History of Global Arms Transfer, 9 (2020), pp. 27-39

Distinctions of the ROK National Security
Policy and the Pursuit of Military
Independence during the Cold War
By KYENGHO SON*The National Security policy of South Korea has been distinctly shaped by its
historical experience during the Korean War. Facing a sudden invasion from
North Korea, South Korea did not have any other option but to rely on the
support of the US to conduct the war. The US began to strengthen the South
Korean armed forces, based on its national security policy, as the armisticenegotiations progressed towards the end of the war. Because South Korea lacked
modern military technology and funds, the US planned a preponderant groundforce, with a small navy and air force that could be supported by US capabilities.
The concentration on ground forces called for self-reliance on the part of South
Korea. Meanwhile, the South Koreans succeeded in concluding a ROK-US
Alliance to secure US commitment for the defence of South Korea. Self-help
efforts and the alliance with the US became two distinctive features of South
Korean defence policy in the Cold War era. However, the US reduced its
commitment to South Korean defence during the period of détente, although
South Korea devoted its national resources to the Vietnam War. South Koreanelites opened a new dimension to national self-defence efforts by producing basic
weapons and developing independent military strategies. As a result, South
Koreans were able to arm themselves with their own weapons. Later, with theincrease of tension with the Soviet Union, the US changed its policy towards
South Korea to re-institute its commitment to the defence of South Korea. In thiscontext, South Korea continued its self-defence efforts, and tried to maintain thecommitment of the US while gradually reducing its dependence on US
capabilities for its defence.

I Introduction
The national security policy of the Republic of Korea (hereafter ROK or South Korea) has
been influenced by the experience of the Korean War and by diplomatic connections with
the United States of America (US). As a product of the United Nations (UN), the ROK was
suddenly thrown, unprepared, into a total war due to the invasion by the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter DPRK or North Korea). The Korean War was South
Korea’s only experience of modern warfare. Although South Korea joined the Vietnam
War, the size and impact of the Vietnam War was not a match for the Korean War’s impact
domestically. South Koreans understood modern warfare and learned its lessons in terms of* Author Affiliation: Professor at Korea National Defense University.

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KYENGHO SON
their experience of the Korean War.
The alliance with the US was the basis of South Korea’s national security policy from its
inception. At the end of the war, ROK President Syngman Rhee pursued this alliance andfinally concluded the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the US on
October 1, 1953. South Koreans needed to rely on the US to protect their country from thepossible aggression of Communist forces. As a result, South Korea’s national security
policy has been subordinated to the global security policy of the US.
The national security policy of South Korea relied on the US most of the time; however,South Korean administrations pursued a degree of independence from US influence fromtime to time. Under the rule of President Park Chung-hee, the ROK government invested indeveloping basic weapons capacity, along with some strategic weapons. At the same time,
there were attempts to retake operational control from the United Nations Command or
Combined Forces Command. Currently, ROK forces and US Forces in Korea (USFK) areagain considering a new command structure to fit the new security environment
surrounding the peninsula.
Most studies that consider changes in ROK national security policy focus on the changing
international security environment in the Park Chung-hee era. Han, Yong-sup emphasises
the Nixon Doctrine and the withdrawal of the 7 th Infantry Division from the Korean
Peninsula as the main factors pushing South Korea to move to emphasise self-defence. 1
Kim Il-young and Jo Seong-ryul adopted the same perspective.2 Park Young-jun also
acknowledged the importance of external changes to the security environment; however, heshed light on the personal aims of the South Korean leadership by citing presidential
addresses.3 In the same vein, Park Il-song emphasised the changing security environment
between 1970 and 1997 as a major factor prompting the self-defence movement in South
Korea.4
These studies, however, have neglected to analyse the impact of South Korean efforts
during the Korean War. In addition, most studies do not pay enough attention to ROK
governments’ indigenous military strategy and the defence projects carried out within its
institutions. In this context, this paper attempts to analyse the efforts of South Korean
governments from the Syngman Rhee era to the New Cold War to understand South Korean
military strategy within varying security architectures. At the same time, the paper explores
institutions involved in self-defence projects. Finally, the paper will assess the results of
ROK self-defence projects to enhance the understanding of the reality of self-defence in aSouth Korean context.

II The Korean War and Self-defence Efforts
The Korean War was the largest tragedy in national history of Korea. With the surpriseinvasion by the DPRK on June 25, 1950, South Korea was dropped into a war that lasted
for years. Since its establishment in 1946 as a constabulary force, the ROK Armed Forces
did not have the strength to counter incoming North Korean forces. Three days into the
1 Han Yong-sup, ‘Dongmaengsogesoui Jajugukbang: Irongwa Siljeui Dilemma [Self Defense under Alliance:
Dilemmas between Theory and Practice],’ Han Yong-sup ed., Jajunya Dongmaenginya: 21segi Hanguk Woigyoui
Jinro [Self Defense or Alliance: The Way of Korea’s Security Diplomacy] (Seoul: Orm, 2004).
2 Kim Il-young and Jo Seong-ryul, Juhanmigun [U.S. Forces in Korea] (Seoul: Hanwool Academy, 2003).
3 Park Young-jun, Hanguk Gukgaanbo Jeonryakui Jeongaewa Gaje [The Development of ROK National
Security Strategy and Task] (Seoul: Hanwool Academy, 2017).
4 Park Il-song, ‘Jajugookbang Jeongchaekui Chujingwa Gunui Hyundaehwa, 1970-1997 [Conducting Selfdefense Policy and the Modernization, 1970-1997],’ Gunsa, Vol., 68 (2008), pp. 93–130.

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ROK National Security Policy and Pursuit of Military Independence
invasion, South Korea lost its capital city. Except for the 6th Infantry and the 8th Infantry
Divisions, most front-line divisions were forced to retreat from their intended positions.
They lost their heavy equipment while crossing the Han River, due to the prematuredestruction of the bridge. Soldiers, civilians and government did not know how to fight amodern war, and the loss of life and property at the beginning of the conflict were very
severe.
The ROK government was able to conduct the war with substantial support from the US.
The US mobilised eight army divisions (the 1st Cavalry, the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 24th, 25th, 40th, and45th Infantry), the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Fleet, the 90th, 95th Task Force under US NavyFar East Command, and the 5th Air Force under US Air Force Far East Command. In total,
523,083 US soldiers joined the Korean War, accompanying 2,402 airplanes and 5
warships.5 US participation was decided on quickly, and the first battalion was dispatchedto the Korean Peninsula within a week of the outbreak of the war.
The US adopted the policy of Koreanisation to promote the defence of South Korea. Afterthe intervention of Chinese forces, the Truman Administration became determined toconclude the Korean War with negotiations. NSC 48/5 typified the direction of US policy
at this time; the document stipulated the build-up of South Korean forces to deal with
future Communist aggressions, as indicated in the following objective:
Permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North
Korean aggression until the above current objective is attainable, continue to oppose
and penalize the aggressor.6
The idea of arming South Korea was passed on to NSC 118/2, published in December
1951. The report set out the US goal: to end the war without harming relations with theSoviet Union, or affecting Taiwan and the seat of China in the UN. To this end, the US
dedicated itself to establishing strong military capacity for South Korea.7
The main line of effort focused on establishing a substantial ground force for the ROK.
Along with the Koreanisation policy, the US launched a 20 division-program for South
Korea. President Truman sent a letter to the ROK government promising to build up South
Korean forces after the announcement of NSC 48/5 on June 5, 1951. 8 After continuingdebate, US officials set the goal of increasing the ROK Army to 20 divisions in October
1952 and achieved this goal by November 20, 1953. The final division to be established
was the 27th Infantry Division in Cheju Island. To maintain 20 divisions, the Eisenhoweradministration not only provided support in the form of supplies like ammunition andrepair parts, but also gave economic support to sustain South Korean society as it
developed these considerable armed forces.9
5 Gukbang Gunsayeonguso, UNgunjiwonsa [The History of the Support of UN Forces] (Seoul: Gukbang
Gunsayeonguso, 1999), pp. 150-151.
6 U.S. NSC, NSC 48/5, Asia, US Objectives, Policies & Courses of Action, NSC 48 Series Folder #4, Asia US
Objectives, Policies & Courses of Action to Southeast Asia, US Objectives & Courses of Action, Box 4 Lot
61D167 Entry A1 1583 A&B, RG 59, Policy Planning Council, Alphabetical Files, 1948–1961, NARA, College
Park, MD.
7 Kyengho Son, ‘Migugui Hangukjeonjaeng Jeongjeonjeongchaek Gochal [A Study on U.S. Armistice Policy
for the Korean War],’ Miguksayeongu, Vol., 36(2012), p. 148.
8 Kyengho Son (2012), p. 150.
9 President Eisenhower sent Dr. Henry J. Taska to investigate the South Korean situation, in terms of its armed
forces build-up, on April 17, 1953. After two months of investigation, he submitted ’Strengthening the Korean
Economy’, which emphasised the importance of economic support to maintain large ground forces after the war.
See Kyeongho Son (2012), p. 158.

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KYENGHO SON
The ROK government subsequently played an active role in increasing the size of ROK
Army at the end of the War. In fact, the 20 divisions represented the vision of the ROK
military community. South Korean Military personnel had thought that 20 divisions would
be necessary to defend their country from any future North Korean invasion. The idea wasformally transferred to General Omar N. Bradley by Foreign Minister Im, Byung-jik on
April 18, 1951, although the US Joint Chiefs of Staff were not initially enthusiastic.
However, the members of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) had agreed to theidea as a practical means to replace US troops on the Korean Peninsula. This initiative
eventually became the cornerstone of the military development program for South Korea. It
is conceivable that ROK soldiers may have promoted this idea persistently to theircounterparts in the US military during the Korean War.10
In addition, the ROK government developed its own defence program after the Korean
War. Sensing the approaching end of the war, President Syngman Rhee issued Presidential
order No. 813 to create militia units to raise defence preparedness and counter any future
Chinese invasion, which would be expected to bring a mass of troops. With this order,
South Korea was able to enlist 1,277,955 militia members into 3,985 battalions by October
6, 1952. Lieutenant General Shin Tae-young took command of all the militia units.11
However, these militia units were then dismissed by the order of Ministry of National
Defense on May 7, 1955. The South Korean government dismissed the militia while
establishing 10 army reserve divisions, which have continued since 1955.12
The South Korean government made a significant effort to formalise the ROK–US
Alliance at the end of the war. Initially, President Eisenhower was reluctant to agree to a
defence treaty with South Korea, because his staff opposed to the idea. Meanwhile, theSouth Korean government was eager to conclude the treaty to get a guaranteed US
commitment to defend South Korea. President Rhee suddenly released anti-Communist
prisoners on June 18, 1953, aiming to threaten the negotiated end of the war. The US had
almost reached the stage of signing the armistice treaty with the Communist leadership.
Syngman Rhee showed his willingness to spoil the treaty by releasing prisoners, upsetting
Communist negotiators. Surprised by this move, President Eisenhower soothed President
Rhee by promising to conclude the defence treaty immediately after the war. The mutual
defence treaty was concluded on October 1, 1953, according to the wishes of South
Koreans.

III The Self-Defence Movement under President Park Chung-hee, 1
Right after the Korean War, the USFK revealed its defence concept in 1957. The idea wasto allow North Korea to invade the territory of South Korea before taking counter-offensive
action.13 Prior to this, the USFK and South Korean armed forces had held the concept of
upholding the line of contact in the case of North Korean attack. However, the US andSouth Korean military then changed the policy: based on this new concept, the US
established three lines of defence above the Han River. At the same time, the new defence
10 Kyengho Son (2012), pp. 152–155.
11Gukbangbu Gunsapyonchanwiwonhoe, Gukbangsa, 1950.6–1961.5 [History of National Defense] (Seoul:

Gukbangbu Gunsapyunchanwiwonhoe, 1987), p. 74.
12 Ibid.
13 Yukgunbonbu, Yukgun 40nyun Baljeonsa [The History of the 40 Years’ Development of ROK Army] (Seoul:
Yukgunbonbu, 1989), p. 111.

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ROK National Security Policy and Pursuit of Military Independence
concept created three consecutive defence lines as far as the Nakdong River.14
This new concept demonstrated the US policy to maintain the status quo in South Korea.
To the US, Indochina rather than Northeast Asia had become the focus of its national
interest. Thanks to the normalisation of ROK–Japan relations and the emergence of astrong anti-Communist government in South Korea, Northeast Asian countries were able tostand firm against Communist aggression. In this context, the US tried to maintain thestatus quo in Northeast Asia and avoid another conflict like the Vietnam War. At the sametime, Asia was a less significant theatre than Europe for US policy makers. In this sense,
US military policy in South Korea had taken a defensive stance, to deter a possible North
Korean invasion and while allowing a first advance by the DPRK toward South Korea.
This policy was maintained into the 1960s.
During the détente era, the US reduced its hostility toward Communist countries andinfluenced its allies not to initiate conflict in the region. Since the late 1960s, the Nixon
administration had sought to relieve US involvement in the Vietnam War due to severe
criticism from the US general public and high inflation caused by the enormous cost of thewar. President Richard M. Nixon declared a famous doctrine, which emphasised the selfhelp efforts of countries in the case of conventional war in Asia, on July 25, 1969. At thesame time, the Nixon administration tried to enhance its relationship with China by
exploiting conflict on the Sino-Soviet border. In this context, the US government
recommended that South Korea make a rapprochement with North Korea. The US directed
South Korea not to ruin the détente between the US and China.
Meanwhile, in January 1968 the US failed to deal properly with North Korea’s armed
provocation. North Korean infiltrators raided the Blue House, the presidential residence, onJanuary 21, 1968, aiming to assassinate President Park. While the attempt failed, it was agreat shock for South Korean society, because the infiltrators had made it as far as the lastcheck point before the Blue House itself. However, the US government did not pay
sufficient attention to this raid, instead the focusing on the seizure of the Pueblo, a US
intelligence-gathering ship, two days later. US officials even held a secret meeting with
North Korea at Panmunjom without giving notice to South Korea. Under suchcircumstances, President Park determined to pursue self-defence as a policy objective.
President Park Chung-hee announced his self-dense concept at the opening ceremony of
a local railroad line on February 7, 1968. He proclaimed self-defence as ROK policy forthe first time and suggested three ideas: moving from a UN-centred defence posture to a
posture of self-defence, arming reserve forces of 2.5 million soldiers and constructing asmall arms-producing factory within a year. 15 Based on these suggestions, the ROK
government established its Home Reserved Forces on April 1, 1968 with 1,662,413
personnel.16 To produce small arms, the South Korean government constructed a M-16 rifle
producing plant by 1972.17
In the 1960s, South Korea was inferior to North Korea in terms of military capability.
The DPRK achieved a continuing development of its armed forces throughout the 1960s.
Specifically, the success of the Four Military Ways strategy was remarkable. Since 1962,
North Korea had pursued the Four Military Ways: to upgrade all soldiers into cadres, to
14 Yukgunbonbu, Yukgun Jedosa [The Institutional History of the ROK Army] (Seoul: Yukgunbonbu, 1981), p.

334.

15 Gukbang Gunsayeonguso, Gukbangjeongchaek Byunchonsa: 1945–1994 [The History of Defense Policy:
1945–1994] (Seoul: Gukbang Gunsayeonguso, 1995), p. 166.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid. The plant was built with the support of the US after the strong protest of the South Korean government
for negligence of the US as an ally on the occasion of the raid.

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KYENGHO SON
modernise the whole armed forces, to arm every citizen and to fortify the entire national
territory. During the 1960s, North Korea was able to recover its military capabilities fromthe damage it experienced during the Korean War and even surpassed its previous capacity.
At the beginning of the 1970s, its ground vehicles and jet aircraft each doubled those ofSouth Korea, while its maritime vessel strength reached four times that of South Korea.
The growth of the DPRK’s military capability seriously undermined South Korea’s national
security.
In this security environment, the US government conducted a defence policy in line with
its national interest in détente, without sincerely considering South Korean defence
requirements. The Nixon administration announced a reduction of 42,000 soldiers in Asiaand gave a notice to South Korea that the 7th Infantry Division would withdraw from thepeninsula in 1971. This was decided at the same time that ROK was dispatching combat
troops to serve outside its borders, in the Vietnam War. In addition, the Nixon
administration dismissed the United Nations Commission for Unification andRehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) at the demand of Communist countries in the UN. At
the same time, the United Nations Command (UNC) was replaced by Combined Forces
Command (CFC) on November 7, 1978.
However, the dismantling of the UNC led to the institutionalization of the ROK–US
Alliance at the level of military command. In fact, the US proposed to dismantle the UNC
as a result of ceaseless requests from Communist countries in the UN. The UNC was themain body to command ROK and US forces, as well as forces sent by other UNC member
countries: it thereby exercised operational control over ROK forces. The creation of the
CFC allowed ROK officers to join the command structure, gaining the right to be involvedin operational control and decision-making.18
The major goal of the Park Chung-hee’s self-defence movement was to nurture South
Korea’s capacity to deter and defeat North Korean aggression without the support of theUS.19 The main effort of this movement was to develop both basic and strategic weapons
capability. Above all, the Park Chung-hee administration tried to equip South Korean
armed forces with Korean-made basic arms. To this end, he ordered the establishment ofAgency for Defense Development (ADD) in August 1970 with Presidential Order 5267;20
the ADD became the cradle of defence technologies from then on.
The ADD had been expected to conduct research, develop weapons for each military
service, develop technologies to localise weapons and heavy equipment and support
military industries overall in terms of technology.21 In pursuit of these goals, the ADD
recruited 50 researchers from the military with suitable credentials and rapidly expanded
research organizations in the ROK. Initially, President Park and his Minister of National
Defense adopted the concept of the ADD from the National Research Council of Canada,
which supported civilian companies in the development of defence technologies andpromoted the growth of the defence industry in a broader sense.22
The ADD had played an important role in conducting the Beongae (lightning) Project,
18 Kyengho Son (2012), p. 53.
19 Han, Yong-sup, ‘Hanguk Gukbangjeongchaekui Byunchongwajeong [The Change of ROK Defense Policy],’

Cha Young-gu and Hwang Byung-mu eds., Gukbangjeongchaekui Irongwa Silje [The Theory and Practice ofDefense Policy] increased and enlarged (Seoul: Orm, 2004), p. 79. It was announced at a new year’s meetingwith reporters in 1970.
20 Homepage of the ADD, http://www.add.re.kr (accessed, December 1, 2018).
21 Gukbanggwahakyeonguso, Gukbanggwahakyeongusoyaksa, Vol. I [The Brief History of ADD], Vol. I(Seoul: Gukbanggwahakyeonguso, 1999), p. 59.
22 Ibid.

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ROK National Security Policy and Pursuit of Military Independence
which developed technologies to manufacture rudimentary items of equipment such as
helmets, grenades, Carbine rifles, mortars and rocket launchers beginning in November
1971. The Blue House ordered basic weapons and equipment to be produced domesticallyon an urgent basis, on November 13, 1971. After finalising this initiative, the ADD tookcharge of developing other selected items. The first Beongae planned to produce the M2
Carbine, M1919 A4/A6 machinegun, 60mm/81mm mortars, MK2 grenade, M18A1 antiperson mine, M15 anti-tank mine and M20A1/M20B1 rocket launcher from Korean
factories.23
The researchers and engineers of the ADD poured their energy to find ways to localise
production. To manufacture weapons, blueprints and materials specifications had to beprepared. ADD applied reverse engineering skills to US-made goods to derive the standard
design and original size of parts. 24 Thanks to the help of Clyde D. Hardin, Assistant
Secretary for Research and Development of Defense, ADD was able to acquire a Technical
Data Package for selected items. ADD conducted three test firings at the end of December
1971 and in January 1972, using weapon prototypes.25 After these tests, ADD correctedflaws in certain prototypes and added new items for the second phase of Beongae by theend of February 1972.26 For the final phase of Beongae, ADD improved the quality of
prototype weapons to reach mass production by September 1972.27

IV The Self-Defence Movement under President Park Chung-hee, 2
The Park administration moved systematically to nurture the production of basic weapons
in South Korea. In April 1973, President Park ordered the ROK JCS to prepare a project tobuild the capacity to produce basic weapons with such goals as the following:To establish a military strategy to enable self-defence,
To prepare a long-term military plan for the return of operational control,
To produce basic arms (except high performance aircraft and missiles) followed by thedevelopment of heavy industry,
To develop an independent military strategy and military development plan on theassumption that there will be no US soldiers in the 1980s.28
ROK officers supported this idea widely. The ROK officer corps began to seek
independent means to deal with US withdrawal from the peninsula. Before the Park’s order,
in 1969 a group of ROK Army officers developed the Army Defense Strategy 1971–1975,
which supported a counter-offensive from the 37th Parallel, after allowing an initial advanceby North Korea, and a move into North Korea focusing on the annihilation of the North
Korean field army and avoiding a war of attrition. 29 At the level of overall strategicplanning, Plan Taeguk 72 was reported to the president in April 1973, created on the
23 Ibid., p. 91.
24 An Dong-man, Kim Byung-gyo, and Jo Tae-hwan, Baekgom, Dojeongwa Seungriui Girok [White Bear, theRecord of Challenge and Victory] (Seoul: Planet Media, 2016), pp. 63–81.
25 Gukbanggwahakyeonguso (1999), p. 91.
26 Ibid., p. 92.
27 Ibid., p. 92.
28 Gukbangbu, Yulgoksaup Eojewa Onul Grigo Naeil [The Yulgok Project, Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow](Seoul: Gukbangbu, 1994). p. 22.
29 Yukgunbonbu, Yukgun 40nyun Baljeonsa [The History of the 40 Years’ Development of ROK Army] (1989),
pp. 260–261.

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KYENGHO SON
assumption that the armed forces’ operations would deal with a North Korean invasion
without external aid. The plan also proposed to advance into North Korea after recoveringfrom an initial setback resulting from North Korean aggression.30 In addition, President
Park received the Joint Basic Military Strategy report and endorsed it as a basic strategy topromote the indigenous military build-up.
Officers of the ROK Army might have assumed that the initial setback was inevitable dueto the lack of firepower available from the US military in case South Korea had to operate
independently. This represented a major departure from the operational plans previously
made by the US, reflecting the idea of retaining Seoul based on the lesson of the Blue
House raid. The ROK plan pursued an advance into North Korean territory, unlike USplans which had stipulated that the demarcation line be upheld and to recover the statusquo ante bellum. It is interesting to observe that army officers had developed this national
strategy and operational plan independently of the US. Incidentally, the initiative was
spearheaded by the ROK Army, just as the main effort towards self-defence focused on
producing weapons and equipment for the ground forces thereafter.
Under the direct orders of President Park and with strong support from the ROK officer
cadre, the first Yulgok Project was conducted from 1974 to 1981. During the period of thisproject, the ROK armed forces were able to increase the combat capabilities of army
divisions dramatically by equipping the ROK Army with Korean-made M-16 rifles, M-60
machineguns, M48A3/A5 tanks and advanced 105 mm and 155 mm howitzers. For the
ROK Navy, Korean high-speed missile boats were provided, and Korean destroyers andpatrol boats were also under development. The ROK Air Force purchased F-4s and also
equipped itself with F-5E/Fs, which were assembled in Korea. To supplement the defence
budget, which reached 4% of GDP, the ROK government collected a defence tax beginningin 1976. South Korea spent 3.1402 trillion Korean Won over eight years. By the time thefirst Yulgok Project was complete, the capabilities of the South Korean armed forces had
grown to 54.2% of North Korea’s capabilities.31
In this context, the Korea Defense Industry Association (KDIA) was established tosupport private companies to begin defence projects. The South Korean government wasdetermined to induce private companies to develop its defence industry; the South Korean
government and the private sector lacked inspiration to direct the emerging defence
industry. The defence industry was hardly on a satisfactory commercial basis; companies
often faced financial problems due to improper price calculations. To tackle these problems,
representatives of the companies created the KDIA on January 15, 1976; its first president
was the Chairman of Gold Star (which has since re-branded as LG).32
Since its creation, the KDIA made strenuous efforts to ensure reasonable laws andregulations for the defence industry. KDIA staff collected ideas from member companies toamend laws and regulations, listened to their complaints and called on the government toresolve these issues. Following this effort, President Park began in June 1977 to presideover meetings to promote the defence industry. Specifically, officials from the ministries of
Defense, Commerce and Finance gathered and worked together to amend the relevant laws
30 Yukgunbuonbu, Yukgun Gihoikgwanli 50nyun Baljeonsa [The History of the 50 Years’ of Army Planning](Taejeon: Yukgunbonbu, 2003), p. 163.
31 Gukbangbu (1994), pp. 34–37. Before the Yulgok Project, the capabilities of the ROK forces represented
50.8% of those of the North Korean forces. North Korea already had started its own defence program, 4 MilitaryLines, in 1962: 12 years before South Korea.
32 Hangukbangwisanyeopjinheunghoi, Sesangul Bakunun Global Power [The Global Power That Changes
World] (Seoul: Hangukbangwisanyeopjinheunghoi, 2008), pp. 77–79.

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and regulations to enhance the defence industry environment.33 The KDIA was a good
catalyst to promote the development of the defence industry by combining government andprivate companies.
President Park Chung-hee attempted to develop strategic weapons, initiating thedevelopment of both missiles and nuclear weapons. On April 4, 1972, President Park
ordered a ‘Plan for Developing the Aero Industry’ to Dr. Shim Mun-sup, Director of the
ADD. This was the code name of a project to develop missiles.34 The scientists of the ADD
struggled to develop a surface-to-surface missile with a range of 200 km modelled on the
Nike Hercules. They needed to overcome the lack of basic technology and engineering
methods required for such a project and were forced to make their own devices. Based onthese efforts, and with some support from other countries, the ADD succeeded in launching
Baekgom (the white bear) on September 26, 1978.35
Unlike the missile development project, South Korea did not succeed in developing
nuclear weapons. In 1972, President Park ordered the development of nuclear weapons. In
response, Second Secretary of the Economy, O Won-chol, delivered the ‘Atomic Nuclear
Fuel Development Plan’ to the president on September 8, 1972. This secret report set out
the plan for the ROK to develop nuclear weapons.36 The South Korean government tried toimport nuclear technologies from France and Canada; however, due to intervention by theUS, the South Korean initiative failed to develop the bomb.37 President Park wrote a
memorandum to US Defense Secretary James Rodney Schlesinger around August 25, 1975,
committing South Korea not to develop nuclear weapons.38
The first self-defence movement had brought an increase in military autonomy for ROK
forces in terms of their combat capabilities. Because of the success of the Beongae andYulgok projects, the ROK armed forces – especially the Army – acquired enhanced weapon
capability. From then on, South Korean forces began to arm themselves with modern
equipment instead of World War II-style weapons. In addition, it is conceivable that the
ROK government had its own, indigenous strategic defence plans based on its domestic
capabilities. Because South Korea lacked the firepower and manoeuvrability that had been
provided by US forces, ROK officers devised their own plans to protect their country from
North Korean aggression. This effort coincided with self-defence projects focusing on the
production of basic weapons and equipment in Korea, mainly for ground forces.
However, the ROK government could not retain structural independence from US forceseven after the initial self-defence movement. The ROK Navy and Air Force, in particular,
needed support from US forces. The initial self-help movement focused on enhancing
South Korea’s Army rather than a balanced increase of all defence forces. South Korea
used 43.3% of its investment budget for the Army, 15.8% for the Navy and 22% for the Air
Force.39 This unbalanced investment made South Korea’s Navy and Air Force vulnerable to
North Korean aggression and the support of the US necessary. In terms of command
authority, the ROK armed forces could gain a wider range of autonomy: ROK officers
33 Ibid., p. 84.
34 An Dong-man, Kim Byung-gyo, and Jo Tae-hwan (2016), p. 108.
35 Ibid., pp. 274–287.
36 O Dong-ryong, ‘Park Chung-heeui Wonjapoktan Gaebal Bimil Gyehoikseo Wonmun Balgul [The Discovery

of Park Chung-hee’s Original Plan for Development of Atomic Bomb],’ Monthly Chosun, (August 2008), pp.
190–199.
37 For South Korean nuclear development, see Ha Young-seon, Hanbandoui Haekmugiwa Segyejilseo [Nuclear
Weapons on the Korean Peninsula and World Order] (Seoul: Nanam, 1991).
38 No Jae-hyun, Chongwadae Biseosil [The Secretary Office of Blue House], Vol. 2 (Seoul: Joongangilbosa,1993), pp. 80–81.
39 Gukbangbu (1994), p. 31.

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joined the Combined Forces Command and took part in major decision-making processes.
In addition, the ROK JCS could retake independent operational authority in the case ofanti-infiltration operations.

V The Self-Defence Movement in the 1980s
In the 1980s, the world experienced the rise of tension following the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. In this era, South Korea maintained strong ties with US President Ronald
Reagan who, unlike his predecessor, did not mention the possibility of withdrawing US
troops. When President Chun Doo Hwan visited the White House, President Reagan
publicly announced that he had no plan to pull out US troops from the Korean Peninsula;
he even added 3,000 soldiers to the USFK. 40
On the other hand, the South Korean government abandoned the development of strategic
weapon capacity at this time. After his inauguration, President Chun stopped the missile
development program. In fact, the US was concerned about the ROK missile program even
before the success of Baekgom. To gain support from the US and to supplement his own
political legitimacy, President Chun stopped the program and dismissed the scientists andengineers who had been involved in the program. Later, the Chun administration resumed
the missile development program after the Aung San terrorism attack by North Korean
agents against President Chun in 1983.41
However, South Korea maintained the momentum of the self-defence movement. The
South Korean government started the second Yulgok Project from 1982 to 1986. During thesecond phase, Type 88 tanks rolled out, Korea type 155 mm self-propelling howitzers
appeared and multi launching rocket systems were unveiled.42 These heavy weapons were
the fruits of the continued development efforts from the first Yulgok Project. The ROKNavy introduced Korean-made destroyers and patrol boats as well as high speed missileboats. The ROK Air Force replaced its F-86 squadrons with F-4 and F-5 aircraft anddeployed Jegongho, an F-5 enhanced with Korean technologies.43 After the completion of
the second Yulgok Project, the South Korean armed forces reached 60.4% of North Korean
military strength.44
In the 1980s, the ADD played a different role compared to its participation in the 1970s.
The ADD was assigned to develop specific weapons and equipment of comparable strength
rather than directly purchasing equivalents from foreign countries. In the 1970s, especiallyin the case of the Beongae projects, the ADD was at the centre of weapons and equipment
development. However, at this time, the South Korean government adopted a ‘dual foci’policy: the ADD should focus on major weapons and weapons customised for the Korean
battle environment, and private companies should achieve weapon development throughimitation and enhancement of models from other countries.45 At the same time, the researchand development share of the budget decreased in the 1980s compared to the 1970s. The
budget for research and development in the defence budget was 2.1% in FY 1981 and 1.3%
in 1985; previously, the annual ratio of the research and development budget had been
40 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Reading, Massachusetts: Addision-Wesley, 1997), p. 137.
41 An Dong-man, Kim Byung-gyo, and Jo Tae-hwan (2016), pp. 347–355.
42 Gukbangbu (1994), pp. 38–39.
43 Ibid., pp. 39–40.
44 Ibid.
45 Gukbanggwahakyeonguso, Gukbanggwahakyeongusoyaksa, Vol. II [The Brief History of ADD, Vol. I?](Seoul: Gukbanggwahakyeonguso, 1999), p. 19

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ROK National Security Policy and Pursuit of Military Independence
2.5% in the 1970s.46
The ROK armed forces – this time the ROK JCS – disclosed a new concept of strategy
the ‘Joint Long Term Military Strategy Planning’ in 1983. This concept argued for a rapid
counter-offensive in the case of a North Korean invasion and to shift to an offensive assoon as possible. The so-called ‘rapid response strategy’ and ‘offensive defence’ were thefoci of the strategy. However, this strategy stipulated that the end state of the conflict was
to recover the status quo ante bellum.47 This shows the influence of the US over the ROK
armed forces and the abandonment of independent strategy for national defence based on
self-help principles. 48 Ironically, South Korea began to pursue a more limited strategy inspite of its increased capabilities in the 1980s due to the influence of the USFK. In thissense, ROK self-defence efforts in the 1980s can be characterised as less independentcompared to those of the 1970s.
The third Yulgok Project began in 1987 and ended in 1992 under the rule of President
Roh Tae-woo. President Roh had fewer problems with legitimacy compared to his
predecessor. The Roh administration deployed Type 88 tanks to the ROK Army andincreased the army’s aviation capabilities to deal with massive North Korean amour units.
At this time, the ROK Army was able to mount three mechanised divisions. In addition, theproject had programs for the ROK Navy, to develop advanced Korean destroyers, the KDX,
and to import a new anti-submarine patrol airplane, the P-3Cs, as well as submarines. At
the same time, the project had a program to import F-16s. 49 For Navy and Air Forceweapons, the third Yulgok Project pursued direct purchases from the US. As a result, thethird Yulgok Project enabled South Korea to reach 71% of the military strength of North
Korea.50
In the late 1980s, the South Korean government enlarged the role of private companies inthe defence industry. Thanks to rapid economic growth and the accumulation of capital,
private sector research and development funding reached 2% of GNP in FY 1988. At thesame time, the number of researchers in the private sector increased to 47,000. The speedof technological development far exceeded the previous achievement of the ADD. In thiscontext, the South Korean government adopted new policies for the defence industry.
Under this new direction, cooperation between private companies, universities andinstitutes was recommended as a new model for the development of the defence industry,rather than relying on the ADD. Meanwhile, the ADD began to take on overall oversightbut delegated direct research involvement except for developing certain critical weapons.
In addition, companies were recognised as major actors in the promotion of cutting-edge
weapon development. In this regard, the KDIA changed its role to enhancing policies topromote the export of Korean-made weapons and equipment rather than soliciting
government financing.51
South Korea continued its self-defence program alongside the revival of the UScommitment to support the defence of South Korea. This is an interesting point, because
South Korea started its self-defence program due to a decreasing US commitment. Thisshows that South Korean leaders had arrived at a firm consensus in support of self-defence.
46 Ibid., p. 17.
47 Jeong Jae-yeol, ‘Hangugui Jeonmyonjeok Gunsajeonryak Baljeonbangan Yeongu [The Study on Ways for

the Overall Development of Military Strategy],’ Korea National Defense University, National Security Course
Thesis, 2018, pp. 23–24.
48 Ibid.
49 Gukbangbu (1994), pp. 40–44.
50 Ibid., p. 47.
51 Hangukbangwisanyeopjinheunghoi (2008), pp. 120–122.

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KYENGHO SON
However, in the 1980s, the program pursued an additional goal: to achieve US support forthe political legitimacy of the Presidential administration. In addition, the main direction of
the self-defence movement shifted from self-development to direct purchase from the US.
At the same time, because of its increasing naval and air capacity, the South Korean armed
forces began to reduce their reliance on the US forces for naval and aerial operations.

VI Conclusion
During the Korean War, the Syngman Rhee administration attempted to establish a basic
defence posture relying on a massive concentration of ground troops to deal with future
Communist aggression in the form of ground attacks. At the same time, President Rhee
managed to cement the ROK–US alliance using brinkmanship tactics. These self-help
efforts, symbolised by massive ground troops and the conclusion of the ROK–US alliance,
were major factors that formed the enduring shape of ROK security policy during the Cold
War era.
President Park Chung-hee pushed a self-defence initiative, stimulated by US security
policy and the US failure to handle North Korea’s armed provocation against the Blue
House with sufficient seriousness. He created a master plan for national self-defence andpursued it vigorously. To a certain degree, he was able to achieve this by producing basicarms and launching missiles. The Beongae and Yulgok projects aimed to produce basic
weapons and equipment within a limited time; the ADD had played an important role inlocalisation of weapons and equipment with the support of KDIA.
Like their President, South Korean army officers developed an independent strategy fornational defence as the withdrawal of US forces from Korea was gradually pursued. This
strategy would respond to an initial advance by North Korean armed forces with a pushback into North Korean territory, contrary to US operational plans regulating the recoveryof territory to the status quo ante bellum. Later, the South Korean armed forces followed
the US concept of military operations based on stopping at the current demarcation line.
South Korean governments continued their self-defence program even after the US
revived its previous commitment for South Korean defence during the New Cold War in
the 1980s. However, personal motivations on the part of presidents hampered thedevelopment of strategic weapons, while the self-defence efforts were re-directed and therole of the ADD changed from direct research and development to overall management of
national efforts and the direct development in specific areas. At the same time, the KDIA
probed possible Korean exports of military goods rather than soliciting government support
for military suppliers. In the late 1980s, South Korea could reduce its dependence on US
military power thanks to its increased operational capabilities.
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