye constantly on all details of the mechanism.

He does

not notice thing§ that have eone wrong until they begin to affectthe operation as a whole and then it is often too late.

In decisive

questions he nru.st ro~ on his collaborators and subordinates, andthus he becomes depc;ndent on their skill, their mental ability; theirperspicacity, their ability to grasp intuitively the organic workingof this vast machinery.

If one little wheel in this mechanism fails,

then the result of his \rork becomes questionable.

On the othor hand,these failur~s cen give the helmsman of the opposing aid~ chances ofdecisive impor~ance and ca~ suddenly place him in-a po~~t;on where hemere~ needs to grasp tho opportunity.

\·Jhether Su.ccess or. failure

results, is quite independent of the personality of the eeneral andof his merit.

The general himself becomes a tiny whcol in the machine.

This work is intended to serve tho truth and hence to serve peace.
The more l·re strip war of its rom.antic charm and reduce it to a basisof fact, the 1r.ore strikingly does its horror appear to us.

Alongwith the heroism of the ~oldier we soe the frightful, dostruc~ive
force of the uar machine of J11nn.r:>r'1 states.

And that forces us toturn at·lay, ''"'1 Lo recognize that uar is not the father ot all things,
but that it merely destroys uhat is positive and is able to cre;:a.te
only what is nc~ativc.

And if, il1 the course o.f ccnturico, thepositive has grOl·:n up again and again out o.f the nflg.1.tiYe, thr;)
credit is not due to l·rn.r but to the cra~tive pOl-:ers inna.t.e in D"..ankind.
Advancing thesa pow~rs means at the sene t:iJr,c decl~.ring \'tar on '.·~.::.r •.And that happcno 1.-h.:n \:c .st.ri-p from it its veil of rc .v•.ntici::.m aYJ.d thexii

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charm o:r adventure.
I deliver this book to the public and the critic with theassurqnce that al1 things mentioned herein are based on facts.
Poss:i.bly here and there a name or a rank or a date mq be wrong.
This is not a vital matter; on:cy the ·happenings as such are significant.

Most of my nctes had to be made from memor.r after I had

seen and studied the authentic documents.

Moreover. all this wasdone at the constant risk of mw life.
This work means neither to praise nor to accuse. neither toglorify nor to judge.

It is intended on~ to aid in finding thetruth.
THE AUTHOR

Swnmer 1945

xiii

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xiv

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REF ID:A59421

RESTRICTEDWAR SECRETS· D THE :&TBIR

WILHELM r. FLICD

1945

RESTRICTEDXviRESTRICTED•PART ONERESTRICTEDTJJE DEGINNlNGS OF TI·IT!: INTF..UCEPT SEllVICE

Tho endeavor to learn what is in the opponent• s mind and to
draw advantage from it has always been very important in tha
histo1·y of mankind in peacetime and particularly in wartime.
During thousands of years only the methods have changed,.

In thodays when there was no technical medium for conveying thought overgreat distances, the only existing possibility was either to overhear the spoken word or to intercept - or at least have a look at messages transmitted in writing.

To guard against this latteJ:-

possibility, secret writing was invented.

The histor.y of the last

three tho~sand years is full of exampleeof great successes instatesmanship or in rnilit~r,y enterprises which were due solely tothe fact that the statesman or general concerned was able to organize
cleverly and to maintain for a considerable period of time a methodof spying on the transmitted thoughts of his opponents.

Cleopatra,

Alexander of Macedonia, Caesar, Napoleon, Metternich, and ~others owed their successes to the extensive use of this type or
spying.
However, the practical possibilities were narrowly limited,
and great individual cleverness was necessary in this work in order
to arrive at the goal.
In the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Morse telegraph carne into use, soon follm1ed by the telephone, new technical?ossibilities of attack resulted by switching-in and listeningj
this quickly produced a new situation.

The invention and use or

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radiotelegrapny, with the pessibility of picking up anywhere atany time the radiations of a transmitter working at any point what-

soever, increased the possibility of interception in a wq hitherto
undreamed of.

The hour when radiotelegraphy was born was also tilehour of birth of illegal listening-in, i.e., of the so-calledintercept service.
There were two countries in Europe in wldch the espionage service had been especially cultivated for centuries:
Austria-Hungary.

France andConsequently, these were the two countries which

first recognized the im~ortance of technical means of intercepting
communications and took corresponding action.
Prior to World War I Austria had several occasions to testout this new means of gaining information.
During the crises which arose in 1)08 between Austria and Italy
in connection with the annexation b,r Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina all Italian radio traffic on the continent and at sea wasintercepted by the Austrians.

At that time Austria began regularcryptanalytic work, and in this way was able to get valuable insight into Italf 1 s attitude; this proved of great value for Austrian foreign policy.
In 19111 when war broke out between Italy and Turkey over
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the Austrian intercept service had an
opportunity for the first time to prove its worth in the military
as wall as in the political field.

Since the Italians h~d set up

several relay stations for traffic between Roma and Tripoli, ·nhere
the first Italicn landings were made, the Austrians h:-.0. z.>. fin'2
opportunit.y to intf::rcept all transmissions more th:m on co - nr1
2.

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therefore very completely.

The radiograms with military dispositions

from t.he homeland, and the reports from the theater of war were allintercepted and deciphered so that the course of the operations in
Libya could be followed day by day by the Austrian intercept service.
This was the first time in history that the course of militar.y
operations between two opponents could be followed move by move by
a neutral third party using technical means at a distance of hundreds of kilometers.
When the war in Tripoli took an unfavorable turn and Turkey•

lost ite last possession in Africa and therewith its dominantposition in the Mediterranean, an opportunity was offered thenations in the Balkans to shake off Turkish rule.
in breaking up Turkey in Europe.

This resulted

The Balkan League,. consisting of

Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro, which had been formed
meanwhile, declared war on Turkey in October,. 1912.

The Bulgar-

ians were victorious at Kirk-Kilisse and Lule BurgasJ

the Ser-bians at KumanovoJ

the Greeks occupied salonika.

on 3 DecembeF

a truce was made.
For the Danube Monarchy the course and outcome of themilitar.r actions and of the entire development in the Balkan~
were of interest.

Therefore, Austria followed the radio ~ratff~with close attention and again had opportunity to make succes~tu1 use of this new means of gaining information, this time,

to be sure, working to some extent with Italy.

Austria and

Italy put through the formation of an independent Albania.

]n'the preliminary Peace of London, 30 May 1913, turkey ceded tothe allies all territory west of the Enos - Midia Line.

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territories.

The Balkan teague broke up.

In blooqy battles the

Bulgarians lfere driven out of Macedonia by the Greeks and Serbs.
Romania and even TUrkey, which won back Adrianople under Enver
pascha, took the field against Bulgaria. A redistribution of territor,y took place in the Balkans 9

And once more Austria had thekeenest interest in following the course ot diplomatic and militar,y events in this area.

For the fourth time within five years

Austria had a chance to get practice in ,.nterception and in cryptanalysis.

At the peace conferences of Bucharest and Constantinople

the new map of the Balkans was drawn.
Prior to World War I France had less occasion to engage inradio interception, but it watched all wire lines leading into
foreign countries and particularly the exchange of foreign diplomatic telegrams passing over these lines.

In the French For-eign Ministry· there was a cryptanalytic section which worked withgood success on the solution of the secret writings used byforeign governments and their representatives.

For instance,even before the outbreak of World War I the French had sol~ed thecryptographic system in which messages were exchanged between theForeign Office in Berlin and the German Ambassador in Paris.
When the long telegram containing the declaration of war on France
was transmitted to the German Ambassador by the Foreign Officein Berlin, the French first deciphered the dispatch and, after
they had taken cognizance of the content, so garbled irrportantpassaees in the orieinal that the Gerrr~n Ambassador could at first

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1113.ke nothing out of the telegram he received.

Only after divers

inquiries was he able to get matters straight.

In this way tho

French gained valuable time.
In the Deuxi~me Bureau of the French General Staff therevas, even before World War I, a desk charged with following all
foreign radio traffic (especiallY German and Italian)t in order tohave an idea or the normal radio situation and or the changes occurring in case of militar,y complications.

The use ot radiotele-

grapqy in the armies of Europe had even then assumed considerable
proportions and would prcbab~ increase considerably in aQY comingwar.

But this raised the question of the extent to wrhich it would

be possible to gain insight into the situation on the ene~ side
by observing his radio traffic.

A prerequisite was to watch thistraffic in peacetime, to recognize the types of traffic, the use

ot ciphers, and aqy methods of camouflage, and by so doing tomaintain contact, so to speak.
These' chances and possibilities had been recognized both inFrance and in Austria before the beginning 'or World War I.
both countries had made preparations in time.

And

As in the French- Deuxi&me Bureau, there was in Vienna in the Evidenzbuero a desk
for watching foreign army radio traffic, while in the Foreign
Ministry in Vienna and in Paris, bureaus had alreaqy been set
up which w~re engaged in the decipherment of the cr,yptograms whichI

were customary in the diplomatic correspondence ot·other states.
In Ge:rmany to be sure, the General staff thought of suchpossibilities, but down to the outbreak ot World War I had under·•taken practically nothing.

Even in the Foreign Oflice nothing
5

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11\:lt 1 :CLJ
had been done in this direction which was worthy of mention.

In

England at the Foreign Office the deciphertnent of cryptograms had
been attempted some years before the beginning of World War I,
and good results had been achieved.

In Russia, on the other hand,no attention had been paid to this matter.
This then was the situation respecting, the intercept service
and c~tanal7sis at the beginning of WorldjWar I.

At that time

people did not suspect the proportions which interception would
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TANNENBERG

Heavy, gloo~, the towers or the Tannenberg Monument once
towered against the s~ of East Prussia.

Grand and powerful stoodbehind them in those d~s the spirit of General Hindenburg, asymbol, as it were, of a force which must necessarily wreck~-­thing that endeavored to attack it.

The Battle of Tannenberg had

become, since 1914, a symbol for the German people. MUch has
been writtena1d spoken about this battle, but orily little about thedecisive factor i~ this mighty action.
Even for one who knows&

Tannenberg - a symbol&

For it was at the same time a symbol or

the ease with which small causes can unloose great effects, of therapidity with which a great success can be achieved, if b,y accident the human inadequacy of wholly secondar,y and insignificant
persons on the. other side opens the way.

Tannenberg - a symbolof mighty superiority and at the same time a symbol of fatefulchance.
The Battle of Tannenberg was the first in the histor,y of maD
in which the interception of ene~ radio traffic pl~ed a decisiverole.

This is all the more remarkable since the intercept serviceof the Germans at that time was not yet syste~atically organized,
and the intercepted radiograms often represented the resul·ts ofchance occurrences.
After World War I a series of books was published which, among
other subjects, dealt also with the Battle of Tannenberg.
ones were:

The chief~

Hindenburg 1 s 11 Aus meinem Leben," Ludendorff•s "Erinner-·

ungen, 11 General Danilov• s 11 Russland im Weltkrieg, •• and the German

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Archives publication "Der Weltkrieg 1914-lBV

In the three last-

named publications the interception of radiograms of the Russian
Ar~ before

and during the battle

it discussed fully.

is discussed;

but nowhere is

In the German Archives publication the inter-

cepted Russian radiograms are touched upon briefly;

but there aremany sentences attempting to prove tha·l;, all the Russian radiograms

intercepted at that time had no influence whatsoever on the outcome of the battle.
What are the facts?
At 1400 hours on 23 August 1~14 the new head of the German
Eighth Army, General von Hindenburg, and his Chief of Staff, Major
General Ludendcrff, arrived in Marienburg and assumed command.
The Eighth Arnw, which was to defend East Prussia, was composedon that day of an Eastern Group (I Reserve Corps, XVII Army Corps,
and First Calvalry Division ) on the Nordenburg-Insterburg line,
and a Wester~ Group (mostly the XX Am~ Corps ) in the region of
Tannenber·g.

•.rhe I Army Corps was being transported by railroad

from the Eastern Group via Marienburg to the Western Group.
The Eastern Group was facing the Russian First Arii\Y {General
Rennenkampf) consisting of the XX, III, IV, and II Ar.my Corps
plus five and one-fourth cavalry divisions;

the Western Groupwas facing the Russian Second Arrrry ( General Samsonov ), consisting of VI, XII, XV, XXIII, and I Army Corrs, plus three cavalry
divisions.

The two Russian Armies formed an Army Group under

General Shilinskij.
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heavy radio stations at the A~ Headquarters, one heav.r andtwo light stations in the First Cavalry Division, making a
total of five mobile radio stations for the entire A~~·In

addition there was one radio station each in the garrisons bl
IIKonigsberg,
Graudenz, and Thorn.

Just what radio equipment the Russian Arm¥ Group had andhow it was allocated cannot be accurately statedJ

it seems,

however, that most of the staff headquarters down to the corps
staffs were outfitted with radio stations.

At the outbreakot the war there was one radio company each in I, II, IX, and
XV Army Corps in European Russia, as well as in the Caucasus
Corps.

As can be seen from the above, I and XV Corps belonged

to the Russian Second Army, and III Corps to the Russian First
Army.

Each of the companies which had been organized in theyears immediately the outbreak of the war had at its dispos-

al at least six radio stations.
General Shilinski 1 s objective was - according to directives of 13 August - to make a decisive attack in which theFirst ATM¥ was to surround the German left wing ( the Eastern Group ) and prevent its retreat to Kgigsberg, while theII
Second A~ was to advance into East Prussia south of Konigsw

berg in order to cut off the enemy•s retreat to the Vistulaand to attack him in the rear.

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The German Arnur Staff Headquarters obtained information on tl£1s
objective of the Russians through an order ,.,hich l•'l':l f'1und o:1 .~Russian officer who had fallen in the battles around Gawaiten ~, ~~August.

This order contained an extract from the above-mentioned

directive of General Shilinskij.
Almost simultaneously with the arrival of this order in theGerman Army Staff l~adquart~rs, a Russian radiogram was intercepted which mentioned this attack and contained an attack order for theRussian IV Army Corps (which was attached to the li'irst Army).,Thi~telegram was, therefore, a confirmation of the order found on

the \fallen Russian officer.
On the evening of 23 August General von Hindenburg' s oper-

ational plan was essentially complete.

The entire Eighth Army was

to be concentrated for the attack on the Russian Second Army.

The

XX A~ Corps was already organized, primarily only for defense
purposes.

The I Arnur Corps - being transported by railroad - wasto be stationed to the right of the XX Co1~s 1 to attack first theleft flank of the enemy, and then the rear.

The principal partof the XVII Corps and the I Reserve Corps (unl.il then in the Eastern Group) were to march in a southerly direction and attack theright flank of the Russian Second Army.

The two lastnamed corps

were at that time still at a distance of about three day• march.
Only the cavalry division and a small portion o£ the in£antry of
the XVII Corps were to remain behind to face the Russian Niemen
Army.

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RESTRICTEDREStp:!tf€~ 1
How far this plan was capable of execution depended, on the one
hand, on General Rennenkampfts tactics when he discovered the departure of the two German army corps and, on the other hand, on
the ability of the XX Corps to maintain its position until theconcentration of the Eighth Ar~.
On 23 August the battle began along the front of the German
XX Ar1111' Corps 1 where the Russians started to attack.

The GermansIat firs~ maintained their positions, but - to reserve their strength
until an actual crisis - retreated somewh&t on the 24th.

on thisday several radiograms were intercepted, which among other ti1ings 1

gave information on the line of march and the mission of theRussian XIII Ar~ Corps.

This Corps was to circle around theleft flank of the German XX Corps and appear in the rear of the
Corp's 37th Infantry Division.l
The Germans succeeded in avoiding this encirclement without
too great losses on their side.
On 25 August they continuedwith the concentration of the·1

The two radiograms which were intercepted on 24 August at
0500 and 0555 hours were as follows&
To the Commander of the XV Corps.
The Corps will deploy along the Komusin-Lykusen-Persing
line till 0900, at which time attack is desired. I
shall be in Jablonica. Kljujew (-XIII Corps).
To the Army Chief of Staff
The XIII Corps will go to the support of General Martos(XV Corps) and will deploy along the flank and rear of
the ene~ at 0900 ••11

RESTRICTEDEighth Ar~ troops.

on this day General von Hindenburg intended

to leave for the front early in the morning, meet the head of the
I Army Corps, General von Francois, in Montawa~ D~d acquaint him
with the existing situation.
Before his depa~ture from Marienburg a radiogram was handed
him which had been intercepted in the night of August 24-25.
This radiogram, which was not enciphered, but had been sent inplain text, contained (a thing·which until then had never happened)
a complete operational order of General Rennenkampf to the IV
Ar~

Corps.

From this intercepted Tadiogram General von Hindenburg

obtained information on the future aims of the Russian First
Army, which up till then had been competely unlmown to him.
Among other things, the radiogram stated that the First Army would
not reach the Gerdauen-Altenburg-Wehlau line until 26 August withthe southern flank (IV Corps) at Gerdauen.

Also the marchinggoal for the 25th was given, which was to be several miles eastof the above-mentioned line.l* Montawa not found., there is OI' was a Montowo in Western Poland.
1

The radiogram contained the following•
To General Aljev, IV Corps.
The army will continue the attack. on 25 August it willreach the line of Wirbeln-Saalau-Norkitt.en-PotaurenNordenburg; on 26 August the line of Darnerau-PetersdorfWehlau-Allenburg-Gerdauen. The river divides the XX anci
III Corps; the Schwirbeln-Kl. Potauren-Allenburg roadbelongs to the III Corps. Chan Hussein Nachitschet·mnski(2 Cav. Div.) is to proceed in direction of Allenbure
before the ar~ front and in the sector between Pregcl
and the r.arkehmen-Gerdauen-Bartenstein line; north of it
Rauch (2 Cav. Div. Guards). Crossinb of Preg~l is ~is~ionof XX Corps.
l ')

-·

RESTRICTED[Ed.]

Hindenburg now knew that for the present Rennenkampf was nomenace.

Therefore, in the course of the day he was able to decideto decrease still further the number of troops which were facing
the Russian First A~ and to withdraw the entire XVII Ar~ Corps
0

toward the south.
Hindenburg now went over to the I Army Corps.

On his way

down there, when he was passing Lgbau, another intercepted radio•
gram of no less importance was handed to him.

This time the organ-

ization and destination of the Russian Second A~ were completely
revealed.

This radiogram, also in plain text, was dated 0600

hours 25 August and contained an order of General Samsonov to
the Russian XIII Army Corps.
what garbled.

To be sure, this radiogram was some-

The intercepted contents were as follows:"After battling along the front of the XV Army Corps
the enenzy" corps retreated on 24 August in the directionof Osterode. According to information ••••• the land
defense brigade by Gilgenburg ••••• The First Army pursues
the enemr further, who retreats to KBnigsberg-Rastenburg.
On 25 August the Second Army proceeds to the AllensteinOsterode Line; the main strength of the Ar~ Corps occupies: XIII Corps the Gimmendorf~Kurken Line; XV Corps
Nadrau-Paulsgut; XXIII Corps Michalken-Gr. Gardiene,
Boundaries between the Army Corps on advance: between
XIII and XV the Maschaken-Schwedrich Line; between XV andXXIII, the Neidenburg-Wittigwalde Line. The I Corps toremain in District 5, to protect arnv's left flank ••••••The VI Army Corps advances to the region Bischofsburg•
Rothfliess, to protect the right flank. To protect station
Rastenburg the 4th Cav. Div,, subordinate to VI Army Corps,
will remain in Sensburg to observe region between the
Rastenburg-Bartenstein Line and Seeburg-Heilsberg Line.
The 6th and 15th Cav. Div••••• staff quarters 2 Army in
Ostrolenka."

12

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Thus when General von Hindenburg arrived at 1300 hours on 25
August at the General Command Staff ot the I Army Corps, he wascompletely informed respecting the mission ot the Russian Second
Ar~ torthat day.

It was decided to begin -~he German attack on

the following day.

On the same day- at 2030 hours the orders forIthe ~ to attack on 26 August were released in Riesenburg.
one must admit that it was a piece of unusually good fortune
for the Germans that both these radiograms were intercepted on
the morning of 2S August, that is, at a time when critical decisions had to be made.

It seems the more remarkable that these

two radio grams were the only ones of any considera~le length
and with contents of decisjve importance to be sent in plain
text by the Russ:Jans, and intercepted by the German radio stations',
during the entireof the war to the. period from the beginning.
middle of September, 1914.
On 26 and 27 August the I

and XX Army Corps prepared toattack the lett flank of the Russian Se~ond A~.

The Germ&n div-

isions which had advanced the farthest toward the right (the Sth
Landwehr Brigade and the 2nd Infantr,r Division) met with stiff
opposition, and for a while the situation was critical.

on the~orenoon of the 27th, Russian radiograms were intercepted which

disclosed that the Russians were expecting reenforcements orperhaps had already rf:Ceived them, among others, the Third Guard
Division from Warsaw (which was attached to the XXIII AriiiY Corps).
This info1~1ation contributed to the fact that General von Francois(I Arn~ C01•ps) no longer deemed it possible to proceed eastward'-,,....
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to Neidenbur~ in order to sever the ene~'s conncction3 in therear, but decided to turn ~he attack in a southerly and southeasterly direction.
The left wing or the XX Ar~ Corps, which on 26 August had
not been drawn into the battle to any great extent, was attacked

by the Russians early in the morning of the 27th.

Tha attaok

graduallY spread out more and more toward the north and finallY
reached the German Third Reserve Div. lion, which was on the letto£ the XX A~ Corps. A Russian radiogram which was intercQpted .
b.y the Germans now gave information on the attack mission ot the

opposing Russian XV A~ Corps and revealed its intention to encircle the German left wing.

Other radiograms disclosed that theRussian XIII Army Corps intended to support this attack toward
the right of the ~ Ar'I'IJY' Corps, and to proceed toward the rear ot:
the German Third Reserve Division.
While these encounters were progressing, the German XVI!
A~ Corps

and the German First Reserve Corps made forced marches

toward the battlefield.

on 26 August at Gross·BSssau they foughtwith the Russian VI Army Corps which then retreated southward.
SimultaneouslY, a Russian radiogram was intercepted from whioh
the German Eighth A~ Staff Headquarters assumed that the Russian
II A~ Corps, which was at Rennenkampf's left wing, had beenproceeding northward £rom Mauer lake and was now supposed to marchin a southerly direction, in order to help Samsonov.
That the Russian II Arlfsy COI'PS was proceeding northward fromMauer.Lake was already known from reports o£ the Lotzen
garrison•"but that it was supposed to advance in order to suppo1~ the Second

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Army was news.

The Germar. First C!lvalry Division, which wasstationed in the region of Schippenbeil, now received orders tohalt the advance. of the enem,y corps along the Raat.enrurg-Korsc.:h":'r:Line.
The German Artn7 order for 28 August was signed by Hindenhurg
on the evening of 27 August.

Later in the evening information wasreceived that Russian troops from the south had arrived in Allenstein.

There was thus the possibility that the Russian XIII Corps

was striving to reach the north in order to join the approaching
II Corps.

The Ar~ order which had just been signed was now im-

mediately replaced b.r a new one which, among other things, ordered
the XVII Corps and the I Reserve Corps to Allenstein.
On 26 August at 0700 hours Hindenburg and his staff arrived
in Fr3genau t~ direct the battle from there.
vailed at A~ Headquarters.

~reat tension pre-They were entirely in the dark as tothe ene~•s purpose at Allenstein.

This group still had complete~reedom or action.
At 0800 hours radiograms of the Russian XIII Corps disclosedthat it was marching from Allenstein southward to Hohenstein, e.r~that ita vanguard would arrive at 1200 hours in Grieslionen, fivekilometers north of Hohenstein.

Its purpose was to aj.d tho XVArmy Corps.
On the basis of this knowledge, an order uas irr.n:.odiatclysent by air}:lane to the :~orman I Reserve Coz,::s to proceed n.t ell'

speed, rccardlcss of evetything, by the s:Portest pos~iblo route,to the Stabigottcn-Griesl~enen Line (northe~!'lt o:f IIohcnr.tain}.

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Even while the battle against the Russian Second A~ wasstill at its height, the attention of the Germans was called tothe pending operations against the Nieman Ar~.

on the 28th aRussian radiogram announced that the II Corps (left flank Corpsof the First A~) was to begin the retreat toward the frontier
and to be transported by railroad.

This move, however, did nottake place.
Early in the morning of 29 August, an incomplete radiogram
was intercepted, which stated as followss'Because of heavy battles of Second Army theCommand orders supporting reinforcements •••and advance of cavalry ••• •"1

Ar~(General Rennenkampf had received orders on the morning of
28 August to proceed with his left flank to the support of theSecond Army.

This radiogram was apparently an order of Hennen-

kampf to one o£ his Arrey- Corps.
interrupted thead~nceagain).
/

A later radiogram, however,

The above-cited radiogram confirmed what they had been ex•
pecting in the German Eighth Army Headquarters.

During the nightof the 29th a number of radiograms were intercepted whiCh mentioned the encirclement of Kgniesberg from the south.

on the morningof the 30th one such radiogram gave information that the head of
the Russian II Army Corps on his countermarch (which thus had been

~or a second time) was to demoli~h completelY the railroads
and teligoaph wires west of the K~goberg-Rastenburg line, inorderedcluding Korschen and Rastenburg.

This last-mentioned radiogram

made it possible for the German Eighth Army Staf£ to devote

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. . . . . -.& --RES 'lfEii ,1~!121~

further attention to the remnants of Samsonov•s Army.
All these Russian radiograms were intercepted by the German
garrison radio stations Thorn and K~n1gsberg 1 but also in partby the two heavy stations o.r t.ha Eighth Army Sta.r.r, and were immediately translated and transmitted to the German Ar~ Command.
The German Command therefore knew not only the strength and organization of the enc~, but also his objectives.
It ~s very interesting to note how differently the importanceof these intercepted Russian radiograms was estimated in the postwar period.

Ludendor.f'f mentioned this fact very casuall,y in asubordinate sentence:"••••we had received an intercepted ene~telegram which gave us a clear picture of the enem_r• s moves for :·the following days."

Ludendor.r.r forgot that there was not onl.7.

..

"one" radiogram but that several dozen were intercepted during
the course of operations which revealed the situation of the ene~.
Hindenburg himself, in his book, "Aus m.einem Leben," whichappeared in September 19191 did not devote even one word to theradiograms;

on the contrar.y, he described the course of the Bat-

tle of Tannenberg in such fashion as to give the definite impression that he was in the dark as to the enemy• s objectives and.
organization.
The Russian General. Danilov spoke of an "unpardonable negligence" in the Russian radio service, and declared that theimperfect co~nunication service had been the chief reason for thecatastrophic outcome of the battle.
The German Archives publication declares:

11 •••

on the whole

the Ger:n~m Army Comm-:1nd vierTed th,.. intercepted radiocr;~r.1s aa an

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extremely welcome source of intelligence.

The Army staff becauseof them, was temporarily, and even immediately before the beginning of the Battle of Tannenberg, advised of the objectives ofthe enemy in a way rarely possible in wartime."

And in connection

therewith, the German Archives publication immediately strives
to save the face of the German Conmmnd by continutng:"BUt thecritical decisions and orders for the battle, according to theunanimous statements of all participants, were made independentl;rof the information which became known on the morning of 2S Allgust•

through the radiograms.

One cannot assume that without these radio-

grams the course of the battle would have been different."
To this one can only reply:

The general has not yet beenborn, who, after winning a battle, would admit that he had won
it thanks to a well-functioning intelligence service.

Since thevictory at Tannenberg had become a symbol for Germany, the "unanimous statements of all participants" could not of course 'be
aqy different.

Undoubtedly the dispositions for the battle weremade before the first radiograms were intercepted.

But during

the course of the battle the knowledge of the contents of theintercepted radiograms played a decisive role.

The developmentof the battle without these radiograms would ver,y definitely
have been entirely different.
Now we shall try to find out why the Russians sent their communications in plain text.

To use plain text for such important

communications as the two radiograms of 28 August was a mistakeof the gravest kind.

However, an exa1aination of the circumstances., ~1

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on the side of the Russians gives an explanation.

The Russiancommunication system operated ver,y imperfectly during the battle.
As a result, the army orders reaohed the staffs of corps at thef'ront too late.

Many times they did not receive their orders until

about 1000 hours of the same day on which the orders were effective; under such circumstances the troops could not enter into
action in the designated formation until almost noon.

Very sel-dom were there telephone connections, which was partly due to thetact that there were insufficient cables.

For this r~ason, where

there were radio stations, these were preferred for the transmission or communications, as was the case between the a~ leaders
and the army corps.
In itself this would not have been dangerous if the radio
traffic had been handled so as to prevent ene~ interception, but\

this was not done.

The radiogram of General Samsonov to the XIII Army Corps at
0600 hours, 25 August was of an urgent nature since it pertained

to the operations of the same d~.
sage.

It was sent as a priority mes-

There were no wire connections.

One can assume that time

did not permit the encipherment of this messacc; in the last analysis, however, the reason seems to be that in the XIII Corps noradiograms could b~ deciphered; they had no cipher key!

Hence anenciphered radiogram llas simply out of the question in trafficuith tho XIII Corps.
I;th:s nlmost unb3l~evable state of affairs was the reason lthy,uhan the above-mentioned corps headquarters attempted to l:iL.tcn
in on thn tr;1f'fic of a J;tC"lrhy corps •·rith the Ar:roy Ct::"!'

RESTRICTED•r•i :i.. l ordi>r

to obtain desired orientation, this trnffic could not be decipheredby them nnd as a result could not be read.

For example, on 26

August the XIII Ar~ Corps was ignorant of the position and missionof the VI Corps, although they had in their possession intercepted radiograms from the traffic of this particular corpsl
Since various Russian corps headquartera did not possess facilities for deciphering radio~ams, it is probable that this was also
the case in the Russian IV Army- Corps, to which

General Rennenkamp!

sent the above quoted fateful radiogram in plain text.
General Danilov, QUartermaster General at the Russian Headquarters, in his book 11 Russia in the World \'lar, 11 gives a different explanation for the use of plain,text in radiotelegraphy.
He writes:

11

The use of radio was sonJething entirely new and there-

fore unfamiliar to our staffs.

1

Moretver, our ene~ was guilty ofIthe same errors, and now and then we were successfUl in intercepting their plain-text radio messages and orders.

But this does

not absolve us from the charge of unpardonable negligence.••
Danilov considers the faulty functioning of the Russiancommuhications to be one of the major causes for the catastrophic outcome of the battle.

Although the Russians at times madeactive use of radio~ this means of cooonunication was, nevertheless,not utilized as it should have been.

On the Russian side there

was not the experienced leadership which is required for the maintenance of a dependable radio notwork.

vn1en General Samsonov

botook himself on the morning of the 28th to the XV A~ Corpsand sent the major portion of his staff with his radio station
across the Polish border to Ostrolenka, all radio traffic on the2

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part of his army ceased.

All connections, both with the Chief ot

the Army- Group and with the VI and I Army Corps were thus interrupted, wherewith the command of operations on the Russian side on
thisd~ practically ceased.

on 31 August the Battle of Tannen-

berg came to an end.
In Gennan military literature these circumstances have beencare~passed over or greatly reduced in importance.

But ~-

one who has ever experienced how thirsty a command in a criticalsituation is for reports regarding the enemy, whoever knows how
difficult and nervously exhausting it is to have to reach decisions
without a knowledge of the enemy's situation, such a person willentertain no doubt that the knowledge of the content of the Russian radiograms decisively influenced the course of the actionsin the Battle of Tannenberg.
The Germans had learned something from the happenings along
the ether waves at the Battle of Tannenberg which was supposed tobe put to practical use during the "Battle of the Masurian LakesV
Before the German attack on the Russian First Ar~ began, theGer·ma.ns wanted to tie up the important eneley" reserves stationed
farthest to th _,. north - (east of K8nigsberg) - so t. hat these could
not be moved to the south where the German attack was in progress.
Since no troop contingents were available to hold this large enemy
reserve, the German Eighth Ar~ Staff resorted to strategy.

In

the forenoon of 7 September, the rad1o station at K8nigsberg senta radiogram in plain text as followsc

RESTRICTED"To the Corps Chief,
Guard Corps,
Priority telegram.
Tomorrow the Guard Corps will join the •••immediately west of Labiau, parts of V
Army unloaded •••• (here follows a seriesof garbles).......... •Army Staff Headquarters."
The radiogram was intercept>ed by the Russians and the strategy succeeded.

This is the first known case of purposely mislead-ing radio traffic during World War I.

The contents and the precise

wording of the radiogram had been well thought out.

The Guard

Reserve Corps, which had shortly before arrived in the theater had
in reality a different mission, but still was the northernmost ar~corps within the German at,tack organization; l'.ence the mission designated in the radiogram could be possible.

The V Ar~ Corps,

which was stationed in France, was garrisoned in Posen in peacetime, hence its presence in East Prussia appeared possible.

The

Russian Armr Command had also believed for a long time that thisV Army Corps belonged

to the Eighth Army, although they did notknow where it was located.

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THE GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN INTERCEPT SERVICE IN THE EAST
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD WAR I

When the war broke out in August 1914, there was no fixedorganization on either the German or the Austrian aide for, in•tercepting the foreign a~ radio traffic which immediately developed. The field regulations for German telegraph troops did foresee the possibility of listening-in on foreign radio traffic during
those periods when their own radio traffic was dorment, in orderto get some insight into the situation on the ot~· ~ide.

Act-ually this work had never been practiced at all in peacetime maneuvers, and when the war broke out, nobody tho~~ Qf undertaking
the task.
At that time there were two rathe~large fortrese·~adto
stations in eastern Germany which had relatively little tratf1~of their own and consequentlY were in a position to listen to
the eneJI\Y in periods o:f light tratf'ic.

These were the fortressradio stations at Kgnigsberg in East Prussia, and at Thorn. Moreover, there was in Breslau the radio station of the German Eastern
Europe Inatitute, which was likewise employed £or military traffic
after the.war be~ but was used only for transmission.

Entire~on the1~:own initiative a few operators attempted soon·atterrtbe
outbreak o£ the war to listen to Russian army traffic as a ~­ing proposition, Qo to speak; it was not long before the t1rst
messages wer~ i~tercepted but no one knew quite what to dowith,·them because there was no regulation stating what ahould be done
21

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1..rith such radiogrHmo~

In those days radioteleerapl•y was a novel-

ty both in Gcrmnny and in Russia.

people wore astounded nb ·th.;,teclmical progress wluch m~do possible wireless transmission of information over rather great distances, but they did not yet under~
stand how to make sensible use of this technical advance in orderto gain information.

In the Russian army the idea had not evenbecome general that messages sent out by radio could be heard jus·t:.
as well by the ene1ny1 and on t'1.e German side the i1ea was utterly
foreign in lower and medium commands that one might be in a posit•
ion to shape or alter one's own plans on the basis of intercepted
traffic.

Milita!'Y thinking tended to considor one's own operatio11

on the basis of the orders issued to be a fixed factor which could
in no wise be influenced by any messages which might be intercepted.
The Russian operational orders intercepted in the last phasebe~orethe Battle of Tannenberg were forwarded to General vonHindenPurg by motorcyclists solely on the personal iniative of thechief of the German fortress radio station at Thorn.

The impres-.

si~n which this produced on the German High Command was, so to\

speak, the birth hour of the German.intercept service, since now
for the first time were the value and the possibilities of thisservice recognized.
The Austrians had already advanced somewhat further in this• no special
field by the time the war began. Here again there wasorganization for intercepting foreign radio traffic; here, too, they
employed existing fortress radio installations for intercepting
foreign traffic as a side issue.

In the main, the stations at

.. ,,

I' •

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Krakow and at Prze:m;rsl were the ones involved.

Howe1e1, • ~~. ~was already rather more system in the org.u. i 7-ation of th'! uorkand, above all, provision had already bc-,.., l''l.df" bef'..,r~ • ··-tor passing on and utilizing intercepted enemy messages
In this way the Austrians in the very first days oi' the war

had definitely geared this new branch of the service with theii·
secret Service.l Mor~over, the cipher section had taken up its
work as soon as the war began, so that within the first fortnight
it was able to read enciphered Russian radiograms.

In QermanT, on the other hand, the cryptanalytic ser\~Celimped so badly that it was almost half a year before the first
regular wcrk in this field began to take shape.

It hardly seems

credible that, in spi ta.....of the exaiUple of the Austrian intercept
organieation and in spite of the stimulus which must have resulted
from the intercepting of Russian radio traffic after the Battleof Tannenberg, a fixed German organization for the systematic
monitoring of foreign radio traffic did not come into existence
until nearly
one year after the beginning of the war.
a1

(G~heimdienst

Chancellery.)= Crypto6I'aphic Section of the Irnperl:ll,.

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WB~ 1.J.
.I.~.I.~ .1. ~ A..l

AFTER TI~ BATTLE OF TANNENDERG
Tho Russian radiograms intercepted before and durine theBattle of Tnnnonberg had suddenly pushed the value of the intercept
service into the foreground with the Gorman comnJ.'lnd.

Only not-r thepeople began to say that, apart from the radiograms of the armies
of Rennenkampf and Samsonov, ma~ Russian radiograms had been heard
which might
have been valuable in the execution of one•s own mea,
I
Isures, had they been exploited in time.

The fortress radio sta-tions were now instructed to do intercept duty in periods whun they
were free or had light traffic, and even the a~ stations weretold to start hunting for Russian mess~~s, insofar as their own
traffic a'~owed.

Naturally that was a rather pitiful measure -compared with the practical possibilities - £or it resembled asuggestion rather than an order, and gave the receiving opera·t'or nohints at all as to how he should do his job, since for this there
should have been a systematic search o£ all wave bands whichmight come into account.

The effect for the moment was merely toarouse interest in this work, while aqy practical res~lto depended
on the intelligence and skill of the momentar,y heads ot the stations.

The only thing that was covered by regulations was the for•warding of intercepted telegrams so that at least there was Dl)
longer any doubt on this point.

The radio intercept service was

attached at that time to Section IIIb of the General Staff and wascontrolled trom there, insofar as this word can be applied to conditions o! those days.

Only during the seqond hal.f of 19J5 were

special receiving stations for monitoring foreign military traffic

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set up with the arli\Y groups and only .frr..·m ti1~ · p.-,int. on w··s any
real, systematic coveraee of the enems possiblt..
Army ConDlland hnd attacked and solved tlJe q \',J

the Genr..:~.,

stJ.ou o.L mt 1 "~l -~land evaluating enemy traffic in the fall of 19lh, il it had in-troduced a special ore;anization for this purpose ln the enst \J~·the end of 1914, i.e., at a time when the cnell\V' was Ma.kihg one
mistake after the other in this field, it is highly probable thata number of decisive operations might have been added to thelist of German successes.
The Chief of the Ger~An General Staff in the years 1914-

16, General von Falkenhayn, stated later in his memoirs&

11

The

radiograms intercepted by us permitted us to follow the movementa of the enemy on the eastern front, day by d~ week by'
week, from the beginning of the war nearly to the close of 1915,
and we adapted our measures to this circumstance."

Conrad von Hoetzendorf, who describes the activity of theAustro-Hungarian Headquarters in World War I, remarks in Volume

IV of his memoirs that "from the time when the Supreme Army Command was set up in Ncu-Sandec (i.e., since the middle of September1914) it was able to get information in an ever more exact anddependable manner regarding all measures which the one~ orderedby radio."

At another point he says:"In this way a b?Lsis forthe performance of the COlJI.I!'-V.LCi functions was created uhich no previous war had ever known •••• 11
In Volume V of his memoirs, Conrad von Hoetzendorf cr..philsj zt;os
the fact that uhenever the wo1"Cis 11 accordinB to rclit:.'blc re:ports"~.·

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were usod in conncc t.ion wi t.h orders of the Supr(i!ne ColTIIII.r'l!ld of theAustro-IIuncarian troops, only such reports were Lo be understoodas had been obt.ained from intercepted radiograms; this was neveradmitted in order not to betray this highly esteemed source.
Colonel Nikolai, Chief of the German Information Service in theyears 1911+-1918, writes; 11 The intercepted Russian telegrams constituted a ver,y trustworthy source of information.

Of course, theorders were enciphered, but the cipher system was ver,y simple and was
rarely cha."lged; consequently 1 it \.ra.s easy to read the radiogr~s. 11
The common conduct of the war in the east by the Ger.man and theAustrian Armies was dominated at the outset by the point of view that
Russian attacks should be beaten off' by active defense until, after
the expected decision in the west, adequate forces could be broughtfrom the west to pass over to a decisive attack in the east.

The

Austrian Army \'las to make a thrust from eastern Galicia against theRussians still on the march, the Austrian First and Fourth Armies
began the advance on Lublin and Scholm; defeated the Russians near
Krasnik and Komarov; but, due to t.he failure of the Austrian Third

Arrow near Lemberg, had to withdraw in the face of superior Russian
strength during the first half of Sept~nber to the Carpathi&1 Mountains
and behind the Wisloka.

The German Army Command no1-1 decided tosupport the Austrian front by detachments from the Eight.h Army
located in East Prussia, which had participated in the Battle ofTannenberg, and, using these detachments, to set up a new German
Ninth Army in Upper Silesia, with its right wing extended to Kr~~ow.
Hindenberg took over its conunand.
•) <I,~.,

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The removal of large portions of the Eighth Army in order to
set up the Ninth Army had to be carried out with great caution inorder not to reveal to the ene~ that East Prussia was now left
with very feeble protection.

Consequently, the Germans decided totry deceiving the enemy again by radio.

Since the movements of thetransports could not remain entirely concealed, it was decided tobluff the Russians by pretending that a new German thrust from East
Prussia was impending.

Two radiograms lelating to such unloadingwere intentionally sent in garbled plain text under the assumptionthat the Russians would intercept these messages.

Actually, thetrick worked.
Meanwhile, the Russians had recognized the danger of sending
plain text by radio, and the Supreme Corr~nd of the ArmY (the socalled 11 Stavka11 ) sent out instructJ.ons by radio on 14 september tothe effect that as a mat.ter or principle military arrangements should
only be sent completely enciphered in the future.
instruction came too late.

However, this

The Austrian :ryptanalytic servic~

had already gott.en so well started that the Russian di~it cipher
was solved on 19 September.

Henceforth, reading Russian radio-

grams no longer caused aQY difficulty.
Meanwhile, the German initial ~ssembly in Upper Silesia wascompleted.
In their retreat the Austrians had expected the Russians topursue them sharply; hor1ever, after reaching the San the Russians
took a very sloli pace and finally stopped at the Hisloka.
This conduct of the Fr.ussians posed a serious riddle for theI'

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Austrian Arrrw Connnand, especially as it. was lcnrned from intercepted messages that the Russians were constant.ly receiving reenforcements..

J:t'rom these doubts tbe Austrians were relieved on 23 September

by an intercepted radiogram of the Conunander of the Russian N.lnth

Army, General Litchjzkij, who ordered the XVI Corps to return fromthe Wisloka toward the San to Stany on the following day. ~lith this,the assumption that the Russians would continue frontal attacks was
dismissed.
Meanwhile, at the Austrian army commandpost, reports were coming in from agents who spoke of strong Russian cavlry forces in
the area between the Uida and the River Vistula.

Soon, however,

the radio intercept service showed that here it was a question of
the Novikov group, which consisted of only one cavalr,y corps but
regarding which the Russians had been spreading exaggerated reports.
An intercepted radiogram from General Novikov to the Russian High
Conunand in Tfllarsaw, dated the morning of 2h September, revealed to
the Austrians the complete results of his recormaissance workand also showed his intentions clearly.
It was probab~ the first time in the history of warfare thatthe result of ene~ recormaissance was revealed so swiftly to thoseagainst whom this activity had been directed.

While the Russian

cryptographers in \varsaw were busy solving the radiogram, theAustrians were working on the same text.

The telegram was inter-

cepted at 0840 hours.

Toward noon it lay deciphered before theAustrian High Command.

At 1600 hours the German Army Gonnnand

had been apprised of the content and was able to make good use of
the data in its dispositions for 25 September.

:q_

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'l'he day following, Austrian and German d1visions stood rea.dT
tor battle in their new positions.

tn this phase the .Austrians

agqn intercepted an important order ot the COllllland at the iiu•sian~inth Arm;r;

it reads as 'rollows:

JJt dmlllliAlid o£ the Supreme Commander artd w:f.th reference to the impending movements t drder the with-dra1ta1 tomorrow, the 26th, of the troops ot the Arm:rbehind the Wisloka and the leaving behind at only
small rear f?,Uards at t.he Wisloka. The troops areto be quartered in the areas previously oacupied ~them. The g11ard corps will :f'eJ11a.in "in the area
Xolbuszowa - Kupno, which it reached tod~J its
Advance guard is to approach neare~.

Wiih this the situation was clarified for the Austrians.
~4dfi

Obvious that the Russians were undertaking regrouping& for a

new operation.

The Gerntans now began ta urge the immediaie begin-tting ot an offensive, in order to attack the Russians during their!'egt-oUping.

The Germans had their eyes 011 the middle reaches of

the Visiula.

, !:ft the night betore 28 September the Austrians intercepted
the Russian order for a shift of the Ninth A~ behind the V1stula,below the mouth of the San.

It was new ciear that the Russians plan..

ned to shift their main weight from Galicia to Poiand.

On 28 September the German Ninth Arrnt and the Austrian First Arzrw,
which joined it. to thn r i eht, startt d an ~:~civa.ncc an Ivc.ngorod northof the lower Vistulo..

Eouth of thll Vist.ula the Austl'io!?.n Fourth,'I'hird, and ~ccond Armies mover fC'Irth on 4 Octoter touard the san.
TJ,e Auntrjcn intE'rccpt aer\"i•:o= l'>.ad received frc'm Ruse:ia.n radio&;ran:.sfull j nforrut:i en r:-barcH n:l: thC' l 1 'ssit..n clispcs:i.H en.

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T}.r. Army ecc ..

.e

For a time the German-Austrian offensive progressed wel~.
Soon, however, the intercepted radiograms showed daily mole ~nd
more clearly a shift of the Russian Ninth, Fourth, and ~~fth Armies.

trom the San to the middle reaches o£ the Vistula, and of the FirstI

and Second Armies £rom the Russian "northwest sector" to tha area
porth o£ Warsaw.

Other Russian dispositions betrayed the tact that

the Russians were assembling an enormous force tor an advancelgainst the heart of Germa~ from the Ivangorod - Warsaw area.
Jo less than 94 Russian divisions were to attack $2 German and'ustrian divisions at most, in which connection it should be re·~emberedthat the effective strength of a Russian division was tar

sreater than that ot a German or Austrian division.

In the eventof an attack by this military force, a catastrophe for the armies/

ot the Central Powers/was inevitable.

on the·'basis~ information obtained from intercepted Russian

radiograms, the Germans decided to retreat. Without the Russians
I

noticing anything, the German and Austrian units broke contact withthe ene~ and retreated, to the Russians' s~rprise, to the line of
the Carpathians - Krakow - Upper Silesia.

Hindenberg was now ap-

pointed Commander-in-Chief of all German forces in the east.

i

I

Mackense? took over the Ninth Army; it was moved to the area of'fhornprepared for a """ t.hrust. at. t.he ri.ght. flank of t.he ad·vancing,~ussian a~ group.

Protection of Upper Silesia was takenover by .the Austrian Second A~, which was moved from the extreme
right wing of the Carpathian front to the region north of Tsch~n­stochau.

From East Prussia all available forces were sent to the:3:3

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e.
tor a general achraraee c..n t.he tollr•• · \i' .uo~;vdq.

't..•J ; • 1\l'~ ·'h,;.t•'•t

From this it was evident t.hat t.he Ru~:~sie.nB ha•i no idea ofthe extent to which thoir nort.hern ilarlk vas tlu·eat.tj•l~·Jj the;,thought that the German Ninth Al'll\Y which was attackih-' amounted t.oa corps at most.
On 19 November the Russian Commander"in-Chief, Grand Du.~eN~kolaj

Nikolaevich, radioed that the hour had come 1 when by e~­e~ing all ~heirenergies the general attack woatd be crowned bysuccess.
The next day brought the Germans and Austrians a sudden surprise. A communications officer of the Russian Fourth An•v announced that the old cipher key had come to the knowledge of the ene~.
A new cipher was introduced.

The Russians had captured the German

cipher key, had deciphered a few messages, and had learned tn thiswq that their system was known to the opposition.
Thera resu~ted a painful situation for the armies of the Central Powers, since the great struggle had reached its climax.
The right wing o" 'bhe Russian ani\Y neEH' Lods~ was almost encircled;
capitulation was awaited hourly.

And at this moment the best re-connaissance means of the Germans failed.
The German Command now had to operate without knowledge of theene~situation.

Thi$was all ~he more disagreeable since fromthe Warsaw area new Russian forces were coming up.

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In a few days

~i>iP~l
R Es~.1.'-.1. '-.J ...
.&.; AJ

the fortunes of war changed.

The German group, which was supposed

to encircle the Russians, was itself encircled.

It consisted of the

XXV Reserve Corps under the conunand of General von Scheffer-Boyadel
and tha Third Guard Infantr,y Division under the command of General
Litzmann.

The result was the well known battle of Lodz, in thecourse of which the annihilation of the German group seemed almost
certain.

In ice and snow, without any supply, it was obviously

fighting in a lost position.
At the Austrian and German cipher bureaus they were working
feverishly to solve the new cr,yptographic system used by the Russians•
There were direct teleprinter connections between the two offices, andever,r meaning which was recovered b,r one or the other was exchanged
immediately.

In the evening ~ours or 21 November solution of theRussian cipher was accomplished, and with it a solution of a numberof intercepted radiograms.

From these the troops forming the encircle-

ment ring were recognized.

But it was also discovered that this ring

was not absolutely closed but that there was a relatively weak spotnear Brezeziny which was closed o~ by Russian cavalr.y units.

Thisfact was reported by radio to the encircled German groups, and General•
Litzmann undertook the task of breaking through the Russian ring nea:rBrezeziny.
Meanwhile, the Russians had already prepared means for transporting the encircled Gennan units off into captivity.

To thesurprise of \verybody General Lit~~nn's break-through was a
success, and ~he encircled group was able to escape although its•

heavy materiel \'ias left behind.

This feat later won for General

Litzmann tho nickname, "The Lion of Brezeziny."

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Nobody made anymention of the cr.yptanalysts whose work made it possible to recognize the weak point in the Russian line. If they had not succeeded with their decipherment, then the whole German group would havebeen taken off into Russian captivity along with the 11 Lion.•
Before and during the winter battle of the Maaurian Lakes ( 4-22 Februar,y 191S) the interception of Russian radio traffic b.r
the German intercept service was ot decisive importance.

This time

the Russians sent ver.y little in plain text, but the German cr.yptanalytic service, which had been set up meanwhile, succeeded insolving the cr,yptographic system used b,y the Russians, the so-cal•led "Service Code• (RSK), and thus deciphered all Russian radiograms.
The German attack under the leadership of von Hindenberg was
directed against the Russian Tenth Ar~.

From the line Johannis-

burg-Lotzen- Gumbinnen - Tilsit, the German Eighth and 'tenth"
Armies attacked and with encircling operations forced the Russiansback to the forest of Augustowo where the remnants or the RussianTenth A~ had to surrender. All Russian countermeasures against
the German advance were recogni,ed promptly b,y the German radio
intercept service.
Since the Battle ot Tannenberg

tudendortt had become so ac-

customed to making his dispositions on the basis ot intercept results that he became impatient and nervous it these radio monitoring reports failed to come, were del~ed or gave little information.
His regular question was:

1'Any radiograms?"

Later on he took it

as a matter of course that the Russians would have to send intormative radiograms and that the German cryptanalytic service was
3G

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1
REST!tte;11fti· to decipher them. If tor ano messages or importance were~imeIintercepted, then he used toI growl that they bad not been paying
enough attention and would they kindly do better. It a new cryp,I

tographic system was not solved in a ver,y short time, he called

it a "damned mess" and said the cryptanalyst& had become "absolutel.T stupid ...
In spite or all the German successes, the situation in theeast remained serious.

.

.

on 22 March 1915 the fortress Prse~sltell, atter having been encircled by the Russians. In the Carpathians the Austro-Hungarian tront laboriously warded off Russian
attacks.

Only because of the smooth functioning of the Austrianintercept service was it possible to recognize imperxling dangers
pr~mptly andto take countermeasures.

In March 1915 the Austrian intercept service had ascertainedthat in the area between Tarnow and Gorlice the general milita17
situation on the ene~side was such that this front sector seemedthe one suited tor a break-through operation. The Austrian Chief

ot General start, General Conrad von Hoetzendortt, proposed theretore to General Falkenhayn the inauguration of a large-scale ottensive starting from this area.

The plan of operations wasdeveloped in consultations between the two. It was necessary
to handle the assembly so that the eneJIG" should notice nothing'b7 intercepting Qermn and Austrian radio traffic. Radio schedules and the handling or all other camouflage and secrec7
measures were worked out by' the Austrians, and it was actuallypossible to execute the entire German-Austrian assembly mnoticedb,y the Russians.

Colonel General von Mackensen took command of

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the German Eleventh ArrrJY1 which was to efi'ect the break-through.
on 1 May 1915 the German attack beganJ

front had been pierced.

on 3 May the Russi;m 1

The Russian armies were caught in a vastrolling-up ope~ation in a northeaste~nly direction and wer~ either
defeated or driven away.
sing of the san.

In the second half of M~ came the cros-

Early in JUne Prze~sl was recapturedJ on 22

Jurle Lemberg was occupied. Mackeneen was appointed General Field
Marshal.

In mid-July the German armies in Poland passed to theattack.

In quick succession during August and September the Rus-

sian fortresses Ivangorod 1 warsaw, Lomza 1 Kowno 1 Ncvo-Oeorgievsk,
Oswiec 1 Brest-Litovsk1 and Grodno fell.
During this-entire operation the Austrian and the German intercept services experienced their period of glor,y.

The swift changeof battlefield forced the Russians to make constant use of radiotelegraphy.

.

or course, they were always changing their ciphers, but

the Austrian crptanalytic service had gotten so well tuned to Russian cr,yptographio systems b,y this time that ever,y new key was solvedin a few days.
as~istanceJ

And in this the Russians often afforded wonderfuloften they sent one and the same message in the old key

and in the new one.

or they would send an inquiry- in the evening

in the old key and get the answer from the same station on the fol•lowing day in the new key (which had gone into effect at midnight).
Often they sent messages in plain text with references to encipher•
ed messages, etc. All this facilitated cryptana~sis.

D~ byday the German and Austrian intercept services received so ~Russian radiograms that in ever,v phase of this operation the Command of the Central Powers was almost complete~ orientated regard-

38

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R E tJ~Fn~¥:@+3.1.L ...'-.I. ~ .L
J.J
.J..j

ing the ene~.

In view of the existing strength ratios~ it isabsolutelY impossible that the German-Austrian summer offensive of1915 could have succeeded as it did if Russian radio traffic had
not constantly betrayed the Russian measures.
The prompt reaction of the German and Austrian Command tomeasures undertaken b,y the Russians came so often and in such apersistant manner that it could not fail to be noticed by the Russians.

In Russ~a, however, they could find no other explanation

than the suspicion that treachery was always involved.

The cry1"Treason1" ran through all Russia and the Russian Army~ and asearch for "traitors" began everywhere.

Every Russian officer witha German or a German sounding name now appeared suspicious.
number of them were deposed; many were court-martialled.

A

It went

so far that finally this fury had to be stopped by cabinet orderof the Czar.

At that time no one in Russia got on the track of theactual •traitor~ And in that fact lay the great tragedy for theRussians;

for in t.aose summer days of 1915 the entire campaign was

decided and decided against them.

And that was the opening act of

the revolution of 1917
Late in September 1915 the front·ran along a line from CzernoIt•

witz almost due north to Dunaburg and from there along the Dvina
to the Gulf of Riga.

on the Russian side, the Grand Duke Nikolaj

Nikolaevich was relieved and the Czar resumed Supreme Command of
the ArD\Y himself.
The eastern front subsided to a war of position.
Early in October 1915 began the great GerJnan-Austrian offensive in Serbia which led at the end of November to the complete

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collapse of Serbian resistance. !ar11 in December Serbia had been

. I

almost compleie13· cleared or Serbian troops. 'he huseians now de: I

cided on a di~rsional offensive to aid Montenegro, which was thenserious11 menaced.

They- began to bring ubi ta from. southern Russia\

to the eastem Galician front, and to ahiti t.he Ninth and Eleventh
I

I

Armies thither. These measures, however, ware ver,y soon re.eaiedby the Austrian interc~pt service which was able to deduce there-

from an impending Russian orrenaive against eastern Galicia.
ln this tense situation the command ot the Russian southwest.
front on 2 December forbade all radio traffic until further rtoiice.
The measure was correct; but it came somewhat too late, sinai too

1much had alreaey been betrayed. Three weeks later ( 20 Decetiiber,\at eight; in the nening) Ruaaian radio trat't:l.o ataried up with alnew cipher (now the thirteenth) J however, this cipher had long;since been solvec1 because the Russian Third Arli\Y, which did ftbt!

belong to the Russian "southwest sector,• had begun working ~th\I

it on 14 December. The so-called New Year•• battle was not a
success tor t~.£1 Russians J the exertions •de were in vainJ Montenegro vas ftot saved.

4.0

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1

THE INTERCEPT SERVICE IN THE WEST

AND THE "MIRACLE OF THE MARNE"

When the war began in 1914, there were two countries whichsought to shape the fortunes of war in their own favor as quicklY
as possible by a swift, powerful thrust far into enem;y territory
and by crushing hostUe armies.

The Russian armies wer , to fightdecisive battles in East Prussia and then advance quicklY on Berlin.

In the west the German armies were to advance through BelgiWil

and northern France and deliver a crushing defeat to the Frencha~ somewhere east of Paris.

There is a certain iror17 in the fact that, at the veey time
when in the east the Russians, by clumsy use of radio, were exposing themselves so disastrouslY that the course ot the battleof Tannenberg wrecked their entire plans for the campaign, theGermans in the west should make the same mistake with the same

results -- namely that, although the war continued for ;years, thefundamental idea had already been hopelessly wrecked.

In theeast it was the Battle or TannenbergJ in the weet the Battle ofthe Marne.
There are few battles in militar,y histor,y regarding which
so muoh has been written as about the Battle of the Marne.

There

are many names for itJ one of the best liked among the French was"The Miracle of the Marne."

People have sought and found all sortsof explanations for the seemingly inexplicable bogging down of theGerman advance, and they have tried b,y clever reasoning to figureout what the course of the Battle of the Marne would have ~en it

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this or that measure had been taken.

on the German side Lieut-

enant Colonel Rentsch or the Supreme Command of the A~ came off
worstJ he had to accept the role ot scapegoat because ostensiblJ
he called tor the German retreat without compelling necessity.
People contented themselves with this explanation because it sounded as it the Battle of the Marne had really 11 almost 11 been won.
In 1928 the Polish Lieutenant Colonel Szieszynski, and shortly
afterward the French Colonel Calvel, lifted the curtain, inasmuch
as both of them gave out so~ information from the archives of theFrench Deuxi'me Bureau. These were little memoirs which were notgiven to the public but had only a limited distribution.

InGer-

maqy they were not publiShed at all but were passed over in absolute silence.

These glimpses into the French secret archives gave

an explanation of the "Miracle of the Marne," which was no miracle.

but onlr the logical result of very commonplace and factual matters •The German war plan had consisted in advancing with a strong
right wing through Belgium and then by a gigantic sweep eastward
to the lett, thrusting south past Paris, and surrounding and destroying the French armies in a grandiose, encircling battle. With
that the entire campaigzt was to be decided. The German right wing
was made up of the German rirst A~ under Colonel General von
KluckJ to this a~ belonged a cavalr,y corps under the. command ot
General von der Marwitz.
Immediately after the beginning of operations, an active useof radiotelegrapq, began on the German side.

Since the Germans haddone practically nothing with radio intercept before the war, they
could have no idea of the effect which the use of radiotelegrap~
42

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by armies in'the fie~d wou~d have on the opposite side.

Consequent-ly, camouflage measures were ver,y inadequately developed.

The useof station call signs, for example, was such that all radio stationsof an army had call signs beginning with the same letter.

More ..

over, th(re was no change of call sign or of wave length.

Therefore

it was possible after a short time to recognize a given radio station as 'belonging' to this or that army' by its call signs.
To this we must add the astonishing lack of discipline inradio operation on the part of the German station personnel.

Theradiograms were not enciphered (or deciphered) by the sender (orrecipient), i.e., not b,y the staffs which were exchanging messagesJ
the staffs turned the messages over in plain text to the radio
stations where the cipher materials were located.

The messages

were enciphered here by the rldio officer of the station and werethen transmitted.

If we consJ.der the lack of experience in trans-mitting, receiving, enciphering, and deciphering radiograms, it
is clear that ' chain of errors must be the result;frequently the.
receiving station requested repetition of part or all of the radiogram; sometimes merely of a single cipher group or of a word.

Im-patient persons sometimes requested the answer in clear.
'.

study by the French of the numerous messages intercepted soon
permitted a division of the intercepted stations into the following three groups:
a. Stations, each of which was in communication
with a number of receivers - always the same ones;.
a~ong these were recogniz~d the stations of the higher
edhelon command; their correspondents were recognizedas\ stations of their subordinate units.
b.

Stations of those units which were constantly

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or often act..i vc; l;.hwa~ t...rcre int.erprc lied to be stations
or cavalry di visiom. ope rating on French or Belgiansoil.
c. Stations of the lower echelon co~~d, which
operated rarelY and obviously belonged to units whoso
staffs rarely changed location; these were the radio
stations of army corps and of infantry dirlsions.

Accordingly, a mere checking of radiograms and station callsigns allowed the French information serVice to differentiate quickly1 ·Call signs of stations belonging to staffs of armies,
Call signs of stations to be considered as belonging
to staffs of most of the uavalr,y diVisions,
Call signs of stations which were to be considered as
belonging to staffs of some arll\Y corps and intantey
divisions.

The fact that various cavalr,y divisions belonged todefinite corps
was easily recognized because the station call signs of diVisions
subordinate to the same corps began with the same letter. What waseven more important was that the call sign of the station of the.

staff of a cavalr,y corps could be recognized b,y the fact that it was
the only station within a group of radio stations which regularl7
communicated with all other stations having call signs beginningwiththe same letter.
I
This allowed the French to recognize four groups of control
radio stations, each of which belonged to a cavalry corpaJ the difl.aional stations of each corps had call signs beginning with the letters"S", "G", "L", or "D". "S" operated in Belgium., "G" in Luxe!llbourg,"L" in the Woevre plain, and "D" in Lorraine.
These findings were soon confirmed b,y various radiograms inplain text which were intercepted b.Y the French.

t4

RESTRICTEDGenerally the messages were enciphered.

Nevertheless, fromtime to time single words of plain text were encountered; thesewere either geographic terms or words which the recipient had notunderstood.

Radiograms were intercepted repe~~edly which wereentirely in plain text, and sometimes even bore the signature of
the originator in clear.

Thus, ~,fter a few days, it was lmown that

General von der Marwitz command~d the corps whose staff radio stat.
ion had the call sign beginning with 11 5 11 ;while General Baronvon Richthofen commanded the corps whose staff radio station used
a call sign beginning with "G"•From an intercepted radiogram sent in clear {by a station withcall. .sip beginning with
L~iona bad forced"L" ), it was learned that two cavalry div-

their way ~nto the Woevre Valley, and were moving

tow.ar.d YS'\Il.un via Malaviller1:. and Xivry-Circourt, where one of thedi.ri.s~ hadits staff quarters.

1ie French had committed their intercept service in full, even
lbef'~ tile•

begiming of the war, and were following German al'li\Y"'b<df':fe attentively.

After a few days they had a perfectly clear\

picture of the operational strUcture of the German ar~ in thewest._ It was of greatest importance for them to follow the mo~e­ments of the German right wing on its way through Belgium in the
direction of Paris.
The above-mentioned cavalry corps of von der Marwitz was relatively well fupplied with radio equipment, and consequently used itIextensivel,y"~There w-ould have been no objection to this in Yiew of thesituation and of the rapidity of the advance.

.'

RESTRICTEDWhat vros veryrisky was thG fact that these radio stations sent a vast number ofmessages in plain text giving locations, troop designations, movemente, plans, orde~s, and commands.

In between, enciphered messagesiwere sent, but the{ were all quickly solvable because they referred to the content' of the plain-text messages.

Sometimes thereI1

was a question in clear, while the answer was sent in cipher. This/I
made it possible/for the French to solve the cryptographic s.ystemin the shortest possible time.

In the course of 14 d~s, the'French intercept' service picked up some 350 radiograms from thecavalr,y corps~der von der Marwitz alone, and through these ~~were informed not mere}¥ of all movements of this corps, its plans 1
and its geographical distribution, but regarding the whole German\
First Army of von Kluck, and the Second A~ of' von BUlow adjoini~gto the south.
The French intercept service did not fail to note the movement of the German First Army toward the north to avoid being
outflanked by the French Sixth Army of' Maunoury; furthen1tol'~,
the overexpansion of the German front and the resulting gap beI

tween the First and Second Army, which could only be filled by thecavalr.Y corps of vnn der Maniitz, could be quicklY recognized b,ythe French intercept service.
The cavalr,y corps of von der Marwitz was supposed to effecta screen between the areas of the German First and Second Armies.
But what the troops tried to accomplish in carljring out their orders
was utterly ruined b,y the German radio service, for the transmitted·,

radiogrruns gave the French an absolutely clear picture of thesituation.

That gave the French and English the possibility
1G

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of breaking into the above-mentioned gap on 8 September, sinceIthey knew precise~ the weak places in the German front.

Thisthreatened to encircle the a~ of von Kluck, and to outflankthe a~ or von Bttlow; and this circumstance was decisive forthe recall of the German front.
It is not true that Hentsch ordered the retreat without
cogent reasons in a situation which was favorable for theGerman troops, and that the Allies were surprised and followed
only hesitant~; rather, the penetration\by the Allies gave
Rentsch occasion to recommend withdrawal to the Aisne.

On·theFrench side, the fighting units were indeed surprised by thechange in situation but not the higher command, which had aprecise view of events on the en~ side during the entire
course of operations becau~e of the intercepted radio traffic.
With the outcome of the Battle of the Marne, the German
attempt to gain a quick decision in the west had failed.

The

resulting war of position and the subsequent superiority or
~

I

•,

the Allies in materiel decided the entire course of the 'campaign in the west.

RESTRI~TEDI

RES'Eft:I6)f~21'l'IIE Dl~Cirm:.niNG OF Clfli'TOGH.Al·(lIu the cour&o of l..ho prcc~'l(lill~ dGscripl..ionn, Lhcrc lw.~. been

repeated mcnt ion of t.he fact. thai.. l..l!c AusLrlans, F'rench, anrl Gormo.ns broke tho cr~·ptoeraphio syat.cms used by fol'eign eoverrunont.s
o:r armies to re.n.der t.:tw:il" CQ!llmunications safe from una.ut.horized

ln lay Qircles, a.ny such decipherment of J.'oreign cip:ners

reading.,is always regarded as a kind Q.f "Qlack art" wharG one wq:rks bymagic recipes.

'!'hat, tun·rever, is not t.ruo; instead, the art of.

deci:phcrrnont resta on exact scientifi.c foundations,':!.'A :renQ.er

the TJ,a,ture Qf this Wl;!l~k ~QffiCl'lhat intclli~i\:>le tq :J-aymen, fiU1. attempt.
will be made be:J.Q>.,. tQ i;ive some c:!,~rU'y.lnr; explanatioqs.
First, a few words on the question of whal.. ~ cr,r.pl..o~raphic
system is.

W~

JTLaY remark here that. in thia CQnnectiQrJ. ~~Qretwritings produced with oh~mi.oa.l ink, which can only pe recogn~~edby somfJ chemical or physical procedure, will not be considered
ht:l;re.

Nor CTW we t.:re~t he:re cr,YPt.ograph:ic systems found :j.p. antiquity

when a lon~ ~trip Qf parchment was rolleg arP~A ~ ~gnica+ ~t~ff,
inscribed ac;rQss the laps and then removed, so that tb~ 3trip
appeared t~ Pe covered merely wilh mysterious signs ~d Q9~~dQnJ~ oe:read by the person who, as rie;htful r!aoipient, poasessed

nn ab~olut~l¥ identical ~ta!! aroupd which h~ wr~pped the strip

in t):}e prescribed manner.

Only such systems will be described as

can be transmitted b;y technical means (by radio or by wire).
Cryptographic s.ystems of the last mentig~ed type were likewise> used in olden times.

One of the besL kngwn was inventeQ. by

Julius Caesar, who subsLitutect for each letter of the alphabet

RESTRICf'ED

REs!tfitf~'!'W

1either a group or digits or or letters, and thus transtonn~d theopen plain text into a cryptog~am which consisted mgrely of a longseries of digits or of letters arranged in seemingly meaningless.fashion.
This type o.f cryptogram could not be solved until it was learned that every language is constructed according to definite matheroatical lmis 1 i.e,, that the frequency of occurrence of tho individual
letters in any languace differs. mentioned.

and is subject to the laws justIn the German laneuage, for instance, the letter E oc-

curs most fr~quently; then, at considerable intervals, follow theletters R and N, then D and T, then S, and so on.

Accordingly»

one merely neeas to substitute the corresponding letters on thebasis o.f the frequency of the cipher elements appearing, and he canin this -.ray solve a considerable portion of the cryptogram; therewainder comes as a matter of course.
During World War I this typP formad the basis of many cryp~tographic systems; indeed, it uas often used in the same way that
Caesar used it;

for this reason it is also called "Caesar."

In Germany during the ~1iddle Ages 1 an abbot by the name ofTritheim invented a cryptographic system in which, instead ofreplacing single letters by secret elements, ho replaced syllables, endings, word stems, prefixes, etc. This resulted in agreat multiplicity of secret elements occurring in a cipher, andthe p1·oblem of solution seemed to have been rendered much moredifficult, until people became aware of the fact that a fixed
regularity underlay the occurrence oi' endings, prei'ix€.s, and tllc
like, tiith respect to their frequency of occur1·ence.

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After that

cvc:n thls typo of cryptogram could be solved ..
People nou vlCnt on to the use of the s o-callcd muU.iplc valuoa(variants), i .. e., instead of assiening one secret elcmont for themost frequently occurring letters, endines, prefixes, etc., they
now assigned several.
w~s

But the art of cryptanalysis also foundof solving these cryptograms.

Little by little an entire sci-ence developed, both with respect to the creation of new cr,yptoeraphic systems and in respect to their cr,ptanalysis.

They create~

the systent of the reenciphered ''Caesar" or "Tri theim" through theaddition of specific groups of numbers to the cipher texts, andin this way transformed the so-called "open" cryptograms into 11 concealed" cryptograms; this did for the noment veil the frequency o£the cipher elements occurring, and prevented recognition of theIcipher elements as such.

people invenited the "box" transposition,.

the "comb, 11 the "Raster,"( grille) the 11 double box," and theu reenciphered these with a limited or an infinite "additive sequence,"i.e., b.r a correspondingly long chain of digits.

They also invent-ed the 11 open 11 or 11 concealed 11 code by numbering the entire vocabular,y of a language from 00001 to 99999, for instance, according toa definite system; or they sometimes used groups of letters insteadof groups of digits.

When the llm1ts of the individual code groups

were effaced by reencipherment, then the cryptanalysis of such a
messagE

clearly caused considerable difficulty.

But let the resulting ciphers be what they might, the scienceot cr,yptanalYsis alw~s found w~s of solving them after a while,
because every cryptographic system conceals witlun itself a number

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~F-g\Q=i.Jt5i~l

RE o:r .a."... '"" ... .a:. .J.J

of possibilities of solution;
final~ encountersthese have to be tried, until one

the one and onlY correct possibility.

It is

I

simplY a question of making the number of possibilities so great,\'when setting up the system, that tpe unauthorized decipherer needs\'
such a.',long time to t,ry out these ~~ssibilities, that, practically,
there

J

11 be no useful result;with a:real~ complicated crypto-

graphic system, the numbers of possibilities to be checked runs intoof cryptographic systems is in most cases facilitated by\ errors in their use.

In World War I, for instance, it

frequently happened that a station receiving an enciphered message
could not decipher it completely and asked the senders 11 Send 0317•

in plain text, 11 which was sometimes actually done.
change of key:

11

Or in case of

We have not received the new code books yet; please

repeat in the old code."

Ey comparing the two transmissions, it wasoften possible to solve the key., Sometimes requests were made inplain tex·li and the answers were sent enciphered, or vice versa.

Inthese cases one generally knew the approximate content of the message, and that helped greatly in the task of cryptanalysis.

The

number of such compromising errors was so great that we could takea long time telling about them - so we shall only suggest that in~ostcases the quick solution of an enemy cryptographic system waspossible only because of errors made.
In the use of cryptographic systems, the Russians at that time
were/so unskilled that the recipients of radiograms often asked whe-/ther there had not been a mistake in the encipherment or wheather thjs

~I

J

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I

or tlnt eroup uas correct.

The Austrian cryptnn~lysto, on theother hnnd, were already so adept at solving Russian ciphers thatthey would often hnve been in a position to help the Rusaian ad-

dressocs decipher their own messages.
Ionce in a whil+ an original Russian Qipher book (cod~) was •I

captured.

i

In thia rase it was not necessary £or them to make a~analytic decipherment, since they could eo about decoding at once,I

using the captured waterial.

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RE&'flt!€1'P!f 1
THE DiltEC'riON FINDING SERVICE
To~ ever,y ~choolbo,y knows

finding.

the essential things abou~ direction

At one time - in i915 - this invention wa.s a novelty, andat first an English rather than a German novelty.

Soon after the

beginning of the war the English had developed the system of"direction fjnding," that is, of fix.i.ng the direction in which atransmitting radio station was locatc:l; and they had put it to uoe
against the floating units of the German nav,y.

Direction finding•

stations were not introduced into the Ge~nan ar~ until about theend of 1915.
Since the radio se1~ice in all armies \~s tending moro andmore t~rard the principle of secrecy {not merely regarding thecontent of the radiograms dispatched, but also regarding thelocation of the transmitters), while determination of the locationof an enemy station \tao or great importance,since it al't·TB¥5. ,.

coincided \'lith the location of a unit staff, and the dot.ormina.tionof the territorial distribution of radio stations lik~,lise gavoclarity regardj.ng the front organization of the enemy, hencaforl:.h
direction finder stations l"rere coupled with all radio intercept
statior~s.

The sum total of their direction finding readines madepossible the deterndnation or the location of transmitters ldthina fourth of a square kilometer since at that time all armies wereusing long lJaves.

With this the system of changing call signs,

which had been devised to prevent idcntific~tjcn of tho st~ticns,
lost effectiveness.

As a rule three direction findinG re£..d.incs

froB different receiving stations sufficed to dctcn·l,lino the r;:,lot
1::t::-t>o t.hc radio station t'las

set up.

Sinc'J tl:·:: ll:··A,o:..• ol' ::..t~"'..tions

RESTRICTEDRES¥R:f€~ 1

in t.ha armioo of. Europe in thooc do.ys l-T.:l.S very omall uhcn cont.t·v.st.cd'rlt.h tho }>l'ancnt., :lt wao almost a.lw~s possible to idontify positively

thaoo trant~IIlittinc; stations.
This bacamo rcol.ly important whon troop movements were boing
carried out b,y tho opposing side.

In this w~, one could often

follow ror hundreds of kilometers the movements of radio stations(and honea of the ur,its to which they belonBed). This was true in•a ver,y significant w~, for instance, during the preparations forthe first grand Brusilov offensive in the east; later in connection
with the support of the Romanian front by the Russians; in connection
with the Austrian grand offensive on the Italian front in 1917; and!

•on other occasions.
The French set up their direction finding service (goniometricservice) ver.y quickly and in a very perfect fashion; the Italians
were also very active in this field.

The Russians, on the other

hand, limped far behind, and had not gotten beyond some very modest
beginnings by the end of World War I.
Looked at practically, direction finding operations in those d~s
were by no means so simple as they are today.

At that time there wereno maps showing local and magnetic deviations.

It was necessar,r tolearn b.1 experience how deviations of the direction finding r~
behaved in the terrain lYing between the transmitting station and the
direction finder.

When a direction had been .fixed, it was very

important to know whether the station fixed 1~ at a distance of 20,

50 1 100, 200 kilometers or more. Such experience had to be gathered
and collated.

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RE~f~ffl

Direction finding operations achieved their greatest importance in the naval intercept service.

Tho English in partict ,~~scored outstanding successes in determining the movement ofGerman warships., particularl,y of submaJ.~ines.

Many a German

submarine sunk in those days could be credited to the British
direction finding service.

Moreover, Zeppelin raids wereobserved constant~ by the English with excellent results.

Thetask was rendered easier f'>r them by ttle fact that the Zeppelins
handled their radio traffic on a definite wave· length, and worked
with a fixed system of call signs.
~all

Therefore 1 as soon as such asign was heard., people over l:.here knew at once that a

Zeppelin was coming, and they mere~ needed to follow ita course
by readings at short intervals, which was easy to do because o.r

the low flying speed of the airships.

RESTRICTEDPOLYPS AND PENKAL/\S
By a polyp wa understand in zooloey a marine aniln'l.l \lhich

catches its victim in ita outstretched tcntacleo in ord(n· toeat it.

\'fl1a.t a "Penkala" is, that probably fe'\"1 people know

today.

Thorefore, it m:zy be mentioned that this \'las the nameof a firm which before and during World liar I tras producine thefirst mechanical lead pencils.

In its advertising, this firm

11sed a he:ui ldth an enormous ear behind which uas stuck such amechanical. pencil.

Beneath was simply the word "Penkala.."This big ear uf the Penkala poster and the tentacles of thepolyp se1~ed the Austrian and the Germnn intercept services
respective\1 from ear~ 1916 on as the symbolic designation
for a n~1 branch of this service '\>rhich will be described below.

In the summer of 1915 Gcrrr~ oncinecrs near Verdun had
captured instruments by the aid o! which the French had beenintercepting German telephone lines.

These instruments had

been improved in Germany by the then Postal.Counc:iior Arendt,
and they had been used in the war of position, first b.1 theGennan and then by the Austril'l"J. army, to intercept telephone
conversations of the enemy.

The~edevices were installed in a

dug-out in the front line, and from here insulated wires radiatedout which ended in the so-called "search grounds"; theso searchgrounds consisted of metal st&ces which were driven into the groundas clooe as possible to the on€llzy''s system of trenches.

Where asingle telephone lina was used the currents passing throuch tho soil

56

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l~uldencounter one or more of these search grounds, and afterb~ing

amplified b,y the attached apparatus b~re rendered audible.

' carried over the teleThus, as if l~th a magnet, conversations

phone net of the enemY were attracted, and, b,y using a switchboard, any number of search grounds could·be thr~r:n in selectivelY
to eavesdrop on a definite sector of the front.
a~ theseIn the German

listening posts, which by the beginning of 1916 were

installed evoeyv-1here along the front, were c~led "Arendt Stations"or "Polyps"; the Austrians called them 11Penkalas11 (big earsl).
Since at that time the Russians at the fz•ont used almost
exclusively so-callud single \dres, and even in the \rost single'Wi!"es were still uaed to a great extent, the German and Austrian
listening stations generally had very good results.

While theradio listening service gave tho connections, orders, and reportsof the hieher staffs, the Arendt service supplemented the picture~dthrespect to srrk~ units and the !ron& line.

The results

during 1916 -~ especial.ly in the east -- were so abundant that one
Arendt stat.ic·n uas supplying on the average 15 to 20 pages a. day ofsienificru1t jnformation regarding the enemy.

Excellent resul+.s wereachieved by the Aust.rians with their Penkalas on the Italian front,
where thr~y t·mrc always ve17 exactly informed of the situation on

, ..
• i.

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tho :.mr;.~ncr or 19l(Jonrl the liotcninr; in on Lolq~lronn convr.r.:;ations

bcc:l!ll.J k.noHn 1 I'""'oplo bcgon to uso cvo l:iro connectionn C'TCryuhero.

IL.

'J .t::1 lllllCh mol'O difficult, ( ofl,cn imponoiblc) lio intercept lihutH3 ..

Ncvorl,holo;:.1s, it Look a very lonr; time t.o make tho chanr;e and tosnfocuard telephone traffic at the front - particular~ for the
Rttosj_ans - to such an extent tho.t listoning in bccruno virtuall.y
impossible..
~rere

In any case, the German and Aust..rian Arendt, services

able from ear~ 1916 till about the ~iddle of 1917 to hear

most o.f the telephone conversations of the Russians up to fivekilometers behind the front, and t.o,utilize tho content forshaping their o\'m measures.

The Hussian telephone operators werever,y loquacious when seated at their instruments.

When a Russian

telephone operator took over either by d3\Y" or by night, he began"testing" all his connections by calling up the correspondent
stations.

Generally he knew the men at the other end of thewire, anci a conversation ensued in the course of which the two
exchanged exp3riences, impressions, and observations.
they spoke also or official matters.

Ver,y often

They discussed impending or

1. It is true that the Austrians did not find out until November
1917 that the ~talians, beginning early in 1916, had likewise
set up a considerable number of these listening stations. As
General Max Rone;e states in his book, "Military and Industrial
Espionage," the Italians listened in on some 5200 telephone
conversations of the Austrlons j_n the sector between l'lippachand Rombon. In October 1916 the leader of an Austrian listening station deserted to the Italians, and was able to acquaintthem in detail '\'lith the Austrian arrangements and to warn themfully. Later on a number of Austrian deserters were employedb•r the Italians in this listening service on the basis of theirlineuistic ability.
5~

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accomplished rcB.efs, the question of supply., the spirit of thetroops, extension of positions, losses suffered, changes in con~and,...

reenforcements received, and the like.

Aside from t.hese bits of private information, very good :i.nfor-:.

mation could sometimes be obtained from the conversations of theofficers.,, ra..rticularly lihen patrol undertakings were impendine.,
attacks l'rere planned., etc.

Precise information was obta.in~d r.ega d-

ing the locations of staffs, batteries, depots, and the lll{e.
Artiller,r obselTVers could generally be heard clearly because theyliCre stationed trell fon-rard t·d th their telephones.

'!'hoy gave fir-ing directions; by observing where missiles struck and comparing
the figures t.raruJmiiJI:.~d, one could soon get the exact location of
the hostile be.t.+.cry.

From nol-v on it was impossible tp prepare, for. .

~my m:J.jor militarya.ction uithout its being noted by the Arendt',
service, since, if an order was given to stop all telephone traffic

and this was done., this very measure was enough to attract atton.tion and to indicate that the enemy was making preparations.
Since the telephone lines of the staffs further to the rear
trcre atl;ached to the same Sldtchboards in which lines from thefront tenninatcd, induction often made it possible to listen also
to these ldres, over l·rhich eA.-trcrncly informative conversations\'1C3re Cllrricd.
Tho introduction of the "Pol;yps" lll'l.d "Ponk~~as" in the a.nnies
of the C~Jntrul Po\~~rs sj.Qlified from the military point of vicu an
unparalleled facLor.

Sincc,from the summ'3r of 1916 on, thesesto:Lion5 'l;icre located at intervals of about 10 kilcmetors alone the

RESTRICTEDRESTll!{;'Yf!fj 1
cntir..: .front, it was possible to monitor the entire oncw.v teh..phone
trni'fic at the front almost without a break.

In tho cast. thia one-sided surcriori ty continued down to the el'ld of t.ho tra.r; in tho lrost
it uas equalized since the French and Enelish used similar apparatus
to intercept German conversations.
In the eastern theater the practical result of this superior-

ity was that a large part of the troops of the Central Powers
could be withdrawn without risk, since there was now no dnnger
of a surprise movement b,y the ene~.

It would never have beenpossible for the armies of the Central Powers to keep the eastern
front stabilized, if they had not had such extensive insight into.

the enemy situation, due to the results of the radio intercept andthe Arendt services, since the streneth ratio on the eastern front
was in many sectors 10:1 against the Central P~rers.

·.o

RESTRICTEDRES'N:I@Di6D21
THE \'lEST\vhilc in the eastern theater the intercept service during
World War I resulted in a one-sided German superiority, thesituation in the wost was quite different.

Here it was not theGermans who start-ed using this novel,. means of ga·thering informa.tion and thus got a head start, rather it was the French whobegan workinJ systematically and purposefully in this field assoon as political tension began and l'rho derived a corresponding
advantage.

There were two reasons for tlds:

the first wasthat at the ve17 beginning of the war the French had at theirdisposal a fair~ well set up system of interception whichmerely had to be adapted to the new tasks; they a.li•eady lmew thevalue and the possibility of using this means of gathering informo.tion.

The second reason was tactical:

while the French wereoperating in their own countr.r and could rely on a closely knit,
und&maeed wire network and consequently needed to use the radio
but little, thus affording the enemy few chances to employ radio
interception, the situation was reversed for the Germans.

Aftercrossing the frontier the Germans encountered a telephone andtelegraph net \ihich had been more or less destroyed or rendered
temporarily useless.

They either _had to set up their own field

wires, which took time and on the right wing l'ras hardly pz·acticable due to the Sldj."t advance, or they had to resort to re.diotelegraphy.

This l·ras done to a grf:\at extent and afforded theenemy a marvelous opportunity to get practice in interception.

•

After a fe-.1 days the French intercept service had al1•oady eot ten

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ii.;:; b.:-..l.rlllL.,~:, <md frcm Llu.. n on maint::dnod vocy close conL~-.:t. uith\·Jc have al.rcu.cly reported briefly on tho French in t.erccpt

scrv:i.co which b~..·come so in\porl.c.nt before and durinG l.he battle'of the llnrne.

Imntcdiatcly al't~r this fateful battle there fol-loued in,t.ho ·uest the so-called "race to the sean.

The Ge:nP&l

I

atLcmpt to outflank the enemy again fl'Oin the nort..h called forthe utmost wo.t.ch.fulness on the part of the French.

Once again

the focus of French 1·econna.isea.nce la.y in tho intercept service.

On the other hand, the French army command Lriod to croat.e a now
sil.uc1tion he1·e by threaten:l.ng the Ge:rn1a.n r1.eht uine;. Thns the two•
opponents kept crolf!Cli.ng one enother more and more to the noz•th andthere resulted the famous nra.ce to the sea.u
These movements forced the German anny command to make extensive shifts of troops.

'l'l!e French, on the other hand, were facedwith the problem of recoenizing these movements, their type, extent,
and goal, and of doing this in time.
The Germans were still resolved to continue to hold the front
in Lorraine and the Vosges by defensive action and to force a
decision in the north.

The tl':O German "Southem Az'lllies" (the Sixth

and Seventh) were withdrawn from the front and replaced by new:cy-

activated army units.

The Seventh Army, l'Thich lm.s in t.he Vosges,

was transferred to the Aisne sector and conunitted there.

'l'he Sixth

Anny was m~ved from Lorraine to the extreme German right l'r.ing.

Thus

the Germans succeeded in counterine; the movement or the French a.nd theEne;lish which was extending farther and farther to the north.

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1 to 13 OctoLor the battle raged around Arras; by mid-October a newfront ran from Noyon to north of Lille.
The removal of the tt·ro Gen11an armies from the southern flanl~,their replacement by new units, and i:,heir march to the new areasof comrni tment were recognized in the, very beginning by the FrenchIintercept service as clea.r:cy- as one ~~ould wish.

It was the first\time in the history ~f war that such.a Inovement had been followedby the technical means of radio intelligence.

The French a~so

recognized these units as they appeared one after the other in
the new areas.

That gave them and the English a basis for carr,y-ing out countermovements, whereas the Germans had to relY exclusivelY on reconna.i.t;se.nce by patrols and scouts along the front;
thus at best they had success with their reconnaissance only
after the hostile units, which had been brought up, had alreaqy
been committed.
On 9 Octooer 1914 Antwerp had fallen.

From the besieging

troops thus released and from n~1 units activated in Germaqy ane1o1 Fourth A'I."'.Dy 'liaS

formed in Belgium., which started its advanceon 18 October with the purpose of bringing the channel coast under
German control.

This movement was also recognized promptly by

the French intercept service and by the intercept service of the
British Expeditionary Arrrry which had in the meemthile become
active, so that appropriate countermeeGures could bo taken intime.

After heavy fighting the German attack ua.s stopped at theYsor.

•rhe attempt of the German Sixth Army to break thi'OUGh

tol·rard Ypern, which uas prematurczy betrayed in r.a.dio traffic,

RESTRIC'f~D

was lilccuisa without success.

With the end of the battles around

Ypern the war of movement in the west was concluded for the time
baing.

'l'ho \far or position beean.

Several years after World War I the French Colonel Calvel
prepared for instruction purposes for the Signal School in
Versailles a timetable containing all the German ~ radiograms.

intercepted b,y the French intercept service during those months.
Upon comparing this table with the operational movements executed by
the Allies one recognizes clear~ that these results were the basic
factor in carr,ying out countermeasures, and that it was only due tothe intercepted German radio traffic that the French and Eng~sh weredable to act so promptly and to eliminate the German threat in ;thenorth.

~t

the uerman intercept service accomplished in the east,

the French did here in the west.

With remarkable parallelism there

took place here an equalization of spiritual forces which determined
the outcome of the war back in the fall of 1914.
In the further course of the campaign in the west the forceswere e~alized in respect to the intercept service, just as the forceson that f~ont had been equalized in other respects.

On the basis ofexperiences in the east, the Germans began late in 1914 a systematicinterception or enemy radio traffic.

Both sides no\1 developed

extremely great activity in this field.

There resulted an invisible

struggle between camouflage, concealment, and deception on the ono side,and the intercept service, evaluation, and cr.yptanalysis on the other,which wa.o soon carried on by both pnrties with t.he most refined Il'.ethods.
This service extended to interception of all technical means or cor.1mun{1.J

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i.ca.tion of' the enem.v, but was concerned primarily ldth l'a.dioLele~.r:-dpQy and the telephone.

As recognition o£ the danger o£ using radio-

telegraphy £or transmitting secret information began to per-meate
everywhere, people in the western theater began more and more to
give up the use o£ this means of corrununica.tion.

Furthermore thestabilization of the fronts afforded a possibility or extending wirecommunications.

Consequently, the focus of the intercept service inthe west shift..ed more and more to the interception of telephone li.nes,
both on the Allied and on. the German side.

'l'his duel sometimes assum-

ed violent forms, as for example, in 1915 near Apremont, where m~tualinterception or the telephone conversations of the artiller.y for.med
the tactical basis for the militar,y actions.
droll situations resulted.

At times some rather

Once the Gennans had even learned thehour of the impending attack.

But instead of learning a lesson·rrom

this and being doubly cautious in the use of their own telephones,
the Germ&ls made the 1nistake of passing the time of the expected
French attack in plain language b,y phone, and aLl countermeasures
were adjusted to this point and time.

This was inter~epted b,y the

French jn turn, whereupon the French attack was advanced several
hours and was completely successful in spite of all German preparations
for defense.
In the autumn battles in the Champagne (22 September t.o

J November 1915) and at La Bass&e and Arras (25·September to

13 October 1915) the Germans were able to frustrate the intended•

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bn.:il..:-L.hl\)UL,ll of' Lhc. crJo.'m,y e:iJnpl,y hccc.u:J,.., through tho iut.ercc:rtion

thry h1pcudJJ:1G n.L!:.o.ck and. to prepare appropr.in1.e defcm.>a.,.

In Scptcu•ber 1916 duriAlB 'l:.he t·.tt.!..le on the Somma, the French
intorccp~ed

a GE~rman rad.logrmn fX'Ol'l ltJ •.loh they loa't"ned details o£

the in1pendinr; t;l•t.'a.l.. Gen'lan count,crat.L:l.ck :ln the vid.nity of
Bouchavesno.
The French Colonel, Givierg<., l'lho dasct•ibes the results o.rinterccpt:i.on durlng the FiJ•st W(•rld Wu.r, says:"'l'he results

achieved by deciphering telegrams l•~ra unueuallJr great. since
they made possible the ident.ificat,il)n of many units.

of rcconne.i&~:>ancc;
ment,s of p\'isonen>..

pt>eaenc~,,h::l~e

If ·ue glance

divlr:.d.on:; "'•.n:·e l.~.t.c1' check,=ld by the state-lvloreov~:n·,)2 infun t.·:yregiments werP, spolt.ed•of a1:.. 'atti:lck di\·ision~ '1c->rth ..:>f SiJ.., Quentin; anothertelegJ.·am of 10 D~cEunl>En' :l.nfor.ne1 us o" t.h•3 presence of Generalvon Erpf. comm!l.ncler o.r ~ho 242nrl divis:.i.on; .J.not.her telegram or
1' Decer11bel' allouod us to a.li.lcip.v.e l:.he Ge:":!'Oan sori.ie against tho
Albia .li'arm; our Ll·ocps a."l.t:l.cipat..ea t11e enemy and ·threw him back.
A radiogra.'1l of 5 Dc-cember reported to us tho change or call sign ora German radio station, and gave us the old and new- call signs ... •"RESTRICTEDOf tho utmost importance in the intercept service were so··called ltttle things; the,y often proved of decisive value.

Inmany cases the French discovered and identified German radioIs'1)ations by the fact that. lihen they changed call signs the German~tations.

did not. break the sequence of message number in the/headings.
One Germ.an divisional radio station (183rd' Infantry Division}
could alt•Tays ba recognized by the fact that it put the sendingt:Une and the word count at the end of the radiogram instead ofat the beginning, af was general~ done.
Another Gezman station could be recognized by the stereotype formula:"Can you hear all right ? 11 , which occurred eacht:Une it began traffic ldl:ih a col·l·esf>OJ.ld$ut.

In such cases it

did no good to change the call sign ..
The French and English were especial~ successfUl inlistening to the radio t1•affic of the German Air Force.

At

the very beginning of the \11'ar the German airships lrere easily
recognized in radio air traffic because they all had call signs
beginning with tho letter "T".

lrlhenover this sit:;nal was heard,

it was Imolm that t.he transmitter of a Zeppelin l'tas involved;
the position of the airship lrras then determined quickly wlth
the aid of radiogoniomctl,r.

At the beginning of the war theseairships cruised over the North Sea and radioed incessantly totheir hnse in t.he Helgoland Bight; they rc:r-orted the spott.ing

or mine fields, submarines, l'rarships, mer•chant e:hips, etc.
French kept pooted on these matters by lis'Lenin~ to i..hes-:::RESTRICTED

The

t.r.:m~·•.l.b::>it"Jnc

ov• 1· a cllutuncc of ?00 i.o t!OO Id.loJ:t'.ll.. cr:; ..

Dur.i.nr, tll3 alr att.1o..:ko on Parif} :lnri. London, the Zoprclino andl:J.rGe ai.rcr."lfL \rhich c~rricd ouL the uomb,:~.rd.m( nt 1 rcr.:J ccnotnntly

rcqucol-illl,; bu:~ l'int;s from vnrious Germ::~.n direction findinG .sta.Lions.
This entire rt.'li.o corroopondonce uao list.cn~d to by the Franch andEl1clish, \Jho thus received dirccLly from Lhe enemy valuable cluesrogo.rdinc thu movement and the direction of the Gcrm:m atLncks.
l1oroovcr, a.fLer the Engli~h ~nd French direction findinG stations
had _beco:no acquainted 'l:'!lth t,he signals of the German Air FOl'CQ

trane:ndttors, they took the necessary rcad.i.nes and dote11trl.nod
the momentary posi'l..ion of the airships.
TO\'fcll.'d t.ho end or t.ho wur t.ho Gorm.:m di1·iciblcs - like theland stations - changed their call si&"l'ls almoot da.izy so thr:tL it

l1as more difficult to recognize themBut t.h.is difflculty \fl:l.S

offset. by the routine uhich hnd hc~n acq·uircd nL<::~mJdle by the
French a.l'ld English intorct;)pt op::lrators and by the aid of the
improved direction finrling system.
Iuterccpt.ion of hostile arLillcry aviators \"tas .likewisf3
carriod on succcssfulJ.y.

Ona system of interception, which wasore.;a.nized particularly for the purpose, yielded a mass or information l·Thich pcrnrl.ttod the command to orient, il..self on the follo\"dngquestionv:
a.. Int<:!ntions of the enemy artillery; recoenition of the
fil'ine; procedure of ne,·rly committed bat..l..erics a.l'ld the .fit•ine;of old batteries e;ett:Lne a range on neu tareets.

b.

Zones and dist.ribution of r:trc of enemy heavy artillery.

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Interception of this type is not so easy as listening to thetraffic of ground radio stations.

'l'he planes move very fast;

fixing their mamentar,y position in the air calls £or great speed
and practice on the part or the crew of the direction finding
stations.

In addition, it is nece~sar,y to recognize the trans-mitters again in spite of the daily change of call signs; moreover, decipher-ment of the radio dispatches calls tor no little
effort.

In addition, the precise times of the flight must becompared with those of the artillery,t.ire and evaluated.
Nevertheless, it was possible again and again to get valuable
infor.mation and to shape one's own measures correspondinglY•With the introduction of universal militar,y service in'January 1916, England manifested the tenacity of its purposeto keep fighting.

On the other hand, France appeared greatly

weakened both in a military and an economic wa:y.

In order towear do,. 1. the French oompleteq and thus bring about a decisiorin the west, the German ~ supreme command decided to attack'Verdun.

The attack began on 21 February and continued until!I
I

September without achieving the desired success.

In thesebattles the intercept service on both sides played an unusuallyimportant role.

The telephone line~ were constantly being

damaged by t:.he uninterrupted artillery fire so that there \·tere
possibilities of interception by the resultant grounding.
J.:oreovcr, a ne't.,.. phase began in the uer of inLcrcept.ion.

.!!."'very-

uhcre along the front so-called ground tele gre.phy j nstrun1ent s•

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w·1·o in::I;.;Jle•\ ..

'l'lll.:il' inlJvduciL:>Il h.Hl hG•..:om•.· 1.11c•~~ ..:mc;y1•·-··~,-·:

rcliab tu twc ol' Lh...• i •:l•Jrhow• h.;1d h~·~;ornt? iJllf'OEmlbl· ln v l(,r r of llvJ
dc:.rt.rucU.vo l!i'fccL of Lhe urLillcl.J' fitc.

Tlll.l grouud lclt::ej'.:JJ.•hsent hu~:r.nr cm·1-.:mls inlo llw earth, und we~:..; 1.het·r~for•J indonpenrknt
of 1-dres..

or cour::.c, it could ue heard Ly tla~ cuE:u'.'f aL shortdista.nce::i lJul not t.o Llw ~·<\rnc exLenl.. a~; radloL(;legraphy.

1'heintercept sl.al,ions, at 1.·rhkh ld I h•'I''Lo t.h•::: 11-;i..cn·....,rn h<:~.rl bc·m
accustomC'd to hear nnd

t.1-anr:l.)f ·-·oJ·al convc1·:::.at.ionn, no1·1 la..-ul I 0

shift to int.ot·ccpLinr: ~JOf:>e Lcl<~:-~r~Ph.Y. ·~~hi r::h ·'llno of!'(:l . rcu a
possibility for tht.." ur.·~ of cr;tJ'tOf~l·::-sphi c ::;ysl,r:-m:.;..

The English

ha.d constructod a special d.t•vic:c for sicn::~l conununication in the
combat zono,. t.ho ;;-u-c;1Jlcd F•:ll•.J'phow~,. l~lti ch t.lv:?y consi(le1·ed secureagainst eavesdropping; hnt eoven Lhi n Lilt nc::d ouL t..o be subject., tointerceptj on under ce l'l.ain co11di Lll)t. & ,'30'l haL \.h.:: struggle in thisfield never C'•. --.ed but. rri..:.rel.\- ciHmt~r~d i11 il.:.; technical aspP.cl:.s.
The inte1·r.;t:>pl. service achie·,,d slral._,;i r; sicuificance in thewest only once on the G·.:>l'lll<HJ s i d·~, :utd l hn L l·tO.G in February }1arch 1917.

From connlle~;:::; ir.t.m·cept.r"d rcnver:mtions and telegrams

the Germans had ascer1.oit:cd lbei. th~: Al'lj.;>~ "'~r-:.1 1weraring an attack
on a grand scale in t..he SorrHtn arc::~.

'l'he areas of at Lack and the

directions of thruf:lt.. could L~J clr::ur~: recor.ulzed.

'Ihis Lime theGerman supreme command v.cln;,,ll.y did draw th~ correct conclusions£rom the a.vailablb infol·rna.t..ion, nnd

j n~1•edi:l1.~J..v

Lu.forc. the aLtack

was to begin ordered ;) -v-1iLhtlr~mal to Llw ::.;o-call•~d ~1icgfried Line.

In this wny, the Larg•JL. \••as \'rithr.lrmm fl'om the cru.-3hinc sup~rlority

REgl!~"JP'tf'~.l.
.&. .L'-.L '-J .... ..... .....,
o.f the Entotitf'.! in materiel, and the a.t t.ack petered out in empty
space,

Of course, tho Allien had recogni.zed !rem intercepted

German trc..ffic the Germa.."l intention to reLreat, but strane;ely
enough they did not draw the onzy corr;:wt deduction and
immediately continue the attack 1-rhich could have resulted in aver-3 difficult situation for· the German troops.

Instead,, theyclung rigidly to their existing plan and missed a vez7 favorable
opportunit.y.
Meanwhile, the French had been n~ing excellent progressin the field of direction finding.

As earzy as October 1914

they had started experiments with direction finding apparatus,
and then developed a model \'thich could be used in the field,
being held to such dimensions that it could be installed in a
vehicle..

The ratable frame had 3ides two meters long and was

located on the roof of the vehicle.

The apparatus itself was

mounted inside the vehicle.
With this mobile direction finder the French got excellent
resUlts.

Such direction finding stations particularly proved

their worth early in 1917 when the Germans \rere preparing toretreat to the Rtndenburg Line.

Long before they started tooccupy this defense line, radio stations \-rere set up a.Yld put
into operation.

Of course, that was sheer stupidity because· there was no valid reason for operating 1•adio stations far
behind the front as it thon stood; they could have gotten along
very well with the existing wire corrununications.

71

RESTRICTED'l'he fact that

RESY!{!L:ctprAH-2 1,iunL no I,Ji ..t.;ht l,<w·~ b~c•1 done for practice accordi.nc to Lhc prin-cirlcs cmploy•:d t~~roril l'Jl./ 1•

The nou radio ol..u.tiono 1·F>3l'C :iJILlLCdintc-]Jr rccor;ni.~..::d by 'Lho French; rcudine::; wore ta.kcn, and th~J loca.t:lonsdct..ormlncd,

E;O

LhL\1., iu a. rcl:l:l..ive}¥ r.hort time t..hoy roco(7lizcd theexact cour::;c oi" a nett Ucrman line of defense.

The French uorc a.l~·in a position to rccoori.zo >-:iLh certainty the irrunincnco of Gcm1M

retreat operationa.
A little \"lhile arLor that. Lhc Gel.'1!lO.ns also missed an ex.cocdinely.

.favorable opporttu1ity uhich the int.erccpt. sen-vice sarved up to them,so to sp~ak.

In the midcllc of April 1917 the French under General

Nivelle l'rith sLrong employmont o~ troops ru1d mal..eria.l made an attackon the Aisne and in the Charnro.01e, east of Reims.

The Ger1n.:ms

intercepted this thrust by a mobile defense, a.YJ.d in heavy fighting
ceu~ed the FrPnch ouch severo losses that the morale of the Frencharwy uas badly shalten.

In numerous anny corps t.here was mutiny.

Troop units and single soldio1·s w<~re leaving the front, or goingover to the cne•11y.

The German intercept service had its great hour in the '\1.-est,

as one intercepted mess,gge aftc1• the other revealed clear:cy thecritical situation on the enemy side.

In this situation the French

front could not have resisted a Gorman o.ttnck..

happened:

But the incredible

the Ge1•1nan cornmr.md saw in these events u. parallel to thoseon the Hussian i'ront, and expected a collapse o.f the French pouGr o.f.. ,RESTRICTED•RES'PilleP!D21
resistance without any action.by the Germans.

It missed the chance

which was never to return, and kept waiting until the French Govern\

ment and the army command had succeeded in restoring the situati~.
Petain resumed supreme command; the crisis came to an end; theFrench front again stood !irm.

America was able to proceedcalmly in shipping its divisions and armies to Europe.
Monaro~The Danube

recognized the hopelessness of the situation, and the ·idea of a separate peace began to spread there visib~.

The

Entente had survived the crisis; the scale of victory slowly
tipped in its favor.
In respect to the intercept service, the tide now began toturn.

Just as the German intercept service in the east had

been able to follow the increasing war weariness of the Russian
soldiers from ear~ in 1917 1 so now the French were often able
to observe similar phenomena among t~ German ~roops, ~venthough not to the same extent as had been the case in the east.
The resolution in favor of peace passed b,y the Reichstag on ·19 July 1917, the Peace Note of the Pope, the German rep~
thereto, the formation of the "Independent Social Democratic
Party," the resignation of Reich Chancellor von Bethma.nnHollweg, and ~~ other happenings became the subject ofoccasional short convJrsations over the telephone, in spite

.

I

.

of all regulations, and these· allowed the Allies to inferthat there was a general, slow decline in the wi·ll,~f theI

German troops to resist.

'-......

Thi~ phenomenon was increased'as.

the.,American troops began to arrive ~n France from overseas;----

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conversations on this topic occurred a8ain and again on thetelephone, and shO'\'red that the Germans at the front were by
no means indifferent to this problem.

But

the most valuable

intelligence was gained by the Fren~h intercept service inlistening to the telephone con versations of German units whichwere moved from the eastern to the western theater beginning in
December 1917.

These units had no taste for the war, and theFrench intercept service was busy seeking such units sin~e theirtelephone conversations afforded the best information.

Never-

theless, the French did not succeed in recognizing from intercept-·
ed telephone traffic the impending German offensive of March 1918.
This offensive, which broke loose in the morning hours of 21 l~rch,came as a complete surprise to the French, at least as far as ita
timing and the direction of thrust were concerned.

Numerous

Ger.man troop movements had been recognized qy the French intercept

service, but in the main ver,y good radio and te~ephone discipline
had been observed by the Germans.

Hardly had the front come into

movement, however, when the German radio stations again began tosend eagerly and to supply the French with excellent material.
Foch quickly recognized that the qerman offensive had been undertween without adequate, fast movidg forces, and he quick~ took
his countermeasures.

I

After barelt. two weeks of successful GermanIattacks, the great spring offensiie had bogged dmm.
A fer.-r examples may serve to ~hO\i the importance uhich \·ras

attached to the intercept service even in 1918 - after the danger

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.•of using technical means of corrununications had been generally
recognized'I'he French Captain Ccusillan relates that on 6 M:~ 1918,
for example, the French station 11ZZ2" sent a telegram tostation "ZZl" which began with the words:

11

The lieutenant andchief of the radio service with the staff of Genera~x.

To thechief of the radio service with the staff of General Y. 11

Tl·~

Germans, who knew, naturally, what divisions were led by thesegenerals, discovered in this w~ the presence of these units inthe sectors involved.
The presence of several Italian divisions on the French
front was brought to the attention of the German intelligence
service by the fact that an Italian operator made what would
seemin~be a ver.y slight mistake.

The Italian radio stations

employed in France were required to follow French regulations andIto accommodate themselves to t;he French traffic in all particulars.
The operator in question made ~the mistake of transmitting tne
I

Italian signal ny di xrr insteap. of the signal ny de X" whencalling another station.
units on French soil was

In t~is way the presence of Italianbetr~ed.
I

On 1 June 1918 the French intercepted a Ge~ radiogramI

which they deciphered on the second day following.

It hadbeen sent by a station in the region of Roye, and contained
the text:"Speed up supply of ammunition even by day, if

not subject to observation."•

This telegram, which suggested

an impending action, was a warning --~~gna.L..£or the army of75

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c:n!'lt"lY•'d uy C~·u~rL•.l I\·mc;in on 11 Jur1P. uuo.r l{..:J.',Y-Courcollos tohol•.i the a'LL:. . ck, llhieh t-La.rlc..d ncar ,t.~on'Ldid:i.~~l' in lh-:: nic:h'L
fl.'Ofll

9 t.o 10 JllJlO.
'Ilw ord.ur of tlJo day of tho German Seventh Army on 9 July

191S stales llw.l. tho presence of the French Tenth Arrrry hnd been

revealed to tho Gcmans by mentioning a French radio offlccr by'!'his o.rn:y betrcyed itself by the storootypa fo.tmula'Liou or

name.

the daily reports of the weather station Trilport.

The Gorman

daily report also remarks that an the end of the week the station
call signs of 'Lhe American 'l'hird Division 'had been heard in thearea east of Chateau-Thierr.y.
The French intercept service scored its greatest trimnph in
Ju~ of this year before the beginning of the German attack on

both sides of Reims.

From intercepted German telephone conversations

and ground telegraph traffic, as well as from several interceptedradiograms, th~ French had ~cognized the area and the t~e of theattack.

Th~y didthe only thine possible under the circumstances -they evacuated the front positions and received the German thrust in
their rear positions.

Twenty-four hours after the attack began, theGerman supreme conunand had to issue its order to stop the offensive.
Liken.dse, the attack of Foch from the forest of Villers-C9tterets
on lS Ju~ against the right flank of the German bulge was supported
for the most part by the intelligence gleaned qy the French intercept
service, main~ from intercepted ground telegraph traffic.

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The sameR E S -21
I

I

I

II

held true for the attack by Foch ~e~we~~ the Somme and Scarpa in. .

.

the direction of Cambra! on 21 Au~st,and again in connection
:f
'\
I fl

\I~ ~~

1o"

O

~ L

I

'

,f

•

I

with the American attack shortlY thereafter.. on the Lorrainef

J ~":'~'"I~

front near St. Mihiel.
(

In all these cases interception of Ge~n ground telegraphtraffic had given the Allies extensive insight into:1.

the structure of the German front,2.

strength, or losses, and weakness of theGerman units,3.

difficulties with supply of artilleryammunition, and with respect to the qualityof the badly used up German guns,

4.

morale of the troops, conditioned by thedifficult s~PPll situation, by the war
weariness orun~ts brought from the east, andby the impression on morale made by' the tanks
now appearing in large numbers on the Allied
side.

.~

I

r

o(

•

On the German side, the above:-menti~ned attacks by' the enemy
had been recognized in time b,y intercepting telephone and groundtelegraph traffic; however, there were no forQes le~ which
I

I

0

...

•

I

,

I

~

I''

0

I

I

could be opposed to the superior forces of the enemy.
The French direction finding service had been greatly
developed during 1917 and during the first half of 1918.

A

large number of mobile direction
finding stations had beenI''I

ass~gnedI,/'

I

to the armies, and these patroled the entire front.

These stations proved their worth admirably in J~ly 1918; without'havi~g todecipher a single'German radiogram, the German

intention to retreat beyond the Veale, then the Aisne, thenthe.Aillette was recognized clearly from d~ to d~ by comparing the French direction fixes.

The fact that the German

17

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ut.c:Lion c."'..Ll ~•J.1 •J:.. ~;ere ch..!ue•xl d.c.l.ll,y,o. da,\',

l-1 i.dnut.. U.l.J[~ni:Jc Lll.lo.

··r;r.l..:l.lr•Klf:lseveral ti.l.n:J'l'ho Gcrrnn racllo ~t01.t.iona ucrc

lvorkiJJG so lwlu:... Ll"i fJl.u:;ly t.hat tho l•'rc11ch · •..:rc able t.o racoQlizc

t.ho idcnt.lL;y oi" tho..) ot.at:ton:J from Lhc abundance of di1·cctlon

findinG fixes 1.:lv~ucver there uas a chru1t;e of co.11 sign..

'lholong moves of the \WaLher st..ations in tho 1•ear area.o h~ld by

the Gcnn•.'1.ns eavo i..hu French valuable clues o.s to tho Genn:mini..ention.:J ..
Shortly a.rt.cr the end of the lfar it was aoaorl.11d ou theGorman sido th!l.t i.ho GGl"lllall aney in th(\ \'rest. ha.J rc turned
unbeaLcn from t.he war· and that only the "dam;er thrust. _i'rom
the homela.ndrt (the Revolut.ion of Uovembcr 1918) had brought
about the oo.taetrophe.

While mnlntaining complete objectiv-

ity, I must observe that there can be no mrmtion of such athing.

I had opportunity Lo compare t.he results of the Germanintercept service and those of the Allies for the year 1918,
to \-reigh thern agai11st one another, and to compare the military
measures which l-rere then carried outc

The intercepted messages

gave a reliable picture of the siluation on both sides; they
showed the degree of readiness for bat.tle nnd the morale onbolh sides.

Without wishing to detract in the least from thevalue of the German soldier, it must be stated factual~ butemphatically that, from l'.iey 1918 on, the German front was inan utterly hopeless situation.

'l'he assumption that the Germans

might perhaps have succeeded in gaining more favorable conditions

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e·for an armistice b,y retreating step b,y step and fighting all thel"lay is quite erroneous.

Had this bcea done, then a. complete

collapse ltould doubtless have come in the spring of 1919 ~~helatcsh and it would haye resulted in the complete annihila.t:tonof the Gorman army in the \"lest.

Any attempt to gainsa;y thisneglects the facts, and these facts' were nmthere reflected more.

I

cJemly than in the results of the in:tercept service.

The German1soldier fought bravely; motethan tha.t - he tried with heroicIself-sacrifice to resist just as far as possible in spite ofundernourishment and hopeless inferiority in materiel.
is such a thing as the impossible.

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But thererl'llli BECOfoiD ID\LF OF 'l'llli \-11\.H lN 'l'JJE l~ABT{Ll\TEl 1915--l918)
From Scpt..cmbor ~9~5 to tho end or 14o.y 1916 virtua.lJ.y noth:ln~

occul.'rcd "ln the eo.st, operat:J.onally spca.klnc;.

,.,

Then in Jtma 1916

on t.he Austro ..Jiuncar:lnn front the famous Drusil.ov of.fena:l.vc broke looGe,just o.t t.hc moment when the Austrians ho.d commitlied all their available forces on the Italian front.

'l~isoffensive wus not quite un-

expected by the Austrians, for the Austrian t"a.d:l o intercept sc:t•v:l.coalone; ~iith tho Arendt service had picked up mo.ny indicationa of animpending large scale opera.t:ion.

In•particular, there vl:o.s a nuosian

telegram sent on 3 June which betrayed to the Austrians the itopcnd.ing
l•1rc,e scale attack.

But in uownriBht, frivolous underestimation o:r

the fightina strene;th of the Russians, the Austrians had taJccn thematter lightly and made almost no preparations to vra.rd ofr the o.ttaclt.Thus Brus:l.lov was able to penetrate deep in the region of Lutsk e.nc1
particularly in the Bttkovina before rccmfol·cetnents from other sectors
brought the wavering front to a stand.
r.rhe Al.ls·trian intellic;once serv:l.ce bad not at that ·ti\'11::! recoanized fuJ ly the vo.lue of the At'endt service, and had not OJ:•e;o.nizcd the
cxploito.tion or the iutercepte:.d convcrsat:f.ons, as it should h::we (1onc:.
I'1oreover 1 tho Austi•ian army cOti:Ill!l.nd had turned ita en·&ire attention
to the I t..a.lia.n fl'Ol'lt' and, despl te the '\ta.rnincrs or the CO!IUI!O.ndo:r-s
in the ca.::::t, ltu.LI not been able to make up its mind to send reenf'Ol.'cementa to 1..l'l.e tllrl!atened f1·ont.

In the central sector of the ens ta1.•n

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front 1 which was hel.d by German troops 1 the Russian attack had.
no success 1 for here the peopl.e bad known how to make better and'prompt use of the results of the intercept service. At tho.t time
I

'

'

'

aJ.l. Russian arrangements from army down to company orders bad.
I
I ·.

been in,ercepted l.ong bei'ore the begimling of the offensive.

The

attacks ~t with a wel.l.-organized resistance.

\

Even at the end of 1915 the Russ:J.ans were stil.l. 'suppl.ying\pl.enty of material. for the opposing intercept service.

Onl.y sl.owl.y

did recognition of the danser lurking in the careless use oftechnical. means of communicatio11 begin to spread among them.

Latein 1915 one station of the Russian Fourth Army was ordered tomonitor the work of its own stations.

This was the first recorded

attempt to increase the securi~y factor by monitoring their own•

radio discipl.ine; at that time, however, it was al.ready too l.ate.
In the ~ring of 1916 the Russians attempted a radio deception
on the Austrian front 1 and this caused much amusement in the Austrian intercept service.

To veil the withdrawal. of tvro corps,

they had several. radio stations carry on deceptive traffic.
Ronge reports that the Russians, innocent as chil.dren 1 announced
this in advance in a radiogram which was solved, natural.ly 1 by theAustrians.

Moreover 1 they prefiXed to every fake telegram an en..

ciphered sentence with the follcn1ing content:
this· is just deception"/"Do not be e.larmedj

This intermezzo was comi'ortina to the Austrians,Iinasmush as it showed that the Russians bad no idea that their
I

•

:n

RESTRICTED

'rh(' 1\nw·tJ.ov offensive 'tTO.G !;he lr.toh o.tLcll1pt by Cm:~.ria~ nuosia: 1

to tu1•n the for l;tmcs of 11o.r in 1-~o awn i'nvor.

\-11th i ';s expirationin Ser>tcml,•.::r 1916 o.nd with the outcome of tiLe i'ollmrina ca1upaicsn inRomania., the ·uar f:lpil.·.tt in Russia ho.d disa.J.')peo.redft

Intercepted

Russian tclcpllone conversations revealed a rapid decline in fiehtine
tuoralc and o. clear rise or revolutionary i;endcncy.

Over the telephone

men scolded openly about Lheir officers and talked about the senselessness of prolonc;inc the \-Tar.

The thouc;hts of the Russian soldier

turned more o.nd mol•e towo.rcl hom0 re:hher tho.n to the front and to theenemy.

Even amon.g the officer corps trends could be reco1311:I.zd'd which

aimed at ending the war, since o. military victory was no lonser considercd possible.
was bo.d.

fJuppJy 'WO.S lno.dequo.te; the O.lllm.tmition ~ituationeSocial tensions beGan· to occt\py more ant'l. more space in a.1lconversations.
In I.fu.rch 1}17 the revolution broke out in Petersburg.
l~ichola.s

II abdlcatcd ln l..he nir:;h-c of 15 - 16 Harch.

Czar

The middle
IIclass Democrats am:l the morlcrate Socialists under Kerenski took
pmrer.

In spite of the '1ar 1rea.riucas of' the soldiers, they determined

to continue the ·uo.r.

llonitorloa or nussian in·t;ernal traffic showed

tb.D.t a. ncu wave or enel'Q' fi•oul v.uovc J:lOUl'cd ou(, over the country andthe army.

Thcr~'\rae an n~tl.::l.lpli under uational democratic vatchwords

to rcenliven l.he mllito.ry i'.ic;hl..ing spb·it o.l. the f.1.•ont.
Very soon the inl..e:t·ccpt fiel.'Vice l.ea:.·nc..:•l chat tll·~ 11uostan front'\TUS

s b.bilizine; il..scli' o.nc··r, a.nd v1e.s !'l'eparinc:; for ofi'encive battles.

RESTRICTED•While the Germans were engaged in violent defensive battles in Flanders, and the Austrians stood at the Isonzo, the Russians under Brusi~ov,

who had mea:mrhiJ.e become cotl'ID'ID.nd.er-in-chief of' the entire Russian

Army~ attacked on 1 July 19~7.

The i~enil.ing attack had long since

been recognized by the German and Austrian intercept service.
had had ample time to prepare for it.

They

The men at the instruments sat

tense and listened to every conversation which referred to the attackand its execution.
German ~ines.

From Riga to Smorgon the storn broke before the

Only in Galicia did the Russians b·~e partial success.

But in the coWltertbrust German and Austrian troo:, s broke through theRussian lines near Tarnopol, and caused the entire Russian front to\raver.

All of East Galicia and Bukovina, which 1u.a. been lost theyear before, were again occupied.
To con:g;~le·te the ·military collapse of' Russia, on the left flank
the German EiB}lth Army attacked and took Riga. on 3 September.

Theislands Oesel:, Moon, and Da.goe lrere occupied in October.
MeamrhiJ.e, the intercept service had learned of the complete
break-down in morale of the Russian front.

The former '\oTar '\oTearinessof the Russian soldiers bad made way for definite hostLlity toward " ' \war.

The tension between men and off leers changed into open conflict.

The social ft...ctor came into the foreground, sharp and clear.

',

All con-versations. turned on the ending of the war and the readjustment or social
problems •• They to.lked only about capitalists and bottrgeois as parties
interested in the "VTur; it 're.s clearly to be felt thtrt the 'iru.• on t:!J.e

RESTRICTED\,

•rnvolu.tion bl·ol;:c out in rctcrsuw.·c.

K•-l·•:nok·r "Wt'll .ovurtlu·owJ.l.

'l'hc no11Jhcv lQ ta toolt over tbc covcrnnlt nt..

l(O\T propncn.ndo. l'&\lio-.

gro.nm n.ud ittBtl·uc·tions £rom tlle nc'\-r c;ovcrllU1ent went out o.ll OVCl."

tho cotml.ry by l.he dozen, t.hy 1/Cl"C hoard by t.he Ga:rman lltld Aus:trianintt..-rcc."Pt se1•vj ccs o.s well.

Tho major activity or. thcoe oCTVices

wo.s now tm-n~d !'rom monitoring Russian military radio trai'£ic toli&tenine; to Hussian internal traffic.

It wo.a a question o:r go.in,..

ing clarity regardinG events in Russia.

The milit~y intercept

serv;ice in the ~o.st had completed its o.sstanment; pow the pol.itioal
assignment stepped into the forearound.

A1'ter the end of '-lorld \·Je.t" I, General Ro.r:rma.nn, :Ln his book
11

The War o! ltiissed Opportunities, II stated with rogo.rd to the inter-

cept service that during the entire war in the east this service
had su;pplied t.he German comrno.nd currently with such cmqplete in-formation regardina the enemy that it was always fully informed
rcga.iod1ng the situation on the enemy side.
From Ta.nn.rnberg to the em oi' the war the interception of
Ruso1a.n technical means of cormmmications had given the German
I

and Austrian ccmnand. so many suggestions rar the execution of theirown measures that it is i'II\POBSible to conceive how the 'W.r in theeast 'might have gone, if this meRna of intelligence had not been
eD4lloyed b;r the Central Powers, and i f the Russians had not usedtheir technical means of communications in such a careless manner.

:RESTRICTEDeRESlFRI~D 1

In the course oi' Worl.t1 \~a1.• I the in~ercept service on bothsides scored various successes which mode it possible to win b~ttl.es,
to plan and cal.'ry out operations, or co help shape entire campaigns ,'to a very greac degree.

Hovrevcr iuqlOrtant chese individual Sl.l.cces-·ses '1ere and hO\-Tever GI'eatly they inflttenced the course of rnl.itary
events, they vrere nevertheless not able to produce results 't-Thich
would decide the war.

Onl~in ~ case did this happen, and thiscase will. now be described briefly.
It '-1as in August 1911~, a fevr days a.:fter the occupa·tion ofBrussels' by the German troops, '\"Then a German officer appeared in
an aristocratic villa in the suuurbs of Brussels, presented abillet slip and took up his q:uarters there.
to the family Czelt.

The villa belor.ged

On the following day the son of the house,

Alexander Czek, an engineer by calling, announced himself to theGerman officer and asked for a brief interview.

I·c was gran·ted will-

ingly, and now Alexander Czek related that he had. set up in his
house a short time before a radio sending and receiving set which
was not being used by him at the moment but was ready for operation.

He desil·~d to brine; this fact to the a:litention of theGerman military a.trlihorities so that he would not corr.e under suspicion of' carrying on espioP..age ;rith the aid of' this re.dio set.
IIe l.ed the Gerr.'lan officer into the room in question o.nd ~hm·red him
the o.ppara.tus.

The officer nou gave instructions to leave the

r

...
•

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conpetcnt.. Gcrm'ln r.>iennl officer 1 '\-Tho wonJ.cl tlv:.:u t..ul<:c 1)ropc1• action.
On the follovinc; do.y thoro apl)Co:t•ed o.t tha home of,l\l.e=:::J.ndel'
C~oko. Ccrun.n l.icutcnnnt. colonel., the s:ic;no.l offi.cer or the Germo.n

cotmno.nd in Brussels, nho ho.d the sot demonstro.ted4

He recoe;nizcd

at once thnt Czck had constructed au apparatus which '\orus bro.nd ne'\oT·in the field of radioteiec;ro.phy, since it made possible working
on an extraordino.rily '\Tj.dc wave-band without havinc; to ~crtD.ltc
cotnplicated S'\oritchinc;s or other chanc;es.

Such an apparatus was

exceedin~ly important for l1andli~ receptton,

espcciaily for the inter-1

cept service which still had t'b count on !~he enemy's using '\fo.ves forI

which one was not equipped.
taken to beadquart.crs.

Czel:'s appa.I·.~tus lftl.B dismounted andHith that the matter was settled for thetime being.
Some weeks later technical trouble develqped in the transmitting apparatus of the heavy German radio station in Brussels, which
could not be eliminated '\>Tith the means at band.

By chance, someone

retnembered the enc;ineer Alexander Czek and had him summoned.

Czek

.

succeeded, in eliminating Ghc trouble in a shm·t time and in getting
the station ready for operation.
The radio sta~ion of the Brussels general cor.nnand had threeassiann~nts

at the time:first, it had to work the arn~ traffic of

the higher Gertnan mil.i tary authorities; next, it "'To.s in direct cotnmun:l.cation with ~Te.uen and KBnies'lorustcrhausen for handling diplornatic

RESTRICTEDRE~HIJl

rau:to tl'nfi'ic 'between the Foreien o.r:r:tce in Bcrljn o.nc1 ·the "l·:tili'
tary J\.dministro.tion Bclcium"; the third taslt consisted in copylngIduring free periods foreiGn radio traffic, i.e., in carrying on\·.intercept '\-To1•k.
\

The technical qualifications of the engineer Alexander Czek

bad now attracted the attention of the Germans, and it was decided\

tq m.<J.l;:e use of his services.

Especially since, as it turned out,

Czek '-ras not a Belgian but an Austrian.

His father had held a highposition in Austria and belonged for a time to the intimate circleof Emperor Franz Joseph.
woman.

Alexander Czek 1 s mother was a.n English

The family had resided in Brussels for several years, andBelgium had become their new homeland. Before engaging Czelt's
services for a long ter , some investigations were made, which a1l
turned out in favor of the Czek family.

In Vienna it was statedthat there was not the slightest doubt regarding the family ingeneral or about Alexander Czek in particular.
lfuereupon, Alexander Czek was requested by the Brussels command
to appear, and they now revealed to him that there was a prospectof using his services for sorr~ little time; they suggested thathe enter the Brussels radio station on the basis of a civilian
contract.
Aside from his technical knOl-lledge in the field of radio,
Czek had a good lmOl-Tlede;e of several laneue.:::;es, and it was thislo.ttor circumstance '\·Thich finally proved tl:e determining i'c.ctor

,~I

,.
·~

RESTRICTED

in cn[})G in~.; 111m o.t: t.l1<..: radio s to:l...! on.

C?.t:!k a.gr(~c<l l).llu , nr;

vrcn tl~illl':lon, r1·ovec.l. i.o l.n~ o.n cxtrctooly useful fellow worker.

He took care of

all ·tll.':} appru.·.:J.tus, m...\dc swo;c;cotionc foranrJ. on cvr:.ry

impl·ovcl.li~nts,

occa.sion r~.:uJ.uretl !;OOd t>~rvico with his linc;uis tic kno"rlcdce.

They

'

cam') to l:.J.'1J.st him o.bsolut.ely and one d.o.y rev'ca.lcd t.o him that theyinteudctl to usc hlm in the radio receivinc; nervice.
Czek lu1cw the Uor!lc al;pho.bet o.ud. could copy nt wh::~.t '\o7cs thenthe us\ml ~:~peed..

lie was Blven addi tiono.l tro.ininc; in Ct\1" recCI~tion.,

ancl "r;To./ then eti!ployed in copylna the tre.nsmisoions or foreign stations
I
I

sent fn p lo.in text.

They ho.d ha.(l Czclc sir;n a plcclc;e of secrecy; l1rv1.

'

ad.monj shed him to maintain a.baolute silence; and 1-tif...h that, all t.heifor~~lities

I

were at an end.

In his nm·r field Czcl;. vrurkcd to cveryl>oiy' s satisfaction.

Evidently
t.hr::y had
I

m:J.rle a e;ood. find at the Brussels 1•arlio sta:t.iou.

Ai'ter sottte months ho.d. pP.sscd, they went. a step further and usedI

Czek for their own sendinc; aml receivinG service, pri.rnn.ri.ly OL"l traffic'\(ithUaucn e.ud KBnic;smts terb..u.usen.

H~

llo.d to sen<l or receive theenciphered telearows.
Alexa.wlcr Czck 1ms not only o.. corrrr:etent t..cchniciru.l o.nd lille;ttiElt 1
but he nlao proverl to be on ae;reeo.ulc cotrr.(.lo.nlon and cOtitt•ar.lc.

Hespent mo.ny an cv .=.mina i.n anj m.~tcL1 conv~rsatiou 11j.th l1is ll<".:1-t cot.w::"a.de::;o.r.d 11lth tllt:! officers or 'Lh·.: Bruoscla conn"and und "'T.J.G ever:r·rhcrc
a. 1TelCOlll.:l et'-"Gt.

ThtJ (;Cll•?l'O.l confidence in hilll 1:a.s tUlbOU'Ylrlec1.

One

duy 1rllen thr;re ·u3.s _peo.k orere.tion o.t the l'aclio station, sevc:~:e.l verylon~

cncipherec.l. tcleG1'ams o.rrived frota thoJ Fcrcian Off lee at lJcrlin.

ns

RESTRICTED

It a.lso h..-"l)_Jpcned that t110 ])Cople at t~he station were si.ck.

The

heo.ds mail.e up their minds quickly and ho.11ded Czek the two codebool\:s by the aid of which the cryp togl"a]."lhic system used uy lihe
Foreic;n Office '\-Ta.S deciphered, cave him the necesso..'l·y instructions
for using the t'\m codes, ~d Czek sc·t t;o 'tvork.
The 'cryptogro.ph:i.c system used by the foreiBil Office in communication with representatives abroad (including the adminstra.tion of the 11General-GouverntJJ.ent Belaien") consisted of a code andan cncipherment.

The code, or "Schluessellluclt" as it "t-m.s ca.lled

at that time, "tva.s a thick volume in which the code elements andI

their meanings in plain text were entered in alphabetic sequence.
A decipherment by the aid of this key book 'liro.s quite simple; one
only had to l.ook u;p the code groups :In their alphabetic seqLtence

and read off the meaning.

To make the system more resistant tounauthorized decipherment, they had provided e.n enci:_pherment by
the aid of which the secret text derived by chaneing the plain
text into code grou,ps 'tvas changed again, i.e., was reenciphered.
This encipherment book tr.:!S a relatively small volume, and when
deciphering a telegram it 'tYa.B necessary to work with this little
book first, i.e., to find the basic key by removing the encipherment.

This procedure 'tvas relatively simple, but called for a ce:r·-tain sldll_, since radioarams sometimes ar1•ived in garbled conditionend the solution of the groups "'·Tas not al"'-ra.ys obvi01.1.s.

Therefore,

it '\Tas necessa.Ty to master the Morse alphabet. e.nc1 to l::!!O"'7 the

8D

RESTRICTEDREST!HUf~ 21, . . . . . n~:Jbl~ .. ~·-~·o:.:r. n.\1(1 G Tl·l-::o in ordC.l." to rc.:J.ch ::1. .;:;olll i. :.ell or r .. :1·blc.J wcs~:=- ~;co ·uitl1out ho.ViJ18 to Ecnrl 'L:lC-1=. lone :1 nr.ru11•io:6 ..
Cr.:~l:;. turrred

out to be o.n c::ct;remol.y cl-::vcr dccorl€:..·, r-n·l :r:a.·u~a.

then on be 1~~::; u~cd repeatedly !or decodj_l'l£1 li'cannc;cs orri'lri.ne
frOi.l DCJ.•li.n.

By beinB introduced into the intercept nervlce,.

into the entire sendinG ~nd receiving activit,r or th~ ~tatjon,
into th:! m>l"lt of decodiuc;, 0.11tl j_nl:;o questions of tochnol.oSY1
Czck. hc.d e.l"TiV'Cd a:L a confidential position of the i'irst ro.nl" ..

r.:c i'illcu it conGciontioWJllr1 and gave no occc.sion 1'01" at"JY compl.a.ints ub.:J.tsocver.

In the D\'Llh.r!.:n" o.r 1915 o. co.pto.in or the En{llish Intelliscnce
Service turned up in Dr\losels "ho ho.d lcanl! c.l. tho.t there vas ams.n enu?loyed at the Brusscln rc.diu st.,. t!on 1rllo lmd. b'!cn rcsidillcl

in Brussels.

He thou:;ht tb.:f :s mic,ll.t b~ a cllO.llCC to aet soma insicht

into the operation o:r the EiLa.t:ion, a.ncl bcco.n to spin a. lreb a.r~Czek, so to spool'".

A youn3 lt>tl.;r ol' nrur.cclo l'o.s selected to ·uin

Czek over to work for tho British sec1·ot service.

This '\TDS not

e:xactl.y ee.oy beco.uso Czclt be.d. endeavored thus fa.r to ba correctin every wa:y.

Gradua.lly" the youna lady broucht AJ.c:m.nder Czclt.

into contact vith members of' the Belaio.n Ji ·,era tion movement, ando.fter months of work f'inall.y succeeded in convincine; him tho.t it

was his duty to work not i'or the Germans but for t.bc .AJ.lies.
They reminded him oi' his mother 1 s nationality1 of his new homeland, of' the German attack on Belgium, of the German striv.ina for

I

RESTRICTEDRESM.-IGfFJBD21
pmrer, of the just cause or the Allies, and brousht it about. that
Czek said he was ready to prepare a copy of the code of theBer~in Foreign Officefor the British secret service.

This was the goal of the entire activity of the Brj.tish
secret service, as far as Czek was concernea.
This task was not exa.ctl.y easy since the two code books wre
not in Czek's custody but were only handed over to him from time
to time when he had to decode an incoro.ing telegram.
was by no means the rule.

A1JfJ. thisNormally, decoding was done by theGerman personnel. of the station; Czek was on1ybrought in to
hel.p out.

Moreover, there was usually a second person in theroom so that it did not seem feasible to ccrpy the book systema.t1.ce.lly.

Consequenli1y, Czelt chose another way.

\·Then decoding

incoming tel.egrams, he noted the groups occurring :J.n the tel.egram
al.ong 1-rith their meaning on a sheet of paper, as a draft :f.'or his:::'air copy so to speak, and then copied the text nea.t~y.

Thepencilled notes on the draft he did not destroy but concealed on
his person.

In this wa:y he succeeded over some months in notine

the meo.ning of' all the code groups contained in telegrams received
during this period.

And after a.l.l, those were the sylJ.a.bJ.es,,.,ol'ds, or phrases which were most frequently used.
Czek 'Wen·!; about his work so cleverly that never once did
suspicion fall on him..

It was in a. different 'tray that he aroused.

the mistrust of the German military authorities.

91

RESTRICTED

Ee had. been

RE~IUFml 1
Tiulalan lJ.bcra.tion movulil'::nli.

l'coplc ,.,atchcd h.!.111 e.l'lcl i'ouncl l,r••~.t he

she lia.s in contact 1·1ith the 'Br 1 ti::;h occrct service.

'rherC\l,L)On, C: • 1·

was dismisscJ. £rom the service of the Brussels milito.ry corron.-m.(1, end
was ordered to rcn•::l.in in D1·ussel.o and not to lco.ve ·tho.t city.
Ilo\-T Czek so.w danBE>l.• arisinG for himself o.nd. for his lTOl·l:., an'1

he decided to i'~cc.

'R'e left Brussels, ta.kine; a.l.ong his skr r·ch<..s,and l"ea.chcd the Dutch border.

1\.lonB this border the r.crmo.no h'-dstretchr:d a. greo.t 'Wil"O bar1·1ce.do ch.a.re;cd llith cl.cctrlcity •knew this.

C~c]:-'·Ti th ~~o boards which he 'Wrapped with inflated. bic~rclotubes, he succeeded in producing two inuulated plates by the aidof which he cravl.cd unc1er th~ electric fcuce and rca.ched Dutch
territory.

Shortly ai'ter,.,o..'l.·ds Czck•a sketches wore in the British

Cipher Dur\::o.U in London.

lo'rom then on they were able to decipher andread a.ll ra.di<.u.:rams which were cxcha.nscd between the "Rerlin Fol.·eien
Ofi'ice e.nd the German representatives abroad.

This '."'S th~ case

frOlll about the end of ~?15 on.
Even though this stroke by the "Rritish Intelligence Service
deserved e;reat recognit~on,i~

is simply marvelous tl~t the Enelishaucceeded in keeping secret throuBhout l.he entire war the fact thatthey knew the cryptographi.c system.

r-Iot Lhe slightest shadO'W ofsuspicion was aroused by e:ny lack of caution.

EYery German telecro.m

enciphered by this system was laid bc.rore the 'Rritish ForoiBn IIinister persona.lly 1 1~ho made his dec is ions c.cc ordir.e;ly.
~:!

RESTRICTED

l~ha:l.. madethe Alexe.ndcr Czelt case a matter of the utmost im-

porta.nce will nati be revealed,
The Secretary or State for Foreien Affairs in Ber~in at tb.o;tLate in 1916 and ea.:~.•ly in 1917 the role of thetime was Zimmermann.

United States a.s purveyor of '\Tar material for the All.ies had a.osumed
su.ch importance that it c.lmost equaled a. state of bellic;erency.
Again and a.ga.in, voices had been raised in the Uni·ted States to theeffect that the United States must enter the 't-Tar in order to shorten
its duration.

On the German side, a.n intensive counter-propaganda.

had been ca.J.•ried on, and Bl'a.due.lly there had developed a. war party
and a. peace party.

As seen :Crom Germany, ·the possibili·ty o~ theentrance oi' the United States into the 't-To.r loomed threatenine;lyon the political horizon.

Then in the Foreign Ofi'ice they decided

on a political intrigue which was intended to afford a. coux1terpoise for this danger.

Zimmcruwm decided to play Mexico against

i:ihe US1\..
At tb.o.li time the President or Mexico was Carranza, lrho had. a·cta.ined the presidency by the aid of the United States buL, nevertheless, had taken a position distinc·tly friendly toward Germany.
About the mid~e of 1917, ZinnJJ.ernJ.ann had 1•ecourse to the Germanambassador in l·1exico, von Ecltha.rdt 1 :i.n a rather long telegram.
This telegram"YTas so illiportan,t f'o1• Z:!.mmermann tho.t he vas
Ivery anxiotts to have it reach the Ge1•man ambassador 1 von Eckhardt,
safely under any circums·tances.

Accordill{;ly, several 1•outcs ucreu .•.., •JRESTRICTED

chosen for transmission.

The i'irst led via radiotelegraphy from

Nauen to Sayville on Long Island for forwarding to the German
Ambassador von Eckhardt in Mexico.
The government of the USA had, to be sure, since the begin-ning of the war forbidden the use of this wireless link for thetransmission of messages dealina wi·th the war, and had kept an eye
on the radio traffic.

Nevertheless, the ra.diogralll was sent anddelivered to Co\Ult Bernstorff, the German ambassador in v1ashington 1
Who forwarded the contents to von Eckhardt.
The second route was via SWeden, by wireless from Stockholm
to Buenos Aires, from there to Washington, and from there again
to Mexico.
The third route was not without its humorous side.

It hadbeen planned to send the telegram in the form of a letter on thelarge German submo:rine "Deutschl.and," whose captain, K6nig, wasconsidered at that time one of the best submarine comme1'1ders.
The departure of the submarine, which was origina.lly fixed for 15
January, was delayed and they withdrew the letter in order toappend its contents to a telegram 'Which was being sent by thethen American ambassador in Berlin to his government in W~shington.
How this route came to be chosen was as follows:

The German Foreign Office applied to the ambassador of thetTSA in Berl.in, Gerard, with a request to transmit a telegram of
the Foreign Office to Ambassador von Bernstortf.

94

RESTRICTED

Since 1 t wascustoma.ry to show the text of the tel.egram. in plain l.angu.age'

in such cases, the Foreign O~fice showed Ambassador Gerard atelegram numbered 157 which was directed to von Bernstorff and.
I'

I

'Which referred to ·!;he peace action of President W:Uson.
approved of sending the teJ.egra.m.

GerardIn real.ity1 however 1 theForeign Office bad appended to the enciphered ·text of the telegram 157 another telegram, namely, the one previously mentioned
and. intended for Ambassador von Eckhardt.

The grotesque feature

was that Zi'Dlillermann was usil'lg the American ambassador, Gerard,
and the American Secretary of State to transmit a tel.egram 'Whosecontent concerned a hostile action against ·the USA.

At the Berl.in Foreign Office they felt at that time thatthey had been very sly, and they were proud of having so neatly"taken in" the ambassador of the USA. But it is an old story
that, precisely when one is trying to be especially sl.y, one ise.lready about to commit something especia.l.ly stu;pid.

In thiscasa the stupidity was enormous 1 for 1t was known to the Foreign
Office that this tel.egre:m. had to take the following route:fromBerl.in by wire to Copenhagen, from there by cable to London, and:f'rom London by ~abl.e to New York.
After the outbreak of war 1 Engl.and had generously declareditself ready to forward enciphered telegrams of neutral diploma·ts
which contained messages of the German Government to its diplo-•

matic representatives abroad.

It never occurred to anyone in95

RESTRICTED

Berlin that this ~Jencrosity 't-18.S prompted by the idea of beinG
able in thi.s way to _control all German telegrams in both directions.
The humorous part, in this instance, lay in a di:f':f'e:rent
direction.

On 16 January the British Intercept service hadintercepted the Nauen telegram to Sayville; however. the :reception was so bad that tbe message could only be cop:J.ed in bac1ly
g~bledform.

When they,had deciphered the enciphered text tp

London, they fine.l.l$ go~, -the following:--\

To the Imperial German Ambassador in Washington.
Count Bernstorff,ll

For the Iuq>erial Gertila.l\ Ambassador in Mexico, von Eckhardt.
'
Strictly secret, intended only for the personal information of Your Excellency and. to be forwarde~ to the Imperial.Ambassador in :Mexico, by means of • • • by a secure route.
I.

We are planning to start ~estricted submarine warfare beginning 1 February.

Nevertheless, we are very anx-ious to keep the United States neutral ••••

If that is not\

successfUl, we propose to Mexico an alliance on the following basis:••• warfare •••• conclusion of peace.

Your Excel-

lency will, for the time being, inform the President ••• \rerwith USA ••• President ••• , that our submarines will force
En13land to make peace 't-Tithin a few months.

Confirnn.tion

requested.
Zinu.. Jrtna.nn
f:6•'

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Th:i.s d:l spatch shm1ed tbat o. di11lom1J.t:i.c action or the firstIrank by Germany '1r1ns :i.nvolvec1. . rl'llc 11 :..:ecre t 3ervi ce 11 was imrr.cclia. tely told L.o purcho.se :i.n Uexico C:ity from the l;elegrc.ph btu•oa.u a.

•

copy of the tnlec;ram fol""'-Tardcd hy von Hcrnotorrr to vou !!.ckhtu•dt.
Hov1cver, before l;h is happcnec1, the tclecram sent by Gerard to'Hashine;J.;on arr.ivec1 in Hoom nur.1bnr J,o of l.,hc Eritish Admiralty,
and this suppllctl ~he Bl·itt::;h '!r:;l"~tarm.l.yi,jr. Gcrv1.ce with a com.•plete text of ti:mt;;~lc1.1"o.mof ~:it n.,r~rr:m.nn to von Eckhardl;.

On the avenin!; of' 23 li'ehrnc.r;,· 1/17, the a1,1bo.ssador of theUSA

in London, l·h·. PaGe, received a l..c-lP.phonc c~ll from theBr:l.tish ForeiGn Ilinj_ster, IIr. na.li'our, who rcCJ.U~stcd hint to callat the Forcic;n Of:!'ice t.hat so.me oa.;y.
to Do'1rm:l.nB Utrect.

PrJ.se l:.c tnok hh1nelf at once

After the r.;enl;lei.len had c;rccted one another,

Balfour without o. lmrd llf.1.ncled ·~he nmbaoso.dor or the UGA a sheetof paper whose t;ype,-7r:f.tten text Page read lrith crmr:inc; interest.

In the i'ollowin£3 nieht the follmri.n3 w~ry tu•r.;cnt cablcc;l.'am.
went from London to ~~ashinGton:
21~ February 1917

To the President,
Office of the Secretary oi' State, Hashington.

In about three hours I shall dispatch to the Presiden·t ond
Secretary of State a teleGram of the {;l'eatest importan~e.
Page.

97

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R E S -1
At llt~ r-,qllrn.tton or liht: DrulO\U\PCtl IJJrC'l bOUl"S tiJc London

211- Fobrna.r7 1?17

To Llm l'r•:o lrlt"nl.,orr~ coor l..lt•• t''l'"l-ol:.o.ry or Otn.tc, Uo.sbtncton.

fJt'Cl"t'(...

J.t'or t.h,. l"Tco lt\onL and Llm or.r.Lce or tho fl'!crotaryBo.lt"OUl• hoG clv."n me Lbc lcxt or on ~nc lpht!l"Od

Lolo~o.mIfrom Zblll"l"111111Ul t.o t.bc C:el"'IID.ll nmtJaef'oilor ln tlcxico.

Ua.ohin:;Lon.

A cop:r'lhc flrot (T~lUJ1 fl'lcJ.Lco.tna t.bn telc(..'l'a.m mnriborJI

pornono.J

t n•1 r.t"ntl:l n.,; by pnn t. a. ca,p7•clrnl 1 r1 rn t.: on T.l'\l1ll,.

!ICD.Il'Whtle lhr, !:u 1 1 •.1\ 1.1'1\llnlrst.lon fol.lC'WD;

slmll 1r1Ql:•.· I :t•X i rC) 1\ lll' .,xmll.llll\ fer r•n ulllt•J].t•., Oil the rol1

0\\J' pru•t. i.h:..~.:~ 11~ f I •·n i r

I o :r't'I"Oil !ll~"l' l,lt.· l"E L [l.l t.r\n ot' '.Ccxna,
I

I'

RESTRICTEDRE~tiJCHDl
most secretly inform the President of this when the entranceof the united states into the war had become certain, andsuggest at the same time that he on his own initiative callupon Japan to join us, and that he mediate between Japan and•ourselves.

At the same time, call the President's attention

to the fact that we are waging unrestricted submarine warfare,and in that w~ shall force England to make peace in a few
months.
Zimmermann"
I hasten to send this message so that all necessar,y measures may be taken to guard our territor,y against invasion ••StrictlY secret& -- At the beginning of the war the
British Government came into the possession of a code.
served for decipherment of the above telegram.

It

The Govern-

ment obtained copies of von Bernstorff's telegrams which went
to Mexico.

They were sent to London and deciphered there.

This system has hitherto been a strictly guarded secret regarding which the British Government informed me only in view of the~usualcircumstances and of its friendly feelings for theUnited states.

The British Government requests maintenanceof strictest secrecy, but has no objection to the publicationof this Zimmermann telegram.
Copies of this and other telegrams were not secured in
Washington, but were purchased in Mexico.

99

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I have thanked Balfour.
The Japanese have not as yet been informed 11 but it isprobable tba.t they will discuss the matter publicly when
they have knowledge of it 11 in order to clarify their position
and to prove their fidelity to the Allies.

Page

The way in Which the British came tnto possession of thisI

message is described in the words:
in Mexico.""The telegram. was purchased

ltawever, the English secret $ervice actually got

this precious message in the following ways:
1.

by intercepting the radiogram from Nauen to Sayville J

2.

by intercepting the radiogram from Stockholm to Buenos
Aires;

3. by reading the cablegram from Berlin via Copenhagen to
London and Washington;

4. by purchasing from a Mexican telegraph official the
Morse tape, preserved in the telegral?h office in Mexico,of the telegram from von Bernstorff to von Eckhardt.
The purchase in Mexico did not take pl.ace, to be sure, until
a knowledge of the content had been obtained in the first three
ways mentioned; it merely served for confirmation.
One can imagine What impression the knowledge of this dispatch
made in Washington on the President and on Secretary of State Lansing.

100

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Al.though the content of the Zinnnermann telegram was condit:J.one.l
and only applied in case the United States declared war on Germany,I

nevertheless this German step aroused great indignation in Washing-

.

ton.

The support - even though conditional - of Mexico's claim

to the three southern states which it had lost to the UnitedStates in the war or 1846, was reearded as an attack on the territorial status of the United Sta~es.

They overlooked the basic

idea of the dispatch which was to the effect that Germany wastrying to maintain the neutrality of the United States, and only
regarded the contingent consequence which would be released byAmerica's entrance into the war.
In spite of all their indignation, people in l'lashington were
mistrustful. of London.

Suppose the entire Zimmermann telegram were

only a fake to maneuver the United States into the wart

They wanted

proof, and telegraphed to the ambassador in London that he should
ask the British Government to turn over a copy of the German secretcode.
The British Government declined from basic considerations of
security, but decl.a.red that it was ready to have the Zi:nmermann
telegram decoded once more using the code present in London, andto have this done in the presence of a member of the American
enibassy in London.

This was an easy matter, since Mr. Bell, theSecretary of the American embassy and representative of the signal
service, lived quite near the British central intelligence office.

RESTRICTEDThe enciphered Zimmern~nn telegram was given to Bell; theBritish loaned him their precious German code, and Dell was now~

able to perform the decoding w:J. thin a few hours. Wilson was now ina position to determine that the message was absolutely authentic.
However, the President insisted on receiving the German original ·text.

In answer to this Page telegraphed:

To the Secretary of State in Washington
The first group signifies the number of the telegram 130 ••The second indicates the code to be used in deciphering.
From group three on, the groups read:
AuswRrtiges Amt, Januar l6.Nr.l. - Ganz geheim.
Selbst zu entziffern. - Wir beabsichtigen- •••••••••
Meanwhile, the second Zimmermann telegram had been decipheredin London and Page got a copy:
To the Imperial German Ambassador in Mexicq von Eckhardt

8 February 1917
Strictly secret.

To be deciphered personally.

·Under the assurqption that the USA would find out nothing
about it, you are requested to present again to the President
the proposal for an alliance.

Any f:i.nal decision, however,is dependent upon the entry of the United States into the war.
The President may enter into negotiations with Japan on his

102

RESTRICTED.
own initiative.

If the President sbouJ.d fear retaliation,I•

you are authorized to offer him a permanent alliance after theIconcl.usion of peace 1 provided he succeeds in drawing Japan•

into the all.iance.
Zimmer~In London they declared they were ready to have deciphermentof tel.egrams of the German Foreign Office carried out jointly witha member of the embassy of the USA in order to give guarantee of thegenuineness of the material.

They were also ready to have messages

sent to Berlin by German representatives abroad deciphered in his
presence.

•

In Washington they agreed to this.

In Berl.in 1 meanwhile 1 people entertained the firm conviction

tha·t the ciphers of other nations might be capable of sol.ution but
not their own.

And the method of transmitting a me~sage of suchimportance through the et~r d:i.d not appear to them as a piece offolly.
Through these two tel.egrams of Zimmermann's, Wilson's position

in regard to Germany '\m.s now clearly determined; for those states•

which had not been able to get up any enthusiasm. for the war thesedispatches afforded proof that an intrigue of the Berlin Foreign
Office was Will.ing to hand over to the Mexicans great areas of theUSA.
Mea.:n:while 1 in Washington they had become convinced that thelo,·

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•

f:irst allCl snnoncl :t.lmmrn·mnun telt'Cl'nmn wt:lrt• ~r·nul nr·.

'l'hr.;y- 1nqulredin r..onnon whcl..ll('\' ll""c~l] r. l,hcrc uonld o.tsrcP. to hJ'l.ldng t.hc content
of the firn I, t..~ lr.cram l.no'm.

A rt.cr sottJc lles i. Lo.l.. i.on thn Brftls'hGovernment~ sl~wd t.ho.t. :f t WO\.tld scree on rondll.lon thuli 'the t..rue.

source should not. ho 1'" ,H~alcd bul. t.im.t t..ll•! ill[)rcaa ton should begiven that thel.ol"CQ."O.lll 111).11'hroen brou~ht l.o i;be o.l..t..cnt.loil or l.he

United States in n01nr. l•IDnncr Jn llcx1c·o.

'l'hPrPupon, \fi.l&on at. theWhite nouse publishcrl l.ht- conl.cnt.. o£ l,he rUsrn.t.•·h Oll 1 Ji.'J.TClt.
A storm o:C indic;na.t;ion ;pnsn,..cl lhrou.1,1\ •JlP. Conc;rcas and thP

entire coWltry".

The wnr ro.1·t:,· got~ nn cnOTtnonn J I rt.

The pul>liC"o.ti.on In \·!o.r.l1 tn:~·.PI, ,,r t.hc ~'.1nmlcrt.l8llll dispatch'

became known n.l. onC"c in DeJ'li.Jl.

'•'here ua.n a.n t:'J~cit.crl se3sion o.r'Was genu tne •"1-le cannot c0111prc~'end row t\ ILPb~rLI/' ···•· :::"'!h ~lll10l"l..liL"e can cotce

to the knowl.cdc;e o! a. ror'=li..:;u r·n~~o·:•:.

~.r rf'.nnn'" C"om·u:J'ire that.

'though he were tllc \Jt:!st O-J.•l hi.OU ... r··l:

!l·

'''

tlu..: vo.rlrl."

Oh the vc1•y da;r on uh t<'11 ~I U:..;....,u vo.u p·.11 ll·;l, h ;, f.:ho.: t.ext of the

..

I •

R:ESTRIC'I'ED

the results of the negotiations. According to him, Corranza had
shown himself "not adverse to such plans" J he would "consider
benevolently, 11 and he had "talked tor an hour and a half" with
the Japanese ambassador in Me~co.
But on the very same dq von Eckhardt learned of events in•washington, and on the next day he telegraphed:
To the Secretary ot State of the Foreign Office 2 March
1917, in Berlin.
The local paper "Universal, 11 which is friendly to the
Allies, publishes today the same report that was contained inyesterday's Washington Telegram - and which apparentlY has
been in the hands of President Wilson since the breaking ofrelations - namelY, the wording of cablegram A Nr. 1. Naturally, this was not revealed by" me here.

Treachery or indis-

cretion must have occurred in the United States or cipher
I 3040 has been betrayed.
The wording ot cable Nr. 2, which reached me in the otherfamiliar fashion, has not been published as yet.

I havedenied everything here.
v. Eckhardt
In Berlin the uneasiness grows.
the betrayal.

They seek the source ot

The following exchange ot telegrams ensuess

To v. Eckhardt

7 March 1917

Please burn all compromising instructions.

•

10:>

RESTRICTEDHave publicl7

recognized the cable.

Please see to spreading the word thatthe alliance was only intended in case of America's entrance
into the war.
Zinun.erma.nn
To v. Eckhardt

21 MB.rch.l917

Strictly secret.
Decipher personally.
Please cable in the same code used for deciphering cables

1 and 2 bow the originals and keys were safeguarded~ andespecially whether the two cables were kept in the same place.
Stumm. - Berlin.
To v. Eckhardt
Various thing indica.t;e that the treachery took place in}.fexico.

The ut.mJst caution is in order.

Burn all con1promi-

sing documents.
Zimmermann'21 March 1917'.ro Zlmm.el'mo.nn

Doth cables were deciJ:!hered by Hagnus a.cco1·ding to my special
inst1-uctions • Bo Lh telegrams, as al~m.ys where political
documents o.r secret character are involved, did no.t come tothe lmowledge of embassy personnel.

Telee;ram Hr. l K 1~

e.rrived in the c 1pher system I 30l~oo 1 whi le Kinkel (a former
employee of the German embassy in Ua.shin13ton), ~rho is now

1 or.

RESTRICTEDRE~!l£7FB1i 1
employed here, thinks he recalls that the Washington embassy
sent it, like all other enciphered telegrams sent here, from
Cape Cod (a cable station) • In both cases the originals
were'burned by Magnus and the ashes were scattered.

•

•

Bo~

cablegrams were preserved in an absolutely secure safe, which
was bought solely for this purpose and was' located in Magnus•
bedroom, down to the time that they were burned.
'Answer to telegram Nr. 21.

Instructions were carried out.

cable number 18 has not arrived as yet.
v. Eckhard-t

In a further telegram of 30 March 1917, von Eckhardt asserts•'

again that any indiscretion in Mexico was not possible and recounts
again all security measures, the reading of the telegrams in a low
voice at night, the security of the safe, etc.J

l111t at the same time

he calls attention to the less cautious procedures at the German

embassy in Washington, where even secret telegrams had been known
to the entire chanceller,r and where two carbons had always been
made for the registry office, something which was never done in
Mexico.

Final~,

he insists upon a judicial investigation by

Consul Grunow.

• of vonIn Berlin they allowed themselves to be convinced
Eckhardt's innocence by this telegram, and confirmed this to him
b,y radiogram of 4 April 1917 in which it says:•

101

RESTRICTED"No blame attaches

to you or I Jn.cnus • "l-Ica.tl'\o7h:J.lc, ncc;otia·tlons with Ca:rram:a :t.n Haxico continued because the deliveries of aumn.mition stood in the forefront.

17 March 1917

To v. Eckhardt, Mexico

Find out; who.t a.mnn.mition and weapons arc desired and whatl·1exican harbor on the east; or '\ores t coast a. German ship would
enter uncler a forei~ i'la.a~

As far as poss-ible, Hexico mustprocure arms from Japan oo1d South America~
Zimmermann.
The Berlin Fore i&rn Office, however, did not 'Luild all its
hopes on Carranza. alone.

They even went so i'ar as to draw his

political opponents and antagonists into the circle or intrigue.
Thus, on 24 Hal'ch 1917 the German military attache in Mexico radios
to Berlin:
The Vice-Consul in Hnzatlo.n repor!;s that Villa., who is being
supported by the Germans, is cxpectin~ three shiploads ofa.mnn.mi t:J on to be landc1.'1. between I Iazatlan and f.f.a.nza.nnillo.
It is thought liha.t Cantu is also in the alliance.

( Can·tu was a

Mexican revolutionary leader '\-Those field of activity was
southern California.)
These tele~rams WCl.'C deciphered in London, and the content
disclosed in s small intj.mate circle.

The Gorman search for thesource of the compromise occasionc(1 great merri'(llent.

1 o~~

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In this connection, it :must be emphasized that the Brit.ish
intercept service was able during the entire war to keep its work
so secret that not the slightest hint regarding it reached theoutside.

The British secret ~ervice, to wlttch the intercept

service belonged, even went so fal~ in camouflagjng its work thatit al~owed articles to appear in the British press critici~ing
its own work and making violent attacks on it.

In these articles,

which were written by the service itself, the wo:r·k of the British
secret service was characterized as total~v antiquated, and it
was asserted that one .failure followed the other.

The atf"air ofthe ZimmernJSnn dispatch was macle the occasion for special cr.i.t...

icism;

it was said that the American intelligence service wasmuch more 1~horough and precise and it. was a shame that the Zimmer....

..!

mann affair had been discovered in Washington and not in London,• ,..i!

ay this constant self-ridicule they fooled the German intelligence
service and German public opinion so thoroughly that these articles in the Engli.sh press were seized upon with great delight,
were reprinted, and provided with appropriate commentaries.
Far more serious, however, was the effect of the Zimmermann

telegrams in the United States.

Between mid-Januar,y and the endof April 1917 soma 60 telegrams were exchanged between Zimmermann
and von Eckhardt.

All came to the knowledge of Wilson.

pression of a plot between GermaQY and Mexico.

They tipped thescales in the foreign policy of the United States.

•

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Their

On 6 April

~917

the USA declared war on Germany.
Ho'\ol'evar, the exha.nge oi' telegrams between Berlin and Mexico

continued:
Ziunnerma.nn, Berlin~3 April 19~7

To v. Eckhardt, Mexico

Plense answer te~egram nwruJer ~0 stating the sums which wi~~be required to support our policy.

Preparations :ror the

shipment of considerable amounts (aid, eventually -weo.pons,too)are being made here.
I

v. Ecld1ardt, :t-fexico

13 April 1917

To Ziunne:rmann, Ber~in
For Nadolny and the Grand General Starr.
Mexico 12 April.

Where is Lieutenant Wohst 1 Did he send approxima:te~y 25 1 000
dollars to Hilken'l

He or someone elsa nn.1.st send me money for

55793 quarterly payments for Hermann.

An explanation:

Hermann, a handsome, blonde German with an Engl! sb accent 1
claims to have received from th~ general staff a year ago themnssion to destroy the Tampico o~l field by fire; this order
was repe&.ted supposedly by Hilken in January; he now proposes
to carry it out, and asks me whether he is to do so.

Uoul.d it

not be wel~ to answer him that I am not in touch with Ber~in'lVerdy thinks tha. t he and hi q companion B 5ll58 Gerda are

110

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REs~21

English or American ~ies.
Request an immediate answer.
v. Eckhardt, Mexico•

To Zinnnermann, Berlin

14 April. 1917

The President decl.a.res he :l.ntend.s to rematn neutral under o.J...!..
circumstances.

If' Mexico neverthel.ess becomes it11tol v~·:l in ·thewar, we must wait and see.

In his opinion the all.iance has

become a ridicul.ous matter due to the premature publicationof the telegram but may l.ater turn out to ~ nef!essary. As.
_,- .....
for the deliveries of amnnmition - 'f mm Mauser rifl.es - andmoney, he will give an answer when he has the power of decisionin his own hands after getting powers plenipotentiary from theCongress.

The Congress is dominated by the pro-German tnilita.ry

party.
v. Eckhardt, Mexico
To Zimmel'tllB.nn, Berlin

17 April 1917

Mexico, 16 April.
Yesterday I attended the opening of the Congress.
President expressed his strict neutrality.
going I received great applause.
live the Kaisert"

Both coming and"Long live Germa.nyl

Long

On entering the hall the entire chamber

manifested its aood will.

The American ambassador was whistl€uat feebly three times ••The'll:ESTRIGTEDThe German public learned nothing of all these events, andin the Foreign Office at Berlin no one had any idea that the entire telegraphic correspondence between Berlin and the German
representatives abroad was being read in England, insofar as it
could be picked up there.

In Berlin they strove for the utmost·,

secrecy, and yet, for all practical purposes, it seemed as if themost secret matters stooti in the public press.

Down to the end of

the war the English were able to follow precisely all dispositionsof the Be lin Foreign Office and of the German Imperial Government.
of the British secret service during the wqr 1 Adndral
William Reginal~ Hall, declared in 19201 i~ a very interestingspee~~at Manchester,that the decipherment of the Zimmermann tele-grams/had decided the World War in favor of the Allies.

It would

be impossible to estimate highly enough the significance of thisBut what became of Alexander Czek? - When World War I had·~.oan end, his father tried to follow the trail of his -son.····:..

e inquired in Holland and after much difficulty discovered thetrace~in Rotterdam.

From there on nothing could be discovered.

Since he knew that his son had worked for the British secretservice, he applied to the chief of that service after the end of
the war, and requested news of his son's whereabouts.
this information:

He received"I have received your letter and must informI

you that this is the first time I have ever met the name Alex Czek.

112

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~~fil
.1.\..L~~-ft"Y'~ _ _ _

I

i

t

I

•

I am sorry to have· to inform you that I cannot; tell you anythmg,II

whatsoeve;t" regarding your :!J'on and his fate."
I

Al&xander Czek bad disappearea.

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ll4

RESM.-16ND21

TilE :IN'mRCEP.I' SERVICE AT SEA
I

I

The var at ,ea 1914--1913 (aside from submarine wa.r:fare)I

did not. pl.ay the 1rol.e that one bad. initia.lly been l.ed to e~ect.
Germany's

princ~bal opponent at sea 'W8.S Great Britain. On theIquestion Wbethe~ the Gel~ fl.eet should seek a decisive battl~
Iwith the English Battl.e Fl.eet, the German Imperial. Gc..vel"lJ1•JSl11..
diff~red with

the Admiralty Staff and with the Secret.lry of theImperial l'iavy, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz.

l-lhile these J.o.st t\l'owished to commit the fl.eet, above all to interrupt Engl.ish-FrenchcOllllllWlications across the channel., the Iu:perial Government considered it correct to guard the fl.eet against severe losses so as

to have it as an instrument of power at the time ot tbe peace
negotiations.
lUth.LD the framework of the intercept service 1 however 1 theintercep·tton of ene~ radio trai'i"ic occupied no l.ess a place at
sea tban w1 th the land forces.

In fact, ve may sa,y that thebattl.e in the ether at sea YB.S much more intensive than on l.and.
J?rimarUy it was England and Germany which paid most attention

to the naval intercept service and repeatedl.y 1mew how to deriveadvantage from. this invisibl.e weapon.
'l!be principle of disguising radio traffic w.s here pushed

into the foreground far more than ashore.

From the very begin-ning, the use of cryptographic systems was on a larger scale ••115

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Moreover, the system of so-called falte radio traffic vTflS very
good; he1·e a mcssaae from e. no.ve.l command station to a sh.lp o.t
see. was epparently dispatched by radio to some other coastal station, while the wo.rship stood by for reception on the same wave
length and heard it at the same time,
Soon after the outbreak oi' the war, the German fleet sufferede. misl1ap which later turned out to be very dise.dvantaeeous for theGorma.r~ naval forces.

In the Baltic the German fleet opened the•naval: war with an attack by the small cruisers "L\ugsburg" andI''-:Jagdeburg" on Libau on 2 August 1911~.
I

A 'few months later theicruiser "Magdeburg" was sunk by Russian naval forces in the Baltic.
That did not rema:l.n e. secret.

llowever, it did remain e. secretthat the RUSsians sent down a diver to the sunken "1-ia.gdeburg"
who broughi; up from the radio booth the code boolt with its heavy
lead covers.
utter:i.~rThe book was dried carefully and turned out to be

undamaged.

Monitoring of German naval trai'i'ic by the

Russian naval intercept station at Kronstadt; revealed that theGermans were still l-rorkill8 with this secret system.

Now there

began a lively deciphering activity at the Hussian cipher bureau
in Petersburg which yielded excellent :l.nformation regarding all
events in the German high seas fleet.

The Enelish got a copy ofthe code, and henceforth were likewise in a position to decipher
German naval radio traffic, -- and that for a period oi' years!
One of the first successes of th~ British fleet, which

116

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was based on results of the intercept and deciphering service,
was the battle at the Doggerbank on 24 January 1915.

The English

had been able to follow exactly the approach of the German lightnaval fotces, and they lmew all the' German ship units which had
been counnitted for this action.
cruiser

11

B~tlcher"

The sinltine; of the German armoredat that time was due to the English intercept

service.

'

In the course of Horld w·ar I, the interception of naval radio
traffic assumed ever greater proportions; the English in partieular achieved very noteworthy res~tts,especially in monitoring thetraffic of German submarines with their bases and with other naval
units on the high seas ••The London "Times" on 22 December ~927 pub~ished a short

resume of a lecture delivered by Sir A. Ewing, Professor or the
PhilosO);lhical Fa.cul.ty at the University of Edinburgh.

This man,an outsta.ndillg professor, was, during the period 1914-1918, chiefof that bureau of the English Admiralty whose task it ,ms to decipp.er the intercepted radiograms of the Germs.n navy.

This bureau

thrived 'lbe,yoni!l all e:x;pectation and had more than 50 regular decoders;on the average 2 1 000 intercepted messages were handled here daily.
All. movements of German 1-m.rships were followed by the British
Ad~ralty,

fashion.

primarily by the aid of information sec~~ed in this
As Sir Ewing remarked, thanks to various fortunate ac-

cidents, the British information service had nearly all the German,·

117

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cod.es :i.n its poRSession; the remain(ler wore solved by o.ne~lyt.ic
methods.
The cnrryinG ott!; of the lone; ranc;e blocka(le or th~ Gcrr•um.
Nm:th Sen coast by l:.hc British was possible '\-Jlth only .mt:!a~er forces,.because they were prong;>tly informed re{.Sa.rdine all movements ofGerman units.

Moreover, the British cipher bureau very qui.ckly

succeeded in solvinG the German cipher used in the radio tro.f!ic
with submarines.

This was a success of really inestimable value,

since now :in connection with the direction finding service the'English were i~ a position to follow the movements of the Ge~nsubmarines precisely from day to day.

While in Germany people

were anxiously endeavoring to keep everything pertaining to the useof submarines strictly secret, doublin~ and tripling their guards•
and security measures in a downright convulsive fear of English
spies, the English intelligence service had nothing to do but tofollow carefully the German naval radio traffic.

In Room Nuniber

4o in the British Admiralty, in whtch the evaluation center was
located, there was busy activity day and night.

On an enormous

wal.l chart the ascertained positions of German units were entered.
Everything having to do wi t.h this was as well known here as ii'
details had been published in an "Extra."'l'hc EnsJ.ish were the first in Horld \-Tar I to create a tech-nically exact and fast working system of evaluation, a sysl:.em which
can be regarded as modern even today.

The "direction finding"

118

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stations were connected with each other and with the central
office by teletype.

.

Every reading taken was passed at once tothe central office, and laid out here by the aid of silk threads•Ion a great orientation map which was mounted horizontal.J.y.

In

the cipher bureau sat the men who day and night deciphered every
incollling intercepted radiogram.

An enormous card file contained

all station call signs 1-1hich had hitherto appeared ill \·he inter ..
cept service, along with all other available de.ta, and this madeit possible to recognize ctcrTently che systems according to which
cal.l. signs were changed in German traffic, to reconstruct these,and even to tell in advance what call signs this or that Germwl
station would have tomorrow or day after tomorrow or a week hence.
The collaboration between direction finding, evaluation,and decipherment was sensible and well-organized, as it never wasin Germany either during World War I or after the ~·, or evenduring World Uar II, because here people never got away frompetty concern with their own interest and egotistic pride in theirown unit.
What significance the English attached even at that timeto the intercept service is evident from the n~re fact that there
was an admiral at the head of the service~in Ueumuenster ("trhere

the central office of the German naval intercept service was loc ..
ated} it was a naval lieutenant.

In London, at the last, several

hundred men were engaged in decipherment and evaluation; in

1.19

RESTRICTED

:Neumucms l..er there were a fe"~JT dozen.

And if, in s~ite of that, sue ..

ceases were scored by the German naval :1 ntercept service,. then thatwas due to l:ihe intelligence and initia·tive o:r: ind:l.v:ldual men.

The over-all orr;aniza.tion was inadequate.
'fl1e ere~test success or the young German submarine weaponcame soon after the bec:lnning oi' the war in the sinking of three~batEnglish armored cruisers by "U-9" under Lieut(-!na.n·l:; lfeddigen.

was bei'ore the breaking of the German cocle far submarines.

Later,

when in February 1917 submarine warfare was ca.rr:l.ed on according toplan, :l.t did n6t br:l.ng the expected results, and for the above ...

mentioned reasons could not poosibly do so.

Ai'ter the sink:lng of

the "Lusitenia" submarine warfare was also lin1.i. ted by Americanp't·essu1.•e.

And when it was resumed ar;aln in an intensified form on 1

February 1917, it only served in co11junction with the Zimmertna.nn
dispa·tches to bring the USA upon t.he scene as an active opponent.

'rhe forces available at the beginning of the war for cruiser
warfare aur0o.d consist~d essentially of the East Asiatic Cruise1•
Squadrou W1dc1• Vice Admiral Count von Spee.

Since von Spee couJ.d

not nainLaJn himsel~ in eastern Asia asainst the superior ~orcesof the Allies, he put out into the Pacific on 13 AUBUSt 1914.

His Sf"!.Hal1ron consisted of the armored cruisers "Scharnhorst" a.nd
"Gncisenau," and the small Cl"'lliscrs "Dresden, 11 "J.cipzig," and''NUrnl)erc."
mm.t happened in the next weeks on the Paciric was an

120

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extremely interesting battle in the ether, which was essentiallysomething brand new.

While the English radioed away bravely intheir search for von Spee 1 s squadron, with the result that it
was al~ys possible for von Spee ~o keep posted on the movementsof the enemy, he himsel~ was able so to mislead the enemy by radio
silence and occasional deceptive radio traffic by the ship's
radio of the little cruiser "Emden," which had been ordered into
Australian waters, that his appearance in Chilean waters came as
a complete surprise.

At Coronel on 1 November 19l4 von Spee's

squadron in complete battle order and battle readiness met thesquadron of the utterly unsuspecting Admiral Cradock, who supposedthat von Spee was far away in the direction of' Australia.

Von

Spee was able to brins his ships into such a favorable posi·cion
and to strike so une:x;pectedly that within a very brief time the
British armored cruisers "Good Hope 11 and ":Monmouth11 were sw'lk,
and several other units were badly danJB.ge.d.

By this naval vic-

tory Allied shipping in adjacent areas was almost completely
paralyzed for a number of weeks.
To be sure, the "Emden" itself fell victim, so to speak,
to radio traffic a few days after the battle at Coronel.

Aftera fairly long career as a raider in tm :lhd.ian Ocean, it bad appeared off the Cocos Islands to take on water and destroy the radio
station there.

In so doing, the radio station of the "Emden"

engaged in traffic with the land station, which took the "Emden"•

for an Australian cruiser.

During this radio conversation the

121

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o:pcro.tor of tl1e "Emden" did somethinc; in an ,J.nskili'ul "'tray so tho.t
the la.nd station recosnized the true character oi' the ship ancl
sent ouli alarm mess:1ges; the "Emden" now sent out s. lanolina party
to dnstroy the ro.d.io station.

'.Jhile the ship was vaitiD-6 for the

return of this unit, a superior Australian cruiser hurried up in
response to iihe ala't"m messae;es from the station, :fired on t,he
"Emden" and ~lo.maeed i·t so badly that 1 t had to be run on the reefby its own crew.

Count von Spee had a similar misfortune with his sqttadronon 8 December 1911~ when, on his way a-ronnd South Amertca, he wasapproachinG the Falltland Islands and made contact with the radio
station there, without noticing that a strong British squadron was
lying p:rotec ted by the Islands.

In this way von Spee gave himself

away prematurely, o.nd was a.tta.clted Wlexpectedly without. being able
to deploy h1o ships properly.
'rhe greatest see bai.Lle of rTorld \Tar I was !.he battle of the
Skagerrak. on 31 May 1916.

It, too, was influenr.ed by the :l.ntcrcept

service and, to be sure, on both sides.

Both Lhc British and theGermans had f.ollv\-7cd the course o:r the enemy sqnadrons; l;he onl.yd:if::r'erence was t;hat. the Germans hatl succeeded jn veiling tlle
course of i~he Gcr•.um main fleet so tho.!; it appeared as a SUl!'.l•ise
for the En.r;lish, and by so doine; decided lille c:ourse of the bP l;t.le.
Ill many other undertakings at sea durinG Uorld 'Har I thei.nl..ercept service :played a decisive role.

A de tailed accounf,of' a.l.l. these cases will be reserved for a. le.t.el' work.

]22

RESTRICTED

THE ITALQ-AUSTRIAN WAR
Down to the beginning of l'lorld War I the Austrian intercept.
service had been directed against Italy.

The Austrian oryp1;a.nalytic

service had succeeded even before the outbreak of the war in solving\

the cryptographic system used by th:' ItaH.ans in traffic between
Rome and the diplomatic representatives abroad, and it was able toread such traffic.

That was a success or the greatest importance,since the attitude of Italy :was one of the significant problems
occup,ying the Austrian diplomat1c service in those decisive d~sof July and Aueust 1914.

And the question still remained open;

therefore, it was a matter of employing all possible intelligencesources to obtain clari t.y.
At the outbreak of the \'lorld War, Italy had proclaimed its
neutrality.

In December 1911+ negol.iations were started between

Vienna and Home which dragged on lazily.

Beginning in January

1915 the Austrian radio intercept service established the factthat Italy was turning more and more to the Allies, a11d that.

prelLninary conversations wore Laking place in Paris between the
Italian ambassador and the French Mi.nister of Foreign Affairs,
conversations which must ba taken s-eriously.

Viezma decided,

the:refore, on a countermove, and on 30 Harch 1915 made the
Italian Govcl'l'liD.ent a proposal to relinquish thi'J p\.\rely Italian
portion of t.he southern Tyrol in return for tho assurDnce of
benevolent neutrality on the part. of Ital;r u.nt..il the end of thet'lar, and of complete froedo;n of action for .t'-tu::;U:·ia in the Balkans.

RESTRICTED

veraat.ions wlth the French and F.tlg~tsh ru;"JhAssadors, t.he results of~llch wereagain revealed in radio traffic picked up and decipheredby the Austriaus.
••

It could bo clearly recoe:rrt~ed that. a much greater

Austrian concession -- especially with regard to Trieste, Istria, andI

the Balkans -- would be necessary in order to influence the attitudeof Italy decisively in favor of Austria.

The ereateat haste was also

demanded in order to meet successfully the effurts of France andEngland.

In Vienna, however, th(."Y stuck obstinat.ol,y by a peculiar

misinterpret.a.tlon of strength ratios, and decided to wait.
The Italian Foreign Mlniater thon officiallY turned down theAustrian offer as inadequate, and Italy decid~d to D'ake its entry
into the war on the side or the Allies.

Ear:cy in Apri.l 1915 thisintention of Italy could be recognized be,yond doubt from several
radiograms exchanged between Rome and London.

On 26 April Prance, England, and Russia concluded in London asecret treaty '\lith I ta.l3 which obligated Italy to declare war on
Austria 'Within one month.

In reLurn, Italy was assured of tho

fulfillment of all its territorial claima and aspirations in Europe,and a.lso or an equal shat>e in the division of Turkey.

The content

of the London secret. treaty was known in its essential points in
Vienna on 30 April.

On 4 Ma;v Italy denounced the Three Power Pact; on 23 May it
declared war on Austria-Hungar¥•
Apart from the previm1sl3 mentioned information received byradio, which -- from a military point of view -must exclude any

factor of surprise from the sta1·t 11 the Austrian intercept service

124

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~~~1succeeded during April and M~ 1915 in following the Italianassembly. especial}¥ behind the Isonzo.
clear~

But instead of taking therecognizable situation into account in aQY adequate fashion.

and mass~~ strong forces in the southern 1yrol to create the hase

for a rapid thrust in the direction of Venice. in order thus totake the entire Italian assem.bJ.y in 'the flank• the Austrian command
had its principal forces drawn up on the Isonzo front to await hP.: ll
the ene~ts attack.

The consequence was that series of fruitl~

battles on the Isonzo wh.lch characterized the entire J t..vl·:~~.\P itii.tm
War.
The entire conduct of the Austrian command is all the moreincomprehensible. since the Austrian espionage service had succeeded
during the summer of 1914 in securing the most important Italiancode• nam.e:Q- that for communications of the higher statts. which
actuall,y came into use shortly after the outbreak of the wa.r andwhich gave the Austrians an abundance of excellent information. 1
The Italian "Field Keys 11 had been solved by the Austrians
back in June 1915.

To be sure, they were changed on 10 July but

the Austrian cipher section soon found the solution of the new
ciphers.

Subsequentlf the Italians changed their cr,yptographic

systems very frequently. but this did not help them much.

Early

in October 1915 they put the 11 Cifrario Tascabile" into use, which

the Austrians had bought long before the war..

[ t had proved aprofitable deal.
1.

•

This was the so-called "Cifrario Rosso" which was used for·traffic between the general staff and the army command •12:5

RESTRICTED

R E S - 21
For t.ha rost, the "Cifrario Rosso" remained in force for almosta year~No!. tmtil 30 Narch 1916 did t.ho Italian High Command. forbid

in a radiogram !urthor use of this system in radio traffic, "since thesuspicion that it was pa.rt.ially lo1own by the enemy has been confil"'ned11 •In reality, it was entire:cy knc..wn to the Austrians.
new system went into effect.

Twenty~.rourOn 1 April the

houl's later it had beensolved by the Austrian cr,r.ptanalystsr
Probably rarely has a sequence of ve:cy important. intelligence

resuli;s been used to so sli.ght a degree as in the first phase of the
Italo-Austria.n War.

And therewith the course or the entire campaign

was decided,.
Not until the spring of 1916 did they try the obvious plan of aflank attack.

With several German divisions, which had been requested

and promised as reenforcements, they want.ed to do what a year before
would have been correct and might ha.re been crowned by success,. butwhat now could no longer be accomplished since the Italians had. meanwhile ma.tez•ia.J.zy" strengthened the Tyrolese .front.

There was the added

fact tha.'l:. the requested GernlB.D divislons could not be spared, because
tho bleeding of the Ger.man am~ before Verdun had exceeded all expectations.

Tho Austrian con~d then decided on an attack wiLh its own(inadequate) means.

As mic;ht be expected, after initial successes at

Asiae;o and Arsiero, the atLack bogged down and had to be broken ott,because the Brusilov offensive had started ~1ich brought the entire
Austrian eastern front into retreat.

In connection wit.h Lhis Austrian attack, thore was a piece of
deception which we shall not allow t.o pass 1dthout mention.

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In orderto mislead the Italians and to force Cadorna to hold his operational reserves in readiness behind an entire~ different sector,
the decision was reached at an interview between General Ronge,•

Chief of the AustriL~ Evidenzbuero, and representatives of theGerman General Staff to carr,y out a deceptive action on a ~·gescale based on experiences of the iritercept service.

The Italians

were to be tooled into believing that a German anny was beingbrought up.
The on~ chance of success was by using the radio.

'l'he entire

action had ~o be prepared ver,y conscientious~ and carefu~, andcarried out with the same care, if it were to succeed.

For theexecution of.- thi.s action, a staff was formed, at the head of whichstood the German von Bonin, at that time Major in the General Stat£.
He was charged with the tactical management of the deceptive measures.
For the technical execution, a German radio compall\Y was employed which
was under the command of the then Captain Meydam.

Furt.herm.ore, abattalion of mountain light infantry was detailed for the purpose.
The plsn was to lead the Italians to believe, over the space ofseveral weeks, that a German arJey", the headquarters of which had
hitherto been in East Prussia {as far as I recall it was the TenthA~) was moving up into the K!rnten area.

Mean\ihile, it had become known to the Austrimls that the
Italiana·were preparing for a new attack on the Isonzo.
The radio comp~ detailed for this deception had four heavy
and four medium mobile radio stations.

They began by having t."h"Oof the heavy stations and a company of mountain infa.ntry change
trains as conspicuous~ as possible in Munich.

127

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The leader of theor general i.n·.d..ructions, Md then enjoined uron them the utmost
secrecy..

"No one nced:J to lmow that we balonc to a Ger•1·~n army

going to the Italian ~heu.ter," he declared at. the end.

Th'.t grinsof several bystanders showed that the first seed hnd l'.n.l..len on
fruitful soil; tho innate need of the Genn.a.n to tell soinething would
take care that \d.thin 211 hours hal! of Mwtich would know all about
the sending of a German army to tho south.
During the transport, these peopl':; had to show themselves
diligently, and to drop rn;ysterioue hint.s.

At the ll')cation selected.

for an~ heauquarLers, they ~et up the firat of the heav.y stations •The transmitter was tuned up, and then communication was begun with

two Austrian army radio stations.

'

On tho following d~, the second

heavy l'a.dio station was set up at a distance of some 15 kilometers.
Doth stations immediately entered into regular traffic with one

another.

.lt,or their radio traffic l.hey used a cipher which had been

produced ecpeciaJJ...v for this purpose by the Austrian cipher expert
Captain Figl; it was so constructed that thE' Italians could not failto solve it, but the intent-ion to miAlead must not be evident in any
event.,.

For t.h•J rest, the manner of handling traffic at ·t..he German

st..al..i our dlfi"t:l"Ud marked~ from that of the Ausl.rian stations so t.hat· jl h ••l.ations could n<">t fail to be recognized at once a.s Ger.ntan.
A radiogram or thi.s 11&"lny stat.i.on" was transm.it·V~d to t,hc garrison,-uo station at 1-iunicfl with t.he request Lhat mail arriving there forlhv starr of th~ Tenth Arrny be sent. to • • • in the Tyrol.
~.rentOther messages

via. Nunich to Kt1nigsbcrg and had reference to the handling of supply1)~rc}1a.rat.ion--

of quarters for the t.roops, fonrar<.li.ne or mail, r.nd the arrival

128

RESTRICTEDRES"Tili~B-1

ot single formations belonging to the Tenth Al"'JJ1•

A few days later the two remaining heavy radio stations
arrived in the area picked for the fake assembly, and entered into
communication with the ••arll\Y radio stationn and with each ot.her.
They were ~pposed to represent corps stations.

A second and athird company of mountain troops also arrived; they too had toshow themselves as much as possible in the 11assembly area''; they
were quartered now in this and now in that place, and special
billeting officers went through the entire region and abe-led buLld·
ings and barns with the numbers of formations belonginp ~.o the Tent}
Arn'\f•At intervals of two d~s, the nine medium stations arrived andentered into traffic in the manner prescribed for them. They were
supposed to pass for divisional stations.
The traffic grew more and more animated.

The content of themessages now referred to the arr~~ o£ individual units, and had
to be cor. .a)IJSed very carefully in order to make the fake transpo:r.·t
movements agree with the capacity of the Austrian railways.

j

In order to help the Italians in their task of decipherment,Ivarious intentional errors and breaches of radio discipline wer~made;a few messages were sent in plain text.

The handling of theentire traffic·was managed so that the new radio net could not help
but stand out clearly from the Austrian picture.

It was intended toreveal to the Italians tt e entire 11 assembly area" of the German
Tenth ArD\Y ••RESTRICTEDRES':EfPii Tf.~1121.&. .&. ~.& ' - I ...

-

....-

ncn'l it was most important to ascertain how tho Italian int..~rcoptI

service lwas rea.cting to this li"t,tle Grone.

A few deys afl:.er tho firststationJ had started operations, an Italian instruction to thoir own
radio s·Jntions was intercepted and deciphered.

It ca.lled :for allmitat~on of thei.r own operation so as not to "disturb interceptionof the derma.n stations which had just appeared. n A da,y later cameIthe instruction "to follow most caref'ul..l,y al1 traffic s:t, the German
stations, since this was mos·l; important."

A :few days lator several

telephone conversations of the Italians were intercepted from whichit could be recognized that the opposine Italian forces had been.

ordered to watch for aQY relief in the en~ lines and to ascertain
when the !irot. German troops shO\iCd themselves at the front.

A

couple of Austrian horse-drawn batteries, to which a number ofGe~~

mountain troops had been assigned, l1~d to drive aroundbehind the front, go into position, i'ire a few shots to get therange, and thus little by little indicat.e the ar1·.i.Yal or l.hc Germa.'l
artillery.
Soon it could be noted from intercepted l~alian radio traffict.ha.'l:, the Italians were beginning to st.rengthen the opposing .front

and to set up operational reserve units behind it.

The ruse had

succeeded.
On 13 March 1916 Cardona. began his fl£th batt.le of the Isonzo.

It brought him no more success than the four precedine; incidentally,
he was holding a. considerable portion of his tl'oops behind theK!lrnten front in expectation of the "German attack."

130

RESTRICTEDRES-1
But the Austrian offensive on the T,yrolese front suffereda great del.q through ~normous snowfalls which made the entire
district impassable.

Instead of beginning in mid-March, it did

not get going until two full months later.
A few dqs before the Austrian attack in the T,yrol, thedeceptive station set up as ttan-q radio station" began sendingtime signals tor setting watches.

This had alw~s been a signal

tor an impending large scale att~Lck.

German mountain troops

appeared at v.•rious points on the front, and had to carr;r on
telephone conversations which they were. sure would be heard by'
the Italian intercept stations.

Twenty~tour hours before theattack, all Austrian artiller,r assigned tor the deceptive gamebegan drumfire on the Italian positions, while already, on the~ before,

the radio stations had sent out orders for a changeor position and then ceased sending; only' the main radio station
sent out ~sterious X-signals.
Then the Austrian attack on the T,yrol broke loose.

Afterintial successes it bogged down and ended indecisive~.

It hadbeen prepared and carried out with tota.l.l;r inadequate means.
Soon the Austrian intercept service was able to recognize
the bringing up or Italian reen.torc~ents.

In the night trom

19 to 20 Mq, an Italian radiogram was deciphered from which
dispositions for a great Italian counter-attack were learned.
At 3 otclock in the morning the deciphement was completed; anhour later the orders tor counter;measures to break up the attack•

were already going out.

On 1 June the Austrian intercept service

RESTRIC¥ED

,....... ,....,..,,....,.,.
~·

.....

.;._, •~

recognized the appearance of a new Italian radio station in theregion north of Padua.

Here the Italians were preparing strong

forces for a great counteroffensive.
Meanwhile, in the east the Brusilov offensive had started.
Reenforcements had to be sent hasti4r at the Vf;ry moment when the\.

superiority of the Italians on the Tyrolese front was increasing
great~.

Part of the territor,y gained had to be sacrificed.

The

entire operation fizzled out with~ut lasting results.
General Hoffmann later called the First World War the •rwar of
missed opportunities," i.e., of opportunities missed by Germany to
end the war decently.
hal~ measures,''

I should prefer to call this war a ''war o£or the "war of inadequacies." From beginning to

end these appeared on all sides, but they were especial~ bad in the
Italian campaign.
The whole action should have been based on a re~ big anddecisive operation.

A deceptive maneuver of the lCLnd described above

can be effective on~ ~i.

aqy prospect of success.

it is h~ possible to repeat it with

Therefore, one should have saved these

deceptive measures tor a case where their execution must be re~profitable.

Instead, they made use of it where its effectivenesswas allowed to peter out.
feeble forces.

The Austrian attack \'ras made with too

When it was done, histor,y re~orded another battle,

but the Austrians had to write off what was in and of itsel.i' anexcellent ruse which they had wasted useless~.

.

Since the war between It~ and Austria developed chiefly as·a '\-:a.r of position, the "PenkaJ.a.sn achieved_special importonce here.
One or the principal reasons 1-rhy all Italian attacks, part.icuJ.c1.rly

REST RimED
._.

"o

.

I~

RES~~ 1•on the Isonzo~ failed, 1~ in the tact that all preparations of the
Italians were recognized by' the Austrians in good time by lis11uning
to their telephone conversations, so that the necessar,y defense

or co.urse, t.he Italjans likewise eaves-measures could be taken.

dropped sucoessful:Q- on the Austrians, so that in this field things.

were equalized in .the long run.
The Austrian intercept service in this thea~er attained its
greatest importance in connection with the C~rman-Au~trianI•'

offensive in October and November 1917.

Down to the autumn or

1917 the Austrians, thanks to their intercept service, had beenable to frustrate all Italian attempts at an oi'fensive and t.c>maintain their front.

Nevertheless, in September 1917 the situa-tion was so tense that the Central Powers decided on a 1&•ge scale•attack.

Nothing less could give the Austrians a breather •The Austrian intercept service had learned meanwhile thatthe sector Flitsch-Tolmein seemed best suited for such an attack,in view of the grouping of the Italian forces.
therefore, to choose this sector.

It was decided,'l'ho German Fourteenth Army

was directed into this area and was to force a break-through.
From 24 to 27 October followed the attack and break-throughunder the command of General Otto von Belm~.
was occupied.

On the 28th Udine

Advancing along with the acgo.mdng Austrian armies,'

the Tagliamento was crossed earl;y in October.

The Italian radio

service had been thoroughlY disorganized by the German attack.
All movements of the Italians, all plans, and the entire constitu-•

tion or their front could be recognized clearlY.

1 3!J

RESTRICTED

ScarcelY had one

o.r tho Italian :::~1io stations taltcn up a now po~iti<:>u lJhcn it
annow1ccd in plnin text. "1 am packine up,'' ~mr:l t.lwn armounccd its
nm., location..

That shO'Ivcd thni- the retreat. w~s contilmillG ..

•Tho entlro offensive bo~o.i'mc a triUilJl)h of the Austrtan intercept
I

I

service.
I

Soon, hO\'fO.vor, two things became evident from the interceptedIradio traffic:I.first, that the \'laatern .A..llirJa were bringine up strong

fdrces to support the Italians; and socondly, that a strong n~~ defen1·ve front was being fonned on the P1ave.

J

On the Austrian aide they wore w1cortain re:Jp'"'cting the strengthd organization of the new front.

o} the Italian radio service gRve

. I'

'l'hcn a lon~ message from the chiefab~olute clarity. In its addressI

this message listed a.ll the higher units With the locations of their
I.This bctr~cd the entire organization of thestaff radio stations..

new battle alignment, but showed t.ha.t the nrmy group opposing theAustrian and German troops was far too strong for the lat.ter to thinkof overrunning the new front..
break of! the offensive.

'I'here.Core, the decision W£18 made toHenceforth, t.he Piave remained the new frontline.
In summing up, lre must 5~ thg,t the results of the .Austrianintercept selll'ice during th~ entire H.al~an c.empa.ign we1·e soabundant and good that st times thoy far exceeded the results of
the intercept service on the Russian front.

Strangely enough, fulladvantage of this was never talte~1, except in connection with thelast described attack in the fall of 1917.

But at that time theproper moment had already boen missed, due to gc•neral political andmilitar,y developments.

RESTRICTED•The strugg,le was to flare up once more on the Austro-It,alianfront in the su.mme:t• of 1918..

Early in March the Austrian intercept

oervice noticed that. the English and French had begun to withdraw

their troops i'rom Ital;y'.

By mid-March it could be clearly seenI

; that only the French XII and the English XIV !Jorps were left.
I
I

I

The intercept

The. Austrian attack was planned .for mid-,June.

eervice began in the spring to strengthen its work because thelisten~.ng

stations which had become free in the east could be

profitably used here..

By the begizming of Jw1e more than SO"Perucalas" had been insta.lled on the Austrian southwest front.

The Austrian radio intercept stations aluo found. a fruit.ful
field or activity.

There was, to be sure, on the Italian sidea general order to use radio only in urgent c~ses, but the chiefof the Ita.lian army radio service required dai l.y reports from aU
his stations, so that the Austrian intercept service was ver.y well

supplied with material dq by day.

The situation reminded one of'the fairest dsys of' the war in the east.

All the prerequisites

fol" the suo cess of the Aust..rian at tack were at hand.

But in this case the equalization or strength in the intercept
field 1 which I have mentioned several times, s~owed up in anespeci~stri.king rashion.

Not only had the Austrians been

listening industrious~, but so had the Italiru1s.

In spite of allorders to the contrary, the Austrians had used the telephones
incautious]~··The preparations for the attack 1, and even the

precise hour of atta~k, had become known to thEl Italians.

135

RESTRICTEDThey abo.ndow. d their front.. l.i.ncu atltl dolw:,..d tlJf• l!tlvr•nc i 1"1/~ A·

I

I

r

·= , . lIa hail of shells fl'Oin bntLorios which lmu. .lik.... ul:.Ju :.hli'l.utl l.hr.:lr I•'J.,il.lol'

in tlmo.

'l'ho AusLrlM art.lllcry prcrllraUon had been l'aul.cd c•n an c.mpt.yarea; the second Il..alian defcn~c lino wa.s woll equippGd.
at,tack fo.i.led and tho looses wure heavy.

136

R~STRICTED'l.'ho Auat..l·io.n

1.'he desorlpt:i.on of t.he affair with t.he Zinv:ner.mann telegrams.

abov·e has shown that t.he Allies during almoeJt 1.hree ;rc:~ars ofWorld W&I• I were in a position to decipher t.he diplomat~tc trafficof the Berlin Foz·e:i.gn Of'f:i.ce Bnd 'to 'derive o. gt·oat dea..l of' profit

therefl"'m.

In rega.z'Cl to Austria, something similar occurred in

the course of 1;.he 1mr" although in quite different. .form, and"indeed, in the following way:

Since 1.913 Count. Czern:in had been in Bucha.rest as theAustrian s.ntbassador·.

Ha wa.s a. diplomat o£ the old school, andlikewise a. polished society rne.n and cavalier who not on]¥ knew
h:ls job but also knew· hrm to take l i..re in an ag1•eeab.le fashion.

Just when the event we are about to describe took place I can
no longer recall. exa.ct:cy 1 but I believe it was before ·the outbreakof World War I.

Count Czemin had talcen a little ride in a cab

and then gone :i.nto e. cafe to spend e. brief hour.

While he wastalkir1g ld'lih a lady ot his acquaintance a.t one of the tabl.es, i·t;
suddenl~ occurred tocab.

hi1n that he had left his brier case in the

He excused himself, hastened to the cab, -,rhich was waitingfor him, only to dlscover that the brier case h.ad vanished.

Thecab driver could give no explanai.ion; he had :tar-t. his carriage
for a little while and claimed that he had not noticed a briefcase in it.

Jn this brief case there were a nmnbor of extreme~

importm1t documents, including the cipher used 1),1 the Austrian•embassy in Bucharest for comm.unica:Liol'l with Vienna •J! ::J7

RESTRICTEDRES'¥ll~D 21
Count Czcrnin i.mrn.cdiate}Jr r·2ported the mo.l.t.er to tho Bucharest
police l4ho ld~lingzy pJ.·omlaed their aid, and irorncdiat.ezy bognn
investic;at.ions concerning the whereabouts of the brief case.

Three

dB.l''S l.a.ter Count. Czernin goL back his brle.t caae undamaged and withall tl1e conte;nto.

ConscientiouslY Count Czernin h~d informed Vienna of theoccurrence, and offered his Nsignati.on.

Dnperor Franz Joseph inhis courteous fashion declined to accept the res1gna.l.ion, called
the mat l:.er a reerettnble ov~~rsir.,ht., and requcsl:.ed Count Czernin tc
continue in affi.ce.

With that the wh9le affair was settled, snd in

the Foreign Office u1 Vi~nna it never occurred to anyone to change
the cryptographic system, although lts continued use contravened

all principles of security; for any document which has been in
strange hands for even a row hours \'flthout control must be regarded
as comp1·omis19d ..
'l'ho first ph'lee of World War I ran its well-known course.

The

attitude of Romania toward A11stria became cooler and cooler;
relations grfiW more and mor~ tenoc; and fina.l..ly, at the insistenceor Russia and ·t.he Western Allies, Ro•nania det>lared war on Austriain August 1916.
~·hecourse or the c~.Jnpaign lYO.S not \'That had been generally

expected, tl.nd after a few months the Romani:m anny was crushed a.nd
Romania was conqllered.

Huasia had not been able to give adeq1Jate

l-LSSi.stance because, from a miU.tary point of view, Russia itael.f'

had alrea.ccy- been forced tl., the defensive.

RESTRICTEDWhen the Austrian troops had occupied Bucharest, the dwellings
o:l members of the former Romanian Government and other perso11s ofhigh station were searched.

1'here in the atc:i.o of the villa of ·(,heformer Romanian Prime Hinister 'Bratianu was found a box of photographic negatives.

lihon they were studied more closely and theindividual plates checked, some turned out to be photogl"'aphic

copies of all the documents which had boen in the brief case ot
the Austri&l ambassador, Count Czernin, at the time of its loss,
among them the seCJ."'et code.

The Rom.a.n.:tans had, therefore, been

in a position to follow the entire t.elegraphic correspondence of

the Viennese Foreign Office with the Austrian embassy in Bucharest,
and also to decipher all Jnessages enciphered in the same syst~n andradioed to other Austrian embassies.

Meanwhile, Count Czernin had become Austria's Minister of
Forei.gn Affairs.

Not until now was the cryptographic system of

the Foreign Office changed.

Hm1ever, the damage could not be

repail..ed, for in 1917 the war had been virtua.ll.y decided.

On the one hand Zimmermann, on the other Czeminl

The

Allied secret service could be quite satisfied with the Cent.ral
Powers, since copies of the Austrian diplomatic secret code had
been supplied to France and England by l:.he Romanians.
It seems almost :Lncredible that the two pm-rers which had developed the intercept service to a high degree of perfection during

World \'lar I and whose militaey operations were based to a very great
extent on its results, wM.ch therefore lmew very 'tlell how exposed thecommunications of a country or of an a~ are to the attack of an

139

RESTRICTEDRERRIF:tFIRJIJ 1
oncnzy, shouJ tl havG displnycd at times such uttor unconcern inrospocl. to l..hclr mm comrnuni.cRLions, an tmconccrn which could hardl-3"

be oxcccdcd.

l4.0

RESTRICTEDRES-1'l'HE 11JUDGENENT OF GOD" AND ITS EXPLANA1'ION'

During World War I there was a German soldier song v1ilich
contained, a.rnong others, the follotdn8 couplet:••• For this campaign
Is no fast train ••• •Although in general there is little logic and sense to soldiers'
songs, the accuracy of tlli.s verse could not be disputed.

From acampaign at express speed, such a.s had been expected in August, 1'-~~.'
there developed one which at best had the speed of a sJ•"'\' .ft•el!{ht-.,
and this was true on all fronts.

'l'here was on]¥~ exception. c.11dthat was the campaign 1916-17 against Romania.

In four months th l.s

action was carried out. from the beginning to a completely tiUCCAe:u.ruJ.
conclusion, and the ene.'ey" was utterly beaten.

In those days inAustria and Germany they spoke of the Judgement of God which had
fallen on this country.

But thay were careful never even to lrhtt.

at what had rea.l.ly brought on this nJudge.m.ent of God.u
In 1913 Romania had renewed its treaty of alliance t'lith tbfl

Central Powers.

The condition for any actlve pa.1 tj.r.ipD-tion in the,.,.ar by Romania on the side of the Central Powers wa.s that the attack
must not be made by l.he Central Powers, and that Italy should immediately enter on the side of Austria and Germany.

However, since

Austria had let loo.:!e the 11ar by its at.ta.ck on Serbia, and since
Italy took a waiting attitude, Romania proclaimed its neutrality
on 3 August 19lh.

After the death of King Charles on 10 October

1914, it became more and more evident from month to month th~t
Romania 'llras turning more and more to the Allies..

•

At 'Lltc tiJJIC

of my sojourn in Hon1..<mia in the spring of 1915, I could fc-91

RESTRICTED

~~----~--

pJ..'l.inly thnt. :::;ymprLl hy Col' U10 Can t.rnl ro~Icro lmd rcccclctl croatl;t,a.nd the.t U10 quc:;t,lon of cnl.orll1G the Hill' on the sidl) of Lhc Allies
ha.d b,.;com"J w:m:::Jy ou-::l of t.lln:::l C'Jld of a ravorablo opport.unity.
Strnnccly cnoueh, people in Aust..l'ian :.:md Gorman official circles
Gimply wou:J.d not bclluvc th.i..a change,.

The Austrian amba.osa.dor,

Count Czcrnin, sent to Vienn.a one report art.or tho ot.her in \"lhich
he cmphaoizcd nomnnio.' s love of peace and strcoscd the fact that, ho,
as representative o:r Austria, was being treatcu by aU organs o:r the
Romanian Government in the most respectful o.nd cooperative :fashionand that he li"aS constantly being asnurod that. Homa.'1ia's entry into
the war against Austria l'.ras a thins l'TM.ch could not even be discussed.
The German ambassador took a sindlat' position in his reports.

On theother hand, the Austrian military a.Ltache had his oyos wider open.
From the sprine of 1916 on, he reported earnest militar-.r preparations
on the part o:r Rom::1.nia \·lhich by their vcr-;1 nature could only bedirected against Austria.

The difference of opinion bctueen theAustrian a.."nbassndor and tho military attache \tent so far that anopen conflict brol<:c out bet\·;een them.
It must be e.d:nittcd t.hnt.. the Romanians \·1•.3re able to deceive thediplom'l.tic ropre::;onta.tives of tlvJ Ccnt..r:.U. Poucrs in masterful fashion
roc , ding the t,rue a.ttil.udt.· of tho eovernment..
I

wcro invited ou every occasiou,l.}1.)'The tl·lO ambassadors

nt.ru.ditiona.l frie~dship" with

Austria and Gcr.rnany l'Ias dilieent..J..y strcsoad, and the existence or any
tension or of causco fo1~ con:fl.icl. ltas positively denied.
Sin~ot.he Hom':\..'lie.n Govcrnnl!.."nL \'Tas in pooseooion of the Austriancode, it I":OUld follou p.<'tlcise:Jy the eff.oct or its deceptive measuresby rc·.!d'i.n~ the ·t.cl.q;r~·lil:J sent by Ccuul~ C:.:.crnin Lo Vic11na..
~!A:~

RESTRICTED

For thoRomanians it was an extremely' interesting pl~ which was going on
here behind the scenes.
Now while the official. diplomatic representatives of theCentral Powers continued their•reports frou1 the point ot viewthat the Romanian Government intended to maintain absolute
neutrality, the reports of the Austrian militacy attache took
on more and more a tone of warning, especi~ after the beginning of the Bruailov oflensive.

'fhese warnings f:J.nally led to

a common consultation of the chiefs of staff of Austria andGermany during which it was decided to set up an increased

security force along the Transylvanian border.

A newAustrian First AI'IIIY' was fonned, with a new German Ninth Arrt13'
at its right; but both consisted solely of worn-aut formations
which had been withdrawn from the Russian front for rest andto be brought up to strength.

Marly of them consisted of very

scant l"emnants withou·l; any fighting st.rength and needed to bebuilt up almost entirely from new personnel.

This was done with-out aQy haste because noboqy believed there was aQY serious
threat to the Austrian border in the southeast.
Meanlrilile in Romania they were preparing for the attack;above all, the Russians urged a.omania's entry into the war.
On 27 August 1916, on a qui.et Sunday a.ftemoon,

the Romanianambassador in Vie11na delivered a long-winded declaration of ..war,

II

while in the same hour the Romanian troops began their advance.

•

143

RESTRICTEDThe moment or Romania's entry into the war could not havebeen better chosen, for the Austrian offensive in It.al.y hadbogged down and the Austrian troops there were engaged in severe
defensive fighting.

'rhe Brusilov o.ffensive was progressing

beautifully, and a thrust by the Romanians could tie in with theadvance of the Russians.

Germaqy and Aust.ria had their hN1ds

fu1.l trying to stop this Russian advance.

Furthermore, Gexmany

was badly tied up in the west before Verdun.

Moreover, posseo-

sion of the Austrian diplomatic code gave the Romanians extensive
information and a reeling of great security.

'l'hey were convincedthat the collapse of Austria was impending, and that for the
Romanian arnzy- it would merel,y involve more or less of a picnic.
'rhey had to hurry in order not to arrlve too late for the divisionor the spoils.
'fhe Romanian decls.rat.ion of war was direct.ed onl¥ against

Austria-Hungary,. hul, necess"'ricy and auLomaLica.l~ lt involved
Germany too.

The .first result. of t.his doclaral.lon of war was

the resignation in Genna.ny of n£meral Falkenha..vn as Chief of theGeneral St.a.l"f; Lhe failures al Verdwt and tho crises on the Somme

had help,rt hri.ug this about.
Quart.erma.st.er General,

Hindenbttl"lh wi.th !.urlrmdC~r.f! as First

I ep Ll\celif'al k~"'nha.vn, while Lilt• latterasswned conunand of t.he Gel'man Uinth Army ~g~tinsl ftomnni.a.

GeneralArz von Strausscnl:eq; roriJITl;lrtde(t Lllf:! Ausl.rian J-~jrsl.. Anny.

On

Bulgarian soil alonr~ t h~ ~ouLlttH'n frontlc1· oi RoDJ.Rnia 3tood U1eDanube Army under General liosclt 11'.:-J lllo Dulga.ria.n Third Anl\V, thE'latter .facing t.he ]}")hrurl,pt.

1 .f '

RESTRICTEDRESifRI~'J1§tD 1
The Romanians had 1narshaled their main forces on theTransylvanian border.

Inunediately after t.he declaration ot war,

they started sri attack on Transylvania from the east and thesouth, using an encircling operation with g1·eat]Jr superior
forces against the German Ninth A~·

Fighting a del~ng

action, the German units withdrew while the Romanians press~dforward over the eastem and southem Carpathians and turned in
the direction of Klausenburg.
The Austrian and German intercept service had done 1.0 k'O_r.!t
against Romania until shortly before the outbreak of the wPr;
in fact neither Romanian diplomatic nor ~ radio traffic had

been monitored.

Now and then they had listened to Romanianstations, but that was rather due to accident.

ConsequentlY,the Central Powers had no special experience with the handlingof' Romanian radio traffic before the end of' JulY 1916.

Notuntil early August were several receiving stations committed
by the Germans and Austrians to begin a systematic monitoring.
However, during their assembly the Romanians had been so
cautious in their use of radio telegraphy that very little
information could be gleaned.

When war broke out on 27 August,the German and Austrian intercept service faced an utterly n~r
problem.
The picture changed, however, within a few days.

Scarcely

had the Romanian advance gotten under w~, and scarcely had thefirst engagement resulted, when the Romanians began to use tpe
radio to their hearts' content and, to be sure, in a w~ that

145

RESTRICTED

~ftB21n..na:)-rn..!~ ___ _would have mado Lhe incautious Russians of 19lJ+ tux'Il pale with
envy.

They 1·adiocd l'd th fixed cal.l siena in plain text; eave thenomes, munbers, and designations of troop llnits and formr'ltions;sent back all reconnaissance reports in plain lanetJ.age; andreceived their instructions and commands in clear.

or course,

they used cipher for a large part or their radiograms, but thiswas done with so little skill, and the number of plain-text
messages gave the Austrian cryptanalysts so many clues, that thecryptographic system was solved in a ve~ short t~ne.
And now on the part of the Ge~ and Austrian intercept
service began an activity l'lhich was and remained unique during
the entire war.

The number ot translators was hardly sufficient'

to translate all the intercepted messages.

The evaluators werebusy d~ and night turning the results into situation reports.
In a short time they had a clear pictux·e of the organization,

strength,and intentions of the enemy, and of all of the

difficulties which the enemy was ~eriencing in respect toaupp~and communications.

Rom~lians

Through their own radio traffic thegave away their operational and tactical situation socomplete~that even the handling of radio traf ric by the

Russl&ts before and during the battle of Tannenberg seems
simply superb in comparison with what went on here.

fnr

Tanncnbcrg was something ~hat happens only once, and OW' hnd
to excu~e lll'~ Russians be~ause of the nov~lty iri the UG~" oftl1ls rno,l(!t·u means of communication.

J.leanwhile, however, ·t..hcre

had l:Jco.:n L:1o years of war and the Romanians of a.ll people should
h-.:.~.v·~ d1 :a-mo. lesson for t..hciJ· cnm OrJI\Y from their pracl.ice in
1 1 r,

RESTRICTED

RE~1R~~~9 1
intercepting Austrian radio traffic.

But now they aQted as if the,yhad never encountered the idea of an inte1~ept service.
General F'alkenhayn seized the opportunity which was thus
offered him.

Eve1~ threehours the radio evaluation center of

his oper.a.tl.onal section had to supply a situation report on theen~.

For four weeks he withdrew into the Ulterior of the countr,y,deceiving the enemy.
!or his blO\fe

Then the si'l:.ua.tion was such as he requ..i.red

From 26 to 29 September he cruahed t.he Romanianleft flank near Her.mannstadt; in the following weeks he brokethrough the center or the Romanian line o~ battle near Fogaras,
and inunedia.te:cy afterward in the battle before the Geisterwald
drove the enc~ back on Kronstadt.

On 8 October Kronstadt

was taken; on the loth the passes of TUrzburg and Predeal were
occupied.

At. the same time~ on the left, of the German Nint.h

Az-my the Austrian First, Al'll\1 at tacked the Romanian right wing ~and threw it back.,

Transylvania was reconquered within two

weeks.
In the meantime, the Bul.garian Third Arnw had begun its

attack from the south against the Dobrudja.

Collaborating with

the Bulgarians, the Austrian intercept service had set up a
central office in Sofia~ and from here was able to give the
Bulgarian a.rrny valuable suggestions.

On 6 September the bridge-

head Tutrakan was taken; on 9 September Silistria was occupied.
A!'ter t.he loss of' Konstanza the Rol'IIB.I\ians withdrew f'rom the
Dobrudja late in October, and left the protection of the mouthof the Drumbe to the Russians.

147

RESTRICTEDIU'IV lilto a '.,hund<Jl•nt.onn.

Tt• .rr1ulri hAppen as 1L did m ,~,. because the

UonvmiPd 1·a.dlo serv i.ee supnlJ Pr\ the ~'1P.!Jij! "' t 1 '• :\ll 1 he d~! :-:; · 1.a requir-

ed by itf.~ inte.lllgeuc~ e.arvic·~·

It. 148.5 a. play 1rri th El• r.>tesaue

charm\"mich one wAs vatohinll hAre; if aJXYOne were to descr.i b.; the detailsof th.e or.,rai,J_nn.s cat·lled out. on the basis (.,. intercept results, itwould give a stocy con\parahle \i'Uh t.he moet tla~illin8: uot.e.cl.ive story.
Th<=t RoJTI:vdQilS WG.re de~~;l;y impressed by the prec"LAi_on with whichconvince~'!

that treachery was "involver.!..

'l'llP.V looked !c)r traitors,

replaced men in ..1ario,1e posH.:\.ons, co,lrt-mart..i.alled a. numbe1~ of hlgh

officers:t but. in t..h~ main a.Uoweri. th ..d t" ra.c\io to O!lr:!r~te in the same
old 'lla.J'•

They mllrely rhanped some cr:vptopre.phic systems and did S•)

wi:lh the coop~ra.t.l•Jll •>(i.b~ Ji'n:.-r;•~hJT1.n.it1n·y misrinn vhi._t~lt had. meanwhile

a.r:ri.vert.
But. it. hap-penE"c!

~hat.

in th~

dP-dphPrin::~,offi.c,:; {•f the Nint-h Armythel"'6 W"l'f:l t~.o decJ.p~<ct·ers who hr.ti workol for ~"'~'~'"' l.i •lr:' solvi.ng French
crypt.,JJ?;l arhi ....

ftysl.e~ns.

'rho;r wEn·A '-"''l":lJ.nted wit.h a d£>fiulte French

ach!.P.ved t:oml"I1Ate su~cH.~!'l..

A.l.l told, the Gert"'M and Austri.::.n inter-

Heam;hile, the i/.OIJII\11i'~J1S had once agaL1 uull ·d thmns·alvet:i
tor:<"'ther for determined 1 .1sist.nn::e. m·•d nppc•se·1 all I!I.Vailra.ble.

Tt'l":.;hurr: ~'ld Predeal Pass t.oHm·rl 1-mcha:r·es I..

'J'h~'Y \-lll.~re( ·'RESTRICTED

c•::nvincedthat the German att.ack would come here, and omitted strengthening
theil• le.C't l~':i.ng.

This circwnstance could be recognized in alldetails from intercepted traffic.

Falkenh~

therefore decided ona mighty surprise attack against thE! Romanian left wing..

In mid-November at the Vulcan and Surduc Passes the right wing of the.

A~

br?ke through the Romanian position, overran the main

Romanian force on 17 November near Targu-Jiu, and m~ 21 November
took Craiova.

The out-flanked Romanians then had to abandon

their resistance at the Roten-Turm Pass.

On 23 November the

Danube Army, which had learned from intercepted Roln.i:u{'ian traffic. • ....A'of the withdrawal or sorne units, forced a crossing or the Danube
near Swischtow by a surprise attack.

The battle on the Argesul{1- 5 December) ended with the defeat of the demoralized
Ro1nanian troops and with the evacuation or Bucharest.

Coveredb,y rear guard actions the Romanians retired behind the Sereth.

The Romanian campaign was then concluded and settled into a
war or position.

The Russians, for whom Romania's entr.y into

the war was supposed to bring relief, bad been forced during
the last phase of the struggle to send troops of their own to
aid the Romanians.
At the conclusion of the Romanian campaign, three-fourthsof the Romanian ~ had been annihilated and, save for a meager
remnant, had ceased to exist.
Later on, the lightning campaign against Roma..'lia was ascribed•to the outstanding strategy of General Field Marshall von Mackensen,

149

RESTRICTED

whose troops occupied Bucharest.

Actually, von Mackensen was nominal

commander-in-chief of the troops operating against Homania but onl3
the "Aney- Group Mackensen", which was con1poaed or the Danube Arm,y andthe Bulgarian Third Anl\Y, was directly under his command.
g1~up wasThis sout.hem

assigned only a secondar,y role during the entire campai~1.
I

The decisive operations took place on the northern front, and the
focal point hore l q with the Ninth Ancy.

This anny, however, would

never have been able to deliver such decisive blows against theI

Romanians' in Transylvania, and later on against their left wing in
the no'J'· i f Romanian radio traffic.had been handl i according tomodem/prl:nciples or concealment.

The on:cy credit due Mack:msen camefrom 'he crossing of the Danube near Swischtow, the battle of theArge ul, and tho occupation or undefended Bucharest.

All this was

Falkenha,yn' s operations - and t,hanks to

ian radio Lraffic.

RESTRICTED•RESErTHE I.N'rERCEPT SERVICE II~ THE BALKANS

The various campaigns and operations in the Balkans during
the course of Vlorld V/ar I were very largely influenced by theAustrian intercept service.

In a number of iz~ividual actions

the Austrians and Germans were successful soleq because of theresults of the interception of' the technical means of communications employed by the ana~.

To report on this in detailwould far exceed the limits of this work.

However, we must

not fail to mention that, after their landing at Sal.onUa, theAllies on their part devoted very great attention to l:ihe intercept service and were especia.ll.y' concerned with preventing
intelligence material from reaching the ene~ through theirradio traffic.

The greatest triumph in securing one's own

radio traffic against enemy- interception oame for the Allies
in September 1918.

At that time, the French l22nd Divisionand the 17th Colonial Division succeeded in maintau1ing

absolute radio silence up to the moment of their comm:f.tment
at the front, so that neither their disembarkation nor theirtransport to the front was recognized b;r the enemy.

Accordingto an admission of the Bulgarians, the element of surprise,
which was thus gained, was the reason for the defeat of the_Central Powers in the Balkans••

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BRESr-L:r.rOVSKOne of tne main goals of the Bolshevik Government immediate~I.

ai't.er it seized power was to bring the war to an end.
'I

Not mereq

the war between Ralssia and the Central Powers, but the World WarI

as a whole and 011 all fronts.

I

This was the burden of the appeals

which went out by radio from Petersburg and Moscow.

The,y wereI

directed to the working populn~ion o£ the Western Powers, andto their organizations and representatives•.

Bu.t it soon appeared. that the political power of theseorgans was rar too small to have any decisive influence on theattitude of the governments of these countries.

On the basis

ot this discoverr, the Soviet Government decided on separate
negotiations with the Central Powers to bring about a separate
peace.

On 22 December at Brest-Litovsk conversations began

between the Russian delegation headed b,y Joffe and the repre•
sentatives of the Central Powers whose spokesman was, in themain, General Hoftmam.

The course o:t the negotiations is in

general well-known; what is not known, howeve't", are certain
circumstances which will be mentioned here for the first time.
The special character of these peace negotiations ~in the faot that here there sat at the conference table toend war not merely representatives of the two countries orgroups of" countries which were in a state ot war, but that
here two philosophies stood opposed to one another, between•

Which - from the point of view of ideologies - there was DO•

bridge; on the one side were the representatives ot militarism,

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impcrial.i~m,and capitalism; rn the other the representatives o.f."ra.d:i.cal socialism, or anti-militarism, and or the inl.crnal..ional
collaboration of the prolel..ariat.
created a hostile atmosphere.

From l..he bcc;innine; this

There was the added fact that the

Bolshevik Government had only been in power a few weeks, and thisin the greatest continental country on earth.

On the side of theCentral Powers there was, therefore, a very great interest in gaining insight into the actual ail.ll:1.tion in the newly created Soviet
Union as well as into the thoughts of its delegatj~on.

Accordingly,

in all haste a. large radio intercept .center was set up in Brest-

Litovsk, whose task it was to intercept all Russian internal radio
traffic and to exploit it for the infol'll'lation of the Gennan andAustrian delegations.

A great staff of evaluators and analysts

with linguistic ability was at work day and night.
A teletype line for direct exchange of telegrams with theSoviet Government had been placed at the disposal of the Russiandelegation.

The Russians even had permission to use ciPher.

The

Hughes teleprinter at Brest-Litovsk was oper~ted b.y Russian
personnel.
Without the Russian telegraphers' knowing anything about it,other teleprinters had. been wired in parallel with the Hughes
teleprinters used to transmit telegrams.

The tapes produced here

went at once to the cr.yptanalytic bureau set up especia~ for the
purpose, where 15 cryptan~sts were sitting ready to begin work•
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at once.

On the th:trd day o£ the prooeec:U.ngs the German crypt.-

analytic service succeeded in solving the er.yptographic systemused by the Ruasia.na.

From thin on, p.ll ,incQming and outgoing.

telegrmns could be dec~phe~,~~ IA4 ~ner~ Hoffmann r~ceived
their content c.urrentzy;

ep.m•t~n~•

the thtcil'hered messages werelaid before him during tne conver,~ti~ns,
Aside from these two inte~qeit devic•a, there was a third
B.stening device installed ill :Sreot-LitW9sk,

In the conference

roam of the Russian delegation tbe Germans ha~ installed in thechandelier several microphones from which ~ll-disguised leads
ran to a listening room.

Here sat several interpreters who took

dmm in shorthand the conversations of the R11ssians.

Moreove1•6behind the l'lallpaper in the living rooms of all members of theRussian delegation there had been concealed a series of microphones from which there 1~re ~ad~ tQ th~ above-mentioned
listening room.

Thus, every conversatipn or the Russians could

be heard.

The net result ol.' these three listening devices was that thechief negotiat.or of the delegation of' the Central Powers was not
only very well-informed at all times regarding the sometimes
very unclear situation within the Soviet Un1.on and regarding theactual power of the new government, but was also informed
regarding all instructions which the Russian delegation
received, all reports which j t sent to Moscow, and all ideas
discussed within the oel~("9.+ion.

•

1hr>y kn<'J\'1 precisely hOli' fa.;rloll

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they could go, how far tho Russians.were ready to go, and what they
could answer to the threats of Joffe and later of Trotzlcy.

The

Russian delegation could bring up anything it wlshod, but this did
not make the slightest impression on General Hoffmann, since heoften knew the enemy's situation better than the Russi&ls themselves.
Twice it happened that General Hoffmann said too much in theheat of debate so that the Russians noticed that their correspondence with :Moscow was being read by the Germans.
~hanged

Thereupon, they

their cr.r.ptographic system but this too was broken inbarely a week, and the total picture was now the same as before.
The Russians, from a technical standpoint, found themselves in ahopeless

defensive position and could not go a single step

forward.

Then on 10 February 1918 Trotzky declared that Russia'regarded the war as ended and would dispense with a for.mal treaty·of peace.

He then broke off the negotiations.

On the German side this step by the Russians was used as apretext for doing aw~ with the armistice; beginning 18 Februar,y1918 German troops occupied Livonia and Esthonia as far as Narva
and thus threatened Petersburg.

'l'he Soviet Government founditself forced to give in, and on 3 March the treaty was signed at
Brest-Litovsk.
Meanwhile, a government had been formed in the Ukraine which
was quite independent of the Bolshevik Government; it had comeinto being with German support; on 9 February it concluded a

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separate peace with Germaqy and Austria-Hungar3 which provided
for the entr,r of Genruan and Austrian troops into the territor.yof the Ukraine.

Beginning 18 Februar,y the troops of theCentral Powers marched into the Ukraine, occupied Kiev,
Odessa, and Kharkov, and early in May advanced to the Don.

In the south the Crimea was occupied.
In spite of the conclusion of peace the situation in
the east remained ver,r strained, indeed - i'rom a military
point of Vi6l'1 - it became still less favorable than it had
been up to Februa17 1918, since in the enormous expanseo:r the western and eastern Ukraine there was stationed only
a relatively thin~ distributed force of the Central Powers.
The Soviet Government on its part now set about organizing
with great zeal a new "Red Arll\V, n and let it be recognizedthat it had no thought of tolerating permanentlY the situation in the Ukraine.
It was now necessar,r i'or the Central Powers to keep an
exceptiona~ watchfuleye on the development of the situa-tion in the Soviet Union, in order to be protected fromsurprises.

A whole net of radio intercept stations was

set up by German and Austrian troops in the Ukraine and in
the occupied northern territories, in order to monitor theentire radio traffic within Russia.

The results were sogood that actually a completelY clear picture could besecured currently.

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Along wit.h t-heir entire governmental appa.ra.tua, the Russiansal•Jo had Lo reorganize their entire radio service, and in t.he earlymont.hs they made t.he same mistake as once before by sending out
their measures and arrangements all too frankly int-o space.
they soon made up for this error in another w~.

But

They began tosend over their hieh-pOh~r transmitters a propaganda campaign in
the German language which was directed to the German and Aus t.riansoldiers.

These transmissions were intercepted by all Gem.t>'lreceiving stations, and despite all sccul'ity measures were soo11
trickling through ever.ywhere.

The German and the Austriansoldiers, wear,y of war, filled with the questions of a new social
order, were eager to hear and to absorb what was coming out of thisland or consistent socialism.

The reports of the Russian trans-mitters, however, were calculated t.o under.mine confidence in theleading class of one's own countr,y.

The system of radio

propaganda, used here for the first time in history, began tobear very serious fruit in the summer of 1918.

The war in theeast was ended, to be sure, but - and this signified far more the troops which had been left there began to drop out of thepicture as a dependable military force for the Central Powers.
At that time Russia was the first country to recognize and makeuse of the value and power of modern radio propaganda.

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1
RES~ JP.qr&'F.t')?
""' ........ -............

COMPIEGNE.

The First World War showed during its course a number of parallel incidents in the intercept service, some o:t which strike oneI

as remarkable, some as downright comical.

The first of these paral•

lels is between the battle of Tannenberg in the east, and the Batt~e•of the Marne in the weatJ

the last is between Brest-Litovsk in theeast and Compiegne in the west.
In the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk the Germans listened to
all communications from and to the Russian delegation, and deniphered them - insofar as was necessar,r.

In the forest of CQMpiegne thesmne thing occurred, although in an abbreviated and simplified form.
On 8 November 1918 the German armistice delegation headed b.rErzberger arrived at Allied Headquarters in the Forest of Compiegne.
It remained there until 11 November.

During this time all telegraph...

ic traffic of the delegation was deciphered b,y members of the Deuxieme
Bureau of the French General Staff.
Erzberger:

Even the famous dispatch to"Tr,y for milder terms; if not obtainable, sign never-theless." was deciphered by the French.

To a certain extent, thisdecided the fate of the defeated partner in the negotiations.

The. interception and decipherment of the German telegrams to and from
Compiegne were the last act of the intercept service during WorldI

war I.

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REER!RFU'P!B 1'

lGO

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162

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TirE GERl·IAN Il'l'l'ETICEPT SERVICE
J\li"l'.tm 'rl.[l!: l!:IIJD. OF U01:1IJ) lo/AH I

The collapse in the west a1~l the armistice in the Forestof Com;pieGne ended the First 'Ho1·lrl \Tar.

At least in the west.

In the cast the s ~ruggle went on in a new form; in the l.J1a-aine 1
in the Baltic provinces, and alone; the Polj.sh fron~~ier 1 since thePoles had announced extensive claims and had set up a new a:rmy,
and since there i-Tas fishtinG in ~he border re~ions.
side, volunteel.' corps vrere formed.

On the GernJa.n

In Berlin the National :f..:Iinistryof Defense '\TaS created; a small remainder of the general staff
tool~

up j_ts i-Tork anei-T.
The German intercept service likewise began immediately,

under the chanc;ed conditions, a task adapted to the new· situation.
All ga:rrison radio s"t.ations we1·e reoriented for intercept service,
which they had to carry on along with their mm traffic.

It '\-Tasa question of following developments in the Soviet Union where
civil war had flared up.

Moi·eover, the sjtuation in Hunaaryrequired the closest attention.

In Berlin, in Friedrichs·tro.sse,

a new central office was set up for the intercept service and thecryptanalytic section.
took charge.

The then Lieutenant Colonel Buschenha.gen

He had been concerned '\lith the Geru~an radio decep-

tion in Italy a.nd had subsequently worl:.ed in the intercept service
at Grand Headquarters.
This newly created office bore the designa.tion 11 Voluntcer

lG3

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Evo.luaUon orrlcc or lihc OIIL11 o.nd consi~ticd at~ rlrst or a ulJla.llgroup, '\·Thich \fD.S sl..jll tnore reduced in o. shortl..jw~

when vu-rlous

pe.rtj_ci:pnnl:.s rountl more promisinG jobs in pr:i.vatc indu:::;try.
Buschenha.Ben no1..r cndetwored to create a. new Grour which would
form the ba.sis for the subsequent development of this brnnch of theservice.

At Gllc so.me tim.c a Captain SelchorT, lTho had lil>:';nvise

been active in the intereept service during ·t;he '\>Tar o.m.1 bad for a.
time headed ·the cryptanalyi..J e (7'0U:£l of the Olll,,

SC1..

Up a bureau'

in the Foreign Office which was occup:!ed wlt.h the davel.011meut; ofcryptographic systems and !:.heir employment in diplomatic correspondencc and o.lso - and thls uo.a t..he r.ovelt..y - with the decipherment
or i'orci1311 systems.

The assignment covered foJ.•cjgn di:plomo.tic

radio ta·afr lc.
Tht ts a.:r ter the end of t..he wa.r there enoucd l:.he l..yp :i co.l German
phEnomenon, that insLeud or l!Omuininc o.ll enerc;ies to attain thegreatest possible useful re~ult.a, Lhere be60.l1 a spU.tt.ing u,p, a.
struge;le bet,-veen rivo.lo.

•ro Lhe oul:iside wor] d l:ihc creacion of

the two btU'"lo.Us was ,jus l:;lf led by sajlinc; l:.ha.t !..he "Dltreo.u Buschenhagen" was to occupy itself with cr;ypi..uua.lysis and evoJ.uo.tionof i'oreic;n military ro.dio traf'fie, while 1113urcau C of t.he I•'oreign
Office" vas to carry out cr,ypt;analysis of foreic;n llJplomi..ic cryptographic systems.

In pra.c tice, houever, it was by no t:J.cans easy

to dra1-r ·the line l)etvreen t.hem since the :radjo trarr;c of o. military att.achd',for exo.tnple, can fo.ll both inl..o t.he mtlltary anti

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into the U.iplotr.atic circle oi' inl;.ereat.

Furtllerlllore, in solving.

a cr;yp toe;ro.phie sys t.etn i l;. is an 011en quos !..ion \-lhel'e l;.he contenli
oi' the messaaes to be deciphered will lie.

l•'urtllcrmore, a. cryp'l:;o-graphic system - no ma.l;t.el' '\·There it is uoed - is simply a. cr;}ytographic syste111 1 '\oThich ho.s to be solved by l;he so.me methods

1-rith-out ree;ar<l ror the use to wh i.ch it mo.y be put.
The methods or c1·yptan.o.lysls halt to be tile same, naturally,in both bureaus, and the experience and. yractical application
were the same •Any knowledGe o;a thered in one of the t.wo bureausmust also be oi' value to the 1-rork of the othe:r.
Hi'l:;h rational. collaboration betvreen the liwo offices, it would
have been possible in the J.ong run to avoid duplication and one
could ho.ve euiployed the scanty perso1mcl available in a rationalmanner.

However, anyone who knows German conditions will not beastonished if I tell him that, as soon as the two offices had
been set up, there sprane; up a mut.ua.l jealousy, an efi'ort on thepart of each to out-sl;rip the other, to flnd out as 1nuch as possible fro~ the other without givinc anything in return, and to
hold i"l:;self apart as far as posslble.

'l1here was an attempt, tobe sure, to keep up appearances and to arranGe a. so1·t of excl:.~ane;eof ldeas 1 but l'rom the begiimine; these a~Gtempts uere not bo.sed
on any honest intent.ion, so that no really senGible collaboration
came about, either during the period oi' organization or the t'\iO
bureaus or later.

Of com•se, with the small nu..tber oi' 1·eally

hiQ,ll-gra.de crypte.1.1a.lysts available, this mean~ a very j_m.prac·tical
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U'"IO o:C 1:'1out r~,'l. t•:-ny ~"Cc.Tn rssr-cd b·~:Cu-~. .... ·th~ t.;:.J ori'.i.c.:~a l"t:""ddevelor ~d nn crl.--.:qn• ..t') mn"-.,.'.!1' o:r cood cr:,'j?tr.Jryl.y;:..t..a.
Uh.ll.c '\d:l-1\ B\r,·oun C of' t\'~ Forci(lil O.i'£1cc the;! P :.ln. c:;.·h.~."\h.'1r.io'Wcla on c:t."Y!l1:·,'tln.l.y~1o 1 :l.n thd con"t.J.•ol office of tlle 1Jrl;c:rct:!:'pt ~:tel·...

vice or the l!o.tiC.i.~~ l.Uulnl.:r,Y or Dc.:C4"::11Ge, tj.,, li'"'\1.11 c.;.;~ho.sis r:!Oont\U"nf::d to tln field of oo-coll.cd cvaltuJ.tion, :f••t)., to tho synte...

'lll!1.t1c !'ir.cill,(J tQgotl\-"~1· Of 111.1·' er.Ot.!S sir.l{;le I'l'u::nrq;;:::no. in :f."w_~;::ipl
radio tl'L'.fi'ic i"vr tl!'!! p'1.1l."J.)Ofl!:.t O.f c~t;l;.in_z V'l QVI..;r-nlJ. p1Ct'l.n."e O[ t.hesituatiou in the o:r.·ca. to bo ohrJ~"t"V'•::lu.

'J.lJ,,.t: lnf; to the point, c.nd

cOl"rCGPOnded to the dntloo of an 1ulc..1·ccpt; cOiltrol. s·tation o.ttacbcd to th~ hit..h·~Gt co~D•ll~rnl or tho arw.~<l rorcea o:C a coun:try.

Th~

ree'Ult 1 hOt.'.lVr}r 1 'l,.!Jl tllat soon there brol\.c out o.n cuvloun CO-.DJJ~­

t.tt1on botw... en th'J eec tiona "Cl·y_pl.ana.lyuiu'' tm•l 11.EVtJ.luat1on", re ..
gardilllJ -which mo1•e will bo c:lid lute1·.
As el.'t'C-t'f.ly U·-::J'bic:,n.:=d, ltu•Jl""::dio.t.ely.-.f.'t·..r tL~~ cu...l ot tb~ G.A.'~O.t

l-ltl.l." 1 :t'!~b.f.it~B b:.ld llrOk•~n out u~I.\.~Oll thrl Polco l"lld Ccru!:ms along

tbo u..:..\tly ~ol.ir.bllt:l•~;d t·ut•udo.ry in th~ co.at.

Ou th•.: Goi"i!!fl.U vide

so...call.c.d BN'd"\'r CU!Ll.'U AI.•n1<.B 'Woi:l'~ vet up; o.o:;.-, :Pordt..r Gu.a.r'l Army
Soul..h vith itu cluur co.:•. :. •.a.ud in Dreolnu, (ttl•l a. r·:c't,2JJ. Dorr:\·~r Gu:.~1.·J.
Arl!iY Ilorth \dth ito cll1c:::1' cc-t•,J'I:md .Ll1 thu Vich,!ty o:r: IT.lT,lU•Jl•l.~·t.e:in.

These ccroioted in 'l.ll.e m.:.~.'in or v"l.unt:.:-cr rol~n·,tiOll~;; 1;l)~ c011lm.·•:lJ.J. 1bo;)1o"aVCl"",, ..1b.l.".

o.h-ua.<ly loul.ouc;....J to the ced:.a.·e or tlle 1l ~·wJ.y e r.:-·u:tcd Rc1cbo-

In boLh Do1·d•::r Gu.:.-.l:d /u.y.nics cvaJ.uat.iou <.:i..ll<.:!"....i li.!l"..: set up:fo'J.· t;he inh!rcept; JJ'".rvicc~, t-1J1•l the a.tl.:.Jo'Jl)t lT.:.:.Il ~,_._,lc t.o intu.rc~..-pt

RESTRICTEDPolish traffic both by radio and by wjre.

Since the Poles ho.d

no experience in this field, they used their technical meansof' communication jn a very carefree fashion, and. thus Gave theGerman intercept service a vas·t amount of e;ood :i.ni'ormation.
All preparations and plans of' the Poles, all proposed undertakings,
and all details regariling difficulties encountered in them ·uere
revealed to the GerrrJDll in'Gercept serviC'e, so that it was almost
alv7ays possible to start countermeasures in time.
Here in the east there was a repetition of the situation which
had existed on the Russ.i.an front during Horld War I.

With theinternal sjtuatlon of those days tn Germany, with the great variety of political currents, with the constantly recurring, ~ever~I~··-

internal tens ions, wi·th the militia-like character of' the rel'~- ··tively feeble border guard formations, it would hardly have beenpossible to safeguard the German i'rontier in the east to the extent it was, had not constant knowledge of events among the Poles
put the German command in a position to intervene at the danger
points in such effective fashion tl1at the enemy was always forced
to take the defensive.

Here the Poles bad to pay the same tuition

fees that the Russians had had to pay at the beginning of WorldWar I.

Of course, they learned their lesson niDre ~uickly thanthe Russians and GOVerned themselves accordingly.
something to say on this poini; later.

lG'l

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Older readers may perhap~ recall an episode '\oThich occurredin 1906 in ·(;he vid.nity of Berlin and which, under the title"The Ca:;?tain of Koepenick," formed a favorite subject of converse.tion for many years and, in a sense, even became a part of German
history.

For those to whom l:;llis theme is new '\ore will report l:;heoccurrence briefly.
On a beautiful summer Sumlay morning a small detachment of'German soldiers under the charge of a non-cotnmissi_9r.J.ed officer~•• ._,-:-<

was ma.rchin~ throu~h the lttt.le old city 'o'!f Koepenick, southeast;o:f' Berlin.

In the vicin·Ity or the city hall, a man in captain's

uniform ra.et them, to whom !:;he non-commjssioned officer reported his
netall in accordance with regula. tlons.

Thereupon he was ordcrec1

by l.he captain to march with hj_m to l:;he ICoepenick city hall, sincehe (the captain) had the rnisston of arresting l:;he mayor because ofserious malfeasance in office.
The non-coumdssioned o!f'icer saluted snappily, had his
f'orma·tiion about-face, and marched his little force under 'Ghe corunandor the captain to the city hall.

The entrances were occupied, andthe captain, along with the non-co1nmissioned officer and two men,betook himself to the office of the mayor where the latter vms toldthat he was under arrest because of serious irregularities, and was
to turn over the keys, in particular that of the city strong box,·t;o the captain at once.
a~·ray;This was done, ,.,hereupon the mayor was led

the detachment or troops departed; the captialn reu~ained in the169

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..,~-, rJ.··~

RESftl~2-lbuilding.

On Gllc .rollowina day it tur11ed out. thR.t lihe whole a.i'i'air

was a. bluff; the supposed captain had been a ahoemalcer, \Ulhel '11
Vo1.gt, who had a.l1•eady been convic·t.ed rcpeo.tedly.

lie had procured

a captain's uniform and relyin~, correctly enough, on the absolute
obedience in the Gerrr.an army to the insignia or a higher ro.nk,
had used this occasion to appropriate ·ulth the aid of this su~alldetachtll.ent, all the money he could lay hands on in the town hEll,
and

thai
1/

hsii vanished vith it.

T~ere

and
to

was a great deal of laughter about the a1fair later on,

was called "t:JPically Prussian," althoueh people were incli£1e"iJ.mi t the. it probably could happen but once. It probably wasttypJca.l.l.y Prussia.n, but it can be said that it would onl.y happenI.

o7e as far as the external circunwta11ces were concerned; Koepenick
pJ:a.nks of like type ha.ve often occurred in Germany especially :l.n
Jrussia; onJ.y they vrere less ta11ced about.

I

The event described above l1a.s been mentioned here, because an
event which took place in the suwuer of 1919 in the Border Gt~dCommand South in Breslau J.•emlnds one vividly of the Captain ofKcepcnick, save ·that in Breslau matl.ers "Were f'a.r more serious.
One forenoon in March 1919 there appeared in "St. Petersburg
Court" in the Teichstrasse in Dresla.u, where the Al.•rny High Command(South) was stationed, a. ~entleman in army tmii'orm, having theinsignia of a technical officer ""i th ·the rank of major, to see thehead of the intercept service.

..

He introduced himself as Dr. Winiker 1

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pl'i.va.t.e Sl;hol.a.r and. teacher at the Ins·titute of Tecbl1ology ln

Berlin, and declar~d that he,, along 'With a.ll students of thisinstitu·tion, bad. placed himself at the disposal of the Border
Defense against Poland.

!
H~himself had been ordered to the Armyliigh Command (South) in Breslau by the head of the communication
system in the new Defense Ministry because o~ his linguistic
ability, and was now placing himself at its disposal.
Winiker gs.ve the impression of a man weil vel"Ud. in the
ws;y& of the world and pos-sessing godd mannei'&J he wa.B" very etociabl.e

and in a short time -w-as lmown all over tht! place • He was- m>ta friend of much work, in contrast to this~ hawsver, a friend oflong drawn-out conversations and gos-sip.
co~leteSince he possessed a.

command of &he Polish language, he was en1ployed in the

trQSla.tion ot' Polish documents.

He telephoned to Ber-lin almost

daily 1 especially to numbe1•s in tlle D6fense Mirt::ts.try, and madea. great showing oi' his far-reaching connections.

Since his family -as he declared - was living in Berlin, he sometimes traveledfrom Breslau to Berlin over the weeltend., e.nd. as a rule 1 did not

return unt.il some time the following Mond.4y.

'l'hese- trips a.J::wa.ys

f'w:nfshed hill~: with more material i'or chats in his circ~e of cotm'adesin 1\ftGhm.

Xt wu :tretther rema.rlta.ble that on his journeys between

Berll.n e.W! Bres1.'8Al ~ -.a:.rJ.y always met someone ~Jllilo was very well:lo.t'ormed on the situath>n in Poland.

At tha;t tinne no one inBre.sl.au attar.hed any ~Jignificance to this circumsitfnlce, but on thec~y, they~~ ~yinterested in the stories told by Winiker •171

RESTRICTED- .........

.

bcGa.ll to dlsaypcar from ·t;he main o:f'i'ice of the intercep·t servlce,I

ad well as from the o:f':f':ice of the head oi' the connnunications system,

fo which Lhe intercept service was subordinate) these, however,;generally reappeared e~sewhere •As a rule, it so happened tha:lithey disappeared towo.:rd the weekend, and reappeared on one of theI:f'irst days of the follo"tdng vrcek.
It took a. very long time before one beGan to p1..y attention
to the legality oi' these happenings.

Ai'ter some time it was estab-lished that. the Poles at different times had information at theirdisposal 1vhich they could have acqulred only through treachery.
In the mea.ntime,·Winiker lived in Dreslau in a good hotel, boasted
about his excellent connections in Derlj.n and his private wealth';a.nd,wherever possible, incurred debts.

•

The months passed until the beginrlinc; of August 1919.

Then

on a Saturday .forenoon, there disappeared from the private officeof the head of the comnrunications system a strictly secret map,
on which 1-rere mimLtely drawn ·t.he complete wire connections of' theSouthern Army.

This disappearance was immediately discovered a.nd

created great excitement;.

Not until J.londay, when Dr. Winiker failed

to report for duty, did they become suspicious and make inquiries
at his hoteJ_, on_l_y to discover that Dr. Winiker had vanished leaving behind him nothing bu.t a large unpaid hotel bill.
Now an investigation was begun which showed that Winiker was

•

1'72.

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.

neither a doctor nor a professor at the Institute of Technology

I-in Berlin, but e,n1 ordinary spy who had bra.zened his way into theI

Defense Ministry/inBerlin through his personality and references
to his outside crnnections in the same way that he had deceived
the men in BresJ.au.

I

They nov found out that 't-liniker had undertaken,

while in BresJ.au, to obtain for himsell' knowJ.edge of the most secretmatters, wh:l.ch he then deJ.ivered on h:l.s journeys "!Jetween Breslau
and BerJ.in to J.iaison men of the PoJ.ish secret service.
~eincident was hushed up as much as possible in the officeof the Army High Connnand (South) because the affair was too shameful.

All. inquiries e.s to what had become of the ce.pe.bl.e co-worker

yiel.ded no resul.ts.

The episode has been reJ.ated here ~ecause,

for one thing, it is symtomatic of German cond.i tiona, but al.so
because the effects of this incident were very far-reaching.

•

Winiker had communicated to the PoJ.es all results of the Germanintercept service, and had given them vaJ.uabl.e pointers on what
not to do in radio traffic.

This gave the PoJ.es their first

lesson in regard to camoufl.age and one must admit that they J.earned
to foJ.l.ow these instructions in a comparativeJ.y short time.

1'13

RESTRICTED""1"" ...,..

...

.......

174

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THE WOHK 0.1!' 'l'II!!l GEHMAN IN'l'.I!:HCEPT SERVICEIn February 1920 !.he "Volunheer .Eva.luation Office oi' ·theArmy High CoTiliilalld" moveu from Friederichstra.sse to the De:J:ense
Ministry Building in Bendlerstrasse~

The oi'f.ice now received thedesignation "Cipher :Bm•ea.tt oi' bhe Army High Conlilla.D.d," and bel.on,eed
to the "Abwehr"* Section as Group II.
Section lasted only a !ev yeats.

This merging with the 111\.bwehr"

Since the intercept service had

to l7ork 1d th personneJ. aud e13.u1.pment of the communication troops,
there na·burally i'ol~ow~d e. c::lose dOIUlt;iC tion 'With the Inspection oi'
Communlca.t.ions Troops.

In l;iruQ thiJJ led to friction between the

Abwehr Soetion and the lnapectiou o£ Ootumunications Troops, sothat evenbu.a.J.J.y the illtarclilpt ae:tvice was wholly subordinated to
the Inspection ot Communications Troops.

or course, to a certain

extent cooperation ,.,.t th the Ab\rehl' Section 'tias still main·~ained;
this was, howev,'!.r, mo:t•G of a.n ini'ol'!Jla tional chw!a.c ter.
In the ycrJ.rS l.S120 ...1~25 the ts.IJlt OJ: the O<:!:t'Uiall Intercept Service consisted in ,.fatchi.ne5 tha enti:l.~o inLerna.tional :press rad:i.q
service.

'.Che interoe:PtB \ICl."e \rr:l. b ~en ttp in brief reviews, antl

e.;ave the government 'V'B.l'I.J.a.1Jle :t.nsi~h~j a11d ini'orma!.ion of a pol.itical and economic charaGtcu·.

:Cn a.rlt11 t:Lo11, they turned rr.ore andt!lore to the e:x;pansion or t))lil cr~'l'to.nr.tl.j"tio e;roup a.'r}.d the intercaption or international di;lot~tic radio t~~ffic.

This work proceeded----------------------._·~-------------~---·------------------------~·X· 1\.hHehr = counterintelliGence

•

171)

RESTRICTED

ra·ther slowly, but was carried on very systematically o.nd in time
showed gradually increasing results.

At that time they were es ...

pecially successful. in deciphering Ita..l.is.n diplomatic traffic,
and in this way derived rrom the reports of the Italian ambassadors and lec;ates in London, Paris, !--loscm-11 and other places, a good
insight into the governmental proceedings or these nations.
Viewed as a whole, the focal point of the work of the ':e,..l:'l.a.r.
intercept service lay in the field of politics.

With regar<" t.omilitary matters the work was limited to the observation of eventsin the Russian Civil War and the course of the Greco-~·kish War.
Es,pecial.l.y in regard to occurrences in the Soviet Union it waspossible for the Gen~l intercept service to pursue events in almost uninterrupted sequence.

It was especially interesting, how-ever 1 to follow the radio traffic on both sides, and in particularon the Russian aide during the Russo-Polish War in 1920.
The course of this campaign was one of the first noteworthy
things in the period following 19.1.8.

At that time Russia found.

itself in a state oi' civil war which raged everywhere.

The armiesof' Kolchak, Denikin, lvra.ngel, Pet.l.jura., Judenich 1 Hiller, andvarious other \lhite Russian leaders were seriously threatening ·from a.l..l. sides the structure oi' the newly arisen Soviet Union.
Resurrected. Poland took adv&1ta.ge of this condition to declare
war on the Soviet Union, and to annex large areas. At that titr.e
the Poles succeeded in pushing forward and reaching the Dnieper,

176

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in crossing it at some points 1 and in advanci~ beyond Volb.ynia
toward the south.
A very criticat situation resulted for the Soviet Union, but
this soon J.ed to an astounding reaction; the resul·t was that 'With..
in the territories dominated by the Soviet government all politicaldissension ceased at once and there arose a united defensive front~ainst Poland.

Even high officers of the former Czarist army

placed t.hemselves at ·the disposal of ·!:;he Soviet government, and the"Third Har for the Fatherland" began.
The onrush of the Polish troops was brought to a halt, andin bol.d a.dvances 1 units of the Red Army succeeded in th:ro'Wing thePol.ish forces back a. long way.

It was particularly the cavalry

a:rmy of' Budjennyj which was able to achieve surprising resul.ts inthe beginning, until there came that famous "1-Iiracl.e at the Vistula. 1 "which wa.s no miracl.e at all. but the resul.t of very matter-of:-factcauses.

These were as fol..tmil"s:Dm•ing lforl.d v1ar I the Russians had had to pay dea:rl.y for ,their lessons in the proper use of radio in the face of the Germanintercept service.

Ii!'everthel.ess 1 they b.a.d begun to learn and in

the course of three years of the war had in some cases ma.cle very
good pro13ress.

The collapse of the Czarist army resulted in scat-tering all previous e~erience and knowledge to the wind likechaff 1 and the newly arisen Red Army virtuall.y had to begin again.i'rou the beginning.

•!Jllat meant that in respect to the security

177

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or their mm J.•adio tra:l.'i':l.c they were precisc~y where the Czarist
arlll;y had been in ~9J.4.

TlJ.e command of the Hed Arrny attached great importance l;o theuse oi' wireJ.ess te~egraphy in c;encra.l nnd e-specie.lJ.y in the a:rmy.
When the new t..1efcnse al-mies vrore set u;p B.Ba.inst the Polish invader 1
they were equi)_)pcd. e.bundanLly "N"i th radio apparatus from tho remaining stocks of the old Czariot &•my.

This equipmeut was - :relatively -i'm• more cxtensi"'re than any one or the Czar:! st armies had ever had
during the Wo1•J.d War.
The shock of the Russian forces, whic.-11 had passed to the attack,threw back the Polish i'l·ont. anu vresoed it nearer a.m.l. nearer to t:.he
VistuJ.a.

I-t looked as though there woul.d be a vast bactJ.e of anni-

hilation in the g1•ea.t bend or the Vis tuJ.a, but the Russian su.r:cesses suddenly besa.n to diminish until i'ina.lJ.y there came the wellknO"Wll, decis:l.ve turning point.

Thts came about in the following

wa.y.

In the first pl1ase of the Russian a.tta.~k, the Polish conw~dhad virtuaJ.J.y r·o information regartling the organization, a trengch,
of'fens:i.ve pmrer, aud intended direction of a.btack o.r the lrussianarmies.

Thus l:ihe Russla.ns "\rere able to take advantage oi' the elementof surprise l;o a full. extent.

However, scarcely had the Polishfront beGWl to move ba.cla-1ard when the Russians beGan to use radio
on a large scaJ.e.
al~Tliis ioTas par·tlcularly the case vTi i.h the cava.J.ry

of Budjennyj.

178

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Some eight years a.flier this campaign, the Pol.ish Colonel.
Szieszy11slti rev-eaJ.ed the secre·ts of those days in a briei' memoir 1 *and cited a number of interesting ra.diogratn.s which were sent l>y ·!;heRussians during those weeks 1 partly in clea.l', portly in a very
primitive cryptographic sys tern 1 and which were intercepted anddeciphered by the Polish intercept service.

The Polish intercept

service had been built up i'rom former Austrian-Polish and GermanPolish officers as soon as the Polish army was created.

From theevents mentioned in the Ui11iker case, they had had a good opportunity to gather e~erience and to brain themselves.
When the Polish-Russian War broke out, there was a stnall but
nevertheless very useful Polish listening organization.

It wasimmediately committed for the monitoring of Russian military traffic, and after the beginning of the Russian offensive afforded such
an abundance of fine and superfine intelligence regarding the enemy
that "l·re can only corrq;>are with these events those associated wi·th
the cavalry corps of von der 1-fa.rwitz in 1911~, but with the difi'erence that the individual. messages of the Russians were much morecomprehensive and informative than those sent in its day by thecavalry corps on von der 1-fu.rwitz.

In content the Russian tele •.

grams closely approached those from the d~s of the battle ofTa.nnenberg.

In particuJ.ar 1 i't; was the cavalry army of BudJenn;y-J

which soon distinguished itse1i' in this direction.

* For the Polish Signal Corps.
1'19

RESTRICTED.......

~.., ...

Such conduct

RES ,..A{!e'f¥D 21
tmtst natl~ally lead to a se~ious reverse sooner or la~er, especially since the Poles for their part made no use of radio due tolack or apparatus, a.nd hence were not supplying the n.ussian :l.nt;er...
cept sc1·vice, 1-1hich did not exist to any a]?prcciable ex'Gent, 1-1ith
info~nation

or like value.

The nussions revealed their measuresand in·!ientions to such a degreE~ thali the Pol:J.sh general staff,
in collaboration wlth the l!,rench military mission, could pre -...-~tl
successi'ull.y wil:ih the preparation ond execution or a counl:ierhlaw.
This 1ras the famous "Miracle of the Vistula.," that as·l:ioundingly
strildng pera.:llel to the batlile of the Harne, which c;ave a. decisive turn to the enl:iire cauipa.iBn and put the Poles in a position
to secure a drawing of the boundary virtually as i l:i remained until
the autumn of 19 39 •From the giGantic mass of radio messages intercepted by the
Poles we reproduce a. few bel01-1.
From a telegram intercepted 2 July 1920 from the chief of theradio service of the Bolshevik Fourth .A:rm:y, IJr. 517/op. ta.j., it
could be learned that; the radio station oi' the 48th Infant1•yDivision was to be moved to Dzisna to serve the stafi' of theFoll.t'th AJ.."ffiY.

In this 'l·Tay the Polish in·fielligence service received

definite con:t"irmation of earlier reports or the formation of' aFourth Army.

At the same time, the ~ocation of' the aJ."llly stafi'

was disc~osed.
On 24 July l:ihe chiei' of' the signal. service of the 16th Arrey

180

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revealed in a service message through the signal officer of the20th Infantry Division the location of the army staff in
Bara.novichi.
On 26 July the chief of the radio station of the Fourth Infantry Division informed the chief of the radio station of the54th Infantry Division of his location in the village of Olszana~ ..
On 30 July the heads of the radio station of the 10th and53rd Infantry Divisions clid the same thing.
duri~~

This was repea·ted

the entire war, so that the Poles knew the precise loc~tionof all higher Russian starrs, and hence the grouping of the enemy.
On 10 August a service telegram of the War Commissar of the
Fourth Army was intercepted which lvas deciphered on 22 August;its wording was as follows:"To the \far Commissars of the 20th, 22th, 25th, 53rd, 54th, and48th Divisions, to the Third Cavalry Corps, to the 261Jth Brigade,and to lihe Quartermaster Section of the Fourth Art.ny:

from. themoment or the arrival. of this presc;;nt; messa~e tlle use or cipher
1

Natisk 1 :l.s forbidden; in its plD.Ce the key "Hevolucija. 1 w.tll

be used f'or counnunication o::r d.ivisi.on staffs 11ith army staffs.
The key 1 Natisk' may be used up to receipt of the key "Hevolucija. 1 1
which has been dlspa.liched by cow.•iel".

Then it is to be retired

from use, and sent to the field sta.i'f' of the .xrtJoy.

Report onreceipt of the key and on measures underta..lten."
In July 1920 the Poles learned from most Jt.l].Jortant operational
telegrams oi' the commander o::r the cavalry army, General Dudjennyj 1

181

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'\vh1 ch 11crc llo.t.cd I~>r7.cc, l1 Ju1 y o.t. 20]0 ho,n· :. prl"!l'! i...r.... t1c::-l.d 1:-;oi' hio i nl.cnuc:ll atl.v!:'.nc.c aml t..hc mi.~ito.ry coulJ:lOGll,ion u.L l.llc arr:1y,'rhich 'ID.S e;iv~n in l.hc:l opron o.U.rb:ess of \..het.c~P.I~n.m:"To t.hc

C011ll:J.O.l.ldcrG or the l.th, 6th, l~l.h, anrl J_l, !,]! Ca.va.lry DlvisionEJ aml·to t.he Cotmurultlcr of t.hc h)l.h Info.nt.l"y DJ.vlnLou."On 5 July t.h~ first op~"ra.l~ ional orclcr or the Cmut.~uJU.cr ofthe ]'ourth A.ru~y, General •.rsclmvocv [?), loinS heard, ;rhich was

add1·esscd to the commrmdcrs of t.he l2l.h, )3rd, anrl ~8th lllfo.ntry
Dl vis ions, the Commander o1' l.hc

11n,..,,, Hrir~ndc, unc1 ·t.hc CotmHo.nderof l:.he III CavoJ.ry Corps.
Ou G July a. s.itnila.r o1·tlcr frou tl1c connn.o.udcl' of the l~+,hA:rrrq was in l•Jrccp Lcc..1.
th.r~e,These

alT'ios t, s 1u.ul GCU!LOilf.l Ol'•.lcrs uerc the t•a.slc orclcrs

oi' Lhe three l~u::;oio.n o.rmy <'!01:11r.anclcrn forLh·~b·!e,lnnin[7, or a. newstacc or the Hu.sslnn offen!3lvc.
Sur~horrlers in cmol'U.Ol!O lLI•t.ll.cr 1:cu·c lnl.crccptecl and dcciphP.r-

ed clur:i.nr: t!H..: 1nonth nf .]111.).

'll1•·:,r~in l.erccptcd l.cleGro.m.s wereusually dec J.phc?l·~~~l on l..ht· sorK: tlA.,., or ou t.he i'ollowiue, clay aL
the latest, and wr:-n~ b.~.·ov.(:o;ht.. f.;o the iuu.1eulat.e noUe~ or t;llk! II
De~ t.ion::>cct.ion.

of

th~

GcncrrJ. ~j t.aff a~ uc~l as l.o thai; or l.he O!'lC!'al.ions

Tlle 1\ussiun 111 cavalry COt'P:J disl.illGUi»h•::>l1 itself

pa.rtictt.larly ill Lhls l."eSl•C··~ l.; it.. snpplicu t.lw 1-'olh;lt :i nlcrct..rJ? t
service 11ith nt ~co.s~.; oue very illl'Ul'f.la.J..ho radioouw dally.

RESTRICTEDThe events during the Polish-Russlan vla.r were also observed
and evaluated by the German lntercept ser'V'ice no that day by .daythe troop organization of both sldes sud the course of events
could be follmred by use oi' large ma.ps.

This was the first train-

ing which the reconstituted intercept service received and its
first opportunity for practice.
At the beginning of 1920 the tota..l s tre11gth of ·the central.
office of the German intercept serVice inBendlerstrasse consistedof some 12 persons.

Then they began to expand both the cr;ypta.na-

lytic and the evaluation groups.

.

This program, however, was noteisy to carry out, since the organs of the Inter-Allied Military
C~ntroli~~sCommission were endeavoring to follow closely all ha.ppen-in th~ National Ministry of Defense.

The Germans tried withall means in their power to deceive these control officers. The
c::oyptana.l.ytic group was transferred in part to Grunewa.l.d.
outside '~rld

To thethe evaluation group became a newspaper translation

office, and in this 1.fay it was possible again and again to escape
the threatened dissolution of the intercept center.

For the inter-

cept service had been strictly forbidden to the German Reichswebl•by the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.

The ciphe;t" bureau

was onJ.y authorized to develop, reproduce, and distribute cryptographic systems for German use.
fo~e.-ign

Any unauthorized decipher.ment ofcryptosraphic syster.lS 'vas forbidden by the Inter-allied

l-iilitary Control Commission.

A few times the Inter-Allied]83

RESTRICTEDRESI¥ROO?EB2 1•
st~rvcilla.n.cc orc.;r~nnho.d cott.cn on the trace ol' t.he a.c tivl·t.y or the

Gcrmn.n lnt.erccp~ Gervlce, a.nd thc:rc 'WO.S 0. rC(;W.Ell' fox-hunt.

nut

in ca.ch co.ac the matLcr l;urneci out favorably fo1· tlte Gel.·mnn interce:p t center.
Hhilc the Gcrma.n intercept servlce had l,bus far llmitc<l it.self to in Lcrccp t.ion of forci6n ro.d i.o tral'fic, in 1~25 a. t. theintercept center in Bcnlllerd.i·usue o.n office '\-TB.~~ set up whi·~h uo.s
concerned '\-tll.h listening to telephone convcrso.tions.

In lihc main

it was a ques l;ion or l:lotcniug t·.o converso. \.ions or the Hussian
embassy and the Hussian milil.a.ry att.achc.

In a. special. room u

series of S\litchboo.rds was inst.o.llcd, and every tlnvJ a telephone
at the Hussian embassy en Untc~r den Linden ucca.mc active, a :f'lap
fell do'm, and. t.he interprc te1 on du '·.y could listen to ·the conver4

satlon, and if necessary could even record it wlth a. rna.Gnetophone.
Later the Germ-::1s also bet;a.n observin~ the Dri Llsh anrl ]'rencll.
embassies, and the resu.lts or this activity not only p~"OV(..d ofgreat interest because of the direct inl'or!IID.t:i.on 1 bul. al.so indirectly, since they cave such GOOd iusit;ht into vrhat ·vas c;olna on a.t

these emba.ssjes that the cryptnno.l;ysis o.r enciphered messa!3CS
Pmanati:ng from them was in many cae:es grt"o.l".l.y i'a.c:fl.lta.Led ••In spite of all budo::!ta.r:t dif'ficuJ.I:;ics and in spite of thesurveilla.nce of the Inter-Allied 1-lili ta.ry Control Con.:nission, thee:x;pansion o:r the cry:ptanal.yl:.ic r,roup arll1 the evaluation groupoi' the cipher bureau made GOOd proc.sress, whcre"Ly the main errrphasis

1R4

RESTRICTED•

res{,cd more on crypt.analys"is !:;han on evHlllat.ion.

'l'hls situation

did not cha.nc;e when, beainninr; in 1~23, an increased monitoringof the radio t.rafi'ic of roreien arm.icG began.

In particular, theobservation of t;he rac.Uo service or the rolJ sh airi'orce, ancl ·f:;heresults achieved thereby, lent charm and stimulus for a further
extension of the intercept aml evaluat"ion service in the pu:rely
military fi.eld.

A sound bo.lancillG of' the interests of the ·t~robranches of work would have been the only correct solution, since,
in t;he i'ram~mork of the army, the focal po.tnt of the ~mrk mustnecessarily lie i.n a purely military field.
Stl.prisinsly, ho~1ever, a·t that time another development gained
the upper hand, namely, ·the defense Hinis·t;ry meddled in pm•elypoli ticaJ_ affairs and especially foreign political a.f'fa:i.rs.

A

dec:iphered diplomatic radiogram of'fered far more material for
lectures, conversations, and interesting discussions 1~han did
the detcrminal.;ion of rrdlitary details about the armed forces ofi'oreicn cmmt1•ies.
naturally, t.he l''oreisn Offtce did not lil::.e !:;his development
at all, and i.:.llere '\Ta.s cons i..e.nt teusion and fric f:;ion be tMeen"Durea.u. C" a.nc1 the "C::iphel' Durea.u. 11

Anot~er

restLlt 1m.s th,tt a.nincreasinGlY s'IJ..::u•p con Lest c.rC's ~ bet~·een Juhe evaluation ~roup
rull1 f:;hecr~·gt~ma.l;>-tic

GI'Otl.p, since the la.'jter a.b'2.~rl:i•lB5

RESTRICTEDRESTP-!e~ 1Iabove, -.r...a f'B.l" 1I1Cn'"e intel".. Pt('•l :In pol:ltiral p1"0Cell!d11•r•aJchan 1n

Such an 1.n&tallM.t.Lon, wblr.h 1!'1.r-.l•l bn.ve bet!n c1ucti.!ied in•1914 or 1915 but vbJnll nov tsnored +J•l" tMtR ·"'nmpletel.y', later
provell t" have om:lnous1l· tletl'Jntt:ntl\l resul:iia for the German intoe.r-

cept service ,cspec1all.y durins Wor.'.-' War II. 'l'hCI present-dAypursuit of eva.lua1.1uu .!n tbe 'inte,.,:opt r~e!d reauirea aw-h a va&ltho£.know:l~oi' tt.e t'rf:tR.ulzo.'ion, Lact1.rR 1 n1;ructure, an.l equi»-.
ment ot fore LHn au:m.i ••o

1 4111

Rbovo All . tm... h a far-rs=tB!'htng knawlodP.,enel who ore hlu'hlv qun11 r.~Pr1 f'o't" i.• •.is wrl-••

In '-'Olll.ll""UIL r.o tl1ic:••·r- rc,.A.l poLn'L in Cl':yptan91ya.:..a l.Joa

in +:.lP fi~lrt ot st.ttlJq~'r:a, "r'!l~,.h r.nt• be flll'Cl• DIOT'C .rap1.dJ.y 'lii'I.Bt•

l""' ..\11'1"\'1\l,.aett t.~· O" p1,. ~r ~ote1·y 1 am .. suppurted u·~ tbiM ri.Jibus l::\ abltl' 1.... arouse mu.re 1nt'.erP.'St.

•

RESTRICTED..

the evaluation group remained restricted essenti~ to a ver.ysmall group or persons. This picture became still more marked in
the autumn or 1928 when Major Kesselring (who later became General
Field Marshal), as delegate tor the personnel retrenchment program, ordered a further reduction in personnel in the militar.r
evaluation group.
As m.ent1.oned above, the results or observing t.he radio tt~af­
fic of the Po~t$h air'rorce spurred the rzer.mans on to an intense
vigilance regarding the radio s-,rstems or the armed forces of thecountries bordering on Gelllla.l\'Y•

At that time the Polish air force

was being built up and delivared an extraordinari4" large volume orradio traffic 1 which was sent part]¥ in plain text and part;q in

secret text.

The German cr.ypt.a.na.l;ysts were successful in breaking

the system used by the Polish air force 1 and thus were able toread all its enciphered radio traffic.
I

,..--

'

I

ThP. :results were so volt1llli.ri"Olls that the German evaluation ·~1

service, insof'ar as collective proceedings and details of the .
I

Polish air .force we1•e concerned - no matter :tn what field -wa1able to. obtaln the very best kind or :intormation.

rew_j

I

Arter amonths they knew ever.y airplane with its number and engine number,
every pUot, evecy off'icer, all details o£ equipment, organization,
structure, tactical views, preparedness tor commitment, etc., socomplete~ as has perhaps never bef'ore or su1ce been the

the German intercep·t. service.

One day, hatleVer, this fine source

or information was stopped by' the following event:•case in

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J

Polish espi01J81!" service bad been auccesetul in obtain-

ing thJ services ot a German railway postal clerk working betwogn

B:raal&J and Berl.in.

This clerk, whose duty it was to sort the

mail adaressed to Berl.1n whicb came into Breslau and Frankfort

on tbe/Oder, bad received ~nstructions frOlll the Polish secret aerv.t.,eto bold. back pieces of mail bearing certain addresses 1 and on
ar.r:htJl. in Berlin to band theru over to a eonf'identia.l. agent. whocare~ opened

the envelopes, looked over the contents, pl...,to.

stated them, care:t:'Ul.ly reRealed the envelopes, and on the same clay
'rftturned tlJ.P.m to the clerk tor forwarding.
This work proceeded very smootbl:y for several months untUa chance discover, revealed the activity of the railway postal
cl.erk.
drowned.

He was followed, but plunged into the Le.ndvelu.• Ce.nal and
His body wu.s recovered the next day immediately in frontof the Defense Ministry Building.

......

The PoL1oh intelligence service bad obtained from this postal
clerk information tho.t the German intercept stations in Breslau
and Fl"anki"ort on the Oder vere engaged in watching the Polish

air force tro:ffic, and -were able to ascertain from the in·terceptedmaU just how far the Polish enciphered telegrams vere being deciph...

ered by the Germans, since the deciphering ot theee tel.egraDls was
not done in Berlin but in the individual. intercept stations.

The

Poles therefore cllans~d their system and su'Lsti tuted tor it one
that va.s extraordinarily complicated and coul.d not:. be b1:oken bylBS

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Germans for several. years.

In ad.di tion 1 they restricted theirr dlo traffic so greatly, both as to volume and content, that
ere was no comparison at all between the present results and those

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100

RESTRICTEDTIDTI OBSERVATION OF lWW.:UVERSThe year 1928 signified a turning point for the G~rman inter· cept service inasnroch as front this year on the actual duties of amilit~ intercept

service began to be cultivated more than hitherto.

In part this was a natural. developmen~, because in most of the statesof Europe ·down to 1928 there had been no maneuvers on a large scale.
The possibility of t1•aining ·the intercept service in the observationof the course of military operations was therefore prese~t only
to a very limited degree.

Now a maneuver is a. military action

which in its essence closely approaches a state of war.

The intercept

service of the armed forces of a cotmtry has the ts.sk of training
itself for the observation of the radio traffic of a potential
opponent in time of war.

If the German intercept service bad trans-ferred its primary interest to the observation of political events,that would have been an unnatural phenomenon.

Of course, thiscontinued to be the case, but, nevertheless, on the in:i.tiativeof a few men, the proper task of the German military intercept service, namely, the observation of foreign armies, began to gain initrq)ortance.
The first opporttrnity for carrying on an observation of reguM
la.r maneuvers was affo1•ded by the Rhineland maneuvers in 1928.
These bee.;an with a crossing of the Hosel near Trier by the British
troops, and continued dt~ine the course of a week into the vicinity•

lgl

RESTRICTEDRES~ 1or Eunkil'chcn.

At that time the German intercept service sue-

cccdcd .ror the :Cirst time in followina very exactly l:.hc entireIico~·aeor the nmneuvers and in reconstructing the proeross of

op rations in all details.
r.fue next opportunity wns

in Czechosla.valda and Poland.

afforded in 1929 by the maneuvers
The Czech maneuvers at tho.t ·i;ime

lt place some~.,.here in t~e neighborhood of Olmuetz, and one of' thetIman crypta.nalysts succeeded in solving within six hours theitographic system en1ployed.

I

The. t pcrmi t ted such extensive

i~ight into the course ~r the 1naneuvers that these could be reI

'

:

I

constructed in the same '(NB.Y' as the Rhinele.nd maneuvers.

The

German intercept service was not quite so successful that yce:r inobserving the Polish maneuvers in the vicinj. ty of Lida.

To besure, here too they succeeded in recoGnizlna in general the entire
course and the orsanization of the troops; however, l..he way the
Poles used radio and the cryptographic system which they employedcaused such difficull:.y ·t;ha.t only after a considc1•able time vra.s

it pos.siule to gain insighli in!io the details.
'J:lhe observation of these three maneuvers l'PVco.lerl t.ha.L
thE.' tlu·ee col.llll:iries in question differed c,reatly in their use orra.diotel.e~raphy.

Consequently 1

j t\Tas necessary t.o atlnpt~hecornmi tment of interce:p 1., units, diTC(' I:/ion f indlng unl t.s 1 eva.J..u-

ati0n nnd cr}~t~J~yti~ sections to th~ condition- or each individua.l cA.se. Never !;heless, one could say even now that when i'ollowinc;

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...-------------------------------------· foreign maneuvers results could be achieved in every: case, if the.

tac·tics employed in commitment were sensible, and if the units
could feel their way into the radio situation of the country to beobserved.

The extent of this success might vary according tocircumstan~es,

but in all cases good information was to be e~ected.

That n.eant that the' intercept service, if -emp~oyed properly,
must necessarily gain great significance in a. coming war.

If I

say •iii' employed proper~y," then I mean that the connni tment of one • s

own monitoring organs must be carried out very carefull.y and must
be adapted to the situations then eXisting; but I also mean thatfor this type of evaluation of the results of the observations,
it is of the greatest importance to have e. large nuniber of real~yfirst-class men who must be appropriately trained and constant~ygiven additional training.
:fiel.d.

No improvisation is possible in thisIf one does improvise., one is exposing himself to thedanger that not only wil1 the value of the intercept service be
C:,.iminished by false1y drawn conclusions 1 but that this service inthe hands of ine~erienced people can become a great danger for
one's own command.
From 1930 on there began a long series of French maneuvers
and large-scale exercises.

They occurred chiefly in the northeast-

ern part of France, specifically in the French defense distr:I.cts
VI, VII, and XX.

Almost all. vrere observed by the German intercept

servlce and in almost all cases it was possible to gain extrerr.ely

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i'o.r-reo.ch.inlj ins it,.:;hl, llOl- only into the cow.•sc of the m.a.ncnverr;

but also ·ull.h rcopccl:. l;o •t..roop or(5e.nl~a.l.ion,

L1~.c!l;ics c~nJ:>loyc~d,

weapons coumLf.l; l~cd, maJ.•ch pcrrort.m.nce, cmploymcn 1:; oi' the td r rorc:e,France l:;urucU. on l; to be Lllc country whose mancuve:t·s couJ.detc.

be obscl~vcd in o.n es:r>ec:J.ally fa.vorable rash-ton.

'He shall apeak

lut.er Of the l•ear;ons for \..hi B•

It was interestinG not. only to follow the lo.nd manuuvers
but.. also to observe drills o.nd maneuvers of the l•'rcuclt air .force.

Thus Lhe Gert:l.S.l1 intercept S('rvicc succeeded, vh lle ol>oe1·ving o.n
air exercise in the vicinil.y of IT!lncy, :In calr.:ul.e.tlng precisely
how the l!'rench 1rurning servlce wo.r; relal..cd to f;hc speed of theat.ta.cldnc Pnemy.

It wao posotblc to set '.l.J.> rotl\J.)arative titnc-

tahles uh.Lch sholrnd on a. LJ.Tile lJasis f·.he movement of ·Lhe :lncominp;tUli tsand sbr:rwed simu1taneously the uJBllner in which the war11tnr;

ser·1i~ereacl.ed.

It turned out that in all cases the warning

B""rvice went into operation promptly at the s·ta.rting point_, butalerted the objects to be warned much t;oo late, and this based o'l.
the relatively low f.lying-speed of those days!
In observing French air maneuvers in the area of Grenoble,
the German intercept serYice had succeeded in reco11structing the
air ue.rninc; system, the reportine; system, and the coiig?ass points
used by the spotting system, all by means of short; rt!dio reports.
The Ge.rman intercept service succeeded in follm·ring some] rench maneuvers, e •g. 1 on the Aisne in 19 32 and on the Harne 1

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to such an extent tltat the results were considerably more comprehensive than the reports of all the military attaches and agents
employed.
The copiousness of the results of monitoring French maneuvers was exceeded only by the results which could be obtained
against the Italians.

The Italians used radiotelegraphy at all

maneuvers and exercises as if they had never heard of radio camouflage, radio deception, or of an intercept service.

~IDstof theradiograms were cotrg;Josed in plain language • Their conten·t; wasso informative as to rendnd one of the best periods of the Worldl-lar; indeed, they sometimes surpassed these.

The observation of

Italian maneuvers or exercises did offer one difficulty 1 inasmuch
as the distance, the intervening massif of the Alps, and the sharp
angles resulting from a short direction finding base resulted inmany disadvantages; however 1 ·these 1rrere compensated for completelyby the rich and instructive content of the radiograms which weretransmi·tted with high power.

It would be ha.rd to conceive of amore satisfactory opponent for one's own intercept service than the
Ita.lian radio service.
The observation of Austrian, Dutch, and Belgian maneuvers

was also crowned as a rule with very good success.

The problem

children of the German intercept service were and continued to be
the Poles and the Russians.

In the case of the Poles it was pos-sible to achieve certain successes by employine a very large number

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RE~ltf€~ 1
of direction f'ind.ing stations to recognize the movement and tbe
location of the individual radio stations. That in 1tself wasa greo.t dc.al.l

For the rest, the Po11sh air force saw to it by its

use of radiotel.egrapby tha.t 'lllUch was revealed regarding the gr0\1l'J4
forces.

In general. 1 however 1 Polj sh radio tratf'ic was lumdl.ed

so cleverly that i·h was only with the greatest difficulty that
realtions could be recognized.
With respect to the Russians the situation was still less fQ~~
orable.

Distance alone offered insqpera.ble difficulties.

Anymass employment at direction finding station was possible only

trom East Prussia., and consequentl.y gave such sharp angles tbat
any certain J.ocation of' the stations was in most cases impossible.
The radio p1•ocedure used by the Russians was the best in all Europe

as far as the c8.11Y.)u:f:l.nge factor was concerned. Their cryptographics)"Stems also proved in 1ll0st cases incapable of' solution.

ot course,

covering Ruasian maneuvers alwo.ys gave a certain allK)Unt of illf'ormation, but this was so slight that it scarcely repaid the time andeffort e~ended.
Aside tram the observation o:r ::roreign man~uvers there was one
other opportunity to get training on a war bonis.
In general., people are accustomed to regard the period ottime bet"Ween the First and Second WorJ.d Wa:rs as a period of peace.

In reality during this entire time tht>re was an uninterrupted chain

ot revolts, revolutions, 'U,Pr1singP. 1 and mllite.ry actions, with
one following on the heels or the other or sometimes runninglOG

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parallel..

In the years 1.926 to 1.932, for instance, the ItaJ.ians

waged a series of six campaigns in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica,of which one read littl.e in the European papers, to be sure, butwhich afforded an extremel.y wel.com.e target for the training ofa wartime intercept service.
The six Libyan campaigns were led chiefly by General Graziani,
started initially from Tripol.i 1 subdued all Tripol.itania down toGat, and ended later in Cyrenaica with the conquest of the Kufra
oases.

For this, fast mobile colunms were engased which made very

extensive use of radiotelegraphy.

The entire traffic of all units

engaged in these operations both in communication with one anotherand with their bases, in communication between Tripol.i and Benghasi
and between these places and Rome, all instructions emanating from
Rome 1 and almost a1l orders and reports were handled by radio.
That gave a wa.tchful intercept service the chance to follow thecourse of operations and to recognize on the basis of numerous
reports and orders the preparations for further operations long
before they began.
The resul.ts of monitoring the Italian Libyan campaigns 1
together w;tth the results or following Italian maneuvers at home,gave reason to assume that in any coming war the monitoring of
Italian radio traffic by a foreign intercept service would not
fail. to give the best possibl.e results.
· Things were simil.ar in Spanish r.Iorocco during the revol.tof the Riffs under the leadership of Abd el. Y~im.

197

RESTRICTEDThe Spanishexpedl biono.ry troops ma.J nl~o.incu a very uc.: t.i ve ro.dio tra:C fie,bol..h n.tol011[5 f·.hcmsclves and also with the e;arri..3on stat,.i..ons Ccuta,
Te cuan' ancl l·Ielillo..

These lnst three s 1;ations also COnJJ'Iltlni-

cated cons to.n Uy "1-Ti t.h Bo.rcelona and. l1a.drid.
traffic was SC'nt ln plain text.

.AJ.mos t a.ll the

Insofar n.s d.phers were cn~loyed,

they vrere extremely prim-t t1. ve nnd ca11o.hlc of quick solution.
Consequentl.y, it was easy in those days for the l!'rench, as '\vellas for the Italians and GeT·m~=~ns, to c;et. detailed insiGht j_nto
events in Spanich Morocco.
But even the French uc1.·c no L nc ting very dlf rerently inthose days.

In conncc Uon wi l..h t.ht· upr i sine; in Spanish Horocco,

there 1rere other serious nu.t;J ve ltpris.i nss in l~re11ch I·lorocco,
in particu.lar in the area of Lhe midclle and hl c;h At,lo.s ra.nse.
On the one hand, the foral I••)i.nt.s '\.rere in Lhe ro·ce. Ouezze.n -Ta.za. - Oudjda, ru1d on the o'uher ho.nd in t.he area 'l'a.f' llclt Ksar es Souk - Ain ucrra.

The rail.io traffic of l..he lare;cr gar-rison stations cave so many inci.ghi·.s into l..he course of t.he en-til•e operaLion that. one could follow events very pc>rfectl.y from
Europe.

As in the co.sc of l..he Italians andt;}l("

Spanish, theentire he.ncUint3 of militat:"y tJ·a.fi'.i.c was guicled solely by theidea of transmit Ling the in.rorma.tion to the ad~lresRcc quj cldy.
The fe.c lior of dis au i sc ret:rea ted entirel.y lni,o the lJaclq!,round.
From a tactical poinL of vic-;r this was an ~"n·or in any case,since even though it mic;ht be assumed the.L t..I:e J1,\l..jvcs in I.ibya

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and :Morocco had no radio intercept service, and consequentl.y coul.ddraw no advantage from enemy traffic (which is by no means proven),
nevertheless, this reprcaen"l;ed a danger in respect to the trainingof the signal troops, a. danger which was not to be underestimated.

The same signal units, which were developing their radio traffic
in this manner here, mitJhl. be engaged at any moment in an entirelyI

different theater of war.

There lTa.s. great danger that they would

then qpera.te in the same manner they did here.

•

199

.~

..--...

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_....

-~

200

RESTRICTEDRES~- 1
THE INTERCEP.r SERVICE OF OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Not only had Germany p~aced great em.Pha.sis on its intercept
service after World War I and built up a good organization accordingly1 other Europeat\ countries were also busily working in thesame direction.

However, the me·thods adopted were vastl.y different.

On the basis of its previous experience, France had built up
a very good organization, the main part of which was merged with
the Deuxieme Bureau of the General Staff.

This handed out thevarious wo1•k assignments, and here also were to be found thecryptanalytic group and the evaluation center.

The technicalacc01Ilplishment of intercept work was in the hands of' communica:tion
troops.

The organization for intercept service in France differedfrom that in Germany in that the intercept stations installed inGermany from 1925 on formed themselves into special organizations
and were never used for domestic radio traffic 1 while the Frenchmany times entrusted their domestic military radio stations withintercept duties as well.

This was a great mistake, for it hap-

pened again and again that the radio traffic of these stations showedthat they were also engaged in intercept work.

For example 1 theywould request certain forms which were only used in intercept service,or they gave information on equipment which also was used only inintercept service, and so on.

The knowledge obtained from observ-

ing these French radio stations was so far-reaching that in 1931
the German intercept service was very well informed on the French

201

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in"tercc1lt service, its organization and practical accomplislm:ents.
Tho or6ani7.ation of these intercept stations was very ~learly ~ecognized.
While in the l!'rench intercept service the i'ocal pCiint was
directed toward the observation of radio ·~raffic of foreign armies,
the English worked in two di!ferent directions, namely, in observation of all ra(1io traffic of all nations in the world, and incomplete coverage of the international poli·tica.l. (diploma;bic)
radio traffic.

The last-named field was, of course, also cul-·tiva:ted by other countries, but in no co'lmtry in such e. comprehensive and strictly centralized manner as in Eneland.

Accord-ingly, their results in this field were uudoubtedly the best in
Europe, since the English placed great emphasis on the selection
and training of personnel.
The Italian intercept service presented a picture of rather
extreme laxity.

The Italians had erected a legion of relatively

small intercept stations along the :D'rench and Austrian borders,and in addition were operating se\~ral such stations in southern
Italy.

The coutrol s·te.tion '\·rith its auxiliary organizations was

located in Rome.

From a technical standpoint, the Italian inter-

cept stations were well equipped; but their organization and the'processinc of material was deficient.

Also, their cryptanalysis

was in qual.i ty far behind tha.t of the English 1 Germans, andFrench.

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In the four milita'l"y districts of' Czechoslovakia, all thelarger garrison radio stations were integrated for intercept service.

The Czech intercept service operated not at all badly 1 but

it made the same mistake as did the French, by compromising itself
through the radio traffic of its own intercept stations.

The

Czech intercept service was connected with many ol the traditions
and experiences of the Danube Monarchy 1 and maintained excellent

cooperation with the French intercept service.
Strange to say, the new government of Poland had one of thebest organizations.

Indeed 1 I would like to say that this organi-zation was really better than that of the French.

Here there vas

a clear separation between radio s~rvice and tbe interception offoreign radio traffic, so that no comproULtses could take placeby radio transmission.

Occasionally officers of the Polish com-munication service were ordered to France where they participatedin intercept training courses.

Since France had gathered abund&.nt

experience in Worl.d War I, this training was extremely advantageou.s.
On the other hand, the Poles themselves had already had opportunity
to gather practical ey.perience which was now turned to good account.
Polcnd maintained a still more intensive cooperation with the
French intercept service than did Czechoslovakia.
The Russian intercept service had the most obscure organi~zation.

That they attached great importance to it, however, wasshown by the fact that in all communication formations they had

2os

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large contingents for purely military intercept service.

How thewatching of foreign diplomatic and military radio traffic wascarried out as a peace measure is shown only indirectly by thefact that they made use in their own radio traffic of all experience
gained from the mistakes made by all other countries.

For therest, it appears that the organization was very simple but forthat very reason was more rapid and exact in operation.
The Austrians and Hungarians had also estabH.shed a very ,,_,1able

intercept organization in their countries.

Tbe Hungarians as wellas the Germans J.aid stress on the political side, while the Austrians
looked beyond this and directed more attention to the militaryside of the intercept service.

In cryptanalysis the Hungarians

were far ahead of the Austrians.
The cooperation of the intercept services of the different

European countries presented a fascinating picture.

The Germanintercept service bad since 1926 cooperated closely with the
Hungarian service - particularly in regard to diplomatic decipherment.

The cooperation of the cipher bureau of the Defense Ministrywith the cryptanalytic bureau of the Hungarian Honved Ministry
was closer and more intensive than that with tbe Foreign Ministryin Wilhelmstrasse.

Late in 1929 cooperation started bal·tingly between the Germans

and tbe Austrian intercept service, which was beamed especiallytoward Italy and Czechoslovakia.

About the same time cooperation

began between the German and Finnish intercept services, maintaining

204

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a un:ltod front against Ruas:la.

Since the .Finnish intercept sor-

vice on its part also cooperated with the Polish service, very
t:lckl.ish situat:l.ons some·t;Jmes arose.

The German interaep·t,; ser-vice also maintained after 1930 a ccrtf.\in amount of cooperation
with Litbua.nia.

This was directed aga:i.nst Russia as well as

against Poland, but was accompanied by a great deal of mutualsuspicion.
01~ty

occasional cooperation existed be~~een the German end

Spanish lnte~cept eervices.

It was directed against France andEngland and was chiefl.y sponsored by ·~he German naval :l.ntercept

service.

Afte~1933 collaboration was also brought about botween

the Italian and the <lernJan services, especially in the field ofcryptanalysis.

The1•e has l)l"Oba.b1.y sel.don1 been a cooperation

which from its very beaillning was marked by· such strong mutualsuspicion as this.

Dil•ections were always given on both sides to

eXhaust all intercept possibilitiea of one's partner, bu~ toreveal nothing yourself.
The French ma.i11ta.ined good coopera:tion in intercept workwith Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, ahd Yugoslavia, and occasion-

ally also with Svitzerland.
'l'he English cooperated with the I:lOl"\oiegiou and Danish inter· cept services, and also in part with PortuBal.

Essentially they

worked only for themselves, which 'Was easy i'or thera. since they

were in a position to establish intercept st~tions th~oughout

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I.. .:.

to.

I

RE~¥Jar:Rro'F!B 1
bho 'Worlt1. in tho:b:• own l"OOOOI'JS1ona,
Between l"c.)lanu a.nr't O~ochoelc,vo.ltia. o.s wall e.o between Polo.nd
atJ.tl notnnl'l..tll there rU.tlO ~X:I.Sf:.ed flo COopera.liion Which SOmetimes be-t!at'ne qu:J. 'l;!! fo.r ..:reach inG.

Du.t ~.n a.ll the a.bove-men·tioned ce.ses 1

th:J.s 11ave1' lcopt ·tbf.l ool'l.l~:r.·l.\ctine pa:rtors o:f' tho moment from actively monitorinG enoh otl'lera traffic.

One o:r tho closest forms

Of cooperation p:rol>o.bly exisLed later du."C'ill6 World War II betvrcen
Germaey ut1t't H\.U'l.t:nrY and be !,;ween Germany o.nd It.e.ly.

And yet theseth.'t'eiQ Qt.)Un.tries 't-Tatched each o (,her so closely that a large partat OL\Cil. lnonitoring oreanization was burdened with this 'WOrk.

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__._RE~~ JFfPun
1

SO~JE:

HE:M1U1KS ON 'l'l!J!l TECHNIQUE OF THE I].\JT[!}HCEPI' SERVICE

If in what follows somethina is said regarding the teclmiqueof the intcn•cept service, then this does not mean the technicalapparatus by the aid of which the st.ations to·be observed are ronitored, but rather the teclu1ique of practical commitment for themonitoring or foreie;n ra.dio stations and the processing oi' thematerial intercepted.
For the observation of flx.ed radio stations abroad. there werein Gertaa.ny in 1926 six so-called. 11Fixec1 Intercept S t;ations 11 ,; oneeach in
K8nigsberg in East Prussia,
E'rankfur t on the Oder,
Breslau,

Stu t t,go.rt,
MUnsl:ier in Uestphe.lia.
'fhe monitoring of .roreign s ta tj ons was generally dlvided up
by countries, thus Stu t; !.;Bart moni to1•ed France, Spain, and northAfrico.,; Munich monitorec1 Italy, Switzerland, Austria, and a part;oi' tlJe Balkans, e l:ic.

Along 'vi th l:iM.s, hmiever, for technical rea-sons those stat:l.ons vrhich '\rere difficult to hear '\Tere o.ssienecl to
the intercept stations where they could be hea.J.•t1 best.
Not quite so easy to solve 11as Jche question of noni taring
the r.:tL1:i.o t1•ai'fic 1rhen t\lQ.lleuvers uere l. .cld u1:roc.t1.

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J.o'or l:ih:i.s prupose 1

REST!tl'f3~ 1
de tachmcn lis llhtl l..u be set. up ,.,hlch vrer~ ,i11U~hecl i'CJl'l·fr.tl"fl l;o Lhc
i'ronl..ier.

In l.his connecL.lon; the nrear. or c-ormnil.mcnl, depr·lldco. •primo.r ily on l.he arcp. in lrhich Lhe maneuvers to be ol)G<:!rved 1mre
tak.ine place.
siderecl:

Des iclcR i;his, the fo~lowlng .rae Lors hall t;o be con-recnpt;.tou comliL:i.ons in t.he plnc~~;:; where the s'LaciOL1S

were set up; wire connections a.va:lla.hle for trausmission or Lheobserved results; and above all, electromn~netic connitions forem,ploY1nent of direction fin(1Cl'S.

•:rhc J.oce.tions forl.ihe direction

finders ha.d to be selected very carefully if t'he rea.d.inc;s 'tfere
to prove relia.ule •I•'ur thcrmore, it wo.s very impori;a.n t;, wheneuq>loying directlon finders, to kno"tf in which direction the maneuver parties vrould t11ove.

If the maneuver ran orr in such fashionthat the 'l.vro parties Noved po.rallel to the dircc tion i'indine;base, then it ·Has· relatively simplf:' to keep the rallio sta.t:i.ons
apart and [;o determine their locatiolls.

On Lhe o[;her hand, if theparties to the maneuver moved on a. line vertical to tho direction
finding base, then the result. inG angle 'tfa.s Generally so acu lie tha.·li
an error of 1
elusions.

0

in a. readJnc; wo.s oi'ten cnouuh to cause v1rong con..

There.l'ore 1 lt 'tfas no[; a.t all sim;plo to differentiate

the two pa.:rties to tho maneuver 1Jy direction finding.

1\nd wi l;hin

the one party matte1·s often lay so that small errors in ·tlle readil1(5were eno~h to give fo.J.se concep·Lions rego.rdinc; the c;rouping of
this party.

Iu such cases

it was necessary to choose o. rela.ti vely

broad direc t.ion fj ndin~ base.

l!O'tfcver, this "a~ li1:1i lieu by [;he208

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audibili.l;y of the radio s·lia.tions.

The best possibi~:i:ties resulted

when a 1na11euver occurred in an area which could be surrounded,
so "Lo speak, by direction finders.

'.Chis 'Was usually the case,for example, l.rhen oboerving Polish maneuvers, since here the opponent could be taken in t.he flank from East Prussia.
Unti~ 1936 a great obstacle to Lhe observation of French man-euvers lTas the so-called demili ta.rized zone, ~n which no organs of
the German eu·med forces were to be employed.

!!'rom 1928 on, there"\·Tel•e camouflaged ope1•a.tions here each year, whereby the units
committed were represented as technical surveyine; detachments of'
the German Droadcasl;ill6 Cong;>any 1 of the Ge:rman pos lia.l dis·tiricts 1or of the German Central Post Office.

Persons par·ticipa.ting woreI

civilian clothes.

,.t.

So far as I knmr 1 complete c.Usguise of' the ~-commil:itnent was achieved in all. cases; o.t least, the French neverraised any objections throtlgh dipl.oma·tic cha.nnel.s •.

Of the utmost im:portance was the manner or carryine ou.t eval-uation of the incercept results_, since the "\vork '-ra.s so planned as
to lcecp step at all. M.mes 1-1i th the development of' the opera'!:. ionsso that_, for e:r-..c.mpl.e, the fl'uits of the day's activities should
be avtdla.bl.c late that eveninG at -t.he cenl.ral evaluatlon office.

This called i'or precise 'TOl'k Oll the part of the COl'UUUlliCa.GiOllS
se1•vice, and .ror intellieent cooperation by the various branches
of

t.~m

evalu.u.tion se!"Yice.

'l'he reports oi' clir~ct.!.on fimlj n,;o,.,ere passed every hour by Lel..::phor..c to Lhe evo.lt:.a~lon ce:tLer and•209

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of tho radio stations wbich could be heard were marked by coloredpins.

TJ.•ai".fic evaluation endeavored to recognize from the reJ.a:tionsof the radio stations to one another the framework of the command
net of the parties.

~~

cryptanalytic section meanwhile worked

feverishly to solve the cryptographic systems employed, and to decipher the radiograms sent.

The content evaluation section tried

to deduce tactical conclusions from the content of the intercepteddispatches, while the final evaluation section combined the t•eeul.ts
of aLl the above-mentioned branches, and endeavored to gain a cleer
picture of the course of the movements.
We must say that the monitoring of foreign maneuvers by theGerman intercept service dUl•ing tlle period !rom 1928 to 1939 wasattended by great success,1931 and 1937.

The most favorable period lay between

Of the 52 'lllalleuvers and large scale exercises

covered in this period, the German intercept service achieved acomplete reconstruction in 35 cases, a good partial reconstructionin 12 cases, while the 1•esults in the l'o.maining cases were stillgood enough to yield usetul information.

210

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'!'HE CHANCES FOH. THE INTERCEPT SERVICE
The monitoring of the radio traffic of foreign armies andair forces afforded an excellent opportunity for a comparative
estimate of the radio procedures employed in the various
countries.

Spontaneousl,y the question arose, to what extent

the radio traffic of an army would be vulnerable, so to speak,to the enemy intercept service, i.e., to what extent it was
likely to afford the enemy information.

Around 1936 all theEuropean countries could be divided into three groups, and it..; ;: _;;is very tempting to compare these groups yrith one another.
To the first group belonged Lhose countries whose radio
traffic gave the most information and which consequent:cy incase of a future war would be likely to offer welcome targets
for a hostile intercept service.

To this first group beloneed

Italy, France, Austria, Belg.i.um, and Holland.
To the second group must be assigned those countries
l-rhore t.he armed forces worked accordine to radio procedures
which w·ere likewise calculated to offer good information toa 1-ratchful intercept service, but by no means to the same
degree as the countries in the first catecory.

Here belonged

primarily England_, Czechoslovakia, and YugoGlavia.
To the third group bclonccd. tho~::e count.rie:::: l·There ::;p3cial
aLt.ention was given to the camouflaginr; and di.[;r;uisinc of rRrlio
traffic_, and l·ihere these measuros 1·rere so far de•1e loped Lh[l.t~11

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information <.'f a Lu.~ Lico..J.

I

I

111._d cha.ra(:i...or could L•..: obtain-

1'

eu to only a I-ll i ~~hL l'.X.I ... tri

I

I

-.t

·l•ory one rnust assign primar-I

I .' 'U.ion in rn r.r<~ct

ily Ruf'lsia o.uct roland.
Before defining mor-r• }

1

•

•

-1

• I

to theseveral groupfl of countricu,l somc;- l'"IIPtl~o may be in order regarding
radio procedurcr. in ecncral.

The oldest and simplest procedure, which

was used especially in World War I and had heen retainc;od by thecountries mentioned in the first group above, is the so-calledcircular/ traffic (Krcisverkehr).

Here a certain number of stations

conununipate with one another on a common wave lengt··, using fixedI

call sfgns.
any'l'he call siens may be chane;ed daily, but are

fixed for

ope' radio station insofar as its call signs remain the same inIcoiilll\unication \dth any other station.

This system is very convenient

f:ofpractical radio communication, and affords a large degree of

sicurity for the transmission of the message.

However, it has the"tthrnistakable di&advantaee that the enemy intercept service veryilsoon recognizes the connections bet\..,.een the radio stations andcaneasily draw from them deductions as to tactical relations.
Another system is the so-called star traffic (Sternve~kehr),
where a dofiniLc number of stations coiTUnunicate with a control
station.

In this system various call siens and wave lengths canoccur.
A Lhird method is termed net Lraffic (Netzverkehr); it issimilar to star traffic in its usc of l·m. ve lengths and callsigns, but differs in that the radio st.aLions communicate not~12

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only with a control s~ation but also ~ong themselves.

The twolast mentioned systems make the work of the enemy intercept
service much more difficult because the relations within theconunand net are not inunediately obvious, since in every
traffic direction a different call sign and a different wave
length will be used; a considerable amount of observed traffic
is necessary to be able to recons~ruct a tactical or operation··.
·al command net on the basis of the traffic handled and the
direction findings obtained.
It is s i:.ill more difficult \'ihen so-called line traffic(Llili~nverkehr)

is introduced in an army; here only the radio

traffic of two stations with one another is recognizable, sincefor each so-called radio link a particular instrument is emplqyed with its own wave length and its own call sign.

If in thiscase, as happened in Poland and Russia, several call signs areused optionally by one and the same radio link, and if traffic
in the two directions is worked on different wave lengths, withdaily change of wave lenE:,rth and call sign, then recognition of
the relations is possible only if an extraordinarily large
number of very dependable direction finding readings is available,
or if the type of traffic sent permits same deductions.

Ifneither of these conditions is satisfied or is satisfied only..- to an inadequate dee;rce, then v1e no longer get on the evaluation
map of the enemy's intercept service a picture of a coherent
command net, but simply a large munber of individual links
totally lrrithout connections, a'1d with l:.hese nothing can be done.

213

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Vnti.lc H io l·o~;siblc to r.:.•c01:lL'"Ucl, the 1-acl.ical. and opera-

tional commoml no L from Lhc Lra rf 1.c of un nney worki.ne wi. th
Cil'culnl• tt·a.ffic, oven when it is not. possibVJ t.o get. a single
plain text messo.go or to solve quicldy the cryptocrnp:1 tc systemu~od,

it is generally impossible to worl<: out the conunand net

without a knovllodgc of the content of the mcssaees when lineI

traffic is used.

I

Of very groat importa~ce in dissuising radio traffic is themanner or using call signs and wave lengths, or of the system
according to which tables of call signs aPd wave lengths areconstrue ted.
I just used the word. "system", Cllld precisely in this
there is a trap.

If a table of call signs and wave

assign-ments is constructed according to a system (i.e., with aperiodic recurrence of the srune call signs or wave lengths ina definite rhythm), then the enemy is in a position to recognize;

this system after a time, to reconstruct the table, and the
disguise that was aimed at becomes unavailing.

The temptation

to worlc according to a system is very strong, however, since theuse of such a table is extremely practical for the operator andfor handl:ng a change of call signs and wave lengths.

It ispossible to change such tables relatively often and without great
difficulty.

Furthermore, the preparation of such a call sign tableis easy.

If it is lost in any manner, it can be reconstructed

quickly.

When using call sign tables which are without system

the difficulty lies in the fact. that a single table must be

211.

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prepared f01• the entire army in order to avoid repetitions of thesame call sign.

In sp:l.te of its relative simplicity, t~e produc-•tion of such o. table is very time consuming and must be carriedout most conscientiously, if subsequent erro~s are to be ruledout.

If such tables are ~ost, then the dnmo.ge cannot be ca~culat-

ed, since the production of new tables uways call.s for n great
deal of work and their introduction entails a whole avalanche ofchanges in the army.

Nor can one keep such tab~es in stock inany ecsired quantity.

These technical questions have only been indicated here inIa rough way in order to show the significance which the use of a
specific radio procedure may have on the disguising of traffic.
However, there are still other factors affecting to a large degree
the camouflaging of tra.f'fic.

One of the chief of these is the or-

ganization of the communications troops of an army.

In this res-pect the various countries of Europe differed very greatly from one
another, and the organization ranged from one that was greatly
centralized to one which wo.s entirely decentralized~
France had the centralized type of organization with allcommunications troops combined into three regiments from which
detachments were sent, according to need, to the individual divis ions, corps, and armies • On the other hand, there was great
decentralization in the Soviet Union where every division, every
corps 1 and every army had its own s ignaJ,. unit.

From the standpointof disguising radio trafficf thadecentr~ized.organization is•

RESTRICTEDUll•.tllln• t.luw.lbly 1" · Ll.<·r :Ji.nce 1 t is he t.. tcr st~:i.t..cd

t..o Lake into accountthe prncLical n,;;.cdr. of radio opr•rat.ion, o.r;A, no p't"ovionr. nt..,ming
up perioctrr ls required.

In Fr~nce, for instance, when ltJ.rge scale

matlcuv.-Jrs 1-roro held, communicnt.lonr.; companies were assic;ncd to t.hedivisicns comrni.I:..Lcd and these companion had t.o set up their t.raffic
for these divisions, start.ine; from scratch.

Consequently, it l-IaS

often possible to recognize the radio net in t.he maneuver arcn before
the maneuvurs actually began.

In H.ussia such a thine l'ras impossible.

But this phenomenon was not limited to the initial stage of thecommitment but in r~ respects cont.inued on.

With centralizedorganization the signal unit always remained a foreign body within the frame"Trrorl<: of the unit, \-Thile with the decentralized form it wasorganicall3 fused ~~th the unit.
The above-mentioned criteria and a number of other factors were
decisive for the question of the extent to 1-rhich it would be possible
for an intercept service to get insight into the radio traffic of oneof the European armies or air forces in case of li"ar.

They could not

fail to have a decisive influence in any future war ••Within Group I the Italian armed forces undoubtedly took the lead,and there was not the slightest doubt that in any future war the radio
traffic of the Italian army and of the Italian air force would givethe enemy r.tost valuable information.

Not quite so bad, but stillver,y informative, was the situation ln France, Austria, Belgium, andHolland.

The circular traffic employed here, the frequent trans-mission of plain text, Lhe use in France of no less than 78 different
types of radio apparatus, the use of signal tables - which were ver,yeasy to solve - for brief tactical reports, the tendency to be

RESTR¥tTED

RESftM'lll921
ayatamatJ.c in lihe construction or tables ot call siF.ns and wave
J.engths, and. 11181'\1 .,theJ• things. made it certain that tn a war
between Gal'IJI&J'V" and the Ct)Wltri es just mentioned the intercept
aervi.ce WOUld have the best o£ SUCCef'S in gathering inteW.eence.
lfit.h , ..:o,.."t'Cl t.o 1.he countries or Group II t.he prospects

tor a l'ot.... l~rJ intP.rcept service wore distinctl.v less tavorable.
In Eugl~nl1.. rnor("ov'!r. the use or short and u1tra short. waves
had boon ~rea~Jy developed. so that it was rather dittlcult to

l:L-.c:: t.he location or the transmit tinp: stations.
l&tl~,tlarld.

•

iurthermore J

Czechoslova.lci.."· a'lrl Ynp:osla'V'ia strove to make as little

11se as por.::all.Ln ol' 1•attio tra1'1"1e.

It is true that Yugoslavia.

worked ba~ical~v accordina: to French method.sl" but there was a~ertaintiiJildit;v aho•.at. employ!~ radio telep:raph.v. and thistimidity was based on unhappy experiences which :lerhia. had hadin World War I when the Austrians monitored all. 3erbian trafficand derived the beat. possible information therefrom.
Russia and Poland wore the countries where t.ltt• disP.Uiso or.

radio tratric had been develo~ to the greatest poostble perfection, at leas li in the a:rntV.

From trattic ot the airf'orce oreach or these countries it wao still possil•le to f.FJt ~odinformation; on the other ha:l~i. throu~h lnte~-.i·r• t-'"""no~::"'~ ~r ·a point h&d been reacn~:!. ·.·~u:- -.·

.1

,..

. . . . . . . · · : .....

··:'r-_:r- J·.:-nn:,,- ••the needs of its t"":.~&i aonnanc. tr>r the transmiseion of .ncGG.i.o:-:es
and also achieved -ll'ery gcod. disguise.

Long before WorJ.d War II£17

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1 t cou1d be recognized that these two countries had learned a great·edeal from their experiences during World War I and the post-war

period; it was certain that :l.n a war with these two countries the:l.nteroept service ooul.d. oriq count on ve17 modest results.
The preceding remarks force us to roeognise not cml.l' thatthe cent.ral organisation of a well-functioning intercept service
cannot merel,y limit itael.f to stUCV:l.ng and evaluating the radio
traffic of a .foreign COWltJ'I', but that a YeJ'I' extensive training

ot the peraomel employed 1n the evaluation atatf is neoes8&17.
Even in peacetime one must haw an abaollltel,y clear picture of

the organisation, tactics, equ:l.pnent, and training ot 1'oreigo.

cCIIIIIIlWlications troops; must know the 87&tema accordiDg to whichthe;y wrk; must get. practice in reconstructing their tables of calleigne and trequenoies; and must maintain constant touch with thec:eyptographic s;rstems put into use.

For intercepting and evaluating

the radio tratfic of a foreign armed force, a large number of aida
muat be prepared which, in the event of war, will allow the personnel
am;pl.oyed to secure the necesa&r7 insight within a short time.
In this last-mentioned direction, it happens that 1n Geman;racma WJ'I' good prel.1.ad.na.J7 work had beeri done b7 1936.

However,in the train ot the rapid :rea.rmaent, it was so bacf:q battered b7

a personnel policy, which in BODI8 cases was bandl.ed. in a dONDl":lght
senseless fashion, that at the outbreak ot World. War II the Germanintercept service took the field with the BBIII8 mater!ala that badbeen produced between 1930 and 1936.

In most oases these could.

onl,y be regarded as antiquated.

118

RESTRICTED••'l'HE "FORSCHUNGSANT"

It was in the first weeks after the assmnption of powerby National Socialisnt that Hermann Goering in Berlin set about
realizing a plan which was calculated to give the government andthe dominant party such far-reaching insight into the thoughts,
feelings, and aspirations of the entire German people as had
never been known in all history.

Compared with this plan, theinformer methods of l•1etternich and the French Minister of Police,
Fouch&, had been amateurish experiments.
It was Goering's intention to create an organization which
would cover all channels by which an exchange of information
or ideas took place within Germany.

Furthermore, by intercept-

ing all means of cowmunication of foreign countries which wereopen to tapping, an opportunity was to be provided for securingextensive infonnation regarding the situation abroad.
This last-mentioned idea had already been realized in two
forms, since the interception of the radio traffic of foreigncountries and the exploitation of the material thus obtained
was being carried on both in the Foreign Office and in the
Ministry of Defense in Berlin.

These two .Vdnistries were

Cabinet Ministries, however, and it was Goering's intention
to build up an organization which would service and be boundto the Party on the one hand, and to his own person on the other ••219

RESTRICTED•'J'here was thcrefoce no hundred pr:-rcent c:onfidc!tcc in whai was being
dono in Llu.: Dcfmwc lHnistrv and in l.he l"or•·i r~tt orril:'., a.tvl J.?lstcadof uni.fylng and comb.inin:; !.,,,_. dottble organizaLion or 1 h~ intercept
service and thu3 creating a compeiJent one, Goering decided to letthese two offlccs of tht:ll.nt.~rccpt

servic• continue to exist, and to

set up a third one alongside them \'lhich should be al. his pesrsonal
d.isposilion.

In order to realize this idea, it \oras necessary to find trained
technical personnel; w:i.thout long deliberat-ion recourse was had to the
Cipher Burea~ of the Ministry of Defense.

Here there was a naval

lieutenant, by the name or Schirnpi', who had been serving for someyears as liaison officer bet.wcen the naval intercept service andthat of t.he anny, and who was a persoual friend of Goering and aconvinced Party member.
3chimpt' had for some yf."ars p~yed the role of a silent observerat the Cipher Bureau, and had organized within it a National Socialist
Party cell without any w-ox'Cl of thls having leaked out. to Lhe outside
world.

He had made a few trips abroad, had arranged for collaboration

between the u~rman intercept. service and that of the Il..alia.n armed
forces, and had also set up a small il~i.cit German intercept station
on a private estate near Barcelona in Spain.

This intercept station

was working p:rimarizy for the navy and had the mission of watchingshipping in the Mediterranean.

It was also supposed to listen to

FreJJCh radio stations in North Africa and in the southwestern partor lt'rance.

220

RESTRICTED

In connection with these trips, Schimpf had establishedcontact with Party organizations in It~ and Spain, and had
made a great many connections with leading personalities.

It

was Schimpf who was entrusted by Goering with t.he formationof the projected surveillance organization.

From the officers

and civilians in the Cipher Bureau, he immediate~ selected agroup of eight persons, all reliable Party members, who were
to be the key men in the new office.
This new office differed, as indicated above, from thecorresponding organizations of the Foreign Office and theMinistr.1 of Defense through the fact that the two lastnamed limited themselves to the interception of foreign
radio traffic, and thus were organizations such as were
customar,y in all countries, while the office planned b,yGoering turned its attention to the interior,and was intended

to penetrate all means of communications existing within Germany
or leading from here to foreign countries.

This meant, therefore,

the monitoring of ever.1 type of radio connection, of all meansof wire communication within the countr,r, and of all wires
leading over the frontier; it also meant watching the press,
magazines, and all other printed material, the surveillanceof letters, and the interception of conversations carried on
without the use of wire connections, this latter by installing
microphones in particular rooms.
Schimpf and his collaborators went to work about the middleof March 1933..

In Berlin, in Behrendstrasse, a building \'ias

requisitioned and the central office of the ne1,. service lvas set,

221

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up here.

It received. the cover name "Research Thu·eau o.r the German

Air Ministry" ( 11 li'orschunesamL des HeichslL1 Ctfahrl..minis Lerlums"),
q.lt.qq~eh

Hin.:l.r;~tr;v,

it had absolutely nothine; to do functional.J.y wl'Lh the Air
buL \'!Tas directJ..v subordinated to Goering.

In between

atQQq the then State aecretary, Koerner.
For listening to all foreign radio traffic ( e.xc~opt military)and to illicit transmitters within the country, a system orintercept eLations patterned after those of the army was distributed over a.ll Germany.

At the headquarters or all postal districts

and at all cable junctions so-called postal surveillance posts
were established where it was possible either to listen in or tocopy.

In this way all wires leading out of the country were covered

as a matter of principle by switching in, in parallel, a recording
device.

No telegram of any foreign diplomatic representative inGermany could now get out of the country ~dthout a copy going to the
Forschungsamt in Berlin.

That applied to all enciphered telegrams,

as well as to all messages in plain text sent to a foreign addressby a.wone whomsoever in Germany.
Special value was attached to the interception of the telephone
conversations of government officials and of tl1ose holding higll officesin the state and in the Party service.

For this purpose a number oflistening posts were created, some large, some small.

Gradually anenonnous, invisible sp,y net was spun over all Germany.

No officer,

no official, no government employee, no Party functionary, and no
person of any importance could telephone from now on w:i.. th a.rzy

222

RESTRICTED

assurance that his convo1:sat.ion was not listened to.

or course, the Ge1man public had no suspicion ot all this.
Ev-en high and ver.y bigh offices in the state .knew nothing about
the Forschungaamt, or had on:cy veey nebulous conceptions ot thisagency-.

Furthe:nnore; the cover name ••Research Ottice ot the

Air Ministry11 had been so well chosen that &nJOl18 would havebeen led to believe it to be a ~J.y technical agenq.
The Forschungsamt paid special attention to the Ministr.rof Defense and to the commands ot the millt&r7 districts.

Haremost ot the telephone conversations carried on by- higher officers
were listened to; moreover, there was established a qstem. of"confidential agent.s11 whose duty it. was to gather informationand pass it to the Forscha~samt.

The surveUlance or general delivery letters formed a largepart, of the work ot the Forsohungsamt.

The house in Behrendstrasse was cml.y" intended as a provisional and tempora.r.y aol.ution of tho housing problem.
While they began organising the ncnr task in this locat1cm,

a fol'ID.Br hotel., "am Knle", in Charlottenburg was remodeled
tor tho purposes ot this agency.

The technical organization· or thtt 11Haus am Kni"" was car1~iod out according to the mostmoder.n principles.

Po3tal pneuma~ic tubes, teletype instal-lat.ions, soundproof rooms, listeni,ng centers, stritching
devices, etr.., came int.o b.::l11~ here which l'A:t:i:';:) :i.nR-t...alled on'Lho bn.ois of all proVJ.OUS eXpiJl'i'el"!.Ce in tho"J l':I.Ol•i Of intc1-:coption.

'l'O'!.·rard. t.he end o t" 1'133 tho no:mcy mo~·,..,.:l. into Lh'ls.' · ... C)~USTRICTED')In Yth' 111€1MUI'IJ@ 1 ·t.tut psrlionnttl. and matoriol ot tha or;vptanalrt;,io8t16tl6rt llml U\@ ~vJ.lutUon cu•nt.or hAd buan :l.n.,NJtLPQd w\d. Lhult" wo.rk

ha6 beert bd~Uh lit~ ifi the uummo~ ot 19JJ,
At. the outsett 1 the Foraohunt:~tamt triiiCi to work 1n oonjunotion
lflth the tH..pher ~reau 6t the tU.nir~try cr D..:-Cunaa ant\ with Buree.u C~f the Foreign Otfica, but aoon ~t with a ool.g sh01Jl.d.,l" ainoa 'the

Forschungsamt intended &a a ~&tter of prinaiple always to be therecipient. and never tha al"f•It was only a ahorl; time before

there was an open ~ait, an4 the cooperation oont.!AU.ed Otl'l;f in apure}¥ formal wa:t. wltft MM party endeavorlna not to let the othergain 8iii i.ntJ:ilhl. i.1tte tu Wl lfQJ'k.

in ' h t4.N\ ~" of tao work or the Fo:rachUft&Hik\• .a :rrumber

v IJM!M. ohj"t,:\:ve~t a:roee on which work began. (k}e ot tbo aoR
MIW\t.!" was the surveillance or the Officer Corps of the M1n1st.r,r
9f Defense and or the ar.med forces in general.

Tne second target

comprised the high leaders or the NSDAP and their formations, siilce
it was believed that one could not absolutely rely on the J..o;yalt7 otthese men.

The third target was the Catholic Church with all its

institutions and the surveillance of the communications of the Vatican.

with Catholic organizations or personalities within GeJ:'ID8I1Y•.In this

activity the;y found at that time traces of various mone;y transactions

ot Catholic monasteries, and the flood o£ so-call.ed foreign exchange
suits and other measures directed against the Catholic monasteries
had its origin in the activity o£ the Forschungsamt.

224

RESTRICTEDThe :rourtheRESTR!eTP-f 1
target was the German People in general. and part.icularll' all
persons who had .f'ormerq been active in political lite, in tradeunion movements, in labor organisations, and the like.

There

was close collaboration with the Gestapo.
In creating the Forschungaamt, Goering had intended to use

this instrument exoluaiv~ tor his own purposes.

However, thenature of' the work soon brought it about that. Hi.lrlnler attemptedon his own initiative to gain an influence over the Forachungaamt
and :t.ts activity.

This soon .:.Sd to a r:l.valry between the two

men 'ld11ch at times took on a serious character.

In t:Lme H1mnil.er

succeeded, however. in getting a stronger and stronger infiuenoe,
so that gradual Jy power in respect to the Forschungsamt passed.
f'rom Goering to Himmler.

The first great "justification" ot its work was achieved. by'
the Forschungsamt in connection w:lth the Roehm affair.

Boehm and.

his ad.herents, as well as the group in the Ministry of Defense
which was opposed to Nati~ Soc1al.ism, had been 11a.tched. oonstantq since the end. of 19.3.3. .Ever.Y telephone conversation ofthese people, everr letter written by them, and. eveey otherutterance was recorded; in time, a veritable mountain ot material
cou1d be eathered. in this W81' in the eval.uation center of the
Forschungsamt.

In the case of maqy of these man, there had

been installed. in \heir privats rooms microphones which wereconcealed in regular tel.ephones, table lamps, chandeliers,
electric clocks, etc.

It was at that time that tho first serious

contact with Himmler resulted; he used ~he work of the ForschungsRmt,

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in conjunct.lon wlth Ooo1·ing, t.o ellminat.e troublesome opponents.
The evaluated matet":IAl. was cleverq pieced together Ullri Wd
before Hitler,of' 30 June.

whJ "then in!'1.it.uted that celebrated blood purge

In the train or this action f'ell General vonSchleicher, General von Bredow (tormer Chief' or the Def'ense
Section), and other of'ticera.

I

Schimpf, who had meanwhile

I

I

•

I
'

become a councUor of' ministerial rank (Minister:Lalrat),
secured f'or h1meel.t 'b7 this action a position of' great power but
also a nwhber of' enemies who had to be taken ser:l.ouslJ'.
To that period belongs also the attempt on the lif'e or the
stud.ent, Bell, in Kutste1n, wh:!.ch was organized on the basis or
inf'ormation tram the Forschungsamt; the action against Professor
Lessing 1n Karlsbad and the kidnapping of Jakob Sal.Gmon were also
due to the activity or the Forschungsamt.
In mid-Apr!~ 1935 the f'ollowing occurred:

Ministerial

Councilor Schimpf, who until then could almost alwqs bereached b,r telephone, had suddenlJr ngone 8.'Wtq' f'or an indetinite
period," and the inf'ormation one could get was pu.t so str&ngeq'

that it was impossible to keep f'rom. feeling that SCIII8t~ orother was wrong at the Forschungsamt.
c1rculate, and. one dq it came out:

Soon rumors began to
Schimpf' 118.8 dead.

The first version was an auto accident; the strange thing

about. that was that the statements.regarding the place where theaccident was supposed to have occurred dif'f'ered wide:q.

First it·happened in Silesia, then. in Berlin, then in Kltnigsberg.

Soon

228

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i

;

..
a.fte:rwa.rcl it was le&rneci that Schimpf had

6(!111111tt~'.J.aida.

Boll-'ever, the case waa· the same aa with the auto aaoident~ At leut aidosen hotels 1n Breal.au, Dn1sabers, and· Berl1D ancl environa Wz.e
I
D81118d, 1n which the trapd;y wa auppoaed to have ocaurrecl. ODe

ato17 was that he ahot h:lmae1t; the second ato17 waa that hekilled h1mae1f aJ..ons with a l.acV' friend, but even here there wre

80 lll8lJ1' variants that it was 1mmediat~ obvious that the apread1ngof these rumors w.e onlJ' i.Dtended to veil the truth.
In its propasanda. activity National SocialiBDL al'lf8l'B madetke mistake ot world.Dg too olumail,y.

It did not aatisf)' theae

people to wrk out a version ot a eto17 and then spread. it con-e1atentl,y, instead thq al.W8l'B tried to apmad a haze, and tocause contusion by a whole collection of different stories.
Thus it was with the burning ot the Reichstag; thus it was on· .
countl.aas other oocaa1onaa thus it aa later on 1n the Reaa

case; and 80 it aa 1n the case of Sch1m.pf.

Bat the ve17

clnme1neae which underl.q this propa.ganda pneralJT resulted
1n letting people get on the right track fairq 80on.

It na

not l.oDs bef'ore the tol.J.cNins facta were knowna

For his eavesdroppi.Ds on the Min1Btl7 of Defense Schimpf
had mnugg1.ed a number of confidential agents into t-he bureaus

ot this m1n1st17 or had recru1ted persons there tor hie work.
In March l93S one of these agents had extracted an exceedinsJ.1'
I

important Qocument fram a sate 1n order to turn it over to theI

1 Forschungsamt for a short time tor inspection. , As chance would'••

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have it, this document, along with severa1 others, was noeded a few
I

d81'S batoro Easter; they looked tor it and could not tind it.

Aninvestigation, which was started inmediate:cy, cl.eared up the attair,and it waa reported to the then Minister of Defense, von Bl.amberg.

Blomberg, who was alread;r 1n opposition to Goering and Schimpf, wasextrem.e]T· perturbed and used the occasion to make before Hitler aviol.ent attack on the Forachungsam.t.

The matter ended with Hitler's

dropping and diaavcndng Schimpf.
On tlle c11v after Goering's departure on his wedding joun1.e7,

Schimpf was found 1n Gruenewa.ld not tar trom Potsdam with a bullet..

hole in t¢s head.
There can be no doubt that Schimpf did not ccmmit suicide but was

pu:t out ot the 1f8l' by the Gestapo as one who lmew too lii8IJ1' secrets.

,~chilr&pt wasa ha.pw tallow who was extremeq fond ot lite, and who

would never have taken a moral reprimand as an occasion for leaving
this world.

Bll.t Schimpf had become not onl,y unbearable but d.otlnrightdangerous to Goering and H1mmler, and he had to disappear.
Goering prepared tor him a great cremation cermorJ1' at theoremator.r in WilJnerlld.ort, and sent a gl.gantic wreath ot laurel
with ribbons bearing the inscription:"TCS'"l\f Faithful Collaborator·--'·'llans Scbimpt 1•' Gratitude Hermann Gooring.•• State SecNtar.r MilchI

delivered an address.

Then tol.l.owad a "Salute of honor.

The"Voelld.ache Beobachter" carried an article g].orif7ing the"untiring old tighter ot the National.Socialist Movemsnt and faithful. collaborator in the bu1lding of the Third Reich. 11

228

RESTRICTED•IThe Ministry o:r Detenae sent no representative to the crema-tion cerelllOIJ1': Sch.1mp£1a tonner comrades were forbidden toparticipate.

The work or the Forschungoamt round its second justii'ication in connection with tho Tulthachevclci caao, concerningwhich w sh3.1.1 spe~k at o. L'l.t.cr opporlr.ait.y.

In t.hio action theleadine; role w.ss in t.1-J:.'! ha-nds ot' tho £'ot"at!lnmcc::\•n1..~ where, as
sucoesaor to Schimpf, Prlnco ChriBtoph o.r rlesAe httd been

appointed chiet.
The Forscbungsa~rtt. had a '..hi rd opr.-ortur1lt.y "~..o PTOJE' the.

.

•tworth" o£ ita l't'Ork in a bi& ·W"liY 11h~n .!.~to ln "J.'],36 the g1-eat
housecleaning lfQ.S undertalc:on .Ln the then Jiini.Gh'.Y of War.

•Von Blomberg, J?aron vo•1 Ji't•U..... ·~]·, e.utJ. a. n•~~otbur

or othc1· officors

Schimpf case.

A_tteJ• what has b:Jt:n sY.t.d, no ~aa ui!l be :=m.i.~~:;;d.::i!!rl "to hoa1•that this lL(,CllC:f was n' ··~"> (.:., •. ~· ·•"! • "'·: ~)r• l'i&b::..nlr~r·';; Fo1•oi.gn'"Lh:i.ug.

The worlc o! the FnrS~chungBl:.!nt pl::.;:;ed ~ ,-.:=17 .i.rr.!lt:.!"tarrt·, t'Olc

J'.ut;t:;.•lu. bct!oro the Gexm:ut occupa.t.ion.

For th:~ .J t."\r.~~ c. ::::::.c~toJ.

,.r. . .

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subsection was torm.od, arid !I'OIIl here t.ho ponet.ration or theentire communications system ot Austria was accomplished by'
tbe Forschuns~anit.

They had an easy time since a large partot Aust.1'ian otticialdom. PJ;Oved qui.te ready to aid in thisrespect..

For instance, all teleph'one conversations carried onwithin the ministries •. the content or all telegrams sent torepresentatives abroad, and the coutent of many importantJ

documc·ts were channeled. to the Forschungsam.t. They ovenwent

o tar as to betr&l' to the agents of the Fo1 ·chungsamt

pr/ ic~ all the cryptographic 151Btems used by the Foreign
orrroe in Vienna, by the Austrian armed £orcas, ~by theAu~trian police.
I

The Austrian telephone and telegraph cabl.es

I
lfad.ing
through the Berchtesgnden area were tapped. by representa~vesof the Forschungsamt.
During t~e war thero were countless opportunities for

significant wrk on the part or thi'e agency.
these here would lead us too tar afield.

To detail all

We shall onl.¥mention that the r.rustrat.ion or the action of 20 Jul.l' 1944
and the disclosure or those participating in f:.he conspir&cy"
was due in large part to the aurvelllance activity of the
Forschungsamt.

At that time Rimmler had aJ.rea.ctr fought his

way through i!_o a victor,y over Goerihg, and the work: or the

Forschungsamt was dil"fltcted according 1.o his wishes; it lf&B by"
no means an accident that Him.l.or was not present at the tuo
conferences in tho "Fuehrerluiup'Lquartiern during which the

RESTJ111€TED•attempt cx{iu.tler'a lite WI!-B to be and was carried out.- A.tlierI

20 J~ 1944 HiiJIIIler was the I undisputed master, even ::J,n respect/

to the work ot the Forechungsamt.

.

...

•

.,..

181

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181

RESTRICTEDThe SA-Mall, Fo:nais, had taith:tul.q and studiousq done his

d.u1i7 :ln his native WUrttemberg dur.l.ng the so-called llperiod. ot
struggle." He had. marched, had sung, and had. dlligentq drunkbeer on P&rt7 evenings.

You could tell that by looking at him.

· tor his girth had increased so that when he took a bath he on3.l'
had to till the tub

one-eighth full of water; it he thaD laid

himBelt down 1n it, it was sure to be tull.
Along with his lllcing tor SA evenings, he had tram JOU.th.And.

up had. another love, which was tinkering with the radio.

this he did w1th devotion and. skill.

Therefore his ocarades

and superiors 1n the SA considl)tred him a radio apart.

Tbat led

to bis getting a job with the Stuttgart broadcasting station after.

the "assumption ot power,n and, to be sure, .as arm.ouncer.

And.

this ottioe he l.ikew1ae administrated henceforth w.l.th therequisite diligence.

Up to that point his career reveal.ed nothing· extrao:rdinar7
and it might hava remained so tor the rest ot his lite, it. serious injustice had. not been done him by the Party and the· S.A. 1n the 7e&r 1934.

It does not matter to us what thisinjustice was; nor does it signif)' who was responsible tor thisinjustice;' it is certain 1n 1n7 event that Fo:nais had beencalumniated in base fashion and telt de&JU1' aggrieved - despite
his usual cheertulness and optimism.

•

The spectacles of optimiam.

238

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and tait.h 'Lhrou(".h which ho hc~.d hi.LhcrLa rogardc4 evor,yl.hina t.rut.t.

went On within t.he tlSDAr nnd itu .rormations has beon shattered,and he now began to regard very critical.l,y what had. hitherto

been considered by him as an untoucbab1e sa.nctu.ar.v.

It was notlong before Formis had a nose tull.. - aa the s¢ng goes, so .fullthat he thought he could no longer ,.tand tlle stench or the new
era in Ge1'D1811Y1 and betook himself to Czechoslovakia where heattached himaelt to the qppositional Strasser group or the"Strasser Movemant.n
Here in Czechoslovakia a so-called IIBlack Frontll had been
formed which was waging a bitter but hopeless struggle against.
the Hitler regime in GeZ'~~~BZW•

Fo:nn!s with his lmow~ and1deaa -came very opportuneq tor theoe people.

With his aid th"7

thousht or setttng up a propaganda broadcasting station in order

to C&rrJ' their own ideas and their agi tat:t.on against Hitler andhis 87Stem. across the border to GennarJT•
So Formi' went to work and within a short time constructeda shortwave transmitter tor telephorJ1'1 which was so small it
could have been carried in a emall }¥mdbag.

He rented a room ina tavem in the vicinity or Prague and installed his radio station
ve17 sld.ll~ in the upholste:ey or a big armchair, so that outwa.rct:Qr nothing could be s~n or the entire apparatus.

After these technical preparations had been campl.eted Formis
was supplied twice a cia¥ by the ini"ormation section or the "Black
Front" with news which seemed suitable tor propaganda work in Jlerma.D7•

194

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Formie himself' II&W' to the tranaad.a~on, and eerved as announcer.
The transmitter was verr soon heard. in Ge:nJJarJ1' and it wasaatoniabirJs to see how IIIBZV' listeners this first anti-Hitler
German broadcaster£1:t.hin.

wbiapering to one anoth

Evenings at six and mo
But.psstl:

a ve17 abort t:ima.

Peopl.e were

•IHave you heard.? Waw 31m I
gs at tenl.

Verr interestinsl

Don't betrq &DTthingl"/.

.And so they listened with pleasure to the new transmitterof the "m.aok Front." They rea.J..:Qr enjCJ78d he¢ng a voioe atlast vbioh ventured to apeak against this new reg::l.m.e of toroe
which suppressed all criticiam..
Ccapared with present d.a.V standards, the tranBIIIiaaions ofFormia wre not briw.&nt perfo:nuanoea.. At that time no one
had &111' uper:l.ence in this field.

But at that t:l.ms, in 1935,

they wre a sensation and a dangerous one.
The intercept stations of the &l'JII1' and of the police, in

conjunction with the organa of the Foraahungaamt, monitored.
Ithe new sender tor the purpose ot ascerta.ining ita locationand "of picking it up if possible.

said than done.

But this was more easUY

Getting bea.rirl€s on shortwave transmit:tera

was still ;Ln its infancy in those d.qa.

'l'hq got the mostvaried directions and for a time were of the opinion that thetransmitter was located in Hamburg.
to Epgland or southem Gem&ny".

other readings pointed

A good .ma.rJ1' of the readings

did point. to Csechoslovakia, and to be sure, to the generalIarea of Prague •

•

135
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In his broadcasts Form's tried to give the :lJnpression that he

was in German territory.

.

''We are standing here at the microphone,"he eaid once, "and beside us are 600 pounds ot d;vnamite.

It those

bl.aak dogs came (he meant the ss), thq 'Nill be blown up ~withus." Another time he said:.

''We here in Ge:rm&l'J1'••• .n or:•'When.

w look 011t of the window and see those bl"CMl rascals paseingb7··· •"
A few times he did make a slip and used expressions ~ch gave
the :l.mpresaion that he was outside the boundaries of the countey.

Onl.l' one never knew whether this was done intentianall.l' to mislead•..
The newscasts of Fo:nais testified to the tact that there must
be a amoothq tunctioning, tairl,y sizeab1e

information organization

behind h~•. He was al'WQ's veey wll informed on aU happenings
w.l.thin the Party and the government and its organs.

The pneral

tenclenc7 was toward an overthrow ot the Party- government and theabolition ot the entire system.

"Brown is the ••• , and Hit.l.er isleading us to. • • • "After some .months ot observation the Forachungsamt had.

aacezota¥1ed. bT direction tinding the approx:l.mate location ot the
tl'8Zlllllit:_ter.

The axaot location could not be dete:nained, ~·An aacident helped th.a get an ita trail.
I

Hitherto, no one had BZIT idea who the armounoer might be.
'
However,_ Fomia had a characteristicmanner ot spealdns, and in

the ·.Forsphungaamt., whose intercept stations wre mmd.tor:l.ng .thistransmitter, there was an official who had. tormerl,y been wll
acqua:l.n"t41d w.l.th Fo:nais.

He listened to the transmitter several

888

I!

RESTRICTEDRES-21t.imes and came to the conclusion that the speaker could be noneother than ll'o:rmis.

Now a Gestapo man waa sent out into the reg:lon

where the transmitter must be located.

Attar a few dq's he had

gotten on the trail of Formis.
Now the Gestapo was determin.ed. to pick up the station.

But

that was not ao earq, becmtse it was located in Czeohoslovald.a,that is to sq, in an independent countr.v where the Gestapo had

no possibility of making a raid.

It was impossible to oount onan;r cooperation by the Czech police.

Since there was no way ot taking action in •'legal" fashion,
thq resolved on an illegal act of' violence.
oaretul..q about Formis' habits.

'1t187 inquired

An otticial of the Gestapo tooka roam in the same tavem and watohed the Mil•

Attar th87 hadgotten sufficient clarity-, an auto with two other apecielJJ'
selected Gestapo agents was sent out to the place where thetransmitter was located.

The action was CflN..tull,y prepared 1never.r detail. Fo:rmis was to be over-powered and brought toGerman terr:lto17.

At the appointed hour, at six otclook in the evening, i.e.,
at transmission time, the auto arrived in tront of the inn.

.Allthree Gestapo agents rushed into the house and into the roam.
Formis attempted to defend himself and then tried to escapethrough a windoW but was shot during the melee.

The Gestapo

men now climbed into their car again and aped awq- to the frontier.
The occurrence became known instaqtly and all Czech bordor
stations were instructed by' telephone to stop the car ldth the

•

18'7

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perpet.raLora.

'l'his was done.

The German Government., however,imm.ediateq intervened with all possibl-e pressure and t.he Cneh
Govei'Illllen:t., which did not. desire 8ZfT serious incident, gave

.instructions to let the three men go.
This encroachment P7 the Gestapo CC'.used ereat agitationin Czechoslovakia.

In Germ&.nl' there wre lll8.l17 people who•

continued tor a long time a tndtless search on their radio dial
for the transmitter Of the IIBlack Front11 untll they fi.nal.q
became convinced that all their efforts were in vain.

188

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THE THILO CASE

It ie certainl;r not an ~ occurrence that a man. baa the•Iglven 1181118 'fhUo.

!bt 1n the present caee not onl,y should thenama of the -.n be claeeeci ae a raritq but the whole altair can
l.q claim. to being rather unique.
One dq 1n the eprd.ng of 1926 a man was engaged at the

Cipher Blraau ot the M!nieter.Y ot Datenee who had the glvennama Thilo, and who was the brother ot a major 1n the General
Statt who was than functioning 1n the Miniatr.r ot Detanse.
Later on this Major occupied a ve17 high position ot CCIIIII8Dd
1n the amed forces and tor that reason the 1181118 will not; bemantionac:l 1n this connection. . It is enough i t n

apeak hence-

torth ot the "Thilo case."
ThUo was then, as a.J.raadT .mantionac:l, em;pl.oyed in the

Cipher ll1reaU and, to be exact, in that section in 1dd.ch...

or.rptographic s;yst81118 intended. tor use within the &nll8d forces
ware compiled, reproducac:l, and distributac:l.

Th1lo had bean atiret li~tenant in World War I, had then married, and bad hada soap tacto17 and 'bone 7ard 1n the vioirli"t7 ot Berlin.

Hisbu.eineee had gotten into di.tticultiee during the econamio
crisis; ThUo had bean compelled to close the doors ot his
tacto171 and h&d sought the help ot hie brother in getting a
position.
Ae it soon turned out, Thtlo was not one ot tho'se people

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I

who are in the habit of working over hard.

. .

189

RESTRICTED.Even his external.

appeatanoe augeated that he • • ane who could take tbini• ....,., but
1n b1ai wl'k thia • • even .lllON ao.

he Mde. In the .lllOI"D1.DI he -At J..at, that vu the ialpreaaion

the laat to report tor wrk, ·at 110011

the tirat to diaappe&l" tor bia .-.1.1 and a.pprazi.ateq 8V817' leoond.
Dr thi:rd. attel'llOOD he bad••eametb1na to do outaide. tt

In thia marmer

he continued. to work within the Cipher Bureau, without dolns iauoh,td.tbout .lllll1d.D& lliaulelt a burden to ld.a colleapea, or d.iaplqins &IV".

ambitiou tendanciea.

\

Vel7' often he traftl.ed. u aour!.er to ...he~ ot the m:Uit&l"'' diatriota 1 :ln order to brin& the a.

oiphera to the appropriate pai"tiea vben .,at. . wre ohanpd.

He

euperviaed the print1rig ot new lc87a and the reaaU and deatru.ationot Q'Bteaul retind. traa uae.
He did tld.a sort ot work UDtU 1934•

m:lahapa ooourrec:l, due to

Dlr:l.ns tbat time oertaiD \til.o'•. oareleaanaaa and aa a OODaequenoe_,t hie pronounced luineaaa it 1IBII therefore deciclecl to traa.ater
TbUo to anothe1· aaotion ot the Cipher Bureau.

The a~

aeotion cleolJnecl to reoeive hill into ita raakal t1 nel ly he landed
1D "evaluation" and, ainae he bad acae knovledp of the Bnslieh

lensnap, vu set up u a apeoial1at in the Bnsliah IIUbaeotioD•.

Sinoe ThUD had stood on aa. UDall.ent tootiDs v.l.th all bia

prev:Lcma ooJJ..eaauaa, ha continued to .m:lnta:l.n aorrtaot v.l.th the
Motion tor German O.l7'PtosraPhiO Q'8t-. aDd atill 3ourne,red DOW
abel thmJ. to the ...anda ot the lllilita.l7 diatriota aa courier.

He &lao .-..V01"8Cl to continue hta o1ct a\7le ot VOI"k in tbe nw~

140

RESTRICTED.

Ot oouraa that could not. well

so on :ln tbe 1oq run, linoe

the assignment 1ftLB oonstantl;r arowinf& and, in order to muterthe material, it was neoes8&17 to fam11 iarise oneaelt v.l.th .-zo"

questions oonoem:l.ns the British armed toroes.

~towner,neither

k:l.ndq perauaaion nor serious admonitione could. aove '.l'h11o to.

.

familiarise himself more intenaivwJ.y 'ld.th his tifwi, and the 8lldof the •tter was that in 1936 he was. diamisaed tzraa the serviceof the Cipher Bureau.

It • • all the easier to clear up. thesituation, aince Thilo hacl axpresaecl the 1ntention of quittiq'

I

tile service ~ and of reoperdns bis taatory, ainoe he ·bad-==~cl in pttiq topther a conaJ.derable 811011Dt ~t ~,.,..,..inch wOuld enable hill, in the new eooncalo aitqtion1 to pt
his enterprise so:lns v.l.th some prospect ot auoaess.
So 'fhi1o lett the Cipher Bureau and bepn srf.nd1.nl bones
and ma1d.ns soap.

Bu.t the buainesa dicl not last lons, and one

dq Tld.lo tacecl the probl..a of havins to look U'OUDcl tor a nev.

. .. job.

At the M:lnistr.r of Delt8DIIe. the doors wre · clo,aecl to bial .

aocOI'Cti.llW be appl:lecl to the lonohunpalld;, eapeo"!'l17 aiDae .
he aoul.d pl'OV8 that he waa a aoocl old~ ot tile P&r.t7•

Intoak up ld.a vork.
'1'wo 7881"8 later the Seconcl World War broke out.

ns subduec!.

Polaa:dIn the BWIIIIIar ot 1940 Pranae vas ~reel and.

.
.
oooupied, and. at one of the ~ stations in Paris theGerman troops capt'P'84 a .freight train tiUed. with doOUDmlts•

1~1trom the French MiDiatrr ot War and the Foreign Ottice which 1f&8
auppoaed. to have lett tor the aouth of France.

I.
The d.oc-abmte weretaken to Germani' where the7 began to e1tt and arrange

lfatural.q this was done with oharaoteriatic Demani.e., alowq.

L-..

t},o~aa,

Firat of allliata ancl tables of oontenta were pre-pared and 119 a considerable tima vent b71 before anyone tound ou.t

1n detail vbat bad been acquired.
S, the end. ot 1941 thq bad progressed ao tar aa to aeoertaiD

that th87 bad captured here a large number ot docUIIIBDts fraiL the
French aeoret service.

Rov they eat about a 81'ste-.t1o eval.uationot these d.ocWIIItnte and earl¥ 1n 1942 amid the m.ountains ot papera
th87 touncl a neatq arranged list -provided 'ld.th aU deta:Ua andgiv1ng the appearance of an almost Prusaia.n thoroughness -ofthose oont:f.dential apn.ta who bad been vorld.ns tor .l'rench :lDtellipnoe in Gel'Er\Y•

And lo, amoug other wall-known Dames the7 tounctthat ot Mr. Thilo.

Bllt 'llhereaa in the oaae ot the other cont1clential

agents it was generaJ.:q a Mtter ot ao-caUed Blllll l171 ainoe the.J
had. been paid ott with relativelT amall amounts, there were ve17

d1tterent 81IID8 entered 1D Thilo'a aooount, which led one to inter.

that he had rH1J¥ been provici1Ds BOIII81ih1nl·

The lut 811l0U11t wbioh

had. ,._ paid out to him vas the aool round sua of 100 1 ~ Ge~
Ml'ka.
Row it is an open aearet that the espionage aervioe does not,.,,,,,. aot varr ~in pajJlng apnt,s. When 8WII8 ot thia
magnitude ware paid, on:q into:rmat:l.on could be inTolved 11bioh we
ot espeoiaJJ¥ great value to a toreign ponr.

141

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--------------.

~ltf€~1.

Row th87 be~~ f=onow- up the attair and leamed that ow- •triand 'l'hilo durin& the entire period of his aot1vit7 in thelliniatr.r ot Detenae hac:l current:cy- betrqed. to the rrCmoh 11a:lecm.
man ~ Berlin all the cr.vptosraphic s.rateme then uaeclin theGerman &l"'V• Moreover, cl7J)tograpb1c IQ'"atema, tables ot calleigne, detaUs regarding the German cipher machines- allot

which were intended tor usa 1n caaa ot war - had traveled the1181118 route.

In the field of evaluation he had bacOJII8 1110readept than an;yone had BUSpected, since it was with the real

underatandiDg ot an expert that he had brought to the knowleclp

ot the French. secret eervice aU details respect1q the organiu-.
tion of the German intercept service, regarding the BTB~ of.

ava.luation and their appl1cab111t71 regarding the .-thode ot.

German cOIIIId.tm.ant for the observationot tore:Lsn 1118118Uvars 'b7.

the intercept service.

Both the betrqal. ot the or.yptographio

BTBtau and that ot the call sign tables oaul.d. not have ta.il.ecl ·to put the e1U1Q" intercept eerrl.ce into a position where it woul.dbe able to read aU Gel'man radio trattio without ditticultJ".

'l'his 1fBII ot inestimable value tor the French; the betrap.l of
the aas1gnamt ot the German intercept service 1.:1kew1se revealed to them the waalmesaes ot their own. radio organiaation andshowed. them to what extent it was possible to penetrate into

the secreta ot their means of coamunication.
'l'hUo had, moreover, supplied the French with lists ot

those persons who might be considered. as reall,y competent and.
capable evaluators on the German aide; tram this it waa•

possible to aee that their number was exceed1ng4r amaU•

148·.
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RE91'RieTP-t 1
Aside J.ram. t.he things al:re~ mentioned, Thilo had au.pp.Lied theFrench with JD&rW' other bite o:C intormation, which he had bean able
to secure aas:Lq since he was a tam1 11ar figure in the Ministr.r of

Defense and the name of his brother opened doors tor hi'11 8.JV1118iV.
During the period of his activ11i7 1n the Foraahungsamt, he had brought

to the knowledge of the French the entire organisation of that &gellC7
and a good Jll&lV details regarding ita work,
In vin of the oooparatioa between i'IN! french and .Inglish

intelligence aei"ttce, it was aelt-evid.ent fiitK.· the Engl.1ah wre ,alao
intomed of at least a part of these deliveries of Tb1lo.
Th1lo • • arrested. and his hearing revealed ao lllaDl' tbi.Dsa thatthe interrogators r.iever oaaaed to shake tWeir heads~.Before the oaae

reached the courts, Th1lo coumitted suicide in his cell.

Whether Th1ld 118.8 wo:rld.ns cmq tor the French secret aerv.lae or

11hether he hlti at.her connections will probab]T never come to light.
The French at aU events ware not able to profit Dloh from. bia workainoe the war aped acroaa the count17 too End.~.

It is to be

aaSUDIIJd; hoWever; thai. the Bngllsh were able to make use of muchthat Thilo haci supplied to France.

.

It ia interesting to note in this conneot16n that the ftTh1lo

Caae•• bad i& itaide linen wbioh was noi without it.a humorous aspeci.
'.1be oounter-intell.igence aeotion ot the M:lnistry tor Datimse had

gotten on the trail of the work of a Frenoii agent in Berlin in
1930.

'1'he7 decided. to plJv' taice materiai into the hancia ot thisman. Por ih:ts pu"POH a sergeant F. waa aeleoted io act as mi.dcdtr.IM•

144

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r. •s ampl.oyed in the 111nist17 of Defense as cl.erk and drattaaan
He wu now put in touch with the Frenchin the Cipher Bureau.

apnt, had to meet biaL now and than, and had to tum overdocuments or photographic copies thereof, which bad beentalaitied or faked in

Je counterintelligence section. Tbat

wnt IIJ.9ng tor a while quite according io plan.

Bllt 'fb1lo ws

ve17 wall acquainted with this sergeant r. 1 thtV" even vo:rbd

tor a time in the 881118 subsection.

In a clever manner, Dlilo

eucceedecl in transforming r. traa a "fake" euppl.1er into a
ngenu1nen p1J"V810r.

Prom now on he betrqed to the French

apnt !!!!& •a talait1ecl, ao that the Prench aeoret aervioe

vas inf'ormecl regarding the deception.
J'88l"S•The game continued tor

Prom t}le papers captured 1n Paris iu the above .1118Dticmed

tr&in the double rol.e ot Sergeant F. was likeviae renal.ecl.
ThUo's treason gave the Prtmah intercept service an unheard.

ot opport.urdv, tor it macle it possible to read all Geran m111tarr
radio traftic over a lOns period..

It pve the French at the out-

break ot the war poea:l.bUities ot a reaorma1asance servi.ce in theether which coul.ci not tail. to have great consequences. Stranpq
enough, the French did. not make tu1l uae ot this chance.

We getthe impression that, rel,'ring on the ..._.,17 of the clecisive role.

.

ot the French intercept service in 1914 and. in the reassuringknowledge t~t thq were in possession ot the German ciphers andcall sign tables, thq neglected. to clo JII8.IV things wJ!ich thq
necessaril,y should have clone, in view of the German superiorit7•

in personnel and materiel•

145•

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t

141

RESTRICTEDTHB IBVBLOPJOW.r OF THB GBRIWl IR'lBBOBPT SBRVICB .AND
OF I'l'S CCift'BOL STATIOK AP'mR JANUARY 19.3.3
At the end of 19.32 the control a:tation of the Gel'mar1 intero~aervice had reached a state in ita organisation and persozmel
11hich enabled. it to direct the pea.cetillle W01'k ot the intercept
I

service rather wll and to process the resu1ta.

Tnaed1 ateq

after the "assumption of power'' by' National SooialiiiiL inaez..rw1

a devel.opaent set in at the Cipher Bureau wbioh gl'Y8s theimpression of being an advance, but in real:ltJ' siga:lfied aretrogression.
This developraent moved in. two directional on the one harld,

in reprd. to the personnel situation; on the other, in reprd.

to the general organisation.

In the train of the re&l'lllalll8Dt .

which now began, peop1e were constantq brought in who bad. notthe al.1ghtest qualification for the intercept aenice.

Their

on:q •r1t was. that thQ' had been officers in World War I and1d.ahed now to reenter the Ge:rman armed toroea, 11bich were be1na

expanded.

ThQ" were all officers who had served dur:l.ng theWorld War 1h the Signal Corps, but whose outlook 'RB neverbroader than that o:r a COJIIP8D1' cammand.er.
First th87 were brought in as civilians; then ~ sot thedesignation ''L-0£t1cers"; and tinaJ.l1' they' became the so-called·~fficersn.

They usual.q got credit tor a good. III8!J1' years ofservice, and in consequence in mBD7 cases obtained a rank•

higher than that ot the experts who had. been in the service up

247

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to tbat time. ·This :l.nned:latel.v brought a factor ot friction into
the whole situation, and e1.nc-,. the newcomers wre often iDatalled

u section heads, etter a ehcn·t. period during which t.hq wre to

tam11tarise theuelvee with the work, vtdle the previous aection
head.a wre subordinated to tham. the 307 of the old perBODDelin
the work declined rapicll.y, eapeo16l.q a1 the nn JIIUters generall.7
aot.ed in a ve!7' preeumpt,uou.s ft'LBhion.
In~ cues gentlemen wre en~ who turned out later toII

be V817' questicmable ahol\ractfllrs.

'l'htiR,.

ftrr

aample, 1D 19.34\theOrganisation and Assignment Section of the Cipher Bureau-~turned. over to a new .man llbo, up to then, bad bean aellins t.,pevritera, who had no1. tJ1e e..lil'.hteet idea ot the tecbniclue andt.aotica ot the intercept. service, and who 1'1naJ.'q bad to be condemned on account ot various ahad,y dealings.

On the baaia of

docuMnta captured in Waraaw after the occupation ot Poland 1D

19.39 another of theae new gentlemen t.umed out to bave beaa a
fol'lll8r agent ot the Polish aecret serVice.

In the meantime be

Dad rlaen to the rank of DlA.1or in the German 8l'lll8d toroeal
Natu.~,

not all the newq aaa1ped pntlaman w:re inIt.hia aatesor.r; howev"er, thq were in moat inatanoaa - lDoked.
at object!~- whol.lT unsuited and onq had a desire to advaDOe
as quialcl,7 ae poaaible and. .make .a good career tor tbauelwa.

Arqteel.iDg tor careful aaientitic work ..... aompleteq laoldns an their

part.

148

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ArtT ptl'Mation ot euoh eeu1U.w orpzd.•atiana aa theevaluation and the c~ groups by ~ta ot thissort naturalq oouJ.d not tail to cause aerioue harm.

This _.

·. mardteeteclin the case of the evaluation graup, tor inBteDoe,
1n tile tact tbat henceforth then wn •re man.~a covered aad
11.01'8 oftioial journqa made, 'NhUe the reeulte were tar illteriorI•

to thoae ot the earlier Je&I'B•
In reepeot to the orpai•atioa of the interaept aamaa,

the .-aaures
wbich wre now Pit throu.gh nre l.:J.kew1ae auob u\to oauae eariou. concern..

The creation ot the Poreohunsl8mt1

oonaeming which w have reported, withdrew .ti'OII the eoatrol

station ot the Genaan intercept aervioe a ooaaiderable DWiberof aoocl Jl8'l withou.t arJ8 correepcmd1.ns reduction ill the uaip-

JD.ellt.

Por, although it bad been stated ort~n•llT that the.... ,,j·.;.IIIOl'litorins ot all d1plo.mat:l.o radio trat.tio woaJ.d now be taken"'!'V ~ the Cipher Bureau of the Jlild.Bt17 ot Detanae, there'
1f&B aot~ no ohaDp :ln the picture.

~ 11tt1e later aall8 -hera oE the Cipher Jmreau. vmc:leNcl

ott to the K1rd.at17 ot Propapnda.

Jk»reoveor, the DWq oreated.

Air Hin1atr.Y now Bet ap an intercept 181"91oe ~ ita ~. Ud
ap-1 n drew _,. a oe:rtain peroentage of the old, tra1nad

penoa,nel. ot the Cipher asreau.

In this ease, too, there wu

ao ohaDp 1n the ua1 ganwnt of the Cipher Bareau, ainee it bad.
I

to oODtinue to m.cmitor the radio trattio ot foreign air torcea

.

~

'

L

•

..

149

RESTRICTED•just as before, because there was no posa1b111ty, either :lp
lntercept technique or in methods or evaluation, of separatingtlle monitoring ot trattio of to:reisn armies tram that of foreisnS£ forces.
A J.ittl.e while before the ou.tbreak or Wor'l\i War II, the control.
station ot the German intercept service was again aplit up, tbia••

time by assigning one halt to the High CCJIIIIII8Dd of the Artq while

the other halt was lett with the High Ccmnand or the u-c:l Forces.
Instead or creating one great, competent, central intercept orpni11a.,.

.

tion, one waa thus breaking up the little old organisation more andmore from 7e&r to year, and was tilling out the gaps 'b7 engaglng
unsuitable personnel.

A.t the outbreak ot World War II there ware

iptercept organisations in German;y w1th the High COJIIII8lld of theArmed Forces, w:l.th the H:l.gh Command of the II"'IF3 1 w:l.th the Hish

Ccmmancl of the Air Force, w:l.th the High Command ot the Rav, w:l.th
the Forschungaamt, with the Security Service, w:l.th the Ministry of
the Interior, w:l.th the Pollee, w:l.th the M1nist17 for Propaganda,

w:l.th the Foreign Office, &l)d w:l.th a whole string of other agencies
and offices.

Onl.¥ in veey rare instances caul.d one apeak of a.D7 • . ..

sensible cooperation BIIIOIIg them.

In general, the7 worked at best

aide by aide w:l.th an enormous amount of superfluous and avoidable

duplication.
The same dissipation ot energy was also found w:l.thin the Cipher
Bureau, which was supposed to be the control point tor the entire
intercept service qt the ar.ned forces, but which in reality had
not the.. ·H ghtest authority to impose its wishes on the int.f.rcept•

RESTRICTEDH9¥Rfc¥!NJ
services ot the three branches
the umed. aervia4ta•

The olJ:Iof·organisation, which had been tested and proved adequate, ws

t•en.edmore and more, aud new llllbaectiona wre oonatant:a,-created to set apart an appropriate inclependent sphere,areas, which hacl bithert.o been 1ntermeahecl, were now
separated trom one another and each WDt ita own 1ftQ"•
In the .middleo of 1939 the peraonnel atrenath in all" - ' - - ol tile \

intezo8pt. ...m.ae .... lS tiMe

Dumber 111JP1o7e4 :l.n 19321 but there 1IU not even a NDO. .

oO:rreapanclins increase in tanslble 1 useful results •

•

~

151

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•

1&1

RESTRICTED•'l'HB niN'J:BRCBPT ~AHDS"I

The six t:Lxed p.r!teroept stations which existed 1n GermarJT

1J1 1932 tormonito~ torei&D. radio. oo11111nn1 cations wre tmm

then aoaroell' autdoient tor o&rl71DI out the moat neoesaa.zir•

taeka.

I.

.

.

It wu ~onoeivabl..- that th"7 would be in a poaitiaDI.

.

to oOp. with tlie eno~Bll' expand.ins :requirements 1D the oaae
of war. . Bven 1n peacetime the obaervation ot .maneuvers ooulcl .

cm:q 11e carried out :lt the t:lxed :lnteroept stations clete.ohecl
troops and ~ant tlal forward to the Jjorder.

Hcnnrver, th:l1 ·.
4
al.wqa entaUed a temporar.r· ne.gleot of' other ~aisn-nta.

.

.

.A ·

uw Will' bad to be found ot oreatiDg .mob1le to:rmat:lor;us wld.oh.

oould be aapl.OJ'8Ci in case of need (prJariq 1.1'1 war) wb.ere'nr•

They had to exist in time. of peace

tb11 might prove a•C?••8817•

and became thorousbJ.T .f'am1]1ar with the proapeotive.~t.

:ror these reasons :lt was de~d to aet up an interoept· CCIIIpii.IJT,

to wh:loh a aeocmd as aoon added.

In and of itaelt

the idea waa doubtl.ee&q good, a:lnoe a motor1Hd unit which

was kept oonatan~ ill pra.otioe an4 wa trained to manitor the.

&1'1117 radio traf'tio of a apecitio opponent, could achieve aoocl

results at onoe, i t th1np beoame aer.l.oua.
The praotioal CNII"Z7inl out of the traird.q ot theae intercept

OCIDplllliea, hcMmlr, 'W8Il1i ap1nat a:1J. :re&IIOD•

Instead of ooouw-.

inl these fOI'IIIII.tiona constantq with the monitoring of foreign
radio trat.f'ic, thq ware onl1' rarel7 eiiJP].oTed in monitoring•

toreim &Drciaea to sive them "praoticen; in the .ma1n thq were
I

118

.

:RBSTRICTED

.

uaed to" intercept and follow the radio trattio of German units
oarl7in8 out exercises. How the wq the Gezman 8l'IIIJ" radio trath.o
waa handl eel was not comparable with the met:ftod of 8Zf1 ot the ot.her

azmiea of Europe.

The ttpracticalwrk" ot the asBignment and of ita

evaluation resulted, therefore, in a distorted picture and "NUI utter]¥s8DII8less. -Ot courae, under these ciro'ulustanoes it was possible toget praotioe 1D :f'1x1ng a radio station and d.ete:rmin1ng 1t:s pographio

positionl but one ooul.d. not J.eam the characteristics 8Dd pecoJJ.iar-

1tiea ot the trattio 1d:d.oh 1ftJUl.d have to be mo.nitored in case ot war.
I•

The intercept oompaniea, on the other hand, wre more interested in
Us~ to their own trattic than to foreign trattic because thecharaateristiosof their.
. OND trattio wre known to each of the MD in
all deta1ls, ao that the 110rk 11&8 8&81"•

Mo:recmtr, the perscmal oontaots

often made it posld.ble to t1nd out a great deal about lithe other Bide•over a glue of 'beerl this 'II&B of value tor the intercept ~1Dvol.vecl.
~;to it" 'R8 no 110Dder that thesecompanies, llhioh wre later

increased to ldx, tell. down in the JDDnitoring ot foreign maneuvers.
'l'h1s toraecl people to recogrd.se that 'these companies would not, 1D

case ot war, be in a position to suppq uae1'ul intelllpnoe, untU

the7 had had a IIIODth ot tra:iDing under -.rAHISditiou,
aasumiDg, ot,.
~-· that ~.,. wre uatsnecl w1l qual1.t.t.ecl evaluators to 'lfOrk. overthe results ot their DICIIitoring. Pl'eoieeq 1D tld.s :resaz:d,
-L--

·---

hcMmtr, ft17' little . . . . . .

114

RESTRICTED••

It we consider. tJd.s d.evelopnent tram the standpoint of atactual testing ot :Lta value. WB are toroed. to the conclua:Lon.
that the intercept compan:Lea under these circumstances wuld
cause more harm than aood. iD the event ot 'lfBZ"• since theintercept service :La a tw-edged sword.

It it wrka preoiaeq

BDCi v.l.th acientit:Lc accur&CT, then it can be ot great use to ita .

own coiiiiii8Dd.

It it does not do this• and :Lt the work in such acompl.1cated field is carr:Led 0"1 'b7 :Lnadequateq trained people.
then the resul.ts raa.y cause the CODIII8J1d. to make tatetul. errors
in judgement.

•

•
I

•

•

1&5

RESTRICTED

•

•

8&8

RESTRICTED•The interception of teob.uical means of aaammioation badtita bes;imd.Ds in World War I and vu d.eva].gped iuto a ~pifiaantmilitar,r instrument. The number of battle actions, operations,plans,and diplomatic measures vhioh wre baaed on the reeulta ot

actual. intercepts becam.e ver.r areat.
That one was sUent about thie clur1Ds World War I . . . .

aelt-evic1ent.

B.r WBl' ot limitation, I must ZWD&Z"k that tmm'

then 8CIII8 thins• trickled tbroulh to the general pJbl1o, but

wre not given DDloh attention. Por :lnatanoe, a f8tl •eka after
the battle of 'fannenbers a Berlin paper oarr1e4 1111 arliiole 111.

vb1oh attention was called to the fact that Russian nd!o trattlo•

made it poaeible for the German OOJIIDU1Cl to o&l"l7 t.Jurou&h theoperations in the W8iY it d1d.

Two 78&r8 later a haDkturt

paper carried a a1 m1 1 ar article whioh had re.f'erenoe to the reaul.ta

of the intftocept aerr.l.ce 111 the W&at.

'l'he art:Lole 111 the BerliD

aheet gave the Rueeiana a 1I&I"D:LDs and reaulted 1D the:Lr pq1ns

aore atteDt:Lon :Ln the future to the aecur:Lv of their radio

meaaapa.

The art.:Lole 1n the FraDkturt paper &lao turned ou.t

to be ver.r incautious and 1Ulfort.UD&te.

1lheD World War I came to an and, l:Lterature 011 th:La wr

bepn to appear lll.owq :Ln publ:Lo.

The Tarlou pneral.e

expreeeed their opiaiona reprd:Lns the operat:Lona thq had
ocmciuated or reprd:l.Dg the war 111 pneral., ancl hen and there

offered ver.r intereat:Lns c:leta1le on the pract:Lcal application•of the 1Dte:rcept, aerv:Lce •115'1'

RESTRICTEDThis question was treated in a tar mora detailed fashion b7
General Max Ronge, in his book •'M.Utt.nu 1\.nrl Industrial Bapionage,n:ln 1lh:1ch he gave a large number dt "'""'' i ..... rrom. the actual work•ot the Austrian intercept service. So r •• ·'lA I know, this bookrema.1ne the on:q one which occupied iL~·''·! wlt.h this ~em.e toarrr areab ax:t.ent.

The other things llhi.d1 "' r-.ared. on the auhject.

were eithsr relativell' short treatiMs on single topios or .
official memoirs, aometimas there were rather brief art.iole~ 1nDEnriiP8P8l"S and m.a.g&l5inea. ·Among the treatises on individual topics was a brochure by

the weJJ...lmown Austrian. c:ryptana.l,yst, Figl, under the title"87atema ot Decipherment." The French colonel, Givierge,
apressed himselt on the same theme.

The then American. ambaa-

eador in London (Page) expressed himself on the subject of theZiaa.erman telegrams in his book ot war memoirs.

Regarding thebattle or Tanr..inberg, an article appeared first in Swd.en.

Tosum it aU up, during the entire period betvaen the Flrst andSecond World Wars on:Qr three men - so tar as I know- expressed
themselves in brief form on this theme.

TheM were ColaDel

Calvel in .France, Colonel SzieSQ118ld. in Poland, an.d Major
VaaUiu in Bomania.

Calvel'a memoir was intended as a textbook tor the French
ccmmmication. service.

It did cont&in a number of ver.r interest-ins vamples tram the period of World War I, but the chief etresa
waa on teohnioal questions, on what had been learned b7 uperience,

158

RESTRICTED•ItES-QC~1•/

and on directifts tor the· securit.T ot one's OMD COIIIIIUDicatiana

against hostile 1ntero8ption.
The Pol.e. ·Colone1 Sllies~qnald.. 1IU a ptp1l of cal.vel and on

his return tram. Veraaill.es OODJPO&ed a JllallOir which included all.
the examples which had be'come 1mcnm. to him in France. as wl.l asadditional notewort;q J..rw,s tram Ghe period ot the Poliah1
Russian war. SBiesQDald.' s 11181110ir. which appeared under thetitl.e ''Interception and Direction Finding Service as a Sourceof Intelllgence Regarding the J!'lnelv•" contained man;r emiting
exam.ples from ~he past.

This littl.e volume - like Calftl.'s

brochure - was not published but vas intended onq tor •instruction within the Polish conmmications service.

•

The Ramau:t an. Major Vaailiu. had attended the courses inFrance along with SsiesQ'DS)d.. and had llkew:lae brou&ht haDea llWDber of things which he had heard ~ seen there.

In the881118 1flll' as SsiesQnllld.• he composed a .aano1r in which belength directives tor O&l"l7inc on a Mthodioal intercept

service.
In Geruzv' th87 tried to permit as little as posaibl.e toappear 1n PJ,blio on this theme.

After 193.3 there vas even adecree torb1dd1.ns 81J10D8 to touch on such •tters 1n the press••

1&9

RESTRICTED

•

•

180

ltESTltiCTED•

RES'A.ilcr8D 21•

THE .ABMAMENT OF lWROPB .AP'lE 1933

AS RBVEALED B1' 'l'HB INTBROEPT BERVICB\

It. vould. be a great miat.ake to a&SUIIIS that the re&l'IIIBID8llt

ot GerJnarv- did not begin until. the autumn ot 1933 after Oe!B.D7
J.ett the League ot Nations.

It wuJ.d be alao wrong to believethat in the preceding two years there had .m.ereq been a certain
amount ot preparation tor rearmament.

With respect to the

preparation tor the production ot waapona and of technicalequip1181lt, the beginnings of real'D181118nt in Gel'JII&D1' reaohedback into the firat 78ars alter the end of the Firat World War.

HOW8Tel', peopJ.e abroad. noticed rlrtual.l¥ nothing ot this.

•

Even

within the countr,y nothing was lmown about it outside a amall
1ntoi'III.8Ci circle.
The ear]¥ stages ot this effort became visibl.e earq in

1929.

At tb:lrs time a remarkable devel.opDant began both among

the various statts and. also in the H1niat17 ot Defense.

Ever.Ywbere so-called "empl.cr.yees" or "civilian emp].cvees"
appeared, who 'WBre employed at .first 1n simple tasks, butthen in JDDre and more important ones.

of'ticers.

These were all torm.er

The7 were engaged u "spectators" or "assistants"

at drills and maneuvers, and attached great importance tobeing addressed b.r their tomer title.

A series of new sub-sections was set up in the Ministey ot Defense and in the .

seven militar.r districts ••881

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RE~'PilB"-l'----....4---

Ir one onso-8od one of tbese men 1n intimate conversation, one

aoon SOL aoma insight. into their trend ot thought. At tirst theya.proaaetl their satisfaction at having escaped !rom tile interior.

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at.atua ot an agent or traveling sal.eaman and once more at finding
empl.oJment suitable t.o thoir station•

Soon thq would admit tb&t;

things lieN moving toward rea:naament and that their present ocC11Jia.-

tion aa ~·• waa •:rell' an 1nte:rmedia~ stage.

It ozae obaerved the entire :radio tratt1c of other European
countries, it could be recognised that in all countries, wlthou.t
exception, mil1t&l7 amam.ent bad. reached a certain starulstUl.
To be sure,organisational. changes nre made here and there, or

antiquated weapons nre replaced b;y new ones; even the tra.1.ning
regulations ware revised nov and then.

But there was 'Yirtual.q

no real change in effective strength and in respect to thetraining and. preparation ot reserves, or with respect to thequantitY" ot am.s available.
In 19.321 and indeed earq in this 78&r1 German propapnda

tor the creation of a .300,000 man al'II\Y took shape open:q.

In

realit:r the effective strength ot the German armed forces hada.lreaq expanded tar bqond the 100,000 man lim1t set. If one
counted in the numerous "fJIIIPlo7ees" and assumed that thq wereto serve as a skeleton tor a new ott'icer oorps, one :reached theconcl.uaion that aU that was neceasarr was the induction at acorresponding number ot recruits, llhereupon the entire .3001 000
man &l'tltY 1IJOUl.d be complete. · The &l'DIII 1 tools, and equipnent bad.

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long Bince been at banci •I.

The monitoring ot .mU.it&17 1 diplomatic, and intemal radio

trattic ot all the Buropeof:U countries, which 1n general gave
V8l7 good and aometimes ve17 ext.enaive infcmaation, d1c1 not

atford the lllJ.shtest proof that at that time there vas 8IJl'building up ot armaments abroad, not even 1n the spring ot

19.32 when a tlood of plaoarda and postcards poured out allover Ge!'JII&lJ1' showing 1n graphic form. how defenseless andunprotected Ge:rm&rJl' vas against 8ZJ7 hostile attack and what.

the m1lit&r7 strengt,h ratio of all adjacent countries to
Gei'IIIIIZV' was.

These postcards, which were produced 111 aD1'

variations, were sent out through Gel'DI8D1' b.f the m1l.J.1ons •

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Correapcm.din8 large placards could be seen 1n f!IV8r'1' sovemment

office, 1n 8'V8l7' station, and in the corridors ot all pu.blic ·ba:1ld1ngs.

There was not the al1ghteat doubt that this waveof propapnda aaanated ti'ODl the M1n1st17 of Def'enee.
Jmmedi ateq attar the u8UIII;ption ot power 'b7 Rational
Soo1al18111, a great~ increased activi.t.T began in the German&I'DI8d forces, espe9" all7 in the then M:lnist17 Of Defense.

!here seemed to be no tinancial or budptU7 ditticultiea

connected with the empl.oJment ot civilian ampJ.o7ees.

In allparts of the building on 1'1rpitsuter the7 shot up like
DI.UBhroCIIlll attar a rain.

Numerous new organizations 1l8re set

up, and new sub-aeotions were created; there was an anxl.ous'

shutting of oneself ott apinst other sectionsa the requisition-

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ing of ~n from tho ~ b,y tho Ministr,v or Defense and vice versa
assumed ever g1oeater proportions.

The numerical strengt.h or the

milit.B.l"J' district cOIIIIIID.nds doubled within a ve:ey short. time.

The

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creation of the Air M1niet17 was tor 81J1'one at all acquainted lfith
the situation an open indication that this was the first step

toward the creation or a larger German air force.
In tho 'BUDIIller or 1933 in the diplomatic radio traffic ofvarious countries could be noted the first indications t.hat
people ab~ vera beginning to pa:y some attention to this develop-

This occurred primar~ in Great Britain and in Cuchosl.ovald.a,ment.

then to a certain extent in France and Poland.

With respect to theI

Sovi.et Union nothing could be ascertained directq, since the ar1t1re
III

d1pl.oma.t1c traffic of this count17 rema1ned undecipherabl.e; con-tII

ciullions could ~ be drawn indirect~ from the radio traf't:Lo drI

other c-:Juntries.

From this it appeared that Russia was the tirstIand at that time the o~ countey in Europe to recognize quite

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clear]¥ :t.he developnent which was beginning in Gei"JJI&D1' and. to ~counter-steps or a milit&r7 character.

With regard to the othercountries of Europe, nothing or this ·sort could be noted, not even.

when Ge~ quit the League or Nations on l4 October 1933.

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There

was, to be 8111"8 1 a great deal or talk in diplomatic circles to theeft'eot that Ge1'11181Jl' 118.11 beg:l.nning to arm on a large scale.

Moreover,co1umns in ~e nevapapers abroad began to be tilled with articles.
dealing with. this topic.

In the parlialumts questions were introd.uoad

and debates wre conducted.

Blat fl'CIII. a practical. point ot viev

not.b1ns aa f.\one 1n the armies or Europe wbich ooul.d be designated

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mil1t&17 strengt.b, which would threaten Gel'J1181V'•

Or1JT in theSoviet Union was the m1lit&l7 budget increased..
During the course of 19.34 Geman rearmament took toi'ID8

1dlich coul.cl no longer be overlooked b7 the pubJJ.c.

The merebnil ding ot barracks we calculated to give ::lntomation.

However, onq. one who had aome insight into the doings of the
Ministry ot Defense could get an approximate idea of what vas
reaJ.:b' being prepared.

Here events and plans began tall.ins

all ~r one another.

. ~~ ~ ·Iamediate]T attar the assumption ot ·~r, Hitler had

issued the directive to make all preparations tor aettins up••

a 3001 000 man &I'IQ"•

These plans ware 8&87 to C&r17' out, sincethe7 coincided vith the previous trend of thought and with theprel.1.m1narJ' IJI8asures a.J.read1" taken.

Sh~ thereafter

instructions came trom the Ohanoellorr to .IIIBke plans tor a
500,000 man &l'DI1'•

A quarler of a 78&r la:ber Hitler issued

a directive to work on the basis of a 700,000 man standing•arm.?'• Alter a whil.e this nwnbar vas increased to 900,000,
and later to 1,200,000.

Later on, attar 20 J~ 1944, attar he had had him.
strangled, Hitler spoke of former Colonel General Bec_!c as
a miserable weakling who got a nervous breakdown and criedllke a fellow with a hangovar averytima he had something

extra to do •• Beck, during that critical period ot German•

armament, vas the Chief ot General Staff and was reprded in

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wide circle:.; .as a second Molt.ke.

Deck 1 c militG.rT ability" - at leastin tho ~~~tLer or organization - ia be,yond all qaeation.

However,Beck was a ver.r conscientious ~nan who was accusto1ned to L"'ivo all his
pl.t\ns the stBJDP of p1·ecision.

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Tlie constant changGs in ,lirectives,

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thd increases of numbers at sllort intervals, the new :InstructionsiI.
coristantq issu'ed by' Hi.tler, these a.hfal's up8et Beck's previousl s.

It is trobabq true that lll8lQ' times Bock sat at his de&k'

knowing what to do and was more inclined to weep than to laugh.

reason, however, was not a wretched wealm.ess or this man, but

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the impulsive action and order& of Hitl.er which ex.cludod &n7'ccisc1en1:.1oua~ing. Hitler's trends of though~ d~bt.leas madepossible the quicli setting up of a great numerical strength but not
the solid toundatioll which is needed tor a large mod.ern &l'm1'•No

one lmew this better than Back, and in this tact.. is found thee.xpl.anation .~r his occasional want or campoauro wha~ he found .him-•

salt facing the ruin or his previous plAns and. arrangements.
I,

The rirst lndications that people abroad wre beginning totake into military account the situation resulting through Gei'Eilrearmament wre tound in the BUDIID.8r of 1936, i.e., attar German

troops occupied. the ws:t:.ern demi 1 1 tarised sana.

Bu.t even now suchmeasures in the European a.rad.es ware limited to a ver,y meager, notto sq pitUul. extent.
two directions:

Qn:q the Soviet Union began going ahead inin the direction of bt:d.ld1ng up a strong &r11181118Dt

industr.r, and in the direction ot tra.inin& a strons m:Uitar,y.

reserve. · Otherwise, the aituation. in almost aU. the C01D'ltries orEurope .L-emainad practical.J.,y the aame as it had bean in 1929.

was particularq true with respect tq Franca.

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This

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When in the ear]¥ dqa ot Febl'llal7 1938 Hitler cazrled out his•

BWeeping change 1n the Minist17 ot Defense and made h:l.maelt SUpreme

Commander ot the German Armed. Forces, and when he diaadssad. Colonel
General. Baron von Fritsch, who had been opposed to 8Zf8 aggressive

war, there was no cioubt left in the minds of the initiated whither.

this clavalopnent was going.

This devel.opnant was also recognisedin po11tical circles in moat ot the non-German cOUDtriea ot

Europe.

This was moat clear]T the case in .Bngland.

Hare. thq

began inoreasing their armaments in the air and to 801118 extent
on the water.

Csechoalovald.a increased the number ot ita

divisions and their effective strength.

In Poland the air force

was likewise strengthened and a partial rearm1ns ot the tiel.da.rm;r was carried out.

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Othend.se, practical..q nothing chanpd•. Hitler asserted later that increased a.mament ~re.

,abroad bad. forced him to increase ~ts ~ .tinaJ.ll' to

strike.

.'that is totalq untrue .iJlDce the intercept aervice,

which reaJ.q eised up the situation 1n foreign armies and air

toroes doNn to small detaila, did not give the aligbteat
support to the cl.aial that increased armaments abroad nre
torc:lng Hitler· into an &r111811l8Dta race ••RESTRICTED

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188

RESTRICTED••HITLER .AND CZBCHOSLOVJKUThere were two countries against 'Which Adolph Hitler
macle thorough preparations tor war from. the V8l7' first dqa

ot his activit7 as leader ot German pol107: Poland. andCseohoslovald.a.

Harcill' ever in all h1sto17 baa a oount17

been ao IQ'IItematica.:L:b" and deepq undermined and prepared tor

external attack by the empl.oym.ent of spies, agents, and ccm-.
tidence Jll8n (so called V-men), aa was here the cue. The
starting point tor this work waa attorded 'b7 the German

apealr1ng elalent in these countries.

B;r using their attach-ment to all that was German, in all circles ot the GerlllaD~~ population so-cal 1 ad qontidence men ware reoraited•

aa purveJOrll of inf'ormation, partl,y dirac~, pa.rt;l.y throush
the VDA (Volksbund tuer daa Deutscht\Dil 1m Aualand or Peop1et a

League tor German Culture Abroad).

There was a pzreterenoe tor

persons in ottioial positions. or in the Cseoh a.rmed forces
but business Mn, tra'VIJlers, &Dd. the like ware also p.theredin.

It waa moat valuable when. thv succeeded in 'lfiDnina an

otticer ot the Csech armed. toroea as a confi.deDce man, andthis happened repeatec:lq•.Al.read1' by the end ot 1934 the situation waa auch that
almost nothing that occurred in the Csech armed forces._
admird.stration, or industr.r remained concealed trcm. theI

German espionage service.

The number of individual reports. on Csechoslovald.a reachins the count&rintellisence unit in•

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RES!PfRfe!flEt!fBerlin aver"'r;od. rrom five to ten dail.1'· Olten there were adcrcr
f'ilms ot original documents incJ.ud1 ng intonuation on the mostsecret matters.
Eavesdropping on telephone conversations pl.qed a/particular••Jpart in this swing on the Czechoslovak state.

For this an entire

qstem. ot listening statians had been set up.

The results were sent

to the counterintelligence offices in Broslau., Dresden, and Munich,or to their advance branches, and passed from here to Berlin.

Allcable lines leading out ot Czechoslovakia which touched German,
Austrian, or Hungarian territoey were monitored.

For this purpose

there was close cooperation. between the German, A.ustr:l.an, and
Hungarian espionage and c:r'1Pta.na.qt.ic services.
Much energy was devoted in Gel'DI8lJ1" to setting up the radio

intercept servi.ce against Czechoslovakia.
there WB little success.

HOII'SV8r, in this tiel.d

As earq as 19.3:3 there vas oollaboraticm•

betlAilen the German intercept service and that or the Austrian andthe Hungarian amies, but the Cmechs were so cautious in their use

ot radiotelegrapq that the results were onl,y moderate.
A ve17 clear indication that the Cmechs had been salected b7
Hitler as tl'B object ot a military att.ack -was to be had. an

24 December 1936.

On this unusual da.v there occurred at ihe Cipher

Bureau in the M1nist17 ot War at Berlin a d.iecussion with otf:l.cers

ot the Air Minist17• The subject "11118.8 a new organisation and astrengt.hening ot the intercept work against Cmechoel.ovalda.
main theme was a surprise attack.

TheThe Ministr.v tor Air took the

initiative and it looked. as it the air force were to plq the chiefrole.

Not until later was it clear wb.7 the Ministr.v tor Air took

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the lead 1n thia and later oonwraationa:favored the plan.

Colonel General Baron von Fritaoh, Oaaaander-

in-cld.et of the .blqr1 vu opposed•

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Glr.lng and hia atatt

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