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Seeerity Jn::Eer1natien

WAR SECRETS IN
THE ETHER
Part III

By
Wilhelm F. Flicke

Translated by
Ray W. Pettengill

NOTICE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of theUnited States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S. C., Sections
793, 794 and Title 50, U.S. C., Sections 46, 46a and 46b. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

National Security Af1ency
Washington, 25 D. C.

1953)eclassifi ed and aooroved for release bv NSA on 07-15-2014 oursuantto E .0. 1352E

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ft56!PlliS~
Secu~r"::l.'ty IAlePJIIe:~i:efl

WAR SECRETS IN 'l'HE ETHERPart III

By~lilhelm F.

FlickeTranslated by
Ray w. Pettengill.

NOTICEa This document contains :i.nformation affecting the nationalde.fense df the United States within the meaning o.f the Espionage
Laws, Title 18, u.s.c., Sections 793, 794 and Title 50, u.s.c.,
Sections 46, 46a and 46b. Its transmission or the revelation of its
contents in a~ manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

National Security Ageno,yWaah:i.nglion 25, D.c.

195.3

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To the Reader:Parta I and II ot ''Wat' Secrets 1n tl1e Ether" are rea.J.4r thE'prelude to Part III.

Hel~ the atttltor reveali!J aspects of e&)li.OlJage

and the counterespionage conducted on a sea1.e never be.f'o:re JmOtm.•. As the title suggost.s, tile aspec:t;u treatod &:!."8 those oonoemedwith communications; t1·adit.lor.tal. ol.oak and dagger methods ot
secu.r:lng inf'onnation are involved, t.tJ ba sure, but. the spotlight:rareq rest.s on them.
others have a.1.read,y ~otted this field and he.v.s painted
more detail.ed word pictures or specific operations.

Mr. Flicke

has done so h::lmselt in his novel "Dio Rote Ka.pelle" 1 publiBhedin 1949.

The present volume has been somewhat abridged, primarll7

because ot the spaoe devoted to milltar,v operations which areadequateq covered elsewhere~

l'lhen no immediate oonnection

between the main theme and a. particular action was indicated,
the translator has felt tree to cut a bit.

'WbUe tbi B me;y&ave resulted 1n an occasional abrupt transition, :l.t is t1ot
believed that the author's effori.s to make a contribution

to historical research have been impaired.

The Trans.lator.

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Page
To the Readeriii

Table of Contentsv
PART III

The War with Poland and What Preceeded it

1

The Campaign in the West

7

Hitler's Balkan Campaign in 1941

2l

The Campaign in the East 1941

39

Japan Enters the War

61

Radio Agents69

Where did the Russians get their Inf'o~tion

7S

The Otwock Case81

A Word Rega1•ding tho Russian Intelligence Service

8S

Who were the "Radio Agents"

87

The German "Radio Defense"

9.3

Locating Agent Stations

99"Radio Games"

10.3

The "Rote Kapelle Case"107

The Russian Radio Agent Service to 191.,2

127"Die Rote Drei"

131

Kharkov and Sevastopol

137

The Signif'icanoe of the Battle of Kharkov

l4l

From Kharkov to Stalingrad

14.3

Stalingrad

147

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RE~:nl~~..............
....,~

Rommel to El .Alamein""""'~

....

Page
1.5.3

The "Rote Drei" again

l.67

Arter Stalingrad and El Alamein

169

Algeria, Libya and Tunisia 1942-194.3

171

Sici]¥ 194.:3

18.3

The Spring of 194.3 in the East

187

Still the "Rote Drei"

189

The Last German Offensive in the Eastand What Followed

191

The Year of Decision in the East Begins

19.5

Sevastopol Once Again

199

The Case of Vennehre~ and Company

201

It~

20.5

Agent traffic in Czechoslovakia

211

Pretty Milka

215

Notable Happenings in Hungary and Ita:cy

231

Polish Radio Agents in the East

237

What was Happening Meanwhile in the West

245

.Churchill talks with Roosevelt

251

Struggle between Radar and the Intercept Service

255

British Radio Agents in France

2.57

British Radio Agents in Belgium

265

American Radio Agents in France

269

The North Pole Case

27.3

In Preparation for the Invasion

279

The Si~ent Net of the U.C.R.

287
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The Invasion

289

SAS Troops in the West293

English Radio Agents in Ita.cy

295

American Radio Agen·ts in Italy

297

A Cold Bath, a Cramp in the Calf, and otherNoteworthy Mattera

299

English and Rusaian Ra.dio AgQnts in Noz~

303

Radio Agents in Denmark

309

Radio Agents in Holland

311

Polish Radio Agen·ts throughout the World.315

The New Front in hhe West

321.

Agent Radio as Indication of Operations Planned

32.3

Frol and Company.3.31

The German Chrlstmas Otfensiv(! 1944

3.3.3

A Wonder-Weapon and its History.337

Broadcasting in t'lforld War II

Was the German Intercept Service inWorld War II Well Organized?

.381

Big F'ry and Li't,tle Fey.395"Pstl"

399

Vermehren Nr. 2

Small Town Pranks

The End

The Great "Wh..v?"
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TlfE WAR WITH POLAND AND WHAT PRECEEDED IT
Doubtless there will appear numerous books, articles and otherpublications dealing with the war between Ge~ and POland whichbegan in the morning hours of 1 September ~39.

These will cover

the course ot the operations, the events preceeding the war and Jnai\Yother details.

We do not intend to diseuse these things here but

to deal vith some ot the preliminaries ot this war into which relativelT few people had a~ insight.
The question as to when preparation tor the war against Poland
began is difficult to answer but the preliminary period is longer
than is generally' assumed.

We can state with certaint;y that theearliest preparations date back to about 1923.

FroiiL then on, there

began a systematic penetration a£ the entire Polish state by the •rGerman espionage service using so-called confidential agents.
The first part ot this work consisted in current cOTerage ot
all events in Polish official agencies, in the armed forces, inthe government, in industry, in transportation,and in all otheraspects of public lite.

The second part ot the activity ot theconfidential agents consisted in infiltrating and undermining the

Ddl.itarT power ot resistance ot the Polish state.
Conditions were especially' favorable in the Poland ot thosedqs.

Many Germans had become Polish citizens, although at heart

not in sympathy with the Polish state.

It vas now a question ot

enlisting these people tor the work, b7 playing on their feelings
as Gerans.

A special subsection "Poland" in Section 1 of theCounterintelligence Group ot the Ministry of Defense began intensive

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work about, 1923.

Using agents and official and semi-offic:i.al. agen-cies, it endeavored to spin a net over all Poland and in two years
there was hardly a place o:r any size in that countey which did nothave a confidential agent or at least a purveyor of information.
Early in 1926 espionage against Poland was intensit.ied, possiblY because some ve17 useful agents had been enlisted.

One worked

in the Regl.tlations Office o:C the Polish War Ministry and from 1926
on sent photographs or service regulations to Berlin. Two others
were in the so-called n.o.r. (corps areas) !rom which the, supplied
photographs of tables of organization, service instructions, strength
slllT'.maries, etc.

Consequently German espionage was very full.J• infoz·..

med :regarding every branch of the service aTJ.d nearly e,~ery troop
unito

Regulations and inst.ruciJions for maneuvers were al~o ohta.ined

in this manner.

Tl1e :first :lD1po1··t..ant sl·dpment :Crom the agent in the

Polish Ministry of War was a lengtl~ set of instructions for the
Polish Air Force which was then holding its first large scale exercise. ·Sometimea deserters :Crom the Polish Armed Forces brought allsorts of infoi'lliB.tion.

During seven or eight months in 1931-1932,

three office1·s of the Polish General Staff appeart:;d in Berlin andoffered most welcome :i.n:Cormation.
In addition to this work of the spies, the Germans carried onver,y active intercept work against Poland, using the stations inK~nigsberg, Frankfurt on the Oder, and Breslau, which devoted half

their time to Polish traffic.

Of the military successes, the mostimportant were those against the Polish Air Fbrce which by 1926

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hnd v:lrt,H:'-1 l;v completed its orgnnization.

The Poles had a net-

worlt oi' high-powered sta.·tions for their wco.tho1• service, reports
ot' to.lte-oi'.t' o.nd landin~, o.nd for o.dministra:tion of the Air Force.

The Poles made liberal use or these oto.tions 1 ten in all, and
the Gcrmo.n intercept service moni"l:;ored them day and n~.ght andpassed the results to Berlin.

By the end of 1925 the cryptographic

system had been solved and by the e1~ of 1926 nothing regarding
the Polish Air Force was any longer o. secret.

Evc::ry Polish plane

was known by its type, serial number 1 and individual number.
This was possible because the Poles announced by radio every startand every landing ot' a plane, giving the direction of flight,
time of starting or landing, type, serial number, and individual.
number of the plane - all in plain tex.t.

If a plane flew :f'rom

Lemburg to Lida with an intermed:i.a.te landing in Warsaw and returned
to Lemburg by the same route, it lTas reported not less then eighttimes by radio.

There were nol."ma.lly 60 to 80 ot these reports a

day and all planes mentioned were carded.

After a. few months

every plane was recorded, together with its assignment to one of
the six air regiments.

Moreover 1 the condition of the plane wa.s

known and after a few year_a its serviceability could be determined

precisely using coefficients of' depreciation.

While the Polish

Air Force used radio freely and thus gave away plenty of information, the Army was very reserved in its use of' radio.
drills and maneuvers could anything be learned.

Only at

The first German

success was with the Polish maneuvers near Lida in 1929, the courseof' which could be reconstructed almost completely.

It was aquestion, to be sure, whether the A:rmy radio was cloaking

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itself in an excess of security at the expense of the transmissionof information.

In case of war the need for rapid communication

might upse~the whole system of radio camouflage, which was quite
complicated•

Each station worked with three call signs simultan-

eously and on its own wav~ lengths.

Both cal1. signs and wave lengths

changed dai~, sometimes twice a 6ay.

It was inevitable that war

conditions would severely tr,r this sys~em.
While speaking of German cz~ptanalytic activity against Poland,
it may be stated t.ha.t a large part of the d:l.plomatic exchange of
information between the Polish Government and its representatives
abroad could be read.

'l'his gave excellent insight into the act:tvity

of. the Polish diplomats and into the relations between Poland andthe Western Powers.
The German intercept service was concerned not merelY withintercepti~n of Polishion.

radio traffic but also with wire conmmnicat-

The Polish Corridor and Danzig afforded a fine opportunity

for getting at the Polish wire networks. It goes without sayingthat telephone conversations of the Polish Embassy in Berlin andof all Polish consular represent,atives were listened to and eva!uated by the Germans.

Beginning in 1934, ~erman espionage 'was intensified~ as was
the effort to undermine the power of r~istance of the Polish forces.
An army of agents was recruited, often b.Y coercion, and all officesof the Polish armed forces, police, railways, and post&L eervices
were infiltrated.

The rewards paid were surprisingly s~4ll but

from 1934 on virtually nothing regarding Poland's national defense
remained hidden.

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It is generally known that the war against Poland began at 054S
hours on 1 September 1939. It may be less well known that the attack had been planned for 27 August and that all preparations had
been made for that date.

tate in the evening o£ 26 August it sud-denly occurred to Adolf Hitler to postpone the attacko
him to make this change is not known to me.

What induced

Perhaps his astrologer

was responsible or it may have been one of his well-known whims.

Inshort, about 10 o•clock in the evening telephones began to ring,
teletypes to rattle, radio stations to fUnction, and a f~ood. of thousands of orders tried to reach the advance units in time to take account of the new situation and to prevent the troops from launchingan attack.

The fact that it was possible to get these orders throughin time was a masterfUl achievement o£ the German communication sys-tern.
Without doubt the Polish communication service must have noticed
this activity on the German communication network.
a serious warning for the Poles.

It must have been

Any specialist knows what such achange of decision means in modern warfare where there is an intercept service.

This naive change in a plan long since precisely work-

ed out, together with all the dangers inherent in such a change, wasthe first indic~tion of the primitive quality of Hitler's thinking
in militar.y matters.
It is not necessar,y to recount the invasion of Poland.

Thanksto the information available, it was all over in a matter of weeks;that is to say all over save for the repercussions in other countries.

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TlTiil Cl\.NPAIGN IN '.rHm viEST

Tho co.mpaicn :J n the Wos·t; in the summ~r of 191~0 appears to many
people to be the maste1• st1;oke of a military genius.

Even when w

talre in·to account the German superiority in numbers and materiel andappraise adequately the spiri·t of the Gel·tnan troops, many things
still remain inexplicable - in particular the swift drive through the'northern continuation of the Maginot Line.

On the basis of 1-1l1at I

was o.ble to learn, I shall attem,pt to throw a few sid.e lights on
this campaign, vithout pretending to be able to explain everything.
I have already reported. on the situe.t:f.on i11 the intercept service.

Conditions for successful intercept worlt were as favorable

e.s one could desire in France, Holland 1 and Belgium".
From intercept traffic the French assembly and the Belaian andDutch frontier defenses could be recognized so clearly both in respect to organization and geographical dis~ribution that the information was ful.ly adequate for nJB.kin13 German dispositions.

It was apleasure for the German command to be able to enter the enemy's
troop dispositions on its own situation maps on the basis of theresults of the intercept service.
this did not suffice.

In the present case, however,

Before the war the great question was: howgood will the mighty defense system of the Maginot Line be? Will it
be possible to break through quickly or w:f.ll a wa.l." of position on al.arge sca1e develop here? WUl modern heavy artillery be able tocrack these defenses?

liho c~~d answer these questions?

Earlier we reported how Poland and Czechoslovakia were thoroughly reconnoitered by the German espionage service.

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Service did receive current reports and single notices.

Francebad no extensive German minority and conditions were less favorable.
Nevertheless, in the summer of 1939 the Ge~n Secret Service succeeded :f.n puJ.ling off something vhich absolutely made up for theprevious years.

In August :tt was possible to get a photograph ofa French map sbowlng aJJ.. f'o:rts s barriers, obstacles, communications

TOUtes and communications points of the Maginot Line and of its
extension to the coast.

This showed how inu>erfectly the French baddeveloped their sys'l~em of defense along the Belgian frontier and one
did nvt need to stutiy ·the map long in order to pu·t; his finger onI
the weakest roint in this systeu1 of defense. This map was repro-

duc:ed in Germany and was the basis for planning the campaign :!.nFranoe.

In order to dri"e at this weak po:f.nt in the French syst.em or
defense, it "tm.s nece~:~sary to advance through Holland and Belgium.
Consequent1y, this move was decided upon in Germany without hesita.tion.

'J.1le prospect of overrunning the Fl'ench l.ine swiftly was too

inviting and it was impossibl.e for the F1ooench to build up this weak
point within a few months to match the strength of the Ma.ginot Line
proper.
The campaign against Pol.a.nd was followed by a period of calm.
Only 1n the air and a·t sea. d:t.d some minor engagements take place 1
which no one regarded very seriously.

Peopl.e were already beginningto crack jok'.es about tlle "phony V8.1" 11 •Many thought there would be

no ser:J.ous conflict a.11d that France and England were in a state of

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war mrely ''to save face" with respect to Poland.

Peace would

surely cot.D! 1n the spring.

The monitoring of French and English traffic, b.owll!ver, did notindicate that people in those countries were concerned with "saving
face".

War production was unde:r. way; they were arming few battle,

though only for a defensive struggle.

The whole system or land

defense for France since 1919 bad been based on the invincibility

ot the Ma.ginot Line, while England was convinced that economic measures directed against Germany wouJ.d not fail..

Anyhow, one could

not count on a conciliatory attitude in either France or Engl.and.
On 27 January was broadcast Church:l.ll' s speech in which hesaid:"IIitJ.er has already lost his best opportunity".
On 9 April the Garman people were surprised by the informationthat 11 Gerwm troops have undez'tuken the protection of Denmark and

Norway".

The National Socialist Government tried, naturally, totbrow all blame on the Engl.1.sh o.nd. Uorwegio.ns.

Of course no mention

was made of the fact that the invasion might not have been successful,
if the intercept service of the German Na.vt had not ascertained theposition of the Brit:l.sh naval forces and calculated the time so thatno surprises need be feared :from that quarter.

Despite heroic resis-

tance 1 aJ.l Norway was occupied within four weeks during which theGerman intercept service played a not&ble role against both land andnaval. forces.

At Narvik, both the British and the Norwegians usedradio very illcautiousl.y.

IJ.'he course of British ships could be fol-l.owed perfectly at al.l. times.

Several. Norwegian units were encircled

and captured because of their incautious use of radio, and the captureof Bergen with its war stores was possible only becauae of friv1lous
use of radio.

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Of course· the Germans somet:1.mes made mistakes, too, and the British
I

I

fori lowed Ger~n ship movements.
Simultaneous with increase in militar,y radio traffic at the be•I

g~nni ng of'these operations was the ~nonr.OlS increase in diplomaticJ'a~d press traffic.

It was interesting to see how the German advanceagainst the two northern countries affected neutral lands.

\ihiletho German preas tried to characterize the whole action as a 11 British
crime" against which the entire press of the world was clamoring in-

dignantly and while German pape1s were printing quotations fromforeign papers J which had been paid for with German mone;r, intercepts·.from foz-eign CP,Untries eave a very different picture.

Britishaction agai.nst Norua.y had beau started only after Germaey' s intention
had become lmown to E11gland. at the J ast moment.

Consequently 1 t.

wns not England but Germany that had at tacked, and thl s unjustified

a-ttack in defiance of all'internat:.iou.al law lost Germany t}:l..e respectof the worlA and laid the grcundwork fvr }:ler defeat.
On 9 !"lay, one of the leadir'g CicTman newspapers carried
the headline:"Stvpid Dritish Diveraiom.ry Maneuver."The content

was to the effec·~ that the discovery by Germany of' ost~neible British plans haj pr ooucerl such an impression in England. '\..he t t.ho,\" wereresortinc to jivr;-;:of!iom.~.ry m':\neuver~;lll-,,;swae being sprE>l.d abroadthat Holland was sorely thrPat.ened by Germaey.

There was a false

report t.hat two GeriDlin armies were mov-lng toward Holland, but ofcourse that was nonsens~, an old wiv~s. tale of the Ministry ofLies in London.

~1t

the next day at nine o'clock Doctor Goebbels

delivered a long talk on t.hr~ German invasion of Holland, BelgiW111 and

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The war in the west had begun.

The attemp·t to attribu·l..e the blame for the outbreak of hostilities to the

Dutch and Belgians was ridiculous.

From every-

thing that could be observed by moni~or:l.ng thelr trafflc, it was
clear that both'countries did everything possible to maintainneutrality.

on 14 May the Dutch army f_tave up the hopeless strug'

gle and a break was made in the extended l<iaginot Line a·~ Sedan.
On 16 May came a break through the Maginot Line on a front of 100
kilomrters.

On 17 M~ German troops entered Brussels.

Soon

Hitler's threat : 11We will put them in a panic 'tihich will spread! 11
was made good.
This creation of panic was carried on by all modern technicalmeans.

Leaflets were dropped by the hundreds of thousands andserved to spread the wildest rumors.

Agents deposited by para-chute behind the enc~ front cut in on the telephone wires, called
up all sorts of government offices, gave .false instructions tocivilian offices and troop units, and by reports of panic caused
a chaotic flight on the part of the civilian population, which
resulted in a hopeless blocking of the highways.

Captured radio

stations were likewise put int;o operation and issued alarming
reports.

With events moving so rapidly, tP.e

French command had

no possibility of effectively counteracting these activities;
moreove..... , the French did not c~ttch on to these methods until too
I
I

late.

In several cases, whole divisions were forced in thisfashion to surrendero

A number of German agents equipped with\small shortwave radio had been deposited bch~nd the French fro~t. and were working from there with excellent success.

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whicb their work was directed.

For the first time 1.n history a\combat instrumental.i·t;y was emp~oyed here, which in the ater ;year~\of th:ta wa.T 'Wa.s to gi-:.re J.t its special char.a.cter a11d which was tobe turned in catastrophic fashion against Germany.

On 3 June th~ f'rightful. slaughter known in history as the"Battle of F~anders" c11ded with the capitulation of the Belgiana.:rmy and the ench-clem-:ont and e.nnlhJ.lation of Br:ltish and French

forces..

These troops fought bravely but succumbed to au;perior

force.

'.rhe name Dllllkirk became for the Germans the symbol ot a

decieive victory over England and for the British the symbol ofa most success~.a evae~tion, carri~d out with tbe aid of ·the:f~eet.

Both were 7."igh.t - ever.tt.hing depends on the point of view.·

Oncti ags.1n there call'~ a period of t.ense expectation.
would bappen'l

What

Wou.ld the Germans tm'll south and attack the Fre:t?-Ch

divisiono on the A,.Rne and i;he SOlllDW, or woul.d they follow British
The word "invas :l.on" began to spook

troops &.cross the Channel.'laround.

The German High Command dil.igently spread the news that

it was preparing to in·{B.de at once.

In any co.se the fate ofFrance was vi.rtually sea..1.ed..

This seemed to "be a suitable timefor Italy to enter tlle war.

Pressure was put on Mussol.ini.

Afeverish excha.n~ oi" telegrams be1:,ween Berlin and Rome began.
And. final.J.y it happened.

On ~0 Juu.e ~940, f'rom the balcony of

the Palazzo Venezia, Mussolini proclaimed to the Italian peopl.e
and to the world Italy's entry into the war on the side oi'
Germany.

This was speculating on a cheap vj.ctory, on sharing "the12

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spoils ar tc:r France had been completely subdued and England had

pulled out of the war, as it was expected to do.
But even in tb'ls seem:f.ngly so favorable situa:tion, the true
attitude of a. ~arge pa.r·to of ·the Italian Off' leer Corps, in pa-r-

ticular the General Staff Officers, was and remained adverse bothto ·the war and to Germany.

A not inconside:<"able g:t.•oup of' officers

was outright anti-German in synq1athy to such a degree that thiscoul.d be clearly recognized from intercepted !ta.lien traffic.
We shall. have occasion to speak. of ·this later.

For the moment,

however 1 the chances seetned to favor the two Axis Powers andfor the moment this outweighed ev·erything else.
The battle a1ong the Aisne and the Somme began and 1n a. few

days the French army 'Was split :t.nto four groups.

German troops crossed the Loire.

On ~5 June 1

On 18 June 1t1tleJ• and Mussolini

met in Munich to discuss the terms of an armistice.

On 22 June 1

the a.rmis1;ice was concluded in tbe Forest of Camp l.egne; the :B'rench

fleet remained in French harbors.
France was beaten.

Hopelessly beate11 :ln an astoundingly sh01-t

time/How could this country, protec·ted 'by i;he most mod.ern l:J.ne.

/"of fortification and with its strong army, be ca1quered so easily!

For one thing the Germans 1 conti•a.ry to ~'Tench expectation, had

not hesi'l::ated to attack two neutral. and almost defense~ess countries,
Rolland and :Bel.gium, ana thus to reach the Fre11ch frontier where it
was least well protected.

Moreover at tlle beginning of the war

France was distinctly inferior in materieL

Thel"e was lack ofplanes 1 SJ."Uloured tanks and other war equipment.

Despite a.ll. warnings,

including repeated reports to the Deuxleme Bureau.-!i;t'ega.rding Ger-

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serious danger.
tlhen th3 CD.Itifa.ig71 :;.n the \'lest began, the French greatly underestjmated German s.t,l·•.mgt.h, wlule espionage had revealed to the Germans

the weak polnts in the French line of defense.

Anothe:t• unexpectedfacto1· \..ras t.he syster.~at..ic spreading of panic.

In a ver-~ short t.i.:me,millions of French and Bel&1ans were in night, blocking roads andbr ....J.ges so that F'rench troops and &upplies could not get through.

On top of' all that) there was the German radio intercept service.
Most of the French army cryptographic systems and tw~ systellls of

the French Foreign Oi'i'ice l'lere known to

the German cryptanalyt,icservice.

Cour..tles::-; :messar;es with hi8hly important content could

be read.

Mor~Qver,diplomRtic representatives of various countries

were tranE~znit.ting by .~.~adio i'l'lportant information and were doing this:i.n systems already solv-ed i.l'l Gei'IIl3.ny.

Ji'rom a purely miU.tary angle,

the system of French army 'lir.&.ffic resulted in revealing to theGerman Intercept. Service in a very short. time the relation between
tbe higher and mediur.J units.
was knovm at all t:i..!Mls.

The organization of the French front

No mo7eiilP.nt and no dislocation remained

concealed from t.hc Germans..

The French Air Force was most incautious

in its use or radio and the ground s·Lat:i.ons gave countless clues.
The picture waa the same as that observed during French maneuvers

from 1930 to 1S39.
The map of the line of fortifications, the intercept. service,

the cznJPtan:J.l~"tic scr;"ice, the creijtj.on of panic, the 'bJ.,:,cking of
high11ays, air superiority, and superiority of nur.~ters ard lT'.aterielon the German side, coupled with an ineffective intellJ :;ence sor'\"i.ce
1 ·)RESTRICTED

--on the French side - nothing more was needed to gain a crushing
victory- in the west.
The· cs.mpaign in the vest .had ended.
pealed and flags 1'lutte1·ed.

Throughout Germany bells

People were convinced that victory- in • ... ;•,.. ·the west meant the end of the war; now it was up to the diplomats.
to find a way to bring about peace.

It was incredible tr~t England,

the last re~ining antagonist, would dare to continue the war.

Goebbelsorganized a mighty reception for Hitler wllen the latter 1~turned fromthe front; the rumor was spread that America had intervened andEngland would make peace.

Plans for demobilization were worked out

and a few people were discharged from the arm~ed forces.
But although people were convinced in Gonnany that England would
now try to get out of the war 1 longboats, light sailing vessels,
motorboats and other craft began moving northward on special vehicles;
they were to carr.r German troops across the Channel and few people
doubted that this enterprise would shortly be crowned b,y success.
Yet week after week passed and nothing happened.

On the contrary,

the German intercept se1~ce was obliged to report again and againthat England had no thought of subndssion.

Moreover, voices from

America also had to be taken seriously.
While the public was thus forced to settle back and wait for
the invasion which Hitler said was coming. it was remarkable thatall preparations for invasion were carz·ied on in the open insteadof being carefully camouflaged as usual.

Details which normally

would have been strictly secret could be heard ever,ywhere, until
one almost had the impression th~t the invasion was nothing but
a bluff.

15

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Interception of' Englir.h traffic' bov;over I eave ·the inq>ressionthat the Brit:f.sh vero cou.utiJ.lg on an atte~tcd l.e.nding.

Their airreconna.:l.ssa.nce of' po:lnta ·uhl.lre the Germans were concentrating smallboats became intenaive and the aBsemblies ~rere bombed constantly.
Meanwhile the au• wu.r against England began.

It was s~osedto break tbe "W':f.ll of ·the people to reGist,~~ but it soon brought two

disappointments::first;, tbe l3r:ttieb i'iBb.ter defense proved farstronger than expect.ed; second, the ll:t'fec·t of the bombs was by nomeans as great as had been expected.

Furhtermore 1 German aircraftl.oases increased r'3.ther tho.n decreased - some days a hundred ormore machines; -were lost.
Ca.rei'ul. monitt,ring of. a.ll ro.dio tra.f'!ic be"Ween Great :Brit.ain
and the u.s .. A.. showed no Jndiaat.:ton of any ~etur in England's,.,ill.

to resist. l.feek by week the United States was grm1ing cl.oser andcl.ose:t• to Grlflat Drita.in.

Umnista..lta.bly tbe:t.•e 1m.s a. resol.ve to put

an end to tho conquest of one count:t'J'- a:f."ter another by National.
Socialis-m..

Tlle at.t.itud.e of the u.s.A. was ex,prcssed in a speechin Phi1a.del.r'bia on J.8 .August by Mr.. BulJ.itt, former ambassador to

Since the air ·war was not acheiving its purpose~ the German

Government procla.im3d in Augus·t a "total blockade of England".
This step was e.iilll.'l'd pr:.tmo.r:tly a·t the u.s.A. but its effect was likepouring otl on a fire.

It reall.y betokened Gerrran weakness rather

than s·trength.
~fllilethe Gero~n press printed long-w±nded articles on theeffect of Ge:rma.n air attacks on Londou, only sll13.ll type "'vas o.vail·-able on 10 SeJ."'tomber for the ne":vs that the Hot1.sc of Roprecentn.tives

16

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~1QIP..lJt~2-n..LJr:___ ___ _had on the day before accepted the Bill for Compulsory MilitaryService.

The question was no longe1·,''Will the u.s.A. fight?''but., 11When? 11
Supposedly, the invasion was to take place during the night of

lS-16 September 1940 but the English fighter defense was still too
strong, the Navy was still intact, and German preparations were too
inadequate.

OnlY a few o£ the 1,000 large transport gliders called

for had'been completed.

The espionage service had almost complete~failed to fUnction, in particular the establishment of a networkof radio agents had never gotten beyond ver,y modest beginnings.

The

intercept service provided virtually no info1~tion regarding themilitar,y situation in the British Isles.
Of course the decisive factor was Ilitler himself.

He did notseriously believe it would b~ necessar,y to invade by force; he ex~pected England to make peace and Ribbentrop held the same viewo
Not until four weeks after the conclusion of the campaign in thewest did Hitler realize that this assumption was not correct.
Hitler could pursue a goal with great obstinacy but he was an easily
influenced, emotional character and now he shifted suddenly andordered the General Staff (or at least part of it) to make plans
for a Russian campaign which had never been mentioned before.

Hethought that England would change its attitude immediatelyJI i£•
German7should attack the Soviet
Union. Hess entertained the same.
,
opinion.

Points of difference between England and the Soviet Union

were well known, likewise Churchill's aversion to Bolshevism.

If

the English attitude took the course they expected, then invasion
was superfluous.

17

RESTRICTEDRES'PRI~2It is true there was a dilemma;

Hitler must say one thing to

the Germans and anothe1• to the English.

It was necessary to explain

to the German people why the invasion did. not come off':

first there'Cro.s fog, then there were stormJ.'!., then it was said spring was the
only proper time 1 and then when at Headquarters the idea had longsince been dropped, "preparations for the invasion" were carried on in
au os·tentatious manner.

The British were to get the impression that theinvasion was imminent and the bombing attackn continued, although theirintensity decreased.

The main activity was confined to threats.

Amid this tense expectation there was concluded with great
pomp on 26 September 1940 the so-called Three Power Pact be·tween
Germany, Ital.y, and Japan.

This act was purely theatrical.

It vasthe first confession of the fact that from now on the whole threatof an invasion was merely a. bluf!, because if there 1fere an invasion
and England were defeated, then there "Would be no need of exertingpressw:•e on England in the lt,ro.· East.

The fact that this step was

taken proved that the German Government had no Ul.usion regardins
the invasion, even if it should be carried out.
had already been given up.

Actually the plan

I't; was interesting to see how they reached

the same conclusion in England; this was revealed by the mass ofintercepted diplotnat:f.c messages of other governments, Poland in
pa:rticul.ar •The Polish Government had fled to London and was in close contact there with all organs of the British Government and with the
British armed forces.

The EnGlish on thei1• part esteemed thiscooperation since the Polish element all over EUl·ope gave a unique

18

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basis for tlle organization o'£ a loo:ge scale spy ne·t work for t.he
English secret service.

The reverse of the medal lay in the factthat the Polish Government in London talked too much out of schoolin its excha.no,re of telegre.tna.
The cryptoBro.phic systems of the Polish government in Exil.e f01•
the most part had been solved in Gei'lnan.y.

Consequently, insight was

obtained into the thinking ·and the plans of influential. English
offices.

It could be seen that the British took the invasion seri-

ously for only a short time.

In any case, they were ready to accept

it and were resolved, in case it succeeded., to continue the struggle
from overseas.

The fleet was to go to America and the struggle

would be organized anew from there.

A..."'rica was to constitute thestarting point for the attn.ck on tb.e Axis Powers.
reve~tions

There were similar

tn the intercepted traffic of diplomats representing othernations.
The German plan aimed, by threate11ing British possessions in
the Fer East, to force Britain to change her military dispositions.
The idea appeared very cl.ever and :f.n 't.hose days RibbentJ.•op wasconsidered in Germany a very competent and cl.ever dipl.omat.

However,should Japan try to disturb

he had neglected one impol"tant factor:

the balance of power in the Far East 1 this would inevitably arouse
opposition in the u.s.A., and relations between the two countries•

were already tense due to the conflict in China.

When the Japaneseraised this obJection, Ribbentrop assured them that the u.s.A.would
not be in a position to employ its whol.e strength age.inst Japan because Germany would 1 in case of conflict, declare l7a.r on the U.S .A.;
this would mean for both the u.s.A. and Great Britain in splitting up

19

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I

....

-

""

..........

"

•

..

A

•

..

••

• •

4.

,. .... ~..

• -~j " ... ~ -.. ......

....

-.t

of forces and the Americans would be too weak to threaten Jo.pa.n
seriously.
At that moment, what Ribbentrop said was val.id, but one factor
was omitted:

in September ~940 we had from intercepted traffic a

f'a.ir picture of' war prod.uction in the u.s.A with production estimates
for the two ensuing yea1•s.
figures were enormous.
pure pipe dreams.
known to me.

Compared with German production theseHit~erand R1bbentrop said these figures were

lf:nat induced them to take such an attitude is not

The figures were not 'based on propaganda speeches but

were carefully comp:J.led :from authentic sources.

On this occasion

Hitler displayed a characteristic trait; he would be~ieve only
what accorded with his ideas, everything else he rejectE'd a.l)ruptly ••20

RESTRICTEDHITL~R'S

BALKAN CAMPAIGN IN 1941

This book cannot deal in detail with the preliminaries of thePnlknn War.

Basically there is no preliminar,y history, for thiscampaign was simply plucked from a tree like Hitler's other martial
enterprises.

All the Balkan states had endeavored to maintain peace-

ful relations with Germaqy.

However, even before the French Arm-

istice, Hitler and Mussolini had agreed that Italy should be compen"sated for participation in the campaign in the West, not at theexpense of France but in the Balkans.

There would be two spheresof interest: Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria,and Turkey in Europe should• belong to the German sphere; Croatia, Dalmatia, Albania,and Greece
to the Italian sphere.

This meant that a division of the Yugoslav

kingdcm toJas even then being considered.

lvhen the armistice had beensigned, preparations began in Berlin and Rome for 11 the se·litlernentof the Balkan question".
On 27 July, at Salzburg, Hitler received a Bulgarian delegation headed b,y the prime minister.

Close collaboration between

the two states was agreed upon, extending even to military matters.
The division of Yugoslavia was likewise discussed and the Bulgarinns
claimed certain specific areas.
Macedonia was also discussed.

The cession to Bulgaria of Greek
Close cooperation in intelligencematters was agreed upon, especially in the intercept service.
Soon a German intercept station with cover name "Borer" was set
up in Sofia.

It was staffed with German militar,y personnel incivilian clothes and had direct teletype connections with Berlin.
Actually this station had existed since Januarf 1940 on a somewhat

21

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crrJll.llc:r scale o.nd had been tolerated by ·the Bulgarians.

OX'ig1naJ.l.y

it in·l;.erccptcd army- tro.:f'f'ic of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey but

now the vorlt vns extended to cover diplomatic traffic ..
A few dtiys la.ter, Rotoo reilly s·tarted something.

They hada roport sent :tn i'rom Til•ana. tha·t the Albanian population under
Greelt domina:tion was in a state oi' ten•or because of the frightful
po~itical

Rome raise and outcry about themurder of Da.ut Hoegia.

"unJ.f"oerated" Albanian terl,.itol."ies under ·the Greek yoke and about
Greek persecu·tion..

A sho.rp noi~ was sent to Greece to which the

Greeks made a tactual reply stat~15 that the murder waa fn no wisepo~itical..

The Italinns 1 however, accused Greece of fomenting trouble

along the frontier and of being a silent ally of a great power(England) which was new sinking into obl.ivion.

Intercepted Greek

tra.f'f'ic d.id not I'eveal anything to justify these reproaches.
Greece 'tffl.S tr-JinB to remain strictl.y neutru.

Border incidents lladoccurred in this region for centuries 1 but to try to deduce fromthese a hostile attitude on the pe.rt of the Greek Government ,faaclem.'ly an intentio11al. distortion I'Jf' the f'acta.

On the othe1• hand,

it is certain tha.t Italy began sending troops and war material to.AJ.baxlia long bet'o1~e this murder.

Italy was ready to seize upon

any pretext and. an a.Tticle in the "Giorna.le d'Italia" left no doubt

as ·to Ital.y' s attitude.
With the Italians beginning to take action in "·their" zoneof in:f'l.ucnce, t.he Germo.na could not be idle.
"\'l'as the attitt'!.de oi' King CD.l"Ol of Romania.

The chief obstacle
It ia certain th!l.t

Carol. was friendly to ~~·ance but this attitude did not in e.11d

22

RESTRICTEDe

or itscl.i' Gi(.,"llii'y hostil-ity to GornllU1y.

The cxtrem~l.y correctand benevolent ·t.reo.tmen·t b.Y' the nomo.nio.n Government of' tbe Germo.ns
in 'fro.n.sylvonio. bears this out;, but Ce.r.o~ declined to a.l.lo'W' his

com1t1·y to como under National Socialist domination.

be had to be ovcrthroun..

AJ3 a resul.t

The so-called "Iron Gu.'U"d", modeled.

after the NationaJ. Socialist .sA, 1ro.s to o.ccon~lioh this..

On 6

Septcnibcl" ~9ltO, c&~ol 1 s o.bd.ica.tion -r,m.a ailnO'I,Ul,CCd and Prim~ l•linister
Antonescu and Hor.ia. Simo. tcle!ll"o.phed greet:tn~s to Hi tlel~ ""hichwere cordia.J.l.y retltrn.ed.

On 8 September 1 Siu:o. openly st1·esscd

indissolvable unity with the Gel~v.n··Ito.l.ian .J\:D.s.

This n1eanttbat the Axis bad a.l:ree.dy reached the mouth of the Danube.

Southern

Dobrudja. wns innu~diate~y ceded to :3ulc;er:f.a 1 ·thus establishingfriendly relations, as Germany desired.
A few days o.:f'tcr h-:l ha.d sei~cd pouer, Antonescu began re-o1•gan:lzine; the Romanie.n army and. o.sked Hitl.cr to send ins r;ructors.
Soon Gerrua.n mil.itary persom1el bo.d pol."m.eo.tcd the artn~d forces
and the count1-y as a whol.e.

Hitler bad a.t·ta:tned his first goal in

the Bo.llr.ans.
Al.mopt overn:l.ght, Germany ha.d reached the frontier of Turkey.
On 9 September, Tw:ltish territ01•y in Europe was declared a militaryzone.

The German ambassador 1 von Papen, tried in every lttay tomake Tul•ltey favorable to the Axis but i:t vas soon clear that Turkey
would fight if its neutrality were tll'l"catened.

But before southea-stern Europe could supply a fa.vorabl.e juuJPing off place for Hitl.er, it was necessary to scttl.e the boundar,ydispute between Hungary and Romania.

23

Hungarian c.ln.ims could not

RESTRICTED

possib:b' be accepted by the F.omonions and the matter was to besubmitted to arbitration b,y Ge~ and It~.

The decision rend-

ered in Vienna in September 1940 probab~ fi.md the most impossible
t1~ntier Europe

ever s~w.

Both nidoa accepted the docioion~ eventhough ·!,hey lme1..r it was on.ly a. temporary settlement.

For the moment

al1 territorial dlffez-oncee betueen Hungary'~ Roroani.a,ancl Bulgaria
bad been disposed o.r and an a.bsolutel,y pro-German bloclc had beencreated•.An".l.d these developments in the Balkans, one country ho.d beenlett out of the picture entire]J' thus far and tha.t was Yugoslavia.
'l'he1-e was, to be sure, a marked diapla,y of Gorman_.Yugoslav .f'riE?nd-

shipo

On 4 OctobeX' Prince Regent Paul. opened an exhibition of•.rwo days later Mussolini osten-

German a.rchit.ect.ur,,:, in Belgrade.

tat.ioursJ.:' reviewed the Arm_y of tho Po which was stationed along
the Ita.Uan-Yugoslav il'Ontier and to which belonged It~' s mostmodem, tul.:cy motorized div-lsions.

Under the circumstances

Mussol.ini's visit was obviously meant to impress Yugoslavia.
In mid-october 1940, Gennan troops occupied Ranania nat therequest of the Rom&lian Government" 1 but the Germans began to set
up naval. bases on the Black Sea. and to ship in submarines in sections.
Russia began to fortify her westem frontier.
In Bulgaria the people were divided; some favored Russia.,

some favored st1•ict neutral..i..ty, and some favored France; hence
it was imperative that those of'fic:l.als and officers favorable toGermany be protected and supported.

Since the police were like-wise divicl.ed in sympathy, this job was given to the Gestapo.

24

RESTRICTED

Berlin o.lrcudy wo.s "Lo.l.king about occupying Bu.lsnria.
l>lusoolini ho.d dcc:lded. on '\far in ·the Bo.J.ko.l'lB.

Von Papcn's

warnings made llitlcr averse to o.ny immediate action there, but hewas onJ.y a.ulo to restrain Mussol:f.ni to ·the extent of limiting Italy
to war with Greece.

In J.ess than two months the Italians, who

had the ad:V"antaGe in everyth:J.ng save morale, were badly beaten.

The pol~tical leaders were terribly BUi'prised and the Chief ofI

General Staff, Marshal

Ba.doglio, and numerous other high officers. were rel.ieved of their duties.

This did not help ma.tte1•s.

One of the most decisive factors during those weeks was themanner in which the Italians e111ployed radio.

The set ...u.p Ya.s thesame as that used in maneuvers of previous years.

They em,plo;yed

open circular traffic; that is, they used one uniform frequency fora group of stations belonging to the same unit (e.g. the stationsof three infantry regimen·ts of a division for traffic with one
another and with the divisional station) and each station used only
one cal+ sign for all its traffic.

The call sign was supposed tochange daily but was often used for several daysi not infrequently
a change in call sign was followed by e1•rors lThich betrayed thechange.

Traffic was so heavy that the enemy a.J.·uays had a chance

to take bearings and fix locations.
in clear.

FrequentJ.y messages were sent

Several units or the I·tnJ..ia.n Eleventh Army distinguishedthemsel.ves in this respect.

Moreover, the Greeks had obtained atleast two Italian army cryptographic systems 1 haw I do not know 1
but it is certain that in the very first days of the campaign they
could decipher a large part of the Italian messages.

25

RESTRICTEDThis enabledthem to learn promptly most of the dispositiom1 of tho Italian comma.nd and to take appropriate action.

The superiority thus gained

was utjlized cleverly and a series of military actions took place
which heretofore would never have boen deemed possible.
In January 1941

Turkey began srmdina auo.y German citizens.

.

It had become an El Dorndo for the Germ~n espionaGe service, which
was not only spying on Tul~key itself but endeavored to cover the
Near East from this base.,

Moreover, Gornl.-'ln spies atteMpting to en-

ter the Soviet Union were usually sent throuch Turkey.

Since Decem-ber 1940, the German General Staff had among its plano one for an
attack on Turke;r in Europe.

In January l9bl

lart;o and owJ.ll orien, ,;:;~:.

tation pamphlets dealing with Turkey were prep~r~d~- a sure signthat things llere reaching a critical stc..e;e-.

Turkey and the USSR

were discussing the possibility tb~t tl:e lattc1• should supply Turkey
with arms in case of a Germ::tn attack.
On 2 March Bulgaria officially adhered to the "Thl'E:!e Po~.JerPact"..

On the following day German troops nw.rchcd into Bulgaria"as a security measure 11
the u.s.A.

.* This alan11ed Yueoslavia and disquieted

Roosevelt announced that tho flow of war n~t&rial to

Great. Britain and Greece rlould increase until it was adequate f'or

all needs.
Threatened on all sides py G-:lr111:1.n and Italian troops, thegove:rnr.1ent of Yugoslavia yielded to prerisure and on 25 Ho.rch signe>dan official adherence to theThree Poifer Pact.

This ~ction t-ras

bound to evoke resentment. among the Yuc;oslavs and particularly ini~Ac"lu:J.lly .t Fulr;ari&. officially adbeLtld i.v t.l.c t::.ct c.,n l I·!arch
and Gorn1::1n t.roops occupied Sofia a !'ei'i' bt·urs' l .. tt:ll'• ( ~'tl)

26

RESTRICTEDthe officer co1•ps.
negotiations.

That this was not unexpected is clear fi•om otherLong before the wa.r at n time wrhon "the best of rela-tiona" existed between Germo.ny and Italy on the one hand and Yugoslavia
on the other, anri when it 'ms ostensib~y Gemo.ny•s aiM. and ambition tolive in friendship with Yugoslavia., the so-called. Usto.sh:l. were beingorganized, tro.ined, and equipped in Germany and Italy.

The

were revolutionary bands under the leadership of Dr. PaveJ.ic.
numbers ran up to several thousands.

Ustashi
TheirSome were in Croatia and in1-

mcdio.toly ar·te1· the outbreak o:f' the 'Wal' were ac1;ive behind the front
as saboteurs and partisans.
At the very ·time when Yugoslavia was adhering to the Three PowerPact, a verbal agreement was being made with D~. Ante Pavel.ic andGeneral Kraternik for ·the secession of' Croatia from Yugoslavia "atthe appropriate time".

'.rhe1•e were two pot::tsibUities here:

1) Either the adherence vToul.d meet with resistance (as it did) 1
would be dropped, and there wouLd be mil.ita.ry action; in thiscase Croatia was to secede at once and operations of the Yugoslav
Fourth A:rmy were to be hindred as f&.. as pose ible by sabotage; or
2)

The agreement would "go smoothl.y" 1 ln which case Croatia

would secede ai'ter t:J.e "peaceful occupa.ti"n" of Yugoslavia by
German and Italian ·troops.

Incidents could be engineered to~---giv•! the necessary grounds for this "new- a.rre.ngement".
Before the signers of the pro·tocol got home, a coup -was pulled off inBelgrade and the Pact of Vienna became invalid.

The new govern;ment'

made it cl.ear ·t.ll.a.t it entertained no hostility to Germo.ny but it '\'Tasalso clear tha;t there was !"'QW no chance of sending German troops

27

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through Yugoslavia to aid the Italians.

Nevertheless the occuI

pat.ion of Greece was prerequisite to other mE'asures that had bee~planned.
The Nazi press prj.nted all manner, of angry accusations andon 6 April 1941 GermaQY declared war on Yugoslavia and Greece andthe open city of Belgrade was severely bombed.
and Skoplje were occupied.

on 9 Aprjl Salonika.

On lb April tho main body of the Yugo-

slavia arr11,y had been beaten and Belgrade had been occupied.
April the Yugoslav Second Army capj.tulated at Sarajevo.

On 17

Three days

earlier at Agram the newly formed Croatian Government of Dr. Pavelic
and General Kraternik had been set up.

It immediately sent greetings

to Hii..ler and Mus&olini with a request. fox· recognition, which was
granted.
The reasons for the swilt collapse of the Yugoslav defense
lay in the great super:ior.l.ty of the Germans in mn and me.teriel prima.rj.ly in the air - but also in the i'act that the Yugoslav
forces had no time for a regular mobilization.

Furthermore, on

the first day of hostilitiesJ dive bombers destroyed the Ministryof War between 7 and 8 o•clock in the morning and the General
Staff thereafter had no contact with the armies it was supposed todirect.

On 10 April the Conwander-in-Chief sent the following order

to ar~ groups and independent armies.
11

All subordinate troops, wherever they come in contact with theene~,have to fight in all directions on their own initiative,

ld. t.hout waiting for orders from the higher commands."

During the t.en days of fj_ghting, the Commander-in-Chief had to

28

RESTRICTEDRESHI@N9 32
rel¥ ont.irc:cy- on a s11.1J.l portable ra(\io sot.

The entire telephone

ond ·telegraph not110rk l'IUS eithor smashed by the air attack or crippledby the Fifth Column..

'l'hc seven lue;osl.av a.unies had to rel;r exclusive-

ly on radio and now a dctoct in poacetime tl..ainlng proved fateful.

At maneuvers, radio had been used hesitantl;y', hence no great practical.
e.x;ptn•icnc~ein the development and can:.ouflagj.n.g of traffic had beenacquired.

J.foreover, in communications - as in other matters - the.

French pattern had been followed and tho weaknesses found in Frenchcommunications lfl'Jre also round here, o~ aegra.vatcd due to lack ofpractice.

Consequentl,y, i.he Gel'IJUl.n and Ita.lian intercept service had

the best imaginable results, especia.ll,y since the Germans 1rere al.ready reading a.ll the Yugoslav cryptographic systems.

The Germa.n

command had from the first hours of the t"lar a complete picture of
the assembly, movemeute; and intentions of the Yugoslav a.nnies.

This

was a decisive factor, at least, for the speed with w'J.'li.ch operations
could be carried out.
In Gl"eece events movod ra.pidl;y and on 4 Mq 1941 Hitler

delivered a great speech in Berlin, which closed with the prediction that the Nazi State would endure for a thousand years.
,_../"/.As earl.Jr as September 1940 1ii.tler had decided upon 11a.r with

the Soviet Union.

He knew this was no trifling matter and that

careful prepara·tions must be ma.de.

He had his eye on the oil fields

o.t the Near ED.st and his strategic goal w.aa not Greece or Crete but

the area around Mosul, Iraq.

He would attack in two directions:trom the Balkans through Turkey or Crete and &Jriaf and fro.'D. North
Africa.via. Egypt..

These plans were revealed to the German inter-

29

RESTRICTED.

cept. ser11ice uhen rad:f.o traffic of the Ncar East became the centerof' inter~st.

The two intercept stations or the OKW were instructed

to give pr:iol"i·ty to 'l..lle traffic o£ •.rurkey, Ira.n, Iraq, Syria,

Palestolne, Tro.ns-Jordtm, and F.;~.v:pt.

Cr;ypta.na.J.ytic activity became

i'eve-rish, -whi~e in 'fl.U'key a vA.s·t; cspionaee and pl'opo.aa.nda organi-zation was set up.

The Arab population wo.s to be turned against

England and, ii' possible, a "Ht.,ly lva.r" let ~oose.

For success it wasnecessary to have 1\x:I.s ·troops at t.h1~ Suez Canul.

In September 191~0 Gra.z1.anl started his offensive a.go.inst
Alexandria f'rcm Cyrenaica.

On 9

In a. fortnic;ht it ho.d bogged datm.

Decembe1• General \olo.vell began his counteroffensive and SUIL\shed theIta.~ia.n f1•ontvery quick~y.

On 6 Februar;y Bengha.si feU.

Then

Wavell' s off'ensive came to a halt on ·the frontier between Cyrenaica.
and Tripoli·to.nia.

Italy had suffered its firBt great defeat in this war.

This eight weak campaign attracted great a.t.tcntion.

People were

gucssins as to 1ihe:rc the British superiority might have lain.

Cer-tainly not in nutllbers, since the Italtans were far stront;er.

Certain..

ly not in mate1•iel 1 since the Italians llere well equipped and bad

had ·twenty years of' experience in desert warfare; they k.nev the country :f'a.r better tb.un the F.nglish did.

Of course General Uavell wasa first rate millta.ry leader, but Grazieni uas no novlce.

In fact

he was the Italian specialist in colonial warfare and from 1926 to. 1932 he hnd fought all over ~ipolitnnin and Cyrenaica ond conquered
them.

!Iou· could this colonio.l strat~gis t. suffer such o. c.liscrro.ce.ful

defc.mt?
The ammcr is siwplo.

Bo.clt in 19r6-1932 the C•::ll'~&~::m' Intercept

30

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service had been able" to follow currently from l~unich each o£Graziani's operations including all preparations therefor, alldisposit:i.ons and measures (whether regarding supply, equipment,
transportation or what not) £rom Italian traffic.
a distance of many hundred kilometers.

This was £rom

At thali time people in theGerman intercept control station in Berl:i.n tlere astounded at the
frivolous manner in which the Italians used the radio..

Moreover,observation of Italian maneuvers ~Ad proven that they had notlearned much subsequently.
When the Italian campaign in North Africa began in September
19~0,

our monitor1.ng revealed conditions sinrl.lar to those during

Graziani's operations against the natives.

Not quite so bad, it

is true, but nevertheless "bad enough.''

No doubt Wavell had asmoothly .functioning intercept service..

The Italians l'adioed ina way that would warm the heart o:f any intercept operator.

Con-sequently wavell was very well informed regarding the sitlJAtion on
the Italian side.

He could learn not only how many divisions

were available but also all deta:i.ls regarding the disposition ofunits, their strength, their equipment, the number and type ofplanes 1 stocks of fuel 1 etc.
learned by monitoring.

After a few weeks all this could beConsequentlY1 Wavell must have known theconstitution of the Italian front and its effective strength dO'Im
to the last detail by the time his offensive started.
what Graziani might do,

No matterhe had not ti1e leas1, chance of successin the face of the compromis:ing work of his own radio sta.tions.
Early in January 1941 an agreement was reached bet.ween Hitler
and Mussolini to send German troops to North Africa; the German

81

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"Afrj ka Korps" was tCJ be set up under General Rommel.

By mid-January troop trains began rolling over the Brenner Pass.
on 2b narch 19L.l, a few days berore the attack on Yugoslavia,
Rommel launched his attack !'rom El Agheila and iirlrnl3dia.tely ovt>rranthe British front.

Tob.1·uk was reached on 12 April and Solll.:\m on

16 April ..
Viewed from a dists:J.ce, Rommel's offensive was an astounding
success.

But it had been possible only because the British had along supply line and because Wavell had had to give up three di.vi.sions
out of his already weakened fore~ for service in Greece.

Germ~~and Italy had done ever,ythins possible to ~nduce England to send
those troops to the Dalkans, becaust:e it wa.s Rom:11el r s mission to
pus'h through to the Suez CanlJ.l.
th~lt

Ger·man military circles wore sure

after the departure of tht:!se thx-ee divisions, the African front

would be so weak that. a drive t.hrough northern Egypt would be possible~

Sollwn.

But an astonishing ~hing happened:

Rommel did not get beyond

The British had not evacuated •robruk and the encirclementof this city tied down too many of Rommel's forces, which shouldhave been used t.o continue the offensive.
As has been stated, it was Rommel•a ~tssion to push throughto the suez Canal and appear opposite the Arabian peninsula.

Sim1.1.1-

tanoously, an attack from the Balkans was to be la\mched acrossTut·koy in the -direc·Uon of Iraq.

t-1oamrhile, by utonths of effort,

the ground had been prepared in Iraq for the outbreak of a ''Holy.

War 11 the moment Rotnr.,el reached the Suez Can:J.l and Gcrm:m troops
entered Asia Hinot·.

32

RESTRICTEDThere was one man uho warned against this campai~n, ,Juat as

he had warned ar:;ainst the campaign in the Balkans; that was l..haGerman ambassnrior in Ankara, von Papon.

As a result the~ decision

was IIJ..1.de to at tack vla Crete and Syria rather than through Turkey.
In some way the F:nglish must have recei..1ed and deciphered

the teleerams passing bet-..men von Papt"!n and Ribbentrop..

It iscert!in that they had knowledge of the German plans from Januar,y1941 on.

Consequently they directed all efforts ·t.o the Near East.

In Iraq, a powerful friend, Raschid Ali el Gail.ani, had been
won over and everything had been prepared for a coup d'etat.
In Iran, Reza Khan was friendly to Germany and had been reducing English influence in the oil fields of southern Iran.
'Numerous Germans had entered the country and h."ld been enl.ia't.ed in
the intelligence service;

after the beginning of the war, ad-ditional agents had been sent to Iran by way of Turkey.

In thespring of 1941 the situation was such that Reza Khan was readyto act with Germany, once German troops had crossed the Suez .canaland the Eosporous.
In Afghanistan there were numerous German agents engaged in
shaping up the political situation.
In Syria things were even more simple.

As a French mandated

territory it was under the control of the German - Italian Armistice Co~ission.

General Dentz, who commanded the French oc-

cupation troops here, was loyal to Vichy.

No opposition on hispart to the landing and transit of German troops was expected.
Realizing that the majority of the people in the Arab countries can be reached only through religious leaders,Germany had

RESTRfCTED

enlisted the Grand l1u£ti of Jerusalem.

He had been in Berlin, hadcall.ad on m.tl.or rQpeateaq, and 1-ra.e prepared to unlea~h a. •'Holy
War" 'tl'heuevor German::; desired.
On~ in 'frans-Jordun was thegovemm.ont friendl.y to England.

In gratitude for English support, the ruler, Emir Abdulleh, had

placed at t.ho disposal of the British t-wo corps.

But since tho two

togother had scarcely 1000 mon and since the territory \18.9 snall,no se1~ous resit~nce ~~s to be 6h~cted.
Wllile prepo.rationa for a l.a.rge scale action were BQing on in the
Near East, a. divarsione.r,y action was started to give the impressionthat Gerrr~ planned an attack on &iltzerland and ~nother on Portugal
eith~.:r incooJ.-cro.tion with Sra.in or at least 1dth Spanish consent.

This l'.-as done so ~:;uccessfulJy that the countries concerned and GreatBritain soriow3~ counted on such military operations.

On 4 Ap1"ilcame the GeJ.'Ill!lll a.ttack on Yugoslavia; on the sc..me c:Ucy- ROJIImel pushedforward to Benghasi; on the sam~ day thoro l·ra.s a coup d'etat in Iraq.
Although the new government of Iro.q proclaimed. a. desire to remaintriendo trl:l:.h Great Britain and Tur~ey, both countries received these

protestations l'dt.h akepticie!n.

The British l·.r(n-e monitorine Near E"sttraffic and no doubt had broken the cryptog1•aphic F'Ystcmo.

In anyca.zo, Gennan intentions cou1d not rc.-n.:rln concee.led forever andEngland decided to act.
011 17 April stz-ong British units land~d in the harbor of B~uJra.
Early in }f:zy- the Government or Iraq h.."...li-9d the British Govornm.llnt an

ult.im.ltum roquestL11g :L'!.mediate 1•.:.novo.lcountey.

or all Bl'itizh tr.:>ops frc::n. the

A:t:'tel· it e:x:pirad on ll1 N....y, :-::,roral nirticld:J e:lra r.ur-

34

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rouncled and tho pipe ~ine ·t.o Haifa wn.a cttt.

The Mossul oil fie~ds

were removed :rrom Bt·i·I:;:J.sh conhro~ and placed under guard.

IJ.'his in-

ter1•up·t:J.on of the oil su,pply for the B1•itish Mudi't.e:re.nnean :r~eet
was one or tb.c principal. obJect:i.ves of' the operations d.irected from.

Germany.

l'lithout, oil thG British i'lee·t would be inca.pc."~?l.e of act-:l.on o.nd the Italion fleet 1 in sp:ll:;e ~-,r severe losses in l".Jarch 1 'Tould
dominate the Mediterranean, and be able to se.f.eguard German landings.

ThcX'e were anti-Br:l.tish demonstrations in other Arab countries.
German planes with officers and technicians lo.nded in Syria andGerman troops occupied the isl.and oi.' Mll.o.s, ntidwa.y between Athens
and Crete.

Rommel. was at the Egyptia.'l frontiet•.

The end of' Bri·t:J.shdomination in the near Eo.s·t seemed at hand.

On 1.0 ~1ay, Rudolf Hess flew to England to induce the British

Government to reverse ~.ts policy on the hasis of theRe f'o.cts andof the preparations baine: undertaker1 ee;a1.nst Russ:ta.

He 'tfent no·t

"officially" but "unof.:l'icio.lly11 lTith Hitler's knowledge.

On 14 l.fay the Gerwan air attacks on Crete began, bu't the struggle
for the island turned out more difficult than eA~ected; it

involved heavi.er losses and required more time ·than a.nticipa·ted.
Some l~OO air cra.i't vrcre lost and almost 16,000 German sol.dierslost their lives.

Rommel. did not get beyond. Sollum.

i'he B1•:Ltish

appeared at the Syrian frontier; ("..eneral ~Tavell restored calm in
Egypt; the Hess af!tdr failed utterly.

P1•esident Roosevelt pro-claimed an unlimi'bfad state of emergency and llas au·thor:l.zed togive unlimited aid to England.

l-1hil.e German troops were fighting

on Crete, the British moved into S;yria.

The picture had changed

35

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fuudo:melltally.

Tho co.mpa.ign in the Noo.r East was abandoned andtbe Ba.llw.n campaien becomo a mere apisodo •In Rome the Duke of

Spoloto wns proclnim~d Kin6 of Croatia. but did not deem it edvisablo

to go to his new k1.nsdom..
I cannot conclude this cbnpte1• w!that•l; a few more words regard-

ing the struggle for Crete.

This was on~ or t.lle decisive i'actors 1n

tbe collo.pse of th9 plan for a lca.p in the lfcar East.

The Germans

had counted on tolting Crete quicl~ in a. surpr:l.se attack.

'l!he troops,

aircraft, and ships that were nm.de ready were intended pritJJDrilyfor tbe J.anding in Syria.

Unexpectedly a l.arge par·t was used up :l.nthe struegle for the Island ot Crete.
How can we explain the unexpected resistance on this island!
I can orrer no proof 111 suwort of' the e.ssu~tion I am about

to set forth, but all lilY observations indico.Le that the garrison had
precise knowledge of' the i'IIQ?cuding attack.
involved.

I'ossibl.y treachery was

The Gcrnn11 prepo.ratlons in Athens could not be kept secretin the long· run.

Uoreover 7 f'rom all previous preparations one could

easily concl.ude tl"'at an e.tl;ack on the island would follow soon.

All this, hOl;evcr, m"!'rely pe1•mittod ona to recognize tho intention
to e.tt.ack, bardly tho pointH sel.ect-.!d far tho a·ttack.

For vorious

reasons, 1 conoidcr lt probable that tho '13ritish intercept service
llad ol>tain~d llrecise k!1rnr.lede;..:: of d·~ta.Us of the action.

Churchill

said lliu•nel.i' in Cot!il!ons, th~ t tho! Britlsh Cott1.1'.e.nd "Vas 1ni'ortr..r:!d of
the in•pe:mlin~ s.tt:lc!:. ·The 1"CsiAt!!ncc of' th..: Allit...d troops 1 ·ullich e.ll· ost evcryvh3reg:wc the itlj)rct:sion ::il.:lt thoy h~d b<.:m uo.itihg il"pf.t'l:;m:.~y i'ol' tho
GerUJ~n:.J.ttr.ck, tl~ ove:nts off Cope Sp:J.ti:."l ·uh~rtl th:. C-.a.·rr·un convoy
I I•
0) •J

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was scatlered and almost destroyed, these admit of no other explana tion tl1an that the defenders of the island we1·e lul~ in!ormedby radio o.r all details.

rossibly there we1·e English radio agentsin Athens who got thei.r information from high German sources but

it is quite as likely that the German cryp'l:,ographic systems had beensolved and that German traffic was being read.
the British can answel'"•

3'2'

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38

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THE CAMPAIGN IN THE EAST ... 1941

While all the other campaigns of Hitler had some consistent,
realistic basis, something d1·amatically theatrical attaches to thecampaien in the East.

This runs through the entire course of theenterprise, begi.nning uith the plarming of the campaign, the six
documents put out b.Y the OID~ to throw the blrune on the Russians,
and ends -well it ends with the end~
On 22 June 1941. at 0$30 Dr. Goabbels read over the Gerwan radio
a long appeal by Hitler, ·t;o the Garmon people. "Condemned ·to monthsof silence, the hour has now come when I can finally speak openly,"
thus the proclama.tj.on begins.

Then x'ollow all the old arguments&

England's trickery, the dagger-in-the-back s1ory of 1918, the effortsof the National Socialist J.lovement for unitYs tha Jeuish•Bolshevist

rulers in Russia, the treache;rous Russian arming, the imperie..listic.

aims of U:osCOlf, and the Jel'dsh-Anglo-Saxon instigators o:f the ltar.
Many words and many untruths.

At 6 o'clock in the morning, in the hall of the Council ofState in the Foreign Office, Ribbentrop revealed to representativesof the German and foreib~ press, who had been dragged from theirbeds, the note of the Forei~l Office to the Soviet Govermuent.
The effect of this sunday surprise on the German people·varied.
The National Socialists were enthusiastic.

Some people had for-seen something of the sort a.nd were not surprised;others believed

the broadcast and found therein at last the explanation of the nonoccurrence of the invasion of Englandc~ver.ythingl

So Russia was to blame for

At last the story was outl

39

RESTRICTEDBut a very lat•go part o:r tho Gorm::\n. p-;ople hnd a dull reelingof great c:lro'.:tety.
milit~l'Y matters,

A Gei"fllan autho:r, lfho "tm.s lrell-inform(ld in

said to me tha.t do.y:''The ua.r in the East is nosign of Gerro.."\ll st1·ength, rather it is the first serious oign ofweaknef'sJ"

Then the Gcarroen radio became silent.

\ih:Ue everyone wa.i ted

feverishly for ne\;s from the Eastern theater, all soz•ts of things
I

were recounted over the Gcn11an radio, only nothing about the war
in the East.

After a full week Goobbels pulled a theatricalstunt by having read at ha.lf hour intervals some eight or ninespecial reports, scme were four or five d~s old.

It was a dawn-right childish attempt to increase t.he tension in order then tobring reliei" through these special reports as if by a clearing-of£
shower.
lihen th~ campaign in the East began, the Gorman radio intercept

service by months of observation had obtained a rulativeq clear

picture of the Russian. assemb:Q".

This gave the Geman command,.e17 valuabl.s hints ~01~ planning and executing its operations.
Moreover a captatn of the Rusaian airtorce was captured about two
weeks attar the war started who botrqed the Russian air key sothat Moalders t fighter squadron dealt the Russian airtorce several
serious blows - in particul.o.r by shooting down more than 100

machines in a battle ii1 the vicinity or Minsk •The Russian

cryptographic system t'fa.S che.nBed short.:cy arterward., to be sura.

40

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~'h'J G'-'Xllltlll All· Foroo

got. .Q;nother surpr.isc during thoso

the out-bl"CRk of the tial· tbat. t.ho Ilusuie.n Air Forco could
thrmt co~c 10.. 000 ple.nes int.o tl1e struggle.

'l'h.ere v.r<lro al~oII

rel:t:J.bltl r.aports ·t.tutt:. tho Ruo3ien aviation incluet17 lfaS GVell
1tlu:..n ce.p,:tble or i'a.i.rl,y hieh production..

In tbo Q(..norsl. startof the Gon:r,arJ. Air Fol"Qo .no credence "'-"a:'.' given those sta.temant,a ..

action l~-as. 3 J oco ..

shot d.O'i'in but the IW.t:iaian Ail" Fo1·co was still well reprasentod
in tho air.

'Ihtl G-e1·m.e.n Gcno1·al Sto.ft ba.(!ut to m.i.strust its.figures !or plc.ncs shot dc~n..

Sevoi·al. coir;,nissions toe:.•e sent

cut to count l.;ho l'Cnmins of Rl.lss:la.n machines, whereby' morellGN:ound than had been reported.

It l·m.a soon apparontthat tlr;;~ GG1·man General Staff ht.d thorouBhl:y deceived itse-.l.t.
'
On ll Jul.y1941 the OKW rc,por.t mmour1ced that 6,23.3 Rl1ssiana:l.1• craft had boo11 put, out · ot action.
In the .f'i1•st. week o£ July came the celebrated double-

encirclement battle noar Bial;ystok and Mi11sk, o.t the conclusion

ot ·which the. OK\'1 t"igured tho total. mzbcr ot prisoners taken onl l Jul.y at JPQl'fJ tl~ 4001000.

Thia waG an enormous nwnbor andthe numbez·s subooquentl;r reported wero 11ot too modest; they hs.donl~ one out:

they did not quite agree with tho truth, orrather they consisted of a mixture of tl"Ut.h and fancy.

RESTRfCTED

Uot

only col.dier3 but alr;:o m~l.e eivil.inno picked up in tho battle aroa
had 'L~~l CO\U'1tod.
When tho carr.p:den b<"(;JU1 1 tho GQI'JD.Qne expected nc-:>t onl;r the

Ruaaiau aiJey' but also l:;.ho rolitlr.::.U. .stxuctw~o ot the Soviet Union
to coll'lp.so.

Hitl~l.. calledt.ho strum::~c a CJ."'lf.l~.d~J ac;aim't

Bolshmmn md cl.<lir•lcd it \.raa not directed against Rllt;'CJit\ IJrJ&Uch or against the Ruesian pcopla.

Rn.oaion oniernr~ts in Gol'ill8.JV

su:pport..ed thio '\"13r3ien p,nci cleimcd that.. tho Rusniru-t i='~')ple as a

11hole 1-m.s looL;ing £or th~ C'VC"l"'tlll"U:ll' of ~h'3 Dol.r.:hov:J.ol". oyatc.i11 ..

The GenWJl troops ·uero ord(•r£d not to f'ir.o O!l the CC.'UOllSt~ative

procc:as:J.ono "tihich 'H'Julcl com~ to 111et~t thoo, b:::-.rint bu.unertJ 1:ith
pictur.es or oninto and in tb:~ a-'~oi:"tn nr..t.icn~l colors (bluo -l'Jhit.e - 1•cd).

So fclr.Kl li.:J.:J th3 picture cnt,ert:Uned in inf'luential.

Ge:nn.:m. cit-eles ot· politic:U. onndit.icnP in t.ho Surlot Uuic..n f.md o:C

the pcyc:holngy ot t.h') HuaE>lnn J;€-oplol

ThOU{')lt.f\11 p·~op:.to 11ro1"0 Ar.~kine tb :.--1;:-~lvos five qu,.~tiomnl..

\ilmt. wi.J~ he the effect. of tht.t vc.ot ~'f·'lC\l of Hu;"jaiaon .t'"".::.lt LlOVillt't UTiit.~?

Tho Sino-J.t::.prm~r-3 1.-.&r::-J"tordcd sa:.oo cltms but. Lho torr:~.in of EUl"'pa:mrmcsis. lrt".o dirft-.L'e:nt.

2.

l'lhat will b:l the cr.roct o:r th"l R~Jce.irn ';lnter withito 10\.; t~......p-er~.t.ur.n end anou fnJ l r.nd ot: t..l~~ conditionof Ru~~i{!n ltlt;hu:·.ya en o~·3rati.,n::J o£ en a:~t.!!.cker
re\.,vina cll"i.·J:t.']V.,. on n~·:>toriz'Jti l!:-;ri"cro?

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3. Is the int(lnw.J. structure of tha Soviet Union
firm cnolle,h to endure aevore initial dc!cat?
Or is theN d..."\tlgel" that. - as i.n 1917 - unrest

will l"'aul:t. in a chain of def'oata? Is there
really a l_rond at.ratum i.n the popu.latiort uhioh

is suitable and is in a poeaition to start. acountor movemont?

4. Will the Ge:nnan a.tta.ck evoke a. now a.waken.i.ng of
na.tion~l £e~l.il'lg

on th-3 pa.rl of the Russian

people? Russian hislio1:y altows several. suchcases:

once ear:cy in th~ ~7tn Celltur,y underprcsGU.re fro-.n the Poleo afte3r the Houee ot
Rurik had diad out; ag.:dn in 1.812; and a thi:r.>dtime in 1921 in the wa.l." again"t the new Polish

Republic lihile Ruasia ltao :ttaeJ.t in tlla midst

ot civU \'la.rJ
5. \'lha.t is the dl)fensive strangtih of the Soviet
Union in personnol and materiel? liibat is thecapacity of the mun:l.tiono industcy?

These questions could be discussed but on.cy~ the course of
events woul.d give val.i..d a.nawors..
I

The ·Ganu...l\n High C<.\t!Lr.nc.""md had

anstmred 'hem al.l in advance in Gorma.ny's 1'avor, especl~
number 3.

By :U,atlets and by radio reports trrere spread repe~l;edly'

43

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that Rllssian units ha.d kill.Bd their political camnissars a11d.

Dq by' d83r the l<"'inniah radi.o broadeast in Russian

surNndered..

the .admonition:"clViee out l;.he counnissa.rs and clean bot.\se in

Rueeia; then the 0el"!&L1Uls will. rea.dil.;y come to an "Understanding

with ;rou I"
The Rllssian psople is not a hot-·b.l.oodf.!'d race which it is eal.f.r
to intl.aul.e..

Thl3 nuss:l.arz. pee>ple h&.s often been characterized as asl.ugglsh .nu&Si!ll r

This is not carrect.
fOl"\1eor i'lill own..

'rhl) Russiru.A people ha.s a quiet d;vnamio

If this f'o1•ce i.s aroused - and that can orLcy'

happen 'I.Ulde:r ext:raorc:linal.')· circumstances sud even then 110t overnigh-t, but onq by 13l.ow dtSgreas - then it gains momentum and moves

toward :l.t.s goal as inoeoistibl~ .a.s a gi..gantic steam roller, having

regard for· no1.-h.i.ng, ~"'ing at. no dan.ge1•, sparing no sacrifice.
Once .y-oused in this war, this force would not ebb until the last
foe had beEU1. driven fran the sacred soil of Russia.

Wnat those real.ly' acquainted with Russia k11ew and expected, cameto pass..

'l'o the political farl&ticism of the mass of the Russian

people, whicllwould never have proven decisive by' itself', was added

what Tukha.chevcld. had striven for tour :rears earlier, although in a

dif'terent fom.

In the Soviet Union, the land ot the Intemationale,ot the Coodntem, of ooamopolitan Bolshevism, arose the idea. of ane.tional struggle tor liberatio.a..

Tbe \o,"a.tchword was not:"Proletar:tana of all countries, uniteJ
in your behal..tl" 1 but ratheY':

This struggle is being waged"Rise fo1• tho battle of liberation topreserve the inviolability of tbe homelandJtt

44

RESTRICTEDRES~-f€~ 2
Instead ot bringing on denlol'Bliza.tlon, each German victol"',}"

increased the dotemdna.tion ol the Russian people to see theatruggle through to t.he end.

Just what released this force in Russia? It was the tac·tthat the National Socialist Geiman Command had unmasked itstrue intentions premattweq.

The propaganda ot a "hoq war

against Bolshevism" had retreated into tbe back.ground andquite frank tallr. about "space in the East" had taken its
place.

The gospel of napace in t.he Ea.s-li", which had bem1

pounded into the heads or the YQWlger German generation on elloooas:tons, meant the occupation ot the hoq soU ot .Russia.
Anti-Bolshevist Russie.n emigrants in Central and Weetem
Europe turned away :f'l:om the "hoq lfal• agai11at Bolshevism••.

This went so tu tllat in Augus"t· .1941 leading members of theWhite Guard in Paris, 11.tho had riskec\ their l.1.ves .fighting

against Bolshevism, we1-e arrested by the German Gestapo
because they ope~ advocated defense of Russian soil.
Even -~shakov, who had been appointed by the C'lEtrmans chief..--of Russian emigrants in Gel'll.Wl occupied te1•rU.oey, .f:l.nal.q
turned awa;y tl'QiD. Germany.
By the middl.e of Jul;r l.94J., the VIB.l.itz•• in the East wasat an end.

Tllere followed a struggle against an opponent. whofought bitterl;?· and tene.oiousl.1'.
ate]¥~

Every oity was detend.6d desper-

The German tiuletable was alree.~ lf1'8cked...

45

RESTRICTEDThe losses on both sides were enormous-on the German side at

the end of July 1941 'almost a. million men had dropped out.

The

Propaganda Section thought it expedient to COlUbat the "rumors" orbeav,r German losses.

BY mid-August, the Germano reached the

Dnieper, south or K1eT1 and were approaching Odessa, while the advanceon t,eningrad was under wq.

on 16 August the OKW issued an official communique stating thatthe resistance of the enemy had everywhere been broken; the Russians
were throwing in hurriedly-assembled reserves.

On 20 August a battle in the GoNel area terminated, in whichparte or 25 Russian divisions had participated.

Gomel was occupied

but Odessa and Leningrad were .preparing for stubborn defense.

The

degree to which the Russians were prepared to defend their cities had
been shown at Smol.ensk:

Inost or the city was destroyed and o£ its

160,000 inhabitants only 15,000 were there lfhen the Germans marched in.
B.Y the end of August the Oe:nwm advance was growing slower andslower even though indiVidual victories could be reported.
Maqy may still recall tl~ communique or the OKW in the second
half of August which said that the Russian front was in a state ofdissolution; no unified command could be recognized a~ longer.

Behind this p1·onouncem.ent, which was couched in propagandistic ~tyle,there was more than appeared at first sj.ght..
into this last statement.

46

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It is intriguing to look

Under the fury o£ the first German assault, "tfbioh caused

tte entire Russian rront ·to waiver, the system of Russian ~radio traffic had likewise beetl bad1Y shaken 1 especially in tb*
matter o:f' camou:f'J.aee against the foreign intercept se1"V:I.ce.

'

The

Russian radio service barl orP.rated in such fashion that, withthe systems employed, tb.e rele.ttons' o! tbe radio stations andtherefore of' the unl.l:; a (;af!'s w1 tb. one anothel.' t.rere kept fa:r frotn

transparent, and :In many- cases could not be recogf.lized at all.
'

The breaking of the front a.1; vo.rious pojnto; tho encirclement of.
entire divisiolls, corps, and &."'111i~s; tbe awift retreat of' theRussians at many poj nts.; i;he br .l.Jlg1Dg 'l.P o£ l."einforcements andreplacements; the necessity of closing g4ps; recoruJa.issance overlarge o.rea.s; the lack o"f. an;y· wire net of t.~!r own .. all t.'hisforced the Russians in counU.es& caGes. to use 2:a.dio -without consid-

ering whether the enel!t,)'" would de-rive ~netit. tMref'rom o1· not.

mUi.ta17 max:im vhi.ch had to be e ppJ tea in ·tlds ~.,l.n conse-radio eonnectioos atk1 al.ac of tho c~ rel.at1orw e:r:tending.:frola! regbnents end d.lv;Ls.iooe Up to ·th.El h:l&he'st lillta.f'"Fs..
pl'!P-n~n

1.!he-

n.s s.JRfJer to that MM:U'eated in tire C~&mpa.:l.fUl in ttra

We.st..

1Jegt.1!11 au ocde.rl..:T retreat. eeeord~ to plan_, \lhi16 9-.PS :bJ ·tib

:fro 'llt. lrepn w ell.ose ~ on\e.r ret:w:llel BlortJ.¥ 1D the 8als$f.sm

47

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multip..te .tre~Mcies and call signs, cautious haltdling or messages,

avoidance of plain text, etc. 1 ag.edn came into its own.

With tllis,

the connecting lines on tlle radio charts or the eval.uators and ot
the illteroept service disappeared more and. more and a chaotic

picture resul.ted, consisting ot single radio links without 81\Y'connection.

Viewed on the map, ·t.his could. onl,y give the impression

ot a progressive dissolut,ion of the organic subordination hitherto
observed.

The conclJlsion drawn was that the Russian system ofcommand was breaking down more and mo1•a and that the front ever.rwhere consisted merely or resistance groups without cOimection with

one another.

"No un:t..f-led command could be recognized &.n1' longer.n

In reality the reverse was ·la'Ue.

.That wilich represented astrengthening of the Russian front was erroneous:Qr evalua:lied as aphenomenon ot dissolution.
Such a capital mistake was orLcy' possible because 1n the
expansion of' the German intercept service one had neglected to.increase corresponding]¥ the number ot qualified evaluators.
Instead ot training and assigning people or the highest intelligence with a precise knowl.Gdge ot the organiza:t.ion ot theRussian ~ and the Russian radio service, 1..course was had

to non-commissioned officers lrho had no operational backgroundand knew little or nothing about specitica.l.q Russian milita.I7

a.f'fairs.

So tar as I Imow, there t~ere at the beginning ot the

war tuo or three Ger.nan eval.ua.tors who had ha.d eJq>erience withthe radio situation in the EastJ

Ten times that n~~ber would

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have been necessar,r.

Recourse was had to evaluators trained

for work in the West. The first - abnormal - radio picture thesemen got or the Russians was taken b,y them to be the normal picture,
because it corresponded to the nomal picture in the west.

Then

when the situation changed and the normal Russian radio picturevas revealed, these men - using western norms - were misled intodrawing conclusions that would have been appropriate in the west.
This was a fateful error.
Leningrad held out and Odessa fought heroical~ until midOctober.

The battle for these two cities was a prevue of what

was to come.
Meanwhile Hitler and Ribbentrop were tr,ying eagerlT to draw
Japan into the war against Russia but Japan had ather interests it cast its eyes toward the south.
Moreover, war production in the u.s.A. had gotten under wq
and deliveries to the Soviet Union began to now via Iran andthe caucasus.
The National Socialists still maintained that the Russians
were fighting so stubbornlY only because the political commissars
forced them into battle with drawn pistols.

Few stopped tothink that one man - even the wildest,with a pistol in his__,.

hand - C.annot possibly dominate and drive forward the 4000
men of a Russian regiment on the battle field.

No, it was

not the caa~ssars who caused the increasingly fanatical

49

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resistance, it was tb.e lU.Ltional oonsclence, it watJ the will toprotect the homeland.

U11it after unit fought to the last man,few prisoners still had a weapon.

Such resiatanee to the pointof annihilation was not due to COJJII'.issars threatening withrevolvers.

Of course, the commissars did work tirelessl~ withpropaganda to support. the disc:l.pline and fighting spirit but thedecisive factor Wli.S the will to defend the sacred soU of Ruseia.
Such resistance was something the German troops ha.d not met
before.

~rei.&

on Crete, where it htld been toughest, resistance

had not easllll'led these forms.

German operations were slpwed.
up in.·~-r'

comparison with pclJgress in tho west, north, and south.

This

explains repeated reference on the Gorman radio and in the press
to the "criminal and seneeJ.ess resistance of the Sovietstr; it isalso the reaeon for Hitler's remark on 3 October 1941 that in theeast they faced an eneJJG" consisting not or men but ot animals andbeasts.
Significant was the first statanent in that speech:"I sq

it todlcy- tor the first time, because tod~ I can a~ it, thisenemy is already broken and will never rise again".
This aby~al self-deception may be without parallel, at all
events it was fateful. because followed by a second statement:"We have been so forehanded that in the midst of this might:( warot materiel I can nort cut ba.ck production in Iri&IY lines, because
I lmo-11'1 there is no longer any opponent whom we ce.nnot ovor'Ccmewith the stock of a'll.rnuniticn en hand." This l'la.B not propaganda,
production in rr.my lines ![':!! cut and m.art:r a Gcr111..an eoldicr

50

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subsoqucnt~ suffered in consequence.

On the night from 1 to 2 October the decisive battle began

and into it Hitler threw all be had.

On J.a October the doubl.ebatt!$ of Brianek and Viaem.o. ended with the destruction ot
8 Russian! armies and the capture of almost 6501 000 men.

Theroad to Moscow appeared to lie open.
I

On.2.3 October the German papers trlUJD.pban~ published theInews t~t :V.lB.rshals VoroshUov, Timoshenko ,and BudomJ1'j had beenrelieved or their commands and tumed over to the GPU.

Purge", "They are SUent in Moscow''"Greatwore among the headlines.

It was no purge, however, and Moscow had good rea8on to besilent.

These experienced commanders had boen sent to theEast to train new units.
During August, September, and October 1941, the German 8l'JDl'

intercept service had been monitor~.ng radio traffic ot Russianstations east of Moscow (in the area Jaroslavl- Kostroma. Vl.adind.Jr, -:- Rjasan - Kolomna - l~oscow - Kaljasin - Jaroslavl),

which was beccming more and more active.

From this it

appeared that there was being set up in this area an a11IJ1'
reserve of some 40 divisions.

This was not tactical or

operational or practice traffic or these divisionsa thetroop's radio stations were sealed and were not allowed to
put in an appearance; onl1' procurement traffic tor this reserve

was involved.

It was kept in cipher but the Gem.ans were soonable to decipher and :re&d it completeq at the intercept control
station in LUtzen.

These deciphered messages revealed:

51

RESTRICTEDThe numbers ot the divisions bet.Dc IOJ'Illed1
Their type (tank, inf'antr.r, motortf'AMf,. cavalr.r1. or other divisions) 1
Their composition and organisation,
Their numerical strength,

Their equipnent with arms and ammunition,
Their subordination.
Col.onel Kettler, Chief' of the Intercept Control. Station, canposed
an exhausti ....., report and sent it through General E. Fellgiebel, Chiefot the Amed Forces Signal Troops (the man murdered by' Hitler atter'

20 JlLcy' 1944) I to the General startI Section Foreign Armies kst,
General Matzk;y, who passed it on.
What was set forth there met with immediate rejection, however,
and a few dqs later the report came back to Fellgiebel. with thefollowing marginal notations:wrbey ought to put this "Hosensoheisser" Kettler out ot

business.

(signed)"This is also the opinion ot the FUhrer.
(signed)Jodl."
Fegelein. •(Fegelein was Superior Group Leader in the SS and later Hitler's
brother-in-law; he was a near relative of Eva Braun and was shotishort]1' before the end ot the war by order ot Hitler. )Fellgiebel sent the report; back to Kettler and that was the endot the matter.

I

front.

But the •tHosenscheissern was given a command at theLate in October this traffic ceased and at Hitler's Head-quarters they were .t'i:rm:Q' convinced that it had been a Russian hoax.
The "FUhrer" bad been right - as always.

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~ JJ

Novort.hcless, the earq ctqs of November were marked byincreasin~ stiff resistance in front

ot Moecow. Without

the Go:nnan intercept se1vlce at the front having been able tonotice anything, the .Russians had. brought up freah units andasDemble:d them in a might;y arc northwest and south of Moscow.

They now achieved their first great victo17 in the ether.
On .3 November the f'ift.h German offensive bad bogged down

without even approx:tmate]T reaching its goal.
Among German 8.l'DI1' commanders a light began to dawn.

The7

now recalled numerous reports by" X 49, X .33 1 and V 100, mentioning potential. reserves ot the Soviet Union, the time table ofRussian mobilization, a11d the capa.ci·t:.y ot the munitions :lndustr.r

beyond the Volga.

Brauchitoch recommended wi.thdra:wing theGerman front for the 'Winter to the line Riga.- Kiev- Nikolajev.
Hitler's answer was the order tor the siXth German otf'ensive.

against Moscow, although even in his mind the magnitude of' therisk was beginning to da.'Wll.

On 9 November in Munich he nolonger promised the greatest victor.r ot a.:u times but declared~bing was possible,

sa.ve that GeJ."'l1al'l1' would ever capitulate.

He also insisted that a German officer who did not defend
himself would be courtma.rtialed.

The sixth and last driveon Moscow began.
Conversation of officers in Gel'IIJ8D1' revealed that theinmediate goals of the campaign in the East were Moscow and theCaucasus.

Both must be achieved this year; then there would bea breathing spell, and in· the spring the whol.e area woul.d becleared ot partisans.

53

RESTRICTED•Yes, the partisans 1 The German public rarely heard of thesefighters for freedom.

According to the National Socialist press\

they belonged to the "worst scum of the Bol.shevist criminal world".
They were not considered to be sol.diers.

Graduall.y word trickl.ed

through that these were not roving single bandits but very considerabl.e groups who attacked German rear communications according
to pl.an.

But it was quite a whil.e before the German intercept

service establ.ished the fact that these fighting groups weree~ipped ~i:hby radio.

radios and that their activities were controlled

By the time this was ascertained, the extent of thistraffic had taken on stately proportions.
The observation of these transmitters and especially the taskof locating them proved very dif~icult, not merel.y because theychanged their position almost daily but also because the transmission
strength was relat:tvely low, in any cas(: far lower than the strengthof the army stations intercepted.

Since the facilities and. person-

nel. of the intercept co1qpanies (which were monitoring the enemy's
army traffic) and of simiJ.ar monitoring units of Radio counter-

intelligence (which were supposed to cover agent traffic) were by
no means sufficient for the task, there arose a jurisdictionalsquabbl.e between the two organizations, each asserting that this new
type of traffic belonsed to the task of the other.
Actually each was right from its own point of view but that
did not help matters and t?e result was a vacuum which was justbeginning to cl.ose when it was already too late.

54

RESTRICTED"4it

Tol:ard \.he Mh Jl 9f trbe JC&.~ A. t~lT-i-fl e nuJnbCr of pax1:.i5all

radio ~tations ~lc»1~~~~4 bqth b~~~!a fr~Pt5 in a broad b3nd.
The control stations t.fflf@ J:?ghifit.i tih@ fi:t..tU!iiari. front_ the partisan

tranemittors W61"6 oohi.fid tho Getnie.tl fl"tJ1"lti ..
Not untll the aprlng t>£ 19~, 11h~n Ruseian pa.1"tisa.n traffic
ho.d a.aaumed tl'l<.ill\Elndous propor&ion$, 'iiai~ the Co.mm.o.nder of Interoept

Troops Center (in "t:ho~.e area w&re found t.he moat partisan
stations) given tb'O trpl.atoons•i (group·s of about 40 men each) of amonitoring company just trained for oboarving Russian partisans.
Two "platoons" to lfatch hundreda of lttal:.ionsl

A pitif.uJ. sol.utionl

And 1-.lhen in the ;sununer of 19/~2 the tuo platoons were eJq)Qllded to

a comp~, their strength lBS still not equal to the task.
One cannot comprehend the sl01mess of the German commandin reacting to any nct-1 problem and in taking effective countermeasures.

And even then the measures were inadequate.

We mq

anticipate here by stating that the fa.Uure throuBbout the
campaign in the east to combat. Russian partisan radio p:roper:Qr
was astounding.

But to return ·t;o the events or November 194]...
On 22 November the sixth C-ent~nn offensive against Moscow

bad bogged down hopolesal,y and instead or reaching the Caucasus,
German troops had to evacuate Rostov, which they bad meanwhil.econquered.

Bohind the center or the Gorman tront, partisanstrere disturbing conmunications and su~.
In Washington President Roosevelt ordered the Arrrq, Navy,and the Office o£ l'lar Production to work out a •tvictoey program"

55

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RES¥P_f4r!~El¥ 2 -:with an annual outl.o3' of 50.00011 000,000 dol.l.ars.

Mea.nwhil.e,

supplies for:, the Soviet Union were alrea~ rolling through the'

Near East.
On 22 November the last German offensive against Moscow

came to an end.
'

L"l the following night the first gt"eat Russian

winter offensive began.

From Voronesh to Lake Ladoga the Germanlines were pushed back.

Mighty wdges ripped the German front

so that in a few weeks it was a gj.ga'1tic zig-zag line.

On]¥heroic effo""'" s on the part of the German commanders and troops
could prevent a catastrophe.

On1,y by prompt withdrawal. could

units be saved i'ro.-n. annihilation and commanders had to act on
their own responsibility, :following principles or modem strateg:r.
But Hitler would hear nothing o:t such tactics.

He ordered themto hol.d out, no matter how the situation might shape up.

a line they had reached? - never I

Yield

Military tactics must be sub-ordinated to the requirements of politics and propaganda.

Com-manders who had withdrawn to more favorable positions weredisciplined by Hitler.

With his own hands he tore the decora-tions from their necks, degraded them, and threw them out of thearmy.

B.r the dozensl

Ha.d. these men acted as Hitler desired andallowed themselves to be encircled, then the German front in the
East ~:ould have collapsed at that time.

Tho German Air Force

was able to suppl,y the group encircled near Danjansk for months
but it could never have supplied thrae or four such groups.
Twenty-five German generals were rel~eved of their coj".rn.and but~dthout

their action the entire E~stern a~ might hsve been

destroyed during that frightful 1-r.Ll'lter.

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RESTRICTED.eThe t"tro fl"'nts became ellllle::>had.

Gerraan support polnto,

divisions,a.nd COlj>S 1-rero enoirclod.

Alroady 1,.300,000 Genuan

soldiers la;y buried in Russian aoil J .3 ,500, 000 had been wounded.
Fresh troops were hard to fiud; tho Class o:f 192.3, llhich had
been call.ed up in August and September 191..1, was aldpped tothe eastern front and the occupied territories in the east
were almost stripped of troops.

l·Iuosolini refuat)d Hitler's

request for more Italian divisions.
new tum.

Gerroa11 propaganda took a

There was praise tor the bra.ve:cy of the Russian

soldiers, for Russian strategy and :m.ateriel, while thepolitical leadership was decried.

Hitler hoped to prepare theground for a decisive offensive b.r the spring of 1942·
The course of the winter offensive 1941/42 took the whole
worJ.d by surprise.

Most surprised was the German command.

Anyattempt to explain these events sole:cy- by errors of the Gel'lll8l).
command will prove inadequate.

Of course, Hitler deceived

himself regarding a collapse of the Soviet regime 1 he undorestimated Russian strength and productive capacity in a fateful manner, and it was serious !or German troops to have toundergo this Russian winter without proper equipment.

Moreoverthe verve of Russian at"t.acks was astounding, a surprising
factor after the serious defeats they had sutfered.

This does

not mean that the morale and fighting strength of the Germansoldier failed during those weeks and months.

In spite or theseverity of the winter, to 'Which he was utter:cy- unaccustomed, theheroism displayed by the German soldier :rar exceeded all previous

per.tormances.

5'7

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What was it then that enabled the Russians to tum around after
such defeats and bring the northern half of the Genna.n front to thebrink of destruction?
sections.

'l'he reasons will be dealt with in the following

The real reason was radio espionage, by which we mean theequipment of spies and agents ~dth.small por~able sets.
By the middle of January 191..2 the northern half of the eastern

front began to be stabilized.

The Russian counter-offensive was stuck.

The German front was holding and Hitler was beginning preparations forthe summer campaign of 1942.
in the sourh.

This time the decision l'ra.s to be sought

Vast masses of war material rolled to the Balkans.

Repair and workshop material, including special. sections tor Ju 52's*
as well as speed boats in sections, were shipped to the south, most-:cy- to Salonika. and Cava.Jla, likewise two complete airborne divisions.
The plan of the preceeding year was revivcd.

Boats p1•epa.rod for theinvasion of England sailed up the Rhine and at :VJ.B.inz were loaded on
trains for shipment to the Danube.

New transport gliders with aspan of 55 meters were constructed to carry 150 men with equipnent.
People in OKW were convinced that the Russians had thrown their lastreserves into their winter offensive and that these would soon break
down under the p~1arful blows of the German armed forcas.
How badly the C~r.mans still misjudged the enemy situation wasshown 0y the formation of so-called air force field divisions.

Theythought the Russian a.:i.r force i-ras so r:eakened that they could afford
to cut doim their Oim air force to form field divisions .from the~~-Junkers 52 - tra.."1sport plane.

ns

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personnel.

This "W"<l.S dOnl3 when the Russians were just. getting

mass production of planes under wq in Magnitogorslc andCheqab:inslc.
In order to leave ite own higher c01.1l1Da.lidere in the dark

regarding the situation in ho3tile countries, the FUhrer's
Headquarters, toward the end of Januar.r 1942, ordered the\cipher section of OKtof, as the control and evaluation cente'

ot the intercept service, to cease multigra.phing and distri'fting the daily summaries of the situation as revealed by theintercept service and to bring these results to the knowl.edge

ot m'll3 a small. group ot persons, using very few copies.
One was becoming fearful. about letting the actual situation in
Gel!DalJY' and on the enerey- side be known.

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60

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JAPAN EN'fERS THE l'lAR

At tbis point something or ~s:t. significa.nca occurred
which was calculated en tho one hand to divel"t ~tte11tion £rom
the cour.oe of militaey events in Ruasla and on the other handto bring the war as a. 'hilole into an entirely new phaae.

This

was the Japanese attack on Poarl HarbOl" on 7 December l94J. andthe ensuing Japanese declaration or war against the U.S.A.
and Gl~eat Bl"'itain, £ol.l..«»red b;r the declarations of war byGe~ and Italy on ll Docember..

At first sight it seems incomprehensible that thesedeclarations of war shoul.d :resuJ.t at the ver-3" moment when tho
mUita.ry picture was for the first ·t.im.e turning against Genna.ny.

Had the Japanese at.ta.c'k come three or .tour months earlier,coinciding with the German victorles in the East, it Jid.ght
have appeared intel~i.gible.

In December, when the entire

northem hal..t' or the German eas liern front was in a serious

situation, such a step could~ appear incomprehensible.
Nevertheless, there was a ca.usa.l connection between the turnin the fort.1mes of war in F..a.stem Europe and the beginningot the war in the F8.1• E..1.slo.
The sequence ot incidents is interesting.

Starting inAugust 194J. 't.lhen the war in Russia ceased to be brisk andmercy and became bitter and serious, Hitler repeatedl,yinvited the Japanese AmbasS3dor, Hiroshi Oshima, to theeastem front - natura.l.l;r to those points 11.-h.ere the situation

61

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was favorable tor the· ~s. lA Octcber these ~§ o"6ased andeffort.s to intlo.ence ~to .-~u.rage lllf*l t9 trMti the war
became obvious.

Tftere· we:rw-.!_. wo1clent.. .b. t.tw ~ito.

From 1934 to- 19.38 osl~ W txMm ·'~ !IU.U:£ur attache
in Berlin.

It was then tliat tt\e· oo»i l,aiboratl.o111. tO/. mie Japanese

secret service with the countereap~ Mctios ~ tJ:\e Mmistrr
of War in Berlin began.
Canaris.

Oshima was· Wtr.U. LM'~ wtth Admiral

Oshima's bouse - a ten minuie· -~I~ tHe· Ministr.r ot

War - be·Jame a "center of social and' ccmr~ alfl.\octation.nInother ~rds Oshima lm.ew bow to cultivate social. connections whichappeared wort;h while for his worlc.

Earq in 1935, Admiral. Canaris ordered the head ot Group I of
the Counterespionage Section to seru:l to him ( Canaris) tor transmission

to Oshima one cow of all information referring to the Soviet Union
which might be of interest to Japan.

In return, Group I received

from Oshima questionnaires which were translated and passed to X-49

(Dosto) and these were answered by" the latter to the best or hisabil.ity.
At that time the question of cooperation between the Japaneseand German cryptan&4rtic services was brought up for the first time

but was soon dropped again because this cooperation was express:cylimited to the front against the Soviet Union and here Ger.nan
c:cyptanalyt.ic reaults ,.,ere very slim.

Oshima. wa.a unwilling toreveal. anything regarding other cryptographic syate:ns.

Now andthen he received -- without indication of the source -- bits of

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information which "l'fere based on Gf.lnn.atl !l.n.?PtatJJ:1..\vtiO 111'0t'kt.

Down to 1939 th!.s ooopera'b101i 1"elllM.ned 1d.·tb:t.n veq modest

llmits but in the oourBe ot tilne it. d!.d gi:ve 0Hh1.ma e. ver:y good
insight '.n:t;o tha t':rpni~Jat:Lon of tha r~n:JMrt. in'hercepb semce.
There was even t&tl.k ot sending German :!;n. t,e:rcap~ po:raonnel toJapan to collaborate there (:llt Mancllt.l1'1.a).
When Oshima na appo:tn·bed JO.p411G8et am.basq<!O:..'- :Ln 193~ flmutual confidence had reached the po:Lnt whaM collaborationin the field ot general intell.1.gW"J.ctt tra.!l 1•eJAt.i'Hl3' closeh
But it was based sole~· on the pt;l"Stm of Osh:t.nw. and. when h•
was replaced by IDU"llsu :Ln Ootobei' 1939 ~.t soon ebbed awq~

Relations between the bwo aountl'iei!S renld.ttE:d cl.cs" ant! 'bite'.rhree Power Pact was concluded on ~7 St!ipt~bel"' 1940 but

contact in the field bt inteJ.ligt:jnOe ptl&.CM.~a..\2-f Ot!J&Hde
I

I

This wae undesirable tor ,ta:.(lan, I.!IS~o~.a'l:b' a1.a1ae bht

war had entered a phase o£ uncertainty toll~ the t;wnpa.:Lgri
Iin the west.

lh the li'al" :East, ot\ tho ot.h$l' lw.t'ld, the O!!.Uit!U!

ot ccmtlict were .ilibreasing. Meanwbil,e Ja~ 'begw'l 1oold.nl
to the south; i.e., to a front against Orelit 1:1ritainc~~ tlte
United States, e.nd the Netherlands.

aemce Japan w11bocl toreestablish relaM.ens in the iutelli~t tiild bu.t w!.th:reference ·t;o the countries just menticate4. 'bW tht.~ O~lwu"

was the suitabl.e person••

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On the other hand, H:Jtler bad beg~.)n his encirclement oi' the
Sov~Let Union andWilhelmstr~ee

neecled Japan to coiTg?lete his ring.

Ill thea. desire for strengthened relations was manifest.

They remembered Osb.:tma. and ·thought he would be the r:l.ght man.
Kurusu was recalled .in Febl"1llU'y 1941 a.nd. Oshima. a.ppea.re.:t again in

Berlin.

Late in March Mt\tsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister 1

appeared and ~Talked with Keitel and Ribbentrop along the fr.Jnt of
the Guard Company before the Anhalt Station..

Matsuoka's reception

we.s pompous and was intended to emphasize Germany's mUi·ta.ry stren(!th.

But· the results of' the neg_o·t.iations we:r.e. nC't "binding".

B.awever 1 this did notcont1•adictory purposes were too a.ppe.:ren·t.

prevent each party from pursuing its course ~·ld:'entertain;Lug
hope of a·tta.ining :l.ts goal.

---

Cooperation in the field of intelligence was quicltly re-. covered only the Soviet Union.
established but i~ ·the·~in
I

Osh:J.m.' s inter~st meanwhile hat.:1 tur11ed in a different direction.
I

The mom:mt was favorable; various British cryptographic systems;

ha.d been deciphered in Be1•l:J.n.
being read~

Feller's telegl'ama 'Were alreadySome other American systems had been solved~

The na·ve.J.

cx-yptanalytic service had secured a good idea of the radio systems e.nd
cx-yptographic system o:f the Brittsh navy.

The Poles were supplyi::1.g

excellent information rege.:rding the sit1.tation in Enc:.la.nd andelseuhere •* See:

Thus Oshima found the ground will :prepared and"Ron:anel up to r1l Alamein,., pace 153.

64

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:reestab.l.f Ahed his eonnections.
11aw theIn td.s new <lte.rU.tn,e he soon

old circu or acqwdnta.ncv.~s about it.J.m,

On 22 Ju4r 1941 JU.t1et" ~~~~the tstnfgg18 &P,inst theSoviet Union.

At .rust all t413il. aceo~ tt» pl.a.lt 'btrt fr.om

August on th~ situation bPSWJ fA growr ~:nt serious.
Oslrl..ma: was .invitod. to tl:w eatttt~l:!t1 IJ"Oat and shown themost :Impressive points,
in another direction.

'ihio cU.c.f not help,; Jap,gtrfs goal l q
Beg:bu'iing in September Hitler became

ever more anxious .for Japan to ent.er i.tie war on Get'Jlla!1Y' s
Oshima let it be known t.ha.t. the British and Americanside.

ciphers woul.d be of' great value to Japan..

They smiled a.t

one another, talked about Japanese a..L'"t and European technolog,y,o.f the Order or the Cblwysa.nthemUill, or the submarine war -- andwaited.
In Eastem Europe the pictu1-te was growing less pretty frandq to dq.

To wait, you need time, and in Hltlert~ ;a.se time.... ~-was getting short.

...

He .had to use this chknce while the mythot the power ot the Ge:nna.n a.rm.od torces was not yet shaken.
Todq his credit was unlimited, bl.t"l; no one could. tell how it

would be in six months.
When it became clear that Japan did not intend under P.f1Y'
circuml!ltances to enter the war aea;inst the Soviet Union but was
looking tor a front in anotller direction, they intimated to

Oshima that they were ready to give Japan the solved American
and British ciphers and to colla.borate in this field in case

65

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I'

J4pan's decJ.aration of war agai.nst; the two countries .tollowed !&oJce.
-,Oshima telegraphed to Tolcy'o.
~were maey of them.
I

The tel.fagJ...am.s wz-e long and there

They- were intercepted by the Ge:nnan intercept

station, deciphered by OKW, and translated in the Foreign Office.
What Oshima radioed was known.

Also what he received by radio.

The message indicators were:

KOSHI and G~~DAJIN.
Moreover, lielegram.s with the address IUKUGUN TOKYO were not to be
despised.

Hence it was lmOlt~n how and where to applg pressure~I,

Dq and n.:i.ght before Oshima's eyes dangled tile bai.t ot the solved

ciphers as well as tile possibilities o£ listening :i.n on the radio
conversations between Churchill and Roosevelt.
said the Germans, but Oshima said:

lfllov or neverIn,"First the ciphersJ

cooperation in the field of cryptanalysic.?

Complete

Declaration of war byGermany &ld :ttaq against the United States 11.!ithin a week af"ter

the begi11ning or hostilities in the PaciticJn •.

It was a hard dea.t.
challenges now began.

But it. came about.

On Ge~ts part,On 17 Oc'tober the American destl>oye:t•''Kearny"wa.s torpedoed in the Atlantic, short]¥ a.tter the ~.mer-lean destroyer"Greer" had been att.acked..

On l November Hitler's Headquarters

issued a sharp official sta~ement referring to a speech b.f Roosevelt.
Goebbels l.et loose a. wild press campaign against Roosevelt.

The

micles in German papers £rom l November on cau only be evaluated66

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•correctly in connection with tl1e tntention to worsen a situationand to spur Japan to attack.
!

FUrther incidents followed.

On 9 November Hitler delivereda flaming speech in which he violently attacked Roosevelt, Willkie,
and the United States.

the utmost activity.

German submarines were ordered to display

Iapan was to have a good il!lpression. The

British carrier "Ark Royal" and the battleship "Malaya11 were
torpedoed.
way.

Collaboration in the field of cryp·tana.lysis got under

The prerequisite exchange of "infornat:l.on" far the struggle

was already established.
On 7 December :f'oll~fed the Japanese attack on PearliHSrbor.

67

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88

RESTRICTEDRES1¥RffiT~ 2
RADIO AGEN'.rS

The first phase of Adolph Hitler's Oam.paj..gn in the East.

•

was at an end.
attenti~.

The world held its bl"'eath and listenedWe, too,. wil~ pausa briefly in our descriptionof the campaign and listen attentivo]¥ to other things which

will be mentioned hel""e tor the .first ·t.:!Jne.
Later we shall. shm'i in connected fashion the manner inwhich, and the extent to which, the radio ager1ts,. who appeared
for the .f'irst time during \'Iorld \iar II, decisive~ i:nflueneed- the entire course or the unhappy s'l:.r.J.ggl.e.

At tlrl.s point weshall mere]¥ anticipate by' sqing that the Soviet UniQ11 11

recognizing what was to come, began pr¢mptq to span all..

Europe with a network o£ agents in order to get current
reports on milit&"Y, political.,and iudustrial situation& inWestem Europe in the event of possibJ.e mi.J.itar;y camplications.
These agents were eqllipped with radlo apparatus so thatthey might pass their reporlis to MoscOtf as sai"e~ and quickq
as possibleo

One such agent center had been orgardzed :l.n thesummer or 1941 in SWitzerland.

This network, which spraad tram

Switzerland to Germany, had three :t•a.d.io stations, all J.ocatedin Swiss tezTitoJ7•

T'he t.ratfic was soon spotted and monitored

ouiTEJnt.q b.v the German intercept service but for a long time
it was not possible to deciphel' the radiograms.

net was called the •'Rote Drei"•

69

RESTRICTEDThis radioWe ehal1 hav·e a great deal to sq about the "Rote Drei"·Here

we sha.U. merel;y telJ. how this set-u1., worked during the early dqs..

of the Russian campaign ..
Naturally eome t.:ime elapsed before. this espionage service. got
established.

1be first messages were intercepted in September 1941

and th~r had numbers running from 200 UPJ i.e.,the first 200 radiograms escaped the German l.ntercept ser.vice.

Probably this org8ll-

ization began to f'tmction immediate:cy a!ter 22 June 1941.

While 'th~ German troops were s t.onning forward in the east and&Pecial reports or their victories were being bi'Oadcast, in Switzerland (and in otber countries)

activity began.

an intensive Russian espionage

Dq by dq J:•adiogrs.ms went. to Moscow and supplied

the intelligence section or the Russian General Statf with thebasis tor conducting its operations.

It was an invisible struggle

that was developing here.
Typical examples of the messages which were l;o Wldermiue tbe

efforts of the German High Connal.'ld were these messages from
Switzerlm1d to Russia, which were not deciphel~d until too late •.............
According to a Iiigh German Oti•:i.cer in Brittmv, 30 divisions
are being transferred f1•om the \'lest to the East Front •
..

..

...

Ill'

..

Fran Chinese diplomatic circles~
1..

J.,oo,ooo Germans are holding strategic points in It~a~:~guarantee against. a separate peace by Italy.

Feeling in Italf increasing)~ anti-Ger~~.

70

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2.

Germany willing that Finland conclud.e a. oepara.t.e poace
after occupying Leningrad sj.nce this would shorten theGerman front and ease suppJ.¥ and tranaportation.

---=r.
Description o! an anti-aircr&ft cannon.

-=···Immediate aim or the Germans is to cut communications
or U.S.S.R. with Anglo-Saxons by taking Mu:r.mansk.

Swiss Military Attache in Itall' reports increasing.

tension between Italian A~ and Facist Part~ •From Domei r~presentatives in Berl.:tn:
Opinion spreading in high officer circles that., .due

to failure of Blitzkrieg, Ger.man victor,y is impossible
and a.ll Europe will be Bolshevized., unless peace isconcluded with England.

For.mulae for new German poisons.

Hitler's order based on capture of Leningrad andOdessa ~3 15 September.

All in!ormation of SWiss

General Staff comes from a German Off:i.cer locatedat OKW.

Shall call intelligence section o:t SWiss

General Staff •'Luise".

-- . ..,'ii

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IIGermans concentrating troops between Munich and Brenner

because of possibUity of upheaval. in Italy.

Italians

continue fartif1cation of northern frontier.

== = = =I
I

Via Long from Luise from OKW.
1.

DUe to losses most German divisions on the eastern
front have lost homogeneity.

Along with peup:c. completely trained they have men with four to six-

months training and less.
2.

Leading generals in OKW now count on 30 months durationof ·the war after which compromise peace possible.

= = :: = =1.

Tanks of' propaganda companies in Brjansk awaiting
entry into 1-ioscow first was set for 14 then for 20 October.

2.

On 17 October arrangements for possible long siege of
Moscow.

Heavy coastal and naval artlllery under way

for days from K6nigsberg and BI•eslau.

German press

forbidden to write about conquest of' Moscow.

= = == =From Berlin from Luise.
New attack on Moscow not result of' strategic decisionbut due to discontent in army because since 22 June no
new goaJ.s have been attained.

Plan l Ural, Plan 2

Archangel-Astrakhan, Plan 3 Caucasus, abc..ndoncd becauseof soviet resistance.

Supply suffers ~ost tbroughthese changes of plans •'l2

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1.

Stock of German Aircra.tt n~r 22,000 machines or t:J.1•st andsecond line, also 6,000 - 6~00 Ju 52 transport planes.

2.

At presen·t 10 - 12 dive bombers built daily in Gel'D181V•

3·

Bomber units .:ro:nnerly in Crete being trans.f'enoed to theEast:part to Crlm.ea, rest distributed over remaining

front.

4. NUmber of planes lost on east front averaged 45 dai~from 22 June till end of September.

5. New Messerschmitt ground attack plane has two cmmonand two machine guns.

All f'our mounted late1·~ onwings •. Speed 600 Ion per hour.

Germans threw all they had into struggle .for Moscow andCrimea.

Drill grounds and barracks in Germmv almost

entire:Q' empty,.

High officers of Ger.man occupation in Paris estimate

duration of war at two.more years and expect defeatof GerJl'l.any • • • German people weary of war and resignedo
Masses still believe in tina~ victory but intellectuals
and high military circles skept.ical regarding outcome ineast.

Hitler's death or defeat at front woul.d mean endof Nazi rule by militaey dictatorship.

'73

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...........
Victories on east tront cost elite ot German ~·Russian tanks otten superior.

Lithuanians and Esthoniano

convinced Soviets are coming back•.......

Generals, General Staff men,. and Goering no longer consider German militar:y victory possible.

More thanl2 tank divisions destroyed b.r end ot October.

Menwear.r, officer corps shows signs ot discouragement.

'74

REST RIC'!' ED

WHERE DID THE RUSSIANS GET THEIR INFO:m1ATION?

No one can tell toda,y whether, when, a.nd. to what exten·li the
Russians mey somedq rel.ease the a.rehives of. the Information
Section of the General. Stat! ot t;h~ Red Al'!l\Y and let the publ:l.cknow some of the things contained therein:

This would doubt-.

less bring to light many things of which no one dreams to~\If1 in what follows 1 I venture some observations on the 'subject of the Russian information service, I am. well awarethat I can offal' no proof and tbat what fol.l..ows is oncy J1JI'
personal opL"'don.

This opinion is based upon more than 25

years or experience.

Ir I now apeak of' things for which I•

ca.rmot produce documentary p1~oo.f', this is not a flight of .f'ancy
but the resuJ.t of deductions from ma.n;y symptoms which, takencollectively, .forced me to these conclusions.
From the spring of 1.942 on, :t.t could be observed that thQ,

Russians were increasingl.v well info:noed about the Ge:rma.n
ordel." ot battl.e, strength, equipnent, armaments, communications 1
and 5Upp~.

Not. on:cy- that, they were in most cases ini'o:rmed.

ot German operational. plans and preparations.. This was much
more serious.

.

Undoubtedq part of' this lmowledge was to be ~ed D.r
the activity of partisans behind the German lines~

OertainJ¥

the Russians had obtained; much information from the statementsof deserters and £rom captured soldiers and officers as ·well

75

RESTRICTED

as from papers round on the lat16er.

Ce~ they leamed agreat

deal. through the activity of individual. spies in areas occupied by"German troops.

Air reconnaissance also supplied much trustworthy

information regarding en~ situa16ions, troop concentrations,movements and the lUte..

Added to this were the front reports ofGerman propaganda companies, whose radio transmissions often

afforded the ene~q valuable hints.

All these taken togethe..: gave

• the Russian~ vecy useful and enlightening material.

Nevertheless,these do nGt by ~means account for all the l01owledge the Russians
had of German operational intentions, plans ,and preparations. They

do not account for Russian knowledge of details or the German~sit,.ti.on "tdlich were top secret and not al~s lmmm even tQ high/fficers.

When - very much later- it was positive]J" establishodfrom deciphering radiograms of Polish agents that the Russians
had knowledge or many German operational plans, the opinion arosem Ge:rmany that there must be a traitor at Hitler's Headquarters
who was sending current information to the Rtfosians.

The cry ofItreason 'tras ort.en raised later on,. especialJ¥ in the east.

I do no·t; believe that this was true to the extent and in thefor.m gener~ assumed, but this question will be examined some~tmore closely later on.

As for myself, I have no doubt that theRussians drew a very essential part of their inf'o1-mation from theirintercept service)i.e.,fram the interception and decipherment or

Ger.man messages sent by radio and by wire.

'76

RESTRICTEDI do not lmow 'When they succeeded :i11 breaking int.o t-he

German cryptographic systems.

In nry ostil.u.a.tion, they 1-rereable by early March 1942 to read currently at leas~ one or
two of the cryptographic systems used by the German HighCommand.

That put them in a position to recognize all details

or the Gennan initial assembly in the Kharkov area and ·t.he
under~g operational ideas.

For there is no doubt t.hat theykllew all this l.ong before the beginning or t.he fighting.

And

it testifies to their confidence in the otrength and striking
power of the Red Army - this army which Hitler 'l.>Tas supposed

to have broken long before - that as soon as they knew ofGerman inten·t.ious and preparations, t.hey decided to undertakea strong concentration or troops L~ the opposite area and to
strike the German asseo.mblies 1-r.i.th grea.t. force.
The "Kharkov case", \ihich will be clarified later inanother wa:y, wa.s not an isolated one.

There were numerous

indications that the Russians on aJJL sectors of the front
were 1.re~l in.fonned regard:i.ng the situation on the Germanside.

I ha.ve already said that my vie-w of this matter

rests on the symptoms observed and deductions therefrome
I might iJ~ust1•ai..e this general statement by an example.
The cipher machine had been introduced by the German
a.I'.Iey" forradio traffic about 19.27.

Alter yeara o:t work

the so-called "Erd.gma." was developed, a cipher machine
which was opel"ated like e. typewriter and au·t.omatica.lly
tra.nsi'o1-med plain text. into cipher text by a system of.

77

RESTRICTED

wheeJ.s, ri.ng settings, and pJ.uggings •By changing the wheel. order,

the ring setting, and the plugging, a vast number of variations
could be introduced into ·the cipher text and the key could be changed
daily.

..

In the View of the cryptanalytic experts 1 messages

enciphered with the "l'Jnigma" could not be deciphered by unauthorized parties and were therefore secure against foreign intercept

Some experts of the German intercept service had warned fromthe very beginning against attributing excessive significance tothis machine, since it would suffice i:f' the enemy reconstructeda considerable 11umber of the machines - which was possible
at any titne - and then typed off in a purely mechanical manner
the various possibillties - which could be done very rapidly.
With one machine it would be possible to test four variations in

a minute; i.e., 5,500 to 6,ooo possibilities in 24 hours.

By using agreater number of machines this total could be increased correspondingly.
When Czechoslovakia was occupied by German troops, evidence
was found in Prague that the Czechs had deciphered messages
enciphered with the "Enigma".
unknown.

How this was done remained

But this proved tha:t unauthorized decipherment of

Enigma messages was possible.

One of the r.erma.n cr;y:pta.naJ.ytic

experts then undertook to check ·the machine a.ucl f"Jund thatsolution wo.s possible given a. minimum. of 25 nessn.1}::s encipheredwith the same setting of the machine.

Now it is quite easy to

78

RESTRICTED

find 25 tnossages :l.n 2l1- hours, consequently foreign cryptanalytic
services had a good chnx~e of readinB enciphered German army
traffic.

The "Enigma" was then. altered somevrhali by encrea.siog...,

the number of wheels from three to i'ive, whereupon ·the cryptanalytic experts in Ber1in declared that henceforth messases

enciphered with this mnchine would be secure.
Years passed.

The Second lvorld \·ln."t" brought Germany three

years o:r great victories and two years of equally great defeatsand reverses.

During all ·this time the Ge~man military staffs

had worlred to their heart's content 'tTith the Enigma.

Andhundreds of' thousan'is of ra.diogt'ams ha!1 been shot out . into
space.

Then in the spring of' 19411- the :ColloiTing happened:

A German office in France inquired via Paris of thecryptanalytic u11it of OKt-1 in Berlin whether messages on a
Polish agent netwo1•k wi1.;h a certain characteristic were be.ing
deciphered and read.

Due to some disturbance of the te1etype

network, the answer was sent by radio; it was affirmative andwas enciphered by the daily l{ey of the "Enigma".

Before24· hours had elapsed the Polish cipher ceased to be used.
Someone may object that there might have been intentionalor careless betrayal on the part of the C'~rn10.n military officein France and that the content of' the Berlin e.ns'\'rer was
revealed to the enemy after it had beetl deciphered at the oi'i'ice
to which it lias addressed.

Of course this is a poss:tbility.

However, I consider it unlikely.

79

I am convinced that tho

RESTRICTED

messages enciphered by this "Enigma" were currentl;r deciphered andread b.Y both the English and Russian cr.r.ptanalytic services.
In spite of this obvlous warning,nothing changed in German;r.

Any idea or doing away with the "Enigma" mot :iJrJilcdiately withresolute opposition.

In the competent offices there was no longer

the vigor or the possibility or carr.ying out the long chain or
measures and changes which would result from abolishing the"Enigllla.. rr Total mobilization resulted not ill the tot.o.l.
utilization o£ our ~~terial and spiritual forces but in their
exhaustion.

1lHere, too, people did what they had learned and practiced far
years; they strewed sand in their o~n and in each others eyes so'•\

as not to nee things as they really were.

\ef"tl

~":

, tf
11

f"'tt..J1..

I said earlier that I was not in a pos~~ion to offer proofs;t~is applies

simply to the question whether the Russians could~f I or could not dcr ipher German cryptographic systems.

..•~·/

11

Hence even in this field its results wore negative.

• • ..-·

D.J~

'

I can

read:ily offer proof that they were well informed in other ways
regarding events on the Ger.man side.

This ha.s already been done""'· in the brief description or the work o.r'\#ttl~the "Rote Drei".

~econd case or the kind.

80

RESTRICTEDNow a

RESPf"R.feT~~THE OTWOCK CASE

In anticipation of. the danger which threatened, the Russians

some time before the beginning of open warfare had built up an
information service in the so-called Gouvernement General.

It

must have been shortq at"ter the Hese affair when, one starlit
night in spring, two men parachuted fro.~n a Russian plane.

.

was in the area south of Warsaw.

It

Both men were Poles, former

Polish officers who had been captured during the Russo-Polish,

War of 19.39..

They had been won over by tb'l} Russians and trainedfor espionage.

They were Captatn Arcyszcntski and Reserve

Lieutenant. Heyer.

They had been equipped lfrl"l:,h an agent radio

set. and told t.o spy out al~ transpOl""ti traffic on the railways
itt the area. occupied by t.he Germans and to report. their findings

to Moscow.

That was a tremendous task which presupposed ·~hesetting up of a gigantic organ:i.zatlon..

li'or this task they were

furnished the sum of $2,000.

With this "opera.ting capital" the two men went to work.
Their activities could never have been of great extent, had it

not been certain f':'om the very beginning that thoy could counton the reaqy cooperation of almost the entire Polish population.
They began their work in Warsaw..

The transmitter \fras set

up in s. little tm"n called Otwook" south of \'larsa't;.
ArcyszEn-rslti undertook the organization of the spy net

while .Heyer co."tlposed the messages, enciphered them, a..'1d transmi tted

them to l'-1osco~r.

81

RESTRICTED•

I

By month~or tedious e£f'ort, Arcyszewski succeeded in spinningI

a gigantic spider web of purveyors or information over the entire:vernement Gel:lera.l" and the occupied Russian terrii;ories - sincet e war with Russia had meanwhile begun and German troops had quiclcJ.v

I

occupied exter1sive areas in the East.

Soon the two began to transmit "t-heir 1•eport.s to the Moscow•

control station; these were rather scanty at first but buee"lericher from week to week.
Some.mere around Christmas 1941 or early in January 1942, thenetwork of u1for.mers bad been so expanded that it reached from theBaltic almost' to the Black Sea, from Breslau to Oreland Kursk.
In the director's office or each railW8JI", at every junc·l:.ion point 1

at every relatively large station, sat an agent who reported toArcyszewski in an especial.l,y' secure manner everything having to
do with transportation.

Every report on train delay, sabotage ot rail~ installations,trains cancelled, the work of partisans, and the llke w~t toArcyszewsld.

The terribl.e winter of 1941-1942 ltas drawing to a. close.
German preparations fo1• a decisive summer o.t:fensive in 1942 were
getting under way.

Transports or troops, arms, ammunition, tanks,

motor vehicles, motor fuel, etc.,began to roll from West to East,and :reports began to come fl"'m all sides to 4t-cyszewski who sent

them t.o Moscow vi& Meye:r. Every transpo1•t wa.I!S reported in this~ with a precise

statement or ~1at it cont~od, with ooureo anddestillation, with ,tretlgth and b.wl\ber of Wlit contingents, witb astatement of the number and type of anns, tanks, etc.

82

RESTRICTEDAbout September ~941 the German radio monitoring service
first noticed ·the transmitter in Otwock without being able

to ~ocate it definitely.

Meyer worl~d very cleverly so thatthe coverage could Only be inwerfecf....

The cipher used 'tfS.S

so good. that it def.'ied all efforts to break. it.

Since theGerman. intercept service was monitOl~ing several dozen suchtransmitters currently and bad no idea of the dangerous characterof this Otwock station, this traffic d.id not receive ·the e.ttention it ree.lly merited.

ful"therm.ore, the stl•engthof the Germo.n "Radio Defense'1 in the East vas slight and in
the main was limited to the organs of the German police.

Not until June 191~.2 was i·~ possible to "Oick up the station
"'

I

!

in Otwock e,nd to arrest the tvo men, el.ong with a number ofIother persons. .A.U. the keys were found and the Oerma.us !couldI

finaLly decipher tbe previously intercepted messages.
And nmr for the first time a ~ight dawned on Ge~"radio defense 11 •Now they saw tbat here they had. bee11 /dealing with men of conseqttence, with an organization which badfunctioned in a manner ca~culated to bring destruction to theGerman armed forces.

Al~ for $2,000 in thecourse of one

brief yea1•!
It was now necessary to decipher almost 500 radiograms a long, wearisome task.

When it was finished, the conte11t -entered on a. chart - gave a co~lete pic'l:~ure of the assembly

83

RESTRICTEDRES'F«.IWPfiD 32
of the Gel~ and aJJied arwdes for the great summer offensive.
The Russit:an General Starr had an easy time making its dispositions,and the thrust against th"' Gelman assem.bq area near Kharkov could
not fail to ha.ve tar reaching' consequences.

It di..dJ

But what happened on the Gennan side? Was the attention ot
the Ger.man c~d called energetic~ to the full magnitude o£
the danger threatening the armed forces f'rom. radio agents? Was
the German command shown clearly that there ware dozens o.r thesetransmitters which must be combatted by all available mee.ns?
Was a mighty oz:ganization set up to take up the struggle tdth tbeee
radio agents?

Did any expert; of the German "radio defense" appear

at Hitler's Headquarte1•s to deliver a lecture on the Otwook caseand, on the strengl:.h ot this example 1 to draw the obvious
conclusions?

Not.hi.rt.g of the sort..

The man who worked on thecase composed a report to be presented to the FUhrer.

It wasregarded there as •ttoo long-winded" and returned because "theFUhrer is not f'ond or long reports".

A shorter report. wascomposed, but now the arlX:i.ous quest.ion &\"''se~•'What will the

FUhrer say to t.his?tr This was a dud, and the FUhrer "didn't:,l.ike dudsn.

No one :round the courage to present the case 1dth

the appropriate emphasis.

They were afraid.

l.rioreover, thedrama of' St.al.ingrad was now appearing on the stage.
The report. wound up in some safe or "in channels".
agents' game conti...A.ued.,

84

RESTRICTEDThe• A WORD REGARDING THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
The organiz~tion of the ~ssian strategic intelligence service.

in World War II vas, in general, lmown in Ger.m.any, although many
details of its work escaped the German intellignece service.

In

my opinion, it was burdened with a mininiWil of bureaucratic andformal restrictions.

It must have worked with an uncanny precisian

to meet the needs of the Russian military command.
must pq the Russians a complim.enta

Beyond that, I

in this war, Russia was theonl.y" country whose cryptographi.c syatem.cs remained practica.lly'
unbreakable tlu.. oughout, although first-rate experts in othercountries were at tempting their solution.

In particular1 thecr,yptographic systems or the higher m1litar,y commands and those
tor diplomatic traffic remained for foreign cryptographic bureausa "book with seven seals".

or course, the syste:ms were recog-

nized, but solution proved out of the questiop.

After years ofvain effort, the copying of Russian diplomatic traffic wasstopped in Germany.

Exaggera·l:;ed as it ma.y sound to outsiders,

I would like to venture an assertionJ Russia lost World war I
in the ether and won World War II in the ether. By this I do
not b,y any means intend to belittle the importance of its people'swar, its armanents, the capacity of its officer$ and the death
def.ying courage of its soldiers.

1.

85

RESTRICTEDWe can summarize as .tollowss
1.

In the spring or 19~ the Russians lmew the

aeman
I

operational plan for the thrust toward the Volga•and the Caucasus.

2.

They knew the exact area ot initial assemb:Qr ot
the troops destined tor these operations.

3.

They lmew the numerical strength and the table ororganization of the German and allied armies involved.
J.r,.

Long before the battle of KhaJ.•kov they knew thenumbers or a:u the German and allied divisions whichwere to take part in the operation.

5. They knew the names of all the higher unit commanders.
6.

They knew the precise number of tanks, gwts andplanes available on the German side.

7.

They knew the attack plans or all armies employedon the Ge:nnan side in the great summer otfensive.

SG

RESTRICTEDWHO WEil.E 'l'HE "RADIO AGF..NTStt

Espionage bas al.~s p:l.qed a great. role in wartime.

Thedi£ficul.ty in carrying it on ouoca5sful.l..v l.J.>;y less in the pro-

cu.remont of into:rmation th.fm in passing tbe information in goodseason to the military or political. leaders qf the count17
invo~ved.

The best reconnaissance r\'aults WDl~ worthless

un:l.!ss they reached tbe interested parties at a time wheneffective COUllter.measures cottld still be plenned, instituted andcarried out, or uhen it was even possib~a to plan an ope:rat.ion

on the basis of the infonnation ga.i11ed regarding the ene.m;rsituation.

Since a country tries in wartime to secure its

frontiers in all directions ag.ainst. leakago of' information o:Ca m.Uitar.r, political. or economic nature, Ol• at leaat grea.tq

to delay the exploit.ation of auch in.rozmation, a. ma.jor part; orthe intelligence work of foreign agents in earlier tmrs was in

vain; their reports genera.llJ reached the ~ne~JQT command much

too late.

In the ~ong run, onlJ' a fraction o£ the work wasof a.ny real value.

Thus literaJ..q' as \fell as figura.tive:cy ..

narrow l.imits wer'e imposed on the ao~ivj,ties ot spies.

This

problem could o~ be solved if it trera possibl~ to ·find ameans of transmitting the info:ma.tion obt.ained in a wq which
woul.d break down all barriers and bring the report speedily
from the sender to the recipient.
The invention of radio telegraphy did 11ot at first siguify
a solution or this problem.

The long-wa.ve appara.t.us used was

f'ar too big to be operated inconspicuousl;r in l:i.ving rooms and87

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I

the like; tu.rthennore 1 it was easi:q spotted by <lirect:ton finders
and consequent~v exposed to the risk or being quick:cy discovered.

Consequently, this manner o:r canmunica.tion virtually did not comeinto account .tor spies during World War I.

Not untll the dis-1'

cover.r of radio telegrap~ on short-wave and the constrUction ofem.all po1'1.able transmitters and receivers were the conditions

created for a complete revolution in the field of pra.c1;.j r:.P.l
espionage.

Now it was possible to ~-luiP the a.gonts with easi.J,yoperated, easilJr transpor'l:.ed ,and easlly concealed radio sets tor
transmitting their reports and tor receiving inst..ructions, orthey could be assigned special operators.
The Soviet Unlon, German;y, ancl .England were the first

countries to prepare ror the employment or such agents • even
before World Wa.r II, and to put this sy-stem into practice tosome degree.

For purely milita17 reconnaissance GeJ."JllBllY' was thefirst count~ to commit radio agents, first in the Polishcampaign and then - on a much larger scale - in the campaign
in the west.
lVhen describing the campaign :i.n the west, only a few words

were deYoted to the radio agents.

In reality, they represented

one ot the main factors in the German intelligence service.
Eveeyt,hing that the intercept service could not suppq wasreported at that time by radio agents dropped from Gel'm.&l planesin the French rear areas.

They wre committed by the dozens andgave a very good account of themselves.

88

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We must doem it a t·.;.·m::u·l<nblo phenomenon that. in the courseof World Wru.· II Gcnna.n,y omrloy~d m(lans anct methods o:C' warfare
which late1• were employed w.tt.h all their wight agail1s·t thei.r
originator.

Gel'fllall7 taught. its opponents thoao me·thods of. cotl-

ducting a war which led to ii.s own defeat.

Genua.ny invented

banbing warfare and was it.seli 1£,, Vi ln ruins by it.

Gei111&V'

invented motorized warfare and J.t .lnl·.. l beo.ame faterul for
Ge:rmany.

Germany diecovered atornJ o energy and in the fino.l

phase or the war this was turned wlLh annihilating etf'ect against
its strongest al~.

Germany was the first to lwMte use of radio

agents and they laid tm foW'\dation .f'o1~ its m.i.lita:r.r defeat.

Following the German model, the British, Poles, Russians,
and Ame1•icans intl"'duced radio agents on a large scale andincreased their commitment ·to such an. extent that. theiractivity att.ained a significance of the .t'iJ~st order.

The

German "Radio Defense" • l'thich was supposed ·t.o concem itself
with combatting these agen'l:.s, faced during the entire war agigantic task, the complete solut.ion o£ which would havecalled for JDallY times the personnel. and means that wereactual.l;r made available.

Slowq but irresistibly during the course of World War II
the network o.f agent radio stations expanded over a.ll Europe.
It began in Poland and France.
Holland• and the Balkans.

It extended into Belgium,

Wherever a Gel"'lk1ll soldier wa.s

89

RESTRICTEDRESWIWI.D 32
stationed, ev-erywhere he was surx'Ounded b,y this invisible,

intangible net in the ether.
Everything he did or failed to do, evoryth.i.ng connected withhis life and 1tark in occupied territor,y, wa~ constantq Yc~.tched
and reported on by hundreds, thousands -yes, hlmdreds ofthousands - or spies, agents or confidence men.
No troop movement, no transport c»f arms or ammunition, no
construct!~~ears.

of fortifications escaped these watchful eyes andEV'eeywhere the German soldier was watched and eavesdropped.

And ever.ywhere - often in the house in which he lived - stoodthose little short-wave sets b,y means of which these observations
were passed on.

that.

But the Ger.man soldier noticed nothing of all

He went through the st1-eets unaware that he was ensnaredin an enormous spider web - a vast network of invisible, fine,unbreakable threads.

~ a verysmall group knew about

all this and watched the eftorts in the ether.

The radio traffic of the Russian part.isans "Wa8 espec~live~.

It was also developed with great J!!till and became so

extensive tlla~ hundi•eds of German soldiers, Ol'ganized into
monitorillg platoons or canpanies, were busy day and night
trying to get a clear impression of the constantly changing
picture.
The cryptographic systems used by the Poles wez-e very good;those of the Russians were excellent.

Hessages of the Polishnetwork could .frequentl,y be read by the Germans, but by no means

90

RESTRICTED

always.

Of. course, even the best operator sometimes made a

mistake; it \'JaB merely a question of watching patiently f'or
this mistake.

Gener~ itcame.

'!hen it was possible tofix locations, establish identifications and break into

cr.vptographic systems.
In general, it was a hopeless fight against ·t.he agent radios,since £or each transmitter which was seized and for ever,y\operator
wbo was arrested a new one appei.red at an"" location,

characteristics and with a new cryptographic systl!m.

91

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wit\

new

92

RESTRICTED

'J'HE GEllMAN "J?.ADIO DEFENSE"''

Long bafor-n World Wnr II 9 people in most ~~poan countries
were conv:iuced that. lu o. fut.u.re liar tho ba.ttle ·in the dark
betwen the eop:iona.1~o oervice and k:t.ndrc~d c,rge.niza.tions on the
one ha.nd and t.he in t.~1rcopt service on the othex· - in thiscase, therefore, a uaLLle in the ether - would assume gi&Ultic• proportions.

It was clear that this stl-.:tggle would not be

simple and that it was necessary t() create :itt good season anorganization which would occupy il.sell' 'l'Tith spotting andeval.ua.ting espionage t1·a.f'fic in order to br:lng the x•eeults to
the knowledge of one' s <»m COliliil£-l.nd.

Actual.ly nothing ml!Ch was dc,ne until ·t.he ou1..break ofWorld War II.

Only in the Soviet Union ln.-as some attention

givez1 to the ma.tt3r and an attempt made to ga.the1• experience
which IIU.ght sel"'ve in the ev aut o.r war for. the dev"'".l.opment of alarge organization to coro.bat radio agents.

The Germans ~1ould ~~ve had special reason to occup,ythemseJ.~tes ldth this problem and -~ -they did.

in a pure~ theoretical

But since armament and the preparation for

war went ahead at too rapid a pace snd the German intercept
service was weakened 1•a.ther than st..t•engthened by the constanttransfer or trained men, this preliminary orga.nizat:l.on did noteven cane into being before the war.

93

RESTRICTED

I said above that there was special reason tor Germaqy tooccupy itself with such matters;

I shall add some detailsa

Long before the war, the German counterintelligence service(Abwehrdienst) had set up abroad a network of radio stations(the so-called A-net), which was to be used b,y German agents fortransmitting intell:i.gence in the event of war.

At various points

in Germruv control radio stations had been set up to handle
traffic with the agents.

Before the war this traffic was limited

to occasionaJ. tests of transmission and reception, lest the network be unmasked prematurely.

Moreover, in peacetime there wasalways some other way of getting a report to Ger~ speedilY.
The A-nets had beenaet up in Czechoalovakia, in Poland, andin France.

To wha·b extent they ro.ay have been organized in othercountries is not known to me.
Along with this A-net a so-called J-net had been prepared,
which was located within the countr,y and was to function if
certain parts of German territo17 were occupi~d by an ene~.

In

that ease the J-11et would start transmitting reports and have afunction similar to that of an A-net.
The rapid advance of the German forces in World war II soonleft the A-nets behind, whereas the foreign equivalent of the J-net
in the terJ•itory occupied was now behind the Germ-'ln lines.

Thus

the occupation of great areas brought foreign radio aeents into
German controlled territory and the further the Gernmn lines

94

RESTRICTED

advanced, the more foreign spies came into the zone of occupation.
They were ab1e to work under favora.ble conditions, since theattitude of the population in the occupied areas was consistent]ar
anti-German and every agent found aid and support whenever heneeded it.
It was not until vast areas had been occupied that it
occurred to those in authority in Germany that other countries
might have built up organizations similar to the A-nets or J-nets.
Now the agency which directed the German networks was charged withfinding out how to detect and combat such en~ organizations.
The so-called "Radio Defense" was created.

The onlJ' organiza-

tiona available at that time were the radio monitoring statio11sof the police, which had been responsible for watching illegal
amateurs.

These monitoring stations were now obliged to shift

to a new field.
been asleep.

Meanwhile people on the other side had not

The little networks organized before the war were

now located within the German sphere of influence and were
strengthened in fiV'ery possible wa:y.

New agents with theirsets were either smuggled through the lines or dropped b,yparachute so that little by little a very considerable numberof radio agents had been introduced who were able to go about
their work without worry.

On the other hand "Radio Defense"

faced an assignment which grew from dq to day, while its
resources did not suffice to cope with the situation or to gain
adequate experience.

As more and more territory was occupied,

95

RESTRICTEDthe frequency band to be monitored grew wider .n~tl wider and thenumber or radio agents at work. became grealer md grec:-ter.

The

year 1940 saw no notable successes and 11ot uul i .l the end of thatyear was an anny intercept canpany assignn'l ! ., 11 Ha.dio Defense"•
This company had to be entirely z·e-trainerJ.

r/l~nnoor.mli.tted in

the west it soon found that the'task asslened was far greaterthan had been expected.

Fina.lly' two more intercept companies

were assign""ri to "Radio Defense" lihloh also set up an evaluation
system of its own.

Direction finding bases of the Na\'Y' l'l'erG

placed at its disposal..
By the time "Radio Defense" began to work e.ffeotiveJ~n i.e.,in the Sllll'uner of 191-41. the British had 25 recognized circuits inthe west running as far nort.h as Nol"'W'aYi there was a ~'idely
ramified agent network in Westem Poland which was controlledfrom England; in the "Protectorate" (Bohemia and Moravia) an
Iextensive net of tho Russian inteLligence service was fUnctioning,
while a.'lother Russian net covering all Europe h.."ld more than 20
stations in May 19.4 1 and 78 stations in June.

This Russian

network had been built up before t.he war but had been kept
absolutely concealed by radio silence.
Some idea of the problem can be gained fro~ the fact thatin the Soviet Union alone from June 19U to June 1944 some

120,000 agents, including some 30 1 000 operators, 11rere trained
for use in German territor,y.

About one-third of those c~~tted

succeeded in carr.ying on their work for a longer or shorter96

RESTRICTED.e-~--~--·---·-----------------------------~

e.

period.

The Western powers made no such mass employment but ingeneral the intelligence and quality of the agents employed wasIhigher 1 hence the danger was greater.

97

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98

RESTRICTEDLOCATING AGENT STATIONS
A basic requirement in combatting agent transmitters was thelocation of these stations b,y dtrection finders.

For technical ·&nd tactical reasons this broke down into:a.

Long-range direction finding,b.

Close-range direction finding,c.

Work in the immediate vicinity ot the target.

. li'irst of all, the German long-range direct:l.on-finding set....up

had to be changed to correspond to the new situe:liion.

A network.ot long-range direction-finders was l.oca.ted tar beyond the Gennan
frontier, thon these stations were placed under coorditlated control
I

1n order to get s.ynchz~ized s.ystematic readings on the same transmit~er b,y as m~ long-rangeI

direction-finders as possible so as

to get dependable fixes.
•

I

In October 1943 ·the following short-wave D/F- bases.~eIavailable to "Radio Defense":l.

For the west:

Middleki:rk, Wilhelmshaten, Hannover,.

Langenal"gen, Bodensee, Bordeaux(Part~ controlled tram Giessen).

2.

For the east:

Reval, Lemberg, Nikolajev, Pillau,(Controlled from Oranz).

3. For south andsoutheast:

Pulsnitz, Varna, Athens(Radio controlled from Pulsnit~).

In February 1943 instruments in Rome, on Sici:cy-, and on

Sardinia were added to this system.

99

RESTRICTEDRES~D 32
For close-range wo1•k conditions wore as follows:

close-range

D/F apparatus .for tixing the ground-wave had been developed long
before the wa.~ and sets had been. constructed which were suitabl.e
After the search for ene~ agents began

for use in the field.

in the west in the fall o£ 1940, the first such tranoodttor ua.s

located in Antwerp in April 19~~.

This was accomplished after

the area in which the transmitter must be located had bee11
determined 'L..r long-rane;e direction-finding.
Even in this first case, it was manifest that the closerange direction-find9rs must be of. such a nature that the operator
could approach the location or the transmltter unnoticed.

Con-

sequontq even then it was onl.;y' possible to pick up the transmitterby using a special suitcase set which was operated b.f a man

dressed as a locksmith.

With this device ho nan"Owed the choicedown to a .few houses.
In the immediate vicinity,

the work was more difficul.t because

the agents usual.ly had watchers posted..

The probl.em was not solved

until. earq in 191+.3 \men a bel.t D/F set wa.s developed which couJ.d
be wom under the operator's clothing ..
The use of Fieseler-Storch planes as "r:cying close-range
direction-tindel•sll dates rrom the summer or 1941.

'The tirst

experiments began in M~ while the first succe~~ comndtments
began in September.

In April 1942 three machines were used andthe number was later inc1•eased to 12.

1()0

RESTRICTEDDespit.o all the successes or C-e:rman "Radio Defenseet and ,despite aLt the stations picked up, the numbe~ of hostile
agent circuits in the Ger.man sphere ot influence increased
constant]J".

The means and personnel or tile German "Radio

Defense" during the war were in no wise oonmensure.ta witli'

the m;agnitude and importance of the te.slq' the;r remainedI

tota.J.,ly inadequate, quite apart frQJJJ. t.he fact:. that they werej'.
not emplqyed effective~ until much ~oo lateo
/I

•

,

101

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•

102

RESTRICTED

RE-·r"RADIO GAMES"
Picking up an agent's transmitter often afforded the German
inLelligence"ecrvico a chance to enter active~ into the network

ot to1-eign espionage.

The first requirement was that the raid

be a surprise and tha~ all written material fall into the handsor the raiders; traf'f'ic schedules and cryptographic materials

were absolute~ necessar.y for further operation of the captured
transmitter.
A second requirement was that no member of the ,agent groupshould escape and wam the enenzy-.

I.f both conditions ware ful-

filled and it seemed worth while to attempt a radio deception -a so-called "radio game" - permission was secured from thecompetent agencies and the deceptive traffic was carried on b,ypersonnel of 11Radio Defense"•
There were two motives involved:

in the first place, theeneJI\Y might be led to believe that its agent network was :Cuzlctioning normall.y in the area in question; this was a safeguard

against the setting up of' other agent networks.

On the other

hand, it might be possible to mislead the enell\Y wilih false

or falsified information to disguise the actual situationo
Reports on the strength, movement and assignment of troops,
on arms, fortifications, transportation matters, morale,intended militar.r measures, war production and economic
matters (in cooperat:ton with the competent authorities orthe economic command) could be imparted to the enerey- in a wq

lOS

RESTRICTED

calculated to give tbe desired impression.
Carrying on such "radio games" called for great skill andperfect adaptation to the system or reporting hitherto employedby the agents.

In composing messages t·t was necessary to follow

precisely the wording previously employed.

Linguistic usaBe ingeneral and the use or particular expressions, technical words 1 anddesignations must not show the slightest change.

A sing~e

expression used fa.J.sely could jeopardize the success oi' the entire"radio game:".
Sometimes it ,.Tas poss.tble to nconvert" the egent and get him
into the game.

Without doubt this was the best solution bu·t it

assumed that no secre·t signal. had been arranged between the agent
and his employer to indicate that he was worlting under com;pul.s1.on.

The possibllities varied widely and so d1.d tbe resul·ts.

In somecases it was possible to deceive the ~ponent ror years and thus
avert serious damage to one's own side; in other cases the success
was of short duration; sometimes the opponent quiclay recognized
the deceit a.nd either broke off cc.nmnuuication at once or else
played along for a time to delude us into thinking the deception
was successful, wh~~e be was quietly building up a new networkof agents ·u·hich would have to be tracked dmm. by "Radio Defense 11 •The first German deception was carried out in March ~9~1.
The transmitter LOM~ which had been picked up in southern Belgium,
was continued in opera.·tion vi th German perso1mel and captured
material.

The game worked.

The English control statj.on announced

the dispatch of a.d.ditional agents who were to land by pa.racb·:t.r104

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--------------------------

in the night of 9 - 10 Mq in the vicinity of Liege.

They were

promptly apprehended; their radio equipnent with all documentar,ymaterial and keys was secured.
Dozens of these "radio games" were carried on by all parties
during World War II.

One of the most grandiose was the "North

Pole Case" which will be described at length later.

At thispoint we shall give onl1" a little example from the last phaseor the war.
At a time which was very critical for the German m.Uitar,ysituation, an effective deception was carried out success~in the East.

On .14 August 1944 the German police in Rigaarrested the Russian agent, Lieutenant J akushov, and his wife
who was acting as his radio operato1·.

After tedious "interroga-

tions" the tliO were fina.J.4r induced by the Germans to make frankstatenents, whereupon traffic was resumed again by the Gennans
on 20 August.

In the course of two months a large number offalse, but apparently very important reports were tranamitted
1firl.cll made such a great impression that Lieutenant Jakushov

received by radio the trBogdan-Chmielnizki Order, Class II" while
his wife received a "state decoration".

lOS

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106

RESTRICTED

'l'HE "ROTE KAPELLE CASE11

Let us a·t.ate at the outset that this case has nothing to
do with a religious chapel.

Neither was such a chapel used

for setting up an agent's transmitter nor were clergy involved.
The designation resulted from a whim of German offioial.s in
Belgium who applled to every case or radio ag-ents the general* and gave each individual case a: particulartenn 11Kapelle"
designation.

Thus there arose in t.he course of time aI"Schrammel-Kapelle"1 a 11Zither-Kapelle 11 a "Blas-Kapelle", an"Ardennen-Kapelle", a "Kapelle-Etterbeck" and one dq a
"Rote Kapella", 1-dlere the color referred to Bolshevism,
since this 11Caseer had been controlled by' and worked for.Moscow.

The stoi'Y was as follows:

Even before the outbreak or the German-Russian war in
1941, the Russians had set up a netto."'rk of agents Trlhich
expanded over all Central and Western Europe.

It wa.s intended

for espionage and was to become effective in a large W81' o~in the event of an armed conrlict.

When the war with Russia broke[out, this agent radio net was by no means completely developed
and thoroughly organized.

On:cy individual portions were so wellorganized t~at they were tull~· capable of fUnctioning.
Among others, the Russians had set up such a center forradio agents in Brussel.s.

The head of this spy center had

became a partner in a large Belgian commercial enterprise and*KaJ2ell~ also means orchestra,hence a group 'kilich works toget.herl [Ed. ]107

RESTRICTED

thus had provided himself an opportun.lty for making extensive
journeys without attracting attention and of establishingcontact with ~~ leading personalities.

In this ~ hecould gain insight into a number of things and gather infonna.-

At first he sent this info1nation to Moscow throughtion.

Russian diplomatic and ccmmerciaJ. representatives.

This route,which ran via Berlin, ceased to function shortl;y before theoutbreak of the war between Germany and Russia.

They nowresorted to radio to transrn.it to l~oscow the results of their
spying.
The radio traffic itself was soon intercepted b,y German
stations, for the first time on 26 June.

However, it was notpossible to solve the cryptographic system and read thecontents.

Furthermore, it was a long time before the Ger.man

D/F service was able to fix the station.
Not untU November 1941 was it ascertained that the station
was certainly in Brussels.

]\Tow the close-range search began.
I

On l2 December the transmitter wa! fixed definitely so thatsteps could be taken tor picklng it tip.

On 1.3 December it wascaptured by represe11tativ:es of thl!6 derman counterintelligencein Brussels.

This 'Was the first transmitter of its type that

had been spotted in Western Europe.

The villa in tlhich it had

been set up and from which it operated had been rented during
the surrmer or 1941 b,y ·~he Russian eBpionage service and wascared for by a Belgian housekeeper. The building served
not only as the location of the radio station but also as
she~ter

for members of the agent group end as calling point f• 'ragents and informers.

108

RESTRICTEDAt the time of the raid six p3rsons in all. 'trore arrested,among them an operator who came in the following day, two
Russian officers, and a Polish woman who had como frcm Parisand served ~a cipher clerk4
However, t,his was merely the crew of the 'l'adio station;

the chief and actual. head of the agents was not c:a.ught.
Among the material f.mmd 1-rere aome 500 enciphered radiograms forwarded by this transmitter, hence ·!ihere was no doubtthat the enoiphexment and deciphermoot ha.d been done in thehouse and that l:.he cipher keys Dlusl.. be there somewhere.

Until

these were found, nothing could be done with the traffic.

It

was ori4" possible to learn that a grille system tras involved
which was Qbviously reenoiphered with a so-called book key.

As book key, ru~ book ~ be used b,y agreemen~ between senderand 1•ecipient..

F'rom the text:. an "additive sequence". isderived and decipherment is not possible without having thebook used.,
With all the egoism and eagerness to advance its own
interests tl1at characterize official agencies, the Brussels

countez•intelligenoe of'fice declined nror security roaeons"any further cooperation with representat:lves of "Radio
Defense11 ai'lier the transmit.te1• had been picked up..

The

villa, which had been confiscated momentarily, we.s released
after a sho1-t time e.nd six "'-eeks later "Radio Defense"
received a final. report i'rom which it, appeared that those109

RESTRICTED

arrested had otubbo:t'tlJ.¥ refused to make ar:ry statemants, except
the housekeeper, and that. she knew nothine of consequence regard~
ing the orgoniz!l.tion w-hich had operated there.

Attached to thereport 1-rere photograph:J.c copies of the JW).teria.l found and astatement tbnt an attcmrt by the cipbor section of OID1 todecipher the radiograms ha.d not proved successful.•
These photoBraphs l~re subjected to a careful check at the
ccntra1 office of "Radio Defense" and it ltas discovore'd that oneof the scraps of paper which had been photographed contained a
so-call.ed "Caesar" key • such as is tmployod by the Russians !'or
enciphering plain text.

This scrap of paper f!bo't..-ed severalrows of tho enciphezment of the radiogrDJn and this proved that
encipherm.ent had been carried on ldthin the house.

Hence thebooks used must also be there~
Same notes in secret ink and certain letters contained
hints that the organization had bra.11ches in France and Holland.
A study of the groups of the cipher text on t:::to scraps ofpaper revealed t.hat the book must have been in the Frenchlanguage.

For the moment this did not help much since oncya knowledge of the entire content of the book lrould afford a
possibility of current decipher.ment.
By carefull,y questioning the Belgian lady t<rho had run thehouse i·t was possible to learn little by little the titles ofeight or nine books l'Ihich might have been used by the Russi6Il
agents.

Now it \'laS a question of getting theso nine books. The

llO

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•

,..

on:cy W<\Y" was to pw·chaso them on the open market, since 't.he villa
had meanwhile changP.d hands and the entire libra.17 had disappeared.

Even though the titles of the books \-rere nOtr known, there was no
guarantee that the proper edition would be :round in a book st.ore,
i.e., the edition which corresponded ~tact~ in pagination andin text to the one used••The crypta.na.:cy-t.ic sectio11 or ·t.he central office of"Radio Defense", which meanwhile had become acquainted with a.U

cipher systems hitherto known to have been used b.y radio agento
in the east 1 at"l;ernpted l:.o solve this one by anal,yt:.ic methods ..

A ba.l.t destroyed sheet used in enciphermenL l"l8.S the critical.
factor.

After some six wecki'J of work the make-up of theadditive sequence was learned.

On the basis of other agent

traffic it 1-ras fina.l.:cy" possible to tum these digits into
letters Wld the short sentence obtained contab1ed a significant
name "Proctor".

This name was found in one of the novels

which had been procured and thus the key book was revealed andthe system was broken ..
Now some of the captured radiograms could ba deciphered.
The addressesof a number of agents were disclosed and an.
.......---~

opportunii,y was opened for penetrating a wide:cy. rami.fied
Russian agent network extending over the west and intoGe~ itself.

The deciphered messages proved that

"Radio Defense" was on the trail ot a ver;r clever man who
must have connections in th~ vecy highest command, since he111

RESTRICTED•transmited in November 1941 the intention of the German commandto carry out an attack in the Cacausus in the spring of 1942.
Furthermore, his reports on gasoline consumption and existing
stocks of fuel and planes showed that he must have contact with
the Air Ministry or with the High Command of the Air Force.

Heeven transmitted to Moscow the prediction of an impending extremely
cold winter which had been made by German astronomers and ;, !ather
eXperts.

He even gave a clear calculation of the time when Germc;mfUel reserves would be exhausted.
This principal agent in Brussels 1 always referred tq, by the.,:: :

cover name "Kent" , was on the road a great deal'""Oi' the time.
Deciphered. messages made it possible to follow his journeys toCzechoslovakia and throughout all Germany.

Kent received his

principal information f'rom an agent designated in the messagesby the cover name "Coro".
source.

Now it was a question of trailing thisChance provided the following opening.

When the war began 1 the Russ ian intell.igcnce service had
not finished building up its foreign organization.
nections from Germany were not i'unctioning.

Radio con-

The call signs e.nd

the traffic schedules had not been fixed definitely by days but

were to change from one transmission to the next, so the transmitters got out of' step and could not get adjusted again.

This

accidental. maladjustmant was the reason for a radioGram giving
the Belgian group the names and addresses of three collaborators
in Berlin who were to be :tns'tructed to establish radio connections

with the Center in Moscow.

Of course this went counter to t~ ~ rD~t

112

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elemental pri.ncipl~s of conspiracy and can oncy be explainedby the oxig~ncies of the situation.

Kent. came to Berlin to reestablish the contact of the)"Coro" group wit.h Moscow.

in Novemb~r 1941.

This was la.t.e in October or earl¥'

However,. tha contact. remained inadequate

and Coro .continued to send most of hls nk'\terial. by ll!aY of Kent.
The· radiogram had men·l".ioned tht'ee groups in Berlin.

At

first. nothing could be done with one of the Be:r.~in addresses;
more than six months had passed and the dwelling had changed
hands.

~ after along search did one get on the righttrack, but this proved of secondary importance.
more success with the second address.

There "HasHere investigation

led to a first lieutenant of the Air lt'orce who was employedin the Press and Information Section of the Air' l4.inistry, laterin the Jd:, tache' Group of this ministry.

In civil.ian life hehad been a teacher at the University of Berlin and before 1933
had taken.an active part in politics; he had good relations
with the For.:lign Office and contacts 1dth a large circle ofacquaintances and men r of similar political. belief.

He wasa man of outstanding intelligence, openl¥ opposed to National
Socialism and s.ympathizing with the ideas of Communism and with
the Soviet Union.

Through his activity in the Air !-finist:cy hecame int,o contact with most o.:C the higher officers of thedepartment as well as with many other high officials and11i.th industrial plants.

This man, a certain Schulze-Boysen,

was a relative of the Tirpitz family.

Using masterful disguise

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he had become the head of a widelY ramified German resistanceorganization 1o.ffiich was trying to overthro1.-r NationaJ. Socialism
at aQY cost.

In contrast to other Ge~an resistance groups,

l"rhose activity was e.xhausted in preparing plans or in waiting,
the Schulze-Bqysen group l~s geared for action both inside andoutside the col.Ultry.
"Coro" or "Schulze-Boysen" - was now watched l.Ulobtrusive~by the Gestapo, as were hi.s acquaintances and his whole intellectUP~ circle.

Among other things it was established that at

definite times he met Superior Councillor Dr. Hamack of theltinistr7 of Economics in the Berlin Tiergarten and ope~
exchanged information with him.

Dr. HamaC'k later tumedout to b~ one of Coro's most important co-workers.

He alsoappeared in the messages under the name '~Arwid" 111hich 1o~s
actu.alJ.y one of his given names.
Tracing down Schulze-Bqysen's circle of acquaintances andchecking theiJ·
For instn•nuections brought a long sequence of surprises ..
. a man, whom we :;hall call nzrr , was head

construction ID;)., · .u1 one department of the Loewe Radio Company.
He had long been a convinced Communist and had been in l1oscow
but had cleverly concealed his attitude.

He was a clever tech-

nician and was head of the section engaged in developing television, radar and other electronic devices for the Air Ministry.
In essence, the principle of radar had lone been known but; thus

114•

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.far J_tt.l.lc had been done to adapt the in:vent.ion to military
purposes.

During the wa.r this question had become prominent

and 81Jch space scanning devices were proving important in

detecting approaching enem;,r aircraft.

Bomber warfare wasbeing devel.oped and t.he recognition of at.tacld.ng planes atnight or in tog had become indispensab1e, if' they were to becombatted suocessfu.l:cy-.

The Loewe Compa.ey was supposed toassist in devel.oping and bn1 Jding the apparatus.
Anyone who lmows German conditions must real1.me that the.

moment German authorities began to concem themselves with thesematters thore began a busy air of secrecy.

Instead of entrust-ing as ma.tJY people as possible with the devel.opnent o.r thisimportant apparatus and thus achieving a hi~ successtul
product, the whole project was cloaked in an utter~ super-nuous veil or secrecy.

There were cover names for eveeything.

The number or participants wo.s

kept as small ao possible.

No

one wao perrn.it ted to talk with anyone else regarding the problem
as a whole.

The resul.t was that only a small. circle or engineers

was engaged in the work and the direc t.or o:r this section at the
Loewe plant - consequent:Qr in virtual control or the progress

there - was " Z "•The fate o£ this important invention rested

in his hands.

" z " lmew the importance or the task entrusted to him, but
at heart he was not mere~ a Communist but also a bitter :rooor Nattonal Socialism.

He desired its destruction; bore was an

115

RESTRICTEDRES~!t!~1'W 2
opportunity.

By 5abotaging devclopnent of the radaJ.· equipment

he could keep it from benefitting the National Socialist State,at least .:Cor some time.
"Z" had good fellow \fOl'kmen.

Whenever cne of these men ma.de&J.Y" proe;reSS On the device,. nztr had the f ..H:I. report"Jd tO the Air

Ministr,y, but he also saw to it that the rngin~er dl~appeared.from. the plant.

Either his deferment was C.:.l~cc.lled and he went to

the front, "r he was entrusted \'lith "more important" tasks, or he
was mere:cy transferred.

'I'he man who replaced him. was sure to be

more or less a stranger in this field.

For almost two years, ttzn

managed to sabotage this ilztportant work and England and America
got a head start 1 with the result that the German submarine wassoon driven from the seas.
For the time being, the Germans hesitated to arrest Corobecause they wished. to lco.m as much as possible about his relations llith other persons and offices.

A remarkable circumstanceforced than to strike before the time was ripe.
Readers of detective stories know how strange accidents n11d
complications, obviously dragged in by the hair, serve to clear
up or to complicate a situation.

And every reader has probably

assumed that such accidents can only be invented by an author.

I

should like ·to rcmmrk that the best author is a btmgler at im·enting such accidents in cc~p~riscn t.o \·•hat r·eal life can do.
The cryptc.nalytic Group of the station monitcring ~gent radio had
just been reenforced at th:1t time; {'JOOllg the ~~ntlcmen engaged uere two· students o.f the University of Borlin \''ho:u l:e nhall cill "A" ""' 1 "B".

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'l'hero are some 80,000,000 Germans; the crypt.tllla.lytic
section for monitoring agent radio consisted of some 15 men;these 15 mer1 had been chosen at random.

And, sure enough,;among them wore two who trere in contact with Corol II"A"ltad agreed to go sailing with Coro one Saturd~ a~~ernoon
at Wa.nnsee.

At the last moment nA" was detained by his workand t.rled to infonn Coro of the fact..

...

In order to telephone

unobserved, he went to the room of another ana.:cy-st which wa.s
then empty becauso the man had alrea.d,y left.

"A" ca.ll.ed

Corots number but did not find him at home.

He left his name,telephone and extension with the maid, requesting that Coro
ca.ll him imm.edi.ately when he came h()jne.

'I'his did not happen

for Co1•o had already gone to Wannsee and did not return until
1-l:onday.

'!'hen he found the urgent note of the ma:td, which gave

the telephore number he was to caJ~ but not the name.
The telephone had just been installed and the man \'rhollOl"'IIRlJy occupied theroom wa.s none other than the ana:cy-st

who during the preceeding weeks had l"mrked on and deciphered
the radiogrt'hlS plcl<:ed up in the Brussels stationJ

This was aDr. nvn, l"lhO !-.lt'.ll about Coro from the messages and also knewthat efforts were baing made to trap him.
Imagine Dl~o ''V"s" surprise when Coro called him tha.t
Monday1 saying he had been instructed to call the number

l l '2'

RESTRICTED

because someone urgently desired to talk with him.

This call. vas

interpra·ted by the authorities to mean tlla.t Coro must have gotten wind of something.
coincidence.

In reality it vas a perfectly harmless

It was dicidcd to act at once.

Coro was arrested.

And gradually al1 those with 1o1hom be had been in contact werearrested.
Schulze -Boysen ( Coro) was a man of exceptionally high menta.lity 1 gr~a.t initiative and energy, and of such amazing intellectthat his collaborators 1-rere only slie;htly disturbed by the arrest;
they were convinced that this man would betray no·th:lng and that the
Gestapo might easily be convinced of his im1ocence.
After eight days of grilling they had not gotten anything outof him,; he had a. credible explllil.ll.t:!.on of everythins and main·hained
his conu>osure and mental alertness so that he never became
entangled. in contradictions •In spite of the fact tha.t ·the man

was proven guilty by the radio messages, experienced criminologists
repeatedly doubted his guilt, especia.J.J.y as he was regarded very
favorably by his office and by his comrades.

He himself said

nothing but sorr~ of the ~ arrested talked out of school.
:More than 1.20 persons now L~came involved, including a very h:!.gh
official of' the "Foreign Of'f'ice".
Little by little the orgc.nization vas revealed.

ll'here '\orasa gigantic trial ending in the e~~ccution of some 60 persons in
December 1942.
service.

This was a serious blm• to the Russian inte~igence

The G~rmo.ns continued to op::re.te the radio netvorlc and 1-1cre

<"'
11 un
.f.-

RESTRICTED

able to pick up newly dispatched agents on arrival.
it is a question

However,

now far or how long this deceptive traffic

l'm.s real.J¥ able to mislead the Russians for a.t that timethe "Rote Drt~i" was already 110rld.ng at top efficiency.

Innw opinion, the Russians did not allow thomaelvcs to be
deceived for vel~ long but then cleverly continued playing thegame wit.h Germany in order to give the impression that the trick
was a success.

Actua.ll;y they set up unnoticed a new spy not.

1...rhich passed reports to 1-loscow c~ie~ through the "Rote Drei"•

From those arrested leads l-rere secured regarding thepeople connected with the third Berlin address.

The Ger.mans\~reable to pick up a second Russian agent station in Breslau,

taking it b.Y surprise.

Among those arrested was a certain

Hermann lrlenzel, who had played a ro~e in the burning of theReichstag.

The nuu1 ~~s rendered submissive and continued towork under Gei'IIlatl control and guidance until t.he summer of

194.3 when he esr.aped by a bold trick.

He reappeared in Hollan!;contacted the British secret service m1d through London reporta~
to Moscow, but the Russians no longer trusted him.
Me&ll'.11ile in June 1942 another transmitter had been picked
up in Paris.

Nothing much was elicited from the operator andhis wlfe, but it was noted that the messages were composed withthe same agent key as those emanating from the Brussels station•
This led to further revelations.

A special detachment was sent

to Brussels to try to penetrate into the Belgian, Dutch, and

119

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French groups.

Ultimately five stations were taken by surprise in

Belgium and used in radio deception.

Nevertheless, it had hitherto

been illtpossible to clear up two matters.

The principal. agent inBrussels had been able to avoid arrest.

No one lmew who he was,o~h.ts cover name 11Kent 11 was knOlm from the messages.· In thesecond place, it had not been possible to make connections with
the Paris group and to penet1•ate it.
In A~EJ .. 1942 the Germans seized and interrogated very
thorou~ anagent who maintained contact between the Dutch

and the Be~~ian Gl'f.·'.,.

\ihen cornered, a remark escaped him

that~ had once been in the dwelling of the principal agent,~e~t, which he also pointed out.

Investigation revealed that

Kent had lived in the dwall.ing but had fled inunediate:cy atterthe raid on the Brussels radio station.

Kent had been active

as part 0\mer of the Simex Compan;r in Brussels, a commission
house which did bus~ess on a very large scaJ.e with various
representatives of thu German axmod forces and also of the"Organisation Todt"•!<'rom t1.ere a trail led to a similarbusiness j n Paris which was the headquarters of the Frenchgroup.
Kent had as lady friend the widow of a Hungarian; she andher child lived with him and under no circumstances did he wish
to separate himself from this woman.

That proved fateful for him.

Since ~s friend was a striking beauty, it was possible to follow
his trail. and event~ to learn his address in l"iarseilles -120

RESTRICTED

at that. time stilt unoccupied.

Since Kent ·traveled on a Uruguayan

passport, it wa.s necessary to negotiate with ·t.he French Government
before he was picked up in ~Iarseilles in October 1942.
Although close watch wa.s kept on the Puis firm l:l.l1d al.though

an attempt. was made to negotiattJ big deals thr1;>ugh ·t:.he Organisation
Todt, the German a.gents did nc~t at firs l:. succeed in coaxing t:.hc
cautious head of the French group (cover name Gilbert.) out of
hiding.

Final:cy thoy succE'edod i.n arresting soveraJ. intermediate

agents who were picked up so quie·t.l1' outside of. Paris tha·t thefirm no·ticed nothing.

In this way they discovered the name of

Gilbert's dentist. and he was later arr3sted in the dentist's
chair.

The arrest of seve1~a1 collaborators followed promptly.

Further investigation sholred that the trancmitter picked up
in June belonged to the Gilber'l:, group of agents and it waslearned that this group tm.a in contact with the French Communist

Party.

Gilbert had arranged to set. up four additional radio

circuits •Horeover ~foscow had sent through a radio key for

another :important agent with the cover name "Harrytr.

With theaid of the French Communist Party, new operators - two of them
Spanish Reds - had been provided for the Gilbert gt'O\lpo

The

radio schedule fo1~ Gilbert had not arrived; however. Gilbert's
secretary, who had deco~d the radio schedule for "Ha1•1-yn fourweeks earlier, was able to give from me.m.ocy some information

regarding th-a call signs.

It chanced that German monitors had

been listening to a Russian transmitter which regula.r:Qr gave

]21

RESTRICTED

RE~~~~9 2 ·its calla and wait-ed for an answer.

An attempt was made immediate-

4" to establish contact with this tranamitter, since the German
agencies l.fere very anxious to use Gilbert, who was hi~ regarded ·in Moscow, in a deceptive game in order to get clues respecting
other persons in the Russian intellieence service who might be in
territor,y occupied by Germany.

For the moment aQY attempt toenter into communication with Moscow appeared almost hopelessbecause the wave lengths on which transmission liOuld be .-"lfrective
were not known; the wave lengths suggested by Gilbert's secretary

had proved false.

To everyone's surprise, the improbable happenedat the second attempt and - to be sure - qy pure chance.
Moscow Center, whose calls ware monitored,change and gave the new wavelength.

Thesudde~ ordered a

In such cases the number

was usual.ly enciphered but this time it clicked.

The agenttransmitter used by the Germans l'la.S heard in Moscow, whereupon
a message was dispatched to l'-1oscow saying that the radio schedule
had arrived in earbled condition and requesting a repetition~
Even n01.·r it trm.s a question 'Whether contact would ever be madeagain but in the ver,)r next traffic period Moscow ordered a newalternate wave, again using plain nun1bers1 whereupon a ro~ssage wasput through l'rl.th a n ·r schedule for traffic to Moscoi'l and anot(lerfor t1·af.£ic via Lon~hm.

Thus tr..e connection l'ras definitely

assured.
NOTrr it liaS possible to l.'rork in a nel'r connection for agent
Kent:. l'rho had been arrested.

This \'Ta.S very j.mpo1•tant because the122

RESTRICTEDRE~t~2Gcnnans had to keep the Russians from building up a new secret•

spy net.

B.y tying thei~ activity to the Gilbert transmitter,

northern France was henceforth protected against the Russian
intelligence service; the same thing was accomplished in southem France by using the Kent transmitter with German operators.
The reports which now went to Moscow shot.-red Kent - longsince in safe custod;y" - to be a man tdth good connections inFrance.

His outfit included, among other things, a 11spy

organization" headed by a former Latvian General.

This

general had been won over by intennediaries and was made tobelieve that he was working for a French resistance movement.
He organized a spy ring directed against. Germany without
knowing that his work was guided and financed by the Germans.
His reports 1~re valuable and interesting because they gave
insight into ·the l'tea.knesses of German security and because
they could be used in part to provide the Center in Moscow
with credible reports and thus string it along.

At the sametime the Gem.ans l'tere penetrating further into the organizationof the French Conuuunist Party and were lea.:J.'"lling the goals andrepo1-ts which l'i'ere especially important to ].foscow.

Since

Moscow must believe that the Kent; organization was stillworking unchanged, the Germans \\"ere keeping the Russians fromsetting up a new and strm1ger intelligence group.

123

RESTRICTEDThis was tha

timftti~!J!~!fv: before StalJ.n~ad

and in the foot.hills of the Caucasus had bogged down

hopeless]¥~

it was the time 111hen it became clear to every rational being
Germany couJ.d not ldn a military decision.

tha~

It wa.s just the time\

to sound out the political situation so as to lay the foundati.on
for a tolerable conclusion of the war.

It 11~s a favorable moment

for Ge:rm.aey- because the Gerni.an armed forces lT.3re still strong andthere were certain frictions between the Soviet Union on tr. l one
hand and England and the u.s.A. on tho other.
The captured Kent transmitter offered a 11:onderrul opportunity
to touch cleverly on questions the clarification of l':hich wa.s ofimportance to Germa.ny.

Under what conditiona wou.td the Soviet

Union be reaqy to enter into negotiations?

On which questions

was there antagonism between the U.S.S.R. and the Westom Allies?
Did the Soviet Union aim at a penetration of Central and Western
Europe?

In vie111 of the. cha1•acte1.. or the Kent organization, it

would have been easy to put such leading questions in an

innocent and unobt.rusive manner because Kent had already brought
up and discussed all manner or questions.

Certain experts of Gennan

Radio Defense promptly suggested such a course but in Berlin
they had cold feet.

'!'hey considered t.he idea original and n.ot

unattractive but they did not have the courage to do anything.
•tt'lhat would the FUhrer say if he should find out that w-e were inconmnmioation with Mosco1.r?

He 11rou.ld hc.ve us all hanc;edi"

l··an the general attitude.

'Ihe utter lack or freedom on t.he partThatof the Ger::n.."lll authorities - even the highest., the pct.t.ino:::;s of

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their thinking, and their fear of responsibility found expression here.
The "Rote Ka.pell.e Case"- or we might ntore appropriately.

say the "Kent Case" - ,-m,s one of the most inte1-esting casesof the entire t1ar.

The principal agents had been quiet4'"

introduced and established in the countries concerned long
before the war without arousing the slightest suspicion.
Through their position as managers or important commercial
enterprises they had excellent connections with leading
people in industry and trade, with the political parties,
and even with the Germ,.=m Armed Forces, so that they could
get a wide survey or the entire situation.

The principal•

agent, Gilbert, had exact informat-ion regarding tile landingof Allied troops in Algeria three weeks before it took place,whereas the Gennans' were taken complete:cy- by surprise.

125

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•

126

e,

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THE RUSSIAN RADIO AGENT SERVICE TO 1942
The work or Russian radio agents has been adequa.teq described and we shall now review the subject and show the extent

ot this activity during World War II. Communist Russia was thetirst countr.v to undertake radio-controlled espionage on alarge scale.

The sto17 goes back approximateq to the year

1931, i.e., to the time when it became clear that National
Socialism was gaining ground in Germany and a coll.ision .with
the Soviet Union entered the realm ot possibility.

SUch aclash might have come sooner or later an.vwa.y but it wasinevitable it National Socialism seized power.
was necessar;y.

Watchfulness

Therefore the Soviet Union began setting up awidespread short-wave radio network with the control station in
Moscow and a dozen subordinate stations distributed all over
Europe.

At that t:Une the Gennan intercept service tailed toget 81J7 insight into the content ot the messages exchanged; it
was assumed in Germa.ny that this was a control net created by

the Communist International.e to guide Communist propaganda
throughout the world.

How mistaken this was became apparent

onl;v when German radio defense was able to get extensive

insight into the work or the Russian intelligence service.
It turned out that the "Comintern Net" - really a networkot the Russian intelligence service - constituted o~ a ver.r
small portion ot the Russian ~ n~t.

'

The net ot agent stations,which had been establi~hed all over Europe but had remained

12'7

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~lR'JP:tfl~2
ALJr· ___-- --silent until the war began,. was much cre-a.ter and now appeared in
an all the more dangerous form.

'l'he number of agenl:. stations

in Europe :f:ncreased "ve:cy sharply in 1940 and by May 19/.t.l some

25 Russian stations were hea.r~l.

By June 1941 there were 78

circuits in the Russian ''WNA" Net, as the Germans called it, a.rt.er
the call sign of the control station in Moscow.

Just before theoutbreak of the German-Russian War the exchanc;e of teleg~ams inthis net increased enormously:

in August 1941 the Germanintercept service copied no less than 600 radiograms.
The aims of the Russian Secret Service were:1.

To seek information in all fields connected with theanned forces and armed strength of all European
countries, of the u.s.A., of Japan and of a few otherstates.
·,2.

To seek information in all fields of indust:cy andeconomics in those countries.

3.

To seek information on all political happenings in
those countries which might have aQY reaction on
the political life of the Soviet Union.

4.

To infiltrate the secret service of those countries
and gather information regarding aQY measures planned
against the Soviet Union.

B,y using its diplomatic and commercial representatives and b,yemploying special radio ngents, the Soviet Union organized an intelligence network which functioned splendidl~.

It comprised agents

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from all branches of the H.ussian sGcrct service:officers of theGeneral Staff, agents of the People's Corumiosnriat for Internal
Affairs (Nl::VD), Party .functionaries, diplomo.ts, etc.

The

procurement of information on military, poJitir~ l ·:.nd economic
develo:rmcnts in foreign countries was carried out on #l ~randscale and by all possible moans.

The central offi.co3 £. ·t. up

abroad, tho branch offices, and indiv:1 d.ual aecnts 1-.~rc equippedwith special sbort-1-rave sets and were in (lir•Jct contact. lrl.t.ht
HoscO\'/e112 9-

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•

. ..
"

'f

•

~·

·-

~

~~~!i:J~~~-~,Miii~·-!;.,__.;1~..... -.

-,"DJg HO'l'g DHEI'"'

Dul'inc; tho conr~c of t·lorld l·lar II there l:Cro rnony ,croup& ofd~,ccrouso.c;cnts.

'!'he Gcn:m:m::> 1-rcrc able to render some innocuouo,.

::;;cme they could not.

I thhll.;: tho mo~;t d~ngerour~ EI'OUp of all "t-1().0

one t.hcy could not l'(:>ndcl· h~.rwless.

Ti';io flroup could only beclco.rcd up in ::::U.cht dcgrco and that. Jnt c·l too lat~.

Br;ginn:tnc; inJune 1<)1,1 t,he Gorn•a.n ll"ltcl•ccpt service not1..td three raclio eiJ:cui tG
from Suit~orloncl to NoGcpt·r; the three sto.tions ucro loca.tcd in th·.}vicinity of Lo.ke Geneva~

It TrTC.G soon ri7:CO@lized that theoo 11erc

agent sto.tions and that th•..!y belonr;cd to the Russio.n mill to.l>yespionaeo r-ratcm.

No furl,hor c:::oontlal informe.tion couJ.d be

secured , c:.:;pccit\JJy since the cryptocrcrhj.c systems employed
1..ooere

not broken.

studied.

Honth by month the traff~c t.-ras copied and

The net uas cr:.lled "Di.e Rotc D1·ci" e.nd ga.vo a lot of

people a headache, jncludinG_ r..cToo in &·dtzorloncl.
I1!ot unt,il DJccml"-or 191,2, after the o.rrost. of Ag<mt Kent,
did the Ger'll'ans find any clue for breaking into the networkof th~ Rotc Drei.

Kent ::;t.:Ltod th~Lt in 1940 h~ broue}lt acr,yptoc;raphic :::yutc~m to G.:·nova c..nd tl~;·livcrod it· in the
Rue de Lc.u::.:mnc.

Nc..1·r tho ~r.i.os central office of the Condnternt·ro..s loci:\tc<l in the nno do L~uc.:umc.

The trcrwmittcrs had bcon

fixed close tc tho French border.

'l'hro\lGh conficlcnti.U. ~o:.mts

Dijon, France_, ~n .:c.ttcmpt t!:l.S m::-.do to cot o.t thio orc:Jnization,....._.,. _..
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---~~~~~~-

- -

-- --

RES
above all to get some clue to the cryptographic s.ystem, so as to beable to read the tremendous volume or traffic over this net.
Not until the summer of 19~4 was Ger.maqy able to read thosemessages.

The content.s were enough to take ll}at1Y" a person's breathaway.
During the entire eastern campaign, during the first German

offensive in 1941, during the preliminary stages of the camp'lignof 1942, during the critical period of the battles around Sta.lingrad
and in the Caucasus, and later in 1942 when the eastern front was
being pushed back and one hoped to make a stand, possib~ on the
Dnieper, and check the on-rushing tide of the Russian armies,
precisely during those days, weeks and months the most secret
information regarding the German military situation in the east troop units 1 tanks, assembly areas, intentions - was being passed
currently through Switzerland to Moscow.

This was inforn•ation

which must have come from the highest lovel of the German militarycommand.
The sender alw~s signed "Dora"; the sources \\rere dcsie;natcd
as •twerther", "Sissy", "Teddy", "Fernand" 1 11Taylor" 1 "Lucie","Pakl.on, ''l·iaud", "Eduard", "Alfred", 11Jimn, "Salter", ate.

The

man who directed the work from Moscow signed "Director".
Direction-finding indicated that two transmitters were in
Geneva and the third was in Lausanne.
· agents in Switzerland began.

Now the work of Gcnr.,mThey· soon discovered the point

where the trancrnitters were located and the oreanizG.tion "''<hichthey served.

In Geneva, at 133 Rue de Lausnnne, sat es chi.t>:·

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of the orc~nizo.tiou a certain Ra.d.o l'Tho 1.ro,s officially directorof the Goo-rrossc in Geneva.
Alexander Rado wa.s a private scholar and a citizen of Hungary'
He had lived in Berlin prior to March l933 and thon eono first to
Hunga:ry and from thoi"e in 1934 to Po.ri.s, 'mere he was activo in
cartographic Trrork on behalf or the Soviet Union.
fanatical adherent of ~he Communist idea.

He 1rms a

In 1926 he had eone

from Borlin to Moscow for nine months and then returned to
Berlin.

He was a member of the ICPD and of the Associa.1:.ion for

the Study of the Soviet Pl.tmned Economy.

Ai'ter 30 ..To.nuary 19.33

he ~~s again active for the KPD and placed his dt~lling at its
disposal..

His 1dfe had been secretary of the Conununis·t. l'/oman' s
l·1ovcment and l·m.s tho sister of a well··known Corrllilunist,
Gustel Jansen; for a t:i.mr;~ she had vrorked in the Soviet Embassyin Berlin and later she spent some tirne in the Soviet Union ..
It is certain tha.t. flado l'll'as already active as a Soviet
agent in 1939.
Paris..

He must ha.vo been in contact '\·dth Gilbert in

It is uncertain l'lhen Rado came to St'litzerland,

probably earl_y in 1940 or even earlier.

In Geneva. he had tl>IO

tra.m::m.ittors directly at his disposal, one of them in tho
Rue de Soleura I'Io.

5.

The one in Lausanne was in the house at No. 2 Clwmin
Longorai.

The occupant or the house uas A. A. Foote '\'lho

appeared under the cover name John.

He did the cipher l'rorlc

hirnsol.f, ocnt the repor-ts, and al~ had an intelligence

j133

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organization or his own which worked independently or Rado.

The

Swiss authorities lmew nothing about this.
In the course or time the Germans were able to clarify many
points.

They lmew who the "Director" was, who. .Rado was, who theoperators were.

In the end they were able to read the messages.

But, for all that, the most important point could not be clearedup.

liho were the informers whose connections extended into th,,FUhrer's Headq,~.rters, into the OKW, into the Air Ministry, into
all industrial plants?

Who were these people Who knew how tosecure the most important information with such masterful skill?
Above all, who were the final sources from whom they drew theirinformation?
The Germans tried by every means to get behind this secret.
Hundreds of people were watched.

In December 194.3 in the groundsof the FUhrer's Headquarters, of OKH, of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and o·t;her offices 1 special detachments or Nahfeldsuchtrupps(troops charged with policing the air in areas close to the front
lines) were brought in from all directions.
bit of this secret was ever revealed.

All in vain.

Not a

It was and remains the mostfateful secret or World War II.
Late, in the summer of 1944 ·when the "Rote Dreitr had longsince ceased to operate and their shades were no longer spooking
far aw~ in the east on the Volga and the Don but were close to
the borders of the Reich in the east and in the west, at the timeof the clumsily-organized attempt on 20 July 19L,J• to dispose of
the man who had brought misfortune on Gennany and all Europe -134

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--~~-----------------

at t.hat tlme the ghost or the "Rote Drei" rose once .rno1~e fromthe grave.
Germany.

Anot,her convulslve search for traitors S\icpt over

Close-range intercept. detacbm.ent.s watched Hitler's

Headquart'ers for l'reeks, but again no trace of any suspicious
radio connection was found.
never existed.

It could not be found, for it had

The information for the "Rote Drei" had goneto Ra.do by' other, simpler ~a.

ISS

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136

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Kf~OVAND SEVASTOPOL.

-

Hitler aaid that once the German soldier got firm groundunder his feet again he would again stonn forward and drive
the en~ before him.

He asserted that nothing the future migbt

bring could be 1rorse than what the previous winter had brought.
Along with a mighty levy of his c)Wil, a.lm.ost one million foreign
troops were committed, incluc;ting one Italian and one Hungarianarmy.

One goal was the Volga near Stalingrad, the otlEr was the

Caucasus with its oil wells.

First the Crimea was to be cleaned

up J Sevast,opol was ·t,o follow ..
This last decislon wasted an undue number of troops on asecondary goal, since if the Caucasus fell j_nto German hands
the peninsula would automatic~ drop into Hitler's lap likea ripe plum.

But, "the gencral11 1·rould have it so and thestruggle in the Crimea began l'rhich lasted for mont.hs andinvolved tremendous sacrifices.

== ===
While German transpo1-ts rolled to t.ho east and Hitler
delivered his speech calling for all-out efforts, he issued
an order which ld.ped out every trace of hlml.lln freedom a.nd
every vestige of law - insofar as either still existed inGermany.

This \'ras the official beginning of organizedterror within the armed forces and throughout the entire
machinery of the staLe.

It signified that for the first time

Hitler fc' II. t.he ground shakine beneath h.i.m and realized that

13'7

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his officers 414 not &LWD.1B sbare his op:lDiOD auc1 ware :rebell:IDg

a.aa1Dst his 11 geueral.sh1p11 - someth:lna H1tl.e1" aould n?fi eDdure.

He

was reso1'V84 to SOft1'D v:l.th the lash a.n4 to oust I.eaders 'Who

opposed b1s orders 1n the a1:1.ahteat degree.

•'J!be DeV&pajpera were report:I.Dg the conquest of B1DSBiPore by tbe
JapaDOae 1 but tbe7 said nothins about the tact that ~DD oc~us
Bcmg KOng the Japanese raped hundreds ot European VOIIIDI1 a.n4 811'1&

1n tbe open 1118rkotplace and declared an ent:lre Chinese quarter abrothe1 without regard t~ ita :I.Dha.bitanta.

Bul.J' 1n ~ the atrussJ,e 1n the crimea besan.
braa.k-tln-oup uear K'arch vas c01qp].eted.
but wan defeated.

On 12 JfaJ' tha'!be llusaia.Ds fought b1tlier17

On 20 Ma7 the pen1Dsula was occupied up to

Snaatopol. BZI4 the 0101' reported 150 1 000 prisoners 1 1100 &UDB 1...

I~ CJoz'maD co.&centratiOD south ot Kharkov.

·''

B'8 sent h1s troops:Into battla tul.l7 aware tbat be was aacr:t.f:l.cills tbem, that he•t'llil18t aacrU'ice them to upset ~ plana.
•r·~

On 28 Ma7 tbe batt1e

wa decided. '.l!:l.mosbanko's a:rm~·~~ OI'UShecl, but the Oerma.n
advance bad been stopped and GerlllaD 1oaaea 1181'8 troancloua.

'Who

wont
It was a full. month after the battle of Kharkov before tho
Go:: 1."1 !'n troops coul.il &ta:t"t the aut.•'ll'lr oi'f'ens ive.

.. .,
11

t • • IRESTRICTED

ITolf '.l!imoshel'l;:ovrnent and for the infliction of heav,y losses on the enemr.
That gave the Germans new territory but t.he price was dear,
very dear.

Speer had to appeal to German ~sr industry for''more and better armsl" One hundred mill.:ton zinc smallcoins were called in.

For there was a shortage of zinc -and of many other things.

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140_ _ _ _ _ __:_R=E=S~TRICTED

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE OF KHARKOV
In judging milltaey actions people are accustomed to use theword •'victory" or "defeat" according to the obvious outcome.
Nevertheless, a l~st battle ~ be decisive tor the victorious
conclusion of a war.

A classical example is the· Battle ofBorodino in 1812 in which the Russians were defeated but•
lfapoleon's army was so depleted as to decide his fate. I am
inclined to believe that historians will regard the Battle

ot Kharkov as another classic example, ";t.nce it was not at
Stalingrad and not in the Caucasus that the war in the east
was decided but much earlier at Kharkov 1 where the Russians
inflicted severe losses and upset the Ge~ timetable.
Viewed superticiall;v, this was a severe defeat for theRussians; actually they gained their objective.

The

ultimate resu1ts were not immediate:cy- apparent and Ge:nnan
divisions moved forward toward the Kuban area, the Caucasus,'Iand the Volga.

141

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FROM KHARKOV TO STALINGRAD.

In Germany, people were now convinced that decisive blows
were being struck in the east and that autumn must bring acollapse of the Soviet Union.

On 12 August the German press

reported an "annihilating blow'' in the great bend of theDon.

Two Soviet armies had been virtua.l.l;y wiped out.

Fromthen on, no further great success was reported.· or course
minor local successes were stressed but in reality the great
offensive had bogged down.

For the second time the Russians'I

had been able to put up a resolute resistance and b.1 the endof August 1942 it was already clear to some people that theturning point of the war in the east had come.
You lll8iY' think what you will about German National'3ocialist propaganda in World War II; one thing must be
a:lmitted:

it was favored by faL'ul.ous good fortune.

Whenever things began to look rotten somewhere, something.

happened elsewhere to furnish marV"elous propaganda material •Whoever will take the trouble to examine the German newspapers
published between 15 August 1942 and February 1943 will beastonished at the multitude of things triumphant:cy- announced
in the German press to drown out the funeral dirge which was

beginning to sound from the East 1 faint at first, but thenlouder and louder.

\149

RESTRIC'I'ED

In the morning hours of 19 August a reconnaissance detachment of Allied troops to the strength of approximately "a regimentlm1ded near Dieppe.
was beaten off.

Nine hours after the landing the enterprise..

And now Dr. Goebbels and the press began shoot-ing off fire'h-orks.

The mixed detachment was turned into a great"British-American landing corps"; the reconnaissance thrust
became a.TJ. "invasion attempt"; the orderly ret.reat after its
mission was at.complished became a "catasti'Ophic defeat11 •For

weeks this enterprise was talked about and the east was almost•

forgotten.

Then on 9 September the papers reported that one of

the greatest. battles of all time was raging at Stallngrad.

Then

there was silence, - not at Stalingrad but in the papers.

Then

all sorts of strange things were heard:a German-Indies Com.p&n1'

was founded, the craze for {patent) medicine must be conquered, .
the social order was secure.

All with fat headlines.

headings other reports appeared:

With small

about t.he battle in the ruins

in Stalingrad, about ·t.errific hand to hand fighting, and about

the fact that Germans never capitulate.

Quite different fromthe big mouthed speeches of other ~s.
On 30 September 19lr.2 Hitler spoke in the Spo1"'tpalast in

Berlin.

He assured the German people that nothing worse than

the winter of 19U/1942 could ever happen.
he said:

Regarding Stalingrad"you may be convinced that no human being will move

us from this spot".

He didn't sq much about the new militarysituation in the east but he did tell in detail how many

144

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kilometers of rails had been re-laid; what organizational measures
had been taken in the occupied territories; and that they were on
the point of setting up plants to make preserves and noodl.es.

Allthis, naturall.y, on the premise that the areas occupied in the east
would remain in German possession for all t:t.me.

.

-

Stalingradl

The name first appeared in August; in September

people began to feel surprised that the city had not yet been•

captured; in October the name had become for the Russians as.y.mbol of resistance and for the Germans a subject 'or concern.
In November it became clear that the city. could not be taken.

While Gennan troops were shedding their blood before thisunhappy city and in the foothills of the Caucasus, the British
and Americans had a chance to ann.
Winter came.

The German troops suffered fright~.

Thefighting became more and more stubborn, more and more bit·t;er.
It was at this point that Gennan propaganda began a grandiosebut mistaken effort to sow mistrust among the Allies.
propaganda mill ran full speed but to no avail.

The

Meantlhile themighty assem.bzy of Russian armies was being completed.
The order to the defenders of Stalingrad to hold out to thelast man did not signify a senseless sacrifice.

WhUe they were

holding the ruins, the Russian High Command was preparing acounter-blow which was destined to crush the attackers.
thing unparalleled was happening deep in Russia.

Some-

New armies withmillions of men, thousands of tanks, and tens of thousands ofguns were rolling westward.

In Russia harbors great British and

145

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Anerice.n convoys were discharging their cargo.
attention.

Hitler paid no

His eyes were fixed as if in a trance on Stalingrad.

On the evening or 8 November Hitler declared he bad no intention of making a second Verdun of Sta.lingrad p~t that he intended
to conquer the c:i.ty by using small attack units.
say:

He went on to"OUr troops are attacking Stalingrad and they will take it;on that you can rely."In the following night the Russian encirclement began.

Tendays latex the German Sixth Army was encircled and dug in.

Thesecond act of the bloody drama of Stalingrad began.
Once again the Russians had succeeded in executing an enormous
assembly of troops in such a way that German reconnaissance 1 inparticular radio reconnaissance, had not been able to gather adequate
information.
The more German intelligence resul.ts in the East dried up,

the bette1• the Russian intelligence service fw>.ctioned.

Mr. Rado,

Chi':f of the "Rote Drei" in Switzerland, maintained a very animatedexchange of messages with the 11Director" in Moscow.

146

RESTRICTEDSTALINGRAD

As if they had sprung up out of the steppes, Russian divisions
appeared and hurled themsc lves repeatedly against the German positiona.

The German princi >al. front was pushed back slowly, farther

and farther from the enc:..rcled Sixth Army.

let the Sixth Army try to escape.

Hitler refused to

He ordered it to hol.d out inthe ruins of Stal.ingradt, because Goering had promised to suppl.yr

the encircl.ed Sixth Army by air.
Iby the Russian Air Force.

His attel!ilt was frustrated

With heavy J.osses the Germans did

fetch out somei50 1 000 men by air but 2~~ 1 000 were J.eft behind.
The J.osses of the encircled Sixth Army were heavy.= From.

the 19 to 25 November it lost

47 1 000 men killed and 51 1 000

captured, also 1164 guns, 430 tanks, 4000 trucks, 3,000 1 000 shells
and 18 1 000 1 000 rounds of infantry ammunition.

Under a terrificrain of fire the men of the Sixth Army put up an un-pa:rallel.ed
fight.
On 29 January total war was procl.aimed.

It was onl.y acramp of propaganda which was intended to cal.m but onl.y created
new unrest.
On 3 February 1941 the battle for Stalingrad came to an end.
It had cost a quarter of a million dead and 90 1 000 prisoners,incl.uding 24 generals,
OVer the German radio sounded the immortal mel.odies of
Beethoven and Schuber\ and words in memory of the heroes of'Stal.ingrad.

The Russian radio also honored its dead.

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In theeyes of' the whole world, however, the myth of' the invincibilityof' {he German army was extinct, while the danger conjured up by
tha.t unhappy attack of 22 June 191~1 became threatening.
Neit.her Dr. Goebbels nor the German radio nor any newspaper
brought word of the last radio message sent from Stc~ingrad by General
Paulus:"!fy Ftlbrer, in the future follow more often the advice of yourgeneralsl"
There ua.1 no one who ventured to hand this message to IIitler
personall.y.

The cryptographic officer at the ;F)\hrer•s Headquarters

l
bro~t

it with palpitating heart to the adjutant of' General Field

Marsha.ll Keitel who was on duty, and departed hastily.

The adjutant.

read it through a.nd his heart likewise began to pound.

Then helaid ~he telegram in the portfolio and carried this into the roomof the Cbie~ of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
The Field Marshall was sitting s·liiff'ly at his desk; he received
the portfolio, opened it and read the item, while the adjutant departed.

After a short liime, a lamp flashed in the antechamber;the adjutant hastened into the room of' his chief'.

Keitel wasstanding erect; deep wrinkles lay on his brow; he looked sternly
at the officer who entered.

"Unheard on" he snarled.

before the FWn•er 1 Absolute secrecy 1 Thanks t"
tant was dismissed.

"Lay thisWith this the adju-

He carried the telegram to his commra.de in

Hitler's antechamber, laid it along with other papers on the table·~ithout

a word, as if it were a matter of no concern, and left the

room.

148

RESTRICTEDThe FUhrer's adjutant read the mes~age.

OnceJ

TwicelHe leaned back in his desk chair and stared a~ the sheet; theletters began £o dance before his eyes.
in order to caJ.m. h.i.msel.f.

He began to count them

Then he glanced .furtively at thedoor leading to the room of that Heaven-favored, greatest
general of all times; he knew what the effect t>f thistelegram on him would be.

Should he?

Should he not?

But

up gingerly as if it were

he had toJ. He picked the message

a hot iron and laid it in the leather portfolio with documentsthat had to be laid before the Supreme. Commander of the A~ed
Forces; he looked up at the ceiling a.s if hoping for help fromabove and carried the portfolio to Hitler.

Then he left theroom.
For a few minutes there was calm' while the adjutant
I I~
anxiously looked out the t...rindow at the driving snow.
•

I

Then what he had expected happe1ed.
to life.

The adjoinine room came

A marble blotter whizzed against the wall and broke.

A vase followed and crashed in splinters.
turned.

The FUhrer began to raee.

A chair was over-He t1fanted to rescind

the appointment of General Paulus as Field Marshall, which
had been made the day before, and to degrade h1m.
was impossible:

But that

the press had already announced the appoint-

ment; it would have caused a catastrophic sensation.
Hitler tore the telegram to bits.

General F'ield ~..arshallKeitel, who meanwhile had hurried in, stood a feu steps aw~;
his face portr~ed reeulation sternnes::> but was turned a1trrzy

149

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i'rom the FUhrer.

Sone thousands of kilometers away 1 tens of

thousands of German soldiers were marching away shivering into
captivity, with them General Field Marshal

Paulus.
I

New tones from the Ether
The tones of' the "Eroica11 and of the "Unfinished Symphony in

D-Minor11 bad long since died away but in the soul. of the German
people there echoed for a long time 1 tremulously and oppressively1
the un'Wl'itten symphony of the German sacrifice at Stal1ngrad.
The name Sta.lingrad had become for every German a symbol, thesymbol of tragic heroism.

And millions of I thoughtful
people sought•,

desperately for an answer to I the question "Why? 11

For the firsttime during this war 1 doubts arose among the C'rerman people 1 doubts
as to the infallibility and the surpassing gdneralship of Adolf
Hitler.
But there was another group of people wlio felt this "Whyt"with an al.most physical pain.

These were the men who had. fought

and suffered a·t Ste.J.ingrad and had escaped alive from the hellof' insanity.

The 90,000 men marching hungry, bleeding, and freezing

into Russian captivity had experienced in their own persons thatfabulous generalship of Hitler, and sought desperately for an answer
to that question ''lfuy"l 11

What they bad seen differed from the picture

Goebbels had drawn for the people in Germany.

Slowly but logica.l.ly

they became spiritually alienated from a system built upon force,
deception, and incompetence.

'.They could no longer be deceived; they

had become hard realists.

•

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In the prison

camps beyond the Volga something new cameinto being - ·the "Free Germany" movement.

Genera1 von Seydlitz-

Burbach, who had been captured at Stalingrad., assumed the chairmans hip.

Other generals and officers Joined him.

Tens ofthousands of German soldiers followed ana the movement was mentioned in Russian broadcasts.
langua~Whereas hitherto the German

offerings of the Moscow stations had had little to,attract

the German listener, the latter - if he had courage - now began
to listen attentively to foreign stations, particularly when German
officers and generals appeared as spealters. . on these broadcasts •Of course, it was fully a year and a half before this movement was mentioned in the German press and it was then represen.ted
as a piece of base treachery on the part of a few officers.
When the "Free Germany" movement started, the eastern front ran
I~along the Don and tljl.e Donets; n~, a year and a half iater, it
ran a1ong the CB.rpa.thians an4 tljl.e frontier of East Prussia.
the war had been going on •

•

151
•

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For

•

152

•

RESTRICTEDROMMEL TO KL A!JI1.1EIN

How slight and unimpressive are often the initial causes
which lead to great changes in the course of' eventsl

How our

picture of great men varies according to what we know about
them and the point or view .l'rom. which we regard them.lHoweasily the f'ame of' great generaln grows pa.le when we lmow thesecret of' their successes!
Any histor.r or World War II will doubtless mention one
name on the Gennan side with pa.rt;icular respect:

Rommell

L

This name has become a symbol of' German generalship..

In thedeserts of North Africa he and his men won astonishing
victories and bo~ chased the British to the gates of•Alexandria. Actua.l.cy' he wanted to chase them further: out ot
Al.exandria, across the Nile and across the SUez Canal..

suddenly his victorious march stopped.

But

At El Alamein, almost

within sight of Alexandria., it was .suddenly all over.
What had happened?

What was the secret of' his unexampled

victories, and what was the secret of their sudden cessation?

There is no question but that in lfDmm.el.ts case we are dealing
with a man o.:f' gr'Sat energr and dist~ militaey capacity.
It wou1d have been bard to .find a better gemer.al earq in 1941

when it became a question or st-opping Wa.velll.n Africa.

In t.he.fall o£ 1940 the :Ite.l.ians bad crossed the EQptlan fronti~r andadvanced to Marsa Matrult but had been i"orced. to halt and hadgone over to a war of' positio~

On 9 December 1940 General

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\'Iavell started his offensive against the Italians and '?Y mid-Y...arch

1941 had thrown them back to the border of Tripolitania.
MeanwhiJ.e the Ger.mans decided to help the Italians.

The

German "Africa. Corps" was formed and transported to Tripolitania
and General Rommel assumed command over all Gennan and Italianforces in Italian North Africa.
Rommel went to work with great energy.

On 24 March 1941 with

his Africa Corps and some fresh Italian divisions he attacked theBritish• who were weakened by three months of combat and an
extremely long supply line, and w:1.thin 18 days drove them out ofCyrenaica.

However, approximately on the line Sollum-Djarabub

the operation came to a standstill and from early April 1941 on
the front was genera.lly ca.lJn.

Nothing noteworthy' occurred.

At least nothing outwal"~ notewortey.

In reality, something

was being prepared quietly· which belongs among the most interesting chaptel"S in the history of this war.
A certain Fellers, whose militar,y rank I do not recall andwhom I shall therefore call by name only, was stationed in Cairo
as United States military attache'.
~·Experience has shown that whenpeople suddenly disp~ a live~· interest in a new field of

endeavor they merely cause mischief.

Fellers had come to Cairo;

the significance of the North African ~heatre had been stressed

b.1 Rammel's actions, and the entire Near East seemed about tobecome the focal. point of the war.

For an ambitious young manthat seemed to be just the right post.

So Fellers decided to act.

154

RESTRICTEDBut how can a milita.ry attache act?

He writes reports.

are these reports conveyed nowadqs?

By radio •And how•

So Fellers set to and sent one radiogram after another to

Washington.

Reports on the political situation and, above all.

else, reports on everything connected with military preparations
and opera;t.ions.

They were enciphered, o:f course, but the deathof any cryptographic system is found in its frequent use.
Fellers' radiograms were intercepted by the Germans.

All

They bore

the address ''milld wash" or "a.gwa.r wash" and hence were easil;v'
recognized.

By ea.r4'" July the system had. . been solved in essence

and parts of the messages could be read.
mine of important information.

They proved to be a.

Fellers reported to the War

Department in Washington regarding the reenforcement of British:forces in Western Egypt, regarding their equipment with modernarms, regarding each transport of war materiel that arrived,
regarding the withdrawal of the Australian 9th Division from
Tobruk and its replacement b,y British and Polish units, andregarding preparations for an offensive with the aim o.r
encircling and annihilating the Axis troops.
All these reports were passed currently to General Rommel
who was able to plan correspond.ing4T.

The reports were notcomplete, to be sure, for the cryptographic system had notbeen solved in its entirety, but they were adequate to keep
Rommel posted.

Hence it was no surprise to him when in thegre,y dawn of 18 November 1941 the British offensive under

155

RESTRICTEDRESBf!Itfe~ 2
General Sir Alan Cunningham broke loose along the entire front.
Rommel had made good.prepara~ons and was able to hold his front
for a time.

He. could not prevent the British from making a breaksouth of Sidi Om.ar and thus throwing the sout~e.rn part or the Axis
fl·ont orr balance.
He was able to send an Italian ~oured division which met
the British thrust at Sidi Rezegh and Bir el Gobi.
On 19 November the British took Sit..i Rezegh and on the same
~ Churchill proclaimed

the impending destruction of the Axis

troops in North Africa..

Both sides brought up all the troops they

had.

SlowlY but surelY the British drew a ring around the Axis

divisions.

Nevertheless, despite all tactical successes, it

seemed that the first onrush or the British had not achieved
decisive results.

Wherever the British started an action,

Rommel immediatelY sent forces to oppose them.

He even sent a.

column behind the British in the direction or Ha.lf~a. and broke
their connections.
time.

He a.lw~s did the right thing at the right

Small wonder, for in each phase of the battle he knew thegrouping and the intentions or the enemy.
Fellers was sending one telegram after another to t-J'ashingto..'1.
He fairly outdid himself in his reporting.

He ra.Ylged all over thebattle area, sal-r and heard everyt-hing, kne\-r all preparations,
every intention, every movement of the British forces and transmitted it all to the United States.

The German L~tercept station

promptly copied his message, sent it by teletype t.o Berlin i'r:1ere it

156

RESTRICTED

was deciphered and sent b,1 the speediest possible route to Romme1.
That took only a few hours.

By" now the system had been completely

solved.
The British were much surprised.

Preparations for the offensive

had been so thorough that the destruction of the Axis troops inthe very first phase had been considered certain.
not click.
Eas~

Something did

General Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief in the Nearand Wavell's successor, flew from Cairo to·Cunningbam's

headquarters and on 26 November relieved him of his post.

A

young general of 44 years, General Ritchie, was appointed commander..

of the British Eighth ~·The Battle of Sidi Rezegh continued.

Ronunel wa.s trying to

break the British ring both from with and from without.

Thegarrison of Half~a Pass maintained its position and forced th~
British to transport their supplies across the desert.
6 December Rammel began regrouping his forces.

On

He had recognizeda weak point in the British encirclement and on 8 necember hepushed toward the west, disengaging his troops ldthout being
detected.

Before the British recovered from their surprisehe had escaped.

On 11 December Churchill stated in the Lol-rer

House that the Libyian Campaign had not gone as expe?ted.
In the dey-s that followed,

the British occupied several

towns and captured some 25,000 men.

Meanwhile Rommel had

established his units near El Agheila and received dependable
info~tion regarding his opponent(Fellers had seen to that).

157

RESTRICTED

On 2~ January he advanced ~6 km into the British ~ine with 3 armoredcoluum.s.

The British were taken by surprise and had to retreat.

On the 27th Rommel. was north and northeast of Maus.

On that day

Churchill decl.a.red ''We are facing a. very bol.d a.nd cl.ever foe 1 andI ma.y well sa.y - a great general!"On the 29th Bengha.si wa.s taken.
General.

Rommel. was promoted to Col.onel.

On 1.0 February operations came to a. standstill 1.00 km.

west of Tobruk.

Rommel. was not strong enough ·to break through the

new defensive front of his opponent.

Moreover 1 Fellers had failed

him; he ha.d l.ost contact and had to get oriented anew.
a certain amount of time.
information.

That took

Till then he could supply no usefulRommel waited for reports; they did not come.

A pause in the fighting ensued.

Rommel received reenforcement

and suppl.ies.

For the second time OKW turned its glance toward

the Near East.

Rommel. was to be made so strong that he could.

drive to the Suez Canal - yes, he was to go beyond Jerusal.em andDamascus a.nd upset Northern Arabia and Iraq.

The German offensive from Southern Russia was to rol.l. over
the Caucasus 1 over northern Persia.
two armies were to meet.

Uea.r Bagdad or Mosul the

The days of' British predominance inthe .Near East appeared to be numbered; the great British l.ifel.ine through the lolediterranean and Red Sea was to be c:ut.

Once

the oil.fields of the Caucasus a.nd Iraq were in German hands, thehour of final. victory would be at hand.

158

RESTRICTEDA gigantic plan.

And it appeared capable of execution.

OK\V' already was issuing dozens of orientation pa.mphlet.s forthe troops.

On Ira~, Iraq, on Syria and the Arabian penin-

sula, on 'l'rans-Jourdan and Palestine, yes, even on Afghanistan and India.

Perhaps the dey was not far away t'll'hen theGermans could shalm hands with their Japanese allies.
brigade "Free India" was set up and trained.

The

Compared tdth

this operation, the campaign of Alexander the Great ~rould
same d~ appear ver,r modest.
Now there was excellent informatio~.once more regarding
the situation in North Africa.

Fellers had found his speechagain; he wrote until his fingers were sore.
everything he could discover.
listening.
11

He radioed

The German operators were

Again and again messages to "milid wash" andagwar wa.shn were received.

Two ereat stations had bothbeen cop,ying these messages since the beginning of the year
in order that none should be missed and their intercepts
were transmitted as "urgent" by direct wire to Berlin.
I should like to illustrate the precision l'r.i.th which theGermans were working.

The British had care:fully planned andprepared an action against Rommel's airfields.

The,y meant

to drop parachutists during the night l'zho would destroy
everything by means of the explosives they took along.
The action had been so carefully planned that it could not havefailed its objective.

Fellers, radiant l'dth joy, radioed this159

RESTRICTED

to Washington.

.

The message was sent about 8 o'clock in the morningby the station in Cairo; was :received in Lauf innnediate:cy- and transAt 9 o'clock it was on the cryptanalyst's desk;

nrl.tted to Berlin.

at 10 o'clock it was decirhered; at 10:30 it wa.s in the Fuhrer's
Headquarters; and an hour later Ronunel had it.
warn his airfields.
midnight.

He had a day to

The British project was executed shortly after

The parachutists got a. warm reception; the action

miscarried.

On~

one airfield disregarded the warning - here the

British met with success.
Now Rommel knew precise~ how matters stood on the Britishside:

their supplies and equipment, their strength, their plans.

February, ~1arch, and April passed quiet~.
ing in reenforcements.

Both sides were bring-

After the middle of lv!a\Y" the British began

to spot extensive Ge!'JII.8.n movements and counted on an offensive in
the near future.
On 26 M~ Rommel's famous offensive broke loose.

in two columns, emplo.ying seven divisions.

He advanced

A battle developed at

Acroma and advanced troops presseq forward to Sidi Rezegh.

But itsoon appeared that Rommel's frontal attack was a ruse to divert
attention from the southern sector of the front.

.

German tanks

broke through at Bir Hakim and heavy tank battles raged for days
near Acroma.

Approximately 1,000 tanks and 2,000 to 2 1 500

motorized guns were engaged on the two sides.
made a hell of the battlefield.

160

RESTRICTEDHeat and sand sto~sOn 10 June Bir Hakim, the key to thf- British defense system,l'tas token.

General IUtchie no-..r adopted ~ line of resistance con-sisting o:f individual hedgehog positions.
drove through in three columns.

But the Axis trooJ:.IS

Sidi Ro~egh was taken and on

the 19th the Egyptian frontier was reached.

The next ~Tobruk was encircled and on the 21st it was taken, along with
25,000 prisoners.

This had been a bold masterstroke.

On 25 June 1942 Rommel had occupied SolltUn,

the Ha.lfaya

Pass and Sidi Omar and '\..ras in front of Sidi Barani.

Fellers

was still radioing his reports and Rommel was receiving precise
information every hour, 'lrthile his opponent had onl;v such inforlnation as could be picked up at the immediate front.

The British

were amazed; Ronunel seemed to ha.ve "second sight".

No matter'L'lhat the British undertook Rommel always intervened as if the
British High Command had been keeping him posted.
I

On 27 June General Ritchie was relieved as commander o:f

the Eighth Amy; Auchinleck assumed command in person.
Quickly the British retreated to Y~rsa Matruk.

Here

were the fortifications Wavell had laid out when Graziani '!rre.s
at the gates or Egypt.

N~..r Rommel wasat the gates of Egypt.

In less than ~. weeks he had chased the British out of al1

Cyrenaica.

Their only hope ~ in the Kattara depression

between Marsa Matruk and Alexandria which stretches 60 kilometers inland from the coast.

This is an area of nothing but

sand and great blocks of rock, unparalleled heat and absolute

161

RESTRICTED

l.a.ck of' water.

The Bri·tish were resol,re<l to hoJ.d the rectangle

AJ.exandria - Port Said - Suez - Cairo.

WouJ.d they sus:ceed t

Theywere determined to ~oJ.d Singapore, but h;').d J.ost it.

Tb.ey had been

determined to hold the Ba1kans, but bad t.o withdraw.

They wereafraid of' German parachutists.

On 1 July Rommel. was near E1 Al.amein.

The threat to Alexandria had become immediate.

British dominationin the Near East was tmreatened.
Then the miracle occurred.
a tragicomeuy.

No, it was no miracle; it was

It was so comical., so idiotically f'unny, thatit had the effect of' a passage f'rom a dime novel.

Or it was likea bad Joke.
It was Saturday, 27 JWl~ 191~2.

I had turned on the broadcast of'

the Deutschlandsender and was listening toward ~ o'clock in theevening to the annoWlcement of a radio drama.

~•weare offering a dramawith scenes f'rom the British or American information bureau", theannouncer said.

'"'lell, this is goins to be good", I thought, but 1eftthe apparatus tuned in while I occupied myself with some work.

Suddenly,

I pr lck.ed up my ears; the drama had as its subject 11Evento in North
Africa" and political and military matters were ·involved.

One of thecharacters represented the American military attache in Cairo, andnow there followed a discussion of his extensive suppJy of' informationand the way he sent it on to Washington.
I was sp~ech1ess.

To thit~ that•the German broadcast was putting

on something that countless people were trying to censor!
,;as genuine.

It vas only too well played.

Tr~ dra~But bow d:id these 1~<....e..L..:

,_

162

RESTRICTED

,.. • the infonno.tion?
On 29 June, 36 houx•s after this radio drama, the mosse,eosI.rom Fellers to Washington suddenly coased.

The Gorman intercept

operators tried their best; they listened and searched - in vain.
No further •'milid" messa.ce and no "agwar" message was ever heard.
When messages began to flow again, the Americans had changed

their system and were using a machine which defied all ourefforts at solution.
Whi1e the new German otfensive swept forward in southern
Russia and the worl.d awaited the outcome with bated breath,
Rommel remained without inf'o:rm.ation.

The British regrouped

their i"orces; he lmew nothing about it.

They introduced newunits - this remained hidden f'rom Rommel.

New weapons wereunloaded in Alexandria and Port Said; Rommel did not find out
about it.

Henceforth no messages signed "Fellers "gave info:nna-tion regarding the enemy.

The g1-eat general. now had to rely

upon himself' and his reconnaissance at the front.
I

On .3 Jul.;r Rommel tried a strong thrust to the south.

!"ailed.

It

The next. dq, using all available troops, he tried amajor attack near El Alamein.

A;fter heav .t"ighting and initial

successes Rommel had to withdraw.

Since 26 ~ the British

Eighth AI'fl'lY' had l.ost 75,000 men, plus 11.00 tanks and 450 pl.anes.
It was in bad shape, but now it held.

Auchinl.eck was now

personal.ly' conducting operati.ons in the front line.
dug in.

Both sides brought up reenf'orcements.

I

163

RESTRICTEDBoth sides

American tank

forces arrived in Egypt and were given intensive final training.
New contingents a.rrived from Italy.
from Crete.

German tr<?ops 1rere brought in

Alexandria. was attacked by German planes.

01' great historical moment seemed to be impending.

Decisionc

All e;yes were

fixed on Rommel. Mussol.ini betook himself to tlie Egyptia..l'l front inorder to be present at the entry into .Cairo.
General Field Marshall.

Rommel was appointed

But Ronnnel .no longer ha.d a.ny rel.ic.bJ.e

reports concerning the enemy.
Churchill journeyed to Moscow and had a long conversation with
Stalin.

German troops stood bei'ore Stalinszoad end at the foothillsof the Caucasus • Everything seemed to portend a climax to mil.itary
operations in the Near Eas~..
visited Cairo.

On his way back from Moscovr, Churchill

Lieutenant ·General lJJontgomary v7a.s appointed comma.11derin Chief of the British Eighth Army ; r!eneral Alexander '\oras nP..med
successor to Auchinleck.
For the second time during the war the Near East became thecenter of intrigue.
world.

There was great tension throughout the Moslem

In the bazaars and in the oases of the desert, Mohalllr.l~dansgathered and discussed the question of' their future in connection
with the war.

The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem issued o..rer the b;croa.d-

casting station at Ba.ri a. flo.mins appeal to the Moslem vrorld ena.
to the population of India to rise a.~ninst Great Britain and its
Allies.

The Jewish popul.ation "tms torn between fear of an Ar<-b

revolt and the approach of the war.

:Nationalist elerr~nts in 1:.:._,~- 1-

tried to mix water with the casoline in BritiGh taru:s and to str·
sand in the motors.

1G4

RESTRICTEDRES<F1Rf£MD2
But the All.ies were not idle.

In June 20 1 000 Americans landed:New equipment factories in the Near East began large

in Basra.

scale production.

In August another 50 1 000 nen landed in Iraq.

The British Ninth A:rcny was in Syria and Palestine.

In Iraq and

Iran was the Army Group of General Maitland Wilson, formerly of' theNinth .Army.

A.rriry Group Wavell was in India.

Eight Russian Divisions

had been brought to Iran and three Polish divisions were there

also.

The Near East· was preparing for the struggle.

Then, about

mid-August 1942 1 the German offensive in Russia began to bog
down.

In those days Rommel might well have been thinking "akingdom for one good Fellers message".
had dried up.

But this source of information

Rommel decided to attack without Fellers 1 aid.

In the morning hours of 31 August he advanced against the southernflank of the British position at El Alamein but immediately encountered strong resistance.

He threw in his J.ast tanks and had ~avail.able trucks drive around in the rear to kick up a dust andgive the impression that a strong tank force was advancing.

Buteven this trick did not work.
There was hand fighting but after two days Rommel. had toretreat.

He bad 12 divisions and at l.east 6oo tanks 1 but he mis-

sed the Fellers telegrams.

Rormnel' s operations came to a stand-still, as did those before Stalingrad and in the Caucasus.

The

dream of a campaign through Asia Minor had come to an end.

Mussol.ini

returned to Italy.

The period of RotDJII!!l 1 s great victories was ac!er.

On 4 November the British began a smashing offensive against
the Axis front.

On 8 November the front had been broken, the Africa

RESTRI~tEDCorps was beaten, and the Italians 1-1ere cut o:r:r.
retreat began; his star had set.

Rommel's great.

On that same day, the Americans

and the British landed in Algeria and Morocco.
had come into being over nigh·t.

166•

RESTRICTEDThe Second FrontRE&q:ll:-I~!JWJ 2 TBE "ROTE DR&!" A<:;A1M

Immediately after the enc:irc:.lem.eAt at Sto.lin[9.•a.d. and thebreak through the German front, t.b.e Russian intelli13cncc se1·vice
faced a new problem o.r thr utmo;t importance, for it uas nmr cquest:f.on of' keeping precj .ely :f.nformad regarding the enemy
situation.

The Russians had succeeded in strilting a heavy blat-T,

but how were things on the German side'/
have?

What were their intentions?

prepare a counter bl.ow?

What reserves did they\vould they ·and could they

Did the Russians on the southern front

perhaps face the risk of i'a11in6 into a trap?
One of' the LSI'eat hours for the Russian intelligence service
had arrived.

Its best source was the "Rote Drei" which reached

up to the highest German commands, up to OIGT, up to the FUhrer • s
Headquarters .

And this time, too, the "Rote Dre i" did not fail.

It worke(l feverishly and its reports went to Moscow night afternight.
Supported by such rel.iable reports, the Russian offensive
rolled on.

Al.most the entire Eastern front was in motion.

In

two months the Russians crushed or threw into confusion 102
German and allied divisions, many of' which were practicallyannihilated.

In two months the Russians took 200,000 prisoners(not coWlting those from Stalingrad) and 13,000 guns.

In thesouth they advanced 400 km.
The German sacrifice at Stal.ingrad had been in vain.
and America had been arming.

167

RESTRICTEDEngland

168

RESTRICTED

AF'rER STALINGRAD AND EJ.. ~IEIN

Stal:ingrad and El Alamein wora fanfares of a shift 11 of a shift
f:ro.1n an attack to defense, frcm offensive to ret.reat, from theintoxication of victory to propaganda for holding out.

Dr. Goebbels,'\\ilo had p~ed the· melody of intoxicated pmrer and racial. hatred,
l'llho had trampled under .foot every elemental feeling of r:i.ght andjustice, now decided on a shift in the propaganda. li.'Ork.

tlhereas •hitherto the philosophy' of absolute force had been radiated out
into the ether, the:a.-e now ensued a slow but unmistakable change.
The wavelengths remained the same but ~1er them there began to go
out something net'l.

In place of the concepts of power, hatred,'

force, suppression,and the claim to l.eadership, there now appeared
as guarantee o£ German victory the phil.osoph;y of ''histor,yt•.
Germany must win "because there is justice in histor,yt•, but thiswas not sufficient for the Ministry of Propaganda, which now
gave the German people a new watchword bom of satanic in.ta~ey"
and filled with such cynicism toward the German peopl.e as tofairl,y take your breath alfaY·

It ran:"if 1tte are to lose thewar, then the people at home are to blame.

The attitude of thepeople at home is of decisive impo.rtancel"

They said this toa people which for ten years had enjo,yed no other right than theright to make sacrifices and to accept patient]3 wnatever was
imposed upon them.

169

RESTRICTED"

Stal:ingrad and El Al.amein were n1i~tta.ry defeats which, viewed
superf'icial.ly, might not be of vital ilD:I?Ortance.

Such reverses occurin eveey war and neL 1 not have a disconcerting effect.

not even know that they were decisive.

The enemy need

The man who unintention.a].4r

told the Geman people and the rest of' the world the truth was noneother than Dr. Goebbcle.

Abroad they soon notod his new tune andlmew how to draw a.dvan~age from it.

this.

'

Foreign broadcasts soon revealed

A wave of activity passed through en~ countries which wasoccasioned less by the battles of Stalingr3.d. and El Alam.ein than by
the battle waged by Dr. Goebbels in the ether.

For this battle like-wise was lost, slow]J and hardly noticeably, but with a crippling e:r:t:ect
on Ge:rma.ny while it spurred the eneJey" to greater effort.

What thefront had not yet revealed to the enemy, that Dl'1• Goebbols now revealed:
the incipient collapse on the home front of the mighty Germ.3Il war
machine.

170

RESTRICTEDAWERIA, LIBYA, AND TUNISIA 191~2-1943
Military events in North Africa during the winter 1942/1943
and the i'ollowillg spring 't· Lll give future 'tYriters of history plentyof material and the opera~ions in this theater will be discussed
from every possib~e poin1. of view in all the military schoolsof' the world.

Merely the landing o-r the A~ricans in the nig.."ltof 9 November 1942 will•receive consideration, whether it be fromthe standpoint of naval warfare, of: water transportation, of supply 11
o-r air security, or of the planning of the actual operations from
Algeria to Tunis •'T'b.ere :ts no doubt b!l:t that the landing of theAllies in Algeria was a masterpiece but the outstanding feature,
in my opinion, was neither the mighty armada of 850 ships nor thesafeguarding of this fleet against submarine and air attack,neither the solution of' the supply problem nor the execution·of the
1anding in the shortest possible ·time, but rather the compJ.ete
assurance of the factor of surprise.

The landing in North Africa

J.iterall.y had the effect of a bolt from a clear sky.

The intercept service of the German Navy as early as theend of August 19h2 hat found ever-increasing indications ofpreparation for a large,-scale landing operation by the WesternPowers • By mid-October, it was certain that this operation
would be carried out ~n the Mediterranean.
for the J.anding remained unclarif'ied.

The exact point

Men in the German

171

RESTRICTEDRES ___ _na'Y7 thought it would be in the Balkana; the poss:f:bility ot an'invasion ot Sici:q was likewise considered.
By the end or October 1942, the Germa.t\ naval intercept service

was sure that the time tor carrying out this operation Wa.s no longer
tar awq.

All units or the intercept service were instructed to be

extreme:cy- watchful.
The moment tor the entey or the invasion tleet into theMediterranean was clear:Qr recognized by' the German naval intercept\

service.

11or.eover, the extent ot the impending action could bereco~zed.

But the point at which this actic•n would be carriedout remained an open question to the very end.
that ~he Balkans were in danger.

Sane still thought

The possibility ot a landingin Algeria and Morocco was not taken into account at all.

Eve17-

one was greatly surprised when the troops were actual.:cy disembarked
there.

No clues as to the areas selected tor the landings wereI

obtained from intercepted traffic down to the ver,r end.

In· this pertect camouflage ~ the prerequisite tor the success ot
the entire All.ied undertaking and or the tuture campaign in Atrica.
I have already tried to describe the manner in which General
Rommel was supported in his Libyan operations by the intercept andcr.r.ptanal1tic services.
help dropped out one dq.

It was a serious blow tor him when Fellers'
But misfortunes rarely' cane sing4r.

To Rammel's a~ belonged an intercept camp~ which fUnctioned
admirably and supplied excellent results.

Everything that Rommel

could not ascertain by wa:y or Fellers was furnished him by thisintercept company.

Now 'When the great Allied attack on Rommel's

172

RESTRICTED

RE~«!'PEB 2
position at El Alamein succeeded, this ccmpa117 tell into theeneJIG"'S hand earl.;r, with bag and baggage.

The British attack

came so sudden:cy that the intercept station had no time todestroy the most imporhant and secret docwnents pertaining to

its work.

With one swoop the Allies here deprived General'

Rommel of his sole remaining source of information.

Not ~

.

that - the Allies
were now shown tor the . second time the mistakes'
they- had been mak:i.ng.

.,'

In tlie Fellers case they had reacted. :lmmediateq.

did so again nc>tr.

They

Their radio service· oould not have been
I

I

glven a better'lesson.
i

And they le~ed qui~ and tho~.
I

Rcmnel learned something too.
service means in modem war.

He learned what the intercept'

He leamed to lmow what it is toface an otherwise equal opponent without this service.

learned to bow to the changing tort.unes ot war.

He

The Axis. front

at El Alamein consisted of ~gantic mine fields with munerous
fort.itied support points.

A continuous trench system existed

onlv on the norther flank.
On 24 October the Eighth Army" began its attack.

Behind acontinuous wall of chemical tog, the infantry advanced afterheav artUJ.er.r preparation, and the tanks followed.

Slov:cy-,methodicalJ1", and surel1' the attack cut into the Axis lines.
Violent fighting raged tor dqs but on 5 November the breakthrough was completed.

The Axle troops withdrew to Marsa

Matruk but had to occupy prepared positions at Sollum!73

RESTRICTED

and the Hal:fa.,va Pass on 10 November.
attack increased.
captured.

'The fur.y of the British

Most ot the Italians had either fallen or been

The British occupied Dema on 16 November; Benghasi

wa.s evacuated on the 21st; Agedabia on the 2.3rd.. •Remmel's losses already totaled 80,000 men.

Eighty thousandin b~:cy tour weeks%

On 24 November the British 1fere before El Agheila, where'
Ramnel had constl"Ucted a new defense line. All Cy'renaica had been
lost again, this time tor ,good.
Montgomery was a ·methodical man.

He could push forward at once,

tor Rommel waf.' hard hit 1 but he did not like bold strokes ot the•
Ramnel type. He did not l:Lke a 51%' chance J he was all in favor ot
I

a 90% chance.

I

So he decided to sit tight and do some shitting.

That

I

took three weeks.
he was read1'.

But then the su~ probleLl had been eettled andNew troops werG ready, new tanks, art.iller,r, andPlanes, ~es, planes.

Rommel suspected all sorts ot things but

no longer had any reliable :ll1:formation regarding the enem;y.

Inview ot the British superiority in the air, his few remaining

planes could not supply him with the necessa:ry reco1~ssancereports.

On:cy- the intercept service might perhaps have done

this, but t.his source was cut ott.

The intercept CompalV was

alreaey on its wq to Canada and the great general was forced torely entirely on himself and his intuition.

But intuition without

intercept service is a very uncertain thing.

1'l4

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On l4 December 191,2 General Montgomeey began his attack on

the El. AgheUa position.
:to withdraw.

Soon the once famous A.t'rica Corps had

Rommel hoped that the great, waterless 87rtes,

Desert would check the eneD\V but on 4 January Montgomery wasat Buerat and had the entire desert al.reacbr behind him..

At

the same t:iJD.e, General Leclerc was pb.sbing up tran the southand soon the entire Fessan area was :ln the hands of the Free

French.

Soon U:cl.erc made contact with a Fren9h Camel. Corps
Yea 1 trom. Algeria, for there wasoperating from Algeria.

alreaqy a second front in Atrica.
In the night .tram the 9th to the ll:Mih of November 1942,

the British and Americans had landed on the coast ot North
A.t'rica.

They soon had. possession o:t the countr.v trcm OraD toBone and were preparing to occupy Tunisia which was the key

for any further operations.

But once more 1 tor the lasttime in this war, the air superiority of the Axis powers was tomake itself felt.

.

I

With hundreds of planes, troops and weapons were hastiq
I

thrown into Tunisia; positions, passes, roads, and support;
points along the westem frontier were· occupied, 'While other.

units landed in Tunisian harbors under lth~ protection ot
fighters and bombers.

A new intercept COD1p8.117 was also

shipped over and~ had it taken 't~ ita position when

its receivers were delugecU

The Americans radioed a-.;r in

a gq and carefree manner that was a jo.y to the canpa117.,

l7i

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Short:ey- the en61n1 situat,.on we.a Glear. The great AW.ed attack, the•Christa• tank battle Sn 'I'un:l.a:f.a, ended. in f'avol' ot the AxiD• 1ft thenorth the Plrit:leh withd.rew. BT the belJirminl ot JanU&rl acme so,ooo
Axia t:roops .. mostl7 German .. we1.. al.re~d.f in Tuniaia.
..
'

And now a struggl~ began which lasted three full months.

It washard to understand hor the relatively weak Axis forces oould. withstandthe attack ot tar superior American and'I British Forc~s.

This was apuzzle to those who di.d not know the circumstances but was -clear to one•

who did.

F:r.·.1m the coast down to Lake Shoot el Djerid there was acontinuous tront.

In the north was the British First A:rrq, aouth ot it

the American Jt'itth Arur3"1 and .tal"ther south were the French.

All threetried to outdo one another in suppl.7ing the German intercept service
with usetu1 material.

General von .Arnim, who commanded the .Axis
Scarce~ 8.1"\f\;bing on the eneuv-

forces in Tunisia, could be satisf'ied..

side escaped him.

"With the securit7 or a sleep walker" - to use afavorite expression of Hitler - he could do the right thing at theright time.

On 10 Januar.r the Germans thrt.lst fon-m.rd south or Pont

du Fahs into the assemb:Qr area or the enetrtf, dented the Allied
Front and forced a retreat.

On 20 Januar,r the Genna.ns and Italians

attacked the junction ot the American and French forces.

A localsuccess was achieved.
On 27 Januar,r at Casablanca Allied statesmen conferred.

In

connection therewith,. the British, and particular~ the Americans,started a new push on the central front.
and split von Anlin's forces in two.

They wanted to reach Susa

They reached Kairouan and

1'76

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almost reached the coasLbut the intercept service harl learned of
their intentions and preparations so that von Arnin had time toprepare countermeasures.

The· thrust uas parried, the break-through 'l'lras sealed off.
Meanwhile, on 9 January Montgom.er.v attacked R<r.nmel.

23 January he entered Tripoli.

On

Then he prepared to advanceagainst Tunisia and Rommel retreated behind the Mareth Line.
It was decided to hold Tunisia, cost what it might, andreenforcements ,,:ere sent from It~.

But .the first serious

tension bet1roon the military staff's of'..the Axis ,.ras alreadyOn .3 February the Italian Chief ot General Stat.t

appearing.

was relieved o.t his position.
On 9 Februaey an Axis o.f'fensive began for which theintercept service supplied adequate into~ation.
success was immedia.te.

The

The Allies were astounded andblamed their previous ~rcmt or success on the dual command•.

General EisenhadOr became sole Commander-in-Chief ot all
American, British, and French troops in North Africa.
even that did not help.

Bu.tSouth or Kairouan, German annored

forces broke through near Faid and advanced .35 ltUometers toward

Sbeitla..

This threatened America."l positions north or Gatsa. andthe retreating Americans lrtere bad.J3 cut up by divebombers.
Eisenhcxtar had been on the point or regrouping the North American
troops.

The Gel'llk1.n intercept ser.rice had discovered this and theGerman attack b1~ke right into this move~ent.

177

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RE81¥~_f€T£f)3 2
On l.S Febru&rT the Americans had to evacuate Gatsa hurriedJT.

Kairousn was in Gel'II&Sll hands.

Two dqs later Gel'!D.al'i. troops took

Sbeitla and on the.tollowing ~occupied Kasserine Pass.
The Mareth Line consisted ot three separate positions lYing..

one behind the other in a depth ot l.S kilaneters.

Each ot theselines was supported by a number of f'orts bullt in the cliti"s ot thedesert and re-en!orced with concrete.

There were countless barbed

wire entanglements, tens of thousands ot anti-tank obstructions,tank traps., bullt-in positions to1.. anti-tank defense, disappearing
guns, subterranean sleeping ~a.rters ·and water tanks.

The cbain

ot to1'1:.s tilled the territoey between the sea and the mountains.
Behind the 1-i:areth Line is .the Gabes Gap which is onq 20 kil.anetera

wide.
About lS Februar:; incautious French traffic begau mentioning

British reconnaissance aiming to by-pass the Mareth Line.

At first

these were rather small patrols, then stronger tomationo appeared.
They were never mentioned in British traffic.

I doubt it 1m3' suchreports reached the German command in North Atl"i.ca; it they did,they were surel,y not taken seriousJJ.

'!be region is a desert o:tstones and rubble, entirel,y without water, and was consideredutter~ impassable.

Nevertheless, it could be deduced .fran thereports that the area. in question was passable, at l.east :tor small
units.

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On 25 Fabruart aame a violent Allied attack on the Kassarine

Pass..

It did no'b find the Axls troops unprepared, thanks to theintercept eel"'ioe.

'the main bocJ.v ot· Axis troops withdrew bed&U.IJI

the superiol'itr ot the eDeii\T was too great.
the rear guard. gave Up the pass.

Three dqs la-liii"

The British and Americans

empJ.o;recl a terrific number or divebom.bers.

On March 1st the.

Germans launched an attack on the British First A:rl'q andmoved forward 25 kilometers to Bescha.
occurred on the Bescha-Mateur road.

More bitter f1ghting

Then both sides dug in.

On 3 March the Americans took Pichon, .~2 ld.l ometers west ot

Kairouan and even the French became active and attempted anadvance toward Gafsa.
Meanwhile it had become clear that the British Eighth.ArJQ" was preparing a large scale offensive against the MarethLine.

The Germans decided to anticipate the attack and moved

out from the Mareth Line in the moming hours ot 6 March.
After heav fighting they had to withdraw to the Mareth Lineon the second dq and on the same dq the French advanced to

the railroad line Ferina-Gatsa and occupied Toseur on thenorthem shcr e of the Salt Lake 'Where they were stopped by'
the camnitment of fresh Axis t~s.

On 18 March, however.

the French advanced again in the direction of Oatsa which
they took the following day.

The next dq they were 80

kilometers west ot Stax and the situation was beginning tolook bad.

179

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On the moining o:rLine began.

.

21 March the British attack on the Mareth

The Germans were expecting it but ~he exact time hadremained a secret because radio reconnaissance against the Eighth~ had been crowned b.r little

surprise..

success.

5? tQe attack came as a

The line was penetrated but was then restored and to allappearances the situation was .favorable.

Then came the biggest

surprise of the ent.ire Tunisian campaign:

without being detected,

the British moved south, turned the M.ar~th line and advanced toward.
El. Hamma.

~'heF1•ench messages which might have given warning had notbeen monitored.

Now the Gel1lW1 .flank land rear were exposed.

On

28 March the British were at El Hamma; on the following dq "due tomobUe operations" the ¥18reth Line was abandoned.

The British gave

the Germans no time to establish new defense positions.

Rommelhimself left the threater for new dutie~ in Itaq.~ Von Arnim wasin command in Tunisia but there was not much..lert to command.

His

arDG" was split .first into two parts, then into three, and i'~

into four.

The masterly turning of tbe Mareth Line had decided the.fate of Tunisia.

German and Italian troops saw bow hopeless the

struggle was and entire units surrendered.
Ou lJ Mq 1943 that campaign came to an end.

It had cost

76,000 dead; 248,000 had laid down their arms, three-fourths ofthem' Qennans; 28 generals, 17 df them German, surrendered toGeneral. Alexander.
of Stalingrad.

Thus the catastrophe was even greater than thatl3ut this time in Gel'III8.llY they- dispensed with pl ~­ing on the radio Beel;h.Qven 1 s 11Eroica11 and Schubert's "Unfinished

180

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Symphony".

They did not dare reveal to the German people thetull extent or the trage~.

They passed on to new business,

as it the catastrophe in Tunisia were mereq an episode without
special significance.

.

And they were right.

With this, theentire campaign in North Africa had become an episode without significance!

At least there were no entries on thecredit side or the ledger tor the Axis powers.

On the debit

side stood in !.laming letters:
1.

'I'b.e loss or almost a million fighting men,2.

Renunciation of the thrust toward the Near East,

3. The beginning or the collapse·of It~.
It was not mere:cy the German public that was surprised by
the collapse or the Tunisian front.
surprised.

OKW was also great~

They were convinced the Mareth Line coul.d hold andhad organized a supply service on a lavish scale both b.f air
and by sea.

Up to the last moment great transports or supplies

were arriving.
the British.

These were repeated:cy received undamaged by
Von Amim's troops were given supplies andequipnent but the situation had become hopeless and for thatreason they surrendered.

It is not true that they foughttill the last cartridge was gone and no rood or water was
lett.

They surrendered because they saw how hopeless further

resistance was and because they lmew about the tragecy- or
Stalingrad.

181

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-

..

Ill:

...

""

It is difficult ~o determine Who was to blame for the factthat Frenoh radiograms which betr~ed the danger.. of a flankmovement around the Mareth Line did not receive the attention
the7 deserved.

Had this been done, there would ~ave been timeto protect the flank an.'ki frustrate the movement.

This daring

stroke might then have prepared a grave in the desert tor the
British,. .ai'.:"Ce it was a very dangerous undertak-ing.

Military

historr will doubtless regard it as one or the most daring
maneuvers or its kind.

182

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Several times I have sroken or a duplication of cases,
meaning a pure~ accidental coincidence of events o£ similar
character which had no cauJal connection with one another.
For instance, it the Germans in 1914 intercepted Russian
messages and in consequence won the Battle or Tannenberg and
I

I

I

•

at the same time on the \festern Front made almost the same
mistakes as the Russians and thus alJ.owed the French to win

I

the Battle of the Marne, then two similar events are involvedI••

but causally th~y have nothing to do with one another; they are
fateful coincidences.

Such coincidences are involved in thecase or the two "Zimmermansn.

We can ascribe them to the

obscure trlaw of the duplication of cases".
There is also something else, name4" an apparent:cy
existing trlaw of the repetition or the same mistakes" and,to be sure, qy one and the same actor.
Here tre are no longer concerned with coincidences;instead the cause lies if the character of the person concerned.

Hence, if in World., War I the Russians kept on

making the same mistakes in their use of radio telegraphy
and final.JJ lost not merely battles but the entire "war inI

consequence, that was neither an accident nor a ratef'ul
duplication of cases.

'l'he simple .tact was that in thisenonnous a~ insufficient attention was given to thetraining o.t the signal troops - perhaps nothing more was

183

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possible under the circumstances.
The "latf of the repetition of the same mistakes" remains
valid in World t'lar II; this time the Germans kept making thesame mistake ''ldth all the assurance o:r a sleepwalker••.
The radio play about. the Fellers messages may proper]Jr be
cal.led a madhouse incident.

It waa so crazy that I coul.dha.rdly blame anyone for not believing rtr9' statements.
sounds fantastic.

It

But. if anyone should believe me, he woul.d'\gree with the familiar so11g:"that can happen only once;lt can't happen againl" liell, even in this case there was asure enough repetitionl
The battles in Africa had come to an end.
landed on Sicily.

The Allies bad

The first wave of the invasion was slow]Jr

rolling over the island.

It was a bitter struggle, whichsuggested the for.m ·that a fUture battle in the West would
assume.

The Italians began to drop out of the picture a~d therole of the German tmits became more important.

They werenumericall,y inferior to the Allies and any help was doubly
important.

A dependable intelligence service represents sucha help by telling about the grouping and intentions or the en~.
After the catastrophe in Tunisia, a German radio intercept
platoon 1ms established on Sicily and quickly began to provide
useful infor.mation - especially against the Americans.
I no longer recall the exact day, but one evening during
the second half of the s~ruggle for the island four shortreports were broadcast, of which one dealt with the battles in

184

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Sicily'.

And lol

the reporter at the front said frankly and withobvious pride that the Germans were very well informed, thanks tointercepted radio messages.
There was an extensive investigation, but the damage had
been done.

Three days after thisman's report, all keys or

the American troops in Sicily were changed and up to the conclusion o£ the struggle £or this island none o£ the new ke,ys
was solved.

185

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186

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THE SPRING OF 1943 IN THE EASTIn April 1943 the great Russian offensive, which had begun
at Stalingrad, faded out just before reaching the Dnieper.
Kharkov had been taken b,y the Russians atter hard fighting
but in the south, on the Sea of Azov near Taganrog, theRussian advance had come to ~ stop.

Soon the Gennans struck;back but their new advance was of brief duration.

Then thefront became rigid, somewhat to the west of the line reachedin the first advance in 1941.

'What next?

Hitler was

tr,ying to discover reserves, while.same of his commanders seer~~~
hoped there would be no further attack that s~mner.
The German counteroffensive had left something like a gi~antic
nose sticking out from tHe Russ~an lines north of Belgorod and southeast of Orel.

.

By 20 July inter(:epts revealed that the Russians

were concerned with the asse!JlbJ.ing of German troops in theseareas to clip off t~s •rnose~.

The German intercept service

was able to report that the ilussians were well informed regarding
Ge:nnan preparations - they loJlew all the units at the front

and those in reserve.

It was ciear that they were reenforcing

their own endangered positions.

What remained concealed fromthe Germans was an enormous concentration behind the Russian
front in and south of the ''nose"•

Ge:nna.n air superiority had

been lost and the Russian air force permitted t10 German air"t"econnaisance worth mentioning.

The intelligence work shifted

18'7

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more and more to the intercept service and the Russians knew it anddid ever,ything possible to shape their traffic so that it would
betrEcy" as little as possible.

The cryptographic systems were good

and the operators rarely made compromising mistakes.

Consequentl;r

the results of the German intercept service could not be remarkable.
The Russian blows almost al~s came unexpecte~ and were attended

by success.
Both sides were preparing for a decisive struggle and tanks,
guns and troops were rolling up fran the rear areas.

Hitlerappealed to his troops and spoke about the last decisive battle which
was to annihilate the Soviet itate and its Red ~.

And then theGerman divisions began what was to be their last o.f'fensive in the
east.

1SS

RESTRICTEDSTILL TBE "ROTE DREI"At this critical point the Russians had an ally.

An ally

who was not mentioned in the papers or on the radio.

An allyof whom no one knew save the few who were in on the secret.

Aninvisible but uncanny ally - the "Rote Drei".
It bad been working for a year and a half and it was working
well.

If we read the messages which had passed to Moscow

and realize fully their significance, then such terms as"espionage" and "treason" are ,no longer adequate.

This wasI

something new and unique, something which in its effect had noparallel in history.

However you look at them, Tannenberg,

the Marne, Zimmermann, and Fel.lers were fateful coincidences
due to human inadequacy, but what about the "Rote Drei 11 ? Was
it the inspired performance of a spy?

Was it the work of atraitor who sat at the source of most important intelligenceand perhaps sold it for money or the favor of a woman? Was
it the work of a group of' agents employing blackmail. andterrorism to procure access to these most precious secrets? No!

Nothing of the sortt

The 11 Rote Drei" was not a cl.ever

individual act; it was not an accident but a symbol.
a product of the times.

It wasThe "Rote Drei" was the quintessenceof' the spiritual revol.t of a people against a system ofgovernment based on force and suppression.

The frightful

psychic pressure to which the German poeple had been exposed
for nine years was seeking a vent.

Tbe "Rote Drei", the "Rote

189

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RE81¥Rl€!f!El'¥ 2
Kapelle" and all the rest became a vent.

I feel sure ~hat not a.

'single German tfho supplied information to this organization wasworking tor money.

Onl,y the organizers and gatherers ot information

received money tram Moscow.

Rado with all hi&· agents could never

have gathered even a fraction of' that information had not the psychic
state ot the German people prepared the 'Wal'•In Germany they were breaking their heads over these questionsz

whence came the material superiority of' the Russians?

How did it

happen to b~ greatest just where the Gennans attacked?

How did it

happen that the Russians lmew the weak points in the Gexman front andstruck at these?

Can one still wonder after reading the messages of'the "Rote Drei"?
I have said in m:r preface that tho era or great generals is

past.

Even the Russian commanders were no heaven-sent ge11iuses.

They- like alJ. others -were little wheels in the war machine ot
their countey.

They lmew how to utilize their opportunities andthese opporlunities were given them. by the "Rote Drei" with allthat stood behind it.

. .....
And the complex of' the "Rote Drei" was onl,y a single case.
During World War II there were dozel'lS of' such cases and ·the number

ot spy messages ·t;ransmitted by them ran high into the thousands.

190

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TilE LAST GJJ!RMAN OFFENSIVE IN TilE EAST AND WHAT FOLLOWEDOn 4 JulJ 1943 the German offensive north of Belgorod andsoutheast of C el broke loose.
Russia.nsi theIt was not a. surprise to theRote Drei" had been predicting it with precision

for three mont n.

Actually, the Russians wanted it.

They knewthat one-third of all the German armored forces on the eastern
front was asse· bled here and to this they were opposing artillery
and tanlts of tl !!ir own.
became evidentof the Russ ian:

~hat

.

On the very first day of the battle it

the Germans bad misjudged the defensive power

Breaks into the Russian front line were made,of course, but :ach break was immediately sealed off.
on both sides ,. :.'re enormous.

The losses

On the Russian side they could i~edi­a.tel.y be replac t'd from inexhaustible sources but on the German side
they weighed hE :.vily.

The "nose" ·,ras dented a little at the top

ancl bottom, bui that was all.

During the first two days the Germans

lost almost l,C~>O tanks and 300 aircraft.

On 8 July the losses had

mo\mted to 15,C::)O tanks, 650 planes, and. 30,000 men.

The Germans

had committed 1.5 tank divisions, one mobile division, and 14 infantry divisio~1 in the greatest tank battle in world history.
Strangely enou( •\ the German press said little about it.

And when,with perfect 1;.:\ ning, the All i.ed troops under the command of GeneraL
Eisenhower la.rv ed on Sicily in the morning hours of 10 July, there
was plenty to .:.ivert atten·tion from the Russian theater and thehopeless cont~ .:t still raging there.

191

RESTRICTEDOf the mill.ion Italiau, Ro11l8J'l.ian, Hungarian and ~ther vassal.
troops of t.he previous year, onl.1' a scant 100,000 men a;e stillavailable, not more than 2.5 1 000 of them at the front, the remainder
in the zones of communication.

The German di:visions 1 which ha.dhitherto comprised ·t.hree regiments each, were refo:nned into
divisions with two regiments.
lmew much more.

And the Russians lmew it.

They

How short German manpower was getting was~

suggested, among other things, by a decree granting German citizenship to so-~alled Volksdeutsche (people of German blood) fromforeign countr:i.es ~o would serve in the SS, Organisation Todt, orsome other German organization or in a unit of the ar.med forces.
This lure did not achieve much but did betray JDa.DY things andconceal. many dangers •.

The high-sounding catch words of the earlier years were
replaced by others:"It is a ma.tt.er of life or dea.thl" "Victoryor destruction!"
On l3 Jul3 the German of.:Censive was definite]Jr halted; ttrodays later a strong Russian offensive began.

On the 17th theGerman lines had been pierced in places to a depth of 50 lcilometers.
While a few Gel'mans clune undismayed to the old braggadocio andsame others intention~ closed their eyes, a few correctly sized
up the situation and began to offer overt or covert opposition to

the regime.
tion.

The vast majority, hOlTever, felt only a duU. resigna.-

Hitler thouBb-t it necessary to take energetic n:easuresagainst trde£eatif!m"•

192

RESTRICTEDWhen on 1.9 Jull' Hitler and Mussolini met in northem Italy,''military questions were discussed" according to the official
report..

There was no more talk o£ compl.ete agreement, o£ con-fide.nce in victor.v.

One week later, on 26 Jticy'1 Musaolini was

deposed and Bado~o took over the government.
On 5 August the Russians occupied Orel..

fell and the German front began to waiver.
fell.

On 23 August Kharkov

On ~l August Taganrog

Perhaps the Germans never before fought so bravely andwith such disregard for death.

The number of dead was enormous,the n'Wllber of prisoners was small indeed. and most of these were
wounded.
Even the Dnieper could not hol.d up the Russians.

On 6 November

1.943 Kiev fell, the Ho].;y· City of the Russians and the Ukranians.
Gom.el, the most important rail junction in the nort.bem Ukraine,
fell on 27 November.
During this entire period the Russians handled their radio

traffic so that it afforded the German intercept service very
little useful intelligence material.

The German command wasinadequately informed regarding the enemy, who time and timeagain threw unexpected Ufinal reserves" into the struggle.

Tactical details - somet:lm.es ver,y valuable ones - ~"ere obtained
often, but from an operational point of view the picture ot theene.nzy- situation remained obscure.

On the other hand,theRussians were surprisingly well informed regarding the situationon the German side.

They even felt so sure of themselves as to193

RESTRICTED

announce in German language broadcasts the numbers or identified
German units, along ldth the names or the commanders; 7{es, theyeven told of German preparations.

They coul.d aff'ord to - f'or the"Rote Drei" was working f'or them.

As the .f'inal blows were .f'aJl ing

in the east' this organization outdid itsel.t and its reports became

more complete than ever before.

They covered all military eventsnot merely on the eastem front but throughout all Europe; they
touched on politics, industry, agriculture, transportation - oneverytiling

P.;1.ssian intelligence must know.

Any change in Ita,4r,

France, Norwa:-, the Balkans or Ge~ could influence the situationon the Eastem Front.

Therefore German divisions elsewhere must be

watched just as close]J' as those in Russia.

The destruction of'German industcy by the RAF intez•ested the Russians quite as muchas it did the British.

The political situation in Hungary and Ita:Qr

had to be folle»ted closely'.

So the "Rote Drei'' worked .f'everishly.

194:

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1944:'l'REl YEAR OF DECISION Ilf TIIE EAST BEGINSThe year 19~·3 drew to a. close lTi'lih no halt in the Russian.

o:f'fensive which ha.d begun in J'uly.

The new yee:r not only

brought a continuation of this struggle but also the beginningof a new one.

On 15 January the Russians sta:r·ted a ne"W

o:r:rens ive between Leningrad. and Ilmensee,; on the 19th they took
Novgorod.

On the no1:the1•n section almost 40,000 Germans were

killed in the first week.

The Russian superiority on the

ground and in the air became frightful.J.y clear.

On 29 January

the Russians began a mighty encirclement.. :In the Ukraine southof Kiev.

On 3 February 10 divisions of the German Eighth Army

were encircled.

Ago.in the offensive was a surp1•ise because

the German intercept service had not been abl.e to recognize
the preparations.

A few un:J:ts succeeded in escaping, but

70,000 men were kiJ.led and l2 ,000 men were captured.

This

left a mighty hole in the German :f'ront, a result of thestrategic ideas of the "greatest general of aJ.l. times" 1 whonatural.ly had to find a scapegoat end relieved the commanders
of Army Group Center and Army Group North.

Meanwhile 1 fromthe lower bend of the Dnieper five divisions of the new German
SiXth Army were encircl.ed near Nikopol. and seven others werecrushed by Russian frontal. attacks in the same area.

On

9 February Nikopol. was taken by the Russians and the German
bridgehead on the J.e:t't bank of' the Dnieper was el.iminated.

195

RESTRICTEDREft-~
Twelve Gel-man divisions were crushed and m»:',;hat·left on the battlefields.

:h,t, Dnieyer became.precipitate.

Tlle retreat acros!'rom then on one disaster afte.

1

15,000 dead were

nother befell theGerman forces along the entire front.
In the light of these events, there was ). change of attitude in
Finland and Romania.

Later on, people in Gel•t-~oy clAimed

that thedefection of these two countries came as a m 1. rise and that thecollapse of' the northern and southern sector1 c e the eastern front
was due to t~ ~ s treache1•y aThat is not true

1\s early as September

1943 it was cJ.ear from radio traffic that Fir 1,srld. was prepar:f.ng to
get out of the war..

In the first part of Fel "llVY 1944 a Finnish

delegation arrived in Stockholm to negotiate •.rith tb.e Russian
Ambassadress Mrs.. Kollontaj.

Traff lc between SWeden and Mo :Jcow

increased sb..arpl.y and was very reveaJ.ing.

Tb ' dipl.omatic

representatives of the u.s.A. in Stockhol.m aD 1 Uoscow began totalk out of school.

Simil.a.r observations wer~J 1oa.d.e in respect toRomania beginning about mid-February and ear~.'/ in March the former
Prime Minister Stirbey went to Cairo to diacu ;~ with the Allies
Ro~~~Zmia' s

withdrawal from the war.

Early in J'krch Russian terms

tor an armistice with Fi~land became known and on the ~5th the
Finnish Parliament debated the terms :J.n a secxe·t session.

All

this ~ras 'knmm from radiograrr.s more than 6 mont'b.s before theset,.,.o countries finally withdrew t'ron the war.

The onJ.y surprise

was for the German people from. whom the real s:ltuation 'ras concealed
as far as possible.

The tragic thing '-ras that Hitler, vrith

chz:lrac"tcristic obstinancy, refused to see a.n<l comprehend tMn~~

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\fbich did not tit in with b1o ido~.o.

It /tt:J.SJ dango:roua '~o brl.hg

him reports wbich h9 <Li.<l not. wiah to hear ::»r 'boliove.

l)nly f.oq.,,mum tUVlate wero measureB taken and in consequence an entiro C
was sacrii"iced needlessq in Romania.

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198

RESTRICTEDSEVASTOPOL ONCE AGAIN
The great Russian offerJive which began in July 1943 ended
nine months later in April .944.

It freed a:u of the Ukraine andrlhite Russia.

It cost the German a..rmy terrific losses in men

and materiel.

One major task remained in the south:

Crimea.

to free theOn 8 April the , ~ssian attack began and within a. few.

days the German defense crumbled like a house or cards and theRussians took 20~000 prisoners.

The Germans succeeded inholding the ruins of Sevastopol for three lreeka, but on 9 l~these ruins were captured and the remnants or the German Seventeenth

Amr:r, sa.ne 30~000 men, were compressed on Cape Khersones, a tiny.
peninsula.

This was aJ~ that was lett of an army which numberednearly a quarter million men when it was in the area of Kuban ~dthe foothills or t.he Caucasus.
which beggars description.
17th Army surrendered.

\\'hat followed was a slaughter

On 13 May the last remnants of theOn the same day, the official communique

reported that German and Romanian ships had carried out an
unpa.relled evacuation.

If1 reality, bare]Jr 30,000 men were saved.

\'iliat the communique failed to state was the fact that just the
final phase of the struggle in the Crimea had cost almost 60,000
dead and more than 70,000 prisoners (Germans and Romanians).
= == ==

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RE~"ER_ftJ'PPD2
----

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THE CASE OF VERM.EHREN AND COMPANY

The Second Wor1d War was a war of surprises.
military surprises.
every turn.

And not mere]¥

They were encountered everywhere at almost

EspeciaJ.:cy if you were sitting at a radio apparatus.

If you turned the dial, whether intentionall.y or lost in thought,

you could be sure or finding on some frequency or other something
absolute~ new, sometimes or such a character as to take a~your breath, at other times to force a laugh.
evening in February 1944.

I recall one

It was about the 8th or 9th and I

was sitting at my radio running over the whole world, tigurativeq
speaking.

Suddenl;r I ran into a telegram being sent by Cairo.

It was i11 plain text.

What caught nzy" attention was a mention

or the Gennan Embassy in Ankara.

With llV' interest thus aroused,

I continued the reception and what I heard then and in the nexli
few dqs reminded me vividl..y of the Hess case several years
earlier.

Three members of the Gennan :&nbassy in Ankara hadabandoned their posts and placed themselves under the protectionof the local British Embassy.

They were specialists of the so-called counterin~elligence service of the embass,y.

To clarit,rwhat follows, it maar be mentioned that all German official
representatives and organizations abroad had been drawn into
the espionage service.

You could suspect of espionage ~German organization, even a club of stamp collectors in Buenos
Aires or Santiago, for in every case at least one person was

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di.:rect:cy or indirectl.;r 11.-orlc:Lng tor the counterintelligence•section of the Ministr,r or War in Berlin.

This was almost

certainly true ot offices which could claim a limited or un•

limited extra-territorie~tyo

F~ra-ter~tor;&l rights weremisused as a matter of principle.

And so under the aeiP,s ofthe ambassador, von Papen, and under the direct guidance or
the militar,y attache, a German ~ center tor the entire Nearand Middle Es.st had been buUt up in Ankara.

It had connections

with dozens al big and little agencies md sources of information.

It disseminated propaganda amoug the Arabs, Persians, Egyptians
and Indians.

Here, information regarding Allied military,politiceJ and economic measures in the Near and Middle East wascollecte,:l.

This was also the ga.teway by which spies entered theSoviet Union, but this gatew,y wa.s like a ~se trap - it almost
alwqs closed when anyone ventured i11side.

Turkey had become a. focal point and the espionage starr at
the Geman embassy had been :l.noreased g1•adual.:b' until. it numbered

several. thousand persons eax-:Q" in 191.,4. Each of these specialists
possessed a dangerous amount or intor.mation.

The detection or one

individual ooul.d destroy t.he l-rhole netwo1..k or German espionage,
counterespionage ,and propaganda in the Nea.r and Middle East.

So

it was notewortlzy-, or ·- it you will - amusing, that first one andthen two more specialists quit their jobs and went over to the eneJQ".
Thef wre not mere workers or clerl<"s but relatively' high officia1.s

who were t-rell in.fonned regarding eveqthing.
a cousin or Ambassador von Papen.

One had just married

l'fuat they took along in the Mcy"

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or papers, documents 1 photos or plana will probabl.1' never beknown.

They surely did no·fi appear at the British Embassywith empty ~ds.

They placed themsel:ves under the protection

ot the Allies and \..rere soon taken over the frontier.
men'.rhesewere Dr. Erich Verm.ehren, Wi].4r Hamburger, and Carlvon Klekowski with his \d£e; the last two were Austrians.

It was a nice catch tor the Allies.
Picture, it :rou can, the impression this Diade on Hibben+
I

trop and Hitler!

The military at·t.ache in Ankara, General H~svon Rhode, was ordered to fl¥ back and with him went tour..

section heads of the embass,r espionage service.

But no cries

ot rage did anr good. The damage could not be l~paired. The
Allies took care not to reveal what the three men had betrqed.
to them.

The English
did not' react fllike a .flash" as Nationa.t 1.

Socialism loved to do.

GraduallY but surel,.v the whole German

system o:r espiollf.\-ge, sabotage,and propaganda was :U.tted ott
its hinges.

The German posit~on1 in the Near East was hopeless:cy-

damaged.

But the German press priht.eCl not a word on the subject.
On 2 August 1944 Turkey broke or.t diplomatic and econom:lc

relations with Ge:rm.any.

Even before that, far reaching measures

had been taken to abolish German espiona,ee and propaganda on
Turkish soil.

The German espionage and propaganda net in Asia

Minor ceased to exist.

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204

RESTRICTEDITALY
So far a.s I lmow, modem history recorda no alliance between
two states which was more pathetio~'stressed t~ tl~t between
Nazi. Ger.maQY and Faciat It~.

Nevertheless, rarelY has there

been an alliance l'li;t:.h eo feeble a £ounda:hion.

It rested solely·on the personal friendship or Hitl.er and .Mu.ssolini.

Even thecontact between the domil.1ant parties or the \wo countries was veryloose 1 while between the armed forces o£ ItalJt and Germany there
was nothing approaching a cordial co~ta.boration) in fac·l:. between
these armed forces there existed a deep~oted distrust, which wassometimes hidden from view b,y festivities but was alw~s present.
Ita.l;r is the only countey- in Europe lihOse diplomatic systelD.S
were read by ~he Germans without interruption from the end ofWorld War I to the end of World Wa1· II.

We have spoken of theresults o£ the mi.litary intercept service; what was leamed by
1 reading

all ·the Italian diplomatic messi•ges was even m()re extensi'Vl3

but ~ed no decisive role down to 1933.
When in 1933 and 1934 the bond between Hitler and Mussolini
began to assume concrete for.m, the German counterintelligence ser'vice was instr~cted to stop all espionage against Italy immediate~.
~theintercept and cr,yptanalytic 1 services underwent no change,

and ii1 1935 actually increased their activity.

The nForschungsamt11

was monitoring and deciphering all the telegrams and cablegramso£ the Italian Embassy in Berlin.
ltoiuch might be said regarding the results of this monitoring

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~~n-zo:r a "friend and al.q" but w muet l:lmit oureelvoa horo.

Ono thins

was clear the Italla11 Officer Corps in general and tJlo General Stattin particular wert~ not favorable to GermaiO'•

A few dqs after the war began~ Admiral Canaris~ Chief ot

Counterintelligence in the Ministr,y of War~ called together allgroup leaders, speciellsts, and sc.'f!la representatives of the counte~intelligence out-stations~ and delivered a lecture on the political •and military situation from the viewpoint of the counterintelligence

service.

While mos I; o:r 'What he had to say was not particularq sig-

nificant, that passage in bie speech which ,dealt with Ital,y was'

ve:cy interesting.

I

He said he knew that all1:0ng the ot.ricers of thecounterintelligence service I the opinion p~vailed that Itaq would
prove a most unreliable a.l.q and that~ no ma.tter how things devel.oped
tor the present, Ita.l:y would side with tbe d,pponents ot Gel'Jllan7 whenthings became critical.
Can.aris said it waa not the business ot the coun·terintelligenoe
officers 'to deallfith such qlu:astions; that was the tunction o.t theIpolitical leaders.

Of course· he wa~ right; but the statement tha.ta majorit7 or those officers who knew the situation in It~ felt
that, in spite or all the agreements and the alliances with Hitler,Ita]ar still inclined moro to the other side was quite :nwealing.
At first this attitude was not obvious because National
Socialist propaganda was busi.:cy trying to convince the German peoplothat this all:i.ance was firm as the Rock ot Gibraltar.
confirmation was seen when Itacy entered the war.

An outward

Up to that point

the German-Italian Alliance had not been subjected to any stra1n.

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This came onq after t.he f'aUure ot the air attack on England in
September 1940 and again in connection with the Balkan campaign
in April 194J..,

From October 19/,.0 on, Italian radiograms revealed throughout
the Italian anned forces and diplomatic circles a turQing aw~
trom the so-called .bi.s polioy.

I 8hall endeavor to prove that

the German government knew about this attitude of intpOrtant Italiancircles and that it acted in spite of' this knowledge wllen it cont;inued to spealc of a hearty accord with its Italian ~. seeking
in this wq- to thz'OW sand into the eyes of the German people.

On

the other hand, I shall show that bJr their too trank handling of'radio traffic the Ital.ia11:t were a.tf'ording German statesmen an
advantage of l'lhich they had no notion.

This is all. the moreastonishing because there was collaboration between the German and
Italian cryptanalyt.io services.

The Italian M1.nistey of Foreign

Affairs was informed that the Ge:nnan cr.vpta.na:cytic service wasquite efficient and should have figured that. Ita.l :1 an dipl.anatic

trattio would be intercepted.

Aotual.l;v, all Italian t.raflio wasmonitored and all "ester!" and "italdipl." messages were ourrent]Tdeciphered.

The first Italian efforts to pave the wq tor a. separate
peace could be obsel"V'ed earl,y in September 19.41, that is to sa;y1

at a time when the German armies in t.he East were still advancing
victoriousq.

At ~bout the same time, serious tension arose

between leading officers of the Italian armed forces and highofficials ot the Fascist Party.

The militarr men were convinced

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that the Bll.tzkrieg in the East bad te.iled and that a victorioult
conclusion or the t-ar had become impossible.
In October 1941 things had goue so tar that .German troops were

held in readiness in , 1.se the Italian Government should be overthrown.
In November 1941 the "Rote Drei" could reJ.lOrt .~o MoscOW' that theGemans wore more hated in It.al,y than in the occupied territories.
There was oppositipn to sending lta.llan dirlsions to theEastem tront in tbs sp;r.in.g ot 1942 and contingeqts selected were

all recruit(J'i tram. southern Italy aa1d Sici]¥ bec'ause the North
Italians were in a revolutionar,y mood.

After the catastrophe o:r El Al.lf,ova:tn, the. shift in the attitude'

ot in.nuential millta.ry' circles and ot the• ro7al boucehold wascompleted.

It had long been known in Gel"'IWlY t.h•t Crown Prince

Unberto was anti-German at heart.

Now the King /0~ turned

awq frau. Mussolini and le.te in Dec&nber ,19M~ held converaat,ionswith the aim or creating a new government..
Gel1118lJ1' ea.rq in ,ranuarr 194.3·

Tbis became mown in

The presence ot strong German

contingents in Ita:Qr and the slim success ot the AlJ.ies in North'

Af'rica, made the King h~ai tate.

In Februa17 the Italian govem-

m.ent declined to send additiona:L specialists to Gel'lll&Jl1'•
On l3 Mq 1943 the Tunisian campaign ended.

During the final

eight ~s o~ three thousand men escaped to Italf.

The ItalianHigh Command stopped all worlt on coastal defenses in Eastern-

Sicily and withdnn.r ct..astal dFJ!ense tutits.

German commancters in

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2
RE@<JFR.!{;'Y!B
ItalT had to force the Italians to uure dotensive measures.
On 28 June 191+.3 Ita:cy- expressed to the Bri.tish amba.soador at

the Vatican, Osborne, its readiness to get out ot the war and toopen all its territories to tl l:l Allies.

There were t1110 conditionsia.

The i.livasion of Italy should be del.Qod to coincide
wtth tho AW.e(. landil1g i..'"l the West.

b.

The Allies were to refral.n from demands or actions
which would make it impossible tor the ItalianB to
hold ott the Germans until the Allies were read1" toattack on t.~e Westem Fronli.
I

I

This action by Italy ,8nd Ital1"'s attEUnpt to get similar otters'!

for Romania and Finland trere revealed to the German Goverumont byI

deciphered radi.ogr~s.
'
I

Steps were taken immediate]¥t;o sa.toguard
..

;

I

the German position in Ita.:cy against arr::J" Allied invasion and a.r,e,..i..nst

the Italian armod !orcas.

Soon a.tterwa.l'"li the Allies landed in

Siciq; in Berlin, they figured in mid-J~ that Ita:cy- would desert
them by tho snd of August and OKlf planned according].¥.

On 25 Jul,yBad.og].io took over the government; Mussolini was arrested.

The

new government immediate~ entered into preliminar,r conversations'

with represontatives of' the Allies to bring about an armietice ...
On 29 J~ the Olav inf'ormed Badogl.io that the Germans reserved

the right to take all app~priate steps to prevent the allies tram
establishing themselves ~ Itaq or in areas occupied by' Ita."q.
Goering went to Northem Ital.y.

In answer, the Ital.ian goverument

requested Gel'lll8n1' to return 200,000 Italian laborers.

The Germananswer took tlle tom ot new reen£o1oocements and regroupings in
It~.

On 3 September It U,y signed an agreement tor an armisticewhich should take effect at !#he moment most ta.vorable £or

209

RESTRICTEDthe Allies.

This happened on 8 September, but the favorable moment

had been missed.

The Germans had made preparations.

.The Italian

Fifth Ar~ waited until 11 September for the promised Anglo-saxon
aid and capitulated when this failed to appear.

..

units were disarmed b,y German troops.

Numerous Italian

The goal of the Italian gover-

nment to prevent Italy from becoming a theater of operations had
not been achieved.

Italian radio traffic had betrayed all plans

prematurely and Italy had become a battle field, for a year and a
half.

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RESTRICTEDAGENT TRAFFIC IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Beginning ea1•13' in 194J. one could note in the so-called"Protectorate" area of Czechoslovakia an increasing agent traffic
which was controlled from England and worked for the British
intelligence servic~.
established.

Even at that time the traffic was well

There was other traffic which served the Russia11

intelligence service.
On 3 October 1941 the Germans took by surprise an agent#transmitter in Prague 'tthich had been in constant cOIIIIIWirl.cation
with Moscow.

Disclosures result.ing from. t-his seizure led to thearrest of 73 people, among them a former Major or the Czech arm;r~
who was working as head or the Russian intelligence service lnPrauge.

The other net \..Orking wi'l:.h England was the more

import.m1t and mora dangerous.

It was operated by a group ot

Czechs who belonged t,o the Czech resistance movement tor the

purpose or maintaining contact with the gover'l1Dlent in exile
in London and transmitting espionage material.

The traffic waseo well camouflaged that on~ rare]¥ could one break into thisnetwork.

Peculiar!ties of German traffic were utilized as a

disguise.
The at tempt upon the lile of Heydrich had been planned anddirected over tqis network.

That was a big mistake on the pa.rt

or the English and Czechs because it afforded the German radio
defense a complete disclosure not o~ ot the plot itself' andthose directlY participating but also of all the connections

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within the Czech resistance movement.
In 1944 German cr,ypt~sts succeeded in breakirig the cr,ypto-

graphic s,ystem ot the Czech resistance and emigre organization.
Radiograms trcm Lond.on, Kuybyshev, Ist:.anbul, Haifa, Cairo, andBagdad were deciphered.

The content gave interesting in.to:nnat.ion

regarding efforts of' General Gak, leader of' the Czech Legion in the
Near East, to cooperate in a militar.r way with Russia on the basis or
the Benes agreement.

These w£ssages g~ve details of the organizationand stre~h or the Slovak ar.my and of Ger.man forces in Slovakia.

Late in 1943 the Ger.mans succeeded in carr,ying on for aconsiderable tjme a radio deception with hoscow after picking up a
Rtl.Ssian radio agent in Bohemia.

Beginning in M~ 19~ an increased c~tment or parachuteagents of' the English-Czech resistance movement could be observedin the P1~tectorat.e.

up at one'!!.

Most of these groups of agent::; were pj.ckcd

The:z:•e wel"'e some 15 well-trained groups wllich wereto establish direct connection with London and activa\f support
the l"es:l.stance movement.

In Slovakia, which trallied11 with Germany and l'l'here, according

to statements in the German press, such a thing was least to be expected, the resistance movement .t'l.ared up in the middle or 19114 andin this cor~ection the traffic of acents and bands pl~ed a specialrole.

Late in August the revolt. bz·oke out oponly.

£vr.m before

that, increased radio activity of agents from and to this art3:3. c:·1ld

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T~ebe recognized.

revolt had been prepared long betore br the

Czechs and Russians. On tw radio l.inks, which wre monitoredb,y the Germans, the English-Czech intelligence service ot the•Benes Group had made contact with officer circles hostile to
Gel'ID8l11'•

The two radio stations weN in Neusohl and S1Uein.

The uprising was ~rected tram theee areas.

Moreover, aCzeohosl.oTak l.egl.on in the Soviet Union had dropped parachutists.

with radios i11 the areas Mucacevo, Uzhorod, Neuaohl, Rosenberg,

and Povas~ Bystrica; they were to report on the status ot

Slovak pre~arations and on all mattera ot militar.r importanceto the government in exile 1n London anc\. to the Czech militar,rmission in Russia.
I
I'

In part,, the t1-attic was developed verr clumaiJ.I' so that ttte!

German radio defense was informed ot events during all phases

ot this revolt. Thus it was possible to suppress the rebellion,I

although it had been well organized, and to uncove1• all ita
ramifications •. This revolt" ;Like that ot the Poles ill Warsaw,
tumed out to be a trage~ tot 'tftle rebels.
In December 1944, German¥ in the neighborhood of Polonka

pick•d up an Anglo-Americatl mission ot 14 men with ccmplete
radio apparatus and other material tor handling traffic.

It

had been dropped by parachute in September, was supposed toobserve the revolt and latcar to smuggle through the lines thec~ot q- aircraft shot down.

218

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RESTRICTEDPRETTY MILKA

There are pretty women all over" the world and probably the womenof ever,r countr,y are convinced that their own conntr.y has produced
the most beautiful type. But just as ther·e experts on radiotelegraphy~
there are also, ostensibly, experts at judging female beauty.

Such

.

an expert once assured me he was rea~·to be boiled and baked it it•were not true that the prettiest women in the world were in the Balkans.
Meanwhile he has lost his lite in an auto aacident and the death
he was willing to undergo can no longer be inflicted on him.

Butperhaps his idea was right atter all and possibly the countless wars
which have been.waged in the Balkans sin~e the creation of woman
are connected with this fact.
pert in this field.

Who knows? - I do not.

I am no ex-

But I have seen a picture of a woman which

inclines me to grant that the nspecialist" was right.

It was the

picture of a Bulgarian woman with the melodious and significant nameMilka.
Milka means "the lovely one".

Sh~' wasbeauti.:Cul., that isI

true. Whether she was alway;s lovely - who can judge?
···=~·~·············

Thus tar I have spoken •=·t)ly of the lfomen;•

fairness compells

me to say a few words about the men of tb. l3alkans.

They are juut

as different here as in other parts of tbe world.

But - along with

their indubitably good qualit:l.es - the~ Usual]Jr have one characteristic in oommonJ
work.

they do not like to occupy much of their time with

They go on the assump~ion that man was not created to work

...

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restlessly to reshape the world but was created to enjoy whatnature produces, if one merely helps out a little.

They take theattitude that the penalty imposed on man when he was expelled from
Paradise, namely to live by the sweat of his brow, has long since
been paid and is passfl and that we can now lay claim to a condition•

slowly approximating life in Paradise •This view was entertained by the young Bulgarian, Stoinoff.
He was a man ~t good mental ability and, confiding in his intellectand his lucky star, had considered it superfluous to ruin the goldenI?eriod of his youth by too zealous stu4y in school.
••~ him to

It was enoughhave learned a little reading and writing and arithmetic;

anythl.ng else seemed to him excess ballast and he thought it unwise to render life difficult with too much baggage.
Since he was a consistent fellow, he stuck to this attitude,even after leaving school.

He ccntented himself with working a little

now and then, so as to earn what was indispensible to his existence,
and was heartily gl~d when at a dance he became acquainted withpretty Milka who, like himself, was far more inclined toward thejoyous than toward the serious side of life.

The two young people

took a liking to one another and the hot sun of southern Europe
did the rest.

They married and were convinced that heaven would

grant them a carefree life just as it does the birds in the air
and the fishes in the water.

But it turned out that heaven wasoften obscured by heavy clouds and the sun did not always shine.

,That induced the tW5 to consider the course of the world and,
.....

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since the sun rises in the East, they turned their glances toward
the East and decided to Journey sone day to the region where somepeople claimed that Paradise on earth a.nd the golden age of mankind. bad dawned.

'!hey didn't consider long but resol.ved to act.

And since you

can go trom Varna to Odessa by •~hip in 24 hours 1 thei;r.o resol.ve one
day became an accomplished fact.

But it turned out that even in the East ripe fruit did nottall into the mouth of the hungry if one

made no attempt to climb

the tree and pick it, and that in the Soviet Union, even more than•elsewhere, peopla are of the opinion that work makes lite sweet.
Since the two haC{ arrived in a stre.t:J.ge country without money andr

had to learn to "fheir regret that you cannot live in a Communis-e

state without cash, they adJusted themselves to the new situation
with heavy heart end accepted the Job which was generousl.y offeredthem.

That was irr ~e year 193!>.
Stoinotf would haye been untrue to his phil.osophy if he had

not sought some comfortable escape from't~is uncomfortable situation.
I

And. since the Bible says one must seek in order to find, he sought
and al.so found one day a coonecti~ with a lDill1 who held out pros-

pects of living an agreeable life wi1>h very littJ.e l.abor.

In

making this acquaintance pretty Milka had helped somewhat; thisdoes not mean that I would like to say anything unlovel.y about theIlovely lady.

21'2'

RESTRICTEDWith a good letter or recommendation from the Russian inquestion, the two journeyed to 1'Ioscow1 where they were well received
and were housed in a building which looked like a school and turned
out to be one.
This time, however, it was not so easy to regard as a joke theinstruction to which the two had to submit.

The Russians turned

out to be strict schoolmasters. They learned the Russian language,
learned geograpqy; they learned technology - in particular radio
technolOgyJ they received instruction in the law of Bolshevism;
they learned the Morse alphabet; and one.day the.y were told thatthey would now receive the assignment o£ returning to Bulgaria andworking there for Russia as radio agents.

There would not be muchto do, they need only gather ~nformation in certain w~ make friends(in this, pretty Milka could q~lp) and then transmit to Moscow
at specified times and on the specii'ied wavelength the information
obtained.·
Stoinotf' and his wife assented gladly; they got some supplemental training in military matters, industr,y, communications,and economics; a few weeks later, equipped with a nice little
shortwave radio, technical material, and money, they found themselves back in Plovdiv in Bulgaria, where they moved into a little
house and for the moment made some acquaintances on the basis
o! addresses given them.

Meanwhile their family name had changed.

Their name was no longer Stoinoff but Mirtscheff.
That was the year 1939.

218

RESTRICTEDMeanwhile World War II had broken out and Moscow entertained
no illusions as to how things would develop... That the Balkans would
sooner or later. be in flames - as so often. in their histor,y - wasclear.

It was time to get busy.

And Mirtscheff went to work.

He took a liking

In him the Russians had not made a bad catch.

to his new job. The radio connection functioned well, nobody disturbed him;

the task of making contacts and acquaintances and thegathering of information just suited him and his'young wife.
Mirtscbeff was a clever boy who soon succeeded in recruitingI

for the new job his brother Stoino Stoinoff and his brother's wife,
Zarah, who were in Varna.

stoino was a technician and so had agood foundation for radio work and was in other ways a "smart boy".
His wife likewise did not come into this world asleep and so there
was soon a first-rate community of effort. Milka undertook to train
Zarah as radio operator, while stoinoff undertook the technical. maintenance of two sets which had meanwhile arrived from Russia.

Hismain job was gathering information.
The Bulgarian people at that time were politically' divided:
one party wa~ definitelf pro-German, the other pro-Russian.
two brothers could use both groupe in their workz

The

one as a sourceof information, the other for conscious cooperation.
After a year o£ ver.y intensive activity in establishing connections, Mirtscheff and his wife had a circle of collaboratorsand informers which reached up into the highest positions of the
Bulgarian government and of the military command, yes, even into

219

RESTRICTEDthe General. Staff.

The radiograms which he or his wife and Zarah

sent in cipher to Mosc~ and Tiflis had mare and more·content.
But 1t was not until the autumn of' 1940, when the campaign
in France ended and Hitler was actively preparing for his can«>aign..

in the Balkans, that the messages of' the two brothers began to bereally val.uable.

Meanwhile two more agents with radios had joined

his working group and these were followed in the spring of 1941
by three more.

They worked from Sofia, Plevna, Varna, Burgas andPlovdiv; also from a village near the TUrkish border in the vicinityof Adrianapl.e.
Hitherto the German intercept service had not noticed thesecircuits; it had been too much occupied with assignments in Poland
and in the West.

But the Mirtschef'f group was working all shifts.

Mfrtscbeff was the leader and soul of' the entire organization but
in the gathering of' news Milka was the leading spirit.

All reports

on German troop movements, on German auxUiary airfields and naval.
bases, on gasol.ine supplies, radio stations, German staffs, on
diplomatic negotiations, on the cooperation of Bulgarian officials,
organizations, and individuals with the Germans, went to Russia.

Allevents within the Bulgarian army and government, reports on popularfeeling, on the work of' parties, organizations, industrial. output,
del.iveries to Germany - all this was carefully spied out, reduced toradiograms and transmitted.

After Romania and Hungary had been occupied

by German forces, there was plenty of material and pl.enty o:r soUl··- ~s.

They merel.y had to represent themselves as friendly to the Ge~

220

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in order to secure useful information.
Behind Mirtscheff's entire organization stood, as pro-.

tector, Vinogradoff, Russian Vice-Consul in Varna, while theRussian embassy in Sofia put up the cash.
Not until the. autumn of 1941, when the war in the East
was in full swing, did some of the German intercept stations
repeatedly hear suspicious traffic emanating frpm the Balkans(presumabq from Bulgaria).

However1 they were too pre-oc-

cupied with their Russian opponent to find aqr time for monitoring.

The war in the East went on and the multitude of partisan

radio stations which appeared occupied the German monitoring
service to the full.

A system of intercept stations running

an a north-south line from Riga to Nikolaev was establishedin order to have a good base for hearing and locatipg Russianstations.

So it was not until the autumn of 1942 that carefulobservation of these ~sterious Balkan stations began.

In

November there were already twelve which worked with the characteristics of Russian agent stations.

Now a systematic coverage

began.
a•••••••••••=•••••••
On a rainy January day in 1943, when the Battle of Sialin-grad was at its dramatic height, great excitement reigned in thecentral office of the German intercept service on Matthew Squarein Berlin.

They had succeeded in breaking the cipher used by

the suspicious stations in the Balkans and had deciphered a few

221

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dozens out of the many hundreds of messages picked up during thepreceeding months.

From these it was evident that the radiograms

not only contained high1y il!i>ortant information, but that highBulgarian statesmen were clearl.y cooperating with Russia., yes,that even ministers and genera1s were conspiring with this groupof agents.

an

The decipherment of additional telegrams proved thatorganization was involved which comprised two groups covering

the entire country,with collaborators in all Bulgarian offices.

Now it. was certain that these stations must be sougnt in
Bulgaria..

But since the German D/F base in the east ran from

north to south, the resulting angl.es were so acute that the location could not be fixed.

Orders were issued by telegraph forother D/F stations to cover the Bulgarian stations constantly andf1nel1y the approximate localities were determined.

Earl.y in

February 1943 a. short-range D/F platoon was dispatched to the Varna
area., which soon 1earned that one of the principa1 stations
must be located <?ll the northern edge of the town.
room were soon spotted.

The house andIt was a mansard room in the thirdstory of' an apartment house.
Mea.nwhUe, pretty Milka was going quietly about her work.
Her circle of acquaintances was getting larger and l.arger.

She

received invitations and fluttered from one pleasure to another.
But all these pleasures were hard work for her, expecially when
it was a question of getting proof of some important piece ofnews or of getting confirmation from various sources.

•
222

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Milke.

became the Mata Hari of' BUlgaria and Mirtschef'f' s organization
became the "Rote Drei" of' the Ba.lka.ns.
Milka remained modest in her manner of l.ife.

She bought her-sel.f neither costl.y cl.othes nor expensive jewelry.

Her only weakness

was for silk underwear nice,fine silk underwear with l.ots of l.ace.
Such things were espensive in the Balkans; they were easier to getin Germany, and so were dainty, thin silk stockings.

And it wasa piece of irony that she, who was working against Germany 1 was getting these things from Germany.
ways.

By dipl.omacy.

Not directly 1 but in roundabout

As diplomatic baggage.

..

Sl.owl.y the r~rman net cl.osed about MirtsCheff and his stations.
The first blow was to be struck against the station in Varna; it was

Zarah's.
For a l.ong time the Germans del.iberated how to call. in the Bul.garian pol.ice to pick up the station, because it waslikel.y thatthe agents had confidants among the police.

Finally the leader of

the German unit requested some Bul.garian secret pol.ice and did notreveal. the actual. purpose until the very last momen~.
You can hardly call the action of' the Germans cl.ever in thiscase.

Interception of' agent messages in Bul.garia had shown thatthey must be interconnected and have personal contacts with one
another.

In such a situation it would have been appropriate topick up all. the stations at the same time.

Since the counterintel.-ligence forces were not sufficient for that, they contented themselves with picking up one station after another.

223

RESTltiCTED

The raid on

RE8~D32
the station in Varna was scheduled for 21 February 1943.

.

It was known

that this operator put through his traffic with Moscow every morning
at 4 o'clock;

this l "l.S the time chosen for the surprise.

The German and Bulgarian official~ approached the house cautiously
by night and took up concealed positions.
darkness.
room.

The house 1~ in deep

At 0345 hourl3 an electric ligh·t; flashed. in the mansard

Immediately afterwards the heavy curtains ~ero drawn together.

.

A few minutes
later twojGerman radio operators, who had brought.

a'onc a set, heard the agent send a rather long'• message.

Now they"t.r\e.d to break into the house but, were so unskillful in opening'"'C\w. locked door that a pane of glass broke. The men ~limbe..i thel.hree flights; one soldier climed to the roof anq noiselessly
removed the antenna to prevent the agent from se*ding out a warning
signal when he became aware of the intrud~rs.
Now all was ready.

They gathered befare the door of the apart-

ment, not without some noise in the silence of the night.

When they

tried to pick the lock they found the key was in it and that thedoor was also bolted.

Maku1g up their minds quicklY, they brokea pane ~f glass and reached in to open the door.

Noisily thay

forced their w~ into the kitchen in order to get to the living room.
At the same moment, both Zarah and Stoino stoinoff appeared withblank astonishment on their faces to ask the cause of this disturbance.

Both were c~~pletely dressed and shoued no signs of

the sleepiness which might have been expected 11hen people weru
suddenly awakened at 4 o•clock.

224

RESTRICTEDThe Bulgarian police told the couple it bad been ascertainedthat they bad a radio apparatus in the dwelling and had just transmitted a message.

Zarah and Stoino looked at one another in amaze-.

ment and then declared there must be an error because they had notransmitter in the apartment and had only gotten up to so to thedoctor because Zarah bad suddenly been taken 111.
''

However, Zarah did not give the impression of being sick but
looked extremely well.

And when the German so].9.iers went into the

bedroom tbSy noticed on the lady's night table an alarm clock
set for 0345 hours, i.e. a quarter of an hour before the nOrmaltransmission time.

Hence it was quite unlikely that Zarah lmew

when she went to bed that she and her husband would have to get up
at 0345 on account of a sudden illness.

Now the whole dwelling was searched but no trace of a radio
was found.

They went through the coal box and stove 1 euq>tied the

kitchen cabinet, pulled beds: apart, climbed on tables and che~ts,
and created chaos in all tlie 1;rooms 1 but they found no radio. · On

the other hand, they did fincf. some tools and parts of a radio set.
From this they could conclude that work on such an apparatus had been

done in the apartment.

But Stoino denied this 1 while his wife said

she knew so little about technology that she couldn't tell atransmit·ter from a broadcast receiver.

It was all a ridiculous

mistake and she wished they would be 'so good as to leave them inpeace.

Now the man was interrogated and 1t came out that he worked

225

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dai~ until 1630 hours

southwest of Varna.

in the German seaplane harbor, 7 kilometers.

He was able to prove t~s statement at once.

Consequently he could not be the operator since the station was heard
ever,y afternoon at 1500 hours.

His wife asserted she had no idea

ot how to send radiograms and knew the Morse alphabet only fromhearsay.
Now the two were separated and the man was threatened with all
the tortures or Dante's Inferno if he did not confess.

Meanwhilethe dwelling had been searched again with no success.

After long

denial, the man decided to confess that his wife was the operator
and that the transmitter was in, a hiding place he had built under
the fioor of the living room.

A l"flg covered the spot but evenafter it was removed it was hard tp detect the1 cover of the secretcompartment. When the hid:i.ng place was opened 1\they found not one
transmitter but two, of which one was intended, as\a spare.

More-over, they found the message which had just b'en sent and a listof call signs and operational signals.
Now they set up the antenna againJ the uninvited intruders
departed with the couple they had arrested, leaving a Bulgarian
and a German behind to receive possible visitors •.

Three hours later there arrived, all unsuspecting and in thebest of spirits, a reserve officer of the Bulgarian airforce who
was bringing with him, in addition to some interesting papers andsketches, the sum of 50 1 000 leva.

.

This was a sum which he would

hardlY be carrying around with him ordinarilY, but the young man

2~6

RESTRICTED

asserted thatthat was nobody 1 s business and refused to give aqy

information.

The Bulgarian secret police, however, remained curious;

they locked the officer up in a dark cell, gave him nothing to eat
for the time being, and fetched him out ever.y two hours for questioning.

They suggested certain disagreeable consequences, smokedsome good Bulgarian cigarettes in his presence, without offeringnn

him aQY, and drank sliw~ritz.

After two days, he made a comprehensive confession.

From thisit appeared tha the radio fixed by the Germans in Plovdiv had beenin very close contact with the station in Varna.

There had beenclose personal contact between the two stations.

He gave the exact

address of the Plovdiv station.
An automobile filled with members of the German armed forces'

immediately dashed off to the address given.

They stor.mad into thedwelling but in spite of careful search£ound not the slightes~
trace of the transmitter, although this ti~~ they did not forget
to inspect the flooring.

What they diafind was an inordinate amountof the finest silk and .lace underwear and a pretty young laqy who
seemed to go with it and who complained bitterly at the disturbance,
holding out in prospect all the torments of heaven and earth forthe intruders, if they did not clear out at once.
It was Milka and she was not unduly surprised by this sudden
visit.

She had really been expecting it.

For the follotv.ing reason.

On the d~ after the Varna station was raided, Milka planned
to visit her sister-in-law, Zarah. When she saw the broken pane
glass in the outside door of the house she becair,e suspicious.

227

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of--- ---------------

Cautiously she went upstairs.

In the door of' the apartment she

noticed another broken pane and was now certain something unpleasantmight have have happened.

She le:f't ·l;he house in a hurry.

She hunted upa couple of her go-betweens and another radio agent, warned them,..

and took the next conveyance home . Mirtsc~ff' immediatel.y removed

the radio and antenna and. lit out.

Milka remained in the apartment

although she was the one who had operated the set.

She felt absolutely

secure 1 however, and decided to await calmly whatever might coma.
There was a long hearing, since Milka. denied everything.

She

had no idea that the Bulgarian reserve o!ficer bad betrayed her.
Not until she was told this did her resistance cease.
Meanwhile, Zarah bad been induced to tell something about theencipherment and decipherment of the telegrams.

With these hints,

all. messages intercepted by the Germans were deciphered, both thosef'rpm the two stations raided and those from stations not yet discovered.

On the basis of' this information the remaining agents ofthe grou;p could be picked up one after the other.
By now things were really moving.

The deciphered messages

yielded deep insight into the entire spy net.
ment was informed.

The Bulgarian Govern-

But Hitl.er had to be told, too.

placed the entire Balkan situation in a new light.
Ribbentrop wore his most stupid expression.

This revelation
Ritle~

raged.

Serious demarches weremade to the Bulgarian King.

Czar Boris journeyed to Hitler's Head-quarters with a heavy heart.

The Bulgarian government was made over.

King Boris bestowed a couple of' dozen high orders on German officials

228

RESTRICTED

.and officers, which were pinned an the corresponding breasts andbellies or h~ged about their necks.

These were supposed to workI
like essence of valerian on the lilOociot the German government.

Now Milka was taken over by the German monitoring service.
They had all the necessar.r materials lfor a little deceptive game. .
Moreover, they felt certain the raid ihad been executed so cleverlythat Moscow and Tifiis could not have been warned.

They tried

to pursuade Milka to take part in the game. At first she refused,
but later she consented and a little 1game began which cost theGermans much time and effort and pro~abzy evoked nruch hilarity at
the Russian end since the Russians h~d been informed promptlT of.

the arrest. Milka' s observations in Varna and her proq»t warningof the other agents had sufficed to tip off the Center.
lady plqed her role admirably to the· end.

The pretty

Soon one of the agents

who had been arrested succeeded in esc~ping to Russia.

Then Moscow

got a clear account of what had happened.
In Bulgaria there1were whOlesale: changes of personnel but thistinalq stopped and t:ttere was no change whatsoever in the generalsituation. The information which had18R~ to Russia had been suttici'ent to cause the Germans serious ~ge.

However, the Germans

nov recognized that Bulgaria was no long~r an;y real asset.

~29

RESTRICTED

_·

28~

REST.RICTED.

When the hist01"y' of Wr 1r1d War II is written, some odd th:tns;a'Will be discovered regard~ og Gel"ID.EI.DY'1 particularly in the second
half ot the w.r.

J:t w111. often be found that the begiDDing or the.

development ot this or that was known to the GeX'IlltmS in good season,
but rarely vUl one be 1able to ask:

one willmostl1' have to' ask:''Wbat be;ppened thent" J rather''What tailed to happen then"f Typicalare the cases oft BuJ.sa,ria, Romania, and Finland.

However 1 there

wre cases when/ the Germans actually' did" somethiDg. Even at theproper time I

We have already mentioned the case of ItW.

'!he

.

second such case - although 1ess dramatic and much 1ess significant - 'Was that of Rungar-;r.

In Fe'brua:ry 1943 the Gel"1DB.D intercept service 1euned tor the

first time that the Hungarian Government was putting out feelers
tbrough the Vatican tor ,a separate peace.

Provided ltUnga.ry' s

bOWJda:ries rema.inea intact 1 the country was reacly to support the
Allies in case of a l.alu\ing in the Ba.l kans.

At the same time 1

HUJlgal'y' called tor the return ot 30 1 000 wood'lrlOI"kers from Ge:rma.ny ••'l!be negotiations brought no resuJ.ts at that time ••Earq in 1944 it was obvious :f'ro1l1 decrypted traffic that the
Hungarians were cauti0$J.y puttiJ:Ig out feelers to find some wq

to escape from their d1fticu1t sit"Uat:l.on. IJ!o bring about a change
ot attitude in JiUngary, the Chief ot State, :a:orthy1 was summoned

to Hitler's Headquarters in mid-Marcb. Here it became apparent
that Kort~ himself was in favor of these ef:f'orts.

231

RESTRICTEDThe Germans

decided to act at once.

In the night from 1.9 to 20 MS.rch, "at thewish of the Hunga.ri. n Government and in cordial collaboration withit", Hungary was occupied by German troops and Sunday morning (20.3.)
the people of Budapest~rubbed their eyes with astonishment as theGermans marched in.

R~thy wassubjected to pressure and Hitler

succeeded in inducing ~im to continue the strug~e on the side ofGermany.
The Kallay Government had to resign 1;md the Sztojay Government

replaced it on 22 March.

Kalla.y fled tb the T\u-kish embassy in'Rud.apest, was granted sanctuary and! remained there despite all• get him.
efforts toD6me sz·tojay had been Hungarian amb&.ssador fin Berlin and his
name had been Stojakowitech.

He later c~ged his name into Magyar

but continued to be regarded as a convinc~ adv,ocate of German Hungarian friendship and collaboration.
,The ever more unfavorable situation in the east and the obviousl.y :r:m,pending defection of Finl.a.nd, Romania, and Bulgaria createdfor ~ new Hungarian v· 'crnment ever more serious difficulties,
wbich led to a new change of government.
Government was formed.

On 29 August the Lakatos•

Now influential military circles, indiv-

idual -members of the governnent, and Rorthy himself began to thinkof a separate peace.

'The German collapse in France decide.d matters.

Beginning earl.y in September 1 decrypted Hungarian messages excb.a:r.0E:dbetween the government and some of its representatives abroad revealed clearl.y that the Hungarians through their represento.t" 'C'F

232

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at the Vatican end Ankara, were seriously seeking an armistice
and a separate peace.

This time 1t was not a question of feelers

but of unmistakable preparations tar getting out of the war.

N?'b onl.7 this, the c011:1Dl8Dder of the First Hungarian ~,M6klos".

von Dal.nok1 was already conferring 'With representatives of theRussian a.rmy facing him.

.

~ National Socialist g0'\'e1'11111ent.

i111111ediatel.y consulted v:l.th

leaders ot1 the Hungarian Pfeilkreuz [Arrow Cross) Party- and prepared a ad.up d • etat for the overthrow of Hortby atte1• the modelot the action 1n Austria in 1938 • .The Hungarian Government was
to give the signal itself.

And it cl;ld.

On Sund.a.y, 15 October,.

I

Chief of State Hol~ made over the Hungarian Broadcasting sta-tion his famous declaration renouncing the former policy and say..

situation, to continue to _,erve as protective b'U:Dq)er tar ·bhe
Germans and to e2p0se the co)intey to destruction.

He already'hacl the ma1n terms of an a.rm;J.stice.

How the moment had come far active intervention.
night before 16 October the coup was pulled ott.

In thellortby was

taken into custody and Szalasi took over the Governmnt. German
troops and otficif...1s rcmdered active. aid.

Horthy we.s forced toclecla:re his proclamation to the Hungarian peo_ple null and voidanc1 to announce his retirement.
'
The German people did not learn of tbe event untU two day'sl.ater.

233

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It seems strange that the two countries which for years hadcollaborated most closely with Germany in the matter of interception and cryptanalysis, and which therefore must have known therisk involved in the use of radio and must have been nb~e to figurethat the Germans were interceptjng their wire 1ines and who knew
about the work of the German intercept service in decipherinJ
foreign systems, - it seems strange that these countries made theincomprehensible mistake of compromising their most secret messages
by transmitting them by radio in bl.ind reliance on the security ofIt.heir own ciphers.

There is hardly anything more ironical in world

history than what went on here.

The two al.lied nations which worked

most closel.y with Germany in deciphering the radiograms of othernatio~shad no idea that they were being watched by the r..ermans andthat their .!3.ecret te1egrams were all being read.

An explanation

may be found in the fact that countries ruled as these were permit
only an orientation which converges in the top counnand.
like to term it vertical orientation.

I should

Horizontal orientation, on

the other hand, is not only neglected but consciously suppressed.
A classical example is the well knmm "basic order" of Adolph Hit1er
dated ll January 1940 in which we read:1.

No one, no office, no officer :ts to 1earn of' any matter vh.ich
is to be kept secret, if such knowledge is not absolutely-·

essential for official reasons.

2.

No office and no officer is to leaJ.•n more of matter w:1ich
is to be kept secret than is necessary for the cc..~·r:· · .,. o.\t

234

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of its or his assignment.
At first sight this order appears'quite correct and proper.
In practice the resu1t in countries rul.ed by terror is tba.t in theface of such orderQ from the top a sort of fear psychosis resuJ.ts
and people act on the principle:"better tell five offices or

people too few than one too 1D8.DY'. 11
No wonder tbat in such countries the left band did not knowwhat the right band was doing, when wbat bad been learned by one
office vas caretully kept secret from all others. Wholesale errors
azul failures were inevitable.

Secrecy is good; only it liDlSt not be overdone within one • s

own organization.

'

235

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236

RESTRICTEDPOLISH RADIO AGENTS IN THE EAST
When the Polish Government tled to London in 1939 it began'

bui 1 ding up a new Polish state underground.

The main supports

were members ot the fom.er administration who had remained inwhat had been Poland.

England supported the exiled government,

e:xpecting that Polish activity would tie up considerable German.

forces; turthe:nnore,. the intelligence net-wrk required to direct
the Polish resistance movement functioned in the interest ot
British intelligence.

Since the exiled government was socompleteJ¥ cut ott from Poland, and since speed and accuracy

ot transmission and adequate camounage were necessary, theradio became all important ••German intercepts showed that even in 1940 the Poles had
an intelligence network which covered all Europe.

It depended

in the main on radio and was so well camoutlaged that it eluded

German observation tor a long time.

The net was constantq

expanded but German "Radio Defense" did not recognize its
nature and structure clearq until the latter halt of 1941.
Polish radio intelligence assumed a more or less dual
character.

Leading persona!I:J.ties scattered over all parts

ot the world bad to communicate with one another in order tosafeguard their interests and to keep their leaders intormed.
The control station was in London.

Ul.t:ima.teq there was both

diplomatic and agent trattic, although a clear differentiation

RESTRICTED

-----REfl-1RI~fJ2

was not always possible.

The diplomatic stations were in neutral orAllied countries, while the agents were usually in areas under German
control or in neutral countries •The discipline of these stations was commendable.

Traff':l.c wasso well disguised that it could be recognized"as Polish only &fter
long observation.

Of' course on a few occasions the operators

betrayed themselves by using Polish words and abbreviations but it
was almost a year bef'ore the Germans realized that they werelistening to a net of the Polish espionage service.
cryptogJ.aphic system was broken.

Eventually the

It was astonishing to see how theGovernmEnt in ExUe bad built up a service with its very limitedmeans.

Fifty links were' recognized.

The stations were in London,in unoccupied France, in Russia, in the Near East, in the Balkans,in Scandinavia and 1 above all, in Poland itself, where there were

stations in Warsaw 1 Lemberg, Bialystok, Stanislau, Jaroslav, Lublin,
Krakow 1 Zamose, Bilia, Podlaska. 1 Petrika.u, Tschenstuchau, Kielce 1

Sandomierz, Deblin, Kowel 1 Vi.J.na., Grodno, Novogradek, Kamienna,
Ostrowiec, Random, etc.

In the Near East there were stations in

Istambul, Cairo, Teheran, Bagdad, and Jerusalem.

The Polish organization inside the Gouverenment General was
split up into various cells, with no personal contact between them.
Conmnmication was only via London.

Even the agents employed in

Warsaw usually had no contact with one another.
In Sep~mber 1942 came the f'irst major German raid in Warsaw.
There were numerous arrests and instruments and documents wereconf'iscated.

Even then, close range action in Harsaw proved very

238

RESTRICTEDREstfJR:I~D 2
difficult because the Pollsh population was clearly working close.qI'

with the radio agents and warned them.

When German D/F detach-ments approached~ traffic was broken of:£ at once and otten transmission went on without a:ny break from another transni.tter at adifferent location.
The next major blow against Polish agents came in December

1942 when several transmitters or the resistance movement were
picked up in Warsaw and other places.

Among those arrested was

the head or the radio technical section of the illicit communication service.
The organization in Warsaw was almost .fantastic.

If onestation was picked up and the personn0l arrested, it "tm.s
immediate]Jr replaced by another and operations went on unchanged.
No matter how IDBllY arrests the Germans made, the organization was
unShaken and went on working.

Af~er ever.r raid awith a new set took over the blcJ. traffic.

new operator

At times 15 or moretransmitters were being watched in Warsaw alone.
This net was planned to assure communications for the
Polish military resistance movement.

There wa.s also a special

radio net for military espionage or the Polish General St.a:t:f
in London.

Coping with this traffic .was dif£:i.cult, because

after each transmission the operators changed their location
and because they also had watchers posted.

To c:U.sguise theirtraffic they frequently changed their manner of hancll.iJlg it.

239

RESTRICTEDRES'¥Il:Rl?PED 32
It shoul.d also be noted that women were used as operators, watchersand couriers.

The organization had its own workshops, high-speod

telegraph installations, etc.
Whenever the Poles made use of wireless they were exceedin&l¥cautious.

The operators received the messages in enciphered form;

it one was captured, he was not in a position to tell anything about
the cryptographic B7stem. used.
In the summer or 1943 a change was noted in the radio situation.

To the tonne1• radio network two new ones were added:

J,-

I~

An alarm net with transmitter in Engl.4nd and receivers
in occupied Poland, and2.

An operational net with a considerable number of transmittersand receivers in. Poland which communicated with ono anotheron:~¥ throughthe control station in England.

The Ge~ radio defense did not al~~ raid a station when its

l.oca.tion was lmown; it often proved more profitable to read thetraffic and thus gain extensive insight into the structure andactivity of' the Ulegal Polisl:l organization.

Thus the plans for

the August revolt in Warsaw had been learned by the Germans long
before the revolt occurred.

,..

........

240

RESTRICTEDThe year 1944 saw the following developnents in Polishagent traffic:.

1.

Preparation for the general revolt;

2.

Touching ott the revolt in Warsaw;

3. Shift in. the trattic a.tter the revolt.
In Mq it was already clear that the movement was receiving
increased supplies and equipnent by air.

In June it was possible•

to get a picture of' the preparations for opening the revolt andit was no surprise for the Germans when, on 25 JulJr at 1600
hours, transmissions began over the ."Polish aJ.arm net" whichsignified the impending start of' the revolt.

Cert.ain watch-words were to be sent out over the alalm net as signals tor
the prel..imina.r.r' stages "watch.fulness" and "readiness".

The•twatchf'ulness" stage might last as long as l4 dqs, wbile the•readiness" stage must be followed by the revolt within 48
hours.
The watchwords sent out beginning 25 J~ all suggested
that the "watchfulness" stage had been proclaimed tor bothzones.

Beginning 30 Juq changes were noted in traffic whichwere interpreted as cancellation of the "watchtul11ess11 order.

tor the protective zone and one thought this was explainedb)" the rapid advance of the Russians.

In reality it was aclever=b' executed manner of prooJ.aiming the readiness stage,
and the Polish revolt began precise]1' 48 hours later.

241

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It was soon noticed that, following the appealof General Bor

tor support of the Warsaw revolt, there was a concentration of
agent radio stations around Warsaw.

Intercepted tra.f'fic revealed

flights of supply planes.
It was asserted later that the English left the Poles in thel.urch and did not supp~ them with arms, ammunition etc.
not quite true.

This isSupp:cy was well organized but pr:ompt warning of

the coming o'(' supp~ planes by German radio intelligence made it
possible to keep a large part of the material from benefiting theinsurgents.
During the Warsaw revolt, trai'fic on the Polish diplomatic
net also increased sha.l"P:cy-•

It was interesting to see how thePoles tried to form in London a government which would ~ generally recognized •The coni'licts between the special interests of

the u.s.A., England, and the Soviet Union were revealed, while0

jealousy, ambition, distrust and discord among Polish leaders
prevented a.ny positive steps.
their own responsibility.

The Poles had started a revolt on

They had merely made aiTengements with

the English for supplies but they had not discussed the matterwith the Russians.

Consequentl,y the latter emphatical.l.y dis-claimed s:rJ'3' interest, did nothing to support the insurgents, andclaimed the revolt merely aimed at winning the political favo~ ofthe Soviet Government.

RESTRICTEDThe War·saw revolt, which was intended to be Poland's mostheroic action, finaJ.ly becamo one o£ the great tragedieo or thewar.

On 2 October 1944, on the 6.3rd day of the struggle, camethe surrender.

The city was destroyed; the blood o£ thousands

had been shed in vain.

Information regarding the background or th,e re\"'lt and thepolitical atti·l;ude of the Government in Exile l'tas obtained fromintercepted messages or the Polish Civil Delegation.

Traffic

ot the resistance movement continued·undiminished during the
Warsaw revolt but after this had been crushed general Changes
were noted, auggesting re-groupings and displacements of.forces within the AK.

Radio act.ivity tended to concentrate in

the general areas of Kielce-Radom, Krakow and the .foothills
o.f the Carpathians.
The attitude o£ the Polish AK had, toward the end, becomein part definitely anti-Soviet and attacks on the Germans fromtheir rear were stopped.

On the other hand, the attitude of

the AK was very undecided.

However, the further course of

events in t.he East soon rendered this unimportant.

243

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,.
!

244

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lYHAT WAS HAPPENING MEANWHILE IN THE WEST

Having occupied ourselves at eame.length with the east andsoutheast, we sh&ll now cast a glance toward the west where according to Hitler - tlle tm.r had ended on 22 June 1940.
Looked at superficia.l.JJ', that was true - eave tor the air war
which was becoming ever more viol.ent.

France had become an

ElDorado tor the troops stationed there.

.

There one found"t.hings to eat, drink., and purchase which had long since disappear-

ed in Germa.ny.
sh&~.in theEver,y German soldier hoped to get to France and..

good things for a time~

But behind the scenes

something had been going on since late 1940 ot "Which very few
peopJ.e lcnew aJ'Jjthing.

Tb.is was t.he prelude to that 'Which was

t.o prove fatetul. to the Germe.n forces three and one-ha.lt years
later.

It was ·the devel,pmen1;. o£ the resistance movement andot the x·adio agent serv-ice~ which we shall. now discuss.
The Polish Agent Radio Service in France
and Belgium
AJ:ter the collapse of. Poland, part of the officials andof the general staf! officers Who fled to England via the Balkans,renud.ned in France and began gathe1--ing together all Polishel.em.ents.

The immediate purpose was to smuggle Polish citizens

to England via Spain and Portugal tor service in the Polish
Legion.

Since among the prominent Pol.es in France there were.DJ8.lV' f'ormer members of the II SectionJ i.e. ot the Polishintelli~ce se1~ae,and since the attempt to evacuate Poles

RESTRICTED

-

-

-

-

- - - - - - - - - - -was not veey successful. the trout-station France of the II Section
ot the Polish General Staff" was ordered by' the Government in Exile.

to set up an espionage network for the benefit ot the Allies.

At

the same time • an e:x.ceptiona.J.:cy smooth-functioning radio network was..

set up for purposes of control. and to forym.rd the information
gathered.
The Polish inteW-gence service in France bad the following tasks:
1.

Spotting concentrations of the German a.I'!Q"• air force and nav.

2.

Transport by land and sea and naval movements.

,3.

Ammunition dumps; coastal fortifications, especi~ on the
French coast after the occupation ot Northern France.

4. Selection of targets for air attack.

s. Ascertaining and reporting everything which demanded
immediate action by' the military COJJDDand.

6.

Details regarding the French armament industey working
for Gel'JD.all7• with reports on new weapons and planes.

The Poles carried on their work from southem France which
had not been occupied by the Germans.

Beginning in September 1942

it was ce~ain that Polish agent stations were 1ocated in theiJJmediate vacinit;r of the higher staffs of the French armisticeanDY•
In March 194.3 Ger.man counterintelligence was able to deal the

Polish organization a serious blow but after a few weeks it revived,
following a reorganization.
could be read.

Beginning in the summer of 1943 messages

The;r contained milita:cy and economic information.

246

RESTRICTEDThe Poles in southern France worked as an independent groupand received instructions from England, partl,y by courier, andpartly by radio.

They collaborated close:cy with the stat£ o£General. Giraud in North Atrica and with American intelligence
service in Lisbon.

Otficial French couriers traveling between

I

Vichy and Lisbon were used, with or without their knowledge,
to carry reports (in the form of' microfilm concealed ill thecovers of books).
The Poles had a special organization to check on German
rail traffic to France.
fron:liier points:

It watched traffic at the following..

Trier, Aachen, Saarbrttcken, MUnchen-Gla.dbach,Strassburg Mttlhausen and Belfort.

They also watched the Rhine.

crossings at Duisburg, Coblenz, DUsseldorf, KUl.n, Mannheim,
Mainz, Ludwigshaf'en, and \'liesbaden.

Ten transmitters were used

for this purpose.
All the Polish organizations in France were directed byGeneral Julius Kleeberg.

They worked primari:cy against Ge~

and in three fields:
1.

Espionage and intelligence;2.

Smuggling [personnel] ;3. Courier service.
Head ot the "smuggling service" until 1.6.1944 was thecelebrated Colonel Jaklicz, follofed later by Lt. Colonel
Goralski.

Jaklicz tried to penetrate all Polish organizations

and send all available man power via Spain to England forservice in the Polish al'ley'.

RESTRICTEDThe "courier net" in France served the "CivU Delegation" 1 thesmuggler net, and the espionage service by forwarding reports.

eThefunction of the Civ~l Sector of the "CivU Delegation" in France ·was to prepare the Pol.es in France to fight for an independent..

Poland by se·tting up action groups 1 to combat Counnunism among thePoles, and to :f'igb.t against the occupying Oerma.ns.

The tasks ofthe military sector of tbe Delegation were to organize groups With
military training to ca:rry on sabotage,. to take part in the invasion,and to recNit Poles for military service on ''D-Day".

The"Civil Delegation" was particularly concerned with Poles 1n theGerman O.T. (Organisation Todt) or in the armed forces.

Itsought to set up cells which would encourage desertion and to supply
information.
Early in 1944 this spy net shifted to Northern France and theCbarmel Coast.

The Poles sought to camouflage this devel.opment bysending their messages from the Grenoble area and permitting transmitters in Northern France to send only occasional operational
chatter.

'l'he center asked primarily for reports and figures on

German troops 1 tanks and planes, the production of parts inFrance 1 strength at airfields, fuel del.iveries from Ger111all7,
French pol.ice, constabul.ary, concentration camps and control
of'f'ices, as well as rocket aircraft, rocket bombs and Wlma.nned
aircraft.

•

In February 1944 the Germans found that Polish a~nts wereI

getting very important in:f'ormation by tapping the army telephor.l!

t48

RESTRICTED

I.

cable in Avienon.
In Narch 19~4 the Germans m-'3.de a successful re..id andobtained iir:portant radio and cryptographic material.

Quite afew agents wore arrested and the structure of the orcanization't·ms tully revealed.

Beginning early in June, inc~a.scd activity of Polish
radio asents in France became noticoablo.

The,y covered

German control points and tried to report currently all
troop movements.

German countcrintclligcnce lTaS able toclarif,y the organization, its members, and its activity,
by reading some ,3 1 000 :intercepted messages in connection

with traffic anal;y"sis.

With the aid of the Security Police

preparations wore made for action "Fichte" i'ihich "Trtas curled
out on lJ Ju:cy 1944 anrl netted over 300 prisoners in all.
parts of France.

•

This, together with prelifn:ina.r;r and simultaneous actions,af:Cected:
1.

The intelligence service of the Polish II. Section,

2.

The smuggling service,3.

The courier service with its wide ramifications.

The importance o:r the work of the Poles in France isindicated by the fact that in ~.Iay 1944 Lubicz and two agents
wore commended by persons very high in the Allied command"because their work was beginning to surpass first class
French sources".

These agents had :51lpplicd the plans of

249

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-

-

-

-----------------.,

all German defense :i.ltstallations in French territory and valuable
details regarding lreapons and spacial devices.

Decrypted messages revealed to the Germans that a director ot
the Creusot plants was suppzying the Poles with ver,y important
in.t"ormation for England, primarily on plane production.

Thebombing of the electric power plant in Chalons sur Saone was due toinformation supplied by' him.
Down to the middle of November 1944, Polish agents reported noless than 162 launching points for flying bombs directed agaiJlst
England.

When the German occupat,ion or France collapsed, thePolish agent stations reappeared in November 1944.

'l'he organiza-

tional framework was maintained and instructions were given tofind ~s and means or setting up a new intelligence service inthe rlest German industrial area and in other parts o£ Gel'Dia.r1Y' where
Poles were employ-ed or permanent:cy settled.

Meanwhile the Polish II.

Section had moved from Chamber.y to Reims.
In contrast to the radio net of the II. Section.. that of thesabotage organization "Moniko.", subordinate to the "CivU

Delegation", did not cease transmitting after the events inFrance.

Its purpose now was to gather all able bodied Poles into

the Allied .torces.

When France was liberated, the "Civil

Delegation" Jnoved to Paris and as official representative ot
Poland to the French Government maintained radio communication
with Londoi1 and with an out-station in lzy'on.

250

RESTRICTED-•CHURCHILL TALKS WITH ROOSEVELT•

Representatives of the Fascist and National Socialist states
have claimed that the personality of a great statesman can be
fully effective only in a totalitarian state, whereas in a democratic system the energies of a 1ead~~ are dissipated in fruitlessnegotiations with parties and in 'ft.r:l.ous parJ.iE!DlElltary debates.
Only a dictatorial leader can proceed consciously toward his goal.
Probably few people will be inclined to dispute the statement that Churchill and Roosevelt during ·world War II were statesmenof great stature and that they purposefully went their way and so
represented their countries that one could say:

Churchill isGreat Britain and Roosevelt is the United States of America.
Nevertheless they stood at the head of consistently democratic
countries.

They had not usurped power, had not come to power

through a revolution, and needed no SS and SA to remain in power
and no Gestapo to control the attitude of the people.

Hitler knew that these two men represented the will of their-countires and therefore reduced his theory to a.n absurdity.
be knew this, he hated them.

not think logically.
mistakes.

Since

And since he hated them, he could

Consequently, his impulsive actions led to

And since one mistake always engendered another, hissystem could only end in disaster.

251

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Churchill and Rooseve1t represented two world powers in acommon struggle against doctrinaire Fa.scism.

They led two groupsof states which were so widely separated geographically that•

personal. conferences 1 such as those between R;t~l.er and Mussol.1ni,
could take place only rarely.

However, such discussions were nec-

essary, indeed even mare vital in the case of democracies thanbetween the "l.eaders" of totalitarian countries.

It was ilii.Porta.nt

that there be racilities avaUable at e..~y time for an exchangeof ideas over a space of thousands of kilometers and that this exchange should not be overheard by a third party.
This was a problem far technicians and the problem hade.lready been solved before World \-Tar II.

The principle ofscrambled radio telephony was already known.

Just imagine you

are standir.g on the edge of a seething volcano with a dozen yelping
dogs Just behind you and with a few valves and lions howling androaring on the other side of the crate1•.

Add a gentl.e whistle tothis sound mixture and you have an idea of what scrambled speech is~ike.

It is obvious that one can make nothing of a recording ofsuch sounds •Even before ·the United States entered the war, it was known
in Germany that the two western statesuen often talked in this way.
When Hitler round it out, he gave orders to develop, without regard
for cost 1 a device which would me~e it possible to understand such
conversations.

252

RE.S_TRICTEDRES¥Rf"f!'iflBDl 2Group IIIot the Ciphe~ Section was ordered to construct

such a device.

It was a ~estion of unscramblj~g these waves

so as to restore the original form of the spoken word.

It wasnot earq, but within a few months ~ complicated appar~tus was•constructed at great cost, based on the recognized rqythm or.

.

the known distortions.

Now it was possible to listen,t.Q_.jihe

interesting and significant conversations of the two men.

A

special unit was set up and the results were transmitted to
Hitler with ~he least possible delay.
Just as Zimmer.mann had been convinced twenty years before..

that his teleSJ/'ams to von Eckardt. were not known to axr:r third
person, so Ch~chill and Roosevelt felt secure in their conversation.

.

Haq. they known that a few ho~s after they weretalking, Hitle~ had the text1of their conversation neatlT
typed on his desk, it might. have ·itake;n lm.ore than a pill to-e1able them to sleep.

It is well if s~atesmen do not know

too much about the secrets br technology, otherwise the,ywould hesitate to make use of them or e~ to open theirmouths.
Hitler was satisfied and sa1:1 in this new German invention
a sign that Providence was on his ~ide •. He bestowed a few
decorations but one day" his joy carne to a sudden end.
As I recall it, it was some time before the invasion
that the system of scrambled telephony between the British

258

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and t.he Americans was changed.

.

Whether it was an accident orwhether treachery pla7ed a part. I do not lmow.

In an:y evenli•0

the voices could no longer be unscrambled by the new device andhenceforth all conversations between the two .statesmen remained a"book with seven seals." This splendid source of intelligence
had dried up.

Perhaps London knows the 1-eason'U

254

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RE~&I~'J~ 2 -•STRUGGLE BETWEEN RADAR AND THE INTERCEP'l' SERVICE

The invention· of radar was the death lmell :for Genna.n submarine.

However, radar apparatus did not come into being overtligbt

warfare.

and its final. f'orm was the resul.t of years of development and experimentation.

During the phase when radar had not reached its

destructive perfection and the Germans were still ignorant of its
existence, some very tense and interesting contests were going onin the field of technology in which neither of the opponents lmew
the sources of information of the other.
At a time when U-boat successes were falling off noticeab~,
the int~rcept service of the German Navy picked up radio trafficof a large Allied convoy in the Atlantic and plotted its course."
Some 30 German submarines then in the Atlantie were ordered totake positions along the expected course of the convoy.

Eveeythi.n.g

was prepared for destruction o:r the transports.
SuddenJ¥, the naval intercept station in Neum.Unster picked
up a message instructing the convoy to change its course to thenorth because several packs or submarines were :cying in waJ:t;.
People in Berlin were dism.qed and thought at first. that
the Cl'leJ11Y' had solved the U-boat cipher.

A new message \l'as sent

in a spare cipher commanding'them to take battle positions on'

the new l'O'l\te.

The very next day Neum.t!nster picked up anothermessage instructing the convoy to change course again.

Thislast message gave the precise location of all thirty German
submarines.

255

RESTRICTEDRE~tt~;'JQD32•

In Berlin they were ~eysti£ied.

The assumptio11 .that the ci-pher

had been compromised would not explain this sl.·t.uation.

ePeople sJ.owq

began to realize that the German submarines 'h-ere no longer inyj.sibl.e
but that their locations and movements were .observed by the enemy•even when they were submerged.

Again the U-boat packs were ordered

to take new positions; hardl.y had this been done when the convoy for·the third time was instructed to change course, and again tlle locationo£ the U-boats was given precise~v.

This happened a fourf:.h time

before thu two opponents fi.na.l:cy" met in what proved a cost:cy- attack
for the submarines.
There were other similar cases, in fact NeumUnster intercepted
messages giving precisely the location of German submarines at sea;e.g. : 10 subs in that area, 20 in this, 15 in a third, 3 l"'turning
home, seven just putting out into the Atlantic, etc.

Now tbe Germans

realized that the submarines were no longer invisible and soon had torealize that submarine warfare as hitherto conducted woul.d no longer
be successful..

'256

RESTltiC'I'EDe

BRITISH RADIO AGEN'l'S IN FRANCE.

1939' to 1943
In the sunun.er o:C 1939 1 before the war began, the British intelligence service started to set up a special radio network in the west.
This did not expand ~reatly, even in the first half o£ 1940, and theGerman advance soon"left it behind.

It then began working in a newway, undisturbed by German countermeasures.

The ~atter half of 1940

was used to expand this netvork on the basis of past experience withthe aid of newly developed small short-wave transmitters.
When the German radio defense got on the track of this traffic
late in the year there \"Jere already twent-y agent stations.
trol station was in England near Bristol.
were French, Belgian,or Dutch.

Almost all the operatots

They worked separately and their

only contact with one another was through go-betweens.
only slightly disguised.

The con-Traffic wasin, general the agents felt sure their trans-mitters could not be located.

They were stationed in both occupied

and unoccupied France, in Belgium,and in Holland.

In March 191~1

there were 25 stations; new ones were added constantly.

This net-

work now became the chief target of the radio defense.

In October

1941 there were 56 stations, some of them outside of France, because
this set-up had begun to expand over all Europe.
Spain soon became the door for agents of ever,ycPort.

•

Consequent-ly, despite the watchfulness of the Spanish police, various control

stations were set up (e.g.,Madrid, Barcelona,and Cartagena) which corresponded with France.

In November 1941 and in March 1942 radio

257

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defense succeeded in making its first major breaks into the ne·t of
the English agents in France.

A number were picked ~P with theirsets 1 in some cases with full documentary material..
arrest of four additional agents.

This led to the

As a result ~nt activity shifted

during the sunnner of 191-1-2 more and more to unoccupied France.
mat ion was brought fran the occupied areas.

Intor-

To combat this 1 theGermans decided to undertake raids in conjunction with French police
in unoccupied France.

This "Operation Done.r" was pulled off on 21

September.

depended upon the loyal cooperation of ·the~verything

French police who had to make the arrests and screen the material..

Inthe course of three months 12 transmitters were picked up 1 thus disclosing the organizat:i.ons baclt of them.

Now the Germans were able

to proceed on their own initiative and matters ~re speeded up.

The close connection between the British agents in France and the
preparations for the invasion became apparent, when tra:f.'f'ic increased
noticeab.ly from 16 to 20 August before the landing at Dieppe.

Soon

after that the traffic of several English transmitters in France
showed that there were two organizations in France preparing for an
Allied invasion and maintaining close contact with the French resistance movement 11Armee Secrete" •The Chief' of Rayon I of this secretarmy was apprehended on Lyon.

At the same time plans for the landingof airplanes fell into German hands.
Repeated German defeats in the East and in A£rica, the American
landing in Algiers, and the de~reased effectiveness of the German
submarines in 1943 convinced the population of the occupied a~ein the west more and more that the invasion and their l.ibet :ltion
were at hand.

People daily became more wiD.ing to aid All : -258

RESTRICTED,-~

telligence and to join resistance movements.

Those Frenchmen who

had been inclined to work with Germany withdrew, especially as they.

had to fear vengence from their compatriots. Work for Germany wassabotaged and the labor supply was reduced as roung people disappeared into Maquia camps.

The FFI (Forces francaises de 1 1 interieur)

and the sabotage groups of the KPF (Co~nist Party of France) were
strengthened.

In some sections single vehicles ~f the radio defense

could no longer travel the roads.

Collaboration with the Frenchpolice also ceased and the police sided more and more with theunderground.
At the same time Allied influence increased, more arms and supt

plies were dropped, and the espionagei organizations, now supportedby the population, expanded.

Although. all France had been occupied~since November 1942, the number ~f spies and sabateurs, controlled
partly by the English and partly b,y De Gaulle, had become enormous.
The SOE (Secret Operations Jiecutive a subdivision of Milita17
Intelligence headed by General Gubbinb 1 handled supplies.
In June 1943 the Germans dealt British intelligence in France
a heavy blow.

A surprise raid revealed the whole Paris set-up andresulted in the seizure of 11 stations.

At one place all the doc-

uments for the operation of P~ris stations were found, along withunknown plans.

.

All told, 49 complicated radio plans fell into

German hands. C~ose range direction finding ha~ already revealed alarge number of shirting transmitter installations in the Paris area
which made German counter measures ineffective.

259

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Actually, messages

were._ sent by a number of t.ransmi t t ers ope1•at1ng
quence.

in a varj.able se-

The center .sent out the operators daily with their messages,plan~ andcrystals to work with the appointed transmitters.

The so-called 11 Vichy-wave 11 caused the Germaas much trouble.
Various links had been observed on wave le~gths normally used b,y Vic~.
The character of the traffic showed, however, that this could be only •agent work and after DIUch effort the Germans succeeded in Jul7 191U
in breaking i.nto the central of£:i.ce of ~ number of French resistancegroups in Paris.

Many ot the groups were now picked up.

Thirteentransmrtters were seized and ~perators, agent~~&hd nume~oue leading
personalities ot the resistance movement were arrested.

At about

tho same time deciphered messages revealed much of tbe activity ot
the groups known collectively as 11 MouveMnts Unis".

It was also

possible to penetrate "Ceux de la libera.tionn operating in the North.
The composi~ion of the groups around LYon was ~ecognized and aI

number of leaders arrested, including General Delestraint (alias
Vidal) and Prefect Moullin (cover name 11Max").
blow to the movement in that area.

This was a hard

In August 1943 a depot was seizedin Paris whi_ch yielded a number o£ radio seta, including two ultraabort wave sets.
Shortly thereafter, the Germans in Marseilles uncovered an organization associated with the Deuxieme Bureau and disguised as
I

I"Service Radio Electrique de Securite Territoire 11 •It had been tor-bidden by the German military commander but reestablished in seer~~.
6\B

a military establishment.

It had 40 stations with over 300

180

RESTRICTED

trained operators.

It also had a number of trucks and p1enty ofmoney.
A few weeks later the Germans struck at the organization ofColonel Faye, arresting him and several. others.

This eliminated oneof the outstanding agents of the Franco-British intelligence service.

.

He and his station had be~n pursued all over France but had hitherto
avoided arrest.
The frequent raid~, 'followed often by the escape of agents after

they had been interrogated, called for extensive security measures.
Aside from frequJ.nt change of l.ocation and the use of watchers dur-

/

.

'

ing the second balf of 1943 there was an ambitious change in the hand-

/

. ..

\

ling of traffic:, which aimed to make the monitoring and fixing ofstations more difficult.

Sometimes two stations worked with thesame system and the same traffic pl.an.

Spare instruments and oper-

ators, sometimes spare organizations, were hel.d in readiness sothat even after extensive raids service was resumed after a brieftime.

An instance in point-- ... was the breaking up of Col.onel Fa~ • s
~-

I

-

organization in 1943 which was replaced a month later by the organization 11Alliance 11 headed by a certain "Bernard".
The Germans had onel unusual experience with the "Alliance".
The head was a French c01mt with the cover name "Bernard" and his

secretary was the daughter of a French colonel, whom we will callMiss M. ehe was a womaf of unusual intelligence 1 energy and beauty.

When the counti was arrested, Miss M. immediately took overand built up the organi~ation anew.

Later she went to England•

281

RESTRICTEDRES'lf¥Tl~fl32.L ..........
~.&.

-.....,and served as contact for this 1110vement.
I•

one d~ she reappeared in Marse~lles and was picked up in araid.

At first she could not be identified.

She was placed in thecustody or the naval unit in Marsai~ for the night.

..

The man

who was to guard her, quickly took a likin~ to the pretty woman
and thought to spend a pleasant night.

However, he was a cautious

fellow and locked up all the lady•s clothing in a closet in the~xt room, to guard agaiqst unpleasant surPrises.
Meanwhile the German ofticlals had been studying photographsIand learned to their surprise that they had made a good catch.

Inthe moming, when they came to the n~va1 unit to take the woman awq,..

they found the guard fast asleep. f4ss M. had disappeared stark
naked and was not seen again.
The activity of the resistance mov~ment in France began to unfold vigorously in the summer or 1943. In August there were some
20 different organizations and the radio traffic was correspondingly
lively.

Although these organizations differed greatly and sometimes

were politically antagonistic to one another, there was in Englandan overriding organization, the BORA (Bureau Central de Renseignment
et d•Action), whicb guided their efforts and provided them with material and money.

This supply service emplqyed several parachuteorganizations of which the BOA and SAP were the most important.
They saw to it that the material dropped was properly dis~ributed.
France was divided into a north and a south Zona.

The BOA (Bureau

des operations aeriennes) operated in the north, bringing supplies

262

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from England. The SAP (Service dtatterrisage et parachuttage) supplied the South Zone tram North Africa.
s7stems were broken.
success.

Few of the cr,yptographic

In November 1943 the Germans scored a great

By raiding a single station in Paris the7 got enoughinformation regarding the "Liaison Terrestre, Aerienne, Maritime,.
Radio" to pick up 68 persons and 34, radio sets by carrying on aseries of radio deceptions.

268

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. ...... -:.

THE BRITISH RADIO AGENTS IN BELGIUM.

During the entire year 1940 not a single agent transmitter
was picked up in Belgium although th~ Germans had evidence thata number were working in this area.

Not until February 1941 could

they make two successful raids but even then secured little valThe first real~ good c,tch was in May 1941,

uable information.

when a transmitter was fixed in the vicinity of Brussels.

The

location was finally narrowed down to a row of houses which weresearched until the instrument was finally discovered hidden undercoQl in a cellar.

The arrested agent, named Marti~, bad been..

dropped in Belgium on 1.3 october 1940 with two transmitters.

One

transmitter was secured in a raid in February 1941 but Mart~escap•

ed with the second. When he was captured, he had abundant material
which gave a good picture of his espionage activity which included
important military reports to England.
••azaw•:::~~:a•a:.:~•

Sometimes droll incidents occurred in connection with raids~
once, when after much effort the house in which there must be astation had been spotted and the police were just about to enter,two men emerged.

When they were stopped, one of them showed an

identification paper issued b.Y the German General M, top signal
officer in Belgium.

They let the fellow go and did not learn until

the next d~ that he was working for both sides, so to speak.

Asa precautionar,y measure, he had entered the employ of the signal
officer and received the identification papers while, on the side,265

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he was spying and using radio sets to transmit his reports to England.
When they tried ta find him again he had disappeared. 'one peculiarity of the radio agent work in Belgium was that
it was not limited to Belgian territory but almost always reached..
,tover into France or Holland or Luxembourg. The number of "Kappelentt--

was extremely large, sir1ce the British, Russians, French, Belgians,
Dutch, and Poles all used this country as a base of operation~.

The"Rote Kapelle 11 case has been reported at length elsewhere, here a
few other cases will be mentioned.
11

Lagerkapelle 11 •A raid on the station in January 1944 yielded

information on the connections between various Belgian espionage services and their relations to French groups and the "Service Luxembourg".
ttpatriarchenkapelle".

This was related to the "Lagerkapelle".

It worked chiefly in Luxembourg but had connections with three Germangroups in the Eifel, Uunsruck," and Saar areas.

The Germans madea number of raids and arrests.
"Depot-Kapelle".

earful D/F-ing and a surprise raid in Brussels

by radio defense in M~ 1944 afforded the first information regardingthe "Belgian Secret Arll\Y"•In Belgium as in France the activity of radio agents increased
and reached its peak just before the invasion.

All movements of troops

and supplies, every depot, in fact every headquarters down to company level, was reported to England.
The raids in Belgium afforded considerable insight into the or-

266

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cnnization of the British agent s~Jtem.

Control was exercised bythe "Special Operations Executive' (SOE) which was set up for the.

duration within the "M111ta.ry Intelligence Service".
sections for the following countries:

There wereFrance 1 'Belgium, Holland,

Denmark, Norway1 Greece 1 Yugoslavia 1 Czechoslovakia., Pol.and., :Hungary1
Spain 1 and Germany.

"The Milita.ry InteJ+igence Service" and thesam made the necessary preparations for under~ings in othercountries by procuring the necessary information an.d equipping
non-English military a.uxUary forces with agents, money, arms,
and equipment.

In Belgium, which was divided into 5 zones, the SOE made useof the so-called "Belgian Secret ~my" which was made up chiefly
of members of the former Belgian ~led by Belgian officers.

At

the top were the headquarters in $rus'sels 1 to which the zones were
subordinate j the zones comprised ind:f,vidua.l •fighting groups.

261

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--------------~~-~-

268

RESTRICTED~·--REStftRM~2

AMERICAN RADIO AGENTS IN FRANCEThe united States even before the beginning of World War II

had a central intercept station for monitoring illicit radio links.
It belon~d to the. so-called Radio Intelligence Division (R.I.D.)
and had first class equipment.

According to its own statements

the R.I.D. had discovered by the end of 1944 nearly 9,000 illicit
transmitters in the u.s.A. and had identified more than 200 transmit-. 1
ters of' Axis agents in south America.

Quite a respectable number •i f carrect 1<

Because the Axis Powers during Wor1d War II did no~

have ' anywhere near 200 agent stations in America.
After American forces appeared, American radio agents were
enq>l.oyed in mu.ch the same fashion as the Engl.ish agents.

By theend of 1943 the American intelligence service had spread out, inSpain especially, and thus was able to draw information from France
by' various routes.

Down to November 1943 only an English radio

agent service had been observed in "7estern Europe but now an American
service appeared which was supplied from Spain.

Late in 1943 theAmericans had an organization extending trom the Spanish frontier
to Nice.

It was manned by American officers and its duties wereto ascertain troop movements, support points, mine fields, etc.
Its stations at that time were in Lyon, Val.ence, Monyelemar,
Marseilles, Toulon, Chambery, Narbonne, on Corsica and in otherplaces.

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During the first six months of ~944 the American agent network
was expanded to 42 ~inks.

The contro~ station was in llgiers.

It

made use of arrangements of the former French 2me Bureau controlled
by General. Rivet or l.fajor Paillo~e and Major Lejeune, while Major
Lafont, alias Verneui~, occupied the ~eading position in southern
France.

American officers were gradually introduced into the organi-zation and after the removal of' General Giraud a network was organizedalong the lines of' the BCRA (Bureau Central de Renseignements etd'Action) and officers were detai~ed f'rom London.
chute was chiefly f'rom Algiers.

Supply by para-(Beginning in June 1944 the 2me

Bureau and the "Securite mUitaire" were combined in Algiers and the"Securite militaire Algiers" henceforth controlled the e~qploymentof' radio agents in German territory - especially in Austria - using
German prisoners of war by preference).
The American organization which trained agents was the o.s.s.

(Office of Strategic Services) which was set up like the Secret
Service in England.

The head was General. Donovan.

The entire

American secret service f'~ North Africa, the Near East and Europe was
directed from Algiers.

The o.s.s. had aschoo~in Naples training

men to set up illegal org~izations in hosti~e territory and anotherschoo~in Brindisi training radio operators.

used here.

Italian officers were

Camoui'age and security measures were in general. ~ikethose of' the'Eng~ish but sometimes procedure was adapted to that ofAmerican armed forces in attempt to deceive the German intercept
service.

Just before the invasion the various groups of agents were

270

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combined more and more and single agents were attached to existingorganizations.

They did valuab1e work"in preparing for the invasion.

.

Beginning in JUne 1944 monitoring of these stations in southern.

France was largel.y_negl.ected by the Germans, since most of tbe intercept units were assigned higher priority missions in northern France.

.

Contact with the traffic was 1ost and this was one of the reasonsfor the German catastrophe two months later in southern France
0

e.
271

RESTRICTEDRESRfRICL~-2 _272

RESTRICTEDRES!I'RI~D 2

THE NORTH POLE CASE*
The episode abou~ to be recounted had noth1ng to do vitb thegeographic or magnetic North Pole.
and lay in the Netb.erlands.

The scene was remote from both

But German officials ha.d. th~ h1.bit ofgiving a cover name to every "case" and that frosty designation
was selected for this particular affair. ·Just how they hit on
North Pole I do not know since in reality the term "equator" would
have fitted better, inasmuch as those concerned got pretty w~.

'

However that may be, "North Pole" was the name given and ;I.e

there-

fore the title of this chapter.

.

In the spring of 1941 the British began building up an espionage
organization in Holland which was then occupied by the Germans.

The

Government in Exile handled the matter under British guidance; thepractical execution 1ay with the organization "InJ.ichtingendienst".
This was the official information bureau of the Dutch Government,
c0llq)arab1e in a way to the EngJ.ish "Secret Service''·During the summer of 1941 the German intercept service spotted
two agent transmitters in Dutch territory which cou11.1.unicated with acontrol station in England.

----------·----* The l'lashington STAR for 4 Feb. 1953 (page A8) has a notice ofa book recently pub1ished in London: "London Cal1ing the North
Po1e" by H.J. Giskes, ostensibly the chief of the German counterinte1ligence unit involved. [ Ed. ]273

RESTRICTEDAt that time the Germans knew little about any Dutch espionage
service but the German Security Police bad recently apprehended anagent by the name of Tuin who wa.s said to have had a transmitter.
After an auto accident, Tuin had been placed in a hospital in Amersfoort,from. which he was abduc·ted one day.

Since the doctor had found thatin addition in injuries sustained in the accident Tuin had a. serious
kidney trouble and lllUSt be operated on at once, the Germans assumed
that he had been done away with by his own espionage organizationin order to leave no trace.

The two transmitters, which had been spotted and which becauseof their characteristics seemed to belong to one and the same organization, were to be picked up simultaneously, if possible.

The raid

on the transmitter in the Hague misfired due to poor organization; thelocal German counterintellige~ce office was anxious to make the raid
itself and the D/F platoon use~ to pin-point the transmitter was expressly
forbidden by the counterintelligence peopl.e to make an arrest; consequentl.y the leader of the D/F platoon had to stand idly by while
the radio agent and his assistants escaped from the house.
After this incident the second transmitter was seized by representatives of radio defense two days later in Bilthoven nearUtrecht.

That was 31 August 1941.

Along with the operator the.

Germans apprehended an i~ortant agent and found a suitcase withsome 800 individual. reports ready for del.ivery to England.
This immediatel.y revealed the extent of the espionage organization in Holland, which had ramifications reaching deep into
German territory.

There were clues to existing and projected trans-mitters and from scraps of paper it was possible to recognize the274

RESTRICTED

4lt

c~_piJt':!rsystem employed.

aMoreover I in the library of the house

the key books used for enciphering the 'Ulessa.ges were d:tsc~vered.
The operator obstinately refused to talk and the ~ermans were
une.ble for the moment to malte complete use of the material.

.

Ve:r-

.

ious harmless looking notes 1 letters 1 travel expense accounts 1 etc • ,yielded important clues to cover-names and :r:esidences of otheragents.

This permitted the Germans to interrogate in one night

more than 20 persons and to arrest 12 of them.

This meant aswift and significant break-up of the organization •..

After the othet' agents, who had momentarily .gone underground,
were arrested, plans for an internal Dutch radio service werediscovered and steps were taken to prevent Philipps engineers fromsetting up trB.!lsmi tters.

In this connectiO:t;l the man who had ab-

ducted Tuin was discovered among the agents arrested.
been placed in a small sanatorium in Bilthoven.

Tuin had

The sa.na.torium

was searched by the German Security Police without success; Tuin
had dressed as a sister and 1 thus disguised 1 remained another 18
months in the same sanatorium before being arrested again in the
breaking up of a Dutch-Belgian organization.
The breaking up of the Dutch intelligence service after the

seizure of the Bilthoven transmitter enabled the German signal
0

intelligence service to establish itself successfully.

It wasdecided to carry on a deceptive game with tbe captured transmitter.

275

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RE~~ 2
The first transmitter seized could not be used because thekeys could not be solved promptly.

The transmitters picked up in thefollowing raids could be used at once and eventually all the intelligence and sabotage work of the "Inlichtingendienst" lay in thehands of the German counter intelligence and the messages were enciphered by representatives of the German radio defense.

At times

as many as 11 Dutch transmitters were being operated simultaneously
and all the agents dropped by parachute or landed by speed boats
for five different rings were picked up immediately after landing.
Withina short time the Germans picked up one after another•themembers of the English spy net and also took over little by little
the radio system and continued operating it without the change
being noted in England.
This had to be done very cautiously to avoid arousing suspicion.

It was necessary to send many truthful reports to England,

but all sorts of things were introduced which did not correspondto the truth.

Thus the Germans reported greater troop strengthand greater quantities of weapons than were actually available,
told of incoming troop units, fortifications, etc.,to make theirmilitary position in Holland appear more secure than it was.
The British must have been delighted with the activity of their11

agents 11 during the next year and a half, for things really weremoving in Hollandl

The Dutch Freedom and Resistance Movement was

enthusiatically organized.

There were local groups everywhere.

276

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Mcml>ors :f'loeked in i".t.•om month to month.

Aot::; of Ga.boto.ge werecarried out cverywhero 1 build1nss vere blasted, oablas destroyea,
German sentrieB ~re drowned in c~nals or otherwise disposed or.
All these were reported by tb.e previo11Sly a't':rested EtlZen·ts and. thereports in no Wise corresponded to the facts, bec~US0 all th~aa
reports were manufactured at his desk by the head ot this grandiose deception who had the several radio stations send them out
strictly according to plan.
Al1 these r~arts were composed and transmitted in such"genuine" fashion that London did not become suspicious.

That

was clear from the f'act that all. requests for arms, ammunition,.

e:x;pl.osives, sabotage material., yes 1 even for coffee 1 cocoa, chocolate 1 cigarettes, and cigars were pronq>tly com;pl.ied with.
thing asked f'or was delivered by parachute.
visitors from England were announced.
new couriers.

Every-

It was even better:

New agents, new operators,

They were received pronq>tly 1 taken to the comfort-

able lodgings of the "Chef" 1 where they were entertained and '\-Jereabl.e to send their reports to England. by radio.

Only then did

the Germans reveal the true' situation' and'arrest i;b.e agents •.. All. told 1 several hundred planes dropped several thousand

tons of' arms and other material for the benefit of the Germans,
and over 50 new agents and apel~ators ~- ~~·e taken into custody
upon arrival.

277

RESTRICTEDThis game 1 which lasted :f.'ully a year and a hal:f.' 1 pleased theGermans greatl.y and many of the messages occasioned great hilarity.

The game was played faUltlessly until la~ in the summer o:f.'1943.

It might have gone on even longer, had it not been possible

for four of the captured agents to escape from the special prisonin Raarlem.

When two of them reached the Swiss frontier the decep-

tion was revealed.
Anyhow the Germans bad succeeded for two years in completely.

crippling the enemy intelligence service in Holland and avoiding
untold damage by sabota~.

Moreove~,early organization of" resis-

tance in Holla.nd was checked by the prompt arrest of all thuse sentfrom England as leaders.

In conseq\kenee the resistance movement in

Holland was not able to assume proportions comparable to the development in France or Belgium.
Even before the four agents esaaped, the English apparently
got wind of the matter somehow and realized that something was notin order.

Without informing the old group of agents, the British

began in AprU 1943 to build up an entirely new network.

The Germans

soon discovered this through the appearance of new radio stations

and did not wait until the English broke off traffic but senL them
one day a message thanking them for all the information, cigars,
ciga.rettes,and coffee, and good humoredly bade them soodby.

2'l8

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!N PREPARATION FOR THE DWASIOif'l'he year 1944 was marked on the Western Front by the preparations for the invasion, its execution, and the forcing of
the German front back to th~;s frontier.
At the very b~ginning of the year English agent traffic
showed increased interest in the developnent of camouf'lage
measures.

JTevertheless, the Gem an radio defense succeeded again

and again in breaking into agent centers and putting out of commission numero,3 control stations of the different organizations.
In view of the fact that more than 20 organizations were working
in France and tlul.t Jll8llY o:f them had tens o:f thousands of collaborat-

ors and adherent~, it was, of course, impossible to pick up al.l·of
them; nevertheless, th~ir activity could be crippled for a time.
It ~ be assumed that the Gexmans picked up same 10 per centof the agent operators in the course of a month, while .in many
months the numbers of sets seized ~s roughlY equal to the number

ot stations in operation.
ene~ey" toHowever, it was not dif:ficult for the

replace the agents, since they had at their disposal mostof the trained operators of the navy and ~ and of t~e police.
I

And since these men were protect,ed in their work by the populace
they were happy to be employed at good wages in their Ol'm lineof work when unemployment was general, especi~ since theywould also be performing a patriotic duty ••RESTRICTEDWe ~ look briefly ~t a small selection from among the large
number of "cases" which occupied the Gennans during 19l,J.;:"Jade case".

In January 1941+ the Germans broke up an organ-

ization in France which worked directly for British in~elligence.

.

It was directed from Pari ., and had stations in "Reims and Bordeaux•
The head was a certain Lamire.ult, alias Roy.

When he was arrested,keys and radiograms were seized which revealed a ver,y significant
espionage activity.

The organization was widely ramified and had

many agents; on the side it also worked for Russia.
"Cogoy case".

In February near ~1elun a station was raided

which belonged to the "Cogny" organization.

Decrypted messages

showed that this was a. sabotage organization which operated
primarily in BrittaQY and the Vosges.
"Hellos case". A raid on 8 March 1944 in Rouen had to do witha. group working with the R.A.F. in planning attacks on electric

power plants.

It resulted in the arrest of numerous heads of groundcrews and sabotage groups.
"Burgundy case".

In a raid in Bordeaux: in March a number ofmembers of the American intelligence service were arrested.

A

wide~

rruatfied organization was involved wi~h headquarters in

Tarbes.

Records showed espionage missions had been assigned,

covering coastal fortifications in the Hend.aye - Verdon area as

l'tell as harbors and airfields.
"Baltimore case".

In April 1944 some 30 persons were arrested

who belonged to a group working in T,m].ouse and Bordeaux. for theInter-Allied General Staff in Algiers~-; fl (\

RESTRICTED"Danilo caaen.
~.:lt'achuteAt the same time .g. ground organization tor

enterprises was picked up in Nemours.

It distributed

supplies and equipment of all kinds from England to different
resistance organizations.
"~ondcase"•

Immediatel;y afterward an organization was

crushed in southem France which was supposed to set up a special .
radio net for the invasion and to discover landing places for
gliders and planes along the Cote d'Azur.
"Monika casen.

In the same month the Gemans obtained

information regarding the structure and intended employment ofthe ~onika" organization.

This group·compr.ised Polish liOrkers

in France and Belgium who were to aid an Allied invasion by

strikes and active measures.
"Normandy' case".

(French Section) When German radio

defense picked up two e.gent stations in Montlucon on 1 Mq
1944, an Englishman, Ma.jor Southgate, tell into the net.

Since

Janll&!7 1942 he had bullt up in France in the areas of Tours,
Poiters, Vichy, Limoge.s, and Toulouse special transmitting'

groups and had organized numerous parachute deliveries of ar.ms
and ex;plosivee.

A stud_y or the captured materie1 f::l.aabled theGer.mans to identif,y 62 places used tor parachute drops.
"Mithridate - Sorbanne casen.

In ~ radio defense pickedup an ultra short wave station near st. Qn.er.

An exceptiona.l.J¥

clever and active agen;:., Lt. Colonel Donnet, was a.z-rested who

281

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had tor sometime been occupied primari:cy- in reporting on the German
nsecret weapon"•

The "Mithridate" organization was completely smashed.

"Seraphim case".

A raid on a station in Bordeaux enabled theGermans to gain insight into the organization of the Giraud intelligence service ("Nile" later "Mithridate"). . ~his last named was taken
up into the BORA.

Arrests were ma.de and numerous messages and keys

fell into German hands.
"Alliance casen.

In June 19l.4 the Germans raided the command.

post of the "Alliance" espionage organization in Paris and among thosearrested wa.s the chief ot the "Region Nord.".

His statements revealed

that the "Alliance" was subordinate to the 2me Bureau or General
Kanig who had taken over the leadership of French forces in England
after Giraud had been deposed.
The situation developed during the summer or 1944 in suchfashion that in Ju:Q' the Germans made almost a raid a day inFrance, but ~ effective combatting or the resistance movement
wa.s out or the question.

The British intelligence service relied on some 20 organizations which worked independentq or one anol:.her and were controlledfrom London through the BORA (Bureau Central. de Reneeignment etd'Aviation).

Some were originaJ.l-.v Giraud organizations operating

chiet:cy' in southem France but gradua.l.lJ lihey were joined to
DeGaulle groups after Giraud had lett.

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.

'l'he French Section, led by English of:t:'icers, worked prlm.a.ril.V~r t-hecoastal. areas.

It was supplied primarily by the B.. O.A.

(Bureau des Operations Aeriennes), wh:i.le in the south the S.A.P.
(Service d'Atterisage et. Pa.rachutage) !l.ew in supplies rrora
Algiers.

These organizations handled the airborne landing(:cysander) and parachute supply service and worked veey closel,vwith the BCRA.

500 planeloads w~re dumped in the average month. 1

Beginning in M~ 1944 it was noted that the. so-called ''Equipes

Jedbourgh" exercised control over military preparations or the
resistance movement in France.

These were rather small. groups o£

officers dropped b.T parachute and their appearance was an unmistakable sign that the invasion 1'1S.S impending, but those Germans
in responsible positions did 11o-t heed it.
The mass appearance or new agent transmitters or Franco-

British int-elligence in the Vosges-Grenobl.e-I;yon area during
March 1944 showed clearly that the groups of saboteurs there were
to destroy communications between Ge~ and France when the invasion came.
1.

This was also clear from numerous orders or theIt may be assumed that about .30% or the material. riropped was
picked up by ·t.he Gel'DU"ns on the basis or radio P;Wt~S and
decr.ypted messages. Generally the transmitters of the several
organizations could b~ recognized b,y radio Characteristics,
eo that, before a transmitter was seized, one lmew t.he agentsfor whom it worked ano.. also which other transmitters in the
network were still active and which had a.lJ:•ea.d;r been picked up.
This facilitated intelrogations, since those arrested reacted
quicker to sp~cific q~estions and were less inclined to beevasive when they discovered that details or their organization
were already known.

283

RESTRICTEDREWChief ot the F.F.I.

(Forces Francaiaes de l'Interieur}.

This wascontim.ed in full. five months later.
The English, who had set up a wonder~ organized sw network in France, had in Juq 1944 espionage centers with radio
equipnent in almost all the larger cities ot"the country.
These intelligence units were seconded at the time ot theinvasion by airbome troops ot the S.A.S. (Special Air Service)
who were dropped in partisan areas behind the German front.

Theywere to Carl'7 out certain sabotage missions, re:cying on members ot
the F.F.I. who were familiar with thJ countr.r.

They contributed

material.JJr to getting the F.F.I into real activity and to harrassing Ge:nnan rear communications and contusing retreating columns.

284

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41t

RESI¥RP"e~ 2
in ~1scany.

The purpose of the group was:1.

To combine resistance forces into partisan groups.

2.

To select dropping points and regulate suppliesof all kinds.

3. To transmit militar,y reports.

4.

To pass agents and impo~ant documents to Allied
headquarters.

In time Bari became an important junction point for all sorts
0of intelligence services.

The Russians set up a radio stati~

as did the Poles; the latter communicated from here with 21 stationsin German occupied Poland.
British intelligence was not able at first toaet up any si~e­able organization in northern Italy because many agents were arrested
upon arrival.
On the other hand,

the Germans were able to use the documents

found on agents to carry on several deceptive games with the control
station in Bari.

But in spite of all the German successes thenumber of agent transmitters in northern It~ increased to 42 inJuly and 63 in August.

This was la~gely due to the fact that the,agents operated in territory held by partisans where raids could
be carried out o~ by ~arge detachments.
Early in 1945 the radio agents were told to attach themselvesto the political organizations and partisan formations from which
theywere to gather military information and to spy out worthwhile targets for air attack.

They were also to report on the

185

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situation and strength or partisan groups and arrange .ror supp4'"
by parachute.

Moreover agents slipped across the northern boundary

and a regular courier service between Ita,4r ~d Switzerland wasestablished.

·'...

.

286

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THE SILENT NET OF THE U.C.R.
In preparation for the invasion the British intelligence beganlate in 1943 to set up a brand new radio organization.

Usil1gexisting resistance groups with their operators and instruments,
new radio networks were projected along the coast. and in several
lines parallel to it at distances of about 100 km.

Each of theseu.c.R. {Unites de Combat et de Renseignement) was an independent
military intelligence center whose chief was the local l.eader ofthe resistance organization with the greatest strength in theparticular area.

The members of all. otm..r resistance organizationsin the district were direct:Q" subordinate to him and sent theirreports to this u.c.R.
The purpose of the u.c.R. was to provide, under the directionof its chief, direct connection with the stat!' of the Allies whenever Allied operations on French soil should begin and also to assuretransmission of all information gathered by agents of "fighting
France".

Beginning on the critical cia__v the chief was responsible

for all militar,r intelligence communications in his ar~a.
The personnel at his disposal incl.uded int.elliger .-::e agentsand scouts, likewise one or two operators with instruments, andmen· to guard communications.

He also had a certain number of'concealed quarters with secure addresses and "letter drops".

Special scheduJ.es were assigned to the transmitters, which 'tlere
not to 1\mction until the critical day.

Till then the net was tomaintain absolute radio silence and the cr,yptographic s,ystem was
not to be emplo,yed.

287

RESTRICTED'•The command expected the U.C.R. to report as quickly and preciselY as possible on en~ movements in its sector.
to take part in combat.

It was not

Members were strictly .forbidden to shootunless in sel..:r defense or to escape capture.
The chiets o.:r the u.c.R. were instructed ..
to transmit as promptly
as possible precise infor,mation regarding.the strength and movements

ot the enemy in adjacent territories.

This included assemblies andmovements o.:r troops and air units, the construction of fortified positions, the location of mine fields, munition depots, hospital stations,etc. •In June 1944 the Ger.mans obtained b,y accident the keys for the"silent net or the u.o.R." along with the authenticators of six
agents.

This would have meant a wonderful opportunity if the organ-

ization had been functioning like all the rest, but instead it wassilent.
Whereas in the case of all the other agent links the Germans
were dealing with an opponent whom they could hear, observe, locate,and eliminate, here they faced a foew who was not merely invisible
but inaudible and intangible, a foe wl~o, in a sense, didn't exist
at all, who put in an appearance only when it was too late to
q_ombat him effectively.

The Germans lalew the general area in which

he was located but they did not know a single transmitter location,a single go-between, a single letter-drop.

They stood before an

impenetrable wall of mist and all they lalew was that behlnd it,
slowly but purposeru~, preparations were going on ~mich would
mean the turning point on the western front.

288

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THE INVASION
If ever a :m:Uitacy undertaking was prepared for down t.o theleast detail, then it was the Allied invasion in the night. fromthe 5th to the 6th o£ Juno 1944.
We have already shown how British intelligence was informedof all details it. needed ·~o know regarding the situation in France.
The work of the various French resistance organizations made itprobable that, insofar as the German forces were concerned, allFrance resembled a bog which gave we:y wherever one might step.
Sabotage had so damaged communica~ion lines that they could
not be depended on.

Even before the ~vasion started, defenseof the occupied areas in the West ha.a. been so shaken and under-,·mined that- ~n spite or the Atlantic Wall- ouly a few powerfulthrusts were necessar,r ·to cause the entire structure to collapse.
Shortly after the invasion of Northern France sta:t'tad, the English
and .Americans employed special groups (Eqtrl.pes) consisting of two
men with an ultra short wave telephone set and shortwave radio
for telegraphic conmunications.

These groups workerJ under the

direction of the BCRA, r1ere meant tor purely militr... 7 reconnaissance in connection with operallions of German ·troop:3 1 and were
especially interested L, Ger.man retaliator, weapons~

Working

far in advance of the i.'lVaders, each group recruitel some lO
local infor.mers, screened their reports, and radioed condensed
versions.

289.

RESTRICTEDThe ultra short wave traffic of British intelligence increased
rapi~ with the beginning or the invasion.

The German intercept

organization was nowhere near adequate for interception of thistraffic; ~ eome instancee interception was not technical~ possible,
in other cases the service was ~ped.

Since it was impossible,r..

to cover all traffic systema.ticall.y, it was necessary to concentrateon certain links which appeared important - a pitiful solution inview or the tremendous opportunity.

When one station wa.s raided in Ju;ly 1,944, important information'on the Vl was round.

'

It enabled the Br1tish to attack many depots

and launching sites effectivelf.
In A~tst of the same year ultra shortwave messages showedthat very important reports on the Vl and on mill tary operations
were going to England.
For almost two months it looked as though the invasion weremaking no progress.

The Germans had not succeeded in driving theinvaders into the sea, but a stabilized !ront had been formed
which seemed to det,y every attack.

Until the breakthrough near

Avranches which li.tted the German west wing off its hingesl

Just

as the Russian offensive came to a halt, the front in the West began
to move.

The German west wing was penetrated on 3 August; on

7 August the Americans advanced via l{ayenne and were 200 kUometers:trom Paris.

They had taken Lava.l and Chateau Gontier andhad als~ occupied Vanna in BrittaQY.

They reached the coast on

both sides of ,~t. Nazaire and th...us cut off Brittany.

t90

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Since thelanding, 85,000 Genn.a.n troops had been captured.

or :35 German

divisions, 13 had been destro,yed.
In German,y a bloo«V" purge was raging which had begun on

20 J~.

Hit~er sol~ received thenewlY appointed NS

commande-rs and Himmler issued an· order or the day on the creation

ot "the National 5aoialist Peoples AI'DlY' of the FUhrer and his Reich",while Goebbels procla:im.ed "far reaching measures" and release' ofvast reserves of power.

In the German armed forces the "German greeting" wasintroduced in place of the military salute.

291

RESTRICTEDSAS TROOPS IN THE WEST
When the invasion began, it was observed that the British
Broadcast station in Davent1~ int~duced a new special service.
Before or after the entertainment program, sometimes even in the
midst of it the spe~er called several times:"Hello PierreJ"

or "Hello Lul.ul" etc. and then gave enciphered or disguishedinstructions.
As soon as the invasion started, the English dropped socalled SAS units behind the German lines.

These were two

military units of about regimental strength, of which one•comprised two groups with the call names "Pierre" and 11Sabu"
while the second had three groups "Jeannette", nJojo" and "LuJ..un ..
Each of these groups corresponded roughl.y to a battalion.
were sabotage units.

TheseGroups "Pierre", "Jeannette" and "Lulu"

received their instructions in French, While the others got
theirs in English.

Orders and i.rlformation for all SAS units

went under the name "Romo"; those for ~ ''Lulu" units weresent with that name, etc{j l!hciphered messages on the other
hand were addressed directly! to the indi!rldual unit.

..The organization was ver,y rigid and lthe work intense.

It

caused the Germans much trouble and among other things hopeless~ crippled theFrench telephone and teleprinter lines

upon which the German command relied.

All that was left w......

the radio and we have alreac:W seen how dangerous that can he.
After the Allied advance had overtaken the first SAS· 'f')M.(·nt, which was employed prlmari]Jr in Brittany and .iJor ._293

RESTRICTEDSAS TROOPS IN THE WEST
When the invasion began, it was observed that the British
Broadcast station in Davent1~ int~duced a new special service.
Before or after the entertainment program, sometimes even in the
midst of it the spe~er called several times:"Hello PierreJ"

or "Hello Lul.ul" etc. and then gave enciphered or disguishedinstructions.
As soon as the invasion started, the English dropped socalled SAS units behind the German lines.

These were two

military units of about regimental strength, of which one•comprised two groups with the call names "Pierre" and 11Sabu"
while the second had three groups "Jeannette", nJojo" and "LuJ..un ..
Each of these groups corresponded roughl.y to a battalion.
were sabotage units.

TheseGroups "Pierre", "Jeannette" and "Lulu"

received their instructions in French, While the others got
theirs in English.

Orders and i.rlformation for all SAS units

went under the name "Romo"; those for ~ ''Lulu" units weresent with that name, etc{j l!hciphered messages on the other
hand were addressed directly! to the indi!rldual unit.

..The organization was ver,y rigid and lthe work intense.

It

caused the Germans much trouble and among other things hopeless~ crippled theFrench telephone and teleprinter lines

upon which the German command relied.

All that was left w......

the radio and we have alreac:W seen how dangerous that can he.
After the Allied advance had overtaken the first SAS· 'f')M.(·nt, which was employed prlmari]Jr in Brittany and .iJor ._293

RESTRICTED

it took little part in further operations.

Its main bod1' waswithdrawn tram the front beginning in September 1944:
The second SA~· regiment was not employed to any great ext.ent
until late August.

As the Allies approached tb.e German frontier

its employment increaqed.
chie~ in theIts main body was dropped in the Vosges,

forest Jof Senones, north ot St. Die.

This was thearea where the Alllee !made a surprise thrust a tew weeks later which
overran the area betwe}en Nancy and Strassburg i1'l :four dqs andI

resulted in the capture of Strassburg on· 2.3 November.
the SAS units had solved their problems brilliant~.

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Here again

ENGLISH RADIO AGENTS IN ITALY
Immediately afte~ the detection ot the Badoglic Oo~~rftm~H~,.

British intelligence took over all Italian command ag~tldfal, inparticular the SIM (Servicio T.nformasione Mili.tar:l.) and used themto set up its own· agent radio service in Itaq.

From then on thisservice pl~ed a considerable role.
The SIM was absolute~ a British service and its chieftask was to provide British intelligence with agents.

The

central o££ice was set up in Brindisi wj:l:.h Colonel Massaioll incharge.

Agents were recruited among oiricers, in work battalions,and in prisoner camps.

Some were It&lians who had been dra.t'ted

for the Canadian A:rmy and were now sent to Italy for employment asagents.
When recruiting, the srn did not reveal the character or thework; some persons were not .recruited but were selected anddetailed to British intelligence which then tratned them in schools
tor agents and finally deh~red them behind the German lines,
ei~fter b.1 parachute or b,y submarine.

Their radio control station

was in Bari.
At first the Germans were able to hinder the development of
the hostile radio agent service.

Even in the early months of 1944

when the British emplo.yed more and more agents, most o£ them werearrested or remained quiescent since many simply went home totheir families.

295

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Beginning in April 1944, however, there was a marked increase inagent traffic since British intelligence tried to mak" up by quantity tor what was lacking in the qual.1.ty of the agents. aFollowing a
raj.d on a station in Rome late in April, captured documemts andinterrogations disclosed that an organization· wa.s involved which
worked mostJ.,y with the illegal parties (known collectively as the"liberation committee") which had access to material in the highest
German military offices.

The Germans gained valuable infomation inthis case by playing a radio game and were able lio leam the structure of the Jj_beration committee and pt•ove its collaboration with
Allied intelligence.·
The organization "Otto" 1-m.s dealt a serious blow in Genoa in
April 1944.

Its function was centralized suppl,y and military leader-

ship of partisans in Piedmont and Liguria.

Several groups of radio

agents were picked up along with a mass of r&diograms, .many of whichwere later deciphered.
situation in Italy.

These gave a terri.t)ing picture of the true

A control station, which issued espionage

assignments, was located in Bari and communicated with .fully a dozen
stations in those parts ot Italy occupied by the Germans.

There wasa second control. station in Tarentum which commun~.cated with partisansin upper Italy.

Early in July an agent station was picked up b.v the Germans near
Pisa which had been an im:port~ut link ot the partisan organization ~~296

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AMERICAN RADIO AGENTS IN ITALY

American intelligence, directed by' OSS (Office of StrategicServices), set up the ORI (Organizations Resistenza Italia) andrecruited radio agents.

To facilitate the work, most of those

employed in the oss·were Italian Americans.. Radio communication
was directed by the control station in Naples.

The agents weregenera.l.q trained in American uniform and put in· civilian clothing onl;y when they were sent out.
Although there was some collaboration between the English andAmerican services, it was apparent that '&6th followed the same goal
but thought to reach it in a different fashion.
In Mq 1944 the Germans succeeded in picking up an American

station in Milan after an exchange or fire with the agents.

'When

the material and traffic had been sif'ted, it was clear that thisgroup was part of an organizatiol. extending all over northem It&cy. and down to Rome.

B.r following up the clues obtained, the Germans eliminateda large number of persons charged with important espionage missions.
The Germans discovered the regular communication routes used andprevented very- :important material from slipping through:e.g., areport by' Marshal Graziani to GUring on the new~ created Italian~ and its new positions,

together with a complete reconnaissancereport on the German line or defense from the Adriatic to the
Tyrrhenian Sea (the so-called Gothic Line).

297

RESTRICTEDIn September the Germans picked up another American group near

Genoa.

This raid proved the most profitable of all those made inIt~.

The principal agent had exercised con~rcl over all the groups

and single agents of the intelligence service of the American Fifth

..

A~.

He was also concerned with the organization of the resistancemovement, with sabotage (as far north as the Brenner Pass), and withthe recruiting or agents.

As a direct result of this raid five othergroups were picked up.
The control station of the American radio agents was initia.l.ly
in Naples but was later moved to Bari.
With that all the radio agent work of the Allies in the south
was united in one place and was directed as a unit.
Late in 1944 two centers of English and Ane rican agents werenoted:The ltllan-Genoa area (where collaboration of the Italian

Maqui with French troops along the frontier could be noted) and theUd:ine - Venice area.

Here agents l''ere instructed to recormoiter

hight'W81'S 1 bridges, the width and depth of rivers, supply etc ••This was in preparation for the swift advances of the Allies in thespring of 1945 which caused the entire southern front to collapse.
A net of radio agents had been set up which reached far into Austria.
and, as a result, anything that took place behin:l the German front
no longer remained a secret.

298

RESTRICTEDA COLD BA'rii, A CRANP IN 'l'HE CALF, AND O'l'HER NOTl!."'WORTHY MAT'l'ERS.

What person who !mows life will deny that one of the most.

.

.

beautifUl components of which a woman is put together is a pairof shapely legs?

And who will maintain t.hat a bath in a bathtubwith water just a little above the freezing point is something
everyone desires? •I once saw a photograph of G.B.Shaw taken just as he wasbathing in a frozen pond through a hole cut in the ice.

I saw

.

the picture 15 years ago but when I think of it even tod~ I
get goose flesh and am grateful to the e~gineers who invented
the water heater for bathrooms.
And what does all this have to do with "War Secrets in the .
Ether"? - A great dealJ
In my youth I had a teacher who often asserted that the Middle

Ages with their applied cruelty were gone forever.

I am glad he diedlong before World War II, otherwise he would have had to admit that
his theory was the greatest mistake of his life and in the philosophyof the 19th century.
But you still inquire what connection there is between "WarSecrets in the Ether" and my philosophical remarks.

Pardon the

digression, my dear reader, I will tell you.
We have alreaqy spoken several times of the fact that agentsor their operators were arrested by the German police and that sameof them made statements which afforded considerable infor.mation.

RESTRICTED .

RES'lVt§ Ifl'~~32
Thus far, however, we have said nothing about the way in which suchpeople were induced to talk.

For it is clear that as a rule they

were not a.t all inclined l:.o give information regarding their organization and to betr~ their own cause.

On the other hand,

the wholes,ystem of agents constituted for Ge~ intel~gence such a serious
danger that one tried by all available means to get these men andwomen to talk.
The organs of the German Security Service (S.D.) - corresponding to its nature - had a very simple recipe.
cruell.y mistreated.

Those arrested were

The result was generally very slight.

abused person roared \1ith pain and then grew silent.

The

Or he fainted.

After this treatment most of these men were so embittered and fanatical that they would have preferred to be executed rather than s~a single word.

The agents of the a~ed forces had in such casesa "more humane" method of interrogation.

Essentia.lly there were on:cy-

two methods, but the,y were quite effective.
with women, and the other with men.

One was used principa.lly

In the case of women they applied

to each calf a clamp with a fairly wide surface which could be tightened by means of a screw.

The result after a short time was a cra.mp

in the calf which could be endured for a few minutes, perhaps, but

not for long; it became torture and - especiallY in the case of
women who were concerned with the beauty of their legs and did
not care to get varicose veins - quickly opened the mouth.

If

the clamp was removed, the cramp soon let up and the leg showed
no trace of abuse.

In the process not even the sheerest silk hose

300

RESTRICTED

would be damaged.
EqualJ.y "considerate" was the method employed with men..

The

delinquent was stripped, bound hand and foot, perched on the edgeof a bathtub filled with ice cold water.
water was splashed on the man's back.
of an electric shock.

With the open hand,

The effect was like that

If this didn't suffice, the man was laidor seated in the tub and that had a more powerful effect.

How-

.

ever, it did not alw~s suffice to break the pe~sonts resistance •In such cases the man was immersed and held under water until his
tongue was loosened and he was ready to talk.

Frequently briefelectric currents were sent through th~ water to stimulate thebather.
Many of those arrested tried to commit suicide in the tub •by throwing themselves into the water and violently swallowing andbreathing water.

They were then fished out promptly and none ofthese "guests" ever ma.de a second such attempt at suicide.
The "cold bath" almost always worked and, like the clamp,
had the advantage of leaving no marks.

Along with the cold bathand the cramp in the calf there was another - and indeed morehumane - way to get the desired statement~ from the apprehended
agent.

He was put in a sort of trance by a narcotic and specificquestions were put to him again and again.

This recipe did notalways work but it did in many cases.
It is well known that people are not exactly gentle in the
Balkans when they get an enemy in their power.

Gennan close-

range detachments who had to raid agent stations often got into

301

RESTRICTED

difficult situaM.ons..
the partisans.

And woe to those who fell into the hands of•

It happened more than once and then there were

tortures such as the German Gestapo never dreamed of.
A favorite method was "lighting up the soles".

..

They suspended·t.he prisoner by his hands with his naked feet some 30 em above theground.

They then placed burning candles beneath them and patiently

waited for the results.

B.r fettering the legs one could preventthe tormented victim from pulling them up away from the heat.
There were other methods of bloodless torture but I do notwish to enumerate them here.

The human race is bad enough; I do

not wish to teach it any more evil tricks.

302

RESTRICTEDENGLISH AND HUSSIAN HADlO AG.l!:N'l'S IN NORVIAY
Noi'\..ra.y had been occupied in Hay l9h0.

Tho Government, tli thl{ing Haakon at its head, had eone to England.

'I'he Starting in its

final session had decided thaG if an independent government within
the counGry were not possible, it should go outside the country
for the time being.·
Thus the cabinet with Prime Ninis ter Nygaardsveld continued
to be the legitimate government of the country•• It issued ardent
appeals to the people for passive resistance.

Daily broadcasts in

the Norwegian language gave the people all they needed to know.
The armed conflict was at an end.
begilining.

The spiri·tual conflict was

And the man who had undertaken to represent theIiiorwegian people and the Norwegian state, Vidkun Quisling, hadfirm ground under his feet only so long as he was under theprotection of German arms.

Beyond the range of German guns he

had no power and his name had become throughout the civilized world
a symbol of treason and a term of opprobrimn.
As early as February 1941 some agent transmitters appearedin Non~ay, which obviously belonged to the British intelligencenet.

It could soon be recognized that British intelligence wasproceeding here as in France to build up an agent network, utilizing the Norwe.gian resistance movement.

'!'hanks to the geographic

peculiarity of the country, these agents found ideal protectionin the mountainous regions which were difficult of access •

•

so a

RESTRICTED

During the year 1941 this agent network spread over the wholecountr,r so that British intelligence could get report~ from allparts of Norway.

Among other things there was developed an organ-

ization called 11Scorpion11 for reporting on shipping.

It wasdirected from Drontheim qy ships' engineer Rolf ~stadt and shipyard director Groen.

Reporting units were set up along the entire

coast of No~; they observed ship movements and reported themto England by radio.
To safeguard the traffic one soon resorted to short traffic
periods and clever disguise, just as was done in France.

Agentswere often able to avoid arrest by frequent~ changing theirlocation.
The Germans tried to locate these transmitters by long range
and short range D/F-ing, and D/F readings taken from Storch planes,
but rare~ was a raid successful, and if one did succeed a new
devotee of fre~dom immediate~ stepped into the gap.
In May 1941~ the Germans raided an agent station on theisland Onoye where the transmitter was located in a cave fromwhich shipping could be observed readi~.

An abundance ofapparatus and documentar,y material was secured.
had been passed to England.

All observations

It was virtua~ impossible for a

German ship to enter or leave a NOI'\'Iegian harbor or even to sailalong the Norwegian coast without a signal going to England
immediate~.

By picking up an agent station in NOI'\Tay in r':arch 19l~h the•Germans secured information on the military organization of the804

RESTRICTED

•resistance mov~nent and of the English ~adio intelligence service
in all Norwegian territories.
"Defense Command"•It was d-.. rected .t'rom London by the

In Nol'W'q 'r.here was the central control unit

which issued orders to the several dist,~ots, sectors, and areas.

An extensive intelligence net was being' built up in No~ which
was intended to start functioning when r.ilitar.v operations began
or in connection with a possible Ger.man withdrawal.
Until ~ 1944 the number of radio agents working in No~
averaged 15.

From then on the network was expanded great:cy-.

In

June t.he number of transmitters had doul::·led and earl;r in September
another large increase in number was not.ed.
not loss than 86 stations.

In October there were

In view of t~e character of the terratne,

the Ge:rman radio defense encountered gre.tt diff'icuJ.ty in its
ef.f'orts to suppress them.

Not onq were the agents protected byinaccessible locations, they also had a ~hance to get what the,yneeded either by water or £ram SWeden wi~h virtually no interference.
Host of the agents were charged with watching shipping andreport.ing their observations to England.

However, "there was anincreasing number of' agents charged l~th preparations for sabotage
and WJ.th support and furtherance of the ill·n-wegia.n resistance movement.

A supply service by parac)lute was ?rganized which at times

assumed great importance in the area around and southwest of Oslo.
Late in September 1944 an agent stati.on was picked up not far
from EHmlU and the operators, Ragt'la.ld ~Ia.ck and Rolf Kjoz Hansen,

sos

RESTRICTED

were arrested.

Decr.yptod rndiogrnms .found thero contained reports

on fortifications in tho s·ca.vanaor aroa, on troop ·crcil'lopor·t.o 1 troop
organization, and ~\bnarino reports.

Tho ohio! agents; Ernst

Arklldscm and Artur Do.ldtll, eucoeoded. in C3Dcapina in a spoed boo.t •..

In October l9L.l~o the Enalioh Mo.jor Adamaon Wll.S captu1•od neq,rBodoe.

He l·las leador o£ a detachment of "Spoc:l.o.l Forcosn "VThich

had been sent in to carry on sabotage and rooonnaioaanoe.

He ho.dlanded "tilth some 15 parachutists to look up suitable soa.~~d air·landing places in the Helgoland district, ·t.o block Hi6hi'm,y 50 possibzy by destroying bridaes ncar Viakiskja r.md Kroks·l:iranden and later to cut tho Northern Railway.

The purposC!l was to inter-fere with German '\·r.i:j:,hdra>'ln-1.
A raid by the German radi.o do.fenso in November 1944 disclooed
an organization l'thich worked o.cross the .frontier into 8\redcn o.ncl
was concerned with reporting on shipping o.nd 1-rea.the1~.

(Locdingeen-

Narvlk case).
AJJnost "tdthout exception the agent transmittel~s 't<Tcre loca.ted
in the southern half of the country (south of Drontheim).
ma.j ol~it,y \rere nco.r , the coo.st.

The

From this .face one could concl.u.dc

that they '"' I'(_' \rorkina exclusively on shipping.

It is true, ofconrse, that most of them uere carefully 1·ro.tchinc; the shippinG
alone the coLJ.st da.y and nic;ht and reportint:; their observations toEnr;la.nd and t.ho.t for this reason they had to be located in coastal
a.r.:a.s.

IL is o.l::;o true, houever, tha.t t.he concentrD.i,i_n'1 oi' rc.d_Lo

RESTRICTED

agents in these areas can be explained by the geograp~ of thecountry and the fact that the interior is thinly populated in comparison with coastal areas.

Wherever fairly densely populated areas

were to be found in the interior, e.g~ in the area of Oslo, one also
noted an increased employment of radio agents.
In addition to this net of radio agents controlled from England"there was a similar net of Russian agent transmitters which also
handled their traffic ver,y skillfully and constantly manifested adesire to mislead the German radio defense.

The centra~ station

was in the Murmansk district and the control
station was in Kola •..
During the first half of 19L3 it was noted again and again that
the Russians were very quickly and very accurately informed reg~rding
shipping in the north of Norway since ships wou~d ~4rdly have put
to sea before hostile aircraft would appear m1d attack them.

Itbecame clear that Russian intelligence had planted radio agentsalong the Norwegian coast who reported currently on GerMan sea transport to the Murman coast.

The agents were put ashore by submarines

and since the distance was short, wave lengths of 80 to 100 m withlow output were used which could not be picked up by the German monitors.
In the fall of 1943 the Germans succeeded in raiding several
Russian agent stations and the ensuing radio eame with the Russian
control station was successful.

The GcrniDns succeeded in enticing!-l07

RESTRICTED

in and probably sinking a Russian submarine1 as t.;all·as in apprebending agents when they were landingA

Apparent~ the Russians did

not become suspicious and the deception t'ITent. on for sorr.e time.

RESTRICTEDHADIO AGENTS IN DI.!~NMAnK
En&Jish and Hussian radio agents appeared in Denmark too,bl;lt were not of great importance.

Th~

number of agents there

was small and not until October 1944 \~s any great activity
observed.

In November there were twice as many agents active

as in the month preceeding and the volume of traff:i.c swelled
rapidly.
A raid on a Russian aeent station in Copenhagen in
December 191!2 was the first step in unmasking a large Danish
Comintern organization.

A raid in November 1944 crippled asabotage group which operated again~t tho railroads.

Justwhen a sort of barrier of sabotage detaclnnents and radio
agents had been set up in Alsace and in the Burgundian Gateway - a similar phenomenon was noted in northern Denmark.

Here three groups of radio agents were noted:

one in northern

JUtland, a second in eastern JUtland, and a third near Copenhagen.

The last l'ras tho most important and exercised someinfluence upon the other t~ro; its traffic l-d.th England wasvery active.

'rhe purpose of those groups were to reconnoiter

military objectives, to transmit messages ~~d to prepare andcarry out acts of sabotage.

The speed with which thinGS

happ :mod in the sprinG of 1945 did not give this organizutiona chance to accomplish much.

809

RESTRICTEDRESTRICTEDRADIO AGENTS IN HOLLM~D
Holland is the onlY coun Lry in which the English radio agent
servico had downright bad lucl., simply and solely because of thearrests in the "North Pole Case".

Not until 1943 did the English

begin slowly and gropingly to develop a new net.

.

In August threetransmitters appeared on the west coast but again the C~r.mans
carried out several successful raids.
On 3 February 1944 the Ge~s picked up an agent stationin Amsterdam.

That led to a major break wto the newly organized

Dutch spy organization "0rdre-Dienstn.
von Borsum-Buisman, was arrested.

The principal agent,

Documents seized revealed thatthe !onmer radio deception become known in November 1943 when
DourLein and Ubbink escaped to Switzerland.
Later the.Germans made further raids but did not succeed inbreaking up the new organiza·tion.

A new invisible spider began

spinning its net over the country.

Before the invasion started,

the work of the British agent stations in Holland had expanded
enormously.

That remained true after the new western front hadstabilized for a time.

Moreover, an absolutely new organizationof the entire Dutch resistance movement had resulted.
major groups
Ordre-Dienst
Raad van V'erzet
Knock-Ploegs
now combined to form a triangle, the so-called "Delta".

811

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The threeBeginning earJ..y in September 19lrl"' the military forces of the
Dutch resistance movement (including those in Ger.man oecupied territories) were placed under the unified command of Prince Barnhardt,
who in turn was directzy subordinate to Eisenho1ver.

At, the sametime the Dutch Government pr?posed to recognize"the resistance orgrolizations official:cy- as Dutch armed forces.
Orders were then issued to the resistance organizations toprotect important public works, such as water works and electric
power plants, the docks at Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Ym~den, the broadcast. transmitters, telegraph offices, and repeater stations.

The.y1-rere also to seize a number of bridges ap.d prevent the Ge:rma.ns fromblowing them up.

lv1inefields 1-rere also to be marked and advancing

Allied troops were to be aided by agents familiar with the locality
who were to report :in pairs with a password to the signal officerof the nearest brigade.
The Government also tried to induce expe~tis on harbor administration and the regulation of rivers to agree to be smuggled to
Eindhoven by agents.

One route ran via Culemborg - Piel.

Later,

agents 1-rere ferried across by canoe.
Of course the Germans raidad some of the agent stations but
they merely succeeded in getl:.ing a picture of the organizationand 1vork of the "Daltan 1dthout being able to combat it. effectively.
Partial success 11as achieved, in purticulur in respect to the famousE!.1rli:::h parachute action ncar Arnheir:t •·rhich turnad out disastrously.

312

RESTRICTED

Nm'll' all the rcoislia.nce movements in the count:r;y \"lore assigned tointelligence \'II'Ork in ord~r to procure dcpendab~e infor.rna.tion.
This required time, naturally, and never assumed crcat propo1tions,0

although at times some 30 stations l.rere rrorking ..
Late in 19l1J+ the transmitters li'Orking in Holland might l1e
divided into two groups:•~fl1at1.

A group with some 15 radio stations of t.he "Delta11
triangle,

2.

Another group of about 15 stations which apparent~
bclonecd to a British organization for airbon1e andparachute troops.

now ensued on the German side was a hopeless struggle,

just as hopeless as the one a year before in Franue.
Of the more important "cases"m~

on Dutch soil the following

be mentioned:"Gerhard case".

The seizure of an agCJat station in Zaand.am

in l·iarch 19/.J.~ dealt ldth tr0rdre-Dienstn a serious blov.r.

lh sets

1.1ere seized, along i·Tith cipher data and operation schedules.
"Fallschirm case".

In October 1944 the German radio defense

seized an agent station in Leiden l'll'hich l"Torkcd on ultra-short.
wave and had sent to England reports on the use of the Vl(Vergeltungswaffe).

Only part of the clever group of agentsl.'ll'as apprehended.
"Rotterdam casen.

In December 19l~~ a station rre.c raided ir.. •not.terdam and a complete plant for the production of false iC:.::.:fltification papers "0-th numerous rubber stamps or ·aennan Ifl.i.litn.:!:"y a.:.-1d
pCLrty of.Lices fell into Germ.ro1 hands.

In this case an orcv.rL.i..3c:.::..:::.oni;a.s involved l..rhich supplied resistance groups and s::.bota~e UY.~_t::; ..

313

RESTRICTED

.314

RESTRICTEDPOLISH HADIO AGENTS 'l'J IROUGIIOU'l' 'l'IIE WOILLD
Aside from t.heir acent nets in Poland and France, the Poles
had a great system of agent networks wl1ich covered all Europe &ld
extended into the Near East.

It is obvious that because of its

central location a.l'}d neut.rality S1rr.i.tzcrland afforded favorable
conditions for setting up such a net.

All organization was developed

here which increased in importance, espccial:cy after the end of.

1943. The connections of "the Poles with Switzerland were more
extensive and varied than those available to the various Frenchorganizations.

Moreover the local chie! 2 Captain Choynacki, was

one of the best Polish intelligence officers.

Over a transmitterin Switzerland espionage report.s were sent current~ to London. ·Beyond a doubt the British "Secret Service" is one of the best0

secret. services in the world.

There are people who claim it isthe very best and I am. 1dlling to believe it.

And even if it didn't

work with poison, murder, bombing, safe cracking, and bur,ying people
alive, as National Socialist propaganda claimed, it undoubte~ hadpulled off ~ a clever stunt with the result that over the decades
the British Goverrunent has been one of the best informed in t.heworld.

It was that way before l'Vorld War II and it was that 1-r~

during the war.

However, twice during World ~Tar II its work wasoutshone as the moon is by the sun.

Once by the itork of the nnote

Drei", which has been described in detail.

And the second t:iJne

it '1.-ras again by a group 1rorld.ng in Swit.zerland.

815

RESTRICTEDThis t:iJne it "TrTa.s

by the Work of Captain Choynacki in collaboration with the officeof the Polish military attache ln Berne.

In the "Rote Drei" case proof has been offered.
case I should llke to omit such proof's.

In the Choynacki

If I were to give all themessages- or even the most important ones (and who can say which
message was not important1) 1 Ii' I tried to give all the telegramsfrom the Marne to Brest-Litowsk, from the "Rote Kapelle" to "Otwock",from the North African Theater to Stalingrad, thell it would makenot a book but a sizeable Ubrary!
I hope, therefore, that the reader will believe without proof

that the "Berne case .. , as we shall call it, belongs alongside the"Rote Drei 11 as one of the most sensational cases of World War II.
What was sent out from here by the Polish secret service was ofgreat, in many cases decisive importance for the Allied conductof the war.
'l'he f'ntei'ul thing !or the Germane - just as in the "Rote Drei 11case - was the fact that the inliercepted telegratns were decipheredmuch too late.

When they were deciphered and laid before influential

persons in Germany, it was wel.l that the office chairs of thesegentlemen were sturdily constructed, with stout broad arms which
kept them from falling from their seats and allowed them to rest
the hand lamed by terror on those broad arms and say with resignation:"Den Akiba lied!

Such a thing never happened before".

The c;entlcmcn were right, even though they were often ;,1rong.

316

RESTRICTEDAs a sample of this Berne case I should mere~ ltke tomention the fact that that dramatic final Gennan offensivein the East 1 which began on 4 J~ 1943 near Orel and showedin the very first hours that it must inevitab:cy .tail, hadbeen betr~ed in all details back in the spring of 1943b,y this Polish grohpJ

Throe months before the first shotof this offensive was fired, every detail had been trans.mitted,.
including every division, every tank, and ever,y gunJ

All thisand much, much morel·The content o£ decr,r.pted Polish telegrams revealed two..

things:1.

That the man who supplied the information was
undoubtedl,y in Hitler's immediate vicinity;

2.

That the content o£ foreign diplomatic and military
messages decr.ypted by the Ger.man cryptanalytic
service was lmown to that man.

The German Chief Signal Officer, Fellgiebel, Chief of theentire German Intercept Service and Signal Service (who was hanged
by order of Hitler tor participation in tho conspirtJ.C¥ of 20 J~

1944) 1 then issued orders that decr.ypted foreign messages should
be shown to onl,;y a limited number of persons.
cut down more and .more.

Thi~;~ number was

The Chief of German counterinteUigence,

Admiral Canaris, person~ con~ucted an investigation tor the
purpose ot discovering tho mrsterious source or this Polish

information.

All in vainl

The riddle ~ned un13olvedJ

Rlr/

RESTRICTED

In June 1943 the transmitters of the Polish agents were distributed as follows:
England

5

France6

Switzerland

3

Italy

1

Poland15

Hungary2

Romania1

Turkey2

Iraq

1

l!lgypt

1

Iran

l

Palestine

1

Algeria

1•

The Pol.ish agents in Romania pulled a hot one in 1943.

Two

Poles employed by the Japanese attache in Bucharest used the transmitter of the Japanese military attache to transmit their messages
in a feeling of. absolute security.

In addition they installed

two add.i tional sets, one of them concealed in a large broadcast

receiver. These transmitters caused the Germans a headache fora long time but at last a surprise raid was pulled off with the•consent of the Japanese,
who were not a little astonished to findthey were harboring Polish agent transmitters in their own qunrtcrs.

318

RESTRICTEDThe Poles vere arrested} the material confiscated.

This eaveconsiderable insight into the organization ot Polish espiona.~ inRomania.
Subsequently MaJor Zicmianski, the principal Polish agent inRomania, was apprehended and the organization broken up, at 1east
for a time.

in Istanbul.

It had been directed by the Polish e5pionagc service.

The cro.11iest thi.ng o.bout the whole cra.sy n.ri"o.ir wo.sthat the two Polish operators were cleverly uslng the courio1•a or

the Japanese embassies in Bucharest and Istanbul to carry their..

reports.

319

RESTRICTED

820

RESTRICTED

THE NEW F'HCNT IN TilE WF.ST

After the new front. in the West uas .forlile9 anci hao stabilized
in the fall of 19Ll.J, the Germans bec;an j_ntensive intercept activity for the purpose of learning the groupin~ and intentions of theene~forces.

In this connection it is very interesting to study

the extent to which the several Allied armies gave the Germans information regarding their situation by their use of radio telegraphy.
The Canadian First Army l'Tas extremely cautrious in its use ofradio so 1. hat the Germans learned almost not,hine.,
The English Second ArmY was a little more generous but evenhere the results of the German intercep't: service v1ere rather modest.

The America'1 ~inth Army was very· silent and usually gave theGermans little to work on, so little that on m~ days the Gerw~nintercept service had nothing to report.
Conditions were similar in the case of the American F~rst

Army.
The most profitable target for the German intercept service
was the American Third Ar~;

it sent an exceptional number ofradiograms and was very incautious.
The American Seventh Army, on the other hand, cnuld be compared with the American Ninth since it was very careful and sparing in the use of radio.
The French First Army was also ver,y cautious·at first, but

321

RESTRICTED

. in November shed its reticence and later supplied the Germans withvery good intercept results.

322

RESTRICTEDAGENT RADIO AS INDICATION OF OPERATIONS PLA.NNIID
The monitoring of agent traffic, when combined with carefuJ.
evaluation, often made it possible to recognize the area in which.

the enemy was planning new operations.

If a considerable number of

new agent stations appeared in an area occupied by German troops,
it could be assumed with certainty that this area had been picked
far a major operation.

Hence the mere tact that such stations

appeared was enough to justify far reaching conclusions.

For in-stance, in the spring of 1944 there was considerable increasein agent traffic along the northern coast of France.

On 6 Junefollowed the invasion of Normandy.
Beginning in May 1944 an increase in the nttmper of F.nglish
stations in southern Greece and on the islands of the Aegean wasnoticeable.

In October mos·t; of these islands were occupied by the

Allies.
Beginning earl.y in June 1944 it vas noted the.t a center of
agent activity was developing on the French coast between Toulon
and Nice and in the Grenobl.e area.

Five weeks later came the Allied

landing.
In the very earl.y days of August 1944 agents were dropped byparachute in Holland, primarily around Eindhovou, where British
airborne forces were employed in September.
Moreover, the intention to shift the focal point of operationsin the east to Hungary wa.s revealed early in this manner.

323

RESTRICTEDThereRES ~f,DJ.~2010 n:I"" OL L JJ
was a regular parachute invasion by agents.
On 30 June 1944 the Germans captured the Russian parachutist
I

Beatrice Markovich south of Budapest.

Shortly thereafter the oper-

ator who had dropped with her was arrested.

Beatrice M. was sup-posed to use her knowledge of the lanauage to contact German officers
and gather military information.
On 9 July along the Slovak - Hungarian border east of' Rumennea group of Soviet agents was dropped and all efforts at apprehension
proved vain.
In the night from 26 to 27 July, 13 Russian
agents (10 men andI
I

three women) were dropped with two radio sets, explosives, ammunition,'

maps, etc., near Sarkad - Rokviese {east of' Beresaba).
I

I

Some werearrested or shot but most of them escaped.
I

In tl:ie Banat southwest of Novi Bejec, two English officers
I1

parachuted down in a uniform witb Soviet ste.ts.

\

They had four radiosI

along and were assigned to the English mill' lry mlssion to Tito,
for which they were to gather information f'rom the Banat and Belgrade.
Both escaped.
On 17 August nine parachutists vere dropped east of Grosswardein.
Two were arrested, one operator was sho·t in the melee, and anotheroperator was apprehended.
All tl~se cases indicated clearly areas which were to be focal
points of aetion in the near :future.
Beginning in mid-July 1944 a considerable increase in the number
of English agent stations behind the then southern front was noted.

RESTRICTEDRE~OO'JSEB2This was a sure sign of impending major operations in the area.
The most striking ex~mple of the extent to which impendingene~ action could berecognized by wa~ching the employment ofagents was to be fO\md on the east front between August 19L.4 and12 January 1945.

This was the initial phase of the final Russian

offensive.

.

Beginn.lng in August 1944 the Germans noted in the western partof Poland an increased employment of Russian reconnaissance groups
with radio equipment;
partisan radio.

they worked with the cl1aracteristics of

The individual groups were well armed and cam-bined into bands of several hundred·men.

They were in contact

with radio control stations in the Russian front area.
As the Russian front approached the frontier of East

Prussia,

the Vistula and Slovakia (late oc liober 1944) there was a change inthe employment of Soviet espior~ge and reconnaissance.

Ever sincesummer there ~d been a noticeable decline in reconnaissance in
depth and ln strategic espionage on the part of the highest Russianauthorities.

Apparent~ thereason was that a large number ofraids and German radio games had caused the value of this type oflong-range reconnaissance to sink in the estimation of the Russians.
Moreover, military operations had already prospered to such an
extent that the Russians could now dispense with strat~gic longrange reconnaisance, since for final success purely militar3
means, supported by tactical and operational reconnaissance, wereadequate.

825

RESTRICTED

32{tE§?.IlRBftD
ennan frontier had overtaken and left

The approach to lie

behind most of the partisan bands (except 1n Slovakip.) and thus
eliminated one of their principal sources of intelligence.

More-over, the Russians could no longer count ~o the same extent as
beforeon the cooperation o£ the natives.•

Espionage now became primarily a concern o£ the front staffs
and served chiefly for operational aims.

Agents were employed inareas where mill tary operations were planned and this shirt in theuse of agents was soon recognized.

The missions assigned b,y thefront staffs and the general staffs included reconnoitering basic
factors in the en~'s military defense.
were assigned.

F~~ sabotage missions

The groups .employed were to l:imit themselves topure intelligence work.

The Russian front staffs nbw received ]reconnaissance resultsfrom the following sources:
1. ·From agents: (eroups of scouts beyond the main lineof battle ranging to a depth• or almost .300km.)

2.

General reconna:tssance by' tl..:~ troops (air and ground).

,3.

Signal Intelligence (intercept service and crypta.na4r'sis).

4•

From evaluation of own sources (captured documents andstatements by p1-isoners).

The emplqyment of agents before the great Russian offensive
did not take place all at once but started slow~ about August

1944 and long before the front stabilized in October it indicatedthe focal points of coming operations.

Three principal periods oftime could be distinguished:

326

RESTRICTEDe..

To mid-October,b.

l rom mid-Octover to early December 1

c.

From early December to the beginning of the offensive.

1

If we examine the groups of agents el'II.Ployed in these periods
and their work, W: see clearly the focal points and lines of thrust
proposed.

It was interesting to see the almost unbroken sequence.

in which the Russians reconnoitered military objectives, supply
routes, fortifications, etc. in the areas of interest to them.

It

was patent that in East Prussia
where the German counterintelligencet
network was closer meshed, any .groups ~~iminated were always replaced by new ones.

That was proof that the Russians were especial-ly anxious to spy out this area.
Since ·the Russi~ls used a large number of these scout groups(average strength some 6 men with one operator), it was frequently
possible for them to check reports of several groups against one
another and e1imina:te some of the false statements which consciously or unconsciously appeared in agent traffic.
When groups were dropped, they were given the usual set "Sewer"(output about 2.5 watts, range about 500 km); the supply of' batteries was generally used up in i.""Wo months; consequen·tly if' a groupwas still operating after two months i·t was clear that it had been
supplied from the air.

That meant tha·t the Russian staff stressed

the achievements of this group, since only those groups whose work
came up to expecta.·tion were supplied by air; others were either
recalled or left to their f'a·te.

827

RESTRICTED

----------

B.r concentrating on areas o£ importance for impending operationa, the Russian ~ net became so dense that in such sections as
East Prussia, the Posen or Krakow area, virtua.l.ly every bit ofrailwq was under constant observation; other important military..

objectives were likewise constant~ checked b,y radio agents.
Regarding their conduct in the areas of commitment we shouldnote the following:groups employed in the sununer of 1944, inparticular on the 3rd White Russian Front, had some fighting
strength.

They genera~ consisted of some 15 qualified agents

under the command or a Russian officer and moved about in theirarea of commitment in the manner of a small partisan detail.

The.

results of their reconnaisance were very comprehensive, as wasseen from decrypted messages.
B,y a ver,y clever adaptation to the situation and b,y staying

in inaccessible areas, several individual. groups were able tocarey on their work successfu~ for months.

If such a group

found conditions favorable, it would recruit informers among the
local population or would use local people as watchers to wa.mof ~ danger.

The missions of these groups included, alongwith sp,ying out military objectives and reporting on transportation,
reports on the morale of the population, s.ubversive activity and occasion~ -sabotage.

They were also to watch Ger.man administra-

tive measures, the use of identification papers, police regulations,the economic situation and details on all leading personalities.

S28

RESTRICTEDWhen a great mass emplo,y.ment of scout groups began in
October 1941~, these groups had few·er people and theirmisa::l.ot•·· \orere more precisely defined.

to contact the local population.

.They lfere forbidden

Genna.n prisoners of war

were often assigned them for the procurement of provisions.
The missions were generaJJ.y to be completed by the time.

Russian troops a.rr:l.ved.
How successfulJ.y the Russians had prepared· for thisfinal, wholesale employment of scouts is apparent fromthe .fact that about 100 such groups worked uninterruptedl.y
for longer than two months and passed t.Iieir repo:rts byradio to theiz· emplqyers.

Moreover, more than 200 othergroups of radio agents were committed which \orere notdirect~ identified by the German monitors(the firstmentioned 100 groups \iere recognized positively!).

Thismeans that the final Russian grand offensive, which beganon 12 January 1945 and crushed the Gennan eastem front,
had been prepared for by some 3,000 agents with app~~te~500 radio operators!

Working with the security police and other agencies,
the German radio defense was able to break up approxima.te]3
100 scout groups in a period of about 4 mm1ths; this,however, was not even a third of the number commit-eed by
the Russians.

Nevertheless, what was learned in combatting

Russian radio agents was quite adequate to give the German
milltary command clear indications of the operational

329

RESTRICTEDRE~Ie:PmJ 2
intentions of the Russians and the proposed line of advance of their
a:t'ley" groups.
If the German top command had evaluated the reports as they
deserved and had shaped its own measures according:cy, the German
eastem front would not have been split up into single groups.
Rigid adherence to their own operational notions, contempt for
Russian leadership 1 disregard of everything which gave strategicand operational intelligence regarding the en~, and slavish
execution or the strategic ideas or the "greatest general. of alltimes" resulted in the smashing or the German eastem front withina few months.
No doubt the mass emplo.yment of radio agents greatlY facilitated the military success of the Russians.

They were able to gather

the ripe fruits of this activity so quick~ o~ because the Ger.mans
utter]3 rejected any active evalua;t.ion of the warning signs obtainedby monitoring Russian agent traffic.

Conscious:cy- or unconscious:cy-

one no longer tried to take effective counteDaeasures and to launch
ne\1 operations on the basis of the intelligence gained.

The upper

echelons simply allowed themselves to be guided by the will andwhimsy of Hitler.

One either was resigned or one placed hope in

the use of those fabulous wonder weapons of which there had been
so much talk for two years.
In no enemy offensive could the details be i'oxeseen so prompt~

and so completely as in the case of the Russian offensive of
12 January 1945 and in no other case were the results of our own
intelligence so utterlY disregarded.

330

RESTRICTEDFROL AND COMPAlVY

Get'lerally speald.J.'lg, the agen1;s and the:I.:r radio operators
were very co.utious and clever.

But there were some who 1 despite

their ability, were incautious and so prepared tor themselves a•
speedy end. A case in poin·t; vas the age11t l!'rol., etrg?loyed. in
Berlin by the Engl.ish.

Ivan Frol was a Croatian by birth who

bad bad an unstable l!fe as technician in Italy; Germany andSouth America.

In 1943 he was located by a. Yugoslav embassyin South America and sent to England as' one subject to military

service.

Because of his good knowledge of German, he was im-

mediately trained as an agent.

After several unsuccessfulattempts he was dropped by parachute near Heilbro~ on
2 October 1944 with his radio man Betzinger.

From there they

made their way to Berlin by train and found lodgings in BerlinCharlottenburg,. Sachsenplatz 5, an address given them in England.
Here they set up thelr radio se·t.
The two began work.

Their radio connection was good.

Frol gathered information which Betzinger forwarded to England.

That their work was not unimportant is obvious from a message
sent on 21 October 1944:"It is urgentl.y necessary to bomb the General. Staff
Buil.ding in the Bendlerstrasse.

Position is 100

meters NW of bridge over Landwehrlc.anal.

Destruction

will interrupt intelligence communication with all
fronts.

Reenforced concret roof 4 meters, walls

331

RESTRICTED

More exact. 1~eport follows by courier.

2-l/2 meters thick.
Source B."

The first rash act on the part of the two was to transmit
diligently without changing the location or their set so that the
Gennan intercept service soon noticed this new tratfic and leamed
the approximate J.gcation by close range D/F-mg.

Still it might

have been weeks before a raid tiOU.l.d have been possible 1 it Iwan
Frol had not been guilty of the same kind or stupidity that proved
fateful for so ~·He talked.

He liked especially to talk and drop hints during air raid
alarms and when he met a man with a Polish sounding name in the air
raid shelter near the Zoo and di.scovered tha.t the man lived in
Reichstrasse (in the same area as he), his ~ess disappeared
and he proceeded to tell how he ha.d come from England and dropped byparachute and that he had important things to do.

The man tdth thePolish name arranged to meet Iwan short~ thereafter at the cornerof Leipzigerstrasse and Friedrichstrasse.

He also reported thematter promptly to the police and Fzool was arrested at theirrendezvous on 28 October.
He immediately confessed ever.ytl~, identified his lodgingson Sachsenplatz and his operator.
The following da.y the police raided the station.

Betzinger

defended himself with a gun and lBS shot d<nm after a long exchangeof bullets.
With that the activity o£ this group was at an end.

RESTRICTED

THE OERMAN CHRISTMAS OFFENSIVE 1941~.
Who has forgotten the howl of triun~h in the National
Socialist press when on 16 December 19~ the celebrated German
Christmas Offensive, between st. Vith and Monschau brokeloose against the American First Army.

It was the lastoffensive which the armies of Adolf Ri·tler were to undertake.
The press b:..•oughli out article after article on the unconquered
and. unconquerable strength inherent in the Na·tional Socialist
State and :i.ts armed fo1•ces.

..

And. when the first successes

were recorded, people were fairly ·turning somersaults.
the Americans would be shown a thing or two!

Now

Ifow they were to

be driven back to France and annihila·ted in great battles ofencirclement.

Broadcasts were. made in the Flemish language,

appelaing to the population of Belgium to prepare for the newcoming of German troops, not to leave their cities but to wait
patiently far a new liberation.

Within a short time all Belgium

would be occup:J.ed.
But it did not turn out that way.

Attcr ten days, during

which certain successes were obtained, the German offensive
began to bog down; on 29 Decembc1• it was com.ple·tely stopped.
A bitter struggle began.

Then on 10 January the German

retreat started slowly.

The dream was over.

The offensive

had shown not how strong Germany still was but how little
offensive power was left in the German army.

839

RESTRICTEDHow was it possible for the relatively weak German forces toscore such remarkable initial successes1 How was it"possible forthe offensive to take the Allied High Command so completely bysurprise as to bring the American First Army into a critical
position1
The swift change in the military situation in the west in
August 1944 did not for the moment greatly change the radio agent
situation.

'fhese agent opera·tors did not move back with theretreating German forces but remained in their oWn areas.
After the :front had approached the German boundaries 1 theactivity of radio agents in ~~ance and Belgium fell off gradually.
Most of' them ceased sending during the second half of October.
In September 191~4 a new situation arose in the west.

TUl

then the Allied agents bad had an easy time working and building up
resistance organizations among the predominately anti~rman populations of' France and Belgium.

Now it was necessary to use

German speaking agents in German territory.

Such agents ,.rere

not available in great numbers and their work "Was not as easy
as that of the French and Belgians in ·the occupied territories badbeen.
At the northern end of' the front in Holland and at the southernend in the French Departments Doubs, Haute Saone 1 and Vosges conditions were more favorable for the agent.

Here he was given stout

support by the Dutch and French population.

Hence Allied spies

worked from the two ends of' the lli1e over into the German area of
operations.

It was possible to introduce into this area relatively

RESTRICTED

quic~ alarge number of agents, although many of them were

prompt:cy apprehended by the Germa.ns - not less than 1,..50 in
the single month ot September l944J
Sometimes the Germans were able to carr,r on ver,y profitable"radio games", e.~., on the southern sector in November 1944.

On

1 November they apprehended a French agent Le Touche as he crossed

the lines near LaForge with a radio set and various instructions.
He was "turned" and used for a deception which lfa.S maintained
almost two months.
Gradua.l.ly, hmrever, a kind of vacq~ arose on German soU
for the Allied radio agent service so that by the end of
October- 1944 this means of intelligence virtua.lly had to be
written off and no information was obta.i.ned regarding thesituation behind the German front.

That is why the Germans

were able to assemble troops :Cor the nchristmas offensive"quite unnoticed by the en~.
On 26.12.44 General Payton March, Chief ol Staff, statedthat the lack of dependable information on the militar,ysituation of Ger.rna.ny had been responsible for developmentson the western front.
On the same day one

u.s.A. intelligence agency reported

that the success of the Gennan offensive in the west was
attributed in official circles to the £allure of Allied
intelligence.

A clean-up was to be expected which would

extend into circles close to General Eisenh~rer.

335

RESTRICTEDEar:Q' in 1945 British and especial.l7 American intelligence•began building up a new network or radio agents' behind the German
front and in occupied H.Qlland :tn order to set reliable intorma.tion

on which to base tuture operations.
was successful.

Thitt !heaviq tinanced activity

In a tew weeks a 137stem. 4f I!ID.oothly functioning

agent stations came into being.

The last lfia,se ot the struggle inthe dark began and the scales soon tipped swiftq in tavor of theAllies.

938

RESTRICTED

u ...........l~fJ2___ _R:E~
A WONDER-WEAPON AND ITS HISTORI

Tho ~sult might be quite in~vresting i ! someone cared to taketho t:roublt9 to r@eor4 the nwnlJer of timea Hitle:r, Goel'ing, Goebbele,•
Milch, P1•itz•cho and many other leaders ot the 'lbi.rd Reich etated ·positive]¥ that air aupariority was decisive tor the oourae and outcan~

ot a .utodem war.
The validity o£ this statement is not open to critioiem,

World War II has supplied unmistakable proof.

It is all themore surprising then that the Gennan air force, which had manifested
decisive superiority in the fi1~st two years of the war, began to
decline in the first phase of the Russian campaign, one DUQ' even sq
had begun to decline (at first scarcely perceptabl.1', but then more
and more obviously) in the aut'¥1m of 1940.

After the campaign inthe west, after experiences in the "ai1• battle over England11 inAugust - September 1940, after experiences over Crete, etc., one
would have expected that every- effort would be made to develop
the Ge::nnan air force, especi~ since the German intercept service
and other means of :intelligence showed clearly that in England andin the UsA the value or the air fo1..oe in modem war had beenrecognized quiokzy' and the output. or the aviation industry was
being increased to the limit.

The figures reported from America

were so high as to challenge attention before the middl.e ot 1940.
Nevertheless, in the fall of 1941 it was. clear that the German
air force was being eclipsed and in 19421 when the British began

93'7

RESTRICTED.

air attacks on German territory1 people in Ge:rma.ny- asked anxiou~
what had, become of the German air force that was to prevent suchattacks.

The summer and autumn or 1942 showed that the German air

force no longer dominated the air over Gel'DJalJ1'•

How had this beenpossible?
To answer the question, it is necessary to recall the origins

ot the German air force.

It had been developed by a small groupor officers with a trl.gh degree or technical and tactical training.
These included Wever, Udet, Loeb, Kesselring and Jeschonnek.
Wever was a real strE.tegist and tactician, an ideal German general
starr officer.
tactics.

Udet was the leader in practical work and commitment

Loeb was the man or vision who planned and promoted theGem.an aviation industey.

Kesselring was a good organizer andadministrator - perhaps a bit too gradiose in his ideas but a manof ability- and energy.
planning.

Jeschonnek was the genius or tactical

The others who came into the picture were - apart froma few capable specialists - healthy and ambitious men looking
tor a career.

Wever was killed in an accident before the war.

Udet lost his life in the Russian campaign under peculiar
circumstances.

Loeb had a fatal accident in the summer of 1940.

Kesselring - ;yes, his was a peculiar stor,y; he became a General
Field Marshall and helcl high commands in Ita4r to the end of the war,
but strangq enough in the a.rmy rather than in the air force.

He

was a victim of the most debated person in the German air force:

838

RESTRICTEDGeneral Field Marshall Milch.

Maqy people have called Milch theevil genius of the Gennan air force; he was a career maker of thepurest sort.
Germany found no replacement for these men, or perhaps did

not lmow how to put the proper men in their places.

The declineof the German air.force began back in the swmner of 1940 andthis decline eventu~ proved fatal for the Third Reich andfateful for Ser~.
There were plenty of reasons for the gigantic catastrophiesof 1944 - 1945• Without question, one of the most importantreasons for the German collapse was German air inferiority from1942 on.
Mention has been made of the fact that the German intercept.
service recognized during the first half of 1940 that the development of the aircraft industry in the u.s.A,. was assuming alarming
proportions.

It was no great trick to figure out when the results

would begin to be manifest in the European theater.
People in the German Ministry for Air and in OKL underestimated the capacity of American industry and did not believethese reports.

Hitler himself called the figures "astronomic

and of no significance because they were. U'topian"•

Never-

theless it was certain that the struggle with the fast expanding
American superiority in production could on~ be carried on
success:ful.4r by' superior and clear sighted leadership.

889

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Even before the war, work on a new type of _propellerlessturbine- air streampr~ulsipn (jet aircraft) had led topromising results.

In the spring of 1938 the possible use ofsuch propulsion devices was discussed.

Computations
and pre..

liminary studies at the Messerschmitt plants from the fall of1938 to the spring of 1939 ·showed that a plane with the newdevice would have far more speed tban the old planes withgasoline motors.

Work began at once on plans for ·a "Stre.hljU.ger11

In June 1939 a project of the BMN* for a pursuit plane with
1;wo Jets was 1aid before the Ministry for Air.

This was given themodel designation "Me 262", which later became famous.

This model

corresponded, except for some minor details, to the final Me 262.
On the basis of this draft, the Ministry for Air ordered theconstruction of three experimental planes; construction was tobegin in 1939. Early in 1940 the e:x;perimental workshops werebusy producing devices and single parts and about the mid~e of1940 tbe fir~t plane reached the assembly stage.
This ~chine represented the first stage in a development
calculated to bring about a basic change in air warfare.
-were two reasons:speed and fuel economy-.

There

Speed is of decisive

importance in a prusuit plane and the first year of the war had
shown that the superior performance of German planes could hardly
be maintained in the long run because high performance gasoline·
motors were not available in Germany.

* BMW =Bavarian MOtor Works.
940

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RE~~~~ 2
It now appeared that the production of the jet power plant
could not keep pace with the development of the aircraft.

On

the one hand, great difficulties of a.purelY technical character
were encountered in developing and testing a new type of propulsion; on the other hand, surpriain&cy enough, an incompre-.

hensible laCk of interest in this revolutionar,y novelty wasdisp~edin official circles.

What happened was the exact.

opposite of what might rationally have been expected.

In thefirm conviction that the l'TS.r would end with a quick victory,
people thought that active furtherance or this work was not..

urgent.

They thought the jet plane would came out much toolate to pl.a.y' an important part. in the war.

This attitude

prevented suitable continuation and expansion of the intensive
work already done.

It is true that- a few people in the RLM

did have vision, but their effort came to naught "in official
channels" leading through their superiors.
Not to let time pass unused, the Messerschmitt Comp~installed a normal gasoline motor in the abbreviated nose of
the first experimental apparatus.

On lB April l9U the !-1e 262'(without jet propulsion) made i~s first flight.

Some valuable

information was gathered but the primary purpose - developmentof the ,jet planes - was not furthered.

Thus a full year passed,

a cost:Qr year that could never be made up for, because thedelivery of the first jet engine was dela;red a full year due to941

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inadequate support ot the compa117.

Fina.J.:cy, on 25 March 1942, theMe 262 started tor the first time with two BMW jets. ·Theseexperimental. flights showed,

however, that the engine 'lias not yet

up to expectations.

Meanwhile the Junkers Cam~, which was working on a similar
engine~

.

'

'

.

achieved a tair]J' good e.xperimental fozm and there was hopeot getting ahead faster with this model. A second Me 262 wasequipped with this engine.
middl.e of J~ 1942.

The first flights were made ~tbout the

The Junkers engines still e1howed various

defects, especially in regard to regulation, but they were reliabl.eenough to justifY experimental operation.
The pilot who tlew the plane was enthusiastic about its
pertomance.

.

It had now been proven that a wonder-plane had

actua.:L:cy been created.
In 1940 Schulze-Bo,ysen (s~e Rote Kapella case) learned ot thework on this new type ot aircraft.

He took a great interest in thematter but agreed with various high otticials ot the R1J4 that no
usable machine ot this type could be produced in the torseeable
tllture.

It mq be, ot course, that Schulze-Boysen was the man who

intentional.:cy' belittled the project in the Ministry tor Air inorder to sabotage developnent.

There is evidence that ho put

out propaganda against the Me 262.

Through Schulze-Bqysen theagents ot the "Rote Drei" leamed of the development and throughthem word reached England in 1942.

Here the reports were initial.l;rconsidered dq dreams and not until 1943 apparent~ was a;ny serious

ettort; made to SPY' out the truth.

Ear~ in 1944 England was

942

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fairlyRES'~D 32
well infor.med regarding the state of development.
Any sensible person would assume that after the brilliant

results of the first trial flight with the jet engine, people
in Ge:rmany would have done eve:cything possible to get thisdevice into assembl,y line production.

Quite apart. from somevaluable tactical advantages, the Me 262 with a ~ speedof 870 lan per hour affordE!d an advantage of more than 200 km
an hour over tbe fastest planes in the world.

And that at atime when all countries were on a so nearly equal footingthat they were straining ever:,v nerve to gaj.n an advantage of'even one kilometer.
Nothing of the kind happened. 'The Ministry for Air latein 1942 issued an order for a total of ; experimental planes(I repeat:

fiveJ) and 20 ,others which were to be delivered by

the end of 194:31

At the same time a program was worked out

providing for a production of 20 machines of the Me 262 typea month (I repeat:twenty a monthf).

Whenever before and during the war people compared noteson the three ar.med services, it was gener~ agreed that theGerman air force was relativel,y the most advanced., that it
acted most swiftly and took account or changing situations
faster than the others.

In the present case I should consider

the term 11sleepy headsn a piece or flattery.
no word for such an attitude.

There is absolutely

Obviously the people were notcapable of estimating even approximately the importance of this849

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new invention.

Perhaps there were people in the Ministr,y for Ail..

who didn't wish to.

But it was not onl.Jr the RIM which revealed

the lack of interest, even OKL clearly mani:f'estei the same indi:f':f'erence.

The Office or Development or the RLM addrsesed several

letters to the command or t:.he air force describing possibilities ot
using the device and offering to reveal the specifica~ions they
wished to make for this aircraft.
~ after

The l!tters remained unansweredl

repeated admonitions by RLM did a message come from ·hhecommand starr or the air force early in 19l~3 to the effect that the
number of jet planes ~ecified for deliver,r in the program was considered adequate and that atte~ gathering sufficient experience.atthe front this number might be increased at the expense or othertypes.

A~ the air force

staff was not concerned with ~ing

down any specifications for such an ail..cra.tt.l

That was the upshotof e:f'fort.s of. the German air force through "channels".
This didn't help the Gennan aviation industry - in this case
the Messerschmitt Company.

lihat the company needed was a sympathetic,

intensive furtherance of the project from above, su1ce the capacityof its plants was by no means equal to the current demands, to a~
nothing of providing for large scale production of the nell machine.
Before the Me 262 could go on the assemb~ line everything would haveto be rearranged and brought up to the minute, since the project was
alrea~ three years

oldJ

At the same time development, construction,and servicing of a numbe1~ of other types had to be carried on witha very small number of workmen and draftsmen.

The necessary techni-

cians could only be drawn from the aviation industry itself and for

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this the aid or the RIM was essential.

The total capacity of theGerman aviation industry was fairq great and if work had been.

concentrated on a relative:cy small number or critical. tasks, it.

wouJ.d have been possible to make ample deliveries or the taotical.:cynecessary types.

.

It was the duty or the IUJ-1 to exercise control

in this matter •. But'this was preoisezy where the leadershipfailed complete:cy.

Late in 1942 no less than 53 types or planes(disregarding various sub-types and series) were in use or underconstruction.

General Field Marshal Milch could not comprehend\

the need for changing this sitUation and did not. stand up against\

the special wishes or the generals in the' various services and it'

was due to these special wishes that the multiplicity of types
had been developed.

This explains wey the outp-11t of the aviationindustry was so much less than capacity.

It also explainsdifficulties of suppl;r and with the ground organization.
The agents of the "Rote Dreitt were very well informed
regarding these conditiona and numerous reports on the subject
went from Switzerland to Moscow.
Repeated suggestions by men in the industry that production
be limited to 6 or 8 basic types in order to get higher production
were not listened to by Milch.

In the face or such an attitude

all efforts at increasing production were virtuall.y doomed to
failure.

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Iri Aprill94.3 the 1-lesserschmitt Comp~ r~ succeeded inintere~ing the troops in the l-Ie 262.

Captain s., ante£ of an air

force testing command, .flew the Me 262 and was enthusiastic about it •.

He declared that even in the experimental model it could be used togreat advantage at the front.

One month later Major General Galland,;t•

took oft from Lechfeld on a fairq long experimental flight.
retumed great]J" impressed.

He

He was convinced that with tactics

adapted to the performance and peculiarities of this plane
air warfare would be complete]3 revol,utionized.

He called tor

deliVe%7 of 100 planes before the end Of 194.3 and for the building
as soon as possible of large numbers - in addition to the previous
program for fighters with gasoline motors.

He promised to convince

Hitler through Goering that the Messerschmitt Com~ should begiven the necessa17 support.

Shortly after Galland's visit MUchcalled tor detailed plans for assembq line production ot the Me 262
and promised to take special measures to assure supplies.

At thesame time he stopped production of several other machines.
Gall.and's request tor d.elive%7 or 100 machines by the end of'1~4.3

could not be complied with, - too much time had been lost.

'l'his number could not be tumed out untU May 1944 at the earliest.
Quick production in s~ries could only be guaranteed if the RLM met
the conditions Mrl.ch had been discussed repeatedly.

These were:

1.

Giving the Me 262 top priorit;r.

2.

Absolute protection or the workers against clafms or theanned !orces (hero catcher program).

3. Prompt fulfillment of detailed, specific requirements in theway of material, machines, men and space.

946

RESTRICTEDA few weeks after the Mescherschmitt company stated its
requir~nentsJ

R.IH.

it was clear that these could not be met b,y the

Obviously no progress could be made without the aid of

Speer, Minister of Annaments.

The chainnan of the Messerschmitt

board, Seiler, then h#ld a conference ea1..ly in July 194.3 with
Sauer in the Mi.nistry for Armaments and la.id before him various
facts:

that in the view of General Galland and other experienced.

officers the Me 262 afforded the air force an unparalleledopportunity, that the RlM was not in a position to suppl,y themen and machines necessary for the program, that General Field..

Marshal Milch had shown no sympathy with the suggestion thatthe number or types in production be cut below 53 to getcapacity for the Me 262, and that in consequence the support
or the Ministr.r for Armaments wao urgent~ needed.

Using

reports from agents in France, President Seiler endeavored
to prove that the air superiority of the Western Allies wasincreasing from week to week although the -eornma.nd of theGerman air force was not drawing the proper inferences fromthis fact.
Saur pointed out that he had been told a few days before

by Hitler to take charge of the construction of submarines
in order to increase greatly the production of these vital

weapons.

For this reason alone he would not be in a position

to intervene activel.y.

Moreover, he thought that Seiler ~1as

too pessimistic in his view of the air situation.

RESTRICTEDThe enem1

was suffering in its attacks losses which it could not stand in thelong run.

At the present t.hE:tre was goirig on a test of.morale which

had to be won.

In spite or 'all the ai.r attacks since the spring of

194.3 oD4 eight percent of Gorman industr,y had been put out of operation by the beginning of July.

I

The onq decisive weapon was the sub-marine; he was confident that subna.rine warfare would be resumed on alarge scale in November 194.3.
It is hard to erq which of Saur's lines of thought was the more
surprising.

World War I had clear~ shown that submarine warfare

does not decide a war.

Now, when tho Allies were combatting sub-marines effectively with their radar, one could no longer count on
a success with this weapon, even if thousands were employ-ed.
Regarding the inc1•easing superiorit:r of the enemy as a temporary
test of morale ·when America was just starting to produce bOJnbers ·is simp]3 incomprehensible.

One can onq comprehend it if one
II

assumes that Saur was getting his information on other countries
solel3 from the broadcasts of Hans Fritsche.
Arter an interview lasting nea.rl,y two hours, Seiler left
Mr. Saur with the impression that ·~he latter simpJ,y did not comprehend the simple tact that a modern war cannot be waged with ~prospect of success without clear superiority in the air.
soon to get a sharp lesson.

the score was.

Speer wasThe British attack on Hru:nburg showed what

In the wake of this catastrophe Saur del.:f;vered alecture at Hitler's Headquarters and mentioned Seiler's suggestion.
He said he would be ready now to take over the guidance o:r theaviation indust1~ but on condition that he be given full respon-

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sibillty.

The German leaders, however, were not at that time

reaqy for ~ such incis~ve measures.

Again months tiere allowed

to pass and this l'Ta.s in the summer of :1.943 after the di~aater inNorth Africa, after Sicily, after Stalingrad, when Allied air
raids were increasing in number and violence.
In September 1943 Seiler approached General Field Marshal

Milch once more, supported this time by Director General Fr,ydag

or Goering's council.

The two gave Milch their-opinion that a

number of models of the Messerschmitt, Dornier, Jur.U<ers andFocke-Wolf lines must be dropped to get capacity for the Me 262.
But if the gentlemen had assumed that under the :f.;lfiuence ofthe Hamburg
diaster Milchwould grasp the need for new.
.
revolutionar,y decisions, then they had deceived themselves
mightily.

Milch accused Fryda.g of accepting bribes .from theMesserschmitt concern because he was representing its interests.
The interview was fruitless; not a single type was dropped.

The

motto everywhere (not. merel,y in the air .force and RLM) was''wash lii3" hide but don't get me wet I" The fact that this was
jousting with windmills and evading the issue, that theaviation industry had on~ limited resources and was heavi]Jr
overburdened, either was not comprehended or else people
purposely closed their eyes and played strong man.
we have to do it~ neverthelcssf"

"Oh~

well,

strong words, bu-& feeble brain

work.

Air Force Program number 223, drawn up late in August 1943,
provided for serial production of the Me 262 in Januaey 194J.f. andfor an increase to 60 planes per month by 1'-tay 19~+'+•~4 ~)RESTRICTED

Beginning.

in October 1941~ after a complete change over to large scale

production, the output was to jump to a maximum of 1000 planesa month in September 1945 - I repeat: 1945. i.e.,two full years
If this program was nonsensical at a :t;;lme when the air

a.wEq.

superiority of Britain and u.s.A. was becoming more ma.nife~t
ever,r dq and when onJ,y quick action could be of any avail, it
was obvious that the program was a mere pipe dream in view of
the inability of the RLM to meet the requirements of the
Messerschmitt Compa.ny.

All these pregrams :were drawn up withan eye to their propaganda value, I!JO that the proponent might~ £he strong man in lecturing on the
Hea~ers

subject at Hitler'sand perhaps get a decoration.

British and American ai.r activity over Germany shOlfed that
assemb~ linere~production of aircraft in Allied factories had

started.

The restoration of Ge~ air superiority had

become a vital matter.

The problem could only be solved by

a complete break with previous methods.
Meanwhile the British agent service had not been asleep
and as a result people in England were fully aware or the danger

threatned b,y the Me 262.

The,y decided to act.

On 17 August

there was a heav.y bombing attack on the Regensburg p~nt which wasbactcy- damaged.

It was due solely to the initiative of a fet"' ofthe leading men that production could be resumed in a relatively
short time.

The system of moving, camoufla.eing and protecting

the workshops had justified itself completely.

Neverthelessvaluable time had been lost onco more.

950

RESTRICTED~

R ES§:§i... tt~1132~.L'-.L... - . . . . ,In October 1943 the rnanager in Reeensburg induced Goering
to agree to inspec·l; the reconstructed plant.

At the same time

he wished to hear all complaints about inadequate support or
the Me 262 program in the pa.st.

On 2 November Goering appeared• with }.IUch, Gall..and, General Vorwald, Colonel Diesing andseveral engineers o£ the RU-1.

President Seiler had agreed•
with all his men to take tull advantage of this one favorable.

opportunity to tell Goering all their desires and all their~complaints, even though the gentlemen t:ronr. the RLM and Milchmight not be exact~ deliehted.
Reichsmarshal1 Goering opened the meeting by requesting
the gentlemen of th~ Messerschmitt Company to apeak quite
openlY and set forth a11 their desires and complaints.

In theconference, which lasted several hours, tht~ history of the
Me 262 was given in detail and. with absolu1:.e :frankness, likewise

all ef.forl:.s to secure machines and personnel, which thus far
had brought no satisfactory results.

Using tables and diagrams

they demonstrated that' because of lack of hundreds or technicalmen, production was so far behind that the delivery dates suggested in the program would have to be deUcy-ed by months,
entirely due to inadequate support on the part or the autQ.orities.
The statements by the men at the Messerschmitt Company l'rere
confirmed by a starr engineer .rrom the starr or Colonel Diesing,although Field J.farshal Milch kept popping up with objections
llke a jack-in-·lihc-box.

S51

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After four hours the meeting came to an end.

Goering promised

to see to it that construction should be furthered so as to makepossible the production of considerable numbers of machines.

The

truth of the matter is, however, that Goering"ts visit did not help ..
the Messerschm:ttt Company at all, although alJ. the leading men
reminded the offices concerned of the promises made b.f Goering.
It is en elementar,y observation that the employment of a newweapon can o~ be successful if

1.

it comes as a surprise and2.

it is used in great quantities.

If this is not done but the weapon is used in homeopathic doses,
the enemy has a chance either to imitate it or to invent a moans

ot defense, or to change hie tactics and adapt them to the newsituation, or to interfere with production of the new weapon.
Obvious~ there

could be no thought or surprise.

It soonappeared that the British and Alllericans were starting to change
their tactics for the safety of the bombing squadrons.

The criticalfactor 1 however, wa.s that the general. air superiority of the Allies
ha.d already increased to a point where they couJ.d begin systematic
destruction or the German air force and or the aviation industry
thus reducing the stock of airplanes and also preventing mass
production or jet planes.

One plant after the other was attacked

and production sank rapid:cy.

Moreover the German air force '\'TaB used

up in the efforts to combat the invading planes.

The Allies had

already deal.t the German air force a frightful blow by the attackon the Experimental Institute of the Air Force near Peonc-nJJnde
952

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and the mass emplo.yment of fllfng bombs had been postponed
indefinitely.

Both the "Rote Drei" and the British radio

agents had meanwhile picked up so much infozmation thatpeople :i.n England and the Soviet Union were pretty wellinformed on the s~bject of the jet plane.
Prodded b,y the Allied air attacks, the Supreme Commandt~ decided to dosomething for the air force.

In March

1944 when the sparrows were already chirping about the coming
Allied invasion, the ttJr.tgerstab" was f~r.med under saur, a staff

ot men from the Annament Industry of Speer. This office controlled labor, machine construction and the procurement ofmaterial, as well· as transportation.

Actua.J.:cy' this transfer

of responsibility for producing pursuit planes brought
extraordinary results.

Aircraft production reached a figure

several times as high as in the dqs when the pl.ants werestill :intact.

There was large scale shirting and bunkeringof production facilities.

The "J!lgerstabtr signified for theaviation industry a great boost by rendering available all
those things which the Air Ministr.r never had at its disposal.
But this was no longer the point.

It was· now necessa.r;y tocreate something absolutely new and that could not happen.
There was no change in the basic attitude of the top command.
The countless types continued to be built; the chief emphasis
was shi.t"ted to production of fighters but the production of$59

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-·-bombers ot all sorts still tied up a large portion of od.Xisting
capacity-.

It was no longer a question of equaling the production

ot the English and American industry but ot catching up and surpassing it; of course this was not possible.

Therefore the o~..

wq of regaining air superiority was by building the greatest

possible number of tar superior fighters.

It was necessar,r toshoot down so Dl8llY hostile bombers that the eneJey" would fallbehind in the race.
~

The l4e 262 was not immediately affected by the "Jigerstab".

Its principle duty was to overcome as quickly as possible theresults ot ~r attacks and to increase production.

Neverthelessthe general support also aided the Me 262 in modest measure sothat the fi1•st serial numbers could be delivered to the l:.roops
beginning in March 1944.

To put it mild:cy', that was late enough.

The use of the machine by test units of the air force inBavaria against hostile reconnaissance planes and long-range
fighters definitely established the superiority of the Me 262
over aQY other aircraft.

The number or planes shot down andthe moral effect of this new type aircra..tt had the result thatfor weeks no en~ reconnaissance planes ventured into thisarea.

These results justified the assumption that the jet

pursuit plane Me 262, if properly employed, "'"'uld restore air
superiority in a short time.

The results of the intercept service

revealed that the English were not only giving much thought to the

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Me 262 but were 'seriously worried lest the Germans succeed in
producing the machine in la.J:>ge quantities.

From this it could

be inferred that neither the English nor the Americans had a.

model capable of opposing this aircraf't.

Even if theysucceeded in copying the machine, it would be a long time
before it coul.d be" employed by the Allles in quantity.

The

last chance had come for making extensive use of this 'trea.pon..
All the more astounding was the news that Hitler at thistime had ordered that the Me 262 be used as a high-speed
bomber.

Why this order was given never became clear.

are indications tbat Milch advised it.

..

There

It is also quitepossible that Hitler, in his impulsive headstrong .fashion,
hit upon the idea and put it through.
£or purely propaganda purposes.

In any case it was done

The German people and theenemy were to be shown that the .German air force. was still
able to drop bombs on the target unscathed.

So the German

propaganda machine raced away madly and Fritsche got a newlease on life.
Of course the Me 262, like ~ fighter plane, could
carry bomb loads tor certain purposes but in the firstmodel as a straight fighter plane l~thout sights for bombing the success was bound to be slight and not worth while.

As came out ultimate~, the effect of such missions was
unimportant.

A11 efforts to get the order rescinded failed.

General Galland, who s~w hiln.sel:r robbed of the onq chance

RESTRICTEDRES~T~N32
1 n:1
X>
to 1ead his f~ghters to success, retired in vexation after vain
attempts to alter the situation.
o£ the question.

Hitler forbade aQY discussion

England breathed a sigh of relief •. This story shows how far the German Supreme Command failed
to.assess correctly the tactical possibilities of the air forceIand in part:tcular the value of the jet fighter.

OnJ.y at the

beginning o£ the war was the employment of the air force
correctly pl.a.nned and executed, and this was due solely to-the foresight and hard work of a few men who were no longer ~•Charge and for whom no adequate successors had been found •.Later on everything was improvisation and was based on propaganda
considerations.

This explains the commitment or the air force,the mailY' types, the constantly changing construction programs,-and the changes demanded all the while by the troops, which
together with the incompetence of the leading figures of the RLM,
hampered iihe German aviation industry.

When the Allied landing

took place earl¥ in June 191.4 and the German Air Force was hard.:cy'able to impede, much J.ess to stop enemy operations, the lack ofa stro~ air force t'll"B.S felt keenl;r.

Only then did people in the:highest places see in the Me 262 a means of regaining air
superiority.

Saur meanwhUe had expanded his trJ!!gerstab"to an arma.111ent staff which wa.s to look after the entire
armament industry.

In this cor.nection he had taken aircraft

production over into th~ field or competence or the Ministr,rfor Armaments.

In his proposed program dated 22 June 1944

Saur called for sharply increased production o£ the Me 262 witha montll:cy production of 500 planes by December 1944.

'.RESTRIC.TED

The program'oould not be fulfilled.

Too little preparator.rwork had been done and production or parts was far behind, due
to want or technicians.

The requests ~r the Messorschmitt

Company for equipnent experts and tool makers were forever
being questioned; several commissions were appointed to check.

on the domand.s, although these al.ways turned out to be justified•.A:Uocations remained absolutely inadequate and at this time couJ.d
not be satisfactory.

It was too late.

As a resuJ.t, the needfor common labo~ers to keep production going increased all thewhile.

There was also a demand for experts and administrators.'

for the numerous depot workshops and to look out for a large
number of foreigners who had been employed.

Even tho Annamont

Staff was no longer in a position to meet the requirements of
the Messerschmitt Company in tull.
In the spring of 1944 the ~es began their attacks onplants making synthetic gasoline.
l'l8.S bad:cy damaged.

One plant after the other

During the summer a point was reached where

the resulting shortage of aviation gasoline forced the aircommand to limit radio~ the number of types.

A number oftypes which had been ready for replacement before 1943 were
now discontinued.

The Messerschmitt Company thought thiswould release overseers, experts and machines for tho Me 262,
and permit a rapid increase in production.

Instead, Hitler inAugust ordered the construction of a 1-TL-Fighter of T,ype 162.
This is the stor.y:

the Heinkel Company had meanwhile been

RESTRICTED"WOrking on the developuent ot a jet tighter and developod a cheap
model. with onl7 one jet.

Const.ru:ction 'traG completed in the S\mlr.l.Or

ot 1944. It was the above mentioned Type 162. It l'laS to bo put.

on the assembly line and be used early in 1945. in lo.rge numbers •The period from. initial production to serial production W"d.S not

to exceed nine JllOI'lths; in the light ot Messarschrni1.t' s cxpor-lonce

this was an impossibility, sinco there would be tho sc.rno difficulty
in regard to personnel, machines, etc.

Even assuming that 'l'ypG 162

was c.'teaper than Tfpe 262, even if we grm1t that it was simpler 'and hence could be built more ra.pi.d:cy, yes, even 'lf we grant. thatII

it would perhaps be better than 'l)'po 262, wo must neverthele3s
conclude that in this case the better was not more~ tho foe ofthe good but became tho foe of the entire cause.

The time when

this decision was made was not a ouitab1e time tor trying timc,consuming e:lqlerim.ents.

There was time in 191+0, not in 1944.

The

Me 262 'WaS already thorough:cy tested, \f&S on the p1•oduct. i.on l i. nt'
and Called for 2,000 hours, 1n othor 1\"0rdS l'laS cheap.

Jt lrr.l.S~ necessar,y to develop the necessar,y ca~city for mass productior..

Instead ot getting larse scale production of this model goine#recourse was lu'.d once more to the schema of oplittinz up Ir.c~.tcl.•i.c.land personnel and - instead of reducing t!le nt:r.J.hcr of types, ()DC"
mo:rc type l·!~s put into proc.11ction.
cxr.~rlc.::.co.\ccordin.:; to i l l p1· ..~viou.s

tho rccult could only b~ th:-.t noithe:t" tho OilO no~" th,.

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Furthermore T,ype 162 was inferior to Type 262 in one respect andit also was based on a jet motor or the BMW which was not yet inlarge scale production and was not yet. technical:cy right.

The

whole thing boiled down to rival.ry between the two firms, whichmeant a wastage of energy-.
Early in October 1944 there were large new drafts for thearmed forces and the Messerschmitt Compaqy was not spared.

If

the quota demanded by' the armed forces had been released, theproduction of the Me 262 would have been out of the question.
President Seiler went to see Goebbels as plenipotentiar,y for
utilization or man-power since he ~s responsible for the newdraft calls.

The interview took place on 10 October in Berlin ••Dr. Goebbels expressed astonishment that the long promised"wonder weapon" was not yet coming out in quantity.
gave him the whole stor,y of the· Me 262.

SeilerThereupon Dr. Goebbels

sent his Chief of the Personnel Division, Dr. Schultz vonDratzik, to check up on the spot.

He found that what Seiler

had reported corresponded with the facts.

Goebbels now

intervened and the Messerschmitt Compaqy were excused fromsupplying men to the anned forces and were assigned a numberof first class specialists and other urgent:cy needed helpers.
But the basic question of changing the entire aircraft program
could net be solved even by' Goebbels.
The occupation of the Ruhr, the loss of Upper Silesia
and the unrestricted air superiority of the enemy ushered in
the final phase or the war.

The German armament industr,y had

359

RESTRICTEDRESRfRJe:::P~ 2

to~ contend with extraord.ina:ry difficulties.

Hitherto the unparallel-

ed discipline of the German people as a whole had rna~e it possible
to keep the work going in spite of' cons~ant attacks on the cities.
Now a new phase of the air war began:means of communication.

.

~

the s.rstematic destruction of

The dispersion of manufacturing plants,

which had been accomplished in. the preceeding years, now presented
almost insoluble problems when no~ transportation ceased.

The

German air force was frittering· itself awa:y and using up a large

portion of its strength in the counterattacks of Januacy 1945.
Wa.s no longer able to keep the enemy 'from achieving his aim.

It
The

Ger.man people waited in vain for an effective employment of the new''wonder weapon".

Onl.y rarely- did· one hear of the use of individualmachines which indicated the unu~ superiority of the Me 262.

But

the tot~ inadequate tactics prevented aQY decisive success.
Everywhere in Germany- you could see the !ole 262 just as you could thebazooka (Panzerfaust) which was on disp~ in offices, armories,
omnibuses, guard houses, etc., ever,ywhere except where it could be
used in great numbers.

It was disheartening to see the Me 262

standing by the dozens on airfields ready to start and offering aperfect target for hostile bombers and fighters.
start did not come.

~?

-I do not know.

The order to

It was no longer possible

to protect the aviation tndustr.Fitself from low-flying hostilo\

aircraft.
In the last three months of the war events crO\ided one anotherand in administration and command circles there 1o~ero pot.:crful ltJords
and reDounding phrases ~hich ml'lrely served to dise;uise the ch:-.<.m ..

RESTRICTEDFinally they had become a."t-rare of the fact that tho ~~e 262 shouldbe the focal point of production.

Production of all othermodels, including the Me 162, which had bogged down because ofpoor tests results and the unsatisfactor,r condition of the
B~N engine,

was stopped.

If that had been done a year earlier

it would have made sense, nmf this hasty measure only resulted
in snarling up production as a whole.

Sauckel, Gauleiter ofThuringia, promised Hitler in resounding tones an additionallarge scale production of the Me 262 in his plants, giving
incredibly near term delivery dates to which it was obviously
impossible to adhere.

In February 19L.5 Degenkolb, who had

become prominent by his successes in the program for building
locomotives, was put in charge of the production of the Me 262
and given plenipote~tiar,y powers.

Four weeks later Speer had

to tul•n over the Me 262 program to the SS, which had longsince betrayed ito tntention of getting control of indus·t:.ry.
55-0bergruppenf~rer and General der Waffen-SS Kammler was

appointed by Hitler Commissar for the Me 262; he had all
authority and placed his officers in all plants engaged in ~10rk
on the machine.

But it was too late to think or any \fell coor-dina.tad production.

'l'he swift advance of the Allies made itnecessary to move the shops into those pares ot· southern
Germany which were still unoccupied.

Transportation l'ro.s sucha problem that a large part of the material was often on the

Sn:iRESTRICTED

m.il'W33" or highway. for long periods..

Anyone with a grai.n of scns'3

was already convinced that a.ll efforts were now useless.

Kamm.ler,however, continued issu:i.ng ~is unintelligible directives and threatened to have his SS-men shoot anyone who did not follow out his
instructions at once.
The advance of the Allies bacame more and more rapid.
entire area of Germany wae occupied.

Soon theTho hist:.o:cy of the Me 262 came

to_ an end.
I have not described the struggle of the Messerschmldt CompaQY

in behalf of the Me 262 in this volume to give prominence to the con-cern; there were other co~1pnnies. in the aviation industry of no lessimportance whose perfon&~ce merits equal recognition.

The stor,y has

been told because it involves a matter of decisive importance for thecourse of the war and because the history of the Mo 262 is typical orconditiona in Gei'IIlail3'.

On the one: hand, manifestations o.r real. genius
I

-

'1.

••

... -

on the part of the indi.vidual. scientists and technicians, on the other

hand, the failure to recognize the big opportunity because of the
obstinancy and indifference of men.in hir~ positions.

Activo, untir-

ing effort on the part of individual industrialists and long drawn out
handling or affairs by high officials; mighty plans intondad to make agQOd impression, which could not possibl\r be carried out;

consciouc

c:J..osing of the eyes to the ca.tastr.ophic sertouoness of the oituation;
working at cross purposes by the individual abencies, and the waterine
d0\,'I1 or any really great plan "in official channels".

This is symbolic

not mere]¥ for the He 262 1 but a'-'tually for everythlnr. that happened inGermany.

Consequently in the histol"Y of the l{e 262 ,.,..E.: rco..UJ' have a bitof the hi.story of the Gorman p•~opl«?.
!l·~~

RESTRICTEDBROADCASTING IN WORLD WAR II
A fat volume might be written on the propaga.nda broadcasts ofthe various belligerents of Wqrld War II.
person will do this.

No doubt soma competentIn this volume we sha.ll ~mention broadcast

propaganda in a general way, in particular with regard to the mannerin which it was reflected in the intercept service.

....

The word "propa.gancle" has gotten a bad conn\)":.ation during thelast decade and a half' since, untortunatel,y, we ha.ve had toaccustom ourselves to its use, not to gain recruits tor a goodcause but to force upon others against their will ideas which areneither good of themselves nor useful to those upon whom they are
imposed.

Things have gone so far t~t there is a general avcrs.i.on

to everything connected lfi.th propaganda and an immediate resistance
where propaganda is even suspected.
The different countries made use of broadcasting in different
w~s,and certain developments resulted in all countries on thebasis of observations made.

If I mention so-called broadcast

propaganda, I do so with reference to the role which broadcastingp~ed

as a means of psychological warfare.

The use of broadcasting as a menns or propage.nda by government
originated in the Soviet Union.

In this federation the enor.mous

possibilities were recognized which centr~ controlled broadcastinghas forpropagating specific ideas.

With revolutionar,y resolution

they set to work and created a mighty organization for the use of

36S

RESTRICTEDthe government and the Communist Party.
In human af'f'airs one must always be very- cautiolUS about making

comparisons.

This is especially true when comparing .f'orms of' govem•

ment, countries, peoples, and the like.

Of' course this mq be done

objectivaq in order to recognize dif'f'erences·, · but one must guard
carei'ul.:cy' against attaching any estimate of' value.

These are sure

to be one sided and to yield a distorted picture.

Thus if we observe the type of Russian broadcast propaganda
within the limits of' the Soviet Union, we find much that is very'.

primitive.

However we must not forget that Russian internal pro-.

paganda is intended f'or the Russian worker and peasant, who stands
on a low mental level, and that it is calculated precise]¥ .f'or his
concepts and his attitudes.
circles.

Consequent~ it

has its effect in these

The extent to which it achieves its aim of' affecting theentire population was shown clear]¥ during World War II.
When the Russians broadcast in the same manner in German toGermans, then they sho"tred that they knew little of the soul of theGerman people.

On]¥ during the course of the war did they learn totake actual conditiona into account, both regarding what they must
sq to the German people and to how they must S&"j" it.
But in spite of' ever,ything, Russian broadcast propaganda p~ed
only a subordinate role during the war.
effectivene~s

It began to have a. certain

only when captured German generals, officers andenlisted men appeared on Russian broadcasts and addressed theirmessages to the German people and the German soldiers.

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Ps.ychological warfare had begun in Europe long before
the outbreak of open ho~tilities.

Soon after the assumptionof power by National Socialism, an ardent effort was made to
proclaim lou~ tQ the world the National Socialist doctrine
as a panacea for all countries and all peoples.

In con-.

junction with other "cultural accompl:i.shments•• or National
Socialism (struggle against the churches, struggle against
labor unions, persecution of Jews, subjugation of the press,
concentration camp~, etc.,) this activity aroused opposition
in all foreign countries and this opposition found expression
in foreign broadcasts.

In reality these were not counter'
propaganda transmissions but merely efforts to discuss thovalidity- of National Socialism and its practical methods,
coupled at times with corrections of National Socialist
claims, insofar as they- were applied to other countries.• But
even that was enough to make the National Socialists denounce
these broadcasts as pure propaganda and atrocious lies.
The British were ver,y reserved in this matter.

The

French, on the other hand, were somewhat more act~ve, and intime (beginning about 1936) the Strasbourg transmitter became
the mouthpiece or liberal democratic ideas.

1

RES1 RICTED

Indicative ot the skepticism. with which Nat:i.onal Socialist
propaganda was secretl,y viewed in Germany is the tact that theStrasbourg broadcasts were listened to by eve:r;yone who had asuitable receiver.
Even at that time people in the Ministry of War and Ministr.ro:t Propaganda in Berlin were aware that in any future war a largepart ot the population would regularly listen to the broadcasts otother countries.

But since National Socialist propaganda ~~rked

chiefl7 with invented ~r distorted arguments. there was serious
danger involved in listening to foeign broadcasts, because
untruths are onq effective when there is no ·one on the spot
to disarm them by a convincing presentation ot tho truth.

An attempt was made to render the German. people immune tof'breign broadcasts.

This was to be done primarily by shi.ft.ing

the whole German broadcasting program over to wire radio.

The:instruments were to be so devised that it woul.d be absolute~imposil~le to hear foreign broadcasts ..

This was a gigantic program and considerable timo must elapse
before it could be realized in full.

The preliminary stage wa.s

represented by the so-called "people's r.eceivern l'Jhich was planned
to receive onq qerman transmissions.

When l'Vorld ~far II broke out,

wire radio was still in its earl,y stages.

It 1-ms necessary to findsame other ~ ot keeping foreign broadcasts from the Ger.man people.

RESTRICTED

It ~as deoidod - ldth clk~actorictic Nation,ii ~~cialist U1orouglness - to uae the univoroal cure of strict prohibition.

The

death p.sna.lty 11as fixed for listening to foreign broadcasts.
They even 1-rent so far as to include liaten:ing to broadcastsof allied countriel5 under the e.--we ban.
It l1as been claim~d that the Natio1'lal SocialistG 't:ere
In general that is true.

good psychologists.

At l.ea.st by

personal. experience they recognized aJJ. the I!,Ot?8,tive o.spects

ot German character and took the point ot view that their .2!mattitude, j;h~ .2li!! inner inferiority m-Ust be as6Um.ed to bepresent in all other people.

Thoy lmow perfectly uell. that thebroadcasts of other· countries would be listened to in spite ofa:u prohibitions.

But in order to reduce to a. minimum. theresul.ting dangers, they established that maximum penal.ty tor

listening and passing on what had been heard.
choice.

They had no

Their system ot having everyono spied on by oveeyone

else would see to it that listening to f.o1..eign broadcasts did
not get _out o:t: band.

Immediatel.T af'ter the outbreak of tbe war t.he French
started a violent agitation., using tranfllllitters in Strasbourg
and Paris.

It was directed against the l~a.tional. Socialist

government ot Gel'IDa.IIY and its responsibility tor bringing on•

RESTRICTEDWorld War II. 'The management of this propaganda was poor.

One

attempted to use a clumsy instrum~t on a. clums.v objec.t and in sodoing caused more dama.ge than would be suspected.
When the militar;y events tumed against France in J.9l,O, thebroadcasts of the above mentioned stations bec~e a wild scolding
and with that lost all effectiveness.

These transmissions werelistened to onlJ' with loathing and shrugging of shoulders.
Somewhat more clever were the transmisoions of the British
broadcast stations but they revealed such a lack of lmowledge ofactual conditions in Ge~ that the listener often had to shakehis head.

Had the English been asleep these past six years?

Didn't they know what had happened in Ge:rm.any since 19.3.3? rlhat
had became of their celebrated "Secret Service"?

If it hadn't

learned more than appeared in the sometimes dot·;nri~t simple
propaganda, then the British \i'ere indeed ba.d:q orr.
Many of the statements made coul.d be checked a.t once andshown to be incorrect.

No, propaganda, if it trere to bo crmmed bysuccess, was not that simpleS

One got the impression thnt a. numborof newspaper reporters were t10rldng here contusecl:cy' tdthout
centralized control, without any comprehension ot the ectU31
situation in Ge:rsneny.

OilJ¥ the report.s on events in Englend

and America were of interest, including report.s on thG sesoions of
Parliament, on the industrial situation, on ideas rec~rding thotuture course of the tro.r.

From these it uas so!:let:i.!l1.os posoiblo

to d.ratf a1J. sorts of deductions, frequently more th:::m - frc:n a.

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militn.ry point, or vit~,.,. - wan good .tor t;he Bri.tlsh..

But since

pooplo in Gcr.many wero dccuat.omed to regard broadcasts as pure

propa.gmd.a,. thoy e;ave no credence to those report,s to wh:teh itwould have bean wiso to pay sane att~ontion.
1'here wa.s a basic change when B:r.andc:m Dracken took over
the Mlnistr:y of Propa.r,ru1d.a.

The wey in which the entire st;yle

or broadcasts to forolgn countries ch...mgod in about. four weeka
was real]Jr e.tr.UdJlg.

From an w1sm•e and tor·t.uous path, one

shifted resolutely l..o the only cor1-ect path unuer the circumst8llces -to the path of t.ruth.ruJ.., fn.ct.ua.l reporting..

Peopl.G in Gennany' hadplenty or int,rusive propaganda. and because people knew that. thepress and the radi.o were not. describing th:i.n~s as they were,
but j.n the wa:y National Socialism m<~an t them to be regarded
by the Gel'Dl8.11 people, there developed a real hunger for some

objective reporting on burrting quest.ions or immediate andvital importance, n reporting \tlaich ahotl.ld be free trom scolding,.
accusation, self-glorification, and distortion.

n1e British

didn •t need ~o do any'Lhing nlOl"EE than tell l:he German people thetruth.

That w..ts enough.

That alone was so hard and a.nn.:i.hilat-

ing !or National. Socia.lisn that., any added propaganda tenn.s, any
injected propag:mda pul"poso., could on~ 1·1<:aken the effect.

It

was necessa.I7 to depict t.hinga in such deta.ll and :i.n such fashionthat a.n,yone coul.d a.t. u:oy time check theit• accurt\.cy.

And at the very time who:n the British broadcasts were making
truthf'ul. reportine; the found.."it.ion o:f their propaganda, Dr. Goebbels
was procl.a.irning openly in Derlin:"prolXJganda

Etf19

RESTRICTED•

i; never lim:i.tcd tothe truth but. io only d'-t1-~nnined l·;v- t.ho {"l:ll"P'JFJo .. n

The enemy or the lle and or distortion ia the t l"'.1 f-,h.

~when unadulterated tnttb is nsed as a. 1-reapon can it be effectivein the long run.

l~ational Social.iat. propaP.,anda relied on theprinciple ot the "lie of the moment"; that is to sq one bol.dl.;rasserted anything and thus achieved .ror the moment the desired

effect.

If time ultimately revealed the untruth or the state-ment, one had accumulated meanwhile

a number of ne\.f "facts"

wh.tch could be trot Led out with much to-do and -which would so:tu.l.q cl.a.im public interest that no thought would be lett for

the former trstupiditY'"•
English propaganda. - if we insist on using the term- began withthe coming of' Bra11don Bracken to work on a 1ong term basis and thisassumed that there should be no eontradictions in the stories told
or in the argwnents.

On the other hand, peop1e over there coul.d

now attord to collect. and toes back in ·wholesale fashion thecontradictions in the speeches or German statesnen and propagandists,
in German publi.cations, il1 the press anrt. in broadcasts.

That alone

was vel'T effective. Fo.r this purpose the;r recorded in England everr
speech or Hitler, Goering, GoebbeJ.s, and othere, every lecture or a•

militar;y or political nature, every article read over the German

broadcast stations, and so were able to produ.ce, as it were, amultitude of living witnesses.

That wa.s damnably painful f'or German

propaganda, especial.l.y as there was noth:ing to offer in return.

So

the Eng~i.sh indulg~d ill entire programs in which nothing was heard

370

RESTRICTED

but skill~ selected ext.racts fro.m speeches b,y prominent
National Socialist leaders.

Only one course ra~tned for

reducing the effectiveness or these broadcasts - that was
jamming.
So now the Germans used every a"'a.ilable means to makereception ot the Ger.wan language broadcasts tram London
impossible.

However they were rarely successful. because theEnglish sent out their broadcasts simultaneously on 3, 1,.., 5~
sometimes even B to J.O, diffe1-ent frequencies.

Reception wasalwa;rs possible on at least one 01• two or them.

No.tural.ly

this varied from place to place.

The jammers did not reall;v"

interfere everywhere and aeyone who seriously intended to hear
the offerings of the British Broadcastb1g Compaqy gener~
succeeded - of course there were exceptional cases.
I am not asserting that the English like lil;v" whiteangels l:i.m.ited thems•,lves to lC.J percent .fact with no propaganda.

By no means!

They sent out what were admitto~

propaganda broadcasts, only they always separated them fromstraight reports.

As I said, these wore admitted propaganda

and everyone knew that things were invented.

HOl-mvor, thesebroadcasts were spiced with so much spirit and humor thatpeople liked to hear them.

They had not been hewn with abroad ax like the products of the l-iinistry of Propaganda in
Berlin.

As a rule they betrayed a cleverer hand and werepretty well worked out.

RESTRICTEDAs an exampl.e we mq quote the reports 'tSl 11Pfc Adolf
Himachal." who was at first on the eastem front and·later in.

'various other sectors or stations tram which he wrote l.ettersto his wife which began "Dear Amel.ia, beloved w.tfeJ
I

inform you that todq- has been the best ~going to tell. you wby'••••• nThis is toot 'llf3' l.ii"e and am

Listening to them, it was hard to

keep from laughing so bard you fell ott your chair, they
were so tull. of spicy wit and iroDT•

There ware people who

waited :impatient]T for dqs for 1..he nexli "l.etter of Pte Adol.t
Himachal"•Once a wU there was a nreport." on the meeting of two
friends 1 Kurt and l"lill,y1 nameq senior teacher Kurt. Kruger andW~

Schimanski, counse.ll.or for the Ministry of Propaeanda,:ln their regul.ar cate on •the Potsdamer Platz, later - after thebombing ot Berlin began- in a Berlin suburb.

The~ in which

the methods of Goebbel.s' Propaganda Ministr.v 'fa,: ·!iDflm up wasvery- amusing.
Now and then "Mrs. Wemicke11 :put in an appearance andtalked on life in Berl.in but these broadcasts were among the l.east
clever, they were on4' suitable for people "who were veey modest
in their demandsn.

One ot the best broadcasts came dai:cy at 1800 hours; it wasthe "broadcast tor the German armed forces". It gave a good· --,..~te survey of the situation on the fronts and of general
111111tary problems connected with the war.

Of course, events

372

RESTRICTED

at the front which were un!avo1•able to the Wies were notstressed too greatlyJ sometimes one forgot to mention them.

Those were exceptional cases.

otherw1.se the description ot

the situa.tion tallied with ~he facta and it was posldble trcm
these descriptions toevents.

ge" "de1:~endable picture ot m.ilitar.r

Not only or mil:lt'\ary events, but also ot the situa-tion in Ge:nnany.

For, it British :l.ntell:l.gence had been.

almost completel;y uninformed on this subject during thefirst year or the war, this had changed as the war continued..
Perhaps some da;r someone in the British
intelligence..
service will reveal how. and by 'What means the great apparatus

was buil.t up which per.m.itted the British to learn ve17 quickll'.
about all events in Ge1'.lll.atl\Y.

I am sure British intelligence

got a major port.ion o£ its information from radio agents,
since through these it had available the services of confidential agents (men or women) in the verr highest offices
in Germany.

How well informed the British were regarding the inten-

tions ot Hitler's headquarters was revealed, tor instance,
when in April 1944 the London radio announced that Hitler
planned, after the colla.pse ot the ea.stem and weatem
fronts (at that time on the Dnieper and the Atlantic), toemploy the "stra.t.eltf or the scorched earth" in Gem.any•

RESTRICTED,.

and meant to realize :ln terrib]¥ tragic and gruee...,me ra,bion a"heroic epic or the death of the Gonnan people".

And this W8B

a year before he began to convert hts intention into deeds.

Long before they 1-rere used , the British reported openly

on the new German jet fighters and d-escribed Lheir good and bad
qualities.

Sometimes somebody was incautious and by' prematurereporting endangered the sources or information..

On the whol.e•

however, I must sa;y the English lmew how to build up a firstclass intelligence service under roost difficult conditions ~1dalso to derive benefit from its results~

Results both formil.itary operations at the various fronts and for psychological

warfare, especi.a.l..'cy' by' means or radio.
There is one other series of broadcasts I would like tomention here - these were the broadcasts to Gennan women sentout twice a dq.

These also were ad'?'pted to the outlook and thespirit of 'the Gennan woman but in general failed to be effective
because - from 'the standpoint or ·t.ime - they were badly" placed

and because Gennan women were not sufficient:Q" accustomed to thinking for themselves to be able to ~ace these mo.tters with adequate

understanding and the necessary critical spirit.
The so-call.ed "workers program" loma not especially for&unate;
it. more or l.ess missed the problems and offered the Gen:nan worker

little of positive value.
l'lhil.e in Gennany the pena.l.ty for listening lio foreign broad-casts liaS death, the British Goverrnnm1t did not attempt to limit
listening to German broadcasts.

The Gennans had organized a

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sorvice for listeners in Enc]..a.nd, but if a.nybo<\7 0vor

m.:tssed tho mark, i.f any laborious effort over a.chievod a
100 percent f'o.il.l.l.X"Q, it t·ms here.

It oven ret:.ohod thepoint tmore the Bfi.tiah rcoal'iill.endod liatening to the Gennan
ntations.

l·n1at waa offered oithor p:J.-Ovoked a shaking of heads

or a co.n1passionate ~lo.

I once ~rkcd tha~ the National

Socialists "Were gooo psycho1ogiots.

This t·:as true only inQrespect to their Otm people..

t'Jhen cWaling tdth othercountries they disple~ed without exoept~on a total inability
to enter into the thirU{ing of other people.

For that rc~GOn

German National Socialist propaganda. was usu.a.l.ly lllerely aflash in the pan, un1cas it t·ras supported by vory practical.
,

economic interests.

The United States of America. set up a

German language broadcast, tho •rvoico of America., the Voicoof One of the United Nations" immediately after the beginningot the liar. The broadcasts, h<»,""e"Vor, trere dif'ficul.t to hearand found littl.e fol.l.owing.
Of all. the American broadcasta in "the GellllSn lDngu.:>.ge themost interesting t-rere the addresses of the well knotm nuthor,
Thomas Mann.

They t·:ero permeated by' much spirit tmd knot·:ledge 1

were excellent :in styl.e, and inspired by a glmd.ng hatred o:rNational. Socialism.

Mann lla.G a.lwoys trel.l in!orm'3d rv~arding

devel.opnents and con•litions in Germany.

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The trcmd of thou~talwqs cl:i..ma.x$d in the theme:"Ge1111an people, how much more must

you fear victor.v than defeatn.
Nationa1 Socialist loaders called Thomas Mann the "Peck's badboy of the Apocacypse"* and it is a.o.!e to B8:1' that. ro.re~ has somuch truth been c.."'q)reased in so few words..

It outlines clearly theenormity of the actions or the National Socialist leaders of Gen~and also suggests how pett;r this whole group or men re~ was.

Thus far I have men~ioned only broadcast stations which workedo~ and without

disguise, i.e. could be recogni~ed by theannouncer's statement as being in Moscow, London, New York, etc.
But there were other tra.nomittero which worked with tho mostvaried disguises.

If one watched carefully, however, one could

al.wa¥s determine after a while the country in which this or thattransmitter was located.
of the SA-Fronde".

For instance there was the 11Trans:ttter

It worked in the Soviet Union and tried togive the impression that it 'WaS located in Germ.a.ny and rapresented
an oppoaition group inside the SA.

The nGe:nlWl. People's Transnitter"

WcJ.O liketrl.se in Soviet territory.

It ua.s usually easy to recognize

trancmi ttors 1·:orking f1"'0m the Soviet Union because of the nu."D.bor oftimos "Ka..rnoradonl" occurred.

Almost every oecond or third aentence

began thus.
The so-c:.U.led "Atlantic Transrnitter" 11as listened to by many
Germano.

Its oi'i'eringa were not aluayo ucll chooen, its ini'onnation

not alu<:cy"s dopcnd.D.blo.

It r1orkod from Alr,iera and uas the u.s.A.

*~~~~--~~---~--~~----·-------------------------------Al">Ok~tischer ~usb1.1.ben.

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propac;ru1.da station for Lhc German armed forces.

'J'hc so-called"Gcrnlall li'reedom Station" waG in the srune area and 1mdcr thesame dlroct..ion.

li'or a time "Gustav Siegfried .l.!:ins" made quite

a otlr.

It \-ras located in Enc;land and used as theme song the

melody" - bis an dcin kUhlcs Grab", i.e., the continuationof the theme sonc; 'Of the "Deu·Lschlandsendcr".

It soon became

kno1rm popularly as "dcr Scheisscsender11 for the. follo\·ringreasons:
Several times each evening at seven minutes before thehour this transmitter brought a talk by the "Chef".

This

chef's langua~e \'las_ enough to make a hal"'d-boiled soldier at
the front turn pale.

He never used a noun without prefixing"Scheiss - " and there was a c;enerous interlarding with
"ArschlHchcrn", "Schclsskerlcn", "Histhunden" etc.

He gave

descriptions of the private lives of the National Socialist
bic;-wigs.

Generally these uere pure fiction or at least

greatly exaegeratcd.

One of the maddest pranks was the reporton "Sch\-ro.rze Juttan, the supposed lady friend of a German admiraland the principal heroine of the wildest orgies.
This \v.ild scolding wearied ru1d repelled the hearer.

These

broadcasts did not have the least effect.· People aslced themselves:"if the 'Chief' uses such language, how· lv:i..ll the 'underlings' talk?"
There was a huc;e nwnber of other transmitters but theirimportance vms slieht.

=== =RESTRICTEDThe importance attributed. to foreign broadcasts.in official
circles :and. the danger one saw in them during the war is apparent..f'rom a decree of the Chief' Signal Officer, General Gimmler, datedll October 1944, regarding listening to foreign transmissions •.Among other things he said:"It is a sign or the most pitiful baseness and of themost dangerous weakness when one listens to foreign
broadcasts."
And in view of the character of the National Socialist
propaganda it was downright grotes~e when he then repeatedGoebbels' words that propaganda is never confined to the truth
but is ~ limited by its purpose.

Final.J.Y the order ends up:"I order ruthless intervention without regard for person

or rank whenever this greatest of all crimes is discovered."
Along with the type of broadcasts alread1' described, there

was one other - shall we sq "active" use of' radio, especia.J.l¥
by' the British; I mean the so-called special. messages which wereintended for agents employed in Gel'IIJ8lV'.

They were short andmight read eomewh&t as f'ollmm:"Stettin is in Germa.ny"'
11Ma:cy' s brother bought two chairs and a table""The first window is lighted, the second is dark"''My mother is at home""Vienna is in Austria""Keep your children at home, it is still too cold""Englal;td's women are happyrt, etc.

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These were mee~t~ages agreed upon in ~d'V'~noa whioh had. reterencn
to parachute drop•, agent meetings, ohan-Et of trequtnq1 and. tholike.
OccasionUJ,y paces ot music wn ~d to oonvq pPOM"".J'anged messages, primarU.Y :f.n the Pol.i1h broadoNtl ot tbo DrtttPh
Broadcasting Comp~· which were intended tor the Polish resistancemovement.

They reterred ahiefl¥ to parachute ~PSI these wereregularly' announced by melodies, e.g. the soldier song 11Es reitan
die Ulanen ••••11 or ••oh du mein Rosmarin, enttalte dich ••• "• or"Die tausend. Tapteren" and so on •. . Ill.-SUmming up the role or broadcasting ar a *'&118 of psychologtcal
warfare, we can describe it as far reaching and significant.

But.

if' anyone shoul.d. get the idea that the German people l.ost the war

because it surrendered to the poison ot hostUe broadcast propaganda, he woul.d be missing the point entirely.

It things had

worked this 'Wa1', England would have had to lose the war because
German broadcasts tor five years aimed at breaking down the willot the English people to resisli. Or else the German peopJ.e shouldhave given in late in 1940 when British propaganda was trying todivide and inf'Utrate.

But it mere]¥ met with resistance, justas the broadcast propaganda ot Dr. Goebbel.s was rejected in England.
The importance of the English, Russian and other broadcasts
seems to me to lie in another quarter; they helped the German

9"19

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t..J --J--

people in its search for the truth. in its effort. to learn the real
relations of things • in its conscious and unconscious urge tor
spiritual recove17, in ita search tor a wq out ot the labyrinth ot
aberrations.

It, after the outward collapse of.. the National

Socialist reign or terror - a collapse "Nbi.ch was inevitable - theGerman people showed that a vast majority had long since broken
with that negative system and created conditions favorable to •positive course, then a good part of this cure mq be ascribed tothe critical searching of the broadcast frequencies.

Broadcasting

showed that it can onl.T be an effective weapon if it uses the truth.
And. that is a J.esson tor the tuture.

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~-----------------------------------------------WAS THE GERMAN INTERCEPT SERVICEIN WORLD WAR II WELL ORGANIZED?

Perhaps .:rrom. what I have said the impression mq have•been gained at times that the German intercept service during
World War II was ver.v poorq organized and tailed on that

account.

I do not wish to sa:r alVthing of the kind.

In itsseveral parts the intercept service was verr weU set up andachieved useful results in numerous cases.

However, it did

suffer fran some defects to 'Which I shall ccme back later.
That which was d.e.tinite~ -det~ctive was· the use ot theresul.ts of this service.
National. Socialism ,vas a system which sabotaged itself in
ever,y wq and in the long ·run achieved the very- opllOsite ot

what it sought.

We can fd.nd plenty of confirmation of this.

I will pick out the following typical 'example in connection

with the intercept service:J
In the Cipher SectioJJ er OKW a group had been set up at

considerable expense and. with ·good technical equipn.ent tor
monitoring all transmisslGne intended :ror arrr considerable
circle, including broadcasts, radio teJ.ephone, pre&s andeconomic radiograms.

Hundreds of messages were copied dail.T,

evaluated, and put together in so called nchi-Nachrichtenll.
When worked over intensive:q, they were a regular mine of

information on the e.mament situation in ene~q countries.

881

RESTRICTEDBut this cal.J..ed in the first place tor a genuine oearch tor thetruth, i.e. tor the actual situation - no matter whether thefindi$lgs agreed with one's wishes or not; in the second place it
wa.s necessary that the circle dealing with the~~ "Chi-Nachrichten"
should not be too emall., lest it fail to extract .£rem themlaboriously all that .might be extracted.
Neither the one or the other condition was satisfied.

In theThird Reich the search tor truth was synonomous with hostility to
the state.

The universal watchword was an Arab proverb:

the ass where your master wishes it to be tied".

"Tie up

SUch a system,as the guiding principle or a state, is well suited to give theuninitiated an impression of ttpo\-rerful. national. unitytt.

In

reality it contains the genn which will bring on its own destruction.
Fear lest the truth become lmown dominated the leaders of thestate.

.

Instead of evaluating the extensive and significant cipher

messages and thus learning about developments in hostile andneutral countries, there was an order by the FUhrer that thesesmnma:ries should: be given a very limited distribution to on:cy a
few office chiefs.

It was forbidden to pass them on.

Now anoffice chief is a man who in view ot his duties as administrator
cannot, even wit}f the best of intentions, read through 10 - 20 pages

ot decodes ~~ digest them and derive from them a clear picture.
ile ha.s bareq time enough to glance at them.

Actual.:cy' the upshot wasthat the recipient of these decodes initialled the upper right corner

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and put them in the safe.

Ever;v two or three months came a "des-truction procedure" and the stack or paper which bad accumulated
A1l the laborious effort. of Jil8%lY' people,

meanwhile was burned.

all the outlq of material, equipnent and time had been useless.

That is the way the FUhl"er would have it.
~s a•And so in countlessIsystem degenerated in which the truth alwqs got anegative label while mistrust aJ.wa.7s received a positive score.
I said before that the German intercept service BUttered

fran some defects.

We shall take up two of them here.

One

was also characteristic of the ar.med services of the Third
Reich as a whole; rearmament had proceeded too fast on an
inadequate folUldation.

The resu1t was a critical lack of goodexperienced ~ecialists.

You can not train scientific traffic

evaluators on the drill ground.
not achieved depth.

There were many intercept companies but ,onl1' a few useful evaluators.
ext.em.als.

People had spread out but had

Much importance was attached tp
I

In the Red A:mor fonn meant nothing, content meantt

eveeything; in the ~'bird Reich outward fom occupied theforeground at all times.

Man;r things were organized to death.

The other defect was the splitting up of the Germanintercept service.

Even though one IJUcy" grant that each of

the three services wa,s justified in havtng a sop..1.rate intercept
service corresponding to its peculiar needs, nevertheloos all. other faci~ttieo for monitoring the radio traffic or foreign

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countries Should unquestionably be combined in one central organization.

~.thuscould there be l.lV guarantee t.hat .all available

messages were evaluated and made the basis or reliable estimatesor the situation in hostile and neutral countries.
was not the case.

This, however,Instead or one central strategic radio intelli-gence there were almost a dozen organizations working in this field.
There was either absolute~ no collaboration among them. or thecolla.boration was very loose and suttered £rom mutual mistrust.
Quite prevalent, on the other hand, was a sort ot competitive
struggle.

Each or these organization was ambitious to beat the others.

Each wanted to appear to work raster and batter than the rest andallfq's tried to represent itselt in a favorable light and its
rivals in an unfavorable 1i.ght.

The concept or unselfish andcarnplete cooperation tor tlle benefit or the countey was foreign to
all these organizations.

This splitting up o£ the work used up an Wldue nwnber orvaluable workers; each individual worker diligentq and withinterest but on the whole a considerable portion or these workers
and or their ettorts was wasted.

and other instrumentalities.

The same ns true or the machines

With centralized control several times

as much work could have been turned out and the damage caused bJroverlapping and antagonistic etrorts could have been avoided.
This resu1ted in a pecul.iar situation where the individualorganizations functioned well but the intercept service as a whole,

384

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due to over-orgnni~ation, did not achieve the results it might
have achieved.

A patient cannot be treated success~ by adozen physic.tan:J, of whom one feels his pulso, another listens
to his lungs, and a third examines his throat 11 etc. , and each
one subsequentl,y ma.lces his own independent diagnosia.

That isthe wa.y things were in the German intercept service after the
middle of 19.39.
One other clrcumstance might be mentioned which was
calculated to let the results or the labors or the intercept
and evaluation services go up in smoke uselessly; theimportant personages before whom these results were laid for
utilization had a preference for so-called "hot ones", i.e.
for individual messages with an especially interesting content.
That is all right once in a while but such messages mere:cybring details into the limelight.

That which is of real value

in the :intell:lgence work of a modern war is the totality ofthe many l.i.ttle single hints, evaluated and combined in
instructive su.rveys.

And there was a general dislike forthis detailed work.

It is har~ possible to reproach ~ individual forthis situation.

Every official person in the Third Reich -including the armed forces - was at all times so overburdenedwith superfluous nonsense that he simpl;y had no time left for
cclm, scientific, critical work.

Thus the most important p~rt

385

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,of strategic intelligence was lost in the mad scramble ot unpro-.

-ductive, intentional.l.;r or unintentiona.l.q purposeless business.
The development or the German intercept service during WorldWar II was a remarkable one.

Not in the mattexo ot organization-

here there was little change - although individual technical andorganizational measures were allflcy"s being put through.

The devel-

opnent o:t which we shall speak bad to do with the assignments.

The artless reader wUl probab]J start out with the assUll'lrliionthat the German intercept service during the war had as its prima.l:7
assignment the monitoring ot the trattio o:t hostile countries and asa secondar,r assignment the monitoring ot neutral countries whose
attitude 1f8.S open to doubt.

He will h.ardJ¥ hit upon the idea that themonitoring ot the traffic ot countries aJJ_i.ed tdtll Ge1"1Datl1' would tinda place, since that would not mere:q indicate mistr11st o:t one's allies
but from the very start place the alliance on a ver.r unstable foundation.

An alliance Which is not based upon complete mutual conti-

dence, an aJliance with mental reservations, especialq in wartime,
resembles a contract which either ot the two parties is reaey toabrogate at a moment's notice.

Whoever enters upon a lite anddeath struggle relying on such alliances admits that his cause
is a poor one and lmows that his partner intends to escape fromhis contractional obligations in case ot a crisis.

RESTRICTEDThis means awar with two fronts:

a visible outward front against the ene~

and an invisible inward front against one's friend, a front which
mq burst into flame at any moment 1 p~bab]Jr when one's strength

is most urgently needed on the outward .front.
When the Third Reich entered this war it had a political,
ideol.oglcal. and military a.JJiance wi'lih Ita.:cy- and with Japan.

There we1·e halt a dosen similar agreements with other countries.
The all.iances with Ital;y and Japan had been celebrated :tor yoa.rs
in every key, painted in every color, and discussed in countlessarticles.

"Never yet" had there been aeyt.hing with so firm afoundation.

"Never yet" had an alliance been so stoutq

support.ed by a common philosophy; "nover yet" had there beensuch i.ndissolub}3 close, such cordial alliances as t.hese.
Moreover the:ro was such a strong peraonal lriendship uniting
the leading stateomenlThis was the quintessence of all

alliances tho world bad ever seem, the Himalqa of mutual.
confidence.
'l'hat is the way the public saw it.

Yet in the scheduleot the German intercept service were listed Italy and Japan andall the other ootmtries with which there we1-e treaties IJJld

agreements.

But that was not a.ll.

The portion of the timeof the Ger.man intercept se1~ice devoted to these two countries
amounted at the beginning of the \"Jar to almost one-eighth o:lthe total tiorking tir.lc.

In /.pril. 1943 the number of Italian

1939 ..

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The pl."'foOrtion o! i.11tercepts or "triendl;y" countries in comparison to those Qf hosti.le countries ino:toeae~d fl"'m mont.h to month as
the war went on.

Far behind the scenes, ~cut in the darkness

back stage, an invisible struggle was tak.ing pl.aca - without swords
and noise to be sure - the effects or which were bringing death,wounds or captivity to thousan~A and tens or thousands at the front.

This was the struggle between C17ptograpb7 and c1'7J)ta.na:Qrsis.
While British and Russian cryptographio security was constant]¥

incroasing and the inte~eption of the measagea in these ~stems
retreat.ed more and .more :l.nt.o the background because decryption
proved :h~possible, the r~orman. or.yp·L:.a.nal.:yst. kept. in touch with thesystems of the !!!!.!.4 st.a.~lies.
their vstew.s..

This was a poor t-estimonial. tor

It ws a. poor om&l to1• ·t;bis struggle 111 the da.rk

whi.oh wae merel1 9. precu-re~r. of th6 st:ru.ggle .a:t the t:ront:.a...

So

the proport,1on of message~ of .t.:r.t!A~ powel"S cJont.;\nued to mountunchecked.

In the spring ot 1943 theee amounted to more than aqparter or the total interceptse
Instead of waming the lesser. allies and caJ.llng theirattention to the vulnerability o:r their systema.~~ there was rejo.:l.c-ing over the cryptana:J.;vtic successes and the interes·l;. manifested
in the trattic ot these countries was as great as the interest inthat of the ene,nur countries, sometimes even gr-eater.
There was a further reason lor the increase in the proportionot alliod and friendlY massages intercepted and decr,r.pted and it
was just as serious as the first.

The attitude or these countries

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•toward Ge~v was becoming more uncertain and more unreliablefrom year to year and from month to month.
to

So it was necossary

fq ndghty close attention to these "friends", if one wished

to be safe from surprises.

In the case of Ita:JJr, Hungary, andFinland this "checking" proved very valuable.
a:z a

•

a

•

I cannot conclude these remarks without sqing a few words•

about the German cryptanal.ytic service.

From 1922 to the end of

the war it was under the direction of Ministerialra.t Fenner,
who was well lmown abroad.

As an individual he was one of themost debated personalities in the Ger.man intercept service.
Regarded protessiona.l.ly, he was an organizational genius who•developed the art and science o£ Ger.man cryptanal~sis to ahigh state of perfection.

He was bo1n and grew up in Russia(in St. Petersburg, the later Leningrad).
His right hand man was a Russian emigrant by the name ot
Novopasche~ whoin Czarist ~s had been a professor at theastronomical observatory in Pulkovo near Leningrad and had
rendered good service during World War I in the Imperial
Russian Navy.

He served on a Russian destrqyer in the Baltic

until it hit a mine and sank.
him no pe:r:manent harm.

His cool bath apparently' did

The Bolshevists during the great Russian

revolution made it hot as hell tor him and sentenced him todeath.

•

Novopasche~ thought their treatment unfriend:cy' and889

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fled to Eni!land t:here he worked f.or a time in Scotland Yard.

•

In

1921 or 1922 ho turned up D\YSterioualy one dey in Gc:rm.b.ny, bocame
aoqu..."\intcd 'With Fenner, gained his .rriendahip and l·m.s ma.e;:tco.lly
im;tall.od by him in his aoction in tho t.hon Miniotry of Dofcnc;o •..

Althouah Novopo.ochc~ (llho l'laS ct\Ued in the outfit "Tho Old I-1:anof the :t-iountn:in" and sometimes the 11Shoik") ram'.\incd n man withouta. country, they kept him in tho German c:rypta.rw~ic service uhore
ho developed truo analytic decryption.

Tho oriein~ vet,y cmall

croup of cryptanal.ysts was expanded graduol.ly and a.t times during\'lorld \'lar II numborod more than 150 pcreons.
Strango to relate, Fenner proved to be a £cn~tical, ococcntric
chc.p 1mo roi'uoed all collaboration ldth the oft roontioncd trova.lua.-tion rervice" and obatino.t.c:cy stood 1.1p for his 0"1.1Il section withoutr-)e;':'.rd for tho functioning of tho intercopt oorvieo as e uholo.

Tothis lnck o£ coop~ration w~y bo ascribed the fact that, dospitoo..""CCcllont perforw2nce by tho crypt::ma.:cyt.ic ooction and oxccllcnt•

porfo:rmance by the cvalw::.tion Of;lrvico, tho .final rosult o£ thointercept t'!~l"Vico a.s a tmol.o t~~a not uha.t it oboulrl havo bflf..ln.
Fenner typified the trl.do oprca.d German chlr~ctorioliics ofoccc-ntricit.y, prido in his q.t:ficia.l unit, :?.nd rojcction of ~ll th:.:tt
did not fell 't·r.i.thin his ot.:n narrou province.

He t:J.o e...11 o:p~~-:>ncnt of

Nc.ticm\l. Socicl~c~, not frc:'!l philoc~phic:.l conviction, but cluo to.:: .i.:niotr:.tion frc:J. Ce::· .:-i(: ., ..:1n to f:.';,-!1 .:.ml ['chl•;ic~.::r..

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H:J t

.1

•

t.hc spirit which al:ffiV'S d~nied - as Goethe said.

*

Dut he represented Gcnnan cr.yptanalysis and was its soul andinspiration.

It seems a.ppl'0priate in this connElction to mention anothe1•matter connected with the central otrlce of th~ German strategicintercept service .in Berlin, the so-ca.lJ.ed "Chiffrierabteilungtt.
l'lorld \'1ar II began in September 19.39• hence Jn November

194.3 more than four years had already elapsed.

Aerial warfare

had increased in intensity, the bo.mbing"of cities had become

more extensive.

Btit still the "Chi.tfrierabteilung" worked

undir;;meyed in its own quarters on the Tirpitzufer in Berlin.
Durine the early part. or the war an alternate location had

been selected outside Berlin but this was g.tven up later.
Most of the records were kept in single copies in the t-.-orltraoms
in 1100don or at best in steel cabinets.

They acted just as

thoue;h the aintar l·rere of absolute:cy no concern to the Cipher

Section, as if' it 1rere impossible for this centor o£ thestr~tocic and militar,r-political intercept

aervice to bodGstroyed by an air attack.
Shortly after the bor;inn:L11g of the 1;ar this ir:1porttc.nt
N•;;ncy cot a nct1 Chief, a Lieutenant Colone1 K.::.npt.

Ho t~oa tY!'ic3.1 clrillground officer 'rlthout ury spiritu:.l or ht·:.• • ne
it-I•1 G'-1.:. tho' a Fau:;t l-Iopllistotelcs anys:-..1•:;-ya dcnioau.

••I at1 the r.!Jii~t--cr;:;r-RESTRICTED

qu:U.ities, a stickler for reeuJ..ations in the wrst' sense.

It

1;JOU].d lk~ have been possible to find in the entire a:rmy alllQre unou.ita.bl.e head for this center of technical signal. intelligcncCl!.

In his mind the important things itere.. correct uniform,.

correct aaluting, correct bearing, and a. milita17 haircut.

-He

had not the £~test conception of this special service and still•less of hot1 to get along with people in such a. sensitive organization.

On the other hand he succeeded in ruining firry pleasure his

as:Jociates might. have round in tho \'IOrk.

In place or any joy or

accomplishment the motto became "duty".
A few weeks' after his departure (hailed with joy by' alltconcerned) came the terrific British attack on Berlin in theInieht ot 22 November 1943. With astounding precision bombsi.

hit all the buildings along the Tirpitzufer which contained
sections or the "ChiffrierabtoUungtt.

In a. single hour all thekeys end reports, card files and orientation f'o:lders, ta~les ,and
skctchos, that hfl.d been created during decades of painful effort,'

were destroyed. I It was not long before the effects of this bl.ow
began to be fel.t.

It \fa.B as i f the main nerve center of a hUIIIL\n.

A sense of'being hnd been dcal.t a heavy, bl.o1r 1-rith a blackjack.

baing crippl.ed !'ell upon all. the work o:f' this center and this wasaggravated by later air at·t.acks.

\'lork "Went on of course.

Files'lfare st3.1"ted, nel'l' counts and new card files were produced.

But

the actual creative work recovered o~ slowly and imperfect~.

.

Far too much hnd beon destroyed that night •$92

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PiPf332... ... ... _...._~

On 1 October 1943 Kempf was replaced by Colonel Kettl.er,aman lmo al.reaey- had considerable practical exparience in theintercept servi~e and who had been chief' of the intercept control.
station of the a~ for several years.

B.f dealing with his

personnel in an outstanding fashion he was able to inspire andmaintain an interest in the work.

position too la.te.

:UU,t he reached thisHad this man with his clear insight and.

understanding guided the agenc7 from the beginning of the war,
probabl,y .marJ7 a tate.tul. piece or st11J'i.rl!~ l-.l.d never havebeen perpetrated.

*

*

*

,

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894

RESTRICTEDBIG FRY AND LITTLE FRY
Pumping the servants has always been a favorite methodo:C finding out what the master and mistress of the house were

up to.

In the secret services of the various states this.

0<\urse has been fol.l.owcd f'requent:cy, of't.en with good success.
It may seem somewhat strange to say the same method can be usedin radio intelligence and yet during WorldWar II something of

the sort did happen, although perhaps instead or the classdistinctions "master" and "servant" we should speak of the..

big and wealthy on the one hand and the littl$ poor fellows
on the other.

.

Or perhaps we should distinguish between those

who are at the moment "the haves" and their "dependents"•
What I mean is this:Hitler's attacks on the small states ofEurope from 1938 to 1941 had forced the governments of thesecountries to take refuge abroad in order to continue efforts
for the recover,y of national independence.

Most of thesegovernments in exile had gone to London. Here they maintained•
little ministries and kept in touch with their representatives
in foreign countries, i.e. with ·~heir embassies, consulates,

missions, delegations, and the like.

They made extensive useof radio telegraphy and thus supplied ra1., material for the Germanintercept service.

And this "raw material" was - first classl

At least in most cases.

And for two reasons:in the firstplace, the c:cypt.ographic systems used trerc not ordinarily first

395

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class - the Germans usuall.y solved ·them vecy quick:cy-.

Thesecond reason was that these decr,r.pted messages were exceeQingly
informative.

Since these governments in axlle reall.y had very

little to do• they- had ample t.lm.e to pick up information in allquarters.

And as soon as the Minister for Foreign Affairs or

the Minister or l'lar round out something, he was just itch:tng topass the information on to the embaesies,eto.
Everything that the "big fcytr (i.o. the governments orGreat Britain, u.s.A•• Soviet Union. etc.) strove to keep secret.,
It was fun to read their

these "little fey" diligent:cy tattled.
messages~

worst.

Poland and some of the Balkan governments were theAn eapecia.J.:cy- rruittul source was opened fOl' t.he Germans

in June 1943 by the solution of the systent used tor PolishmiJitar.r attache t.ratfio between Lon~on and Bor.n.

The "results"

were outstant\ingl
The Turks li.kEildse gave the Germans valuable infonna.tion
throughout ·t.he CO\trse or the wa:r.

The Germans had to give up

monitoring Russian' diplomatic radiogr&ns because ever,y attempt
at decrypt.ion failed, but beginning about the middle of June 1941
they were able to read ~'urki.ah diplomatic messages between Mosca-IIi

and Ankara and so obtatned very valuable clues.
~te fruit~al.

Bo~1g in September

Persia l'TOS also

1941 the focal poi~t ofthe entit-e intercept. t.zork 11a.s concerned with t.hc Jinlcs
Ankaro.-MoacQ; r
Ankara-London

andTchoran-Hos·~ow

If

Tehe1·an-London""

Ho::-cov..J.nko.ra
T,ondcn-l.nk...".:"A
l·{o::;cc.-;;-'l'ell~ran.

l,ondcn-'I'eh:.m~n~96

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If Mr. Churchill and the British Foreign Minister and theCommissar for Foreign Affairs,. Mr. Molotov, had lmcnm. how theirlittle "boarders" were tossing their secret measures ·t;o theGermans l:ike hot biscuits, such hair as they had left would
have stood on end.
Ot the 1tbig fey" the USA. provided its enemies most ampq

with information.

Among other things a special radio network

had been set up in 1942 which covered the entire globe.

This

was the 1'WVNA-net11 (named from. the caJJ.-sign of the stationin Karachi, India, which was the first one heard).

l-lost ot theexchange of messages could be read current:Qr; it at.f'orded
information on American military measures in the Far, Middle,
and Near East. and in A:rrica.

The following survey shows theextent o:f the network in November 19l.2:
WVNA-net

ca:u sign, location, cover name and interpretation
wa r

Washington

agwar• Adjutant General., War Department

milid... Attache

ceypto• Secret communications service

victor= Proper name, (head of "crypton}"Signatures: Arnold, Oambela,Groninger, Kroner, Loughey,
Marshall, Ohnsta.ed, Osborn,
Reybold, SommerV"ell, Strong,
Ulio.

S9V

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-------

RE~RIP:tf!~ 2
wvna

Karachi{India)speck• proper nameSignatures: Jordan (viceconsul).
Wheeler (General and head ot
the USA military mission)

wvmt

Basra
{Iraq)

amsir• American militar,y section Iraq
Signature: Conno]4r (Viceconsul) · ·

wvnv

Cairo
(Egypt)amem.eawvnt

Asmara(tormer:cyIta.J.ianEast Africa)

amseg• American militar,y section Egypt.
Signature: Hodges

wvmy

Teheran(Iran)

amrus= American militar,y section Russia

Delhi(India)aquilas9x

American militar,y section
Middle East

Signature:

Ondrick (Mil.Att.)= Cover name for American air

forces.
amm.del.

• American military mission Delhi

amobsin • American militar.r observer India
Signatures: Tiger, Speck(only there !or a short time)
nekci

j

7z

bud

Chungking{China)amm:lsca ... American milita.r.r section Karachi
office in Chungking.

Kunming(China)Gura(fo:rmer:cyItalian
East Africa)

amil.at• American militar,y ~&tache
Signature: Stil\-rell(General. and Commander ofu.s. Forces in China)
Barrett (Mil.itar.r Attache)
Gauss (Ambassador)ammkun-= American military mission Kunming.

amgad

... ?

Signature:. . =- = =898

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Bishop, Signal.s.

It was in the BWIIrll.er of 19/,.1.._ when llttlo slips wore pasted up
all over Gel"'llatlY" which bOM nothing but. three !otters:•1Pstl 11 •Theya.ppt"ared on tho windows and doors of railway cars, on letter boxes,
on match boxes, on the mirrors in barber shops and even in toilets.
These wero intended to lceop people from gossiping.

Bu.t apparently

that was on]¥ meant for the la;ymen because in "initiated circl.os"
they were diligcntl;v' chattel"'ing out of school. ·In other connections cases l:"mve been mentioned where the Germa.n

broadcasts or the Gorman press compromised the work of the German..

intercept service b,y reve~ling details which came from the intercept
serv:J.ce.

North Africa (Fellers) and Sicily are examples.

were in the year 1942.

Those

However, the lessons were not suf'ficient

to prevent repetitions in the y-ear 1944•. After a long time and infinite pains the Germans had succeededin breaking one of the cryptographic systems used by the PolishI

resistance movement so that they could read the intercepted mossagos

currentlY.

One ~ late in October 1944 they decr,ypted a message

telling that the Russians had set up in the area they occupied aconcentration camp for members of the Polish resistance movement
Where the prisoners wero confined under disgraceful conditions.
Numerous detail.s were given.
Three weeks later there was a Genruwn broadcast on conditionsin the part of Poland occupied b,y the Russians, in which thatdecrypted message ua.s repeated verbatim.

999

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On the previous ~ the•RE~ip~2::Lli.& ~ ...
.&.I
..&j

"0stdoutscher Beobachter", published in Posen, has also printed thismessage verbatim.

or course it was not stated that this was a.

decr,ypted message or the Polish resistance movement but the content
was enough to catch the attention or the Poles.
It is a well lmown fact that in this life extremes often meet.
Alongside the tendency to gossip there was something else which led
to serious compromises.
The excessive secrecy within the Ger.man armed forces, which
had nothing to do with aqy sensible or necessar,y secrecy, ledeach of the services to maintain an anxious silence with respect
to the others.

If there was a.rty' real orientation, it was usu.alJ.;ylimited to commanders who then kept their wisdom to themselves.
Thus the right hand frequently did not lmow what the left was
doing.

This explains the countless compromis•!S which resulted

from ignorance or real condttiona and their conf.'equences.

It also

explains ma.ny- compromises in broadcasts, in the press, etc ••Unclassified memoranda., which were distributed down to thecompanies and doubtless tell into the bands or the enc.m;r' o.rt.enreferred to the possibilities and assignments or radio intelligence.
The cover designation "S.Qu." (sure source) for decrypted messages
was explained.

The consequence was an increasing reticence on thepart of al~ our enemies in the use or technical means or communi-

cation; this 1-m.s felt especially beginning in July 19/+4 when
during tho retreat of Gonr.an t1~ops on all fronts all kinds or

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mat.crial fell intothe hands or the enemy.

A further consequence

uas an intensification of all camouflage measures.
in a new decline in intercept results.

That resulted

And this led in November

1944 to an order by General Praun (successor to General Fellgiebel)
regarding new cover words.

"S.Qu.-Nachrichten11 was replaced nowby "Heinrich-Meldungen", "Otto-r-1eldungen" and others.
result was the same.

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But the40?..

RESTRICTEDVERMEHREN Nr. 2
Ben Akiba said that all things are repeated in life and thateverything that happens consists on~ of copies.
We have a.lready reported the Vermehren ca.so which happened in

Ankara.

Halt a ;year later something simil.ar happened in Stockholm.

Here again the rats 'deserted the sinkin,g ship.

Beginning 10 October.

1944 non-German broadcasts brought sensational. reports in rapid suecession.

One member df' the German embassy- atter .the other renounced

National Socialism, deserted the German Embassy, placed himself
under Swedish protection and requested that a . J.ssport be issued
him as a ulan without a count17.

On 13 October 8 people had alreadytaken this decisive step, including the press attachd, two sec1~taries and a niece of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, who had been arrested
a short time before b;y the Gestapo.
The German press said nothing about this but foreign countries
were all the more interested a.nc it is easy to imagine the impression
produced there.

What did the boastful words of Party bigwigs

signify when members of the German missions .preferred to break aWSl'!'rom the National Socialist regime and placed themsel.ves under theprotection of a foreign power in spite of all the dangers threatening them fl.'Om the Gestapo?

How hopeless the situation in

Gei'Jll3llY must be for the second air attachcl at the Ge:nnan Embassy inStockholm to quit on 7 November 1944, to renounce Nationa.l Socialismope~ and to place himscl.t under &redish protection!

40S

RESTRICTEDWhat alift this gave other countriesl
Nor did these matters remain hidden from the German people.
For a long time ever,yone who had a good broadcast receiver had been
listening to foreign broadcasts.

The prohi.bition against listen-ing to such broadcasts carried with it the threat of imprisonment
and was intended to protect the Gennan people against improper innuences;

actually it became a challenge to disobey.

It is worth

noting that the workers were the ones who first began openly listening to foreign broadcasts.
and more.

German broadcasts lost interest more

Goebbels had lost ground.

And so had the entire

National Socialist system.

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~---------- -SlviALL TO\'IIN PRANKS
Whoever has followed attentiva4' the descriptions of radio ag~...... "activity and the way- it 'Iotas combatted can hardly have reached anyother conclusion than that the German "radio defense" wa.s by no means
adequate to keep paoe with the devel.opment ot the mighty network offoreign agents, let alono to overcome it entirely.

The few units.

assigned for mozrl.toring and D/F-ing had their hands full it they
tried to cover the most important linlts and fix the trantunittors.
But which were the most important, i.e., tho m.ost daneerous
tranmnitters?

late.

Frequent~ this was notlearned until it was too

The ma.in evaluation unit had plenty to do.

There coul.d be

no thought of complete interception and current coverage of agont
traffic as a whole.
Despite the fact that this service had nothing ld1atsoever to dowith that of the so-called Staffs of the Zones or Communications, it
was all-zays a.f'focted by" cuts and reductions which a.ppliod to all rear

arflS\ services.

Instead of strengthening 11radio defense", it wast,eing weakened.

11 1

1' '

devised:have some protection ae;a.inst this, the fol.lowing OO.."Pedient was
the two battalions of "radio dcf:ense" l\ilich comprised theexisting companies \Jere combined to form a regiment.

And most of thepeople serving on tho starr of radio dofcnso 1·rore "transferred" tothis regiment.

(Actll3l.ly only on pn.por.)Thus they disappeared

from the lists of OKU; ono had nm.de an "extensive 1•cduction inforce" and could nou commandeer thoso people back to "radio do:t:en.:3ou

405

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fl'"';n tho un..,gii,1..m.'li"•

Tb6 f~tlh tho:b thia 11roeiJn.cnta.l staff" 1<m.sl.tleutcd in tho llmno place as tho staff of "radio do£U1:::o" is anobs~rvation

l'ro m.~ kocp to ouroelvos.

\'lith this tho old situation l·ro.s virtu.all;y- roooto.bl.ishcdl

But

tho execution of this measure had called for ~ terrific numbor ofnegotiations, con!eronccs, lcttors, and lectures - n gigantic
expenditure of cnore:r and pxtns that should ho.ve boon needless.
It \~s nocossar,y time after time to uso such childish methods
to protect oncoolf aeainst lack o£ undorstandi.ng in ono 'a ot·.rn ccm.p.
And the resulting loss o.r time and '\'m.sto of energy hurt tho l':Orkitaolf.

In n<ldition to these II1.3.ttors, a struer;lo t\.'B.S going on duo to

jc.'\loucy bott·sccn tho radio defense of OIG'l :md thc.t of tho police.
Frc::n. tho beginning of tho t·r.l.r to its very end the struggle lTa.B
going on behind the scenes.

O.ne agency t:a.a jealous of tho othor,

begrudged it its successes and tm.s doliehtcd a.t G"Vory failure of thoother ''Party" l·rhich it could use as proof that its o-~m t-.'Ork t"lasb~ttor.

From the very beginning Oia·T tried to g~ control of a.ll

anti-agent activity and to have the police agencies subordinatedto itself.

The police resisted ~nd tried to co the ver.y opposite,

relying on Himmler 1-:ho l.'l'.S almost all-potr!Cri'ul.

Even uhcn tho Allioa t·:ere in Ktlln and Koblcnz end the Ru~cic..11s
uere in Stettin, Ktt~:;trin, end G;Jrlitz, this int3rnal tight continued

RESTRICTEDRESJ!fR-Je-TP£)3 2 and even became more bitter from day to day.
that the work suffered seriously?

Is it any 1-ronder

Sinco tho stunmer of 19h4 thewhole structure of the German armed forces and hence o:f the antiae;ent activity had been so rotten that, the struggle was more concerned l'lith questions of competence between police a,nd armed .force::
than with actual combatting of the agents.
Soon militery events took a tum \rhich inevitably brought about
the end of the "Thousand Year Reich" of Adolf Hitler.
People in the German radio defense were pro-u,.d of the fact thnt
in 19h3 they seized twice as many agent transmit1ers as in 19h2 andthat this was repeated when they seized' twice as many in 19h4 as
in 1943.

They boasted of it and led themselves and others to believethat anti-agent activity was going along very success:fully.
Actually this was merely jousting l'rith windmills :for the numberof radio agents was increasing so fast tho.1, it would :P..ave beennecessary to pick up te-ntimes as many as in the previouf' year,

just to keep pace with them.

The existi.lig resources of radio

defense and of the police were by no means adequate for this purpose and the struggle between the two did its part to slow thingsup.

The much touted Ger~~ uniLy remained a dream, even in this :field.
On 21 December 19h4 the Russian o:ffensive broke loose against

the German bridgehead in western Latvia \there some 25' divisions were
putting up a hopeless struggle, quite cut off from their native
country.

These were the first flashes before the final storm in

the cast.

Jlnd while the Russians were preparing for their e;reat407

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pl.tsh, oi'f'icors end oi'ficiol.s of the (k)nnan arm=d forcoa tioro b~lnc
d':l~f.'.Ch<'a to No.t:toxml. Socit\ll.Dt troining centers £o1· "opiritu..U. end

ic:J::ologica1 tr~.i.ning".

Evon tho cipher ooction ond rc.dio dcfcnoouith ell thoir subordi.n...'\to unit.s ho.d to det.~ch from their accnty
poroom1ol people for idcologicl.\l tr£\ining.

'l'hc o££icors indoctrin-

v.tcd v.t these tr~ini.llS ccn~ors thon traveled -around ae "National.
Sociru.ist J..l:ru:lorship Officer~" (rlSFO) visiting c;arrioons and o.c;cncioo~d d~livcring

fiery prop~eunda speeches.

In Zin~ ncar JUtorboe,

uhcro tho central office of radio defense •·m.s located and th<> nw.~sor l;ork co-ning in every day had everybody m-~mrod, an NSFO colonel
turned up onco a '\'rook and delivered speeches lasting for houra lo;hichovcryono l·ros obliged to a.t tend.

Ho declared that tho situ~tion lr.:.ot:·Jrious but by no means hopeless.

There l'I~S con~t:mt rorcrcnoc tol''rl3dcrlclc the Great, tho Scvrm Yoa.rs ~Tar, tho I'la.polconio l·[::Lrs{'lltl other hiotoric events.

Ot.hortr.i.so tho m.:--.in thine uaf:i proper

oo.lutine; end a good milit.o.ry bearing.

Thoco t·JI.)ro tho l'NJis or t.l~cfighting pouer of tho pcoplo 3lld the t·.r:i.ll to r.Jsic:t.

grc~tcst

Alll01g othercvlU

At tho High Ccrmn:md of the Ji.rrny they crc..\t-::.1 thJ r::>~:itic:l••Gonorcl. of SicnU. Intolli.gulC·.) att.o.ch:.d to t:D C~ti.cf of Si:.~'.:i o::"' "!r. ""•
"'·

J

1

I

-~,..I'.............

,. .. .- . . . .
"" - - . . . . .

t:!.lcn ::-tvc t....l1.d :.t h:tlf y•:::.ro..

, .. ;.,....... ---J

408

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w

•

.-

........... '"...,, .~.;

•

more than 50 all told.

That was a siza.t-,lc oreo.nization.

Dut its

work £izzlod because all these compo.nios were not under centraliz
control but a1.1 sorts o£ staffs were sandt·1iched in bet1-reen and thiscaused dal.a.y and dissipation of cnergr.

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-------~--------~•

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THE END
Ever.v end has a beginning but it is hard to fix. the beginningof the end o:r World War II pracisel,y.

In my opinion, this end began

promptly in comection with the bogging down of the Gennan December
offensive in the West. in 1941•·

Up to that time the structure of theentire Gennan military apparatus and of tho state had stood up
pretty tmll in spite o:r heavy burdens and the whole machine was:functionjng, n.lthough serious disturbances had long since been
evident.

With tho carl,y d::.cy"s of January symptoms of collapse

became so obvious that no one could mistake them.

And now something

happened 'tihich is no+. without a touch of tragi-comed_y.
Six montha earlier a group or officers, who recognized thesenselessness or continuing the war, tried to avert the worst by
an act o:r violence.

The attempt failed.

The newly appointed Chiefo:r the Roplaccmcnt Army, H:i.mmlor, now introduced a discipline ofterror.

It resulted in giving the structure of the ar.m~d forcesin all its branch.,s an appearance of g1•cat solidity.

people trdid their dutytr diligently.

Everywhere

Everyone avoided speaking

about tho war and its prospects or else tho,y spoke l1ith feigned
conviction of tho certainty of fino.l victory and ma.do mysterious
mention of tho impending uoe or new and decisive l"leapons.

This

wns especiall.y true in officer circles.

At dinner in tpe casinos

ceremony renched ridiculous proportions.

\i'hat had been a freennd ~~~y meal became a demonstration of discipline and of National

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~Jtt!~2
Socialist thinking.

The ''German greeting" and a snappy clicking

ot heels became trump cards. A meal without raising one's arm
five or six times was no longer conceivable.

And at the same time

there was an epidemic of reorganizations which were fatal to al~
regular work.

Combing the lists and gl.vlng up personnel (andcombining units) sl.owly but surelzy' upset the former oxact system ot ·work and administration at the upper lettels.
The speeches and addresses of the commanders at so-called
officer gatherings kept getting sharper and nsm.a.rt.er"•

The checkon rail~ trains and stations reachod a point where enough people
were employ-ed to form whole divisions.
dq to dq.

And they- increased tram

But this very thing led a care.f'ul observer to think

that, in spite of outward diocipline, the inner structure of theamed forces was in a state ot dissolution.

The "~g" and".motorized" courts martial didn't change matters.

Executions by

the firing squad and publ.ication of the.n in railroad stations and incities brought no change.
among officers.

Desertions became more numerous, even

Listening to foreign broadcasto became generalin spite of all prohibitions, because these broadcasts revealedwith terrif'ying clarity the hopeless measures in Germany.

On 12

January 1945 the Russian offensive broke loose from the brigehead

near Baranow (near Sandomir).
Kielce.

On 1; J anuacy the Ro.ssians were atSoon the entire east front was in motion.

On the 17th

Warsaw and Tschenstochau tell and the Russiana were before Krakow.
On the 19th they took Strassburg and advanced to Graudenz.

Lucenec tell.

412

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Up to tlto.t timo t.horo he.d. hc·::n en out:.-otat.ion of tho G:~r.n2.n

intcl"Ccpt oorvico in TDchonstocbo.u l'mich monitored m.dio tro.fficof th~ Polish rcoiot~nce movement ond of Rusoi~ agents.

1heexistcJlce of this sto.tion was knol'tn to both tho Poles and theRu8sians.

\fucn tho front bec.a.n to dra.'\"r noar to tho city, tho ata:l:.ion
roportcd tho fact to the hoa.dqua.rtors in Zinna and aokcd where
it lma to go.

At tho control station they ~VGd big bravo boy.

Tho head of tho service belonged to that group of Nationalsocialist officers who alwnys shut their c.yos to ovor,y criticalsituation and concealed the truo picture· from themael.ves nnd
their aubordinatos b,y braddadocio.
The anawars sent to the out-station wore hardl1 what might
have been expected'

they should not roga.1"<i the situation a.o ID.Ol'"eserious th...-m it 'ttro.s; for the prosont there l'ras no cl.o.neor 'tlhateoevcr, they trould kind.l¥ refrain from spreading panic; uithdral·r.il
111'0uld be ordered when tho time crune ~ and so on.
The result was what one might expect.

'When the Russian

tanks were rolling into the city, the hond or the out-station
hastily ordered his people to pack up what they could lo;y hc.nds
on quicl~, ~dth tho rocult that evcr,yboqy thought o£ his
privatc possessions 1.-Jhich he loaded on the fe111 availablo
trucks, and the unit raced out o£ to....m 1dth the Polish roboJ.stiring at them from the l'rindot..ra or the housos.
1'10N

Not until thoy

several hours a1m.y did they r¢cover from their fl"eieht

sufficion~~ to ro~J5zc

thc.t eoc~~nt~ of tho ut~ost impo1~anc~

41.3

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for the counterintelligence service had been left behind, including
a report \-thich had arrived ju:st 21~ hours earlier with all det,a.ils

that had been learned regarding the Russian radio agents.
Although people in Zilma ncar Berlin wore encouraging tb.e outstations at. Tschenotochau t.o be of good couragf), they themselves had
begun preparing to evacuate in case of a Russian advance..

Howevex-,the way in ltlhicb these measures were carried out shOlied how completely
the command there had lost lts head.
old ru.,s in boxes.
near enough boxes.

~enFirst they began packing thet.hey discovered the;r didn't have anywhere

New ones were not to be had.

So they unpacked

again and burned all. the f.lles down t.o the end of 1941....
~eThis had todone as swiftly as possible and it t.zas inevitable that :in theirhaste they also burned up the things they needed for their current work.
Meanwhile groping attempts were made to find out where the control
station of radio defense should go if the situation became critical.
In conferences of of.ficors, on the ot.her hand, it was stated fi~that they had no intention of changing location and would ste,ar here
till the very last ndnute.

They set up ridiculous tank blocks.

Bazookas were stored in the of'f'ices and gas masks were tested out.
The Russian prisoners or wa.r saw this and grinned.
AD. the while things were moving at the fronts.

Allies occupied Bastogne and Honsf'alize.

In the west the

The last three weeks hadcost the German ~ 100,000 dead and wounded.
On 28 January the Russians were 6 km :from K8nigsbergw

and Thom were encircled, Me-mel was in Hussian hands.
been cleared of German troops.

Posen

Lithuania had

In East Prussia 200,000 Gorman troops

414

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l·rcl~ocncirc1cd..

Kattouitz and Douthcn, l·Jobla.u, Dyhcrnf'u.rt, andObcrnieJ.c ba.d beon tclcen by tho Rusoians.

Bombs ro.i11cd do•ro on

Berlin and other cities night after n:i.t:;ht cripp]j.ng al~ uork an.ddostroying the most essential il1otallationa.
In tho offices of' OKW ancl no.o.r tho Potsdam bride;o there -wasno loneor any real l-rork.

People ran ohivoring throuch the rooms,

W'-'ro tolophonine_, and aettin£; up mn-r £iloo, or uo3ro packine..
some or this p.t-.cldng ,;..ras done undor a. groat nel"VO. atra.in.

.And

Thv

ocnt out pooplc to look for alternate qua.rtcra but there uasn't
much to bo .found for bombine had already dostroycd too 11'\Uch andtho rc.:naininB buildingo l1cro alroo.dy ovorcrm.:dcd.

Tho most co>Ilicol. situ.a.tion or .O.:U ua.s found in thoso ag·:.llcies
tdti.ch l"fOl"O GUbordinato to the Clliof Sieno.l Officer or the Amt)d Forccss,

Gonora.l G:i.ll!mlcr.

Giir.ml.or 't'raa ono o:C thofi.o of'ficcr:a t:ho novor gP.t

boyond tho horizon of a hard boiled top oorge:mt.

All hiOJ dispo~i-tions, orders ond instructions botro~cd that f~ct.

Ho c~ung

torucioucly to B~rlin :.md insisted just as obstinatoq that tho only

possible alternate ~ocation for offices of the Signal Service of theAr.mod Forces t~uld be tha A~ Signal Schoo~ in Hnllc.
This Signc.l School l·ras a. e;1"0up or buildings tha-t stood out so
prcmiaon~ in tho

torraino that it l·ro.s only o. quoation oftimo 1-.'hen tho:Jc bo.rr~cka t·:ould be a victim o£ c.nG..-ny bc-ntbs.

Con-sequently all tho units under. General G:i.mmlor \.l'\ll"e dei'initol;yavers:~

to moving to Halle.

They tried dcspor~toly to talk the chie:tout o:r this idoo., but tho more argumonta thoy broue}lt up c.g3.inat th~plnn, the more obstirultoJ.y tho old m&l insistod U}.:<>n it.
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Some of the sub-c'b.iofs did, nevertheless, try to '1 iacovc1•
alternate locations, but this was done more to salve their consciences than with any honest purpose.

The fewer positive preparat-ions they made rar possible evacuation from tho Berlin area, thegreater became the mountain of paper covered with directives andinstructions, orders and arrnnscmcnts for transferring the units.
Piles of instructions on how to conduct onese1f in case oftransfer of the units were prepared and stored and everybody knew..

perfectly well that if matters beca~ serious, nobody could possibly'

follow out what was set forth in these instructions which bad grown
to book l.ength.

:Nobody had time to read ·them through and even thespecial.ists, who bad to be e~loyed for the purpose, were all at sea,
because the contradictory ideas laid down here, the constantly
changing situation, the continual chon~es in personnel made every
pl.an obsolete as soon as it was drawn up.
In addition, the bombing o:C rall l.ines had made any orderly
move iliiJ?ossibl.e.
Final1y they beean to realize this and drew up lists showinG thecomposition of the marching columns.

They b.e.d reached the point

where the members of the hicbest units of the ~ad forces were to
set out on root with their bundles of docum~nts and head for the
A:rm:y Signal School· in Hal.J..e •Some o-r the files and other documents

had a.l.J:ea.dy been shipped to Ha1J.e.

liali' o-r them '\Tera lost on the '\yt:J.Y,

the other half fell victim to Allied bombs in Ealle.

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~----------------------------------~-------------------

On 31 January the Russians reached the boundary o£ Lower Silefn '"'•In Breslau the Mayor, Dr •. Spielhagen, was executed publicly 1.n themarket place for cowardice.

Three weeks latel ·the. Russians were at

the gates of aBrlit~ m1d of Guben;

Graudenz was already encircled.

In the west nothing could halt. the Allied armies.
At the time the German capital reflected faithfully the processof decay;it was frightful to see the mad speed with which things

went down hill.

Berlin became the rallying poi11t for deserters:

There were so called passes for entry into Berlin in order to make·some control possible.

Only such members of the armed forces (in-cluding officers) as ha.d such a pass were permitted to enter thecapital from outside.
a deserter.

Anyone else ran the risk of being treated as

These passes had Lo be shown at the barriers along wit~

all other papers.

But these passes didn't help because anyone who•wanted to desert found a way.
Checks on the railroads and sentries at, the barriers and along
the rail lines we~e powerless bec~se the destruction of stations
made it possible to enter or leave railroad property without having
to go through tlw gates.
In the final days of March it reached a poj.nt where individual
officers in confidential conversations spoke openlY or their intention to desert.

This showed how rotten the armed £orces had become

behind its outer facade.

Single ofrices began moving out to the south~and southwest in what approached panic and frequentlY ran into the41,

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arms of the advancing ene~.
The higher officers of radio defense in Zinna held two Storch
planes ready to save their own hides.

But there were already someof the men standing by with machine guns, just waiting for theseplanes to start, to give them a final salute.

The rest of the per-sonnel was to make its way on foot.
The situation was similar at the central office of the ar~ihtercept service in Zossen near Berlin.

They attended strictly

to business and talked about things which no longer interested
them in the least.

Any direction of the processing of results o£

the intercept service had long since dropped out.

In most cases

wire connections were interrupted and radio traffic was quite inadequate.

Now the control stations of all branches of the inter-

cept service began transferring small unite and within a shorttime they were all fluttering around like pennants in the breeze.
The final hour of the German intercept service conincidedwith the end of the German armed services.

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I

•

/
THE GREAT "WHY?"

This book covers the entire field of the intercept service during
the last 30 years.

A lot of space has been devoted to t he work of

Russian, English, and other radio agents during World war II.

These

agents worked in behalf of their native land and thus rank with thesoldiers at the front.
This was known to the German command.

Since early in 1942 it

had not been ignorant of the strength of this uncanny opponent in theether.

It knew that these radio agents represented the consolidated

defensive power of all Europe in the face of the war let loose by
the National Socialist leaders.

Whoever was permitted to observe

the effect of this force could come to no other conclusion than that
this war could never be won.

There was no way of counteracting thisinvisible power successfully, unless it were by extez~inating all
the non-German peoples of Europe.

So the question arisesa

wqy didthe National Socialist leaders in Ger~ fail to give due consideration to this fact? Wqy did they continue the war although it washopeless? The results of the intercept service revealed how strong
the ene~ was ln all fields.

Why did they not stop the war when

they knew it could not be won? Why did they go on adding victim to
victim, destruction to destruction, suffering to suffering, until
all Europe was brought to the brink of the abyss? There could be
no hope of victory and yet they continued the war.
Clausewitz once said: " •••• often ever,ythll1g depends on ths silken
thread of imagination" but even this sentence is not justified here.

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Thorerore I ask in the name of all the pooples of Eurqpo and notleast in the name of the German people:

WHY?

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••

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REF ID:A59332

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