ASC-TUFS Working Papers

Volume 2 (2022)

African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies(ASC-TUFS)ASC-TUFS Working Papers
Volume 2 (2022)

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Editorial Board
Editor-in-Chief
Takeuchi, Shinichi
Editors
Demachi, Kazue
Murahashi, Isao
Muratsu, Ran
Nakayama, Yumi
Oishi, Takanori
Sakai, Makiko
Administrative Staff
Midorikawa, Natsuko

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Foreword to the ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)
Since its establishment in 2017, the African Studies Center -Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (ASCTUFS) has actively disseminated its research results as working papers. Last year, we launched a newpeer-reviewed journal, the ASC-TUFS Working Papers. I am pleased to announce the publication of the
ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022).
This volume is based on the international symposium commemorating the ASC’s fifth anniversary
held on 3 and 6 November 2021. The original versions of the working papers were submitted to thesymposium. Each author revised them following the discussions at the symposium and the reviewers’comments.
The symposium comprised the following six sessions.
Session 1: Young Scholars’ Networking Session
Session 2: Considering Africa - Japan Relationship for TICAD VIII
Session 3: Cross-border Mobilities in Sub-Saharan Africa
Session 4: Africa in the Market Economy
Session 5: Ecology and Socio-politics in Contemporary Africa
Session 6: Religious Plurality in Contemporary African Societies
In Session 1, 17 young researchers studying African studies at Japanese universities made shortpresentations on their current research for the purpose of networking. Three papers were presented per
session in Sessions 2 to 6, followed by comments and discussions. As can be seen from the session titles,
diverse academic fields were covered, from political sciences, economics, and international politics, torural sociology, social anthropology, and ecological sciences. The wide variety indicates the broad
challenges that current African studies have to tackle. I strongly hope that readers enjoy each paper
addressing the important part of the challenges.
Shinichi Takeuchi
Director, African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies―1―Japan’s Peace Policy in Africa:
Discussion towards TICAD VIII

Shinichi Takeuchi
African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan
Institute of Developing Economies - JETRO, Japan

Abstract
This study examines Japan’s peace policy in Africa. Peace and security are one of the central issues inJapan’s diplomacy towards Africa, and the importance is repeatedly emphasised in each Tokyo
International Conference on African Development (TICAD). As evaluation of Japan’s policy has notbeen studied in depth, this study attempts to fill this gap by examining the characteristics of recent armed
conflicts in Africa and Japan’s policy papers on peace. The Japanese government has primarily
contributed to African peace and security through multinational cooperation, as well as activities of the
Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for peacekeeping
and peacebuilding, respectively. Japan’s attempts to dispatch the JSDF to UN peace operations havebeen facing serious obstacles, as the country has failed to build a relevant legal framework for its
activities in complex circumstances, such as current conflict-affected situations in Africa. Peacebuilding
will undoubtedly be a central component of Japan’s peace policy, but which JICA activities are
considered peacebuilding will depend on the country’s view on peace. Therefore, Japan is required toclarify what kind of peace it intends to build.

Keywords: conflict, Japan, peace, policy, TICAD― 23 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

1. Introduction
Peace and security are central issues in Japan’s diplomacy towards Africa and are constantly discussed
at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). Since it started in 1993, theconference has been held once every five years (once every three years since 2013) and has provided an
opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues related to African development. While the conference has
become increasingly business-oriented, peace has always been considered one of the most important
issues and a prerequisite for development. In a series of TICADs, concrete policies and practices forpeace have been discussed and implemented.
Although peace is a consistent priority in Japan’s diplomatic policy in Africa, this needs to be further
investigated because ‘peace’ is a broad and sometimes controversial concept. If Japan wants peace inAfrica, what kind of peace does it want? There is a broad consensus that policy interventions for theachievement of peace can be roughly divided into four sequential stages: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding (UN 1992). This classification raises the following questions:
What are Japan’s ideas regarding policy interventions at these sequential stages? What should be done
and who should play a major role at each stage? In this paper, policy interventions that aim to achieve
peace and security are referred to as peace policies.
This study aims to clarify, evaluate, and revisit Japan’s peace policy towards Africa. Such an attempt
is particularly necessary and valuable today, as the circumstances surrounding peace and conflict havebeen rapidly changing across the world, particularly in Africa. On the one hand, Africa has seen marked
changes in the characteristics of armed conflicts over recent years. The key characteristics of African
conflicts in the 2010s are different from those in the 1990s. As policies for peace should be formulatedon the basis of conflict analysis, this is the right time to re-examine Japan’s approach to African conflicts.
On the other hand, the international peace policy has recently changed. There was a global shift inpeace policy after the end of the Cold War, when international interventions for peace were actively
initiated (UN 1992). As a result, in the 1990s, the number of peacekeeping operations increased
significantly, and international NGOs and member countries of the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development － Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) began eagerly
conducting peacebuilding activities in conflict-affected regions. Japan was no exception; since the 1990s,
the country has made efforts to participate in UN peacekeeping operations and a variety of peacebuilding
activities (Government of Japan 2003). However, the trend of international peace policies has changed
since then, culminating in the US’s decision to retreat from Afghanistan in August 2021. In this context,
it would be valuable to re-examine Japan’s peace policies while considering these recent international
events.
Currently, there is insufficient existing literature on Japan’s peace policy in Africa. Although somescholars have investigated Japan’s diplomatic policies towards Africa and the TICAD, policies for peace― 24 ―

Japan’s Peace Policy in Africa: Discussion towards TICAD VIII

have not been the centre of the discussion (Ampiah 2005, Morikawa 2005, Gwatiwa 2012, LumumbaKasongo 2013). Similarly, Japan’s peace policies, including peacekeeping and peacebuilding, have been
actively discussed in academia (Iwami 2016, Honda 2017), but there are few studies that specificallyfocus on its policy in Africa. By considering Japan’s peace policies in Africa through its main policy
platform (TICAD) and the realities of armed conflicts in the region, this paper contributes to a better
understanding of this topic. Our analysis could also serve as a basis for discussions at TICAD VIII in
2022.
In the next section, this paper investigates the recent characteristics of armed conflicts in Africa, as
well as their wider implications on peace policies. The following section examines Japan’s policy andpractices for peace in Africa by investigating documents on each TICAD and its foreign aid policies.
Finally, Japan’s peace policy is discussed on the basis of arguments presented in the previous sections.
2. Current context of peace and conflict in Africa
To understand peace, we first need to evaluate the conflicts that are occurring in Africa. This section
examines the characteristics of recent conflicts in Africa. Although it has been a long time since thetransformation of armed conflicts has attracted academic attention (Van Creveld 1991, Kaldor 1999),
Africa has recently had characteristic changes, which inevitably affect peace policies and practices.
The datasets provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) provide useful information(Gleditsch et al. 2002) regarding the characteristics of armed conflicts in Africa. Figure 1 shows theevolution in the number of conflicts over three decades, based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset Version 21.1. The dataset includes all armed conflicts in which the government participates (atleast as one of the warring parties), and distinguishes them into two groups according to the intensity
level; ‘minor conflicts’ include incidents that caused between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given
year, whereas ‘wars’ refer to incidents that caused at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year
(Pettersson 2021a). Figure 1 indicates that the number of minor conflicts has increased over time,
particularly in the 2010s.
These low-intensity conflicts have different features than high-intensity warfare. They tend to takeplace anywhere in the territory, including rural areas, and remain active for a long period of time.
Violence caused by religious extremism is a typical example of this kind of conflict. Among the 27 lowintensity conflicts recorded in 2020, religious extremism accounted for at least 16 cases 1. Most of them
have emerged since the beginning of the 2010s, when Boko Haram began its attacks in Northern Nigeria
and separatist groups took power in Northern Mali with the support of groups affiliated to Al-Qaida.
1

Nigeria (Boko Haram), Nigeria (Islamic State, IS), Cameroon (Boko Haram), Burkina Faso (Jama’at Nasr alIslam wal Muslimin, JNIM), Burkina Faso (IS), Algeria (Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM), Mali (JNIM),
Mali (IS), Niger (IS), Chad (IS), Kenya (Al-Shabab), Somalia (Al-Shabab), Somalia (IS), DRC (IS), Mozambique(IS), Tanzania (IS).
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

Despite military interventions from national and international forces, religious extremism is spreadingin Africa. Other typical examples of low-intensity conflicts are situations in the eastern part of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter DRC), anglophone regions of Cameroon, and the Central
African Republic (hereinafter CAR), indicating that low-intensity conflicts have proliferated in specificparts of the territories, where the governments fall short of establishing authority due to their lack oflegitimacy or limited capacity.

Figure 1. The number of armed conflicts in Africa (1990-2020)
Source: Created by the author from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 21.1.
The rapid increase of low-intensity conflicts caused by religious extremism is underpinned by manystates’ lack of capacity and legitimacy for governance. In this context, international interventions havefailed to deliver tangible results. For example, in the Sahel region, violence has continued to spread
despite France’s military intervention and other international peacekeeping operations, including the
Minusuma (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali). Similarly, theresults of long-term international peacekeeping operations by the Monusco (United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC) and by Minurca (United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic) in CAR are questionable.
Another important feature in Africa is the growing number of conflicts between non-state actors. As
shown in Figure 2, the number of non-state conflicts has steadily risen throughout the 2010s; thisphenomenon is closely related to an increase in low-intensity conflicts. As shown by conflicts in the
DRC and CAR, the number of armed groups has markedly risen in recent conflicts in Africa. Conflicts― 26 ―

Japan’s Peace Policy in Africa: Discussion towards TICAD VIIIin these countries are different from those in which relatively organised rebel groups fight against the
government 2. It is often the case that such rebel groups have proliferated in areas where the state’s
capacity of effective governance is limited.

Figure 2. Organisation of non-state conflicts (1990-2020)
Source: Created by the author from UCDP non-state conflict version 21.1.
Note: The ‘formally organised groups’ refer to rebel groups and other organised groups that have asufficiently high level of organisation, which makes them part of the state-based armed conflict category.
The ‘informally organised groups 1’ refer to groups composed of supporters and affiliates of politicalparties and candidates. The ‘informally organised groups 2’ refer to groups that share a common identity
along ethnic, clan, religious, national, or tribal lines. See Pettersson (2021b) for details.
The rise of non-state conflicts is also related to drastic changes in Africa’s rural environment. Overthe last couple of decades, rural societies in Africa have undergone significant changes for a number ofreasons. In particular, the growing population, commodification of land, and climate change havemarkedly affected local communities (Takeuchi 2021). The average population density of Africancountries, which had been 37 persons per km2 in 1970, increased to 72 in 2000 and 107 in 2018 3.

2This type of conflict between two parties was observable in countries including Angola, Chad, Ethiopia,
Mozambique, and Rwanda in the 1990s.
3
Calculated by the author on the basis of World Development Indicators (https://databank.worldbank.org/ reports.
aspx?source=world-development-indicators/ Accessed on 31 August 2021). The number is the average of country
data without weighting the population size.
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

Considering the fact that Africans living in rural areas still accounted for 58.7% of the total populationin 2020 4, it is evident that the population has been rapidly increasing there, thus increasing the demand
for land use. In addition, the massive transfer of customary land to private investors has contributed to
the reduction of cultivable land. Agricultural lands in Africa have attracted considerable foreign andnational investments, particularly since the 2000s. Furthermore, the transfer of customary lands has been
accelerated by the land tenure reform that many African countries began in the 1990s with strong support
from donors (Martín et al. 2019, Takeuchi 2021). In short, recent changes in rural areas have made it
increasingly difficult for inhabitants to secure land and maintain minimum standards of living.
The reduction of customary land has resulted in rising tensions in and among local communities.
Without significant technical innovation in agriculture, land scarcity makes farmers’ and herders’ lives
more difficult. In general, such environmental changes can exacerbate inter-community conflicts, andin this case it has seriously impacted the relationship between farmers and herders. In many places across
Africa, farmers and herders have maintained symbiotic relations through the complementary use ofcustomary lands over long periods of time. However, the reduction of customary lands, which isexacerbated by climate change, has made such a symbiosis more difficult (Moritz 2010, Olaniyan et al.
2015, Akerjiir 2018). The UCDP’s dataset reflects this; Figure 2, which indicates a breakdown of nonstate conflicts, clearly shows that conflicts between the ‘informally organised group 2’ account for an
important proportion of this type of conflict 5. In other words, groups that share a common identity along
ethnic, religious, and tribal lines have played a significant role in recent non-state conflicts. The data
include a number of conflicts between farmers and herders, as well as community conflicts that arerooted in land problems 6.
The analysis of recent armed conflicts in Africa, which found that low-intensity conflicts and thosebetween non-state actors had increased, provides the following insights and implications. First, it is clearthat the legitimacy and capacity of the state have been critical factors to fuelling or containing violence.
Efforts for institution building and state-building are still valuable and necessary in terms of peace policyin Africa, as the necessity has been repeatedly emphasised by donors (OECD 2008). Yet, recent
experiences in Africa have also shown the limits and deficiencies of external state-building, as in the4

Data provided by World Development Indicators (https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=worlddevelopment-indicators / Accessed on 3 September 2021).
5
In reality, the three classifications in Figure 2 are not mutually exclusive, and some ‘formally organized groups’
may have a clear ethnic basis. This is one of the reasons why certain conflicts can be powerful in terms of popularmobilization. In the case of Eastern DRC, the main rebel group, Rassemblement Congolais pour la DémocratieGoma (RCD-Goma), was clearly supported by ethnic Rwandans (Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge, particularly
Tutsi) and was backed by Rwanda’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)-led regime, though it should be noted that not
all ethnic Rwandans in the DRC supported the RCD-Goma during the war, as shown by the group led by Pacific
Masunzu (Reyntjens 2009). This caused strong anti-Rwandan sentiment, thus producing a number of ethnic selfdefence movements, called Mayi-Mayi. Therefore, the clashes between these groups have strong ethnic
connotations.
6
For example, farmer-herder conflicts are included in the UCDP dataset of non-state conflicts in 2020. Ichen and
Tiv, Fulani and Kadara, Fulani and Irigwe, Chabo and Hausa, Fulani and Tiv (Nigeria), Massalit and Fulani(Sudan), Amhara and Gumuz (Ethiopia).
― 28 ―

Japan’s Peace Policy in Africa: Discussion towards TICAD VIII

cases of international interventions in the Sahel region, DRC, and CAR.
Second, recent African conflicts remind us of the inseparable relationship between peace anddevelopment. For instance, in West Africa, the situation has often been exacerbated by the instability ofrural communities, which is caused by a combination of various factors including the reduction ofavailable customary lands and climate change. The impoverishment of rural areas has formed abackground to the recent features of African conflicts. Clearly, development is an indispensable part ofpeace consolidation activities.
Third, recent changes in the characteristics of conflicts will create further obstacles to international
peace operations in Africa. Following the UN’s recommendation in 2000, international peacekeeping
operations have been equipped with more robustness in terms of their size, capacity 7, and mandate.
Despite these transformations, international peacekeeping operations have not resulted in peace andstability in countries such as the DRC, Mali, and CAR. In these countries, the complexity of conflicts
has constantly hampered stability. The new features of armed conflicts have made peacekeeping
operations more unpredictable and dangerous than before. Warring parties are interested in fuel conflicts
and opportunistic violence for civilians and peacekeepers. It is now evident that peacekeeping operations
alone will not be able to achieve peace.
3. Japan’s policy for peace in Africa
To examine Japan’s peace policy, this study took three directions. First, the final documents in each
TICAD are examined. As peace and security have always been considered one of the most important
topics in the conference, analysing the final documents is critical for understanding Japan’s peace policyin Africa. Second, the TICAD progress report (2013-15) will be investigated. As the TICAD final
documents are a kind of joint communique from all participants, they provide only an abstract pictureof Japan’s policy. The TICAD progress report provides supplementary information by indicatingconcrete projects and practices of Japan in the field. Lastly, Japan’s related policies and practices,
particularly the ODA and peacebuilding, are carefully examined.
3.1. Analysis of TICAD’s final documents
As a prerequisite for development, peace and stability have always been identified as priorities in
TICAD. Table 1 shows the keywords related to peace and conflict mentioned in the official statements
at the TICAD from 1993 to 2019. The keywords paint a rough picture of Japan’s peace policy for Africa.

7

For instance, the Monusco has been equipped with a robust military capacity that is called the Force Intervention
Brigade.
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

Table 1. Keywords relating to peace and conflict in TICAD statements
TICAD 1
(1993)
TICAD 2
(1998)
TICAD 3
(2003)
TICAD 4(2008)
TICAD 5(2013)
TICAD 6(2016)
TICAD 7(2019)

keywords
prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts

sourcesTokyo Declaration

prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts,
post-conflict development, peacebuilding, peacekeeping
peace and good governance, prevention and managementof conflicts
consolidation of peace, peacekeeping, peacebuilding,conflict prevention, early-warning, conflict resolution
peace and security, conflict prevention, peacekeeping,post-conflict recovery and development
Social stability and peacebuilding (Priority areas of
TICAD VI, Pillar 3: Promoting social stability for sharedprosperity), peacekeeping,
Strengthening peace and stability (The three pillars),peacebuilding, conflict prevention, the humanitariandevelopment-peace-security nexus

Tokyo Agenda for Action
TICAD Tenth Anniversary
Declaration
Yokohama Declaration
Yokohama Declaration
2013
TICAD VI Nairobi
Declaration
Yokohama Declaration
2019

Source: Tabulated by author. See the reference for detailed information about the sources.
Peace and conflict were not the centre of discussion in the final document of the first TICAD. The
term ‘peace’ did not appear in the 1993 Tokyo Declaration, which only welcomed the initiative of theOrganization for African Unity (OAU) to establish a mechanism for the prevention, management, andresolution of conflicts (para. 20). The paragraph was situated in the subsection ‘Emergency aid anddevelopment’, which dealt with natural and human disasters. Armed conflicts were not independently
discussed, and Japan’s role was not mentioned. However, it is important to note that this document
strongly emphasised the importance of democratisation, respect for human rights, and good governancefor economic growth (para. 5). The importance of democratic values for development was repeatedly
mentioned in later TICADs.
Issues related to peace and conflict were actively discussed in TICAD II in 1998. This was not
surprising, as Africa had witnessed a number of serious armed conflicts in the 1990s, and the UN
Secretary-General, Kofi Anan, published a special report on conflicts in Africa in the same year (UN1998). Tokyo Agenda for Action in 1998 referred to this report and provided an action plan in Section
3.2 (conflict prevention and post-conflict development). Its goals included 1) strengthening African
capacities and institutions for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, and 2) achieving
a seamless and rapid transition from humanitarian assistance in the conflict-affected situation to postconflict development. Peacebuilding was referred to in this section, but as mentioned in the efforts madeby African states. Meanwhile, international partners, including Japan, committed to assisting African
initiatives to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts, as well as African training centres for conflict
prevention and peacekeeping. Japan has so far been actively engaged in assisting the PKO Training
Centre in Africa. The basic posture of the TICAD, emphasising the importance of peace and stability as― 30 ―

Japan’s Peace Policy in Africa: Discussion towards TICAD VIIIa prerequisite of development, was fixed at this conference in 1998 and has so far been inherited.
An important development of TICAD III was the introduction of the concept of ‘human security’.
Originally mentioned in the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) human development
report in 1994 (UNDP 1994), the concept was adopted in Japan’s diplomatic policy under the Obuchi
administration (1998-2000). Although human security is a concept that is linked to a wide range ofdevelopmental and security problems, the concept was not explicitly linked to issues related to peaceand conflict in TICAD III. It is also worth noting that the concept of human security was introduced in
the revised charter for the Official Development Assistance in 2003. This new ODA charter was epochmaking, as it identified peacebuilding as one of its four priority issues. Although the term ‘peacebuilding’was not mentioned in the TICAD’s Tenth Anniversary Declaration, it appears that the concept ofpeacebuilding was widely shared in TICAD III.
In TICAD IV (2008), human security was conceptually linked to the consolidation of peace. The
conference’s final document (Yokohama Declaration) identified two aspects of human security, namely
the socio-economic and political, and linked the latter with the ‘consolidation of peace’ and ‘good
governance’ (Section 5.0). Logically, this means that human security was critical for the consolidationof peace, but how these two concepts are linked was not explicated in the document. This section
emphasises the importance of the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, as well as effortsof peacebuilding; it also welcomed AU’s initiative for the African Peace and Security Architecture(APSA) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). However, the role of international partners
was not clearly mentioned in this document.
The relationship between human security and peace was further discussed in the final document of
TICAD V (2013). The document stated that the promotion of human security, which was identified as
one of the four strategic principles in the TICAD process, included cooperation and capacity buildingin the field of ‘humanitarian challenges, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, post-conflict recovery anddevelopment, human trafficking, and the fight against terrorism’ (Section 3.0). However, arguments on
the link between human security and peace have not deepened. In the final document of TICAD VI(2016), human security was referred to as ‘one of the guiding principles of TICAD’ (Section 3.4), but
no explanation was given on how the idea concretely related to specific policies 8. In this document, theterm ‘peacebuilding’ was used in the title of Subsection 3.3.1 (Social stability and peacebuilding) under
the third pillar (Section 3.3 ‘Promoting social stability for shared prosperity’), but the argument in the
8This change may correspond to the mainstreaming of human security. In the UN (2010; 2012), human security
was actively discussed at the general assembly and was defined as a concept resembling human development andrespecting state sovereignty. Due to pressure from developing countries that were cautious about externalinterventions, the concept of human security was defined as one that is completely different from the‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P). The connection between the two concepts was completely denied. Although thismainstreaming was led by countries including Japan, the initiative resulted in a narrower concept by almost
removing the ‘freedom of fear’ aspect. Consequently, linking human security with peace and conflict became
conceptually difficult.
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

subsection did not systematically deal with peacebuilding and just touched on the importance of youth
empowerment and capacity development.
‘Strengthening peace and stability’ was one of the three pillars of TICAD VII (2019), which followed
the structure of the final document of TICAD VI. No significant changes can be found in the contentsof the section. Whereas a new term, ‘humanitarian-development-peace-security nexus’, was used in thesection, the term ‘peacebuilding’ disappeared from the document. The promotion of human security wasmentioned in the general statement, but not in the specific context of peace and conflict.
By analysing the final documents from six TICADs, some characteristics of Japan’s peace policy
towards Africa can be identified. First, issues revolving around peace have been constantly considered
one of the important issues in TICAD. Because of a broad consensus that peace is a prerequisite fordevelopment, it has always been given an important place in the final document. Second, it has
consistently emphasised the importance of African initiatives on the prevention, management, andresolution of conflicts, and supported AU’s institutions, including APSA and APRM. This reflects
Japan’s stance with regard to respecting Africa’s ownership and supporting its initiatives. Third,
although it is evident that Japan appreciates and works for Africa’s peace through TICAD, the kind ofpeace that should be pursued is relatively unclear. Although Japan is a democratic country that hasemphasised the importance of democracy at TICAD, it has rarely requested African countries to follow
this path. Moreover, the relationship between peace and democracy is mentioned less often in the mostrecent TICADs 9. If Japan promotes peace in Africa, does it appreciate ‘peace’ under a brutal dictator?
Fourth, whereas Japan considers the promotion of human security as one of its basic policies(Government of Japan 2015), the linkage between the concept and peace is not clarified. Does thepromotion of human security contribute to peace consolidation? If so, how?
3.2. Analysis of the TICAD (2013-2015) progress reports
In a sense, it may be natural that the TICAD’s final documents provide only limited information about
Japan’s policy towards Africa, as they were issued under the name of all participants, including African
heads of state. Therefore, these documents cannot be considered a reflection of Japan’s explicit policy
statements, although there is no doubt that they provide important clues for understanding its attitude
towards Africa. In particular, the 2013-15 report provides useful information about the actions taken
after TICAD V. The following activities were listed as Japan’s contributions to consolidating peace,

9

The necessity of democratization and democracy was often mentioned in the documents until TICAD IV. For
example, see the Tokyo Declaration (1993, para. 5), Tokyo Agenda for Action (1998, para. 29). The documents at
TICAD III and IV mentioned democracy as a necessary condition of peace (TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration
2003, III 2., Yokohama Declaration 2008, 5.2). However, the Yokohama Declaration at TICAD V (2013) madeno mention of democracy. Although democracy was mentioned in the final documents at TICAD VI and VII, its
link to peace was not clear in these documents.
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Japan’s Peace Policy in Africa: Discussion towards TICAD VIII

stability, democracy, and good governance (Government of Japan n.d.: 26-28) 10.
(1) Support capacity building in the area of peacekeeping and peacebuilding: Assistance for 12 PKO
training centres and support for the democratisation of the DRC national police.
(2) Support for activities by AU/RECs (regional economic communities) for peace consolidation:
Contribution to AU peace fund.
(3) Contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations: Dispatching Japan Self-Defence Forces(JSDF) to South Sudan in 2011, and contributing to the Triangular Partnership Project for African Rapid
Deployment of Engineering Capabilities (ARDEC) in 2015.
(4) Contribution to United Nations peacebuilding activities: Commitment to the UN Peace Building
Commission by chairing the working group and contributing to the UN Peace Building Fund.
(5) Contribution to maritime security: Conducting counter-piracy operations by deploying the JSDF
to the Gulf of Aden, and supporting capacity building in the maritime security field in Africa.
(6) Promotion of dialogues with counter-terrorism and security officers: Capacity building throughworkshops and seminars.
(7) Support for peace and stability in the Sahel area through development and humanitarian support
amounting to JPY 100 billion: Provision of the ODA (JPY 96.5 billion) for countries in the Sahel region.
(8) Support for poverty reduction, measures to counter youth unemployment, empowerment of
women, and others in fragile states: Support for conflict-affected and post-conflict countries through theJapan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and international organisations.
These eight activities indicate that Japan provides a wide range of assistance for peace. Activities
can be classified according to actors. Whereas Japan directly implements the peace policies in cases (3),(5), and (8), it only provides funds and assists the African organisations and the UN agencies in (2) and(4). In (1) and (6) they support capacity building, which is primarily achieved through financial aspects
and facilitating or lecturing. As for (7), no information is available on the extent to which Japan directly
runs the programme.
In peace and conflict, another classification is possible from a sequential perspective. In accordancewith the UN (1992), UN peace operations are classified into four phases: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Following these distinctions, (6) can be understood as acontribution to preventive diplomacy. (1), (3), and (5) focus on peacekeeping operations, in which JSDF
plays a major role 11 . Meanwhile, (4), (7), and (8) contribute to peacebuilding. Although detailed
information about (2) is not available, the support will be used for all the sequences.

10

Although the report also describes the activities and initiatives by Africa and its partners (African Union, RECs,
UNDP, the World Bank, UN Office of Special Advisor on Africa,), no information is provided about the extent ofJapan’s contributions (Government of Japan n.d.: 29-31).
11
A part of (1) (the support for the democratisation of the national police) can be understood as the security sector
reform, namely peacebuilding activities.
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

The above analyses reveal that Japan has contributed to Africa’s peace and security through various
means, including the provision of funds, capacity building, dispatching the JSDF, and theimplementation of development projects. However, although the progress report clarifies its
peacekeeping activities, information about peacebuilding is scarce, as the report does not mention
concrete projects in (7) and (8). Moreover, information about peacebuilding projects has not beensystematically provided by the main implementation body (JICA) despite the fact that the organisation
has always emphasised the importance of peacebuilding 12.
3.3. Japan’s peace policy through ODA
The development of Japan’s peace policy is closely related to that of foreign aid policies. Japan started
the provision of ODA after its return to the international community through the San Francisco Treaty
in 1951, together with reparations to Southeast Asian countries. During the early post-war period, it was
no exaggeration to say that the main objective of Japan’s ODA policy was to serve its own economic
recovery. This economic-cantered approach has often been criticised by foreign scholars and the OECDDAC (White 1964). Although Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted a publication explaining therationale for foreign aid (MOFA 1981), purpose of the ODA was not clearly defined in the government.
Moreover, the country was clearly reluctant to discuss the political implications of the ODA in the Cold
War era. Under the US’s hegemonic influence, Japan chose to keep a low profile in the field ofinternational politics and instead concentrated on economic growth.
However, international circumstances in the 1990s urged Japan to change its position. Because of
the end of the Cold War and Japan becoming a top donor 13, the country was pressed to contribute tointernational peace and security and formulate its philosophy with regard to foreign aid. In this context,
the country decided to dispatch the JSDF abroad (Cambodia) for the first time in 1992 to participate in
the UN peacekeeping operation, despite serious internal opposition 14. In the same year, the first ODA
charter was established (Government of Japan 1992), which strictly prohibited the use of ODA for
military purposes. The first TICAD was held the following year. In short, at the beginning of the 1990s,
Japan was urged to express itself about how to deal with global issues, including peace and security,
poverty reduction, and development.
The 1990s saw an important development in Japan’s peace policy. In addition to the government’s
decision to dispatch the JSDF for UN peacekeeping operations, two important concepts, namely

12

JICA’s website indicates several examples of the peacebuilding project including that implemented in NorthWestern Uganda, Central and Northern Cote d’Ivoire, and the Darfur region in Sudan. Nevertheless, the projects
that are classified as peacebuilding are not clear in the annual reports.
13
Japan surpassed US in the volume of ODA for the first time in 1989 and was the largest provider until 2000
(except 1990).
14After the operation in Cambodia, the JSDF has participated in the UN peacekeeping operations in countries
including Mozambique, East Timor, Iraq, and South Sudan.
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Japan’s Peace Policy in Africa: Discussion towards TICAD VIII

peacebuilding and human security, were introduced into its diplomatic policy. The concept ofpeacebuilding was rapidly disseminated among the international community in the 1990s, as donors andinternational NGOs actively launched related activities 15 . Japan was also eager to engage inpeacebuilding. In addition to the establishment of the first JICA’s guidelines for peacebuilding in 2001
(JICA 2001), the concept was identified in the revised ODA charter in 2003 as one of the four priority
issues along with poverty reduction, sustained growth, and tackling global problems. As mentioned in
the previous section, Prime Minister Obuchi actively mentioned the concept of human security and wasofficially introduced to Japan’s diplomatic policy through the revised ODA charter (Government ofJapan 2003). Although no explicit explanation was made, a close connection between human security
and peacebuilding was arguably a prerequisite for the revised ODA charter.
Japan’s official peace policies have not changed since then. The concept of peacebuilding was
repeatedly emphasised in the National Security Strategy (Government of Japan 2013) and theDevelopment Cooperation Charter (Government of Japan 2015). In the latter, peacebuilding was
specifically mentioned in one of the three priority issues, ‘Sharing universal values and realising apeaceful and secure society’ (Government of Japan 2015). In this document, Japan committed itself toaddressing ‘a wide range of factors causing conflict and instability,’ and providing ‘seamless assistancefor peacebuilding’ (ibid. 6).
Despite the fact that official peace policies remain unchanged, it appears undeniable that Japan’s
attitude towards the peace policies shifted as a result of both external and internal factors after theestablishment of the ODA charter in 2003. Over a decade, we observed gradual changes in the attitudeof OECD-DAC countries towards ODA policy, which has increasingly prioritised national interest,
particularly in business fields, thus placing less emphasis on peacebuilding activities. As a consequenceof changes in the international environment, such as the decline of the ODA in comparison with otherfinancial flows and the rapid rise of emerging economies, particularly China, donors’ ODA policies
became more realistic in the 2010s.
The UK is the clearest example. While the country was very eager to be engaged in DAC initiatives
under Prime Minister Tony Blair and took a lead in peacebuilding activities throughout the 1990s andthe 2000s, its ODA policy under the subsequent conservative governments became much more businessoriented. Following the 2001 military intervention in Afghanistan, DAC countries were highly
motivated to undergo state-building in fragile places (Fukuyama 2004, OECD 2008). However, such
enthusiasm waned in the 2010s, culminating in the US’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. While
the UK and US cannot represent all DAC countries, it is safe to say that donors’ attitudes towards
15

Although the idea was originally used in Galtung (1976), it expanded rapidly in the 1990s, particularly following
the publication of the UN (1992). According to the UN (2000, para. 13), peacebuilding stands for ‘activities
undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on
those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war’.
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

peacebuilding became much more nuanced in the 2010s compared to attitudes in the 1990s. It is highly
likely that this change in international circumstances affected Japan’s policies on international peace.
Moreover, Japan’s experience has mattered. The most important one was the participation of the
JSDF in the peacekeeping operations in South Sudan. Following the independence of the country in
2011, and the subsequent establishment of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), Japan
dispatched the JSDF for the peacekeeping mission. Considering the volatile security situation in the
country, the JSDF confined themselves to civil engineering activities such as the construction of roads
and bridges. Because of the strong opposition to the JSDF’s participation in international peacekeeping
operations 16, the law that was adopted in 1992 17 was highly restrictive with regard to JSDF activities,
thereby deliberately precluding the possibility of fighting a battle abroad. The contents of the law canbe summarised in the so-called five-point principle on PKO participation. Most importantly, it was
stipulated that the JSDF would not be able to participate in peacekeeping operations without the‘existence of a cease-fire agreement between parties in a conflict’. In fear of being involved inunintended fighting, the government decided that the JSDF’s activities should be limited to civilengineering.
South Sudan fell into a de facto civil war in 2013. However, the Japanese government neverrecognised that the fighting took place in Juba in order for the JSDF to remain in the position. The
requirement of a cease-fire agreement between warring parties might have been relevant for the
deployment of the UN PKO in the Cold War era, but this is clearly unrealistic now, as the UN haschanged its policy and has pursued robustness in peacekeeping operations (UN 2000; 2017). The
government’s decision to withdraw the JSDF in 2017 revealed Japan’s institutional unpreparedness for
its contribution to international peacekeeping.
4. Discussion
The analysis of the TICAD documents shows that Japan has actively taken various approaches to realise
peace in Africa. The country has greatly assisted international organisations, including the UN, theAfrican Union (AU), and regional economic communities (RECs) to this end. Examples include theircontributions to the UN Peace Building Fund and AU Peace Fund, as well as assistance for PKO training
centres in Africa. There is a broad consensus that Africans have the advantage of managing conflicts bythemselves, and multilateral approaches are more effective when external interventions are necessary.
As mentioned in the Yokohama Declaration at TICAD VII (2019), helping to strengthen the AU’s

16

Because of the constitutional restriction and the memory of Japan’s military aggression against Asian
countries during the second World War, many Japanese people strongly opposed deploying the JSDF abroad
during the deliberation process of the 1992 law.
17
Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (Act No. 79 of June
19, 1992).
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Japan’s Peace Policy in Africa: Discussion towards TICAD VIII

institutions, such as the AGA and the APSA, is the right way as these institutions have been rapidly
developing (Engel 2017). Japan’s active participation in the UN peacebuilding commission is highly
appreciated not only in terms of accountability to Japanese taxpayers, but also because of its serious
engagement in peacebuilding activities. For the assistance of African organisations such as AU and
African RECs, it is imperative for Japan to build up its own capacity to work with them. For this purpose,training and cultivating human resources with deep practical knowledge of these organisations will beprioritised. Nominating an ambassador of Japan for the AU in 2020 is a step in this direction.
It is undeniable that Japan’s current laws do not provide suitable conditions for the JSDF toparticipate in peacekeeping activities in Africa. Security situations in low-intensity conflicts acrossArica are not what Japan’s 1992 law on PKO presupposes. Although Japan can contribute tointernational peacekeeping through various means by (for instance, by sending a few officers andcivilians to UN missions and assisting PKO training centres), it is unrealistic to send JSDF troops tocontribute to UN peacekeeping operations without amending the relevant laws.
Peacebuilding has been the most important field for Japan’s peace policy in Africa and should bestrongly promoted. Although Japan has already conducted a number of peacebuilding activities, it has
been insufficiently mentioned in TICAD progress reports. Among policies and practices for peace,peacebuilding might be less diplomatically conspicuous than peacekeeping, although there is no doubtthat they are equally significant. One of the reasons why peacebuilding has not been systematicallymentioned in TICADs might be related to the problem of its definition. Due to the above-mentioned
operational and judicial constraints, Japan has primarily developed policies and practices on
peacebuilding through JICA, which has considered peacebuilding activities to be fundamentally thesame as the regular type of ODA projects, but with a consideration for conflict 18. Although this has been
the result of a ‘bottom-up approach’ conducted by an implementation agency of foreign aid, it has
resulted in some confusion about what peacebuilding projects are, because discussions about what kindof activities can contribute to building peace have been scarce. In fact, what kind of activities should beconsidered ass peacebuilding? Should all projects implemented in a conflict-affected country beconsidered peacebuilding? The answer depends on the definition of peace and peacebuilding.
The Japanese government should be clear about what kind of peace it aims to promote. As a country
that emphasises democracy and freedom, the peace that Japan promotes should be compatible with thesesocial norms. Whereas many Japanese people agree that the country shall not explicitly request Africancounterparts to become more democratic, it may be necessary or even inevitable for them to redefine‘peacebuilding’ activities from the perspective of their own values.

18

Honda 2017. JICA identifies two considerations with regard to conflict. One is to avoid a project having
negative impacts on the conflict, and the other is to promote a project that has positive impacts such asreconciliation (JICA 2009).
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, which has caused serious socio-economic damage
worldwide, every African country faces the danger of being affected by conflicts and violence, as
indicated by the massive violence in South Africa in July 2021 19. Efforts to build social and economic
infrastructure in order to strengthen state functions are crucial for enhancing state legitimacy.
Considering the characteristics of recent conflicts in Africa, assistance to ensure the living standards ofpeople in rural areas are maintained is urgently needed to prevent violence. However, whether theprovision of aid for these purposes is considered peacebuilding depends on the donor’s view of whatkind of peace is desirable, and how the assistance contributes to the purpose.

Acknowledgements
I am grateful for the valuable comments given by Scarlett Cornelissen, Kweku Ampiah, and Ian
Karusigarira in an informal meeting held on 25 August 2021.

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The Matrix of the Human Security Projectin the Context of the TICAD Process

Kweku Ampiah
School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds, United Kingdom
African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan
Abstract
The paper adapts Seymour M. Lipset’s thesis, which draws a correlation between economic
development and democracy, to argue that the former is the basis for human security. Effectively, it
argues that human security (better life chances) is made more possible and sustainable through a
productive economy, with the implication that an economy requires a government to function and grow.
My position also rests on the idea that social rights as abstract ideals by themselves do not change social
class inequalities and the insecurities they breed, but state policies that are designed and supported toobviate the insecurities of citizens might.

Keywords: ‘freedom to live in dignity’, Seymour Lipset, modernization, ‘better life chances’,
economic development, self-reliance― 43 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

1. Introduction
In the following analysis, I will emphasise the United Nations’ (2009: 8-9) framework of protection as
the basis for human security by exploring economic development as the tool for achieving better life
chances, or Lebenschancen (Dahrendorf 1979), a Weberian concept, in Africa. While acknowledging
that human security is indeed a goal, not a reality, the discussion will use the Japanese government’s
foreign policy flagship, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) policies,
as a platform to assess how a more coherent system of structures for human security might be achieved
through development assistance between the Japanese government and the African states. This takes
into consideration the pivotal role of the State, with the support of an external power, to engender andensure better life chances for the people. Given the development content of the TICAD initiative, therole of the private sector, which the TICAD process has recently tried to capture within the initiative asa potential contributor to the economic development of Africa, is also discussed.
The discussion begins with remarks about some salient aspects of the concept of human security,
followed by an assessment of the modernisation thesis concerning the correlation between economic
development and democracy, as articulated by Seymour Martin Lipset in the 1950s. This is followed bya discussion of the TICAD as a policy instrument for engendering economic development in Africa. The
relevance of human security to, and how it is factored into, the TICAD discourse is explored in theanalysis. Finally, I discuss a dimension of the third objective of human security, which is the freedom
to live in dignity, to interrogate how development assistance, and the discourse surrounding it, could
itself undermine the dignity of the recipient. Integral to the overall analysis is a question about how therealisation of the three objectives of human security, freedom from fear, freedom from want, andfreedom to live in dignity, could be fulfilled through the TICAD. In other words, how do we resolve thetension between the development of abstract entitlements and their actual realization by ordinary citizens(Turner 2010: 238)?
2. Stating the argument
Taking my cue from Lipset, I argue that in a modern state, human security is not achievable without aproductive economy due to the constraints that the hardship of poverty and its consequences bear on the
citizens and on the existing system of the state as the country attempts to grow its economy to reducepoverty (Huntington 1968: 39-53). Thus, I contend that while the objectives and ideals of human security
are laudable, the view of the Human Development Report (HDR) of 1994 that ‘[t]he idea of humansecurity…is likely to revolutionize society in the 21st century’ is only as good as the extent to which it
can engender democratic norms and values in poor countries like Niger or Myanmar. Consequently, I
suggest that the goal of human security as articulated by the 2003 Commission on Human Security(CHS) report, which focuses on three areas, freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live
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The Matrix of the Human Security Project in the Context of the TICAD Process

in dignity, could be pared down to a single goal, which is freedom from want. This point is partly derived
from the fact that in reality, if not in principle, human security is largely perceived as the problem ofpeople in deprived and poor economies. I further suggest, in the last section of the discussion, that thethird objective of the CHS, freedom to live in dignity, is also invariably rooted in our economic
circumstances. In other words, dignity may be derived from a productive economy that creates
livelihoods for its citizens and is not dependent on economic aid from donors. What is worthemphasising here is that those who live on charity are conscious of that as a fixture of their identity,
which deprives them of their dignity.
3. The human security problematic
The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) HDR of 1994 inaugurated the idea of humansecurity, in part as an indictment of the way security is conceived in international politics, by confirming‘[i]t has been related more to nation-states than to people’, with a narrow emphasis on national interests,
prioritising among others the security of the territory of the state from external aggression (UNDP 1994:
22). Forgotten in this matrix of security ‘were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought
security in their daily lives…’, not least because for many of them ‘…security symbolized protection
from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression [from thestate] and environmental hazard’ (UNDP 1994: 22). Certainly, for many ordinary citizens, their senseof insecurity derives from the circumstances of deprivation within which they eke out an existence
undermined, day by day, by the overwhelming power of poverty in its various dimensions, including
the tensions that accrue from want with consequences for crime and violence. The report notes that inmany instances the deprivation that ordinary people endure is made worse, if not terminal, by the very
governments they look up to for protection (UNDP 1994: 22). Fanon (1961: 132-133) noted, in relation
to the post-colonial states, how their leaders aspired to reclaim independence from colonial rule, but also‘… hasten[ed] to make their fortunes and to set up a national system of exploitation’, to deny theordinary people the ‘utopia’ promised by independence. Basically, Fanon affirmed that independence
did not create ‘a state that reassures the ordinary citizen’, but ‘rather …rouses [their] anxiety [as their]…country sinks all the more deeply into stagnation’ with the potential for violence and war.
To mitigate such risks, human security is designed ‘as a policy tool for programming in the fields of
security, development, and humanitarian work’, and the strength and appeal of the concept for analysis
and programming lies in a variety of components, primary among which is the framework of protectionand empowerment (United Nations 2009: 8-9). These are two mutually reinforcing pillars that are
seemingly endowed with the ability to achieve better life chances for people in vulnerable situations.
Protection, according to the Commission on Human Security (CHS), amounts to ‘strategies, set up
by states, international agencies, NGOs and the private sector, [to] shield people from menaces’ (CHS
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

2003: 10). This includes the necessary institutions emboldened by the requisite norms and processes ‘toprotect people from critical and pervasive threats’ (United Nations 2009: 8). The operationalisation of
the norms and processes, indeed the institutions that implement these, imply a cascading process fromthe top, premised on the understanding ‘that people face threats that are beyond their control’ (United
Nations 2009: 8). Inexorably this demands not just the establishment of the rule of law, but one that is
enforceable and works through good governance, accountability, and social protective instruments(United Nations 2009: 10). Incidentally, this provides the State, as a form of human association whose
primary responsibility includes the establishment and maintenance of order and security, with ‘… theprimary responsibility to implement such a protective structure’, although with input from otherstakeholders such international and regional organisations, donors, and the private sector (United
Nations 2009: 8, CMS 2003: 2). This formulation of human security automatically confirms Michel
Foucault’s (1972) notion of the State as a productive force, even if it also has the tendency to objectify
its subjects. Suffice to say, ‘[p]rotection involves strategies that enhance the capacities of theinstitutional/governance structures needed to protect the affected community(ies) against…identified
threats’ (CHS 2003: 4, United Nations 2009: 18).
Empowerment, on the other hand, is conceived as including ‘…strategies that build upon thecapacities of the affected community(ies) to cope with…identified threats and to strengthen theirresilience and choices… to [enable them to] act on their own behalf and those of the others’ (United
Nations 2009: 18), an idea that resonates with the values of self-reliance, which we will address more
extensively later. The CHS also notes that empowerment involves ‘strategies [that] enable people todevelop their resilience to difficult situations’ in a ‘bottom up’ approach (United Nations 2009: 8), in
contrast to protection, whose effectiveness is dependent on a top-down operation. More precisely,
empowerment aims to develop the capabilities of individuals and communities to make informed
choices and to act on their own behalf based on the principle that ‘[e]mpowering people not only enables
them to develop their full potential but also allows them to find ways to participate in solutions to ensure
human security for themselves and others’ (United Nations 2009: 8, CHS 2003: 10). Theinterdependence of these two elements is emphasised in the discourse as necessary for the humansecurity agenda.
The TICAD as a development initiative indeed involves measures on the part of the government ofJapan in collaboration with the African countries to modernise the African economies, which, if
successful, may augment the human security of many poor Africans by addressing the conundrum of
poverty with its profusion of complex socio-political demographics. This is based on my understandingthat achieving economic development would amount to freedom from want, which in a cascading
sequence of events would lead to the realisation of the other two objectives, as is evident in the historical
processes and development of the European and North American countries since at least the end of― 46 ―

The Matrix of the Human Security Project in the Context of the TICAD Process

World War I, and more recently in East Asia since the 1960s. Indeed, I take into consideration the factthat human security, as with democracy, is a process with evolving and infinite aspirations, whichmaterial goods alone cannot easily fulfil. As the HDR of 1994 (UNDP 1994: 24) noted, ‘People in richnations seek security from the threat of crime and drug wars in their streets, the spread of deadly diseases
like [covid], soil degradation, rising levels of pollution, the fear of losing their jobs and many otheranxieties that emerge as the social fabric disintegrate’. More recently, the Black Lives Matter movement
has reaffirmed how problems of racism undermine the dignity and humanity of black people in thewealthy nations of the world, most prominently in the US. Moreover, as Anthony Appiah (2001: 43)
intimates, to ask a gay person to hide their identity undermines their dignity. Nevertheless, the indicatorscomprehensively show that how secure a population is, is shaped by factors correlated to the national
economy and how that plays out with regard to people’s income, class, education, healthcare, andcommercial and environmental conditions, and in all these areas, the poorer countries fare comparatively
worse, resulting in adverse human security for them.
4. Modernization theory and human better life chances
As Seymour Martin Lipset (1959: 86) argued in his seminal study, ‘In the modern world… economic
development involving industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards, and a steady increasein the overall wealth of the society, is a basic condition sustaining democracy’, and ‘it is a mark of theefficiency of the total system’. Thus, Lipset (1959: 71) invokes the economic development matrix andits consequences for democracy as a way of fulfilling people’s better life chances. In essence, Lipset’s
analysis indicates causality between democratic governance and economic development, premised on
the argument that the latter engenders a functioning democratic system. Following that thesis, based
indeed on his libertarian position, he argues that given ‘…the existence of poverty-stricken masses, lowlevels of education, an elongated pyramid class structure, and the ‘premature’ triumph of the democratic
left, the prognosis for the perpetuation of political democracy in Asia and Africa is bleak’ (Lipset 1959:
86, Banerjee 2012). Lipset further suggests that ‘[a] society divided between a largely impoverishedmass and a small-favoured elite would result either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the small upper
stratum) or in tyranny (popularly based dictatorship)’ (Lipset 1959: 75, Banerjee 2012).
Lipset (1959: 73) further points out that ‘[m]ost countries which lack an enduring tradition of politicaldemocracy lie in the traditionally underdeveloped sections of the world’, whereas ‘concretely… themore well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy’ (Lipset 1959: 75).
Consequently, he argues that economic wellbeing is a prerequisite for functional democracy (Lipset
1959:71): ‘…a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing thegoverning officials…[and] social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decisionmaking among conflicting interest groups’ in a state of reasonable peace. Central to this thesis are what
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Lipset (1959: 71) refers to as ‘two principal complex characteristics of social systems…: economic
development and legitimacy’ because ‘…they bear on the problem of stable democracy’, and he notesthat ‘the effectiveness of the system… [is] a function of economic development’ (Lipset 1959: 71). In
other words, poverty undermines the attainment of what in principle should be basic to every person.
Supporting Daniel Lerner’s earlier (1958) formula, Lipset (1959: 83) argued that a high level of
education and literacy causes and sustains belief in democratic norms (Lipset 1959: 83). By extension,a higher level of education, which often amounts to increased income, and greater economic and social
mobility, is likely to effect more belief in the norms of human security, the necessary factors that would
permit those whose human security is threatened to develop, in Lipset’s words (1959: 83), ‘longer time
perspectives and more complex and [critical] views of politics’, to enable them to understand the needfor norms of tolerance. Thus, education is identified as a strong factor, one of the primary indicators infact, in better life chances from the bottom up, and yet, evidently, this is more easily attained indeveloped economies than in poorer economies.
In effect, a developed economy is more likely to reconstitute class relations more positively, if only
because (Lipset 1959: 83):
The poorer a country, and the lower the absolute standard of living of the lower classes, thegreater the pressure on the upper strata to treat the lower classes as beyond the pale ofhuman society, as vulgar, as innately inferior, as a lower caste. The sharp difference in thestyle of living between those at the top and those at the bottom makes this psychologicallynecessary.
This projection suggests ‘the upper strata… tend to regard political rights for the lower strata,
particularly the right to share in power, as essentially absurd and immoral’, thus resisting democracy(Lipset 1959: 83-84), and in the process denying the human security of those who are poor. If this iseven remotely correct then it serves as a reason for creating the enabling structures to achieve economic
growth for the deprived economies, if the objective is to achieve human security in those countries. The
TICAD may well provide such an opportunity, despite its conceptual and practical ambiguities.
5. The TICAD policy and its architectural framework
Shirato Keiichi’s 2020 essays on the origins of the TICAD reveal that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MOFA), which single-handedly created Japan’s renewed policy towards Africa in the early 1990s, wasapparently afflicted by a conflict of bureaucratic interests regarding how to approach Japan’s
development assistance to Africa. By the time of the first TICAD summit in 1993, the consensus within
the Ministry was that there would be no financial pledges made towards aid for Africa within the― 48 ―

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framework of the TICAD, with the objective that the process would be more advisory, based on the ideaof self-reliance and ownership by Africa of its development. The TICAD was therefore conceived as aforum for enacting guidelines and methods for development, a fact confirmed in Prime Minister
Morihiro Hosokawa’s (1993) keynote address at the first TICAD summit.
Within the context of Japanese development practices, at least in comparison with assistance towards
the Southeast Asian economies (Shimomura 2013, Shimomura and Wang Ping 2015, Wade 1996), theabove stance towards Africa was a deviation from the norm, which involved massive commitments inthe form of loans and technical assistance, most of which were intrinsically linked to the interests of theJapanese private sector and helped to attract investments from the latter in the aid-recipient countries.
Nevertheless, the principle on which TICAD was initiated evoked an ambition to assist the Africancountries to graduate from their structural dependence on aid, with its inherent inadequacies andindignities, and to own, that is to take control of, their development through their own initiative. This is
in part based on the conception that the ‘backdrop of development success lies in the combination of astrong commitment by the leadership and the people to economic prosperity, appropriate long-term
development strategies and functional government administration to pursue these strategies coherently’(MOFA 1993a).
In principle, the African participants of the TICAD agreed with the above premise, as they
consistently referenced ‘the recognized limitations of ODA’ and continued to project trade andinvestment as the pathway for Africa’s development, while also emphasising the strategic importanceof infrastructure development through ODA (ADC 2012: 12). The discourse notes that, despite the nopledge approach adopted by the originators of the TICAD, the process began to transform systematically,
if slowly, from 2008, beyond the original plan. Increasingly, the TICAD has progressed towards
involving Japanese government pledges and Japanese companies more actively (Hirano 2016, Dōyūkai
2013). The turning point was in fact earlier, which I will explain below.
The indications that a transformation was beginning to take shape in the way the Japanese
government approaches TICAD may be attributed to the Minister of Finance, Mr. Koji Omi’s (2007)
keynote speech at the Africa Day Symposium at UN House on 25 May, about a year before theinauguration of TICAD IV, where he shared what he referred to as his ‘fresh ideas’ about how toapproach development issues in Africa. His address included remarks about ‘making effective use offinancial resources including aid flows, debt relief and revenues from natural resources’, improving‘public finance management’ and ‘debt management capabilities’, as may be expected from a Japanesefinance minister speaking to an African audience. He also spoke about the importance of nurturing theprivate sector, and noted the joint initiative between Japan and Africa, involving private sector
development through Enhanced Private Sector Assistance for Africa (EPSA). Following a few
comments about innovations in science and technology, Omi further remarked that ‘I sincerely hope…
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Japan will build win-win relations with African countries not only through financial instruments, butalso through utilizing the power of science and technology’. The ‘win-win relations’ Omi alluded torelated to the emerging transformations of Japan’s approach to Africa, which have arguably contributed
to the changing dynamics of the TICAD process. In fact, the situation had been made possible by the
economic prospects of the African economies, which were growing at a healthy pace due to the resourceboom triggered by China’s imports from Africa.
Thus, with cautious optimism, the Dōyūkai (2013) noted that:
Throughout the 2000s, Africa as a whole achieved steady economic growth: from 2001 to
2010, the average annual growth rate reached 5.8%, and nominal GDP and the amount oftrade increased 2.8-fold and 3.6-fold, respectively. Since the population of Africa is
expected to increase by 300 million per decade, in 2050 it is estimated to double the levelof 2010, to reach over 2 billion.
Consequently, the Association proposed that Japan should ‘renew its strategy in Africa’. Morerecently, the Keidanren (2018) also confirmed:
Africa has…been enjoying rapid economic growth. Total GDP has increased roughly 3.4
times over the past 15 years, from US$632 billion in 2001 to US$2.1 trillion in 2016. Its
population passed 1.2 billion in 2016 and is expected to exceed 2.5 billion people by 2050,
potentially comprising a larger consumer market. With ongoing economic growth and thegrowing middle-income population expected in the future, Africa has even greater potential
for the future.
What is perhaps pertinent about the public intervention of the Minister of Finance in the dialogue
regarding Africa’s economic development is that Japan’s leading economic ministry had, if hesitantly,
publicly commented on the potential mutual benefits in economic relations between Japan and theAfrican countries, perhaps indicating that the ministry might be interested in the TICAD after all, butalso that economic relations rather than aid was the best way forward to developing the African
economies, away from the dependency trend and its attendant indignities.
Indeed, TICAD IV in 2008 revealed a transformation in Japan’s strategy towards Africa, as thesummit indicated a shift from dialogue between heads of governments to a more diversified engagement
involving the private sector and a preference for public-private partnership for the development of Africa.
Riding on the momentum of TICAD IV’s theme, ‘Boosting Economic Growth’, the Japanese
government pledged to double Japan’s ODA to Africa to $1.8 billion by the 2012 fiscal year, and to― 50 ―

The Matrix of the Human Security Project in the Context of the TICAD Processoffer yen loans amounting to $4 billion in the five years until the 2012 fiscal year. The government
further began to study and examine more proactively various problems regarding Japan’s engagementswith Africa through discussions with NGOs, NPOs, and relevant private companies (Dōyūkai 2013).
Thematically, TICAD IV’s priority areas also included ‘Towards Ensuring Human Security’,
including achieving the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) and consolidation of peace and good
governance. However, the concern for human security was largely subsumed under the MDGs in a
fashion that projected its rhetorical importance rather than its essence, perhaps an indication of theconceptual ambiguity between the two. The conflation of the two concepts may also be seen as areflection of the Japanese policymakers’ bias in favour of economic development, and the belief that the
primary components of human security and the MDGS could be realised through the eradication ofpoverty. Not surprisingly, according to a recent statement by JICA (2021), ‘…poverty raises the risk ofviolent conflicts, [and] freedom from fear and freedom from want ...’.
If the Ministry of Finance had begun to engage with the TICAD process, Ministry of Economy Tradeand Industries (METI) also started to emerge more actively in the TICAD in tandem, as demonstrated
by the participation of the METI minister Akira Amari in the proceedings, including delivering a keynote
speech at the TICAD IV session on ‘Boosting Economic Growth’ (IIST 2008), with its emphasis on thefollowing sub-themes: ‘Accelerated Industrial Development’, ‘Agricultural and Rural Development’,‘Trade and Investment’, ‘Promotion of Tourism’, and ‘Role of the Private Sector’. Amari reflected on
the pledge to double Japanese investments in Africa, and Japan’s plan to deliver the hard and soft aspects
of infrastructure through flexible yen loans towards Africa’s development. His presence at the side ofPrime Minister Yasuo Fukuda at the opening ceremony of the African Fair 2008, hosted by METI and
its agency, the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), to promote African export items, also
indicated some attempts on the part of METI to encourage more imports of African products to Japan.
At TICAD VI in 2016, METI minister Yoshimitsu Matsumura (METI 2016) repeated the format
followed by his predecessor, promising Japan’s support for the Japanese private sector’s role in the
African economies, and the industrial development of the African countries through the Japan-Africa
Public and Private Economic Forum.
The discussion about the engagement of the Japanese ministries in the TICAD alerts us to a sectionof the bureaucracy that also deserves highlighting, which is the kantei, the prime minister’s office. In
particular, under Prime Minister Shintaro Abe, TICAD was given much of a boost through his attempts,
in my assessment, to make the policy beneficial to Japan’s national interest in the manner that Japanese
ODA served as a catalyst for economic growth in Southeast Asia, which subsequently ‘developed into
an important market and investment destination for Japanese private companies, and therefore, an
extremely important region for the Japanese economy’ (MOFA 2015: 8, 12). As suggested above, thekantei’s proactive interest in the TICAD has to be seen in the context of Abenomics, which are policies― 51 ―

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to invigorate Japan’s long-term depressed economy. TICAD VI of 2016, which also highlighted thekantei’s interest in Africa’s development with an emphasis on public private partnership further provides
evidence of the prime minister’s office’s involvement in the promotion of TICAD.
As a policy initiative, the TICAD shares one thing in common with human security, which is thatthey are both single-handedly run by MOFA, to the extent that the foreign ministry has a monopoly on
both, although it might be argued that perhaps MOFA’s unwitting grip on the TICAD, as indicatedabove, is beginning to loosen up. The point I wish to make here is that MOFA’s monopoly on the TICAD,
an initiative that demands a multi-sector, cross-cutting approach, barely helped to attract interest in theinitiative from strategic sectors such as the METI, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism and their relevant agencies, such as the Japan Bank forInternational Cooperation (JBIC), an indication that the Japanese economic system was not particularly
keen to support the TICAD with the cross-cutting tools of engagement that Africa’s development
desperately needs. Certainly, the apathy of the Japanese private sector towards the economic prospectsof Africa compounded the situation.
6. The human security discourse in the context of the TICAD
As noted by Kurusu (2016: 3-4), Japan has been at the forefront of the human security discourse, whichby coincidence was inaugurated just six months after the commencement of the TICAD process in 1993.
It is perhaps no coincidence that the Japanese government, as the originator and benefactor of the
TICAD process, and indeed given its predilection for economic development, based on Japan’s own
historical experience, as a means for poverty reduction, chose to emphasise, out of the three objectivesof the Human Security Commission (HSC), freedom from want as a pillar of its foreign policy and ODA(Takeuchi 2021, Kurusu 2016: 6, 9, Mine 2007: 70).
Indeed, the government of Japan embraced human security as a foreign policy initiative, and byextension incorporated it in its ODA Charter of 2003, and seemingly in tandem with the CHS
recommendations of 2003, Japan became more oriented towards the ideals of conflict prevention andconsolidation of peace, in reference to the Commission’s objective, freedom from fear (Kurusu, 2016:
6). This was translated into the modus operandi of TICAD III, which was also held in 2003, as follows(MOFA 2003):
It is...imperative to protect the peoples of Africa from any threats to their survival, dignity,and livelihood, and moreover to empower all, including women, children and othervulnerable groups, to shape and fully own the process of building communities and nations.
Such protection and empowerment are pivotal concepts underlying human security.

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The ideal of self-reliance, from the bottom-up, as it were, is projected in the statement through theword ‘empowerment’, although its twin, ‘protection’, which refers to State’s role in the provision ofhuman security, is also noted. It is interesting that this development at TICAD III coincided with theyear Sadako Ogata assumed the Presidency of JICA in 2003 after retiring from her post as head of the
UNHCR. Incidentally, in the same year, and in the context of the TICAD III, the MOFA (2003) declaredthat:
The Millennium Declaration of the United Nations in 2000 and the report of theCommission on Human Security in 2003 underscored the fact that the peoples of Africa
still face serious problems such as poverty, hunger, infectious diseases including the
HIV/AIDS epidemic especially, and a lack of education, thus indicating that Africa is thecontinent where human security is least assured.
I suggest that these seemingly coincidental factors made it necessary for ‘[t]he TICAD process… [toplace] great emphasis on the concept of human security with a view’, according to MOFA, ‘to relieving
the African people of their present afflictions, providing them with peace and hope for the future, andengaging them in the development process’ (MOFA 2003).
Correspondingly, in 2004 JICA (2006, Kamidohzono et al. 2016), the implementing agency ofJapan’s ODA, also cannibalized this aspect of the human security ideal by injecting into its project
objectives what are designated broadly as the Seven Aspects of Human Security, the fourth aspect ofwhich affirmed it would ‘comprehensively [address] both ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’’.
Nevertheless, JICA’s operations in Africa and within the TICAD framework have largely been in therealms of achieving economic development to eradicate poverty, which I attribute to the agency’s
understanding that achieving freedom from want would enable freedom from fear, and by extension
achieve freedom to live in dignity.
The human security dispensation was again highlighted at TICAD V in 2013, during which a
symposium on human security was held on 2 June. That forum on human security (MOFA 2013a)
included Prime Minister Shintaro Abe, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, and Dr. Sadako Ogata, who
had by then retired as President of JICA, having led the organisation for more than eight years, but who
was then serving as an advisor to the Foreign Minister. The event also included Ms. Ellen Johnson
Sirleaf, President of the Republic of Liberia, a country that had recently suffered one of the mostegregiously violent wars in the history of West Africa, and Mr. Hailemariam Desalegn, Chairperson of
the African Union (AU). In his speech at the event, Prime Minister Abe called for promotion of humansecurity in Africa and for the development of the region, indicating that human development was ‘…the― 53 ―

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basis for the development of countries’, (MOFA 2013a) a point that reaffirmed the emphasis on
development in the TICAD process.
At the summit’s Fifth Thematic Session, devoted to the enhancement of peacebuilding, Abe however
evoked peace in the context of Japan’s historical experience, referring to it as ‘a fundamental source ofgrowth’, affirming that ‘Japan achieved its prosperity by learning the value of peace’. Consequently heappealed to the African countries to work towards achieving peace ‘for the well-being of each individual’in the region, a point that nevertheless reflected the Japanese government’s concerns about the securityof Japanese nationals living and working in Africa, as staff of the JGC Holders Company had been taken
hostage and murdered in Algeria in January 2013 (MOFA 2013b, Yoshida 2013). Crucially, in his
keynote speech at the opening session of TICAD V on 1 June, Prime Minister Abe (MOFA 2013c)
articulated Japan’s faith in economic development and affirmed that ‘…[t]he idea that poverty can beovercome through growth is something that has been axiomatic for Japanese right from the start’, further
confirming that ‘[t]he TICAD concept also places an unwavering emphasis on growth’. He proceeded
to elaborate on aspects of the processes for achieving growth in Africa through public private partnership(PPP), an initiative he described as holding the key ‘…to revolutioniz[ing] the way of providing
assistance to Africa’.
Following the example of previous Prime Ministers, Abe pledged (MOFA 2013c) to support Africa’s
growth over the next five years through the PPP initiative with ‘public and private means [amountingto] approximately $32 billion, including ODA of around 1.4 trillion yen and other public and private
resources of around $16 billion dollars’. In addition, he promised that Japan would allocate $6.5 billion
towards infrastructure development over the next five years in Africa, and ‘…underwrite a maximumof $2 billion of trade insurance’ towards Japanese investments in the region. The list of pledges included
the construction of ‘hubs for human resource development’ at ten locations, with Japanese experts invocational training. This suggests a clear attempt to entice the Japanese private sector to participate more
actively the TICAD process. Thus, with an emphasis on PPP, and in conjunction with the business
community, the Abe administration created the Council on Public Private Partnership to Promote
TICAD V (MOFA 2013d), which included the Keidanren. Seemingly with an eye on Africa’s markets
and natural resources, and with a swipe at other competitors, conceivably China, Abe announced ‘…we
will not simply extract resources and take them back to Japan. Japan will assist Africa to ensure that theblessings of Africa’s natural resources are conducive to Africa’s economic growth’ (MOFA 2013d).
Abe’s point about revolutionizing assistance to Africa is worth reflecting on, as it carries interesting
implications. Firstly, the plan as laid out by Abe confirmed packages of economic development
programmes, which itself is not a novelty, either in Japan’s experience with development assistance oreven in the discourses about development in general. However, the plan was revolutionary because
Japan had never approached Africa’s development that way, nor had any of the donor countries. Most
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The Matrix of the Human Security Project in the Context of the TICAD Processof the development assistance to Africa had been on the level of bilateral relations, which had been
largely humanitarian orientated. Again, from the Japanese perspective, Abe’s promise was revolutionary
in the sense that it aimed to rope the Japanese private sector into the business of developing the African
economies, following the format Japan had used in East Asian development. As Japan’s Development
Charter of 2015 attests, the formula for Japanese development assistance was equally designed to serve
Japan’s own national interests, and certainly those of the Japanese private sector. The policy to fashion
Japan’s ODA in a manner that would serve the interests of Japan was nothing new of course, but anovelty in the history of Japanese ODA to Africa, which had largely been oriented towards humanitarianassistance, a type of assistance that had no concrete benefits for the Japanese private sector and therefore
did not commit Japan to the realisation of Africa’s economic development. Suffice to say, even as theDevelopment Cooperation Charter of 2015, consistent with the National Security Strategy of 2013,referred to the human security dispensation, promising to ‘focus its development cooperation on
individuals – especially those liable to be vulnerable such as children, women, persons with disabilities,
the elderly, refugees and internally-displaced persons, ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples – andprovide cooperation for their protection and empowerment so as to realize human security’, the essenceof Abe’s approach to Africa largely emphasised economic development.
7. The freedom to live in dignity: Contending with self-reliance in the TICAD
As noted above, the TICAD policy was premised on not making pledges towards ODA, but exhorting
the African countries to apply self-reliance to develop their economies. Thus, from the inception of the
TICAD process we find constant references to self-help (which I will use interchangeably with selfreliance for our purposes). Consequently, in the keynote speech of Prime Minister Hosokawa at TICAD
I in 1993, he expressed the ‘hope that during the two-day discussions the African countries [would]
express their determination to pursue self-help efforts, and that their development partners [would] show
an equally determined commitment to support these efforts’ (MOFA 1993b). Following that trajectory,
Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda’s opening remarks at TICAD IV in 2008 used self-reliance to mean taking
ownership of one’s own economic development, conflating the two ideas (Ampiah 2012).
As a matter of fact, self-reliance has become increasingly integral to the Japanese government’s
approaches to development assistance (Shimomura 2020: 180-181), which reference Japan’s identity asa country that developed its economy through self-reliance. While the narrative may well be designed
as a motivational message for developing countries, and could indeed be understood as a way of
empowering recipient countries in the manner that empowerment has been used in the human security
discourse by the CMS, it raises the following important question: when is self-reliance self-reliance; isit when it is successful? The point of the question is that, of course, all countries apply self-reliance intheir efforts towards economic development (Morawetz 1977). For example, Tanzania’s political and― 55 ―

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development history reveals how under President Julius Nyerere’s leadership the country implemented
self-reliance in the Ujamaa policy in the 1970s (Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003), which incidentally failed tofoster economic growth in Tanzania. Whatever the outcome of that particular historical experience,
however, we cannot fail to observe that Ujamaa was a resounding exercise in self-reliance, as was
Kwame Nkrumah’s Rural Industrialization Policy in Ghana in the early I960s. Cuba was conceivably
one of the most self-reliant countries on earth in the twentieth century, necessitated of course by geopolitics, yet there is no appreciation in the development discourse for any of these countries because
none succeeded in delivering the citizens of these countries from the human security ideal of freedom
from want. So, to reiterate the question, when is self-reliance self-reliance?
The problem is of course compounded by the lack of a reliable definition of self-reliance. According
to the UNHCR (2005), ‘[s]elf-reliance, as a programme approach… [is about] developing andstrengthening livelihoods of persons of concern and reducing their vulnerability and long-term relianceon humanitarian/external assistance’. Dependency theorist Amin (1977) thought a self-reliant economy‘should not become dominated or dependent on another economy’. Both these ideas aspire to end
dependence on external assistance, which embodies the ignominy of indignity.
This brings me to the matter of the third objective of the CHS’s aspirations for human security, whichis freedom to live in dignity, an ideal that is also burdened with conceptual complications, not least
because it is wrapped up in a complex and amorphous body of norms and morality. Relevant to thediscussion is indeed the concept of self-reliance, which is heavily referenced in the Japanese
government’s discourses about ODA, particularly to Africa, and has implications for how dignity isconceived in the relationship between the donor and the recipient.
Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that ‘[a]ll human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights’. Yet Appiah (2001: 43) has argued, even from his libertarian
perspective, that ‘a life of hand-outs is not dignified’, implying that a person’s dignity may indeed be
destroyed either temporarily or permanently due to being dependent on charity, signifying that there isa social contract even in the conception of human dignity. When referring to Emmanuel Kant’s notionof dignity as a quality attributable to all human beings and inviolable, an ideal that ascribes autonomy
and agency to individuals, Mosel and Holloway (2019: 258) invoke Aurel Kolnai’s nuanced conceptionof dignity to suggest that because dignity is ‘inherent in being a person’, it can be destroyed temporarily
or without redemption, in contrast with human rights, which, in the worst-case scenario, can only be‘disregarded, negated, insulted, violated or suppressed’.
Based on that, Mosel and Holloway (2019: 1) argue that, without knowing what dignity means to thepeople it aims to support, those implementing humanitarian assistance would find it difficult to ensurethat its responses to them are dignified. Effectively, they suggest that the didactic use of self-reliance is
not dignifying to the poor, as it ‘tends to reinforce recipients’ feelings that they are not self-reliant’― 56 ―

The Matrix of the Human Security Project in the Context of the TICAD Process(2019: 18). A contrast is drawn between ‘what things ought to be … and what things are’ (Holloway
and Grandi 2018: 4), a sense of self-worth that could easily be denied by others is the basis of the
problem of human dignity.
Indeed, despite the universality of human insecurity, the human security problematic is largely
viewed and understood as the preserve of the poor countries in the global south, where poverty and its
consequences, including famine, infant mortality, illiteracy, social violence, political instability,
dysfunctional politics, and so on, are well woven and hardened into people’s lives and existence. Thus
Kurusu (2016: 24) chronicles how the Japanese government, for example, tends to view the humansecurity initiative as a component of its foreign policy, reducing what is a universal problem to one that
divides countries into ‘us and them’, rich and poor, donors and recipients, and north and south. It seems
that the Japanese government has had to be sensitised by other Japanese stakeholders, including NGOs,
about the concept’s relevance to the life chances of Japanese people as well (Kurusu 2016: 10-11), inview of recent calamities in Japan such as the Fukushima crisis of 2011.
8. Conclusion
Adopting Lipset’s thesis, which draws a correlation between economic development and democracy, I
have argued that the former is the basis for human security. The argument I have pursued takes into
consideration the historical experiences of the European countries, the North American states, and more
recently the East Asian countries to make the point that as the economic fortunes of neighbouring
countries mutually improve, the more protected is their citizens’ human security. Thus, while noting thereciprocal relationship between and the interconnectedness of the variables and factors that account forhuman insecurities, I have argued that human security (better life chances) is made more possible andsustainable through a productive economy, with the implication that an economy requires a government
to function and grow. My position also rests on the idea that social rights as abstract ideals by themselves
do not change social class inequalities and the insecurities they breed. However, state policies that aredesigned and supported to obviate the insecurities of citizens might.
The analysis has explored aspects of the TICAD process in the context of Japanese development
assistance to show the Japanese government’s bias in favour of economic development as the basis forcontending with human insecurities. We have also noted, with reference to Kurusu (2016: 6) and
Kamidohzono et al.(2016), that following the CHS recommendations of 2003, Japan became oriented
towards the ideals of conflict prevention and consolidation of peace, in reference to the Commission’s
objective of freedom from fear. Nevertheless, due to its historical predilection for development, theJapanese government has tended to focus on the latter in relation to Africa. As revealed in the discussion
above, however, the TICAD process itself was originally conceived and devised as a brain-storming
initiative about Africa’s developmental malaise, premised on the principle of self-reliance and― 57 ―

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ownership by the African countries of their economic development. As suggested above, the TICAD
failed to attract the Japanese private sector to invest in the African economies in part because of the
MOFA’s initial decision against making financial pledges towards Africa’s development. Following
TICAD IV in 2008, the momentum for a more proactive involvement of Japanese companies in thepolicy seemed to slowly pick up pace, despite many structural difficulties with the policy itself andindeed in the African political economy, as the Dōyūkai and Keidanren reports reveal.
The indications from the above discussion are that the government of Japan has used both thedevelopment package and the human security discourse to address Africa’s socio-economic problems,
although it is clear from the TICAD policy that the momentum is more in the direction of development.
This is partly because Japanese policymakers have a historical affinity towards economic growth as a
remedy for poverty. Secondly, despite enthusiasm for human security as a foreign policy concept, itremains a learning curve even within MOFA, in part because the concept is loaded with normative
ambiguities. Thus, the Japanese government’s pronouncements about human security are obfuscating.
This may be partly attributable to the following bureaucratic point. Personality in Japanese politics andforeign policy is often neutralised except in exceptional cases, as in the case of the advocacy of theprinciple of human security, which was essentially led by no other than Sadako Ogata. It seems that
Ogata led the principle of human security by hand through the corridors of power in Japan and madesure it was internalised as a foreign policy norm. Her role as President of JICA from 2003 to 2012, andsubsequently as advisor to the Japanese foreign minister in 2013 ensured that her experiences and viewsas the former head of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees were taken
seriously by the Japanese government. However, this begs the following questions. To what extent
would human security have become integral to Japanese foreign policy if not for Sadako Ogata’s
personal and tenacious interest in the ideal? To what extent have Japanese policymakers, even within
MOFA, embraced human security as a workable concept? How far is the Japanese government likely to
go with the finer details of the concept without Ogata’s leadership?
On the question of self-reliance as a function of empowerment and economic development, theanalysis has questioned the conception of self-reliance itself. I have argued in relation to the third pillarof the CHS objectives, the freedom to live a life of dignity, that the didactic references to self-reliancein the development discourse undermine the dignity of the aid recipient, which underlines Kwame
Appiah’s point that indeed ‘a life of hand-outs is not dignified’. The point to stress here is that, despite
its good intentions, the discourse undergirding aid giving is not dignifying to the recipient, because alife of handouts is not dignifying, a fact that cannot be resolved through platitudinous references tohuman security or ‘dignitarian’ norms (Riley 2020). The only potential chance of countervailing this isthrough economic development to obviate reliance on aid. It is in that sense that economic development(rather than abstract notions of social rights, or humanitarian aid) is an attribute of human dignity, in so― 58 ―

The Matrix of the Human Security Project in the Context of the TICAD Process

far as it modulates and mediates the relationship between the donor and the recipient to restore a senseof balance and mutual self-worth and self-respect. That of course means that the onus is on the African
partners of the TICAD, and all aid recipients, to aim to redeem their dignity, which is only possible inthe context of the global political economy through economic development.

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January.

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Why Do Informal Cross Border Traders (ICBTs) Operate Informally?
The Paradox of the Formalization of ICBTs in Africa

Yumi Nakayama
African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan

Abstract
Informal Cross Border Traders (ICBTs) are commonly observed throughout the African continent.
Without any official trading approval, ICBTs travel frequently to import or export various goods. As
ICBTs benefit local communities as well as their households, they could be considered as an embedded
social system of the borderlands in African countries.
Although they have not been very attractive either to African governments or international societies,
efforts for the formalization of ICBTs have been made in the previous decades. The COMESA
Simplified Trade Regime (STR) is an evolutional example designed to benefit ICBTs by reducing theirburden at border posts. However, the STR has not been actively used by ICBTs. This study will analyse
why ICBTs choose to cross borders informally as well as the paradox between their formalization claims
and actual practices. Based on a detailed literature review of relevant surveys, this study focuses on thefact that the majority of ICBTs are divorced mothers, which might make them stay away fromformalization.
Keywords: Informal Cross Border Trade, COMESA, the Simplified Trade Regime, women’s
empowerment, formalization, informal economy― 65 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

1. Introduction
Africa has a long tradition of regional trade throughout the continent since before the colonial era (Golub
2015: 188). Informal Cross Border Trade became a prominent phenomenon between the late 1970s andthe early 1980s when the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was introduced by the World Bankand the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Njikam and Gérard 2011: 4835-4836). The SAP resulted
in an economic decline with the shrinking of formal sectors, specifically severely damaging womenheaded households (Jackson 1996: 492). Thus, instead of men who lost their job in formal sectors,
women began to engage in Informal Cross Border Trade for supporting their families (Nchito andTranberg 2010: 169-170). Although the African continent has been experiencing economic growth sincethe 1990s, such trade remains a vital income-generating activity for African women.
According to Afrika and Ajumbo (2012: 1), 43% of the African population supposedly earns income
from ICBT. Moreover, in terms of intra-regional trade, the ration of Informal Cross Border Trade forregional trade as a whole is 30–40% in SADC (Afrika and Ajumbo 2012: 4). Various essential goods
for local communities, such as foods, groceries, clothes, small electric devices, and so on, are exported
and imported. The value of these goods is generally low, approximately US$50–US$1,000 (Afrika andAjumbo 2012: 3). Thus, Informal Cross Border Trade creates job opportunities and ensures resilienceamong border communities. These facts indicate that it is essential both for people residing in Africa
and macro economies in the continent. However, because of its informality, traders engaging in Informal
Cross Border Trade are not given legal protection and remain vulnerable. In this respect, political actors
inside and outside the African continent have attempted to formalize ICBTs. Nevertheless, the effects
are insufficient.
This study intends to examine the paradox of the formalization advocacy that occurred between thepolitical actors and the traders themselves. Why do ICBTs remain informal despite efforts offormalization? So far, various researchers have deeply investigated how ICBTs contribute to
micro/macro economies and the kind of obstacles they face. But only a few of them have discussed thereason why ICBTs remained informal despite offers of formalization. The first step of this analysis is to
examine the definition of ICBTs and the form of their trading activities. After that, I will take up theformalization efforts of political actors, then discussing the detailed profile of ICBTs to consider factorsof informality.
2. Who are Informal Cross Border Traders (ICBTs)?
2.1. Vague definition of ICBTs
Although the term ‘Informal Cross Border Trade’ 1 has been broadly used both in various policy and1

In some papers, International Cross Border Trade is referred to as Small-scale Cross Border Trade.
― 66 ―

Why Do Informal Cross Border Traders (ICBTs) Operate Informally? The Paradox of the Formalization of ICBTs in Africa

academic papers, a clear definition is still lacking. According to Lesser and Moisé-Leeman (2009: 10),
Informal Cross Border Trade can be categorized into three types (Table 1), with Category B and
Category C emphasizing the illegal aspects related to trade regulations of formal actors, namely,
smuggling. In contrast, Category A is based on the informality of the traders’ status.
Many policy studies follow Lesser and Moisé-Leeman (2009: 9), a report of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which describes Informal Cross Border Trade as‘trade in legitimately produced goods and services, which escapes the regulatory framework set by thegovernment, as such avoiding certain tax and regulatory burden’. In this reference, regardless of theCategory, irregularity of trading activities is emphasized rather than the status of traders. In contrast, theUnited Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) defines Informal Cross Border
Trade as ‘trade between neighbouring countries conducted by vulnerable, small, unregistered traders.
Typically, it is proximity trade involving the move of produce between markets close to the border.’ Inaddition, UNCTAD (n.d.) explained that ‘the informality refers to the status of the trader (unregistered),
not necessarily to the trade itself (captured or unrecorded by the official customs system)’. Even among
RECs in Africa, the definition of Informal Cross Border Trade varies. For example, according toBlumberg et al. (2016: 16), SADC defines Informal Cross Border Trade as ‘any business operating ingoods and services that trades across the border, and that has no official export/import license or permit
within a defined threshold and frequency’. In contrast, COMESA refers to Informal Cross Border Tradeas ‘a form of trade that is unrecorded in official statistics and is carried out by small businesses or traders’
and which ‘involves bypassing border posts, concealment of goods, under-reporting, false classification,
under-invoicing, and other similar tricks.’ The difference is that while SADC problematizes the statusof traders, COMESA emphasises the criminal perspective of trading activities.
According to UNCTAD’s view, this study will focus on Informal Cross Border Trade operated bytraders without a formal licence, who are vulnerable residents of border communities without access toemployment in formal sectors. In this sense, Informal Cross Border Traders (ICBTs) can be considered
as a part of the informal economy.
Table 1. Categories of Informal Cross Border Trade
Category A
Informal (Unregistered) traders
or firms operating entirely
outside the formal economy.

Category B
Formal (registered) firms
totally disregarding trade
regulations and evading duties(e.g. avoiding official bordercrossing posts).

Source: Lesser and Moisé-Leeman (2009: 11).
― 67 ―

Category C
Formal (registered) firms partly
disregarding trade regulations
and evading duties by resorting
to illegal practices (e.g. underinvoicing, wrong classification,
wrong declaration of country oforigin, and/or bribing borderofficials)

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

2.2. Form of trading of ICBTs
Products transported by ICBTs are quite varied. For example, East African Community Customs Union(2006: 35) mentions that in East Africa, agricultural products, such as grains, fruits, vegetables, foodcrops, and cash crops, are traded frequently because women ICBTs manage their households fromagriculture. However, industrial products, such as textiles, hides and skins, clothes and garments, andstatuettes, are traded as well.
ICBTs travel frequently and their duration of stay in destination countries is quite short. For example,
Zimbabwean ICBTs stay in South Africa for 1.8 days on average (Chikanda and Tawodzera 2017: 2).
They transport goods in various ways, such as beasts of burden, porters, canoes, buses, and motorcycles(Afrika and Ajumbo 2012: 2). According to the most recent survey by COMESA in 2018 conducted atborders between Zambia and Malawi, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia andZimbabwe, and Zambia and Tanzania, 66% of the traders used bicycles and 20% carried goods on theirheads (Chibomba 2021). While some ICBTs pass through official border posts, others prefer to avoid
them and use informal routes concentrated around established townships and customs posts along theborders (UBOS 2006: 4). Due to porosity of the borders in Africa, ICBTs have developed many informal
crossing points, making it extremely difficult for governments to control their border crossing.
According to Golub (2015: 185), some ICBTs pass through the bush or cross borders by water even if
they would prefer to use official checkpoints because border posts are few in number and are locatedtoo far away. Besides, Lesser and Moisé-Leeman (2009: 19) mentioned that ‘Africa has the longest
customs delays in the world’, and such delays also make ICBTs avoid official checkpoints.
In terms of trading forms, ‘re-exports’ are well observed among ICBTs. Re-exports refer to ‘goods
imported legally through formal channels into countries with low trade barriers and then shipped
unofficially in large volumes to neighbouring countries with higher barriers, with minimal or noprocessing aside from transport services’ (Benjamin et al. 2015: 381). This contributes to the deliveryof goods to countries with highly protected markets (African Export Import Bank 2020: 12). In addition,according to Ndlela (2006: 22), ICBTs sometimes offer more money than formal employment.
3. Formalization of ICBTs
3.1. International organizations’ acknowledgement of ICBTs
In spite of a long history, ICBTs had been less attractive to international societies. However, since thelast two decades, international organizations started advocating the formalization of ICBTs. For example,
International Labour Organization (ILO) started focusing on Informal Economy as a part of the
advocacy for decent work in the 2000s. Besides, ICBTs attract international organizations and theirdonor countries in terms of food security. The pioneering research on ICBTs was conducted by USAID(United States Agency for International Development) in 1994–1995 at borders between Kenya and― 68 ―

Why Do Informal Cross Border Traders (ICBTs) Operate Informally? The Paradox of the Formalization of ICBTs in Africa

Uganda, Tanzania and its neighbours, and Malawi and its neighbours, and the research in 1995–1996
covered borders between Mozambique and its neighbours, revealing that staple foods, such as maize
and other food products, were transacted a lot among other goods (Ackello-Ogutu 1996, Ackello-Ogutu
and Echessah 1997; 1998, Macamo 1999). Moreover, after the serious draught in early 2000, the Famine
Early Warning System Network (FEWNET) and the World Food Programme (WFP) started empiricalresearch on ICBTs at the Mozambique-Malawi border (Bata et al. 2005). According to Makochekanwa
and Matchaya (2019: 155), based on data from FEWSNET, a share of the informal maize exports by
Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa to SADC/COMESA for formal
trade navigates between 4–15%. The ICBTs’ contributions to food security are now well known, anddiscourse on the desire to formalize ICBTs is being shared among international organizations and theirdonor countries. As an example, the African regional office of the Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO) issued an advocacy report in 2017 (Koroma et al. 2017).
3.2. Regional organizations and ICBTs
In practice, the formalization of ICBTs progress with concrete policies at regional levels. In Africa,
since around the 2000s, economic integration has been accelerated among various Regional Economic
Communities (RECs). One of the proactive RECs, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa(COMESA) is a leading agency for formalizing ICBTs. COMESA was established in 1994 and consistsof 19 member-states from eastern and southern Africa 2. As its member-states have actively promoted
trade liberalization, the COMESA Free Trade Agreement started with 9 member-states in 2000 and is
now accepted by 16 member-states, benefitting formal traders in various ways.
In terms of ICBTs, the COMESA Simplified Trade Regime (STR) is an evolutional scheme tofacilitate small-scale informal traders. In 2007, at the COMESA Business Summit and Exhibition,
ministers of member-states agreed to introduce the STR (Southern Africa Trust 2014: 12). After anexperimental implementation in 10 selected countries (Burundi, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi,
Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), COMESA officially launched the STR in 2010. The
STR is designed to facilitate ICBTs importing and/or exporting goods worth USD 2,000 or less
(COMESA 2018: 14) through simplified documentation, lower fees, and rapid customs custody. Trade
Information Desk Officers (TIDOs) were designated at some border posts to assist ICBTs by providing
trade information and filling the STR form. Moreover, products not exceeding USD 500 were exempt
from tax (Lesser and Moisé-Leeman 2009: 6). By the end of 2019, the STR was implemented in 8
member-states (Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe)(COMESA 2020: 23).
2
Burundi, Comoros, D.R. Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe― 69 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

Apart from COMESA, political actors outside the African continent have also supported theimplementation of the STR within the COMESA region. For example, USAID, along with the
Department for International Development (DFID), a government agency that once existed in the U.K.,
assisted COMESA to establish the first Trade Information Desk (TID) at the border post of DR Congoand Zambia (COMESA n.d.). More recently, the European Union has been financially supporting
COMESA’s projects to promote STR and improve the trading environment of ICBTs (European Unionn.d.).
The Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Programme (GLTFP) approved by the World Bank in 2015 also
aims to facilitate ICBTs (World Bank 2015), targeting the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
Rwanda, Uganda, and COMESA. It aims to reduce poverty among vulnerable borderland residents byfacilitating ICBTs in such areas, also consisting of a part of the wider projects for peace and stability inthe region. The GTLFP focuses on improving core trade infrastructure, such as border markets andborder posts.
Besides COMESA, other RECs have also shown their interest in formalizing ICBTs. For example,
the SADC Secretariat studied ICBTs in the region using secondary literature in 2008 and hosted theHigh Level Policy Regional Workshop on Informal Cross Border Trade in 2010 (Malaba and Chipika
2012: 28–29). In addition, the SADC has introduced ‘A Regional Advocacy Strategy on Informal Cross
Border Trade’ under the Secretariat’s Gender Unit in 2011. However, it remains unused. And themember-states have not agreed on the STR either.
As mentioned above, COMESA’s efforts of formalization of ICBTs deserve special attention.
However, it is inferred that COMESA focuses on formalizing forms of ICBTs’ activities and not on theroot causes behind their informality.
3.3. The role of governments
Generally, governments in the African Continent prefer restrictive trading policies to protect thevulnerable domestic industries. Thus, many governments considered ICBTs to negatively impact thedomestic economy or industries because they triggered an influx of lower-costing products than those
domestically produced. Thus, usually, African governments were neither willing to admit thecontributions of ICBTs nor encourage their trading activities.
However, since the mid-2000s, governments’ attitudes toward ICBTs seemed to be changing. So far,some governments have made great efforts for collecting data on ICBTs, essential for their formalization.
As a pioneer, the government of Uganda has been collecting data on ICBTs continuously since 2005,
and the first report issued concluded that ‘the size of the informal trade figures reported in this survey
suggests that the countries in the region depend on each other more than has been known’ (UBOS 2006:
26). The government of Rwanda is another enthusiastic actor collecting information on ICBTs since― 70 ―

Why Do Informal Cross Border Traders (ICBTs) Operate Informally? The Paradox of the Formalization of ICBTs in Africa

2009 (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda 2018). Surveys conducted by both the governments ofUganda and Rwanda are supported by key government agencies, such as the Central Bank and theStatistical Office. Good practices of these two countries started to spread in other African countries(IBRD and World Bank 2020: 6-7). In 2013, ministers of the EAC member-states agreed on theharmonization of the measurement of ICBTs’ survey instruments (IMF n.d.). These data collected by
the governments themselves would be considered in regional trade negotiations and would be useful indetermining market access and product enhancement (IBRD and World Bank 2020: 12).
Reducing the cost of border-crossing is another support offered by governments. In the formal
process, traders require business permits from governments to engage in trading activities. However,informal traders usually travel without such permits. To get a visitor’s permit, they are required to submit
paper-work and/or to pay relatively costly visa fees. For example, a single-entry visa to Eastern Africancountries costs USD 50 and a single-entry visa to South Africa costs USD 167. Moreover, sometimes
they must provide documents such as bank statements or invitation letters. In this context,
implementation of the COMESA Free Movement Protocol might greatly benefit the ICBTs in the region,
although only 4 out of the 19 member-states have ratified so far (IOM 2017: 3). Moreover, applying forvalid passports is costly for ICBTs. In addition to the applicant fee, they must pay for the travel expenses
to capital cities in which the passport should be issued. Under such circumstances, some governments
issue temporary certificates called ‘day passes’ to borderland residents, including ICBTs, with which
they can cross borders legally, even for trading. This effort is supposed to contribute to the formalizationof ICBTs. However, people with ‘day passes’ are only permitted to move within fixed areas, which are
not enough for their trading activities (Sommer and Nshimbi 2018: 9-10).
4. Examination of the informal status of ICBTs and the gender perspective
4.1. Women and ICBTs
Although it is not particularly reflected in the STR or surveys conducted by governments, ICBTs areimportant from the gender perspective. A report of the ILO in 2004 turned the spotlight on ICBTs andother organizations. For example, UN Women (former UNIFEM) started collecting data and supporting
women ICBTs. So far, many research revealed that women ICBTs have been observed more often thanmen. Africa and Ajumbo (2012: 2) estimated almost 70% of ICBTs in the SADC to be female. Several
detailed observations listed in Table 2 show that many interviews or surveys conducted in various
African borders also revealed that women account for 60–70% of ICBTs.

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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

Table 2. Gender Gap among ICBTs
Reference

SampleMale (%)

Female (%)

520

39

61

Chikanda 534

32

68

Ama et al. (2013)
Tawodzeraand(2017)
Mutsagondo et al. (2016)

196

34

66

Titeca and Kimanuka (2012)

43781

26

74

Source: Author’s construction using references appeared in the table.
4.2. Women ICBTs and education/literacy levels
For the apparent difference in gender ratio among ICBTs, the generally lower educational levels andpoorer literacy levels of females compared to males in Africa have been considered as a major cause.
Additionally, the causal relationship between lack of access to education and poverty has beencommonly shared because lower education or literacy levels mean fewer opportunities of employment
in the formal sector. Thus, discourse that women in African border communities with low educational
levels and poor literacy levels are supposed to act as ICBTs is widely shared. Indeed, Mupedziswa andGumbo (2001: 28-29) insisted that education levels of women ICBTs in Zimbabwe were extremely low
in the 1990s.
However, the most recent report of UNICEF issued in 2020 in collaboration with UN Women
analysed that both educational and literacy levels have improved within the last two decades. In detail,in Sub-Saharan Africa, the literacy rate among youth aged 15–24 years has increased from 61% in 1995
to 74% in 2015, diminishing the gender gap in literacy (UNICEF, UN Women and Plan International
2020: 13), probably caused by the 72% enrolment ratio of girls in primary schools in 2019 comparedwith 54% in 1999 (ibid. 12). Furthermore, the enrolment ratio of girls in secondary schools increased to
34% in 2019 from 18% in 1999 (ibid. 12). Though in terms of completion rate, more females failed tocomplete lower and upper secondary schools than male students (ibid. 13).
Reflecting the improvement in education/literacy levels of women in Africa, a recent survey revealed
that literacy or education levels of women ICBTs are not necessarily as low as was expected. Njikam
and Gérard (2011: 4837–4838) found that both women without formal education as well as women who
have finished secondary school engaged in Informal Cross Border Trade. Tawodzera and Chikanda(2017: 915) stressed that most of the Zimbabwean women ICBTs interviewed in 2014 had finished theirsecondary level and 11% even had college certificates. Ama et al. (2013: 4224) found that among thewomen ICBTs interviewed at the entry point of Botswana, 33% had secondary school
certificates/diplomas, 21% had university degrees, and 14% had professional certificates.
In the context of education/literacy levels of women ICBTs, low education levels is considered as a
― 72 ―

Why Do Informal Cross Border Traders (ICBTs) Operate Informally? The Paradox of the Formalization of ICBTs in Africa

reason behind the STR not working effectively despite of various ingenuities and benefits. Thishypothesis is supported by some empirical studies, such as an experiment conducted at the border
between Zimbabwe and its neighbours, where ICBTs paid more tax than necessary because of little
knowledge about the STR itself (Muqayi 2015: 13-16). In addition, it is explained that filling forms for
the STR is too complicated for low educated ICBTs. Of course, the influence of low educational/literacy
levels cannot be completely denied, however, findings of recent surveys that educational/literacy levelsof women ICBTs have improved imply that negative attitudes toward the STR is not caused simply byeducation or literacy levels.
4.3. Women and accessibility of ICBTs
Then what are the other factors that cause women to act as ICBTs? This section will focus onaccessibility. Ratio of female ICBTs is obviously greater than that of agricultural labour. For example,
according to the World Bank, data from Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda showthat approximately 40% agricultural labour are women. In detail, 24% in Niger and 56% in Uganda arefemales (World Bank n.d.). This is why most women in Africa rarely have land rights. Instead of having
their own land rights, women usually access agricultural lands through their male relatives: husbands,
fathers, or brothers (Meinzen-Dick 2019). Thus, women’s land accessibility is still insecure because
they might lose it because of deaths of husbands, divorce, or changes of men’s minds. Therefore, thelack of land rights is supposedly a reason for women, especially for divorced or widowed women withchildren, to engage as ICBTs that do not require land access.
In addition, low entry barriers compared with employment at formal sectors is considered toencourage women to be ICBTs. They usually start their activities with relatively small capitals. For
example, the survey conducted by Ama et al. (2013: 4225) revealed that 15% of women ICBTs started
their business with less than USD 125, while 81% spent between USD 125–1,374.88. These findings
are consistent with those of Tawodzera and Chikanda (2017: 921-922) where almost three-quarters of
the interviewees started their business with ZAR 5,000 3 or less, while 8% started their business withover ZAR 10,000. In the latter survey, some respondents answered that they could basically afford as
little as ZAR 2,000 to start their business.
Although ICBTs can start their trading activities with small amounts, many women still struggle toraise funds. Because they have little access to official funding systems such as bank loans, nearly 80%
of ICBTs raise funds from informal sources and about 50% use their savings (Ndala and Jnr 2019: 400).
Moreover, support from family or friends, or social network in other words, is considered a vital source
for women ICBTs. However, they sometimes face negative attitudes of their husbands or family

3

Approximately, ZAR 10 would convert to USD 1 at the exchange rate of 2014.
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

members towards trading activities (Mupedziswa and Gumbo 2001: 20-21). As the social network
becomes concentrated on their family after marriage, married women face more challenges in raisingfunds than single women who are able to act like men (Kyalo and Kiganane 2014: 3-4).
The recent survey listed in Table 3 shows that Married/Divorced/Widowed women engage as ICBTs
more often than women who have never been married. Moreover, some studies argue that single-mother
ICBTs, especially divorced, have been observed the most (Munyoro et al. 2016: 34). In various
interviews, women ICBTs have explained that they cross borders as ICBTs to buy food for thehouseholds, reinvest in business, pay school fees for children and relatives, access health care services,
pay for rent, and so on.
Therefore, the source of funding remained vulnerable for women ICBTs compared with men,
especially for married or single mothers. Owing to fund shortages, it is necessary for women ICBTs
with limited stocks to cross borders continuously (East African Community Customs Union 2006: 35).
Moreover, women ICBTs who must care for their children and other family members by themselves
have limited time for trading activities. As a result, they must go through the troublesome procedure
during each travel, which would raise a new problem.
Table 3. Marital Status of women ICBTs
Reference

Married/Divorced/Widowed

Never married (%)(%)
Mutsagondo et al. (2016)57

43

Ama et al. (2013)44

56

Jawando et al. (2012)

96

4

Source: Author’s construction using references appeared in the table.
4.4. Women ICBTs and challenges at border posts
Although national IDs or ‘day passes’ are supposed to replace valid passports or business permits insome countries, women ICBTs still face problems because of corruption and insecurity at border posts(UNCTAD 2019: 3). Legal protection for ICBTs is lacking in general and women ICBTs are at a higher
risk than men.
One risk is harassment by customs officials or border-post officers which includes beatings, verbal
insults, stripping, sexual harassment, and even rape (World Bank 2012: 4). Women ICBTs often
complain about the corruption of border officials and are often forced to pay bribes (Malaba and Chipika
2012: 23). Moreover, they spend longer times at the border due to suspended inspections (UNCTAD
2019: 3), raising risks of physical harassment. According to Kurebwa (2015: 66), long durations atborder posts force women ICBTs to sleep in the open or negotiate for accommodation with security― 74 ―

Why Do Informal Cross Border Traders (ICBTs) Operate Informally? The Paradox of the Formalization of ICBTs in Africa

forces, touts, immigration officials, money changers, local residents, and truck drivers, increasing therisks of sexual abuse and vulnerability to HIV/AIDS. Therefore, some women ICBTs prefer to avoid
border posts, although informal routes are also risky for them (Malunga 2018: 59).
4.5. Women ICBTs’ participation in Cross Border Traders’ Associations (CBTA)As a breakthrough in the stagnation of formalizing ICBTs, Cross Border Traders’ Associations (CBTAs)
are expected to play intermediary roles connecting ICBTs and formal political actors. Before formal
actors such as COMESA started paying attention to ICBTs, some ICBTs started organizing CBTAs tofacilitate their trading activities since the late 1990s. For example, the CBTA in Zambia is proactive andwas established in 1999 as a non-profit organization. So far, claims have been made regarding theestablishment of political systems benefiting ICBTs, with lobbying targets including the COMESA, the
SADC, and the Zambian government. Although CBTAs have limited influence on formal politicalprocesses, they play an intermediary role between ICBTs and formal political actors. They also aid
ICBTs by providing places for merchandise and trade information and assisting them with bank loans.
Following the establishment of the CBTA in Zambia, they were set up in Zimbabwe, DRC, Burundi,
and Rwanda (Table 4).
Table 4. CBTAs in the COMESA Region
Country

Establishment Year

Burundi2009

Congo DR

2004

Kenya

2010

Malawiestablished in 2005 (registered in 2009)

Rwanda2010

Ugandan.d.

Zambiafounded in 1999 (registered in 2000)

Zimbabwe

2002

Source: UNECA (2012: 20).
However, CBTAs are often confronted for a lack of management capacity. Despite that, they arecommonly operated with membership fees as the income, and the number of members ICBTs is limited.
It results in a fund shortage, forcing some CBTAs to stop their activities. Therefore, formal politicalactors established several programmes to improve the capacity of CBTAs. For example, the COMESA
has supported CBTAs through the Cross Border Trade (CBT) Desk under the Secretariat, assisting them

― 75 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

in various projects. From the gender perspective, although more women tend to join them, relatively
fewer women take up important positions in CBTAs. In contrast, as male ICBTs likely to participate in
CBTAs are more active, the number of women ICBTs started to decline (Malaba and Chipika 2012: 23).
In addition, there is a lack of information on CBTAs; they are not yet well-known among ICBTs to getenough participants (Malaba and Chipika 2012: 23).
5. Conclusion
Undoubtedly, ICBTs play a prominent role in the African continent, constituting essential parts of theAfrican regional economy. With support from international organizations and/or donor countries, theCOMESA has been simplifying trading procedures while supporting ICBTs to follow them.
Supplementally, certification of border crossings by all governments might also encourage theformalization of ICBTs. These efforts should have benefited both the formal economy and the ICBTs
themselves. However, there is no real indication of the progress of such formalization.
Through the literature analysis in this study, I conclude that this paradox is possibly caused by theunderestimation of the gender perspective of ICBTs in the process of creating a system. Deep
investigation of various surveys have revealed that the profile of ICBTs is more characteristic thanvarious definitions used in policy debates. According to recent surveys, the majority of ICBTs consistsof women with children, especially divorced women. Although their education levels are not necessarily
as low as was expected, poor social networks caused by their marital status make women ICBTs stayaway from formalization efforts by political actors. However, the STR pay little attention to such gender
perspectives of issues related to ICBTs. Moreover, CBTAs that are expected to be intermediaries
between ICBTs and formal political actors have also been dominated by male traders. Thus, women
ICBTs’ voices are difficult to be reflected in policy debates, making the emergence of a gap between
them and the formalization discourse inevitable. In this sense, the formalization discourse might havean opposite effect.
The COVID-19 pandemic delivered an extreme blow to Africa and to the ICBTs themselves.
Especially, restrictive border control and market closure directly affected their trading activities.
Without access to markets, they lose their source of income. Moreover, many ICBTs do not havesufficient capital/savings, making the management of their daily lives difficult during the pandemic(Quartz Africa 2020). Even after lockdowns are over, the environment surrounding ICBTs is not thesame. Some countries have stopped giving day passes to border-community residents (Mvunga andKunaka 2021: 5), raising the cost of border crossing. In addition, ICBTs might have to pay for COVID19 tests.
An increase in the costs of border crossing would deal long-term damage to women ICBTs, theirfamilies, and the community as a whole. It is necessary to pay attention to African borders and strengthen― 76 ―

Why Do Informal Cross Border Traders (ICBTs) Operate Informally? The Paradox of the Formalization of ICBTs in Africa

political approach that directly reflects ICBTs’ voices.

Acknowledgements
This work is based on the research project titled ‘Comparative Studies on Intra-Regionalism on
International Migration’ (JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 21H00686, Principal investigator: Junichi
Akashi).

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Facilitation’.
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October 2021>― 82 ―

Refugee Mobility and Uncertain Lives:
Challenges and Agency of South Sudanese Refugees in Uganda

Isao Murahashi
African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan

Abstract
Mobility is essential for improving the standard of living and enhancing food security, particularly fordisplaced people. For those living in the conflict-ridden areas of Africa, border crossings and onwards
movement are commonplace, which complicates simplistic ideas about displacement and return. This
paper examines the mobility of the South Sudanese people who crossed the South Sudan-Uganda border.
It highlights historical cross-border mobility and the current situation for refugees in Uganda. Since themid-1950s, when the first South Sudanese took refuge in Uganda, both the Ugandans and South
Sudanese repeatedly crossed the shared border to escape civil wars. Currently, most of the South
Sudanese, who fled the recent conflict in South Sudan, remain in Uganda despite the peace agreementof 2018. They seek an opportunity to return. South Sudanese in exile have continually been exposed to
uncertain futures. Uganda, which has the largest number of refugees in Africa, prioritises the repatriationof refugees. Here, we present a case study of mid-western Uganda. I present the experiences of multiple
refugee displacements. I discuss the agency of refugees, discuss how they employ mobility for a secure
life, and whether they decide to settle among the local population in Uganda or return home.

Keywords: refugee mobility, border crossing, civil war, South Sudanese, Uganda― 83 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

1. Introduction
1.1. Aim: Human mobility in conflict-ridden areas
At the end of 2020, the data of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR) showed that 82.4 million people were forcefully displaced worldwide, including 26.4 million
refugees and 48.0 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) (UNHCR 2021a). The number of forced
migrants has almost doubled since 2010, though the mobility of displacement has been restricted due tothe Covid-19 pandemic. For refugee issues seen as a global crisis, the UNHCR is mandated to seek longlasting solutions, viz., 1) local integration in neighbouring countries, 2) resettlement and permanentasylum in a third country, and 3) voluntary repatriation to the country of origin. Of these, voluntary
repatriation is considered the most appropriate solution only if the home country is peaceful and secure(Yonekawa 2020: viii).
This view is grounded on the assumption that most refugees who fled conflicts will take refuge inrefugee camps. There, the UNHCR will provide relief, food items, and basic services with NGOs.
Refugees will eventually want to return home. Repatriation to the home country is regarded as avoluntary return, ending ‘the refugee cycle’ — both breaking the cycle of violence, persecution andflight, and the completion of the cycle for those able to return to their homes (Koser and Black 1999).
In that sense, repatriation is seen as an unproblematic and sustainable solution to displacement by the
UNHCR and the international community. Despite multiple cases of ‘official’ repatriation in the last
three decades 1 , little is known about refugees who experienced multiple displacements, the later
movements of those who returned home, or the onwards movements of those who rejected repatriation.
Furthermore, given the repeated conflicts in some parts of Africa, the regional cross-border movementsof local people are more multifarious and diverse than the linear trajectory of the ‘refugee cycle’. They
disrupt simplistic ideas of return and repatriation.
As Long and Crisp (2010) indicated, there is growing recognition in the UNHCR that refugee
mobility is a positive asset that can contribute to their lasting protection. This is reflected by many
academic reports indicating that the home country of forced migrants is often not a desirable place toreturn to, given its chronic insecurity, food insecurity, and a lack of basic services and livelihood means.
Meanwhile, it is recognised that mobility and transnational networks often constitute effective strategies
among the protracted refugee population. Even though secondary movements (also called the onwards
movement — which refers to refugees moving independently from the first host country to a third
country 2 ), are seen strictly of concern to the international refugee regime (Scalettaris 2009: 58).
However, the changing attitude of the UNHCR to refugee mobility has not been embraced by the
In the 1990s, known as the ‘decades of voluntary repatriation’, on average, 1.5 million refugees were able toreturn home each year.
2
Onward movement includes movements of the migrants who do not have official travel permits such as visas.
They are often called undocumented migrants.
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Refugee Mobility and Uncertain Lives: Challenges and Agency of South Sudanese Refugees in Ugandainternational community. Displacement solutions have focused on containing or reversing the
movement of migrants, rather than on restoring the lost rights which prompted flight (Long and Crisp
2010: 56).
This paper scrutinises the mobility of the South Sudanese, focusing on historical cross-bordermobility in wartime and the current protracted situation for refugees in Uganda. Here, I discuss refugee
experiences in multiple displacements and movements, revealing what it means to be a ‘refugee’ in
Uganda, when and why a ‘refugee’ refugee decides to remain or return in uncertain social conditions,and how they employ mobility to seek better lives or respond to various demands from their families. Inline with recent issues, such as the protracted refugee situation and Covid-19, I discuss the complex
realities of the displacement and return of the South Sudanese, and interrogate simplistic ideas about
repatriation based on binary views about home and away.
1.2. Background, methods, and location
Uganda has a long history of hosting refugees in Africa. This can be traced back to the 1940s, when
under British colonial rule the Polish refugees were hosted in two settlements (Lingelbach 2020). In
1955, tens of thousands of refugees who fled southern Sudan under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium
arrived in northern Uganda. In addition, after the ‘Social Revolution’ of 1959, more refugees came from
Rwanda into southwestern Uganda. Since its independence in 1962, Uganda has been an epicentre forrefugees, being a favourable destination for those who escaped from conflict-prone African countries,
including Sudan/South Sudan 3, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, andBurundi (Figure 1).
Today, Uganda is the top refugee-hosting state in Africa. At the end of 2020, Uganda hosted
approximately 1.4 million refugees (UNHCR 2021a). Moreover, Uganda generated refugees in the late1970s and witnessed almost two million IDPs in the 1990s when the government of Uganda fought
against the rebels of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the northern region. Prolonged insecurity inthe region means that Uganda has hosted a considerable number of refugees for several decades, manyof whom have stayed for protracted periods.
This paper focusses on the refugee-hosting areas in mid-western Uganda. Each refugee-hosting area
has its distinct history and characteristics 4 (Figure 2). For this study, I collected the data through a survey
and participant observation during fieldwork. Three districts which consist of the former Masindi
District, viz., Kiryandongo, Buliisa, and Masindi in the Bunyoro sub-region, have hosted refugees forSouth Sudan seceded from Sudan to become a sovereign state in July 2011, after a twenty-two-year civil war. In
this paper, the name of southern Sudan is used for the time period before independence, while South Sudan refers
to the state after its secession from the north, namely present-day Sudan. South Sudan almost corresponds withsouthern Sudan in terms of geographical location.
4
Apart from mid-western Uganda, West Nile Sub-region – north-western Uganda and the south-western region
are also major refugee hosting areas.
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decades. The Masindi settlement (1942–1948) in Buliisa District was the first refugee settlement in
Uganda. It hosted the Polish refugees. In the 1960s, Kigumba in Kiryandongo District saw an increasein population, due to the influx of labour migrants from Kenya and self-settled Sudanese who escaped
the escalating intensity of the civil war 5 (Charsley 1974). I interviewed a South Sudanese man whosefamily members had been in exile in Uganda; he came to Japan as an international student. In 2021, I
paid a short visit to a family member who remained in a village in the Buliisa District.
I most often visited the Kiryandongo Refugee Settlement (KRS) in the Kiryandongo District for
research. The KRS was established to host Sudanese refugees who escaped from the East Bank of Sudan
in 1989. Since 1991, most of the refugees hosted in the KRS have been South Sudanese, except in 2007
and 2013. As of 2021, the total population of the KRS is estimated to be over 72,000 (UNHCR 2021b),
while Bweyale has approximately 31,000 (UBOS 2014) 6 . My initial fieldwork for South Sudanese
refugees began in August 2014 in the KRS, about half a year after the South Sudanese conflict brokeout in Juba and the north-eastern parts of South Sudan. Since then, I have collected data whenever I
visited KRS intermittently between 2015 and 2021. In most cases in the KRS and its adjacent Ugandan
town, Bweyale, using semi-structured interviews – sitting, chatting, eating and drinking together withinterlocutors in KRS.

Figure 1. Refugee flows of 1961–2014 in Uganda
Source: Crawford et al. (2015).
Note: This figure is based on the number supplied by the UNHCR consultant.

Self-settled refugees refer to the forced migrants who are not encamped, intentionally or accidentally, in theofficial refugee camps or settlements established and recognised by the refugee-hosting states and the UNHCR.
6
The refugee number that the UNHCR publishes represents those who register with the organisation in the KRS.
The actual population of the settlement may be less, considering that many South Sudanese refugees are practicallyliving in Bweyale.
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Refugee Mobility and Uncertain Lives: Challenges and Agency of South Sudanese Refugees in Uganda

Figure 2. Map of the research area and refugee settlements in Uganda
Source: UNHCR (2021b).
2. History of wartime migration
2.1. Initial wave of Sudanese ‘refugees’
In the 1960s, the number of Sudanese refugees increased when the fighting between the Sudanese Armed
Forces and the southern rebels, known as Anya-nya, raged. This was the first wave of refugees fromsouthern Sudan to Uganda. By the end of the First Sudanese Civil War in 1972, the Sudanese
government estimated that 500,000 people had hidden in the bush, and another 180,000 had crossed intoneighbouring countries, with 74,000 settling in several official camps including Onigo, Agago, Acholipii, and Nakapiripirit, among others (Moro 2019). Refugees mostly came from areas contiguous with
the Ugandan border. They included various ethnic groups such as the Bari-speaking people 7, Lotuhospeaking people 8, Madi and Acholi. In some cases, they had co-ethnic Ugandan hosts, such as Kakwa,
Acholi, and Madi.
In the 1960s and the 1970s, more than half of the displaced Sudanese were self-settled in a group inother parts of Uganda. Some stayed together with their Ugandan relatives and friends, using alreadyestablished transnational networks. Others took refuge in official camps, seeking educational
opportunities.

Bari speakers include Bari, Kuku, Nyepu, Kakwa, Pojulu and others, living in both banks of the Nile.
Lotuho speakers include the multiple ethnic groups, such as Lotuho, Lokoya, Lango and Lopit, living on the eastbank of the Nile.

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2.2. Informal self-settlement: Experience of uncertain journeys
Here, I describe the experience of the family of sons of displaced Sudanese, taking their journey andsettlement in Uganda as an example. All individual names shown in this paper are pseudonyms so thatno individuals can be identified.
Jacob was born in Nyabyeya village, close to the former Masindi settlement which hosted Polish
refugees. His grandfather, who joined the rebels as a fighter, fled home with his wife in the late 1960s,
when he was targeted for killing by the Sudanese army. They first settled in Kigumba, where Kenyan
migrants had already settled. At that time, they did not receive official support from the government or
NGOs. Therefore, they had to look for jobs as wage labourers.
Jacob narrates the experience of his family as below 9:
When they arrived at the time, they were not helped as ‘refugees’. They did not receive
any assistance. Life was very hard, but the industrialisation of Uganda facilitated displaced
people to have started looking for jobs. Some of my grandfather’s colleagues went toKakira, where there was a sugar factory 10. My grandfather and colleagues were factorylabourers. They travelled to and between Kakira and Kigumba. My father was born in 1970
in Kigumba as a son of [a] Sudanese ‘refugee’. Kigumba was like an informal settlement,
and Arabic was commonly spoken.
In the late 1980s, after the Kakira sugar factory stopped operating, my grandfather left
for the Budongo Forest 11 in Masindi, where the timber industry was operated in a sawmill
factory. In Masindi, the Kinyara sugar factory 12 was also operated. They decided to lookfor jobs in sugar or sawmill factories. They moved with their families to Nyabyeya, located
40 km west of Kigumba. The Sudanese Nyepu 13 people self-settled in the village, where
the Polish refugees left.
Over several generations, they have not been recognised as Ugandans. My family
members were all born and have lived, including me, but not seen as refugees or Ugandans.
My grandfather, and later on, my father told us that we have been temporarily staying in
Uganda, and must go back [to] Sudan as peace comes to there.

This narrative is based on my interview with Jacob held in the winter of 2020.
The Kakira Sugar factory was constructed in the 1940s by the Kakira Sugar Works Limited, which was set up
by Muljibhai Madhvani, who was of Indian origin, and continued to operate till the 1970s, when the Madhvanifamily was expelled from Uganda by the erstwhile Ugandan president, Idi Amin.
11
The Budongo Forest is located close to Lake Albert. It has abundant tropical rain forests and wild chimpanzees.
12
The Kinyara sugar factory dates to a jaggery factory constructed in the 1950’s by Kinyara Sugar Works Limited.
Since then, Kinyara Sugar Works Limited has been the second largest sugar producer in Uganda.
13
The Nyepu is the ethnic community in the southern Sudan. They are sometimes recognised as a splinterpopulation of the Kuku, but the Nyepu claim their own ethnic identity.
9

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At the time of the signing of CPA 14, the Sudanese in Nyabyeya gathered together, and weare performing traditional dances for celebration. I then started returning to Sudan.
His narrative about their family’s experience of displacement and dispersal, shows how the Sudanesein Uganda try to seek employment without official support from the UNHCR. They are considered
foreigners, not refugees or Ugandan nationals, by Ugandan host communities. As Moro (2019), who
was once displaced with his family in Uganda 15, points out, the Sudanese who were not encamped in
the official refugee settlements in the 1960s and 70s acquired land with their earnings and became poll
taxpayers in Uganda, thereby shifting their place of residence. Some settled in Gulu, the largest town innorthern Uganda, while others went southwards to settle in Kigumba and Bweyale in the mid-west. In
these towns, Ugandans of Indian origin operated cotton ginning mills or other businesses and employed
them as casual labourers. In Kigumba, a group of Sudanese people began to settle as migrant labourers
under a government-led settlement scheme launched in 1957 16. While their numbers increased greatly
in the mid and late 1960s due to the upheavals in southern Sudan, it was without any official sponsorshipor organisation (Charsley 1974: 342). They have settled, widely recognised as a distinct group under an
ethnic label of ‘Sudani,’ among the heterogeneous peoples, including native Nyoro, Kenyan and
Ugandan migrant workers (ibid. 347). Although many displaced Sudanese were free to move in Uganda,
they were vulnerable to exploitation and harassment, and their lives were hard due to a lack of citizenship(Moro 2019).
In 1972, with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, the First Sudanese Civil War, which costan estimated one million lives, came to end. The Repatriation and Resettlement Commission wasestablished to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees, supported by the governments of Sudanand Uganda. The UNHCR also coordinated the official repatriation program with the provision of food,shelter and transportation to returnees. According to the Commission’s report in 1974, half the Sudanese‘refugees’ 17 had settled ‘spontaneously’ among the local population in the country of asylum. The
largest group of self-settled refugees was in Uganda (63 per cent), followed by Zaire and Ethiopia (Akol
1994: 81).

The CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) was signed between the government of Sudan and the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in January 2005 in Naivasha in Kenya, ending the twenty-twoyear Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005).
15
Leben’s family were settled near Gulu, the largest town in northern Uganda, among a host community of
Ugandan Acholi. The ethnic group of the Nyepu, that Jacob hails from, is now considered part of the Kuku, that
Leben Moro came from.
16
The Kigumba Settlement Scheme was launched during from 1957–1962 to encourage agriculture. It was not
obvious where suitable settlers could be acquired from, and about twenty plots were allocated to Sudanese,selected from those already at Kigumba. Three months later a Mulugoli, a member of one of the Luyia tribes (theMaragoli) from western Kenya, who was working at Masindi as a railways clerk, heard of the scheme (Charsley
1968: 17).
17
In the Commission’s report, all persons directly and indirectly affected by the conflict were included and definedas ‘refugees’, broadening the OAU definition of refugees to meet the specific needs of the refugees and IDPs.
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At an early stage, this official repatriation operation faced many challenges that were contrary to theCommission’s optimistic expectations, partly because many refugees were reluctant to return home.
Like Jacob’s family, several Sudanese remained in Uganda and settled informally among the local
population, after the official repatriation operation ended in 1974 18 . The ‘voluntary’ repatriation of
refugees was influenced by several factors: 1) the way refugees had been settled during their exile, 2)
the first impression of the early returnees of the general situation in southern Sudan, and 3) the level ofsocio-economic development that ‘refugees’ had achieved while in exile (ibid. 84). In the 1970s,
relatively self-sufficient and affluent Sudanese, who chose to self-settle, tended to remain in Uganda
until the fall of Idi Amin of 1979, while those living in poverty were more ready to return home.
In terms of mobility, the main characteristic of the Sudanese in Uganda during the First Sudanese
Civil War (1955–1972) was that they were able to exploit a transnational network, based on the links ofkinship and friendship, which had been established during the colonial era through trade and seasonallabour. They preferred self-settling to being accommodated in camps. Even though they enjoyed thefreedom of movement to seek informal employment, and were incorporated informally into theheterogeneous community of multiple ethnicities without overt segregation in mid-western Uganda,
their lives were hard and precarious, due to the lack of citizenship and their refugee status.
3. Encampment policy and its effect on refugee mobility
3.1. Second wave of Sudanese refugees: Establishment of the KRS
The relatively peaceful time did not last long in southern Sudan. In 1983, the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was organised to wage an armed struggle against the government of Sudan(the Second Sudanese Civil War). The civil war was so brutal and prolonged that it had a disastrous
impact on the civilians, who suffered disease, displacement, famine and impoverishment. At least 1.5
million people were killed, over four million were displaced internally, and hundreds of thousands more
were displaced to neighbouring countries by the time the CPA was signed in 2005. Most Sudanese
refugees experienced protracted refugee conditions, until mass repatriation began in the mid-2000s.
They arrived in Uganda in large numbers in the late 1980s and early 1990s, especially in the aftermathof internal divisions in the SPLM/A. The new wave of refugees received generous assistance from the
UNHCR and the government of Uganda, whose policy was to confine refugees in camps and dedicatedareas called ‘refugee settlements’. Effectively, the policy redefined a refugee as ‘someone receiving
assistance and living in a camp’ (Kaiser 2006a: 605, Moro 2019). Since they were presumed to besupporters of the SPLM/A, a close ally of Uganda’s governing National Resistance Movement (NRM),

In Uganda and Zaire, 6 per cent of total ‘refugees’ refused to return home, while about 70 per cent were officiallyrepatriated and the rest are believed to have returned home independently, without support by the UNHCR, or tohave remained in the country of asylum without registering for a repatriation programme.

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Refugee Mobility and Uncertain Lives: Challenges and Agency of South Sudanese Refugees in Uganda

no obstacles were put in the way of refugees seeking entry to Uganda and they were granted refugee
status on a prima facie basis, obviating the need for individual status determination procedures (Kaiser
2008: 255). During this period, large refugee settlements were established to host approximately
200,000 Sudanese refugees in the West Nile (Arua and Moyo District) 19 and mid-western Uganda(Masindi District).
The KRS is one of these refugee settlements. It dates back to the Ugandan government and the
UNHCR’s establishment of a transit centre to host about 14,000 Sudanese refugees, who fled Eastern
Equatoria in southern Sudan after an attack by the SPLA on Torit and the border towns in 1989. While
this group arrived in Uganda from various areas of Sudan, the majority were Sudanese Acholi. Those
who crossed the border were hosted in a transit camp in the Kitgum District of northern Uganda. Shortly
after they arrived, they were harassed by the LRA rebels. In 1990, the Ugandan government granted theland in the Masindi District for use by refugees and set up a transit centre to fulfil the UNHCR’s requestthat the Sudanese refugees be transferred to a safer location. In 1991, the government of Uganda and the
UNHCR formalised the establishment of the KRS and allocated land to refugees the next year. Eachrefugee family, due to the lack of citizenship and their refugee status, was allocated a plot of land inproportion to the number of family members (Mulumba 2010: 192) 20.
In the 1960s, many Sudanese Acholi who fled to Uganda, opted to self-settle among Ugandan
communities where they had links of family and friendship. However, in the late 1980s, many Sudanese
refugees had little choice but to be accommodated in the official camps or settlements, owing to
insecurity and distrust among the people in northern Uganda. Since the 1980s, the official settlement
policy has been more thoroughly enforced by the Ugandan government in the context of regional
insurgencies. According to Kaiser (2000a), this was partly because the Ugandan government was
prompted to monitor the Sudanese refugee situation via its network of Local Councils (LCs) 21, due totheir suspicion that the Sudanese government supported the Ugandan rebel activities of the LRA.
Furthermore, Ugandan Acholi also feared repercussions from the Ugandan government or the LRA ifthey absorb their Sundanese relatives into their communities (Kaiser 2000a: 39).
3.2. Refugee mobility in the protracted situations: The case of KRS
Kaiser (2006a: 598) pointed out that states prefer the encampment of refugees for the following reasons:they offer visibility (which helps with claims for burden-sharing), they offer mechanisms forcontainment and control (which help mitigate any perceived security threats in the short term), and they
Adjumani District was created in 1997 when the eastern part of Moyo District split off in 1997. Yumbe District
was established in 2006, when Aringa County was split off Arua District. At present, these two districts host thelargest number of South Sudanese refugees in Uganda.
20
1.2 hectares to 1.4 hectares of land was provided to Sudanese refugees in KRS.
21
The local government system of LCs was introduced by the government of Uganda in the 1990s fordecentralisation of power.
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reduce the risk that the refugee populations will coalesce into the host population, thereby failing torepatriate when conditions change in their home country. In Uganda, the state’s preference for theencampment policy was supported, if not actively encouraged, by the UNHCR.
For the government of Uganda and the UNHCR, there were several reasons the encampment policy
was seen as a feasible solution. First, it was necessary to protect Sudanese refugees physically fromunstable security situations in northern Uganda, where there was a risk that refugees would be targetedby rebels like the LRA. For the Ugandan government, the location of refugee settlement in remote,politically marginalised border areas meant that it could keep security risks at a distance. Second, the
UNHCR and its NGOs can provide relief operations, such as food assistance and service delivery, more
promptly and effectively to the ‘settlement refugees’ – the recognised beneficiaries. Third, thegovernment of Uganda and the UNHCR seemingly prioritised the ‘voluntary’ repatriation of refugees
to Sudan over local integration in Uganda, among the permanent solutions. Refugee encampments
reflect the desire to maintain separate refugee populations, thereby preventing them from merging into
local Ugandan communities and instead facilitating ‘voluntary’ repatriation.
In the Ugandan settlement system, refugees were required to stay on plots allocated by the Office of
the Prime Minister (OPM). They were also encouraged to practice agriculture to produce substantial
crops for self-consumption and a surplus of cash crops for selling. They were expected to earn a living
over the years through agricultural production and other income-generating activities, under the
Ugandan refugee policy, which was aimed at achieving refugee self-sufficiency and integration ofservices for refugee settlements and refugee-hosting areas. This policy led to the introduction of the
Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) for refugees, launched in the West Nile in 1999. The SRS was
enthusiastically welcomed by the UNHCR and NGOs. For the UNHCR and international donors, theobjective of the SRS was to create a situation where refugees no longer needed direct assistance to meettheir immediate and wider needs, in their country of asylum.
In the KRS in the mid-1990s, the UNHCR and its implementing partners withdrew their relief fromthe settlements and sought to ‘hand over’ responsibility for them to the Ugandan government (Kaiser
2000b). A partial explanation is the UNHCR saw that many refugees in the KRS produced enough maizeto achieve self-sufficiency, and the KRS was the only settlement for Sudanese refugees in Uganda that
had never experienced any insecurity. However, the UNHCR’s withdrawal faced strong opposition from
Sudanese refugees as well as the local hosts. The former were worried about the degradation of basic
services in the settlement, while the latter feared it would lead to competition with refugees for resources.
The UNHCR’s withdrawal from the KRS triggered discussion over the responsibility between the
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Refugee Mobility and Uncertain Lives: Challenges and Agency of South Sudanese Refugees in Uganda

the refugees and their hosts 22.
In fact, during the late 1990s and the early 2000s, there was no significant improvement in foodsecurity and livelihoods among Sudanese refugees, although the situation varied between refugeesettlements. In some settlements, land quality was poor and the allocated plots for farming were far fromlocal markets. Even during the 2000s, Sudanese refugees in the KRS were unable to generate enoughproduce to meet their basic needs and fund necessities such as health care, education, and non-fooditems (Kaiser 2007). Years after the plots were allocated, the increase in population led to added pressure
on the land, which was already exhausted from repeated use (ibid. 222). Some inhabitants continued toreceive a proportion of the full food ration, but food rations were phased out for many of them.
Furthermore, some families had unregistered relatives who received no food aid, either because theyfailed to negotiate the bureaucratic system properly, or because they had transferred illegally fromanother settlement (ibid. 223).
Sudanese refugees’ livelihood strategies were negatively affected by legal restrictions on their
movements. They were required to obtain travel permits issued by the OPM 23 when they left thesettlement in which they were registered. Not only were refugees unable to choose where they wishedto live, but they were also not allowed to take up opportunities to access available fertile land outside
the settlements. Nor could they move freely to access other employment opportunities and engage inbusiness activities (ibid. 223).
Despite such constraints on mobility, refugees sought ways to generate income to make a living forthemselves and their families. The most common was to sell agricultural products to local traders andmiddlemen. In the KRS and its neighbouring local communities, maize was the main crop for daily foodand cash. In the KRS, traders entered the settlement with trucks at harvest time and bought at relatively
low prices (Murahashi 2021: 266). Some refugees were able to establish themselves as vegetable farmers
as well as petty traders within settlements or in the local Ugandan market. They sometimes travelled
outside settlements to sell their agricultural produce without travel permits. Local Ugandans gatheredaround the settlement to get access to health and educational services, both inside and outside thesettlements. Bweyale Town, the Ugandan host community adjacent to the KRS developed and attracted
various informal business activities in the 2000s (Murahashi 2021). It has more than doubled in size
since the arrival of Sudanese refugees and significant numbers of Ugandan IDPs, who fled the LRA’s
attack on civilians in northern Uganda.
The same situation was also seen in remote refugee settlements close to the border areas, where
economic activities and the population around the settlements increased notably. Refugees with businessThis discussion between the UNHCR and the government of Uganda led to the SRS in 1999.
The OPM is the refugee affairs authority of the government of Uganda. It has centralised control andmanagement over all refugees and asylum seekers in the refugee settlements and Kampala.

22
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interests, professionals such as schoolteachers, and other people with non-agricultural professions
desired to remain in urban settings to pursue their livelihoods. The cross-border movement between
Uganda and Sudan was facilitated by self-settling in urban settings outside the settlements. Some
refugees left the settlements for a few weeks or a month to get casual work, called lejaleja in Kiswahili,or to receive schooling in distant towns.
Kaiser (2007: 223) describes those refugees who left the settlement, temporarily or for a relatively
long time, as ‘moving up and down looking for money’ in various ways, and they drew on a range ofresources to do so. Consequently, Sudanese refugees preferred to move out of settlements, to improvetheir livelihoods through casual labour and trade, if they could afford to do so. However, Ugandan
refugees moved to settle in areas close to a settlement, so that they could get involved in work and haveaccess to the various services provided by the settlement, such as schools and health centres. Some
refugees married local Ugandans and were integrated into their communities. Others divided their family
members into settlements and outside locations.
In 2005, when the CPA was signed to end twenty years of civil war, residents of the KRS welcomed
it, though they had been relatively slow to register for voluntary repatriation (Kaiser 2006b: 72). Many
refugees wondered if their homes would see infrastructural and developmental progress before returning
to the areas devastated by the prolonged war. Most of the KRS Sudanese returned to South Sudan by
2010, while approximately 10 per cent of residents remained in the KRS for reasons such as overseeing
the continuing education of students and looking after aged parents and vulnerable groups. Thesefamilies opted to divide family members between the settlement and their home country. For example,
one of my interlocutors, Sarah, fled a village called Pajok 24 near the border in 1990 at age ten. She wasraised and educated in the KRS and married an Acholi refugee. Her husband returned to Juba to seek
work, rather than the rural village, after the CPA was signed in 2005. She chose to remain in thesettlement, for the sake of her children’s education and to care for her elderly father. Her relationshipwith her husband worsened after he married another woman in Juba. Her father, elder brother and elder
sister lived in the settlement. She managed to make ends meet without her husband’s support.
4. Recent waves of South Sudanese refugees
4.1. Recent waves of South Sudanese refugees and the ‘new’ refugee policy
After the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War in 2005, movement across the South Sudan-Uganda
border became commonplace and much easier, until fresh conflicts began to affect the border regions.
In 2011, South Sudan’s secession from Sudan was largely supported and welcomed by the South
Sudanese. Only two years later, however, the world’s newest country lapsed into a civil war. This war
Pajok is a village on the Ugandan border where most of the KRS’s Acholi residents hail from. They escaped thearrival of the SPLA, after it attacked the military barracks of the Sudanese army near the village in 1989.

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was so brutal, devastating, and fragmented that by mid-2016, South Sudan was Africa’s greatest refugee
crisis. Both soldiers and civilians were targeted for killing and looting by government forces andopposition on an ethnic basis. Uganda hosted 970,000 South Sudanese refugees (62 per cent of all
Ugandan refugees) (UNHCR 2021b).
In 2006, the Ugandan government renewed its legal policy for refugees with the enactment of the
Refugees Act, followed by the 2010 Refugee Regulations, by which refugees and asylum seekers wereentitled to have relative freedom of movement with permission to leave and return to their designatedsettlements, and to work and access Ugandan social services, including education and health systems.
The new Ugandan refugee laws were praised by the international community and UN agencies as aprogressive and open-door policy.
After the new influx of South Sudanese refugees, Uganda launched a response scheme called the
Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) Strategic Framework, aiming at bringing
together a wide range of stakeholders to more effectively promote the resilience and self-reliance of theentire population of refugee-hosting areas. As with the local settlement policy, the Ugandan government
allocated refugees land for farming and residence within a settlement, to supplement food rations.
4.2. Uncertain lives in exile and fragile peace at home
Despite such a new and progressive approach to refugee response, it has been argued that there is a gap
between the goals and practices. Several disadvantages have recently been noted, owing to the vast
number of refugees as well as a major corruption scandal. First, land issues in the settlement became
more serious. Due to the increasing number of refugees, the land given to refugees in the settlements
was so small that it was almost impossible to maintain a self-sustaining life. By 2017, a plot of land only
30 × 30 m was allocated to each refugee family in any settlement in northern and mid-western Uganda,
including the KRS.
The lack of land forced refugees to demand monthly food rations. However, the World Food
Programme (WFP) has been forced to cut the amount of grain (sorghum or maize) in food rations due
to severe funding shortages. It also frequently fails to distribute food regularly because of the poordelivery system.
In addition, refugees were often harassed by the corruption that some Ugandan officials and UNHCR
staff are suspected of. Refugees are asked to pay bribes for registration and they fail to obtain refugee
status or receive food rations if they cannot pay. Meanwhile, some refugees inflated family attestation
cards or increased the number of family members to receive more food, in exchange for bribes. This
corruption was exposed in the spring of 2018 (Sserunjogi 2018). In response to this ‘Refugee Scandal’,
which revealed the systematic inflation of refugee numbers, the UNHCR instituted a large-scalebiometric registration and verification programme for six months. It lasted until September 2018 (WFP
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)2018). The UNHCR sought to quantify the true number of Uganda-based refugees, reducing thepossibility of corruption and refugees cheating the food ration system. After the verification program
was completed, registration in multiple settlements or double registration of family members wasbanned to prevent the taking of double food rations. Instead, a cash transfer system was offered to
refugees as an alternative option. Refugee families could choose to receive cash or food rations.
This change and stiffening of the food ration system did not resolve the food shortage in refugeesettlements. Some refugees could no longer double register themselves and their families or collect foodfor the absentees, such as friends and kinsmen who had left the settlement and settled in local towns, as
they had been able to do under the previous system. Although more transparent, the new food ration
system harmed food security. Food rations are indispensable supplements, as insufficient food can beobtained by casual work alone. Refugees stranded in the refugee settlements depend on the minimal
support and services offered only in rural settlements, not in towns.
Security concerns remain significant, even after the 2018 signing of the Revitalised Agreement on
the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) 25. Although the R-ARCSS
was viewed positively by South Sudanese refugees, most recognised that the peace process is so fragile
there is no guarantee that it will end the conflicts. Fighting between government forces and a rebel groupthat rejected the signing of the R-ARCSS has continued in the Uganda-South Sudan border areas. Even
after the peace agreement that was established, based on political arrangements between the politicomilitary elites in South Sudan, incidents such as road ambushes on the highway, indiscriminate murders
in Juba or other towns, inter-and intra-communal conflicts in rural areas such as cattle-raiding have been
rampant and there are no clear signs that such violence will end. Therefore, most refugees are unwilling
to return home.
In 2019, the Ugandan government changed its attitude towards South Sudanese refugees. The
Ugandan Minster for Refugees called on them to return home after the signing of the R-ARCSS, arguingthat their country is ‘now peaceful’ (Ahimbisibwe and Belloni 2021: 20). This statement clearly showsthat the Ugandan government prioritised the voluntary repatriation option of the three permanent
solutions under the CRRF self-reliance and resilience policy. In Uganda, it is not expected that refugees,
irrespective of how long they have been in the country, will be naturalised into Ugandan nationals.
In March 2020, when the first case of Covid-19 was reported in Uganda, refugee mobility andlivelihoods were affected by new restrictions on cross-border movement (Okiror 2020). This has madeit more difficult for some refugees in Uganda to visit South Sudan to check on their relatives and assets,through what had been relatively porous borders (Sebba 2020). In addition, national travel restrictions
have had a significant impact on livelihoods, since refugees are no longer able to move to the next village

25

R-ACRSS is the peace agreement between the rival political-military parties in South Sudan.
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Refugee Mobility and Uncertain Lives: Challenges and Agency of South Sudanese Refugees in Uganda

or town to find work, sell their produce or purchase supplies (ibid.).
4.3. Refugee response and mobility in KRS: Individual practices and journeys
In the KRS, new waves of refugees include people with experience of exile. Many refugees who fled
the South Sudan-Uganda border areas had been refugees before, some as many as three times (in the
1960s, 1990–2000s and the present). Almost all Sudanese Acholi and Madi were refugees in the KRS,
other Ugandan settlements and Kenyan camps in the 1990s–2000s. Moreover, many continued to moveacross borders even after they were registered in Uganda. (Murahashi 2018). For young males who haverelatives and some family members in Ugandan towns, leaving and returning to settlements has been
constant for various reasons, such as attending college or university in Gulu, visiting relatives in
Kampala and attending funerals at home in South Sudan.
Here, I present the narratives of two refugees and their life stories as materials for discussing how
individual refugees employ mobility to sustain their lives. The first case is Dominic from the Madi inSouth Sudan, an adult orphan in his early 30s. Dominic narrates the experience of his family as follows 26:
I was raised as an orphan in a town near the Sudan–Uganda border after my parents were
killed during the Second Sudanese Civil War (supposedly 1980s–early 1990s). I stayed in[the] KRS, protected by a Catholic priest’s family during the 2000s, but I was chased awayby the host family after the pastor died. After the signing of the CPA, I repatriated [to]South Sudan. When fighting broke out in Juba in December 2013, soldiers searched forhouses and looted all properties. My house burned down. I decided to go back to
Kiryandongo, but I have not registered yet and stayed in a settlement because I am afraidof my former ‘family’. When I asked them to add me as a family member, they refused. If
there is no family, it is challenging for me to get support.
In 2014, Dominic started an informal job as a ‘mobile photographer’ with his friend’s support. He
takes photos of people, both refugees and Ugandans, in and around the KRS. Every 10 days, he goes tophoto studios in Kampala to retouch and develop them. There is a high demand for photographs of hostcommunities and refugees among the residents of the KRS.
He expected to benefit from more business opportunities by staying in the town rather than settling.
He emphasised that being a ‘mobile photographer’ was his only means of survival and said, ‘Suppose,
I live in the refugee settlement, I will have no money. Nobody will help me’. He wants to resume his
schooling at all costs, because it stopped at the primary level due to a lack of money.

26

This narrative is from my field note, written in 2015, based on my interview with Dominic.
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

His life was punctuated by several upheavals. He was robbed of most of his belongings by a thief in
mid-2015. He can no longer rent a house in the town or take refuge in the nearby church. He told methat in such a situation, ‘All I can do is pray to God’. Moreover, he was hospitalised in a nearby city
after he fell seriously ill and collapsed on the road.
Later, he told me that he had been unconscious in the hospital for some days and could not moveeven after he was revived. This crisis led to a new encounter. A Ugandan woman cared for him while
he was hospitalised, and they began to live together in the town soon after he was discharged. They bore
a son in 2016 and were registered as a refugee family in the KRS. Although his marriage was notguaranteed by any payment of a bridal price, the mother of his girlfriend allowed them to stay together 27.
When he had a new family, he decided to register as a refugee with his wife and son, and successfully
obtained refugee status.
He is currently running a kiosk and resumed his job as a mobile photographer in Bweyale. He aspires
to lease a plot of land in a town and bring over his aunt, who has lived alone in a suburb of Kampala
since her husband passed away 28. Like other South Sudanese youth, his life is uncertain and contingent
on social conditions (i.e. war, death of biological family members, his adoptive family’s refusal to accept
him, looting and theft). His future aspirations do not include repatriation, as his wife is unwilling to stayin South Sudan and he has no job and only a few relatives to care for them. Instead, he opted to settle in
Uganda to stay with his family.
The second subject in this study is Alex, a former rebel soldier in his late thirties from Moru in South
Sudan. He did not become a refugee until 2014. He had been ‘in the bush,’ implying that he was fighting
as a guerrilla soldier for the SPLA, during the Sudanese Civil War. However, the SPLA targeted his
ethnic group, due to political antagonism between the South Sudanese government and local supporters.
Soon after his arrival, Alex had several entrepreneurial ideas (i.e. the transnational trade of maize
produced in the settlement to South Sudan). He received four acres of land from the OPM and begancommercial farming. While many refugee farmers were not successful, he applied trial and error toincrease agricultural inputs and productivity. He worked on farming various cash crops, such as
vegetables, fruit, and sunflowers, and introduced an irrigation system into the settlement. His efforts
were evaluated and rewarded by NGOs, and he was hailed as a ‘model farmer’ in the KRS. His tribesmen
and kin have high expectations of him, and regard him as a leader who can rebuild the community in
the KRS.

The woman hailed from Ugandan Acholi. The people from the Uganda–South Sudan border area, such as the
Acholi and the Madi, have similar cultural habits. Intermarriage between two ethnic groups is not rare, eventhough there are not many cases of marriage between refugees and Ugandans.
28
The Refugees Act of 2006 in Uganda, states that refugees cannot own the land they cultivate or the homes they
live in — even if they have lived in the country for years. However, the growing population of refugees requires
the leasing of land outside of the refugee settlements for use in some refugee-hosting areas, which raises issues
over land between refugees and Ugandan nationals.
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Refugee Mobility and Uncertain Lives: Challenges and Agency of South Sudanese Refugees in Uganda

However, this does not mean that Alex has become a successful farmer, fully managing household
budgets. A lack of initial capital, an insufficient water system for irrigation, internal disputes between
refugees, and low payments for NGO extension workers were all obstacles to living in the camp.
Alex believes that educational opportunities for his children will ensure a better future for him andthem, although expensive school fees place a financial burden on the household. He said, ‘I have to pay
school fees for my children. Education for children will lead them toward a better future. However,school fees, including boarding, costs too much, and I cannot manage the total expenses’ 29.
He began to imagine a different future after five years of camp life. The first was the dream ofresettlement in a third country. As refugees in the KRS believe, the transnational network between the
refugee settlement and a third resettlement country can provide a great opportunity to overcome
stagnation, and pursue a better life. In 2018, Alex’s neighbour resettled in Australia through a family
reunification program. It is believed in the KRS that only those with families and relatives abroad canmanage life in the camp, as they receive remittances from them. Alex obtained a resettlement form froma friend in Australia and applied to the Ugandan authorities. His application was almost approved, but
he was asked to pay a heavy bribe that he could not afford.
In February 2020, following signs that the South Sudanese government and the opposition could
compromise in the implementation of the R-ARCSS, he decided to leave the settlement and return toJuba. Although he had already given up joining the opposition armed groups, he was always regarded
as a rebel commander in his hometown. Travelling home could have been a risk to his life. He said, ‘I
decided to leave the military because it is extremely useless in the current situation. I lost interest inserving my country because everybody is engaged in fighting for no good reason. Thus, I cannot findany reason to fight in South Sudan’.
In February 2020, when the government decided to collaborate with the armed opposition groups toform a new government, he returned to South Sudan. He is now self-employed in Juba, and has decided
to leave his wife and children in the KRS so that they can benefit from the safe environment and proper
education offered in Uganda.
5. Concluding remarks
The dynamics of many contemporary South Sudanese movements across the South Sudan-Ugandan
border suggest the continuation of the mobility patterns of earlier generations. During the fighting, boththe Ugandans and South Sudanese repeatedly crossed the shared border to escape the civil wars.
Currently, most of the South Sudanese who fled the recent conflict in South Sudan, remain in Uganda
even after the peace agreement, looking at an opportunity to return. The South Sudanese who are living

29This narrative is taken from my field notes written in 2018 based on my interview with Alex.
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

in exile have to cope with uncertain social and security conditions, while Uganda now hosts anunprecedented number of refugees.
Most refugees continue to investigate new possibilities to live and realise a better future in highly
uncertain conditions. Most of their attempts to maintain their livelihoods are directed toward their andtheir descendants’ futures, particularly focusing on education. The classic care and maintenanceprogramme has been criticised as it does not include any plans, whereas self-reliance and resilience
policies foster refugees’ hope for a better future. However, many refugees face challenges due tostructural constraints (i.e. income generation, employment, living costs and educational expenses).
Transnational networks between their homes in South Sudan and refugees in Uganda, or between
refugees in Uganda and their relatives in developed countries, play a key role in coping with uncertain
lives. Even Alex, who was regarded as a successful refugee farmer by the NGOs, failed to realise his
expectations and aspirations, due to insufficient NGO support.
In the camps, individual refugees aspire to different futures, according to their original plans for theirlives, as well as their experiences in the settlement (i.e. third-country resettlement). Whenever they failto find any tangible future in exile, they tend to escape into an imaginary world and harbour a fatalistic
attitude toward their future.

Acknowledgements
This work was supported by a Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellows (JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number
JP17J09937 and by the 2020 Canon Foundation in Europe/Kyoto University Japan-Africa Exchange
Program for fieldwork. During my fieldwork, I was supported by the OPM, the UNHCR in Uganda andthe refugees in the KRS. I would also like to express my thanks to the anonymous referees and Editage(www.editage.com) for English language editing. The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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Beyond the Cessation Clause:
Rwandan Refugees in Uganda—From Refugees to East African Citizens?

Frank Ahimbisibwe
Faculty of Interdisciplinary Studies, Mbarara University of Science and Technology, Uganda

Abstract
Since 2002, Uganda has been trying to find a durable solution to the Rwandan refugee issue without
success. Despite various attempts at (in)voluntary repatriation, the majority refuse to return.
Resettlement is not possible, and local integration is yet to be explored. Simultaneously, therecommendation for the cessation of refugee status by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees has not addressed the problem. We analysed the prospects and challenges of granting East
African citizenship to Rwandan refugees by issuing East African Community (EAC) passports orresidence permits that would give them freedom of mobility, residence, and employment in the EAC inaccordance with the Common Market Protocol. Searching for a durable solution at the EAC level comesat a time when efforts to establish the East African federation continue. This has the potential to end oneof the most protracted refugee situations, promoting the rights of Rwandan refugees, and enhancing
people-centred regional integration.

Keywords: Rwandan refugees, cessation clause, durable solutions, East African community, mobility,
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

1. Introduction
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘by the end of 2020, 82.4
million individuals were forcibly displaced as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights
violations or events seriously disturbing public order’ (UNHCR 2021: 2). Out of 82.4 million, 26.4
million were refugees 1, 48.0 million were internally displaced persons, and 4.1 million were asylum
seekers (UNHCR 2021: 2). Developing regions hosted 86 percent of the world’s refugees in 2020 under
the UNHCR mandate (UNHCR 2021). Uganda hosted over 1.4 million refugees in 2020, the highest
among all African countries and the fourth highest in the world (UNHCR 2021: 2). The Office of thePrime Minister (OPM) and UNHCR put the total number of refugees in Uganda at more than 1.5 million
by the end of August 2021 (OPM and UNHCR 2021). The majority of these refugees come fromneighbouring countries and the wider region comprising South Sudan, the Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC), Burundi, Somalia, Rwanda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, among others. By August 2021,
around 19,010 of the 1.5 million refugees in Uganda were Rwandan, who arrived during and after the
1994 Rwandan genocide.
Rwandan refugees have settled in Nakivale, Oruchinga, Kyaka II, and Kyangwali refugee settlements
in rural Uganda, while some others are in urban areas (Karooma 2014: 11). Other Rwandan refugees aresecondary movers – those who came from neighbouring countries such as Tanzania and DRC following
the forced repatriations of 1996/1997, and were unable to return because they faced persecution on
account of their first departure (ibid.). Rwandan asylum seekers (both Hutu and Tutsi) continue to cometo Uganda claiming persecution, human rights violations, and dictatorship in Rwanda 2. These asylum
seekers and secondary movers include ‘recyclers’ 3 who were repatriated to Rwanda but had to moveback to Ugandan refugee settlements and urban areas (Amnesty International 2011).
This paper argues that despite various attempts to search for a durable solution, the Rwandan refugee
problem has remained. Since 2002, Uganda has promoted (in)voluntary repatriation, but the majorityof refugees refuse to return and continue to stay in the country. Resettlement is not available, and local
integration is yet to be explored as a long-term solution. At the same time, the recommendation for the
cessation of refugee status by the UNHCR has not addressed this problem. Using Long (2009); Adepoju
et al. (2010); Long and Crisp (2010); Long (2011); Long (2015); Long and Rosengaertner (2016) workon mobility that goes beyond traditional durable solutions, this paper proposes granting East African
citizenship to Rwandan refugees by issuing East African Community (EAC) passports or residence

Out of 26.4 million refugees, 20.7 million refugees are under UNHCR mandate and 5.7 million are Palestinian
refugees registered by United Nations Relief and Works Agency.
2This is based on personal interviews, observations, and interactions with new Rwandan Asylum seekers in
Mbarara, Kampala, Oruchinga, and Nakivale refugee settlements during the period June 2010 to 2019. Rwandan
asylum seekers include government officials, genocide survivors, journalists, and students, together with ordinary
people.
3
The author has interviewed several ‘recyclers’ living in Nakivale and Oruchinga settlements in Uganda.
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Beyond the Cessation Clause: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda—From Refugees to East African Citizens?

permits that gives them freedom of mobility and residence in the member countries in accordance with
the EAC Treaty and Common Market Protocol. Searching for a durable solution at the EAC level comesat a time when efforts to establish the East African federation continue. Despite a number of challenges
that might hinder its implementation, this solution has the potential to end a protracted refugee situation,
promoting the rights of Rwandan refugees and enhancing people-centred regional integration in theregion.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the prospects and challenges ofalternative durable solutions to protracted displacement. The UNHCR and refugee hosting countries,
including Uganda, have attempted to find a durable solution for Rwandan refugees with little success.
In fact, it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain solutions for contemporary forced migration flows
using the traditional durable solutions provided by the existing refugee regimes (Long 2009). This paper
responds to this challenge.
The paper is structured as follows: The following section presents the methodology, andsubsequently, the search for a durable solution is presented. (In)voluntary repatriation, cessation of
refugee status, and the challenges involved are discussed. Other durable solutions, such as resettlement
and local integration, have not been used or are yet to be explored. Subsequently, the paper analyses the‘new solution’ of granting Rwandan refugees East African citizenship by issuing EAC Passports orresidence permits that gives them freedom of mobility, residence, employment, and other rights in the
EAC in accordance with the Common Market Protocol. The prospects of this durable solution and thechallenges that might affect its implementation are discussed, followed by the conclusion.
2. Methodology
This paper is the result of four research visits carried out at different intervals between 2010 and 2019.
The first three visits were carried out at the Nakivale and Oruchinga settlements in south-western
Uganda and focused on Rwandan new caseload refugees 4. During these visits, I spoke to over 200
Rwandan refugees, with help from two research assistants. The fourth visit partly covered Nakivale,
Oruchinga, and Kampala. It looked at Rwandans among refugees from other nationalities.
While the first visit lasted for one month, the remaining were two weeks long. Semi-structured
interviews were conducted to collect data from refugees and local hosts at the study sites. The researchalso included key informant interviews with OPM, UNHCR, and NGO officials. Focus group
discussions (FGDs), with six to twelve refugees each, were organised. Direct observation was crucial
for understanding some of the issues, such as living conditions, forced repatriation operations, victims

Rwandan new caseload refugees refer to the Hutu that came during and after the 1994 genocide. Before them,
Uganda hosted old caseload Rwandan Tutsi refugees who arrived in 1959 and the early 1960s. The majority
returned to Rwanda after the genocide, but a significant number stayed in Uganda.

4― 105 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

of human rights violations, refugee-host relations, etcetera. I have also used documentary evidence suchas text books, journal articles, magazines, newspapers, government and UNHCR policy documents, andlegal instruments such as the 2006 Refugees Act, the 1999 EAC Treaty, and the 2009 EAC Common
Market Protocol. Purposive criterion sampling was used to select the study respondents, namely the
refugees and asylum seekers, Ugandan government officials, UNHCR and NGOs officials, as well as
local hosts around the Nakivale and Oruchinga settlements, Isingiro District, and Kampala. In addition,‘recyclers’ were identified through snowball sampling. Recyclers are Rwandan refugees who have been
repatriated to Rwanda but have returned to Uganda claiming human rights violations, insecurity,
persecution, and the inability to recover land and property in Rwanda.
In all four research visits, the Rwandan refugees and other categories of respondents answeredquestions on themes such as refugee physical security, refugee rights and obligations, refugee-hostrelations, voluntary and forced repatriation, local integration, resettlement, the so-called cessation clause,and alternative durable solutions. Thematic and content analyses were used to analyse the data. The
analysis further made use of secondary data, both scholarly articles and grey literature. The study was
cleared by the OPM and Isingiro Districts in Uganda. During the data collection, the respondents werebriefed about the purely academic nature of the study and they participated voluntarily. Theirconfidentiality and anonymity were protected throughout the research process.
3. Challenges in the search for a durable solution
3.1. Voluntary repatriation
Since October 2002, the government of Rwanda (GoR), the government of Uganda (GoU), and the
UNHCR have played an active role in promoting the voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees(UNHCR and IOM 2011). The GoR has strongly pursued the return of all its citizens, stating that thecountry is enjoying stability and economic growth, so there is no reason for anyone to remain in exile(MIDIMAR 2011). Rwanda would also like to see its refugee population return from exile so that they
can take part in rebuilding the country, as well as put an end to vital security and justice issues whichflow from Rwanda’s history of genocide (Human Rights First 2004, IRRI and Refugee Law Project
2010, Karooma 2014).
In 2003, a tripartite agreement was signed between Uganda, Rwanda, and the UNHCR, to set up a
Tripartite Commission to oversee the repatriation process, and joint communiqués were issued fromtime to time. Sensitisation campaigns were also carried out in the settlements to encourage refugees toreturn. Furthermore, ‘Go and see, come, and tell visits’ were organised, under which refugee delegations
to visit Rwanda were escorted by OPM and UNHCR. On return, the refugees shared their experiences
about what they had or had not seen in Rwanda.
However, several challenges have hindered this repatriation exercise. First, the refugees do not trust― 106 ―

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the information they receive from the UNHCR and officials from Rwanda and Uganda. In FGDs,
refugees noted that, ‘We were shown videos and pictures which paint a good picture of Rwanda. They
showed us the conditions in Rwanda and how they have improved to enable us to go home. However,we were not convinced because they only showed us the good things about Rwanda when we know very
well that our country has another bad side’ 5.
Second, during the visits to Rwanda, the refugees complained that they were not taken to all theplaces they wanted to visit which cast a doubt on the whole process. For example, in the FDGs, therefugees noted that they were taken to selected areas in Rwanda that the government was interested inshowing and not what they wanted see 6. They observed that these visits were state-managed and aimed
at painting a good picture of Rwanda 7. They noted that they were not able to see or understand the otherside of Rwanda, which is hidden from the public 8. They noted that they would have loved to verify thestories of arrests at night by the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), disappearances of civilians,
genocide ideology laws, human rights violations, and land conflicts to mention but a few of the things
that they have heard 9. These stories do little to convince the already apprehensive refugees.
Despite all efforts to promote voluntary repatriation, Rwandan refugees have been reluctant to return.
Since 2004, refugee returns have remained low. The following are the number of refugees who havereturned since 2004: 2004 (2,400), 2005 (1,591), 2006 (none), 2007 (2,732), 2008 (461), 2009 (5,583),
2010 (1,762), 2011 (19), and 2012 (157) (Rwandan Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugees
Statistics Report 2012).
3.2. Forced repatriation
Because of the low numbers, in the late 2000s, repatriation became associated with forced repatriation
operations, deadlines, threats, withdrawal of land for cultivation, and reduction of food rations. In short,what started as a voluntary process had taken a coercive turn. In other words, repatriation became aforced return (Ahimbisibwe 2020).
For example, on 5 October 2007 it was reported that ‘Ugandan security operatives on Wednesdaynight raided Kyaka II and Nakivale refugee settlements and violently drove out thousands of Rwandan
nationals’ (Basiime et al. 2007). It was further pointed out that ‘reports indicate that up to 3,000 people
were evicted but UNHCR official said 1,535 people were forcefully repatriated’ (ibid.).

Focus Group Discussion, Rubondo zone, Nakivale settlement, on 8 July 2010; Focus Group Discussion, Sangano
Base Camp, Nakivale settlement on 10 June 2016; Focus Group Discussion, Sangano Base Camp, Nakivale
settlement, on 28 November 2019.
6
ibid.
7
ibid.
8
ibid.
9
Focus Group Discussion, Sangano Base Camp, Nakivale settlement on 10 June 2016; Focus Group Discussion,
Oruchinga settlement on 29 August 2016; Focus Group Discussion, Juru zone, Nakivale settlement on 30 June2010.
5

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In another incident, ‘on 14 July 2010, the Ugandan and Rwandan government police and militaryentered Nakivale refugee camps in Uganda. Some 1,700 Rwandans were gathered together in Nakivale
on the pretext that they were to be informed of the results of their refugee status claims, but then foundthemselves being herded into lorries at gunpoint to be returned in Rwandan military lorries’ (HarellBond 2011). According to refugees’ investigations and reports, 14 Rwandans died, families wereseparated, children were left behind, and 17 recognised refugees were refouled (ibid.).
Again, since 2009, Uganda has imposed a cultivation ban on Rwandan refugees. ‘Since then,refugees have become extremely food insecure and reported resorting to numerous coping mechanisms
that, in turn, increased their vulnerability’ (Amnesty International 2011: 12). According to Amnesty
International, ‘such a ban directly discriminates against the Rwandan refugees on the grounds ofnationality and as such violates Article 3 of the 1951 Refugee Convention’ (ibid.). This ban on
cultivation came at the same time when vigorous efforts to promote repatriation were put in place.
Rwandan refugees were given a deadline of 31 July 2009 to repatriate or the Nakivale settlement would
be closed (ibid. 13). This deadline was extended to 31 August 2009 (IRIN News 2010). ‘The ban on
cultivation was used as a tool to force Rwandan refugees to return’ (ibid.). Despite these efforts to force
Rwandans to return, the refugee issue has not been solved. Even those who were forcefully repatriatedfound their way back to Uganda, either returning to the settlements or disappearing into the hostcommunities (Karooma 2013, Ahimbisibwe 2015).
3.3. Cessation of refugee status
In 2011, the UNHCR put in place a Comprehensive Strategy for the Rwandan Refugee Situation(hereafter, comprehensive strategy) an important component of which was the elaboration of a common
schedule leading to the cessation of refugee status 10, initially foreseen to commence on 31 December
2011 (UNHCR 2011: 1). The cessation of refugee status targeted Rwandan refugees who fled theircountry between 1959 and 1998, thereby assessing that Rwanda had become a safe nation for theserefugees to return (Gillaume 2012). ‘Unlike refugee flows from Rwanda after 1998, the abovementioned periods shared the character of group or large-scale forced population movements as a resultof armed conflict, events seriously disturbing public order and/or the presence of a consistent pattern ofmass violations of human rights including genocide’ (UNHCR 2011: 6). It was asserted that all these
disturbing events had since stopped and ‘Rwanda enjoys an essential level of peace, security,
Refugee law provides for cessation of refugee status: Article 1 C (5) of the 1951 Convention states that ‘He canno longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased
to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality’; Article 1 (4) (e) of
the OAU Convention states that ‘he can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he wasrecognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of
his nationality’; Section 6 of the 2006 Refugees Act also provides for cessation of the refugee status such that theperson shall cease to be a refugee if the circumstances in connection with which that person was recognised as a
refugee have ceased to exist.

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reconciliation, democracy and human rights’ (ibid.).
However, Uganda did not officially implement the cessation clause. The cessation of refugee statusoriginally set for implementation by the Ugandan government on 30 June 2013 was suspended until
further notice. After the 2016 UNHCR executive committee meeting in Geneva, the implementation of
the cessation clause was scheduled for 31 December 2017 and later postponed indefinitely. According
to the Minister for Disaster Preparedness and Refugees, the postponement took place due to the pending
resolution of legal ambiguities and the charting of a way forward towards the implementation of local
integration and alternative legal status as required by the refugee law and comprehensive strategy(Government of Uganda 2013). Overall, the implementation of the cessation clause is not a solution to
the Rwandan refugee problem (Kingston 2017). It risks creating stateless people and other protection
challenges (ibid.). The threat of the cessation clause has made the refugees disappear and go off theradar, with a number of them moving away from the settlements and self-settling in different parts ofthe country 11. This is not a solution. Rather it only complicates the situation further and makes protecting
them even more difficult.
4. Unexplored durable solutions
4.1. Local integration
A possible durable solution for the Rwandan refugees in Uganda is local integration. This solution wasprovided in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter, the 1951 Convention).
Article 34 calls upon states to assist in the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees enabling them tobecome citizens of the host country. According to Crisp (2004: 2), ‘Strictly speaking, it can be argued
that the process of local integration becomes a durable solution only at the point when a refugee becomesa naturalized citizen of his or her asylum country, and consequently is no longer in need of international
protection’. Ahimbisibwe et al. (2017) argue that any integration without the attainment of citizenshipmay not be a durable solution, and despite the socio-economic integration of Rwandan refugees,
naturalisation is yet to be explored for the Rwandan refugee caseload. Although it is not available as asolution, it is worth noting that the majority of the Rwandan refugees support this option (ibid.). It haseven been argued that local integration has the potential to address the refugee challenge (ibid.).
However, there are a number of challenges to naturalisation that range from legal ambiguities in
Ugandan laws, unwillingness of Uganda and Rwanda to naturalise these refugees, security concerns
regarding the possible hostility of the host population, etcetera (ibid.). These challenges have added tothe dilemma of finding an appropriate solution for Rwandan refugees in Uganda.

Field Notes 2016, 2018, and 2019.

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4.2. Resettlement
The second traditional durable solution is resettlement. Resettlement involves the selection and transfer
of refugees from a state in which they have sought protection to a third state which has agreed to admit
them as refugees with permanent residence status (UNHCR 2011). The status provided ensuresprotection against refoulement and provides a resettled refugee and their family or dependants access torights similar to those enjoyed by nationals (ibid.). Resettlement carries with it the opportunity toeventually become a naturalised citizen of the resettlement country (ibid.). However, there are noresettlement opportunities available to Rwandan refugees. The number of refugees is too high and thenumber of slots available for resettlement are usually very limited. Resettlement remains a dream, as
there are no countries accepting large groups of refugees (Ahimbisibwe 2015). In general, only 1% of
the world’s refugees benefit from resettlement (Long 2011). In fact, ‘given the narrow quotas, the chanceof being resettled is slim, and indeed many people in refugee camps think of resettlement as akin to
winning the lottery’ (Jacobsen 2005: 55). Also, ‘the Rwandan government has promoted the notion to
the international community that there is peace in Rwanda. This has made the international community
reluctant to resettling Rwandan refugees when their country of origin is secure and willing to welcome
them’ (Ahimbisibwe 2015: 290).
5. Beyond traditional durable solutions: A brief overview
As already stated, it is difficult to solve today’s refugee problem using traditional durable solutions.
Long (2009: 3) argues that ‘it has become increasingly clear in recent years that the three durable
solutions 12 are not always able to respond adequately to the complexity of contemporary forced
migration flows’. Failure to find durable solutions, among other causes, has led to the emergence of
protracted refugee situations. It is clear from the above discussion that the three durable solutions arelimited in addressing the Rwandan refugee problem. Amidst these limitations, scholars have proposeda number of ‘new durable solutions’ to respond to the challenge of forced displacement. They range
from addressing the root causes of conflicts in countries of origin to granting refugees freedom ofmobility, establishment, and residence in host countries and regions with regional citizenship withinregional integration blocs.
5.1. Addressing the root causes of displacement
The ideal solution would be to address forced displacement at the source and avoid a situation in whichpeople flee as refugees in the first place. However, the reality is that Rwandan refugees in Uganda andother countries find themselves trapped in protracted. Guterres has argued that ‘we have to recognise
As already shown, ‘voluntary’ repatriation has not addressed the Rwandan refugee problem. Local integration
and resettlement have not been or are yet to be tried.

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that there are no true humanitarian solutions to refugee problems. Rather, solutions require political will
and leadership’ (Guterres 2012). This suggests there is a need to look for political solutions to refugee
problems. We need to reconstruct the state and build institutions that promote accountability of leaders
to the population, clearly separate powers between the arms of the government, and put the army undercivilian control through good civil-military relations, and conduct regular free and fair elections.
Mushemeza takes this idea further, arguing that ‘Rwanda, and Africa as a whole, must build institutions
that allow popular participation in decision making, transfer of political power from one group or
generation to the other, and generally, address the question of democracy and good governance’(Mushemeza 2007). This will address the challenge of future displacement that might arise as a resultof bad governance, undemocratic tendencies, and human rights violations in EAC member countries.
Furthermore, there is a need to create mechanisms for resolving disputes in the countries of origin
peacefully. The use of violence has been the main reason behind the forced displacement of Rwandan
refugees in the recent past. In the FDGs, refugees stated, ‘As Africans, we have to learn to resolve ourconflicts using peaceful means. The use of force is responsible for the problem of refugees in ourcountries’ 13 . They further pointed out that ‘our leaders should learn to use dialogue to resolve thedifferences. If President Habyarimana had sat with Kagame and RPF leaders to resolve the Tutsi
grievances, perhaps we would have avoided the 1990 invasion, the 1994 genocide, and the wars that
followed in Zaire/DRC’ 14.
Political ethnicity has been at the root of wars and conflicts in Rwanda that have resulted inconsiderable bloodshed as well as the displacement of people as refugees during and after the war. Deethnicisation should be encouraged as a political solution aimed at creating harmony and peacefulcoexistence. Government officials, civil society organisations (CSOs), religious leaders, traditional
leaders, and the media can be the main vehicles for delivering the message and encouraging people todiscard toxic notions in this regard. However, mere legislation is insufficient for de-ethnicising society,especially if there is continuous discrimination and segregation against a group of people. For example,
the current legislation against genocidal ideology in Rwanda is ineffective unless the government isseen to be fair and willing to promote equal justice as opposed to one-sided justice that favours one
group at the expense of others. Equal opportunities for all citizens of Rwanda, protection of humanrights, and promotion of unity and democracy are necessary to bring about true de-ethinicisation ofsociety instead of legislating ethnicity away. The refugees stated, ‘Kagame should be a leader for all
Rwandans. He should not favour Tutsi and discriminate against Hutu. This has been the source of ourconflicts in Rwanda. We should learn from history that exclusion and discrimination breed grievances

13
14

Focus Group Discussion, Sangano Base Camp, Nakivale settlement on 24 June 2010.
ibid.
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and lead to violence, whereas inclusion and non-discrimination can lead to peace and security’ 15. The
next section looks into the possible durable solutions of refugee mobility and regional citizenship of the
EAC or future political federation.
5.2. Refugees, mobility, and regional integration
Regional integration is one of the avenues through which the refugee problem can be addressed. With
the East African countries as one political federation, there is hope that a bigger economy and a wider
country would swallow the narrow attitudes of ethnic segregation. If the federation comes through, thepeople would be known as East Africans rather than Rwandans, Ugandans, Kenyans, Burundians, orTanzanians. Rutinwa (1996) argued that regional integration has the potential of addressing politicalinstability in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Economic integration is capable of addressing economic
factors underlying the political conflicts. However, it would be a while before the political federation of
East Africa is realised (Kasaija 2004).
Long and Crisp (2010) proposed a solution for the mobility of protracted refugees. They argued thatfrom the point of view of labour migration, refugees’ mobility is a positive asset that can contribute totheir lasting protection, and labour migration has the potential to ‘[address] the needs of protracted or
residual refugee populations unable to access the three traditional durable solutions of repatriation,
resettlement or local integration’ (ibid. 57). Long (2015: 6) argued that labour migration has been foundto assist the traditional three solutions. She has highlighted the role of labour mobility in bringing an
end to protracted refugee situations by allowing refugees access to markets through further migration orfinding opportunities in the host country (ibid.).
In addition, ‘in a broader sense, it is now increasingly recognised that human mobility provides animportant means for people to improve their standard of living and to contribute to the economic andsocial life of their countries of origin and destination’ (ibid. 56). Mobility enables refugees to obtainrights and protection in destination countries. Refugee mobility creates ‘transnational diasporiccommunity networks that can contribute positively to the de facto protection of refugees, asylum seekers,
IDPs and other persons of concern to UNHCR’ (ibid.).
However, Long (2009: 1) also states that ‘regularised labour migration cannot, and should not,replace the traditional citizenship-focused durable solutions of resettlement, local integration or
repatriation’. She argues that labour migration should not be seen as a fourth durable solution but rather
as a part of the solutions framework intended to address forced displacement (ibid. 5). She admits thatlabour migration is limited in its scope as it cannot function as a durable solution without being
connected to some form of citizenship in the state of origin, country of asylum, and regional or

15

Focus Group Discussion, Rubondo zone, Nakivale settlement on 27 November 2019.
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supranational organisation like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and East
African Community (ibid.). She adds that without access to citizenship, labour migration is an
incomplete solution (ibid. 23).
Long and Rosengaertner (2016) expanded on the notion of labour migration to include mobility foreducation and training, family reunion, and marriage. Young refugees face the challenge of disrupted
education cycles and, hence, the acquisition of skills due to displacement (ibid.) even though schools
and training institutions are available in host countries. Allowing refugees to cross borders for further
studies enables them to expand on the opportunities available to them and take control of their future.
This is relevant for Rwandan refugees in Uganda. Their mobility for school and training within the East
African region is necessary to build their potential, provide opportunities, and deepen people-centred
regional integration. However, financial aid and scholarships would have to play a key role in opening
study and training migration channels to refugees (ibid.). Left on their own, the costs of education andtraining programs would be too high for refugees to bear.
In practice, refugee mobility has been implemented in the context of ECOWAS which was founded
in 1975 to promote trade and economic integration in the West African sub-region (Adepoju et al. 2010).
A protocol on free movement was adopted by ECOWAS in 1979 ‘which confers on community citizens
the right to enter, reside in and establish economic activities in the territory of any ECOWAS member
state’ (ibid. 123). Furthermore, ‘the ECOWAS protocols extended residency, including the right to seek
and carry out income-earning employment, to community citizens in host ECOWAS member States,
provided they had obtained an ECOWAS residence card or permit’ (ibid.). The protocols further statethat ‘obliged member states to grant migrant workers, complying with the rules and regulations
governing their residence under ECOWAS, equal treatment with nationals in areas such as security of
employment, participation in social and cultural activities, and, in certain cases of job loss, reemployment, and training’ (ibid.).
Within the ECOWAS protocols, refugee mobility and right to residence have been guaranteed. For
example, in 2009, Nigeria issued three-year ECOWAS residence permits alongside re-issuing passportsof residual refugee populations from Sierra Leone and Liberia (Long and Crisp 2010: 57). Similarly,
Gambia also issued ECOWAS residence permits to Sierra Leonean refugees who chose to stay in
Gambia. At the same time, Sierra Leonean passports were issued to these refugees by the Sierra Leonean
High Commission in Gambia (Long 2009: 10).
According to Long (2009: 26), ‘the success of the ECOWAS migration-based solutions frameworkfor Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees suggests that labour migration could prove particularly usefulwhen incorporated into wider regional frameworks intended to promote economic integration’.
Although this approach had its own set of challenges (Omata 2016), it was an innovative durable
solution in a world where durable solutions to forced displacement are becoming increasingly difficult.
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The EAC is one region that can learn from the ECOWAS refugee mobility experience and deal withresidual refugee populations including Rwandans within the framework of the Common Market
Protocol that provides rights of movement and residence to East African citizens (Long 2009).
5.3. Refugees and regional citizenship
Refugee mobility and residence are linked to regional citizenship, which creates new dimensions ofidentity and belonging away from the nation-state. According to IRRI (2014: 1), ‘Citizenship isunderstood both as access to legal citizenship, and more broadly as a recognition of the right of a person
to belong in a community and the power of that acceptance/belonging as a means of accessing otherrights’. Citizenship is defined at two levels: legal and empirical citizenship. Legal citizenship ‘denotes
a legal status given at the national level that designates full membership in a state with concomitantrights or entitlements and duties’ (ibid. 5). It refers to the relationship between the individual and thestate. The individual has rights and duties under the law, and the state has certain responsibilities in thislegal bond (ibid.). It spells out how individuals and groups are related to their state or community (ibid.
5). Legal citizenship, under which an individual carries a passport or national identity card, shows alevel of belonging at the national level. On the other hand, empirical citizenship ‘is about individuals’
or the groups real life experiences of belonging and being able to claim rights on an equal footing withother community members’ (ibid.).
Although citizenship, to a large extent, still operates at the national level, regional citizenships, likethe one seen above under ECOWAS, are emerging. Under such regional citizenship citizens are able tomove freely within a regional bloc. The West African bloc introduced an ECOWAS passport andresidence permit that allowed Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees to settle in member countries suchas Nigeria, Ghana, and Gambia. Long (2011: 35) points out that:[O]ne important insight from these case studies is to recognize that new citizenships may
unlock elements of protracted displacement crises by sitting either below or above
traditional or formal state-citizen structures. The emergence of new ‘citizenships’ orcommunity memberships within regions of protracted crisis, as described above, is one
facet of this development. The other is the development of new supra-national and regional
citizenships that may in coming years have a profound effect on both integration prospects
and mobility, helping both to unlock and to prevent protracted displacements. ECOWAS
citizenship has proved useful in resolving residual displacement of Liberian and Sierra
Leonean refugees.
Similarly, Long and Rosengaertner (2016) argue that regional citizenship may be crucial for the― 114 ―

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mobility of recognised refugees. As citizens of regional blocs, recognised refugees would be able tomove for protection and livelihoods. We now look at the possibility of refugee mobility and regional
citizenship in the context of the EAC and its challenges.
6. The EAC Treaty and Common Market Protocol
The EAC was first established in 1967 by three countries: Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. The EAC
collapsed after 10 years in 1977 due to a number of factors, including ideological, political, andeconomic factors (Ojo et al. 1985, Rwekaza 2000). A treaty re-establishing the EAC was signed by thefounding nations in 1999. Rwanda and Burundi joined the EAC in 2007, followed by South Sudan in
2016. The DRC and Somalia have also expressed interest in joining the EAC.
Chapter 17, Article 104 of the EAC Treaty provides for the free movement of persons, labour services,
right of establishment, and residence. Article 104 (1) states that ‘partner states agree to adopt measuresto achieve the free movement of persons, labour and services and to ensure the enjoyment of the rightof establishment and residence of their citizens within the community’. Member states are to achieve
this goal by: (a) ease border crossing by citizens of the partner states; (b) maintain common standard
travel documents for their citizens; (c) effect reciprocal opening of border posts and keep the posts open
and manned for 24 hours; (d) maintain common employment policies; (e) harmonise their labour policies,
programmes, and legislation, including those on occupational health and safety; (f) establish a regional
centre for productivity and employment promotion and exchange information on the availability of
employment; (g) make their training facilities available to persons from other partner states; and (h)enhance the activities of the employers’ and workers’ organisations with a view to strengthening them.
The Common Market Protocol was put in place to ensure the effective implementation of this last goalof the EAC Treaty.
The Protocol for the Establishment of the EAC Common Market was signed in Arusha, Tanzania by
the Republic of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the United Republic of Tanzania, on 20
November 2009, and it came into force in 2010 (Kago and Wanyama 2017: 345). Article 4 of theCommon Market Protocol provides that the ‘overall objective of the Common Market is to widen anddeepen cooperation among the partner states in the economic and social fields for the benefit of thepartner states’. One of the specific objectives is to ‘accelerate economic growth and development of thepartner states through the attainment of the free movement of goods, persons and labour, the rights ofestablishment and residence and the free movement of services and capital’. Article 7 of the Common
Market Protocol provides for free movement of persons such that ‘the partner states hereby guarantee
the free movement of persons who are citizens of the other partner states, within their territories’. Partner
states further commit themselves to respect the principle of non-discrimination of each other’s citizens
based on their nationality.
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Rwengabo (2015) argues that the Common Market Protocol guarantees freedom of cross-border
movements of persons, immigration, right of residence, and ensures the creation of a regional sense of
belonging that spans the EAC geo-social space, leading to the creation of an East African Citizenry.
Under the Common Market Protocol framework, East African citizens are free to move within the
EAC. The Common Market emphasises the mobility of East African citizens as a way of strengthening
regional integration. The Common Market provides an opportunity to discuss solutions for residualrefugee caseloads, including Rwandans, with freedom of movement and residence in the region. Withno clear traditional durable solution in sight, guaranteeing mobility and regional citizenship to refugees
could be a starting point in the search for a solution. In fact, Long (2011: 35) hopes that ‘EAC citizenshipcould address the problem of refugees in East Africa, a region with historically high levels ofdisplacement’. The International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI) (2014: 4) made a similar observation:‘New regional arrangements such as the EAC are building a sense of regional belonging that may prove
powerful in promoting access to rights across the region. Guarantees of freedom of movement andestablishment for community members may act to protect refugees in practice (with or without formalreference to refugee status)’.
One way to explore this is by granting East African passports to refugees. The first EAC passport
was introduced in 1999 and was recognised as a travel document within (but not outside) the regional
bloc. This passport enabled East African citizens to travel freely within the region. A new internationallyrecognised and valid EAC e-passport with increased security features was introduced in January 2018
(UNHCR 2018). The new passport is issued by member states of the EAC with their coats of arms andother national symbols. This paper proposes the EAC passport, could be offered to Rwandan refugees
as a step towards shedding off the refugee label.
The other option is to give them EAC residence permits that grant them the right to be permanent
residents within the EAC. This would allow them freedom of movement and residence, get employment
opportunities, and pursue other livelihood strategies. This will end their legal status as refugees in the
short run while also opening a window for future solutions such as East African permanent residents,
citizens of the federated state of East Africa, or naturalised citizens of member countries of the EAC
like Uganda.
The granting of both EAC passports or residence permits, will only be a part of the solution which
may become a durable solution when linked to support other solutions, such as naturalisation. This is inline with an earlier argument by Long (2009) that labour migration is not a complete solution until it islinked to citizenship in the country of origin, host country, or regional organisations. Rwandan refugees
willing to get Rwandan passports can access them in Uganda. This is a renewal of their Rwandan
citizenship, which means that they will remain Rwandan citizens but live as diaspora. However, ourfindings suggest that not many Rwandan refugees would be willing to take on Rwandan citizenship out― 116 ―

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of fear and uncertainty about the Rwandan state. The other category is naturalisation in Uganda. This isbased on the fact that Rwandan refugees have received de facto integration in Uganda. They havesuccessfully attained socio-economic integration (Ahimbisibwe et al. 2017). In addition, a good numberof them already have Ugandan de jure citizenship through unofficial channels (Ahimbisibwe 2022).
Furthermore, there is a potential of citizenship at the level of the East African community. Although
the East African community is a young organisation, it has the potential to grant citizenship to Rwandan
refugees, especially in the future when the East African federation becomes a reality. IRRI (2014: 4)
opined that, ‘Although rights at the regional level are envisaged as relying on a base of national
citizenship, its potential should be developed in such a way as to expand protection and complement
current refugee protection structures’. Some lessons can be drawn from the ECOWAS regional durable
solution for residual Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees in West Africa and develop it further with
innovations, making it appropriate and relevant for the East African region.
7. The prospects of an EAC durable solution
This proposed durable solution has some possibility to succeed owing to a number of factors that mightfavour it. These include the de facto integration of Rwandan refugees, similar ethnicities across borders,the EAC Common Market Protocol, and the fact that Rwandan refugees favour integration as East
African citizens. We will discuss each of these below.
7.1. De facto integration of Rwandan refugees
Rwandan refugees have acquired de facto integration in Uganda. Faced with forced repatriation andcessation of refugee status, a large number of Rwandan refugees have resorted to integrating themselves
into the local communities. During the data collection exercise, I observed Rwandan refugees who had
integrated themselves into the local communities 16 in the surroundings of the Nakivale settlement. I also
found that a large number of refugees had migrated to the Isingiro, Mubende, Kyenjojo, Kamwenje, andMbarara districts of Uganda. Those who had money had bought land, built a house, and bribed the local
council officials to get a voters’ card or village residents’ identity card (Ahimbisibwe 2022). With time,
the refugees are able to claim that they are Ugandans, especially since the country is open to refugees
and immigrants and local officials and populations are not strict to new people coming into their areasof jurisdiction. Rwandan refugees who have used this option benefited from the fact that they speak
Runyankore, the local language spoken in the Ankole sub-region, and share the physical appearance of
the Banyankore of south-western Uganda. I found that although it is easy to identify a Rwandan Tutsi

16
The researcher met de facto integrated Rwandan refugees in Ngarama, Kashumba, Rugaaga, and Mbaale sub
counties surrounding the Nakivale Refugee Settlement. A number of them had already acquired identity cards
from local councils or village leaders showing that they are Ugandan permanent residents.

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by physical appearance and features, this was not possible with Rwandan Hutu. In addition, many
Ugandan Banyarwanda have made it easy for the Rwandan population to mingle and interact. This also
includes the former old case load Rwandan Tutsi refugees that arrived in 1959 and the early 1960s. As
noted above, although the majority returned to Rwanda after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, a significant
number stayed in Uganda. Rwandan refugees are locally integrated and spread across different parts ofUganda. They are able to reside and move freely, work, and carry out businesses and other livelihood
activities. Granting them East African citizenship or residence status only reinforces the already existing
reality on the ground.
7.2. Similar ethnicities across borders
Some of Uganda’s population shares cultural, linguistic, and ethnic ties with the Rwandan refugees. The
colonial borders that separated people shared similar cultures, languages, and tribes. The World Bank
(2016: 17) argues that:[T]he shared ethnicity among communities living along all of these countries’ borders is
another important contributor, with nearly half of Uganda’s 64 constitutionally recognizedindigenous communities having become administratively divided from their kith and kin
by the colonial borders.
For example, as already pointed out above, there is a large population of Banyarwanda in Uganda similar
to Banyarwanda in Rwanda. The 1995 Constitution recognises Banyarwanda as one of the tribes in
Uganda. In addition, the Bafumbira in Kisoro district in the south-western part of the country speak
Rufimbira, a dialect of Kinyarwanda spoken by Rwandans. It is common to find groups such as the
Acholi and Madi in Uganda and South Sudan; the Kakwa are found in Uganda, South Sudan, and DRC;
the Bakonjo and Alur are found in Uganda and DRC; and the Samia, Iteso, and Sebei are found in
Uganda and Kenya. In situations of forced displacement, refugees usually cross borders and stay with
their tribemates. This was the case when Rwandan Tutsi came to Uganda in the late 1950s and the early
1960s when they settled in most parts of the south-western region. The current Rwandan Hutu refugees
also settled in most parts of this region. Even the settlements hosting Rwandans like Nakivale,
Oruchinga, and Kyaka II border the local hosts of similar tribes and languages. This has facilitatedinteractions, intermarriages, and other socio-economic relations between the local hosts and Rwandan
refugees. An East African regional durable solution builds on the existing interactions and relations andis likely to strengthen people-centred regional integration.

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Beyond the Cessation Clause: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda—From Refugees to East African Citizens?

7.3. The EAC Common Market Protocol
The enactment of the Common Market Protocol that grants East African citizens the right to establish,
settle, and reside, and the freedom of movement and employment is a positive development. The
Common Market Protocol provides a legal framework that governs the mobility and citizenry of thepeople of East Africa. Although there are a number of challenges for making the common market areality in the lives of ordinary people, the fact that the protocol exists is a step in the direction of regional
integration. This is similar to the 1979 ECOWAS Protocol on free movement, which has been used to
grant the right of movement, residence, and employment to Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees by
ECOWAS member states. The existence of this protocol provided a foundation for creating a durable
solution. Similar to the West African sub-region, what is necessary is the political will and commitment
to make durable solutions work and respond to complex forced displacement crises like the Rwandan
refugee problem.
7.4. Rwandan refugees favour integration in East Africa
Refugees in a focus group discussion argued: ‘We fully support the idea of the East African Federation.
It will help us look beyond our own small countries. As people of East Africa, we will be able to moveand live in any of the countries without any hindrance. Why should we be forced to return to Rwanda
when we can settle here in Uganda, Kenya, or Tanzania? Besides, regional integration will strengthen
our economies and address the conflicts that come as a result of competition for power and resources’ 17.
Another group of refugees had the same thoughts about East African integration. They said, ‘We request
the EAC to consider us as East African citizens. We don’t want to return to Rwanda and face harassment
and death’ 18.
The refugees asserted that an EAC-based solution would be the best solution, especially if President
Museveni 19 spearheaded it. They look at President Museveni as a Pan-Africanist who believes in theunity and cooperation of Africans. They stated, ‘He is a great leader who looks at them as fellow Africanbrothers and sisters who need to be assisted through local integration. He has helped many Africans,including those from Somalia, Burundi, and South Sudan. He has been a champion of East African unityand does not believe in small countries and their borders. He wants a united East Africa. We support his
idea of one East Africa, where East Africans can stay where they want. This would save us the troubleof returning to Rwanda which we don’t want’ 20. Others said that refugees should be granted a chance tostay wherever they wish. For example, they talked about regional integration of the EAC, where people
would be free to stay in any of the East African countries without hindrance. They believed that this
Focus Group Discussion, Juru zone, Nakivale settlement on 30 June 2010.
Focus Group Discussion, Oruchinga settlement on 29 August 2016.
19
Museveni is the president of Uganda. He took power in 1986 after a guerrilla war in Uganda.
20
Focus Group Discussion, Rubondo zone, Nakivale settlement on 8 July 2010.
17
18― 119 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

could be a durable solution to the refugee problem in Africa, since people would live where they felt
most secure. According to some refugees, there is a need for a discussion on the proposed East Africanfederation, where member countries would federate into one East African state. They observed that sucha solution would address the Tutsi-Hutu ethnic tensions in Rwanda and Burundi and make them look atthemselves as citizens of a larger entity called East Africa 21.
However, they are aware of the challenges of establishing the East African federation, especiallygiven the current tensions between Uganda and Rwanda on the one hand, and Rwanda and Burundi on
the other. ‘We have heard about the tensions between Museveni and Kagame. This makes us wonder
whether we shall ever achieve East African integration’ 22.
8. Challenges of an EAC durable solution
A number of challenges are likely to hinder the progress and success of the proposed solution of granting
East African citizenship and residence status for greater mobility to the Rwandan refugees. These range
from the slow pace of the integration process, Rwanda-Uganda tensions, security concerns, and issuesof sovereignty and territorial integrity.
8.1. Slow pace of the integration process
Article 5 (2) of the treaty for the establishment of the EAC states: ‘The partner states undertake toestablish among themselves as in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, a customs union, acommon market, subsequently a monetary union and ultimately a political federation’. Although the
EAC Common Market has been established, the revived integration process is moving slowly (Kasaija2004). It is not clear when political federation will be achieved (ibid.). Some countries like Tanzania
and Burundi are slow to implement the political federation and other stages of the EAC (Ngari 2016).
Even those advocating for it are not trusted by others and the Common Market is yet to be fully
implemented by all member states (Bainomugisha and Rwengabo 2016). We have argued above thatcreation of a federated East African state would be crucial in granting citizenship at a supranational leveland neutralising ethnic and national identities. The more the political federation is delayed, the higher
is the likelihood of delaying the East African federated state and its associated citizenship.
Meanwhile, there is also a lack of political commitment to the integration agenda. Despite therhetorical declarations by leaders, practical commitment is still lacking. Member countries are notcommitted and willing to put in place agreed upon policies and plans. Leaders have made decisions
contrary to the principles of the EAC Treaty. For example, the decision by Rwanda to close the borderwith Uganda in early 2019 contravenes the spirit of the Common Market Protocol and raises questions
21
22

Focus Group Discussion, Oruchinga settlement on 30 November 2019.
Focus Group Discussion, Sangano Base Camp, Nakivale settlement on 28 November 2019.
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Beyond the Cessation Clause: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda—From Refugees to East African Citizens?

on Rwanda’s commitment to the EAC integration trajectory.
8.2. Tensions between EAC member states
Another challenge relates to the tensions between the member states of the EAC. Regional integration
tends to slow down every time member states engage in conflict. Instead of focusing on how to advancethe integration agenda forward, they busy themselves in engaging in actions that undermine integration.
This is a reality that the EAC currently faces. For example, Uganda and Rwanda are engaged in a numberof disputes, including the border dispute that led to the closure of the common Katuna/Gatuna border in2019 (Byaruhanga 2019). The border closure has negatively affected trade, business, and other economic
activities between the two countries (ibid.). This is contrary to the EAC Treaty and Common Market
Protocol that emphasise open borders, free movement, and granting residence to each other’s citizens.
The citizens of the two countries have paid a heavy price for the ongoing tensions. Rwanda does notallow its citizens to travel to Uganda, warning them with arrest, imprisonment, and torture (ibid.). In
some cases, those who did not abide by their government’s directives have been shot and killed forcrossing the common border. In Uganda, Rwandan citizens and the Ugandans of Rwandan origin havebeen greatly affected. A number of them have been arrested and imprisoned after being accused of being
Rwandan spies. The fact that her citizens face harassment and human rights violations on Uganda’s soil
is one of Rwanda’s grievances against Uganda. Consequently, there is a section of Ugandans of the
Banyarwanda tribe who have called for a change of their name to Abavandimwe, citing political witch
hunting, discrimination in accessing passports and national identity cards, public service jobs, and otheropportunities (Council for Abavandimwe Uganda 2021). Although they are Ugandan citizens, theiridentity as Banyarwanda has been a source of insecurity. They are victims of the political tensions
between the two countries and feel it is safer to rebrand their identity (ibid.).
On the other hand, Rwanda and Burundi have had tensions amidst accusations that they are
undermining each other’s security and territorial integrity (Feyissa 2021). Burundi accused Rwanda ofbeing behind the failed coup d'état of 2015 and at the same time giving military support to Burundian
refugees (ibid.). The common border remains either closed or inactive, and this has greatly affectedsocio-economic interactions between the countries. Amidst these tensions, regional integration has
suffered. It is difficult for these countries to focus on the EAC integration agenda when they do not see
eye to eye.
8.3. Rwanda’s security concerns
Rwanda has only favoured repatriation as a feasible solution and opposed other alternative solutions.
For example, since 2002, Rwanda has repeatedly requested the UNHCR to invoke the cessation clauseon Rwandan refugees who were unwilling to return (Fahamu 2011). Rwanda has always regarded all its― 121 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

nationals abroad as either a political liability or security threat (IRRI and Refugee Law Project 2010,
Ahimbisibwe 2019). Rwanda thinks that it is easier to control people on its soil than as diaspora.
Granting East African citizenship or residence status may not take away Rwanda’s fears that its
population abroad may be a security threat, especially now that there are groups opposed to the Kigali
government that can easily get support from this diaspora population. Therefore, such a solution may becurtailed by these Rwandan forces that are only interested in a solution that brings refugees back to its
own soil where they will be able to monitor them well. According to Barongo (1998: 124), granting
permanent asylum to refugees who have political interests in the country of origin would mean placing
permanent conflicts on the political agenda of the neighbouring countries. This is similar to granting
citizenship or permanent residence to Rwandan refugees who may have political interests in Rwanda
and may use the new legal status to advance their political agenda. Rwanda’s fear is premised on thefact that Rwandan refugees might use residence or citizenship abroad for political mobilisation, freedomof movement, acquiring wealth and education etcetera. It would be hard to control such an empowered
population especially when they decide to engage in subversive activities against Rwanda. The Rwandan
Tutsi did exactly the same thing during the period they were refugees in Uganda. After achieving
empowerment, they formed a rebel movement called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and attacked
their country of origin on 1st October 1990. This was followed by a civil war and the 1994 Rwandan
genocide.
8.4. Sovereignty and territorial integrity
Kasaija (2004: 31) has argued that ‘the fundamental principles of the community seem paradoxically to
be working against the establishment of the political federation/union’. Article 6(a) of the EAC Treatyemphasises the sovereignty and equality of member states. A federation requires the surrendering ofsovereignty to a central political unit (Rwekaza 2000: 89). In practice, member countries are still
preoccupied with sovereignty instead of focusing on the bigger picture. For example, we have seen somecountries like Rwanda closing the border with Uganda in early 2019, prioritising national agendas at theexpense of the EAC. Some countries like Tanzania and Burundi have been slow on the East African
integration programmes, leaving Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda to be at the forefront of the integration
process. At this point, the three EAC countries were called the ‘coalition of the willing’ (Onyango 2015).
But this was before tensions emerged between Uganda and Rwanda. At that time, they were willing andcommitted to fast-track EAC activities and projects, including the East African federation. One wonders
how a political federation will be achieved when the treaty and member countries are still focusing on
sovereignty, both in theory and practice. This presents an obstacle to achieving the East Africanfederation.

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Beyond the Cessation Clause: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda—From Refugees to East African Citizens?

9. Conclusion
This paper has argued that despite various attempts to search for a durable solution to the refugee crisisin Uganda, it has remained elusive. Since 2002, Uganda has promoted (in)voluntary repatriation, but the
majority of Rwandans have refused to return and continue to stay in the country. Resettlement is notavailable, and local integration is yet to be explored as a durable solution. At the same time, therecommendation for cessation of refugee status by the UNHCR has not addressed these problems. Given
these challenges, this paper proposes a durable solution for granting East African citizenship to Rwandan
refugees by issuing EAC Passports or residence permits that give them freedom of mobility andresidence in the member countries in accordance with the EAC Treaty and Common Market Protocol.
Searching for a durable solution at the EAC level comes at a time when efforts to establish the East
African federation continue. Despite a number of challenges that might hinder its implementation, thissolution has the potential to end a protracted refugee situation, promoting the rights of Rwandan refugees
and enhancing people-centred regional integration.
The insights in this paper have methodological and policy implications. From a methodologicalperspective, it is necessary to conduct further research to understand the potential contribution ofmobility, regional citizenship, and other alternative durable solutions to similar protracted refugee
situations in the Great Lakes and Eastern African regions associated with the complex forced
displacement phenomenon. Since it is becoming increasingly difficult to address the refugee problem
with traditional durable solutions of voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement, it isimportant to think of other possible alternative durable solutions.
From a policy point of view, it is important that the EAC enacts the necessary policy framework in
the context of the treaty and Common Market Protocol for freedom of movement and residence, andgrant regional citizenship to refugees. There is a need for political will, focused and courageousleadership, and cooperation of the member states to ensure that the EAC policies are implemented andrespected. A number of times, good policies are made but fail at the implementation stage. For us to beable to address the Rwandan refugee problem in Uganda, the implementation of EAC policies onrefugees will be crucial going forward.

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The African Sovereign Debt:
Financial Dominance over Development
Kazue Demachi
African Studies Center (ASC) - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan

Abstract
The Sub-Saharan African countries began borrowing from the international capital market in the 2000s.
African sovereign bonds are accepted in the international market; however, the accumulation of liability
triggers international scepticism against debt sustainability, the necessity of borrowing, the legitimacyof spending, and the responsibility of foreign lenders. A brief review of the African sovereign bonds
issued in the international capital market in the post-debt cancellation period poses fundamental questions
regarding the ability of the market to foster the development and stabilisation of African economies.
Keywords: Africa, sovereign debt, due diligence, bond market― 129 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

1. Introduction
The financial environment around African economies changed drastically in the 2000s. The primaryfactor was the completion of the long-lasting debt reduction and cancellation procedures. Most of thewestern aid donors presented the condition that those countries which were exempted from debt repayment
should not to be eligible for new concessional loans; however, it appears that none of them had expectedthat the interest rate in the international capital market would remain lower than the concessional loansat the time of negotiation for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) scheme (Figure 1). Theinternational society soon witnessed the accumulation of the new African debt which even coincided withthe completion of debt cancellation (Demachi 2019).
In the meantime, the introduction of private money to the investment projects in developing countries
has started to gain ground. The private-public partnerships (PPPs) in development projects have beenpromoted in a certain circle, especially in developed economies since the end of the 2000s. The 4thHigh Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan in 2011 is often cited as the turning point of theintroduction of private funding to the investment projects in developing countries (IOB 2013). Based onevidence, critics have been consistently opposing to PPPs, listing the failure of PPP projects worldeide(AUC/OECD 2021, Eurodad 2018, Leigland 2018). Although the effectiveness of PPP in the context ofdeveloping countries is still disputable, the report published by the African Union and the OECD in 2021
strongly supports the further promotion of ‘blended concessional finance’ by combining concessional
funds with commercial financing for investment in Africa.
Given the international trend that private money should be introduced to the relatively large publicprojects in developing countries, especially in the construction of infrastructure and natural resource development, the international market has responded with a relatively favourable view of African countries’
entry into the international capital market. Several countries have succeeded in rolling over sovereign
bonds. However, the situation gradually aggravated as external debt piled up and some countries defaulted
while others turned to the facilities provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Africa is not the only group of countries that has accumulated external debt. The International
Debt Statistics 2021, the World Bank’s annual publication on the world external debt status, has alreadywarned about the accumulation of external debt since 2019, indicating that ‘almost half of all low-income
countries were either already in debt distress or at a high risk of it’ (World Bank 2021b: vii). At the
inception of the recent global pandemic crisis in 2020, most governments of the G-20 member countries
agreed on the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI). DSSI became effective in May 2020 and was
originally meant to continue until the end of 2020, but it was extended by one year (World Bank 2021a1).
Many African countries are eligible for this initiative. However, given the difficult pandemic situationthat has originated from the pandemic along with poor institutional and fiscal capacities, the debt burden
1‘Covid 19:
Debt Service Suspension Initiative,’ 24 September 2021.
The World Bank homepage,https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/covid-19-debt-service-suspension-initiative (last accessed on 18 October 2021).

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The African Sovereign Debt: Financial Dominance over Development

Figure 1. The world interest rate and concessional loans to Sub-Saharan Africa
Data source: International Debt Statistics: DSSI for World Bank’s International Development
Association (IDA) data. The data were retrieved via the World Bank’s DataBank. The data for
the U.S. Treasury Bill were retrieved from the FRED published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis.
Note: SSA average is the average interest rate of lending applicable to the 36 countries eligible forlending under the IDA term. The T-bill rate is computed as a simple annual average.
on African countries is expected to linger.
This unexpected temporary suspension of the debt problem stands as a fitting opportunity to review
the changes in the economic situation of the African HIPCs after the previous debt cancellation. Has
access to the international capital market enabled African governments better steer their investment andgrowth? How is the raised capital invested? The increase in the number of studies and reports published
not only in academia but also in the business society stressing on the lenders’ responsibilities and theimportance of due diligence implies that the answer is not very positive.
Numerous studies have observed the relationship between the governments of the emerging Latin
American countries and the international financial market. Studies on sovereign bond risk premiums andeconomic performances suggest that the international capital market responds to the economic behavioursof the borrower countries so that the risk premium and the spread in interests reflect the market responseto the debtors’ risks (e.g. Grandes 2007). If this is the case for any emerging economies, the market
mechanism should automatically evaluate the debtor governments’ effort in minimizing the default risk,
while the government putting in insufficient effort must face a higher cost of capital. However, as discussed
below, recent studies suggest that this is not applicable to the African sovereign debt. If raising capital in
the private market is neither cost-effective nor discipline-enhancing for the African governments, what is
the implication of the recent external borrowing? This study aims to review the background of new debts
and their impact on African countries. While the debt of African countries consists of several types of― 131 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

borrowing, this study puts more weight on the issuance of eurobonds, as it is a new feature of borrowing
adopted by of the African governments in the post-debt cancellation period. In the following sections,the term ‘sovereign bond’ is used interchangeably with ‘eurobond,’ denoting the government’s borrowing
from the outside of the country, often in the U.S. dollar or euro, through the issuance of bonds.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section provides an overview of the
debtor countries’ prevalent situation. The third section examines the recent discussions on the sovereign
debt of developing countries. The final section concludes by referring to the responsibility of the investors
and lenders.
2. The new African sovereign debt
The aggregated amount of debt outstanding for each country is officially reported and publicised by theinternational financial institutions, but there is no publicly consolidated information about the details ofeach sovereign debt (e.g. issue date, amount, tenure, coupon, type, currency, and yield at the issue).
International financial institutions, especially the IMF, provide the Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
for the member countries, and their primary concern is the total amount of debt outstanding. However,
how to pay back the debt in what timing is sometimes more important than the total amount of debt.
On this point, notably, the World Bank started to publish the Debt Report in 2020. The report provides
detailed information on each new issuer, which is usually referenced in the market. This can be viewed
as the international financial institution’s response to the rapid increase in the eurobonds issued by the
emerging and developing countries.
2.1. Who has borrowed and from whom?
The previous debt cancellation process has induced a debate between opponents of and proponents fordebt cancellation. Several studies (e.g. Easterly 2002) argue that debt cancellation induces moral hazard,
and the debtor country will expect another debt cancellation in the future. Cohen et al. (2007) offer afundamental discussion on ‘loans or grants’ and insist that both need to be combined to achieve the aim ofinternational development. Although the international society exerted a strong push for the cancellationof developing countries’ debt, the rationality of debt cancellation was backed by the studies on debt
distress and debt overhang (Krugman 1988).
The creditor governments in the HIPC’s debt cancellation process have indicated the possibility thatafter the old liability was exempted the offer for new bilateral concessional loans would become difficult.
For example, the Japanese government expressed its outlook on official development assistance in April
1999 and stated that, ‘Once debt relief is extended to a country, it will be quite difficult to extend newloans there in the future’ (MOFA HP2).
2‘Japan’s Comprehensive Plan for Development and Debt Relief for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries,’ 28 April 1999. The― 132 ―

The African Sovereign Debt: Financial Dominance over Development

Figure 2. Official bilateral loans to Sub-Saharan Africa (billions USD)
Data source: Joint External Debt Hub. Data is retrieved via the DataBank of theWorld Bank (World Bank 2021c).
Note: Sub-Saharan Africa includes South Africa.
Bunte (2018), on the other hand, argues that sovereign creditors have incentives to lend money to thecreditor governments that once defaulted. However, in reality, the actual stagnation, if not decrease, of
official loans and grants to Sub-Saharan Africa has been recognisable since the beginning of the debt
cancellation process. Figures 2 and 3 show the trends of bilateral loans and grants provided to thecountries in Sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, Figure 4 shows the other selected financial flows
along with bilateral loans. The increase in other flows to African countries is remarkable, and the size ofother flows dwarfs the size of the official bilateral loans.
This study focuses on governments’ external borrowing as sovereign bonds (or eurobond, described as‘international debt securities’ in the figure); it is noteworthy that cross-border loans also increased in the
post-cancellation period. A relatively large share of such financial flows is attributed to the investments
in South Africa and Nigeria. However, it is still astonishing to see the increase in ‘debt securities heldby nonresidents,’ which suggests that there was a surge in the inflow of capital to the domestic capital
markets of African countries.
Regarding debt securities, it is worth noting that most of the African sovereign bonds are not in theinvestment category according to the ratings provided by credit rating agencies; therefore, it is less likely(though not impossible) for passive investors and long-term investors, such as pension funds of developed
countries and life insurance companies, to invest in the African sovereign bond. Mecaguni et al. (2014),
for example, show the composition of investors in the Nigerian sovereign bond listed on the London Stockwebpage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/loanaid/plan9904.html (last accessed on
19 October 2021).

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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

Figure 3. Grants received by Sub-Saharan Africa (billions USD)
Data source: The World Development Indicators (World Bank 2021d).
Note: Excluding technical cooperation. Sub-Saharan Africa includes South Africa.
The spike in 2006 indicates the debt cancellation.
Exchange since 2011. Majority of the investors (70%) are fund managers, 12% are banks and privatebanks, and 10% are hedge funds. This suggests that the investors searching for high yields are more likely
to invest in African sovereign bonds.
2.2. de jure and de facto purposes of spending
Governments have several reasons to borrow money, but the intended use of the bond proceeds is usually
not publicised, especially in the case of international sovereign debt. Related to this point, Olabisi
and Stein (2015) analysed the cost of borrowing for African countries using the market data, but their
appendix also provides an extensive qualitative summary of the selected countries’ use of sovereign debt
proceeds. They cover the period between 2006 and 2014 and summarise the information related tosovereign debts, such as the usage of proceeds, background, and market responses at the time of issuance,
for the selected African borrower countries. Their sources of information are mainly media and official
documents. They cover seven HIPCs, namely, Ghana, the Republic of Congo, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire,
Zambia, Tanzania, and Rwanda, and five non-HIPCs, namely, Seychelles, Gabon, Nigeria, Namibia, andAngola. Table 1 is based on the appendix provided by Olabisi and Stein (2015) but is extended andsupplemented by the available information. As Table 1 shows, as long as officially known, there are 15
Sub-Saharan African countries that issued sovereign bonds until October 2021, excluding South Africa
and Mozambique. South Africa is excluded from the study because the country issues a relatively large
amount of sovereign bonds annually, and this behaviour should be distinguished from the other Africancountries. Mozambique is also excluded for its limited availability of bond information, possibly due to― 134 ―

The African Sovereign Debt: Financial Dominance over Development

Figure 4. Liabilities of Sub-Saharan Africa (billions USD)
Data source: Joint External Debt Hub. Data is retrieved via World Bank’s DataBank of. Note: SubSaharan Africa includes South Africa. The numbers in the parentheses are the variable codes used in the
database.
its default in 2017 and related scandals.
In the early phase of sovereign debt issuance, that is during the end of the 2000s, the stated purpose andintended usage of the bond proceeds were often investments in infrastructure. For example, the Ghanaian
government intended to invest in the Volta River Authority, which is in charge of managing hydropower
plants and power generation, the Electric Company of Ghana, and other dams and ports. Senegal, Gabon,and Namibia have also reported the intention to invest in infrastructure.
However, it became clear that the intended purpose of bond issuance has often not been fulfilled,or the project halted far before its completion. Considering the period between 2013 and 2014, Tyson(2015) argues that in Cote d’Ivoire and Rwanda, sovereign bond issues are associated with an increase
in infrastructure investment, while in other countries, the effect of debt is mixed. Other countries’
governments also used the proceeds in a controversial way; for example, Ghana boosted the salaries ofpublic servants and Mozambique purchased gunships using the proceeds. The stated purpose of therecently issued eurobonds is often dominated by the repayment of old debt. Several prospectuses ofAfrican eurobonds, which can be browsed on the internet, state simply ‘funding its fiscal gap’ as theplanned use of proceeds (such as the 2020 issuance by Ghana).
Such a shift in the purpose of African sovereign debt from genuine investment in infrastructure tomere debt financing is an alarming trend. However, there are no binding regulations on raising money forinternational sovereign bonds. Submission of a prospectus is stipulated in the European market, but there
is no penalty even if the bond issuer allocates the proceed to other purposes. In 2019, an article in The― 135 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

Table 1. The issuance of eurobond by the SSA governments, 2006-2021(October)
06
AngolaBenin
Congo
Cote d’Ivoire
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana
Kenya
Namibia
Nigeria
RwandaSenegal
Seychelles
Tanzania
Zambia
Total

07

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

1
1

1*

1*

1
2
1
1

1*

1*

1

1*

2
1

1
1

1

4

2

2

3

3

20

2
1

1

1
1

19

1
7

1
1

1

1
2

2
2

1

2
2
2

1

3
2

1

7

2

1

2

2

1
3

1
2

1*

21

7

1

8

6

5

Total
3
3
1
9
1
3
13
6
1
6
1
6
3
1
3
60

Source: Author’s summarisation based on the appendix of Olabisi and Stein (2015) and thecollected information. Note: South Africa and Mozambique are excluded. The year starts
from 2006, denoting the time of bond issuance. More than one issue in a year means either
the issuance of different tenure bonds at one time or issuance in different months. An asterisk
indicates that the bond is defaulted or restructured. Congo denotes the Republic of Congo.
Financial Times claimed that ‘Africa’s eurobonds are a blank cheque,’ suggesting that there is no binding
check mechanism in the market, as the blank statement of the ‘purpose of spending’ and the borrowers’
mission drift still do not hinder the investors from bidding on African eurobonds (Roche 20193).
3. Merits and risks of borrowing from the international capital market
According to Olabisi and Stein (2015), bond issuers are expected to be bound by the market mechanism,and the governments of the developing countries need to choose between the market discipline and conditionalities attached by international financial institutions. One possible reason of the increase in sovereign
bond issuance is their reluctance to the conditionalities attached to concessional loans. Although Olabisi
and Stein (2015) consider several African countries, especially oil exporters, who issued eurobonds toappeal to foreign investors, the low market interest rate suggests the possibility of sovereign bond issuancebeing cost-effective.
3.1. From concessional loans to eurobonds
Through the post-debt cancellation period, some African countries have moved up on the ladder to middle
income category (Table 2). Although the gap between the leading ‘emerging’ economy, that is South
Africa, and the other African countries is still large, the change in the official income category makes
3Andrew Roche, ‘Africa’s eurobonds are a blank cheque,’ 17 October 2019, The Financial Times,
https://www.ft.com/content/25589487-78ba-4892-9fcf-cfe8556861b7 (web edition, last accessed on 19 October 2021).

― 136 ―

The African Sovereign Debt: Financial Dominance over Development

Table 2. Income categories of the Sub-Saharan African countries by the World Bank, 1995-2020

Source: Author’s summarisation based on the information collected from various WorldBank documents. The World Bank does not officially provide historical records and dataof the member countries’ income categories.
Note: The figures in the table denote the income category, 1: Low, 2: Lower middle, 3:Upper middle, 4: High income countries.

― 137 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

Figure 5. Concessional interest rates of the loans offered by the World Bank, 1995-2020
Source: International Debt Statistics: DSSI, retrieved via DataBank of the World Bank.

a remarkable shift in the development plans of the countries. One significant change associated withthe official increase in the income of developing countries is the loss of the eligibility for IDA’s loans
provided by the World Bank to the least-developed countries. Some studies, such as Guscina et al.
(2014) and Olabisi and Stein (2015), ascribed the increase in bond issuance by developing economies’
governments in the private market to the decrease in concessional loans from aid donors. In fact, outside
Africa, a number of countries have debuted in the international capital market as they graduated from
low income to middle income country, and experienced a decrease in the opportunity for concessional
financing (Guscina et al. 2014).
However, as Table 2 indicates, African countries have started to access the international capital market
before or without its shift to middle-income category. Moreover, the comparative size of private financial
flow to public flows indicates that private money inflow by far surpasses the possibly expected size of aid
flow. The increase in international liabilities for African countries needs to be explained by other aspects,
especially the financial environment in the international capital market. While a separate analysis basedon an appropriate data set is required, the comparison of Figure 1 and Table 1 implies the correlation
between the issuance of eurobonds by the African governments and the spread between concessional andmarket interest rates. In the period when the market interest rate (represented by the three-month U.S.
Treasury Bill rate) is higher than the concessional lending rate (represented by the loan provided by theInternational Development Association of the World Bank), the eurobond issuance slows down.
Moreover, the interest rate average for IDA loans is, in fact, higher than that for the term provided forthe eligible countries to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the World― 138 ―

The African Sovereign Debt: Financial Dominance over Development

Bank, for most of the post-debt cancellation period (Figure 5). This may be rational in terms of market
mechanisms (good borrowers get a loan at a lower price), and IDA loans usually have a longer grace
period and maturity than IBRD loans. However, it is pervasive as the price of the tool for development
assistance. The main reason for this reversal is the world’s low interest rate, led by financial policies
in developed economies, especially after the international financial crisis of 2007-08. Increasing accessto the international capital market by developing countries is rational given the skew in conditions ofconcessional lending.
3.2. Risks of being an ‘emerging’ in the international market
If concessional loans are no longer the primary financial source for the governments of developing
economies, the question that needs to be asked is what kind of risks are associated with borrowing fromthe international capital market for promoting growth. Guscina et al. (2014) express the recent increasein eurobond issuance by the governments of developing countries, including Africa, as ‘déjà vu’ and pointout that there was an increase in debut to eurobond issuance in the 1990s, mostly by the Latin Americancountries. In the 1980s, these countries suffered from international debt problems. Still, as the Brady
Plan successfully resolved the issue of old debt (mainly from the western and U.S. private banks), many
countries started to borrow in the international market and rapidly accumulated debt again. While Africancountries also suffered from international debt problems in the 1980s, the debt cancellation process HIPCs
were much more complicated because a large part of the debt was owed to other governments and theinternational financial institution. It took an additional decade for the HIPCs for the old debt problems to
be resolved, but now they are experiencing the same boom in debt as Latin American countries.
The experience of Latin American countries in the 1990s was not that impressive. Latin Americancountries have shifted from a government-led import-substitution style of development to market-based
development. The currency regimes anchoring to the U.S. dollar enabled several governments to achieve
macroeconomic and price stabilisation (Demachi, forthcoming). However, as Nishijima (2003) suggests,
the liberalization of economies was associated with the increase in unemployment, deterioration inreallocation of wealth, fragile financial system, and currency crises.
Several Latin American governments defaulted their sovereign bonds. Repeated default and comeback
to the capital market of Argentine are widely known. Given the economic size, the Argentina sovereign
bond remains attractive even after a serial default. However, the relationship between the international
market and emerging economies today indicates that access to the international capital market comes at
a great cost.

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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

3.3. ‘You surrender, but the game goes on’
The most serious risks and costs are associated with borrower countries’ default on debt. Unlikebank loans, the bondholders participates from across the world; the borrower government is required
to communicate and negotiate with the creditors. The holdout problem is now well known, and anincreasing number of sovereign bonds follow the recommendation to include collective action clauses in
the contract at the issuance of eurobonds (Van der Wansem et al. 2019, Fang et al. 2020, Demachi 2018).
Nonetheless, the debt restructuring process is stressful and costly; this may lead to disruptive litigation,
which will have a detrimental effect on the government’s functioning of fostering growth.
Today, sovereign defaults do not simply imply the unilateral suspension of payment and debt cancellation. Rather, it leads to a prolonged process of negotiation on debt restructuring, with a haircut (reductionin either principle or interest, or both) and extension of the period, though this was far from the norm
observed in the past (Roos 2019). This indicates that once the developing countries’ governments enter
the international capital market, they cannot simply stop participating by citing a default. The relentlessmarket mechanism will not allow the emerging governments to halt and rebuild the economy until thedebt is paid back.
The issues related to the vulture funds and creditors’ holdout clearly indicate the weakening of sovereign immunity in the international capital market. Closely related to this point, Roos (2019) argues
that the strengthening of private credit is the main reason behind the dramatic decrease in the unilateralsovereign default after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. He points out that along with the
integration and centralisation of the international credit market, the unison of the principle of the private
market and the intervention of international financial institutions (namely, the IMF) has created the baseof the current financial dominance over the sovereigns.
3.4. Specificity of the African sovereign bond
Roos (2019) argues that the concentrated and centralised international credit market provides market
discipline; the market mechanism skilfully holds that the debtor government keeps financing and isthreatened. However, whether the market provides the discipline to the debtor is in question, especiallywhen the debtor is small and risky, such as the African government.
Recent studies on African sovereign bonds using market data reveal the possibility that the international
capital market does not provide discipline to debtor governments. Morsy et al. (2021) show that there
exists an investors herding behaviour in the African sovereign bond market and suggest the possibility
that the bond yield and risk, measured as the CDS (credit-default swap) spreads of the African bond,does not correctly evaluate borrowers’ risks in the market. Closely related to this point, Olabisi and Stein(2015) argue that African bond issuers pay a higher cost of borrowing from the market, contrary to thegeneral expectation that access to the international capital market enables the African government to raise― 140 ―

The African Sovereign Debt: Financial Dominance over Development

capital at a lower cost. Based on empirical analysis, Senga and Cassimon (2020) suggest the existenceof a contagion effect among the eurobonds issued by the African governments. These studies all point
to the possibility that the international capital market is not providing market discipline to the African
borrowing governments, as the investors lump all the different countries’ eurobonds as African bond;individual economic conditions and risks are not reflected in the prices of bonds in the market.
Unlike the Latin American debt problem that occurred in the 1980s, the current form of sovereign
finance through the issuance of eurobonds exempts any possible loss of private banks, which only arrange
debt issuances, distribute bonds, and charge fees. Given that the Latin American debt crisis was in fact
the creditor’s crisis, the involvement of developed economies’ governments, namely the United States
and the IMF, was reasonable. However, this understanding also implies that there will be no future ‘debt
crisis in emerging Africa’. Given the small size of the African sovereign borrowing and the nature of thecapital market where African sovereign bonds attract risk-takers, any default and restructuring of debt
will not attract enough official attentions to extends a support. The faith in the market mechanism thatprovides no appropriate discipline to the borrowers leads to international indifference with regard to thedevelopment issues of Africa.
4. Conclusion: The limit of the market mechanism
It is now widely accepted that the market has a short memory. Given the insatiable risk appetite in theinternational market, even the governments that once defaulted, such as Argentina and Cote d’Ivoire, canreturn to the market. This fact may be welcomed by the emerging governments; however, the real setbackof resorting to easy financing in the international capital market needs to be recognised.
Roos (2019) argues that the sovereign defaulter’s exit-and-back process may exacerbate the dominanceof private finance and the subordination of sovereign power, which oversees the steering for growth.
Repeated debt restructuring processes may undermine the development of democracy in the borrower
country, while the distribution of limited capital may be further skewed (Roos 2019: 299). The issuance ofan international sovereign bond may provide an easy and quick solution for mitigating the fiscal deficits ofthe cash-short governments, but it may hinder the medium and long-term orthodox efforts to consolidate
the institutions and systems to raise the tax from the citizens and disburse it in an accountable way.
The recognition that the growing influence of world creditors needs to be associated with stronger
responsibility in lending has already begun to take shape. The move forwarded by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was triggered by the Argentine experience of prolonged and conflicted litigation with creditors (Buchheit and Gulati 2010). OECD has also started toprovide official guidance for the required due diligence in responsible business conduct in several sectors,
such as mining and banking.
In 2015, Deloitte, a multinational consultant and auditing company, published Sovereign debt audit:― 141 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

A way to mitigate future sovereign debt crises (Deloitte 2015). This guide was published based on the UN
general assembly in 2010 and the UNCTAD initiative. Although the publication envisages the conductin European countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus, it is still remarkable that themarket side has gradually started to recognise the risks associated with sovereign debt. In Africa, theAfrican Legal Support Facility (ALSF), hosted by the African Development Bank, has also published aguide, Understanding Sovereign Debt–Options and Opportunities for Africa in 2020 (ALSF 2020). This
guidance mainly envisages the African borrowers, and such movements suggest the real need for theinternational assistance for capacity building in the area of financial management in Africa.
As the issuance of eurobonds by African governments is relatively new, there are many issues that
require further analysis. For example, bond issuance is associated with additional costs, such as thecost of roadshow (the advertising of debt issuance beforehand) and the cost of carry (interest incurredby the untapped proceeds). These additional costs may render the international borrowings to be more
expensive than that expected by the borrower governments. The impact of the issuance of eurobonds on
domestic policies, such as elections, investment policy, and taxation, are also entirely unknown in Africa,
and further studies are required to be conducted in this regard.

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edition. <https://www.ft.com/content/25589487-78ba-4892-9fcf-cfe8556861b7/ Accessed on 19 October 2021>.
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― 144 ―

Over-indebtedness of Microfinance in Rural Africa:
A Sociological Perspective of Tanzania

Makiko Sakai
African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan

Abstract
Focusing on Tanzania’s examples, this article aims to enumerate and analyse social factors, identifying
the specificity of microfinance (MF)’s over-indebtedness in African rural areas for further discussions.
As globalisation advances due to the remarkable development of information and communication
technology, ‘financial inclusion’ has become a new slogan for poverty reduction. The financialisation of
the MF movement proceeds as a part of financial inclusion. However, MF movements in Asia, Latin
America, and Africa have not advanced as expected. Since the early 2000s, MF markets and institutions
have experienced severe global crises. Over-indebtedness is a severe problem in the ‘developing’ andthe ‘developed’ countries, including those in Sub-Saharan Africa, facing rapid urbanisation. The
increasing expenditures to meet daily necessities and satisfy material desires make people depend on
debts. The vicious circle of the debts deteriorates the borrowers’ daily lives and puts the MF institutions’performance quality at risk. Although over-indebtedness can be explained by an individual’s lack offinancial literacy, this clarification is not enough regarding the rural social structure, mode of production,and social relationships, playing important roles in redressing the balance of household management.

Keywords: microfinance, over-indebtedness, rural areas, Tanzania― 145 ―

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1. Introduction
Since the 1980s, the microfinance (MF) industry has been celebrated for its social impact on poverty
reduction and profitability. Today, globalisation advances supported by the remarkable development of
information and communication technology, the ‘financial inclusion’ has become a new slogan forpoverty reduction. International society promotes financial opportunities for poor people who have noaccess to formal financial services to provide them with different types of loans, credits, savings, andinsurance. This is how the financialisation of the MF movement has advanced financial inclusion.
Nevertheless, excessive financialisation may negatively impact society.
As expected, MF movements in Asia, Latin America, and Africa have not developed. Since the early
2000s, MF markets and institutions have experienced severe crises worldwide (Guérin et al. 2015).
There are increasing fears about excessive ‘financialisation’ caused by the expansion of the global
economy and the availability of colossal capital in the MF markets, causing instability (Servet 2006,
Guérin et al. 2014; 2015; 2018).
Among the many global concerns related to the financial situation, household over-indebtedness has
become a common and severe problem for the ‘developing’ and the ‘developed’ countries such as theUSA, EU, and Japan. The same phenomenon has appeared in Sub-Saharan African nations, facing rapid
urbanisation (Koomson and Peprah 2018, Mutsonziwa and Ashenafi 2019).
Notably, the rapid globalisation compares the world’s households to American lifestyles regarding
material consumption based on many kinds of debts. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the middle classes increased
in urban areas, eager to attain a privileged goal to buy a new car, TV set, refrigerator, and washingmachine. This social change in the urban areas also stimulates material desires in rural areas. However,
economic indicators such as the income-to-debt ratio are limited in clarifying rural reality. This study
examines the social factors that identify the specificity of the MF’s over-indebtedness in the rural areasof Africa and foresee where the overindebted persons look for help.
From a neoliberal perspective, over-indebtedness is considered a personal cause, such as a lack offinancial literacy. However, can over-indebtedness be solved if people learn to manage their debts at
school?
We need to understand the phenomenon from a broader perspective: living in the financiallyconnected world ruled by the preconceived assumption that we cannot design our daily life without debt
in the name of ‘financial inclusion’. This worldwide campaign oriented by the financial sector,
international cooperation agencies, and donners have provided a positive image for debt and encouraged
the poor to borrow easy money, regardless of the objectives. This study does not deny the importanceof the financial sector. However, its excessive dependence could alienate the value of broader social― 146 ―

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exchanges embedded in the other side of the monetary sphere 1, where money is defined as a catalyst ofsocial structure rather than as a strict economic tool. This sphere, where the meaning of money differs,
may play an important role in maintaining social structures as a buffer zone, especially as a shelter fromdebt in terms of strict economic regulations. We define this concept more clearly in the next section.
Depending on each context, there are different meanings of money in rural and urban areas. However,many MF studies do not consider the different roles of money in them analyses. Few studies on overindebtedness exist, featuring the background of the economic and social structure of rural areas basedon the different production cycles related to the natural environment. However, it is also important tofocus on the portfolio of agricultural production, different types of income, and reciprocal social
relationships that help keep their structure stable.
Moreover, it is difficult to treat all points cited above. With page limits, focusing on a Tanzanian case,this study aims to enumerate some social factors indicating the incompatible aspects of the MF
mechanism with reality. This may contribute to rethinking the broader meanings of money in the context
of over-indebtedness.
2. Definition of the related terms
Before entering the discussion, we define the terms MF, over-indebtedness, and spheres where money
plays different roles to clarify the range of this study.
2.1. Definition of microfinanceMicrofinance is a collective term of the different kinds of small financial services such as credit, saving,and insurance, for the poor and the low-income brackets with the aim of poverty reduction. Its common
definition is usually limited to financial services provided by outsiders for the poor. For example, MFoffers credits or loans with minimum interests without a mortgage for the poor, as they do not have any
properties to mortgage. However, some institutions require mortgages or charge high interest due tomanagement issues.
The borderlines of MF are expanding in theoretical and practical fields due to the complexity of thecontemporary world. This study discusses small loan services and their users in the rural areas of SubSaharan Africa, such as small-scale farmers, pastoralists, tenant farmers, farm labourers, small
entrepreneurs, and artisans.
The MF is classified briefly into three categories:(1) Financial aid programmes offered by governments, international cooperation agencies, and NGOs.

This expression is provisional and interchangeable. You could find for example ‘non-commercialised sphere’
later in this article. I am still looking for more adequate words to express this sphere.
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)(2) Financial services offered by specialised MF institutions (MFI).
(3) Self-reliant financial activities (saving and credit) made of users: cooperatives, rotating saving, andcredit associations (ROSCAs).
We cannot exclude the traditional ROSCA type from the third category because the distinction
between cooperatives and ROSCAs is unclear. As many kinds of ROSCAs are popular everywhere(Ardener and Burman 1995), some NGOs provide ROSCA-type assistance programmes such as
VICOBA (Village Community Bank) in Tanzania. Moreover, traditional money collecting services (i.e.
‘Ajo’ in Nigeria and Ghana) (Falola 1995) are adopted by some MFIs as efficient, practical tools forsaving.
Although we cannot ignore that local financial services such as pawns and usuries provide specificoptions for the local context, they are not in the MF category because they do not aim to reduce poverty.
Karlan and Goldberg (2011: 21) enumerated nine characteristics of MF. As they call them ‘traditionalfeatures’ of MF, many variants have appeared based on mobile money and e-money. However, these
new services are based on digital tools. Therefore, we need another opportunity to examine thecharacteristics of newcomers.
(1) Small transactions and minimum balances (whether loans, savings, or insurance).
(2) Loans for entrepreneurial activity.
(3) Collateral-free loans.
(4) Group lending.
(5) Focus on poor clients.
(6) Focus on female clients.
(7) Simple application processes.
(8) Provision of services in underserved communities.
(9) Market-level interest rates.
Karlan and Goldberg (2011: 21) emphasise the significant difference among MF programmes interms of their targets and conditions. Generally, MFIs provide loans to improve micro entrepreneurs’businesses. Thus, money must be invested in income-generating activities instead of daily consumption
and family obligation. Some MFIs ask their clients to submit their business plans and visit borrowers’
business places to verify their correct usage. Other MFIs are less interested in the purpose of loans,disburse loans with few conditions, and operate more like consumer credit lenders. Moreover, the useof credits is not strictly defined.

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2.2. Definition of over-indebtedness
Kasoga et al. (2019) describe that ‘Over-indebtedness occurs when a customer continuously struggles
to meet repayment deadlines and has to make unduly high sacrifices related to their loan obligations thathave more than transitory effects’. However, over-indebtedness deteriorates the borrowers’ daily lives;
it puts MFIs’ performance quality at risk, spreading to donors, investors, and the MF industry as a whole(Kasoga et al. 2019: 35).
These are the criteria of an over-indebted person (Mutsonziwa and Fanta 2018: 5).
(1) if a person is borrowing to repay another debt.
(2) does not want to borrow because of too much outstanding debt.
(3) had loan applications turned down because of too much debt.
(4) had debt restructured;(5) defaulted on debt obligations; and(6) had an order of seizure.
Generally, the three indicators are used to identify a client’s state of over-indebtedness are the debtto-income ratio, multiple borrowing, and delinquency (DeVaney and Lytton 1995). However, these
indicators are rather suitable for urban situations and have difficulties illustrating the specificities inrural areas. The types and regularity of incomes vary significantly, self-production still plays animportant role. Moreover, mutual support in cash or in-kind could be practised individually. Economic
indicators do not reveal this fact.
2.3. The different meanings of money and their spheres
For convenience, we propose to distinguish briefly two different meanings of money. On the one hand,
it is defined as strict economic tools that belong to the ‘commercialised sphere’, and on the other hand,
as a catalyst of a social structure founded by the interaction of people belonging to the ‘noncommercialised sphere’. This distinction is referred to from Parry and Bloch’s proposition for the twodifferent cycles of exchange: short and long cycles of money exchange.
Many urban residents, salaried workers, or informal business people rely on money. However, inrural areas, some spaces remain for subsistence agriculture 2 and pastoralism, other subsistence activities,
and irregular and small income-generating activities. Moreover, in both cases, the meaning of money
differs. First, money exists as an economic tool to gain and accumulate more money. However, itInstead of adopting the strict term of ‘self-sufficient’, in this article, we use ‘subsistence’ as larger meaning,which indicate small-scale, family-based agriculture which produce their daily food and sell surpluses in the local
market.

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circulates in and outside society as a lubricant to elaborate the social foundation.
Parry and Bloch (1989: 7) critically remarked on the distinction between ‘monetary’ and ‘nonmonetary’ societies. In traditional anthropology, there is a tendency to consolidate a fundamental
division between non-monetary and monetary economies or even societies. This stereotype brings us to
the world in other dichotomic ways: capitalist vs pre-capitalist, modern vs traditional, commodity
economy vs gift economy.
For example, Bohannan (1955) reported that the Tiv people in rural Nigeria had principles for
distinguishing different types of traditional transaction spheres. Bohannan emphasised how the
introduction of Western money destroyed the ‘primitive society’, where the people organised
transactions and exchanges without the mediation of Western money. Currently, this discourse is anexcessive dichotomy that created a fixed view of ‘primitive’ societies. However, Bohannan clarified theexistence of multiple exchange routes and their conversion before the penetration of the Western
monetary economy (Sugiyama 2007: 148).
Parry and Bloch (1989) provide a good perspective for clarifying two different spheres on thediversity of money exchanges. The authors emphasised that two modes of money exchange, namely
short and long cycles of exchange, must contribute to analysing the different meanings of money. The
authors defined that the short cycle of money exchange is practised to obtain economic gains based on
individual competition. The long cycle is defined as money exchange that contributes to maintaining
the social foundation over generations, such as funerals, local festivals, seasonal community works, andcommunity infrastructure maintenance. Mutual support in kind or cash must be included in this category.
The lengthy exchange cycle is hardly considered in MF discussions because of the invisibility of theimmediate profit in economic terms. But the ‘non-commercialised sphere’ referred to as the long cycle,
plays a significant role in debt management in daily life. We can see an example of ‘Bank of Affection’in Case 1, presented in Section 3.
Graeber emphasises that the ‘obligation’ through reciprocal trust between those who know each other
differs from the debt in the financial sense, calculated and quantified under the economic rules (Graeber
2012: 21). In Graeber’s sense, money is an economic tool to realise the debt. However, in the ‘obligation’in daily life, money can stimulate social relationships. If we define the two different monetary spheres
precisely, the diverse meanings of money can be considered economic tools and catalysts in the social
systems 3. In this regard, what factors clearly distinguish the two monetary spheres? The existence ofinterests and mortgages must be examined as creating a border between commercialised and noncommercialised spheres.

Several studies about the diversity of meanings of money exists in the anthropology and sociology. Among many,see for example: Parry and Bloch (1989), Guyer (1995), Aglietta and Orléan (1998).

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3. Household over-indebtedness
3.1. The context of the global and Sub-Sahara African over-indebtedness
Referring to the French regulation theory, Servet and Saiag (2014) explain a current radical change inthe economic and social structure established under the 1960s ‘mass-production and consumption cycle’symbolised by the USA’s Fordism, accompanied by the consumption style-oriented by the instalment
plans. Later, credit cards allowed users with stable employment and secure salaries to purchase goods
through easy credit. Although the domestic industrial production and trade cycle had served the financial
industry until the early 1980s, this cycle has deteriorated due to globalisation. Credit purchases continue
to grow globally, and finance has become increasingly predatory. The expansion has been draining
resources for the benefit of the financial sector (ibid. 27). In this regard, financial intermediation plays
an important role. According to the digital money transaction, all types of exchanges must be realised
through financial companies with a transaction fee, permitting the financial sector to be more prosperous.
Generally, over-indebtedness has become severe based on the current financial atmosphere,
explained by exacerbating the gap between needs and incomes (ibid. 31). While income does notincrease further, households’ expenditures rise considerably. This situation pushes households to depend
on increasing debts to meet the necessities of life.
African countries also follow the same path as consumption-oriented societies in cities (Mutsonziwa
and Fanta 2019). Although the enlarging gap between income and expenditures is that the middle classes
realised a new lifestyle based on the USA model, material consumption depends upon debts andstimulates daily expenditures. Additionally, imports of several cheap Chinese goods may also stir upmaterial desire (Kernen and Mohammad 2016). Moreover, more opportunities to access debt in the nameof financial inclusion ironically encourage over-indebtedness. Koomson and Peprah (2018) expressed
this situation as an addiction to MF.
Using the World Development Indicators, Servet and Saiag (2014: 32) explained that the percentageof domestic credit to the private sector in most regions increased significantly between 1980 and 2007,
doubling in Africa and the Middle East increasing by almost 150 per cent throughout Asia and the Pacific.
Only Latin America and the Caribbean seem to be exceptions, marking less than 30 per cent. The processof urbanisation accompanies these figures.
This remarkable increase in domestic credit is partly due to consumer credit. However, the authors
highlight that such data tend to underestimate household debt in the South because the statistic bureaus
consider indebtedness only to financial institutions. Still, most household debts in developing countries
come from informal practices. It shows the difficulties in quantifying the reality of the households’ debts
in developing countries, differing in volume and form. Notably, informal financial practices are diverse;
rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) and many kinds of organisations and intermediatorsserve the financial means at the local level, covering funeral expenses, local celebrations, community― 151 ―

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works, and infrastructure. Regarding local market business, market mammies borrow products fromtheir intermediate merchants and repay them with sales at the end of the day 4. We discuss this aspect in
Section 4.
3.2. Specificities of the MF’s over-indebtedness in the rural areas: Tanzania’s case
3.2.1. Urbanisation
We examine the rural areas in Dodoma, Tanzania. Since 2010, we have conducted field research inseveral villages neighbouring Dodoma City. This semi-arid area has historically suffered from severe
famines, considered the nation’s poorest region (Sakai 2016a). Although Dodoma became the capital
city in 1974, Dar es Salaam remained the national capital, and Dodoma remained the ‘rural’, keeping
the ‘traditional’ production system. However, since the ex-president Magufuli’s era began in 2015, it
has faced rapid urbanisation due to his strong initiative to construct Dodoma as the real capital city. This
rapid and radical change in the social structure directly impacted local people’s daily lives.
The main residents in the region are the Gogo people, agro-pastoralists, relying on subsistence
agriculture and livestock keeping with small casual incomes. Gogo agriculture can be characterised as‘rainfall-dependent subsistence’. They mainly cultivated maise, sorghum, millet, mixed beans, andvegetables for daily food and groundnuts and sunflowers as cash crops. They mixed crops andvegetables in the field and cultivated different crops to minimise the risks of food shortages.
However, as the suburban area was considered the bedroom town of Dodoma, the administration
requisitioned N village’s residents’ lands to relocate a national bus terminal. The small compensationand delay became big problems, and people’s dissatisfaction exploded over the government’s dishonest
attitude. Moreover, many new residents, mostly office workers, commuted to Dodoma and bought landto build new modern houses. However, some old residents were blinded by large amounts of money andsold their land carelessly. Consequently, they lost the means to produce their food and needed moremoney to meet their necessities.
The pastoralists shared a huge common pasture in the northeast of N village, which became theconstruction site for a new international airport. Prohibited to access and graze their cattle in the area,
they were forced to seek alternatives; some sold their cattle, moved to other regions, and some asked fortheir relatives living far away to care for their cattle.
People’s lives consisted mainly of subsistence production, complemented by irregular small incomessuch as day-labour in the construction site, farmwork, night watch, selling charcoal and firewood, andsmall agro-products in the market. However, rapid and abrupt urbanisation deteriorated the social andeconomic structures of local people. This radical change reveals the importance of subsistence4

For some more examples of Southern part of Chad, see Sakai (2007; 2016b: 214-217).
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production in rural households, derived by partially ‘non-commercialised sphere’. Although the rapidityof urbanisation varies, many rural areas in Africa have faced similar structural changes that impacted
local production patterns. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether MF provides adequate structural
support for this situation or just a temporary measure.
3.2.2. Introduction of MF in Tanzania
The government of Tanzania introduced MF institutions with the first MF policy in 2000 to increase
access to financial services for the poor. It revised the second MF policy in 2017 for MF’s better
promotion (The Government of Tanzania 2017). Therefore, the financial sector has experienced aremarkable increase in local and foreign MF service providers, investors, development partners,
government funds, and programmes. In rural areas, different types of MF services coexist. On the one
hand, international MFIs such as FINCA, PRIDE, and BRAC 5 provide group lending and individual
lending; on the other hand, self-reliant groups VICOBA (village community bank) multiply NGOs’
support. However, cooperative SACCOs have a long history in Tanzania (Sakai 2016b: 221). These MF
actors compete with each other for the acquisition of new clients. For example, in Dodoma, Care
Tanzania launched the VICOBA type MF programme called ‘Ongeza Akiba 6’ in early 2000. As Coreen,an NGO, ‘Good Neighbours’, expanded their programmes in the same region, Care Tanzania decided towithdraw. Additionally, PRIDE and FINCA organised seminars in villages to expand client networks inrural areas.
3.2.3. Case studies
Here, we introduce two cases of over-indebtedness collected in field research in ‘N’ village, 10 km awayfrom Dodoma City. The Village Savings and Loan Association (VSLA) is one of Care Tanzania’s‘Ongeza Akiba (Accumulate the capital) Project’ from 2008–2011. Although another NGO introduced
the VICOBA system, the local people call all the ROSCA-type activities ‘VICOBA (Village Community
Bank)’ as a general term of this methodology. After the withdrawal of Care Tanzania, some NGOs weredismissed, and some remained and continued their activities by themselves.
[Case 1] Bank of Affection
We met Ms A when we visited our Japanese friend, Ms T, engaged in a small business of traditional
medicinal plant products in Dodoma City. Ms A asked my friend to borrow money or in-kind to meet
her MF’s repayment. Ms T is always ready to help people who need little money. Instead of giving them
FINCA (Foundation for International Community Assistance), PRIDE (Promotion of Rural Initiative andDevelopment Enterprises, BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee).
6‘Increase the capital’ in Swahili
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money directly, she bought raw materials like baobab leaves and seeds, hibiscus in exchange for
handmade soap, bottles of baobab oil, and packages of hibiscus tea to sell the products and earn money.
I used to call her service the ‘Bank of affection’. Those who failed to manage their repayment schedulesought her help.
Ms A was a farmer in the neighbouring village and bought second-hand clothes in Dodoma City tosell them in the peripheral rural areas for a long time. Since 2010, she has participated in the
microfinance group VICOBA (A). The members must save money (5000 Tanzania Shillings/week)
every Wednesday as an investment (‘hisa’ in Swahili). After three months of saving capital, they canapply for a loan. She started to get a loan of 30,000 TZ shillings to complement the purchase of usedclothes. Three months later, after completing her first repayment, she could borrow 60,000 shillings.
She needed to earn a certain amount of money regularly to respect the repayment period fixed at threemonths. Still, she could not get a regular income because of the instability of her small business. The‘hisa’ and the repayment of loans became a burden. She participated in a VICOBA (B), meetings areheld every Monday in her village. She tried to tide over the loan repayment or ‘hisa’ payment in GroupA with this money. She became the third group member to stabilise her money management. However,she said, ‘Although I participated in MF groups to be richer than before, I am forced to be busier working
for repayment. I feel loaded with paying money every time. I never feel rich’.
[Case 2] Drop out
In 2013 in ‘N’ village, suburban Dodoma, we saw a young couple who had participated in the VICOBA
groups. The husband had run two kiosks in the village. The wife helped her husband’s kiosks, walked
around selling homemade mandazi (doughnuts) and tea. They had taken part in several VICOBAs to
manage debt repayments and earn more money. However, we could not see them two years later when
we revisited the VICOBA group. Based on other members, the young couple dropped out of the group
because they failed their business and defaulted on their debts. Thus, the regular members that remainin the MF groups are considered successful, and those who failed leave as losers.
3.2.4. Some findings
As these cases show, over-indebtedness and multiple debts become common problems for MF in therural areas of Tanzania. Several types of MF encourage local people to borrow money easily, and thisatmosphere brings the users to juggle their debts for survival and for some to drop out of the MF’s
repayment cycle. However, only a handful of people master debt management and benefit from the loans
and reinvest in their small businesses.
Kasoga et al. (2019) surveyed urban and rural areas toward the international MFIs PRIDE andFINCA. They interviewed the PRIDE and FINCA users randomly selected by MFIs, 398 persons in four
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areas 7: 118 in Dar es Salaam, 113 in Dodoma as urban areas, 87 in Kibaigwa, and 80 in Gairo as rural
areas 8.
Over 50% to 60 % of the users commit to three or more credit contracts, indicating that multiple
borrowings become frequent and common among users. A high percentage of income-to-debt ratio (75–90%) for most MF users shows that the money received from the MFI as credit passes through the clients’hands and drain to the outside for their repayments. This vicious circle does not contribute to an increase
in income.
Meanwhile, Mpogole et al. (2012) researched Iringa Municipality to analyse the incidences andreasons for multiple borrowing and its effects on loan repayment. According to the inquiry results of
250 MFI borrowers, notably, over 70% of users engage in two or three or more debt contracts, and over
70% of respondents delayed their repayment. For the 4th question about the reasons for multiple
borrowing, the responses can be briefly classified into three categories: first, for managing the debt
repayments (loan recycling and delayed loan disbursement, 15.6%), second, to meet the family
obligations (24.0%), and third, related to the MF’s mechanism itself (too small loans 32.0% and relaxed
procedure18.0% = 50%).
The second reason, ‘to meet the family obligations’, scored 24%. Remarkably, 50 % of respondents
wanted to have more loans. Among them, for 32 %, the amount of debt offered by MF is too small tofulfil their needs, or for 18%, the easy procedure of the debt contracts encouraged them to have more
debts. Additionally, the influence of friends with multiple borrowings cannot be ignored (10.4%).
Regarding delays in repayments, 42.4 % of respondents provided poor business turnover as an answer.
However, 34 % mentioned that multiple loans become a cause of the delay of repayment, illustrating a
vicious circle of multiple debts. Heavy obligation on family issues is consistently cited as an importantcause of over-indebtedness and delay of repayments (23.6 %). According to the principles, MFIs provide
loans as investments to improve clients’ small businesses, and they set the target to encourage small
entrepreneurs with loans. In reality, over 40 % expressed that the business invested by MF debts did notbenefit enough for repayments, and most clients used loans to complement household expenditures.
4. Analysis
In many studies, the causes of over-indebtedness are analysed on the borrowers’ and MFIs’ side (forexample, Schicks 2010, Duflo 2010) 9. Some look for the causes of over-indebtedness at the individual

Des Salaam, Dodoma City, Kibaigwa (Dodoma Region), and Gairo (Morogoro Region).
Unfortunately, the difference between the urban and rural could not appear in the figures, which reveals theslight limit of this approach depended on only economic indicators.
9
Among many, Duflo (2010), in the third chapter sacrificed in the MF, approaches from the economic point ofview, the correlation between individual behaviours such as moral hazard and the credit market mechanism.
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level: lack of financial literacy, laziness, and uncontrolled desire, reaching a moral hazard 10 , andadverse selection 11 of clients. In the logic of neoliberal individualism, those who make full use of MF
tools with financial literacy would flourish, and those who lack this ability would impoverish themselves.
However, these individual defects constitute only one side of the problem. We must also look for causesin the MFs’ and the credit markets’ mechanism, provoking multiple debts and over-indebtedness.
Moreover, the economic gap between the poor and the rich extends in the case of Tanzania. However,it must be also be highlighted that the radical change of social and economic structure is derived fromurbanisation. Therefore, the differences between urban and rural areas must be studied with sociologicalinterest. The urban-rural borders may highlight the significance of the different monetary spheres wherecommercialisation differs. However, this buffer zone does not exist separately, correlates with individualand collective situations at the local level, and is influenced by the mechanism of capitalism. The resultsof the studies shared above were explained instead in the individual behaviours. It is hard to judge
whether those findings can be considered general or specific to the research areas because of the lack ofcontextual information. Therefore, we analyse three levels: individual behaviours, MFIs in the credit
markets, and social and economic structure, which vary according to the local context.
4.1. Analysis at an individual level: limit of the economic indicators
Kasoga and Tegambwage (2021) focused on income-to-debt, multiple borrowing, and delinquency as
indicators that suggest a positive correlation with over-indebtedness. However, these economic
indicators cannot clarify the complexity of the income situation and debt management. The authorsinterviewed 535 clients from two international MFIs (FINCA and BRAC), and 96 % of respondents
were female. Most (78%) respondents were in the age group of 26–45, productive, and had family andother social responsibilities (Kasoga and Tegambwage 2021: 8). Although this survey did not identify
rural and urban areas, it could provide us with a rough sketch of the over-indebtedness of MF in Tanzania.
This study shows a high percentage of the debt-to-income ratio, indicating that most respondents(503 / 535 persons, 94%) spent 75% or over 75 % of their monthly income repaying debts. Similar
results were reported by Kasoga et al. (2019) for Dodoma and Dar es Salaam. Therefore, most
respondents use 75-90% of their total income to repay their debts in this research. According to DeVaney
and Lytton (1995), when debt repayments exceed 50% of a borrower’s income, it indicates a significant
risk of over-indebtedness. Thus, the figures show that most respondents were already highly over-

10
Moral hazard means the risky situation provoked by the users, who do not respect the promises to implementof his or her project, in spite of enough benefit by the success of the business, he or she neglects the repayment of
the debt, and so on (Duflo 2010: 103).
11
Adverse selection means here the situation in the credit market where the debtor does not give to the creditor
the personal information such as his or her credit records, which increase the risk of bad debt to the creditor (Duflo
2010: 103).

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indebted.
The most important remark here is that some respondents seem to hang on. In contrast to DeVancy
and Lytton’s argument above, 6 % of borrowers whose debt-to-income ratio exceeds 50% but less than
75% seem to afford food, education, and medical expenses. This fact suggests that even if the incometo-debt ratio is over 50 %, they might not suffer from serious repayment delinquency. The authors
speculate without any evidence that ‘these borrowers might be receiving free financial assistance fromclose relatives and friends, not disclosed to the researchers (ibid. 9)’. Although it is difficult to quantify
and visualise the effectiveness of affectional relationships, this supposition may not be irrelevant. The
role played by the ‘Bank of affection’ in case 1 can be frequently seen in daily life. More qualitative
research is needed in this area.
4.2. Analysis of the mechanism of MFs in the credit markets 12
Regarding MF mechanisms, several critical points exist. The three categories are described below.
1) Disfunction of the Microcredit mechanism for the poor (Bateman and Chang 2012)
This approach looks for the reasons for success or failure in the function of MF services based on theeconomic perspective: the number of clients, the total amount of credit via the number of running
projects, validity of interest rates, and percentage of repayment, among others (Duflo 2010).
2) Mis-management of the MFIs
This approach is based on organisational theory, categorising different MFIs’ organisations. The main
discussion points are, for example, the balance between economic independence and subsidies. If MFIs
pursue their total economic independence, they must adopt stricter loan requirements to avoid risks,preventing the poor from the service. However, if fund management is based on donors’ subsidies, MFIs
tend not to demand repayment of debts for clients. The looseness of management could bring the MFI
to corruption (Sinclair 2012).
3) The excessive financialisation and commercialisation of MF industry/ markets
Lazzarato (2011) criticised that the current wave of financialisation at the international level makes oursociety overindebted. Megabanks have increasingly injected massive capital into the MF industry
through the global financial market. This tendency is supported by the global trend of SDGs and ESG
investments, considering social and environmental sustainability. Commitment to the MF activities

For the situation of MF in Chad under the influence of the Petroleum Development project in late 1990s, see
Sakai (2007).

12― 157 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)shows how those companies resolve global issues. The slogan of poverty reduction adds an extra touchof sincerity to them. The ‘SDGs wash’ must be examined from the perspective of the MFIs’ reliability
and the balance between economic benefits and ethics.
In reality, avoiding the risk of delinquency or default is the top priority for all financial institutions,preferring to lend money to those with financial stability and used to manage the debt repayment. Thus,
some MFIs seek more clients among the middle class instead of the poor, while others require mortgages
or higher interests for their security. Consequently, this may contribute to excluding the poor from MF
services. This type of mission drift of MFIs is often discussed as the main problem. Moreover, MFIs
must continue maximum efforts to get new clients to maintain their organisational structure. Therefore,
some of them become more flexible in their principles. Although some MFIs provide loans only forinvestment in small-scale businesses, others favour more consumer credits for the clients’ sake.
For example, in M village in Dodoma, an MFI organised a seminar to invite residents for MF
activities. One of the audiences (Ms C) told us that the lecture had attracted them, saying, ‘Do you notwant to buy a TV set? How about a refrigerator? If you participate in MF activities, I am sure that you
can afford those kinds of electric home facilities’ 13. This phrase was attractive to Ms C and made her
join MF activities. However, she could not manage her debt repayment with her charcoal sales anddropped out.
MFIs have the nature of financial institutions that respect management policies for the stability andexpansion of institutions. Meanwhile, they have to undertake the role of poverty reduction and maintaina charitable image. MFIs constantly waver between the two contradictory roles.
We cannot deny that the MF’s small credits or loans help low-income people in urgent situations.
Access to financial services allows them to spend a certain amount of money on an investment in theirbusiness, providing a chance to expand their possibilities. Nevertheless, debt is not a donation. In otherwords, the essence of the debts consists of delaying tactics, just borrowing money from the future.
According to economic theories, it is natural that the excessive accumulation of debt becomes a heavy
burden and harms borrowers’ daily lives. Kasoga and Tegambwage (2021: 12) have shown that overindebtedness forces people to forego daily necessities. Authors call this ‘sacrifice’. Among the 535
respondents in over-indebtedness, 94 % had difficulty buying enough food and paying children’s
education fees. They did not have pawn assets for repaying loans. For some people, their assets havebeen seized by MFIs for missed repayments 14. However, 6% of respondents in multiple borrowings

Interview in M village, North East of Dodoma (August, 2013).
It is regrettable that the authors put all these individual reactions or ‘sacrifices’ in the same category for analysis,
it is difficult to clarify the detailed states of the over-indebted persons.

13
14― 158 ―

Over-indebtedness of Microfinance in Rural Africa: A Sociological Perspective of Tanzania

seem to hang on to their debt situation.
Are there any spaces in the social system to refuge overindebted persons to complement theireconomic difficulties? The non-commercialised sphere can be a shelter. Is it too idealistic to expect?
However, it seems that the economic sphere in the strict term cannot offer such incalculable support
beyond management policies or even companies’ ethics. The mechanism of the debts itself, as we cansee, creates vicious circles. In the next section, we discuss the non-commercialised sphere where
economic indicators cannot be clarified.
4.3. Analysis of the social structures
Financialisation cannot be reduced to expanding financial markets, impacting daily life (Servet andSaiag 2014: 30). First, it is necessary to understand that monetarisation induces the commodification of
the necessities of life. As households do not produce daily convenience goods or food, they aresubstituted by industrial products offered by companies. Therefore, households need more money tomeet daily necessities. Table 1 shows the change in the percentage of households’ daily expenditure
share in urban and rural areas in Tanzania.
Table 1. The percentage share of consumption by type of item consumed
Dar es Salaam

Other urban
areas

91/92

00/01

91/92

00/01

91/92

00/01

91/92

00/01

Foodpurchased

67.1

52.2

56.9

52.8

30.5

35.2

35.8

38.6

Food-home
produced

0.7

2.1

9.4

7.9

41.8

31.8

35.5

26.8

Durable goods

7.6

7.8

7.4

8.0

7.2

7.1

7.2

7.3

Medicalexpenditure

0.9

2.9

1.2

2.4

0.9

2.1

0.9

2.2

Education
expenditure
Other nondurables

1.1

4.0

1.1

3.0

0.8

1.6

0.8

2.0

22.6

31.1

24.0

25.9

18.9

22.1

19.7

23.1

Total

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

of which, total
food

67.8

54.3

66.3

60.7

72.3

67.0

71.3

65.4

Rural areas

Total: Mainland
Tanzania

Source: Made by author referenced by Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics (2002: 70).
In Table 1, the highest increase in expenditure between 1991–92 and 2000–2001 is in education, fourtimes in Dar es Salaam, tripled in the other urban areas, and doubled in the rural areas. Following this,― 159 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

medical expenditure also showed a sharp increase in all areas. Regarding food supply, households inrural areas now purchase more and grow less food for their consumption than they did in 1991–92.
However, subsistence agriculture and livestock keeping continue to play an important role in the daily
food supply in rural areas, evading buying them with money. Interestingly, in Dar es Salaam, thepercentage of homemade food production tripled (0.7 % in 1991/1992, to 2.1% in 2000/2001). This may
be the return to self-reliance strategies for survival.
The self-production of food has not received much attention because it is difficult to visualise andvalorise its ‘profit’ in the economic context. In economic development theories, monetarisation andmarketisation are effective tools for modernising society. Subsistence production is considered to beunderdeveloped and inefficient in terms of productivity. Therefore, this area tends to be rapidly
discarded. Tanzania’s Household Budget Survey in 2000–01 emphasised the percentage share ofpurchased food and home-produced food; this category has disappeared in the successive Household
Budget Survey reports (National Bureau of Statistics 2014; 2020). Financial inclusion contributes toshrinking non-commercialised agriculture, but it contributes to fulfilling the necessities of life without
the market economy. Moreover, it plays an important role in social and environmental stability and may
provide shelter from the debt burden.
5. Conclusion
Mpogole et al. (2012) conducted a survey with practical recommendations for MFIs.
1) MFIs should devise a way of sharing clients’ loan information.
2) MFIs should provide adequate loans.
3) Some form of training should help clients distinguish between business and family matters.
However, there is a doubt that these recommendations can solve the over-indebtedness of MF users.
The authors recommend that MFIs improve their management to solve over-indebtedness. Furthermore,their recommendation encourages users to contract more loans by improving their financial literacy.
With irony, Servet and Saiag (2014: 39) describe the reality of financial institutions and their recognitionof over-indebtedness.
However, if the dominant forms of private credit are at the root of the crisis, it is difficult
to imagine that they (the banks) will solve it. It is as if a therapist who, after forcing apatient to become an alcoholic to attain illusory happiness, proposes a treatment thatinvolves drinking more wine (Servet and Saiag 2012: 40).

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Over-indebtedness of Microfinance in Rural Africa: A Sociological Perspective of Tanzania

The problem consists of radical changes in socio-economic structures due to excessive urbanisationand financialisation. Therefore, those with access to the land to produce food were alienated andimpoverished regarding money and social safety. This situation forces people to depend on more debts
to meet their necessities.
It means that the MF mechanism, consisting of the ‘investment-profit-reinvestment’ cycle of thecapitalist rule, does not allow many users to manage their debts. As the steady growth model designs
the MF mechanism, income must be increased in the users’ business plans. Typically, it is expected tocreate incompatibility with the recycling-oriented societies, surviving with frequenting between thecommercialised and non-commercialised spheres. However, the borders are not divided. Currently,
financialisation accelerates in globalising societies, in which the social structure itself extends the gap
between the rich and the poor. In this sense, another financial literacy is required to critically judge thereal necessity of debt to use MF services. MF has not yet established an adequate model to connect two
different spheres to adapt to reality, especially in rural areas. The excessive use of loans should worsen
the situation. Through our reflection, we realise that outside the commercialised sphere could provide ashelter to avoid delinquency risks and juggling multiple debts. Further analysis of the shelter wherestrict economic rules do not work is needed to understand if it could resist the instability and volatilityof the values in a commercially oriented world.

Acknowledgements
This work was based on a research project (JSPS KAKENHI B Grant Number 18H00776, Principal
investigator; Yuko Sugiyama).

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― 163 ―

Mobile Money and Structural Transformation:
Evidence from Tanzania

Christian S. Otchia
Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University, Japan

Abstract
In less than a decade, mobile money has risen from a simple tool to transfer money with cell phones toan innovation that delivers credit and insurance. We use rich panel data from Tanzania from 2008 to2019 to investigate whether mobile money adoption leads to structural transformation. Leveraging thestaggered introduction of mobile money agents through difference-in-differences and event-study
strategies, we find evidence that areas with mobile money agents experience a sharp reduction inagricultural employment and agricultural land use. While released workers reallocate to non-agricultural
sectors, we also find that these changes cause extensive migration of people. Mobile money also leads
to an increase in the use of improved seeds as they become more available, a decrease in the use of banks
and cooperatives, and promotes new migration patterns.

Keywords: mobile money, agriculture, employment, structural change, difference-in-differences― 165 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

1. Introduction
The era of mobile money is perhaps one of the most important innovation episodes in fintech history inAfrica. In 2007, Safaricom introduced M-Pesa in Kenya to enable people initially excluded from theformal financial system to perform financial transactions via cell phones. Six months later, more than
17 million users and 65,000 agents were registered with M-Pesa (Mizutani 2021). In 2008, Tanzania
introduced a mobile money service with further innovations that could revolutionise the way peopleinteract financially in the country. In 2020, Tanzania’s mobile money penetration reached 53%, with29.7 million mobile money subscriptions. Ghana introduced a mobile money service in 2009. By 2020,
there were 14.7 million active mobile money accounts and 235,000 active agents. Today, there are nearly
146 million active accounts in sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth Africa), representing 10% of the region’sGDP (compared to less than 2% in most other parts of the world). In addition to providing moneytransaction services, mobile money operators have been increasingly providing credit and insurance
services.
Recent evidence suggests that mobile financial services have positive effects on economic outcomes
and can reduce transaction costs (Jack and Suri 2014). Most of these studies have focused only on the
micro side, such as households and firms. However, we still lack a clear understanding of how theprocess of structural transformation generated by the introduction of mobile money influences theseeffects. In particular, little is known about the structural effects of mobile money due to the lack ofconsistent panel datasets in African countries. In this study, we compiled a novel dataset on mobile
money penetration in Tanzania between 2008 and 2019 to estimate their effects on structural change at
the sub-national level, on the magnitude and direction of labour movements that they generate, and on
the allocation of factors across sectors. Using Difference-in-Differences (DiD) and an event study, we
find that areas with mobile money agents experience a sharp reduction in agricultural employment andland use for agriculture, while the released workers are absorbed in the non-agricultural sector. We alsofind that mobile money increases competition in the seed market, leading to a decrease in seed prices
and an increase in consumption. Furthermore, there is evidence of substitutability between mobile
money and traditional finance systems, such as banks and cooperatives. Finally, we show that mobile
money affects migration patterns.
This study contributes to the literature by measuring the potential effects of mobile financial serviceson the local economy while addressing the knowledge gaps identified in recent studies on mobile
financial services. We contribute to a few studies that attempt to assess the macroeconomic effects ofmobile financial services. More broadly, extant literature has documented that mobile money helps
households share risks and smooth shocks (Abiona and Koppensteiner 2020, Batista and Vicente 2020,
Jack and Suri 2014, Riley 2018) and reduce poverty (Suri and Jack 2016). This literature has also
focused on women, as they are the most facing discrimination in access to finance. Jones and Gong
― 166 ―

Mobile Money and Structural Transformation: Evidence from Tanzania(2021) found that promoting mobile money savings improves women's ability to cope with adverse
shocks. Van Hove and Dubus (2019) find that the introduction of mobile money services has improved
financial inclusion, but those left behind are poor, non-educated, and women. Our study also adds to thework on firm growth, which shows that mobile money is strongly correlated with measures of firm
performance, such as firm investment (Islam et al. 2018) and productivity (Beck et al. 2018).
Our analysis also fits within work on structural change in Africa, which has documented a pattern ofincreasing agricultural productivity and a declining share of the labour force in agriculture. Otchia andOtsubo (2021) found that agriculture and manufacturing labour productivity growth was almost threetimes higher than productivity growth in the service sector. Several explanations for this pattern may
also explain our results. For instance, Diao et al. (2019) found that the nature of technologies available
to African firms is highly capital and skill intensive and may be an important reason behind thisstructural change. Alternatively, rapid growth in agricultural labour productivity coincides with the
expansion of small and informal firms’ manufacturing employment (Diao et al. 2021). This study helps
to better understand the underlying causes of these observed patterns of structural changes.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background information on
mobile money in Tanzania. Section 3 discusses the data and provides descriptive statistics. Section 4
presents the empirical strategy, and section 5 discusses the results. We conclude the paper in section 6.
2. Mobile money in Tanzania
Mobile money is a form of digital wallet operated by mobile network operators as a platform forreceiving, sending, and saving money. The service is provided through pre-registered e-wallets tocustomers' phone numbers facilitated by registered agents who act as money points. Its convenience andsimplicity make it a popular banking option for the financially excluded population segment. It operates
on the USSD (quick codes) system, meaning that customers can also use feature phones to access theiraccounts where internet connection is not a requirement. Users can withdraw or deposit cash from anextensive network of mobile money agents available throughout the country. Mobile money combines
an innovative way of obtaining market information, value-added services, and digital currency
technology for the majority of the population in developing countries. Market information, credit
payments, utility bill payments, international transfers, microinsurance, airtime purchases, and salary
disbursements are some of the value-added services enabled by mobile money.
Mobile money has emerged as a powerful platform to improve financial inclusion because it provides
an innovative and effective way to finance millions of people in Tanzania. What can be seen in Figure
1 is the growth of mobile money agents in Tanzania. One of the many striking features is the phenomenal
growth of mobile money between 2008 and 2014, followed by a gradual increase. With respect totraditional financial systems such as banks and cooperatives, one can see that the incidence of banks is― 167 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

still small and remains steady over time. Since many households in developing countries possess mobile
phones but not bank accounts, access to mobile money could enhance their financial power, increase
productivity, improve security, lower transaction costs, and create a platform to grow business.

80

Percentage

60

40

20
Bank
Mobile money agent
Cooperatives

0
2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

Figure 1. Access to finance in Tanzania
Source: World Bank (2021).
While the traditional financial system is lagging, it is important to note that access is even worse forrural populations, smallholder farmers, and women (Mushi et al. 2017). Between 2004 and 2011, there
was an average of 1.56 commercial bank branches and 2.22 ATMs per 100,000 population. Furthermore,in 2012, 17 percent of the adult population (aged 15 years and above) had a bank account (Abiona andKoppensteiner 2020). The figures indicate that traditional financial services provision is still low,
resulting in a financial gap between rural and urban populations, between men and women, and between
rich and poor. Mobile money has the potential to include all populations in the financial ecosystemowing to its availability. Figure 2 shows the substantial growth in the availability of mobile money
agents in 2010 and 2019.

― 168 ―

Mobile Money and Structural Transformation: Evidence from Tanzania

b. Mobile money agents, 2019a. Mobile money agents, 2010

(0.50,1.00](0.25,0.50][0.00,0.25]
No data(0.50,1.00](0.25,0.50][0.00,0.25]
No dataFigure 2. Mobile money availability in Tanzania
Source: Author’s computation from World Bank (2021).
3. Data and empirical strategy
3.1. Data
The principal objectives of our analysis are to estimate the effect of mobile money on structural change
and assess whether mobile money can accelerate industrialisation as more finance becomes available.
To carry out this analysis, we use data from five rounds of the Tanzania National Panel Survey (NPS)
conducted biennially since 2008. The survey was administered in collaboration with the World Bankand Tanzania’s National Bureau of Statistics. The first wave was conducted in 2008/2009, the second
wave in 2010/2011, the third wave in 2012/2013, the fourth wave in 2014/2015, and the fifth wave in
2019/2020. The NPS uses a stratified, multistage cluster sampling design. The sampling frame is the2002 Population and Housing Census, which includes a list of all populated enumeration areas.
Multistage sampling involves the following stages: First, a simple random selection of districts, villages,
and wards was taken to be included in the survey. Then, simple random selection was employed for the
sampled households 1 . Households represent the sampling units for data collection. A total of 409
primary sampling units (clusters) were randomly selected based on their population sizes.
The survey has three datasets: household (household demographics and consumption expenditure),
The method was used to avoid bias in the selection of households. In this way, all households had an equal chanceof being selected.

1― 169 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

community (finance), and agricultural (agricultural inputs, crop production, and harvest). The survey
provides detailed information, which results in the choice of variables to be used. Although it has
uniform coverage, the NPS has information on several important variables, such as the total number ofworkers, workers in the economic sector, the existence of cooperatives and banks, and mobile money
agents. Table 1 defines the variables employed in our analysis, as well as their descriptive statistics.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable

Description

Mean

Mobile money

Mobile money agent point
Share of employment inAgriculture
Share of agricultural land
Share of wage worker in
non-agricultural sector
Share of employer in nonagricultural sector
Share of self-employed in
non-agricultural sector
Share of improved seedHouseholds migrating into
the districts
Households migrating outof the districts
Cooperatives
Bank

0.375

Standard
deviation
0.484

0.809

Agriculture labor
Agricultural land
Wage job
Employee
Self-employed
Improve seed
Immigration
Emigration
Cooperatives
Bank

Minimum

Maximum

0

1

0.569

0

2.73

0.594

1.500

0

49.90

3.331

5.936

0

25.69

3.117

6.409

0

31.03

3.069

5.412

0

24.69

0.323

0.468

0

1

2.343

1.187

0

6.91

2.133

1.129

0

6.91

0.330
0.068

0.470
0.253

0
0

1
1

Source: Author’s calculation.
3.2. Empirical strategy
We begin the estimating the following DiD specification
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = α𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 β + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,(1)

where 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 refers to a set of structural change measures in district 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 and year 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡. For example, in our study,

the share of workers employed in agriculture and the share of land use in agriculture. These two variables
are suitable proxies for the first stage of structural transformation, as shown in previous studies. Resultson other measures such as the share of wage workers, the share of employers, the share of self-employedworkers, and the share of land used for residential, are provided later as a robustness check to provide acomprehensive picture of the impact on structural change. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable taking
the value of 1 if the district has a mobile money agent in year 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡. Hence, α is the coefficient of interest
which measures the effect of mobile money adoption. We control for a large set of covariates 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 toaccount for the variation in the cross-section. 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denote district and year fixed effects,― 170 ―

Mobile Money and Structural Transformation: Evidence from Tanzania

respectively, to account for time-invariant district characteristics and common macroeconomic shocks,
respectively. In robustness specifications, we control for district-and region-level linear time trends toaccount for the underlying heterogeneity and region-specific trends.
For α to be identified, it is required that districts connected to the mobile money agent would have

had similar trends to districts without mobile money agents, in the absence of mobile money services.
To validate this assumption and understand the dynamic nature of the effects, we also study differencesin structural change before and after mobile money adoption by estimating the following event-study
regression:𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =3�

𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=−2,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗≠0𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 1(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 β + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,(2)

where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the year in which district 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 connects with a mobile money agent and 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 represents years

relative to this event. The 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 coefficient estimates the effect of mobile money adoption at time 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

for two years around the mobile money adoption event. We follow standard practice and normalise theyear prior to each event to zero, such that 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋−1 = 0. This means that each coefficient is interpreted as thedifference in the outcome compared to the year before the mobile money adoption status. We assume

that if there are no observable differences between mobile money adoption districts and non-mobile
money adopting districts prior to district gains connection to the mobile money agent, it is more likelythat any difference post mobile money adoption can be attributed to mobile money adoption.
4. Findings
4.1. Main impacts
We begin by evaluating the identification assumption for the DiD design. Figure 3 shows the resultsfrom estimating Equation (2) for agricultural employment and land. Throughout, we find no evidenceof pre-trends in the outcome variables prior to a district adopting a mobile money agent. This suggeststhat the parallel-trend assumption was satisfied. Moreover, the figure illustrates a negative effect on
agricultural employment and land in the years after adopting mobile money. This implies that the
introduction of mobile money accelerates structural change by releasing labour and land fromagriculture to other economic sectors. The effect on structural change appears immediately in the year
after districts connect to mobile money agents and remain throughout.

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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

b. Share of agricultural landa. Share of agricultural labor
10

10

0
0

Estimated impact

Estimated impact

-10

-20

-10

-20
-30

-40

-30
-2

-1

0

1

2

-2

3

-1

0

1

2

3

Time to treatment

Time to treatment

Figure 3. Event-study impact of mobile money on agricultural labour and land
Source: Author’s calculation.
Table 2 reports the results from estimating Equation (1) on two measures of agricultural outcomes.
Column 1 presents our estimates with district fixed-effect and district-year fixed effects. Column 2
estimates an alternative specification, which replaces the district-year fixed effects with time trend
whereas column 3 introduces the region-specific time trend. Column 4 is similar to column 1 but
includes our set of time-varying control variables. Panel A presents estimates for agricultural
employment. We find that in areas where mobile money agents were introduced, agriculture’s share of
employment decreased. We find a negative effect of 0.231 which is statistically significant at the 1%
level. This estimate implies that mobile money adoption reduces agricultural employment by about 23%
on average. These estimates are similar when we control for time trends but slightly decrease when we
include control variables and region-specific time trends. Panel B presents the effect of mobile moneyon agricultural land use. Throughout the specifications, the results suggest that the share of agriculturalland also fell in districts where mobile money was introduced. Our estimates are also large, as they vary
between 15% and 19%. This can be interpreted as labour-saving technological change in agriculture.
These findings suggest that mobile money leads to an increase in agricultural productivity, leading to arelease of labour and land to other sector of the economy. Another possible explanation is that increasedin agricultural productivity increased the demand for non-agricultural goods such as local manufacturing
products and services.
― 172 ―

Mobile Money and Structural Transformation: Evidence from Tanzania

Table 2. Mobile money impacts on agricultural outcome
(1)

(2)

Panel A: Dependent variable is Share of agricultural labor
Mobile money-0.231*** -0.240***(0.031)(0.030)Observations
R-squared

2,042
0.087

2,044
0.066

Panel B: Dependent variable is Share of agricultural land
Mobile money-0.169*** -0.189***(0.048)(0.049)(3)(4)-0.129***(0.026)-0.193***(0.031)

2,044
0.430

2,042
0.131

-0.923***(0.021)-0.159***(0.049)Observations
R-squared

2,042
0.141

2,044
0.050

2,044
0.122

2,042
0.150

Controls
District FE
District Year FE
Time trend
Region-specific time trend

No
Yes
Yes
No
No

No
Yes
No
Yes
No

No
Yes
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
To explore this possibility, we now proceed to look at the question of whether non-agricultural
employment expanded (contracted) in areas where mobile money services were introduced. Table 3
reports DiD estimates of Equation (1) for three non-agricultural sector outcomes: share of workers inwage employment (column 1), share of employer (column 2), and share of self-employed workers(column 3). We find that areas which introduced mobile money agents experienced a faster increase in
non-agricultural employment. The estimated coefficients show that wage employment and the share of
employers in non-agricultural sectors increased more than that of the self-employed. These results imply
that mobile money expansion led to an increase in both employment and wages. There are several
possible explanations for this result. The finding on wage employment growth might be driven by thefact that the local non-agricultural sector absorbed workers released from agriculture to meet theincreased demand for goods and services. It is also possible that areas with mobile money agents could
attract different types of workers because of the new opportunities it brings through access to finance.
These mechanisms are explored in the next section.

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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

Table 3. Mobile money impacts on agricultural outcome(1)
Wage job(2)
Employer(3)
Self-employed

Mobile money

2.082***(0.291)2.356***(0.330)1.677***(0.268)Observations
R-squared
Control Variables
District FE
District Year FE

2,042
0.302
Yes
Yes
Yes

2,042
0.231
Yes
Yes
Yes

2,042
0.289
Yes
Yes
Yes

Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4.2. Mechanisms and additional explanations
Having established the importance of mobile money in structural transformation, the next step is toevaluate the potential mechanisms. We first discuss the mechanisms driving the negative effects ofmobile money on agricultural outcomes. To do so, Table 4 estimates the effects of adopting mobile
money on different inputs in the production function, which can be a substitute or complement toemployment. We focus our attention on the price of seeds sold within the village (column 1), the priceof seeds sold at the closest sales point (column 2), and the use of improved seeds (column 3). Column 1
shows that the effect of mobile money agents on the price of maize seeds sold within the village ispositive, small, and not statistically significant, which implies that mobile money has no effect on theprice of seeds sold within the district. In column 2, we find a negative and statistically significant effect,
implying that the price of seeds fell in areas where mobile money agents were introduced. Column 3
consistently shows a positive and significant effect on the use of improved seeds. Putting the results
together, the effect of introducing mobile money substantially increases the use of intermediate inputs
as they become more available and affordable. This result confirms our previous findings that mobile
money leads to labour-saving and land-intensive technological change.

― 174 ―

Mobile Money and Structural Transformation: Evidence from Tanzania

Table 4. Mobile money impacts on agricultural outcome
(1)

(2)

(3)

Local price Market price Improvedof seedsseedof seeds

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Bank
transaction

Sacco
Immigration Emigrationtransaction

Mobile money

0.361(1.864)-1.011***(.056)

0.137***(0.026)-0.377**(0.183)-1.234***(0.204)0.474**(0.231)0.790***(0.245)Observations
R-squared
Control Variables
District FE
District Year FE

2,042
0.161
Yes
Yes
Yes

2,042
0.161
Yes
Yes
Yes

2,042
0.066
Yes
Yes
Yes

2,042
0.201
Yes
Yes
Yes

2,042
0.218
Yes
Yes
Yes

2,042
0.042
Yes
Yes
Yes

2,042
0.041
Yes
Yes
Yes

Source: Author's calculations.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Next, we provide additional evidence to understand the mechanisms behind the positive effects on
non-agricultural employment. We estimate Equation (1), in which the number of transactions in the bankand cooperatives, the number of immigration and emigration are dependent variables. The results arereported in Table 4. Columns 4 and 5 show a negative and significant effect of mobile money on thenumber of bank and cooperative transactions, which indicates that areas where mobile money was
introduced tend to have a low number of banks and cooperatives. It seems possible that these results are
due to the fact that mobile money can be a substitute for traditional financial institutions. These findings
are consistent with the evidence presented in Figure 1, where the share of Tanzanians who have bankaccess has not increased since mobile money was introduced. Our findings also corroborate Mbiti and
Weil (2011), who observed that mobile money services have quickly replaced the former money transfer
services offered by bus companies, the post office, the Western Union, or through friends. Next, weanalyse the second group of variables related to migration. Column 6 shows that the districts which
introduced mobile money saw an increase in immigration. Mobile money could have attracted a new
type of worker with a different skillset to take advantage of new opportunities in rural areas. Column 7shows that emigration also increases. Comparing Columns 6 and 7, our results suggest that themagnitude of the effect on emigration is larger than that of immigration.
5. Conclusion
This study examines the effects of mobile money on structural changes in Tanzania. We find that areasthat introduced mobile money agents had a lower share of agricultural workers and a lower share of
agricultural land. Using event-study analysis, we also find that the share of workers and land in
agriculture decreased faster in the year immediately after the introduction of mobile money agents.
These results are robust across various specifications and suggest that mobile money can be assimilated― 175 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

to a labour-saving and land-intensive technical change in agriculture. In the second set of results, wefind that mobile money leads to employment growth in the non-agricultural sector. We found that wage
jobs, the share of employers, and the share of self-employed increased in areas that introduced mobile
money agents.
Four additional mechanisms support the evidence of structural changes caused by mobile money in
Tanzania. We find that the decreased employment and land used in agriculture could be explained by
the increase in the use of improved seeds and the decrease in the price of seeds. We explained theincrease in non-agricultural employment by the fact that mobile money increases access to finance andthus becomes a substitute for traditional sources of finance such as banking and cooperatives. The basisof this interpretation is the reported decrease in transactions in banks and cooperatives, following the
introduction of mobile money. The results also show that mobile money led to both immigration andemigration. While the impact of immigration is smaller, the findings suggest that mobile money creates
new opportunities that require new skills.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Yoichi Mine, Simplice Anutechia Asongu, and participants at the ASC-TUFS 5th
Anniversary International Symposium for helpful comments and Rehema Mussa Karata for outstanding
research assistance. I am also grateful to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, grants
18K18266 and 21K13281, for financial support.

References
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doi: 10.3368/jhr.57.2.1018-9796R1.
Batista, C. and P.C. Vicente 2020. ‘Improving Access to Savings through Mobile Money: Experimental
Evidence from African Smallholder Farmers’. World Development 129.
doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104905
Beck, T., H. Pamuk, R. Ramrattan, and B.R. Uras 2018. ‘Payment Instruments, Finance andDevelopment’. Journal of Development Economics 133(C): 162-186.
Diao, X., M. Ellis, M. McMillan, and D. Rodrik 2021. ‘Africa’s Manufacturing Puzzle: Evidence from
Tanzanian and Ethiopian Firms’. NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research) Working Paper
No. 28344. Cambrigde: NBER.
Diao, X., M. McMillan, and D. Rodrik 2019. ‘The Recent Growth Boom in Developing Economies: A― 176 ―

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Structural-change Perspective’. In The Palgrave Handbook of Development Economics. Eds. M.
Nissanke and J.A. Ocampo, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 281-334.
Islam, A., S. Muzi, and J.L. Rodriguez Meza 2018. ‘Does Mobile Money Use Increase Firms’
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Mobile Bank Savings on Transactional Sex in Kenya’. Journal of Health Economics 78.
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Mbiti, I. and D.N. Weil 2011. ‘Mobile Banking: The Impact of M-Pesa in Kenya’. NBER Working Paper
No. 17129. Cambrigde: NBER.
Mizutani, A. 2021. ‘Can Mobile Money Remittances Reduce Short-Term Poverty? Evidence from
Kenya’. Forum of International Development Studies 51(3): 1-18.
Mushi, E., G. Irma, J. Seifert, and S. Kewe 2017. FinScope Tanzania 2017: Insights That Drive
Innovation. Dar es Salaam : Finscope Tanzania.
<https://www.fsdt.or.tz/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/FinScope-Tanzania-2017-Insights-that-DriveInnovation.pdf / Accessed on 10 November 2021>
Otchia, C.S. and S.T. Otsubo 2021. ‘The State of Global Manufacturing and Risks of Deindustrializationin the Developing World’. In Desigining Integrated Industrial Policies. Eds. S.T. Otsubo and C.S.
Otchia, London: Routledge, 46-94.
Riley, E. 2018. ‘Mobile Money and Risk Sharing Against Village Shocks’. Journal of Development
Economics 135(C): 43-58.
Suri, T. and W. Jack 2016. ‘The Long-run Poverty and Gender Impacts of Mobile Money’. Science354(6317): 1288-1292.
Van Hove, L. and A. Dubus 2019. ‘M-Pesa and Financial Inclusion in Kenya: Of Paying Comes
Saving?’. Sustainability 11(3). doi: 10.3390/su11030568.
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<https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/3885/ / Accessed on 10 July 2021>― 177 ―

The Trans-region Movement of Seasonal Labour in Ghana:
Settlement Formation of Populations in the Upper West Region andTrade Network

Hitomi Kirikoshi
Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Kokushikan University, Japan

Abstract
The Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana (now divided into the Bono East, Brong Ahafo, and Ahafo regions)is located in the vegetation transition zone and is also known as the ‘food basket’ of Ghana. In 2001,
18% of the crops distributed in Ghana were produced in this area, and many agricultural products were
exported to neighbouring countries. Crop production in this region is performed by local people and theDagaaba people from the Upper West Region, who rent farmland from locals. In the late 1980s, theDagaaba people began engaging in crop production in the Brong Ahafo Region. They have since set up
production bases and sent their families to the Brong Ahafo Region. Savannah people such as theDagaaba people and the Akan people, who live in the humid southern regions, differ in their culture,religion, and customs; but they have established relatively good relations and have avoided conflicts.
Immigrant communities called zongo established themselves rapidly in various parts of the country
during the migration of the Dagaaba. This likely made it possible for the Dagaaba people to engage inproduction in a new area far from their ethnic territory.

Keywords: migration, Dagaaba, kola trade, Hausa, zongo― 179 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

1. Introduction
In the savannah zone, an alluvial plain formed in the middle basin of the Niger River in West Africa,
ecological conditions are finely differentiated, presenting an extremely complex mosaic (McIntosh
1998). Constant negotiations with the environment have promoted diversification among humancommunities, contributing to the development of specialised livelihood strategies (Gallais 1962).
Sustaining diversified livelihood strategies in West Africa requires supplementation through theexchange of products, and local communities are organised in a system of exchange based on livelihood
strategies and social differences.
Food shortages also occur frequently in West Africa due to unpredictable precipitation fluctuationsin the short and long terms, river floods, drought, the effects of damage to crops caused by desert locusts,
and rapid human population growth in recent years (Oyama 2020). Communities in the region have dealt
with unforeseen circumstances by complementing each other to sustain their livelihoods. A commercial
trade that compensates for shortages has developed, along with relationships of mutual aid, providing
the basis for the formation of great nation-states in inland arid areas.
Against this background, communities have actively interacted with each other in West Africa sinceancient times, and complex trade routes have developed. Trade with the Arab world (Trans-Saharantrade), which may have begun before the Christian era, has energised inland trade in West Africa. In the
15th century, when Europeans arrived on the coast of West Africa, inland trade networks became
connected to coastal areas, further expanding and developing the region’s trade networks. Railways androads were constructed during the latter half of the 19th and 20th centuries under British and Frenchcolonial rule (Van der Geest 2011). After independence, colonial construction projects provided a basis
for further infrastructure development. Since the 1980s, active cross-border exchanges between
communities have occurred in West Africa, which is equipped with well-developed means oftransportation. In particular, movements from inland arid areas to wet coastal areas have intensified.
However, problems have arisen because the number of immigrants has increased each year.
For instance, Côte d’Ivoire gained independence in 1960 and experienced rapid economic growth in
the 1970s. Its coffee and cacao production sectors grew rapidly from 1975 to 1977. Between 1976 and1980, 1.3 million immigrants entered the country, mainly from the savannah zone (OECD 2009: 75). A
large number of immigrants settled and started farming in the southern area of Côte d’Ivoire with
political support; they have continued to occupy and own land without former registration. The rapid
influx of agricultural workers and settlers both from abroad and moving within the country created anunderlying structure of conflict between migrants and local residents in the woodlands that served as a
reception site for the new arrivals. This developed into a civil war in 2003.
This study focuses on the migration of people from the savannah zone to the wet regions of modern
Ghana and the interpersonal network that supports it. This movement is common among West African― 180 ―

The Trans-region Movement of Seasonal Labour in Ghana: Settlement Formation of Populations in the Upper West Region and Trade Networkcountries and contributes greatly to securing labour in the wet regions. On the other hand, this intensified
migration can cause friction between people, as it did in Côte d’Ivoire. Thus, this study seeks to clarify
how people from the savannah zone migrate and maintain relationships with the host society byexamining the case of the ethnic Dagaaba people in the north-western part of Ghana.
2. Migration in West Africa
2.1. Ghana’s ecological zones and migration
West Africa’s topography is generally flat, with a low elevation. Therefore, differences in topography
have little effect on precipitation; annual precipitation generally changes along the latitude, with more
northerly areas being drier. Ghana also has a dry savannah zone in the north and a wet semi-deciduous
broadleaved forest zone (woodland) in the south (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Ghana’s ecological zones and research sites (regional lines as of 2014）
The savannah zone of northern Ghana has clearly divided rainy and dry seasons. In the rainy season,grains and vegetables that are resistant to dryness are cultivated. However, since the dry season is anagricultural off-season, younger men tend to look for seasonal labour (migrant work) in the wet regions
and urban areas in the south. On the other hand, the woodland in the southern area does not have clearly― 181 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

distinguished dry and rainy seasons, and precipitation falls throughout the year. This woodland area has
become the centre of cacao production, and people from the savannah zone migrate there to join in the
production.
The transitional zone between the woodland and savannah zones is an essential area for Ghana’s
food production. Although the region has a very short dry season, crops can be produced throughout theyear; varieties such as grains, root vegetables, green vegetables, and fruits are cultivated. The transitionzone is called the ‘food basket’ of Ghana. In 2001, 18% of the crops distributed in Ghana were producedin the Brong Ahafo Region (now divided into the Bono East, Brong Ahafo, and Ahafo regions) locatedin the transition zone, and many agricultural products are exported from this region to neighbouring
countries (FAO 2002). Many people from the savannah zone come to labour in the areas of thistransitional zone and borrow farmland from locals for agricultural production.
2.2. Kola trade and its trade hub, zongo settlements, in West Africa
Zongo, immigrant communities formed around the trade of kola, play an important role in the migrationof people in West Africa. Kola nuts are seeds of Cola nitida, a tree belonging to the Malvaceae family
Cola genus that is native to tropical West Africa and has been produced and consumed in large quantities
in the region for several centuries. Kola exportation began from southern woodlands to European
countries in the 19th century. Kola was used as an ingredient in early Coca-Cola production.
Kola is a luxury good among Muslims living in the savannah zone and has a high ritual and social
value among the people in the zone. Kola contains a high content of components such as caffeine andtheobromine; when chewed, it can relieve drowsiness and act as a stimulant (Lovejoy 1980: 2-5,
Burdock et al. 2009). Men and women purchase kola daily and work while chewing it. People tear kola
into small pieces with their fingers, put it in their mouths, and chew it like chewing gum for about 10 to
30 minutes to alleviate feelings of hunger or thirst (Abaka 2005: 128).
Kola is mainly consumed in the savannah zone of West Africa, but production is limited towoodlands, so it requires long-distance trade across climatic zones. The transportation of kola can follow
a trajectory of more than 2,000 km until it reaches the savannah zone and the Sahara Desert. While kolais consumed daily in the savannah zone, which is its consumption area, it is not consumed in the
woodland zone where it is produced, although its ritual value is high.
Kola requires long-distance transportation, but freshness must be maintained since it is perishable.
Therefore, speed is a transportation requirement. Zongo trading hubs built in various parts of West
Africa enable the rapid transportation of kola. In the 18th and 19th centuries, zongo emerged in the cola
trade between the Hausa Kingdoms and Asante Kingdom, in an area that is home to a large number ofmerchants. Kola is transported by merchants living in a zongo, who hand it over to merchants in the next

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The Trans-region Movement of Seasonal Labour in Ghana: Settlement Formation of Populations in the Upper West Region and Trade Network

zongo, using the zongo network. Kola producers are ethnic Akans 1. Christians living in the south, andits consumers are Muslims (ethnic groups such as the Hausa) living in the savannah zone; kola is thustransported not only across regions but also across ethnicities and religions.
In the 18th and 19th centuries, zongo was established in large cities like Accra or Kumasi. However, inthe late 1980s, according to kola merchants, zongo became rapidly established in various parts of the country,
even in small villages. This zongo establishment coincided with a period of crisis caused by drought. People
from the savannah area needed opportunities to earn money in forest areas such as cacao production, kolatrade, and other informal sections.

Zongo, originally a Hausa word meaning ‘encampment’, is used to indicate a trading settlement, but
it has in recent years increasingly become understood to refer to a community of migrants. HistorianPhilip Curtin describes zongo where other ethnic groups gather in a space mainly occupied by Akan
ethnics as ‘ethnic islands’ formed in the city (Curtin 1998). Many of the migrants from the savannahzone first set foot in zongo, where they establish their livelihood base. This is true even for migrants
who have no relation to the kola trade.
2.3. Demographic change in Ghana
According to 2010 Migration in Ghana, a report compiled by the Ghana Statistical Service based on the2010 census, three regions located in the savannah zone (the Northern, Upper East, and Upper Westregions) and three regions adjacent to the Greater Accra region (the Central, Volta, and Eastern regions)
all had a negative net migration. On the other hand, net migration numbers were positive for the Greater
Accra, Ashanti, Western, and Brong Ahafo regions, with arrivals outnumbering departures (Table 1).
Of the four regions with positive net migration, Greater Accra includes the capital, Accra. Ashanti
includes Kumasi, the former royal capital of the Asante Kingdom, which flourished between the 17thand 19th centuries. Accra and Kumasi are large cities that always compete to have Ghana’s largest
economy and population. The other two regions are in the transition zone described above. A vast
farmland extends throughout, and trade cities such as Techiman and Wenchi have emerged at nodal
points. Among the cities in these four regions, Accra, Kumasi, and Techiman have large markets, andzongo migrant communities are distributed in areas near them.

1

An ethnic group that speaks the Akan language residing in an area extending from Togo to Côte d’Ivoire.
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

Table 1. Out- and in-migration and net migration by region (in populations)RegionOut-Migrants

In-Migrants

Net Migrants

Western

279,394561,513282,119

Central612,458

374,443-238,015

Greater Accra

322,874

1,598,326

1,275,452

Volta

681,833

146,162-535,671

Eastern

750,400

418,314-332,086

Ashanti

613,731853,751

240,020

Brong Ahafo

339,687

457,571

117,884

Northern

433,121

100,524-332,597

Upper East

328,990

61,298-267,692

Upper West252,841

43,427-209,414

4,615,329

4,615,329

0

Total

Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2013b).
Note: Created by the author using Table 3.6: Migration effectiveness ratio for each region.
Table 2 reports the migration status and employment type of workers aged 15 to 64. It shows that thepercentage of self-employed workers without employee(s) is higher regardless of migration status, andthis trend is stronger in rural areas. In addition, an examination of migrants (both intra- and interregional) reveals that the proportion of those working as employees is relatively high, and that this trend
is more pronounced in urban areas. On the other hand, the proportion of domestic employees 2 is higher
in rural areas. In such areas, there are many self-employed agricultural operations consisting of abusiness owner who runs the agricultural farmland and household members who stay on the farm toprovide services. It is assumed that agricultural workers working under such an arrangement are counted
as domestic employees in rural areas.
This study examines workers engaged in agricultural activities in the rural area of Brong Ahafo (thosecategorised as ‘self-employed without employee(s)’ and ‘domestic employee’ in Table 2), focusing on
ethnic Dagaaba people, originally from the Upper West Region.
3. Research summary
3.1. Research methods
The main research site was K-village in the Lawra district in the Upper West Region of the Republic of
Ghana. Research was also conducted in the Techiman municipality, Brong Ahafo Region (currently theBono East Region; see Figure 1).
2
A domestic employee is a self-employed worker who provides services for household members running amarketable business establishment but who is not considered a partner due to the lower degree of involvement inmanagement relative to that of the owner (determined by national standards such as working hours; see
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=665).

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The Trans-region Movement of Seasonal Labour in Ghana: Settlement Formation of Populations in the Upper West Region and Trade Network

Table 2. Proportion of workers 15 to 64 years old by migration and employment status (in percentages)
Employment / Migration Status

Total

Urban

Rural

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

Employee

18.6

28.5

8.4

58.9

53.3

64.7

4.8

6.7

2.8

Self-employed without
employee(s)Self-employed with employee(s)Casual worker

2.0

2.1

1.9

Contributing family worker

12.0

4.3

19.9

Apprentice

2.8

4.3

1.4

Domestic employee

0.6

0.6

0.6

Other

0.2

0.2

0.2

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

Employee

13.3

23.2

5.6

62.6

57.9

66.3

Self-employed with employee(s)

4.2

6.3

2.5

Casual worker

1.6

1.9

1.4

Contributing family worker

15.0

6.0

21.9

Apprentice

2.6

4.1

1.4

Domestic employee

0.6

0.6

0.7

Other

0.2

0.2

0.2

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

Employee

22.1

30.6

12.4

57.4

51.3

64.3

Self-employed with employee(s)

5.7

7.7

3.3

Casual worker

1.9

1.9

2.0

Contributing family worker

9.0

3.2

15.7

Apprentice

3.3

4.7

1.6

Domestic employee

0.5

0.5

0.5

Other

0.2

0.2

0.2

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

Employee

26.5

34.6

13.0

52.9

48.2

60.8

Self-employed with employee(s)

5.5

6.8

3.3

Casual worker

2.9

2.7

3.3

Contributing family worker

8.3

2.8

17.5

Apprentice

3.0

4.0

1.2

Domestic employee

0.8

0.8

0.7

Other

0.2

0.2

0.2

Non-migrants

Self-employed without
employee(s)Intra-regional migrants

Self-employed without
employee(s)Inter-regional migrants

Self-employed without
employee(s)Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2013b).
Note: Created by the author using Table 3.7: Proportion of workers 15-64 years by employment status,― 185 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

sex, and migrant status.
Research was conducted in Village K from December 8, 2013 to January 8, 2014 and then from
September 2, 2014 to January 5, 2015, totalling approximately 150 days. Research in Techiman was
conducted for two days, on March 12 and 13, 2014.
The investigator lived in Village K during the research period while also conducting
micromorphological research using a hand level and vegetation research using GPS (Garmin e-Trex
20xJ), and collecting data on farmland distribution and area. In addition, in parallel with the results ofthe present study. Quantitative data collection, interviews, and participant observation were also
conducted on agriculture, livestock care, cooking, housework, migrant work, and other activities.
Dagaare and English were used in the course of the research.
For research in Techiman, the investigator requested an informant from Village K to serve as a guide,and data collection consisted mainly of interviews. The interviews, conducted mostly in English infarmlands and markets, concerned agricultural activities, ethnic composition, and migration history.
3.2. Environment in surveyed areas
Northwestern Ghana, including Village K, is located in a wet savannah area. The average annual rainfall
is 1,119 mm, and the average annual temperature is 28.5 °C (Figure 2) 3. The seven months from midMarch to mid-October constitute the rainy season; mid-October to January is the relatively cool, dryseason; and February to March is the hot, dry season. Although the annual temperature range is small
during the rainy season, when the amount of clouds increases, the temperature drops slightly during theHarmattan season 4 from December to January because clouds and dust block the sun.
What mainly characterises this location is the iron pan distributed over a wide area. The soil
distributed in this area is classified as plinthosol. Plinthosols are widely found in the area stretching fromBurkina Faso to central Ghana (EC-JRC 2013). This soil is rich in iron and tends to form a hardened
iron pan. When the iron in the soil comes to the surface, it hardens owing to the strong sunlight andprecipitation in the savannah area and becomes an iron pan. At the survey site, this hardened iron pan
was exposed on the ground surface, and the crop layer was thinly deposited on top (Figure 3). The
thickness of this layer in the iron pan area is approximately 10–20 cm, which is not suitable forcultivating crops.

Ghana Meteorological Agency observation data were used. Average precipitation was calculated from 2004–
2014 data observed in Lawra. Average temperatures were calculated using data from 2004 to 2014 in Wa, thecapital of the Upper West Region. As the temperature was not observed in Lawra, observation data for the capital,
Wa, were used.
4This is a local wind that blows in the Gulf of Guinea region in West Africa. It is often observed in the dry seasonfrom November to February due to eastern or north-eastern winds. It is extremely dry and contains fine dust
because it blows in from the Sahara Desert.
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The Trans-region Movement of Seasonal Labour in Ghana: Settlement Formation of Populations in the Upper West Region and Trade Network

The environment of Techiman is very different from that of Village K. Techiman, located in thetransition zone from the forest to the savannah, is slightly dry from December to January, but
precipitation is observed year-round (Figure 4). The average annual rainfall is 1,463 mm, with anaverage annual temperature of 27.7 ºC 5, which makes it a milder climate than that of Village K. This
area has a wide variety of cultivable crops, including grains such as corn (Zea mays), root crops such as
yams (e.g. Dioscorea rotundata), and vegetables such as tomatoes (Solanum lycopersicum). Fruits suchas cashews (Anacardium occidentale) are also cultivated, similar to rice (Oryza sativa) near the river.
The soil is fertile, but the crop layer is not very thick. The creation of mounds is indispensable for crop
cultivation because crop growth is affected by topsoil runoff due to precipitation. Therefore, the Dagaaba
people are often required to grow crops using mounds. As Figure 5 shows, the people of the Upper West
Region tend to stay in the ecological transition zone of the Brong Ahafo region.
The Brong Ahafo Region, where Techiman is located, is the ethnic territory of the Bono people, an
Akan ethnic group. The town of Techiman developed as a trading hub before the 18th century andfunctioned as the economic centre of the Brong Ahafo Region (Dickson 1969: 62). However, its
population density has remained low until recent years, perhaps because it is located on the peripheryof the Asante Kingdom. Therefore, it has a surplus of land that attracts many people.

Figure 2. Average precipitation by month in Lawra and average temperature by month in Wa from2004 to 2014
World Weather Online was used for Techiman climate data (see https://www.worldweatheronline.com/techimanweather-averages/brong-ahafo/gh.aspx / Accessed on 17 September 2021).

5― 187 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

Figure 3. Cultivated land with iron pan exposed; an iron pan is exposed on the surface, with a thinlayer of soil deposited on top

Figure 4. Average precipitation and average temperature by month in Techiman― 188 ―

The Trans-region Movement of Seasonal Labour in Ghana: Settlement Formation of Populations in the Upper West Region and Trade Network

Figure 5. Places where over 5% of the population comes from the Upper West Region
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2013a; 2013b).
Note: Created by the author.
3.4. Daily lives of people in Village K
The people of Village K are agricultural Dagaaba people. In the Laura District, where Village K is
located, Christians make up 58% of the total population, 37% follow traditional religions, 4% are
Muslims, and 1% are ‘other’ (Lawra District 2015).
In December 2013, Village K had six compounds 6, 44 households, and 971 people. Dagaaba society
is composed of patrilineal extended households that join together to form a compound. The compounds
are residential groups composed of multiple households. 7 In these compounds, joint activities such as
exchanges of food and fuel logs take place across households. Households in compounds are composedof multiple families (Figure 6).
The households comprising the compound consist primarily of the male household head and his
relatives, including married men and their wives and children. Agricultural work is carried out on ahousehold basis, with men in the household cooperating to cultivate the land owned by the head.
The nuclear family that makes up a household consists of a husband, wife, and children, all of whom

6
Compounds in Dagaaba are called yiri, which means ‘family’ or ‘residence’. Resident groups called yiri havealso been confirmed among Burkina Faso’s Mossi people. These are resident groups consisting of paternal relatives
and the spouses of married men, and they are regarded as the basic unit of social life. Even in this surveyed area,yiri are regarded as residential groups, which are the basic unit of social life.
7
Households forming compounds are called rol in the Dagaaba language.

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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

eat and sleep in one house. Each nuclear family owns one cooking stove, on which the wives of eachnuclear family prepare meals. Daily meals are prepared in rotation by multiple wives in the household.
Wives prepare meals for the entire household with their own stoves and distribute them to each nuclear
family in the same household.
The survey participants were 13 households in four compounds in Village K (see Table 3). The headsof households within the same compound have a common grandfather or father, with the compound
name indicated by the name of the founder of the compound followed by the compound’s yiri in the
Dagaaba language. Fili yiri is a compound with a male founder, Fili, from Debuo yiri. Doro yiri is said
to come from other compounds in Village K. Garo yiri is a compound that moved from another village.
Frequent exchanges of crops and meat between Debuo yiri and Fili yiri, who were originally one group,
still occur.
3.5. Agriculture in Village K
The people of Village K cultivate staple foods such as sorghum (Sorghum bicolor), pearl millet(Pennisetum glaucum), yams (early variety: Dioscorea alata; late variety: Dioscorea rotundata), corn,rice, secondary foods, peanuts (Arachis hypogea), Bambara groundnuts (Vigna subterranea), blackeyed peas (Vigna unguiculata), okra (Abelmoschus esculentus), and roselle (Hibiscus sabdariffa).
Though the region has many cultivars, the distribution of the iron pan imposes restrictions. In addition,
each planted area is small, and food is often exhausted during the in-between seasons (see Table 3).
Cereals are sown and yams planted in March to April before the rainy season, and the period from
September to November is used for weeding. Men engage in farming in Village K during sowing andharvesting time but travel to areas in southern Ghana such as Techiman for seasonal labour at othertimes. Men are often absent from the village during weeding time; thus, women and children typically
perform this task.
Farming in Village K is characterised by a variety of mounds and ridges formed within the cultivatedland (Figure 7). As mentioned, the thickness of the crop layer in the iron pan area is 10–20 cm, whichis insufficient for crop growth. For example, for pearl millet, the thickness of the crop layer needs to beat least 30 cm because the roots grow. Mounds and ridges must be created because a sufficient crop
layer cannot be obtained in the iron pan area, which occupies a wide part of the village (Figure 8).

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The Trans-region Movement of Seasonal Labour in Ghana: Settlement Formation of Populations in the Upper West Region and Trade Network― 191 ―

Figure 6. Compound structure (Debuo yiri)Table 3. Number of cultivated land parcels and planted area by household crop for each compound surveyed
Sorghum

Pearl Millet

Yams

Corn

Rice

Peanuts

Bambara groundnuts

Total cultivated landCompoundHouseholdDebuo yiri

Db1

3

0.63

5

1.03

1

0.03

1

0.32

1

0.11

9

1.28

2

0.54

21

3.83

Db2

1

0.03

3

0.68

2

0.05

0

0.00

2

0.07

1

0.42

2

0.44

11

1.68

Db3

3

0.18

2

0.31

4

0.07

2

0.37

1

0.05

6

0.32

2

0.37

19

1.62

Db4

6

0.95

1

0.20

2

0.05

0

0.00

0

0.00

7

1.54

0

0.00

16

2.75

Db5

5

0.68

1

0.44

3

0.05

1

0.17

0

0.00

5

1.27

2

0.61

17

3.23

2.48

12

2.66

12

0.26

4

0.86

4

0.23

28

4.82

8

1.96

84

13.11

3

0.52

2

0.75

3

0.07

2

0.03

0

0.00

8

1.65

0

0.00

18

3.02

Fl2

1

0.20

1

0.12

1

0.06

0

0.00

0

0.00

4

0.65

0

0.00

7

1.03

Fl3

1

0.07

1

0.07

1

0.01

1

0.13

0

0.00

2

0.30

0

0.00

5

0.51

5

0.79

4

0.95

5

0.14

3

0.15

0

0.00

14

2.59

0

0.00

30

4.55

8

1.46

2

0.32

2

0.07

0

0.00

0

0.00

8

1.11

0

0.00

20

2.95
1.66

Total
Garo yiri

Gr1
Gr2― 192 ―

Total
Doro yiri

Total

Dr1

5

0.42

2

0.34

1

0.04

2

0.19

0

0.00

7

0.86

0

0.00

15

13

1.88

4

0.66

3

0.11

2

0.19

0

0.00

15

1.97

0

0.00

35

4.61

5

0.90

4

0.53

1

0.02

0

0.00

0

0.00

4

0.59

1

0.10

15

2.14

Dr2

5

0.65

1

0.02

2

0.06

0

0.00

0

0.00

3

0.57

1

0.27

11

1.55

Dr3

5

1.02

3

0.70

1

0.03

1

0.25

0

0.00

3

0.92

0

0.00

9

2.36

15

2.57

8

1.25

4

0.11

1

0.25

0

0.00

10

2.08

2

0.37

35

6.06

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

18
Fl1

Total
Fili yiri

mber of parce Area (ha) mber of parc Area (ha) mber of parc Area (ha) mber of parc Area (ha) mber of parce Area (ha) mber of parce Area (ha) mber of parc Area (ha) mber of parc Area (ha)The Trans-region Movement of Seasonal Labour in Ghana: Settlement Formation of Populations in the Upper West Region and Trade Network

All crops (except peanuts) are cultivated by creating mounds and ridges. The mounds are called
potors, the border ridges that surround the cultivated land are called beguras, and the other ridges arecalled rairai. Yams, pearl millet, sorghum, and bambara groundnuts are planted or sown at the top of
the mound. Vegetables such as corn, capsicum, and tomatoes are cultivated on ridges. Cowpeas, okra,
and roselle are mixed with corn and sorghum, and rice is sown under mounds on irrigated arable land.
Peanuts are cultivated every other year, at which point the previously created mounds are knocked down
and flattened.

Figure 7. Crop cultivation methods

Figure 8. Cultivated land with mounds and ridges― 193 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

4. Movement of people in Village K
4.1. Need for seasonal labour outside the village
Environmental restrictions have a substantial impact on farming, which comprises people’s livelihoodin the region. Van der Geest (2011) conducted an interview with the Dagaaba people from the Upper
West Region of Ghana to investigate the reasons for their migration. Many studies have reported thatsoil oligotrophication is cited as the main reason for migration. While few people cite events such as
drought and floods due to fluctuations in precipitation as reasons for migration, many have said that themain problem is the difficulty of securing food due to the volatile climate and low soil productivity.
The iron pan widely distributed around Village K was formed when the iron buried in the soil
emerged onto the surface. The iron pan covers the ground and helps protect the soil from wind erosionand hydraulic action. On the other hand, the iron pan becomes an impermeable layer, and precipitation
cannot penetrate the ground. Because the soil deposited on the iron pan is washed away by surface
currents, the accumulated soil on the cultivated land is thin, and a sufficient crop layer cannot be obtained.
Land without an iron pan is suitable for cultivation, but such land is limited in Village K. Around
70%–80% of Village K is iron pan area. Villagers divide the iron pan-free land into agricultural land foreach compound; however, the acreage per person tends to be limited due to the increase in the numberof compounds and in the overall population.
Yams are considered an important staple food for the Dagaaba people (Lobnibe 2010). However, in
recent years, the proportion of corn-cultivated land has tended to be higher than that of yams, and thistendency intensifies as the total cultivated land area declines (see Table 3). According to interviews,
yam cultivation is decreasing, as it requires a thick crop layer, but corn can be cultivated even if the crop
layer is thin. Thus, this crop tends to expand to land with an iron pan. However, corn requires more
nutrients to grow and tends to cause soil deterioration.
Precipitation in Village K fluctuates greatly from year to year (see Table 4). Some years, it exceeds
1,300 mm, as in 2006, whereas it falls below 680 mm in other years, as in 2012. Fluctuations inprecipitation have a significant impact on crop yields in rainwater-dependent farming among the
Dagaaba. This does not mean that a large amount of precipitation is beneficial. If the amount ofprecipitation is too high, surface currents are likely to occur, and the runoff of surface soil causes damage,such as the uprooting of crops. This may also create barriers to the growth of certain crops. The Dagaaba
people say that continuous heavy rain causes crop roots to come up to the surface. In particular, strong
precipitation when crops do not grow sufficiently removes soil and greatly impacts crop growth.
According to the interviews, 2012 saw a poor harvest due to light rainfall of less than 700 mm. By
contrast, the rainfall in 2014 totalled 965 mm, which was insufficient but was an average level; thus,
crop yield was also average. When total precipitation reaches 1,200 mm or more, as in 2006, yams
become susceptible to disease, and the yield of pearl millet, which has low moisture resistance, decreases.
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The Trans-region Movement of Seasonal Labour in Ghana: Settlement Formation of Populations in the Upper West Region and Trade Network

Table 4. Changes in annual rainfall in Lawra from 2004 to 2014
Year Annual rainfall（mm）
2005
1,198
2006
1,321
2007
680
2008
―
2009
―
2010
―
2011
―
2012
678
2013
―
2014
965
Average969―：Lost year

Source: Ghana Meteorological Agency observation data.
Note: Purchased data from Ghana Meteorological Agency.
In poor harvest years, many village households cannot secure a sufficient amount of food. Therefore,
men from each household must leave the village for work or seasonal labour. As mentioned, fertile soil
is distributed in the area around Techiman, and this area experiences precipitation throughout the year.
The population is relatively sparse; therefore, there is a surplus of land. These ecological characteristics
are a pull factor for immigrants from the Upper West Region (Van der Geest 2011). In fact, there is ahigh share of people from the Upper West Region among the population of Brong Ahafo, especially in
the Techiman and Wenchi districts. People in Village K said, ‘Even here [the Upper West Region], you
cannot do anything in the dry season. Farming, business opportunities, and cash to survive the year are
all in southern Ghana’. They discussed how important it is to find a job in the south away from thevillage to make a living.
4.2. Types of migration for people in Village K
The Debuo yiri is used as an example here to illustrate how migration to southern Ghana takes place.
The Debuo yiri, one of the compounds surveyed, consisted of five households (households A to E), as
shown in Figure 6, and comprised 106 members in 2015. They are one of the oldest compounds in
Village K and are relatively large. They are led by the eldest son of the founder, Debuo (L in Figure 6).
Of the 106 members of Debuo yiri, about half (54) lived in southern Ghana. In many households, theeldest son of the head of the household as well as his wife and children live in southern Ghana, and thesecond and subsequent siblings, their wives, and their children remain in Village K to assist thehousehold head. The eldest son generally engages in agricultural production in southern Ghana andreturns to Village K only once a year. The second son works to produce subsistence crops with the head
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)of the household during the rainy season, but, during the dry season, he stays with the eldest son andother family members (members of the same compound and other households) and engages in seasonallabour there as a labour base. In seasonal labour, many choose work in the agricultural sector, but somechoose other work, such as in commerce or as mechanics. Households within the same compound often
have different labour bases in southern Ghana. While household C has a labour base in a rural area near
Techiman, other households have a base in a rural area in the suburbs of Wenchi. Furthermore, even inthese suburbs, the rural areas of labour bases differ between households.
In Household C, L, who is also the head of the household and of the compound, went to Techimanin the late 1980s with the help of an acquaintance. There, he negotiated with the Akan ethnic group andsigned a contract to rent land for housing and fields nearby. After that, he lived in a house near Techiman
for about 15 years and worked in agricultural production while paying land rent. His eldest son got
married, so he left his eldest son and his wife behind and returned to the village. The eldest son now
works in agricultural production while paying land rent. He returns to Village K once a year, but hebrings back corn to supplement the food that tends to be in short supply. The eldest son said, ‘My son
will soon be a man and will get married in a few years. Then, I will go back to Village K’, indicatingthat he would soon leave his residence and land in the south to his children.
Interviews with other compounds and people in other villages make it clear that the method ofbuilding a base used by the Debuo yiri is universal in Dagaaba society and that many Dagaaba people,
as in the case of L, travelled to southern Ghana in the late 1980s to create such bases. It is also clear that,even if they live in southern Ghana for several years, few people spend their lives there; they tend toreturn to their villages when in their 50s or 60s.
5. Changes in movement patterns
5.1. Start of seasonal labour in southern Ghana
This study examines the current state of Village K. In this section, I refer to the interviews and literature
to clarify the establishment of Dagaaba migration patterns. According to the interview findings, thepeople of Village K earned cash in the 1960s after Ghana’s independence by engaging in road
construction and the school/hospital construction projects of state-owned enterprises. While someconstruction projects were located near Lawra, several interviewees stated that they travelled to Accra
or Kumasi to engage in construction projects there. In addition, the villagers were sometimes employedby Christian churches for the construction of schools and in afforestation activities led by Christianschools 8. L, a Debuo yiri, stated that he also worked at schools and road construction sites before moving

According to interviews with Village K residents and the Forestry Commission Lawra Station, and as cited in
Nanang (1998). Afforestation activities have since continued, being conducted each year since the early 2000s(Forestry Commission Lawra Station 2014).

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The Trans-region Movement of Seasonal Labour in Ghana: Settlement Formation of Populations in the Upper West Region and Trade Network

to southern Ghana.
Subsequently, the 1970s and the 1980s witnessed a turning point in Ghana’s cacao production. Until
this period, though Ghana had enjoyed the highest cacao production in the world, production began to
decline, and the Ghanaian economy stagnated due to multiple factors, such as 1) large-scale illegal
exports to neighbouring countries; 2) inadequate cacao farm maintenance due to a lack of inputs; 3) the
aging of cacao trees and cacao producers; and 4) a large-scale forest fire (Posnansky 1980, Bulír 2002,
Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011). This decline in the Ghanaian economy prompted the acceptance of IMF
and World Bank structural adjustment policies after 1983, leading to a decline in illegal exports andimprovements in cacao farm maintenance. As a result, cacao production recovered (Kolavalli andVigneri 2011).
In 1982, just before the introduction of the structural adjustment policies, a large-scale forest fire
broke out, altering people’s lives completely. The forest fire burned down cacao trees as well as
perennial crops such as plantains and bananas, which had been the staple food of the Akan ethnic groupin southern Ghana. The Akan began to grow yams, an annual crop; this change necessitated therecruitment of many labourers to produce cacao and yams (Lobnibe 2010). Figure 9, which shows thechanges in the planted area of yams in Ghana, reveals that it increased rapidly in 1984. This rapid
increase is believed to have been caused by the switch to yam cultivation following the forest fire.
Ghana’s structural adjustment policies led to budget cuts in the agricultural, educational, medical,
and other public sectors, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and reductions in the number ofcivil servants. This resulted in the loss of employment for many people in the savannah region. In searchof work, the newly unemployed Dagaaba people moved to cacao-producing areas, which had been inneed of a labour force, and to the vicinity of Techiman, which had a large surplus of land. This gavethem a greater opportunity to enter the agricultural sector. The Akan ethnic group, who lacked the skill
to produce annual crops, likely regarded the Dagaaba people and their high level of agricultural expertiseas important labour factors.
The infrastructural development of the 1980s is another reason why the Dagaaba people started towork in seasonal labour. The construction of the bridge over the Black Volta River in 1981 had thegreatest impact on the people of Dagaaba. Until then, a boat had been used to cross the river; therefore,
large numbers of people and heavy luggage could not be transported in one trip. The construction of thebridge made migration to the south more feasible (Lobnibe 2010).
The complex intertwining of such factors accelerated the movement of the Dagaaba people tosouthern Ghana in the 1980s. The Dagaaba people, who are praised within Ghana for their great skills
in agriculture, sought jobs in the agricultural sector in their new destinations. Due to year-round crop
production, people sent compound members to southern Ghana to secure a residential base andagricultural lands so that they could engage in agriculture at any time. Since then, the Dagaaba people― 197 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

have established a mobile style of living, staying with family members in southern Ghana while
performing seasonal labour.

Figure 9. Changes in the planted area and yield per hectare of yam in Ghana
Source: FAOSTAT data 9.
5.2. Relationship between agricultural technology and migration of the Dagaaba people
Following the increases in cacao prices after 1984, ethnic groups of the savannah region moved to cacaoproducing areas and their environs and entered into the production of cacao and other crops. A
sharecropping system was employed in cacao production in southern Ghana, in which tenant farmers
gave a share of the produced crop to the landowner. This sharecropping system, which allowed tenant
farmers to start farming without a large amount of cash, brought many ethnic groups in the savannah
region into cacao production (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011).
In the early 1980s, the Dagaaba people began travelling to the forests of the South to work as seasonallabourers in cacao production. However, in the late 1980s, the Akan ethnic group switched from thecultivation of yams to that of plantains and bananas, which meant that the Dagaaba people could nolonger grow yams, their specialty. The Dagaaba people are said to have left the forest area as a result,and moved their labour base to the Brong Ahafo Region, where various crops could be cultivated(Lobnibe 2010). As Figure 9 shows, the planted area of yams decreased between 1990 and the late 1990s,
but has increased ever since. In addition, the yield per unit area of yams has steadily increased since thelate 1980s, when the Dagaaba people moved their labour base to the Brong-Ahafo region, reflecting the9

https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QCL― 198 ―

The Trans-region Movement of Seasonal Labour in Ghana: Settlement Formation of Populations in the Upper West Region and Trade Network

higher productivity of this new region.
The Dagaaba people state, ‘The Akan people in southern Ghana do not know how to prepare mounds
or grow yams. The Dagaaba people will make mounds on the land of the Akan ethnic group and teachpeople how to make yams.’ The Dagaaba people, with their strong agricultural skills, are now an
indispensable labour force for Ghanaian agricultural production and contribute greatly to domestic andinternational food production.
6. Modern population movement and zongo settlements
6.1. Access to southern Ghana through zongo
There are many cultural, religious, and customary differences between the ethnic groups of the savannah
region and the Akan ethnic group, whose ethnic territory is in moist southern Ghana. In addition, theethnic people of the savannah region have been treated as a fringe group of the Akan since their
independence, and many feel they have been removed from the centre of politics. On the other hand, theAkan fear that the influx of ethnic groups from the savannah region will deprive them of their land andresources (Ametewee 2007). For these reasons, various problems arise when the people of the savannah
region try to mix with and live among the Akan ethnic group. Despite the high proportion of Christians
among them, the Dagaaba people have a strong sense of belonging to the savannah region, which is
predominantly Muslim, and they are psychologically detached from the Akan ethnic people, who are
Christians.
The zongo settlement, made up of migrant communities, is important in helping the people of thesavannah region establish a living base in Akan lands. The people of the savannah region, such as theDagaaba people, rely on networks of relatives and hometown groups when moving to the Akan ethnic
lands. They maintain these relationships while living at their destinations. Many already have relatives
and hometown groups in various zongo settlements; therefore, it is said that even first-time visitors will
have no problems at their destination if they depend on zongo during their migration.
Zongo settlements are made up of ethnic groups deeply associated with commerce, such as the Hausa
and Kusasi people, but they are also open to others. Zongo settlements have emerged across Ghana, andvarious ethnic groups live together in each zongo community, such as the Kusasi and Dagaaba people
from northern Ghana; the Mossi, Yanga, and Busansi from Burkina Faso; and the Hausa people, wholaid the foundations for zongo settlements. The following has been said about ethnic relations within the
Zongo community:[Interview 1: Unity among ethnic groups in the savannah region]*( ) indicates the author’s notes.
When the Kusasi people worked as servants for the Asante [before Ghana's independence― 199 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

in 1957; exact date unknown], they observed that Dagaaba people enthusiastically engaged
in agriculture. The Kusasi love hard workers; therefore, they soon became close with the
Dagaaba people. The Dagaaba and Kusasi became relatives by marrying their daughters
into each other’s families.
Since then, when the Dagaaba people wish to come to Asante land, they would first be
invited to the zongo settlement and introduced to the Asante (by the Kusasi) as theirrelatives. The Asante people sometimes reject and kill people from the north. Therefore,
the Kusasi people have introduced to the Asante people various ethnic groups (not only the
Dagaaba people) as their relatives, and the ethnic groups of northern Ghana (savannah
region) have protected each other by moving together.
People from northern Ghana always moved or did things in pairs. The Asante people
thought that all of the ethnic groups introduced by the Kusasi were also Kusasi people, andthey called us ‘twins’ for always acting in pairs.
(February 6, 2015; Kusasi man, I）
As [Interview 1] shows, ethnic groups of the savannah region protected and helped each other byliving side by side in zongo communities. In particular, there is strong unity between the Dagaaba andKusasi ethnic groups of northern Ghana. The zongo settlement, which had been established as a trading
hub, is now the headquarters not only of merchants but also of a wider set of ethnic groups from thesavannah region.
6.2. Acceptance into the zongo and relationship maintenance with the Akan ethnic group
The modern zongo settlement is described as being open not only to merchants but also to all people.
However, in reality, there are conditions for entering into the zongo settlement, and one must receive
permission from the megida, the proprietor:[Interview 2: Acceptance of the zongo settlement on Akan ethnic land]*( ) indicates the author’s notes.
Prospective residents of the zongo settlement must be introduced to the megida with a‘friend’ (nzua) as his host (sponsor/guarantor) 10. Anyone is eligible to live in the zongo
settlement with consent from the megida. One can find a nzua even after arriving here
(Akan ethnic lands). It might even be easier if one has a connection with the kola nut
business (kola trade).

10

The sponsor/guarantor is referred to as nzua, a word that means ‘friend’ in the Kusasi language (Kusaal).
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The Trans-region Movement of Seasonal Labour in Ghana: Settlement Formation of Populations in the Upper West Region and Trade Network(January 26, 2015; Kusasi woman, A）
Zongo settlements were established and flourished amid the kola trade, and they followed its customs
in many ways. New entrants into the kola trade are required to go through an intermediary. The
responsible party listens to the intermediary’s input, verifies the person’s reputation through the trading
network, and decides whether to admit him (Kirikoshi 2021). [Interview 2] described the requirement
by which newcomers must have a host when entering the zongo settlement. This is a strong remnant of
the practices that ruled the kola trade.
Scholars argue that the norms by which new entrants were admitted into the kola trade were
established for the security of the merchants based in various regions and to maintain relationships withthe host society (Lovejoy 1980). In other words, the kola traders removed untrustworthy individuals toprevent trouble, thereby maintaining a good relationship with the host society and protecting themerchants. The customs adopted around zongo acceptance are also a way to restrict the disorderly influxof immigrants and maintain a safe environment for residents of the Akan ethnic group.
In addition, the statement in [Interview 2] that ‘It might be even easier if one has a connection withthe kola trade’ indicates that membership in the kola trade is the mark of a credible person and thatthings will go smoothly when one is introduced by such a person. Therefore, one might call on an
acquaintance who is a kola merchant to arrange an introduction if he has no relatives or hometown groupmembers at the destination.
7. Conclusion
The people of the savannah region have long maintained their livelihood by utilising differences in theregion and the main source of livelihood to exchange products and solve the problem of unstable crop
production. For this reason, people have emphasised seasonal labour and interactions with other ethnic
groups and have conducted such practices across wide areas bridging the savannah region and forest,
the rural area, and the city (Rain 1999). In recent years, the effects of climate change, land degradation
due to rapid population growth, and increased terrorist activities by Islamic militants since 2010 haveunderscored the importance of migration. As a result, population migration has accelerated from thesavannah region to moist/wet areas.
As mentioned, rapid migration can cause friction between migrants and the host society. In Côte
d’Ivoire, which neighbours Ghana, people rapidly flowed into the cacao industry with government
encouragement and settled without fully understanding the host societies. As a result, tensions deepened
between migrants and host societies, causing conflicts.
By contrast, in Ghana, no visible conflicts have broken out between migrants (the people of thesavannah region) and the host society (Akan ethnic group). It goes without saying that the differences― 201 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

between the Ghanaian government’s policies and those of the Côte d’Ivoire government have played amajor role in this contrast. However, a considerable role was also played by the framework designed tocurb rapid population influx and pre-empt conflict structured around the customs and relationships that
the Ghanaian people have built over time (Kirikoshi 2019).
This study’s analysis of the migration patterns of the Dagaaba people show that three factors help
maintain the balance between migrants and the host society. The first is that, despite having some family
members in southern Ghana, the people of the savannah region recognise it as their home base. Theinterviews indicate that many ethnic groups, including the Dagaaba people, consider southern Ghana atemporary place of work needed to sustain their livelihoods rather than a permanent home. The migrant
population in southern Ghana does not grow rapidly, as people return to their hometowns to live out therest of their lives after they have arranged for successors.
The second factor is that a crisis in the Akan ethnic group’s subsistence agriculture induced thepeople of the savannah region to start conducting seasonal labour. The Akan ethnic group understands
that they received help from the people of the savannah region, albeit temporarily. With regard to current
food production, they stated, ‘It would not be possible to maintain production without the people of thesavannah region’. Thus, the Akan people cannot unconditionally criticise the influx of migrants.
The third factor is the well-established link between the migrant community and host society. The
kola trade contributed significantly to the formation of this link by connecting the Asante Empire andthe savannah region. Coastal kingdoms such as the Asante Empire and the Kingdom of Dahomey inpresent-day Benin accumulated wealth through the sale of slaves to Europe, but the abolition of the slave
trade stripped many realms of their national strength. The Asante Empire also suffered heavy damage
but maintained its economy by strengthening the kola trade to the savannah region (Lovejoy 1980). Thus,
the Asante Empire has stronger ties to the savannah region than other coastal kingdoms, and therelationship between the two regions is maintained through the kola trade and the zongo.
However, the Akan ethnic group is threatened by an increase in migrants. Currently, population
movement is restricted by the spread of COVID-19, but the balance may be disrupted if the migrationof people from the savannah region accelerates rapidly after the restrictions end. It will be necessary tocarefully monitor future changes in the environment, trends among Islamic terrorist groups, andresponses from the Akan ethnic group.

Acknowledgements
Research for this study was supported by Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research of the Japan Society for
the Promotion of Scientists (JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP16K21411, JP16H06318, JP17H04506,
JP18H03439, JP19KK0031, and JP19K20517).
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The Trans-region Movement of Seasonal Labour in Ghana: Settlement Formation of Populations in the Upper West Region and Trade Network

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Asante & the Gold Coast c.1820-1950. Accra: Woeli Publishing Services.
Ametewee, V. K. 2007. ‘Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Ghana’. In Ethnicity, Conflicts and Consensus
in Ghana. Ed. S. Tonah, Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 25-41.
Bulír, A. 2002. ‘Can Price Incentive to Smuggle Explain the Contraction of the Cocoa Supply in Ghana?’
Journal of African Economies 11: 413-439.
Burdock, G.A., I.G. Carabin, and C.M. Crincoli 2009. ‘Safety Assessment of Kola Nut Extract as a Food
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FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) 2002. ‘Special Report: FAO/WFP Cropand Food Supply Assessment Mission to Northern Ghana’. FAO Global Information and Early
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Forestry Commission Lawra Station 2014. Plantation Reports 2000-2014. Lawra: Ghana Forestry
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Gallais, J. 1962. ‘Signification du Groupe Ethnique au Mali’. L'Homme 2: 106-129.
Ghana Statistical Service 2013a. Brong Ahafo - Population and Housing Census of Ghana, 2010. Accra:
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—— 2013b. 2010 Migration in Ghana. Accra: Ghana Statistical Service.
Kirikoshi, H. 2019. ‘Migrants’ Participation in Cocoa Production: Trust Building among Multi-ethnic
Group in West Africa’. In ASC-TUFS Working Paper 2018 ‘Development, Migration, and Resourcesin Africa’. Eds. H. Kirikoshi, Y. Matsunami, and S. Takeuchi, Tokyo: African Studies Center - Tokyo
University of Foreign Studies, 45-59.
—— 2021. ‘West African Traders and Their Interactions with “Aliens”: Focusing on the Careers ofTraders in Today’s Ghana’. In Development and Subsistence in Globalising Africa: Beyond the
Dichotomy. Eds. M. Takahashi, S. Oyama, and H.A. Ramiarison, Yaounde: Langaa RPCIG, 321-345.
Kolavalli, S. and M. Vigneri 2011. ‘Cocoa in Ghana: Shaping the Success of an Economy’. In Yes, Africa
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D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 201-217.
Lobnibe, I. 2010. ‘Of Jong Migrants and Jongsecans: Understanding Contemporary Rural Out-migration― 203 ―

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from Northwest Ghana’. Journal of Dagaare Studies 7: 1-21.
Lovejoy, P.E. 1980. Caravans of Kola –The Hausa Kola Trade 1700-1900. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello
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Lawra district 2015. <http://lawra.ghanadistricts.gov.gh/?arrow=atd&_=110&sa=5720 / Accessed on 16
July 2015>
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Nanang, D.M. 1998. ‘Suitability of the Normal, Log-Normal and Weibull Distributions for Fitting
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Posnansky, M. 1980. ‘How Ghana’s Crisis Affects a Village’. West Africa 3306: 2418-2421.
Rain, D. 1999. Eaters of the Dry Season – Circular Labor Migration in the West African Sahel. Colorado:
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International Migration 49: e69-e94.

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People and Dogs in Rainforests: Multispecies Relationships Under the
Rising Pressure of Conservation Policy in Southeastern Cameroon

Takanori Oishi
African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan

Abstract
This paper describes and analyses how forest dwellers, especially the Baka hunter-gatherers ofsoutheastern Cameroon, perceive and interact with dogs in daily life. I will also discuss the social andecological contexts of how dogs are involved in the politics and economics of their host societies (i.e.
hunter-gatherers and their neighbours). The relation of the Baka to dogs seems dichotomous between
the forest and village environments, whereas people treat dogs as hunting and gathering partners in theforest, but tend to treat them maliciously, as ‘food thieves’, at their settlement. Sedentarisation andagriculturalization have continued for decades among the Baka. In addition, the recent increase in thepressure of conservation has facilitated this trend. Changes in the subsistence activities of humansocieties are reflected in the diet of dogs and their marginalisation at human settlements. Analysis of thecauses of canine death suggested a heavy impact of human activities on dog mortality. In tropical forest
environments, the survival of dogs independent of humans seems difficult; consequently, their lifespan,
health, and population dynamics are related to the ecology of their human host population.

Keywords: human-animal relations, farmer and hunter-gatherer relationships, local livelihoods, huntergatherers, conservation― 205 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

1. Introduction
1.1. African hunter-gatherer societies and dogs
The dog was the first animal to be domesticated by humans and has been more widely ‘useful’ to people
than any other domestic animal (Lupo 2011). Their many ‘uses’ include their contribution to subsistence(e.g. hunting and transport), their role as guard dogs to protect people from potential predators, evil
spirits, and other dangers, and their support as social companions for people, keeping them warm on
cold nights and watching over children and elders. Dogs in hunter-gatherer societies have been studied
from an evolutionary perspective because their domestication dates back to the time when all humans
were hunter-gatherers. While many studies have focused on dogs’ contribution to hunting activities, lessattention has been given to the socio-economic aspects of hunting dogs (Ikeya 1994) and to the socialand cultural relationship between people and dogs outside of hunting situations (Meehan et al. 1999,
Kohn 2007, Musharbash 2017).
Because dogs are kept in most of the world's hunter-gatherer societies, it can be easily assumed thatthey may play an important role in hunting activities to ensure hunting success. However, recent studies
comparing the hunting role of dogs in small-scale societies in different parts of the world indicate thatthe use of dogs does not always increase hunting efficiency (Lupo 2017). Lupo (2011) quantified thecontribution of dogs to hunting success in the Central African Republic by examining how hunting
results differed with and without the participation of dogs in net and spear hunting practiced among theAka, with results varying according to prey size and hunting type. Koster (2009) used the theory of
optimal foraging strategies to examine the effects of hunting among hunters in Nicaragua, Central
America, and found that the use of dogs had a reverse effect on hunting efficiency. These studies
demonstrate that it cannot be assumed that dogs consistently contribute to hunting in terms of catchweight.
From an economic point of view, as Ikeya (1994) indicates, owning a dog is not a small cost for
hunter-gatherer households. An historical examination of dog hunting among the San of the Kalahari
Desert indicates that hunting with dogs has not always been popular, but that the onset of food
distribution by the Botswana government to San communities has triggered a rapid increase of dog
breeds consuming the surplus of rationed foods and dogs being used for hunting (Ikeya 1994). The San
hunters give their surplus human food to dogs for their auxiliary role in bow-and-arrow hunting.
According to Ikeya (1994), the lifespan of dogs used by the San for hunting is quite short (less than a
few years). Sugawara (2019) mentions the harshness of the San's treatment of dogs.
Concerning the African tropical forest regions, the use of dogs is often described in the collective
hunting methods of spear, bow-and-arrow, and net among the various hunting and gathering societies,
including both the Pygmy hunter-gatherers and Bantu-speaking farmers (e.g. Sato 1983, Terashima1983). In previous studies, dogs were documented as playing a role in hunting techniques. Apart from― 206 ―

People and Dogs in Rainforests: Multispecies Relationships Under the Rising Pressure of Conservation Policy in Southeastern Cameroon

Terashima’s (1983) study of bow-and-arrow hunting among the Mbuti and Lupo’s (2011) study of the
Aka hunting with dogs, only fragmentary accounts exist in ethnographies of the Pygmy peoples.
However, as Colin Turnbull notes in his classic ethnography The Forest People, the Mbuti use dogs
‘without rest from the day they are born to the day they die’ (Turnbull 1961/2015: 100), and dogs tend
to be portrayed as objects to be used solely for labour.
This paper focuses on the social aspects of the relationship between dogs and the Baka, huntergatherers living in the tropical forest region of Cameroon. I will demonstrate how the ecologicalinterdependence between humans and dogs, which has been cultivated through the joint practice of
hunting, has extended to social and cultural spheres.
Reports that dogs are often treated harshly in Africa are not limited to hunter-gatherer societies.
Compared to the West, where issues of animal welfare are becoming institutionalised at national andregional levels, the modern concept of animal welfare is rare in African countries, similar to various
regions of Asia. However, forms of animal care differ among cultures. In this paper, I aim to compare
the relationship between the Baka and dogs with the relationship between dogs and agriculturalists andurban dwellers, such as the Bakwele, who live in the same ecological environment as the Baka.
As portions of the data used in this paper were published in the form of a book chapter in Japanese(Oishi 2019) before the COVID-19 pandemic, citations have been added throughout the subsequent text
where appropriate.
1.2. The Baka hunter-gatherers
Congo basin hunter-gatherers, who are traditionally referred to as African Pygmies, are estimated tonumber around 900,000 in Central Africa (Olivero et al. 2016). Most of these people have alreadybecome partly or fully agricultural and sedentary, and should therefore be described more accurately as
former hunter-gatherers. The Baka comprise one of the largest hunter-gatherer groups in the Congo
Basin, with a population estimated at 35,000–40,000 (Njounan Tegomo et al. 2012). Their language isBaka, a Ubangian language. The Baka have established relationships with more than 18 different
farming groups in Cameroon, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo (Bahuchet 2017). The relationshipbetween the Pygmies and neighbouring farmers entails a mixture of confrontational and appeasement
aspects and ambivalent feelings toward each other (Takeuchi 2017).
Among the Baka of southeastern Cameroon, a major change in settlement patterns, from a nomadic
lifestyle to farming and settlement, occurred in the 1950s (Althabe 1965). A diversification ofsubsistence activities was observed, from hunting and gathering to participation in subsistence farming,
wage labour, and cultivation of cash crops (Kitanishi 2003, Oishi 2012; 2016). The focus of hunting
activities has also transitioned from collective spear hunting to individual snare trap hunting (Hayashi2008).
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

In recent years, as sedentarisation processes, most hunting activities have evolved into day trappingand gun hunting based on settled villages (Hayashi 2008). The Baka sometimes participate in extended
hunting and gathering camps, called molongo, lasting several months every few years.
The Baka are especially excited about molongo, which are attended by most members of thecommunity, including women and children. The main reason is because they can consume forest foodsuch as wild yams, game, and freshwater fish. The frequency of these camps, however, has decreased
considerably depending on various socioeconomic factors, especially due to the regulatory conditions
introduced by conservation policies.
The Baka also go on small-group hunting trips called sendo and maka, both of which require dogs toaccompany them to camp. Around the study area, dogs were not tied up or caged, but were allowed toroam freely. However, there are no wild dogs (feral dogs) that are completely isolated from humans.
Dogs do not form large packs of more than a few individuals and do not bark in groups.
1.3. The rising pressure of conservation policies on local livelihoods in international border zones
The Cameroon Forest Law of 1994 established the zoning of forest space into areas designated forspecific land use, including national parks. Subsequently, regulations on local people’s use of the forest,
including hunting and fishing activities, soon began. Control over game animals depends on theircategorization by endangered species, created by the Cameroon Forest Law of 1994: A (integrally
protected), B (partially protected), and C (other species). The implementation of these regulations
became increasingly stricter. For example, while abundant game meat could have been observed inmorning local markets until the mid-2000s, it became rare or minimal in the 2010s.
In addition, elephant poaching has increased significantly in international border zones between
Cameroon, the Central African Republic, and the Republic of the Congo. The ivory trade was bannedby the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in
1989. However, illegal trade continues. Specifically, in the late 2000s, large-scale poaching of elephants
was reported to have become more prominent. One of the technical aspects that facilitates large-scaleelephant poaching is military weapons, such as Kalashnikov automatic rifles supplied by civil wars andother armed conflicts.
Unfortunately, the reputation of forest knowledge of the Baka has caused some of them to be
recruited, equipped, and sent to the forest for poaching. Elephant tusks are brought outside of the forest
for international black markets. While the arrest of local actors has often been reported, identifying
actors at higher levels of this hierarchy is extremely complex (Kamgaing et al. 2016). In response to thecrisis, conservation in these bordering forests has become very rigorous and often militarized using
national armies. When wildlife crimes are reported, an immediate series of operation ‘coups de poing’is conducted in targeted hotspots of poaching. It has been reported that these operations have rapidly― 208 ―

People and Dogs in Rainforests: Multispecies Relationships Under the Rising Pressure of Conservation Policy in Southeastern Cameroon

reduced poaching (Dongmo 2011).
Accompanied by soldiers, ecoguards visit forest camps, threatening local people and resulting in asignificant decrease in forest use. At the research site, the following observations were made: (1) asudden decrease in the local population and the collapse of sedentary village settlements following
military operations, (2) the evident reduction and cessation of daily activities in the forest by local people,(3) physical and mental trauma among the local people involved in violent military operations, (4) therise of social tension between local people due to suspected betrayals, and (5) a spatial shift of hunting
sites instead of a reduction in hunting practices (Oishi et al. 2015). In conservation contexts, there isless concern that the restriction of forest access due to conservation may have a significant impact onhuman communities (Remis and Robinson 2020). Local people, especially the Baka, remain theprincipal victims of anti-poaching activities, yet also occupy the key position to successfully tackle
poaching at the local level in the context of conservation (Kamgaing et al. 2016).
Another growing concern related to wildlife conservation and hunting activities is zoonotic risk
(Dounias and Froment 2011). Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, dogs have primarily been studied as acarrier of pathogens (e.g. rabies and echinococcus) from the viewpoint of public health and hygiene
since the colonial period. In vitro transmission cases of retroviruses from wild animals to hunters incentral African forests have been reported (Wolfe et al. 2004). As dogs occupy an intermediate position
between wildlife and human communities in rural areas, it is possible to hypothesise that zoonotic
diseases can also be mediated by dogs, e.g. in the case of hunting practices. However, little is known
about how the frequency and pattern of human-animal contact relates to the socioeconomic and cultural
conditions in which the forest population is located. Although this paper does not directly address theissue, it is meant to provide data on actual relationships between humans and dogs at the local level.
2. Research area and methodology
This study is based on intensive fieldwork conducted in March 2015, September 2016, September 2017,
and August 2018, mainly in the villages of Ndongo, Moloundou District, Boumba-Ngoko Province,
Eastern Region of the Republic of Cameroon (Figure 1). In addition, short-term fieldwork was
conducted in the nearby provincial cities of Bertoua, Yokadouma, and Moloundou to enable comparison
with city dwelling communities. The study site is surrounded by a humid environment of tropicalrainforest dominantly consisting of semi-deciduous tree species with an annual rainfall of approximately
1,500 mm.

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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

Figure 1. Location of the study area
Source: Prepared by the author.
The village of Ndongo has a population of approximately 600 people, about half of whom are Baka
(approximately 60 households), while the Bakwele (approximately 25 households/250 people), Hausa,
and other inhabitants (approximately 50 people) live adjacent to the village. Ecologicalanthropological research on the Baka has been conducted by Japanese researchers around Ndongo
village since 1994. The author has been involved in the research since 2002, and has examined therelationship between farmers, hunter-gatherers, and merchants (Oishi 2012; 2016).
Ethnozoological data collection on dogs has been undertaken, aiming first to understand the actual
situation of dog recognition and management by local people, especially among the Baka and the
Bakwele. As preparation for implementing the individual identification method, I identified as manydogs as possible at the settlements and camps, then observed individual dogs and interviewed theirowners. In rural areas, it is difficult to identify all dogs as they move between forest camps andsettlements with their owners. Therefore, I attempted to document as many dogs as possible in the
study area by repeating the surveys. Interviews were conducted with the dog owners. Forty-three Baka
adults (41 males, 2 females) and 14 farmers and urban dwellers (10 males, 4 females) wereinterviewed about 112 dogs (63 males, 47 females, 2 of unknown sex) regarding their names, mode ofacquisition, use, character, and whether and what they were fed. For the 45 dogs that had already died,
we inquired about the cause of death. Hereafter, I use pseudonyms in place of the personal names of
local people to whom I refer. Ethnic or local terms are italicised.

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People and Dogs in Rainforests: Multispecies Relationships Under the Rising Pressure of Conservation Policy in Southeastern Cameroon

3. Ethnozoology of dogs among the Baka
3.1. Baka perception and uses of dogs
The origin of indigenous African dogs is unknown. However, genetic analysis using mitochondrial DNA
suggests that dogs that originated in Northern Europe spread to North and West Africa between 12,000
and 14,000 years ago, indicating genetic adaptation to tropical humid environments, including resistanceto malaria (Adeola et al. 2017, Liu et al. 2017). Lupo (2017: 143) hypothesises that dogs were introduced
500 years ago with the extensive expansion of Bantu speakers, as no dogs of older age have been locatedin sites in the tropical forest regions of Central Africa. Of course, dogs were brought to Africa more
recently during the colonial period. Today, modern dog breeds can be found in urban areas. However,in the rural areas of tropical forests, most dogs are medium-sized hybrids closely resembling the wellknown ‘basenji’, the native dog breed of the Congo Basin.
In the Baka language, a dog is called mbolo. The Baka consume more than 60 species of forest wild
mammals for food—referred to as ‘meat animals’—however, dogs are clearly distinguished from wild
animals and are not eaten or expected to be eaten. Therefore, dogs are not subject to the same taboos offood avoidance as are wild animals. Thus, the position of the dog in the folk classification is unique anddifferent from that of humans or other animals.
The dogs were identified and given individual names. In addition to dogs, the Baka also keep
chickens as domestic animals, and occasionally, young wild animals obtained from hunting; however,they do not give them individual names. Only one name is given to an individual dog, and the namegiven is shared, not only by the owner, but at least within the camp.
Examples of the names of the seventy-eight dogs named by the Baka are provided in Table 1-1. The
languages used in the naming of the dogs include Baka (28), French (28), Bakwele (5), Lingala (2),onomatopoeic and mimetic (2), and unknown (13). Naming patterns varied widely, but included namesthat described attributes or characteristics of the dog, such as eating habits or the dog's behaviour andattitude in the forest when hunting, names derived from commands given to the dog, anecdotalmonologues unrelated to the dog's characteristics, and names borrowed from other cultures as a resultof cultural contact. No dog inherited its name from a parent or previous owner, and anecdotal naming
was prominent.
Table1-1. Examples of names given to dogs by the Baka (name, language, meaning)
Food and food habits
Kimot

Baka

Bubul

FrenchNjumuyeBaka

It's cooked.

Akwelbil

BakweleIt does not like rotten food.

A dish made by steaming plantain bananas
Boule boule (ball ball): many round chunks of
kneaded cassava porridge― 211 ―

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Behaviour in the forest
MeshanWose nyanga
Bokɛnga
OttondoKaimanBombulu

French
Baka
Baka
Baka
FrenchBaka

Aggressive
Fashionable woman
Many hills
Aggressive
Large crocodile
Cowardly

Health and hygiene conditions
Mokoumgendja
Baka
Mosunge
Baka

Has hernia
Ticks

Social relationship and role
NabimoBaka
Kado
FrenchGaadiɛnFrenchNanga
LingalaYour friend
Present
Guardian
Mine

Commands
KelelundeEssion
Siaye
Yaye

Baka
FrenchBaka
BakweleLet us go
Let us try
Look up
How about your condition?

Anecdotal monologue type names
Nde wole
Baka
Andemaniyo
Baka
Abeya
Baka
Qui me dit
FrenchYato
BakweleMalungu
Baka
Delaanyo
BakweleJealoux
FrenchI do not have a wife
If I knew that
Do not look at your faults
Who talks to me
I am going
I know things
The village is not good
Jealousy

Cultural contact
Medoh
CEFFIC
Blek
Mapouka
Dakar
Lulu

Female name
Logging company
Character of a comic
Music genre from Ivory Coast 1
Capital of Senegal
Trade name of whisky in plastic bags

BakweleFrenchFrench
Unknown
land nameUnknown

Source: Oishi (2019: 177).
Explanations for the example names within the different categories include:(A) Names associated with food or eating habits. Kimot and Bubul are named after the dog's favourite
foods (steamed and pounded plantain bananas) or appetite for food (number of bowls of cassava porridge
1

The music is pops and used for dance in groups with sexy choreography.
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People and Dogs in Rainforests: Multispecies Relationships Under the Rising Pressure of Conservation Policy in Southeastern Cameroon

eaten). The name Njumuye derives from the fact that the dog does not eat the prey it kills when hunting,but waits for its owner to arrive.
(B) The name refers to the dog's behaviour and attitude in hunting scenes. The name Bokɛnga, meaning‘many hills’, refers to the strength of the dog's legs, Kaiman to the ferocity with which it bites its prey,
Bombulu to its timid nature, and Wose nyanga to its utter uselessness, as in ‘a woman who is always
dressed up’. Wose nyanga represents the attitude of a useless dog who does not work at all.
(C) The name refers to the relationship between the owner and the dog and the dog's role. Nabimo is thename of a female, meaning 'your friend' in Baka, but refers to the fact that the dog mated randomly withvarious males ‘without regard’. The Baka do not take any direct part in or attempt to control the sexual
activities or breeding of dogs. Incidentally, according to the male owner of this dog, the name is meant
to advise people not to assume that one’s wife will only mate with her husband. The various names
based on the attributes and characteristics of dogs reflect how hunters grasp the individuality of various
dogs (Ikeya 2002: Chapter 4, Okuno 2018: Chapter 14), which cannot be summarised merely as‘hounds’.
(D) Anecdotal monologue-type names. The name Jealoux was given when jealousy between a man anda woman led to a quarrel (likombe), while Delaanyo was given when relations with the villagers
deteriorated. This pattern is similar to what Kimura (1996) called the ‘record’ type of naming, in thatthe name itself is a record of an event or incident in a nearby society.
(E) Names borrowed from other cultures. There was only one instance of overlap with a person’s name,that of a peasant woman called ‘Medoh’. Other dog names include the corporate names of timber
harvesting companies, the trade names of luxury goods, and the names of places in exotic capitals infaraway West Africa.
When I compare these Baka dog names with those of neighbouring farmers and urban dwellers, there
are some similarities as well as differences. Table 1-2 presents examples from the 30 names given todogs by dog owners of farming populations, including city dwellers.
Table 1-2. Examples of names given to dogs by farmers and urban dwellers (name, language, meaning)Appearance
Black

EnglishBlack

Guinness

EnglishGuinness beer

Schäfer

Proper nounFirst name of the former coach of the Cameroon
national football team (Winfried Schäfer)Behavior in the forest
OttondoLingalaAttacker― 213 ―

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Social relationship and role
Essenyelam
Zediassam
GuardienMɔnil

BakweleBakweleFrenchBakwelePart of my bodyWho does not hurt me
GuardianOrphanAnecdotal monologue type names
Abeya
BakweleMoyaanyo
Bimo
Kuɛl-djaako
BakweleBergerFrenchDon’t look at your faults
Human beings are bad
Love to Djako
Who builds a house

Cultural contact
Dakar
JericoAngolaNounousou

FrenchEnglishProper noun
FrenchDakar （capital of Senegal）
Movie Character
Country name of Angola
Name of a doll

MapoukaUnknown

Music genre from Ivory Coast.
Common name for a dog
RokiDragon
Lex
Blek
Flek

Proper noun
Proper noun
Proper noun
Proper noun
Proper noun

Source: Oishi (2019: 179).
In addition to the same naming patterns used by the Baka, such as dog characteristics, anecdotalmonologues, and words borrowed from other cultures, there are also examples of people naming theirdogs with common dog names or repeating the name of a dog they had previously. Names associatedwith the dog's characteristics were also common, such as Black, Guinness (both descriptive andmetaphorical for the black colour of the body), and Schäfer (a metaphor for the hair), while names
associated with the dog's diet and health or behaviour in the forest were rare. Anecdotal monologues
related to the owner's desires and feelings that have nothing to do with the dog, such as Kuɛl-djaako(‘love to Djako’: Djako is a local group identity of the Bakwele ethnicity), are common among the Bakaand neighbouring farmers 2. Alternately, the fact that many names are related to the life and ecology ofthe dog is likely to be a characteristic of Baka dog names.

2This type of dog naming can occur more extensively. There are few descriptions or data regarding dog namingin Cameroon. I could only find a fragmental reference in a linguistic paper treating personal names in northern
Cameroon (Ajello 2011: 28-29). The Gizey name dogs the same way that they name people. Ajello noted that dog
names function to transmit messages between people among the Gizey.
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3.2. Social relations in dog ownership
Next, let us examine dog ownership. Among the Baka, dogs are considered to be owned by individuals,
but when they are used for hunting or other purposes, they are not necessarily occupied soley by theirowners, and their use is open to relatives, friends, and neighbours. There is a large gender difference indog ownership in the study area, with 5% of adult females owning a dog compared to 43% of adultmales (Section 2). The average number of dogs owned by a person was 1.58 (1-6, standard deviation
1.1).
Of the 74 dogs owned by the Baka, 57 of the 74 dogs for which the method of acquisition was known
were gifts from relatives or visitors. This was followed by 10 self-breeding dogs (born to other owners),
six purchased dogs, and one inherited dog (Table 2 (a)). It can be said that most of the dogs in Baka
society were acquired through gifts. The gift and exchange of dogs among the Baka seems to be aprerequisite for them to be able to breed their own dogs in sufficient numbers.
Table 2. Comparison of dog acquisition by the Baka, farmers, and urban dwellers（a） Baka
Gift
Home reproduction
Purchase
Inheritance（b） Farmers/City dwellers
N (%)

N (%)
57（77.0）
10 (13.5)
6 (8.1)1 (1.3)74 (100)

Purchase
Gift
Home reproduction
Found at crop field

12 (41.3)
10 (34.5)
5 (17.2)2 (7.0)29 (100)

Source: Oishi (2019: 181).
Conversely, in the case of hunters among the Bakwele, a farming community living in the same study
area, nearly half of the 29 dogs they owned (12 dogs), were purchased from nearby cities (Table 2 (b)).
The price of a dog in the settlements of the study area is 2,000 CFA Francs 3 (3.08 euros) per individual
dog, while in the capital Yaoundé it is more than 10,000 CFA Francs (15.4 euros). Thus, farmers andurban dwellers tend to buy dogs more actively than the Baka, among whom there is little or no dog trade.
Thus, who gives dogs to who, among the Baka? In 30 of the 57 cases, I confirmed the relationshipbetween the giver and the receiver of the dog. More than half (17 cases) were from the family in-law,such as the wife’s uncle, father-in-law, brother-in-law’s wife, son-in-law, and hunband; six were fromthe owner’s brothers and other relatives; three each from friends and farmers; and one from the stranger
to the village. In this case, the gift was given to a man by a visitor to a camp who came to work as acontractor for a logging project in the newly established ‘community forest’ near the village (Table 3).
CFA Francs (or FCFA) is currency used in central African countries, including Cameroon. FCFA is anabbreviation for Franc de la Coopération Financière en Afrique centrale (Franc of the Financial Cooperation incentral Africa), for which the value is guaranteed by the French treasury. The exchange rate is fixed at 656 FCFA
per 1 euro.

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Table 3. The relationship between the sender and receiver of a Baka dog gift
The relationship with the donor as
N (%)
percieved by the recipient
Family-in-law
17 (56.7)
Own family
6 (20.0)
Friend3 (10.0)
3 (10.0)
Farmer（Bakwele）
Visitor from town
1 (3.3)30 (100)
Source: Oishi (2019: 181).
In Baka society, dogs are not regarded as property of bridewealth, and there is no ritual significanceattached to the giving and receiving of dogs. However, it can be said that dogs tend to be given andreceived between members of a married family. These interview results suggest that in Baka society,dogs are exchanged between groups and settlements through social relationships such as marriage andvisits.
However, when dogs are given as gifts, this does not mean that dogs are given and received regardlessof their individual characteristics. Different hunters have different preferences and requirements for dogs.
For example, some hunters prefer males, while others prefer females. Those who preferred males
reported that females were not good for hunting because they became pregnant and could not go hunting.
Those who are looking for a dog may negotiate by observing the behaviour of the owner’s dog daily.
Therefore, it may be more appropriate to say that dogs are given as a result of a request rather than as asimple gift or sharing.
The gift and ownership of dogs can have social implications. For example, a male dog named
Andemaniyo was given to Michael by an ex-wife of his brother-in-law, Linda, after their divorce.
Andemaniyo, which means ‘if I knew that’ in Baka, originally belonged to Linda's ex-husband Colin,
but it became more attached to Linda than to Colin and followed her when they divorced. Michaelremained with Andemaniyo for five years until its death and recalled how faithful the dog had been tohim.
Michael hinted to the author that there was a special relationship between he and Linda, which
explained why Linda gave him the dog, and Michael named it Andemaniyo. In this way, a person canform a strong attachment to a dog because of the relationship between the people behind the gift. For
Michael, Andemaniyo is a ‘meaningful other’ (Haraway 2007), who will not be forgotten even after its
death.
3.3. Cooperation between humans and dogs in hunting activities
In this section, I document the relationship between the Baka and dogs during hunting activities. In the― 216 ―

People and Dogs in Rainforests: Multispecies Relationships Under the Rising Pressure of Conservation Policy in Southeastern Cameroon

central African rainforest area, collective hunting methods such as spear, net, and bow-and-arrow havebeen widely employed. Although the hunting methods of the Pygmy hunter-gatherers vary and changewith time and region, dogs often participate in the practice of collective hunting, such as bow-and-arrowand net hunting, during which a certain area of forest is enclosed and the dogs play an important role inchasing out prey animals (Terashima 1983). The Baka have used dogs to practice spear-hunting for
African red river hogs (Potamochoerus porcus), but as they became more settled, the importance of
gun-hunting on behalf of farmers has increased (Sato 1999). As one older Baka hunter put it, ‘the dog
used to be the best gun for us the Baka’.
Dogs play a variety of roles in hunting activities. The most common hunting methods currently usedby Baka include gun and snare traps. When dogs are used for hunting, they are released to follow the
prey. A wooden bell, called a jangali, is attached to the dog's neck to determine its position and speedof movement in the forest. The dogs bark at or fight with the animals they catch, and the hunters who
track them from behind kill the prey with spears or guns. Here, dogs were used to stop the movement of
prey animals in the forest. Some hunters removed half of the dog’s tail to make it braver in close combat.
Conversely, dogs are not used in so-called stealth hunting, in which the hunter walks alone through theforest looking for his prey and shoots it with a gun. Dogs are also not used when hunting monkeys (ex.
Cercopithecus spp.) with guns in trees because their prey may escape. Thus, dogs are not involved insome types of hunting in which guns are used.
Dogs are often taken on forest visits to patrol snare traps. Snare traps are used for small roaming
animals such as porcupines (Atherurus africanus), medium to large antilopes such as blue duikers(Cephalophus monticola), Peter’s duikers (Cephalophus callipygus), and large animals such as African
red river hogs. Trapped animals often break free from the snare cables and escape before the patrols
begin. When this happens, dogs are used to track them down, locate them, and, if possible, kill them.
When hunting large animals, such as the African forest elephant (Loxodonta cyclotis), which is thehunter’s biggest prey, dogs are not used. They say that dogs are useless because they are too small forelephants and can easily be torn apart and killed.
After a successful hunting, the dogs were given meat. Jerome Lewis, who studied the Bendjele,another Pygmy group living adjacent to the Baka, describes the practice of ‘distributing’ the lungs ofthe prey to the dogs after a successful hunt (Lewis 2008). Bendjele’s reason for sharing meat among thedogs is as follows: ‘Hunting dogs, like people, have an ekila. When they attack a prey like a wild boar,
they swing their hind legs so hard that they dislocate their hip joints and render the animal immobile.
Then, the dogs bark and call for people. The dog killed the animal. They keep their ekila alive by eating
the lungs of their prey’ (Lewis 2008: 313. Note 7).
Ekila is a core concept of complex norms relating to food avoidance, disease, and misfortune, andthe success or failure of hunting, commonly held among the Pygmy hunter-gatherer societies of the― 217 ―

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northwestern Congo Basin, such as the Baka and the Benjele. Dogs, as well as humans, have ekila,
which is maintained by feeding them meat from specific parts of the game (e.g. lungs).
Among the Baka, hunters feed meat to their dogs before and after hunting. However, in the study
area, the meat was not from a specific part of the animal, but from various parts, such as the thigh, arm,side of the buttocks, lower abdomen, and internal organs (intestines). Often, the meat is cooked withstarches such as plantain bananas. In such cases, many hunters mixed a ‘dog medicine’, called ma bolo,with the meat when it was cooked. Just like giving medicine to a person, giving medicine (ma) to a dog
will change its behaviour and internal character and make it ‘aggressive’. Specifically, the dog becomes
more aggressive in its pursuit of wildlife and is more successful in hunting. The Baka word njele and‘méchant’ in French are used to describe this state of the dog. Aggressive dogs are particularly favoured
when hunting large animals, such as African red river hogs and gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla). In thisway, hunters and dogs work together in forests.
As for important, but expensive hunting equipment, such as guns, Baka hunters are sometimes
entrusted with hunting equipment by neighbouring farmers (Hayashi 2008). In such cases, the prey does
not belong to the hunter, but to the owner of the hunting gear, who has the greatest right to share theprey. However, we could not find any examples of Baka hunters borrowing dogs from neighbouring
farmers. Given the limited number of farmers who own dogs, it is likely that the maintenance of hunting
dogs in the study area has been the responsibility of the Baka themselves. Hunters use dogs belonging
to themselves, their families, or those with whom they share their hunting camps.
3.4. Relationships between people and dogs at settlement
In the forest, I observed a relatively cooperative and interdependent relationship between people anddogs, which is centred on hunting activities. Here, I describe the relationship established between people
and dogs in the settlement village, which is another major living space for both. I will focus on aspectsof the relationship that are different from those found in the forest, such as the differentiation of people
and dogs through violence and, conversely, the care given to dogs by people.
Violence between people and dogs occurs on a daily and sudden basis. In everyday food preparation,even if dogs are present during cooking, eating, and sharing meals, they are not given a share of the food.
If they eat the meal or meat without permission, they are treated as ‘thieves’ and are subject to violent
sanctions by people. These include beating, kicking, throwing firewood at the dogs, and hitting themwith the belly of a machete. As a result, in settled communities, dogs are often placed in a moremarginalised position.
Baka dogs may be expected to function as watchdogs, as evidenced by the presence of a dog named
Guardian. As a result, a misunderstood dog may bite a person on rare occasions. If a person isintentionally bitten, the dog can be killed immediately. People respond to bites in different ways, and― 218 ―

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there are two main treatments. Wounds are treated with pounded maize flour or shavings of the bark of
the sombolo (Penianthus longifolius, Menispenmaceae) tree. Some Baka reported that if they were bitten
accidentally by their own dog, they would let the dog lick the wound to heal it.
The difficult position dogs occupy in their coexistence with humans is well illustrated by the causesof their deaths. Descending order of frequency, the causes of death in dogs (35 cases) include: killingby human error, slashing, poisoning, being eaten (10 cases), sickness (8 cases), being injured by wild
animals such as wild boars and porcupines (7 cases), being bitten by snakes (6 cases), being caught insnare traps, and being eaten by crocodiles when crossing rivers (1 case) (Table 4).
Table 4. Causes of death of dogs kept by the Baka in the study area
Cause
Killing by humans
Sickness
Killing by wild animals duringhunting
Snake bites
Fall in snare trap
Predation by crocodileN (%)
10 (28.6)
8 (22.9)
7 (20.0)
6 (17.1)
3 (8.5)
1 (2.9)35 (100)

Source: Oishi (2019: 186).
The fact that the leading cause of death is killing by humans illustrates the marginal position in whichdogs are placed. In addition to unintentional accidents such as being mistaken for prey while hunting
and being shot or cut with a machete, there are also many cases of dogs being killed by their owners
after they have eaten the entire store of meat during the night, as well as deliberate killings byneighbouring farmers. Dogs killed due to getting caught in the snare traps of their owners or otherhunters is another indirect form of human-inflicted death.
As mentioned above, none of the Baka eat dogs, however, some Bantu farmers are in the habit ofeating them and often steal dogs from the Baka. In addition, when social relations deteriorate between
certain farmers and Baka individuals, Baka dogs are sometimes killed. A common example of issues
that arise is when a Baka dog goes to a farmer's house to steal food; even if the dog is not killed, thefarmer will blame the owner of the dog. Usually, the Baka do not bury the bodies of their dogs, but leavethem in the nearby vegetation. However, in cases where their dogs have been killed by farmers, theowners sometimes dig a hole for their deceased dog in the same way that they bury people, and cover itwith a little earth. Hunters often remember their dead dogs just as much, or more, than they do theirliving dogs. This was especially the case with dogs that died during hunting.
While some dogs were treated harshly, others were treated as if they were pets in settled communities.

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One of the dogs that made a strong impression on me was a male dog called Zazo, kept by a Baka woman
named Babbie. Zazo accompanied Babbie everywhere she went, not only to the forest, but also to thefields and to a nearby camp, where it was well fed, well fattened, and well groomed. Babbie had beenmarried and divorced several times, partly because she was unable to have children. Babbie sometimes
lived alone for several years, but Zazo had always been with her until its death.
Sometimes, people take care of old dogs. Shiho Hattori, an anthropologist who has lived 100 km
from the research site, writes in an essay about an elderly woman who cares for her old dog in her hut:
I went to the house of an old woman called Abenyon. As I was about to enter the house, I
heard movement from behind the fire. I looked and saw a big old black dog lying on thefloor. Abenyon told me that she was giving the dog food and water because he was too old
to work. She also said gently, with a respectful look. "It was a very good hound when it
was young and led Liangkom (Abenyon's husband) on many successful hunts. He once took
an antelope (duiker) and a wild boar himself, and even drove a gorilla into the ground”.
From Abenyon's behaviour, I learned that the Baka also have an appreciation and respectfor dogs (Hattori 2008).
These ethnographic data demonstrate that there is room for a relationship between the Baka and thedogs, not just as an order maintained by human violence, but what Haraway (2007) refers to as a‘significant other’.
4. Conclusion and Reflections for Further Studies
4.1. Dichotomous human-dog relationship between forest and village
Through hunting practices, sometimes people and dogs experience a physical as well as a spiritualconnection, form attachments, and become ‘significant others’ (Haraway 2007). Some hunters are evenso traumatised by the unfortunate death of a dog during hunting that they find it difficult to recover.
Conversely, it is also true that the Baka are heavily involved in the life and death of dogs by forcing
them into an overwhelmingly inferior position. Because dogs cannot survive on their own in tropicalforest environments, they must rely on people for their survival. The fact that people are directly or
indirectly responsible for more than a third of all dog deaths demonstrates how much control people
have over the lives of dogs. Particularly in settlements, dogs are often violently punished as food thieves.
Dogs that ‘do not listen’ are punished mercilessly. Thus, there is a double standard for the position ofdogs in Baka society. In the forest, they are treated as hunting companions, but in the villages, they areoften treated with violence and subjugated. The ecological background for this ambivalence might bethat dogs can contribute to the livelihood of hunting, but their maintenance as domestic animals is costly.
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In the forest, dogs are more likely to have access to meat by participating in hunting, but in thevillages, they are more likely to be fed cooked farm products. Combining this with the general good
health of dogs in the study area, the position of dogs, at least in the study area of Ndongo village, must
be considered within the context of the changing livelihoods of the Baka, who are undertaking a greater
proportion of farming and wage labour in the settlements (Oishi 2016). What do the numbers and healthstatus of dogs owned by hunter-gatherers tell us about their relationship with their human hosts? This
question can be addressed by examining dogs in settlements and camps of different socioeconomic status.
4.2. Examining conservation in a multispecies world
In the eastern region of Cameroon, the conflict between conservation and human rights protection has
become acute following the partial militarisation of conservation enforcement (for example, see the 5January 2017 The Guardian article (Barkham 2017) and WWF Cameroon’s statement on 21 December
2016 (WWF 2016)). The debate between indigenous rights and nature conservation, both rooted inmodern Western dualism, has become a sterile proxy war.
At the same time, there is growing recognition of the Western dualistic view of humans and naturethat should be reconsidered. For example, multispecies ethnography aims to reconsider human-animal(plant) relations beyond dichotomous approaches to nature and culture (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010).
Increasing attention is being paid to understanding shared, or mutual, ecologies between species,
including humans, involving different disciplines, including both biological sciences and ethnography(Remis and Hardin 2009). All these emphasise the relational nature of human-engaged biodiversity andthe interrelatedness between species.
As this case study on the Baka and dogs demonstrates, nature conservation has a major impact not
only on human life, but also on the other species with which human populations interact. Spatial
restrictions on local people, including the Baka, and species-specific hunting regulations are thecornerstones of current conservation policy, but these measures fail to consider the interconnectedness
among people, plants, and animals. These inter- and intra-species relations, ‘multispecies assemblages’(Aisher et al. 2016), involve more than just material exchange. Such complex consequences should be
explored and considered when applying conservation policies. As Remis and Robinson (2020) suggested,field anthropologists working with local populations who interact closely with their natural environment
may contribute by exploring collaboration across existing hierarchies of knowledge production abouthumans and nature.

Acknowledgements
This study was conducted under research authorisation by the Cameroon Ministry of Scientific Research― 221 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

and Innovation (MINRESI). This study was supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
Grants-in-Aid (KAKENHI Nos. 26870297, 26284138, 17H06342, 18H03439). Mr. Moïse Mvetumbo(Graduate student, University of Yaounde 1) partially participated in the fieldwork and supported theauthor’s activities at the research site. I thank the Baka and Bakwele informants who cooperated withthe data collection about their dogs.

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Aboriginal History 23: 83-106.
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Implications of Transboundary Natural Resource Management: Analysis of
the Cover Change of Mangroves and Surrounding Inland Atlantic Forestsin the Bakassi Peninsula of Cameroon

Evariste Fongnzossie ab and Ngendoh Zedekiah caAdvanced Teacher’s Training College for Technical Education, University of Douala, CameroonbcAfrican Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, JapanPINESMAP-BPCE Project on Participative Integrated Ecosystems Service Management Plan for

Bakassi Post Conflict Ecosystems, Ministry of Environment, Protection of Nature and Sustainable
Development, Cameroon

Abstract
The Bakassi Peninsula has experienced a twenty-five-year-long border dispute between Cameroon and
Nigeria since the 1980s, a crisis that has affected its environment and natural resource assets. Currently,
it is threatened by deforestation and degradation; however, information on the magnitude and pace of
this degradation is lacking. This study assessed land cover dynamics over the past decades using semistructured interviews and remote sensing analysis. The main drivers of deforestation and forest
degradation were identified, and the implications for transboundary natural resource management in thisarea were ascertained. The annual mangrove deforestation rate was 0.40% (an annual loss of 1014.5 ha),which is twice the global average. The main drivers of forest degradation in the area include population
structure and attitude towards mangrove conservation, abusive and illegal wood exploitation, mining
activities, commercial farming, poor natural resource governance, post-conflict peacebuilding andreconstruction efforts, insufficient financial and human resources, and poor collaboration between the
Nigerian and Cameroonian governments in addressing transboundary issues concerning natural resource
management. The situation is exacerbated by the ongoing ‘Anglophone crisis’, which has put all regional
efforts towards sustainable development in jeopardy. The authors advocate for strong political will andconcrete on-the-ground activities.

Keywords: Bakassi peninsula, Cameroon, conflict, mangrove, land cover dynamics, transboundary
natural resource management― 227 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

1. Introduction
The Bakassi Peninsula is located at the extreme western end of the Gulf of Guinea and spans latitudes
4°25'–5°10' N and longitudes 8°20'–9°08' E. It is watered by the mouths of the Akwayafe, Ndian, Lokete,and Meme rivers, which together form the Rio del Rey estuary.
The region is a biodiversity hotspot of global significance and supports a high diversity of animaland plant species present in large numbers within restricted ranges, many of which are threatened. Of
the 28,946 water birds of 59 species found in the Cameroon Coastal Wetlands, 23,353 (80%) birds of
29 species are found in Rio del Rey, making it the richest site (Ajonina 2008). The area harbours
mangrove and coastal forest ecosystems. The mangrove forest ecosystem in Cameroon covers 200,000
ha, representing 30% of the total coastal area. These forests are the most important in Central Africa andthe 6th most important in Africa (UNEP 2007, Ajonina 2008). Rio del Rey accounts for 100,000 ha ofthe 200,000 ha. According to current taxonomic knowledge, seven species constitute the floristic
composition of the Rio del Rey mangrove ecosystem. These include Rhizophora racemosa, Rhizophora
harrisonii, Rhizophora mangle (Rhizophoraceae), Avicennia germinans (Avicenniaceae), Laguncularia
racemosa, Conocarpus erecrus (Combretaceae), and the exotic palm Nypa fructicans (Arecaceae). The
ecosystem is recognised as an important reproduction area and hiding environment for both migratory
and resident birds. Seventy species of birds visit the mangroves and coastal zones (Ajonina et al. 2003).
Starting in 1993, Bakassi experienced a twenty-five-year-long border dispute between Cameroon
and Nigeria, a crisis with its roots fundamentally in an ill-defined border following colonisation, and thediscovery of possibility of oil exploitation in the region (Baye 2010). Lessons learned from the vast
majority of armed conflicts that occurred in the last sixty years in developing countries show that postconflict societies are likely to suffer from serious environmental problems including destruction of
infrastructure, decrease in forest area, lack of effective laws and policies, and loss of human andtechnical resources (Miyazawa 2013, Bruch et al. 2012). The past three decades have seen thedestruction and overuse of mangrove wetlands and forests in the Bakassi Peninsula (Din et al. 2008).
Unfortunately, information regarding the magnitude and pace of this degradation is lacking. In this study,
we aimed to assess the land cover dynamics in the peninsula over the last decades in order to improve
our understanding of the extent of mangrove forest degradation, discuss the main drivers of forest
degradation, and ascertain implications for transboundary natural resource management in the area.
2. Study site
2.1. Biophysical context
The Rio del Rey estuary is located in the southwest region of Cameroon, downstream of the forest areasof the Cross River, Korup, and Takamanda. The Bakassi Peninsula is composed of five main islands(Isangele, Kombo Abedimo, Idabato, Bamuso, and Kombo Itindi). The peninsula is bordered to the west
― 228 ―

Implications of Transboundary Natural Resource Managementby the Akwa Yafe river, to the east by the Bamusso subdivision, and to the south by the Atlantic Ocean.
The peninsula is crossed by a network of creeks and streams of varying size and navigability.
Transportation on the peninsula occurs mainly through the sea.
The total area of the peninsula and its surroundings is approximately 3,400 km². The naturalvegetation of this area was classified by Letouzey (1968) as Atlantic biafran forests. Thomas (1996)
modified this classification and described the coastal forest of southern Korup and the southwestern partof Mount Cameroon as Oubanguia alata forest, a vegetation type dominated by this species where theannual rainfall exceeds 4,000 mm. This vegetation consists of three main types of ecosystems:
mangroves, swamp forests, and Atlantic forests, which form the Korup rainforests. This site is unique
because it is rich in biodiversity and represents the centre of floristic endemism.

Figure 1. Location of mangroves in Cameroon showing the Rio Del Rey mangroves (Ajonina et al.
2013)
This area has an equatorial climate consisting of two main seasons: dry and wet. The dry season isusually very short and runs from November to February, whereas the wet season is long and is between
March and October. The mean monthly temperature ranges from 23–30 °C (Akoachere et al. 2019).
2.2. Population
The population census conducted as part of the framework for the elaboration of council development― 229 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

plans revealed that Bamuso and Idabato are the most populated councils of the peninsula (Table 1).
Table 1. Population size of Bakassi Peninsula
CouncilIdabatoIsangele
Kombo Abedimo
Kombo Itindi
BamusoTotal

Population size
42,680
3,476
5,160
4,782
95, 674
151,772

Source: Council development plans (PNDP 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d; 2011e).
The main activities of the population are fishing, agriculture, fish smoking, and trade of wood andnon-wood forest products. The main markets are the neighbouring Nigerian towns, Ekondo Titi, and, tosome extent, Mundemba in Cameroon.
2.3. Historical and geopolitical background on Bakassi peninsula
The Bakassi Peninsula is geographically located in the Gulf of Guinea and is an oil hotspot of global
significance. In past decades, the peninsula was the theatre of an armed conflict between Cameroon and
Nigeria. According to de Konings and Mbaga (2007), the genesis of this conflict is often traced back to
the First World War when the so-called German protectorate, Kamerun was shared between Englandand France in 1916 after the withdrawal of Germany. Bakassi became a part of the British-ruled
Southern Cameroons attached to the eastern provinces of Nigeria until 1954. Southern Cameroons thenobtained limited autonomy and, finally, full regional status in 1958 (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997).
However, contrary to all expectations, upon independence in 1961, 70% of the population of southern
Cameroon voted to be attached to French-speaking Cameroon, rather than being integrated into Nigeria.
This referendum made it complex to administer the position of Bakassi. Its population considered itself
Nigerian, and the Nigerian authorities exercised effective control since the 1930s, but the territory
suddenly became a part of Cameroon officially.
Aware of the successful exploration for petroleum in the Niger Delta, the former President of
Cameroon, His Excellency Ahmadou Ahidjo, asked Nigeria to recognise Cameroon's sovereignty overBakassi in 1964, but the Nigerian civil war (1967–1970) and the oil crisis of the Niger Delta suspended
negotiations. Ahmadou Ahidjo was quite supportive of Nigeria during this war with the Biafra
separatists. At the end of the war, he kept trying to convince Nigeria for a boundary demarcation thatwould place the Bakassi Peninsula firmly on the side of Cameroon. The Yaounde II declaration
established a joint boundary commission in 1971 and a maritime border was delineated between
Cameroon and Nigeria in 1975 (Ogunnoiki 2020).

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Implications of Transboundary Natural Resource Management

Oil revenues reached the historic record in 1981, and with the discovery of large oil reserves, thesituation in Bakassi became challenging. A clash between Nigerian and Cameroonian armed forces overthe Bakassi Peninsula led to a military confrontation; however, the situation remained stable until theearly 1990s when Cameroon tried to take control of the region. In 1993, Nigerian troops occupied the
Bakassi Peninsula, and serious incidents of border incursions provoked shooting and deaths on both the
Nigerian and Cameroonian sides. In 1994, Cameroon submitted the border-related dispute with Nigeria
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for adjudication. After examining the case for over eight years,
the ICJ delivered a judgment on 10 October 2002 deciding in part that sovereignty over the peninsulalies with Cameroon. Following intensive diplomatic activities, on 12 June 2006 an agreement called the“Green Tree Accord” was signed between Cameroon and Nigeria, under the mediation of the United
Nations. On 11 August 2006 the first phase of Nigerian demilitarisation was conducted, and on 14
August 2008 Bakassi was formally transferred to the Cameroonian government.
According to Kimengsi and Lambi (2015), the Bakassi Peninsula exhibits all aspects of a natural
resource controversy, and rigorous government intervention is required to reverse the paradox.
3. Research methods
The method used in this research comprised semi-structured interviews with relevant government
agencies, NGOs, and household members; and remote sensing analysis.
3.1. Stakeholder interviews
We requested interviews with local government representatives from the Ministry of Forestry andWildlife; Ministry of Environment, Protection of Nature and Sustainable Development; and Ministry of
Economy, Planning, and Regional Development. Stakeholder perspectives were gained by discussing
topics related to mangrove conservation in the area, including the main drivers of mangrove degradation,
current initiatives to mitigate negative effects, and the perceived future of mangrove forests.
Interviews with household members in fishing camps in the study area were designed to obtain
qualitative and quantitative information on the extractive activities carried out by the resident populationin mangrove forests, the main threats faced by mangroves, and perceptions of mangrove conservation
policies.
3.2. Remote sensing analysis
The annual evolution of forest degradation in the peninsula was mapped between 1973 and 2018 basedon historical Landsat imagery. Digital image processing (remote sensing, GIS) and statistical tools wereused for image classification and determination of the annual mangrove deforestation rate. The annual
net deforestation rate was calculated according to the FAO (1995) formula:― 231 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

Q = (A2 / A1) (1 / (t2-t1) - 1
where Q = Annual rate of deforestation (% per year), A = forest area at time t, and t2-t1 = time interval
between the observation dates of the clearings (in years).
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Mangrove cover change
The state of mangroves (extent and condition) generally declined across the peninsula, however, withsignificant variation depending on the location (Figures 2 and 3).
Remote sensing analysis revealed that approximately 33,350.8 ha of mangroves were lost between
1974 and 2018, representing 21.5 % of the total mangroves in 1974. This corresponds to an annual loss
of 0.48 %. According to the results, the annual mangrove deforestation rate was lower during the period
1974–2000 (0.3 %).
The total surface area of natural vegetation stands (Atlantic Forest and mangrove) decreased from250,195.83 ha in 1973 to 204,540.02 ha in 2018, equivalent to an annual deforestation rate of 0.40 %,representing an annual loss of 1014.5 ha (Table 2).
Table 2. Evolution of surface area of different land use types and net change value in 45 years
Land use type
Built environment andempty lands
Atlantic forest
Degraded mangrove
Intact mangrove
Hydrography
Agricultural fields
Total

Surface
Surface
Surfacearea
in areain area
in
1973
2000
2018
2,984.8
3,846.3
4,522.6
94,794.3 90,271.7 82,489.3
12,712.2 25,308.7 32,760.7
142,689.2 118,138.8 89,289.9
85,803.2 87,809.6 87,346.3
8,763.6 18,253.8 28,494.7
347,747.5 343,629.0 343,666.2

Net change

Net annual change

[ha]

[%]

[ha]

1,537.8

51.5

[%]

34.2

1.1

-1,2305.0 -13.0-273.420,048.5 157.7
445.5-53,399.3 -37.4 -1,186.7
1,543.1
1.8
34.3
325.1 633.2
7.2

-0.3
3.5
-0.8
0.04
28,494.7

Overall, there were significant changes in the trend of land cover change in agricultural fields (mainly
dominated by vast plantations owned by agroindustries), mangroves, and Atlantic forests (Figures 2 and
3). Between 1974 and 2000, corresponding to the border crisis period in the landscape, there weresignificant positive changes in hydrography, agricultural fields, and degraded mangroves. This change
was negative for the intact mangroves and Atlantic forests. Intact mangrove is the land use category thatexperienced the highest cover change across the peninsula.

― 232 ―

Implications of Transboundary Natural Resource Management

Oercentage change of cover area

8.00

Trends from 1973 to 2000

Trends from 2000 to 2018

6.00

5.53

4.00

3.71

3.91
2.79

2.00
0.88
0.26
0.00

0.20
-0.14
-0.99

-2.00
-2.27
-4.00

-6.00
-6.65
-7.23

-8.00

Figure 2. Percentage change in land use in the Bakassi Peninsula between 1973 and 2018

― 233 ―

― 234 ―Figure 3. Mangrove cover change in the Bakassi Peninsula

2000

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

1974

Implications of Transboundary Natural Resource Management

The results show that the net annual change in intact mangroves in the Bakassi Peninsula is far above
the global average. Recent reports indicate a global average annual loss rate of 0.21% from 1996 to 2016
(IUCN 2016), corresponding to a global total loss of 9,736 km2 during this period. This number is higher
than the average tropical and subtropical forest losses (Keenan et al. 2015), but lower than that of othermangroves in Cameroon, where a deforestation rate of 1.04% has been reported, especially in the
Cameroon Estuary (Ajonina et al. 2013).
4.2. Main drivers of land cover change
4.2.1. Population structure
Population growth is the primary contributor to mangrove deforestation worldwide. Although Bakassi
has experienced a significant reduction in population as a result of a security crisis and population
migration during the last decades, anthropogenic pressure on mangrove stands remains significant due
to extractive industries and high market demand for fish products and mangrove wood in neighbouring
Nigerian cities. In the mangrove resource exploitation sector, the overexploitation of natural resources
is exacerbated by the high dominance of foreigners (field interviews revealed that approximately 90%
of Bakassi residents are Nigerians), majority of whom are reluctant to comply with Cameroon laws.
With limited law enforcement, management plans for natural resources are virtually ineffective in
general.
This predominance of Nigerian nationals indicates that many Nigerian-origin inhabitants of thepeninsula opted to stay after the Green Tree Agreement. Nyuymengka Ngalim (2019) hypothesised thatsome intervening variables might have influenced the choice of these inhabitants to remain rather than
relocate from the Peninsula. Some of these variables include Cameroonian nationality, indefinite stayon the Peninsula (by implication, level of disarticulation and disconnection from Nigeria), access towork, and uncertainty of resettlement, among others.
4.2.2. Abusive mangrove wood exploitation
Bakassi is currently under high pressure from increasing anthropogenic activities, especially fuelwood
collection, illegal logging for sawn timber, bush clearing for periwinkle harvesting, and construction ofhouses (Figure 4).
From a survey conducted in fishermen camps, the total annual fish landing on the peninsula wasestimated to be 109,440 tonnes. Considering that an average of 0.165 m3 of wood is required to dry 30
kg of fish (ENSET-CAMECO 2020), a total of 547,420 m3 of wood is harvested annually.
In general, fish smoking is artisanal. Artisanal fish dryers consume large amounts of wood. Intense
deforestation in the Bakassi area began with the Bakassi dispute and heightened when the peninsula washanded over to Cameroon. Exploiters with no permits infiltrated the peninsula and cut down the trees.
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

The total annual flow of mangrove wood from Bakassi to Nigeria is estimated to be 60,000 m3 (CAFER
2015). This resulted in an average total annual wood extraction of 607,420 m3.

Figure 4. Deforestation activities in Kombo Itindi: A= Mangrove wood cuts for fish drying, B=
Mangrove wood cut for construction, C= Area of recent wood cutting, and D= Old degraded area now
colonized by the invasive Nypa palm
Healthy mangroves are a prerequisite for all aspects of coastal protection (Mazda et al. 1997).
Conversely, pollution, subsidence (owing to deep groundwater/oil extraction or oxidation upon
conversion), and unsustainable use jeopardise mangrove sustainability.
Among the coastal areas of Cameroon, Bakassi is reported to be among the most vulnerable to sea
level rise because of its lower elevation, ranging from 3–10 m (Figure 10). People who live in lowelevation coastal zones less than 10 m above sea level have been described as being at significant risk
to the effects of sea level rise (McGranahan et al. 2007).
Exploring the coastal areas of Cameroon, Fonteh et al. (2009) indicated that 112 km² and 1,216 km²of the coastal area will be lost from 2 m and 10 m sea level rise, equivalent to a low scenario by 2050
and high scenario by 2100, respectively. Approximately, 0.3% and 6.3 % of ecosystems could be at riskof flooding by 2050 and 2100, respectively.
4.2.3. Mining activities and commercial farming
Six mining companies are actively exploring oil in the peninsula: ADDAX Petroleum, DANA
Petroleum, GLENCORE, KOSMOS, NEW AGE Petroleum, and PERENCO. Therefore, the Bakassi― 236 ―

Implications of Transboundary Natural Resource Management

area is prone to oil spills, either from oil exploitation in Cameroonian territory or Nigerian territory(Figure 5). In addition, there are approximately 606 oil fields in the Niger Delta, of which 360 are onshore and 246 offshore. Reports indicate that between 1997 and 2001, Nigeria recorded a total of 2,097
oil spill incidents that caused severe damage to the coastal environment (Oseni 2017). Masumbe (2018)
raised concerns about community lands being eroded by the activities of multinational oil companies,
making the traditional occupations of the inhabitants, such as fishing and farming, no longer viable.
The Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) and palm oil company PAMOL are the two main
agroindustries in the area. Their estate extends and encroaches on mangrove ecosystems (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Mining permits and agroindustry estates in the mangrove-dominated area of Bakassi
4.3. Environmental geopolitics of the Bakassi Peninsula: rethinking transboundary natural
resource management
In coastal areas, mangroves play a key role as essential habitats for several migratory animal species; asnursery grounds for many commercially important fish and shellfish species; and in providing important
indirect services such as coastal tourism, coastal water quality, and shoreline stability.
The value of Cameroon’s littoral mangrove resources was estimated to be approximately USD
383,482.662/ha/year. Aware of its great potential, the mangrove-dominated estuary of Rio del Rey was
identified in the forestry Zoning Plan as in need of protection and was recommended to be demarcatedas a wildlife sanctuary in 2003 and later as the proposed Ndongore marine protected area in 2005.
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However, the development in the formalisation of the gazettement of this protected area is hampered,as the Bakassi crisis did not allow any fieldwork in the area during the past decades.
The Cameroon government has recently developed a national master plan for the sustainable
management of mangrove ecosystems and has received funding from the Global Environment Facilityof UN-Environment to implement a project on ‘Participative Integrated Ecosystems Service
Management Plan for Bakassi Post Conflict Ecosystem (PINESMAP-BPCE)’. This project is expected
to contribute towards improving efficiency in the management of protected area systems; integrating
biodiversity conservation in various land-use options, including agriculture, mining, forestry, andproduction; and promoting an integrated approach to management at the landscape level through thedevelopment and implementation of an interactive land use plan. This project is also expected to help
develop and strengthen a supportive policy in the environment and knowledge creation for the
implementation of an interactive land use plan and to manage changes in ecosystems that could result
from immediate and ultimate causes.
By decree n⁰2017/8819/PM on 21 August 2017 (Republic of Cameroon, 2017), the Cameroon
Government also launched the Bakassi Peninsula Development Programme, whose main missions were,among others, facilitating access to the area by land and sea, establishment of a permanent security
system and administrative supervision of the populations, development of the fishery sector, andprovision of basic socio-economic facilities (reliable water supply, electricity, fishing infrastructure,
health infrastructures, schools, and telecommunication system).
Significant achievements have been made thus far. However, as argued by Roca et al. (1996),
conservation efforts in areas like Bakassi need to transcend geopolitical boundaries to protect entire
landscapes and ecosystems. In this context, the Bakassi Peninsula is part of the Korup-Cross River transboundary landscape, a continuous moist forest block which extends from the southeastern edge ofNigeria to southwestern Cameroon. The area contains the Cross River National Park in Nigeria (3,640
km²) created in 1991, the Korup National Park in Cameroon (1,260 km²) created in 1986, and the
Takamanda National Park (696 km2), recently created on the Cameroon side of the block. This forest
block, totalling approximately 5,000 km2, represents more than 50% of Nigeria's remaining tropical highforest and is considered one of Africa's most important biotic reserves (Schoneveld 2013). It is renowned
for its emblematic and highly endemic species. It is home to primates, such as the critically endangered
Cross River gorilla and Nigeria-Cameroon chimpanzee, as well as the forest elephant.
The findings from other cross-border initiatives in Africa show that operational trans-boundary forest
management initiatives in West and Central Africa are associated with different types of managementagreements, ranging from informal and unwritten local conventions to low-level collaborationagreements, such as between the national park administrations of trans-boundary conservation areas,and high-level bilateral agreements where heads of state meet to agree on management orientations― 238 ―

Implications of Transboundary Natural Resource Management(MPRU-KWS 2015, Ngandje 2018).
Unfortunately, cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria to fight against the illegal exploitationof cross-border natural resources remains poor. By the facilitation of the Wildlife Conservation Society(WCS), workshops to strengthen transboundary conservation between Cameroon and Nigeria wereorganised, the most recent held in November 2013 in Calabar, Nigeria (Fongnzossie et al. 2014). The
major orientations for this cross-border collaboration, which unfortunately do not specifically integrate
the mangrove problem, remain at the stage of good intentions and are based on five main pillars: (1)protection and law enforcement; (2) research and monitoring; (3) community-based conservation,
livelihoods, and conservation education; (4) the creation of a cross-border conservation trust fund; and(5) sustainable cross-border trade in timber and non-timber forest products. Landscape level meetings
were held in 2016 on the possibility of instituting a trans-boundary landscape. The WCS recently
reinforced its commitment to support the development of a transboundary conservation agreement
between the Cameroonian and Nigerian authorities.
However, there have been no further developments, as the current Anglophone crisis (Agwanda etal. 2020) has hampered all efforts in this direction. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the Korup– Cross River trans-boundary landscape could play a critical role in ensuring the sustainable utilisationof mangrove resources. The legal formulation of such a collaboration will require strong political willin both countries and input by a multidisciplinary expert team experienced in national legal regimes andinternational law, as well as in peacebuilding approaches in post-conflict societies.
5. Conclusion
This study found that natural vegetation stands (Atlantic forest and mangrove) in the Bakassi Peninsula
decreased from 250,195.83 ha in 1974 to 204,540.02 ha in 2018, equivalent to an annual deforestation
rate of 0.4 % per year, representing an annual loss of 1,014.5 ha. This rate, although lower than that inother tropical forest stands, is, however, twice the global average rate of mangrove deforestation. The
study pointed out the following as the main drivers of forest degradation in the area: population structure
and attitude towards mangrove conservation, abusive and illegal mangrove wood exploitation, mining
activities, commercial farming, weaknesses in natural resource governance, post-conflict peace building
and reconstruction efforts, insufficient financial resources and staff, and poor collaboration between the
Nigerian and Cameroonian governments in addressing transboundary issues in natural resource
management. This situation is exacerbated by the ongoing Anglophone crisis, which jeopardises all
efforts towards sustainable development in the area. Strong political will and concrete on-the-ground
activities are needed to address all the highlighted issues.

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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

Acknowledgements
The authors express their gratitude to the Regional and Divisional Delegations of Mudemba of the
Ministry of Environment, Protection of Nature and Sustainable Development, the Regional Delegationof Ministry of Planning and Regional Development, the Forestry Chief of Post of Bamuso, the Council
Development Officers of the five councils of Bakassi, particularly Mr. Patrick Okenye of Bamuso
Council, Mr. Jonas KEMAJOU SYAPZE, Director of the Organisation for Environment and Sustainable
Development, and all people of the study villages for their cooperation and assistance during this study.

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Affective Healing:
Pentecostal Charismatic Churches and Religious Plurality in Benin

Ran Muratsu
African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan

Abstract
The growing popularity of Pentecostal Charismatic Churches (PCCs) in Africa has often been analysedin terms of their characteristics of rupture with traditional religions and kinship, rather than tolerance
for other religions, and has been widely discussed in relation to contemporary economic and political
dynamics. However, their healing practices, which have opened spaces for religious plurality, have notreceived sufficient analytical attention despite becoming people’s immediate motivation to join the
PCCs. PCCs’ practices are characterised by strong bodily engagement and affectivity. Drawing on
empirical cases from Benin, this paper aims to understand the popularity of PCCs and religious plurality
from the perspective of healing and affectivity. First, I will explore the healing itineraries of PCCs’
followers in Southern Benin to shed light on their complexity and the role of affects. Second, I will focus
on how healing efficacy is felt through PCCs’ religious practices and clarify their material and affective
characteristics. Through this analysis, I will discuss how affective healing practices found in PCCs haveinfluenced their growth, as well as the religious plurality of contemporary Africa.

Keywords: Pentecostal Charismatic Churches, religious pluralism, healing, affect, Benin― 245 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

1. Introduction
Since the 1970s, many African countries have witnessed the growth of Pentecostal Charismatic
Churches (PCCs). The social, economic, and political aspects of PCCs in Africa have been widely
discussed in terms of their relationship to modernity (Meyer 1999, Corten and Marshall-Fratani 2001,
van Dijk 2001, Blunt 2004), in connection with globalisation and neo-liberalisation (Comaroff andComaroff 2001) and with regards to their public and political role (Gifford 1998).
With respect to the practical features of PCCs, Piot (2010: 68-69) argues that ‘affect’ is an important
term to analyse. According to him, PCCs in West Africa generate intensities and affects 1, such as joy,confidence, empowerment, optimism, and hope. Such affects are generated not only through theemotional words of the pastor’s sermon but also through praying and singing. PCC’s practice can beconsidered as ‘affective practice’, which is ‘a figuration where body possibilities and routines become
recruited or entangled together with meaning making and with other social and material figurations’(Wetherell 2012: 19); however, compared to the economic and political aspects, the affective aspects of
the PCCs in Africa are not well documented.
Another feature of the PCCs is their claim of ‘rupture’ from tradition. The demonisation of otherchurches and religions, especially indigenous religions and African Independent Churches (AICs), is acommon tendency in most PCCs in Africa (Kalu 2008: 66), and many PCCs refuse indigenous religions,which largely relate to kinship as well as the obligation of the larger family. PCCs suggest breaking withkin, neighbours, and ancestors. Although these attempts do not always achieve their goal (Meyer 1999:
211-212), research has tended to highlight the PCCs’ aggression toward relational rupture,individualisation, and distancing from traditional religions. This aggression, which stems fromdemonising people outside their denominations, has led to physical conflicts (Smith 2001), and thebroadcasting culture of PCCs tend to introduce intolerant attitudes toward other religions into the publicsphere (Hackett 2012). Thus, in terms of religious plurality, which is generally ‘characterised byhumility regarding the level of truth and effectiveness of one’s own religion, as well as which
particularly goals of respectful dialogue and mutual understanding with other traditions’ (Norton n.d.),
PCCs in Africa could be generally considered as a force that opposed, rather than encouraged.
However, Janson (2021) suggests that instead of the conceptional level, it is necessary to focus on
the religious practices, which are characterised by ambivalence and contradiction, to understand thereligious plurality in Africa. Healing is an important religious practice of PCCs; it is reported that in
Latin American, Asian, and African countries where PCCs grew rapidly, as many as 80–90% of firstgeneration Christians attribute their conversion primarily to having received divine healing for
Affect, a concept strongly inspired by Deleuze and Spinoza, is considered as intensities that pass from body tobody, in both humans and non-humans (Gregg and Seigworth 2010: 1). Thus, affect is something that goesbeyond the boundaries of individual subjectivities that coincide with enclosed bodies. It is not something simply
reducible to emotions, which are culturally categorized states, and it is inherently intertwined with practice.

1― 246 ―

Affective Healing: Pentecostal Charismatic Churches and Religious Plurality in Beninthemselves or a family member (Brown 2011: 3). In the context of Africa, Omenyo (2011) argues,
focusing on the example of PCCs in Ghana, that Africans adapted and modified missionary Christianity
along the lines of pneumatic and African traditional spiritualties that prioritise healing. It has also been
pointed out that the healing practices in PCCs are sometimes less expensive than traditional healing
practices, which has led the people to convert to the former (Pfeiffer 2006). Although healing practices
are not the only characteristic that defines PCCs in Africa (Gifford 2011), they are at least one of theimportant aspects that should be explored further to comprehend the reason for the rapid growth of PCCs
in contemporary Africa. However, although many studies mention the healing of PCCs, their actual
therapeutic itinerary, and the way in which people feel healing efficacy in a particular setting, has notbeen well documented. Therefore, this paper aims to explore the healing practices and affective
experiences of healing to clarify their actual itineraries and particularities, as well as the role of PCCs
in the context of religious plurality in Africa.
2. Research setting and methods
This paper relies on data and examples gathered through ethnographic fieldwork in Benin, which has
experienced a rapid expansion of PCCs since the 1980s. These churches include the denominational
Pentecostal church based in Europe and the United States of America, as well as churches locallyestablished under the influence of the Pentecostal-Charismatic movement. Benin is a relatively small
country in Africa in terms of population and surface, yet it is religiously dynamic, with the influence ofIslam, Christianity, and an indigenous religion called vodun in Fon 2. In southern Benin, where both theeconomic and political capitals are situated, there are strong Christian influences, including Methodist
and AICs such as the Celestial Church of Christ. However, the influence of the Roman Catholic Church
is most prevalent. Pentecostal-Charismatic movements have become increasingly visible, especially in
the South, and their rapid expansion has had a major impact on the country’s contemporary religious
landscape, particularly after its democratisation (Mayrarugue 2008).
This paper takes examples from the church called ‘La Très Sainte Église de Jésus-Christ, Mission de
Banamè’ (hereafter, the ‘Banamè Church’), which has rapidly gained popularity since its creation in2009. According to the Church, after the exorcism of a teenage girl called Parfaite by an exorcist of the
Roman Catholic Church called Matthias Vigan, the Holy Spirit came into the girl’s body and started to
speak as God 3. The Banamè Church claims that God descended to this world devastated by demons toeradicate all the demons and witches, and it has attracted many followers with this assertion 4. While the

The case studies examined in this article reflect the ethnic diversity of the Banamè Church such as Fon, Gun, andYoruba, the ethnicities common in southern Benin. As masses are held in Fon, which is the common language ofsouthern Benin, this article refers to terms in Fon.
3
The Holy Spirit and God tend to be considered indifferently in the Banamè Church.
4
The claimed nominal number is two million believers in 2014, according to the Banamè Church.
2― 247 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

Church’s claims about the founder as God make it different from other PCCs, its emphasis on fighting
against witches through deliverance practices is an element that is common to other PCCs.
The idea of ‘witch’ (azètɔ́), against which the Banamè Church strongly fights, is the same notion
shared and widely feared among the general population in Benin, regardless of their religion. A witch is
not considered to be an innate state of being but, rather, something that a person might unintentionallybecome as a result of having been given azě (witchcraft) by various means such as eating foods. The
presence of a witch is generally perceived, especially, through misfortunate events. Whether misfortunes
are caused by a supernatural power is conventionally determined by diviners called bokɔnɔ. When theroot of misfortune is determined to be witchcraft-related, rituals including sacrifices are typically carriedout at midnight.
3. Illness and healing itinerary
Healing is one of the most common motivations for converting to PCCs in Benin (De Surgy 2001), as
well as to the Banamè Church. I asked 62 followers of the Banamè Church the immediate reason forjoining it. Their reasons usually include several factors, but almost half of the followers mentioned
recovery from illnesses in their or close relatives’ cases as the main reason for conversion.
The symptoms, which were claimed to have improved, varied among followers. Some pointed outthat they suffered from affliction in certain body parts, such as the feet, waist, throat, abdomen, some ofthese simultaneously, or the whole body. Others reported problems with reproduction, including
repeated miscarriages. Descriptions of the pain level also varied: ‘like a snake crawling through thewhole body’, or ‘painful as if the body was stabbed’. In addition, people were experiencing varied
chronic pain, including pain in the lower back, or the abdomen.
This wide range of symptoms is related to the process by which they visited the Banamè Church fortreatment. Of those interviewed, 21 out of 26 told that they had been to hospitals before going to the
Banamè Church. In other words, as they were not cured by the medical treatment in the hospitals, theyjudged that these were not ‘simple diseases’ but ‘sent diseases’.
As in many places in West Africa, illnesses are classified into two categories: natural illness andprovoked illness. Among the Fon, on the one hand, there are ‘ordinary illnesses’ (azɔ̀n yàyá）or ‘white
illnesses’ (yovó sín azɔ̀n), which occur naturally without any intervention of bad intentions. On the other
hand, ‘sent illnesses’ (azɔ̀n sedo mɛ), ‘black illnesses’ (mewì sín azɔ̀n) or ‘witchcraft illnesses’ (azězɔ̀n)are provoked or triggered by transcendental powers such as spirits, witches, magic, or deities. In Benin,
hardly any case of illness is considered a priori as natural or provoked. The quality of illness isdetermined in the course of or after the therapeutic itinerary by observing whether the remedy waseffective.
It should be noted, however, that biomedical doctors’ decisions are not necessarily the final one, and― 248 ―

Affective Healing: Pentecostal Charismatic Churches and Religious Plurality in Beninthe Banamè Church was not necessarily the last step in the interviewees’ illness episodes and healing
processes. For example, Emilienne, a woman in her thirties who sold household goods from her home
in a middle-sized town called Allada, was a moderate follower of the Roman Catholic Church and rarely
went to the Church when I met her in 2013. Two years later, she became a follower of the Banamè
Church and claimed that she had healed there. However, when I met her again in 2017, she had becomea follower of another PCC. I asked her about her itinerary through religions which, at the time, coincidedwith her itinerary through healing practices. The description below is the beginning of her itinerary.
In 2014, Emilienne was returning to the town where she had moved from her husband’s
former village when she felt strange as if there were ‘ants crawling up her anus’. Then, herhead and throat started aching. She also started to spit a great quantity of white saliva andhad to run to the toilet as soon as she ate. She could not sit up and felt dizzy. She could not
sleep at night; her chest felt heavy, and she could not breathe well. She went with her
husband to the local health centre.
The doctor suspected that she had haemorrhoids, but as no abnormalities were found inher blood tests, he advised her to look for religious treatment. Thus, on the way home, thecouple went to a Catholic church and asked the priest to pray for her. However, it did notwork. A week later, her husband’s friend introduced them to a diviner (bokɔnɔ) in aneighbouring town, who performed a ritual for her. However, that didn’t work either, sothey went to a priest of Christian Celeste, an independent church in Benin, who worked
also as a diviner. The priest applied a potion to her muscles and she was able to move alittle. However, they could not continue because she could not afford it. She, then,continued to go to another diviner and another Christian Celeste Church; then, to a PCC.
After praying did not help in the PCC, they were told to go to a hospital for tests andwere referred to a doctor who was a member of the Church. A blood test showed that she
had typhoid fever. Then the doctor referred him to a hospital near the capital, but no bacteria
were found through examinations at that hospital. They were told that she should have an
x-ray done, so she went to the central hospital and did an x-ray; however, they could not
find anything wrong. She went back to the previous hospital to ask what she could do, butthey dismissed her, saying there was nothing they could do. On her way home, she went toChristian Celeste church and participated in a ritual service.
Her treatment continued for a long time; in the middle of it, she spent some time at the Banamè
Church. Emilienne’s condition improved; subsequently, she stayed there with her husband for about six
months. However, when her condition worsened again, they left the Banamè Church in search of other― 249 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

healing practices. She continued to visit many diviners, churches, and hospitals but was finally healed
in another PCC, of which she was a member when I interviewed her.
This is the common itinerary that many Beninese take when they are ill. People do not go only to
PCCs when they fall ill. In their therapeutic itinerary, patients try churches, including PCCs, AICs, andindigenous religions, as well as biomedicine. This practice, sometimes indicated as ‘healer shopping’(Kroeger 1983: 147), and given a rather negative connotation by studies, could be conversely understoodas an enactment of religious plurality between PCCs, AICs, and indigenous religions. In front of healing
efficacy, people tend to treat religions equally, despite the furious demonisation at a discursive level.
This case also indicates that the ‘healed’ state is a form of the process, rather than the final state. Justas ‘healed’ is fluid, ‘illness’ here is also fluid and does not remain fixed in one form or another. It wasconsidered as ‘haemorrhoid’, or ‘typhoid fever’ at times, but failed to stabilise its form. Meanwhile, the‘sent illness’ also did not stabilise, as Emilienne was told to go to the hospital by the religious healers.
The ‘sent illness’, as well as ‘natural illness’, emerged in a certain form through the entangled results of
examinations by and diagnoses of spiritual healers as well as medical workers. In the process, the‘therapy managing group’ (Janzen 1978: 4), which consists of family members, friends, andacquaintances, also influences the healing itinerary. However, the feelings of the afflicted person are
crucial for determining the illness. For example, it was the transformation of the sensation that madeEmilienne determine her affliction as ‘sent illness’ at the Banamè Church and it was again thetransformation of the sensation, the relapsing pain this time, which pushed her to seek others. The
healing itinerary is, thus, the bodily, affective way of knowing and coping with an uncertain situation.
4. Therapeutic particularity with the affect and materiality
The relationship between the body and healing efficacy in a religious setting was discussed in a seminal
study by Csordas (1994), which focused on the charismatics of North America. He describes the self as‘an indeterminate capacity to engage or become oriented in the world, characterised by effort andreflexivity’ and claims that ‘the locus of efficacy is not symptoms, psychiatric disorders, symbolic
meaning, or social relationships, but the self in which all of these are encompassed’ (ibid. 3). The
centrality of the self is the body, and he showed that the therapeutic process in ritual healing produces
an altered self in the transformation of somatic modes of attention, a capacity for orientation in the world(ibid. 67). In other words, those who are healed by PCCs may have altered their selves, or the somatic
mode of attention, through the latter’s practices; but, how so? Each PCC has different strategies andways of healing, but, to deeply understand the practice, I consider the specificity of healing practices in
the Banamè Church as an example.
According to its followers, many of them had received treatment in other religions before arriving at
the Banamè Church. Out of the 21 interviewees, 15 said that they arrived at the Banamè Church after― 250 ―

Affective Healing: Pentecostal Charismatic Churches and Religious Plurality in Benin

having tried treatment in other churches or by local healers. Table 1 shows the specific ways in whichthose who said that they were healed at the Banamè Church were perceived as meaningful in terms ofefficacy. Most respondents said that they had visited the holy city of Banamè and participated indeliverance rituals. Many also said that applying the oil, salt, and water sold in the Banamè Church had
a healing effect. The rest said that they prayed, met with Daagbo – the Holy Spirit in the body of Parfaite– in the Banamè Church, and listened to him.
Table 1. Practices mentioned for the healing efficacy
Mentioned causes of healings
Went to the holy hill of BanamèParticipated in the ritual of Deliverance
Applied sacred oil, salt or water
PrayedHad a meeting with God (Daagbo)
Heard a sermon of God (Daagbo)

Number
19
10
8
5
2
1

The holy hill of Banamè is the most mentioned factor. Banamè, where the Banamè Church was
created because it was where Parfaite was exorcised by the priest Mathias, is a secluded village that canbe reached from the city by driving on an unpaved road. The hill of Banamè is considered holy and tohave curative properties, especially when walking barefoot. Many devotees with illnesses move to livein the area around the hill for healing. When there are no meetings, the hill remains deserted compared
to when large meetings are held; however, there are usually 10 to 20 sick people staying on it for healing.
Banamè offers physical or bodily experiences to those who seek healing: moving from where they live,
climbing up the hill, walking barefoot, praying and living.
Deliverance is the second-most mentioned reason for healing. Deliverance Masses in the Banamè
Church are held as large congregations attended by thousands of people where prayers for Daagbo play
an important role. They may also be held during regular Mass in district churches where the laying onof hands by the priests plays a major role. On both occasions, the practices physically engage theaudience, for example, in singing, dancing, and shouting, and are largely affective. In the African context,
deliverance, the practice of casting out demons and evil spirits, is performed not only against biblicalevil entities but also against local divinities and spirits, notably witches (Gifford 2014, Onyinah 2002).
Liberation from those evils spiritual entities brings not only health but also prosperity, social success,and good human relationships. During deliverance, which, in many PCCs, coincides with exorcism
rituals, sometimes possessing entities, such as witches or other local spirits, manifest themselves throughthe possessed person (Meyer 1999, Newell 2007). The possessing demonic spirits embody the cause of
the misfortunes that afflict the person and, during the ritual, these spirits sometimes actually confess intheir own words how they possessed the person. Therefore, deliverance is a way of getting to know both

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the causes of misfortunes and countermeasures. In this sense, deliverance encompasses the traditionalroles of divination and rituals. The ways of knowing and coping with the spirits became more embodied
and affective through the PCCs’ practices.
Many objects for healing and protection against sorcery and witchcraft, including salt, oil, and water,which were particularly mentioned for their healing efficacy, are sold in Banamè churches. Salt andolive oil are also used in Roman Catholic churches, but those sold in Banamè churches are ‘blessed by
Daagbo’, according to their followers. Water, salt, and olive oil are not only drunk, sipped, and applied
to the body in times of illness but also used in a variety of ways in everyday life: sipped before goingout, dissolved in bathing water, used in washing the body, added to food, and placed in the corners of
the room to prevent witches from entering the house or evil spirits from entering the body. Thus, these
items make the followers physically and bodily engage in daily practices.
Therefore, the things mentioned for the healing efficacy were largely connected to the practices that
require bodily commitments. However, it is still necessary to clarify how they become integrated into
the healing itinerary of the people.
5. From physical disorder to suspicion of witchcraft
I will examine the healing itinerary of Odile, a woman who began with physical illness, experienced
possession, and, then, recovered in the Banamè Church. Her healing process has something in common
with the stories of many other followers, such as not being healed through biomedicine, the suspicionof witchcraft, dreams, photographs, and the holy hill. Therefore, by following her healing process, itwill be possible to shed light on the overall characteristics of the healing process in the Banamè Church.
Odile, a woman in her late 20s, lived near the economic capital with two children and herhusband, who worked at the university as a clerk. Odile said that her bodily disorders began
after her husband married another woman. Despite her status as the first wife, her husband
chose to live with the second wife, so Odile was obliged to rent a room in the same city.
At first, she felt a pain that she had never felt before in her feet as if the ‘bones werebeing eaten’. She visited a private hospital and started feeling better after medications wereprescribed. However, after a while, her chest began to hurt, so she went to another private
hospital and was diagnosed with typhoid fever. She took the prescribed medications, but
she began to feel sick, so she stopped taking them. After that, she had a headache described
as if ‘the head was about to fall and leave the neck’.
Her symptoms emerged one after another in different body parts; thus, she began tosuspect that her illness was a ‘sent illness’. She reached out to many churches for treatment,
but nothing helped. She did not go to the Banamè Church because of rumours claiming that― 252 ―

Affective Healing: Pentecostal Charismatic Churches and Religious Plurality in Benin

Parfaite, the girl who claims to be God, was Mami Wata (a water spirit). One day, herhusband took one of his second wife’s children to Odile’s place and ordered her to takecare of him for a week. The child did not behave at all: he defaecated in the room, climbed
a chair, and scattered clothes on the table. When Odile hit the child, she ‘felt as if I were
hitting a tree’ (a zìn nù dǒ atín ɖɔ́hùn). ‘He had witchcraft’, Odile said.
On the following day, Odile had a stomach ache and laid down after feeding her children.
She vomited, and her neighbour took her to the hospital. Later, Odile’s husband visited her.
When Odile woke up, her husband said that she had murmured ‘somebody, somebody,somebody’ (mɛlɛ mɛlɛ mɛlɛ) while she was sleeping.
This was a typical illness itinerary in Benin, which includes bodily symptoms, the involvement of
biomedicine, suspects of witch influence, and a dream that entangled to constitute a ‘sent illness’, wherea spirit intervenes. The starting point of the itinerary was the sense of pain that Odile had neverexperienced. The abnormality of the pain level, its repetition in other body parts, and the lack ofimprovement after medical treatment suggested some kind of ‘sent illness’, which implies that its cause
is external to one’s own body. Odile reiterated the unusual sensation from touching the second wife’schild, which can be seen as a consequence of an outward ‘somatic mode of attention’ (Csordas 1994:
67). Odile’s narrative shifted from her internal pain and biomedical treatment to the abnormalityof hitting the child, ‘like hitting a tree’, because her ‘somatic mode of attention’ was directed outward,
toward the body of a particular other. Therefore, she could feel the invisible witchcraft concretely, which
led her to assert that the child ‘had witchcraft’.
The recognition of the existence of witchcraft often emerges in concrete contacts andcorrespondences with the environment. According to my interviews, other typical examples in whichpeople perceive the presence of witchcraft involve encounters with whirling air on the street, the strange
behaviour of animals, such as hearing unusual wails of cats at night, or meeting people in dreams as
Odile implied. The commonality of such phenomena is that they move autonomously, and, unlike
ordinary unmoving things in the environment, they can approach the bodies of people in unpredictableways. This tangibility and abnormality allow such encounters to be structured as witchcraft. Throughthese experiences with these external agents, Odile’s somatic afflictions were connected to a particularperson in society.
6. Toward possession and healing
Up to this stage, ‘illness sent by a witch’ had emerged, but the element of healing efficacy was still
absent. It came through possession in Odile’s case. The occurrence of witch possession is not unusualin the Banamè Church, as well as in other PCCs in Benin, but it is not usual in the conventional― 253 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

understanding of witches in Benin. Odile also said that she had never heard of a witch possessing people
before, nor had she ever been possessed by anything before. How was she oriented toward witch
possession? To investigate the specificities of the Banamè Church and PCCs, I will analyse how
deliverance occurred in Odile’s case.
On the day of the deliverance, Odile stayed at her aunt’s house because she had a quarrel
with her husband. The aunt was a member of the Banamè Church and had gone to the Massthat day, so Odile was alone in the house with her children. She was suffering from pain
all over her body, so she had knelt and prayed to the picture of Daagbo hanging on the wall,
although Odile ‘did not believe in it’. Looking at the picture, she talked to it crying withanger: ‘If you are really God, why don’t you help me when I am struggling with such a
pain?’ Then, she sang a song to praise God to please him, because she thought that it would
make God feel like helping her.
When Odile was lying down, Father Erick from the Banamè Church went to see her,having known about her through her aunt. She was glad that the priest was going to prayfor her, as she was desperate for healing. After a short talk with the priest, he asked her if
she had the salt and olive oil of Daagbo, so Odile gave him her aunt’s stuff. The priest madeOdile kneel in front of him, anointed her forehead with olive oil, and made her lick the salt.
During the laying on of hands, she felt something leaving her body, and she lost
consciousness.
As the priest prayed, the kneeling Odile began to shake a little and fell completely on
the floor. She began to move like a snake, folded, and unfolded her upper and lower body.
Seeing the sign of possession through such bodily movements, the priest approached thefallen Odile, held her head, and called out to her. He began to question the spirit and, after
making sure it began to answer his call, he started an audio recording on his mobile phone,so that Odile could later hear it as evidence.
In the recording, he first asked who the spirit was, and it answered that it was Odile’s
co-spouse’s mother. He asked if she was a witch, and the spirit answered yes. Then, thewitch spirit started to confess that she was the one who made Odile ill for the benefit of her
own daughter. The spirit recounted in retrospective detail how she worked to break up
Odile and her husband’s relationship and how she made Odile ill and distressed. It also
confessed that she sent her grandson – the child in which Odile had sensed something
unusual – who was also a witch, to make Odile ill. The conversation between the alleged
spirit in Odile and the priest lasted nearly two and a half hours. The spirit’s voice sounded
muffled and low at first, hesitantly and passively responding to the priest’s questions, but― 254 ―

Affective Healing: Pentecostal Charismatic Churches and Religious Plurality in Beninover time it became more and more active.
On the day of the deliverance, Odile saw the ‘picture of Daagbo’ on display and talked to it whilecrying angrily; then, she prayed and sang for Daagbo. The photo stirred her feelings, and she carried out
the ritual practice as though she was in front of somebody, asking for grace. In this way, she had alreadybecome oriented toward the practice of Banamè before the priest came, although she said that she did
not believe in it. In the mood for a ritual with items such as salt and oil, and with the laying on off thehands of the priest, Odile fell down. However, falling itself does not condition the emergence of thewitch’s spirit. It was through communication with the priest Erick that the particular spirit, the ‘cospouse’s mother’, came out. It is Father Erick who, after Odile’s fall, created an assumed space in whichthat particular person could manifest herself by asking who the spirit was. Answering these questions,the subjectivity of the spirit emerged as a particular spirit form, a witch, and, more specifically, as themother of the co-spouse. In other words, the subjectivity of the spirit emerged as a ‘capture’ of
correspondences between the photograph of Daagbo, Odile’s affective response towards it, and Father
Erick’s words and postures (cf. De Antoni 2017: 12). Then, because it emerged, it was possible to bedelivered.
Possession is the ultimate bodily recruiting practice, which reorganises the experiences of the one
possessed and its surroundings, as in the case of Odile. Her affliction was explained by the spirits, andher understanding of the illness experiences changed and was reorganised after the possession. She
broke up with her husband and became a follower of the Banamè Church. She said that, after thepossession, her symptoms gradually improved, but, according to her, it was only after she reached thehill of Banamè that she was completely healed. This story of healing through possession is also typicalin other cultural settings.
The relationship between possession and illness is a well-discussed topic; for example, Lienhardt(1961), who discussed it by focusing on the relationship between the Dinka spirits or ‘power’ andhumans. Noting that there is no word to indicate the opposite of ‘actions’ in English, Lienhardt used theLatin word passiones to mean both passiveness and suffering. The spirit, or ‘power’, is the image andsource of human passivity. The diviner separates the image of passiones from the experience of thesufferer, either by possessing the diviner himself or by possessing the sufferer and his relatives throughspirits. By separating the subject-self from the object-image, the Dinka people create a desired form ofexperience.
The healing efficacy of possession was also discussed in Kapferer’s work on exorcism in Sri Lanka(Kapferer 1979). He analysed possession by relying on G. H. Mead’s theory of the self, in which theself is constituted in an inner dialogue between the ‘I’ as the subject and the ‘me’ as the object, drawn
from the social other through interaction. During possession, as in most cases, the individual loses― 255 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

consciousness, the ‘I’ becomes absent, leaving only ‘me’. The suffering caused by the devil is the denialor dissolution of the ‘self’ through the captivation of the ‘me’ by the devil. Exorcism is the ritualreconstruction of the ‘self’, and through these processes, the ritual achieves its primary goal, healing.
Therefore, Odile’s possession can be understood through the ritual separating her and the ‘witch’
which is the image of passions, and that made possible to reorganise her experience. Simultaneously, inthe confession of the witch during deliverance, Odile, the subject ‘She’, became ‘her’, the object. Odile
as ‘her’ was captivated by the witch, but, in the end, ‘her’ was released by the priest’s prayer. This
process can be understood as the reconstruction of a new ‘self’, letting Odile recover from her suffering.
Subsequently, looking at the case from the beginning, Odile was oriented towards possession by thepractices and materials of the Banamè Church, making her ‘possess-able’. Through thesetransformations of feeling, her illness was ultimately healed. Thus, the practices of the Banamè Church,
by bodily and affectively engaging Odile, oriented her toward a ‘healed’ state. Therefore, the affective
materials and practices, which entangle people, are the specificity of healing in the Banamè Church andthe possible source of the healing efficacy.
7. Conclusion
As stated above, ruptures with conventional religions and relationships, as well as intolerant aspects,
were usually highlighted by studies as features of PCCs in Africa. However, the reason for joining PCCs
is often related to their healing efficacy, and, as I showed, personal itineraries of therapy and healing
ensure religious plurality. This study explored therapeutic itineraries among PCCs and the particularities
in their healing practices, focusing especially on their affective quality.
Through analysing the cases, I clarify that ‘sent illness’, which indicates spirit intervention, was nota stable concept, but it emerged in the process of correspondence between bodily feelings, biomedical
practices, and religious healers. The suspicion of spirit intervention oriented the bodily attention towards
the outside, which facilitated entanglements with non-humans in the environment. Through theseencounters, the spirits became more concrete. In the case of Odile, this process occurred through bodily
contact with the child of the co-spouse. At that time, Odile encountered ritual practices in the Banamè
Church. Consequently, possession, the ultimate form of bodily engagement, occurred.
Certainly, there are specificities of the Banamè Church that elicited Odile’s possession and healing.
Healing in the Banamè Church occurred through relationships between physical things such as holy salt,oil, and photos, as well as through correspondences with environments through affective practices andtechniques such as climbing the holy hill in Banamè, or the laying on of hands. The Church sells goods,
which may look like mere commodification and consumerism. However, the cases suggest that theseobjects contribute to orient newcomers and believers toward the novel reality of the Banamè Church
bodily and affectively.
― 256 ―

Affective Healing: Pentecostal Charismatic Churches and Religious Plurality in BeninAs the case of Emilienne indicates, not only the Banamè Church but also other churches and religious
practices provide healing efficacy. Healing is central to the growth of PCCs in Africa, and most churches
have different ways of healing that emphasise different aspects. Odile was healed in the Banamè Church;
however, in the case of Emilienne, the symptoms only temporarily improved in the Banamè Church but
worsened afterwards, and healing eventually occurred in other PCCs. Thus, healing may occur as aresult of entanglements of bodies, symptoms, discourses, and things in the environment, but it is notalways achieved. Symptoms, personal histories, the timing of supplicants’ arrival at a certain healing
practice, and the bodily reactions during the practices are all different. The trajectories of supplicantsseeking healing point at the search for therapy that works for them. Therefore, trying many therapeutic
practices is a way to enhance the possibility of a cure.
The affective quality of PCCs may be related to these healing itineraries. As Piot (2010) argued,
PCCs generate affective experiences in the people, and this affective quality may recruit the sufferers
toward certain orientations, especially when their bodily feelings play an important role, and theirsomatic modes of attention are oriented outward. Affects have been described as something ‘sticky’,
which become attached to certain cultural or political products (Ahmed 2004), and I argue that affects
generated and elicited by practices of PCCs are particularly sticky to those who are seeking to heal.
These practices sometimes lead to radical bodily engagements, such as possession, which often open up
possibilities for healing. This suggests that the affective and bodily engaged practices of the PCCs
provide the opportunity to orient people towards being healed.
Therefore, even though PCCs tend to be discussed from an economic and political perspective andrupture is considered as one of their characteristics, a focus on healing practices can shed light on morepractical strategies employed by people. On the one hand, from a discursive perspective, the aggressive
attitude of PCCs towards other religions may sometimes cause conflict. On the other hand, PCCs allow
people to enhance the possibility of healing through itineraries that suggest practical attitudes toward
religious pluralism. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on PCCs as a whole, including their practices andthe healing itineraries that they allow and create, rather than exclusively discussing their discursive
aspects.

Acknowledgements
This research was financially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 17J10569 and the grant-inaid from Global Survivability Studies (GSS) at Kyoto University.

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Where Muslim Spirits Possess Christian Mediums:
The Hadra Meeting in Boset, Ethiopia

Yasuo Matsunami
Faculty of Sociology and Social Work, Meijigakuin University, Japan

Abstract
Christians are in the majority in the religious composition of Ethiopia, but the number of Muslims has
been increasing in recent years. Historically, Christianity (Ethiopian Orthodox) has been the majorreligion of the highlanders in the north, the political centre of the country. Islam has expanded mainly
among the Oromo, living in the lowlands. However, while this dichotomy illustrates the contrasting
situation from a broad perspective, religious practices, which are an integral part of people’s lives, arenot clearly divided into Islam and Christianity. For instance, many Christians participate in the hadra
meeting, originally derived from Islam, which is prevalent in the Oromo communities of the East Showaregion. They chant the name of Allah and praise Muslim saints during the ritual. This study focuses on
the religious complexity of the ritual and how it relates to ethnicity and local history.

Keywords: Christianity, Islam, spirit cults, Oromo, Ethiopia― 261 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 2 (2022)

1. Introduction
1.1. Possession cults
In a study, Boddy (1994: 407) defined spirit possession as follows: ‘spirit possession commonly refers
to the hold exerted over a human being by external spiritual forces or entities more powerful than she.
…possession is a broad term referring to an integration of spirit and matter, force or power and corporeal
reality, in a cosmos where the boundaries between an individual and her environment are acknowledged
to be permeable, flexibly drawn, or at least negotiable’.
Possession cults are widespread in Africa and zar is one of the better-known forms of spirit
possession found throughout the Horn of Africa. In the zar cult, a person, usually a woman, joins thecult when she is chosen by a zar spirit as a medium. This usually begins with the onset of illness, which
is diagnosed by a balä-zar, a person who has a formidable zar spirit. In the course of being possessed,
the initiate makes rapid movements which indicates the nature of the zar. The zar medium then performs
a traditional praise song in which a zar spirit reveals his name and demands. Unlike in other spirit
possession, zar spirits are not exorcised, rather a long-term relationship between the medium iscultivated. Once a member has been successfully initiated into the cult, she participates in groupmeetings (wädaǧa) while being possessed. On these occasions, she assumes the character, dress andbehaviour of her zar spirit.
While scholars generally agree that women are particularly prominent in the zar cult, there is noconsensus as to why it is so. Some suggest a bio-medical explanation of the initial onset of zar possession,
if not the cultural articulation of the cult, may be related to symptoms of malnutrition, particularly
calcium deficiency (Kehoe and Giletti 1991). They support this argument by studying the dietary
patterns of poor Ethiopians, particularly women and children. From this perspective, the feasting andfeeding of the zar are not merely metaphorical, but also a response to the physiological needs of their
devotees. Others tend to stress psychological factors such as stress, anxiety and highly structured
inequality in social relations. Messing (1957) compares the zar cult to group therapy and suggests thatthe afflicted person, whether a woman or a man benefits from participation in the cult by uplift his/her
status and receiving attention. Young (1975) emphasised the role of disease and cathartic hearing in thezar cult. Other scholars follow Lewis (1966), who encompasses shamanism and possession anddistinguishes between main or central morality cults and peripheral ones, such as zar. Viewing the zar
as an example of a deprivation cult, the religion of the oppressed in which weak members of society
who cannot legitimately demand better treatment allow their zar to extort gifts and better treatment on
their behalf. In response to Lewis’s deprivation theory, based on her research in Northern Sudan, Boddy(1989) extends the scope of possession to conclude that zar had a symbolic meaning beyond that. She
pointed out that the zar began to appear historically in Sudan in the 1820s and argued that it was related
to the Turkish and Egyptian invasions and occupations. She said that the zar symbolised resistance to― 262 ―

Where Muslim Spirits Possess Christian Mediums: the Hadra Meeting in Boset, Ethiopia

external forces and official Islamic penetration, as well as women’s resistance to men.
The fundamental apprehension of these studies has been characterised by reductive, naturalising, or
rationalising approaches. Studies constructed along the way were rendered in Western common sense
or natural scientific terms and they suspend contextualising the enquiry of those terms. Csordas (1987)
tracks the rationalising tendency by charting a progressive medicalisation of possession in AngloAmerican literature. He suggests that the religious, aesthetic and quotidian significances of possession
were repeatedly eschewed in deference to its function as group therapy, even when informants described
their experience as religious (Boddy 1994: 414).
There have been many studies on spirit possession, including zar. Particularly in rural African
societies, the practice of possession in Islamic societies has been discussed in terms of resistance,
deprivation, and symbolism, as mentioned above. This argument is accepted by most people, but it
leaves the unexplored aspects of the relationship between some religions, such as Christianity and Islam,and rituals regarding spirit possession, especially in the condition of the increasing diversification ofpeople's religious lives in many parts of rural society in today’s Africa.
This study regards the phenomenon as the daily experience in the local context and grasps it as themultiple refractions of religion, morality, and their social history.
1.2. Wuqabi cult in Ethiopia
Although the rituals and beliefs on the zar cult vary from place to place, they are often regarded as
variations on a continuum spectrum, rather than representing an independent form. The wuqabi cult,also a common possession cult in some areas in Ethiopia, rests on this spectrum.
Wuqabi is individual or family spirit that possesses a medium and treats other people through her.
The specialists who deal with these spirits are mostly mediums (balä-wuqabi) who appease themthrough sacrifice or gift. Similar to zar, the wuqabi spirits are a possible source of solving a wide variety
of problems in the extent and nature of some communities in Ethiopia. As problem-solvers, possessing
spirits may be viewed as benign, or at least potentially beneficial to the possessed person if he or shelearns how to appease and treat the spirit when they are possessed.
Wuqabi spirits are believed to exist in the abstract, sometimes expressed metaphorically as the skyor the wind. They are thought of as having dominion or power over the world and to be able to possess
or otherwise influence any human being, regardless of race, gender or religion. There are spirits formany different statuses and roles. Some are warriors, others are judges, rich farmers and priests.
Similarly, there are Christian and Muslim wuqabi, whose lifestyles are thought to resemble those of
their terrestrial counterparts. For instance, the wuqabi named Taqwal is well-known as a ChristianAmhara, while Adal is a rich Oromo judge and merchant (Morton 1973).

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The question of taming and training in the context of possession is multifaceted. It is not only aquestion of taming a wuqabi spirit, but also of the wuqabi taming the ‘horse’ which it ‘rides’, namely
the possessed person. The process of accommodating a possessing wuqabi, which is initiated when awuqabi first comes to possess a human being is designed to discipline both the ‘rider’ and the ‘mount’.
Wuqabi are spirits that generally protect human beings from evil spirits and build a long-time
relationship between a wuqabi spirit and the medium. The sacrifice of her/his wuqabi spirit is essential
for the relationship to protect her/him (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Relationship between a human being and a wuqabi
If the wuqabi spirit does not receive enough gifts, it becomes frustrated and the relationship with theperson deteriorates. Then, the protection becomes weak or is cancelled, and evil spirits can come closer
and attack the person. The result of the attacks can be visualised in any form of suffering in the person’s
real life, such as illness, infertility, poverty, a poor crop, animal disease and so on (Figure 2). In thisnarrative, any suffering is understood as the expression of the insufficiency or inadequateness of thegifts for the wuqabi. What the narrative offers is that any suffering can be solved by a good relationshipbetween the person and her/his wuqabi. This narrative opens the hope that the suffering could be
resolved without reducing it to the individual.

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Figure 2. Deterioration of relationship between a human being and a wuqabi
2. Hadra meeting
In this section, hadra meeting, seen in some societies in rural Ethiopia is described based on myfieldwork conducted to understand the religious life of the people in the Boset area in the Oromia region.
It was conducted over 13 non-contiguous months, from August 2007 to November, September 2008 to
February 2009, November 2009 to March 2010, December 2011 to March 2012, and February to March
2014. During the fieldwork, I conducted research using the Amharic language.
Kalani Ambäsay (d.2011), widely known as one of the eminent mediums in the Boset area, was bornto the priest family of an Ethiopian Orthodox Church in a village at the foot of Boset Mountain. When
young, Kalani became aware that she was a spirit medium in a dream. She left her father’s home andcame to Bori village following the instructions of the wuqabi.
The administrative officer around Boset was a Christian Amhara from Wällo in northeastern Ethiopia,
named Wäldä Gabriel, dispatched from Addis Abeba. With his permission, Kalani took up residence
on the outskirts of the village. When Wäldä Gabriel heard of Kalani’s reputation for powerful spiritualability, he attended Kalani’s meetings frequently to ask her to pray for him. The more her reputation
grew, the more those who admired her, including Wäldä Gabriel’s relatives, came to reside around her
dwelling. They built a hadra bet, a hut for the hadra meeting, in the centre of their dwellings.
People from places around Boset began to visit her to participate in the hadra meetings after hearing
about the reputation of the ritual. At its peak, the hadra hosted by Kalani was attended by nearly 100
people. The ritual space was separated from the residential space so spirits could come to the hadra bet.
Everyone who entered the ritual space had to be clean. Some taboo states, such as having attended afuneral, had sexual intercourse or menstruating, precluded entrance to the space.
The ritual was usually held from dusk until dawn. On the days of the meeting, Kalani’s relatives
prepared the necessities of the meeting, such as khat, coffee, sugar, frankincense resin and perfume.
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These items were shared by participants during rituals. While the rituals were held several times a week,
and the spirits which possessed Kalani varied depending on the day, every ritual had almost the sameprocedures viz., chanting prayers, the descent of the spirits, and dialogue between the spirit andparticipants. In the next section, I give an example of how the rituals proceeded based on my field notes
for the hadra meeting in Boset, which I attended in October 2007.
2.1. The procedure of the meeting
The evening of Friday of the first month of the Ethiopian calendar, when I went to the bet, was coolcompared to the extreme heat felt in the day. It was the ceremonial time for the wuqabi spirit. I followed
people in white clothes into the hadra bet at about 8 pm. The flame of a small gas lantern at the entrance
was insufficient to illuminate the entire room. In the dim room, participants could not clearly identify
each other. The hut was circular. A large crimson curtain used as a partition created a tiny space on theside opposite the entrance. Participants sat facing the curtain.
The medium’s daughter-in-law, Abbäb, moved in and out of the hut. She put frankincense resins on
the burning charcoal in the brazier placed next to the pillar in the centre of the hut. The room was filledwith white smoke. It smelt clean. A man sitting by the curtain repeated the phrase ‘Bi-ism Allah alRahman al-Rahim’ in a slow tempo. Abbäb, holding bamboo baskets, walked among people. Some put
a 1-birr note in the basket, while others put some in plastic bags with a handful of sugar or coffee.
One of the women by the curtain started chanting a religious prayer. The rest listened while swaying
their bodies sideways. The religious chant continued until approximately 11:30 p.m. The curtain was
lifted slightly from behind and hands holding a bundle of khat (Catha edulis) 1 were thrust out. An old
man took the bundle, untied the strings holding it together, carefully separated the branches and handed
them to the participants. The branches were passed from hand to hand to all participants. They chewed
the khat. There was little conversation. The entrance had been closed for some time.
While the khat were distributed, Abbäb prepared to serve coffee. She washed the raw coffee beans,roasted and ground them finely. She put the coffee powder into a gäbäna, a black pot for preparing
coffee, and brought it to a boil. The smell of coffee filled the hut. Dozens of small cups were filled. The
participants turned their heads and chewed their khat silently. Abbäb handed out coffee cups. As in the
khat distribution, participants passed them on. They used their right hands only and the cups were neverplaced on the ground. Participants drank quickly and silently. Empty cups were sent forward from theback. Abbäb repeated the coffee brewing three times.

1 Evergreen shrub native to East Africa and southern Arabia, more specifically around Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia,
Kenya and so on. The leaves and young shoots are chewed fresh to permit absorption of its soluble ingredients,
which are known to produce pleasurable, stimulating, and euphoric effects. In the context of some Muslim societies
in Ethiopia, it has always played an important role in their prayer meeting (Ezekiel 2004).

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A pair of wooden drums covered with animal skin was brought into the hut. The woman who led thechant had a scratchy voice indicative of a heavy smoker. Both of her cheeks were puffed with khat
leaves. As the man next to her beat the drums, the people stood and clapped their hands while shaking
their bodies vertically. The air in the room was thick with excitement. It was almost 1 a.m.
People in the hut clapped their hands, shook their bodies and chanted loudly. The inside of the hut
became even hotter. The lens of my camera fogged up repeatedly. Suddenly, a loud shout echoedthrough the hut. The voice came from behind the crimson curtain. The drums and chanting ended. People
kissed the ground and shouted ‘Iririri...’ to show that they celebrated the descent of the long-awaited
guest, the wuqabi spirit, on the medium, Kalani.
‘As-salaam alaikum’ 2, came from behind the curtain. The voice was different from Kalani’s usual
voice. The people replied, ‘Walaikum asalam’, placed their foreheads on the ground to show theirrespect and exchanged the words below:
wuqabi: As-salaam alaikum.
participants: Walaikum asalam.
wuqabi: I am here to convey the message of Allah.
participants: Amen 3.
wuqabi: I am here as the messenger of Ayyo Momina 4.
participants: Amen.
wuqabi: The way of human beings leads to a deep dark valley.
participants: Amen.
wuqabi: People desire to go to the valley.
participants: Amen.
wuqabi: If you are going to the valley, may Allah stop you.
participants: Amen.
wuqabi: May Allah give wealth to the poor.
participants: Amen.
wuqabi: May Allah give health to the sick.
participants: Amen.
wuqabi: I am here to convey the messages from Ayyo Momina.
participants: Amen.

Meaning ‘peace be upon you’ used as the most basic greetings between Muslims.
Generally used not only between Christians but also Muslims in many societies in Ethiopia, as a concluding
word, or as a response to a prayer.
4
The name of a well-known Muslim saint in the region. For her life history, see Ishihara (2013).
2
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wuqabi: If you are facing some problems, speak out it.
After a while, a man stood and shared his problems. The participants in the hut looked down andappeared to listen his story carefully. The dialogue between the man and the spirit continued for several
tens of minutes. As soon as the spirit concluded his advice and the conversation was over, the people
around him said a short prayer for him. Then, another participant stood up and began to tell the spirit ofhis problems. In this way, people’s problems were presented to the spirits one after another. It was past
6 a.m. when the dialogue between the spirits and the last participant was over.
2.2. The dialogues
The hadra meeting consisted of three sessions: chanting prayers, a spirit descent on the medium, anddialogue between the spirits and people. It is probably the last session that motivates many people toparticipate. In my fieldwork, I found that almost all the participants came to the ritual with some problem
they hoped to solve. Analysing the aspect of healing or dealing with trouble through the involvementwith spirits is important; however, my purpose is not only to explore this.
More noteworthy here is the ritual appearance in its own way. The purpose of this paper is not toshed light on the functional aspects of the ritual, but to provide some explanation for the area in which
Islamic elements are represented, even though the (human) participants are Christian. To understand thecomplex relationship between the two religions in the ritual, it is necessary to grasp the local context
that is also reflected. In this section, I explain how ethnicity is involved in the advice given in the hadra,using a specific conversation between a participant who wants to solve a problem and the medium
Kalani.
Kalani, a Christian medium, was well known to the local people for having several wuqabi, thehighest-ranking of which was a Muslim male wuqabi named Mälqat. Due to her problem-solving
abilities and his erudition beyond human comprehension, he was regarded as a jurist by the people.
Mälqat held Kalani hadra meetings on Wednesdays and Fridays only.
Participants talked to Mälqat about many problems such as illness to the person or their family,infertility, poverty, death of livestock and deteriorating family relationships. Some of the ways in whichthese issues are discussed are as follows.
Participant A: I got married a few years ago, and we have not been able to have children so
far. I serve the wuqabi every week without fail.
Mälqat: Is there a chälle in your house?
Participant A: Yes, it is. I keep it in a proper place.
Mälqat: Did you inherit it from your husband’s parents?
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Participant A: No, I got it from my sister-in-law.
Mälqat: Why? That’s the wrong way. What is it?
Participant A: That is, in my house, it used to belong to my sister-in-law. I brought it to myhouse after her death.
Mälqat: No. What you do is not correct. Give it to your sister-in-law’s son immediately. It
will be better for you and the child.
A Chälle (Figure 3) is a traditional necklace of fine blue, white, and red beads threaded on a string.
These necklaces are worn mainly by Oromo women and are said to show the honour of a spiritual being
in the traditional belief for waaqa which is the name of the supreme being in the Oromo language. They
are worn on various ritual occasions. Some women wear it almost every day. They are kept in a safe
place and passed down from a parent to a child. In the above dialogue, the wuqabi accused the womanof not inheriting the chälle in the customary way. It was likely the cause of her suffering. A Chälle isworn by a woman, but it should be inherited by the male descendants. Therefore, there should be nosuch thing as passing on a chälle between sisters. In this case, the genie pointed out that Participant A
had violated this and should pass it on to her nephew (Figure 4).

Figure 3. A Boset woman wears chälles

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Figure 4. The way to inherit a chälle
Like chälle, irreccha is a practice associated with Oromo societies and conducting irreccha is often
encouraged through dialogue by wuqabi at the hadra meeting. Irreccha is dedicated to prayers for peace,well-being and fertility, as well as to the fulfilment of vows and to express thankfulness toward spiritual
beings. It is a common practice among Oromo communities. Sometimes it is held on a large scale with
the involvement of the state government and other times in secret by only a few relatives. In the latter
case, people go to a nearby river or lake, float a bunch of grass on the surface of the water and show
their gratitude to the spiritual beings by placing the water on the surface of the grass on their forehead.
In the hadra meeting in Boset, the wuqabi sometimes instructed participants to perform irreccha, as in
the following two examples.
Participant B: My daughter is a student who has been sick for a long time.
Mälqat: Let her go to school.
Participant B: She has a very sick eye.
Mälqat: Learn what your old fathers and mothers did and serve the spirits, as you did in thepast. First, take a bundle of grass and teach her how to conduct irreccha. When yourdaughter learns it, she will be cured soon. Learn it from the old and wise people aroundyou.
--Participant C: I was sick and am now better. However, as soon as I was healed, my son
became sick. My husband just sits there and does nothing.
Mälqat: Did you conduct irreccha for the son?
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Participant C: I did it a long time ago, 40 days after his birth.
Mälqat: Haven’t you done it since then? How about after you got sick?
Participant C: I haven’t.
Mälqat: That’s enough. Do the irreccha for the son.
As the above dialogue shows, many participants were advised to encourage practices related to theirethnicity, such as inheritance and management of chälle and implementation of irreccha throughdialogue with wuqabi in the hadra meeting.
3. Religion, ethnicity, and local history in the hadra meeting
As mentioned in the previous section, Kalani was Christian and her wuqabi was Muslim. She conducted
Ramadan fasting as a gift for her Muslim wuqabi Mälqat. Followers participated in the meeting
regardless of their religious identities, and they paid respect and welcomed the Muslim spirit in a Muslim
manner even if they were non-Muslims. Mälqat gives his diagnosis as a return of their gift or respect,and it is mainly based on the knowledge of their ethnicity.
It is clear that the actors and practices, based on Islam, Christianity and ethnicity, are patch-worked
in the single frame of the hadra meeting of the wuqabi cult (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Islam, Christianity and ethnicity in the hadra meeting
At the end of the 19th century, during the era of Emperor Yohannes IV, hard-line measures weretaken against non-Christians in Ethiopia. A proclamation was issued that forbade non-Christians fromparticipating in the government unless they converted. Muslims were given three months to become
Christian. Many Muslims converted to Christianity, but those who refused emigrated or were killed(Ahmed 2001). Ahmed (as cited in Pankhurst 1968) stated that in the Wallo area, however, even when
they did convert to Christianity, many did so only ostensibly and led a double life as ‘Christians by day
and Muslims by night’ (ibid. 182).
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The above discussion of Wallo in Pankhurst’s study is common to the narratives heard in the Boset
area. According to my informants, Muslims in the Eastern Shore region were also forced to convert andthose who refused had their limbs amputated or were banished. Faced with this difficulty, Muslims
pretended to convert to Christianity. They lived as ‘Christians’ during the day in society and held hadra
meetings as Muslims at night. This local history is probably one of the reasons why the hadra meeting,mostly attended by Christians, starts with the chanting of ‘bi-ism Allah’ and the name of Allah is recitedin the chanting.
The wuqabi cult forms a different layer from world religions such as Christianity and Islam.
Therefore, the people of Boset have been able to use it as a foothold to share the ritual place where both
Christians and Muslims pray together without treating each other as exclusive.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed the religious complexity of a ritual held in the Boset, Oromia region and how
the complexity relates to ethnicity and local history. Many Christians participate in the hadra meeting,originally derived from Islam, which is prevalent in the Oromo communities of the East Showa region.
This study focused on the religious complexity of this ritual and how it relates to ethnicity and local
history.
In the first section, previous studies of mainly anthropological research on spirit possession,
especially the zar cult, were reviewed. It was argued that the practice of possession in Islamic societies
in rural Africa has been discussed in terms of resistance, deprivation and symbolism, which omits theunexplored aspects of the relationship between some world religions, such as Christianity and Islam,and rituals with spirit possession.
Then, I introduced a local spirit cult, the wuqabi cult in Ethiopia and illustrated a practice based on
my fieldwork. In the hadra meeting, participants chanted the name of Allah and praised Muslim saints
during the ritual. The meeting had three sessions: chanting prayers, a spirit descending on the medium,and dialogues between the spirits and people. It would not be wrong to say the third session most
motivates people to participate. We examined some conversations between participants and the medium
to understand the interactions in the dialogue. It was observed that ethnicity is involved in the advice
given in the hadra.
Followers participated in the meeting regardless of their religious identities, and they paid respect
and welcomed the Muslim spirit in a Muslim manner even if they were non-Muslim. The spirit gave his
diagnosis as a return for their gift or respect. This was mainly based on the knowledge of their ethnicity.
It is clear that the actors and practices, related to Islam, Christianity and ethnicity, are patch-worked in
the single frame of the hadra meeting of the wuqabi cult.

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Where Muslim Spirits Possess Christian Mediums: the Hadra Meeting in Boset, Ethiopia

In the religious composition in Ethiopia Christians are the majority. Muslim numbers have been
rising in recent years. Historically, Christianity (Ethiopian Orthodox) was the major religion of thehighlanders in the north, the political centre of the country. Islam has expanded mostly among the
Oromo, living in the lowlands. However, while this dichotomy illustrates the contrasting situation froma broad perspective, religious practices, which are an integral part of people's lives, are not clearly
divided into Islam and Christianity.
The wuqabi cult forms a different layer from world religions such as Christianity and Islam.
Therefore, the people of Boset have been able to use it as a foothold to share a ritual place where both
Christians and Muslims pray together, without treating each other as exclusive.

References
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and Boston: Brill.
Boddy, J. 1989. Wombs and Alien Spirits: Women, Men, and the Zar Cult in Northern Sudan. Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press.
—— 1994. ‘Spirit Possession Revisited: Beyond Instrumentality’. Annual Review of Anthropology
23(1): 407-434.
Csordas T.J. 1987. ‘Health and the Holy in African and Afro-American Spirit Possession’. Social
Science & Medicine 24(1): 1-11.
Ezekiel, G. 2004. Leaf of Allah: Khat and Agricultural Transformation in Harerge, Ethiopia 1875–1991.
Oxford: James Currey, Hargeisa: Btec, Athens: Ohio University Press.
Ishihara, M. 2013. ‘The Formation of Trans-religious Pilgrimage Centers in Southeast Ethiopia: Sitti
Mumina and the Faraqasa Connection’. In Muslim Ethiopia. Eds. P. Desplat and T. Østebø, New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 91-114.
Kehoe, A.B. and D.H. Giletti 1981. ‘Women’s Preponderance in Possession Cults: The Calciumdeficiency Hypothesis Extended’. American Anthropologist 83(3): 549-561.
Lewis, I.M. 1966. ‘Spirit Possession and Deprivation Cults’. Man 1(3): 307-329.
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Pankhurst, R. 1968. Economic History of Ethiopia (1800-1935). Addis Abeba: Haile Selassie I
University Press.

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Young, A.A. 1975. ‘Why Amhara Get Kureynya: Sickness and Possession in an Ethiopian Zar Cult’.
American Ethnologist 2: 567-584.

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List of Contributors(in alphabetical order)
Adekeye Adebajo
Professor, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship (CAS), University of Pretoria, South Africa
Christian S. Otchia
Associate Professor, Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University, Japan
Evariste Fongnzossie
Associate Professor, Advanced Teacher’s Training College for Technical Education, University of
Douala, Cameroon
Visiting Associate Professor, African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan(October 2021 - January 2022)
Frank Ahimbisibwe
Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Interdisciplinary Studies, Mbarara University of Science and Technology,
UgandaHitomi Kirikoshi
Lecturer, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Kokushikan University, Japan
Isao Murahashi
Specially Appointed Researcher, African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies,Japan
Kazue Demachi
Associate Professor, African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan
Kweku Ampiah
Associate Professor, School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds, United
Kingdom
Visiting Professor, African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan(September 2021 - January 2022)― 275 ―

Makiko Sakai
Associate Professor, African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan
Ngendoh Zedekiah
Coordinator, PINESMAP-BPCE Project on Participative Integrated Ecosystems Service
Management Plan for Bakassi Post Conflict Ecosystems, Ministry of Environment, Protection of
Nature and Sustainable Development, Cameroon
Ran Muratsu
Specially Appointed Researcher, African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies,Japan
Shinichi Takeuchi
Director / Professor, African Studies Center, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan
Chief Senior Researcher, Institute of Developing Economies - JETRO, Japan
Takanori Oishi
Associate Professor, African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan
Yasuo Matsunami
Associate Professor, Faculty of Sociology and Social Work, Meijigakuin University, Japan
Yumi Nakayama
Associate Professor, African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan― 276 ―