ASC-TUFS Working Papers

Volume 3 (2023)

African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies(ASC-TUFS)ASC-TUFS Working Papers
Volume 3 (2023)
ASC-TUFS Working Papers Editorial Board
Editor-in-Chief
Takeuchi, Shinichi
Editors
Demachi, Kazue
Muratsu, Ran
Nakayama, Yumi
Oishi, Takanori
Sakai, Makiko
Administrative Staff
Yanagida, Mayuko
Published by
African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (ASC-TUFS)
Address) 3-11-1 Asahicho, Fuchu-shi, Tokyo 183-8534 Japan.
Tel) +81 42 330 5540
Fax) +81 42 330 5884
e-mail) asc@tufs.ac.jp©March 2023 by ASC－TUFS
Printed by
Nihon Root Print & Publishing Co., Ltd., Tokyo, Japan
ISSN (print) 2436-1542
ISSN (online) 2436-1607― ii ―

Table of Contents

The 2015 Presidential Elections and Religion in Nigeria:
A Comparative Study, from the Jonathan to Buhari Administration …………………………… 01
Adama Ousmanou
Decoding Political Discourse on Digital Platforms in Africa:
Rumour Networks among Rural Populace in Kenya’s 2022 Elections ………………………… 29
Laban Kithinji Kinyua
African Trade Ties and Networks ………………………………………………………………… 51
Kazue Demachi
Implications of Customary Land Conversions on the Power of Traditional Leadersin Mungule Chiefdom of Chibombo District in Zambia ………………………………………… 73
Priscillah Nsama
Trajectories of Cocoa Production in Tshopo Province:
Potential for Climate-Change Mitigation ……………………………………………………… 93
Germain Batsi, Denis Jean Sonwa, Lisette Mangaza , Ebuy Jérôme ,Jean-Paul Kibambe, Marc Janssens and Corneille Ewango
Preliminary Reflections on Water Vulnerability Stemming from Anthropogenic
Activities and Climate Change in the Forested Province of Tshopo,
Democratic Republic of Congo ………………………………………………………………… 107
David Ushindi Chishugi, Denis Jean Sonwa,
Josue Bahati Chishugi, Joseph Matunguru, Felix Losembe,
Destin Itunda Buke and Kim Vercruysse
Perception and Management of Diseases and Therapeutic Resources among
Ewondo Population (Central Region of Cameroon):
A Case of Malaria and Spleen Disease ………………………………………………………… 121Moïse Mvetumbo, Mbonji Edjenguèlè, Paschal Kum Awah,
Denis Jean Sonwa and Takanori Oishi― iii ―

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The 2015 Presidential Elections and Religion in Nigeria:
A Comparative Study, from the Jonathan to Buhari Administration

Adama Ousmanou
Maroua University, Cameroon
Visiting Associate Professor, African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan

Abstract
A simplistic representation of Nigeria characterises the African giant as a country with northern Muslim
and southern Christian sections. This regional and religious dichotomy hides ancient ethnic tensions
rooted in Nigeria’s colonial past. Since 1999, Nigeria’s democratisation process has exacerbatednational divisions during the presidential elections. Thereafter, the zoning system—a mechanism tomanage the political tensions among northerners and southerners, between Muslims and Christians, andamong the Yoruba, the Ibo and the Hausa-Fulani—was adopted, soon becoming a key characteristic of
Nigeria’s political landscape. Additionally, Goodluck Jonathan, as Musa Yaradua’s vice-president, roseto the presidency after the latter’s death. Jonathan’s association with the Christian Association of Nigeria
promoted a Christian agenda to fight against what they perceived to be Muslims’ ‘evil’ plans for Nigeria.
Through a comparative analysis of the period ranging from the 1999 presidential elections to date, thepresent study analyses the impact of presidents’ religious affiliation on democracy, development andcorruption in Nigeria.

Keywords: religion, region, ethnicity, democratisation, presidential elections, Nigeria

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1. Introduction
Electoral conflict and political violence have characterised Nigeria’s democratisation process, revealing
weaknesses in the management of its elections and rules for healthy political competition, as well as theabsence of an impartial judiciary that can interpret and adjudicate electoral disputes. The challenges
posed by electoral violence underscore the country’s initial transitional problems in managing elections
and establishing institutions to manage competition in a way that its results will be widely accepted byboth winners and losers. In Nigeria, political and electoral violence may express ethnic and/or religious
contestations that justify the reactions of groups that feel disenfranchised because of their origin andidentity. During the 2015 elections, incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan warned that if his opponent,
Mohmamadou Buhari, won, the latter would Islamise Nigeria. This campaign platform transformed theelectoral process, thereby emphasising religious identity rather than political programmes as thedeterminant of the country’s development. Violent acts occurred at various stages of the electoral
process, which led to large-scale extremist violence in north-eastern Nigeria. The fact that the elections
led to such violence, in addition to the loss of life and destruction of property, raises questions not only
about the organisation and management of the country’s elections, but also about their long-term impact
on the consolidation of political competition.
One of the key aspects of Nigeria’s decolonisation was the transition of authority, from the handsof white settlers to those of Nigerian nationals. However, the country’s independence did nothing to
reduce the influence of religion and ethnicity in the management of state affairs, even though politicalleaders tended to portray Nigeria as nation-state, despite the complexity of its regional, religious, andethnic diversity (Solomon and Leith 2001).
The aim of this paper is to understand the implications of ethno-religious identity in Nigeria’s sociopolitical context, particularly vis-à-vis democracy. Indeed, the functional character of Muslim policies
inherited from colonisation led to ethno-religious differentiation, which conditioned social promotion,access to high office positions, and even wealth. Consequently, ethno-religious markers have become
the source of legitimacy for all unconstitutional power (Okpanachi, 2012). Thus, the inequalities that
determine the national’s recruitment to high office positions of different ethnic groups have been thesubject of several studies (Dresang 1974, Mustapha 2002; 2004). However, it remains unclear how
religion and ethnicity exacerbate socio-political differentiation in Nigeria. Therefore, our study analyses
the instrumentalisation of ethno-religious identities in Nigeria’s presidential elections. Considering thereligious markers on the political ideologies that emerged ahead of Nigeria’s 2015 elections andexacerbated that year, many people feared that the country’s unity would be tested. The elections saw a
Christian presidential candidate from the south, Goodluck Jonathan, facing stiff competition from
Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim candidate from the north. The extent to which candidates’ religious
identity captured voters’ attention is the main concern of this paper.
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2. Conceptual and theoretical justifications
Ideology and religion play a significant role in Nigerian public life, not only in discourse but also in
strategic alignments (which are crucial in ‘strength in numbers’-type power struggles). Nevertheless,the religious question has been largely ignored in Nigeria’s past. British colonialists ensured that preexisting economic and cultural divisions were maintained. Today, even though the majority of authors
prefer to study Nigeria from an economic perspective, the theological axis remains highly relevant. The
richness of the symbolic and religious spheres in Nigeria deserves to be studied from a secularperspective. Religion is an inescapable element if one is interested in studying African political societies
in general, and the processes of democratisation in particular.
The Nigerian constitution provides that the government should not adopt any religion as the state
religion. Section 38 of the constitution ‘guarantees that every Nigerian citizen shall have the right tofreedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change [their] religion or belief andfreedom to manifest and propagate [their] religious belief.
Nigeria has secular jurisdictions at the federal level. However, twelve of the thirty-six federal states
apply Sharia (i.e. Islamic) law. These two legal systems operate concurrently, with recurring
compatibility problems. Out of 225 million Nigerian people, 53.5% are Muslims and 45.9% are
Christians, of whom about 74% are Protestants or Evangelicals and 25% are Catholics (Mwangi 2015).
Furthermore, in some cases, elections and campaigns are rooted in religious sentiment. In this case,religion can be used to either canvass support for a candidate or dissuade the electorate from voting forthem. This is why some Christians do not support Muslim candidates and vice versa. In 2003, Major
General Buhari of the All Nigeria Peoples Party was criticised for his stand on religious matters, which
indubitably affected his political prospects (Magbadelo 2003). As a perceived advocate of Sharia law
and a fundamentalist, he was quoted to have said that Muslims should not vote for Christian candidates.
This may explain his defeat in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria. From the foregoing, it can beinferred that religion could be a dangerous factor in the electoral process (Umeanolue 2019).
There may still be some reluctance on the part of the scientific community to apprehend Nigeria’s
religious identities not as a fact but as a total social phenomenon. The phenomenology of religion
concerns the experiential aspect of religion, describing religious phenomena in terms consistent with theorientation of worshippers. It views religion as made up of different components, and studies thesecomponents across religious traditions in order to gain some understanding of them. Religion is indeed
a precious object of sociological and anthropological interest for understanding any society. The mostapparent oppositions in Nigeria (non-native/indigenous, Christian/Muslim and inter-ethnic) underscorethe generic and symbolic nature of the ‘community’ or ‘ethno-religious’ labels that categorise them. In
Nigeria, freedom of the press and that of association have never been stifled; additionally, its electoral
tradition is strong, while multi-party elections are a well-practiced affair. The centrality of the federal
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state fuels tension between northerners and southerners (and between the southwest and east). Within
this geographical division, there are also ethnic and religious divisions: Hausa-Fulani, Ibo and Yoruba(the ‘Big Three’), as well as Muslim and Christian. A simplistic characterisation often presents Nigeria
as a country in which the north is Muslim, while the south is Christian. However, this does not reflect
the reality on the ground, as Yoruba people, who are mostly Muslim, do not feel that they are northerners,
which distorts the dichotomy between the Muslim north and Christian south. For this reason, ethnic andreligious identity is strongly attached to the ancestral territory of Hausaland, Yorubaland and Iboland,
which are concepts that exclude other ethnic nationals but are not religious (Nicolas 2002). This type ofprocess has led to strategic manipulation by identity-based entrepreneurs who are attached, in theirsearch of political power, to the affirmation of this identity—sometimes ethnic, sometimes religious—by local aristocracies and the leaders of political formations who covet control of sources of enrichment
or local or federal power, and who do not hesitate, depending on the circumstances, to make provisions
for either one or both identities to achieve their ends.
The centralisation of 80% of oil revenues at the federal level makes the conquest of political powerat this level a major issue in the country. Ethnic identifications have also developed from the opposition
and reification of the categories of non-native and native.
The political management of the differences that existed before Nigeria’s independence hascontinued and intensified with the democratisation of the country since 1999; it has become a legal
framework for dissociating natives and non-natives and for establishing quotas in public services, toaccess certain jobs and gain admission into university (Bach 1997). This management of ethnic andreligious differences, still characterised as an apparent opposition, is challenged by Adam Higazi, whoargues instead for an entangled opposition (Loimeier 1997). Ethno-religious differentiation was, for themost part, localised to each federated state. However, religious confrontations have always had anational dimension. At the heart of the opposition between Christians and Muslims is the syndrome ofencirclement, where each faction perceives itself to be under siege by the other. This suspicion datingback to the pre-independence period was exacerbated by democratisation because of a combination ofrecurrent controversies (debates on Sharia law in 1976–1978 and 1986, Nigeria’s entry into theOrganization of the Islamic Conference in 1983, and the contestation over the transfer of the capital to
Abuja from 1976 to 1991), the perception in the North that Christianity is progressing in its traditionalzone of influence (especially in the Middle Belt region) and the development of radical religious
movements (Evangelicals, Pentecostals, pro-Wahhabi and pro-Iranian reformists), especially among
student associations, youth and the wealthy and urban strata (Peel 1996, Loimeier 1997). These
ambivalent movements do not hesitate to demonise the other, especially through the intensive use of themedia (Marshall-Fratani 1998).
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Politics and religion in Nigeria have an inextricable relationship. The common idea in Western
democracies of a clear separation between religion and politics amounts to relegating the religious poleto the private domain, while political power is assumed to reign, in all autonomy, in public spaces. Whenone affirms that there would be, on one side, ‘the government of myth’ and ‘rational behaviours’ on theother, one may impose a watertight partition between the two domains. Such a Western conception ofclear and legal differentiation between the ‘temporal’ (i.e. secular) and ‘spiritual,’ when analysing
democracy in Nigeria, should be questioned using a critical approach, inciting to redefine and reposition
the interdependence of the ‘politics-religion’ dyad (Isaac 2014). This is because religion can be used forstate management in a multi-faith society such as Nigeria.
Like exclusivist clubs, cliques, or cults, members offer each other unmerited help, favors,
and considerations. This is what makes the politicization of religion most objectionable ina multi-faith society like Nigeria because the objectivity of ‘brothers’ in public offices islikely to be blurred by religious considerations in serving a heterogeneous community(Takaya 1992).
Accordingly, there is simultaneously coexistence between these two terms—thereby defining a‘theological-political’ approach—and an opposition; further, these fundamental notions constitute a
dyad linked by a long history. This history sheds light on the multiplicity of this relationship’s forms
and transformations. In addition, the relations between political and religious authorities are constantly
modelled to compose new social landscapes.
There are some fundamental principles underlying religious factors in Nigeria’s electoral process.
One of these is how religion often determines the choice of flag bearer/running mate for the posts ofpresidents and governors in some states. This is done to ensure that the interests of the adherents areprotected. When this principle is adopted, there is usually a Muslim/Christian or Christian/Muslim ticket.
Thus, in 1979, the National Party of Nigeria adopted a Muslim/Christian ticket, whereas the Unity Partyof Nigeria did not take religion into account, which led to its adoption of a Christian/Christian ticket(Ayantayo 2009). Perhaps Chief Awolowo identified this as one of the reasons for his defeat in his
presidential bid, as he later chose a Muslim from the North as his running mate in 1983.
Some military regimes have even recognised religion as a factor in governance. For instance, theMurtala/Obasanjo era was a Muslim/Christian ticket, while Obasanjo, upon becoming the Head of State,chose a Muslim as his deputy. Both Abacha and Abubakar maintained the status quo, as they pickedDiya and Akhigbe (Christians) as their second-in-command, respectively. During the civilian regime,
the Obasanjo/Atiku regime was Christian/Muslim. Yar’dua/Jonathan was a Muslim/Christian ticket,
while Jonathan/Sambo was Christian/Muslim. Similarly, the current regime of Buhari/Osibanjo is5―5―ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

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Muslim/Christian. In subsequent political dispensations, religion has been a sensitive factor in choosing
principal officers at the two levels of the National Assembly. These instances show that political parties
and administrations have recognised religion as a key factor in governance in Nigeria (Umeanolue 2019).
Nigerian society is characterised by great heterogeneity in almost all areas of social life. While thismay appear to be a source of conflict, such diversity is also enriching. While many differences can befound among Nigerians from one end of the country to the other, at least one commonality must be
noted: they have an omnipresent religious fervour. However, today, this faith in God is becoming theprivileged instrument of a handful of individuals who are affected by the vis dominandi (i.e. the desire
for power). These religious effervescences both stimulate and slow down political reconstructions, as
religious cults can alternatively be the instrument of power or the weapon of socio-political contestation.
We would like to highlight the apparent domination of the temporal on the spiritual by emphasising thetrue interdependence that exists between these two powers in the context of democratisation in Nigeria.
As politics work on religion, religion works on society.
3. Ethno-regional and religious identity fault lines at the federal level
Muslim politics in post-independence Nigeria seems to have replaced the political exploitation of the
Uthmaniyya (Njeuma 1994). The Uthmaniyya system can be understood as a set of spiritual andinstitutional guidelines governing the actions of Usman Dan Fodio’s followers. These instructions—which amount to a constitution for the administration of Sokoto and Adamawa—can be described as a‘memorandum for the jihad in Adamawa’ (Aminu 1992). Usman Dan Fodio advocated the pragmatic
application of Islamic law and tradition as the best means of maintaining the trust and confidence ofAdamawa’s citizens. This treatise and the many other publications of Usman Dan Fodio and the other
Sokoto writers were greeted with considerable interest, while attempts to apply their recommendations
and instructions became the basis of public administration by Muslims in Nigeria (Last 1967).
The advent of political parties, combined with Amadou Bello’s desire to unite the entire North under
his own banner, crystallised identities at the federal level. The ordination of the Uthmaniyya to Tafawa
Balewa (the then-Prime Minister) by Amadou Bello, for the purpose of strengthening unity in the North,completed the religious dimension of the federal government and invited Islam into the national politicalgame. The fear of non-Muslim populations of expansionism at the higher state level sustained separatist
and revolutionary discourses in Nigeria’s political life at different stages of its evolution. It should be
noted that the notion of the republic in Nigeria, is determined by constitutional changes. While the first
republic inherited the 1951 Constitution, the second republic owed its existence to the promulgation ofa new constitution in 1979. The latter was put on hold by military regimes, thus giving rise to a third
republic. Despite these various socio-political changes, we must bear in mind the instrumentalisation of6―6―The 2015 Presidential Elections and Religion in Nigeria

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Islam and ethnicity in Nigeria’s post-independence politics. This constitutional instability is indicativeof a vast ethno-regional and religious divide in Nigerian civil society.
The first line of fragmentation is ethnic diversity (Anonymous 1960): Nigeria is a country with over
250 ethnic groups. The three dominant groups are the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo. The second lineof fragmentation is region: Nigeria is also divided into rival groups based on region. The North andSouth argue over the national scene. The third line is religion, which is represents a deadlock between
ethnic groups. All these fragmentation lines operate in a complex tangle.
The Hausa-Fulani or Muslim northerners are considered followers of the Dan Fodio heritage inpublic affairs in Nigeria. Therefore, the tangle of opposition that Higazi (Nicolas 2002) referred to mustbe put into perspective. The Muslim north embodies the specific identity markers of ‘northernism’ that
the Uthmaniyya system referred to: the legacy of the nineteenth-century Islamic jihad, Muslim
sultanates and emirates, the reign of a rigid Islam, isolationism (illustrated periodically by xenophobic
pogroms against southern citizens) and the hegemonic rule of the political class at the local and national
levels.
The Yoruba population is concentrated in the southwest. In fact, Yorubaland is a region divided into
former kingdoms that were often hostile. The region is divided into a more islamicised northern areathat is partially open to the northern Hausa-Fulani influence (corresponding to the former continental
Oyo empire) (Encyclopedia Britannica n.d.) and a maritime south, dominated by a regional bourgeoisieborn out of the cocoa trade and carrying an ideology that is both tribalist and progressive.The Ibo aremainly anchored to the southeast, although they are found in urban centres across the country—they are
predominantly Christian. Their region, which failed to gain independence in 1967–1970 under the nameof Biafra, is also divided into two areas: one continental and one maritime. Contrary to the perspectiveof the secessionists, who presented it as a coherent nation, the Biafran project was, above all, acontinental Ibo formation whose hegemony was rejected by coastal minorities. Coastal minorities
refused to accept continental hegemony, and a large part of them joined the federal system, thereby
obtaining two Ibo states in 1967. Further complicating this ethno-religious and politico-ethnic tension
is the wide dispersion of small ethnic groups within the preferred areas of the dominant groups. Thisposes an administrative challenge to both local and federal governments.
Nigeria balances an ineffective and corrupt civilian government and a repressive and corrupt military
government. Political instability, economic recession, Muslim politics, regionalism, and divisions areamong the problems that exacerbate ethnic tensions to the extent that the nation’s survival is threatened(Gordon 2003: 15).
Frequently, ethnicity is more important than national identity, loyalty or class consciousness. Yet,
we must keep in mind that ethnicity is neither the only nor the primary identity of Nigerian individuals.
Indeed, from the late 1960s onwards, the use of ‘identity strategies’ emerged on several fronts in
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Nigeria’s political history. Various sub-trends co-exist within this rather vague category, the common
ground of which is the idea that political leaders actively and continuously construct a religious identity
based on Hausa/Fulani relationships with other southern ethnic groups. Thus, there is some inspirationfrom such interethnic relation in this approach. Broadly speaking, the interethnic relationshipunderpinnings that can be detected include the situationist, interest-group, and power conquest’s strategy,
as understood in praxeological theory (Yengo 1997).
In other words, strategies are conceived as conscious and purposeful (referring to purposes that areusually economic and/or political). The identity strategy based on religion—in this case Islam—from
this point of view, mobilises and (re)constructs a set of symbols and practices in a continuous movementof redefinition in relation to other ethnic groups in the South and the Federal State. This is certainly nota theological strategy, although the temptation to Islamise, while always present, is of no interest to
successive Nigerian political leaders in the Muslim north. We examined the impact of regional andreligious differentiation on national unity in Nigeria through the implementation of a non-constitutional
Muslim policy.
In addition to the existing north/south and Muslim/Christian divide, there is an economic disparitythat dominates Nigeria’s regional relationships. The country’s oil reserves are all located in the south,
specifically in the Oil Rivers region of the Delta State. The North, which has long demanded a share ofthese oil profits, built a massive pipeline (with the approval of the federal government) across most thecountry to transport oil directly from its extraction point in the south to its distribution point in the north.
Another key factor in interregional relationships is competition for agricultural land. Both nomadic
and sedentary herders, mainly Fulani, were forced to change their routes or relocate because of theclimatic crisis in West Africa during in the 1980s. This has caused the relocation of pastoralism towards
the south. This relocation has been the source of many local conflicts, not only for religious reasons, asmentioned above, but also because of lax regulations on transhumance corridors, which has led roamingof herds to damage farmers' fields. This opposition between sedentary farmers and nomadic herders has
become one of the main sources of conflict and has taken on a religious dimension in the media, where
it has been characterised as a conflict between Muslims (herders) and Christians (farmers). However,
the main issue in these confrontations remains that of land, the key to self-sufficiency and food survival.
The British were satisfied with the division of the country (centred on the ‘Y’ formed by the Niger
and Benue rivers) into three large groups called the ‘Big Three’ (World Culture Encyclopedia 2022)—
i.e. the Hausa-Fulani, Ibo and Yoruba. Each of these groups was thought to comprise millions ofindividuals; however, in reality, these three giants are surrounded by more than 200 ethnic minorities
that were obscured by their colonisers to simplify a purely political spatial configuration. After Nigeria’s
independence, these groups’ exclusion only amplified the discontent of these minorities, who stood up
against the hegemony of the Big Three. United by the same cause and, above all, not wanting to continue
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to be disenfranchised, they have constantly tried to take over the tactical positions of public
administration, the first of which is the national army (Adetoye 2016).
Even today, individuals belonging to ethnic minorities comprise the majority of federal police
personnel, which stirs up jealousy in some and a superiority complex in others. As a fourth force, they
believe they are the guarantors of national unity, which is threatened by constant confrontations between
the Big Three (Sanda 1976). With such strategic positions at their disposal, ethnic minorities have
gradually succeeded in obtaining from successive military regimes the constitution of an increasing
number of states. However, this division into federated states has not proved to be an ideal solution,
since even today these groups, which were very closely linked at the time, are also competing for land,jobs, subsidies and power.
Nigeria’s geopolitical field is also marked by a third divide, based on religious affiliation. This
opposition seems the most apparent today. Each group previously had its own socio-political functioning,which stemmed directly from its customs and traditions. Until then, the large dominant ethnic groups
had scarce contact with each other, as they lived mostly self-sufficiently.
Thus, attention must be focused on the role played by the military and civilian elites in postindependence Nigeria to understand the instrumental impact of ethnic and religious identities on theadministration of the country. The ruling class is divided between ethnic, regional and religious
affiliations. These affiliations are, in turn, crossed by alliances likely to promote the interests of the elites,from the perspective of the monopoly of political power and the accumulation of wealth. Indeed, we
observe that ethnic, religious and regional identities do not reinforce monolithic solidarities among
ordinary Nigerians. In other words, there is a strong tendency for competition and conflict acrossethnicities, religions and regions.
Among the elites, the purpose of any positioning struggle is the maximisation of resources and wealthfor individual well-being and the creation of patronage networks through government control, especiallyat the federal level. The rest of the population is impoverished and oppressed by the succession of themilitary regime. Under these conditions, any attempt to challenge the governments that would threaten
the interests of the elites leads the latter to appeal to ethnic, religious and/or regional divisions to pit
communities against each other. These manoeuvres can be observed from the first republic to the later
military regimes, as they wrestled for access to the state and social promotion.
4. Post-independence pluralism between politisation and religionisation
Theoretically, independence gives rise to general euphoria among its supporters. This is because
independence not only opens the way to ‘modernisation’ but also to political stability and democratic
freedom. Political leaders and intellectuals conceived of the post-colonial state as beneficial to collective
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own prejudicial interests. The concept of ‘nation-building’ has become the key word for both politicians
and intellectuals in Nigeria:
Theoretical prebendalism refers to patterns of political behavior that reflect as theirjustifying principle that the offices of the existing state may be then completed for and thenutilized for the personal benefit of office-holders as well as that of their reference or support
group. To a significant extent, state in such context is perceived as congeries of officesusceptible to individual and communal appropriation (Joseph 1983: 24).
National unity and integration were to take root in the political system while the economy became
extroverted, dependent and underdeveloped. The euphoria of post-independence development gave way
to the constraining realities of dependence and underdevelopment. Instead of political stability,
democracy and development, Nigeria is plagued by political disintegration due to ethnic, regional andreligious rivalries. In a political system where politics is reduced to zero, while cultural pluralism basedon ethnicity, regionalism and religion prevails, political instability becomes the norm rather than the
exception.
In fact, in Nigeria, the term ‘zero politics’ refers to an economic concept applied to democratic
governance. It encapsulates the concept of the zero-sum game, where the winner takes over all resources.
Looking at the practice of politics in Nigeria, the zero game was initially based on the politics of sharing
allocation, yet it is now a zero-sum game (Vanguard 2013). Today, political actors in Nigeria are
involved in the game to benefit themselves. It is a situation in which one politician’s gain comes only atthe expense of another politician’s loss. The net balance in total wealth allocation is now zero, meaningthat the resources that should have been used to develop the nation are taken over by political actors fortheir use (Ashindorbe 2022).
James O’Connell (1967) emphasised the ‘inevitability of instability’ in Nigeria. Ethnic groups on thefringes of power—whether civilian or military—were fighting to supplant the regime that was deemed
to be failing to take power. The failure of successive governments to improve socioeconomic conditions
has led civil society to believe that religion is a panacea for both individual and collective problems.
Religious communities have formed important channels for the expression of frustration. In other words,
this has led to the politisation of religion and the ‘religionisation’ of politics by political and religious
leaders. The quest for political power relies on religion to reinforce ethnic and regional antagonisms.
Thus, religious identities at both the individual and collective levels oppose other ethnic andregionalist solidarities to the extent that they exacerbate the polarity between Islam and Christianity andthe conquest of political power in Nigeria. Thus, Nigeria’s independence has reinforced ethnic andreligious rivalries over the control of political power. The rise of this phenomenon has been perceptible10― 10 ―

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since the early days of the First Republic. Umara describes this intertwining of religion, region andethnicity in Nigerian politics as follows:
An increase in concern of the part of ostensibly religious collectivities with governmental
issues and, secondly, an inflation of interest among those with declared religious
communities in coordinating the latter with secular-ideological perspectives andprogrammes… Politisation and religionisation are mutually amplifying processes, in thatthe more religious the state becomes, the more it provokes expansion of the activities ofostensibly religious actors along political lines (Ibrahim Umara 2014).
Thus, the role of religion in regional and national politics is demonstrated in Nigeria’s postindependence events. To understand the evolution and complexity between ethnicity, religion and power,
it would be interesting to analyse the historical trajectories of suspicion, recrimination and agitation toshow their impact on Nigeria’s politics. The political crisis during the first republic led by Tafawa
Balewa originated from religious considerations. The northern leader, Sir Ahmadou Bello, who was
Sardauna of Sokoto, embarked on religious expansionism, which became the cornerstone of the Muslim
politics of the nascent nation. Southerners accused northerners of prioritising Islam to expand the Sokoto
caliphate.
Ahmadou Bello was actively engaged with traditional authorities in the Middle Belt through alliances
openly formed based on religion. Indeed, when Nigeria became a member of the Commonwealth as arepublic on October 1, 1963, with Azikwe as its first president, the Nigerian federation maintained
governors in each of its four regions.
In the North, Prime Minister Ahmadou, a Fulani from Sokoto, and Governor Kashim Ibrahim, aKanuri from Borno Maiduguri, hold reins of power. In the East, Prime Minister Okpara is from Umuadia,
while the Governor is a national from Abakaliki province. In the West, Akintola is an Ijebu and theGovernor is from Oyo. In the Central West, Osadebay is from Benin Province, while Governor Mariere
is an Urhoho from the Delta. At the federal level, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa is from the North(Hausa-Fulani) and President Azikwe is from the East. Thus, the first republic was defined on purely
regional and ethnic lines. The North is dominated by the Hausa/Fulani, the West by the Yoruba and theEast by the Ibo. All three regions and ethnic groups aspire to superior federal state control. However,there is no cordial agreement among them regarding the methods of distribution of national revenues
and key positions 1.
1

Interview with Deputy governor of Borno State, Maiduguri, 7 September 2008.

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In 1966, with the elimination of the Action Group (AG), the Northern People Congress (NPC) andthe National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) can no longer hide their internal dissension
over census figures, which give the North a majority of 29.8 million people compared to 25.76 million
for the three southern regions. Fearing northern hegemony (with 168 seats in the assembly), the AG and
NCNC announced that they would campaign together in the upcoming elections. In response, Ahmadou
Bello’s NPC formed the Nigerian National Alliance, which included a few small parties in the south(Chike Obi’s Dynamic Party, Harold Dappa Birye’s Niger Delta Congress, and James Otobo’s Midwest
Democratic Front) and, above all, the Nigerian National Democratic Party, which Akintolo formed fromhis faction and NCNC elected officials from the western region, led by Chief Remi Fani-Kayode.
The AG and NCNC, convinced that Muslims were hindering their candidacy in the North, decided
to boycott the federal elections. The boycott was widely distributed in the East and West. This led
Azikwe to deny Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa the authority to form a government. Faced with threatsof secession and an army uprising, Azikwe bowed to the pressure and agreed to form a government of
national unity without AG. Disorder spread in the West, following the victory of the United Progressive
Great Alliance. Thus, the main feature of politics in the first republic was not only the ethnic identity ofthe political parties but also their strong regionalist and religious tendencies.
Under these conditions, the first republic was not only shaped by the centrifugal forces of ethnicity
and regionalism, but also by electoral malpractice and communal violence. The Tiv uprising, which had
been contained since 1960, broke out in 1964. This uprising was indicative of the reaction of a minority,
repressed and oppressed by a regional government determined to maintain its hegemony. The failure of
the police to maintain the law and order led the army to come to the rescue.
The existence of communal identities that can mobilise citizens in divergent ways challenges national
unity, especially since it is conditioned by political unity. Thus, to avoid social division in Nigeria,
researchers such as Nnoli (1978), Nwosu (1978) and Achike (1978) suggest that regionalist, ethnic or
sectarian alternatives are possible. However, such alternatives are often reductive because they are
inspired by binary models that fetishise the identities in question. For example, the idea of adopting theAmerican political system, a two-party presidential system, does not seem to solve the Nigerian enigma
because it limits the country’s politics to a bipolar distribution that is not representative of its complexity.
Conversely, this complexity seems to be perfectly suited to a multiparty system. Nigeria, a country
subject to a dynamic game of variable polarisations, is thus abusively reduced to a game of opposition
between the state and a centrifugal current with a regionalist, ‘tribal’ or confessional base.
The impact of the First Republic’s 1951 Constitution on the country’s instability can be seen at threelevels. First, with the regionalisation of the government, the state weakened any possibility of national
unity and integration, as there was no national forum where the emerging Nigerian elite could discuss
the future of the country. Second, it gave rise to an ascendancy of ethnicity and regionalism in the12― 12 ―

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political process. The political parties that emerged to contest political power were crowded exclusively
through ethnic mobilisation within their respective jurisdictions, which is contrary to national sentiment,
but their goal was to win political power. Coleman stated that:
There is little doubt that the implementation of the constitution of 1951 accelerated the drift
towards sub-group nationalism and tribalism. Educated Nigerians who aspired to fill the
new positions of power and status opened up to Nigerians by the Constitution realized that
their most secure base of support would be the people of their own groups. The indirectelectoral system strengthened this realization (Coleman 1960: 74).
Nigerian opposition should not be based solely on a confrontation between Muslims and Christians,
nor should it stop at a simple regional confrontation between two poles—North and South. The
proportions have probably changed since 1963 in favour of the two imported religions. However, the
70% rate put forward by the Muslim authorities seems largely exaggerated. The voluntarist strategy ofcertain political-Muslim circles, which tries to unite the Muslim electorate with the national wholecomes up against divergent positions opposing the southern Muslims to their northern co-religionists.
The former are reluctant to politicise their religion, while the latter, strongly supported by the local
Muslim monarchies, are sensitive to the calls for mobilisation launched by various radical Islamist
currents that refer to the models disseminated by their Arab, Pakistani, Iranian or black-Americancounterparts, as well as to the writings of the leaders of the local jihad in the 19th century. Amadou
Bello is a political figure situated between the medieval Islam of who he claims is his grandfather,
Uthman dan Fodio, and the Islamic reformism he encountered during his travels in the Arab world 2.
While claiming to be a Dan Fodian, Northern Prime Minister Amadou Bello (1954–1966) worked
tirelessly in the shadows of power for the unity of his region and to strengthen the influence of Muslims
in the Nigerian federation. He argued that political unity had to be achieved through religious unity. His
assassination during the first coup d’état led Muslims to find another charismatic leader who embodied
the North in the federation: ‘The coup leaders justified the coup with the need to eradicate tribalism.
The coup d’état came when the southeast region, dominated by the Ibos, was virtually excluded fromthe coalition that governs the country. Most perpetrators of the coup are Ibos (among the eight officers,
seven are Ibos and one Yoruba)’ (Kane 2002).
Islam is closely linked to power in Nigeria. What is interesting to note here is that the search for the
purification of religion has become a search for the political foundation of the state. Since religion is thefoundation of the Sokoto Caliphate, Hausa/Fulani hegemony is de facto not detachable from Islamic
2

Interview with Adam Asjiri, Maiduguri, 7 September 2008.

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religion. Thus, Islam is the focal alibi for the legitimacy of the ruling class in northern Nigeria, andpolitical leaders from this region present themselves as defenders of this faith. Thus, since the Jihad, theproclamation of the fear of Allah, the consideration of Dan Fodio as the Bawan Allah (servant of God),and the trust in the will of Allah (Ikon Allah) are prerequisites and persistent political-economic aspects
among the northerners (Falola 2009, Waziri 2020).
Therefore, northern Nigerian Muslims have not abandoned their quest for an Islamic state. Civil war
gave them the opportunity to conquer, convert, or humiliate the infidel and subjugate them once and forall. Northerners have found unwavering support in Arab countries as they fight for the cause of Islam 3.
Therefore, Christians believe they are fighting against Islamic expansionism, while their warlords are
implicitly supported by the Pope, who stated that his ‘beloved people are suffering in Biafra’ (Udoidem
1997: 159).
Thus, politics became a zero-sum game (Omoh 2013); no impersonal rules were sufficient to regulate
resource allocation and the access to office and its spoils. Because the state itself was the major sourceof money and opportunities, it could neither remain outside these conflicts nor effectively assert its
regulative functions. In effect, it was unable to maintain cohesion, which facilitated the establishmentof stable bourgeois domination and hegemony (Ashindorbe 2022).
The interweaving of religion, ethnicity, and especially region plays a crucial role in Nigerian politics.
The race for power and control is rooted in Nigeria’s political and religious history. Competition fordivergent worldviews, embodied by religious and ethnic leaders who aspire to political office, distorts
the political game and fuels the ambitions of the military. We have attempted to identify the components
and manifestations of the Muslim polity in Nigeria, which posits that, if not an Islamic state, at least one
Muslim must lead the nation in order to perpetuate the Dan Fodian legacy. However, this aspiration isdifficult to implement because of the complex diversity of Nigeria today. The problem of establishingan Islamic state must be understood in conjunction with the nature of national politics, ethnic
composition and the competition between Islam and Christianity. The failures of a biased state that is
unable to extensively develop the country have opened the way for the radicalisation of political Islam.
The dynamism of fundamentalists of all stripes must first be understood in light of the Nigerian elites’
failures to formulate a coherent societal project oriented towards the satisfaction of the general interest.
These political settings have imposed upon the country the adoption of an unconstitutional arrangement
between northerners and southerners, as well as between Muslims and Christians, for the sake of thecountry’s development.

3Interview with Kiary Tidjani, Maiduguri, 5 September 2008. Refer also to Miles (2000).

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5. Zoning system
The principle of zoning and rotation of power is a philosophy of power-sharing adapted in Nigerian
political competition. It is widely known that this system was practiced in Athens and Sparta. The
Roman Empire used it to great effect, thereby increasing its profits. Zoning and rotation principles arepart of a democratic culture used to address the problems inherent to a polyglot society. It counters thenegative impulse and tendency of a group of people to remain in office for as long as possible and uses
the resources of the nation to service its narrow and parochial interests. It also offers itself as an antidote
to a practice that engenders nepotism, promotes corruption and breeds inefficiency, which in turnstultifies growth and sustainable development. The Nigerian constitution provided that there must be anational spread and balance in such a way that a particular ethnic group or tribe is not seen as dominating.
The composition of the Government of the Federation, or any of its agencies and the
conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal characterof Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty,
thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or froma few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies 4.
The constitutions of the dominant political forces in Nigeria—the All Progressives Congress (APC)
and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)—have supported the principles of zoning and power rotation
since 1999. Nigeria adopted a democratic system on May 29, 1999, after 16 years of military rule. Partial
agreement on power rotation is not yet recognised in the deferral constitution. Therefore, power rotationin Nigeria has remained an unconstitutional agreement between northern Muslims and southern
Christians via the zoning system. The zoning system is a mechanism that manages the problem ofpresidency among the majority religious and ethnic groups in Nigeria. This provision gave thesoutherners a sense of belonging after the North produced the nation’s President/Head of State in quick
succession. The PDP decided to zone the presidency to the South to compensate the Southwest due tothe annulment of the June 12 presidential elections in 1993.
Article 7 subsection 2 (c) of the PDP constitution states how elective and party offices should beshared or zoned. The party constitution states poignantly that in pursuance of the principles of equity,
justice and fairness, the party shall adhere to the policy of rotation and zoning of party and public elective

4

1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Section 13 (3) and (4).

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offices, which shall be enforced by the appropriate executive committee at all levels (PDP Constitution1999).
In essence, the section that is not yet prescribed in the federal constitution but clearly stipulated in
the 2009 PDP Constitution states that power must rotate between the North and South every eight years.
Based on this, some proponents of zoning contend that former President Olusegun Obasanjo won thepresidency in 1999 and was re-elected in 2003. The late Umaru Yar’Adua took over in 2007 to take theturn of the north for another eight years but died in office after protracted illness on May 5th, 2010. His
death paved the way for Goodluck Jonathan to emerge as president, a development that has led some torequest him to jettison the zoning arrangement and contest the 2011 presidential election (Oguntola
2010).
Since the demise of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, there has been debate regarding the politics of zoning
among PDP members. Some strongly believe that power should remain in the North, while others
believe that zoning is no longer relevant and that it should be jettisoned. The provision of the 1999
constitution allows President Goodluck Jonathan to contest the 2011 election, irrespective of his tribe.
Before the 2011 presidential election, President Jonathan met the Northern Political Leaders Forum(NPLF) for support. This forum consisted of northern power stalwarts and brokers, led by Mallan
Adamu Ciroma. The talks between President Jonathan and the NPLF collapsed because the NPLF gave
him two demands to meet. The demands included that he should only spend one term in office andensure that power shifts to the north in 2015 (Alli 2011: 2). As a result of not reaching a consensus on
the matter, President Jonathan rebuffed the NPLP leaders over these demands and decided to get fresh
inroads into the North through alternative power brokers and northern groups. To stop President
Jonathan, there were also plots by opposition parties and the northern power stalwart to defeat the PDP
in the election. The plot was designed in such a way that the PDP would not get the required number ofvotes in the Northwest, which had 18.9 million voters, which would make it difficult for Jonathan toobtain the required number of votes in 24 states (two-thirds).
The 2011 presidential election, which was held on April 19, 2011, showed that northern Nigeria
wanted the power to shift back to that region. Muhammadu Buhari, a northern Muslim from theCongress for Progressive Change party, faced the incumbent Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from theNiger Delta in the south and a candidate for the ruling PDP. The influence of the PDP was highly
undermined by the growing influence and assertion of the Congress for Progressive Change in the statesof Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Gombe, Borno, Bauchi, Jigawa, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara(Oluwashakin, Awopeju, and Adelusi 2012).
The presidential election divided the country along ethnic and religious lines. As election results
trickled on April 17, and it became clear that Buhari had lost, his supporters took to the streets of northerntowns and cities to protest what they alleged to be the rigging of the results. The violence began with16
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widespread protests by supporters of the main opposition candidate. Various protests degenerated into
violent riots or sectarian killings in the northern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa,Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara. Relief officials estimate that more than
65,000 people were displaced and more than 800 were killed. These murderous riots, according to
Akinola, ‘bespeak deep-seated divisions in the Nigerian polity (Neuman 2015).
Muslim rioters targeted and killed Christians and members of ethnic groups from southern Nigeria,
who were perceived to have supported the ruling party, burning their churches, shops, and homes. The
rioters also attacked police stations, ruling parties, and electoral commission offices. In predominately
Christian communities in Kaduna State, mobs of Christians retaliated by killing Muslims and burning
their mosques and properties.
Buhari’s supporters stated that the riots in the days after the April 16 election—in which homes,
shops, churches, and mosques were burned down—were spontaneous, but Jonathan’s ruling PDP
blamed its opponents: ‘The orchestrated violence that greeted the election especially in areas where the
APC won overwhelmingly was a direct fallout of inciting comments and directives made by their leaderseven before the conclusion of elections’ (Afolabi and Avasiloae 2015).
President Jonathan’s decision to run for president in 2011, in disregard of the PDP’s zoning
arrangement that brought him to office as vice-president in 2007, was among the reasons mentioned byriot leaders (Aonduna 2011). Indeed, for many people in the North, President Jonathan had violated thetacit zoning agreement, according to which the president and vice-president should be one Muslim andone Christian. To maintain balance in a country with more than 250 ethnic groups and where tensions
between communities are frequent, Nigeria also practices zoning by alternating every two terms between
a candidate from the north and a candidate from the south. Therefore, President Jonathan had indeed
broken the PDP’s tacit agreement, according to which the party should have nominated a candidate fromthe North for the presidency. The northerners expected to retaliate during the 2015 Nigerian presidential
election and return to the supreme office.
6. The 2015 presidential elections, religious competition and discussion
In the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria, the incumbent President Jonathan would run for re-election,
as despite declining approval ratings, he was still thought to be popular and had several high-profile
supporters (Diwomo 2014). Jonathan officially confirmed his candidacy on November 11 at a rally in
Abuja and selected Mohammed Namadi Sambo, a Muslim from Kaduna as vice president: ‘Afterseeking the face of God, and in the quiet of my family, and after listening to the clarion call of Nigerians,
I have accepted to present myself to serve a second term’ (Thomson Reuters 2014).

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Jonathan and his running mate received the party’s PDP nomination. However, this was against the
unwritten zoning agreement, and opposition to Jonathan’s candidacy led to the defection of dozens of
PDP members of parliament in the House of Representatives (Monica 2014).
Desperate for second-term office, although Jonathan succeeded in arranging the top four country
representatives from his party, he did not appreciate the speaker of parliament’s transfusion to the APC.
Even though Jonathan considered presenting a more inclusive ticket rather than playing with divisive
agendas that favoured only a portion of the population, he must have also understood that for peace toexist, it was necessary to compete while adopting a state of mind that sees Nigerians as equal regardlessof creed or religion, and add that the aspect of equality calls for sensitivity in the dissemination ofpolitical positions without compromising competence (Owen and Usman 2015).
Ordinarily, there would have been nothing wrong with a Muslim-Muslim or Christian-Christianticket in a democratic dispensation if there were mutual trust and respect for the human person and if
the overriding desire for the pursuit of political office was the promotion of the common good. Referring
to certain past events, the Catholic Church leaders explained that unity was fostered by a balance
between religious and regional interests. They asserted that the country’s despotic military eras in thepast, including most juntas, ensured a balance of religious architecture in their regimes as a means of
ensuring unity (Famave 2019).
When Jonathan said that the APC would Islamise Nigeria if Buhari was elected, he was supported
by some religious leaders like Pastor Bosun Emmanuel in his wake-up call. A constitutional conference
was held in Abuja in late 2014. An audio message released by Pastor Bosun Emmanuel, who represented
the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), began to make the rounds within and outside Nigeria. The
audio message described General Buhari as an Islamic fundamentalist who, if elected, would shariarise
Nigeria; it also stated that Christianity in Nigeria was on its way to obliteration through Jihad. Bosun
claimed that Christians and Christianity were in trouble because Muslims were strategising to Islamise
Nigeria and that Christians should be vigilant. Bosun’s message reverberated throughout Nigeria after
the message received massive amounts of listening and distribution.
Bosun mentioned the Murtala-Obasanjo, Obasanjo-Yar’adua, Babangida-Ebitu Ukiwe, and AbachaDiya presidential tickets in the past, emphasising that there was a need to adopt a similar approach inthe country at that time. CBCN members stated that the former presidential bills also applied to theheads of the various military formations and parastatals of the government (such as customs,
immigration and finance institutions), with the aim of promoting unity.
Bosun argued that regardless of whether Jonathan was doing well and whether people were dying
during his term, since Jonathan was a Christian, he had to remain in the presidency. If not, the APC
would convert all Nigerians into Muslims. In fact, instead of focussing on evangelism, Pastor Bosun
tried to impose his candidate on listeners by stating that ‘G. Jonathan was 100% successful in the sight18― 18 ―

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of God even if he was not successful in the sight of men’ (The Herald 2014). This should be consideredas the pastor’s personal opinion. It cannot be painted as God’s opinion for that God is not a wicked God.
For the APC, ‘the pastor’s allegations [were] flash’ (Sociallogia Team 2019).
However, Bosun’s statements require close scrutiny. If Jonathan had been 100% successful, why did
commodities and fuel prices double overnight during his first term? Further, more than 13,000 people
were killed by Boko Haram, which marked a rate of fatalities unheard of since the Biafra war.
Additionally, the employment rate fell to 7% among graduates, the naira’s value dropped on a nearly
daily basis, unemployment became rampant in the agricultural sector, railway constructions areabandonned, the country’s health infrastructure remains inadequate, while roads remain highly unsafe.
How could Jonathan be successful in the sight of either God or human beings? The Bible states that‘when the righteous is in authority, people rejoice’ (New King James Version, Prov 29.2). It should be
noted that the Bible says ‘the righteous’; it does not say ‘the Christian’. People are not supposed toexperience mourning. Further, during Jonathan’s term, more than 200 girls (most of whom were
Christians) were kidnapped by Boko Haram; however, Jonathan addressed this issue 100 days after thefact. This begs the question, when security and water are still an issue, how can people enjoy them?
Furthermore, in what appeared to be a belated reaction to an allegation by a Borno-based pastor,
Kallamu Musa Dikwa revealed that the money given by President Jonathan to the CAN pastors was
actually seven billion naira. Dikwa reiterated that the CAN leadership received funds on 21st January
2015 and gave three million to each of its state chapel. However, the pastor alleged that the CAN
leadership distributed only a small fraction of what it received to its national membership, keeping toitself well over six billion naria (Sahara Reporters 2015).
The bribery’s alleged objective was to instruct the pastors to preach against Buhari, in addition toderailing the Independent National Electoral Commission’s (INEC) plan to use card readers. The PDP’s
Presidential Campaign Organization emphasised the party’s concern for the INEC’s use of electroniccard readers in the forthcoming elections. Femi Fani-Kayode, Director of Media and Publicity of theOrganization, raised this concern at a news conference in Abuja on Wednesday. ‘Our position on thecard reader remains that the machine has not been tested in any election’ (PM News 2015). However,there is, in fact, a difference between using a permanent voting card (PVC) and a temporary voting card.
While the latter was vulnerable to tampering, the former was not. The APC sustained the INEC’s
decision to use the PVC in the general election in Nigeria, while the PDP sided with Jonathan andrefused the PVC to be implemented. They succeeded in obtaining lawmakers’ backing regarding theiropposition to the PVC, stating that the Nigerian law prohibited electronic voting. They assumed that apoor electoral system is a major cause of insalubrious political competition among power contenders,which consequently leads to electoral violence (LeVan and Ukata 2012).
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Further, President Jonathan sought to postpone the election. In an interview, the former president
Olusegun Obansandjo said: ‘Jonathan is trying to play Gbagbo. He has a hidden agenda that can ensure,by any means, that he wins the elections. It looks to me that the President is trying to play Gbagbo’(Kayode-Adedeji 2015). Gbagbo is the former President of Cote d’Ivoire, who postponed the national
elections until he was sure he would win. However, the election was inconclusive in the first ballot, andI (Olusegun Obansandjo) believe this is the sort of thing Nigeria may fall into, if I am right in what I
observed as the grand plan and then in the run-off. Gbagbo lost 8% behind Ouattara and then refused tocede power (SaharaTV 2015). The former president’s concern regarding the Nigerian poll delay turned
out to be well founded, as the INEC President, Adhahiru Jega, told senators that he could not guaranteethat presidential elections would be held in March 2015 (Premium Times 2015). Jega confirmed that he
was ready on his end, but he could not offer guarantees regarding various security aspects that werebeyond his control. He stated that he had no power over the military, as President Jonathan was thecommander-in-chief of the armed forces. In January, the army chief stated that they were ready for theelections (Agbakwuru et al. 2015). However, in mid-February, the army stated they were busy fighting
Boko Haram. Therefore, the Gbagbo scenario was becoming a reality. States where the PDP is suspected
to lose elections, voters PVC happened to be stolen from INEC offices. Additionally, the Police in Delta
State stated it had recovered 7,565 stolen PVCs in the state (NAN 2015).
In addition, Patience Jonathan, the then-first lady, stated publicly that the opposition party (i.e. theAPC) would never hold a rally in her territory. Rotimi Amaechi, governor of the Rivers state, accused
Mrs. Patience Jonathan and Nyesom Wike, the PDP gubernatorial candidate in the state, of instigating
an attack on supporters of the APC in Okrika on Tuesday. Clearly, Mrs. Jonathan did not want the APC
to campaign in Okrika, her local government area (The Cable 2014). No press release by the President
condemned the violence in his wife’s hometown. From that day, APC rallies were interrupted byviolence against their candidates. Kaduna bomb explosion (Ibanga 2014):
The Presidency yesterday expressed thanks to God that the perpetrators of Wednesday’s
twin bomb blasts targeted at both the former Head of State, General Muhammadu Buhari,
and an Islamic cleric, Sheik Dahiru Bauchi, in Kaduna State did not achieve their evil
motives of killing these two prominent Nigerians, saying that the country would have been
set on fire if they had succeeded (Umoru 2014).
The violence escalation convinced President Jonathan to extend the state of emergency in thenortheast of the country. These different persecutions and allegations made PDP seekers turn into the
APC.
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Coming back to the the wakeup call, Pastor Bosun mentioned that ‘in the Jonathan fear of Buhari
policy to Islamise Nigeria, if he happens to be elected, because all APC executives’ members are
Muslims’. However, this argument was not true. In response to this assertion, the APC released a list of
their interim officers who were Christians, to contest the Pastor’s allegations. The following Committee
officers were identified as Christians: Otunba Niyi Adebayo, ACN, Ekiti State, APC National Vice
Chairman (Southwest); Chief (Knight) Tom Ikimi, ACN, Edo State, APC National Vice Chairman,
South/South; Mr. Uzo Igbonwa, ACN, Anambra State, APC; Youth Chief Kenneth Kobani, ACN,
Rivers APC National Ex-Officio (South/South); (…) (Nairaland 2013).
Pastor Bosun warned Nigerians against voting for the APC even though they produced a Christiancandidate. This pretention shows that, to his eyes, only the PDP was sanctioned by God. However, thisbegs the question, does a political party matter to God? Obansandjo and Jonathan were Christianpresidents, but did they evangelise the country? The Pastor stated that whether Obasandjo did the rightthing did not matter as long as he was “a convenient child “because he is Christian. This is an insensitive
opinion influencing presidential elections. Following the burning of churches and Christians deaths in
Nigeria, if Jonathan had been a Muslim, the CAN would have been on his neck. It seemed as if Pastor
Bosun had forgotten to mention that the so-called Christian president had failed Nigerians, and that even
the CAN itself had failed Christians. For the Pastor, Nigeria’s main problem was not corruption but
rather a dwelled ideology within the Nigerian constitution.
However, all researchers of the Nigerian socio-political landscape acknowledge that the main
problem of Nigeria is its corrupt leaders, both Muslim and Christian (Yagboyaju 2017). To what extent
is Islam more strongly represented in the Nigerian constitution, compared with other religions? If weassumed that Islam was indeed more strongly represented, the CAN surely would have attacked such
unbalanced religious representativity in the Nigerian constitution. No matter how many times
Christianity is mentioned in the Nigerian constitution, this representativity makes no difference to thelives of common citizens if corruption is not addressed. How many governors in Nigeria are promoting
the Kingdom’s agenda (Sokoto)? How can Christian governors be considered incorruptible? Obasandjo
was a Christian president, but it was under his authority that Sharia law was implemented in Zanfara
and approximately ten different northern states. All that Obasandjo said at that time was that: ‘Sharia[would] die a natural death’ (Diala 2019).
Pastor Bosun stated that ‘the 2015 elections should provide Lagos state with a Christian governor’(Akinnola 2014). However, the pastor failed to mention that the Muslim governor of Lagos state built a
new eco-Atlantic city, constructed new railways, and cleaned up the city. This produces several
questions: Had any Lagosians complained that the governor was Islamising them? Did the Pastor note21
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how Babatunde Fashola 5 curbed Ebola? What does the development of a country have to do with aperson’s religion? Fashola’s wife is a Christian and has been one for years; however, Fashola did not
try to convert her, even though the Pastor assured the public that Muslims would convert all of Nigeria
into Islam. Therefore, the Pastor’s discourse encapsulates how religion and ethnicity are blocking
Nigeria’s path to progress.
As tensions escalated ahead of the 2015 elections in Nigeria, some feared that the country’s unity
would be tested and that divisions would be exacerbated by an election that pitted a Christian candidatefrom the south (i.e. Jonathan) against a Muslim candidate from the north (i.e. Buhari). The elections
would not be these candidates’ first faceoff, but they were likely to be, by far, the most closely contested.
However, the extent to which voters would consider the religion of the candidates was yet to be
determined.
You can never divorce the religious sentiment from a typical Nigerian Khadijah Hawaja Gambo said:‘If a Christian leader does not have what it takes to provide good leadership, I will not vote for him
merely because he is a Christian’ 6.
‘However, I will make a choice between that Christian leader and a Muslim leader who may not
guarantee freedom of religion… so to that extent I may lead to the Christian leader but that is not how
it should be’. Many Christians feared that Mr. Buhari had a hard-line Islamist agenda seeking stricter
implementation of Sharia, as Islamic law is already in place across the north. However, Buhari believed
strongly in the secular nature of Nigeria: he was not a religious bigot. He was not a fundamentalist 7.
7. Conclusion
The 2015 presidential elections in Nigeria allowed us to illustrate the material and symbolic violence
resulting from the radicalisation of identities. A deeper analysis showed that the relationship between
Nigeria’s two key political and religious powers can be both unilateral and bilateral. More thanmanipulation, a domination of one over the other, there is a true interdependence that links politics andreligion in Nigeria. If the temporal (i.e. secular) uses the spiritual to achieve its own objectives, thereligious also has a strong influence on politics and contributes significantly to its production.
Since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the presence of strong ethno-religious identities has hindered
the development of a truly pan-Nigerian identity. Politically, Nigeria is a federation of 36 states.
Ethnically, it has 250 different ethnic groups, although 68% of the population belongs to one of the Big
Three (the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo). Religiously, Nigeria is divided into two sections along its
central belt, which separates the predominantly Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south.
He served two terms as Governor of Lagos State from 29 May 2007 to 29 May 2015.
Interview with Khadijah Hawaja Gambo, Muslim resident of Jos, May 2014.
7
Interview with Lai Mohammed, a spokesman for his All Progressive Congress (APC) party, June 2014.
5
6

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How people choose to identify themselves is not necessarily a problem; however, in order to manage
the plurality of identities, government authorities must create a national framework that everyone canidentify with, regardless of ethnicity, tribe or religion. Since most Nigerians derive their sense of
belonging from their ethno-religious background or from an affiliation attributed to them (e.g. native or
non-native), the lack of a common citizenship among Nigerians reinforces polarities in ethnic, religious,
regional and legal status. In Nigeria, identity-based conflicts mask deeper systemic issues at the heart,which include the relationships between political power and the access to resources and economic
opportunities. Ethnic thinking and mobilisation are a result of this struggle for power, wealth andresources.
Since 1999, Nigeria has been governed under democratic systems by way of the zoning system as a
power-sharing formula. The federal constitution’s requirement for equal representation of allcommunities in key political and administrative positions to reflect the federal nature of Nigeria and theneed to promote national unity must be a reality on the ground. However, gradually, this political party’s
governance arrangement has evolved into a system of patronage, a peace-making system of distribution
and allocation of benefits. Instead of promoting a sense of belonging and equality, this political
patronage, often based on ethno-religious factors, has contributed to marginalisation and corruption,
leading to problems of integrity and legitimacy for the government. The government’s inability toprovide an effective electoral system for the equitable distribution of resources, to manage ethnoreligious relations, respect the principles of responsible governance, and assume responsibility forprotecting its population must be addressed, regardless of the ethno-religious identities of the leaders.
By studying the Nigerian conflict, it is evident that two main logics overlap: on the one hand, avicious spiral of violence, and on the other, continuous and combined social mutations of the actors. The
opening of the North to Islamic law has crystallised the passions already present. There remains a fearof the other, because of their difference at first sight, combined with a competition for power, which hasconstantly deepened antagonism, a privileged crucible for the emergence of fundamentalism on all sides.
The multiplication of allegiances and reinforcement of identities, some pitted against others, are partly
responsible for the economic crisis, which is responsible for the diffraction of society.
In a society that is becoming disorganised while facing a concretely non-existent state, the populationneeds to recognise itself in charismatic ‘guides’ and puts its hopes in these ‘holy men’ or ‘supermen’.
The sacred aspect conferred by religion significantly facilitates this recognition. Not finding itself in thesystem that governs it, society seeks a means of redemption. In such a theoretical framework, a so-called
modern state is limited to a purely religious identity and divided entities that offer no reference, neither
conscious nor unconscious, to society. It is necessary to renew three distinct but complementary
dialogues: religious, political and politico-religious discussions. Only this resumption of communicationor negotiation can provide hope for the pacification of Nigerian society and politics. Politics must reflect23― 23 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

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society and vice versa. The simultaneous reorganisation of the relations between the top of the pyramid
and its base is therefore necessary in Nigeria to find a common value for all: development.

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28― 28 ―

Decoding Political Discourse on Digital Platforms in Africa:
Rumour Networks among Rural Populace in Kenya’s 2022 Elections

Laban Kithinji Kinyua
Institute of Asian, African, and Middle Eastern Studies, Sophia University, Japan
Visiting Researcher, African Studies Centre - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan

Abstract
Rumour, a basic feature of rural livelihoods, has often been utilised to dispel fears and elaborate events
deemed complicated. As ordinary people continue to adopt digital platforms to engage with the stateand markets, rumours prominently feature on digital platforms, thus becoming definitive agents forpolitical and social change. This study provides an in-depth analysis of how rumour was leveraged as atool for political messaging on digital platforms in rural Kenya during the 2022 general elections. We
argue that political actors made normative policy claims that were weaponised by the two dominantcoalitions’ supporters at the grassroots level through dynamic networks that spread campaign
information. The weaponisation of policy statements transformed normative claims into age-old
rumours that have aided political discourse in contemporary Kenya. As the rumours spread, the networks
informed the recipience of political messages and their popularity. To build this thesis, this study uses
empirical evidence gathered through fieldwork in an ethnography of the residents of rural central Kenya.
We use social network analysis (SNA) to analyse the subject matter by picking key spreaders of
information on digital platforms to show the networks on which they relied to spread their information.

Keywords: Kenya’s 2022 elections, digital platforms, rumours, rural populace, social networks― 29 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

1. Introduction
The appearance of ordinary people’s stories on media platforms is common in Kenya’s media history.
Since the liberalisation of the airwaves in the late 1990s 1, there has been a proliferation of programmesthat emphasise the plight of ordinary people on the airwaves 2 . To their listeners, these stories are
sometimes breath-taking, especially because they can easily fall into the ‘private’ category. However,the storytellers are often willing to sacrifice their privacy for the favours (either fiscal or award ofopportunities) they gain from the listeners from telling their stories. There are interesting parallels, interms of what a storyteller gains, between radio-based stories and how stories are dispensed on theemerging digital media platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp. For the purpose of our presentinterest, the loci of the storytelling in digital spaces are to establish the ‘truth’ of a specified matter,
exploit the digital media’s capacity to reach a large commune, solicit help from newly foundcommune/expatriate agencies, and re-affirm the ‘controversial’ lifestyles adopted by certain membersof society. We see these loci as catalysts for the proliferation of storytelling in digital spaces by theordinary masses in rural Kenya.
The prominence of these stories thrives on rural people’s pre-existing desires to feature on radio andhave their own stories heard through that medium. This desire has been a theatre for proving what istrue and how that truth is gauged or measured, with stories that appear on media platforms seen as
authentic, appealing, beyond reproach, and truthful. Because not all people have been fortunate to havetheir stories featured on media platforms, two key strands have emerged: On the one hand, Kenyans
have solicited means to dispute some of the media-led discourses. To dispute prominent discourses on
the conventional media, rumour has been the key tool that has been adopted by the rural populace tocreate alternative narratives and discourses that aid them in especially making sense of what they may
regard as misleading political discourse promoted by the media. On the other hand, especially with therise of various digital platforms, ‘all stories’ seem to matter. Therefore, the truth does not exclusively
hinge on the appearance of the stories on the media because the emergence and prominence of the useof smart phones has advertently affected the influence of radio and television as most rural residents
turn to digital spaces as alternatives. This attitude seems to be re-inventing the place of rumour in the
1 In the period from 1990 to 2000, Kenya’s state-owned station, the Kenya Broadcasting Cooperation (KBC),

predominantly controlled the national media landscape. The introduction of the 1998 telecommunications policy
and law allowed the privatisation and liberalisation of the telecommunication sector (EPZ and International
Research Network 2005). This led to a proliferation of vernacular stations across Kenya. By the year 2010, there
were 372 FM frequencies that had been allocated to radio stations. From these, 233 were active and 139 dormant.
Similarly, there were 109 television frequencies issued by the regulatory authorities, of which 71 were active and
38 dormant (see Githaiga 2013).
2
Examples of such programmes are Kameme FM’s muiguithania (reconciler, and Milele FM’s patanisho(bringing together) breakfast radio shows. These stories are used by media houses as bait to expand their listeners’
bases. One of their main characteristics is that people seem to participate in them through phone calls, as if they
were in a therapy session or seeking solutions to their own private or family-based issues. Examples of such stories
include a man complaining on Radio Jambo by Maina 2022 that his wife does not cook for him.
<https://radiojambo.co.ke/vipindi/patanisho/2022-08-03-patanisho-tunalala-kama-kondoo-jamaa-amlalamikiamkewe-kwa-kutompikia-omena/, Accessed on 4 September 2022>― 30 ―

Decoding Political Discourse on Digital Platforms in Africa

society. In an election season, which is the focus of the present study, the number of stories that are told
increases. Again, the capacitation of these stories to spread faster via digital spaces has meant that ‘truth’
is more diverse. Therefore, since an electoral season also demands the absorption and dispersion of vastpieces of information, the spread of rumours in electoral seasons has increased.
Before the spread of vernacular media (radio, to be specific), which widened the participation of
local discourses and livelihoods, the attempts to establish the ‘truth’ of a matter was not entirely absent.
A highly secretive serikali (state) 3 often forced ordinary people to seek alternatives to explain issues
that they felt were not fathomable based on the official state discourse. Musila (2015) has offered
examples such as politically motivated assassinations during the reigns of Presidents Jomo Kenyatta andDaniel Arap Moi. As a highly guarded secret, explanations of political assassinations did not make sense
to ordinary Kenyans, who sought alternative sources to account for them in their own versions.
Alternative accounts appeared in ‘gossip’ printed on the grapevine because the state media 4 were highly
controlled. Therefore, the liberalisation of the airwaves in the late 1990s opened up the space foralternative political discourse. The various media-related reforms after the fall of President Moi’s
dictatorial regime precipitated changes that have complicated political discourse in the media spaces.
These reforms, which resulted from disruptive technologies (Arthur et al. 2020), included the mobile
money revolution called M-Pesa in 2007 and emergence of digital democracy 5. These reforms not only
complicated the nature of political discourse, but their increased adoption also complicated media
ownership, which brought new actors into media spaces. To an extent, our present inquiry concerns thequestion of the identity of the actors on these new platforms. We propose that one way to approach thisquestion is through investigating rumour as an agency for understanding political discourse in Kenya’s
contemporary political history as practised in digital spaces.
Rumour, although rarely discussed, has been central to political discourse in Kenya’s contemporary
political history (Musila 2015). The uses of rumour in political discourse have been diverse, ranging
from critical issues of national concern to political competition. The 2013 and 2017 presidential
campaigns by President Uhuru Kenyatta heavily relied on rumours fashioned against the key opposition
leader, Raila Odinga, to mobilise voters. Key among these rumours were that Raila facilitated thepersecution of the two leading candidates in 2013 that led to their implication with the accusations ofcrimes against humanity at the international criminal court (ICC) 6. Others that spilt over into 2017 andThe local reference to the state in Swahili is Serikali; however, locals may twist this and replace the ‘e’ with an‘i’, so that it reads as a highly secretive organisation, that is, combining siri (secret) and kali (high level).
4
Before the liberalisation of airwaves, the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation dominated both television and radio
networks in English, Swahili, and select local languages (see Githaiga 2013).
5
For studies exploring the nexus between mobile money revolutionary usage and digital democracy, see
Cheeseman et al. (2018), Nyabola (2018), Maurer (2012a; 2012b).
6
An account of Kenya’s 2007 elections and the conflict in the aftermath that led to ICC cases was reported by
Verini J. 2016 <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/magazine/international-criminal-court-moreno-ocampothe-prosecutor-and-the-president.html, Accessed on 8 August 2022>
3― 31 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

2022 painted Raila as a mganga (literally meaning a traditional healer, but used in this context to meana witchdoctor or an anti-Christ in a Christian worldview). In 2017, the Jubilee campaign also capitalisedon Raila as ‘uncircumcised’, a rite of passage that is pertinent to the Gikuyu norms for ascending into
leadership roles 7. Although the former two sets of rumours were targeted at a nation-wide audience, thelatter was notoriously amplified in the central Kenya region as it resonated with the cultural expressionsof the Agikuyu.
In 2018, the fall out between Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy, now President William Ruto,
precipitated ‘handshake’ politics where informal agreement was reached to pave a way for Kenyatta to
support Raila in the 2022 general elections. Thus, one of Kenyatta’s main tasks was to undo the damage
caused over the years to the person of Raila as a presidential candidate and re-shape ‘Railaphobia’ incentral Kenya. Kenyatta’s supporters in central Kenya seemed to understand well the magnitude of theeffects of previous rumours about Raila on the central Kenya region, openly confessing that ‘we [sold]rumours about him, and we will now embark on telling the people that we lied to them to win elections’ 8.
This has proven to be a difficult task for the political class in the 2022 elections as the opposing side
(Kenya Kwanza coalition) took advantage of the pre-existing ‘Railaphobia’ in central Kenya to mobilise
support for Ruto’s presidency, bringing about a political contest that has further complicated what many
have historically described as an ‘ethnic’ mobilisation of votes 9. As Nyabola (2018) rightly claims,
online politics is usually a reflection of plug-off realities; the unfounded fears used in the previous
elections in central Kenya to reject Raila’s candidature were viciously used on the ground. The digitalspaces amplified these realities by spreading the same fears to both on the ground and online audiences,at times leading to fierce exchanges in these spaces.
The ‘handshake’ politics had an enormous impact on different social media platforms as ‘keyboard
warriors’, largely also referred to as ‘bloggers’ in the local setting 10, crafted messaging about the two
7
Uhuru Kenyatta was quoted by KTN News on 5 November 2015 as stating that the Gikuyu community could notelect a kihii (uncircumcised) as a president. See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJPOzxrTXKY, Accessedon 29 August 2022>. These same sentiments were repeated by Moses Kuria, the party leader of Chama cha Kazi(loosely translated as workers party) during the August 2022 campaign. Circumcision is an important rite ofpassage among the central Kenyan communities as it is regarded as a key component to qualify for leadership.
8
These sentiments are associated with Uhuru Kenyatta’s two key supporters in his bid to support Raila Odinga’s
campaign for presidency in 2022: former Starehe M.P., Maina Kamanda, and the Jubilee Party chairperson, Mr
David Murathe.
9Ethnic mobilisation in Kenya has widely been studied as a phenomenon whereby ethnic groups in Kenya rally
behind their own to negotiate for power (see Lynch 2015, Bates 1974, Cohen 1993, Gellner 2006). In 2022, thisstrategy was overturned as Ruto rallied the Gikuyu community against their own kingpin, Uhuru Kenyatta, who opted
to support the long-time opposition leader, Raila Odinga. Ruto variously used the pre-existing fears from Raila’s
presidency that were dominant among the Gikuyu and new strategies that capitalised on Uhuru’s shortcomings whilein power by placing himself as an outsider, although he served a complete term as a deputy president.
10This study uses ‘keyboard warriors’ and ‘bloggers’ interchangeably. These two terms refer to active individuals
on social media platforms who seem to be replacing the classic patron-client roles in Kenya’s political competition.
In Kenya, classical patronism used tribal kingpins as representatives of a constituency while promising rewards topowerful individuals who manipulated the voting bloc (Berman et. al. 2009). In digital spaces, keyboard warriors
have been replacing the classic patrons speaking on their behalf. The keyboard warriors are vibrant peoplecommitted to creating content with an intent to manipulate votes in a given constituency. The keyboard warriors
have been conducting their carefully strategised campaign with eyes on reward from politicians, and therefore
their influence cannot be interpreted as representative of the aspirations of the ordinary people.

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Decoding Political Discourse on Digital Platforms in Africa

candidates at the frontline of political competition, some of whom were strong antagonists of thesecandidates. Key ‘bloggers’ included Dennis Itumbi for Ruto and Pauline Njoroge, a former anti-Raila
campaigner-turned-key ally due to her connections with Kenyatta. These two ‘bloggers’ and others likethem informed the discourse that characterised the 9 August 2022 election and official campaign periodthat started from 29 May 2022 to 6 August 2022. The debates about the elections and candidates werehighly characterised by rumours and sentiments authored by ‘keyboard warriors’, that were aided, tospread like bushfire through the digital platforms. Using this context, this study seeks to analyse the kindof networks that such rumours shaped and utilised to facilitate the spread of political messaging in
Kenya’s 2022 electoral competition on digital platforms, focusing mainly on Facebook and WhatsApp
as channels of distribution.
We explore rumour as a tool for political messaging in the 2022 elections by using research methods
in social network analysis (SNA) combined with ethnographic data collected in two counties of central
Kenya (Embu and Kirinyaga) during the official campaign period (29 May to 6 August 2022). We aim
to analyse the kind of networks that spreaders of rumours exploited to succeed in political messaging.
Embu and Kirinyaga are adjacent, and are among the larger central Kenyan counties. Kirinyaga’s total
population is 610,411, whereas Embu’s is 608,599, according to the 2019 census (KNBS 2020). The
residents of these two counties rely on agriculture for daily survival. They also engage in small-sizedbusinesses to complement their incomes from the farms. These two counties’ landscapes cover both arid
and semi-arid areas, and many areas have emerged as urban spaces hosting a significant number ofliterate youths.
The paper is organised as follows: First, we begin by clarifying the terms and theoreticalunderpinnings of this study, and discuss how rumours were used in the 2022 political competition. We
then explore the methodology adopted in the study, the final part of which section provides a descriptionof the four strands of rumours that we used as empirical examples for this study. In the discussion section,
we show the networks that rumours formed and exploited as they spread, before explaining theiroutcome and purpose. We then discuss our findings, and conclude with a discussion of the usability ofsimilar studies and their centrality and potential to advance democratic progress in sub-Saharan Africa.
2. Definitions and theoretical underpinnings
The communities in this study are predominantly from central Kenya, and use Gikuyu, English, andSwahili languages to communicate in day-to-day conversations. This defines the choice of the conceptof this study, which uses both rumours and gossip as connoting a singular meaning. In Gikuyu, rumourand gossip are best described by the word, muchene, connoting any kind of recent, unverified news orinformation about someone known to a subject. Similar to the views and claims of sociologists andpsychologists (Bloom 2004, Dunbar 2004, Gluckman 1963, Foster 2004), muchene in the central Kenya― 33 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

setting is not necessarily about falsehood. Just as Shibutani (1966) claims that the character of rumouris defined by the intensity with which it spreads, so it is with muchene. Depending on who tells muchene,
the more widespread and widely told, the more plausible it becomes. The mediators of muchene areoften women, who operate in a setting that is usually enabled by traditional networks of social gatherings.
These social gatherings have been complicated by the emergence of digital spaces that have become
pertinent to rural people’s daily lives. The rumours analysed here thus feature on Facebook pages andWhatsApp as topics about other people or institutions packaged as narratives to mobilise for political
victory. However, they are also stories with unverified ‘truths’ when they mention or imply specificpeople or institutions.
Although muchene is ubiquitous across the livelihoods of the central Kenyan communities, there has
hardly been a systematic study that has focused on muchene in both cultural and political life. This isprevalent even though the mushrooming and ease of access to digital platforms has mediated a wideranging feature of rumour and gossip among the Kenyan public. Therefore, this study contributes to theliterature stream that views peripheral communities as key to political discourse through a discussion of
the networks of rumours that aid political decision making for the ordinary people. In his canonicalstudies, Scott (1985) notes that gossip is never ‘disinterested’ when made available in the social realm.
He asserts that ‘it is a partisan effort (by class, faction, or family) to advance its claims and interests
against those of others’ (Scott 1985: 282). As a ‘partisan effort’, gossip and rumours can serve anemancipatory purpose when used by the subaltern as a form of resistance seeking inclusion into
hegemonic public discourse. This is achieved by allowing the emergence of subversive, alternative, andinsurgent counter publics. As a form of resistance, ‘gossip is a kind of democratic voice in conditions
where power and possible regression make open acts of disrespect dangerous’ (Scott 1985: 282). For
the ordinary masses in Kenya, however, during the critical season when people are required to decideon whom to vote for, this Scotian view remains elusive. This is despite a candid discussion of its
applicability in the Kenyan context by Musila (2015), who sees the possibility of rumours as a weaponof the weak against an all-powerful state. We take steps to complement Musila’s (2015) work in thisstudy by underscoring that, compared to the malicious gossip or character assassination used inhegemonic political structures, gossip and rumour in rural central Kenya do not necessarily frame or
discredit an individual’s reputation with a repressive disciplinary intent. Rather, they are broad andinherently ambiguous.
Following the insights from Musila’s work, efforts that aim to analyse how rumours and gossip areused on digital platforms among the rural communities of Kenya are not only necessary, but are also
important tools to unlock the complexities of expressing African rural livelihoods. We extend thisanalysis by underscoring how mushrooming digital platforms have given rumours and gossip a context
to thrive, thus becoming relevant as a tool for asserting rights, claiming those rights, and political― 34 ―

Decoding Political Discourse on Digital Platforms in Africa

contestation. This is as a result of these digital platforms’ influence on rumours. Thus, the larger andunintended consequence of the rumours and gossip featuring on digital platforms has been that ruralcommunities are being creative with the avenues of leveraging digital platforms beyond traditional
purposes to seek interaction with the ordinary people and the state.
3. Methods in SNA
To understand the kinds of social networks that were created by rumours and what made them thrive inrural central Kenya, facilitated by digital platforms, SNA is applied to unravel how the networks ofrumours were structured and used. We collected data on more than 100 participants from twoneighbouring counties: Embu and Kirinyaga. Although the participants came from a rural area, they
were identified as being familiar with urban life. We clustered the survey responses based on four key
narratives that were popularised through Facebook and WhatsApp posts during the official campaign
period in Kenya’s 2022 general election. The author created the networks that formed around these
discourses as the news spread. These narratives appeared at different intervals from the moment when
they were kick-started by either the presidential candidates from the two leading opposite camps or
significant actors during the campaigns. The narratives usually formed when the topics were at theirpeaks and, notably, the news peaked within a few days after embarkment. Using the four discourses, wetargeted a maximum of approximately 50 people for each discourse to establish where they had obtained
their sources of information. For analysis, we focused on participants whose mutual mentions exceeded
two 11. Each network was created in its own specific location in the area of research; thus, the participants
were well familiar with one another. The study was conducted in the towns of Kirinyaga, Manyatta,
Runyenjes, and Kirimari in Embu and Kirinyaga counties, among residents who were small-scale
farmers and business vendors, young people in colleges and universities, and those in waged labour.
A network contains a collection of actors, such as individuals, groups, and organisations, who are
represented as nodes in SNA, identified here as sets of rumour spreaders and ties between them
(Wasserman and Faust 1994). In this study, ties are flows of information to the grassroots populace. The
respondents are represented by nodes with two sets: men by circles and women by triangles. Among thenodes, both men and women who are referred to as ‘keyboard warriors’ appear as important central
individuals in the social networks that were created. Centrality measurements in networks describe thelevels of sending and receiving in relationships in which PageRank is used for measurement (see Gould
1987, Newman 2010). Central nodes mean that they have more ties to other nodes (Brin and Page 1998)
thus revealing which individuals are critical as sources of information (Wasserman and Faust 1994,11
To maintain and satisfy the target for the number of participants, the sociogram included some nodes that did
not have mutual mentions, such as Watugi, Njogu, and Wanyaga in Figure 1, among others. However, the analyses
depended only on the participants with mutual mentions, and their inclusion did not affect the overall structure of
the sociogram.

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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

Newman 2010, Prell 2011) and trust as they structure the networks. Central women are represented bydiamonds, whereas hexagons represent central men. An arrow that connects nodes indicates the direction
from the source of information. Some respondents claimed to have received news from two sources, andthese are shown as bi-directional. Respondents who claimed to have had deeper prior knowledge of andrelationships with one another, among whom it was therefore easy to trust information that was passed
on, are represented in the same colour. As this question was followed by one on the kind of relationshipthat the participants had (the answer was usually based on the kind of relationship they had), thickmargins denote seniority in age, medium margins denote a common understanding based on social status,
and thin ones denote a junior status or no relationship at all. Using the participants’ responses, we
identified ties that showed the sources of information on the rumours that they spread (based on specified
topics) or held onto during the campaigning period. For those who could, we asked them to identify the‘blogger’ from whom the information originated. The outcome is illustrated in sociograms 1, 2, 3, and4, based on the responses in the networks created by the respondents. These networks are connected bydense ties based on rural people’s livelihoods, family ties, neighbourliness, or friendships (see Table 1).
Table 1: Relationships between rumour spreaders and receivers in the social-network graph for thesociogram in Figure 1
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Relationship between the rumour
spreaders and receivers
Women group
Church group
Campaign team
Nyumba kumi (Ten-fold households) 12
Table banking
School/ work colleague
Others
Total

Number of ties in the socialnetwork graph

42
54
28
22
18
9
72
245

Created by the author.
During the official campaign period (29 May 2022 to 6 August 2022), we created a social network
survey using four key topics as they gained prominence towards the election date. From 29 May 2022
to early July, these conversations were tracked online. From 19 July 2022, the interviews were conducted
mainly in person with the local people of the two counties in rural central Kenya that were selected forthis study, which included participatory observations during travel trips to various parts of the counties.

12
Nyumba kumi (literally translated as ‘ten-fold’) is a state-led informal stratification of neighbours into small
groups of ten households. It was initiated in the aftermath of the several cases of insecurity and terror attacks in
2013. Therefore, the main purpose of this initiative was to improve security by incorporating neighbours to survey
on each other. Nyumba kumi strategises on concepts of communal livelihoods that have thrived in Africa, such as
Ubuntu, Harambee, and Ujamaa. For additional studies on these concepts, see Kioko (2017), Mark (2017), andMuchangi (2016).

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Decoding Political Discourse on Digital Platforms in Africa

The four rumours selected for this study are an intriguing representation of how information andmisinformation spread, forming specific networks in rural Kenya during the elections.
The four narratives were chosen based on their uniqueness in terms of the target and categories ofthe stories in which people engaged. Furthermore, they seemed effective in an election season. Thus, inthemselves, the narratives were considered relevant and significant by the respondents. The responses
were used to profile networks based on the four rumours. The responses to the set questions depended
entirely on the interviewees’ judgements of who the sources were. We then conducted an ethnographic
survey using a select few. The narratives from our respondents appeared to form intersections that helped
us decipher how the participants in these channels related to one another and the perceived sources of
information. In each case, we tried to verify the connections as much as possible by establishing therelationships between the participants and those that they mentioned. The four networks that werecreated based on the select participants’ responses might not necessarily have been representative of thethousands of other similar activities that have emerged on digital platforms in Kenya. Nevertheless, they
provided a solid examination of the aspects of the networks created through the peoples’ transfer ofstories among one another on the digital platforms.
4. The four campaign items: from normative policy statements to campaign rumours
During campaigns, political aspirants are keen to articulate their intended policies to enhance people’s
livelihoods. This ‘issue-based approach’ to politics was amplified during the 2022 elections, whenpolitical mobilisation in Kenya was seen to be shifting from the client-patron ethnic-based strategies(see Kanyiga et al. 2022, Cheeseman 2022). The 2022 political mobilisation was particularly unique as
the candidates made economy and gender the main issues of their campaigns. There were fourcontestants who were cleared to run by the national independent electoral commission (IEBC).
Nevertheless, only two camps had a nation-wide appeal. The Azimio la Umoja One Kenya coalition(henceforth referred to as Azimio), led by Raila Odinga, radically committed to the gender agenda byappointing Martha Karua, a prominent human rights activist, as the running mate. The Kenya Kwanzacoalition, led by William Ruto, manifested itself as an anti-establishment coalition championing theplight of those at the bottom of the pyramid with a ‘hustler nation’ rallying call that popularised the‘bottom up’ economic approach. The seriousness of these issues was evident as each group countered
the other with almost equal strategies. For instance, the Kenya Kwanza coalition offered to fill half ofthe cabinet positions with women, while Azimio offered the ‘one county one product industrialisation
plan’. Despite these being core issues, the usual, ugly, name-calling, propaganda-based mobilisation
also thrived in equal measures. We chose some of these schemes and classified them as rumours.
The first set of rumours that we used claimed that Raila had purported to say that ‘mitumba ni nguo
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

za maiti’ (second-hand clothes are for the dead). In what was largely considered as a slip of the tongue
or misrepresentation of what the Azimio candidate meant during his manifesto launch on 7 June 2022,
depending on which side of the coalition one enquired from, Raila, while outlining his policy to revamp
the once lucrative local textile industry, alluded that the potential of Kenyan own-made textiles wasinhibited by Kenya’s continued importation of mitumba (second-hand) clothes. Millions of Kenyans
depend on cheap, second-hand clothes imported into the country from the major developed countries.
Raila’s statement therefore became an easy tool to market his opponent’s rhetoric of ‘bottom up’economic model that had, since the start of the campaigns, been appealing to those at the bottom of the
pyramid. News spread rapidly, with the political class ridiculing Raila as being out of touch with thelives of the ordinary people. Those opposed to Raila’s candidature capitalised on the news castigating
Raila’s stance as insensitive. Politicians went to Gikomba, the biggest second-hand shopping centre in
Nairobi, to show solidarity with the mitumba businesses vendors. Having spent thousands of shillings
buying goods from poor traders, they ensured that the message made it to the top of the news articles
using a hashtag, ‘nguo za maiti’ 13. As the political class went shopping in shanty kiosks around the city
to show solidarity with the downtrodden, the messages about Raila’s utterances about mitumba clothes
spread like a bushfire in digital spaces, while those in the village received the message from those aroundthem and the networks they had built over the years 14.

13
See the British Broadcasting Cooperation’s (BBC’s) Swahili story on this issue on 8 June 2022, available at<https://www.bbc.com/swahili/habari-61730561, Accessed on 9 August 2022>.
14
Interview with Kimani Ndegwa, a Nyumba Kumi (tenfold) leader, at Manyatta on 10 June 2022, who narrated
how his people became restless about Raila’s statement on mitumba, asserting that ‘huyu mzee kweli hajui shinda
za mahustlers’ (this old man does not actually understand hustlers’ struggles).

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Decoding Political Discourse on Digital Platforms in Africa

Figure 1:Raila’s administration will ban the importation of second-hand clothes. Digital spaces
network – created by the author.
This sociogram was drawn based on the ‘nguo za mitumba’ rumour that started to spread on 7 June
2022. It is centred on Njeri 15 , a 42-year-old blogger, who passes her messaging on Facebook andfrequently visits the plug-off spaces on the ground. Wanjira is a leader of several chama (see definition
in section 6) that meet on weekly and monthly rotations. She is active in digital spaces, and thus uses
her time in chama to pass on news that spread in the digital spaces. Before the start of the chamaactivities during the slated meeting days, as many participants are usually late and there are no strictmeasures against time keeping, Wanjira would use the time to discuss current events on the campaign
trails. Wanjira mostly claimed to rely on Wambeti, who described herself as a blogger and was active
on Facebook and WhatsApp. Wambeti carefully managed to craft success on the mostly male-dominatedcampaign teams. She relied on the local representatives’ inner circles to convey campaign messages aspart of the presidential campaign team at the local level. The other two influential nodes were Nyaga
and Gitonga, whose target audiences were mostly in digital spaces.

15
All the names used here are pseudonyms derived from the local naming patterns of the Kirinyaga and Embu
communities representing the participants.

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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

On Sunday evening, 24 July 2022, local daily newspapers reported that at least 30 people had been
killed in a grisly road accident when a bus travelling from Meru to Mombasa swerved off the notorious
killer Nithi Bridge black spot 16. The accident was said to have been caused by brake failure that had
caused the driver to fail to control the bus at the sharp corner near the bridge. Several similar accidents
have happened on the same spot in the past, eventually causing it to be assigned the ‘black spot’ status
and leading to various people’s uproar urging the government to change the design of the bridge 17. Thus,
Nithi bridge has carried the gory stories of horrific accidents for many years, such as one that occurredin 2000, killing 45 people 18. A day before the fateful accident, the Azimio presidential candidate hadjust departed from Meru, a town near the scene of accident. As absurd as it may sound, rumours spreadin plug-off spaces asserting that Raila had ‘killed’ the passengers 19. These sentiments were shared in the
online spaces but seemed to be prevalent in the plug-off spaces. Those who shared, however, were at aloss to explain what informed that kind of conclusion 20.

Figure 2: Nithi bridge accident. Digital and plug-off spaces network – created by the author.
16
See the news report by the EastAfrican on 25 July 2022 on <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/eastafrica/34-dead-as-kenya-bus-plunges-into-river-3891456, Accessed on 25 August 2022>.
17
The two leading candidates also committed to redesign the bridge if they took over power. See the story
appearing on the Star on 26 July 2022 on <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-07-26-i-will-re-build-nithibridge-once-elected-raila/, Accessed on 27 August 2022>.
18
See the news item by F. Naliaka on Citizen digital on 25 July 2022 at <https://www.citizen.digital/news/thehistory-of-killer-nithi-bridge-n302800, Accessed on 1 September 2022>.
19
While on board the matatu to Embu town, a candid conversation started about the accident. A middle-aged
woman, without mincing her words, blamed Raila for the accident, asserting that ‘yule mganga akikuja huku lazima
kitu mbaya ifanyike’ (whenever that ‘witch’ comes over here, something terrible is bound to happen; he is a badomen).
20
For this particular rumour, due to its bizarre character, I conducted several face-to-face conversations with thosebehind it. There was no coherent explanation for their convictions and utterances besides that they portrayed ahatred for Raila.

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Decoding Political Discourse on Digital Platforms in Africa

Following the news of the Nithi bridge accident, rumours raged in plug-off spaces attempting to explain
what had happened. This sociogram was drawn from a matatu (public van) conversation started off byMuthee, who seemed to closely agree with Nungari. We identified several passengers in the matatu;
however, there were other names that emerged from people who did not travel in the same matatu. The
rest of the nodes represent responses of people who were fairly familiar with one another as they
travelled in the same matatu en route to the Kianjokoma location of Embu County. Matatu is a public
space that offers a platform for random conversations that need no substantiation. The passengers sharestories during the journey, although these stories may persist beyond the journey. Gachara, Michuki,
Kawira, and Karimi are among the nodes that received the news a few days after the matatu
conversation, from such nodes as Muriuki, Mathenge, Muthee, and Muthoni, who engaged in theconversation inside the matatu. The number of nodes that claimed to have news sources from digitalspaces was limited, due to the choice of participants in the matatu; however, Mukami claimed to haveobtained her news from a Facebook page that she did not identify.
Around 28 July 2022, a short clip of Raila Odinga making a statement about his possible approachto mitigating the religious divide between Christians and Muslims, mostly by according favours to often
marginalised Muslims while seeking state services, started to trend in various digital spaces. In the video,
Raila states that he will address the historical favouritism towards Christians over all other religious
groups in Kenya when he ascends to the presidency. In an election period during which one of the majorcoalitions had made religion a key mobilising factor 21, religious leaders and followers did not take thesentiments lightly. John W. Nguuh stated, ‘this is a call for spiritual warfare and action for every serious
Christian. As much as Kenya is a secular state, trying to equate Christianity with other religions will bea major setback to evangelism, church planting, and discipleship. A serious impediment to the fulfilmentof great commission. This statement is based on communism. So, help us LORD 22’. Those disappointed
by Raila’s comment also pointed to similarities between his sentiments and those of his wife, Ida Odinga,
which she had raised three months earlier. Ida Odinga had suggested that the mushrooming of small
churches with little or no theological foundations needed to be stemmed or regulated 23. Thus, many antiRaila followers were convinced that his candidature was against the church. Despite efforts by Raila toclarify his stance, it was too late as the message had spread like a wildfire on the social media and in thevillages, claiming that Raila was an anti-church candidate, and that any sober Christian should not vote
The Kenya Kwanza coalition presented itself as pious, religiously committed leaders who often offeredthemselves to be prayed for in public rallies.
22
Facebook post by John Wesley Nguuh, an Evangelical pastor and leader in Nairobi church on 28 July 2022,<https://www.facebook.com/john.nguuh/posts/pfbid036QgyVgJWW2HukjXSkWS7SsajXUvFYMUJ7ThQFr1U
nmxomg4eQpqZRGsuYUbmgJZrl, Accessed on 1 August 2022>.
23
On 30 January 2022, Ida Odinga called on the National Council of Churches (NCCK) to regulate churches byabolishing mushrooming, small churches and to focus on training church leaders to ensure that quality sermons in
the churches were the standard. She later apologised and withdrew the comments after a public uproar. See thenews on 31 January 2022 from Tuko at <https://www.tuko.co.ke/kenya/441786-ida-odinga-apologises-withdrawsremarks-church-regulation-i-meant-no-harm/, Accessed on 22 August 2022>.
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

for him.

Figure 3: Raila is the anti-Christ. Digital and plug-off spaces network – created by the author.
Three local pastors, Ndegwa, Njomo, and Mumbi, were vocal in warning their followers about thedangers of Raila’s ‘kasumba ya ukristo’ (dominance of Christianity) sentiments. The messaging was
highly concentrated among the church goers, such as Njiru and Wanjuki. Kimani and Mumbi used theirpages on Facebook to fiercely state that Raila’s message was harmful to their faith. Kendi stood out as
one who used her WhatsApp group to pass on the same message. There were other notable spreadersof information beyond the digital spaces, such as Kendi and Waithera, who said that they actively
influenced their chama members using the same message.
The day before the general election was calm as the campaigns had already officially concluded. The
candidates were supposed to be resting, to allow the election officials time to prepare the venues,
awaiting the official voting hours on 9 August 2022. There were tensions in central Kenya about thepossibility of rigging in favour of President Uhuru’s favourite candidate. In response to this, various
candidates representing the Kenya Kwanza coalition were keen to report any suspicious occurrences.
Since it was not a holiday, work in all public offices was supposed to continue normally, despite many
people fearing that uncertainties might not allow them to go to work as usual. One group that had towork was the kazi mtaani (work at the grassroots), a group of youths that were offered casual jobs by― 42 ―

Decoding Political Discourse on Digital Platforms in Africa

the state. Thus, the day prior to the election had been announced as a usual working day by the chiefs,
who were responsible for the youth. When the youths were seen reporting to work, alarm was raised. It
was said that the chiefs had been instructed to collect the youths' identification documents in an effort
to negatively influence voters’ turnout. Information from digital platforms, which featured prominent
politicians in the region, such as Cecily Mbarire, the then candidate for governor of Embu, and Moses
Kuria, the candidate for Kiambu governor position, had different versions of events. On the ground,politicians had physical confrontations with the chiefs on this matter, although calm was reported atlast 24. In this context, the rumour spread about ‘Uhuru Kenyatta using his Chiefs to rig elections’.

Figure 4: Chief’s plotting to rig the election using Kazi Mtaani (state program for youth employment).
Digital and plug-off spaces network - created by the author.
Munene was a candidate for member of county assembly. He was among the first on the scene at thepolling centre after reading the news that there were possible rigging schemes around Kithimu from a
Facebook post by Nduta. This sociogram is based on various altercations and exchanges regarding
whence those who went to counter chiefs got their information.

24
We could not establish whether these allegations were founded on fact; however, as it is the norm, they werehighly characterised by rumours. We witnessed altercations between the Kenya Kwanza coalition, a member ofcounty assembly (MCA) aspirant, and the area chief at Kithimu polling centre in Embu.

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5. Networks of rumours
The dispensing of information among the rural populace involves relatively small and often meaninglessand frequent topics in plug-off spaces. Such talks are structured around daily events. They rely on faceto-face networks that thrive on the social gatherings of various groups of people. Women-saturated
networks are the most common occurrence as women have also assumed strategic roles in community
development and wellbeing in organising and mobilising circles such as chama (self-help groups) 25.
This kind of use and uptake of information in plug-off spaces has spilled over into digital spaces, creating
networks that are highly identical to those at the village level-based, face-to-face conversations. In thesample used in this study, seven out of ten respondents reported to have texted at least three times a day
when they were online. The reasons for the texts were variously offered as having been ‘kujuliana hali’(literally, getting to know how one is fairing) and to obtain the current or trending news for the day 26.
There are also categories of respondents who assert that they use digital spaces to respond to specificissues, crises, and emergencies (sickness, school fees, stranded relatives, etc). Thus, cyclicalrelationships based on digital exchanges are already common in rural central Kenya. The debates in andcoordination of these conversations at times account for the spread of news and current issues. As some
topics create channels of support, they also act as leads to news that help locals make critical decisions
such as for whom to vote. Rumours exploit these relations, but also bear potential to form new ones.
Almost all of the four sets of sociograms drawn from the sample in this study show a dominance ofreciprocal ties. Reciprocal ties comprise stories that revolve around the participants, and are therefore
said to be bidirectional. Reciprocal ties imply that individuals are both senders and receivers (Kusimba
et al. 2016). However, key individuals at the highest level dominate as ‘sources’ of information.
Therefore, we can describe them as sending information to a circulating pool. The circulating pool is
described as such since individuals are not specific on how they wish to use information, rather focusing
only on spreading it. In the circulating pool, individuals are highly connected to their peers. This denseconnection of support is not only crucial for spreading rumours, but is also key to benefiting the source(giver), who usually harbours political ambitions.

25
Social organisations similar to chama are prevalent in most parts of Africa and are often leveraged to mitigate
the absence of the state’s provision of social safety nets in harsh economic environments. In other parts of Africa,
associations similar to chama include susu in Ghana (Gugerty 2007, Osei-Assibey 2015). Chama are largely
associated with women, as they are the most active participants, although recent trends suggest that men are also
increasingly adopting the chama model. The primary purpose of chama is to enable its members to save money
through revolving funds, and sometimes to provide access to credit. Thus, the emphasis is on the entrepreneurial
proclivity of its members; however, they also act as a redeeming quality for the most vulnerable families in ruraland urban poor populations (Mwatha 1996). Chama have been vigorously penetrating Kenya’s rural regions andchanging the local people’s livelihoods. Some of the data on chama sampled in Kenya suggests that there areapproximately 400,000 registered and 900,000 non-registered groups that identify as chama. It is also estimatedthat at the national level, six out of ten Kenyan adults are said to belong to such groups (see Central Bank of Kenya(CBK) et al. 2016). Chama, as observed during the fieldwork, have overarching characteristics, such as the holdingof regular meetings on weekly, fortnight, or monthly bases. For more information on chama, see Nyangau (2014),
Kinyanjui (2014), Kinyanjui and Khayesi (2005), and Mwatha (1996).
26
Interview with community leader, Muthoni Nyaga, a resident of Manyatta, on 5 August 2022.

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Decoding Political Discourse on Digital Platforms in Africa

The networks formed are highly characterised by three main issues. The first is dense ties amongpeople belonging to chama. The second category involves regular attendees to religious places ofworship, mainly churches. Both categories are highly dominated by women, since women tend to be
more likely to participate in local chama. The third most prevalent issue regarding these networks is thatthey prominently feature individuals who harbour political ambitions and are at a stage of mobilising
specific candidates that they support. These individuals had formed campaign teams to mobilise votes
in the 2022 elections, and thus their networks can be described as temporal. Table 1 shows the densityof ties and relationships among women and church groups, campaign teams, table banking, Nyumba
kumi, and work colleagues, which shows that networks are formed by dense ties of family, friendships,
neighbourliness, and where they derive livelihoods.
6. Strength of women ties and its centrality
Individuals of varying age, gender, and socio-economic status have proved to be central in these
networks; that is, they have more connections among themselves and/or connections to other wellconnected nodes (Newman 2010, Prell 2011). These individuals, depicted as central nodes, were
designated as having larger nodes in the sociogram. For example, and perhaps an obvious case, thoseindividuals who sought elective posts were easy targets or were consulted as sources of news; thus, they
were well connected among the group leaders and general public. As a result of their connectivity, theyeasily created paths for returning to public life that assured them of resources, a level of stability, and avoice in the community.
The sample of the four social networks, however, singled out women actors, who were seen to be
dominating, by sets of actors identified in similar colours on the sociograms. These sets of womengroups have striking similarities, and may often be connected to one another through the activities inwhich they engaged. The strength of women leaders (shown by larger nodes) can be seen in that they
have more connections and are often targeted by ‘bloggers’. Although ‘bloggers’ have a stronger
influence on digital platforms, they rely on women group leaders’ influence to assert their presence toplug-off audiences. The sociogram in Figure 4 shows two nodes that represent central individuals (withhexagons and diamonds). These nodes represent active individuals in digital spaces (Munene andNduati) who described themselves as bloggers. Although their popularity is rife on digital platforms, it
is not the case in plug-off spaces 27. To reach out to people in plug-off spaces, who were crucial indetermining the outcomes of the elections, Munene and Nduati had to build stronger connections withthe most connected nodes in plug-off spaces. Munene’s target was Makena, who described herself asConversations during the focused group discussion on 7 August 2022 revealed that individuals in plug-off spaces
had not heard of, nor were they familiar with the most popular individuals on digital platforms, including Munene
and Nduati.

27― 45 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

the chairperson of the local women group, a church choir leader, and stated that she was an active
member of three chama. This shows that women’s strength surpasses the hierarchies that seem toconsolidate men’s centrality, which is based on age or leadership position. Central women could be theyoungest; however, they assert their influence on the chama they lead, and these chama help them toincrease their ties.
7. ‘Bloggers’ [‘Keyboard warriors’] as brokers
Brokerage is a state in which actors connect interconnected actors, thus bridging the gap in a social
structure. Brokers can facilitate a transfer of knowledge, and are therefore involved with coordinating
efforts across networks. It is considered as advantageous, elemental, and crucial to social networks(Stovel and Shaw 2012, Burt 2005). A broker is an individual who acts as a unique tie between two
groups of nodes, who can control the flow of resources from part of a network to another and bringcrucial new resources to that group (Granovetter 1983). In sociograms 1, 2, 3, and 4, brokers are
identified as key people whose networks cut across several respondents and are represented by diamonds(women) and hexagons (male) to show that they have unique ties as brokers between information anddigital and plug-off spaces. Various people in plug-off spaces depend on these brokers to circulate news.
Brokerage is common in these networks because even in plug-off spaces, authenticity is built throughheed to take charge of stories and gain reputation as an ‘informed citizen’.
All the nodes that were identified as brokers represent individuals with clear aspirations for political
positions, both in the present and in the future, and are active ‘bloggers’ spreading their own informationthat varies in categories such as motivational stories and spiritual nourishment. They also often appear
to share statements in support of their preferred political candidates in national or local-level political
battlegrounds. Thus, they are a unique tie between the different sets of networked nodes and, using their‘blogging’, they control the flow of stories from one network to another. The ethnographic evidence
revealed at least three ‘bloggers’ who brokered a set of networked nodes. Munene, an aspiring senator,
has active messaging called ‘Pastor’s Desk’ in sociogram 4 and regulates messaging on a WhatsApp
group called Embu Leadership Forum (ELF) 28 as an administrator. In another example, in sociogram 1,
Njeri combines active messaging on her Facebook page with frequent visits to various women-focusedchama and funeral vigils across Embu.
8. Conclusion
This study is concerned with the key question of the kind of networks that facilitate the spread of
rumours during elections in Kenya. We conducted SNA on ethnographic data collected in central Kenya
28
The ELF was initially created as a youth-leadership forum initiative. It has transformed into an open portal forvarious information, including job search and advertisements.

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Decoding Political Discourse on Digital Platforms in Africa

during the 2022 general elections. Using this dataset, we examine four key rumours, aiming at the
networks they forged during the campaigns and considering the different sets of networks that wereformed by these rumours in digital and plug-off spaces. Rumour networks on digital platforms werebased mostly on the popularity of the ‘blogger’, followed by the status they held in the society.
A key finding in this study is that youthful women seem to be the key central nodes in the networksof rumours since they bear larger connections to other nodes. This is an outcome of the vigorous
involvement of women in community-level activities, to which chama seems to be central. Meanwhile,prospective candidates (aspiring) appeared as brokers across the various groups in digital and plug-off
spaces.
Rumours were found to flow within specific, digital-based groups (in this study, we focused on
Facebook groups, although our interviewees mentioned the use of WhatsApp groups), and at times
through sets of individuals on private walls, posts, and people connected to them. Ties to the aspiring
leaders were critical pathways to the success and spread of messaging packaged as rumours.
The potential for transformations (socially, politically, and economically) by the networking
individuals underscores the broader role of information communication technologies (ICTs) andcapacity of online engagements to shape networks (Ilahiane and Sherry 2008). It further highlights that
ICT has the capabilities to shape groups’ sociability (Ling and Stald 2010). This study uses SNA tocapture the various possibilities of ICT as an agency for transformation in rural Africa by accounting
for the network structures that were formed as individuals participated in election-related rumours.
Through these rumours, the social cohesion within groups was enhanced and sometimes amplified
through calls to participate in the voting exercise.
This study shows that rumours that appear on digital platforms have a capacity to circulate along
dense and reciprocal pathways, entwining specific actors more than others. As these rumours spread,they create bonds or re-create bonds of reciprocity based on vernacular, face-to-face, network patterns
in people’s lifeworlds. Thus, enduring practices of reciprocity within society’s sense of belonging,obligation, and exclusion inspires these networks to thrive. There are several similarities between how
these rumours are shaped on digital platforms and how they spread face-to-face. Rather than simplified
attempts to identify ‘fake news’, this study underscores how rural populations assert their voices on
digital platforms with the intent for an equal space for contestation. We do this by following Musila’s(2017) thoughts, which we consider as centring on an emphasis on the particularity of local epistemes
and their interactions with the universal discourses in digital spaces. We claim that this underscores theoverarching importance of furthering research and practices that promote diverse comprehensions ofrural livelihoods, especially those emerging from the contemporary youthful populace of rural Africa.

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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

Acknowledgment
This research was financially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 21K20108, titled ‘The
Political Economy of Digital Platforms in sub-Saharan Africa: Leveraging Decentralisation
Programmes and Digital Democracy by the Youth’.

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African Trade Ties and Networks

Kazue Demachi
African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan

Abstract
This study examines existing trade networks in African countries. Using bilateral trade statistics, a regression analysis examining colonial legacy, geographical relationships, and existing subregional agreementsin the gravity model is conducted. The results suggest that existing regional agreements are associatedwith more trade to some extent, but with exceptions. Moreover, using network analysis, the African tradeties and their historical changes are considered. Visualization of African trade networks clearly revealed
that the importance of Western trade counterparts was overshadowed by emerging Asian and other countries. Moreover, the importance of intra-African trade is confirmed. While African intra-regional trade isoften described as minimal, network analysis also suggests that African countries are indeed connected
through trade ties even though trade volume may be low.

Keywords: Africa, trade, regional agreement, network analysis, geography― 51 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

1. Background
Since 1995, the number of regional trade agreements and preferential trade agreements has increased inparallel with the shift from the GATT to the WTO (Frankel 1997, Freund and Ornelas 2010).

While

several mega-regional trade agreements entered force, African countries also formed regional free tradeareas. Unifying Africa in any form began as early as the 1960s (Ismail 2017).

However, the African

Continent Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and its movement constituted an abrupt change. Since the African
Union’s 10th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly on AfCFTA on March 21, 2018, the movement
toward ratification of AfCFTA gained speed, and the agreement was entered into force on May 30, 2019.
A report suggested that all African countries except for Eritrea have signed the AfCFTA, and 43 countries
have deposited ratification instruments to Chairpersons of the AU Commission (tralac 2022).
The World Bank (2020a) classifies the formation of a regional unified market in Africa as a large
economic impact and forecasts an increase in employment and wages and decrease in poverty. Conversely,a realistic perspective of African trade raises questions about the AfCFTA. The small volume of African
trade, especially among African countries, can hinder the effectiveness of the AfCFTA. Moreover, theeffectiveness of the number of existing subregional agreements in Africa is unclear. If subregional
agreements with limited member countries already face challenges, formation of continental free trade
agreements may be too ambitious.
This study aims to consider these issues based on trade statistics.

This analysis focuses on threepoints. The first point is on the effectiveness of the existing subregional agreements. Using simple
econometric analysis, the effectiveness of existing subregional agreements on enhancing intra-regional
trade is examined. The second point regards to the trade partners to African countries. Important
trade partners and their historical shifts should reflect the characteristics of African trade. A general
picture of African trade is difficult to capture owing to small volumes of intra-African trade, relatively
small economic sizes of African countries, and number of countries in the continent. Moreover, smallvolume transactions are often masked by high-valued commodity trade. This point is addressed using
network analysis and visualization. The third point regards to the sparsity (or tightness) of African
trade ties, both intra-regional and international. This point is also addressed using the idea of network
analysis. By examining these points, this study reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the current
African economic networks. A tightly knit trade network necessitates freer trade conditions; conversely,
a weak trade network reflects local economic activities, which would need something different from free
trade agreements.
To understand the above points, this study combines econometric and social network analyses using
bilateral trade data provided by the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses African
trade characteristics and regional and international trade agreements. Section 3 explains and discusses― 52 ―

African Trade Ties and Networks

the data set and econometric analysis, followed by a network analysis of the same data set. Section 5
concludes this study.
2. Characteristics of intra- and international African trade
Promotion and diversification of trade have been the top agenda for African economies. Stylized facts
about African trade are the small size of trade volumes (Foroutan and Pritchett 1993) and dependence
on commodity exports, which is equivalent to the issues of mining and low-value-added exports (WorldBank 2020b, Abreha et al. 2020). In terms of economic geography, African trade is considered to be
influenced by colonial ties (Rauch 1999). On the other hand, China became a key African economic
partner in the 2000s. Related to the discussion of colonial legacy, the influence of historical conventions
such as Yaoundé, Lomé, Cotonou, and, recently, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with
European Union (EU) are discussed in terms of economic growth and development assistance (Gruhn
1976, Hurt 2003). In the new millennium, the United States also enacted the preferential trade treatment
for African export under the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA).
Furthermore, ‘trade not aid’ has been the slogan of the United Nations Conference on Trade andDevelopment (UNCTAD) in 1968. However, trade requires certain institutions and environment such as
infrastructure for transportation (Limão and Venables 1999). Poor infrastructure of African countries are
considered as the bottleneck of intra-regional trade, and ‘aid for trade’ emerged as one of the international
agenda in economic cooperation for Africa.
Given these facts about African trade, the current analysis aims to understand the importance of external ties for Africa, with conditions of African geographic characteristics. In the next section, historicalchanges in African trade ties are addressed.
2.1. Data
Analyzing trade ties among countries requires observations based on each trade pair. Bilateral international trade statistics are provided by the IMF (DOTS), and the Commodity Trade Statistics are provided
by the United Nations Statistics Division (UN Comtrade). While the UN Comtrade provides more detailed trade statistics based on categories, this study used DOTS data set to obtain an overview of African
trade, as DOTS has wider country coverage. This study’s data set is limited to goods trade, as the trade
statistics on services still have limited coverage of countries, especially for Africa. Focus on goods trade
may become a big restriction in this analysis, considering the recent surge in the importance of service
trade in African countries (UNCTAD 2022). However, for African countries, goods trade remains thecore of trade. In the following, ‘trade’ refers goods trade.
The data set used in this study is constructed using trade statistics reported by African countries(including North Africa). Hence, information on non-African countries is included only as a counterpart― 53 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

of African countries. This asymmetry is necessary to avoid dwarfing small volumes of African tradeand inadvertently excluding them from the analysis. Omitting small island countries, the sample data set
includes 54 African countries and 154 other countries available from the DOTS, totaling 208 countries.
In a simple calculation, this data set constructs 54 × (53 + 154) = 11, 178 possible combinations ofcountries, namely, trade ties, for imports and exports. While bilateral trade data is available annually forthe majority of countries since 1990, this study used only seven periods (1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010,2015, and 2020). This results in 11, 178 × 7 = 78, 246 trading pairs. However, Eritrea was officiallyrecognized by the United Nations in 1993, and South Sudan became independent in 2011. Owing todifferences in the number of countries in some years, the data set resulted in an unbalanced panel.

As a characteristic of trade data, the difference between imports (c.i.f) and exports (f.o.b) exists,
while exports by country A to B should theoretically match imports by B from A. Other elements(e.g. misreporting, underreporting, or overreporting) play a significant role in making trade statistics
inconsistent among reporting countries, especially in the case of statistics reported by developing countries(Ndikumana and Boyce 2021). Discussions have been conducted on such gaps and several efforts havebeen made for statistics to agree, but this study used the data as reported and analyze the trade ties basedon both of exports and imports. While this may highlight the inconsistency of trade statistics, examining
both import and export data is necessary, given the asymmetric construction of the data set that uses only
trade data reported by African countries.
Furthermore, given the characteristics of theTable 1. Summary statistics
lnex
ex_v
ex_S
ex_gdpS
lnim
im_v
im_S
im_gdpS
lngravity

trade data, it is not possible to distinguish between

mean
sd
min
max count-0.11
3.62 -13.82
9.73 34592
28.04 256.29
0.00 16809.68 77004
0.48
2.64
0.00
87.07 77004
0.18
2.44
0.00
270.35 74313-1.23
3.96 -13.82
10.35 35655
27.21 335.08
0.00 31357.50 77004
0.48
3.05
0.00
99.88 77004
0.11
1.02
0.00
101.93 74313
10.43
4.42
0.00
25.68 61218

Note: lnex: natural log of goods export value, ex_v: export
value (in millions of USD), ex_S: export share of total exports
×100, ex_gdpS: export share of gdp×100, and likewise forimports. For the calculation of gravity, refer to the main text.

no-trade and traded-but-no-data if trade data
between two countries are absent. In this analysis,
trade pairs with no trade data are set to zero insteadof dropping from the sample. This is a strong hypothesis, and this procedure produces many zeros
in the matrix. This issue is discussed in the next
section.
Table 1 presents summary statistics.

The

reason of missing values for the natural log ofexport and import values are ‘zero trade’. Lack of

current GDP data (for which the source is the World Bank or OECD, retrieved from the World Development Indicators) and minimal distance information for several countries also resulted in missing values
in calculating the trade share of GDP and gravity (discussed below), respectively (Schvitz et al. 2022,
World Bank, 2022).

― 54 ―

African Trade Ties and Networks(a) Import from African counterpart(b) Import from other counterpart(c) Export to African counterpart(d) Export to other counterpart

Figure 1. Trend of African trade: 1990-2020
Data source: IMF (2022), in millions USD, current.

2.2. Trend of African trade
Figure 1 presents the trend in African trade based on the data set used in this study. Panel (a) indicatesthe increasing trend of total import value from peer African countries. Panel (b) indicates that, around2010, total import value from the rest of the world peaked. Panels (c) and (d) indicate a similar trendof African total export value for trade with African peers and the rest of the world that peaked in 2015.
However, the decrease in 2020 may be attributable to the effect of the global pandemic.
Increases in international commodity prices and increasing economic ties with emerging economies
are often considered the background of these increases in trade values. However, this did not necessarily
explain intra-African trade increases. An econometric model calculated as the average of the sample
does not provide a detailed picture of changes in the roles of actors. In Section 3, an analysis will showwhether the change was induced by any specific economic actor.

― 55 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

Figure 2. Networks based on
the African regional
agreements
Note:
Membership relationships
based on the seven regional agreements and one extra-regional economic agreements are depicted. The
size of each node reflects the economic
size. The network graph is drawn using R igraph.

2.3. Regional trade agreements
Several trade agreements exist in Africa. Frankel (1997) summarizes a list of regional agreements,
including those that have already failed. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the oldest
customs union, dates back to 1910. However, initiatives outside Africa also fostered several regional
agreements (e.g. the United Nations or the IMF) to bolster stagnating economic cooperation throughexisting agreements. For example, in 1976, the UN backed the formation of the Economic Communityof the Countries of the Great Lakes among Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire. On the other hand, theIMF sponsored the Cross Border Initiative, which encompasses all members of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), except for Seychelles, in 1993 (Frankel 1997: 274). This may
be considered as an international effort for supporting African regional development or neoclassicaleconomic thought that considers smallness of economic size as weakness. Some of the currently existingregional agreements are not literary ‘trade agreements’ recognized at the World Trade Organization(WTO), and their memberships are so complex that finding systematic rules is difficult. Figure 2
indicates membership ties based on seven selected regional agreements and one extra-regional economic
agreement. This figure highlights the complexity of the relationships among countries rather thanclarifying the characteristics of the groups. The names of the agreements are indicated in Table 2. In
Figure 2, each country’s location is optimized by the algorithm in the igraph program of R and should
not be considered an indication of any meaningful grouping. However, we can still recognize the roughgeographical grouping of western and southern countries. This should be natural, given the geographicalformation of several economic agreements.

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African Trade Ties and Networks

Table 2. Selected African regional economic agreements
Name

Official nameMembers#

AMU

Arab Maghreb Union

DZA, LBY, MRT, MAR, TUN

5

CEN-SAD

Community of Sahel-Saharan States

BEN, BFA, CAF, TCD, COM, CIV, DJI, EGY, ERI,
GMB, GHA, GNB, LBY, MLI, MRT, MAR, NER,
NGA, SEN, SLE, SOM, SDN, TGO, TUN

24

COMESA

Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa

BDI, COM, COD, DJI, EGY, ERI, SWZ, ETH,
KEN, LBY, MDG, MWI, MUS, RWA, SYC, SOM,
SDN, TUN, UGA, ZMB, ZWE

21

EAC

East African Community

BDI, COD, KEN, RWA, SSD, UGA, TZA

7

ECCAS

Economic Community of Central African
States

AGO, BDI, CMR, CAF, TCD, COG, COD, GNQ,
GAB, RWA, STP

11

ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African
States

BEN, BFA, CPV, CIV, GMB, GHA, GIN, GNB,
LBR, MLI, NER, NGA, SEN, SLE, TGO

15

IGAD

Intergovernmental Authority on Development

DJI, ERI, ETH, KEN, SOM, SDN, UGA

7

SADC

Southern African Development Community

AGO, BWA, COM, COD, SWZ, LSO, MDG, MWI,
MUS, MOZ, NAM, SYC, ZAF, TZA, ZMB, ZWE

16

IORA

Indian Ocean Rim Association

COM, KEN, MDG, MUS, MOZ, SYC, SOM, ZAF,
TZA

9(22)

Note: IORA is extra-regional economic agreement, including other member states. The total number of member states
are in parenthesis.

Considering the feasibility of AfCFTA, the effectiveness of existing agreements has significant implications. Ties among countries in Figure 2 indicate the relationship of countries belong to identicalagreements; however, they also indicate the possible procedures and costs (e.g. meetings and negotiations) to maintain the agreements. Multiplicative relationships do not necessarily mean stronger ties but
may imply burden. In the analysis below, influence of ties based on membership in regional agreements
on economic activities is also examined.
3. Estimation of African trade relationships
3.1. Geography
To analyze trade relationships, specific elements need to be controlled for, especially in African trade.
On economic geography, both geographic characteristics and trade costs are critical in international andregional trade. This analysis follows a type of gravity model that considers the distance between eachtrading pair as proxy for trading cost. As an index of trading costs weighted by economic importance,
gravity is calculated as follows, following Yuan et al. (2021):
gravity =gdpi × gdpj
distanceij

where i and j indicates the reporting country and counterpart country, respectively.

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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

The geographic distances between countries are retrieved from the CShapes 2.0 project1. This data
set provides the minimal distance for each pair of countries (Schvitz et al. 2022). GDP data is obtained
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2022). Missing data in both distance and GDP
reduced the sample size. While assuming that long-distance trade is associated with high trade costs isrational, geographic proximity may not necessarily mean lower costs for African countries given poor
infrastructure. On the other hand, Brenton and Soprano (2018) and the World Bank (2020a) suggestthat the volume of unrecorded cross-border trade amounts to half of officially recorded trade. In Africa,
where many small countries reside in one large continent and national borders are artificially drawn,
many countries share borders with their neighbors that are not natural boundaries (e.g. mountains orrivers). Given this historical legacy and the relatively poor institutional qualities, not every cross-border
trade has been recorded. While volume and size of such small-scale cross-border trade should varyby border, African trade statistics significantly underestimates the importance of economic ties among
African countries. Unrecorded trade is difficult to estimate, but the shared border length (sborder) isused in the models for intra-African trade instead of gravity to address the former issue. The sharedborder length information was obtained from The World Factbook (CIA 2022).
3.2. Model
The simple gravity model is expressed as follows:
yijt = α + β1 lngravityijt + β2 colonyij + β3 clangij + β4 rtaij + υ,(2)

where y is bilateral trade, lngravity is the natural logarithm of gravity, colony is binary variable
that takes 1 if the trade pair has colonial relationship and 0 otherwise, clang is also binary variableindicating common official la nguage, an d rt a is a ma trix of bi nary in dicators de noting me mbership to
identical regional trade agreements based on the discussion in the previous section. Suffixes i, j, t denote
the reporting country, counterpart, and year, respectively. Regional agreements considered here are
identical to those in Table 2 and not necessarily trade agreements. The data for colonial ties and common
languages were retrieved from the database provided by Cepii2 (Melitz and Toubal, 2014). While thecolonial legacy is expected to remain influential to the Africa-European trade, Chinese influence on the
African economies is also expected to be remarkable. Trade with China is captured by a dummy variable
to check the strength of trade ties with China.
Bilateral trade y can be calculated as either imports or exports in the current USD value or as a share.
In this analysis, the share of trade was measured in two ways.
1CShapes 2.0, <https://icr.ethz.ch/data/cshapes/, accessed on 9 October 2022>. Compared to the United Nations listing,for distance data, 36 countries are missing, mainly the small island states, including two African countries.
2Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, <http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/welcome.asp, accessed on 9
October 2022>.

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African Trade Ties and Networks

The importance of trade partner j for reporting country i relative to other trade partners is measured
astrade_valueij
× 100,
trade_share1 = n
j=1 trade_valueiji ̸= j,(3)

where n is the total number of countries, and the suffixes i and j denote a reporting country and its trade
partner, respectively. This version of the trade share is especially convenient, as several African countries
do not report basic and reliable statistics for national accounting, resulting in a lack of observations of
GDP data. trade_share1 prevents the sample size from shrinking as the sum of imports and exports is
independently calculated using the current data set.
Alternatively, it can be measure as the importance of a trade tie relative to the GDP of the reporting
country i, which reflects the importance of trade partner j relative to reporting economy’s size.
trade_share2 =trade_valueij
× 100.
gdpi(4)This version of trade share is straightforward; however, given the relatively small economic scales ofAfrican countries, the importance of ties may be exaggerated. This tendency is salient in small island
countries. Trade networks based on differently defined trade shares may sometimes present considerably
different pictures and require careful interpretation.
3.3. ‘zero trade’
Intra-African trade is considered sparse and low volume, and this is reflected in the many zeros in theimport and export values in the data set. Descriptive statistics (Table1) indicate that more than halfof trade pairs in the sample either do not trade or report trade values. Moreover, the large standard
deviation of the data owing to the widely varied sizes and types of economies in the continent skewed the
distribution of trade statistics. Figure 3 indicates histograms of the import and export values, excluding
zero. In this analysis, ‘zero trade’ pairs are either dropped from the sample in the models using the natural
logarithm of trade values or maintained in the models using the crude values or shares. The many-zeromodels are run using Tobit model.
3.4. Regression results
Regressions were run on the entire sample and the subsample, which only includes African countries ascounterparts, to determine the difference between international trade and intra-regional trade. The resultsof regressions are shown in Table 3 and 4.
For regressions based on import networks (Table 3), lngravity terms are positive and statisticallysignificant in all models. This suggests that countries tend to import more from geographically closer
and larger countries. Moreover, shared border length (sborder) is positive and statistically significant,― 59 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

Table 3. African trade relationships based on imports, 1990-2020(1)
lnim
lngravity

0.198∗∗∗[0.006]sbordercolony

(2)
lnim

(3)
im_v
48.386∗∗∗[0.646]2.486∗∗∗[0.214]5.374∗∗∗[0.362]

comlang

(4)
im_v

(5)
im_S
0.406∗∗∗[0.006]104.375∗∗∗[4.868]605.270∗∗∗[24.684]0.594∗∗∗[0.119]

(6)
im_S

(7)
im_gdpS
0.139∗∗∗[0.002]

1.353∗∗∗[0.079]10.220∗∗∗[0.218]49.771∗∗∗[2.794](8)
im_gdpS

0.438∗∗∗[0.038]2.184∗∗∗[0.070]0.786∗∗∗[0.045]0.319∗∗∗[0.022]

intafrica-0.734∗∗∗[0.092]-21.233∗∗[6.472]-0.564∗∗∗[0.057]-0.092∗∗∗[0.018]CHINA

4.335∗∗∗[0.394]619.177∗∗∗[27.089]7.486∗∗∗[0.239]2.073∗∗∗[0.077]

COMESA

0.742∗∗∗[0.174]0.442∗∗[0.163]77.174∗∗∗[12.363]

0.798[3.865]1.044∗∗∗[0.108]0.459∗∗∗[0.062]0.248∗∗∗[0.035]0.115∗∗∗[0.030]EAC

2.742∗∗∗[0.481]3.276∗∗∗[0.468]-71.947∗[34.169]

73.496∗∗∗[10.923]

0.769∗[0.299]2.179∗∗∗[0.175]-0.219∗[0.097]0.437∗∗∗[0.085]SADC

2.074∗∗∗[0.220]2.074∗∗∗[0.211]35.883∗[15.439]93.997∗∗∗[4.927]0.501∗∗∗[0.136]1.190∗∗∗[0.080]0.177∗∗∗[0.043]0.442∗∗∗[0.039]AMU

3.715∗∗∗[0.637]3.193∗∗∗[0.635]54.734[43.890]104.076∗∗∗[14.649]

0.103[0.388]0.565∗[0.237]0.019[0.123]0.354∗∗[0.113]

CENSAD

0.851∗∗∗[0.165]0.829∗∗∗[0.160]23.906∗[11.454]6.702[3.667]0.460∗∗∗[0.101]0.343∗∗∗[0.059]0.079∗[0.033]0.071∗[0.029]ECOWAS

1.455∗∗∗[0.231]1.644∗∗∗[0.225]61.410∗∗∗[16.010]59.989∗∗∗[5.212]

1.105∗∗∗[0.141]

1.381∗∗∗[0.084]0.260∗∗∗[0.045]0.495∗∗∗[0.041]

ECCAS

0.493
[0.339]0.081[0.317]-129.555∗∗∗[23.870]-40.619∗∗∗[7.437]-0.986∗∗∗[0.210]-0.453∗∗∗[0.119]-0.288∗∗∗[0.067]-0.111[0.057]IORA

2.218∗∗∗[0.238]
world
32171
0.04
0.23
0.19

1.340∗∗∗[0.356]
intra-Africa
10249
0.12
0.15
0.15

139.735∗∗∗[16.416]
world
61218

29.395∗∗∗[8.308]intra-Africa
19716

1.458∗∗∗[0.144]
world
61218

0.436∗∗[0.134]
intra-Africa
19716

0.202∗∗∗[0.048]
world
59508

0.179∗∗[0.067]
intra-Africa
19027

0.02

0.02

0.05

0.04

0.07

0.03

SampleObs.
R2-withinR2-between
R2-overall
pseud-R2

Note: Standard errors in brackets. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Constant and year are included in all models (not reported).
For each model, dependent variables are: lnim is natural logarithm of import value, im_v is import value, im_S is import shareof import sum, and im_gdpS is import share of GDP.

― 60 ―

African Trade Ties and Networks

Table 4. African trade relationships based on exports, 1990-2020(1)
lnex
lngravity

0.143∗∗∗[0.005]sbordercolony

(2)
lnex

(3)
ex_v
37.897∗∗∗[0.472]2.647∗∗∗[0.216]5.309∗∗∗[0.349]comlang

(4)
ex_v

(5)
ex_S
0.337∗∗∗[0.004]108.777∗∗∗[5.653]554.318∗∗∗[18.270]0.518∗∗∗[0.123]

(6)
ex_S

(7)
ex_gdpS
0.283∗∗∗[0.005]2.574∗∗∗[0.125]12.749∗∗∗[0.175]55.762∗∗∗[3.312](8)ex_gdpS

0.922∗∗∗[0.051]4.204∗∗∗[0.185]1.355∗∗∗[0.073]0.509∗∗∗[0.030]intafrica-1.997∗∗∗[0.091]-69.077∗∗∗[4.918]-0.832∗∗∗[0.047]-0.591∗∗∗[0.049]CHINA

4.800∗∗∗[0.378]859.942∗∗∗[19.865]9.801∗∗∗[0.190]5.131∗∗∗[0.200]

COMESA

0.647∗∗∗[0.170]0.407∗[0.168]67.839∗∗∗[9.298]

3.787[4.545]0.725∗∗∗[0.088]0.365∗∗∗[0.100]0.681∗∗∗[0.093]0.117∗∗[0.041]EAC

3.392∗∗∗[0.460]3.558∗∗∗[0.470]12.286[25.277]137.642∗∗∗[12.576]

3.459∗∗∗[0.236]4.969∗∗∗[0.276]0.317[0.253]1.035∗∗∗[0.114]SADC

2.161∗∗∗[0.215]

1.966∗∗∗[0.219]64.838∗∗∗[11.578]

116.867∗∗∗[5.785]1.780∗∗∗[0.109]2.398∗∗∗[0.128]0.739∗∗∗[0.115]0.853∗∗∗[0.052]AMU

4.070∗∗∗[0.614]2.994∗∗∗[0.639]73.759∗[32.534]112.840∗∗∗[16.985]0.658∗[0.311]0.833∗[0.377]0.496[0.324]

0.335∗[0.153]

CENSAD

0.776∗∗∗[0.161]0.722∗∗∗[0.164]35.260∗∗∗[8.689]16.839∗∗∗[4.330]0.522∗∗∗[0.082]0.502∗∗∗[0.095]0.362∗∗∗[0.087]0.171∗∗∗[0.039]ECOWAS

1.814∗∗∗[0.226]

1.778∗∗∗[0.232]59.769∗∗∗[12.090]77.007∗∗∗[6.124]

1.336∗∗∗[0.114]2.123∗∗∗[0.135]0.826∗∗∗[0.120]0.759∗∗∗[0.055]ECCAS

0.819∗[0.323]0.276[0.318]-63.213∗∗∗[17.633]-22.037∗∗[8.547]-0.155[0.167]-0.031[0.187]-0.162[0.174]0.017[0.077]IORA

2.143∗∗∗[0.227]

1.143∗∗[0.360]161.467∗∗∗[12.014]46.237∗∗∗[9.639]1.688∗∗∗[0.114]

1.213∗∗∗[0.213]1.002∗∗∗[0.124]0.550∗∗∗[0.089]SampleObs.
R2-withinR2-between
R2-overall
pseud-R2

world
32026
0.16
0.19
0.21

intra-Africa
9169
0.13
0.16
0.17

world
61218

intra-Africa
19716

world
61218

intra-Africa
19716

world
59508

intra-Africa
19027

0.03

0.02

0.08

0.04

0.04

0.05

Note: Standard errors in brackets. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Constant and year are included in all models (not reported).
For each model, dependent variables are: lnex is natural logarithm of export value, ex_v is export value, ex_S is export shareof export sum, and ex_gdpS is export share of GDP.

― 61 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)(a) import value (excluding zero)(b) export value (excluding zero)(c) Natural log of import value(d) Natural log of export value

Figure 3. Histogram of trade data
Note: Bin=20, and the y-axis represents the percentage.
Data source: IMF (2022), in millions USD, current.

which suggests that neighboring countries tend to trade more. While this may not be surprising, thisensures that neighbors trade more on average, even in Africa, where transportation networks connecting
neighboring countries are not necessarily well equipped. Colonial ties remain effective, and sharing thesame official language is associated with more trade, suggesting that the colonial legacy remains alive.
Coefficient of CHIN A is positive and statistically significant, but the coefficient size is not necessarilymuch larger than that of colony.
The term intaf rica is negative and statistically significant when world countries are included. Hence,
import volume and shares from outside Africa clearly outweigh intra-regional trade. Regarding trade
agreements, only ties through ECOWAS and (or) IORA are constantly associated with more trade.
However, when the sample is limited to intra-African trade, other agreements (e.g. COMESA and SADC)
also have positive and statistically significant coefficients. Remarkably, the Economic Community ofCentral African States (ECCAS) has a negative coefficient, which suggests that member countries tradeless with each other. When it is examined as the trade networks based on export ties (Table 4), the results― 62 ―

African Trade Ties and Networks

are similar to those of imports.
Regression results for African regional agreements suggest that ties established through the SADC,ECOWAS, and IORA are associated with greater trade. Members of the ECCAS trade less than others.
As memberships overlap across the different agreements, a more detailed analysis for each agreement isrequired to distinguish the effect of different agreements. However, the results confirm that most African
regional agreements function to some extent, especially in terms of intra-regional trade. This in turn,implies that nonmembership in subregional agreements is associated with less trade. While we need tobe cautious about the causality between countries’ trading relationships and existence of economic agreements, this may add to the expectation that African continental free trade agreement will push transactions.
4. Network analysis of African trade
The abovementioned econometric model helps us build an average figure for African trade. However,regression results often trigger further questions regarding which countries are the main actors in themodel. This study apply an analytical method of network analysis to this point. Network analysis is a
research area that began far earlier but was rapidly established in the 1990s along with the developmentof world wide web. Analyzing the relationships of things is backed by graph theory, and it is applied
to various areas, from natural science to people’s social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994,
Barabási 2016).
Regarding its application to economic analysis, Snyder and Kick (1979) used network analysis toinvestigate the relationship of countries and examine the discourse of ‘centre and periphery’ in the international economic structure. The recent network analysis applied to the relationship between countries
are combined with geographic information system (GIS). For example, Yuan et al. (2021) examined thedeterminants of the network of the Indian Ocean Region using network analysis and GIS. As trade isthe economic activity between two entities and since world trade is the assembly of those ties, applying
network analysis to international trade should be natural.
4.1. Network graphs
In visualizing the African trade network, the relatively large sample size arises as a challenge. To avoid
the graphs to become ‘hairballs,’ the sample is limited to 54 African countries and their top trade partners
outside. Table 5 indicates the top trade partners for African countries from 1990 to 2020, calculatedusing rankings for each reporting country. Several points are worth noting. First, for importing partners,
European countries and United States have occupied the top rankings for several years, while Japan
dropped from the list around the 2000s, and India (IND) and China (CHN) began appearing in the list.
Moreover, the United Arab Emirates (ARE) ranked among the top two import partners in 2020, whichsuggests that Middle Eastern countries are emerging as important suppliers for African countries. For― 63 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

Table 5. Top 10 trade counterparts of African countries(a) Counterparts of import to Africa
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
1 FRA FRA FRA USA USA
2 ITA DEU DEU FRA IND
3 DEU ITA USA DEU FRA
4 GBR ESP ITA NLD CHN
5 ESP GBR GBR ITA NLD
6 NLD USA ESP GBR DEU
7 PRT NLD NLD ESP ITA
8 JPN PRT BEL BEL ESP
9 USA JPN JPN IND GBR
10 CHE CHE PRT CHN BEL

2015
IND
USA
CHN
FRA
NLD
ITA
ARE
GBR
DEU
ESP

2020
CHN
ARE
USA
IND
NLD
FRA
ITA
DEU
BEL
ESP

14 countries appear within top 10 at least once: United ArabEmirates (ARE), Belgium (BEL), Switzerland (CHE), China(CHN), Germany (DEU), Spain (ESP), France (FRA), United
Kingdom (GBR), India (IND), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Netherlands (NLD), Portugal (PRT), and United States of America(USA).

(b) Counterparts of export from Africa
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
1 FRA FRA FRA CHN CHN
2 DEU DEU USA FRA FRA
3 ITA GBR GBR USA USA
4 GBR ITA DEU DEU IND
5 NLD NLD ITA ITA DEU
6 JPN USA BEL GBR NLD
7 USA CHN CHN NLD BEL
8 ESP JPN NLD BEL ITA
9 CHE ESP ESP IND GBR
10 DNK CHE JPN ESP ZAF

2015
CHN
USA
FRA
IND
DEU
BEL
NLD
ITA
GBR
TUR

2020
CHN
IND
USA
FRA
NLD
DEU
BEL
TUR
ITA
GBR

15 countries appear within top 10 at least once: China (CHN),
India (IND), United States of America (USA), France (FRA),
Netherlands (NLD), Germany (DEU), Belgium (BEL), Türkiye(TUR), Italy (ITA), United Kingdom (GBR), Denmark (DNK),
Switzerland (CHE), Japan (JPN), Spain (ESP), South Africa(ZAF).

Note: Calculated as the sum of ranks based on each countries’ share in total export/import. The country which had the mostshare in export/import in most countries receives the least score and is ranked as number one.

export partners, the trend is similar to imports, but in 2010, South Africa ranked within the top 10 as
the only African country. China has been Africa’s top trade partner since 2005, and Turkey, a country
that has not been listed as an key import partner before, has also appeared in the export partner list since2015. The following analysis included counterpart countries that appeared at least once in the top 10 list.
Excluding South Africa, 16 countries outside Africa are counted as important export and import partners.
In addition to the 54 African countries, this adds up to 70 countries in the network analysis.
Figure 4 are the network graphs that show countries as nodes, trade ties as edges (directed), and importshare (as the sum of imports of the reporting country) as the weight of the edges. The data of trade ties
among the 70 countries are extracted from the same data set used in the regressions above; however,network graphs are drawn only for the years 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2020 to see historical shifts in the
trade networks. To simplify the visual comparison, positions of countries’ nodes in each graph are fixed,
and non-African countries are shaded and located in the inner circle. Graphs were drawn using the igraphpackage in R (Csárdi and Nepusz 2006).
4.1.1. Import networks
In Figure 4, countries at the arrowhead comprise the reporting country importing goods from its counterpart. The graphs indicate that through 1990 and 2000, trade partners for African countries were mainlyWestern countries, especially France. However, the USA also had many strong edges, indicating thatfor US firms, some African countries were targeted markets. For example, Gambian top imports fromthe United States in 2000 comprised raw sugar cane, sugar, and automobiles; however, its other imports
included various goods such as cement, T-shirts, and cotton (UN Comtrade database).

― 64 ―

African Trade Ties and Networks(a) 70 countries: Import share, 1990(b) 70 countries: Import share, 2000(c) 70 countries: Import share, 2010(d) 70 countries: Import share, 2020

Figure 4. Trade networks based on import shares of African countries
Note: 54 African countries and 16 non-African countries. Non-African countries are top 10 import counterparts for Africa
through 1990 to 2020. Edges are weighted with import share, which is calculated as bilateral import share in the total importof reporting country.

Notably, in 2010, strong ties among African countries, namely, South Africa, and others are recognizable. Relatively strong edges from South Africa is directed to countries such as Lesotho and Eswatini(Swaziland), indicating a relatively strong regional network among neighboring countries. However,
several southern countries, especially SACU members (i.e. Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, and Namibia),
only began reporting their trade statistics after 2008. Given the fact that formation of SACU dates backto 1910 and historical economic dependence of the member countries on South Africa, South Africa’s
importance as the hub of trade networks before 2010 must be largely undervalued3.
However, in 2020, considerable change occurred when China and the United Arab Emirates became
the center of trade ties. Particularly, China had a few but strong ties with specific countries, such as
3Author is grateful for the suggestion on this point by Shinichi Takeuchi of the ASC-TUFS.

― 65 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)(a) 70 countries: Export share, 1990(b) 70 countries: Export share, 2000(c) 70 countries: Export share, 2010(d) 70 countries: Export share, 2020

Figure 5. Trade networks based on export shares of African countries
Note: 54 African countries and 16 non-African countries. Non-African countries comprise the top 10 export counterparts for
Africa through 1990 to 2020. Edges are weighted with export share, which is calculated as bilateral export share in total exportof reporting country.

Sudan (2000 and 2010) and South Sudan (2020). From the United Arab Emirates to Niger (NER), the top
three export categories in 2020 comprised cigarettes, vehicles, and petroleum. Conversely, top exports
from China to Sudan (SDN) in 2010 are in various categories related to materials and machines used inconstruction.
4.1.2. Export networks
When the trade networks are determined based on African exports, the picture became even clearer. In
Figure 5, France represented colonial ties in the African trade in 1990. In 2000, the centrality of France asa trade partner remained the same, but several intra-African trades were recognized. Here, South Africa’s
neighboring countries (e.g. Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) export more to South Africa― 66 ―

African Trade Ties and Networks

than to any other counterpart. In 2010, export ties with France and other Western countries remained,
but their importance started to fade, and many edges were then directed to China. Lesotho, Namibia,
Eswatini (Swaziland), and Botswana hold strong ties with South Africa. China’s importance as an export
destination strengthened in 2020, while South Africa’s remained the same for the southern counties.
Notably, the United States has no clear ties with any specific African country, despite the AGOA. Evenfor typical oil exporters like Nigeria, ties with the USA are not heavily weighted. The category of goods
traded between Eswatini and South Africa in 2020, for example, helps to obtain a fraction of the imageof regional trade. Goods exported from Eswatini majorly comprise ingredients for the beverage industry
and various types of sugar, which suggests the relative importance of beverage companies in South Africa
as trade counterparts. Moreover, this case also implies the possibility that other neighboring countries
depend on the inputs import demand of a few big companies in the regional giant economy.
Visualizing trade relationships using network graphs helps recognize important countries in trade
networks. When trade is measured as a share, South Africa emerges as an important regional trade hub.
Conversely, this also suggests that no other African country plays an equivalent role to South Africa.
Considering the outstanding economic scale of South Africa in this region, this may be natural. However,a relatively large economy like Nigeria does not serve as a hub in Western or Northern countries. The
absence of trade hubs in western and northern Africa may be because of their geographical proximity or
historical ties with Europe. Several small island countries, such as Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe,
and Comoros, even anchor their currencies to the euro, indicating economic proximity to the euro area.
However, discussing the African relationship with the EU is beyond this study’s scope, and it remains asa future task.
4.2. Importance of weak ties
The above analyses investigated trade in value, or either its share in total trade or share in GDP. While
this is an orthodox way to analyze trade size among countries, when applied to African economies withrelatively small scales, it results in overlooking not strong—but important—ties. To overcome this point,
this section applies the tool of network analysis; however, here, trade ties are considered as non-weighted.
That is, even when tiny in volume, non-zero trade is equally counted as unity.
Figure 6 shows the graphs indicating the sum of the incoming and outgoing edges for each node
(country). Countries are limited to African countries to present the intra-regional trade ties. Differences
between import and export graphs exist, even though import and export graphs should be mirror images
in theory. While the causes of the gap can be relevant, only export graphs are presented here. Graphs
were drawn using the qgraph in R.
Contrary to the network graph in the previous subsection, the figure indicates that several countries
beside South Africa hold nearly full (53) ties. Graph shapes differ slightly by year, but countries includ-― 67 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

ing Côte d’Ivoire (CIV), Egypt (EGY), Kenya (KEN), Morocco (MAR), Senegal (SEN), Tunisia (TUN),
Tanzania (TAN), and South Africa (ZAF) hold approximately 40 or more incoming ties, although they are
not necessarily associated with as many outgoing ties. These graphs present that the often-shared image
that African intra-regional trade is very little does not reflect reality. The average number of ties is 37.7
for 2020. Given the number of countries in the region, this figure may not be considerably high, and eachtrade value may be small. However, countries are connected through the intra-African trade network.
Moreover, it suggests the potential significance of North African countries as trade hubs on the African
continent. In economic analysis, African countries are often divided into subgroups, where Sub-SaharanAfrica is treated separately from North Africa. The graphs here suggest that the Sub-Saharan and North
African countries are economically connected.

(a) Export ties, 2005(b) Export ties, 2010(c) Export ties, 2015(d) Export ties, 2020

Figure 6. Exports to African peers, unweighted ties
Note: OutDegree is number of outgoing ties of reporting (exporting) country, and Indegree is number of incoming ties forcounterpart (importing) countries.

5. Conclusion
This study examined African trade ties using bilateral trade data. A simple gravity model regression
supported the existing legacy of colonial history on African trade, while it demonstrated the importanceof China as Africa’s trading partner. Among the existing subregional economic agreements, SADC and― 68 ―

African Trade Ties and Networks

ECOWAS are associated with more trade. An extra-regional economic agreements with countries in
the Indian Ocean Region (IORA) are also associated with more trade. Existing African subregional
agreements seem to be mostly associated with stronger trade ties when confined to intra-regional trade,
except for those of central African countries. The analysis using the network graph showed that there
were significant shifts in the importance of trade partners between 1990 and 2020. While colonial legacy
remained significant in regression analyses, strong trade ties with European countries were found to beovershadowed by other countries (e.g. as China and the United Arab Emirates) in the network graphs.
Emergence of intra-African trade, especially around South Africa, is also a big change, although strong
ties with South Africa and its neighboring countries can exist even earlier. Additionally, the network
analysis indicated that African countries maintain trade ties with African countries, regardless of volume.
A conclusion derived from the above results is quite ordinary. As African countries are connected
through trade networks regardless of volume, the next focus should be on how to strengthen existing ties
and not on broadening the network continent-wide. Because the bottlenecks for existing agreements arealso an obstacle to AfCFTA, further evaluation of existing ties is necessary, especially for those wherein
members trade less.
The gravity model regression implies that neighboring countries tend to trade more in Africa. On thispoint, further study on the conditions of transportation and geographic characteristics and the possibilityof underreporting cross-border trade is necessary. Closely related to this point is the quality of the trade
networks and the contents of African regional trade. Network graph visualization indicates that regional
trade ties may be relatively strong in the southern part. However, the demand for traded goods may depend
on a few large counterparts. To observe the weakness or thickness of such trade ties, a more detailed
structure of value chains within Africa needs further examination. However, in the northern and westernparts of Africa, there were no recognizable trade hubs, and the reason for this also requires further study.

References
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Value Chains: Cross-Country Patterns in the Dynamics of Linkages. World Bank Policy ResearchWorking Paper 0439: 1-39.
Barabási, A.L. 2016. Network Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brenton, P. and C. Soprano 2018. Small-Scale Cross-Border Trade in Africa: Why It Matters and How
It Should Be Supported. Bridges Africa 8(4): 4-6.
CIA 2022. The World Factbook. Central Inteligence Agency, United States.
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Csárdi, G. and T. Nepusz 2006. The igraph Software Package for Complex Network Research. InterJournal, Complex Systems 1695(5): 1-9.
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Foroutan, F. and L. Pritchett 1993. Intra-Sub-Saharan African Trade: Is it too litte? World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 1225: 1-32.
Frankel, J. 1997. Regional Trading Blocks. Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
Freund, C. and E. Ornelas 2010. Regional Trade Agreements. World Bank Policy Research Working
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Hurt, S.R. 2003. Co-operation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union
and ACP States and the End of the Lomé Convention. Third World Quarterly 24(1): 161-176.
IMF 2022. Direction of Trade Statistics. International Monetary Fund.
<https://data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B85, accessed on 9 October
2022>.
Ismail, F.A. 2017. Advancing Regional Integration in Africa through the Continental Free Trade Area
(CFTA). Law and Development Review 10(1): 119-146.
Limão, N. and A.J. Venables 1999. Infrastructure, Geographical Disadvantage, and Trasnport Cost.
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2257: 1-39.
Melitz, J. and F. Toubal 2014. Native Language, Spoken Language, Translation and Tsrade. Journal ofInternational Economics 92(2): 351-363.
Ndikumana, L. and J.K. Boyce 2021. Capital Flight from Africa 1970-2018. PERI Research Report.
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts-Amherst.
Rauch, J.E. 1999. Networks versus Markets in International Trade. Journal of International Economics 48: 7-35.
Schvitz, G., L. Girardin, S. Ruëgger, N.B. Weidmann, L.E. Cederman, and K.S. Gleditsch 2022. Mapping
the International System, 1886-2019: The CShapes 2.0 Dataset. Journal of Conflict Resolution 66(1):144-161.
Snyder, D. and E.L. Kick 1979. Structural Position in the World System and Economic Growth, 19551970: A Multiple-Network Analysis of Transnational Interactions. The American Journal of Sociology 84(5): 1096-1126.
tralac 2022. AfCFTA: The African Continental Free Trade Area. tralac.
<https://www.tralac.org/resources/infographic/13795-status-of-afcfta-ratification.html, accessed on 9
October 2022>.
UN Comtrade 2022. UN Comtrade. United Nations Statistics Division.
<https://comtrade.un.org/, accessed on 9 October 2022>.
UNCATD 2022. Rethinking the Foundations of Export Diversification in Africa. United Nations Conference on Trade and Developmenent.

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Wasserman, S. and K. Faust 1994. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
World Bank 2020a. The African Continental Free Trade Area. Washington D.C.: International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.
—— 2020b. Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains. Washington D.C.: The WorldBank.
—— 2022. World Development Indicators. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
Yuan, L., X. Chen, C. Song, D. Cao, and H. Yi 2021. Spatiotemporal Evolution and Determinant Factorsof the Intra-Regional Trade Community Structures of the Indian Ocean Region. International Journalof Geo-Information 10(214): 1-22.

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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)― 72 ―

Implications of Customary Land Conversions on the Power of Traditional
Leaders in Mungule Chiefdom of Chibombo District in Zambia

Priscillah Nsama
PhD Candidate, Centre for African Studies University of Cape Town, South Africa

Abstract
The study examines the implications of customary land tenure conversions for the power of traditional
leaders, who have had the power to allocate land and upholding customary law among occupants ofsuch land. It is argued that conversion of customary land to leasehold tenure system negatively affects
the power of traditional leaders. Using the conceptual framework premised on Gluckman’s theory of
power, one variable factor ‘size of land’ was used to formulate an interview guide. In-depth interviews
were conducted with key informants. For validity and reliability, various stakeholders with different
specialisation on this topic were incorporated to deepen/widen the scope of producing this knowledge.
The results revealed that customary land that was being converted to leasehold tenure system was
reducing the size of the customary land for the Chiefdom. Additionally, the change from customary land
tenure system denies traditional leaders the rights to allocate land to local people. Second, local people
are forced to change their livelihood from agricultural based to informal jobs. Finally, it stops local
people living in clans for their unity and easy formulation of customary law in a collective voice.

Keywords: customary land, leasehold tenure, traditional leader― 73 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

1. Introduction
The ever-increasing activity of personalising customary land has raised critical concerns, not only about
the prospect of such land, but also the institution of traditional leaders and cultural norms in rural areas(Chitonge et al. 2017a). Gluckman (1965: 75) demonstrated that ‘Judges in Barotseland, Zambia,
worked with an ostensibly integrated concept of ownership of land to cover quite different kinds ofrights over other persons and property’. In view of this, Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) highlighted thatthe institution of traditional leaders had a strength of living in close vicinity with the subjects and theirskill and governing approach of collectiveness gave them an acceptance in their community. Thissuggests that traditional leaders have been strongholds in the customary areas, whereby any disturbanceof their existence or operation can lead to detrimental outcomes among the populations that reside incustomary areas.
In 1991, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) took over governing Zambia from theUnited National Independence Party (UNIP). The former embraced the political ideology of humanism,
while the latter favoured a liberalised economy, and, therefore, established a market-oriented socioeconomy (Van Loenen 1999). These developments led to the need for land tenure reforms. Thus, theMMD government repealed the Land Conversion Act of 1975, which, among other measures, stipulated
stringent processes of converting land, replacing it with the new Land Conversion of Title Act of 1995.
The new Act facilitated the merging of native reserves and trust land into customary land and made theprocedure for individuals and companies to convert customary land to leasehold less stringent. In
addition to these legal reforms, the MMD proposed changes to some aspects of land policy in Zambia.
The aim was to capture investors’ interests and critical concerns such as giving investors essential rights
to seclude possession of land, reinstating the assurance of investors by creating more proficient landdelivery systems, ascribing economic value to undeveloped land, boosting private real estate agency
business, and upholding regular issuance of titles to productive land holders both from rural as well as
in urban areas (Roth et al. 1995).
From the aforementioned, it is clear that displacement due to land conversion is not new to the
Mungule Chiefdom Community. When Lusaka was made the capital city of Zambia in 1935, someresidents experienced such land usage conversion. At that time, there were institutions of traditional
leaders in Lusaka such as senior Headman Mwalusaka. He presided over several headmen from Chilenje
village, which was the main town for villages such as Lilanda, Chingwele, and Chipwalu (now Kabanana
Township). Headman Mwalusaka was forced to relocate from the Nkomesha Chiefdom to Mungule.
The heterogeneous communities that developed in Lusaka as a consequence of customary land
conversions by non-ethnic group members, who shifted into the area and eventually took over all thevillages, impacted on the cultures of the ethnic group and contributed to the phasing out of cultural― 74 ―

Implications of Customary Land Conversions on the Power of Traditional Leaders in Zambia

practices as well as recognition of the institutions of traditional leaders in the area. In a similar manner,being near Lusaka, the Mungule Chiefdom has become a hot spot for customary land acquisition.
Customary land conversions have not only created debates in political, social, and economic circles,
but also in the academic sphere. This study is positioned within academic debates. One category ofacademics support and advocate for customary land to be converted. Deininger (2003) and Johnson(2011) argue that the concept of customary land has not protected the interests of well able investors
and non-ethnic group members. It has been suggested that the challenge revolves around the elusive
nature of current laws, limitations in accessing mortgages, as well as the stimulation of efficient markets(Elahi 2013). Scholars with contrary views argue that customary land conversions have not protected
the incapacitated Indigenous community members of ethnic groups, resulting in further marginalisationin customary areas. How these conversions have impacted on the livelihood and social relations of theoccupants of these areas has been investigated (Brown 2005), but limited academic attention has been
paid to the effect of customary land conversions on the power of the institution of traditional leaders.
2. Statement of the Problem
In Zambia, there is a growing tendency towards leasehold tenure systems. Once customary land isconverted to leasehold tenure system, there is no legal provision for reverting to customary tenure(Ntsebeza 2005). Customary land allows people of the same ethnic group to maintain their strong
connections to cultures, norms, and practices passed on to their future generations, as well as promote
institutional memory (Mpofu 2014). Fenrich et al. (2011: 16) suggested that ‘a person observing
dissimilar customary laws may find themselves living in close vicinity with the Indigenous community’.
Thus, influx of new members was a problem because the conversion of customary land to leasehold
tenure system either strengthened or weakened the power of the institution of traditional leaders andmay have contributed to the erosion of customary law and, subsequently, ethnic community weakening.
For example, Ng’ombe and Keivani (2013: 43) demonstrated that ‘once customary land is converted toleasehold, non-ethnic members cease to pay homage to the chiefs and begin to pay mineral royalties andland rates to the government’, a practice that was outside customary law. Mousseau and Mittal (2011:37) further argued that ‘customary rights were extinguished; when customary land was converted toleasehold tenure, the non-ethnic members caused the self-rule that the institution of traditional leaders
had over such land to be disregarded with immediate effect’. However, whether such institution wasaware of these facts or not was unclear. It was therefore necessary to examine how institutions of
traditional leaders retained their power and applied customary law on the land governed under statutory
law and how they controlled new members of these communities. Given the contextual background andproblem identified, the main objective of this study was to examine the implications of customary land
conversions on the power of the institution of traditional leaders.
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3. Theoretical Framework
This study was anchored on the theory of the power of chiefs, which states that the kingly/royal office
on which chiefs operate is sacred and is guided by the spirits of the ancestors buried in the land. It issustained by cultural rituals and practices that tie every member of the ethnic group together; thus, thepower of chiefs’ flourishes in a homogeneous ethnic community because they all observe the same
customs. By virtue of the origin of the kingly office, this theory highlights that there is a form of deeprooted rules of conduct ‘usually prescribed by the chiefs’. In most African ethnic groups, these rules aretightly linked to the throne of the chiefly position (see Daniel 2012). It is important to note that ethnic
members of a community abide by the norms, practices, and values of their ethnic cultural requirement,
not because it is logical but because it is cultural, traditional, and historical, above all their identity,
defining the deeper relationship members of the ethnic community have with the kingly office (Chief etal. 2000).
4. Conceptual Framework
The study applied the conceptual framework premised on Gluckman’s (1965) theory of power. One ofthe variable factors used to study the implications of customary land conversions on the power of
traditional leaders was the ‘size of land’. The variable has a direct link to the power of traditional leaderswhich is founded on cultural beliefs that are embedded in the administration of land. Ntsebeza (2005:20) noted that traditional leaders derive their power from the control of the land apportionment processrather than their inhabitants among their subjects. According to this variable, if customary land is taken
away from traditional leaders, their authority is taken away because it is partly derived from culturalbeliefs that have an interconnection that spills over to land as a key resource where authority is appliedand exhibited. The theory therefore establishes that the size of customary land determines the power thatthe traditional leader has. Furthermore, Gluckman (1965) highlights that the kind of rights one holds inland is a clear indicator of the status quo in relation to whom they are answerable to (the state or the
traditional leadership), which is very important in the traditional leadership.

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Implications of Customary Land Conversions on the Power of Traditional Leaders in Zambia

Customary Land Conversion

Size of Land

Reduces
Cultivation

Limits Land
Allocation

Unsustained
Culture of Families/Clans living

Sustainability of
CulturePower of Traditional Leaders

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework – Size of Land Variable
5. Literature Review
The literature includes extensive debates on land in relation to customary and state land, impacts of
converting customary land to leasehold on investments, land use, land documentations (a common
research stream in Zambia at the time of this research), cadastral systems, impacts of land reforms andland policy formulations, displacements, dispossessions and enclosures, land grabbing, and disputes onboundaries or family/clan decisions. However, a limited number of studies such as Buur and Kyed
(2006), Ntsebeza (2005), Kompi (2018), and Tieleman and Uitermark (2019), have explored institutionsof traditional leaders in relation to evolution, modern city, the colonial administration, and state presence,
among other areas of focus. However, there is limited research on how these land conversions affect theinstitution of traditional leaders. This study is situated within customary land conversion debates andhow it affects the power of the institution of traditional leaders.
The historical aspect of customary land emanates from the colonial period; however, land reforms
for Zambia led to a paradigm shift in land administration. According to Sitko et al. (2015), ‘The 1995
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

Land Act allocated the power to convert from the customary to the leasehold tenure system from thehands of the traditional leadership to the hands of the state… though without provision of the apparatus
to protect customary rights from having their land taken’. Furthermore, Cotula et al. (2007) highlighted
several aspects that led to conversions of customary land to leasehold, including demographic changes,
war over land, change of livelihood leading to diversification into off-farm activities, incorporation ofIndigenous production into the global economy with export crops expanding into areas previously used
for locally consumed products. They further argued that new players also invested in and acquired landfor projected purposes. Additionally, international migration created major financial inflows, whichgave foreign investors easy access to finances to acquire land, and socio-cultural changes driven by lowpriced communication technology and relaxed cultural ‘give-and-take’, which affected the way tradition
was interpreted. The impact of epidemics such as HIV/AIDS affected land access and management,
which also led to customary land conversions (Cotula et al. 2007). Mpofu (2014) established that ‘land
reform models adopted by most African countries were premised on assumptions and did not benefit thehistorically disadvantaged masses’ despite them having traditional leaders who could speak and protect
the masses in customary areas.
The legacy of local power has recognised chiefs as local leaders who have significant roles andlegitimately representing their community. Kompi (2018) and Khunou (2017) define traditional leaders
as individuals who are models of traditions and customs, holding communal political office in line with
cultural customs and values, and enjoying the endorsement from their communities to serve them.
Kompi (2018: 43), further argues that ‘tradition’ is the name bestowed on those cultural attributes which,in situations of change, are to be pursued, passed on, thought about, safeguarded, and not lost.
However, some governments and colonial masters could sometimes manipulate the selection of
traditional leaders and impose it on a community for their own benefit. For example, Tieleman andUitermark (2019) revealed that in some areas like Faroma in Ghana, the chief was just imported fromanother area (Leba). Such operations created a widespread uniform traditional-cum-bureaucratic web,resulting in inhabitants taking little or no role in establishing a chief and an aspiring chief claiming
authority based on his background rather than on his connection to the actual inhabitants of the area. At
this juncture, it is important to note that once a traditional leader is appointed into the chiefly office,they remain in office for life, and in most cases selection of chiefs followed the blood line linkages toreplace them after their death.
Such scenarios could be the reason most of the traditional leaders are paranoid whenever thegovernments begin to discuss land issues with them; even before gaining an understanding of what theirgovernments want to do, they tend to react negatively. Moreover, in Zambia, the constitution indirectly
allows land grab as it states that once traditional land is converted to leasehold, it ceases to be under the
traditional authority but is converted to state land. Considering that traditional land has been in the― 78 ―

Implications of Customary Land Conversions on the Power of Traditional Leaders in Zambia

custody of traditional leaders, while leased land is under the state, this entails that every conversion of
traditional land reduces the size of such land. Tielerman and Uitermark (2019: 715) asserted that ‘as partof the process of state formation, chiefs lose some of the functions they historically fulfilled, but also
take on new roles, including being entrusted with the task of leasing out pieces of land to new settlers,
a legal power enshrined in Ghana’s constitution’. Other chiefs still obtain the power to administercustomary land from the values and norms of the community or ethnic group that they are governing.
Tielerman and Uitermark clearly demonstrated that during colonisation, the Privy Council of London
decided where land in coastal West Africa was proven to have been managed communally and neverindividually owned in a landmark case in 1921. It was reported that this fact influenced the Ghanaian
colonial government to grant all tribal leaders the important position of guarding (custodian) the
customary land within the territories where their tribal communities were given the power to administersuch land among their communities; this was later codified in the constitution (Tielerman and Uitermark
2019). Most of the governments had also bought into this idea, including Zambia. Hence, this research
explored how land administration in the name of converting from customary to leasehold impacted thepower of the traditional leaders in Zambia.
6. Methodology
6.1 Research Design
A case study design was adopted for this study. The selected case, the ‘Mungule Chiefdom’, has had ahistory of massive conversion of customary land to leasehold. Yin (2009: 11) indicates ‘a case study has
a unique strength as it can deal with a full variety of evidence, documents, artefacts, interviews, andobservations, and it is ideal because it studies contemporary events’. This approach was ideal for
examining how the institutions of traditional leaders are sustained after customary land is converted to
the leasehold tenure system whereby the process is continuously reducing the sizes of customary land
from where they draw their strength.
6.2 Data Collection Tools
6.2.1 Interview guide
The main tool for data collection was in-depth interviews as this method allows participants to express
themselves without restrictions as they see appropriate (Bryman 2008). Moreover, interviews allowed
the researcher to gather in-depth data through the interviewee’s moods, competencies, and views (Schutt2018). Semi-structured interviews were conducted in line with the researchers’ own line of investigation
as replicated by the protocol of the case study. Spontaneous questions were asked while following theinterview guide prepared and pre-tested by the researcher. This helped elicit homogenous responses withinformation worth formulating into thematic areas relevant to the topic. Since questions were open ended,― 79 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

it allowed probing to enrich the knowledge relevant to the study. Additionally, Bryman (2008) posits
that as interviews progress, interviewees raise extra and complementary issues that form an essential
part of the findings and that this aspect leads to collecting in-depth data. Additionally, the interviews
were recorded with participants’ consent and the researcher took notes following Mushinge andMulenga (2016).
Since there were seven categories of respondents, seven different interview guides were formulated
and each was complimentary to the others. The main questions common in all of them included thefollowing:
1. What does customary land mean to you?
2. What does customary land mean to the people who are buying it from you?
3. Why do you think people convert land?
4. What is the process of converting?
5. How does converting of customary land affect you?
6. How does it affect traditional leaders in this chiefdom?
7. What strategies have you put in place to mitigate the impact?
6.2.2 Observation
Another data collection instrument was observation. The relationship that was established withparticipants enabled the researcher to gather relevant data through this technique because participants
continued their daily lives as normal (Schutt 2018).
6.2.3 Secondary sources
Other sources of data such as published and unpublished literature, government documents, and relevant
literature were utilised. Review revealed some of the historical and other efforts made to improve
leadership skills such as the curriculum for the training of traditional leaders that was introduced by thegovernment at Chalimbana Nisticle College. Such literature was reviewed and helped the researcher to
add the historical knowledge of some of the background activities and debates.
6.3 Data Analysis
A considerable amount of text data was collected between 2019 and 2021 from several sources. The
chiefdom was first accessed through one of the chief advisors to the Chieftainess Mungule and theyreported that the Chieftainess was unwell at most of the times of the interview in the chiefdom. However,interviews were conducted with the Headmen (Advisory council, disciplinary committee, land
management committee, and village councils), some representatives from the House of Chiefs, Ministry― 80 ―

Implications of Customary Land Conversions on the Power of Traditional Leaders in Zambia

of Traditional Affairs, Ministry of Land, The Private Sector dealing in land such as People’s Process,Medeem, Land Alliance and Caritas, historians, academicians, local/ foreign investors who haveacquired land from this customary area, and the members of the Mungule ethnic community (bothnewcomers as well as the local/Indigenous people).
Most of the participants agreed to have their interview recorded, and this was further transcribed.
Additionally, field diary notes were reorganised to produce chronological and structured interpretations,which became the substantial basis for further analysis and reduction through description analysis. Thisfacilitated the generation of the themes. The data were transcribed subjected to thematic analysis. A
qualitative software tool ‘QDA Miner’ (Qualitative Data Analysis Software) was used for coding andcategorising data, especially large amounts of texts considering that the questions were open ended.
Data mining involved exploring and analysing large blocks of information to determine meaningful
patterns and trends.
6.4 Sample Size
A total of 36 participants were randomly selected from diverse specialisations. The main participants
included seven Headmen from within the Mungule Chiefdom, 11 randomly-selected members of thechiefdom in various villages (local people and newcomers). To enhance the research and data collection,
triangulation was utilised as a strategy and it enabled participants with different specialisations to be
identified (Mushinge and Mulenga 2016). These include four representatives of the government 1, fivechiefs from other chiefdoms but within the country, five private sector personnel from different
organisations, and two historians and two academics from the University of Zambia, since it is the
University with a strong institutional memory in relation to the topic.
Key participants had various lengths of stay in the chiefdom. For example, three Headmen had lived
in the chiefdom for between 6-10 years having relocated from elsewhere, two had lived in the chiefdom
for between 16-20 years, and two had lived there for more than 20 years and were in fact born and bredfrom within the chiefdom. In addition, of the 11 randomly-selected participants from the Mungule
Chiefdom, six had lived there for more than five years (they came from outside and had settled there),
three for more than 20 years, and two were born and bred within the chiefdom.
Following approval from the University of Cape Town Doctoral Degrees Board (DDB), theresearcher went to the field and collected data as presented below.

1

One each from the Ministry ofChiefs.

Traditional

Affairs,― 81 ―

Ministry ofLands, andthe House of

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

6.5 Target Population
The Indigenous tribe in the study area is Lenje. A Village Headmen (HD4, 17th September, 2019)
explained that the ‘Lenje tribe came from Kola in the Luba Lunda Empire in Congo, their king was
Mulopwe, and he was the father of Chief Mukuni of the Tonga people in the Southern Province’. Before
reaching Chibombo, the Lenje people had seven stopovers, meaning they established seven camps
before reaching Chibombo. Several categories of the individuals were connected to the chiefdom insome way, as detailed below.
6.6 Case Study Area
The chiefdom is nearer to the city centre of Lusaka and attracts a lot of people wanting to acquire. The
electricity source is within the parameters of about 400 metres away, and road set-up is good although
not tarred. Chitonge et al. (2017b: 83) and Sitko et al. (2015) in their research, highlight the advantagesof traditional lands that are close and have developed infrastructure such as major roads, railways, andtowns. Their research revealed that such cities were experiencing numerous displacements, which were
facilitated by increased land conversions from the customary to leasehold tenure system. Similarly, theMungule Chiefdom has had several such conversions; therefore, institution of traditional leaders as wellas the local people have had a practical experience of how land conversions have impacted them. The
Nkhomesha Chiefdom has similar characteristics to the Mungule Chiefdom but the Chieftainess does
not allow customary land to be converted; as a result, only 10% has been converted and only for public
use such as community schools, clinics, and so on. The aforementioned characteristics of the chiefdom
provided a potential study area for examining the implications of customary land conversions for the
power of the institution of traditional leaders since this was being practiced even at the time of theinterviews.
7. Empirical Evidence
7.1 Reduced Size of Customary Land
The Constitution of the Republic of Zambia clearly states that all land under leasehold tenure system isstate land. Before the land reforms in 1995, the two-tenure system that existed in Zambia divided landin such a way that 94% was under the customary tenure system and 6% was under the leasehold system.
Considering that there has been a scramble for customary land in the chiefdoms, especially those locatednear cities, individuals with capacity have been acquiring such land. Furthermore, as Chitonge (2018)indicates that, for security reasons, most of the individuals or investors who secure such land have
limitations on how much capital they invest. The aforementioned study revealed that after
individuals/investors convert their land to leasehold tenure system, such land becomes individualised― 82 ―

Implications of Customary Land Conversions on the Power of Traditional Leaders in Zambia

and new owners have no reservations investing huge capital, and through the conversion of customaryland, newcomers obtain ownership of the land ‘title deed’.
When customary land is not converted, investors are often at the mercy of traditional leaders andtheir activities on such land are regulated using customary law. For example, they are not allowed tofence their land for fear of breaking the ‘oneness’ in villages. Meanwhile, if they allow their pieces ofland to be accessible at any time, local people tend to release their animals onto such land and these tend
to destroy newcomers’ crops; in some incidences, local people break into the newcomer’s house andsteal from them.
This clearly demonstrates that converting customary land has reduced the size of such land.
Additionally, other participants stated that this reduction was worsened by the increase in population forthe local people. These factors compelled traditional leaders to reduce the sizes of the land they wereallocating to local people. Other participants indicated that population increase caused some people tobe displaced due to limited resources. Others indicated that due to the perpetually increasing populationin the chiefdom, they neither sold nor denied other people from accessing customary land, instead they
indicated that they shared their land with others in need. The population increase was facilitated by birthor regeneration, as well as migration, among other factors. In justifying the reasons for not selling theirland, some participants, especially the local people of the chiefdom explained that:
Currently, headmen are reducing the sizes of the plots that they are allocating to membersof the village in our chiefdom. (OM5 17 September 2019; OM6, 17 September 2019; OM3,
27 August 2019; OM 1, 28 September 2019).
However, reduction in the size of customary land further affects local people. It reduced theircultivation, changed their livelihood, and meant that traditional leaders have limited customary land toallocate. These are empirically discussed in detail in the next section.
7.1.1 Reduced cultivation in the chiefdom
The size of land for the local people of Mungule Chiefdom was reduced, and they linked this to themassive conversions that were happening in the chiefdom. One of the Headmen stated that:
Since people have been left with small pieces of land, their cultivation is negatively affected
and there are no instances when they have to ask the traditional leaders to provide food. In
most cases, they tend to say ‘Boma ilanganepo’ (local language), meaning the government
should come to their rescue through The Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (HD2,
27 August 2019).
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Some participants highlighted that reduction in cultivation drove the community into poverty because
they were hardly able to address their basic needs in terms of food. It should be noted that the literature
indicates that 14% of the arable land in Zambia is used for agricultural purposes. Furthermore, about
80% of the rural population’s livelihood is dependent on agriculture since they have land as a natural
resource, and maximise their benefit from the land (CSO 2012). Furthermore, this study established that
local people of the Mungule Chiefdom now cultivate maize, soya beans, and vegetables on a smallerscale, while they were previously the major suppliers of the cities. Some participants highlighted thatthrough these supplies, local people were able to send their children to school. Conversely, customaryland conversion meant that newcomers acquire land from local people and develop it into somethingelse, particularly real estate where they built houses and rented them out to people that work in Lusaka,
built industrial works on them, or used them as commercial farming land. Other participants highlighted
that such a scenario compelled local people to continue using smaller sizes of their customary land andthat they had no choice but to use the little remaining land for cultivation regardless of the sizes of theirfamilies. Furthermore, some participants indicated that initially, traditional leaders considered the sizeof the family when deciding the size of the land to apportion. However, they no longer consider thisfactor. Furthermore, another participant highlighted that:
With the Kaonde tribe, where I was raised, we called it shifting cultivation, where you
cultivate a certain portion of land and after 5 years you abandon the area and look for a newone. This was done because there was still enough virgin land; now with this higher
population, there would be nowhere to go. So you will intensify cultivation on the piece ofland you already have access to (A1, 12 February 2020).
Therefore, customary land conversion has reduced cultivation in the chiefdom.
7.1.2 Changed livelihood among the local people
As discussed in the preceding section, Lenje people who live in the Mungule Chiefdom have survived
on agricultural cultivation since time immemorial, and the amount was determined by the size of aparticular family, which traditional leaders used to determine the size of land to allocate. Therefore,
reduced cultivation appeared to mean that local people could no longer sustain their livelihoods, andmost were forced to search for other alternatives to survive. Some participants began to flock to the
nearby cities to search for informal jobs such as garden boys, maid, or shopkeepers. This forced most to
stay away from their chiefdom most of the time.

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7.1.3 Limited space to allocate to local people
As previously highlighted, conversion reduced the sizes of customary land while the population
continued to increase. As a result, such land had to be shared to accommodate others, either throughmonetary transactions or purely sharing without the involvement of money. However, most of theparticipants indicated that whenever the sharing involved money, tension was created not only with theseller but also with their families because, in many cases, heads of households seemed to conduct suchtransactions secretly. Furthermore, it was also highlighted that most such scenarios surprised the initialowners as they observed that the new owners did not cooperate with the rest of the families. One
participant from the ordinary members of the chiefdom stated:
The problem is that when money is given to get customary land, the land becomes theirs,
if they even get title deeds for it. This is where you get to see the new owners begin to fence
their land to cut us off from accessing any resources from such land, and in some instances,
they begin to make you pay for the water and no traditional leader can intervene, since theproperty is now privately owned (OM1, 28 August 2019).
In the same vein, another participant highlighted that:
I sometimes regret having sold land. First of all, there is no land to sell anymore, and when
new people first arrive, they look humble, and seem to bring development for all of us tobenefit from. However, when they finish building their structures on their acquired land,
they change their minds. Therefore, this place looks like it has developed; meanwhile, wehave no access to the many amenities that have been brought into our chiefdom and ourleaders cannot say anything to change the minds of the newcomers once they have madetheir own decisions (OM 4, 28 September 2019).
However, some local people were refusing to sell their land and they had their own reasons for not
selling. For example, one member of the community stated:
We have never sold any land because we wouldn’t want to have our children and theirchildren stranded in the future due to limited space for their allocation or extension of theirpieces of land (OM4, 28 September 2019).
In a similar vein, one of the historians indicated that traditional leaders would not sell traditional land
due to the issue of sustainability. Others indicated that they could not sell the land because it was the― 85 ―

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final resting place for their beloved family members who have died (HD2, 27 August 2019; OM3, 28
August 2019; CH3, 22 June 2020).
8. Findings and Discussion
8.1 Stoppage of the Culture of Paying Homage to the Traditional Leaders
The reduced cultivation among local people in the Mungule Chiefdom causes them to fail to pay homage
to their traditional leaders as part of their culture. Homage is paid in form of the harvest that eachmember of the chiefdom takes to the palace after every season. This is consistent with one researcher
who argued that such resources enabled traditional leaders to exert influence and control over theirpeople in times of need (Geu 2020: 19). In the Mungule Chiefdom, traditional leaders used this harvest
to respond to the food crisis experienced by different members; for example, some participants indicatedthat crises could come through situations such as ‘a breadwinner for a particular family becomes
critically ill and fails to provide for the family’; in such circumstances, the traditional leader would stepin and assist. Geu (2020) further suggested that traditional leaders no longer had profitable means andconstitutional powers to administer the law that can guarantee social order in their community.
In other instances, some participants stated that they have sometimes faced crises due to their own
actions. They gave an example of when they fail to respect the spirits of the ancestors who are buried in
the customary land within their chiefdom. The spirits of the ancestors tend to get annoyed and punish
the whole chiefdom either through mysterious deaths or drought.
Therefore, traditional leaders’ power is enhanced and recognised by onlookers as well as by local
people through their responses to the crises experienced within the chiefdom. When selecting traditional
leaders, people within the chiefdom consider events where individuals help the rest of the community
such as provision of protection or food when there is a crisis. Members of the community tend to build
on such and follow it religiously as a culture of a qualification for one to become a leader. When
traditional leaders fail to respond positively in dealing with a crisis, it affects how the community
perceive them.
The aforementioned is a clear indication that the power of traditional leaders is negatively affectedby every conversion of customary land in the chiefdom. This was supported through an interview with
one of the traditional leaders:
In the past five years, there has been no instance when local people in this village havecome to ask me to provide food for them. In most cases, they tend to say Boma ilanganepo,
in local language), meaning the government should come to their rescue through thedisaster mitigation unit (HD2, 27 August 2019).

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Implications of Customary Land Conversions on the Power of Traditional Leaders in Zambia

This is consistent with Geu’s (2020: 4) findings that lack of power and influence limited sometraditional leaders in Dinka Bor from preventing interclan conflicts and enforcing social cohesions that
could maintain peace and harmony among the communities across villages.
8.2 Unavailability of Local People for Community Activities within the Chiefdom
Nonresponse to crises has caused most local people to look elsewhere for solutions and not to the
traditional leaders as was historically the case. This rendered the power of traditional leaders ineffective,
as demonstrated when such leaders call for meetings or activities such as maintaining the roads in theirchiefdom. Local people are generally not available because they tend to go to nearby cities to look forpiecework to survive. Meanwhile, Honig (2019) argued that among other guidelines of conduct,
traditional institutions term when and why followers ought to be submissive to their leaders and what
they can anticipate in return. However, the traditional leaders perceive those local people as disloyal to
the leadership.
The critical shift of local people and traditional leaders from their domain to the government forsolutions indicates the shift in the authority vested on the traditional leaders over their chiefdoms; hence,
further weakening the command these leaders once had in their land. This implies that traditional leaders
have been replaced by the state, whereby, local people no longer look to them for provisions or any
solutions to their plight. This finding is consistent with Chimhowu (2018), who clarified the dilution ofgeneric set-ups in chiefdoms as a result of dynamics in original set-ups of communities in relation to
production. The foregoing development in the chiefdom has resulted in local people struggling to accessbasic needs, such as food and clothes. Therefore, to survive, local people are compelled to secure formal
jobs. For example, those who were previously entirely dependent on the harvest begin to look forpiecework within, as well as outside the chiefdom. Owing to the demand for such workers, local people
are no longer easily available for local meetings. This development is worrisome for the traditional
leaders, who perceive their people as no longer paying allegiance to them. This could be true to someextent as such a scenario intensifies, and traditional leaders’ power will eventually diminish in theirchiefdoms. The changed lifestyle of the local people is in line with Chitonge et al.’s (2017b) findings,
which highlight how traditional leaders were encouraging their people to engage in other economic
activities apart from cultivating maize because the fields were becoming smaller in the Mungule
Chiefdom.
In the same vein, due to the above factors, traditional leaders’ power has been compromised andnegatively affected to the extent of causing anxiety in the institution of traditional leaders. For example,
Chieftainess Mungule had become very hostile to other traditional leaders from other chiefdoms because
they began to mock her for selling most of her land. This was established when other chiefs realised that
Chieftainess Mungule had stopped attending any traditional leaders’ meetings.

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8.3 Curtailed culture of families living in Clans
The consequence of restricted space for land allocation by traditional leaders weakens the culture offamilies living in clans, for numerous generations, because customary land becomes restricted to sharewith the future generations. Wolf et al. (2021) argue this set-up confines the significant evidence of aprotective family bond and shared social values. Chitonge et al. (2017a: 7) state that ‘the policy which
permits converting customary land to leasehold tenure can be blamed for this increasing phenomenonof monetary transactions in the customary areas’. Meanwhile, through this scenario, it was establishedthat local people were financially incapacitated in that they could not engage in any activity that attracted
money, hence creating an opportunity for newcomers to access customary land and converting toleasehold tenure, leading to the disintegration or displacement of family or clan bonds among the local
people. This outcome forces future generations to instead move to other locations within or outside thechiefdom, which potentially leads to displacement of the local people. As such families are scattered,this creates a challenge when formulating customary laws for the village/chiefdom, thereby affecting
the efficiency of such laws within the chiefdom.
This study reveals the worry local leaders have, that is, losing their family connections. Whenevermembers of some families move, traditional leaders would have no subjects with fathomable knowledgeof their culture, values, and norms, and this would compromise their power in their chiefdoms. Moreover,
the action of people relocating to other areas has potential to cause poverty, family disintegration anddestitution among those who remain since their spaces for cultivation would be reduced with every landtransactions with buyers. Wolf et al. (2021) revealed that lack of family connection brought about
impending social change towards Americanised values and conduct. Geu (2020: 25) affirms that
‘internal conflicts, lack of peace and stability continue to affect villagers … in the absence of empoweredtraditional leaders…’ This study established that traditional leaders are not empowered when clans andfamilies disintegrate because they cannot form proper collective voices to empower the traditional
leaders with customary laws. This has resulted in a challenge for such leaders to control the negative
practices that have been identified within their chiefdoms, leading to the diminishing of the culture andtradition of the local people. Geu (2020) further highlights that the effect instigated by such diminishingpowers could be responsible for the lawlessness and cultural and social chaos observed in the customary
areas.
9. Conclusion
This study established that reduced sizes of customary land renders traditional leaders powerless to theextent of them failing to govern populations in their chiefdom, leading to an inevitable wearing away ofculture in the Mungule Chiefdom. This scenario causes local people to stop conducting certain activities
that are culturally based and begin to follow foreign cultures. This aspect clearly demonstrates that― 88 ―

Implications of Customary Land Conversions on the Power of Traditional Leaders in Zambia

traditional leaders are negatively affected by the conversion of customary land to leasehold tenure. Apartfrom the aforementioned, local people begin to look elsewhere for solutions in times of crisis, especiallyto the government instead of the traditional leaders whom they initially depended on entirely foreverything they needed in the chiefdom; local people’s failure to look up to traditional leaders is a clear
indication of how customary land conversion negatively affects the power of such leaders. Finally,customary land conversions to the leasehold tenure system leads to disintegration of families orclans/villages. Individuals who tend to acquire and convert customary land in most cases tend to settle
between families depending on who sold them land. This aspect tends to break the ‘oneness’ because
newcomers usually build enclosures which subject local people to using long cuts to reach other relatives
or members of the clan. This therefore causes the local people not to stand together with a collective
voice and this becomes a challenge when formulating customary law for the community. Failure toformulate such law negatively affects the power of traditional leaders who use it to govern people incustomary areas. Therefore, this study argues that converting customary land to the leasehold tenuresystem negatively affects the power of traditional leaders.
10. Recommendations
Based on the findings and conclusions, the following recommendations are made:1. There is a need to permit all stakeholders to help traditional leaders sustain their powerin the customary areas. This can be done through the government, who can amend theirpolicies on land that is, integrating land documentation in the policies. This ought to bedone in such a way that the power over land should continue to remain in the hands of
traditional leaders even after land has been documented.
2. Instead of labelling modification of the tenure system as ‘land conversion’, thegovernment should consider calling it ‘Land Documentation’. As such, the government
should help expedite comprehensive documentation of the occupants of the Chiefdom forrecords purposes.
3. Based on Recommendations 1 and 2, the government needs to ensure that they re-value
land through the Land Documentation to the extent of facilitating having it be used ascollateral in banks if a person needs to access financial assistance. This aspect will
empower the community as well as the traditional leaders.

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Trajectories of Cocoa Production in Tshopo Province:
Potential for Climate-Change Mitigation

Germain Batsia (PhD student), Denis Jean Sonwab, Lisette Mangazac (PhD student), Ebuy Jérômea,Jean-Paul Kibambed,e, Marc Janssensf and Corneille EwangoaaUniversity of Kisangani (UNIKIS), Faculty of Renewable Natural Resource Management, DRC
bc

Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Cameroon

University of Goma (UNIGOM), Faculty of Science, DRC and University of Liège, Gembloux
Agro-Bio Tech, BelgiumdUniversity of Kinshasa (UNIKIN), Faculty of Agronomy, Department of Natural Resources
Management, DRCe

University of Kinshasa (UNIKIN), Faculty of Agronomy, Department of Natural Resources
Management, DRC and Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), DRC

f

Horticultural Sciences, Institute of Crop Science and Resource Conservation (INRES), Universityof Bonn, Germany

Abstract
The global demand for cocoa has increased. As a result, the area used for cocoa production rapidly
increased. Africa alone produces over 70% of the cocoa in the world, with Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire
being the main producers. Although listed as a crop that drives deforestation and forest degradation,cocoa farming has the potential to actively contribute to forest restoration. If practised in agroforestry
and fallow or degraded areas, it can considerably contribute to biodiversity conservation, climate change
mitigation, poverty mitigation, and other services. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), whichfeatures a large forest in the Congo Basin (60%), has become a new hotspot for this cash crop. As oneof the areas suitable for the development of this crop, which has been grown since colonial times, Tshopo
province, DRC, is experiencing rapid increases in its cocoa-growing area. As such, our objective in thisstudy was to track the trajectories of cocoa farming in Tshopo and determine their contributions toclimate change mitigation through the restoration of degraded ecosystems. We described all cocoa
development initiatives in the Tshopo province, along with their potential responses to climate change.
Keywords: climate change, carbon storage, cocoa agroforests, MRV, Tshopo, DRC― 93 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

1. Introduction
The medium-term growth in global cocoa consumption has been projected at 3% per year, with newmarkets (China, India, and eastern Europe) ‘discovering’ chocolate, with demand increasing comparedwith that of traditional markets (Europe and the United States of America). Therefore, new emerging
countries producing cocoa must be identified to meet this global demand (Huart et al. 2011). The
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with its suitable climatic and soil conditions, is an area where
African cocoa production is expanding. As cocoa production increases in the DRC, the country can learn
from its West African counterparts to avoid mistakes and to prioritise sustainable and climate-smart
practices, good governance, innovation, and value addition (Downie 2018).
As a developing-world organic cocoa producer and one of the main European Union organic cocoa
bean suppliers, supplying 8.6% of the total, the organic cocoa areas in the DRC have substantiallyexpanded in recent years (Le Douarin 2020). The DRC is a unique country with land that is suitable forthis crop in 16 of its 26 provinces, and is therefore extremely favourable for the development of cocoa
production (Huart et al. 2011).
The production systems in the DRC are mostly mixed, with industrial and semi-industrial plantations
surrounded by village plantations. This production system favours the rapid development of village
production, allowing smallholders to access not only markets but also the technologies and services theyneed, which cannot yet be offered by public services on a daily basis (Huart et al. 2011).
DRC soils are generally deep, well-aerated, and more fertile than those of West African countries,
where fertiliser use has become essential to achieve satisfactory yields. In the DRC, where the agroclimatic conditions are appropriate, high yields can be obtained through the application ofenvironmentally friendly farming practices, such as the use of cover plants, organic waste, or compost(Huart 2016). However, until now, cocoa has been cultivated to the disadvantage of forests (Kibambeand Madibi 2022). Cocoa, instead, should be grown in savannahs or areas that were formerly foreststhat have become fallow (Huart 2016).
In the DRC province of Tshopo, the National Institute for Agronomic Research and Studies (INERA)
station in Yangambi has selected elite cocoa clones that produce of 2 tonnes/ha of cocoa. However, inpractice, the yield produced by old cocoa farms is around 500 kg/ha (Huart 2016). Generally cultivatedunder diversified shade in Tshopo, cocoa farming could constitute one method to store more
aboveground carbon than other agricultural systems (Batsi et al. 2021).
Given the current revival of cocoa crops in Tshopo, especially by people with the financial means toopen up large areas of land (>50 ha) (Windey 2020), vigilance is required. Land grabbing deprives local
communities of their land commonly used for cash crops, and some forest land is being converted toagricultural lands to produce cocoa, thus contributing to increases in the rate of deforestation and forest
degradation. The growing interest in cocoa production in Tshopo is also explained by the rampant― 94 ―

Trajectories of Cocoa Production in Tshopo Province

insecurity in the cocoa-producing areas of North Kivu (Beni Territory) and Ituri (Mambasa Territory).
Identifying opportunities and challenges for cocoa production in Tshopo Province was our main
objective with the current literature review. We aimed to analyse its development trajectories todetermine its sustainability based on climate-smart cocoa production practices for an effective response
to climate change.
2. Geographical context
Tshopo, located between 2°0' N and 2°0' S and 21°24' W and 28°2 E, is approximately 87% covered byrainforest. Agricultural areas (~10%) are located mainly along roads, waterways, and large
agglomerations, such as in the city of Kisangani. Forests predominate owing to the geo-climaticconditions in the region (Omasombo 2020). Covering an area (including the city of Kisangani) of
199,567 km², representing 8.5% of the national territory, Tshopo is the largest province in the DRC(Figure 1). Kisangani is the capital of this province.
Currently, Tshopo has 17.6 million ha of mature forests (Masson 2022). From 2002 to 2021, Tshopo
lost 661,000 ha of primary rainforest 1 at an average rate of 1.5% per year (Masson 2022), mainly due tourbanisation and agricultural expansion. In the immediate vicinity of Kisangani (<1 h), these
disturbances are the most serious.
3. Temporal analysis of cocoa farming in Tshopo
Cocoa cultivation has undergone three major periods in this region. It was first introduced by INERA in
Yangambi during the colonial period. During this period, several agronomic experiments wereconducted, including the selection of different shade-tolerant species. However, this crop was not
popularised in rural areas at that time. In 1979, the Bengamisa cocoa plantation Cacaoyère de Bengamisa(CABEN) was set up in the country. CABEN was managed by a South African company with the aimof developing more than 2000 ha of farmers’ plantations in addition to an industrial plantation. Threefarmer stations supervised by CABEN agronomists were created: Kisangani, Kapalata, and Yangambi.
Several peasant farms were established between 1986 and 1988. However, CABEN went bankrupt, andthe farmers supervised by CABEN lacked a market to sell their cocoa. At the time, CABEN was the
exclusive buyer. Consequently, many farmers’ plantations were either abandoned or converted to foodcrops. A few farmers were able to maintain their plantations owing to the advice provided by the former
agronomists of the company who had settled in the community.
More recently, with the arrival of some communities from the eastern DRC, particularly from NorthKivu, old cocoa plantations are being revived. This is due to the discovery of a new market in the east

1

https://www.globalforestwatch.org, Accessed on 23 November 2022
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

and Uganda, and the presence of new buyers at the local level from North Kivu. Abandoned plantations
have been taken over and rejuvenated. This market recovery has led to the creation of new plantations
by other farmers. Thus, several plantations have been and are continuing to be established. Notably, thisnew expansion of cocoa farming is the work of migrants and local traders who have the opportunity toacquire large tracts of land at the expense of the village community.
In addition to the expansion mainly by migrants, initiatives by REDD+ projects provide support tolocal communities in cocoa farming. However, the process is still basic and limited to a few small
villages and farmer associations that are not fully supervised due to the lack of leadership, technicalcapabilities, and human resources within the Ministries of Agriculture and Rural Development.
4. Varietal and genetic potential of cocoa plants in Tshopo
Tshopo, which hosts INERA, has a collection of 62 genetic materials in a trial cocoa plantation at theCentre de Recherche de Yangambi (CRY). The current germplasm collection in Yangambi has resulted
from selection experiments involving diverse accessions from various introductions. The INERA
research station in Yangambi still harbours old cacao trees, derived from crossings between the best
local selections and the Upper Amazon introductions in 1934. These old trees were probably geneticallyrelated to the trees introduced during the Belgian Congo period. Genetically, the Yangambi collection
is composed of two groups: a hybrid population, originating mainly from Amelonado and/or Criollo–
Trinitario, and, to a lesser extent, from Marañόn and Nanay; and a population predominantly assigned
to Amelonado, but also to Nanay, Contamana, and Nacional.
Most of the CRY cultivars are scattered between the Forastero and Trinitario reference accessions,indicating the hybrid nature of the African collection. Belgium introduced various cacao varieties from
Brazil, Trinidad, Ecuador, and Venezuela, all of which were tested in Brazil. The diverse foreign
introductions and the substantial number of hybridisation events that have occurred in the DRC havecaused an admixed ancestry of most of the CRY cultivars, as observed. Only a small amount isassociated with one reference group: Forastero or Trinitario. The Yangambi collection has someagronomically interesting hydrides, including CRY1424 and CRY15, which are resistant to several
cacao diseases, such as witches’ broom and black pod rot; and cultivars CRY14 and CRY12, which are
known for their high organoleptic quality and floral aroma (Rottiers et al. 2018).
5. Main cocoa production areas in Tshopo
Formerly cultivated only in the area influenced by the CABEN (on the Kisangani–Banalia road) and at
the INERA-YANGAMBI Research Centre, cocoa farming has now intensified mainly in diverse
locations: (1) along the Kisangani–Alibuku–Ngeno road in the Industrie Forestière du Congo (IFCO)
forest concession in Alibuku (36 km from the town of Kisangani on the old Banalia road) (Windey 2020,― 96 ―

Trajectories of Cocoa Production in Tshopo Province

Vyawahare 2022), (2) the Kisangani–Bafwasende axis, and (3) the Kisangani–Lubutu road. The
intensification of cocoa farming has resulted from the growing use of allochthones, mainly from the
Nandé tribe originating from North Kivu, as well as some local elites and notables living in Kisangani
and elsewhere, and some politico-military authorities (Windey 2020). In addition to these initiatives the
distribution of cocoa trees and some shade-tolerant species to local communities by REDD+ projects(including PIREDD-MBKIS, mainly on the Kisangani–Banalia axis (Banalia territory) and PIREDDORIENTAL (Bafwasende, Ubundu, and Isangi territories) have also contributed to the expansion of
cocoa production in the region (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Potential and active cocoa production areas in Tshopo province, Democratic Republic of theCongo
Source: Authors
6. Cocoa production statistics in Tshopo
Currently, evaluating the exact quantity of cocoa producers in Tshopo is difficult because of theinefficiency of public services. However, many producers likely do not accurately declare theirproduction to avoid harassment by various types of public services and the collection of taxes. We
obtained the data (Figure 2) from the National Office of Agricultural Products of Congo (ONAPAC),
which is a state-owned company that controls exports, uses end buyers to declare annual production,and sends a report to the Central Bank of Congo (BCC). Based on the data obtained from ONAPACTshopo and the BCC report, we found that the annual growth in cocoa production at the national level― 97 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

and in Tshopo Province has been exceptional, mainly since 2017. At the national level, production rosefrom 5995 tonnes in 2013 to 58,238 tons in 2021; in Tshopo, it rose from 12.3 tonnes in 2016 to 202.24

A

Tshopo's cocoa production (tonnes)

National cocoa production (tonnes)

tonnes in 2021.

70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0

B
250
200
150
100
50
0

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Year

Year

Figure 2. Cocoa production evolution at national (A) and Tshopo province (B) level
Source: Figures developed from the ONAPAC Tshopo (A) and BCC 2022 statistics reports (B).
7. Main public and private actors in cocoa production in Tshopo
The cocoa sector in Tshopo (Figure3) is organised into three categories of actors: nongovernmentalorganisations, public organisations (public services), and private actors (farmers, buyers, andcooperatives). The cocoa farming sector in Tshopo is driven more by private actors (elites and thepolitical and military authorities, but, to a large extent, non-natives, including the Nandés); the Belgian
Development Agency (ENABEL) through the Agricultural Development Program in the Tshopo District(PRODAT); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Tropenbos-DRC (nongovernmentalorganisation) through the Eastern Integrated Program for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation andForest Degradation (PIREDD-Oriental); Environment and Sustainable Development Ministry (MEDD)
of the DRC through the Integrated REDD+ Project in the Mbuji-Mayi/Kananga and Kisangani basins(PIREDD/MBKIS), which is locally implemented by a nongovernmental organisation consortium:
Congolese Organization of Ecologists and Friends of Nature (OCEAN), Pygmies Support andAccompaniment Organization (OSAPY), and Association for the Integrated Development of Kisangani(ADIKIS).
The cocoa trade in Tshopo is largely centralised around the company Kivu Agricultural Cooperative
Society (SCAK) in Kisangani, which exports cocoa via its headquarters in North Kivu. It is also centredaround certain buyers and wholesalers, such as OMER, who take their cocoa to Edm Schluter &― 98 ―

Trajectories of Cocoa Production in Tshopo Province

Company (ESCO), Kivu, and other companies in North Kivu, or transport it themselves to Uganda.
Figure 3 shows the organisational model of cocoa farming in Tshopo.

Figure 3. Organisational model of cocoa sector in Tshopo, based on field information
8. Cocoa farming in response to climate change in Tshopo
Cocoa plantations are among the perennial crops that the DRC has integrated into its response to
deforestation, forest degradation, and climate change mitigation since the REDD pilot project. Two main
REDD+ programs focusing on smallholder-cocoa-based agroforestry are currently underway in Tshopo.
The first is the Oriental REDD+ program (Bafwasende, Ubundu, and Isangi territories), and the second
is the Integrated REDD+ Project in the Mbuji-Mayi, Kananga, and Kisangani basins (PIREDD/MBKIS).
Cocoa in Tshopo is largely produced within agroforestry systems. These systems substantiallycontribute to carbon sequestration and storage. However, several differences exist between the diverse
cocoa-based agroforestry systems in terms of environmental services, such as carbon sequestration andstorage. Three main systems, defined by the type of shade plants, are more prevalent in Tshopo: underpalm trees, under the shade of forest trees only, and under a mixed shade composed of some palm andforest trees (Batsi et al. 2020). The carbon storage in Tshopo cocoa farms (Batsi et al. 2021, Mangaza
et al. 2022) depends on three parameters: (1) shade tree density (especially large trees), (2) wood densityof the shade species, and (3) basal area. Therefore, the higher the tree density, wood density, or basearea in the system, the greater the carbon storage (Table 1). The carbon stock is mainly maintained bycocoa-associated plants (more than 80%) and large trees (more than 60%). Thus, to increase the carbon
stock in agricultural plots, the planting of tree species in pre-existing cocoa farms should be encouraged
and to shaded cocoa production under forest trees should be popularised. The cocoa farms using forest
tree shade have a multistory structure and, therefore, have considerable potential to provide several― 99 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

environmental services. This multistory structure is also important for creating a continuum to connect
forest mosaics in degraded areas (Batsi et al. 2021).
Table 1. Aboveground biomass carbon storage and associated attributes of cocoa farms in Tshopo
Type ofsystemAssociatedplant
density (no.
ha-1)
88±52

Cocoa tree
density(no. ha-1)

Basal area
(m²/ha)Biomass(Mg ha -1)

Carbon(Mg ha -1)

Reference

INERA916±12023.7±10.3 197.1±119.2 93.62±56,62 Mangaza
Yangambi
et al. 2022
cocoa farms
Smallholder 162±77.98 984±200.55 22.99±3.86 125.12±52.76 59.43±25.06
Batsi etcocoa
al. 2020,
farms–
Batsi etforest shadeal. 2021
tree
Smallholder 182.4±113.3 824±109.8 16.22±2.77 72.59±26.04 34.48±12.37
Batsi etcocoa
al. 2020,
farms–
Batsi etmixed
al. 2021
shade
Smallholder 145.2±38.69 826±114.53 12.1±2.85 71.12±47.41 33.78±22.52
Batsi etcocoa
al. 2020,
farms–palm
Batsi ettree shadeal. 2021
Source: Built from information compiled by Batsi et al. 2020, Batsi et al. 2021, and Mangaza et al.
2022.
In deforested and/or degraded areas, cocoa farming is a viable option because it can maintain up to
approximately 50% of the aboveground biomass (carbon stock) and forest diversity as a perennial crop.
However, new cocoa plantations should not be established at the cost of mature forests (Mangaza et al.
2022) to avoid the massive deforestation that decimated Ivorian and Ghanaian forests. Therefore, theZero Deforestation 2 Cocoa Roadmap can be a useful tool for addressing deforestation from cocoa
farming from a REDD+ perspective (Pirker and Carodenuto 2021).
9. Climate-change-adapted CAFS models of Tshopo and central and west African cocoaproducing countries
Carbon stocks depend on the systems adopted by farmers to manage cocoa farming (Sonwa et al. 2018,
Batsi et al. 2021). Central African cocoa agroforest systems (CAFS) store more carbon than west
African CAFS. In west Africa, particularly in Ghana (the global leading cocoa producer), carbon stocks

Collective commitment signed by the global chocolate industry in 2017 for full supply chain traceability to end
deforestation in cocoa-growing regions.

2― 100 ―

Trajectories of Cocoa Production in Tshopo Province

in CAFS hardly reach 30% of that in mature rainforest, and in Central Africa, they can exceed 75%(Cameroon). This contrast is owing to in the systems adopted by the farmers in these two regions. In
Cameroon, cocoa farms are established under a thinned forest overstory; conversely, in Côte d’Ivoire
and Ghana, cocoa farms are most typically established by slashing and burning the forest (Gockowski
and Sonwa 2010) (Table 2).
Table 2. Aboveground biomass carbon storage and associated attributes of cocoa farms in Tshopo
Country
Cameroon

CAFS' AGC
(Mg ha-1)
170

Reference

Cameroon
Cameroon

70
125.3

Ghana

26

Ghana

36.21

Saj et al. 2013
Madountsap et al.
2018
Mohammed et al.
2016
Afele et al. 2021

Ghana
DRC/Yangambi

41.3
93.62

Asigbaase et al. 2020
Mangaza et al. 2022

Sonwa et al. 2017

Foress AGC(Mg ha-1)
227

Reference

174.8

Gockowski andSonwa 2010
Djomo et al. 2018

173

Brown et al. 2020

229.4

Adu-Bredu et al.
2008

185.73Mangaza et al.
2022

CAFS: cocoa agroforest systems, AGC: Aboveground carbon.
Source: Built from information compiled by Adu-Bredu et al. 2008, Gockowski and Sonwa 2010,
Djomo et al. 2018, Brown et al. 2020, and Mangaza et al. 2022.
The CAFS of Tshopo (DRC) lags that of Cameroon in terms of aboveground carbon storage.
Although the country is too young for cocoa production compared with Cameroon and west Africancountries, the DRC should take the necessary steps to avoid the environmental disasters that haveoccurred in west African cocoa-producing countries. To be well-positioned in the zero-deforestation
process and to increase the value of Congolese cocoa and ensure the ecological transition, the systems
adopted by INERA-Yangambi (DRC) and Cameroon (regarding their level of carbon storage) must be
popularised. In general, the intensification of cocoa agroforestry systems offers considerable potential
for advancing the REDD+ mechanism (Alemagi et al. 2015). Shaded cocoa systems are important forclimate change mitigation and adaptation given the ability of these systems to capture atmosphericcarbon dioxide (CO2) and store carbon in shade and cocoa (Theobroma cacao) trees and soil comparedwith other agricultural practices (Acheampong et al. 2014).

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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

Conclusions
Most of the newer cocoa farms in Tshopo, DRC, have been developed on forest land, either by directly
clearing the existing forest or by first establishing food crops and cocoa farms. Therefore, regardless ofthe size, the development of cocoa farming in this province has contributes to forest degradation anddeforestation This observed deforestation and forest degradation driven by cocoa farming has mainly
been the consequence of the failure of the Congolese state to supervise this sector through the relevant
services. Some communities, particularly the Nandé community from North Kivu, where this crop is
highly developed, have migrated in large numbers to Tshopo either for commercial reasons or to escape
insecurity. Because of the lack of remaining arable land in the densely populated North Kivu, thesemigrants have purchased vast tracts of forest, either from a land acquisition process via provincial
authorities or in agreement with local chiefs, resulting in less diversified cocoa production.
The areas used for cocoa production must be carefully chosen to avoid any form of deforestation orforest degradation associated with cocoa production. Consequently, the choice of zero-deforestationcocoa farming, different from cocoa-based agroforestry, is essential in Tshopo specifically and in the
DRC generally. This requires a coherent agricultural policy and strong coordination between the sectors
involved (the environment, rural development, and agriculture).

Acknowledgment
The authors would like to thank the École régionale postuniversitaire d’aménagement et de gestion
intégrés des forêts et territoires tropicaux (ERAIFT) for funding this study through the Yangambi Pôle
Scientifique (YPS) project, funded by the Belgium Kingdom in delegated cooperation with the European
Union. We also thank the CIFOR GCSREDD project funded by NORAD.

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Shade Systems, Crown Cover, Carbon Stocks and Socio-Economic Dynamics of Smallholder Cocoa
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Adu-Bredu S., M.K. Abekoe, E. Tachie-Obeng, and P. Tschakert 2011. ‘Carbon Stock under Four Land
Use Systems in Three Varied Ecological Zones in Ghana’. In Africa and the Carbon Cycle:
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Afele, J., E. Dawoe, A. Abunyewa, V. Afari-Sefa, and R. Asare 2021. ‘Carbon Storage in Cocoa
Growing Systems Across Different Agroecological Zones in Ghana’. Pelita Perkebunan 37(1): 32― 102 ―Trajectories of Cocoa Production in Tshopo Province

49. doi: 10.22302/iccri.jur.pelitaperkebunan.v37i1.395.
Alemagi, D., L. Duguma, P. Minang, F. Nkeumoe, M. Feudjio, and Z. Tchoundjeu 2015. ‘Intensificationof Cocoa Agroforestry Systems as a REDD+ Strategy in Cameroon: Hurdles, Motivations, andChallenges’. International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 13(3): 187-203. doi:
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Asigbaase, M., E. Dawoe, B. Lomax, and S. Sjogersten 2020. ‘Biomass and Carbon Stocks of Organic
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Batsi, G., D.J. Sonwa, L. Mangaza, J. Ebuy, and J.-M. Kahindo 2020. ‘Biodiversity of the Cocoa
Agroforests of the Bengamisa-Yangambi Forest Landscape in the Democratic Republic of the Congo(DRC)’. Forests 11(1096): 1-21. doi: 10.3390/f11101096.
Batsi, G., D.J. Sonwa, L. Mangaza, J. Ebuy, and J.-M. Kahindo 2021. ‘Preliminary Estimation of Aboveground Carbon Storage in Cocoa Agroforests of Bengamisa-Yangambi Forest Landscape(Democratic Republic of Congo)’. Agroforestry Systems 95: 1505–1517. doi: 10.1007/s10457-02100657-z.
BCC (Banque Centrale du Congo) 2022. Bulletin mensuel d’informations statistiques: mars 2022.
Kinshasa: Direction de la Recherche et des Statistiques. <http://www.bcc.cd, Accessed on 16
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Djomo, C.C. L. Zapfack, and A.N. Djomo 2018. ‘Diversity, Structure and Biomass (above and below)
in a Semi-deciduous Moist Forest of East Region of Cameroon’. Journal of Biodiversity andEnvironmental Sciences 12(3): 60-72.
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Gockowski, J., and D. Sonwa 2010. ‘Cocoa Intensification Scenarios and Their Predicted Impact on
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Kibambe, J-P., and P. Madibi 2022. ‘Détection automatique et cartographie des champs de cacaoyers
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Basin. German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).
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Dewettinck, and K. Messens 2018. ‘Unravelling the Genetic Background of the Yangambi ResearchCenter Cacao Germplasm Collection, DR Congo’. Tree Genetics & Genomes 14: 68. doi:
10.1007/s11295-018-1285-6.
Saj, S., P. Jagoret, and H. Ngogue 2013. ‘Carbon Storage and Density Dynamics of Associated Trees inThree Contrasting Theobroma Cacao Agroforests of Central Cameroon’. Agroforest Syst 87: 1309― 104 ―Trajectories of Cocoa Production in Tshopo Province

1320. doi: 10.1007/s10457-013-9639-4.
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Storage/Stocks of Cocoa Agroforests in the Forest Landscape of Southern Cameroon’. In
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Vyawahare, M. 2022. ‘DRC’s Cacao Boom Leaves a Bitter Aftertaste for Congo Basin Forest’,Mongabay. 18 February. <https://news.mongabay.com/2022/02/drcs-cacao-boom-leaves-a-bitteraftertaste-for-congo-basin-forest/, Accessed on 3 October 2022>
Windey, C. 2020. Abstracting Congolese Forests: Mappings, Representational Narratives, and theProduction of the Plantation Space under REDD+, Discussion Paper. Antwerp: Institute ofDevelopment Policy. <http://www.uantwerp.be/iob, Accessed on 22 September 2022>― 105 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)― 106 ―

Preliminary reflections on Water Vulnerability Stemming from Anthropogenic Activities and Climate Change inthe Forested Province of Tshopo, Democratic Republic of Congo

Preliminary Reflections on Water Vulnerability Stemming from
Anthropogenic Activities and Climate Change in the Forested Province of
Tshopo, Democratic Republic of CongoDavid Ushindi Chishugi (PhD candidate) ab, Denis Jean Sonwac, Josue Bahati Chishugid
Joseph Matunguruae, Felix Losembeb, Destin Itunda Bukeb, Kim VercruyssefabJoin For Water, Democratic Republic of Congo

Faculty of Renewable Natural Resources Management, Kisangani University,
Democratic Republic of CongocdeCenter for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Cameroon

Faculty of Geology, official University of Bukavu, Democratic Republic of Congo

Faculty of Renewable Natural Resources Management, University of Burundi, Republic of BurundifJoin For Water, Belgium

Abstract
In Tshopo, a forested province in the north-eastern part of the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo),
the regulation of water availability and quality is crucial for sustaining livelihoods and protecting
communities from natural hazards. These ecosystem services are crucial for reducing water vulnerability
and providing sufficient water for domestic use in places where the government’s capacity to manage
water resources is insufficient. However, the forests of Tshopo are threatened by climate change andvarious anthropogenic activities. Its rural landscape is dominated by forests that are undergoing severaltransformations, exposing water bodies to contamination. Hence, water is one of the key resources
vulnerable to climate change in the Tshopo Province. As few studies have focused on the understandingof water availability at the sub-national level in the DRC, in this work, we aim to review the current
water situation and its relation to climate change and forest degradation in the Tshopo province. Our
analysis shows the necessity to develop well-defined strategic plans that consider contextual specificities
and to find a trade-off between forest and water management strategies to respond to water-vulnerability
risks in the region.
Keywords: water vulnerability, climate-change adaptation, forested Tshopo province, anthropogenic
activity― 107 ―

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Preliminary reflections on Water Vulnerability Stemming from Anthropogenic Activities and Climate Change inthe Forested Province of Tshopo, Democratic Republic of Congo

1. Introduction
In Tshopo, a province in the central part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), almost 87% of
the region is covered by humid dense tropical forests (Johannes and Sophia 2021, de Wasseige et al.
2015). A substantial part of this province consists of protected areas, logging concessions with a vocation
to be managed sustainably, reserves, and natural communitarian forests, with or without forest
ownership (Drachoussoff et al. 1991, UICN 2010, Katembo 2011, Iyongo et al. 2013). The presence ofan immense forest landscape generally represents a major asset for the regulation and renewal of water
resources (Partow 2011).
Unfortunately, the pressure on these forests is likely to be amplified by climate change and humanactivities, including mining, artisanal logging, slash-and-burn agriculture, fuelwood production, and oilpalm exploitation (Denis et al. 2020, Likoko et al. 2019, Flouriot 2008). Furthermore, many people fromsurrounding areas who experience sustained violence and insecurity are migrating to Tshopo, leading tosignificant additional pressure on forest and water ecosystems (Bogaert et al. 2017). Only 40% of theentire Tshopo province has water services, and access to safe drinking water is insufficient in almost all
territories (almost less than 5%). In addition, a climate-change-predictive model for the Congo Basinshows that water vulnerability is likely to exacerbate in the future (Likoko et al. 2019). Moreover, thepotential benefits of tropical forests in improving water availability are not straightforward—thepresence of forests is not always synonymous with water availability at the watershed level (Mapulanga
and Naito 2019). Indeed, targeted studies must be conducted to elucidate the link between forest
resources and water vulnerability in the context of Tshopo province. Nevertheless, forests provide manyother ecosystem services (Bogaert et al. 2017) and should not be protected only for the benefit of waterresource regulation. A trade-off between the different aspects of the ecosystem services delivered byforests must be considered. Therefore, it is essential to develop strategic plans for sustainably managing
forest ecosystems with explicit attention to water resources. In this study, we aimed to review the current
water situation and its relation to climate change and forest degradation in the Tshopo Province. To thisend, this study provides preliminary insights into the gaps in knowledge regarding the links between
water and forest resources in Tshopo. These insights will help policymakers develop and adopt
appropriate strategies and sustainable forest and water management plans.
2. Administrative context of Tshopo province
The Tshopo province is located at 24°29′E–0°49′N. It comprises seven territories (Isangi, Opala, Banalia,
Bafwasende, Ubundu, Basoko, and Yahuma), six communes in the city of Kisangani (Kabondo,
Kisangani, Lubunga, Makiso, Mangobo, and Tshopo), seven cities (Kisangani, Isangi, Yangambi,
Lokutu, Basoko, Yahuma, and Ubundu), 58 sectors/chieftaincies, and 2,597 villages (South Pole 2020).

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Preliminary reflections on Water Vulnerability Stemming from Anthropogenic Activities and Climate Change inthe Forested Province of Tshopo, Democratic Republic of Congo

The province extends over an area of 200,559km², including Kisangani, which is its chief town, and islimited to the southeast by Ituri, to the northwest by Mongala, to the north by Bas Uélé, to the southeastby Maniema, to the east by North Kivu, and to the southwest and southeast by Sankuru (South Pole2020).
According to the classification of Köppen and Geiger (1928), Tshopo province is subject to an Aftype climate. The data received at the Yangambi meteorological station indicated an average annual
rainfall of 1845 ± 719 mm (2000-2017). It rains all year round with two maxima, one in October (major
rainy season) and the other in April-May (minor rainy season). The average annual relative humidity
varies between 77.5% and 85.2% (Djiofack 2018).

Figure 1. Location of Tshopo, a forested province in the D.R. Congo (drawn by the authors with QGIS
software)
3. Vulnerability to climate change and anthropogenic activities
Forest and water vulnerability related to climate change and anthropogenic activities in the context of
the Tshopo province can be summarized using the diagram in Figure 2, as previously discussed by
Chishugi et al. (2021). They showed that reduction of precipitation and increasing temperatures coupledwith a range of destructive human activities can cause a transition of forest cover into other types ofland cover, which will likely negatively influence the quality and quantity of water at the watershed
level. Communities are highly vulnerable to the resulting impacts on water resources, as they have alimited capacity to mitigate negative impacts or adapt to a changing environment (PNUD 2019).

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Preliminary reflections on Water Vulnerability Stemming from Anthropogenic Activities and Climate Change inthe Forested Province of Tshopo, Democratic Republic of Congo

Exposition

Exposition unit

Responsivity

Change in cumulative rainfall (1931 toForest cover reduction

Poor water2017), Wind and Temperature (1970 toat the watershed level

resource quality

2017) Intense change in LULC

Scarcity of water points

Potential Impacts

Institutional Capacity

Physical-chemical parameters of

NHRS (National

certain water points, unsuitable for

Hydraulic Rural

domestic use

Service) is less wellLong distance between households andequipped as a structure

clean water points Coverage of water

for water resourceneedsmanagement

Individual capacity
Poor populationand less educatedin water resource
management

Adaptability

Very high-water resource vulnerability
Figure 2. Chain of impact for vulnerability to water resources in Yangambi (Chishugi et al. 2021)
4. Water nexus Forest protection and conservation strategies
Pristine forests are known to protect water resource quality and quantity in many watershed landscapes
worldwide (Uuemaa et al. 2005, Carvalho-Santos 2014, Zhu et al. 2015, Brummett et al. 2008). By
increasing water infiltration while decreasing soil erosion, the groundwater is recharged, thus supplying
springs with a lot of quality water that is less contaminated than surface water. However, forests do notnecessarily improve water quality and quantity (Mapulanga and Naito 2019). The processes of water
regulation in forests are complex. In some regions, forest land cover is responsible for decreasing thesurface water quantity in streams and springs by enhancing soil infiltrability, and some incontrollable
sources of contamination can reduce water quality (Maréchal 2011).
Furthermore, a trade-off must be found between ecosystem services related to water regulation andother ecosystem services delivered by forests that are beneficial to communities and the environment.
We need to better understand the different processes occurring in forests and their different uses in local
contexts when attempting to promote water nexus forest protection and conservation strategies.
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Preliminary Reflections on Water Vulnerability Stemming from Anthropogenic Activities and Climate Change in DRC

Preliminary reflections on Water Vulnerability Stemming from Anthropogenic Activities and Climate Change inthe Forested Province of Tshopo, Democratic Republic of CongoIn the case of Tshopo Province, the links between forest protection, conservation, and water
availability are not well-defined. By assessing the state of forest and water, the possible synergies
between the two resources, and the level of the other roles of the forest, we can develop better forest
management strategies that simultaneously promote water resource protection and conservation.
4.1. State of forest ecosystem in the Tshopo
In Tshopo, the forest ecosystems total gross area is estimated at 87% of its area (South Pole 2020). It is
primarily composed of dense and humid equatorial forests (Bogaert 2017). However, in the Ubundu,
Opala, Isangi, Yahuma and Basoko Territories, forests are predominantly swampy or periodicallyflooded (MINAGRI 2010).
The main protected areas are the Yangambi Biosphere Reserve, which has an area of 6,297km2(Drachoussoff et al. 1991) and contains an important species diversity, the Yoko Forest Reserve with anarea of 6,975ha, and the Masako Forest Reserve, which has an area of 2,105ha (Iyongo et al. 2013). The
Maiko National Park and Lomami National Park have a large part located in the Tshopo province,
covering an area of 1,083,000ha and approximately 888,000ha, respectively (UICN 2010, Katembo2011). Tshopo is on the list of provinces in the DRC with the largest area of forest concessions(142,957,661ha) and second on the list with the largest number of loggers permits (14 permits) after
Mai-Ndombe. The forest code of 2002 protects the forest massifs exploited for economic income to be
managed sustainably (ATIBT 2019).
The other parts of the forest belong to local communities. However, nowadays, through the forest
code of 2002 1, the government gives the opportunity to the local community to obtain a permit for theirforest, so that they may manage them sustainably and be protected by law. This law offers local
communities the possibility of obtaining free and perpetual Local Community Forest Concession(LCCF), which covers all or parts of the protected forests among those regularly owned by custom.
Many of them are in process, and others already have the required documents (Trefon 2010).
4.2. State of water in the Tshopo
The forests in Tshopo are part of the watershed of the Congo River, including tributaries such as Tshopo,
Lomami, Lobilo, Ituri, Lindi, and many other secondary streams (CICOS 2015). The Congo River
divides Tshopo Province into two approximately equal parts.
Owing to the situation of the Congo River on the equator and the high rainfall patterns throughout
the year, the river has a large hydrological potential. For example, a hydroelectric plant is located on the
Loi Portant Principes Fondamentaux Relatifs à La Protection de l’Environnement. 2011. République
Démocratique du Congo.
<https://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20administratif/Environnement/JOS.16.07.2011.pdf, Accessed on
21 February 2023>

1― 111 ―

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Tshopo River. In addition, owing to the low population density in the DRC, the potential water
availability per capita was very high. Approximately 15,000–70,000m3 per person per year in all
countries (WHO 2017). The rivers in Tshopo supply drinking water to almost the entire city of Kisangani
and to the principal villages of the provinces. However, the rate of access to safe drinking water andsanitation is paradoxically very low in the province, especially in principal villages (Table 1). This is thecase in most other provinces in the DRC (Brummett et al. 2008). Despite its large hydrological reserves,
only 29% of its rural population and 79% of its urban population have effective access to safe water tomeet various basic needs, including those related to domestic use (IMF 2015).
Finally, apart from rivers and rainforests, few other water-related ecosystems are present in Tshopo.
Preliminary cartography of wetlands carried out by the Congo peatland project, led by the FAO andother partners, shows that wetland coverage in Tshopo province is very low. Wetlands are generally
located in the western part of the country, apart from small-scale marshes (Bambuta and Freeman 2021).
Table 1. Water supply rate in the principal towns of the Tshopo province (DRC)
Town

Total population covered

Total population% Population served

Kisangani

590,698

1,293,221

46%

Ubundu2,121

42,773

5%

Opala

695

31,922

2%

Tshopo593,514

1,367,916

43%

RDC

14,095,564

35,034,196

40%

Source: GIZ and Ministère des Ressources Hydrauliques et Electricité (RDC) 2020

Table 2. Water supply rate in the territories of the Tshopo province (DRC)
Territories

Population

Number ofHouseholds

Drinking water accesshouseholds

accessing waterrate

Bafwasende363,505

77,341

1,589

2.05%

Banalia

3,462,414

73,663

1,832

2.49%

Basoko331,642

70,562400

0.57%Isangi

652,034

138,731

1,250

0.90%

Opala

203,881

43,379900

2.07%

Ubundu233,133

49,603

2,922

5.89%

Yahuma233,128

49,603450

0.91%

Source: GIZ and Ministère des Ressources Hydrauliques et Electricité (RDC) 2020

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Preliminary Reflections on Water Vulnerability Stemming from Anthropogenic Activities and Climate Change in DRC

Preliminary reflections on Water Vulnerability Stemming from Anthropogenic Activities and Climate Change inthe Forested Province of Tshopo, Democratic Republic of Congo

4.3. Possible synergies and trade-offs between forest and water resources
Finding synergies between forests and water resources will be a more integrated and sustainable way tomanage them. NGOs, such as TropenBos DRC and its partners, are leading projects related to water andforest resource protection and conservation. The objective is to find better ways to exploit forests
sustainably and implement sustainable agricultural practices while promoting the forests’ capacity toregulate, provide, and sustain water resources in terms of quality and quantity. Furthermore, otherprojects related to oil bloc exploitation in wetland zones are developing, while others attempt to map
wetlands (peatlands) to help manage them sustainably.
However, the protection and conservation of forests for water in the Tshopo province will only bepossible if synergies between different (conflicting) users are well documented and analysed. For
example, while only one oil bloc is envisaged in Tshopo province, the latest one was adopted without
considering the socio and ecological specificities of the region, which led to unsustainable management
and catastrophic consequences (Partow 2011).
Despite possible synergies that can be developed between water and forest management, it isimportant to note that forests also provide other ecosystem services beyond water. For example, timber
extraction, Produits Forestiers Non Ligneux (PFNL), land for agriculture, hunting, wood energy, andcultural activities (Brummett et al. 2008). Therefore, finding trade-offs between different usages isessential. Conservation strategies play a key role in determining these trade-offs.
4.4. Conservation strategies
Deforestation and the degradation of forest and water ecosystems are often the result of mismanagement
and inadequate policies that are not adapted to the local context (Verburg et al. 2004). For example, anestimated 84% of forest disturbance area in the region is caused by small-scale, non-mechanized forest
clearing for agriculture. Unfortunately, these drivers are sometimes neglected by strategic resource
management plans when conceived at a large-scale level (Tyukavina et al. 2018). The major concern isthat most strategic resource management plans in the DRC have been conceived on a large scale using
top-down or downstream approaches, thus holding the risk of underestimating local specificities. Thereis an urgent need to develop management plans at local scales to protect and conserve forest and water
resources, such as in Tshopo province.
To meet this need, strategic documents have been developed at various levels. The objective was topromote sustainable forest ecosystem management, which would not have negative impacts on water
resources in the current context, to improve the livelihood of the population. Illustrative cases include
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 6 and SDG 15), Agenda 2063 of the African Union, the global
Bonn challenge goal of bringing 350 million hectares of worldwide deforested land into restoration, theAFR100 (the African Forest Landscape Restoration Initiative), the national action program for― 113 ―

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Preliminary reflections on Water Vulnerability Stemming from Anthropogenic Activities and Climate Change inthe Forested Province of Tshopo, Democratic Republic of Congo

adaptation to climate change, and sustainable forest management plans, etc. (Guizol et al. 2022).
a)

Government responses

Indeed, the DRC government recognizes the key environmental challenges facing the country when it
comes to considering multiple policies, strategic documents 2, and all the environmental framework lawsthat deal with the issue of water resources and forest ecosystem protection. For example, the water law
promulgated in 2015 3 gave more power to local communities, such as those living in forest landscapes,
so that they may be involved in the management of resources with more decision power. In addition tothis, there is also the 2002 Forest Code Act, already cited above, through which the logging of timberand collection other forest resources are conducted in a sustainable way, considering the rights of thelocal population and the preservation of some vital ecosystems such as river banks and all water bodies
within the forest massif. The reduced impact logging standards inspired by the DRC’s 2002 forestry
code prohibit logging on riverbanks in swampy areas covered by dense forests and hydromorphic soils.
Article 48 of this code prohibits all deforestation within 50 m on either side of watercourses and withina radius of 100 m around their sources. There are also many other legal arsenals initiated at national orinternational levels, such as the Law on Fundamental Principles of Environmental Protection (2011) 4,
the Congo Basin Blue Fund 5 for Climate Transition and Sustainable Economic Growth in Central andEast Africa, and the National Action Program for Adaptation to Climate Change 6 (NAPA), whose goal
is to identify long-term climate risks and guide management initiatives in the country. This legal arsenal
contributes to the regulation of forest and water resources by considering ecological aspects, the needfor development, and the reality of climate change (Guizol et al. 2022).
At the local scale, in the Tshopo province, there is, for example, the PIREDD program, initiated by
the DRC government as a part of the UN’s international REDD+ goals, which include stabilizing forest
cover in the country by recognizing the role of climate change causing rainfall irregularities, heat waves,
floods, erosion, etc. (South Pole 2020).
b)

Implementation of national plans

Unfortunately, the strategic documents developed to address these issues are not always well
implemented, and sometimes not even clear or adapted to the local context of the DRC’s sub-zones. In
addition, the lack of clear responsibilities at the institutional level and the need to mobilize more funds
for these plans constitute a major challenge. The Nationally Determined Expected Contribution (2017),
CSC RDC. Cadre Stratégique Commun République Démocratique Du Congo 2022-2026. ; 2021
République Démocratique du Congo. Loi n° 15/026 du 31 décembre 2015 relative à l’eau. 2015.
<https://leganet.cd/Legislation/JO/2016/JOS.13.01.2016.pdf, Accessed on 21 February 2023>.
4
République Démocratique du Congo. Portant Principes Fondamentaux Relatifs à La Protection del’Environnement. 2011.
5
Commission Climat du Bassin du Congo. Le Fonds Bleu du Bassin du Congo. 2021. <https://www.ccbccbcc.org/, Accessed on 21 February 2023>.
6
République Démocratique du Congo. Programme d’Action National d’Adaptation Aux Changements
Climatiques 2010.
2
3― 114 ―

Preliminary Reflections on Water Vulnerability Stemming from Anthropogenic Activities and Climate Change in DRC

Preliminary reflections on Water Vulnerability Stemming from Anthropogenic Activities and Climate Change inthe Forested Province of Tshopo, Democratic Republic of Congo

submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, outlines the DRC’s mainpriority actions related to climate change for the period 2021-2030. In this document, the government
expresses major concerns about the lack of real capacity to address adaptation issues in the DRC on alarge scale. Similarly, the absence of a real policy of cross-sectoral intervention in the context of fighting
conflicts of interest between different sectors (mining, agriculture, water, and forestry) does not facilitate
the implementation of actions in the field of climate change within a federating framework of mitigation
and adaptation programs.
5. Socio-ecological system and community resilience
In Tshopo, almost all rivers are directly protected by the forest cover of the region. However, in somewatersheds, destructive activities such as logging, slash-and-burn agriculture, cutting wood for energy,
and heavy erosion occur frequently (Chishugi et al. 2021). These activities increase pollution, which
directly threatens forest ecosystems and water bodies. In addition, immigration into the province, mainly
from the surrounding provinces, especially North Kivu (Yira), Haut-Uelé, and Ituri, constitutes asignificant pressure on local forests (PNUD 2019).
The observed degradation of forests will increase the negative impacts of climate change mitigation.
The population is poor and highly dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods and is therefore
particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change and water ecosystem-related issues (Sonwa et al.
2020). The fact that they are not well informed and lack the capacity to lobby to defend their rights
decreases the socio-ecological resilience of the ecosystems and their inhabitants to deal with changes inthe environment and climate.
It is therefore essential to explore how communities can maximize their well-being on the one hand
without compromising the resilience of the forests and their resources. This was the main challenge inthe context of Tshopo.
6. Lack of data availability and accessDeforestation can be driven by a range of factors (e.g., need for firewood, need for construction wood,
population growth, etc.), and can also lead to a range of impacts (e.g., erosion, loss of soil fertility,
reduced water infiltration, etc.). Unfortunately, the drivers and impacts are likely to be underestimated
if they are not studied at an appropriate scale (Tyukavina et al. 2018). In addition, there is a lack ofcomprehensive data on the quality, quantity, and sustainability of natural resources such as water in
relation to human activities and environmental change in the Tshopo province. Although the policy
documents reveal an awareness of these challenges and concerns about their potential negative impacts
and the need for responses, the country has difficulty accessing scientific data to support policy― 115 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

Preliminary reflections on Water Vulnerability Stemming from Anthropogenic Activities and Climate Change inthe Forested Province of Tshopo, Democratic Republic of Congodevelopment. These challenges make local and sub-regional actions to conserve and protect water
resources and ecosystems highly relevant. Therefore, local research at the small-scale level is needed inthis area (Tyukavina et al. 2018). For the entire province, data on water quantity, quality, and biologicalcharacteristics are missing. There is no sufficient temporal series data on rivers and spring flows that
could help reveal the pattern of this resource with regard to other resources such as forests. In addition,
meteorological stations are insufficient for analysing water patterns in relation to climate. Even the
mapping of different water points is weak because it considers only the principal water bodies. Studies
dealing with water needs or the relationship of the latter with the other elements of the ecosystem), aredifficult to perform in this region.
7. Conclusions
Appropriate strategic plans for sustainably managing forest ecosystems with explicit consideration ofwater resources are urgently needed. However, currently, there is a lack of reliable data and scientificstudies at the local scale to support the development of such plans. More insights and evaluation tools
are needed to understand how anthropogenic activities and climate change increase water vulnerability
in Tshopo province. Well-defined political approaches need to be conceived and applied through theinspiration of peer-reviewed scientific studies that consider the specificities and context of the Tshopo
region.

Acknowledgments
We thank the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (TUFS), Japan; this working paper was developed
within the framework of the project ‘Rural resource management and the state: A comparative study ofGhana and Rwanda’. The research undertaken is part of the CGIAR research program on Forests, Trees,and Agroforestry (FTA) and was performed within the scope of the Global Comparative Study on
REDD+ (GCS REDD+) funded by NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation) and
the PCWR (Protection and Conservation of Water Resource) program funded by EU (European Union)
and DGD (Direction Générale de la coopération au Développement et aide humanitaire, Belgique).
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Bogaert, J., H. Beeckman, and C. De Cannière 2017. Les forêts de la Tshopo Écologie, histoire etcomposition. Presse universitaire de Liège. <http://hdl.handle.net/2268/253707, Accessed on 15
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Iyongo, L., C. De Carnnière, J. Ulyel, B. Dudu, K. Bukasa, E. Verheyen, and J. Bogaert 2013. ‘Effets delisière et sex-ratio de rongeurs forestiers dans un écosystème fragmenté en République Démocratiquedu Congo (Réserve de Masako, Kisangani)’. Tropicultura 31: 3-9.
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Tyukavina, A., M.C. Hansen, P. Potapov, D. Parker, C. Okpa, S.V. Stehman, I. Kommareddy, and S.
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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)― 120 ―

Perception and Management of Diseases and Therapeutic Resources among
Ewondo Population (Central Region of Cameroon):
A Case of Malaria and Spleen DiseaseMoïse Mvetumboa (PhD Candidate), Mbonji Edjenguèlèa,Paschal Kum Awaha, Denis Jean Sonwab, Takanori OishicaDepartment of Anthropology, University of Yaoundé I, Cameroon
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR),b

Central African Regional Office, CamerooncAfrican Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan

Abstract
In Cameroon, malaria is a major public health problem despite the response mechanisms put in place.
According to the Ewondo Population, an interinfluential relationship exists between this pathology andspleen disease, a disease recognized as such only at the community level. Our main objective was todescribe the perceptions and different cultural mechanisms of the management of these two affections.
To achieve this goal, 70 informants were interviewed, and results were obtained. The populations
attributed to these pathologies, namely, ebem koé or snail spleen and tite meki or an animal’s blood
disease describe the characteristics and potential sources of these pathologies. In the event of a malaria
crisis, 37.1% of the informants used their knowledge of existing therapeutic solutions, 28.6% passed
through clinician advices, and 34.3% recourse to traditional pharmacopoeia. For proven spleen disease
cases, 77.1% of the informants directly sought the services of traditional doctors, and 20.8% used theirown knowledge. Of the 42 samples identified, 28 were used against spleen disease and 14 against
malaria, while 9 were used against both pathologies. This reflection contributes to the enhancement oftraditional pharmacopoeia through the enrichment of knowledge of the natural resources used by
Ewondo.

Keywords: African traditional medicine, environment, Ewondo, malaria, spleen disease― 121 ―

ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

1. Introduction
The question of disease eradication has always been the subject of all human societies. Therefore, it isof concern to political decision makers at the national level as well as to international organizations incharge of related issues at the global level. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), healthis not only an absence of infirmity but also a state of overall physical, mental, and social well-being(WHO 1946). In this context, the disease, known as a major source of destabilization of this state ofgeneral well-being, is a complex reality whose appreciation of its existence, nature, and severity depends
on the cultures and medical skills of the populations. In several socio-cultures in Cameroon, thepopulations reported that spleen disease is a real pathology with serious consequences for victims.
Several researchers have provided explanations for splenic pain, a situation that can create confusion in
the minds of the population. Thus, a link between malaria, schistosomiasis, and inflammation of thespleen has been established (Gentilini 1995, Greenwood et al. 1987, Stein and Gelfand 1985, Ouattara
et al. 2008). Based on this clinical reality, biomedical practitioners believe that effective managementof these causes can lead to the disappearance of pain and inflammation. Malaria is still a public healthproblem in Cameroon despite policies to prevent it (Dike DeLancey et al. 2010, Nyam 2020). One of
the reasons for this reality is the cultural representations that the populations have of the disease, which
reveal their lack of mastery of the real causes and, consequently, their disaffection with public healthpolicies. According to the Ewondo target populations of our research, an inter-influence exists between
malaria and what is called spleen disease, a pathology recognized at the community level but which
remains unrecognized at the clinical level by health professionals, a paradoxical but understandable
situation.
In fact, illness is inherent to all living beings, and every society, therefore, sets up a system oftherapeutic recourse that responds to the health problems of its group (Essi 2007: 14). According to theWHO, 80% of the population of developing countries are dependent on traditional medicine, mainly
using plant extracts to meet their needs. This question is all the more topical as new diseases are
emerging, while others are disappearing; new drugs are being developed to replace those that are lesseffective or less available (Mbonji 2009). It can also be explained by the poverty of the population, theirsocio-cultural habits, the isolation of rural areas, the absence of sanitation or rudimentary infrastructure,
the high cost of pharmaceutical remedies, and low income (Dibong et al. 2011). Whether it is malaria
or spleen disease, the solicitations of Ewondo ethnomedicine by members of this community confirm
this reality. To face the various health threats they encounter on a daily basis, they seek various existing
therapeutic approaches. This is the case for traditional African, Asian (mainly Indian and Chinese), andWestern medicine. While traditional African medicine plays a crucial role in the treatment of malaria
and spleen disease, Cameroonians, in general, and the Ewondo community, in particular, mainly seek
Chinese medicine for the benefits of acupuncture, a practice introduced in Cameroon in 1975 (Keubou― 122 ―

Perception and Management of Diseases and Therapeutic Resources among Ewondo Population in Cameroon2018), as well as many therapeutic herbal teas.
This openness reveals the place of the representation of diseases and medicines that the people of
Yaoundé have. Traditionally, culture allows people to take advantage of the wonders of the forest andenvironment to solve their multifaceted daily problems including health issues. The first point is therecognition of the existence of the disease, then comes the discrimination of certain medicinal offers
deemed suspect or ineffective, and the elaboration or adoption of those likely to meet their expectations.
The occurrence of COVID-19, one of the latest major health events, has shown how people’s perceptions
can sometimes be useful in defining medical responses. This paper examines the meanings of the local
names given to these two diseases (malaria and spleen disease), the medicinal practices of the
populations, and the ways in which they access care and therapeutic resources.
2. Methods
2.1. Study site
The study was conducted in Yaoundé, the capital of the Mfoundi Division in the Central Region andpolitical capital of Cameroon. Institutionally, Yaoundé’s administrative post was created in February
1889, making it the first relay of German administration in the hinterland (Quinn 1989, Porto et al. 2012).
The city is located at latitude 3°90 North and longitude 11°50 East (Aimé et al. 2015). The populationof the town is estimated at around 4,336,670 inhabitants in 2022, i.e., a growth of 4.14% compared withthat in 2021 (World Population Review 2022). The population density was approximately 13,487
inhabitants/km2 in 2019. Yaoundé is a city of hills and valleys, located on the southern Cameroonian
Plateau at an average altitude of 760m, a geographical configuration that lends itself to flooding. The
Yaoundé station records an average of 1,564.7mm of rainfall per year, divided into four seasons: longdry season from mid-November to mid-March, short rainy season from mid-March to mid-June, short
dry season from mid-June to mid-August, and long rainy season from mid-August to mid-November.
This city rains an average of 153 days/year. The annual average temperature is estimated at 23.5°C, andthe annual temperature range is 2.4°C (Abossolo et al. 2015). A mixed vegetation exists in the current
urban perimeter of the city consisting of forest relics on the summits and slopes of the mountains, grasses,
gallery forests, market gardening plants that line the bottom of the valleys, and banana plantations andfruit trees along the edges of public roads and houses (Nguendo et al. 2008).
2.2. Focused population
Cameroon is a Central African country made up of a mosaic of peoples, the main cultural groups being
the Fang-Beti in the South, Central, and East regions; Sawa in the Littoral, Southwest, and part ofSouthern Cameroon; the Gras-Fields in the West and Northwest regions; and Sudan–Sahelian in thenorthern part of the country. More than 250 ethnic groups exist in Cameroon, each with their own― 123 ―

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particularities in relation to worldview (Datidjo et al. 2021). Our research focuses on the Ewondo, forest
people living in a crossroad town and experiencing a kind of dualism marked by urbanization and,conversely, by rurality, which is observed through agricultural and livestock practices and the strong
presence of African medicine. Economic/infrastructural development has not completely eliminated thecapacity of populations to preserve their culture, of which health is a part.
Of the eight divisions in the Central region of Cameroon, the Mfoundi Division constitutes Ewondo’s
largest urban concentration (Franqueville 1984, Fotso 2014). A total of 2,501,000 inhabitants are in theCentral region of Cameroon, half of whom live in the city capital Yaoundé. The Ewondo are the original
inhabitants of Yaoundé (DeLancey et al. 2010: 160). This community represents approximately 20.5%of the city’s total population (Franqueville 1968). We interviewed 70 people chosen for their roots inthe local culture and knowledge of spleen disease and malaria. We relied not only on the selection
process of therapists’ knowledge of the disease and their involvement in the care procedures but also on
the recognition of their status as caregivers by the local population. Respondents were selected using asnowball approach, which allowed us to identify another respondent who met the research criteria
operationally. The participants voluntarily agreed to participate in the study. Their answers were kept in
notebooks and audio tapes that were used for transcription.
2.3. Data collection and processing
We organized home interviews with the patients, caregivers, and other holders of knowledge on theirconception of spleen disease, malaria, and the medicinal species their therapists use. We then went withthem into the forest or house gardens where we identified with them the species they used, the privilegedparts, and the instructions for use. We then collected specimens that were well preserved in the Plank
and protected from moisture. After fieldwork, the different species collected were identified at the
National Herbarium of Yaoundé. We subsequently constructed an Excel database with items such as
family names, scientific names, biological types, and sources of therapeutic specimens. These different
elements provided us with a global idea of management strategies for this disease in the community. At
the level of analysis, we were interested in decoding the name and meaning of spleen disease in the
Ewondo language. We then identified the points of convergence and divergence that resulted from thedescriptions. Data interpretation was based on cultural ecology theory, which has the aims of ‘the studyof dynamics, active human behaviour in the context of a changing environment, [and] interconnections
among the dynamic components of our system’ (Jochim 1981: 5). This perspective allows us todemonstrate how this population uses their environmental resources to solve daily health problems, suchas malaria and spleen disease.

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Perception and Management of Diseases and Therapeutic Resources among Ewondo Population in Cameroon

3. Results
3.1. Local denomination of spleen disease (ebem koé) and malaria (tite meki)
Among the Ewondo Population, these two health problems have different names depending on the
degree of severity. To speak of spleen disease, some respondents used the word tite, believing that it isa disease that rages and is manifested by inflammation and pain felt inside the flesh. For the second
category of respondents, spleen or spleen disease is called ebem. According to them, a simple mentionof the name of this organ ebem is enough to draw the attention of an interlocutor to an abdominal ailment,
which is the subject of this research, a disease that people regularly suffer from in the community. To
this end, the informant tells us that:‘Ebem is the spleen generally, it is the disease of the spleen. As far as I know, when we say
ebem in our community, this name refers to the spleen or spleen disease everyone
understands it easily’ (Joseph, Interview on 2021/08/17).
For the third and largest group of respondents, this primary term is rather simplistic in describing thedeeper meaning of spleen disease in the Ewondo language. For greater clarity, this condition is known
in this sociocultural context as ebem koé. This expression is composed of two words: ebem, which means
the spleen, and koé, which means snail in English. Normally, the spleen (ebem) refers to the organ ingood working condition. The term spleen disease is used when this part of the body changes into ebemkoé. Here, people speak of ebem resembling koé; in other words, the ordinary organ called spleen has
undergone modifications or changes due to the intrusion of germs to resemble the mollusc called koé.
According to a therapist interviewed on the subject:‘The spleen is first of all an organ, we speak of koé, to designate what we call spleen disease,
the Ewondo use the expression ebem koé. Koé refers to the snail. Ebem koé therefore meansthat ebem resembles koé, i.e. the spleen that has changed and resembles the snail’ (Omer,
Interview on 2021/02/13).
Following his testimony, the spleen that appears physiologically like a snail and is accompanied bypain suggests that the victim has a potential spleen disease (ebem koé). As for the second condition, we
say that malaria, still known as tite meki in the Ewondo language, is understood as tite, which means
blood, and meki means animal, that is, an animal’s blood disease. Following this conception, it is apathology that generally arises from the infection of patients' blood by harmful germs of various origins.
When the blood that regulates the functioning of the human organism is polluted or infected, the patientneeds specific care that can be provided by biomedical practitioners and community members withknowledge of ethnotherapy.

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3.2. Aetiology of disease
Regarding the sources of these diseases from the community perception, different points of view wereraised in the field depending on whether one is dealing with a person suffering from malaria or is a
victim of spleen disease.
3.2.1. Aetiology of spleen disease or ebem koé
Regarding spleen disease, the respondents considered that its occurrence was attributable to a pluralityof events, the main ones being the family history with notably the transmission from parents to theiroffspring (70.8%), transgression of dietary prohibitions with an emphasis on the consumption of snails
and excessive consumption of iced or sweetened beverages and foodstuffs (54.8%); and the result of
associated diseases such as malaria (12.8%).
Table 1. Summary of people’s perceptions of the aetiology of spleen disease
Aetiology of spleen disease or ebem koé
Affection of mystical origin
Consequence of severe malaria
Consumption of snails
Consumption of sweet foodConsumption of ice-cold drinks
Brown children
Karma or consequence of sins
Disease of uncertain origin
Spleen disease equals malaria
Ordinary illness, i.e., like all other illnesses
Resulting from the “woman's worm”
Hereditary transmission

Number
5.7%
12.8%
31.9%
15.7%
7.1%
1.4%
1.4%
6.9%
5.7%
14.3%
4.2%
70.8%

Source: Table built based on information from the field.
Note: n = 70; the number of people interviewed for this research is 70, and it is based on the calculationof the percentage of each statement in the overall sample.
3.2.2. Aetiology of malaria or tite meki
Malaria, also called tite meki, which means an animal’s blood disease in the Ewondo language, is acondition in their conception marked by the infection of the blood by harmful germs of various origins.
The informants believed that the onset of malaria could be the result of mosquito bites (57.1%),
consumption of poorly cleaned fruit (35.7%), consumption of the first mangoes (21.1%), exposure to
bad weather, such as cold and rain (12.9%), and consequence of spleen disease (20%). On this last point,
the respondents spoke of a simple manifestation of this main disease (i.e. spleen disease). For the latter,malaria, which takes a long time to heal despite the various medications taken, would be a potential
manifestation of spleen disease. On this subject, we would like to put a caveat by specifying that as the― 126 ―

Perception and Management of Diseases and Therapeutic Resources among Ewondo Population in Cameroon

dosage and preventive measures were respected by the users, we are not sure that this is the case.
Table 2. Summary of people’s perceptions of the aetiology of malaria
Aetiology of malaria
Mosquito bites
Consumption of poorly cleaned fruits
Consumption of the first mangoes
Exposure to weather conditions such as cold and rain
Transmission from pregnant or breastfeeding women to their children
Consequence or manifestation of the “spleen disease”
Undetermined causes

Frequency
57.1%
35.7%
21.1%
12.9%
15.3%
19.4%
1.4%

Source: Table built on the basis of field data.
Note: n = 70; the number of people interviewed for this research is 70, and it is based on the calculationof the percentage of each statement in the overall sample.
3.3. Management of spleen disease and malaria
The Ewondo community, like all human societies, relies on their culture to find solutions to the healthproblems they encounter while simultaneously being open to effective therapeutic solutions from othercivilisations. Our work on disease, spleen disease, and their treatment makes sense in that:
Medical anthropology establishes the link between the diseases from which a community
suffers and the remedies to cure them, finds that there is no society without medicine,
simply because there is no society without diseases (Mbonji 2009: 12).
In the case of a malaria crisis, as mentioned in the field, 26 informants used their knowledge ofexisting therapeutic solutions as a first line of defence (i.e. self-medication), followed by recourse to theservices of a clinician (20), and finally recourse to the services of a traditional doctor (24). In the caseof proven spleens, 54 of the informants directly solicited the services of traditional doctors, and 15 usedtheir own expertise. However, one former victim of spleen disease acknowledged that he had found acure by following the prescriptions of a clinician. Self-medication is understood as a behaviour thatconsists of administering pharmaceutical or herbal products for treatment without a specialist’s advice
whether it is malaria or spleen disease (Dohou and Dodji 2015: 64).
3.3.1. Clinical management of malaria in Cameroon
To deal with malaria, the care protocol in force in Cameroon, in coherence with WHO recommendations,
proposes the administration of injectable artesunate-based treatment as the first line, quinine as thesecondline,

followedbyartemether

as

a

last

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resort(WHO2013).

The

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n°0406/D/MINSANTE/CAB on June 23, 2014, on the pricing of the management of severe malaria in
Cameroon sets in Article 9 the price of treatment transfer in the framework of intergenerational solidarityof a severe malaria episode at the level of health facilities throughout the national territory. Thus, apartfrom the cost of hospitalization and possible complications, the cost of which is determined according
to the status of each health facility, treatment for children under 5 years of age is (officially) free;pregnant women from the second trimester of pregnancy, 4,000; and patients over 5 years of age, ashigh as 8,000 CFA francs.
3.3.2 Therapeutic plants used against malaria and spleen disease
In this study, 28 species were described by the populations as containing properties that could be
mobilized against spleen disease, and 14 species possessing anti-malarial properties, that is, a total of
42 plants were identified for both diseases (Table 3). Of the 42 inventoried, 9 were simultaneously usedby the populations against spleen disease and malaria. These common species are: Aframomum
melegueta (Zingiberaceae), Alstonia boonei (Apocynaceae), Carica papaya (Caricaceae), Combretum
micranthum (Combretaceae), Euphorbia hirta (Euphorbiacea), Irvingia gabonensis (Irvingiaceae),
Rauvolvia vomitoria (Apocynaceae), Vernonia amygdalina (Asteraceae), and Persea americana(Lauraceae). The significantly low number of plants used against malaria mentioned on the field is partly
explained by this disease being recognized by both traditional medicine and biomedicine. This meansthat people usually turn to these different medicines in case of an illness. The informants also have apenchant for self-medication, which generally leads them to seek street medicine vendors along thestreets and markets of Yaoundé City.
Table 3. Plants used against spleen disease and malaria
Scientific name

FamilyLocal name

Zingiberaceae

Biological
type
Herb

Ndong

Spleendiseasex

Aframomum melegueta
Ageratum conyzoides
Alstonia boonei
Annickia chlorantha

Asteracae
Apocynaceae
Anacardiaceae

Herb
Tree
Tree

Nyat elok
Akuk
Nfouolxxx

Annona muricata
Artemisia annua
Bidens pilosa
Canariumschweinfurthii Engl.
Capsicum annum
Carica papaya

Annonaceae
Asteraceae
Asteraceae
Burcéraceae

Shrub
Herb
Herb
Tree

Abel

x

Solanaceae
Caricaceae

Herb
Shrub

ChilliFofo’oxxxCombretummicranthum
Croton oligandrum

Combretaceae

Herb

GometanexxEuphorbiaceae

Tree

Ebin

x

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MalariaxxxxxPerception and Management of Diseases and Therapeutic Resources among Ewondo Population in Cameroon

Dichrocehala
integrifolia
Elaeis guineensis

Asteraceae

Herb

Midzlax

Arécaceae

Treex

Erythropheleum
suaveolens
Eucaluptus saligna
Euphorbia hirta

Ceaesalpiniaceae

Tree

Nboan
mevié
Tali

Myrtaceae
Euphorbiacea

Tree
Herb

Okoul bifesx

Gnetum africanum

Gnetaceae

Herb

Okock

x

Guibourtia tessmanii

Tree

Essinganx

Irvingia gabonensis

Leguminosae–
Caesalpinoidae
Irvingiaceae

Tree

Ndo’o

x

x

Mangnifera indica
Milicia exelsa

Anacardiaceae
Moraceae

Tree
Tree

Manguier
Abang

x
x

x

Morinda lucida
Newbouldia laevis

Rubiaceae
Bignoniaceae

Tree
Tree

Akeng
Mbicamxx

Persea americana
Phyllanthus amarus

Lauraceae
Euphorbiaceae

Tree
Herb

Avocatier
Incomoxx

Psidium guajava
Rauvolfia vomitoria

Myrtaceae
Apocynaceae

Shrub
Shrub

x

Solanum torvum
Spilanthes filicaulis

Solanaceae
Asteraceae

Herb
Herb

Triumfetta cordifolia
Vernonia amygdalina
Voacanga africana

Malvaceae
Asteraceae
Apocynaceae

Liana
Herb
Shrub

Menzangamenzanga
ItondoOdondongo
ng-si
Atet
Etoam

x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x

Source: Table built on the basis of field data.
3.3.3. Biological type
Overall, of the 42 samples collected and identified, 18 were trees, 17 were herbs, 6 were shrubs, and 1
was a liana species (Figure 1). Specifically, of the 28 species identified as being dedicated to spleen
disease, 13 were trees, 11 were herbs, 3 were shrubs, and 1 was a liana. For malaria, five species weretrees, three were shrubs, and six were herbs.

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ASC-TUFS Working Papers Volume 3 (2023)

Biological type
50

42.8%

40

40.4%

30
20

14.2%

10
0

2.3%
Tree

Herbs

ShrubsLiana

Figure 1. Biological type
Source: Figure built on the basis of field data.
3.4. Sources of therapeutic resources
Overall, the plants used to produce therapeutic recipes for spleen disease and malaria come from homegardens, orchards, fallows, plantations, and forests.
Table 4. Summary of plant collection sites
Sampling location

Number of plants

Home gardens

35.7%

Orchards

16.6%

Fallows

19%

Plantations

31%

Forests

21.4%

Source: Table built on the basis of field data.
Note: n = 42; the total number of samples identified is 42, based on which the percentage of assertions
about each plant harvesting location is calculated.
The majority of our research samples were collected in home gardens and plantations, the fruits ofambient agriculture in the area, which led to the domestication of several therapeutic species. In addition,
demographic pressure has led to the disappearance of forests, with only a few patches scattered in thelocalities bordering Yaoundé. The familiarity of the Ewondo population with these different areas canbe seen in the uses of the medicinal resources found there.
3.5. Access to therapeutic resources
The therapeutic resources used by the Ewondo population to produce remedies against malaria and― 130 ―

Perception and Management of Diseases and Therapeutic Resources among Ewondo Population in Cameroon

spleen disease come from the natural environment. In Cameroon, all forest resources, with the exceptionof communal, community, and private forests; orchards; agricultural plantations; fallow lands;
plantation forests; and pastoral and agroforestry lands, belong to the state following the 1994 forest law.
In terms of customary property rights, each indigenous family has and uses plots of land bequeathed tothe present generation by their ancestors (Socpa 2010). As in most communities in the forest region, theowner of the land is automatically the first to cut down the forest and create fields or build houses in the
Ewondo tradition. Their descendants are the rightful owners of these lands and the vegetation they
contain. They can take plants for therapeutic use without constraint, as can those to whom they grant
freedom of access. Legally, populations exercising their customary rights may use non-timber forest
products (NTFP) in a traditional and non-profit way in neighbouring forests, except for protected species(Article 8 of Law 94/01, Article 35 (3) of Decree 95/531/PM).
For research purposes of the NTFP, Article 4 (1) of order n° 000001/MINRESI/B00/C00/C10/B30
of January 23, 2019, sets the conditions for granting research authorization. It consists of a stamped
application addressed to the Minister of Scientific Research, a curriculum vitae, a photocopy of thepassport or the National Identity Nard (NIC), passport photos (04), a disbursement of the fees for theissuance of the permit, a research protocol, and a statement on honour. Article 8 (2) stipulates that the
duration of the validity of a permit for scientific research purposes in Cameroon is 1 year and renewable.
Article 5 of the ministerial decision succinctly recalls the terms of renewal. The terms of this article
stipulate that the researcher who applies for this renewal must send to the Minister in charge of scientificresearch, in addition to the documents mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article 4, a report of the activities
carried out during the period of validity of his previous research permit for scientific purposes.
In the context of commercial exploitation of NTFP, any person may exploit NTFPs for profit;
however, to do this, it must obtain an agreement with the forestry profession from the forest
administration (Article 35 of Law 94/01, Article 4 (1) of Decree 95/531, and Article 32 (1) of Decree
No. 95/466/PM of July 20, 1995). The agreement is obtained for life, but each year, licensed operators
apply for annual operating permits specifying the quantity to be collected and collection areas for special
products (Article 87 (1) of Decree 95/531/PM). The issuance of this permit is subject to prior paymentof the regeneration tax (10 FCFA 1/kg) depending on the quantity (quota) requested.
4. Discussion and conclusion
To understand the medicinal behaviours of a population, the anthropologist is advised to consider theway in which ordinary people elaborate their conception of illness through their own practice,experience, and the contacts they have with specialists (Kleinman 1980). At the level of disease

Franc of the African Financial Community

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conception, each ethnic group gives a particular name to a pathology in the mother tongue, a designationthat has meaning in the culture of the people concerned (Kum Awah 2005). This is a reality that must
be considered when conducting research on the cultural conception of illness and understanding thetherapeutic behaviours of victims. In the field, the Ewondo population uses several names tocommunicate about spleen disease (ebem koé or snail spleen) and malaria (tsit meki or blood disease).
These names constitute a frame of reference that makes it possible to identify a part of the history ofthese people, the laws of social regulation, and the context of the emergence or management of these
diseases. The disease is first indicative of the sense of the world of a given human society that is at thesymbolic or ideological level meditated by language (Meziane 2003: 66). Indeed, deciphering thesenames gives legibility to food and animals suspected to be the cause of one or the other disease. The
palpable illustrations are notably the relationship they establish between blood and animal infection in
the case of malaria, and spleen disease, which would be the result of eating snails, conversely.
Nevertheless an essential component used in the composition of remedies, at least for spleen disease,this animal protein is not recommended in the community for children, patients, and pregnant andlactating women.
A similar situation has been observed among the Baka and Bakwele of southeast Cameroon, who
believe that the liver of the animal, which is considered (rightly or wrongly) the primary source of spleen
disease by the local population, is also used as a therapeutic agent against the same health problem(Mvetumbo et al. 2020). We are in the register of explanations of medicinal practices highlighted by
François Laplantine (1986) under the term ‘medicine of fellow human beings’. A better understandingof this social reality can provide researchers with new avenues of reflection and directions for raisingawareness or strategically reorienting programs for political decision makers in charge of health. It is
known that certain etiological beliefs formulated by populations show poor knowledge of the real causesof malaria, a reality that is sometimes ignored by those in charge of their health. As a result, they havea negative impact on eradication initiatives, resulting in the persistence of this disease in Cameroon(Nyam 2020). Like spleen disease and malaria, the Ewondo’s idea of a health problem determines their
therapeutic behaviour, leading them to focus when a crisis occurs. Indeed, the determinants of thedecision to act include the perception of a threat to health and belief in the effectiveness of the action to
be taken to reduce this threat (Godin 1991). In addition, according to several researchers, therepresentation of a disease is an essential determinant of health behaviour (Augé and Herzlich 1984,
Fassin 1992).
This work allows us to understand the importance of environmental resources used by the Ewondo
Population to prevent the spread and cure of these two diseases (malaria and spleen disease). Thus, 42plants were identified and collected from home gardens, fallows, orchards, plantations, and forests.
Beyond this community, many plants used against spleen disease have been identified, and their modes― 132 ―

Perception and Management of Diseases and Therapeutic Resources among Ewondo Population in Cameroonof use are known in several communities in Cameroon (Adjanohoun et al. 1996, Brisson 2011), Gabon(UNESCO 2009), and CAR (Jacqueline 1959). With regard to the use of wildlife resources, we recordeda few species mentioned by respondents as being used as ingredients in the production of traditional
remedies for spleen disease and malaria. However, informants mentioned the frog and snail as part of
the arsenal that could be mobilized against spleen disease. The liver of the pound and doe among the
Bakwele, the liver of any edible animal, and the skin and nail of the elephant are used by the Baka ofSoutheast Cameroon to deal with the same disease (Mvetumbo et al. 2020). The use of natural resources,
particularly forests, still occupies a place in the lives of the Ewondo population regardless of the healthproblems they face on a daily basis.
This population lives in an urban setting that, like most large urban areas, faces health andenvironmental challenges. Urbanization is accompanied by a bewildering anthropogenic change inlandscapes, with degradation, replacement, or complete loss of natural ecosystems, including vegetation
cover, soil, and water (Bolon et al. 2019). The consequence is, as the Ewondo population points out, a
reduction occurs in the availability of plant and animal resources that people regularly use to manage
common health problems such as malaria and spleen disease. Yaoundé, which suffers from thedegradation of its landscape, has a strong history with the forest and its resources, which is reflected in
the names of several neighbourhoods that bear the names of animals and the environment (Essono 2016,
Pondi 2012). It is also shown that water bodies (lakes, ponds, etc.) in urban green spaces are breeding
grounds for disease-carrying mosquitoes (Lõhmus et al. 2015). In the political capital of Cameroon,
malaria, which is a result of this state of insalubrity and a major cause of mortality, is taxed by the fringeof our informants as the direct cause of spleen disease and/or its synonym. Efforts must be made tobetter control and resolve the health challenges resulting from human–environment relationship, as theoccurrence of other threats, such as those generated by climate change, would only complicate thesituation.
In this perspective, the concept of ‘nature-based solutions’ (NBS) that is closely related to othernotions, such as sustainability, resilience, ecosystem services, human–environment coupling, and green(blue) infrastructure (Lafortezza et al. 2018), can be a better option. These solutions are likely to produce
additional co-benefits for societal well-being, thus constituting strong investment options for sustainableurban planning (Kabisch et al. 2016). In the city of Yaoundé and its surroundings, the local initiatives
identified are the creation of home gardens, preservation of plants with therapeutic virtues in plantations,and creation of urban gardens by municipal authorities, although much remains to be done in terms ofenlarging the areas. Urban vegetation can improve air quality by removing air pollutants. Open spacesin cities, such as parks, gardens, playgrounds, and cemeteries, are non-impervious spaces that improve
infiltration during extreme precipitation events by providing water regulation functions (Kabisch et al.
2017). It has been shown that people living in urban areas with more green spaces have reduced stress― 133 ―

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levels and higher life satisfaction than those living in areas with little natural environment (White et al.
2013).
In conclusion, this research notes a divergence of views between biomedicine and African traditional
medicine on the nature of spleen disease and its relationship with malaria. On this point, we believe thata healthy collaboration between different health practitioners is likely to promote the demystification (ifnecessary) of certain cultural considerations regarding the aetiology of the disease, improvement of
medical practices, and especially development of innovative health approaches. Whether it is malaria or
spleen disease, this study reveals the strong attachment of the populations to endogenous therapeutic
knowledge. Access to medicinal resources from forests and the natural environment is governed by bothtraditional and institutional norms.

Acknowledgements
Our sincere gratitude goes to all informants from Yaoundé. We are also grateful to the Mellenium
Ecological Museum (MEM) of Cameroon and our family for their support. We would like to express
our gratitude to Dr. Marlène Toukam Ngansop, Mrs. Sarah Ndonko Fomenap, Mr. Forbi Preacious
Funwi, Leonelle Akepta Touyou, and Princesse Dayna Mvetumbo Foh.

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