BSP UNBOUND:

Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

About the CoverThe line diagram is a stylized representation of the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on workplace
activity in the Philippines. It is based on the Google
COVID-19 Community Mobility Report graph thattracked the percentage change in the number ofworkplace visitors in the Philippines from midFebruary to early October relative to the medianvalue between early January 3rd and February 6th2020. The graph shows a sharp drop immediately
after the imposition of a lockdown in Metro Manila
and the rest of Luzon in mid-March, and a gradual if
uneven recovery in the following months. The stark
image brings to mind the International Monetary
Fund (IMF)’s warning that many countries face a“long ascent” as they recover from the worst effectsof the global public health emergency. Illustrationand cover design by Beatrice Anne Belen-Ferrer and
Dennis Q. Catacutan.

BSP Unbound:Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic
in the Philippines
COPYRIGHT © 2020
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINASISBN 978-621-8173-01-9 (Hardbound Edition)
ISBN 978-621-8173-02-6 (PDF Edition)
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be
reproduced in any form, or by any electronic ormechanical means, without permission in writing fromthe Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, except for reviewers
who may quote passages in their reviews.
Published by
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
Mabini cor. P. Ocampo Sts., Malate 1004
Manila, Philippines
Tel: (632) 87087701
https://www.bsp.gov.ph
Technical Advisor : Gov. Benjamin E. Diokno
Project Director: Dep. Gov. Francisco G. Dakila, Jr.

Book Designand Layout: Dennis Q. Catacutan

Editor: Roel R. Landingin

Project
Management
Team
:
		
		
		
		
		
		

Amenah F. Pangandaman
Laura L. Ignacio
Jay Edward D. Amatong
Eloisa T. Glindro
Yvessa A. Lumague
Carmina L. Paner
Diana C. Camacho

Production: Creative Services Group,		 Corporate Affairs OfficePrinted in the Philippines

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Figuresviii

Abbreviationsx

List of Tables

Foreword

Central Banking and the BSP in the Time of
COVID-19

ix

xiii

Governor Benjamin E. Diokno, Ph.D.

Chapter 1

Central Banks and Crises: Keeping a Step
Ahead of Uncertainty

1

On Policymaking During Crises

11

Box Article: Estimating the Impact of Uncertainty on
Philippine Economic Activity

14

Chapter 3

27

Faith Christian Q. Cacnio, John Michael Rennie G. Hallig
and Jade Eric T. Redoblado

39

Eduard Joseph D. Robleza, Charday V. Batac,
Paul Reimon R. Alhambra, Jasmin E. Dacio,
Jan Christopher G. Ocampo, Lara Romina E. Ganapin
and Dennis M. Bautista
Box Article: Views from the Trading Desk
Ma. Mediatriz M. Boelsch, Richard S. Jadulan
and Kashmirr I. Camacho

42

Chapter 5

57

Veronica B. Bayangos, Ryan Louise M. Briones,
Richie L. Suguitan and Darwin M. Lucela
Chapter 6

Hazel C. Parcon-Santos, Cristeta B. Bagsic
and Ferdinand S. Co

Turning Crises into Opportunities:
How Crises Shaped the Reform Agenda in
the Philippines

Leveraging Monetary Tools to Maintain
Macroeconomic Stability

How Philippine Banks are Holding Up Amid
the Pandemic

Nickson J. Cabote, Vic K. Delloro and Laura L. Ignacio
Chapter 2

Chapter 4

Picturing the COVID-19 Pandemic from a
Systemic Lens

67

Johnny Noe E. Ravalo, Ph.D., Fay Nadine R. Barroga,
Eugenio Alfredo E. Gloria and Ma. Karen R. Serrano
Chapter 7

Legislative Initiatives, Milestones and Legal
Basis of Policy Tools Deployed During thePandemic

Atty. Elmore O. Capule, Atty. Kariza Bianca M. Borlagdan
and Atty. Richard Armand C. Angeles

75

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 8

Payments and Settlement Systems: Anchorsof Financial System Resilience and Stability
in the Time of COVID-19

83

Accelerated innovation and digitalization
Archellis A. Villena, Raul A. Andag, and John L Regala

Jay M. Dizon, Anna Marie B. Lagman,
Remedios C. Macapinlac and Marie Joyce C. Elevado
Chapter 9

Continuity of Core Financial Services andCybersecurity Implications

95

Maricris A. Salud, Jovelyn M. Hao,and Cris Benson S. Leuterio
Chapter 10

Financial Digital Rails and Financial Inclusion

107

Chapter 11

117

HR lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic
Jayzle D. Ravelo

118Management systems audit process
in changing times
Maria Rossette R. Martal, Angelito B. Lopera,
Emmie-Lou Siongco-Aquino, Ryan P. Cureg

120

125

BSP’s communication:
Sustained issues management mode
Elisha Garcia-Lirios

127

Chapter 12

131

Forward Planning for Strategic Crisis
Response

Charina B. De Vera-Yap, Rachel B. Barbosa-Salva,
Golda P. Cainglet, Leana Marie C. Cerrero, Sarah L. Padilla,
Ellen Joyce L. Suficiencia, Rochelle D. Tomas
and Valerie Anne Jill I. Valero

Case Studies in Organizational Support for
Alternative Work Arrangements

121
Overcoming the pandemic: Responses, challenges
and lessons in procurement
Ana Theresa B. del Rosario-Buen, Elvira B. Villanueva, Lord
Eileen A. Sison-Tagle and Cassey E. Ferrer-Palmos

Eloisa T. Glindro, Marites B. Oliva and Lilia V. Elloso
Box Article: Different Types of Unconventional
Monetary Policy Measures

134

Box Article: Central Banks’ Responses to the
COVID-19 Pandemic
Mari-Len R. Macasaquitand Maria Jannie Luiza C. Baluyan

142

Chapter 13

147

The Role of Strategic Policy Coordination
and Communication
Charday V. Batac, Eduard Joseph D. Robleza,
Jasmin E. Dacio, Lara Romina E. Ganapin
and Dennis M. Bautista
Chapter 14

Conclusion: Central Banking in the New
Normal159

Deputy Governor Francisco G. Dakila, Jr., Ph.D.

Afterword

171

viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1. Frequency and Types ofDisasters (1970-2019)

5

Figure 1.3. Daily Confirmed COVID-19
Cases and Deaths (log), World

6

Figure 1.2. Frequency of Disasters (19702019)

5

Figure 2.1. Uncertainty as Measured by
WUI, GEPU and VIX (2000-2020)

12

Figure 2.3. Cumulative Output Loss Due tothe Great Lockdown

13

Figure 2.2. 1997 Asian Financial Crisis vs.
2008 Global Financial Crisis

13

Figure 2.4. International Monetary Fund
Growth Projections

14

Figure 2.6. Impulse Response ofConsumption, Exports, and Investments toUncertainty Shock16

Figure 2.5. Correlation Between Uncertainty
and Consumption, Exports and Investments

15

Figure 2.7. Historical Decomposition ofConsumption, Exports and Investments

16

Figure 2.9. Emergency Response Measures

18

Figure 2.11. Three-Track Policy

20

Figure 2.8. Correlation Between Uncertainty
and Other Economic Variables

17

Figure 2.10. Philippine Macroeconomic
Snapshot, 1991 - 1H 2020

19

Figure 3.1. Natural Calamities and Headline
Inflation in the Philippines, 1985-2020
Figure 3.2. Natural Calamities and CBP-BSP
Overnight RRP Rates, 1985-2020

38
38

Figure 4.1. Timeline of the BSP’s Monetary
Responses, February to August 2020

41

Figure 4.3. Impact of Policy Rate Easingon Major Macroeconomic Variables (BSP
MEM)

47

Figure 4.5. Impact of RRR Reduction on
Macroeconomic Variables (BSP MEM)

49

Figure 4.2. Impact of Policy Rate Easing on
Market Interest Rates (BSP MEM)

46

Figure 4.4. Impact of Policy Rate Easing on
Macroeconomic Variables (BSP PAMPh)

48

Figure 4.6. Total Macroeconomic Impact of
Policy Rate and RR Ratio Adjustments (BSP
MEM)

50

Figure 4.8. Secondary Government
Securities Market Yields, January to July
2020

52

Figure 5.1. Number of Prudential andRegulatory Relief Measures Issued by
Financial Regulators to Address COVID-19
Pandemic Across Asian Economies, MarchJuly 2020

61

Figure 4.7. Bid-to-Cover Ratios in thePrimary Government Securities Market,
January to May 2020

51

Figure 5.2. Organizing Enhanced Risk
Assessment

62

Figure 5.4. Solvency Metrics (CAR,
Common Equity Tier1, Risk-Weighted
Assets) December 2015-March 2020

65

Figure 5.3. Total Loan Portfolio and
Deposits of the Banking System

63

Figure 6.1. COVID-19 and Potential
Spillovers into the Financial System

72

Figure 6.3. COVID-19 and Potential
Spillovers into the Financial System

72

Figure 6.2. The 4Cs Structure of the
Financial System

72

Figure 6.4. Economic Activities and FirmLevel Networks

73

Figure 6.5. Systemic Risk Crisis
Management Framework

73

Figure 8.1.The Philippine Payment andSettlement System (PhilPaSS)

84

Figure 8.3.Comparative Value and Volume
of PESONet and InstaPay Settlements for
45 Days Before and After the Impositionof ECQ

90

Figure 8.5. Reported Declines in theVolume of Domestic Remittances

92

Figure 8.2. Comparative Value andVolume of ATM Withdrawals and Check
Transactions for 45 Days Before and Afterthe Imposition of the ECQ in Luzon

89

Figure 8.4. Comparative Value and Volume
of PESONet and InstaPay settlements forQ1 and Q2 2020

90

Figure 8.6. Reported Declines in theVolume of International Remittances

92

Figure 9.1. Summary of Banks with
Authority to Provide EPFS

96

Figure 9.2. Purely Digital Accounts Opened
During ECQ Period

97

ix

LIST OF TABLES
Figure 9.3. State of Digital Transformationof Banks vs. EMIs/VCEs
Figure 9.4. Digital Financial Services ofBanks vs. EMIs/VCEs

Figure 9.5. Phishing Emails and Malicious
Websites, 1 January to 31 May 2020

Figure 9.6. Creation of High-risk Domains
with COVID-19 and Financial Theme

98
98
99
99

Figure 9.7. COVID-19 Infographic on Top
Threats and BSFIs Cybersecurity Controls

100

Figure 9.9. Changes in Strategic Direction

102

Figure 9.8. Sample Infographic Advisories
on Cybersecurity Issues

101

Figure 9.10. Menu of COVID-19 Supervisory 105
and Policy Responses Deployed by the BSP
Figure 12.1. Global Sectoral Debt

Figure 12.2. Reserve Adequacy in Selected
EMEs
Figure 12.3. Comparative UMP Measures
During the GFC and COVID-19 Pandemic

133
133
135

Figure 12.4. UMPs During the Global
Financial Crisis

135

Figure 12.6. Proportion of Years When r-g< 0 in Selected Asian Economies

137

Figure12.5. UMPs During the COVID-19
Pandemic

135

Figure 12.7. Government Debt-to-GDP
Ratio in Selected Asian Economies

138

Figure 12.8. Primary Balance-to-GDP Ratioin Selected Asian Economies
Figure 12.9. Institutions, Agreements andSize of the Global Safety Nets from 1944
to 2018

139
140

Figure 12.10. Central Banks’ Cumulative
Rate Cut and Benchmark Policy Rates,
January to June 2020

142

Figure 12.11. Summary of Regulatory
Forbearance Measures, January to June
2020

144

Figure 13.1. Selected BSP Social Media
Cards on Continuing Banking Services

149

Figure 13.2. Selected BSP Social MediaCampaigns to Promote E-Banking Services

150

Figure 13.3. Bloomberg Survey ofProfessional Forecasters on Philippine
Inflation and GDP Growth153

Figure 13.5. Google Mobility Indicators for
the Philippines, February-August 2020

155

Figure 13.4. Global Growth Forecasts

Figure 14.1. CBOE Volatility Index (VIX)

Figure 14.2. Change in Visits to Workplaceand Length of Stay at Home

154

161
162

Figure 14.3. Covid-19 Government
Response Stringency Index

163

Figure 14.5. Philippine Stock Exchange
Index (PSEi)

164

Figure 14.7. EMBI + Philippine Spread

164

Figure 14.4. Real GDP of Selected AsianCountries

163

Figure 14.6. Philippine 10-Year Bond Yields

164

Figure 14.8. Peso per US Dollar

165

Figure 14.9. Asian Currencies vs. the US
Dollar, as of 30 June 2020

Figure 14.10. FX Volatility of the ASEAN-4
Figure 14.11. Equities Volatility of theASEAN-4

165
166
166

Table 2.1. Variance Decomposition ofConsumption, Exports and Investments

15

Table 2.2. Philippine OF Cash Remittances and Labor Force Trends in Crisis
Periods

19

Table 3.1. BSP Initiatives During the
COVID-19 Pandemic

32

Table 7.1. Fiscal Incentives

80

Table 8.1 Transactions in PhilPaSS

85

Table 11.1. NEA Survey Major Issues

126

Table 12.1. Global Financial Safety Net
by Institution

141

Table 14.1. Analysis of Variance Pre- andPost-BSP Asset Purchases

167

x

ABBREVIATIONS
4Ps - Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program

BSOS - Banking Sector Outlook Survey

DGS - Department of General Services

Ab - Antibody

BSP - Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

DIC - Data and Information Classification

ACH - Automated Clearing House

BTCA - Better Than Cash Alliance

DOF - Department of Finance

ACPC - Agricultural Credit Policy Council

BTr - Bureau of the Treasury

DOH - Department of Health

AE - Advanced Economy

BYOD - Bring Your Own Device

DOLE - Department of Labor and Employment

AFC - Asian Financial Crisis

CAM - Consumer Assistance Mechanism

DOT - Department of Tourism

AFCS - Automated Fare Collection System

CAMS - Consumer Assistance Management System

DOTr - Department of Transportation

AGFP - Agricultural Guarantee Fund Pool

CAR - Capital Adequacy Ratio

DSSI - Debt Service Suspension Initiative

AIIB - Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

CBP - Central Bank of the Philippines

DST - Documentary Stamp Tax

AKAP Program - Abot-Kamay ang Pagtulong Program

CCAP - Credit Card Association of the Philippines

DSWD - Department of Social Welfare and Development

ANOVA - Analysis of Variance

CCB - Capital Conservation Buffer

DTI - Department of Trade and Industry

APoP - Authority and Proof of Purchase

CCyB - Countercyclical Capital Buffer

EBIT - Earnings Before Interest and Taxes

APPEND - Alliance of Philippine Partners for Enterprise
Development, Inc.

CDS - Credit Default Swap

ECL - Expected Credit Loss

CEG - Consumer Empowerment Group

ECLAC - Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean

ARISE Act - Accelerated Recovery and Investments Stimulus for
the Economy of the Philippines Act

CFM - Capital Flows Measures

ARISE, Inc. - Accelerating Recovery to Intensify Solidarity andEquity, Inc.

CFP - Contingency Funding PlanASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CIO - Chief Information Officer

ASF - African Swine Flu
ATM - Automated Teller Machine
AVCF - Agriculture Value Chain Financing
BAC - Bids and Awards Committee
BAP - Bankers Association of the Philippines
BCP - Business Continuity Plan
BDA - Basic Deposit AccountBIS - Bank for International Settlements
BLU - Branch-Lite Unit
BOP - Balance of Payments
bp - Basis Point
BPO - Business Process Outsourcing
BSFI - BSP-Supervised Financial Institutions

CICO - Cash-In and Cash-Out
CLIA - Center for Learning and Inclusion Advocacy
CO - Communication Office
COVID-19 - Coronavirus Disease 2019
CRD - Credit Risk Database
CSF - Credit Surety Fund
CSS - Corporate Services Sector
D-SIB - Domestic Systematically Important Banks
DA - Department of Agriculture
DBCC - Development Budget Coordination Committee
DBP - Development Bank of the Philippines
DDA - Demand Deposit Account
DepEd - Department of Education
DFS - Digital Financial Services

ECQ - Enhanced Community Quarantine
EDYRF - Exporters Dollar and Yen Rediscount Facility
EFLC - Economic and Financial Learning Center
EM-DAT - The Emergency Events Database
EMBI - Emerging Market Bond Index
EME - Emerging Market Economies
EMEAP - Executives’ Meeting of Asia-Pacific Central Banks
EMI - Electronic Money Issuer
EPFS - Electronic Payment and Financial Services
EPU - Economy, Policy and Uncertainty
EWI - Early Warning Indicators
FCL - Flexible Credit LineFCP - Financial Consumer Protection
Fed - Federal Reserve
FI - Financial Institution
FIA - Foreign Investment Act
FIST - Financial Institutions Strategic Transfer
FISTC - Financial Institutions Strategic Transfer Corporations
FMED - Facilities Management and Engineering Department

xi

ABBREVIATIONSFMI - Financial Market Infrastructure

IDA - International Development Association

MS - Management Systems

FMOSS - Financial Market Operations Sub-Sector

IFI - International Financial Institution

MSME - Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises

FSCC - Financial Stability Coordination Council

IMF - International Monetary Fund

NBFI - Non-Bank Financial Institution

FSPC - Financial Stability Policy Committee

IMT - Incident Management TeamNBQB - Non-Bank with Quasi Banking Functions

FSS - Financial Supervision Sector

IQA - Independent Quality Assessment

NDF - Non-Deliverable Forward

FX - Foreign Exchange

IRC - Interest Rate Corridor

FXI - Foreign Exchange Intervention

IRO - Investor Relations Office

NDRRMC - National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
Council

GCQ - General Community Quarantine

IRR - Implementing Rules and Regulations

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

ISSP - Information Systems Strategic PlanGEPU - Global Economic Policy Uncertainty

IT - Information Technology

GFC - Global Financial Crisis

ITO - Information Technology Office

GFI - Government Financial Institutions

ITSG - IT Security GroupGFSN - Global Financial Safety Net

JICA - Japan International Cooperation Agency

GHS Index - Global Health Security Index

KYC - Know Your Customer

GNI - Gross National Income

LBP - Land Bank of the Philippines

GOCC - Government-Owned and Controlled Corporation

LCR - Liquidity Coverage Ratio

GPM - Global Protection Model

LDC - Least Developed Countries

GPPB - Government Procurement Policy Board

LGU - Local Government Unit

GS - Government Securities

LTNCD - Long-Term Negotiable Certificate of Deposit

GSIS - Government Service Insurance System

MB - Monetary Board

GUIDE Bill - GFIs Unified Initiatives to Distressed Enterprises for
Economic Recovery BillMCPI - Microfinance Council of the Philippines, Inc.

HoPE - Head of Procuring Entity
HQLA - High-Quality Liquid Assets
HR - Human Resource
HWD - Health and Wellness Department
I-O - Input-Output
IATF-EID - Inter-Agency Task Force for the Management ofEmerging Infectious Diseases

MDB - Multilateral Development BankMECQ - Modified Enhanced Community Quarantine
MEM - Multi-Equation Model
MERS - Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
MFA - Multi-Factor Authentication
MFI - Microfinance Institution
MGCQ - Modified General Community Quarantine

IATF-TWG-AFP - Inter-Agency Task Force Technical Working
Group for Anticipatory and Forward Planning

MLR - Minimum Liquidity Ratio

IBCL - Interbank Call Loan

MOS - Monetary Operations Systems

ICT - Information and Communication Technology

MM - Money Multiplier
MPM - Macroprudential Measure

NEA - New Economy Arrangement
NEDA - National Economic and Development Authority
NG - National Government
NIRP - Negative Interest Rate Policy
NLEX - North Luzon Expressway
NNA - New Normal Arrangements
NPA - Non-Performing Assets
NRoSS - National Registry of Scripless Securities
NRPS - National Retail Payment System
NSFR - Net Stable Funding Ratio
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment
OF - Overseas Filipino
OFW - Overseas Filipino Worker
OMO - Open Market Operations
OPS - Operators of Payment Systems
OSRM - Office of Systemic Risk Management
OTC - Over-The-Counter
P2M - Person-to-MerchantP2P - Person-to-Person
Pag-IBIG Fund - Home Development Mutual Fund
PAMPh - Policy Analysis Model for the Philippines
PDEx - Philippine Dealing & Exchange Corp.
PESONet - Philippine Electronic Fund Transfer System andOperations Network
PFRS - Philippine Financial Reporting Standards

xii

ABBREVIATIONS
PH-PROGRESO - Philippine Program for Recovery with Equity
and Solidarity
PhilGuarantee - Philippine Guarantee Corporation
PhilPaSS - Philippine Payment and Settlement System
PhilSys - Philippine Identification System
PIPS - Prominently Important Payment System
PMI - Purchasing Manager’s Index
PPE - Personal Protective Equipment
PPMI - Philippine Payments Management, Inc.
PPSA - Personal Property Security Act
ppt - Percentage Point
PR - Purchase Requisition
PRC - Philippine Red Cross
PrO - Procurement Office
PSA - Philippine Statistics Authority
PSEi - Philippine Stock Exchange Index
PSO - Payments and Settlements Office
PSOF - Payment System Oversight Framework
PSP - Payment Service Provider
QE - Quantitative-Easing
QMS - Quality Management System
QR Code - Quick Response CodeRA - Republic Act
RC - Remittance Channel
RCB - Rural and Cooperative Bank
RCO - Risk and Compliance Office
RDP - Remote Desktop Protocol
repo - Repurchase
REST - Real Estate Stress Test

RFA - Regional Financing Arrangement
RR - Reserve Requirement
RRP - Reverse Repurchase
RRR - Reserve Requirement Ratio
RT-PCR - Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction
RTGS - Real-Time Gross Settlement
SAFr - Supervisory Assessment Framework
SAP - Social Amelioration Program
SARS - Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SBCorp - Small Business Corporation
SBL - Single Borrowers Limit
SBWS - Small Business Wage Subsidy
SCBA - Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SCF - Supply Chain Financing
SEC - Securities and Exchange Commission
SIPS - Systematically Important Payment System
SMO - Systems and Methods Office
SOC - Security Operations Center
SPC - Security Plant Complex
SPV - Special Purpose Vehicle
SRCM - Systemic Risk Crisis Management
SSD - Security Services Department
SSS - Social Security System
STG - Sub-Tasks Groups
T-bill - Treasury bill
TB - Thrift BankTDF - Term Deposit Facility
TPPSP - Third-Party Payment Service Provider

TRISD - Technology Risk and Innovation Supervision
Department
TSA - Treasury Single Account
TSP - Third-Party Service Provider
UAE - United Arab Emirates
UBP - Union Bank of the Philippines
UITF - Unit Investment Trust Fund
UK - United Kingdom
UKB - Universal and Commercial Bank
UMP - Unconventional Monetary Policy
UNISDR - United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction
US - United States
VAR - Vector Autoregression
VCE - Virtual Currency Exchange
VIX - Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
VPN - Virtual Private Network
WB - World BankWEO - World Economic Outlook
WFH - Work-From-Home
WHO - World Health Organization
WinPro 10 - Microsoft Windows 10 Professional
WMOR - Weighted Monetary Operations Rate
WUI - World Uncertainty Index
WUI-APAC - World Uncertainty Index for Asia and the PacificYoY - Year-on-YearZLB - Zero-Lower Boundxiii

FOREWORD

Central Banking and the BSP in the Time of COVID-19
Governor Benjamin E. Diokno, Ph.D.
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) is no stranger tocrisis.
The two major crises in recent memory—the Global
Financial Crisis and the Eurozone’s banking-and-sovereigndebt crisis—have changed the complexion of central
banking. It was during these times that we witnessed
experiments of advanced economies with extraordinary
monetary policy measures, whose vestiges remain at theonset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Clearly, disruptions present important lessons in crisis
planning and underline the need for prudence anddisciplined policy making—reforms included. The pace offinancial market reforms was hastened in the aftermath ofthe crises. Foreign exchange reserves were also built up asprotection against external downdrafts.
This is the reality that I was stepping into as BSP Governor.
And as a reformist at my core, I was in comfortable territory.
I was prepared to bring about reform anywhere I am.
However, I would discover that today’s circumstancesdemand we implement reforms in record time and underthe most trying environment.
Almost a year into my tenure as BSP Governor, I was
invited by the President to join him at the North Luzon
Expressway (NLEX) Harbor Link C3-R10 section inspection.
Nobody knew it then, but this would mark one of the earliest milestones of the
COVID-19 pandemic in the Philippines.
On 7 March 2020, the first local transmission of the virus was confirmed. This
was two days after the event where all attendees were advised to self-quarantine
because of exposure to an individual with COVID-19 during the inspection.
But even during quarantine, there was no time to waste.
The BSP immediately went to work as the world was entering a new era with the
COVID-19 pandemic disrupting old ways of doing things. The colossal epidemic
exposed deficiencies in public health systems and crippled real activity aroundthe world, at a time when global politics is in a state of flux.

As economies came to grips with the severity of its impact,
central banks suited up and aggressively unrolled theirpolicy toolkit as defense against systemic collapse. Central
banks were among the first responders—departing fromthe usual gradualist approach.
Central banks implemented deep policy rate cuts, largerthan-normal liquidity injections, expansion of lending
facilities and massive asset purchases that extend to nonfinancial corporate sectors in some jurisdictions. These
were complemented by regulatory relief measures. These
extraordinary measures bought time for the government torescale and redesign its war plan against the pandemic.
There are now significant undercurrents in the central
banking paradigm. Many advanced economies entered the
pandemic with policy rates at the effective lower bound.
Thus, what used to be temporary unconventional measures
have become the primary mechanisms for achieving thecentral banks’ objectives in many advanced economies.
Emerging market economies (EMEs) have implemented
smaller-scale unconventional measures, most of which aretargeted and time-bound. At the same time, policymakers
need to keep a tight balance between steering expectations
towards their preferred policy direction and creating
unnecessary expectations that are difficult to disengage
from in the future.
Like other EMEs, the Philippines was not a mere bystander. We waded throughthe murky pandemic waters more exposed to disruptive amplification offinancial market volatilities. The BSP, in performing its mandates of maintaining
price stability and protecting financial stability and payments systems, moved
swiftly to prevent the initial onslaught of the pandemic from damaging thefinancial system. The duration and breadth of the pandemic required policy
stamina and adroitness in coordinating multiple policies in a cohesive manner.
The COVID-19 crisis cut the deepest since the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998.
Economic activities came to a screeching halt as community quarantines werexiv

enforced. Our robust macroeconomic fundamentals and regulatory buffers,
products of a long history of structural reforms, served us well.
We started our policy rate cut as early as February. When the community
quarantine was imposed on March 17, 2020, nervous market participants
aggressively sold their government securities (GS), leading to a sharp rise in GS
yield and a plunge in daily trading volumes. As tax revenues plummeted, theGS sell-off reduced the availability of immediate funds for the government’s
massive health and social safety net programs.
With the authority allowed by the new BSP Charter, we extended emergency
financing to the national government through a repurchase agreement andopened a daily one-hour window for purchasing GS in the secondary market.
Financial institutions were granted a wide range of regulatory and operationalrelief measures. To encourage lending to micro, small and medium enterprises(MSMEs), we reduced reserve requirements and allowed MSME loans to qualify
as compliance with the required reserve ratio. In August, we eased the realestate loan limit of universal and commercial banks but maintained the soft
limits on real estate risk exposures that banks can demonstrably manage.
As of early September, the BSP has deployed approximately ₱1.3 trillion worthof policy support measures. Our monetary policy tools and regulatory space
are far from exhausted. But they are not limitless. When we deploy our policy
ammunition, our action has always and will remain evidence-based with due
consideration to trade-offs and unintended consequences. We must not deplete
our policy levers even as we endeavor to remain responsive and prompt in ourpolicy actions.
While COVID-19 may have disrupted the progress of current programs, italso quickened the pace of reform implementation. What were previously
medium- to long-term reforms are now front and center in the crisis recovery
plan. These include the modernization of the country’s public health system;
massive upgrading of the information and communications technology (ICT)
infrastructure; modernization of Philippine agriculture and the government’s
supply chain management system; and strengthening our educational and skills
development system to future-proof our workforce.
My goal to shift at least 50 percent of payment transactions into digital form
has also been fast-tracked because of the pandemic. With various quarantine
measures being observed and physical distancing as a norm during thistime, electronic means of payment has been essential. This is evident in
the substantial increase in transactions in PESONet and InstaPay, the two
automated clearing houses (ACHs) formed under the National Retail Payment
System (NRPS).
In performing our sworn duty to the nation, tighter policy coordination whilesafeguarding our independence is necessary. As we battle the crisis at all fronts,

we also face the challenge of communicating our policy actions. There is lessscope for ambiguous narratives. Instead, communication must be prompt, clear,decisive and truthful to avert confidence problems. We have deployed morenuanced communication techniques that are tailored to specific information
requirements of different stakeholders.
At the organizational level, agility in adapting to the abrupt changes is key tosurvival. Suddenly, the future of work has arrived at our doorstep. Our service
delivery routes have been transformed; our traditional systems and processes
have been upended to give way to better and smarter ones.
As we overhaul the infrastructure facility that supports the rapidly evolving
systems and processes, human resources remain the cornerstone of our identity.
Our people shape the direction of organizational reforms that the BSP iscurrently pursuing. The same principle applies to our efforts in enhancing thedigitalization of financial services for the common Filipinos.
Optimism, caution and disciplined action define our character as an institution.
We will endeavor to ensure that our monetary policy framework and policy
agenda remain relevant and agile as we steer through the pandemic. We remain
steadfast in pursuing continuity, preserving our credibility and undertaking
well-considered reforms as we carry out our mandates of price stability,
financial stability and efficient payments and settlements system.
This encapsulates the theme that resonates in the articles written by BSP staff.
This book chronicles our early journey in pandemic response, the lessons wecontinuously learn and unlearn, and the challenges we face after the threat ofthe pandemic has receded.
But we cannot squander the wave of reform momentum that has been
painstakingly built over several decades. We must ride it to usher in the new
economy and put the COVID-19 crisis—much like the crises that came before
it—behind us.
In any case, the BSP remains a vanguard of firmness and maturity of policies insupport of sustainable and inclusive economic growth, not just for the present
but the future.

2

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

we don’t know when or from where the next crisis will come,but it will surely come.
— a popular aphorism on the Great Financial Crisis(McKenzie and Tasky, 2020)

1. Introduction
Crises are inevitable—the only certainty, in fact—but pronouncements on theirnature, breadth or timeline require some form of divination. How then does one
prepare for what one does not know? Wisdom and experience suggest that thebest response to uncertainty is readiness and resilience—the two pillars on whichcentral banks’ crisis frameworks are built.
The financial system is the lifeblood of the economy—providing the means
to make payments for the exchange of goods and services; managing savingsand providing households and firms with funds for investments; and assessing
and managing financial risks. A stable financial system is critical for economic
growth—it allows for a functioning economy even when macroeconomic
conditions are less than ideal. One of the fundamental tasks of central banks is tomaintain and promote the stability of the financial system.

2. Safeguarding the financial system: Central banks’ crisis
management frameworks
The financial system, through the financial markets, financial institutions andprocesses, enables transactions necessary for the economy to function. An
essential task of financial authorities, particularly the central bank, is to maintainthe confidence of the public—households and businesses—in the financial
system. This is critical in a crisis—a loss of trust may result in large withdrawals
and asset sales that compel central banks to increase liquidity to keep thefinancial system working.
It, therefore, falls upon the central bank to assure the public by sustaining thestability and building the resilience of the financial system. Resilience does not*

Nickson J. Cabote (Bank Officer V), Vic K. Delloro (Bank Officer V) and Laura L. Ignacio(Director) are from the Center for Monetary and Financial Policy.

only mean adequate capital and sufficient liquidity. It also entails operational
flexibility or the ability of financial institutions, financial market infrastructure1 andthe financial system as a whole “to prevent, adapt and respond to, recover andlearn from, operational disruption” (BoE, 2018).
Central banks must develop crisis management frameworks and business
continuity management plans (McKenzie and Tasky, 2020). A crisis management
framework includes the identification, mitigation, reporting and monitoring ofboth financial and non-financial risks. A business continuity management plan,on the other hand, lists measures to ensure the continuation of critical operations
and the safeguard of employees during crises. While central banks carry out theirown business continuity management plans in the midst of a crisis, they must also
make sure that supervised financial institutions are properly implementing theirs.
Preparing for a crisis is not that simple, though. For one, a crisis is a lowprobability event. Management may be reluctant to plan and spend resources
for a far-fetched event (Crandall et al., 2010) but should realize that a crisis witha low probability can be highly damaging. Moreover, plans do not always leadto the expected outcomes, especially in the financial markets where market
players may be irrational and “markets are… prone to excesses, manipulations andfickleness”(Yunus, 2015). Crisis management frameworks must have the flexibility
to respond to a range of conditions.
Communication is an essential component of any crisis management framework
by facilitating coordination and collaboration. In particular, it clarifies authorities’
actions and policies to the public and market participants.
1

A multilateral system, among participating institutions, including the operator of the system, used for the
purposes of clearing, settling, or recording payments, securities, derivatives, or other financial transactions.

Central Banks and Crises: Keeping a Step Ahead of Uncertainty

Finally, crisis management frameworks recognize that responses vary dependingon the type of crisis. Financial systems are occasionally hit by crises of financial
origins such as the Asian Financial Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis. For
financial crises, market surveillance plays a vital role. At other times, financial
systems are struck by non-financial events such as natural disasters andpandemics. Crises have space and time dimensions (Crandall, et al., 2010). The
impacts of a crisis may be limited within a locality or affect a wider region, an
entire country, or even spread globally. Moreover, a crisis goes through stages ora life cycle—birth, an acute phase, which is the crisis, and an aftermath (Crandall
et al., 2010).

3. Crises of financial origins
3.1 Main factors driving financial crises
Financial crises can come from weaknesses in the private or public sectors’balance sheets, and their origins can be domestic or external. Notwithstanding its
roots, a financial crisis is a combination of events. They include sizeable changes
in credit volume and asset prices, stark interruptions in financial intermediation,
especially a decrease in the supply of external financing, and massive balancesheet problems. Often, they require significant government and international
support (Claessens and Kose, 2013b).
While there are many factors influencing crises, they often occur after asset andcredit booms. Indeed, busts, financial crises and weak growth go along withsuch expansions. Because of these types of associations, many researchers
have written theoretical and empirical studies to explain the reasons for sharpchanges in asset and credit markets (Brunnermeier, 2001 and Evanoff, Kaufman,
and Malliaris, 2012 both cited in Claessens and Kose, 2013b ). These studies
distinguished among some proximate causes, such as financial liberalization,ineffective regulation and supervision, and inadequate interventions. However,many questions remain unanswered such as the factors that drive asset-pricebubbles (Claessens and Kose, 2013b).
3.2 Major types of financial crises
Although there are issues with dating, financial crises are quite common andlikely cluster over time. They affect small and large countries as well as poor andrich ones. While there are many common causes, some authors have identified

3

specific theoretical factors and empirical determinants of each type of crisis(Goldstein and Razin, 2013). Claessens and Kose (2013a) classified crises into fourgroups, namely:•

Currency crises. A currency crisis consists of a speculative attack on thecurrency, which leads to a devaluation (or sharp depreciation). It can also
compel authorities to defend the currency by drawing on its international
reserves, or suddenly increase interest rates, or impose capital controls.

•

Sudden stops (in capital flows). A capital account or balance of payments
crisis usually occurs when there is a sudden stop in capital inflows—a massive(and unexpected) decline in international capital inflows or a sharp reversal
in aggregate capital flows to a country.

•

Debt crises. A country can experience a foreign debt crisis, either sovereign
or private (or both), when it is unable to pay its external obligations. It canexperience a domestic public debt crisis when it does not honor its domestic
fiscal commitments in real terms. It can either default explicitly, or inflate ordebase its currency, or resort to financial repression.

•

Banking crises. In a systemic banking crisis, bank runs (actual or potential)
and failures can cause banks to stop honoring their liabilities or require
government intervention to prevent this by extending liquidity and capitalassistance on a massive scale.

Transforming the predictions of theories into empirical applications remains a key
challenge. Unlike currency crises and sudden stops, which can be identified using
quantitative methods, the determination of debt and banking crises still relies on
qualitative and judgmental decisions. Hence, the literature used a wide range oftechniques in identifying and classifying crises (Claessens and Kose, 2013b).
Regardless of the classification employed, different types of crises often overlap.
Many banking crises, for instance, are also linked to sudden stops and currency
crises. The intersection of various types of crises creates additional challenges
in identifying crises and assessing their underlying causes. Since banking andsovereign crises often overlap, it is hard to ascertain whether a banking crisis
results in a sovereign crisis or vice versa (Claessens and Kose, 2013b).

4

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

3.3 Real and financial sector implications
Claessens and Kose (2013b) pointed out that crises have severe implications
on the real and financial sectors and share commonalities across various
types. Many crises exhibit recessions with significant output losses. Also, othermacroeconomic variables usually record sizeable drops. Although there arevariations concerning duration and severity, financial variables, such as asset
prices and credit, often have the same quantitative patterns across crises. Asidefrom their negative short-run effects, financial crises usually have adverse
medium- to long-run effects on activity.
Benigno et al. (2020) estimated a new model of the business cycle and focusedon sudden stop crises. Utilizing Mexican data to analyze the duration of sudden
stops, they reported substantial heterogeneity in crisis duration. They foundthat while the average conditional crisis duration is five consecutive quarters,some episodes lasted more than 20 quarters. They found evidence that for crises
magnified by borrowing constraints, economic recovery may occur, albeit asluggish one.
Chen et al. (2018) looked at a sample of 180 countries, which included advanced,
emerging markets, and low-income developing nations, to quantify the
reduction in economic activity ten years after the global financial crisis. The
authors found that advanced economies and commodity-exporting low-income
developing countries were hit harder compared to others. About 85 percent of
the economies that experienced a banking crisis in 2007-2008 are still producing
output below pre-crisis trends. They concluded that beyond the well-documented
adverse effects on growth, the global financial crisis has long-term consequences,including a steeper decline in fertility rates in many economies and the decline in
net migration rates among advanced economies.
3.4 Are financial crises demand or supply shocks?
Benguria and Taylor (2020) attempted to answer the fundamental
macroeconomic question of whether financial crises are negative demandor supply shocks. They built a simple open economy model of deleveraging

shocks to households and firms (i.e., demand and supply shocks). They set up
the model so that the behavior of the economy in response to shocks to firms
or households would be different. On the one hand, firm deleveraging shocks
reduce exports, keep imports largely the same and appreciate the real exchange
rate. On the other hand, household deleveraging shocks tend to reduce imports,
keep exports largely unchanged and depreciate the real exchange rate. Theirstudy covered 195 crisis episodes, consisting of 77 in advanced countries and 118
in developing countries. Of the crises studied, 108 occurred after World War II
and 87 happened before.
Benguria and Taylor (2020) found statistical evidence strongly in favor of thedemand-side view. Their results are robust even after controlling for other typesof crises, such as currency and inflation crises, stock market crises, external anddomestic sovereign debt crises, and sudden stop episodes. In summary, theirfindings clearly point that financial crises are negative shocks to demand.

4. Financial markets hit by acts of nature
4.1 Natural disasters and their impact on the people and the economy
Natural disasters2 have become more frequent, deadly and costly in recent years(UNISDR, 2011). Disaster frequency has doubled every ten years since 1900
(Djalante and Thomalla, 2012). The same can be seen from the International
Disaster Database (EM-DAT)3 —the number of reported natural disasters trended
upwards between 1970 through 2019 (Figure 1.1). In terms of geographicallocation, Asia records the highest number of natural disasters for the period. The
most frequent natural hazards are flooding and storms affecting most of theworld’s population and resulting in the costliest damages.

2

A natural disaster occurs when a natural hazard interacts with a population, causing harm to people, property
damage and social environmental disruption (Xu et al., 2016). Natural hazards generally occur following
meteorological events (such as hurricanes and floods) or geological events (such as earthquakes and landslides).
They may happen rapidly and without warning. Moreover, they may progress slowly, over the span of days,
weeks, months or even years (Noy and duPont, 2016).

3

EM-DAT defines a disaster as “a natural situation or event that overwhelms local capacity and/or necessitatesa request for external assistance. For a disaster to be entered into the EM-DAT database, at least one of thefollowing criteria must be met: (1) 10 or more people are reported killed; (2) 100 people are reported affected; (3)a state of emergency is declared; or (4) a call for international assistance is issued.” (Cavallo, et al., 2010)

Central Banks and Crises: Keeping a Step Ahead of Uncertainty

Source: International Disaster Database (EM-DAT)Natural disasters affect people, communities and economies, both directly
and indirectly. The direct costs of disasters are primarily the loss of life and thecorresponding morbidities (illnesses and injuries) inflicted on the devastatedpopulation. Economies also suffer in terms of damages to fixed assets and capital,
raw materials and extractable natural resources. (Pelling et al., 2002; ECLAC, 2003).
The direct costs4 of natural disasters have also increased sharply since the 1970s.
For the period 1970-1979, annual damages due to natural disasters averaged
only US$5.4 billion. These ballooned to an average yearly loss of US$168.9 billion
for 2010-2019 (EM-DAT, 2020).
The indirect costs of natural disasters pertain to the loss of economic activity
and the foregone production of goods and services. The shortfall in production
stems from the damages to physical infrastructure. These indirect damages also
include the added costs of employing alternative and possibly inferior meansof production and distribution to keep the economy afloat and continuously
supply the demand for goods and services (Cavallo and Noy, 2009). Also, postdisaster recovery efforts could crowd-out other productive expenditures such
4

The direct costs of a disaster cover only direct damages such as the destruction of infrastructure, crops andhousing.

5

Source: International Disaster Database (EM-DAT)

as education, health and infrastructure, which may have severe implications forlong-term economic development.
At the household level, reduced economic activity translates to unemployment
and, subsequently, loss of income. In the Philippines, Dacuycuy (2016) observed
Filipino families shifting to cheaper food and non-food items in times of severe
weather disturbances, conditional on the needs of vulnerable household
members (e.g., the children and the elderly).
The indirect impact of disasters is far from negligible as it often constitutes a
substantial portion of a disaster’s total damages (Pelling et al., 2002; Tierney,1997). The aggregate loss to households and firms is reflected by the overall
contraction of economic activity measured by the GDP. Severe disasters could
significantly drag down annual GDP growth; this was the case for Developing Asia
(Dagli and Ferrarini, 2019).
Natural hazards could also endanger the government’s fiscal position becauseof higher reconstruction spending and lower tax revenue in light of economic

6

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

disruptions. This could lead to higher government debt both for national andsubnational levels of government (Koetsier, 2017 and Chen, 2019). Consequently,
severe disasters may also set back both bilateral and multilateral trade among
affected territories and their trading partners as adverse shocks also spread throughthe production networks or supply chains (Sheffi and Rice, 2005; Gassebner et al.,2010; Oh and Reuveny, 2010; Felbermayr and Groschl, 2013).
Resilience from natural disasters is noted to be closely determined by the country’slevel of development. Wealthier nations suffer fewer natural hazards-related deaths.
In particular, democracies and countries with strong institutions recorded lower
disaster-related mortality (Kahn, 2005). On the other hand, poorer countries andisland nations are found to suffer more deaths (UNISDR, 2011). Moreover, lessdeveloped countries are also found to be less resilient from disasters over thelong term (Noy and duPont, 2016). Thus, the following country characteristics areassociated with disaster resilience: high income, strong institutions, high literacy, ahigh degree of openness to trade, more developed financial systems, high level ofgovernment spending and sound disaster risk reduction and management policy(Toya and Skidmore, 2007; Noy, 2009).

Pandemics are widespread outbreaks of infectious diseases, which could lead tointensified morbidity and mortality over large areas. They have been noted tocause significant economic, social and political disruption (Madhav et al., 2017).
Pandemics have become pervasive in recent decades owing to heightened global
travel and integration, rapid urbanization, shifting land use and increased misuseof the natural environment (Jones et al., 2008; Morse, 1995). There are several
pandemics recorded in history, with the COVID-19 pandemic as the most recent.
It began in China and quickly spread around the world in just a matter of months(Figure 1.3).6

From the standpoint of central banking, there is growing recognition amongmonetary authorities, financial regulators and bank supervisors that the severe andshifting weather patterns have increasingly become a source of downside risks to
the financial system’s health (Bolton et al., 2020). In the Philippines, Bayangos et al.
(2020) highlighted the deterioration of deposits, loan growth and quality, along withlower profitability of banks, albeit short-lived, following extreme weather episodes.
4.2 Pandemics and the economy
Humankind has long been plagued by various transmissible diseases in the form of
epidemics. The continent of Africa recorded the highest number of epidemics from1970 to 2019. There is also a considerable number of disease outbreaks documented
in Asia and Latin America (EM-DAT, 2020). Modern health care systems were able toeradicate some of these life-threatening infections (e.g., smallpox). However, world
governments and international health organizations, to this day, continue the work
to combat epidemic-causing diseases such as malaria, influenza, tuberculosis, HIVAIDS, Ebola virus disease, and now COVID-19.5
5

COVID-19 is an infectious disease due to the recently discovered coronavirus. This new virus and infection were
unknown before the outbreak began in Wuhan, China last December 2019. The World Health Organization declared
COVID-19 as pandemic, affecting many countries globally, on March 12, 2020.

Source: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) (Roser et al.,2020)

6

Epidemics do not automatically evolve into pandemics, and the transition is not necessarily fast or
straightforward. In the case of HIV-AIDS, the disease was considered an epidemic in West Africa for several
decades before it was categorized as a pandemic in the late 20th century. With advancements in modern
medicine, HIV-AIDS is now considered endemic, characterized by a controlled rate of infection and predictable
infections among specific populations (Grennan, 2019).

Central Banks and Crises: Keeping a Step Ahead of Uncertainty

As of 27 July 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has already recorded 16 million
infections across 216 countries and territories globally. In addition, about 645
thousand people are reported to have died from the disease. This brings the
COVID-19’s mortality rate to 4 percent, slightly higher than the Spanish flu.7
Epidemics, especially pandemics, can have sizable economic impacts in both theshort and long term, mainly on account of population health being an important
determinant of a nation’s wealth and income (Bloom and Canning, 2013).
They are noted to affect a country’s economy through various channels. These
include disruptions in the health, transportation, agricultural and tourism sectors(European Parliament, 2020). A substantial disease outbreak can overwhelm
a country’s health system, constraining its ability to deal with routine healthissues, thus compounding the challenges to public health. Beyond shocks to
the health sector, epidemics can reduce employment as well as productivity.
Physical distancing measures may be required to rein in infection, which entails
the shutdown of schools, enterprises, commercial establishments, transportationand public services. These then results to the disruption of economic and othersocially important activities (Bloom et al., 2018).
Subsequently, trade with other countries could also be jeopardized as thehighly interconnected global economy could hasten disease transmission
via international supply chains. Along with rapid urbanization, increasing
international travel and climate change make epidemics a global concern(European Parliament, 2020).
Before the COVID-19 outbreak, analysts have already projected the costsof pandemics to be sizable. Fan et al. (2018) estimated the yearly cost of an
influenza pandemic to reach around US$500 billion in lost income and cost ofmortality. Further, Bloom et al. (2018) noted that these economic consequences
could potentially worsen despite the limited deterioration of health indicators.
7

Prior to COVID-19, the deadliest pandemic recorded was the Spanish flu of 1918. The virus affected around onethird of the world’s population at that time and was responsible for about 20-50 million deaths—the mortality
rate was estimated to be 1-3 percent. The H1N1 swine flu pandemic of 2009-2010 infected 700 million-1.4 billion
people. Thus, the H1N1 infection rate considerably exceeds that of the Spanish flu in absolute terms; however, it
recorded a lower mortality rate at 0.01-0.08 percent (Dawood et al., 2012).

7

This was seen in Liberia, which registered a contraction of 8 percentage points
in GDP for 2013-2014 following the Ebola outbreak in West Africa despite fallingmortality rates during the period.
Nonetheless, the current COVID-19 pandemic underscores the adverse impactsof pandemics on national and the global economy more than ever. Similar tonatural disasters, pandemics affect the real sector and productivity losses are
instantaneous. However, while natural disasters are typically considered one-off
shocks to economic activity, the impacts of pandemics are more protracted.
The current health crisis is an exogenous shock that took governments
by surprise. They found themselves confronted by tradeoffs between theimplementation of containment measures needed to slow down the COVID-19
infection vis-à-vis the economic losses brought by the massive lockdowns andfirm closures. The COVID-19 pandemic simultaneously disrupts supply, demandand productivity. Moreover, it happened almost simultaneously across countries.
As of date, the health, social and economic consequences are devastating, andrepercussions are feared to persist for a long time, potentially dwarfing the lossesof other cataclysmic events in the past four decades (Ludvigson et al., 2020).
To date, countries around the world continue to face uncertainties on when
economic recovery could start and the trajectory this will take.

5. Summary and conclusion
Crises will inevitably occur, which would affect the functioning of the financial
system, and subsequently, the economy. Central banks are tasked with putting inplace crisis management frameworks and business continuity management plans
to sustain the stability and build the resilience of the financial system.
Communication is essential to a crisis management framework to facilitate
coordination and collaboration. Also, crisis management frameworks must havethe flexibility to respond to a range of conditions as well as to have appropriate
responses to different types of crises.

8

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

In general, financial crises occur due to the buildup of excesses and vulnerabilitiesof the financial system. These usually involve sizable changes in credit volume
and asset prices, stark interruptions in financial intermediation, a reduction in the
supply of external financing and massive balance-sheet problems. Claessens andKose (2013a) defined four major types: currency crises, sudden stops in capital
flows, debt crises and banking crises. Regardless of the classification, financial
crises have severe implications on the real and financial sectors, resulting inrecessions with significant output losses. Economic recovery, while possible, may
be slow.
For their part, natural disasters may affect the financial sector directly or
indirectly. Direct costs include loss of life and illnesses or injuries of people
in the financial industry, and damages to fixed assets and capital, or physicalinfrastructure. Indirect costs, which usually constitute a large share of the total
damages, pertain to the loss of economic activity and the foregone productionof goods and services. Substantial reconstruction spending, together with apossible reduction in tax revenue from the disruptions in economic activity,
could endanger the government’s fiscal position and lead to higher government
debt. Of direct relevance to the financial system, there may be deterioration ofdeposits, loan growth and quality, along with lower profitability of banks.
Epidemics and the more severe pandemics have a concentrated impact on the
population with massive job and productivity losses. These can overwhelm acountry’s health system and compound the public health problem. Trade withother countries could also be jeopardized as the highly interconnected global
economy could hasten the disease transmission via the international supply chains.
Similar to natural disasters, pandemics result in a contraction in economic activity
and an immediate decline in productivity. However, most natural disasters entail
short-term shocks to output. Meanwhile, the impacts of pandemics on theeconomy, as observed in countries severely hit by COVID-19, are expected to
linger for an uncertain period.
The pandemic has hit two flanks of the financial system. First, financially, with theloss of liquidity as well as a decline in asset value in light of the drag on economic
activity. Second, operationally, as health risk threatens the delivery of financial
services, potentially disrupting people’s lives, facilities, processes and technology(Coelho and Prenio, 2020). This could undermine the stability of, and confidencein, the financial system.
To remain relevant and effective, central banks need to routinely review
and update their crisis management frameworks and business continuity
management plans (IMF, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented
crisis in scale and duration, and should be added to the list of crises requiringcontingency preparation. Indeed, to keep ahead of uncertainty, central banks
must be constantly changing and evolving.

Central Banks and Crises: Keeping a Step Ahead of Uncertainty

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Grennan, D. (2019). What Is a pandemic? JAMA,321(9), 910. https://doi:10.1001/jama.2019.0700
International Monetary Fund. (2020). Central bank operational risk considerations for COVID-19. Part of the Special Series Notes on COVID-19 of the IMF Monetary and Capital Markets.
Jones, K. E., Patel, N. G., Levy, M. A., Storeygard, A., Balk, D., et al. (2008). Global trends in emerging infectious diseases. Nature, 451(7181),990–93.
Kahn, M.E. (2005). The death toll from natural disasters: The role of income, geography, and institutions. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(2), 271-284.
Koetsier, I., (2017). The fiscal impact of natural disasters. Working Papers 17-17. Utrecht School of Economics. https://www.uu.nl/sites/default/files/rebo_use_dp_2017_1717.pdf.
Ludvigson, S. C., Ma, S. and Ng, S. (2020, April). Covid19 and the macroeconomic effects of costly disasters.” NBER Working Paper No. w26987. https://www.nber.org/papers/w26987
Madhav, N., Oppenheim B., and Gallivan M. (2017). Pandemics: Risks, impacts, and mitigation. In D.T. Jamison,H. Gelband and S. Horton (Eds.), Disease control priorities: Improving health andreducing poverty. (3rd ed.) Washington (DC): The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK525302/.
McKenzie, M. and Tasky, G. (2020). Covid-19: Financial stability and business continuity management – Part A. SEACEN. https://suara.seacen.org/covid-19-financial-stability-and-businesscontinuity-management-part-a/Morse, S. S. (1995). Factors in the emergence of infectious diseases.” Emerging Infectious Diseases, 1 (1), 7–15.
Noy, I., and duPont, W. (2016). The long-term consequences of natural disasters—A summary of the literature. Victoria University of Wellington Working Papers in Economics and Finance No. 02.
http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10063/4981/Working%20Paper.pdf?sequence=1
Noy, I. (2009). The macroeconomic consequences of disasters.” Journal of Development Economics, 88(2), 221–231. https://doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.02.005
Oh, C. H., and Reuveny, R. (2010). Climatic natural disasters, political risk, and international trade. Global Environmental Change, 20(2), 243–254. https://doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.11.005
Pelling, M., Ozerdem, A. and Barakat, S. (2002). The macroeconomic impact of disasters. Progress in Development Studies, 2(4), 283–305.
Roser, M., Ritchie, H., Ortiz-Ospina, E., and Hasell, J. (2020). Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19). OurWorldInData.org. https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus
Sheffi, Y, and Rice, J. (2005). A supply chain view of the resilient enterprise.” MIT Sloan Management Review, 47, 41. https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/a-supply-chain-view-of-the-resiliententerprise/
Tierney, K. J. (1997). Business impacts of the Northridge earthquake.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 5, 87-97.
Toya, H., and Skidmore, M. (2007). Economic development and the impacts of natural disasters. Economics Letters, 94(1), 20–25. https://doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.020
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. (2003). Handbook for estimating the socio-economic and environmental effects of disasters. United Nations ECLAC.
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Xu, J., Wang, Z., Shen, F., Ouyang, C., and Tu, Y. (2016). Natural disasters and social conflict: A systematic literature review.” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 17, 38–48. https://doi:10.1016/j.ijdrr.2016.04.001
Yunus, N.S.M. (2015, October 28). Crisis preparedness menu for guardians of financial stability [Opening address ]. 14th IADI Conference on “Crisis Preparedness Institutional Arrangements andCoordination, Crisis Communication and Contingency Planning”, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

The primary challenge that
we face today is uncertainty.
– Carmen M. Reinhart1

1. Uncertainty and economic activity

pandemic-induced economic uncertainty2 but notes that actual impact may belarger (see also Boone et al., 2020 and McKibbin and Fernando, 2020). Jorda et al.
(2020) further emphasize that the economic fallout caused by pandemics can lastfor decades. Indeed, there is ample evidence showing that an economy’s growthtrajectory is adversely impacted long after a crisis (Erken at al., 2020; Jackson etal., 2018; Kalleberg and Von Wachter, 2017; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011).

Uncertainty pertains to the likelihood of future events being unpredictable orincalculable (Kay and King, 2020). A host of events could induce uncertainty– political conflicts, economic recessions, wars, natural disasters and disease
outbreaks. It is generally known to have a cross-cutting impact on all sectorsof the economy—households, businesses and financial markets—prompting
responses from authorities.
Measures of uncertainty suggest that it typically rises abruptly but declines
gradually (Baker et al., 2016). Uncertainties during periods of great economic,
financial and political shocks spike. Uncertainties in the early 2000s were
triggered by the 9/11 attacks, Iraq war and the SARS outbreak. These were
followed by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and Great Recession in 2008-2009
and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe in 2012. Uncertainties declined relatively
after 2012 but increased again due to the US Fed tightening in 2015, Brexit andUS elections in 2016, and US-China trade tensions in 2018-2019. The emergenceof the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) amplified uncertainties even more
(Figure 2.1).
The COVID-19 crisis has heightened uncertainties regardless of the measureused. Uncertainties associated with the COVID-19 pandemic revolve on the
resolution of the spread of the coronavirus; temporariness of policy interventions
and forbearance measures; speed of economic recovery; impact on businesssurvival and bank balance sheets; and long-term shifts in consumer behavior andbusiness models.
Since the outset of the crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has revised
its global growth forecast thrice—attesting to the great uncertainty associatedwith the COVID-19 crisis. Baker et al. (2020) predicts that the COVID-19 disaster
could cause a large output contraction, more than half of which may be due to*Hazel C. Parcon-Santos (Bank Officer V), Cristeta B. Bagsic (Bank Officer V) and Ferdinand S. Co (Bank Officer V) arefrom the Center for Monetary and Financial Policy

1

From remarks in a UP School of Economics webinar entitled “Is This Time Different? Navigating the Transition to a
Post-Covid World” held 9 July 2020.

Notes:
1. The World Uncertainty Index (WUI) is a GDP-weighted average of uncertainty across 143 countries.
It is computed by counting how often the word “uncertain” or its variants were used in the
Economist Intelligence Unit country reports, normalized by total number of words in the report.
2. The Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (GEPU) Index is a GDP-weighted average of national EPU
indices for 21 countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, France, Germany, Greece,
India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United
Kingdom and the United States. Each national EPU index reflects the relative frequency of owncountry newspaper articles that contain a trio of terms pertaining to the economy (E), policy (P)and uncertainty (U).
3. The VIX Index is a financial benchmark reflecting market estimate of the expected volatility of the
S&P500® Index. A higher number means higher uncertainty and vice versa.
Sources: Ahir et al., (2020); Bloomberg
2

The authors show that about 60 percent of contraction in US GDP is caused by COVID-induced uncertainty.

On Policymaking During Crises

2. A crisis like no other

This time it really is different.
—Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff3

2.1 Global economic impact

13

The COVID-19 shock has caused temporary and permanent business closures,
reduced capacity utilization, delayed investment expenditures, reduced
household earnings and consumption, and increased unemployment. ILO (2020)
estimates a rise in global unemployment by 5.3 million to 24.7 million froma base level of 188 million in 2019, resulting in overall losses in labor incomeof US$860 billion to US$3.44 trillion. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
estimated cumulative output loss of around US$12.5 trillion in 2020 and 2021 dueto the Great Lockdown (Figure 2.3).

During the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), the US economy was strong andhelped stabilize affected economies—the ASEAN-5, in particular—towards
recovery. During the 2008 GFC and the Great Recession that followed, Asianemerging market economies (EMEs) underpinned global growth (Figure 2.2).
Both these crises originated from financial and economic events. By contrast, the
COVID-19 crisis is a pandemic-induced one that has significant repercussions forthe economy.

Source: IMF WEO Update June 2020

The dramatic increase in uncertainty, the abruptness and severity of economic
effects, and the synchronized deep downturn expected in 2020 highlight how
this crisis is different (Figure 2.4). All these imply that the global economy willbe less hospitable to exports; resumption of economic activities will be moreasynchronous; and the labor market will remain seriously impaired, with adverse
impacts on poverty and income inequality (Guinigundo, 2020).

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database3

From Bloomberg feature published 18 May 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-05-18/
harvard-s-financial-crisis-experts-this-time-really-is-different

14

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Even as this crisis is different, authorities adopted policy responses implemented
in past crises, though they were quicker and bolder this time. They also devised
measures that were not conventionally part of the policy toolbox.

Estimating the Impact of Uncertainty on Philippine
Economic Activity
Since the days of John Maynard Keynes, the role of “shifting and unreliable
evidence” (Keynes, 1936) or uncertainty has been recognized to affect output
and its components. Theoretical models show that increases in uncertainty
can affect economic activity through several channels. Firms may delay
investment and hiring due to irreversibility of investments and increase incredit spreads (Bernanke, 1983; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) and households may
reduce consumption and increase precautionary saving (Basu and Bundick,2017). Empirical research, regardless of the econometric approached employed,
supports the notion that uncertainty shocks indeed reduce economic activity
through contractions in business fixed investment and durables consumption,and reductions in employment (Jackson et al., 2019; Jo and Sekkel, 2019; Baker etal., 2016; Jurado, et al., 2015).
As an exploratory investigation to assess the impact of uncertainty on
Philippine economic activity, the following Vector Autoregression (VAR) modelof order p was estimated:(1)

Source: IMF WEO Update June 2020n the calculation of WUI-APAC, including the Philippines. WUI-APAC instead
ncertainties caused by external events also have an impact on domestic

riables (CONS, EXG and IFIXED) are I(1) in levels, but I(0) in DLOG form. Basedest, CONS, EXG and IFIXED are not cointegrated, hence VAR is an appropriate
in level. VAR ordering is WUI-APAC DLOGCONS DLOGEXG and DLOGIFIXED,-2020Q1. Based on various VAR lag order selection criteria, the optimal lag
w that the estimated VAR satisfies the stability condition, is not misspecified,

where Yt is an n x 1 vector of endogenous variables, Ap is a matrix of coefficientsto be estimated, c is the intercept vector of the VAR, and vt is a generalization ofa white noise process. The vector of endogenous variables includes the World
Uncertainty Index for Asia and the Pacific (WUI-APAC) by Ahir et al. (2018),5
final household consumption expenditure (DLOGCONS), exports of goods(DLOGEXG) and gross fixed capital formation (DLOGIFIXED).6

5

There are 22 countries included in the calculation of WUI-APAC, including the Philippines. WUI-APAC instead of
WUI-Philippines was used as uncertainties caused by external events also have an impact on domestic economic
activity.

6

Except for WUI-APAC, all variables (CONS, EXG and IFIXED) are I(1) in levels, but I(0) in DLOG form. Based on
the Johansen Cointegration Test, CONS, EXG and IFIXED are not cointegrated, hence VAR is an appropriate
methodology. WUI-APAC is I(0) in level. VAR ordering is WUI-APAC DLOGCONS DLOGEXG and DLOGIFIXED,
estimated for the period 2001Q1-2020Q1. Based on various VAR lag order selection criteria, the optimal lag
length is 1. Diagnostic tests show that the estimated VAR satisfies the stability condition, is not misspecified andhas no serial correlation.

On Policymaking During Crises

Consumption, exports and investments are all negatively correlated with uncertainty (Figure 2.5).

Source of basic data: Philippine Statistics Authority, Ahir et al., (2020)

Variance decomposition shows that variations in WUIAPAC are mainly manifested in changes in DLOGCONS
and DLOGEXG (Table 2.1). While changes in WUI-APAC
account less for changes in DLOGIFIXED, changes in
DLOGEXG impact changes in DLOGIFIXED. Impulse
response function shows that after a one-standard deviation
shock in WUI-APAC, DLOGCONS immediately falls andtakes about 10 quarters to go back to its pre-shock value.
DLOGEXG decline on the 2nd quarter after the shock andalso takes about 10 quarters to go back to its pre-shock
value. Based on historical decomposition, uncertainties
caused by the COVID-19 crisis may have contributed to thedecline in all three indicators of economic activity, at least in
the 1st quarter of 2020 (Figure 2.7).77

Impact of uncertainties in the three economic indicators may become more apparent
if the COVID-19 crisis progresses and remains unresolved.

Source: Authors’ estimates

15

16

The BSP and COVID-19 Pandemic

Source: Authors’ estimates

Source: Authors’ estimatesOn Policymaking During Crises

Meanwhile, other economic variables are likewisesignificantly associated with uncertainty. Growth in foreign
direct investments (DLOGFDIEQUITY) and overseas Filipino

remittances (DLOGOFREMIT) are both negatively correlatedwith WUI-APAC, while unemployment rate (UR) is positively
correlated with WUI-APAC (Figure 2.8).

Source of basic data: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Philippine Statistics Authority, Ahir et al., (2020)

References
Ahir, H., Bloom, N. and Furceri, D. (2018). World Uncertainty Index. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3275033. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.
https://doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3275033.
Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., and Davis, S. J. (2016, November). Measuring economic policy uncertainty, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4), 1593-1636.
Basu, S. and Bundick, B. (2017, May). Uncertainty shocks in a model of effective demand. Econometrica, 85(3), 937–958.
Bernanke, B. S. (1983, February). Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(1), 85–106.
Dixit, R. K. and Pindyck, R. S. (1994, July). Investment and uncertainty. Princeton University Press.
Jackson, L. E., Kliesen, K. L., and Owyang, M. T. (2019). The effects of uncertainty on economic outcomes, St. Louise Federal Reserve. https://www.stlouisfed.
org/on-the-economy/2019/july/effects-uncertainty-economic-outcomes.
Jo, S. and Sekkel, R. (2019). Macroeconomic uncertainty through the lens of professional forecasters. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 37 (3),436-446.
Jurado, K., Ludvigson, S. C. and Ng, S. (2015). Measuring uncertainty. American Economic Review, 105 (3), 1177-1216.
Keynes, J. M. (1936). The General theory of employment, interest and money. Macmillan Cambridge University Press.

17

18

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Note: As of 28 July 2020. Gray indicates no data.
Source: Elgin et al. (2020)

On Policymaking During Crises
Based on the database of COVID-19 response measures7 created by Elgin, Basbug
and Yalaman (2020) covering 166 economies, fiscal packages were implemented
by most, with Japan’s at 42 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP).
Monetary authorities delivered as much as 100 percent policy rate cut vis-à-vis
their 1 February 2020 level, as well as other monetary measures. About a thirdof the economies covered by their research implemented balance of payments(BOP) and exchange rate policy measures (Figure 2.9).
2.2 Impact on Philippine economic performance
Despite intermittent bouts of inflation driven by oil and rice prices, the Philippines
has been able to stabilize inflation since its adoption of the inflation targeting
framework in 2002. Its strong growth in recent years was accompanied by pricestability, stronger banking sector, declining unemployment rate and improving
tax efforts, as well as much-improved external and public debt profiles. Thus, thePhilippines met the pandemic in sounder economic and institutional shape thanin past crises. This is not trivial comfort because unlike in the AFC when the US
and other advanced economies (AEs) buttressed global demand, no one is sparedin the COVID-19 crisis. All economies are in the same stormy sea, albeit withdifferent levels of policy space, financial resilience and global interconnectedness.

19

The Philippines slid into recession territory in the first semester of 2020, with 16.5
percent GDP decline in Q2 2020 after falling by 0.7 percent in Q1 2020. In the firsthalf of 2020, output dropped by 9 percent (Figure 2.10).
The pandemic-induced global weakness is particularly treacherous for economies
like the Philippines that rely on migrant worker remittances. Remittances had
supported the consumption, educational and medical needs of families of
migrant workers not just during normal times but more so during crises (Chami,
2020; Sayeh and Chami, 2020). Overseas Filipino (OF) remittances that provided
counter-cyclicality during the GFC experienced a dramatic decline as early as thefirst five months of 2020 in the COVID-19 crisis (Table 2.2).

Notes:
1. AFC and GFC OF cash remittances numbers reflect cumulative year-on-year growth rates for
December 1998 and December 2008. The figure for COVID-19 OF cash remittances reflects year-onyear change for January-May 2020.
2. AFC, GFC and COVID-19 labor force data reflect Labor Force Survey results for April 1998, April
2008, and April 2020, respectively.
Sources: Philippine Statistics Authority, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

Sources: Philippine Statistics Authority, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Bureau of the Treasury
7

The economic policy package database has three categories using six policy variables. The categories are: fiscal
policy, monetary policy and balance of payment/exchange rate policy. Under fiscal policy package are theadopted fiscal measures as a percentage of GDP. The monetary policy category variables are: interest rate cut(measured as percentage of rate on 1 February 2020); size of macro-financial package (as percentage of GDP);and other monetary policy measures (dummy variable with value of 1 if there are such measures and 0 otherwise).
Lastly, the BOP and exchange rate policy category variables: BOP measures (as percentage of GDP); and dummy
variable with value of 1 if there are other reported measures and 0 otherwise. (Elgin et al., 2020, 3-4).

In April 2020, the Philippines recorded its lowest labor force participation rate
at 55.6 percent and highest unemployment rate at 17.7 percent (Table 2.2). The
services sector has underpinned domestic economic growth. It was more than
three-fifths of the GDP in the first half of 2020, while the industry sector was
almost three-tenths. Both dragged economic performance in the same period(PSA, 2020a). Nonetheless, the pandemic and the changes in social interactions
it ushers can be expected to have more fundamental impact on the operationof the services sector. For instance, numerous restaurants and fast food outlets
shifted to repackaging their menu as grocery items and sold these as either
frozen items or meal kits for their customers to prepare at home. Dine-in service
has been severely limited. As of April 2020, the services sector employs more than
57 percent of the labor force, while service and sales workers compose more than
18 percent of the total employed (PSA, 2020a).

20

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

The tourism sector, with 13.5 percent share in 2019 total employment, hasbeen hit hard (PSA, 2020b). The Department of Labor and Employment (2020)
reported in July that 95,702 repatriated Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) havebeen brought to their home provinces, while 240,583 requests for one-time cash
assistance (of US$200 or ₱10,000) under the government’s Abot-Kamay ang
Pagtulong (AKAP) program for repatriated OFWs were already approved.8
While more than 63 percent of workers are wage and salaried employees, those
self-employed without any paid employees consist of almost 29 percent of
the labor force (PSA, 2020a). Meanwhile, by the nature of the necessary policy
response to cut off the transmission of the virus, the informally-employed, suchas jeepney barkers and curbside parking attendants and street vendors, among
others, have had to rely on government cash assistance. Even with lifting oflockdowns, the much-reduced economic activities would not immediately allow
them—and many entrepreneurs—to pick up where they left off.

3. A multi-track policy menu: Endure. Bounce back. Thrive.

There are no solutions; there are only trade-offs.
— Thomas Sowell, A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of
Political Struggles
An analogy for the COVID-19 pandemic states that we are not all in the sameboat but rather in the same stormy sea where some have leaky boats, others haveadequate ones, while others have boats that can outlive the storm. Policy tries toeven out the chances of survival, recovery and revitalization for everyone.
In any crisis, the policy menu can be categorized along three overlapping tracks
based on descending urgency of implementation. Track 1 includes survival tools toprotect the existence of citizens, businesses and the financial system. Track 2 consistsof stabilization tools to stabilize, rehabilitate and reconstruct the capacity of labor,
capital, productivity, financial system and institutions to recover. Track 3 involves
transformation tools to promote reforms for productivity, labor and capital andboost their capacity to thrive post-crisis.

8

According to the BSP’s Selected Economic and Financial Indicators (as of 7 August 2020), there were around 2
million OFWs deployed in 2017. Thus, the need for cash assistance could further increase.

Source: BSP

3.1 Track 1: Survival
When crisis roils an economy, it must have plans to ensure survival andendurance until the immediate threats are overcome. The policy toolkit must
aim to provide the basic needs of vulnerable households. It must also extend
necessary support to the informal sector, micro, small and medium enterprises(MSMEs) and corporations (to avoid rise in liquidity and credit risks), and thefinancial sector. Lastly, it should also aim to protect market functions.
Fiscal policy. In an economic downturn, automatic stabilizers can help easehouseholds’ financial stress by decreasing their tax bills or by boosting cash andin-kind benefits (Debrun and Kapoor, 2010). In some countries, the government
provides unemployment insurance, welfare benefits and other transfers to theunemployed.
In the Philippines, public and private sector employees are covered byunemployment benefits and insurance through the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS), respectively. For
the private sector, the benefit is only available to those not over 60 years old at
the time of involuntary separation. Employees eligible for unemployment benefit
receive 50 percent of their average monthly salary credit for a maximum of twomonths (SSS, 2019). For the public sector, the benefit is in the form of monthly
cash payments equivalent to 50 percent of average monthly compensation. The
duration of the benefit depends on the length of service and ranges from two to
six months (GSIS, n.d.).

On Policymaking During Crises
Due to the severity of most crisis episodes, automatic stabilizers are often not
sufficient to mitigate adverse effects. Governments enact additional policies—
called discretionary fiscal policies—specific to the recession. In the Philippines,
like other EMEs, the limited role of automatic stabilizers calls for more
discretionary fiscal policy (Iizuka et al., 2009; IMF, 2009).
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Philippine government launched afour-pillar socioeconomic strategy with a fiscal package amounting to at least
3.1 percent of GDP to provide support to vulnerable groups and individuals andexpand resources of the health sector (IMF, 2020). These were partly financed
by borrowing. By end-June 2020, the national government has incurred an
outstanding debt of ₱9 trillion, a 17.1 percent increase from ₱7.7 trillion at
end-December 2019. Relative to GDP, debt has risen from 39.6 percent in
end-December 2019 to 48.1 percent in end-June 2020 (BTr, 2020). Globally,
government debt rose to 90.7 percent of GDP in the first quarter of 2020 from87.1 percent in the same period the year before (Tiftik and Mahmood, 2020).
Monetary policy. During crisis episodes, central banks adopt various measures
to avert the collapse of financial systems and support aggregate demand throughreduction in policy rates and quantitative easing (QE). Evidence shows that monetary
policy plays a key role in offsetting the negative impact of uncertainty shocks (Jackson
et al., 2019; Basu and Bundick, 2017).
When monetary policy is not constrained by the zero-lower bound (ZLB), cuttinginterest rates may be appropriate to ease borrowing costs in an economy (Dietrich
et al., 2020). However, if monetary policy becomes ineffective due to the ZLB,
higher uncertainty can have even more negative effects (Basu and Bundick, 2017).
Fabella (2020) warns that in a free-falling economy or in an anemic recovery,
cutting interest rates to encourage investments is akin to pushing on a string
as corporations prefer to batten their hatches (i.e., pay down debts, buy backshares), not invest. During periods of high uncertainty, central banks must be
mindful of the possibility of a liquidity trap, as investors’ liquidity preference
sharply rise due to fear of capital losses, weak expectations about future
profitability and uncertainty about prospective yields (Michl, 2010). The
Japanese experience in the last decades provides lessons to central banks to
avoid the ZLB constraint.
During the COVID-19 crisis, many central banks have cut policy rates. A numberof central banks, including those in EMEs, have also resorted to QE (Hartley andRebucci, 2020;9 Arslan, 2020; Benigno et al., 2020).109

10

Average developed market QE announcement effect on local 10-year government bond yields had a statisticallysignificant -0.14% 1-day impact. EME QE announcement was significantly larger, averaging -0.37% and -0.63%
over 1-day and 3-day windows, respectively. Across developed and emerging bond markets, an overall average
1-day impact of -0.27% was estimated.
Benigno et al. (2020) argue that QE could be embraced by EME central banks to expand the policy toolkit,
particularly in the time of COVID-19, provided that they are credible, have a flexible exchange rate regime, enjoy
well-anchored inflation expectations, and are issuing local currency sovereign debt.

21

In the Philippines, the BSP undertook unprecedented measures to ensure
adequate domestic liquidity, shore up market confidence and sustain the flow ofcredit to support growth (Glindro et al., 2020). The BSP measures are estimated atabout ₱1.3 trillion, equivalent to 6.4 percent of the country’s GDP (Diokno, 2020).
Foreign exchange intervention (FXI) and capital flows measures (CFMs).
Participation in the foreign exchange market and CFMs can create more policy
space for the central bank, especially in the presence of volatile capital flows.
Adrian et al. (2020) demonstrate in their simulations of COVID-style crisis scenariothat the systematic use of FXI and CFMs could reduce risks to output andinflation, stabilize private borrowing spread, lower the path of the risk premiumand reduce the likelihood of large real exchange rate depreciations. Economies
with less well-anchored inflation expectations, significant foreign currency
mismatch and weak initial conditions11 can potentially benefit from using FXIs
or CFMs in the short term. They find that when regulations are credible, “verysmall adjustments are needed for outflow CFMs.” Furthermore, the exchange rate
depreciation induced by FXI could help address a liquidity trap by stimulating
exports if the central bank does not raise policy rates in response to the resulting
inflation, and, for an EME, if it has healthy debt levels.
Regulatory relief and forbearance measures. To further ensure continuous
flow of credit and liquidity in the economy and provide relief to the financiallyconstrained, central banks and financial system regulators have responded tocrisis episodes through regulatory relief12 and forbearance measures13 . Examples
include the utilization of available bank capital and liquidity buffers, relaxationof prudential accounting measures, restructuring of loans of heavily affectedborrowers and temporary payment moratoria. For the Philippines, the BSP
enacted a broad set of regulatory relief and forbearance measures that werelarger in magnitude and scope than it had implemented in previous crises(Glindro et al., 2020).
3.2 Track 2: Stabilization
Within the second track are policies that aim to stabilize, rehabilitate (the financial
health of households, MSMEs, corporates, promote financial resilience of banks
and financial markets), and reconstruct affected but non-zombie sectors so thatchanges can take root in fertile soil and allow the economy to bounce back. Not
only are individual policies important but their sequencing need to be well-timed.
11

Such as high debt levels

12

Regulatory relief refers to easing of macroprudential policy or temporary relaxation of financial requirements(Metrick, 2020).

13

Forbearance measures are concessions provided by a bank to a counterparty experiencing financial difficulty(BCBS, 2016).

22

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Authorities ought to boost confidence in financial markets by clearly signalingthat they stand ready to intervene in the resolution of failing banks. Confusionand panic should be prevented. These require well-crafted communication
strategies. The prevention of illiquidity, insolvency, credit distress and financial
crisis are important in both the survival and stabilization tracks. While adverse
solvency effects in the financial system will most likely not be immediate,appropriate and precautionary responses should be prepared at the earliest
opportunity. As former Intel chairman Andy Grove used to say, “complacency
breeds failure.” (Ibarra, 2016)
Recognition of inter-sectoral effects is crucial. The GFC highlighted theimportance of macrofinancial linkages, i.e., the interactions between the real
economy and the financial sector. The importance of these interactions has
resurfaced in light of the developments involving the COVID-19 crisis. Sloweconomic activity reduces profits of businesses and incomes of households,
magnifying default probabilities that weaken balance sheets of banks andother financial institutions. When households have a lot of debt, their spending
decreases. When firms become highly indebted, hiring and investing slow down.
The confluence of these events not only weakens financial and macroeconomic
conditions but also hurts the growth potential of the economy.
Hasty removal of stimulus must be avoided but exit strategies must be
defined. Blinder and Zandi (2015) caution fiscal policy not to swing from stimulus
to austerity until it is clear that the economy is enjoying self-sustaining growth.
Until the labor market is clearly approaching full employment, confidence andeconomic recovery will remain fragile and vulnerable to almost anything that
goes wrong. The same is true for monetary policy. Kohn (2013) highlights thatthe decision to exit easing should depend primarily on economic and financial
conditions rather than calendar time. Easing might be scaled down and stopped
when the central bank can see reasonable prospects that the economy is on asustainable path of higher levels of resource utilization, with inflation moving withintarget. These exit strategies must be communicated well to anchor expectations.
Delayed withdrawal must also be resisted. Timely withdrawal of policies thatassisted the financially constrained during the survival track and stimulated
demand during the stabilization track is necessary for several reasons:First, borrowings incurred during the survival track can result into a debt trap. If
debt rises faster than economic output, it becomes unsustainable as future debt
servicing can weigh on future aggregate demand (Mian et al., 2020).
Second, having too low rates for too long may lead to financial instability.
Households and corporates may be encouraged to take on more debt, and low
returns on safe assets may prompt a leveraged search for yield and increasefinancial vulnerabilities (Bean et al., 2017). This is true also for regulatory relief
and forbearance measures: their effects will only become apparent over timein various forms, including deterioration of asset quality and compression of
profit. Inevitably, a higher proportion of stressed households and corporates willaffect banks’ financial strength. As Warren Buffett said, “It’s only when the tidegoes out that you learn who has been swimming naked.” Hence, it is importantfor banks to exercise due diligence. Delaying recognition of losses until the tidegoes out will leave banks and supervisors with fewer options for dealing withthe repercussions (Coelho and Zamil, 2020). Authorities need to be proactive.
As such, a framework on how to clean up balance sheets would be useful. In
the Philippines, the proposed creation of Financial Institutions Strategic Transfer(FIST) corporations to acquire and manage non-performing assets (NPAs) and to
restructure debt of financial institutions aims to moderate the spillover effects on
the real economy (HOR, 2020).
Third, while FXI and CFMs can create more policy space for central banks, the costsof the use of these policies over the medium- to long-term need to be accountedfor. Such costs may include the slowdown in the development of derivative
markets and the emergence of greater currency mismatches (Adrian et al., 2020).
Fourth, while limiting business closures in the short run may be necessary topreserve employment, long-run support based only on size or sector rather than
productivity generate misallocation (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2017). Policymakers
should avoid creating ‘zombies’14 that limit the growth of new, higher-productivity
businesses (di Mauro and Syverson, 2020). This task may be challenging
especially if there are many medium and small firms. A sorting mechanism would
be needed to differentiate the firms that have no prospect and will fail from thosethat have a chance (Rey, 2020).
3.3 Track 3: Transformation
The words of an ancient Roman general ring true in thinking about policies under thethird category: “Si vis pacem, para bellum.” (“If you want peace, prepare for war.”) To
14

Zombies are firms that in normal circumstances would exit because of poor performance.

On Policymaking During Crises

23

thrive and flourish in the post-crisis environment, unwavering and necessary reforms
pay great dividends. The post-AFC track of reforms provides convincing evidence.
The need for structural reforms to address fissures that became apparent during
the GFC and during this current pandemic must be pursued. For good or bad, thepost-COVID world — as with other post-crisis landscape — would require refocusingof resources and fine-tuning of goals. However, basic principles need not change.
The effectiveness of policymakers and decision makers to scan the horizon and meetincipient risks and opportunities remains critical. In prosperity and in peril, the ability
to leverage the information from “scanning the horizon” is the best tool of central
bankers and regulators.

Seek windows of opportunity. Crisis events change mindsets and institutions.
Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” highlights how a crisis dismantles longstanding practices and ushers innovation. Behavioral changes and government
protocols caused by the COVID-19 crisis were disruptive for some businesses, butothers were able to find and create opportunities from them. For instance, theincreased preference for online activities have prompted businesses to shift toonline platforms to promote and sell their products. Likewise, social distancing
rules have increased the demand for delivery services. Social planners must takeadvantage of the potential of information technology, digital retail and logistics
to contribute to poverty alleviation and growth inclusion.

Address shortcomings revealed by the COVID-19 crisis. While a bit of acliché, authorities must remember to “never let a good crisis go to waste.” A
crisis uncovers what is wrong with, and what needs to be fixed in, society andthe economy, including what was or could not be done before the crisis hit(Sheng, 2009).

Prepare for black swans. A black swan, such as the COVID-19 crisis, is a highly
unpredictable event, often with catastrophic effects. What it is and when it
happens are difficult to predict. Thus, one cannot fully prepare for it. Whileauthorities cannot possibly identify all possible scenarios, one can prepare
for them by building resilience. Vulnerable spots should be identified andaddressed early on. Contingencies can be put in place to deal with the mostdamaging eventualities.

The COVID-19 crisis revealed a number of weak policies or actions. First, greater
investment in healthcare is required. Second, the increased use of online services
and digitization during the COVID-19 pandemic has accentuated technology andconnectivity disparities, highlighting the need to invest in digital technology andcybersecurity. Policies and regulations also need to keep up. Third, automaticstabilizers must be reviewed and strengthened. Ideally, they should be timely
and tied to the extent and duration of the downturn (Leiserson, 2020). Fourth,on the labor front, the pandemic has exposed a significant portion of the labor
force that cannot work from home. At the same time, from a business continuity
perspective, enterprises would be remiss not to explore which of the functions
performed physically in the workplace could be augmented or even replacedby technology and artificial intelligence. Government policies on education andtraining/retooling, as well as information technology, will have to be ahead of thecurve on this.15 Fifth, policies to empower citizens to acquire adequate housing
to provide a conducive environment for work-from-home arrangements andstudents’ learning are desirable to enhance both physical safety and productivity.
Sheng (2009) emphasizes that there may be “only a short window of opportunityof reform before memory fades and vested interests again capture the need forreform. If we do not reform whilst the sun is shining, crisis, like the next tsunami,
is an inevitable consequence.”
15

It might be helpful to assess the mapping of the distribution of the workforce according to functions and theirrisk of being replaced by technology vis-à-vis development and retooling/retraining policies.

One must not wait for the next crisis to occur before preparing for it. Candidates
for the next crisis include those caused by debt overhang, massive cyberattacks,
geopolitical events, climate change or even another pandemic.

4. Conclusion
Trust in policymakers result to more effective policy in normal times but more
so during crises. Trust is a function of credibility, which takes time to build.
Credibility rests on effectiveness. Effective policymaking rests on superior
capacity to scan the horizon. Effectiveness also rests on resilience; and thus, while
efficiency is desirable, it is important to balance it with resilience. Nonetheless,a credible policymaker can enhance efficiency, e.g., by complementing open
market operations with open mouth operation.
In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, a multi-track framework that integrates
the needs for survival, stability, rehabilitation and recovery of the economy withaspirations to thrive in the post-COVID economy—by leveraging on the strengths

24

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

and addressing the weaknesses of the economy that emerged as the different
sectors dealt with the crisis—is useful for rebuilding the economy into a morerobust one.

mandates where they are more effective than the other, as well as limits rooted
in economic theory and empirical evidence. Coordination enhances the power ofchosen policies while addressing their limits.

Strategic use of data and science aid the paramount role of expert
judgment. While an important element in formulating crisis policies is to ensurethat immediate concerns are addressed, it is critical to understand how thesepolicies might shape the economic landscape in the years and even decades
to come. Uncertainty that delays investments and changes consumer behavior
can have important implications not just on current output, but on productivity
and potential output. The immediate economic effects are already apparent.
Results of stress tests, early warning indicators, quantitative models and machinelearning help inform decision makers on possible policy responses. Given thecomplexity of economic relationships, however, judgment plays an important rolein assessing the output of models. The presence of uncertainty further increases
the value of judgment because authorities must make decisions without knowing
the probability distribution of the choices under consideration. As Kay and King
(2020) point out, the management of uncertainty cannot be delegated to models
and risk professionals, but rather rests on answering the question “What’s goingon here?” This pandemic and similar crises like this generate uncertainty that
requires expert judgment from decisionmakers. This judgment can be assisted byscientific methods that could help them understand the risks because if risks canbe controlled, uncertainty might be more ably managed.

Targeted measures are favored. In any crisis, policymakers must resist thetemptation of “throwing money around,” and should aim to protect those liable
to suffer in the short run and likely to gain from waiting out the end of the crisis(Fujita et al., 2020). For instance, small- and medium-sized businesses are among
the most exposed to liquidity issues, thus special facilities to keep lending to small
businesses are appropriate. Likewise, workers affected by income shortfalls may be
given subsidies in the short run. Balisacan (2020) emphasized that crisis measures
must be well-targeted, transparent and fair, efficiently administered and timebound. These are necessary considerations to ensure that assistance and stimulus
measures could deliver their intended results even with limited resources. Given
the uncertainty on the resolution of the COVID-19 crisis, targeted measures arenecessary to ensure that government resources are not wasted.

Governance matters. Credibility of policy rests on the governed trusting theirpolicymakers. Trust can be enhanced by speed but more so by perception thatinterventions are coordinated, targeted and well-communicated.
Coordinated policy responses are essential. Pro-active and integrated measuresacross all policy areas are necessary to make strong and sustained impacts.
Baldwin and Weder di Mauro (2020) and Blinder and Zandi (2015) highlight thatpolicy coordination is the most effective action during a crisis. Following a large
shock, the confidence effects of a coordinated fiscal and monetary support cancompound the power of policies (OECD, 2019; Boone and Buti, 2019). Each has

Communication and transparency mitigate uncertainty and anchor
expectations. Confidence- and trust-boosting tools could amplify theeffectiveness of crisis interventions. Communicating goals and commitments
to the public increases trust and market confidence, which enhances theeffectiveness of policy tools. Transparency is critical because without it, markets,
consumers and businesses would always be guessing the true state of thefinancial system. For instance, Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2020) raised thepossibility of bank runs if depositors do not have sufficient information on thetrue state of banks.
In summary, while the medium- to long-term effects are still uncertain, thepolicies that will be deployed by authorities would influence the size andpersistence of the effects of the crisis, i.e., the scars of the crisis. Furthermore, byadhering to the principles of collaboration (among policymakers and stakeholders),
accuracy (in identifying the targets of the measures), agility (to self-correct in a timely
manner when emerging circumstances require) and transparency in implementing
policies, uncertainty may be lessened.

On Policymaking During Crises

25

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28

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines... while all these (global) risks are severe, none is as threatening as the specter of avirulent, deadly global pandemic … In terms of likelihood and potential damage that
may be caused, pandemics pose a significant risk to both global health and economic
stability.
— Ian Goldin, Future Opportunities, Future Shocks: Key Trends

2.1 Financial and economic crises

1. Shaping the global economy and society
The COVID-19 pandemic is like no other crisis that the Philippines previously
experienced. The fundamental difference lies in the origin and nature of thesecrises. While earlier crises were primarily monetary, financial and fiscal in nature,
COVID-19 is essentially a public health crisis. The impact of these crises on
the Philippine economy as well as their breadth and depth differed. The crisis
response policies and measures implemented also varied across crises.
This chapter presents the policy interventions that were put in place to mitigate
the adverse effects of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as the initiatives andmeasures being proposed to bring the economy on the road to recovery. Context
is given to these measures through a discussion of the policy responses toprevious crises, including natural disasters like earthquakes and typhoons. The
chapter likewise highlights the lessons learned from earlier crises and how thesehelped shaped the reform agenda in the Philippines after each crisis.

2. Turning the tide: crisis to reforms
Developments over the past decades show that the Philippines is able to turnadversities and crisis into reform opportunities. Thus, over the decades, thePhilippines managed to build a resilient economy through policy and structuralreforms that were, in part, adopted in response to previous financial andeconomic crises, and natural disasters.

*

Faith Christian Q. Cacnio (Bank Officer V), John Michael Rennie G. Hallig (Bank Officer V) and Jade Eric T.
Redoblado (Bank Officer V) are from the Center for Monetary and Financial Policy.

In the early 1980s, the country experienced what is arguably its worst crisis afterWorld War II.1 In 1981, the country’s domestic financial sector experienced a crisisof confidence which led to substantial withdrawals by domestic and international
investors from the local capital market (Intal and Llanto, 1998). The financial crisis
was eventually followed by a BOP crisis in 1983. It resulted in a deep economic
recession in 1984–1985.2 Following sharp devaluations, the Central Bank of thePhilippines performed its lender-of-last resort function to avert the collapse of
the domestic banking system. However, this action impaired the CBP’s balance
sheet and constrained its ability to institute credible monetary policy (Guinigundo
and Cacnio, 2019).
The critical lesson from this crisis is that debt-fueled growth requires adroit debt
management especially with respect to external debt. The debt-driven projects
did not lead to productivity gains and thus failed to contribute to significant
structural change in the economy. This would have mitigated the exposure of theeconomy to commodity price shocks that subsequently helped trigger a balanceof payments crisis.
Following the crisis, the Philippines undertook important reforms to strengthen
the banking and financial sectors. There was a shift from a fixed exchange rate
regime to a managed float. The BSP likewise adopted monetary aggregate
targeting as framework for monetary policy. This helped bring double-digit
inflation down to more manageable rates.

1

The twin crisis of the early 1980s started with a crisis of confidence in 1981, which severely affected the country’s
banking sector. The banking crisis was eventually followed by a debt crisis in 1983.

2

The crisis likewise had a political dimension in that in 1983 former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. wasassassinated, setting off a widespread political unrest.

Turning Crises into Opportunities: How Crises Shaped the Reform Agenda in the Philippines

29

The restoration of a functioning democracy in the mid-1980s after decadesof authoritarian rule provided further impetus for the implementation of key
economic reforms in the country (Appendix A provides a list of selected policy andstructural reforms in the Philippine economy). Starting in the 1980s until 1990s, thePhilippines undertook important policies and reforms geared towards liberalization,
deregulation and removal of barriers to competition. Key reforms implemented
during this period include the removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers in the
trade sector; enactment of Republic Act (RA) No. 7042 (Foreign Investment Act of1991); passage of RA No. 7721 allowing the entry of foreign banks in the country;
liberalization of the telecommunications industry; privatization of water services;and deregulation of the oil industry. These measures were aimed at facilitating theefficient allocation of resources, factor mobility and growth of industries to ensuresustained growth and rapid poverty alleviation.

monitored and preemptively addressed. Macroprudential policies likewise
became standard tools in the policy kits of Asian central banks. These are
deployed to address emerging systemic risks in the financial sector.

A crucial reform instituted in 1993 was the restructuring and recapitalization of
the central bank.3 Under RA No. 7653, the Central Bank of the Philippines wasreconstituted into the CB – Board of Liquidators and a new monetary authority,
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, was created pursuant to the stipulation of the1987 Constitution for an independent monetary authority. This gave the BSP thefreedom to define its policy tools, without influence of the government or otherinstitutions of authority. Price stability was established as the overriding objectiveof the BSP. An important provision of the new central bank act is the granting offiscal and administrative authority to the BSP.

The Philippines is situated in both the Pacific Ring of Fire and Typhoon Belt. As
a result, natural disasters such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and typhoons
have made their mark on the history and economy of the country. Throughout
its history, the Philippines sustained countless human toll and immeasurable
economic damages from these natural calamities. In 2016, the United Nations
put the Philippines as third most vulnerable country to natural hazard risk in theWorld Risk Index.

The structural and key reforms implemented over these decades put thePhilippines at a stable macroeconomic foothold. Thus, in 1997, when the Asian
Financial Crisis (AFC) hit the East Asian region, the country’s economy sufferedless compared to its Asian peers. Nonetheless, the AFC provided Asian economies
vital insights in safeguarding economic stability. One crucial lesson from the
AFC is that sound macroeconomic policies are not sufficient to ensure economic
stability. Economic resiliency entails strong financial and external positions as
well. Thus, authorities in Asia adopted a more proactive and thorough approachto banking supervision. This is to ensure that idiosyncratic risks are closely
3

Republic Act No. 7653, also known as the New Central Bank Act, was passed on 10 June 1993.

Lessons from the AFC shaped many of the key economic, financial and structuralreforms that were implemented in the 2000s. These, in turn, provided thePhilippines with the strong economic foundation that allowed it to withstand thesevere shocks that emanated from advanced economies during the 2009 Global
Financial Crisis.
In the post-GFC period, the Philippines continued to carry out policy reforms thatfurther enhanced the various sectors of the economy.
2.2 Natural calamities and disasters

In the face of these calamities, the National Government (NG) responds throughdisaster relief and mitigation. Additionally, the NG undertakes the reconstructionof the physical damages (especially of public infrastructure) sustained from such
calamities. For its part, the BSP has been vigilant in monitoring the effects ofnatural disturbances on prices, the banking sector and the general economy.
Periods of calamities that did not inflict significant costs to the economy4 wereassociated with noticeably lower inflation rate compared to periods of destructive
natural calamities (See Appendix B, Figure 3.1).
4

Damages from these natural disturbances that did not cause significant economic losses are valued in thischapter to be below US$50 million. (EM-DAT, 2020)

30

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Higher prices that result from natural disasters are considered as exogenous
shocks to the economy and they are temporary. These types of higher prices
are attributed to the supply side5 of the economy, which mainly fall outside thepurview of monetary policy (Abenoja et al., 2010). In cases of supply-side shocks,
the BSP supports government measures designed to address these shocks andit engages in credible communication to the public. In 2004, when supply-side
pressures pushed inflation beyond the government’s target, the BSP coordinatedwith other government agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture andDepartment of Trade and Industry, in identifying measures to fill in gaps in the
country’s food supply (BSP, 2005). An example of central bank communication
regarding a breach in the inflation target due to supply-side pressure wasprovided in 2018, wherein the BSP informed the public that the rise in prices wasa result of cost-push forces and that monetary policy was limited in countering
inflation in such cases (BSP, 2019).
Recognizing the potential impact of natural disasters on financial institutions,
the BSP deployed temporary regulatory relief to banks in regions and provinces
devastated by various typhoons and earthquakes (e.g., the 7.2-magnitude
earthquake that rocked Central Visayas, particularly Bohol province in 2013.
Bayangos et al. (2020) confirmed the BSP’s observation that extreme weather
conditions can adversely affect financial intermediation, particularly throughgrowth of loans and deposits, loan quality and profitability.
To assist in the recovery efforts after natural calamities, temporary regulatory
reliefs are extended by the BSP to affected parts of the country. These include:•

Excluding existing loans of borrowers in affected areas from the computationof past-due ratios;•

Reduction of general loan-loss provisions;•Non-imposition of penalties on legal reserves deficiencies of said banks;•Moratorium on monthly payments to BSP for banks with ongoingrehabilitation programs;•

Booking of allowance for probable losses on a staggered basis (subject to
BSP approval);

5

Supply-side shocks are events or disturbances that either cause increases in the cost of producing goods andservices or reduce the supply of the same good and services available in the economy (BSP, 2005).

•

Non-imposition of monetary penalties for delays in the submission ofsupervisory reports;•

Allowing banks to provide financial assistance to employees;•

Granting of grace periods to settle outstanding rediscounting obligations; and•Allowing banks to restructure outstanding rediscounted loans.

Among the most vulnerable sector during natural calamities is the micro, small
and medium enterprises (MSMEs). They have limited access to coping strategies
and are generally unprepared to confront these adverse events (Ballesteros andDomingo, 2015). MSMEs play a significant role in the economy. They comprise
99.5 percent of the total number of enterprises in the Philippines as well as
provide 63.2 percent of total employment in 2018.6 Cognizant of their economic
contribution, the BSP extends assistance to allow MSMEs to survive the after
effects of natural calamities. These include regulatory relief such as excludingloans of affected borrowers from computations of past-due loan ratio andreduction of general loan-loss provisions.
Keen and Pakko (2007) observed that the monetary authority should increase
its nominal interest rate in the wake of a natural disaster.7 However, historical
data shows that despite the effects of natural disasters, particularly typhoons,the BSP usually does not adjust its monetary policy stance as a result of thesenatural events alone.8 Nonetheless, the impact of unfavorable weather conditions(including El Niño and La Niña) and other natural calamities on prices is part ofthe BSP’s assessment of the country’s inflation environment.9 It should be noted
that, since the BSP adopted the inflation targeting framework in 2002, bothinflation and policy rates have been broadly stable even in the midst of naturalcalamities (See Appendix B, Figure 3.2).
6

Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) 2018 MSME Statistics, available at https://www.dti.gov.ph/resources/msme-statistics/

7

Keen and Pakko (2007) studied the appropriate monetary policy stance after Hurricane Katrina hit parts of theUnited States in 2005.

8

In 1972, following the strong typhoons that hit the country in August and September, the Central Bank of thePhilippines (CBP) adopted a more restrictive monetary policy stance via restricting the growth of bank credit andmoney supply (CBP, 1972).

9

Based on various BSP inflation reports (i.e., 3rd quarter 2010, 4th quarter 2013, and 2nd and 3rd quarters 2015).

Turning Crises into Opportunities: How Crises Shaped the Reform Agenda in the Philippines

The Philippines recognized the importance of timely, quick and collective
response to natural disasters and calamities. Thus, in 2010, RA No. 10121
Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 was
passed into law. The act provided for the strengthening of “capacity of thenational government and the local government units (LGUs), together withpartner stakeholders, to build the disaster resilience of communities, and to
institutionalize arrangements and measures for reducing disaster risks, including
projected climate risks, and enhancing disaster preparedness and response
capabilities at all levels.” Moreover, the act established the National Disaster
Risk Reduction and Management Council (formerly the National Disaster
Coordinating Council) which coordinates efforts towards disaster risk reduction
and management. The NDRRMC is also responsible for safeguarding the safety
and welfare of the people in times of calamities, disasters and emergencies.

3. Dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic
Some experts have pointed out that the COVID-19 pandemic is more of a “pinkflamingo” (Hoffman, 2015) event than a “black swan” (Taleb, 2007).10 In 2014, a
global outbreak of the dreaded Ebola virus was averted with prompt action from
authorities and health workers. Gates (2015) raised the possibility of anotherpandemic happening in the near future. He discussed the need to think about
good ideas and solutions that could be put in practice for scenario planning,
vaccine research and health worker training.
While significant progress has been made since the Ebola epidemic in West
Africa, health systems around the world remain under-prepared for significant
outbreaks of other emerging infectious diseases such SARS, ZIKA and MERS
(World Economic Forum, 2020). In 2019, the Global Health Security (GHS) Index
released its inaugural comprehensive assessment of the global health security
capabilities of 195 countries. One stark finding is the fundamental weakness innational health security worldwide—no country is fully prepared for epidemics or
pandemics (GHS Index, 2020). At the same time, the group behind the GHS Index
observed that collective vulnerability to the economic and societal impacts ofinfectious diseases is increasing (World Economic Forum, 2019).
10

According to Taleb (2007), a black swan is an event or situation which is unpredictable and for which theconsequences could not be measured. Meanwhile, Hoffman (2015) described a pink flamingo as a predictable
event that is ignored due to cognitive biases of a senior leader or a group of leaders trapped by powerful
institutional forces.

31

Goldin (2014) observed that while supply chain risk, cyber security and risks tophysical infrastructure, natural disasters and climate change are severe global
risks, “ ... none is as threatening as the specter of a virulent, deadly global
pandemic… In terms of likelihood and potential damage that may be caused,pandemics pose a significant risk to both global health and economic stability(pp. 12 and 76).” In 2020, the world came to know the significant costs ofglobal pandemics.
The COVID-19 global pandemic has put considerable strain on nationaland global health systems. While it is primarily a public health crisis, itsdire repercussions reverberated in economies across the world. Countries
implemented community quarantines and lockdowns to prevent the coronavirus
from further spreading among the populace (i.e., flatten the curve). This
also intended to ensure that health systems are not overwhelmed. However,lockdowns brought economies to a virtual standstill with both production and
expenditure sides of the trade of goods and services coming to an unexpected
halt. COVID-19 plunged the global economy to its deepest recession since theGreat Depression (1929–1933).11 The IMF projects the global economy to shrink
by 4.9 percent in 2020.
In the Philippines, the lockdowns in Luzon and in most parts of the country havedisrupted economic production and dampened private sector demand. These
resulted to a decline of 9 percent in the domestic economy in the first semesterof 2020. The Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) sees the
economy contracting by 4.5 percent to 6.6 percent in 2020, and growing again by
6.5 percent to 7.5 percent in 2021.12
3.1 Policy responses and interventions to COVID-19 pandemic
Previous crises have shown that their depth and persistence can be significantly
alleviated with appropriate policies. The Philippines entered the COVID-19
pandemic with ample space to adopt necessary monetary and fiscal measures.
These allowed the NG to implement needed policy interventions to assure
markets and restore confidence in the financial system. Significant initiatives fromthe NG include the Bayanihan to Heal as One Act of 2020, Bayanihan to Recoveras One (Bayanihan II) and the Philippine Program for Recovery with Equity and
Solidarity (PH-PROGRESO).
11

IMF World Economic Outlook, June 2020.

12

Revised GDP growth assumptions adopted by the DBCC on 28 July 2020.

32

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Bayanihan to Heal as One Act of 2020. RA No. 11469 or the “Bayanihan to
Heal as One Act” of 2020 was signed on 24 March 2020. The act provided thePresident additional authority to combat the COVID-19 global pandemic. It
allowed the President to reallocate a budget of almost ₱275 billion from the 2020
national budget in response to the pandemic. The realigned amount is about 1.4
percent of GDP. The act expired on 24 June 2020.
Bayanihan to Recover as One (Bayanihan II). On 11 September 2020, the“Bayanihan to Recover as One” bill (i.e., Bayanihan II) was signed into law.
The measure sets aside ₱140 billion to support the NG’s COVID-19 pandemic
response with an additional ₱25.5 billion in standby funds. These resources areto be allocated to various government programs that will help Filipino households
and businesses recover from the adverse effects of COVID-19.
Philippine Program for Recovery with Equity and Solidarity (PHPROGRESO). PH-PROGRESO is the Duterte administration’s 4-pillar
socioeconomic strategy against COVID-19.13 The strategy requires a total fundingof ₱1.7 trillion or 9.1 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. The fiscal
and monetary responses are largely financed domestically, combined with loan
agreements with various multilateral and bilateral agencies.
Pillar 1. Emergency support for vulnerable groups (₱595.6 billion)
Pillar 2. Expanded medical resources to fight COVID-19 and ensure the safetyof frontliners (health insurance coverage for all COVID-19 patients; special risk
allowance, hazard pay and personal protective equipment (PPE) for frontline
health workers; increased testing capacity; etc.) amounting to ₱58.6 billion.
Pillar 3. Fiscal and monetary actions to finance emergency initiatives and keep
the economy afloat (₱610 billion, which includes standby financing for Pillar IV or
the economic recovery plan, and ₱233 billion liquidity infusion into the economy)
amounting to ₱1.1 trillion
Pillar 4. An economic recovery plan to create jobs and sustain growth13

https://www.dof.gov.ph/the-duterte-administrations-philippine-program-for-recovery-with-equity-andsolidarity-ph-progreso/

BSP initiatives to mitigate impact of COVID-19. While health and fiscal
measures were seen as frontline responses to the pandemic, the BSP
implemented measures to ascertain sufficient liquidity in the system amid thesustained uncertainty brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic (Table 3.1).
The BSP’s prompt and unprecedented actions during the crisis were “to ensure
adequate domestic liquidity, shore up market confidence, and sustain the flow ofcredit to support growth amid stronger headwinds” (Glindro et al, 2020).

Turning Crises into Opportunities: How Crises Shaped the Reform Agenda in the Philippines

Table 3.1. BSP Initiatives During the COVID-19 Pandemic (Cont)33

In an unprecedented move, the BSP utilized a tool included in its arsenal by
Section 89 of the New Central Bank Act.14 The BSP undertook a P300 billion(around US$5.9 billion) purchases of government securities (GS) from the
National Government under a repurchase agreement with a term of threemonths, which can be extended by another three months subject to Monetary
Board (MB) approval. Additionally, the BSP remitted P20 billion in advancedividends to the National Government.
The BSP also performed targeted liquidity and lending operations with the
reduction of the reserve requirement ratio (RRR), temporary reduction of term
spread on rediscounting loans and temporarily cancelling the term deposit facility(TDF) auction.

Source: BSP

Prior to the implementation of the Enhanced Community Quarantine (ECQ), the
BSP already reduced its policy rate by 25 basis points (bps). Cumulatively, the
BSP has reduced its policy rate by a total of 175 bps since February 2020 withthe policy rate settling at 2.25 percent by June 2020. The BSP likewise reduced
reserve requirement (RR) ratio of universal and commercial banks (UKBs) andnon-bank financial institutions with quasi-banking functions (NBQBs) by 200 basis
points. Further 200 bps cuts in the reserve requirement have been announced
for 2020.

Recognizing the importance of MSMEs in the economy, the BSP implemented
measures to encourage banks to continue lending to these industries. The BSP
adopted regulatory relief measures specifically designed to support MSMEs
survive the pandemic (BSP, 2020). These measures include, among others,
temporary reduction in the credit risk weight of MSME loans and assignment ofzero percent risk weight for MSME loans covered by guarantees.
A significant increase in the use of digital facilities for fund transfers andsettlement transactions was observed during the ECQ period. This is in viewof the limited physical mobility for most people. To encourage BSP Supervised
Financial Institutions (BSFIs) to offer safe, efficient and reliable digital channels,
the Monetary Board in April 2020 approved the waiving of fees related to theprovision of electronic payment and financial services (EPFS). This will be in effectfor a period of six months from 8 March 2020, the date of declaration of the
14

Section 89 provides that “the Bangko Sentral may make direct provisional advances with or without interest to the
National Government to finance expenditures authorized in its annual appropriation x x x” (italics supplied).

34

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

President of the state of public health emergency under Presidential Proclamation
No. 922. This period may be extended depending on the development of the
COVID-19 situation.
Legislative measures to support economic recovery. Legislative measures
have been proposed that would provide stimulus to mitigate the impact of theeconomic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic on the Philippine economy andfinancial system. These are:•Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) Unified Initiatives to DistressEnterprises for Economic Recovery (GUIDE) Act
The bill mandates government financial institutions (GFIs) to expand
their credit programs in order to assist affected micro, small and medium
enterprises (MSMEs) to meet their liquidity needs.

•

Financial Institutions Strategic Transfer (FIST) Law
The bill aims to ensure that distressed financial institutions have amechanism to strengthen their balance sheet. The FIST Law encourages theprivate sector, government financial institutions (“GFIs”) and governmentowned-or-controlled corporations (“GOCCs”) to help in the rehabilitation of
distressed businesses.

3.2 Reform imperatives and opportunities post-COVID-19
While the COVID-19 pandemic is still an ongoing concern, it has shined a light onreform imperatives in some sectors of the economy as well as opportunities fortransformative changes.
One of the Duterte administration’s 10-point socioeconomic agenda calls forinvesting in human capital development, including in health and educations
systems. The country’s experience with the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed
the vulnerabilities in the Philippine health sector. Regional and socioeconomic
disparities in the availability and accessibility of resources have affected
the delivery of health services in the country (Dayrit et al, 2018). There isdisproportionate distribution of infrastructure and human resources acrossregions. While there is high concentration in NCR and other major cities, otherregions have barely enough. Moreover, the Philippines finds it challenging toensure adequate availability of health-care professionals as they prefer to workoutside the country (Dayrit et al., 2018). Such conditions, which have existed
prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, became more pronounced as the crisis put
considerable pressure to the health system of the country.
Moreover, while the Philippines ranked 53rd out of 195 countries in the 2019 GHS
Index, it scored zero in five health security indicators.15 It was also observed thatthe country has yet to establish health protocols relating to potential pandemics.16
These are some of the concerns that the Philippine health sector need to address
going forward.
There is also the need to provide better social safety nets for vulnerable membersof society including the elderly, children and young people. The elderly aresome of the most affected by the pandemic, not just for health reasons, but also
because they tend to have weaker social ties than younger ones (Hyman et al.,2020). Special programs may be needed for them, particularly during periods
when risks prohibit them from leaving their premises (Ducanes et al, 2020).
Children and young people are mainly affected by closures of schools. This
would, however, vary depending on socioeconomic status of those from lowincome families most likely be affected. Online courses and classes will be difficult
to access for poorer students (Hyman et al., 2020). Policymakers need to takethese into consideration when they design social programs.
Meanwhile, for the BSP, the experience with COVID-19 highlighted the increasing
importance of digital transactions. It was observed that the volume and value
15

These include i) biosafety; ii) dual use research and culture of responsible science; iii) linking public health andsecurity authorities; iv) communications with healthcare workers during a public health emergency; and v)
completion and publication of a Joint External Evaluation (JPE) and Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS).

16

The Department of Health (DOH)’s Health Emergency Management Bureau Manual of Operations on Health
Emergency and Disaster Response Management released in 2015 does not contain protocols relating
to potential pandemics. Health Emergency Management Bureau of the Department of Health of thePhilippines. 2015. “Manual of Operations on Health Emergency and Disaster Response Management.” https://
hospitalsafetypromotionanddisasterpreparedness.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/complete-manual-20150129.pdf(Accessed: 16 August 2020).

Turning Crises into Opportunities: How Crises Shaped the Reform Agenda in the Philippinesof the combined transactions of PESONet and InstaPay during the Enhanced
Community Quarantine (ECQ) period surged. The combined transactions of thetwo payment networks climbed by over 70 percent in volume and 42 percent invalue in the two-and-a-half months when Metro Manila and Luzon were under
ECQ (17 March – 31 May) compared to the same duration prior to ECQ (1 January
to 16 March). On the other hand, the volume and value of check payments and
ATM withdrawals declined over the two periods. These numbers suggest that theutilization of e-payment services rose during the ECQ when people needed these
services the most.
The BSP envisions an accelerated uptake of e-payment services through digitalplatforms such as InstaPay and PESONet in the Philippines over the next three
years. The adoption of the national QR code standard as well as the use of
online payment facilities for government transactions are significant strides inthis direction.

35

4. Conclusion
Crisis episodes often expose the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of economic
systems. As such, crises can provide possible directions for policy reforms. The
Philippines has managed to turn lessons from previous crises into reforms that
helped enhance the economy’s resiliency. Compared to previous crises, the
COVID-19 pandemic is different in terms of its origin and nature. Nonetheless, it
required a prompt and collective response to mitigate its adverse consequences.
While it is still an ongoing concern, COVID-19 has underscored some reform
imperatives and opportunities that warrant consideration from policymakers.

36

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

References
Abenoja, R., Bautista, D., and Ramos, C. (2010, Sept - Oct). Medium-term inflation target of the Philippines. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Newsletter 10 (5).
Ballesteros, M. and Domingo, S. (2015) Building Philippine SMEs resilience to natural disasters. Philippine Institute of Development Studies (PIDS) Discussion Paper Series No. 2015-20.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (2005, January 18). Why was actual inflation in 2004 higher than the government target? An open letter to the President [Media Release]. http://www.bsp.gov.ph/publications/media_archives.asp?id=105&yr=2005
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (2010). Inflation Report Third Quarter.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (2013). Inflation Report Fourth Quarter.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (2015a). Inflation Report Second Quarter.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (2015b). Inflation Report Third Quarter.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (2019, January 25). BSP open letter to the President on the 2018 inflation [Media Release]. http://www.bsp.gov.ph/monetary/open_2018.asp
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (2020, 5 May). BSP adopts relief measures in support of MSME sector [Media Release]. http://www.bsp.gov.ph/publications/media.asp?id=5376
Bayangos, V., Cachuela, R., and Prado, F. (2020) Impact of extreme weather episodes on the Philippine banking sector: Evidence using branch-level supervisory data. BSP Working Paper Series No.
2020-03.
Central Bank of the Philippines (1972). Annual Report.
Dayrit, M., Lagrada, L., Picazo, O., Pons, M., and Villaverde, M. (2018) The Philippines health system review. Health Systems in Transition, 8 (2). Asia Pacific Observatory on Health Systems andPolicies and European Union.
Ducanes, G., Daway-Ducanes, S.L., and Ravago, M.L. (2020) Special programs needed for the elderly and elderly households during the enhanced community quarantine. Policy Brief 2020-02.
Ateneo Center for Research and Development.
EM-DAT (2020). The international disaster database. [Data set] Natural Disasters Trends. https://public.emdat.be
Gates, B. (2015, March). The next outbreak? We’re not ready [Presentation]. TED2015, Vancouver BC, Canada. https://www.ted.com/talks/bill_gates_the_next_outbreak_we_re_not_ready (Accessed
16 August 2020).
Glindro, E., Parcon-Santos, H., Cacnio, F.C.Q., Oliva, M., and Ignacio, L. (2020) COVID-19 exit strategies: How do we proceed? BSP Working Paper Series No. 2020-01.
Goldin, I. (2014). Future opportunities, future shocks: Key trends shaping the global economy and society. Citi Global Perspectives & Solutions.
Guinigundo, D. and Cacnio, F.C.Q. (2019). Pursuing the cause of monetary stability in the Philippines: agenda for the future. In The story of Philippine central banking: Stability and strength atseventy (pp. 30 – 75). Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Hoffman, F. (2015, August 19). Black swans and pink flamingos: Five principles for force design. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/black-swans-and-pink-flamingos-fiveprinciples-for-force-design/ (Accessed 16 August 2020).
Hynes, W., Linkov, I., and Trump, B. (2020). A systemic approach to dealing with Covid-19 and future shocks. New Approaches to Economic Challenges (NAEC), OECD.
International Monetary Fund (2020, January). Philippines: Selected issues. IMF Country Report No. 20/37.
International Monetary Fund (2020, June). World economic outlook.
Intal, P. and Llanto, G. (1998) Financial reform and development in the Philippines, 1980 – 1997: Imperatives, performance and challenges. Philippine Institute for Development Studies Discussion
Paper Series No. 98-02.
Keen, B. and Pakko, M. (2007) Monetary policy and natural disasters in a DSGE model. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper Series No. 2007-025.
Llanto, G. (2016) Risks, shocks, building resilience: Philippines. Philippine Institute for Development Studies Discussion Paper Series No. 2016-09.
Nuclear Threat Initiative (2019). Global health security index: Building collective action and accountability. https://www.ghsindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2019-Global-Health-SecurityIndex.pdf (Accessed: 16 August 2020).
Taleb, N. (2007). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Random House.
World Economic Forum (2019). Outbreak readiness and business impact: Protecting lives and livelihoods across the global economy [White Paper in collaboration with Harvard Global HealthInstitute]. https://www.weforum.org/whitepapers/outbreak-readiness-and-business-impact-protecting-lives-and livelihoods-across-the-global-economy (Accessed: 16 August 2020)
World Economic Forum (2020). The Global Risks Report.

Turning Crises into Opportunities: How Crises Shaped the Reform Agenda in the Philippines

Source of data: PSA, BSP and The International Disaster Database

37

38

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Source of data: BSP and The International Disaster Database

Source of data: BSP and The International Disaster Database

40

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

One of the key lessons the BSP has learned from previous crises is that crafting
appropriate and effective policy responses requires a clear understanding of
the nature of the shock. The COVID-19 pandemic is mainly a public health crisis.
Hence, the primary response of policymakers should be towards containing thevirus and providing adequate care for the infected.
However, deliberate policy choices to slow the spread of infections and arrest afull-blown health disaster inadvertently drove economies into an induced coma.
Containment measures disrupted global and domestic supply chains, halting
production and hindering the delivery of services. At the same time, restrictedmobility and activity resulted in revenue losses especially for smaller enterprises,in turn causing layoffs and dampening household spending. Meanwhile,
uncertainty surrounding the scale and duration of the pandemic also shook
financial markets and led to some tightening of liquidity.
In the Philippines, the shock on both the demand and supply sides of theeconomy has been palpable. In the first quarter of 2020, real GDP declined by
0.7 percent year-on-year, the first recorded contraction in output since after the
Asian Financial Crisis in 1998. By the second quarter of the year, the economy had
fallen into a technical recession, with real GDP contracting by 16.5 percent during
the period.
The unprecedented shock called for a bold and coordinated response from the
National Government (NG), with both fiscal and monetary policy authorities
playing distinct yet complementary roles in mitigating the adverse economic
impact of the pandemic. Fiscal policy has been geared primarily towards
alleviating supply bottlenecks and providing income support to vulnerable
enterprises and households, while monetary authorities’ role has been to ensure
the proper functioning of credit and financial markets while supporting demand.
*

Eduard Joseph D. Robleza (Bank Officer V), Charday V. Batac (Bank Officer V), Paul Reimon R. Alhambra (BankOfficer V), Jasmin E. Dacio (Bank Officer V), Jan Christopher G. Ocampo (Bank Officer V), Lara Romina E. Ganapin(Acting Deputy Director) and Dennis M. Bautista (Deputy Director) are from the Department of Economic Research(DER). This chapter was prepared by the DER under the supervision of DER Director Dennis D. Lapid, Monetary
Policy Sub-Sector (MPSS) Assistant Governor Iluminada T. Sicat and Monetary and Economics Sector (MES) Deputy
Governor Francisco G. Dakila, Jr. The DER also acknowledges the contributions of colleagues from the Financial
Market Operations Sub-Sector (FMOSS), Ma. Mediatriz M. Boelsch, Richard S. Jadulan and Kashmirr I. Camacho.

This chapter maps the BSP’s quick and decisive monetary responses to safeguard
macroeconomic stability amid the COVID-19 pandemic. A preliminary assessmentof their impact shows that these measures have helped calm market sentimentand ease financial conditions. The monetary easing, in particular, could also
lead to improved growth prospects and slightly higher inflation over the policy
horizon, although their impact on the real sector has yet to manifest fully. The
chapter closes with directions for future policy responses by the BSP in its mission
to help stabilize the economy amid an unprecedented crisis.

1. Mapping the BSP’s monetary responses
With the onset of the pandemic in the country in February, the BSP observedsome financial market volatility and a tightening in liquidity as prospects fordomestic economic growth dimmed. On 17 March 2020, a total lockdown tookeffect over Luzon and Metro Manila, with the rest of the country following suit
shortly thereafter, further dampening market sentiment.
While the BSP saw that Philippine financial institutions continued to be soundwith adequate capital and liquidity buffers, it also recognized the need to shore
up market confidence to ensure the proper functioning of the financial systemand prevent serious scarring of the economy over the medium term.
Therefore, guided by its mandate as the country’s central monetary authority,and in accordance with the provisions of its Charter, the New Central Bank Act,1
the BSP deemed it necessary to act decisively and take extraordinary measures tocomplement the National Government’s health and fiscal programs in mitigating
the impact of COVID-19 (Figure 4.1). By ensuring sufficient liquidity and theproper functioning of financial markets, the BSP aimed to assist the country’s
financial intermediaries in responding to the needs of Filipino households andbusinesses amid challenging times.
1

Republic Act (RA) No. 7653 approved on 14 June 1993, as amended by RA No. 11211 on 14 February 2019

Leveraging Monetary Tools to Maintain Macroeconomic Stability

41

Source: BSP

1.1 Monetary policy easing
From February to June 2020, the BSP reduced the interest rate on the overnight
reverse repurchase (RRP) facility by a total of 175 basis points (bps) from 4
percent at the start of the year to an historic low of 2.25 percent. The series ofaggressive and decisive policy rate cuts included a decision by the Monetary
Board (MB) to reduce the policy rate by 50 bps during an off-cycle meeting on 16
April 2020, substituting for the scheduled monetary policy meeting on
21 May 2020.2
The benign inflation environment afforded the BSP the scope to ease its
monetary policy stance considerably. Baseline inflation forecasts hovered firmly
within the inflation target range of 3 percent ± 1 percentage point for 2020
2

The Monetary Board decided to reduce the policy rate by 25 bps on 6 February, and by 50 bps each on 19 March,
16 April and 25 June.

up to 2022, reflecting mainly the impact of the pandemic on global demand,
domestic economic conditions and commodity prices. Moreover, the balanceof risks to the inflation outlook leaned toward the downside owing largely topotential disruptions to domestic and global economic activity. Meanwhile,
inflation expectations remained well within the target range over the two-year
policy horizon.
At the same time, the BSP noted a considerable slowdown in domestic economic
activity with the enforcement of necessary lockdown measures. Prospects for the
global economy also deteriorated amid considerable uncertainty surrounding
the extent of the health crisis. Even as economies began to reopen by June 2020,
global recovery was seen likely to be protracted and uneven.

42

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Views from the Trading Desk

Given these considerations, the BSP saw enough scope for monetary policy tohelp cushion economic activity and support financial conditions. Keeping themonetary stance sufficiently accommodative amid a benign inflation environment
would help mitigate the strong downside risks to growth and boost market
confidence. Even with the improvement in domestic liquidity and market function
owing to the BSP’s suite of liquidity-enhancing measures, the policy rate cuts
during the first semester of 2020 were also expected to reduce the cost of
borrowing further and ensure ample credit and liquidity in the financial system.
1.2 Reserve requirements
The BSP also reduced reserve requirement ratios (RRRs) to ward off any potential
liquidity constraints. The move also aimed to encourage banks to continue
lending to both retail and corporate sectors, especially amid the lockdowns
imposed beginning in mid-March.
Effective on the reserve week beginning 3 April 2020, universal and commercial
banks (UKBs) and non-banks with quasi-banking functions (NBQBs) shall maintainreserves equivalent to 12 percent of their deposit and deposit-substituteliabilities, down 200 bps from the prevailing ratio of 14 percent prior to thepandemic.3 Meanwhile, the equivalent ratios for thrift banks (TBs) as well as
rural and cooperative banks (RCBs) were reduced by 100 bps to 3 percent and 2
percent, respectively, effective on the reserve week beginning 31 July 2020.4
In addition, to further incentivize bank lending to businesses affected by severe
economic disruptions, the BSP allowed alternative modes of compliance withreserve requirements. Prior to the pandemic, required reserves are kept onlyin the form of non-remunerated deposits maintained by banks and NBQBs intheir demand deposit accounts (DDAs) with the BSP. Beginning 24 April 2020,
new peso-denominated loans granted to micro, small and medium enterprises(MSMEs) after 15 March 2020 would be eligible forms of compliance with RRRs
against deposits and deposit substitutes.5 Beginning 29 May 2020, the BSP
expanded the coverage to include new loans to large enterprises as well as
loans that were renewed and restructured after 15 March 2020.6 This mode ofalternative compliance is available to banks and NBQBs up to 30 December 2021.
3

Circular No. 1082, dated 31 March 2020

4

Circular No. 1092, dated 27 July 2020

5

Circular No. 1083, dated 22 April 2020.

6

Circular No. 1087, dated 27 May 2020. The policy excludes loans granted to other banks and NBQBs that mayotherwise meet the prescribed definition of MSMEs or large enterprises.

Ma. Mediatriz M. Boelsch, Richard S. Jadulan and Kashmirr I. Camacho
Uncertainty over the severity of the COVID-19 outbreak weighed heavily onmarket sentiment at the onset of the lockdown. Jittery market participantspreferred to hold cash and aggressively sold their GS holdings. Consequently, GS
yields rose sharply, with the five-year rate increasing by around 90 basis points in
March 2020. Further, daily trading volumes fell to as low as ₱4 billion on 24 March
2020 from the ₱34-billion average prior to the imposition of the quarantine.
This lack of buying interest in the debt paper market was also reflected in thepoor market participation in the BTr’s regular auctions during the first two
weeks of the lockdown. The auctions held from 23 to 30 March 2020 were mostly
undersubscribed and submitted bid rates were 60 bps–163 bps above market
rates, prompting the BTr to reject all bids. Said premium over market rates was
substantially higher than the two-basis-point average premium from 6 January to
16 March 2020
In response to the pandemic-related uncertainty plaguing the financial
markets, the BSP actively injected liquidity into the system to calm market
sentiment. First, four TDF auctions were cancelled and outstanding TDF
placements were allowed to mature. The suspension of the TDF auctions ensured
adequate short-term peso liquidity in the financial system to sustain the smooth
flow of funding to businesses and households during the quarantine.
Secondly, the BSP Financial Market Operations Sub-Sector (FMOSS) opened a
one-hour GS purchase window starting on 24 March 2020 to support the local
debt market. The BSP’s GS purchases are in line with Section 91 of the BSP

1.3 Financial market operations
The BSP also reduced the scale of its liquidity absorption through its open
market operations (OMO) to smoothen the flow of funding to businesses andhouseholds amid the lockdown. By limiting the volume offerings for the BSP’s
OMO, the BSP aimed to encourage counterparties to lend in the interbank market
or to rechannel their funds towards other assets such as government securities(GS) or loans.
Immediately after the lockdown began, the BSP suspended the auctions for all
tenors of the term deposit facility (TDF) scheduled between 18 March and 8 April
2020. The BSP also scaled back the overnight RRP volume offerings beginningon 8 April 2020. The BSP aimed to urge counterparties with maturing deposits to
deploy their funds towards servicing their clients’ funding requirements.

Leveraging Monetary Tools to Maintain Macroeconomic Stability

43

Charter, which allows the BSP to buy and sell such securities for its own accountto “achieve the objectives of the national monetary policy.”
The operation of said window was challenging given the reduced number ofoffice personnel working during the quarantine and the lack of automatedtrading and settlement systems for straight-through-processing.
Given resource constraints, FMOSS limited its initial purchases to the threemost traded securities to ensure liquidity and the availability of a price. On 8
April 2020, the Monetary Board expanded the list of eligible securities to include
all Treasury bills, Treasury bonds and retail Treasury bonds. By then, FMOSS
had already established procedures that enabled it to cope with the expanded
list. These procedures included setting up Bloomberg price pages for easy
reference on market levels, and the use of Bloomberg confirmations as a basis
for the details of done trades. The transactions are encoded on the domestic
operations system, an electronic platform that captures trade data for settlementby the back office.
To protect the health and safety of personnel, the FMOSS workforce was
equipped to work from home while a minimum number of onsite staff operated
the most critical processes. Departments were split into teams on rotatingschedules to guarantee continuous operations during the pandemic. Meanwhile,
those who worked from home were given the necessary technologicalsupport, such as BSP-issued laptops with proper security features to eliminate
cybersecurity and operational risks, and offsite access to the BSP’s systems anddatabases via virtual private networks (VPNs) and remote desktop protocols(RDPs). The enabling but secure technological infrastructure empowered FMOSS
personnel to operate efficiently within a reliable and safe environment thatallowed the seamless transfer of data between onsite and offsite staff.

Market functioning and liquidity improved in the succeeding weeks, as indicatedby oversubscriptions in the TDF and RRP auctions. Hence, guided by its liquidity
forecasts, the BSP found scope to slowly reconfigure its OMO. The 7-day TDF
auctions resumed on 15 April 2020, with the 14-day and 28-day TDFs following
shortly on 10 June 2020 and 1 July 2020, respectively. Meanwhile, the BSP
also began to gradually normalize its overnight RRP volume offerings in June.
These incremental changes were operational adjustments aimed at reinforcing
previous liquidity-enhancing measures and allowing better policy traction on
short-term interest rates while preserving the overall accommodative stance ofmonetary policy.

1.4 GS purchases in the secondary market
On 24 March 2020, the BSP opened a daily one-hour window between
9:30 AM and 10:30 AM within which it could purchase only selected series ofhighly-traded and liquid GS from banks at market prices. Beginning 8 April 2020,
the BSP expanded the range of eligible securities to cover all peso-denominatedGS issuances. The measure was aimed at reassuring market participants ofdemand for GS should they need to liquidate their holdings, thus encouraging
participation in the primary GS auctions. The window was set to remain open
until June 2020, or until market conditions returned to normal.
1.5 Rediscounting
As a form of standing credit facility available to qualified financial institutions,
the BSP’s rediscounting windows also help banks meet their temporary liquidity
needs by refinancing the loans they extend to their clients using the eligible
papers (i.e., credit instruments such as promissory notes, or drafts or bills of
exchange) of their end-user borrowers as collateral.
On 19 March 2020, the BSP approved a temporary reduction in the term spreadon rediscounting loans relative to the overnight lending rate to zero, effective up
to 19 May 2020. The effectivity of the relief measure has been extended up to 30
September 2020.
For the period covering 1 January to 31 July 2020, total availments under the Peso
Rediscount Facility stood at ₱20.7 billion. There had been no availments under the
Exporters Dollar and Yen Rediscount Facility (EDYRF) over the same period.
1.6 Extraordinary liquidity measures
The BSP also implemented extraordinary liquidity measures in support of the
NG’s efforts to soften the impact of the pandemic on the economy, in line withthe provisions of its Charter.

44

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Remittance of dividends. The BSP’s newly amended Charter stipulates that any
and all dividends declared by the BSP in favor of the NG shall be released anddisbursed for the payment of the increase in the BSP’s capitalization. While the
BSP is no longer mandated to remit its dividends to the NG, the crisis prompted
the Monetary Board to defer the application of the BSP’s dividends for 2019 to
the BSP’s capital and instead remit ₱20 billion in advance/partial dividends tosupport the NG’s COVID-19 response programs. The funds were directly credited
to NG’s deposit account maintained with the BSP, or the treasury single account(TSA), on 26 March 2020.
Provisional advances. Section 89 of its Charter allows the BSP to directly
extend funds to the NG, with or without interest, to finance public expendituresauthorized in the NG’s annual appropriation—akin to a cash advance. On
27 March 2020, the BSP extended provisional advances to the NG through arepurchase (repo) transaction with the Bureau of the Treasury (BTr). This was
the first time since the BSP’s inception in 1993 that a provisional advance wasrequested by the NG and subsequently granted by the BSP.
Under the repo agreement, the BSP purchased GS from the BTr amounting to₱300 billion. The NG, in turn, committed to buy back the GS and repay the BSP
within three months after the disbursement of the funds. Prior to maturing on
29 June 2020, the repo was extended by another three months to 29 September
2020, the maximum duration allowed under the BSP Charter.
Because of its temporary and time-bound nature, the ₱300-billion repo
agreement with the BTr should not be seen as a quantitative-easing (QE)
measure. Unlike the QE programs implemented by other central banks suchas the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, the BSP’s repo
arrangement with the NG is not aimed at bringing down market interest rates
over the medium term through large-scale asset purchases. Rather, it is a shortterm relief measure intended primarily to give the NG the added fiscal flexibility
to finance its programs to counter the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
At the same time, the provisional cash advance to the NG, or any of the BSP’s
money-creation tools, is not a long-term source of financing for government
spending. The Charter expressly stipulates a ceiling on the amount of provisional
advances the BSP can extend to the NG—provisional advances should not, in

their aggregate, exceed 20 percent of the NG’s average annual income in thelast three preceding years, estimated at around ₱560 billion. Moreover, the capon the duration of the provisional advance—i.e., a period of only three months,
extendible to a maximum of another three months—should ensure that thetransaction would not result in a long-term or permanent expansion in themonetary base or the BSP’s balance sheet, which could otherwise feed adversely
into the public’s inflation expectations.

2. Analyzing the potency of monetary measures
The policy response of the BSP aimed to provide sufficient monetary support
to the banking sector and financial markets to help credit expansion keep pacewith the overall growth and funding requirements of the economy. The BSP
reduced its policy rate by a cumulative 175 bps to a historic low of 2.25 percent
in the first half of 2020. The RRRs of UKBs were also lowered by 200 bps to 12
percent. In addition, the auction volumes in the overnight RRP window and
TDF were temporarily reduced, bringing the weighted monetary operations rate
(WMOR) closer to the floor of the interest rate corridor, which currently stands at
1.75–2.75 percent.
Tracing the potential impact of the BSP’s monetary policy adjustments suggeststhat monetary easing could result in higher growth prospects and a slightly
higher, but still within target, inflation path over the policy horizon. Meanwhile,financial market sentiment and activity appear to have improved in the weeks
following the deployment of the BSP’s monetary measures. However, banklending remains tepid as constrained economic activity has also dampened
demand for credit. Nevertheless, the BSP expects credit conditions to improve as
the economy gradually reopens, and as the monetary measures continue to work
their way through the usual transmission channels of monetary policy.
2.1 Examining the potential impact
As reductions in the RRP rate and RRRs are estimated to affect key
macroeconomic variables with long and variables lags based on standard theories
of monetary policy transmission, the actual impact of these policy measures isLeveraging Monetary Tools to Maintain Macroeconomic Stability

likely to be felt fully in 2021, even as their initial effects continue to work their
way through the economy. For instance, monetary policy rate adjustments by
the BSP are estimated to impact inflation with a lag of six months, with the peakoccurring after 15-21 months. It should be noted that the policy actions may havea short-term impact on the economy through market expectations, which are notfully captured by the models.
An indirect way to examine the potential impact of policy measures is to assess
how the forecast paths of key macroeconomic variables have changed due to thesaid adjustments. In order to assess the impact of the BSP’s policy adjustmentson the projected path of major economic variables over the forecast horizon, acounterfactual exercise can be performed using the BSP multi-equation model7(MEM) and the policy analysis model for the Philippines8 (PAMPh). In thisexercise, a scenario without policy actions (i.e., baseline case) can be comparedto scenarios that incorporate the actual policy rate easing and reduction in RR
ratios. Specifically, the forecast path used for the February 2020 monetary policy
meeting represents the baseline case. All other assumptions on exogenous
variables, such as fiscal policy, world GDP growth, foreign interest rates andglobal crude oil prices, were held constant in order to isolate the impact of policy
adjustments on the forecast path.
In the BSP MEM, changes in the policy rate affect the economy through thestandard transmission channels of monetary policy, i.e., interest rate, credit,
exchange rate and expectations. An easing of the policy rate is projected to resultin lower market interest rates, faster domestic liquidity growth, a depreciation in
the exchange rate and higher GDP growth and inflation. Meanwhile, a reductionin the RR ratio leads to a corresponding increase in the money multiplier whichraises domestic liquidity and inflation via the standard quantity theory of money
identity. The estimated impact of these policy adjustments affects the major
macroeconomic variables with a lag, with the peak impact occurring after about
4–6 quarters.
7

The MEM is the BSP’s workhorse model for forecasting and policy analysis. It consists of 23 identities andsimultaneous equations estimated largely thorough the error-correction mechanism (ECM) approach.

8

The PAMPh is a New Keynesian semi-structural gap model for analyzing monetary transmission mechanism of
key macroeconomic variables and generating their medium-term forecast path.

45

In the BSP PAMPh, a change in the BSP’s policy rate influences the market interest
rate, which subsequently determines the real interest rate. The real interest ratethen feeds these variations back to the real economy. A monetary policy rateadjustment enters the output gap equation in real terms as a gap relative tolong-term interest rates. Holding the neutral rate constant, a policy rate cut is
expected to support aggregate demand as households and firms consume aswell as invest more given lower opportunity cost of funds. Meanwhile, headline
inflation is estimated as a composite of core, volatile food and energy inflation.
A higher output gap, reflecting the impact of a lower RRP rate, consequently
leads to higher core inflation, other things being equal. However, a reduction inreserve requirements cannot be directly captured in the PAMPh. Nonetheless, tothe extent that the WMOR, instead of the headline RRP rate, and interbank callloan (IBCL) rates are used in the model, the impact of other BSP liquidity-easing
measures, including the cut in RRRs, is implicitly considered in the analysis.
The counterfactual exercise in the PAMPh was implemented by fixing the WMOR
at actual levels as of the second quarter of 2020, instead of using the endogenous
monetary policy rule in the model. Meanwhile, all assumptions on exogenous
variables were held constant. The baseline case was likewise represented by theforecast path considered in the February 2020 monetary policy meeting.
Impact of BSP policy-rate easing on forecast path. Using the BSP MEM, thereduction in the BSP RRP rate was contemporaneously reflected in the secondary
market yields of government securities as well as in the average lending rate of
UKBs. However, the reduction in market rates was estimated to be higher than
the 175-bp reduction in the policy rate over the forecast horizon (Figure 4.2). This
reflected elevated levels of excess liquidity in the financial system due primarily toother liquidity-enhancing measures of the BSP, which pushed short-term interest
rates closer to the floor of the BSP interest rate corridor, as well as improved
confidence in the primary and secondary GS markets.

Figure 2

46

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines			

Source: BSP Staff Calculations

Meanwhile, the exchange rate was projected to depreciate over the forecasthorizon through the standard interest rate and purchasing power parity
relationships (Figure 4.3). However, other developments in the economy, whichwere not captured by the model, affected the demand and supply of foreign
currency and resulted in the actual appreciation of the peso in recent months.

These factors included the significant decline in corporate demand for dollars
given lower import volumes, as well as foreign exchange inflows owing to foreign
borrowings by the government partly to finance social and health measures toaddress the pandemic.

Leveraging Monetary Tools to Maintain Macroeconomic Stability

			

47

Source: BSP Staff Calculations

Not surprisingly, projections of lower market rates, higher domestic liquidity
growth and the depreciation of the exchange rate following the RRP rate
cut resulted in the upward adjustment of the GDP growth forecasts by half apercentage point (ppt) on average for 2021 and 2022. Similarly, the inclusion ofpolicy rate reduction in the scenario generated higher inflation projections of 0.1
ppt for 2021 and 0.2 ppt for 2022, relative to the baseline case. Nevertheless,inflation remains within the announced target range in the scenario with lower
policy rates.

Results of the counterfactual exercise using the PAMPh pointed to a similar
narrative. The lower policy rates resulted in a more depreciated currency over theforecast horizon, along with higher forecasts of GDP growth and inflation (Figure4.4). The projection for output gap was revised upward by 0.6 ppt in 2020, while
the forecasts for headline inflation were higher by 0.3 ppt and 0.4 ppt in 2020 and
2021, respectively.

48

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines			

Source: BSP Staff Calculations

Impact of reduction in the RR ratio on the forecast path. The liquidity
released from the 200-bp reduction in the RRR in April 2020 is assumed to raise
domestic liquidity as banks are expected to accelerate lending for production
activities. The lagged effect is consistent with the historical episodes of reductionsin the RRR wherein credit activity started to expand 6–8 months after the RR cut
implementation in the absence of other shocks.

The extent by which banks can lend out free reserves is determined largely by themoney multiplier (MM).9 The reduction in required reserves is expected to raise
the MM if the public’s demand for cash holdings remains broadly stable. Basedon the BSP’s calculations, the MM as of June 2020 is estimated to range from 4.2
to 4.7. This implies that an additional peso released to the financial system fromthe BSP’s liquidity-enhancing measures (net of BSP monetary operations) canpotentially generate up to ₱4.30-₱4.70 in additional credit.
9

The MEM does not incorporate any assumption on possible supply constraints that could influence lending
activities of banks.

Leveraging Monetary Tools to Maintain Macroeconomic Stability

The lower RRR has resulted primarily in double-digit M3 growth rates following
the slower M3 expansion noted in 2019. Domestic liquidity growth is projected
to be higher by 3 ppts in 2020 and 2 ppts in 2021 (Figure 4.5). Meanwhile, theimpact on growth prospects will be seen largely in the second half of 2021

			

Source: BSP Staff Calculations

49

following the assumed lags in the impact of reduced RR on credit activity. On thewhole, the cut in reserve requirements resulted in the upward adjustment in the
inflation forecasts of 0.1 ppt in 2021 and 0.2 ppt in 2022. Inflation also remains
within the announced target range in the scenario with lower RRRs for UKBs.

50

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

In summary, the combined reductions in the policy rate and RR ratio are seen tocontribute to lower market interest rates, faster domestic liquidity growth anda depreciation of the exchange rate compared to the scenario without policy
actions. These factors could lead to slightly higher inflation and improved growth			Source: BSP Staff Calculations

prospects over the policy horizon. Nonetheless, the BSP projects that inflation is
likely to remain firmly anchored within the government’s target range following
these policy adjustments (Figure 4.5).

Leveraging Monetary Tools to Maintain Macroeconomic Stability

51

2.2 Analyzing emerging trends
As the impact of the monetary measures continue to work their way through theeconomy via the usual transmission channels of monetary policy, it remains too
early to confirm any tangible impact on output and inflation, as well as on actualbank lending. Nevertheless, there have been incipient signs of their potency,
particularly on market sentiment and interest rates.
As the previous section demonstrates, interest rates are among the first variables
to respond to monetary policy adjustments, with reductions in the policy ratetranslating to a nearly contemporaneous decline in market rates.
A cursory look at the results of the government’s primary auctions for Treasury
bills (T-bills) reveals how market sentiment has responded to the government’s
measures to contain the outbreak and mitigate its potential adverse economic
effects. Figure 4.7 shows that bid-to-cover ratios, which measure the strengthof demand in an auction for government papers, in the primary GS market for
T-bills had been on a steady rise at the start of 2020 up until mid-February owing
to ample liquidity as well as to buoyant market sentiment. However, market
sentiment quickly deteriorated in March as the medical authorities confirmed the
local transmission of the virus and as the NG mulled imposing strict lockdown
measures to arrest it. Market participants turned risk-averse and participation in
the primary auctions for T-bills sank, as indicated by the sharp decline in bid-tocover ratios for all offered tenors.
Shortly after Luzon was placed under lockdown on 17 March 2020, the BSP
deployed a suite of monetary measures to shore up market confidence andensure ample liquidity in the financial system. Among these was a decision to
open a daily window to purchase GS in the secondary market beginning on
24 March 2020 to reassure market participants of demand for GS should theyneed to liquidate their holdings. Together with subsequent measures to reduce
the policy rate and RRRs, the BSP’s actions helped encourage and restore
participation in the primary GS auctions.
Meanwhile, in the secondary market for GS, yields have been on a downward
trend since the BSP began deploying monetary measures in March 2020, withnotable drops typically observed following reductions in the BSP policy rate.

Source: BSP Staff Calculations, based on data from BTr

This supports the notion that the BSP’s measures have helped shore up market
sentiment and ensure the smooth functioning of the GS market, thereby
facilitating the stabilization of broader domestic liquidity conditions (Figure 4.8).
More importantly, to the extent that banks use the BSP policy rate and GS yields
as benchmarks for their lending rates, the BSP expects this development toeventually translate to lower borrowing costs for households and enterprises in
the coming months. A special survey by the BSP on monthly quoted lending ratesof UKBs for the period January to June 2020 showed some early evidence of adecline in lending rates, suggesting that the BSP’s policy actions are starting togain some traction.10

10

The special survey was conducted by the Supervisory Policy and Research Department (SPRD). It may berecalled that, as part of the BSP’s regulatory relief measures, the submission of some regulatory reports by BSPsupervised financial institutions (BSFIs) that fell due between March and May 2020 was temporarily suspended.

52

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

3. Looking towards new economic realities
The COVID-19 pandemic required the BSP to mobilize its monetary instruments
and other extraordinary measures to avert liquidity strains and to prevent longlasting scarring on the Philippine economy. The measures have contributed tocalming market sentiment and easing financial conditions, although the full
impact of their transmission through the economy has yet to be realized. Thissuggests that there remains room for monetary policy and liquidity measures toprovide potent support to the economy.
The BSP ensures that it administers only carefully considered prescriptions in
nursing the economy back to health. As the end of the pandemic remains highly
uncertain, the BSP continues to monitor economic developments and data togauge the evolving needs of the economy. The BSP has far from exhausted the
instruments in its policy toolkit, and it stands ready to recalibrate or deploy
additional measures to maintain macroeconomic stability. The BSP reiterates its
continued support for the NG’s broader efforts to mitigate the socioeconomic
impact of the pandemic on Filipino households and businesses.

Source: Philippine Dealing & Exchange Corp. (PDEx)

At the same time, given the lags associated with monetary policy adjustments,
it may be too soon to see any evidence on the impact of these measures on
actual bank lending. Preliminary data as of end-July 2020 show that growth inoutstanding loans of UKBs, net of RRP placements with the BSP, has broadly
decelerated relative to its pace in 2019, reflecting constrained domestic
economic activity and weaker demand for credit amid the ongoing health crisis.
Nonetheless, domestic liquidity, as measured by M3, continues to expand at
double-digit rates as of end-July 2020.

Nevertheless, the BSP has always been aware of the limits of its interventions,especially with regard to monetary policy and its instruments. As the Philippine
economy slowly recovers, most of these monetary interventions will need to bescaled back, if not reversed entirely, even as other instruments of the central
bank may have to be utilized. Moreover, fiscal policy, together with structuralreforms, will also continue to share in the heavy lifting to quicken the recovery
by supporting incomes and employment, thus rousing sentiment and demand.
However, the growing overlap between monetary and fiscal policy will need
to be kept in check to ensure the central bank’s independence and credibility(Carstens, 2020). Transitioning towards new economic realities, therefore, willentail some challenges for the BSP in the pursuit of its mandate as the country’ssole monetary authority.

Leveraging Monetary Tools to Maintain Macroeconomic Stability

3.1 Maintaining price and financial stability
The transition to new normal conditions may yet require the BSP to continue
to enforce and deploy measures in aid of the NG’s ongoing efforts to address
the socioeconomic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. As the BSP continues
to coordinate with fiscal authorities, the challenge lies in ensuring that the
BSP’s policy actions remain in line with its mandate to maintain price andfinancial stability.
Price stability. The BSP’s policy responses thus far have been consistent with
its primary objective to maintain price stability conducive to a balanced andsustainable growth of the economy and employment. As shown in the previous
section, inflation is likely to remain within target over the policy horizon, evenamid significant monetary easing, in the absence of further shocks.
Looking ahead, there remains a scope for monetary policy to be accommodativein support of domestic economic activity, to the extent that the inflation
environment remains benign. Baseline forecasts since the start of 2020 haveindicated that inflation is likely to remain within the government’s target band of
3 percent ± 1 percentage point up until 2022. Meanwhile, inflation expectations
have also been broadly consistent with the inflation target.
BSP staff has also assessed that the risks to the inflation outlook lean toward
the downside from 2020 until 2022, consistent with the emerging view that
potential disruptions to domestic and global economic activity amid the ongoingpandemic are likely to exert downward pressures on prices and inflation. Banerjee
et al. (2020), for example, find that a collapse in economic output has increased
downside risks to inflation in both advanced and emerging market economies.
Blanchard (2020) also posits that it is unlikely for inflation to pick up any timesoon, as high unemployment would temper pressures on wages; an increase in
precautionary saving would lead to weak consumption; and uncertainty would
dampen investment. He adds that “the challenge for monetary and fiscal policy isthus likely to be to sustain demand and avoid deflation than the reverse.”

53

Financial stability. The BSP also recognizes the need to continue to support
market confidence and to ensure that liquidity is more actively mobilized while
being mindful of the potential buildup of risks to the financial system. The BSP,
therefore, will continue to carefully calibrate its various regulatory relief andsupervisory measures to ensure financial intermediation while keeping potential
systemic risks at bay. As Restoy (2020) observes, the policy responses of central
banks to the pandemic highlight how “macroprudential tools do matter, for bothfinancial stability and economic stability.”
As the economy gradually reopens, the challenge for supervisory authorities
lies in deciding how and when to withdraw the regulatory relief measures thathave been deployed (Ehrentraud & Zamil, 2020). On one hand, an early exit
may take away much needed support or incentives to lending, and thus toeconomic activity and growth. On the other hand, waiting too long could fomentsystemic risks, especially amid a prolonged environment of low interest rates—asdemonstrated by the Global Financial Crisis.
On balance, it must be noted that monetary adjustments directly affect liquidity
and credit dynamics, which in turn influence banks’ profitability and appetite
for risk. At the same time, supervisory and macroprudential policies also drive
consumption and investment decisions by households and firms—i.e., aggregate
demand—and, therefore, the outlook for growth and inflation (Restoy, 2020).
Therefore, as the BSP looks toward a post-pandemic environment, monetary andfinancial supervision policies will need to be closely coordinated, just as they havealways been under normal conditions.
3.2 Recalibrating monetary instruments
From the perspective of monetary policy implementation and liquidity
management operations, the measures that the BSP has deployed are temporary
and time-bound adjustments directly linked to the COVID-19 pandemic. As such,
most have fixed durations (e.g., alternative compliance to RRRs is valid until
end-2021) although the BSP does retain some flexibility to adjust or extend somemeasures as necessary.

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Nevertheless, recent improvements in domestic liquidity dynamics and market
functioning have allowed the BSP to begin to slowly recalibrate some of its
monetary tools.11 As of July 2020, the BSP has resumed the auctions for all tenorsof the TDF while daily offerings for the overnight RRP facility have been rescaled
and are now back to pre-lockdown levels. These operational adjustments areintended to help prior monetary policy easing measures gain better traction onmarket interest rates and, ultimately, on credit activity.
GS purchases. GS purchases in the secondary market would also eventually need
to be recalibrated as liquidity conditions have stabilized considerably in orderto ensure their consistency with the BSP’s liquidity management operations.
Amid ample liquidity, the bulk of the BSP’s monetary operations remain oriented
towards liquidity absorption with the resumption of TDF auctions and theincrease in daily RRP volume offerings. Hence, the continued purchases of GS in
the secondary market would have to be gradually normalized to avoid conflicting
signals and policy confusion when the majority of the BSP’s operations are on
the absorption side, impeding the effective transmission of monetary policy tomarket interest rates. This will also help foster active liquidity management bybanks as well as encourage counterparties to exhaust all other possibilities before
going to the BSP.
As with the other COVID-19 measures, however, the challenge lies in determining
the precise timing for winding down the GS purchasing window, given thecontinuing need to provide support to domestic economic activity. Goingforward, it will be prudent for the BSP to maintain its outright purchase andsale of GS as part of the IRC framework to enhance flexibility of BSP monetary
operations and as part of the BSP’s operational readiness to respond to various
financial market developments.
BSP securities. Looking further into the horizon, the BSP also continues to lay
down the groundwork for the issuance of BSP securities. As an instrument for
liquidity management, BSP securities will further the BSP’s initiative to shift tomore market-based instruments for monetary operations under the interest
rate corridor (IRC) framework. Within the context of the pandemic, having an
11

The Monetary Board, via MB Resolution No. 703, dated 4 June 2020, approved the gradual unwinding of liquidityeasing measures implemented by the BSP beginning on 10 June 2020, covering both the RRP window and Term
Deposit Facility.

additional tool for liquidity absorption could aid the BSP in stabilizing broader
domestic liquidity dynamics.
On 1 July 2020, the BSP and the BTr signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
to link the BSP’s Monetary Operations Systems (MOS) and the BTr’s National
Registry of Scripless Securities (NRoSS). The linkage will facilitate the seamlessauction process of BSP-issued securities as well as the registry and recordingof these securities, which will enable primary market issuances and secondary
market trading. The initial issuance of BSP securities is set within September 2020,
once all requirements and support systems are put in place.
3.3 Preserving independence and credibility
Finally, while the BSP continues to have ample monetary space and a wide rangeof monetary instruments and regulatory measures to support the economy,
it recognizes that the COVID-19 pandemic is still mainly a public health crisis,
and that medical and macroeconomic interventions should go hand in hand toprotect public welfare.
The need for a multisectoral approach underscores a growing overlap between
monetary and fiscal policy. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, some central
banks have launched various monetary responses to help shield their respective
economies from the macroeconomic fallout. These include standard monetary
responses such as reductions in policy rates amid a benign inflation environment
as well as unconventional measures such as large-scale purchases of government
bonds (i.e., quantitative easing programs).
A brief comment on debt monetization. Some central banks have also takena radical approach by providing direct funding support to the government,
either through direct provisions or purchases of government bonds (i.e.,debt monetization). Nevertheless, debt monetization remains strongly
discountenanced in the central banking community. Even if the stigma
can be set aside, the main challenge, aside from its legality, pertains to its
implications on central banks’ independence, integrating it into the central
bank’s operational and communications frameworks, as well as governance andcoordination issues between the central bank and the legislature and executive
branches (Bernanke, 2016).

Leveraging Monetary Tools to Maintain Macroeconomic Stability

Although debt monetization appears far from being the normative central bankresponse to the pandemic, Blanchard and Pisani-Ferry (2020) still see no reason
to worry, given that large-scale purchases of government bonds have become
an integral part of many central banks’ toolkits even prior to the pandemic. They
comment, “[W]orries cannot be about the principle of central banks buying
government bonds. They must be about them buying too many of them andfor the wrong reasons—what one might call excess monetization, motivatedby public finance sustainability objectives rather than price or macroeconomic
stability objectives.” What should be more concerning is what the behavior ofcentral banks is expected to be when the time comes to unwind the measures.
Against the context of the pandemic, such a situation may arise when theeconomic recovery has gathered sufficient pace and therefore warrants anincrease in interest rates.
For central banks, this situation brings to the forefront the importance of staying
committed to their primary mandate. Public perception that the central bankmight be amenable to keeping interest rates low over a prolonged period—andthus to tolerating overheating pressures—in order to alleviate the national debt
burden risks dislodging inflation expectations, to the potential detriment of
the central bank’s price stability objective. For Carstens (2020), central banks’interventions in government debt markets may not be sustainable, and that“eventually, the natural boundaries between fiscal and monetary policy will need
to be fully restored.”
Central banks must therefore continue take every effort to preserve their
independence and credibility in pursuing their mandates. For an inflationtargeting central bank like the BSP, this entails carefully articulating the55

intentions behind its policy actions. In its various communications to market
participants and analysts, the media and the general public, the BSP has
made it explicitly clear that its extraordinary actions to assist the National
Government in its funding requirement are considered critical and necessary,as any delay in the funding resources needed by the NG could hamper theability of the government to address the ill effects of the pandemic and thus
impede the recovery of the economy. Nevertheless, the BSP has reiterated
that these measures are not intended to provide a long-term source of funding
for government expenditures. Rather, they are a short-term, temporary relief
measure that should not result in a permanent expansion in the monetary baseor in the BSP’s balance sheet. This is why the BSP has consistently reiterated thatits policy actions are and will continue to be in line with its primary mandate
to maintain price stability conducive to sustainable economic growth. It is also
why the BSP continues to prudently recalibrate its monetary instruments amid
evolving domestic liquidity conditions.

4. Conclusion
While the monetary measures deployed amid the health crisis have just begun
to demonstrate their potency, the limits of central banking interventions ingeneral must also be recognized. Under normal circumstances, maintaining
macroeconomic stability has always relied on an effective mix of monetary andfiscal policy, as well as prudent reforms. Amid a crisis such as the COVID-19
pandemic, it is just as true that central banking is not the only game in town.

56

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

References
Banerjee, R., Mehrotra, A., & Zampolli, F. (2020). Inflation at risk from COVID-19. BIS Bulletin No. 28. Bank for International Settlements.
Bernanke, B. S. (2016, April 11). What tools does the Fed have left? Part 3: Helicopter money [Web log post]. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/benbernanke/2016/04/11/
what-tools-does-the-fed-have-left-part-3-helicopter-money/
Blanchard, O. (2020, April 24). Is there deflation or inflation in our future? VoxEU, CEPR Policy Portal. https://voxeu.org/article/there-deflation-or-inflation-our-future
Blanchard, O., & Pisano-Ferry, J. (2020, April 10) Monetisation: Do not panic. VoxEU CEPR Policy Portal. Retrieved from https://voxeu.org/article/monetisation-do-not-panic
Carstens, A. (2020, May 28). Countering COVID-19: The nature of central banks’ policy response [Opening Remarks]. UBS High-level Discussion on the Economic andMonetary Policy Outlook, Zurich, Switzerland. https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp200527.htm
Ehrentraud, J., & Zamil, R. (2020, August). Prudential response to debt under COVID-19: the supervisory challenges. BIS FSI Briefs No. 10. Bank for International Settlements.
Restoy, F. (2020, August). Central banks and financial stability: A reflection after the Covid-19 outbreak. BIS Occasional Paper No. 16. Bank for International Settlements.

58

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

1. Introduction
The unique character of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic
poses unchartered challenges for financial institutions. On the demand side,
lockdowns and social distancing have made consumer spending muted. On
the supply side, containment measures have affected both local and global
supply chains (Beck et al., 2020). These disruptions could induce permanent
effects on the economy, particularly if these lead to considerable layoffs andbankruptcies. The pandemic also shook financial markets in the early stages,
leading to some tightening in financial conditions. As the regulator of financial
institutions, authorities have to deal with the impact and challenges of theinteraction among economic agents and the pandemic on supervised institutions(Eichenbaum et al., 2020).
Coelho and Prenio (2020) argued that financial sector authorities need to deal
with the impact of the pandemic on the financial and operational performanceof the banking institutions. On the financial side, banks have to address andmitigate the sharp drop in the value of financial assets or loss of liquidity,
deterioration of credit quality, erosion of profitability and weakening of capital
position. On the operational side, banks need to address the risk of failure ofresources (people, processes, technology, facilities and information) to deliver
business services.
Although supported by high capital and liquidity buffers since the Great
Financial Crisis (GFC), bank loan quality has weakened while profitability fellsignificantly in many jurisdictions following the COVID-19 outbreak. Financial
authorities should then prevent any risks from being magnified during the
pandemic. Banks should benefit from the swift and strong actions of the central
banks to increase domestic liquidity, provide regulatory relief measures andmore operational flexibility to address these challenges and maintain the flow ofcredit to the economy.
Episodes similar to COVID-19 have happened in the recent past such as SARS
in 2002–2003 and Swine Flu in 2009–2010. The affected jurisdictions, including
the Philippines, already have guidance in place on how financial institutions canmaintain business continuity. (Coelho and Prenio 2020). At the international
level, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Principles for the soundmanagement of operational risk explicitly mentions a pandemic as one of the*Dr. Veronica B. Bayangos (Director), Mr. Ryan Louise M. Briones (Bank Officer II), Ms. Richie L. Suguitan (Manager)
and Mr. Darwin M. Lucela (Bank Officer IV) are from the Supervisory Policy and Research Department (SPRD),
Financial Supervision Sector (FSS). We are extremely grateful to Managing Director Lyn I. Javier, Policy andSpecialized Supervision Sub-Sector (PSSS), FSS for comments on a draft of the chapter.

scenarios to consider in business continuity planning. More recently, supervisory
discussions have shifted towards achieving operational resilience more
broadly. However, these discussions are driven largely by the challenges andvulnerabilities brought about by technological change and an increasingly hostile
cyber environment.
This chapter examines the impact of the pandemic so far as well as theprudential and regulatory relief measures on the financial and operational
performance of the Philippine banking system. As the supervisor and regulatorof financial institutions, the BSP has a critical role in understanding the impactof the pandemic on the financial system and the real sector. The next section
looks back at policy developments prior to the pandemic. Section 3 briefly
enumerates the prudential and regulatory measure introduced by the BSP
while Section 4 analyzes the impact of the pandemic on the Philippine banking
system. Section 5 concludes.

2. Looking back at policy developments prior to thepandemic
1

The aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008 paved the way forcentral banks to stabilize the macroeconomy and financial system to steer
economic development in the face of globalized finance. In the Philippines,
major components of these operational policies in the markets include thereforms in the foreign exchange regulatory framework in 2007 and the formal
shift in the monetary operations of the BSP to an interest rate corridor (IRC)
system in June 2016.2
Eleven waves of foreign exchange liberalization reforms have been introduced
since 2007. In November 2014, Republic Act (RA) No 10641 was approved,
providing the legal basis for BSP to regulate and supervise the entry andoperation of foreign banks in the country. Moreover, RA No. 10574 was
implemented to allow infusion of foreign equity in rural banks’ capital. As of
end-June 2020, there are 29 foreign banks that were approved and authorized
to operate by the BSP in the Philippines. Since the implementation of RA No.
10641, the BSP has approved 12 foreign bank applications (10 branches and 2
subsidiaries). There are also four foreign banks which entered in the Philippines
in the form of representative office. In December 2019, the BSP approved an
1

Discussions in this section are largely patterned after Bayangos and De Jesus (2020).

2

The IRC is a system for guiding short-term market rates towards the BSP policy interest rate which is theovernight reverse repurchase (RRP) rate. The primary aim of the adoption of the IRC is to improve thetransmission of monetary policy.

How Philippine Banks are Holding Up Amid the Pandemic

application to establish a rural bank with a purely digital platform and majority
owned by a foreign non-bank financial institution (NBFI).
Against these developments, bank business models in the Philippines have also
evolved. As of end-December 2019, the BSP-supervised financial institutions(BSFIs) comprise 547 banks, 46 of which are universal and commercial banks (U/KBs), 50 are thrift banks (TBs) and 451 rural and cooperative banks (R/CBs) with
their combined assets approximating the size of the domestic economy.3 The
number of NBFIs has risen to 1,233 units, majority of which are without quasibanking functions such as pawnshops, money services businesses and non-stocksavings and loan associations.
Cross-border activities of financial institutions expanded by an annual averageof 11.6 percent while liabilities by 8.2 percent from December 2016 to December
2019. Growth in domestic total bank deposits has climbed since 2015 following
the surge in overseas remittances, BPO receipts and cross-border liabilities but
dropped to 7.8 percent as of December 2019. In turn, year-on-year (YoY) growth
in total resources of the financial system averaged 10.4 percent from December
2015 to December 2019 due to expansion in loans, securities and other equities
of banks. Annual growth of total loan portfolio climbed from 13.0 percent in June
2011 to 19.6 percent in September 2017, before it dropped to 10.1 percent inJune 2019. Consumer loan growth reached its peak in March 2015 and steadily
went down to 11.7 percent in June 2019.
As banks continued to adhere to sound credit underwriting standards set by
the BSP through the issuance of Guidelines on Sound Credit Risk Management
Practices in October 2014, loan quality remains satisfactory with the nonperforming loan (NPL) ratio of banks at around 2.1 percent during the past five
years. Likewise, banks continued to set aside adequate provisioning for credit
losses with the NPL coverage ratio above 100 percent. The NPL definition was
also aligned with international standards as the BSP adopted the Philippine
Financial Reporting Standards (PFRS) 9 that prescribed the use of expected credit
loss model starting January 2018.
Moreover, the BSP pushed for a broad set of strategic reforms in the financial
system to better promote financial stability, preserve the institutional safety andsoundness of individual banks, and protect the public. These included, first, the3

U/KBs have the ability to underwrite securities and take equity positions in manufacturing, agricultural and otherenterprises. These banks are also encouraged to make equity investments, to promote longer-term lending and
to inject competition into the financial system. By contrast, TBs and R/CBs, which are largely stand-alone banks,
play a pivotal role in promoting inclusive development particularly in the countryside by providing credit to theagriculture, forestry and fishing industries.

59

adoption of risk-based supervision to keep up with the growing complexity ofthe banking business. In turn, the BSP gradually redirected its supervisory thrust
toward the measurement and management of banks’ risk exposures. Second,
driven by the emergence of complex banking groups and mixed conglomerates,
the BSP adopted consolidated supervision.
More capital-based measures and disclosure standards have been implemented
since 2008 due in part to the implementation of the Basel III requirements. The
BSP adopted the Basel III capital rules for U/KBs and their subsidiary banks
on 1 January 2014. U/KBs were required to comply with the 10-percent total
capital adequacy ratio (CAR),4 the leverage ratio of 5 percent in July 2018 andthe framework on the countercyclical capital buffer in December 2018. However,
simpler standards were applied to TBs and R/CBs that are not subsidiaries ofcommercial banks. Finally, the BSP adopted the international framework fordealing with domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs), requiring staggered
implementation of higher capital buffers starting in January 2017 and enhanced
the framework in 2019. As of end-December 2019, bank capital ratios were stable
despite a pick-up in risk-weight assets and well above the minimum thresholds
set by BSP (10 percent) and the Bank for International Settlements (8 percent).
These measures were complemented by an increase in the risk weight on
non-deliverable forward (NDF) transactions in 2013, and the conduct of thereal estate stress test (REST) on banks’ property development sector exposures
starting from 2014.
A liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) rule was issued in March 2016 to promote shortterm resiliency of the liquidity risk profile of banks. A net stable funding ratio(NSFR) rule was issued in June 2018 to promote resiliency over the longer termby creating additional incentives for banks to fund their activities with morestable sources. The banking system maintains sufficient buffers to meet liquidityand funding requirements as the LCR and NSFR are way above the BSP’s current
regulatory threshold of 100 percent. Banks also hold sufficient high-quality
liquid assets (HQLAs) that can be easily converted into cash to service liquidity
requirements over a 30-day stress period. In March 2019, stand-alone TBs, R/CBs
and non-banks with quasi-banking functions (NBQBs) were required to adopt theminimum liquidity ratio (MLR). As a result, banks opted to increase their issuancesof fixed-income securities, including bonds and long-term negotiable certificatesof time deposits (LTNCTDs) to better manage their funding costs. Such an
4

The BSP also adopted the 6.0 percent common equity Tier 1 (CET1), 7.5 percent Tier 1 and the capitalconservation buffer (CCB) of 2.5 percent.

60

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

increase can be attributed to the enhanced rules for the issuance of bonds andcommercial papers.
Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, the FSS has embarked in crafting dynamic andforward-looking assessment frameworks to strengthen risk governance. The
BSP approved the guidelines on the adoption of PFRS 9 - Financial Instruments
for BSFIs. These guidelines set out the supervisory expectations in classifying
and measuring financial instruments and in recognizing impairment to promoteprudence and transparency in financial reporting. The PFRS 9 required theadoption of the expected credit loss (ECL) model in recognizing impairment. The
model requires early recognition of allowance for credit losses even before thedefault or non-payment of the borrower. This approach has been adopted by
the BSP as embodied in the Guidelines on Sound Credit Risk Management. The
BSP’s earlier issuance amending the definition of past-due and non-performing
loans paved the way for the implementation of the ECL methodology in booking
allowance for credit losses.
In 2018, the BSP conducted the first Banking Sector Outlook Survey (BSOS)
which gathered the sentiments within a two-year horizon of the Presidents/
Chief Executive Officers/Country Managers of all the U/KBs, TBs and top 20 R/
CBs. The conduct of BSOS aims to provide a cohesive and pro-active supervisory
approach to address potential build-up of systemic risk which will serve as acomplementary tool in validating the assessments of banking supervisors. In
2019, the Monetary Board approved the adoption of a Supervisory Assessment
Framework (SAFr) to help supervisors in coming up with a supervisory rating.5
It is more business-model centric and facilitates a dynamic assessment of thesystemic importance, risk profile and quality of governance of BSFIs.
The FSS also laid down the proactive financial surveillance and reporting towards
a dynamic banking system such as in supervision of conglomerates, cross-borderrisks and vulnerabilities tools as well as enhanced reports. These developments
were complemented by the passage of key legislative reforms during the recent
past to enhance systemic stability, institutional safety and soundness, andprotection of the public.6 These included RA No. 11211 which amends the New
Central Bank Act; RA No. 11127, or the The National Payment Systems Act, which
5

SAFr will replace CAMELS rating. The SAFr incorporates three major elements – the BSFI’s impact on financial
system, BSFI’s risk profile and supervisory intensity.

6

BSP Annual Report 2019.

promotes the safe, secure and efficient operation of payment systems in thePhilippines; and RA No.11439. or the Islamic Banking Act, which provides for theorganization, regulation and powers of Islamic banks to be established in thePhilippines.
Indeed prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, the Philippine financial system has
become more resilient following the adoption of enhanced and forward-looking
supervisory frameworks, regulatory and financial sector reforms.

3. Swift, strong and time-bound prudential and regulatory
relief measures
Following the COVID-19 outbreak, many central banks in developed andemerging markets around the world engaged in quantitative easing as well as
relaxed prudential and regulatory standards. We have compiled and classified
these measures adopted by 11 Asian central banks in Figure 5.1 into those thatprovide (a) liquidity and funding support to keep level of domestic liquidity
afloat; (b) market functioning; (c) lending and credit support; (d) support tooperational resilience during the lockdown period; and (e) other measures.
From the third week of March to the last week of July 2020, there were 411
prudential and regulatory measures issued by these economies, 38.9 percentof which were meant to support operational resilience followed closely by 29
percent for liquidity and funding support. Australia, Japan, South Korea andSingapore issued the highest number of measures largely to support operational
resilience and liquidity and funding. In the case of the Philippines, there were 31
measures adopted so far by the BSP, majority of which were meant to support
operational resilience.
The BSP issued timely complementary measures to assist the BSFIs survive thehealth crisis as well as to support households and business enterprises. Six
measures were meant to provide liquidity and funding support to keep levelof domestic liquidity afloat mainly through adjustments in the rates of the BSP
facilities and reduction in reserve requirements.
Nine measures enabled BSFIs to extend financial relief to their borrowers in theHow Philippine Banks are Holding Up Amid the Pandemic

61

Source of basic data: Lucela, D. (SPRD).

form of more flexible and favorable lending terms, including loan restructurings.
For banks availing regulatory relief, loans of affected borrowers are excluded
from the past-due and non-performing classification from 8 March 2020 until 31
December 2021. Likewise, banks can stagger the booking of allowance for credit
losses for a maximum period of five years subject to existing regulations andbased on BSP approval. Banks with outstanding rediscounting obligations with
the BSP are entitled to a 30-day grace period on the settlement of outstanding
obligations from 8 March 2020, without penalty charges, or the restructuring ofrediscounted loans of end-user borrowers on a case-to-case basis.
The BSP’s prudential measures were also eased to incentivize credit particularly
to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and large enterprises toallow them to carry on with their business during the pandemic.7 These measures
include the reduction in credit risk weights until end-December 2021 of loans
granted to MSMEs that are current in status to 50 percent from 75 percent(qualified MSME portfolio) and 100 percent (non-qualified MSME portfolio).8 In
addition, the BSP allowed the assignment of a zero-percent risk weight to loansthat are guaranteed by the Philippine Guarantee Corporation, the Agricultural
Guarantee Fund Pool (AGFP) and the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC).
Moreover, peso-denominated loans to MSMEs and certain large enterprisesthat were critically impacted by the pandemic shall be recognized as forms ofalternative compliance with banks/QBs’ reserve requirements against deposit7

For the Philippines, the matrix does not include two relief measures to ease real estate loan limits andrequirements for large enterprises critically affected by the pandemic. If these will be added, measures tosupport lending and credit will be the same as to support operational resilience.

8

A qualified MSME portfolio is diversified with at least 500 borrowers over a number of industries.

liabilities and deposit substitutes. The single borrowers limit (SBL) was temporarilyraised to 30 percent from 25 percent for six months starting March 2020.9 The
minimum liquidity ratio (MLR) of stand-alone TBs and R/CBs was also reduced
from 20 percent to 16 percent until end-December 2020. Lastly, banks and
QBs were allowed to use capital conservation and liquidity coverage ratio (LCR)
buffers during the crisis.
Thirteen initiatives were adopted to ensure access to formal financing channels
by retail clients during the ECQ. Immediately after the adoption of an ECQ,
the BSP relaxed the Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements. It encouraged
BSFIs to temporarily suspend all fees and charges imposed on the use of online
banking platforms or electronic money, including those imposed on the useof InstaPay or PESONet electronic fund transfers and waived the fees related
to the grant of license or authority to provide Types A10 and B11 advanced
electronic payments and financial services (EPFS). The BSP also temporarily
waived the transaction fees charged for fund transfer instructions made with
PhilPass, and granted operational relief measures for foreign exchange (FX)transactions to facilitate the public’s access to FX resources of the banking
system to finance legitimate transactions.
9

The relaxation also covers the increase in the 25 percent SBL for project finance loans to finance initiatives thatare in line with the priority programs of the government.

10This applies to BSFls that can be assessed against the prudential criteria provided under the Policy andRegulations on Licensing.

11

This applies to proponents that cannot be assessed against the prudential criteria provided under the Policy andRegulations on Licensing. These include newly-established BSFls and new applicants for an authority to operateas “Electronic Money Issuer-Others”.

62

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

This section shows that indeed the menu of prudential and regulatory relief
measures adopted from March to July 2020 by most Asian economies, including
the Philippines are strong, time-bound and swift.

4. What has been the impact so far on the financial system

Source: SPRD-Quantitative Research Staff

Section 3 highlights that prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, the Philippine financial
system was stronger than in past crises following the adoption of enhanced
supervisory frameworks, regulatory and financial sector reforms. Nevertheless,the BSP-Financial Supervision Sector conducted weekly monitoring of financial
and operational developments of the BSFIs, including the domestic systemicallyimportant banks. These were formalized in more offsite supervision tools by
Financial Supervision Departments (FSDs) as part of SAFr and separate thematic
assessments such as the Liquidity Report (TAMSD), PESONet and InstaPay, The
New Norm in Payments (PSOD), Surveillance Report on COVID-19 Themed CyberAttacks (TRISD), Remit Express (FSD IX), Analysis on Bank Exposures (SPRD), The
Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism Surveillance
Report (FSID) and Weekly Banking Sector Highlights (SPRD). More stress-testing
exercises were conducted during the pandemic. These are then used to analyze
emerging risks and vulnerabilities that could warrant supervisory actions andare consolidated in the Banking Sector Risk Analysis (BSRA, SPRD). To identify

possible supervisory actions, the FSS rolled out a Comprehensive Baseline
Survey of BSFIs to assess the financial and operational impact of the COVID-19
pandemic on the financial and operational performance of banks, particularly on
asset quality, liquidity position, profitability and capital position as well as digital
payments and cyber resilience.
Figure 5.2 shows the organizing framework for enhanced risk assessment during
the pandemic using the major sections of Quarterly BSRA. Discussions on the
top two red boxes – Risk Monitoring and Early Warning Indicators (EWIs) – arethe main focus areas of the BSRA. The two sections help identify the banks,
sectors in the economy or type of exposures which need closer monitoring
and assess the supervisory actions that are needed. Discussions on the external
environment such as macroeconomic and market developments as well as
cross-border activities are also assessed to see any emerging impact on thebanking sector (green box). The left-bottom box (violet box) covers contingency
funding, particularly banks that availed of additional funding through the BSP
facilities, rediscounting as well as interbank loans during the pandemic. The
discussion includes the movements of deposits, including cash and checks, aswell as through automated teller machines (ATMs) and payments channels such
as InstaPay and PESONet to see how banks retain deposits particularly during
the pandemic.
Based on the organizing risk framework, the impact so far of the pandemic on thePhilippine banking system can be summarized along seven major themes.
First, the pandemic has significantly affected the banking system’s activities as
the ECQ and social distancing pushed banks to adjust their daily operations while
the slowdown in economic activity affected their borrowers’ capacity to pay.
Based on the FSS Baseline Survey, banks employed proactive control measures tosupport the continued delivery of financial services to the general public and at
the same time, protect the welfare of their personnel. Business continuity plans(BCP) enabled banks to immediately respond to the situation. Majority of thebanks’ board members and senior managers continued their oversight function
and addressed emerging concerns through the use of technology. The survey
also shows that the top priorities of BSFIs are the pursuit of digitization initiatives
and management of possible deterioration in asset quality.

How Philippine Banks are Holding Up Amid the Pandemic

63

this time, the value of InstaPay and PESONet transactions rose by 330.4 percent
and 76.1 percent YoY, respectively. Relative to annualized nominal householdspending, InstaPay and PESONet values have been trending upwards until thesecond quarter of 2020.

Source: SPRD-Quantitative Research Staff

Second, growth of bank deposits remained firm as consumers shift to digital
payments while funding cost declined following the decisive reduction inreserve requirements (RR). Driven by growth in current and savings deposits,
total deposits grew YoY by 10.7 percent to reach ₱14.2 trillion as of June 2020.
Time deposits however, registered a minimal increase as a result of falling rates.
In turn, deposits relative to nominal gross domestic product (GDP) climbed to75.6 percent in June 2020, the highest ratio since March 2013 (Figure 5.3).
Annual growth in bonds payable complemented growth in deposits as it shot up
in December 2018 to 150.4 percent but steadily declined to 48.9 percent in June
2020. In turn, bank funding cost, defined as the ratio of total annualized interest
expense over average interest-bearing liabilities, slid to 1.60 in June 2020 from apeak of 1.99 in September 2019 following the reduction in RR.
Meanwhile, an apparent shift in the use of digital financial platforms wasobserved following the ECQ announcement. From the third week of March 2020
to end-April 2020, FSS data showed that around 4.1 million digital accounts wereopened among banks and non-bank electronic money issuers while the volume
and value of check payments and ATM withdrawals significantly declined. Around

Third, banks have become “shock absorbers” as loans slowly expanded.
Following the decline in funding cost, average annualized quoted rates on bankloans, particularly the lower limit, fell from 8.51 percent in March 2020 to 8.37
percent in June 2020.12 However, YoY growth of bank loans went down to 5.2
percent in June, the lowest since March 2013 (Figure 5.3). By economic activity,
loans to manufacturing, mining and quarrying as well as scientific, professional
and technical activities dropped in June 2020. Modest growth was seen inloans to construction and wholesale and retail trade. But loans to real estate
activities and human health and social work activities rose during the same
period. Relative to nominal GDP, bank loans slightly rose to 57.4 percent but wasslightly lower than the estimated trend. Banks expect borrowers to have muted
appetite for borrowings following the lockdown. In ADB (2020), results of theenterprise survey show that the restrictions during the ECQ had a significant
impact on business activity, liquidity and credit access of 2,481 firms as well as
employment and wage payment of enterprises’ regular and part-time workers.
As to operations, 65.9 percent or 1,634 businesses closed temporarily while
29.1 percent or 722 enterprises reduced operations. Of these, 78.4 percent or
566 enterprises operated at half or less capacity, 4.7 percent or 34 enterprises
maintained full operations, and only 1.1 percent closed permanently. Thesefindings are not unique. Using survey responses across nearly 500 listed firms in
10 emerging markets from early April, Beck et al. (2020) found that vast majorityof firms were negatively affected by COVID-19.
Among banking groups, only the TB industry recorded lower loans, posting adecline of 15.6 percent in June 2020 from the same period the previous year due
to the merger of two savings banks with their parent banks. In contrast, the R/CB
industry’s loan portfolio climbed by 2 percent from a year ago following the risein loans to real estate activities and for household consumption. Based on latest
data, the R/CB industry lent out a total of ₱53.2 billion to MSMEs as of endApril 2020, higher than the ₱42.1 billion registered as of end-December 2019.
The R/CB’s total MSME exposures accounted for 35 percent of the industry’s
12Lower limit rates for agri-agra loans, microenterprise loans, motor vehicle loans, private corporations credit card
receivables, SME loans, government loans and housing loans fell in June 2020.

64

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

total loan portfolio of ₱151.9 billion as of end-April 2020. Meanwhile, the top
R/CBs continued to generate new MSME loans amounting to ₱783 million
during the ECQ period.13 Moreover, loans to MSMEs for compliance with the
RRs have increased from ₱9.3 billion average balance during the reserve week
ending 30 April 2020 or, following the effectivity of the relief measure, to ₱106
billion during the reserve week ending 20 August 2020, an indication that
outstanding MSME loans will continue to rise moving forward.
Fourth, loan quality manageably weakened across banking groups. The PBS’ NPL
ratio climbed to 2.5 percent in June 2020, higher than the 1.9 percent averageduring the past five years (2015-2019). In turn, the NPL coverage ratio went up to
109.8 percent following the 49.1 percent increase in allowance for credit losses.
By economic activity, loans to individuals for consumption purposes recorded thehighest NPL ratio at 4.9 percent for U/KBs and 5.6 percent for TBs. Some banks
disclosed that they have yet to adjust to the computation of PDLs and NPLs to
consider the mandatory grace period provided under the “Bayanihan to Heal as
One Act.” Other banks confirmed that the growth in NPL was the combined effectof the pandemic, African swine flu (ASF) and Rice Tariffication Law. By industry,
the NPL ratio of the U/KB industry rose to 2.1 percent in June 2020 from the
1.4 percent five-year average, while its NPL coverage ratio increased to 123.2
percent. The NPL ratio of the TB industry at 5.7 percent was slightly higher than
the five-year average of 5 percent, while its NPL coverage ratio increased to 60.4
percent. The R/CB industry’s NPL ratio of 11.2 percent was also marginally higher
than the 11.1 percent five-year average, while the NPL coverage ratio rose to 73.7
percent. Meanwhile, the estimated probability of default on new loans dropped
from a peak in March to June 2020 based on a proxy indicator for the PBS and 46
U/KBs from December 2019 to June 2020 following the modest loan take-up.
Fifth, financial assets take a hit as well. Financial assets refer to the sum ofFinancial Assets Measured at Fair Value Through Other Comprehensive Income
and Financial Assets Measured at Amortized Cost. The annual growth in financial
assets, which significantly slid from 20.8 percent in May 2019 to 9.4 percent in
December 2019, reversed course in June 2020, when financial assets fell by 2.8
percent as banks opted to reduce treasury activities to be liquid. Based on the
FSS survey, BSFIs will maintain their strategy as the duration of their investments
is reduced to maximize portfolio returns. The top U/KBs did not introduce
major changes in the composition of their portfolios as they assess liquidity risk.
Exposures are concentrated in highly-liquid and investment grade instruments.
13

Based on a survey conducted by the BSP of top 10 banks across banking categories.

Sixth, banks’ net income dives as additional provisioning rises. Profitability or net
income of the banking system fell by 22.5 percent YoY in June 2020. This marksa sharp reversal compared to the 27.7 percent growth in earnings recorded in
the same period a year ago. Net interest income still grew by 15.5 percent while
trading income rose by 115.6 percent. However, provisions on credit losses
for loans and financial assets significantly increased, weighing heavily on bankprofitability. Other income sources are expected to slow down due to lower
volume of transactions, waiver of interbranch and interbank fees as well as the
30-day moratorium on bank fees and charges. Net income for the whole yearof 2020 is expected to decline from 2019. To mitigate the adverse impact of thepandemic on profitability, banks plan to impose cost-cutting measures (e.g.,deferred capital spending and freeze hiring of non-critical positions), intensify
loan collection activities, step up loan monitoring, exercise prudence in loan
releases, reduce cost of funds and boost marketing campaigns for new loans anddeposits. U/KBs also intend to reduce their exposures to vulnerable sectors andto increase ancillary or fee-based business while TBs and R/CBs plan to fast track
digitization initiatives to reduce operating expenses.
Seventh, liquidity and capital buffers remain intact. Liquidity buffers of U/KBs
and subsidiary banks and quasi banks remain ample as LCR, NSFR and MLR
remain above thresholds as of end-March 2020. The HQLA of U/KBs are themost liquid and high-quality assets. Although lower than previous quarters, theoverall structural liquidity position of banks, after considering short-term liquidity
requirements and projected lending activity, was estimated at ₱1 trillion. Thismeans that banks have sufficient liquidity to pursue their business operations.
Contingency Funding Plans (CFPs) of most banks were not activated during thecommunity quarantine period. Nonetheless, some banks have borrowed fromexisting credit lines (interbank loans) and tapped the BSP rediscounting facility toensure ample liquidity.
The banking system remains well-capitalized with a risk-based CAR of
15.3 percent on solo basis as of end-March 2020 (Figure 5.4). The industry’s
leverage ratio also stood at 9.2 percent (solo basis) higher than its thresholdof 5 percent for the same period. The banking system’s capital is made up of
Common Equity Tier 1 (at 14 percent), the highest quality among instruments
eligible as capital. It is also resilient to credit and market risk shocks, based on
the BSP’s stress test exercise. All U/KBs complied with the required 10 percent
minimum CAR on solo basis.

How Philippine Banks are Holding Up Amid the Pandemic

65

5. Conclusion: Uncertainties and impact on supervision andprudential policy
This chapter examined how banks are holding up amid the pandemic. From
March to July 2020, 31 prudential and regulatory relief measures were adopted,
majority of which are meant to support operational resilience as well as lending
and credit. Banks adjusted their daily operations while off-site surveillance andmonitoring of risks and vulnerabilities of BSFIs have become more intense.
Growth of bank deposits remained relatively firm as consumers shift to digital
payments while funding cost declined following the RR reduction. Except for
TBs, U/KBs and R/CBs have acted more as “shock absorbers” as loans slowly
kept flowing. Loan quality across banking groups has manageably weakened
as allowance for credit losses picked up. Net income fell due to additional loan
provisioning. There are large banks that availed themselves of rediscounting
facilities while interbank loans declined. Nevertheless, liquidity and capital buffers
remained whole based on results from stress testing exercise.
Source of data: DSA, SPRD estimates

Mainly driven by loans extended to the corporate sector, credit risk-weighted
assets continued to dominate U/KBs’ total risk-weighted assets (RWA) at 88.9
percent as of end-March 2020. Figure 5.4 shows that YoY growth of the PBS’ RWAs
has been falling since December 2015 until December 2019 as banks have become
progressively less risky over time. The market risk-weighted assets, which made up
2.6 percent of the total industry’s risk assets, went up by 5.9 percent mainly due
to rising interest rate risk and foreign exchange risk exposures. Even in times ofmarket fluctuations, the U/KBs remained resilient given their active capital-raising
activities and robust earnings margins, enabling them to maintain adequate
buffers against unexpected losses. Operational risk-weighted assets also climbed
by 7.5 percent YoY following the rise in earnings of banks.
On the whole, discussions in Section 4 reveal that while the PBS has been
relatively in a strong position during the pandemic, there are challenges to banks
moving forward.

The developments so far take us to the bigger role of uncertainties about thecourse of the pandemic on the economy (Quarles, 2020). The range of plausible
economic scenarios poses implications for banks’ business models, risk profiles aswell as for supervision and micro prudential policy (Borio, 2020). There is a needto closely and frequently monitor risk dynamics in a holistic manner to capture
the true health of financial institutions following the adoption of relief measures.
BSP supervisors should continue to engage BSFIs in understanding how the
COVID-19 situation has affected their business model, quality of assets, lending
capacity, liquidity position, business operations and overall risk profile, how they
are managing risks on their exposure and the role of the board and managementin these activities. More high-frequency banking indicators are also needed to
track the developments and impact of the pandemic. Given the intensity of the
impact and the speed of the spread of the COVID-19 shock, keeping track of the
fast-changing situation is crucially important.  
The findings also entail implications on decisions related to the exit strategies
of relief measures. While relief measures given to banks and their borrowers
have been swift, the exit strategies should be carefully calibrated to avoid “cliff
effects”. Granular and forward-looking data on the impact of pandemic oncredit worthiness of borrowers (corporations and households) based on surveys,

66

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

balance sheet and quantitative models will be extremely useful to supervisors.
The BSP should work closely with BSFIs on the timing of a possible exit strategy
and that precise and clear communication on the features of exit strategies andpossible impact should be planned.
The insights outlined in this chapter have shown that in dealing with theaftershocks of the current pandemic, the BSP faces a crucial balancing act. On
the one hand, the various measures are designed to encourage banks to support
the real economy. On the other hand, these same measures have promoted theuse of flexibility in some standards. Striking a balance between encouraging theuse of flexibility in standards while preserving market confidence such that banks
absorb rather than amplify risk will be key in fostering financial system stability.

In the short run, the BSP’s supervisory priorities will include involvement ofboard and management on operational adjustments, including the BCP, keeping
financial performance of banks at bay and supporting an effective action plan
to resolve non-performing loans. The impact of the pandemic suggests someincrease in non-performing loans after the temporary relief. While there is apending legislative bill seeking to facilitate the sale of non-performing assetsof public and private financial institutions in the House of Representatives,
the BSP should also prepare to act swiftly to avoid a significant buildup of
non-performing loans in the banking system. Over the long run, it should berecognized that prudential policy, while essential, cannot carry the burden ofgenerating sustainable growth alongside financial system stability by itself.

References
Asian Development Bank (2020, July). The Covid-19 impact on Philippine business – Key findings from the enterprise survey. Manila: ADB Manila.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (2019). Box Article 1: 70 Years of Central Banking in the Philippines. BSP Annual Report 2019. BSP.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Technology Risk and Innovation Supervision Department, (2020, June). Surveillance Report on COVID-19 Themed CyberAttacks. (Unpublished)
Bayangos, V. and De Jesus, J. (2020). Have domestic prudential policies been effective: Insights from bank-level property loan data. In Bank forInternational Settlements. Measuring the effectiveness of macroprudential policies using supervisory bank-level data. (BIS Paper No. 110 February2020). Basel: BIS.
Beck, T., Flynn, B. and Homanen, M. (2020, July 16). COVID-19 in emerging markets: Firm-survey evidence. Covid Economics, Issue 38, 37-67.
Borio, C. (2020, June 30). The prudential response to the Covid-19 crisis. [Conference speech]. Bank of International Settlements annual general
meeting, Basel, Switzerland.
Coelho, R. and Prenio, J. (2020, April). Covid-19 and operational resilience: Addressing financial institutions’ operational challenges in a pandemic.
Financial Stability Institute (FSI) Brief No. 2.
Eichenbaum, M., Rebelo, S., Trabandt, M. (2020, March). The macroeconomics of epidemics. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working
Paper No. 26882.
Quarles, R. (2020, June 19), The adaptability of stress testing. [Speech]. Women in Housing in and Finance, Washington DC, USA.
Zamil, R. (2020, April). Expected loss provisioning under a global pandemic. Financial Stability Institute (FSI) Brief No. 3.

68

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

1. A crisis like no other
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) just over a decade ago was supposed to havebeen the milestone with respect to the handling of crises and the oversightof financial markets. The GFC was compared to the 1929 Great Depression,
with most market experts saying how closely the global economy resembled
a waterfall. As a result, the post-GFC reform agenda focused heavily on thelessons learned, specifically how the so-called “Great Moderation” led tofinancial disruption at the height of the GFC. More importantly, the lessons also
considered why the shift took most policymakers by surprise.
The lesson from the GFC centered on interlinked behaviors within a networkas the cause of “systemic risks”.1 Although some work had already been
done on different agents within a community behaving in unsynchronized
ways, the conventional thinking at that time (notably in light of the “Great
Moderation”) was that the oversight of the financial market can be effectively
managed through macroeconomic policies. 2 At the level of regulated entities
such as banks, the thinking was that regulating the safety and soundness of
the risk-taking activities of each bank was appropriate. Indeed, this was thebasis of the Basel II Accord. 3 Both of these views proved to be inaccurate andinsufficient, respectively.
Financial stability, then, in the post-GFC years has been distinctly about
mitigating systemic risks as a collective outcome from a network of interlinked
risk behaviors. Financial authorities, multilateral agencies as well as research- andpolicy-driven institutions vowed to avoid bringing the global system again to theedge of the waterfall. They vowed to do this by building system-wide resilience.
The idea was to prevent financial system weaknesses from spilling over into thereal economy4 while greater focus was given to risks generated by the financial
system itself (i.e., endogenous risks), without neglecting the usual risks to thesystem (i.e., exogenous risks).5*

Johnny Noe E. Ravalo, Ph.D. (Assistant Governor), Fay Nadine R. Barroga (Senior Research Specialist), Eugenio
Alfredo E. Gloria (Research Specialist) and Ma. Karen R. Serrano (Bank Officer IV) are from the Office of the
Systemic Risk Management.
1

The Financial Stability Board, International Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlements definesystemic risk as a disruption to financial services - caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial systemwhere such a disruption has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy.

2

Ferguson (2002), for example, noted that: “The Federal Reserve has found it useful to focus on its financial
stability objectives primarily through the lens of its macroeconomic goals ‒ price stability and sustainable longrun growth.”3

See Morris and Shin (2008), Brunnermeier et al., (2009), and Crocket (2000), among relevant references.

4

This highlights the definition of systemic risk espoused in the FSB-IMF-BIS report.

5

See https://www.systemicrisk.ac.uk/systemic-risk

While so much effort has been invested in this new line of policy, the COVID-19
pandemic created an altogether different dynamic. Starting as a local health issue
in Wuhan city in the Hubei province of China, the World Health Organization(WHO) eventually declared it a pandemic on March 11. By definition then,
COVID-19 had become a global phenomenon and the measures to contain its
further spread required closing national borders and self-imposed lockdowns,
cutting off cross-border supply chains, suspending economic activities anderoding incomes, parallel to the social effects of the virus itself.
This makes COVID-19 different. Unlike the 1929 Great Depression, the 1997
Asian Financial Crisis or the 2007 GFC, the fallout from COVID-19 does not haveroots in the financial sector. It is, instead, a direct shock to the real economy
and the policies instituted to contain the spread of the virus have caused a
global recession.
Describing the pandemic as “a crisis like no other” is not simply a euphemism.
The shock is global in extent and the virus remains unseen until it kills someindividuals, even while it infects many other asymptomatically (making themsilent but effective carriers). Given its aggressive spread, the health infrastructure
has been unable to cope. Early on, lockdowns were necessary to stave off further
infections, but they were also constricting economic activity and threateningsocial disruption (via poverty and logistics). This is why that discussion led to a“lives versus livelihood” debate when clearly some balance between lives andlivelihood is necessary.
For financial authorities, it is important to appreciate this economic environment.
The shock is undoubtedly “systemic” as it is defined.6 But unlike the GFC and the
preparations that the financial authorities have made since then, this is not in thefinancial accelerator vein espoused by Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist (1996) where
even relatively small financial market shocks cross over to become much bigger
shocks in the real economy. Instead, this is the exact opposite: real economy
difficulties may eventually affect the financial markets and create a potential
second-round effect on the real sector.
The “unconventional” character of this systemic risk raises a number ofchallenges. There is no evident “policy playbook” because we have not seen sucha shock in our lifetime. Many institutions, such as the International Monetary
6

Recall that the benchmark of systemic-ness is that the shock must have the ability to affect the rest of theeconomy and not just the financial market. In the case of COVID-19, the shock was already a direct hit on theeconomy.

Picturing the COVID-19 Pandemic from a Systemic Lens

Fund (IMF)7, have suggested that the ramifications will come close to that seen
during the Great Depression. Yet, our understanding of that event does not reallyprepare us for dealing with a health-induced recession where a vaccine may besome time away.

2. Unconventionality in times of uncertainty
By the early weeks of March, it was clear that COVID-19 was beginning to takeits toll on the economy. While the medical authorities eventually called forsocial distancing and the wearing of face masks, the President imposed theenhanced community quarantine (ECQ) in Metro Manila and the rest of Luzonby mid-March. The stay-at-home-and-suspend-business-activities directive was
the immediate and necessary response to curtail the spread of the virus.
Financial authorities, however, understood that such remedial measures could
eventually affect the financial market. This is where the challenges lie: the shock
was not in the financial market (against which the financial authorities could act)
and we did not have a ready playbook for a policy response (precisely because
we have not seen a shock like COVID-19 in our lifetime).
What was clear was that this was a systemic shock. It was no longer a “risk” butrather an actual shock whose impact was still unfolding. What then should be
our response?
From the perspective of systemic risk analysis, our immediate concern was thatboth the supply and demand side of the economy would be affected. In our
Policy Note on COVID-19 (dated 19 March 2020), we noted how fast the numberof confirmed cases was rising at the time that the brief was being written. The factthat the major economies driving growth –– China8 , the US, UK and key Schengen
jurisdictions (Italy, Spain, Germany, France) –– were affected by COVID-19 would
only guarantee that the 2.9-percent growth projection for 2020 would not be
met. What was not clear at that time was how close the world was to a no-growthsituation, as estimates were still diverging.
7

As early as March 24, the IMF noted that the world was already in a recession without waiting for thestereotypical two-quarters of negative growth. In subsequent briefings, the Fund noted that while its forecasts
are prone to a high degree of uncertainty, the likely losses from COVID-19 could come close to those arising fromthe Great Depression.

8

The fact that COVID-19 started from Wuhan, China is itself significant. China is the world’s manufacturing centerwith several multinational companies establishing manufacturing plants there. Wuhan, on the other hand, is amajor rail and airline transportation hub, the latter connecting China to at least four other continents by directflight.

69

The world oil market was also another source of uncertainty, in part from thedemand shock, from supply chain cuts and from the tension between Saudi
Arabia and Russia. This mattered for two reasons. For users of imported crude oil,this meant lower base costs. However, the bigger concern was that market prices
were below the cost of drilling, putting the US shale industry as well as Saudi
Arabia and Russia at risk. Media articles suggested that several US banks had
already set up internal departments to manage the operations of their oil clientsin anticipation of a major credit default.
Amidst the uncertainty, there was a “dash for cash” in global financial markets.
We were already in a “lower-for-longer” period but risk premiums were also
rising because of the uncertainties surrounding COVID-19. This was creating
a divergence that, in a risk-averse world, tends to propagate the latter.
Our view at that time was that the urgency was with curtailing de-risking
and stabilizing the distribution of necessary goods as well as in addressing
looming income pressures.
Taken together, our view of the systemic shocks is summarized in the following
schematic (Figure 6.1) which is taken from the first semester 2020 Financial
Stability Report. It is noteworthy that while there is a shock realized from theeffects of COVID-19, the source of the systemic-ness is neither high inflation nor
low levels of bank capitalization. At this point, COVID-19 is a once-in-a-lifetime
event but the impairment of GDP, which is our ultimate metric for systemic
concerns, is being caused by an income shock and elevated risk aversion. This is
an important distinction.
On one hand, we also know that the effects of COVID-19 are disproportionallymuch more negative on lower income groups than those in the upper deciles.
On the other hand, the reforms espoused under the Basel III agenda would notnecessarily address the risk aversion that has dominated the financial market.
In a subsequent brief to management on 4 April 2020, we laid out our working
premises:•

COVID-19 will impact the global economy at least in 2020 and hence all
cross-border activities (i.e., external trade and remittances) will be affected
for the remainder of the year.

70•

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines“Rebooting” the economy will depend more on local economic activities,
knowing fully well that there are disruptions in both the demand side(incomes, consumption) and supply side (production, supply chains).

The banking industry is affected because both sides of the banks’ balance sheets
are affected. The capital market is affected (and the clearing and settlement
system as well) because market turnover is expected to fall and stay low. The
contingent market may face unscheduled claims and face investment risks if
market rates fall sharply. There will be increased pressure on the cash market tocontinue the flow and reflow of liquidity.
There would be a flight towards safe-haven currencies but given the global
ramifications, it is not even clear which are safe-haven currencies.
We are facing systemic risks already and will encounter more systemic risks ahead
as the macro-financial consequences of COVID-19 materialize. However, we also
recognize that this is not the same systemic risk that was rooted in the financial
market that eventually triggered the GFC.
In many ways then, our traditional thinking has to be modified. We normallyoversee financial markets so that its disruptions –– the risks by the system –– donot spill over into the real economy (Figure 6.2). This was the very point of thedefinition of systemic risk as espoused by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), IMF
and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) that has become the de facto
reference. However, COVID-19 is a shock instead to the financial system. Ourconcern now is for the ensuing weaknesses not to carry over into the financial
market and trigger another round of disruptions that filter back to the real
economy as illustrated in Figure 6.3.
Based on the above premises, the interventions that we specifically espoused
focused on ensuring immediate liquidity in the market and addressing
friction points.
With respect to the former, the unconventional policy of letting the central bankactively participate in the securities market was put forward. More than just theliquidity that this could generate, our view was that this added activity would
reduce the risk premiums embedded in financial prices. This effectively manages
yield curve volatility by separating the normal reward for liquidity and tenor risks
from the uncertainty premium that was being priced-in. Repurchase agreements(repos) between the BSP, the Bureau of the Treasury and the banks may further
stimulate liquidity, in our view.
The fact that the shock was not emanating from the financial market also raised
the opportunity to revisit longstanding issues in the capital market. To theextent that banks would not be willing to take on more credit and liquidity risks–– given the nature of the inherent risks by leveraging on savings mobilization
into intermediation –– funding would likely be more available from the capital
market.9 But in a heightened risk-averse world, risk pricing and valuation are evenmore critical and, as such, specific interventions have been recommended.
To address the flight to safe-haven currencies, it was suggested that the US
dollar-Philippine peso non-deliverable forward (NDF) market used during the1997 crisis be reactivated. The added suggestion, however, was to expand thecoverage to include a broader range of institutions. In addition, a US dollar-based
repo market (last initiated as the GFC was unfolding) can likewise be reactivated.
This would give the market the confidence that the Central Bank could be acounterparty if liquidity tightness ensued.
As the crisis was not in the financial market, we likewise saw an opportunity toflag and address some of the friction points. In another policy note, this timeon the capital market, we raised the need to enhance funding liquidity acrossbenchmark tenors, consider the streamlining of benchmark tenors and thestrengthening of price discovery to make full advantage of “done” transactions.
The possible enhancement of funding liquidity could address the brewing
investment risks faced by insurance companies whose future yields may now bemuch lower than their previous estimates. This could also address liquidity needsfrom unscheduled insurance claims.
As we had been monitoring interest coverage ratios, we could envision how thesuspension of economic activity would likely affect debt servicing, specifically thetiming of maturing obligations versus the announced earnings before interestand taxes (EBIT). At the aggregate level, we were already monitoring leverage
conditions from the standpoint of the credit-to-GDP-gap model as laid out by
the BIS. At the firm level, data available to us allowed us to formulate networks
between and among firms and economic activities. This monitoring initiative wasexpedited by COVID-19 and remains today an important element in our systemicrisk analysis.
9

The disproportionate effect on the less fortunate families suggests that aggregate saving would probably not beaffected much since more than 70 percent of household saving is from the top 30 percent of families.

Picturing the COVID-19 Pandemic from a Systemic Lens

The Office of Systemic Risk Management’s (OSRM) network analysis (a samplingis presented in Figure 6.4), in particular, uses firm-level data to map out
connections with other firms as well as interlinkages with economic activities.
Where data permits, this map extends to activities with counterparties in otherjurisdictions. In this form, contagion and complementarities are easily seenand shocks from various sources can be simulated to give us an idea of how
the overall effects pan out. In the situation as we find our markets today, this iscertainly a useful monitoring construct.
Looking ahead, the country’s experience with the public health issue likewise
highlighted the need for vigilance in the financial market. As approved by both
the Financial Stability Policy Committee (FSPC)10 of the BSP and by the Financial
Stability Coordination Council (FSCC),11 work towards a systemic risk crisis
management (SRCM) framework is now underway under the auspices of the
FSCC. The SRCM (Figure 6.5) is a tactical plan that lays out the key actions to beundertaken once a systemic risk crisis is called by the chairman of the FSCC andidentifies the financial authorities who shall be in charge of the different aspectsof the framework. Such a framework covers several key elements such as logistics,
monitoring, policy and communication.
When all of the above interventions are considered, the common denominator isthe deliberate intent to take a holistic view of risk behaviors and then to “connect
the dots.” The very point of systemic risk intervention is to be preemptive rather
than reactive, and in the cases outlined above, the objective was always to instill
agility. This requires flexibility in the content of the policy intervention and speed
to implement them once these are approved by senior management.

10

The BSP Monetary Board approved the creation of the FSPC in January 2020 to oversee and decide on thefinancial stability initiatives of the BSP. The FSPC was officially convened on 26 February 2020 by the BSP
Governor as its Chairman, counting on the other Monetary Board Members, including the Secretary of Finance,
as FSPC members. This gives financial stability the most senior possible representation with a Board-levelcommittee in the BSP.

11

The FSCC was first convened in October 2011 as an initiative of the BSP. It provides the financial authorities a
distinct venue to discuss the state of stability and discuss possible macroprudential policies, where warranted.
Apart from the convening institution, the FSCC counts as member agencies the Department of Finance,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Insurance Commission and the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation.

71

3. What COVID-19 means for systemic risk analysis
Rahm Emmanuel, former Chief-of-Staff for US President Barack Obama, once
quoted Winston Churchill’s adage to “never allow a good crisis to go to waste”(Mutter, 2016). These challenging times now gives us the opportunity not towaste the opportunities and lessons brought about by a crisis.
The current pandemic presents a “test case” for systemic risk analysis, especiallywith its idiosyncratic origins and outright shock to the real economy. While theGFC lessons placed systemic risk as an utmost priority, the current crisis posed
unconventional systemic shocks that were beyond comparison, moving past thestereotypical systemic risks envisioned by the post-GFC reform agenda.
Does COVID-19 then invalidate a key lesson of the GFC on the need to focus on
systemic risks? The crisis actually substantiates the need to strengthen systemicrisk oversight and policy. Significantly, risk aversion remains a critical GFC lesson
relevant today. For financial authorities, the policy issue will always revolvearound the risk behavior of a community of stakeholders. It is from this risk
behavior (and the linkages among them) that we can draw the following:•

Societal (i.e., system-wide) risk outcomes arise from the interlinked risk
behaviors of individual entities;•

These societal outcomes cannot readily be mapped by simply looking at thestate of each individual entity; that the most rational action of private entities
can be the most damaging for the whole community;•

Entities adapt their behaviors based on experience and adjust
accordingly; and•Different agents under the same conditions are more likely to behave
differently, moving policymakers away from the “representative agent” thathas dominated traditional economic models.

Financial authorities must thus consider these takeaways in crafting post-crisis
policies, bearing in mind that the financial system (and the entire economy) is
a network with sequence-sensitive transactions. Hence, policies must have asystemic perspective and must account for the interconnectedness of entities inthe system, with the realization of non-linearity and rationality of risk behaviors.

72

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Right now, it is clear that the pandemic has (i) impaired incomes and(ii) heightened risk aversion born out of uncertainties. Evidently, none of thesehave stemmed from high inflation or low-level capital, which were the typical
red flags of the post-GFC reforms. Accordingly, the two points from the current
crisis require us then to be highly conscious of how systemic disruptions canhappen within and outside the system and how we can think beyond theconventional policy lens in order to add to the ever-changing pages of our crisis
playbook.

Source: OSRM

Source: OSRM
Source: OSRM

Picturing the COVID-19 Pandemic from a Systemic Lens

Source: OSRM calculations using S&P Capital IQ

Source: OSRM

73

74

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

References
Brunnermeier, M.; Crocket, A.; Goodhart, C.; Persaud, A.; & Shin, H. (2009). The fundamental principles of financial regulation. Geneva,
Switzerland: International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies.
Crockett, A. (2000). Marrying the micro- and macro-prudential dimensions of financial stability [PDF]. Bank for International
Settlements. https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp000921.htm
Ferguson Jr., R. (2002). Should financial stability be an explicit Central Bank objective? https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
seminar/2002/gfs/eng/ferguson.pdf
Morris, S. & Shin, H. (2008). Financial regulation in a system context. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Fall 2008). https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/2008b_bpea_morris.pdf
Mutter, J. (2016). Opportunity from crisis. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-04-18/opportunity-crisis.

76

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

To manage and contain the coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic in thePhilippines, the National Government (NG) was constrained to impose largescale community quarantines that shut down economic activities, restrictedbusiness operations and caused an economic recession.1 The number ofoperating businesses during the quarantine period varied depending on thestringency of the community quarantine, ranging from enhanced community
quarantine (ECQ), modified ECQ (MECQ), general community quarantine (GCQ)
to modified GCQ (MGCQ).2
The unpredictability of the health crisis and its consequences on economic
activities hurt the financial sector and a large number of companies, andultimately, the public. These companies provide employment to the Filipino
people, create goods and services, pay taxes and support the Philippine
economy. In this regard, the State needed to marshal its scarce resources toprovide relief to the most affected and vulnerable sectors and to strengthen
these sectors toward faster and more sustainable economic recovery.
In an unprecedented move, the Philippine legislature used digital platforms (e.g.,
Zoom and WebEx) to conduct legislative hearings to comply with anti-COVID-19
protocols. As such, the Congress was able to enact landmark laws aimed atmanaging the adverse financial consequences of the pandemic and stimulating
the economy. This chapter highlights some of these legislative milestones andtheir salient features. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) played an activerole in crafting these legislative measures, together with the NG’s economic
managers, by spearheading several technical working group discussions andparticipating in various legislative committee hearings.
Cognizant of its role as the country’s monetary authority, the BSP stood at theforefront of maintaining price and financial stability by complementing the NG’s
fiscal policies in dealing with economic fall-out from the health crisis. Using its
legal authority under the New Central Bank Act3 (BSP Charter), which was justrecently amended in 2019 by Republic Act (RA) No. 11211, the BSP immediately*

Atty. Elmore O. Capule (Senior Assistant Governor and General Counsel), Atty. Kariza Bianca M. Borlagdan (Legal
Officer, Financial Supervision Legal Group) and Atty. Richard Armand C. Angeles (Legal Officer, Legal CounselingGroup) are from the Office of the General Counsel and Legal Services.

1

See Mapa, D. (2020, August 6). GDP growth rate drops by 16.5 percent in the second quarter of 2020; the lowest
starting 1981 series. Philippine Statistics Authority. Retrieved from https://psa.gov.ph/press-releases/id/162842

2

See Inter-Agency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases. (2020). Omnibus Guidelines
on the Implementation of Community Quarantine in the Philippines with Amendments as of July 16, 2020.
Official Gazette. Retrieved from https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2020/07jul/20200716-omnibusguidelines-on-the- implementation-of-community-quarantine-in-the-philippines.pdf

3

Rep. Act No. 7653 (1993), amended by Rep. Act No. 11211 (2019).

deployed its various monetary, macroprudential and supervisory tools at thestart of the pandemic. The recent amendment of the BSP Charter is providential,
as this further strengthened the BSP and placed it in a better position to facethe emerging risks to the financial stability and the economy as a result of thepandemic. Likewise, pursuant to its Charter, the BSP injected money to thefinancial system to help the NG fund its war chest through the following: (i)reverse repurchase agreement (RRP) with the Bureau of Treasury (BTr) amounting
to ₱300 billion; (ii) purchase of government securities (GS) amounting to ₱500
billion; (iii) remittance of dividends to the NG amounting to ₱23 billion; and (iv)direct provisional advances to the NG amounting to ₱540 billion. The last part ofthis chapter discusses the legal basis of the tools deployed during the pandemic.

1. Key legislative initiatives
Within a stable financial system, economic recovery is a two-pronged
approach—monetary and fiscal. The monetary aspect falls within theexisting BSP powers and authority under the BSP Charter, which was further
strengthened by the amendments under RA No. 11211 that granted BSP
additional powers to ensure financial stability, promote employment and issue
securities, among others. Conversely, to the extent that some measures neededfor economic recovery are not covered by existing laws, the State must enact
fiscal stimulus and measures to enhance financial stability to mitigate theadverse effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
1.1 Bayanihan to Heal As One Act4 (Bayanihan I)
Bayanihan I was signed into law on 24 March 2020 and took effect upon its
publication on 25 March 2020. Through Bayanihan I, the entire Philippines wasplaced in a state of national emergency and the President of the Philippines wasvested with temporary emergency powers for a period of three months. Oneof these is the President’s authority to implement a mandatory grace period
for all loans falling due within the ECQ and MECQ periods under Section 4(aa)of Bayanihan I.5 This aims to address borrowers’ inability to meet their loans
falling due during said periods because of the widespread cessation of business
operations. It will also allow borrowers to pay their maturing obligations at a later
4

Rep. Act No. 11469 (2020).

5

While Bayanihan I, Section 4(aa) provides that the mandatory grace period shall apply during ECQ period, MECQ
was interpreted to have the same effect as the ECQ with respect to the application of the mandatory grace period[BSP Mem. No. M-2020-042 (18 May 2020)].

Legislative Initiatives, Milestones, Legal Basis of Policy Tools Deployed During the Pandemic

date, without having to pay for additional interest on interest,6 fees and charges.
The Department of Finance (DOF) issued the implementing rules and regulations(IRR) of Section 4(aa) of Bayanihan I on 1 April 2020. Subsequently, BSP issued
several memoranda responding to the frequently asked questions about Section
4(aa) of Bayanihan I. Summarized below are the salient provisions of Section 4(aa)of Bayanihan I:
Covered institutions. The mandatory grace period covers all lenders, includingbanks, quasi-banks, non-stock savings and loan associations, credit card issuers,
pawnshops and other credit-granting financial institutions (FIs) under thesupervision of BSP, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Cooperative
Development Authority, whether public or private, including the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and Home
Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG Fund).
Mandatory grace period. Covered institutions shall implement a 30-day grace
period for all loans with principal or interest falling due within the initial ECQ
period without incurring interest on interest, penalties, fees and other charges.
This 30-day grace period shall automatically be extended if the President extends
the ECQ period, including the MECQ period. Effectively, due to Section 4(aa) of
Bayanihan I, all principal and interest falling due between 17 March 2020 and 31
May 2020 enjoyed the mandatory grace period.
Covered loans. Loans refer to those extended by covered institutions to
individuals, households, micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), corporate
borrowers and other counterparties. Since Bayanihan I and the IRR of its Section
4(aa) cover all lenders without distinction, then the mandatory grace period
shall apply to all loans extended by all covered FIs irrespective of their place of
operation. For example, FIs outside Luzon are covered even if a majority of theareas are not under ECQ or MECQ.
Other benefits. Covered institutions shall not apply interest on interest, fees
and charges on future payments or amortizations of individual, household,MSMEs and corporate borrowers relating to the principal and interest fallingdue between 17 March 2020 and 31 May 2020. Covered institutions are also
prohibited from requiring their clients to waive the application of the provisionsof Bayanihan I, including the mandatory grace period. Any waiver previously
executed by borrowers covering loan payments falling due during the ECQ period
6

The language of Bayanihan I provides “without incurring interests.” The DOF interpreted this phrase to mean
“interest on interest” in the IRR of Bayanihan I, § 4(aa).

77

shall be considered void. Nonetheless, borrowers may still choose to pay their
obligations as they fall due during the ECQ and MECQ periods.
The mandatory grace period shall apply to each of the multiple loans ofindividuals and entities. No additional documentary stamp tax (DST) shall be
imposed on the loans because of the mandatory grace period granted as wellas the resulting credit extensions and credit restructuring. The borrower may
pay the accrued interest during the mandatory grace on a staggered basis over
the remaining life of the loan. Nonetheless, borrowers may pay the accrued
interest in full on the new date following the application of the mandatory
grace period. Likewise, covered FIs may offer less onerous payment schemeswith the consent of the borrower.
1.2 Bayanihan to Recover As One Act7 (Bayanihan II)
With the expiration of Bayanihan I, Congress initiated the enactment of
Bayanihan II authorizing the President to exercise powers necessary to respondto the COVID-19 pandemic and foster early recovery. On 11 September 2020, thePresident signed into law RA No. 11494 or the Bayanihan II. It took effect upon its
publication on 15 September 2020.
Similar to its earlier version, Bayanihan II is an emergency measure passed by
Congress that will expire on 19 December 2020, or when Congress adjourns,
except for some provisions that will survive. This law aims to (i) reduce theadverse impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the socioeconomic well-being of
all Filipinos by providing assistance, subsidies and other forms of socioeconomic
relief; (ii) mitigate the economic cost and losses stemming from the pandemic;(iii) restore public trust and confidence in social and economic institutions;and (iv) accelerate the recovery and bolster the resilience of the Philippine
economy through measures grounded on economic inclusivity and collective
growth through fiscal sustainability. With these objectives, Bayanihan II grants
the President temporary powers to address the health crisis and its economic
implications. These powers include the following:i. Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) financial assistance programs
Small Business Corporation (SBCorp). Section 4(z) of Bayanihan II authorizes the
President to direct SBCorp to expand its existing loan programs for MSMEs,
cooperatives, hospitals, tourism and OFWs affected by the COVID-19 pandemic
and by other socioeconomic reversals. The expansion can be done througha combination of the following: increasing available loanable funds, reducing
7

Rep. Act No. 11494 (2020).

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

documentary requirements, increasing maximum loan amounts per borrower,
reducing interest rates, extending loan terms and using financial technologies
to expand reach, increase access and set fast turn-around loan processing time.
The President may also direct SBCorp to allow the use of loan proceeds forbusiness debt obligations including those incurred before the covered period
or acquisition of new technologies and systems to adjust business processes
for resiliency.

Covered lending institutions shall not impose “interest on interest, penalties, fees,and other charges” during the implementation of the mandatory grace period.
All loans may be settled on a staggered basis until 31 December 2020 or as may
be agreed upon by the parties. The moratorium covers all loans, including salary,personal, housing, commercial and motor vehicle loans, as well as amortizations,financial lease payments, premium payments and credit card payments. However,it shall not apply to interbank loan and bank borrowings.

Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
Section 4(aa) of Bayanihan II authorizes the President to direct LBP and DBP to
introduce a low-interest and “flexible term” loan program for operating expenses
available to businesses affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. This will assist andencourage businesses and their creditors to continue investing in, lending to andoperating their businesses. In addition, Bayanihan II requires that priority shallbe given to agri-fishery and non-essential businesses that are MSMEs, including
start-ups and cooperatives.

Regulatory Reliefs. FIs that agree to further loan term extensions or restructuring
pursuant to Section 4(uu) of Bayanihan II shall be entitled to regulatory
reliefs, as may be determined by BSP, which may include the following: (i)staggered booking of allowances for credit losses; (ii) exemption from loan-loss
provisioning; (iii) exemption from the limits on real estate loans, when applicable;(iv) exemption from related party transaction restrictions; and (v) non-inclusionin the FI’s reporting on non-performing loans (NPLs). Loan term extensions or
restructuring pursuant to Section 4(uu) of Bayanihan II shall be exempt from DST.

Philippine Guarantee Corporation (PhilGuarantee). Section 4(bb) of Bayanihan
II authorizes the President to direct PhilGuarantee to: (i) issue an expanded
government guarantee program for non-essential businesses; (ii) ease current
rules and regulations and give preference to critically impacted businesses,
MSMEs, cooperatives and activities that support Department of Healthinitiatives towards ensuring an adequate and responsive supply of health careservices; and (iii) guarantee the loan portfolio of partner FIs of eligible MSMEs
and cooperative loans.

iii. Lowering of interest rates, reserves and reliefs
Bayanihan II has significant provisions on credit and lending primarily affecting
the banks and FIs. It is noteworthy that Congress merely encourages, but does
not mandate, BSP to perform the following actions, in recognition of BSP’s
independence as the central monetary authority and supervisor of banks:a.

Section 4(x) provides for the availability of credit to the productive sectorsof the economy, especially in the countryside, through measures including
lowering the effective lending interest rates and reserve requirements oflending institutions. Credit accommodation to MSMEs, cooperatives andthose who are self-employed shall be charged a low interest, payable
within three years, and shall not require any collateral if the loan does notexceed ₱3,000,000.

b.

Section 4(ccc) encourages BSP to allow private banks and FIs to (i) reallocate
any unutilized loanable funds to housing loans; and (ii) grant subsidy to thehome loan borrowers at the rate equivalent to the gross receipt tax imposedon banks and FIs on their interest income.

ii. Loan moratorium and regulatory reliefs
Loan Moratorium. Section 4(uu) of Bayanihan II authorizes the President todirect covered institutions to implement a one-time 60-day grace period forthe payment of all loans falling due on or before 31December 2020, thereby
effectively extending the maturity of said loans. Nonetheless, parties may
mutually agree for a grace period longer than 60 days. Covered institutions
include banks, quasi-banks, financing companies, lending companies, real estatedevelopers, insurance companies providing life insurance policies, pre-needcompanies, entities providing in-house financing for goods and properties
purchased, asset and liabilities management companies, and other FIs, public andprivate, including GSIS, SSS and Pag-IBIG Fund.

Legislative Initiatives, Milestones, Legal Basis of Policy Tools Deployed During the Pandemicc.

Section 4(ddd) encourages BSP and SEC to adopt measures to encourage thebanking industry and other FIs to extend loans and other forms of financial
accommodation to help businesses recover from the economic effects of
COVID-19 crisis, and to enable the banking industry to manage appropriately
its risks and potential losses. The BSP and SEC are also authorized to grantreporting relief to their supervised entities.

iv. Additional provisional advances to the NG
Under Section 89 of the BSP Charter, the BSP may make direct provisional
advances, with or without interest, to the NG to finance expenditures authorized
in the annual appropriation, subject to the following conditions: (i) the advances
shall be repaid before the end of three months extendible by another threemonths as the Monetary Board (MB) may allow following the date the NG
received such provisional advances; and (ii) the advances shall not, in theiraggregate, exceed 20 percent of the average annual income of the NG for thelast three preceding fiscal years.
Notwithstanding Section 89 of the BSP Charter, Section 4(bbb) of Bayanihan II
authorizes BSP to make additional direct provisional advances, with or without
interest, to the NG to finance expenditures authorized by law that will address
and respond to the COVID-19 situation. However, to protect BSP’s independence,
Section 4(bbb) of Bayanihan II imposes the following conditions: (i) the advances
shall not, in their aggregate, exceed 10 percent of the average income of the NG
for fiscal years 2017 to 2019; (ii) the advances shall be availed of within two years
from the effectivity of Bayanihan II; and (iii) the advances shall be repaid before
the end of one year following the date that the NG received such additional
direct provisional advances pursuant to Bayanihan II, extendible for another year
as the MB may allow. This authority effectively allows BSP to extend provisional
advances to the NG at an amount not exceeding 30 percent of the NG’s average
income for fiscal years 2017 to 2019. Of the new 30-percent ceiling, 20 percent
is in line with the BSP Charter while the additional 10 percent is by virtue of
Bayanihan II.

79

1.3 Pending Legislation
i. Bill on GFIs Unified Initiatives to Distressed Enterprises for Economic
Recovery Act8 (GUIDE Bill)GUIDE Bill’s principal objective is to provide financial assistance to distressed
enterprises severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and to encouragethese enterprises to continue operations and keep their workers. Particularly,
GUIDE Bill intends to expand the loan programs of (i) DBP to eligible MSMEs
engaged in infrastructure, service industry or manufacturing business; and (ii)
LBP to eligible MSMEs engaged in activities in the agribusiness value chain. DBP
and LBP may also rediscount loans granted by BSP-supervised FIs, SBCorp and
Department of Agriculture – Agricultural Credit Policy Council to eligible MSMEs
affected by COVID-19.
GUIDE Bill authorizes LBP and DBP to participate in the financial and capital
markets by allowing investments in distressed enterprises through a special
holding company (SHC). The SHC shall rehabilitate strategically importantcompanies experiencing temporary solvency issues due to the pandemic,
including those from the agriculture, infrastructure, service industry,
manufacturing and other industries to be identified in the IRR. The establishment,
administration and operation of the SHC shall be subject to the principles,
guidelines, conditions and limitations laid down in GUIDE Bill. These provisions
will cover matters such as equity participation in the SHC, exit mechanism for the
NG’s investment, investment guidelines and qualification and restrictions for the
SHC’s chosen investee companies.
All transactions of DBP, LBP and SHC pursuant to their mandate and functions
under GUIDE Bill shall enjoy the following time-bound privileges: (i) exemption
from applicable taxes and entitlement to reduced registration and transfer fees;and (ii) adoption of Negotiated Procurement under Emergency Cases under
Government Procurement Reform Act9 for their procurements; and (iii) exemption
from Philippine Competition Act,10 ratios, ceilings and limitations under The
8

GUIDE Bill is embodied in House Bill (HB) No. 7749 authored by Reps. Junie E. Cua, et al., and was approved by
the House of Representatives (HOR) Defeat COVID-19 Ad Hoc Committee on 28 July 2020. Pursuant to Defeat
COVID-19 Ad Hoc Committee Report No. 524, HB No. 7749 substituted HB No. 6795 filed by Rep. Junie E. Cua.
(Status of the bills as of 30 September 2020; discussion is based on the HB No. 7749.)

9Rep. Act No. 9184 (2003).

10Rep. Act No. 10667 (2015).

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

General Banking Law of 200011 subject to the conditions as may be determined by
the MB, and the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, as may be appropriate.

Table 7.1 summarizes the types of transfers which are entitled to fiscal incentives
within the entitlement period.

ii. Bill on Financial Institutions Strategic Transfer Act12 (FIST Bill)Due to the disruption of economic activities caused by the COVID-19 pandemic,
most FIs are facing a period of delayed loan collections and are at risk ofrecording higher non-performing assets (NPAs) across all borrower segments.
In order to respond to the looming increase in NPAs, FIST Bill encourages FIs
to sell NPAs to asset management companies, created as Financial Institutions
Strategic Transfer Corporations (FISTCs), by giving tax exemptions and otherfiscal incentives on certain transfers of these NPAs. This will enable FIs to free
up much-needed liquidity for lending to the productive sectors of the economy
crucial to economic recovery. Likewise, the FIST Bill encourages the private sector
to incorporate and invest in FISTCs and help in disposing NPAs with the end viewof contributing to economic growth. BSP recognizes the objectives of FIST Bill incushioning the adverse impact of the pandemic and generally supports FIST Billand its laudable objectives.
FIST Bill uses as a model the Special Purpose Vehicle Act of 200213 (SPV Law),
which was enacted in response to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. FIST Bill
introduces several innovations considering the issues encountered during theimplementation of SPV Law and the FIs’ present needs due to the pandemic.
These include the following salient provisions common to HB No. 6816 and SB
No. 1849: (i) expanded coverage of FIs to include lending companies,14 and otherinstitutions licensed by BSP to perform quasi-banking functions and creditgranting activities; (ii) transfers of FIs’ NPAs to FISTCs shall be in the nature ofa true sale, without prejudice to the FI and the FISTC agreeing to a sharing of
profits, and the transferor-FI must not have legal or beneficial ownership of morethan 10 percent or have a direct or indirect control of the transferee-FISTC; (iii)safeguard against collusion and fraud; (iv) prohibition against injunctive relief
clause; and (v) financial consumer protection mechanism.
11

Rep. Act No. 8791 (2000).

12

In the HOR, FIST Bill, embodied in HB No. 6816 filed by Rep. Junie E. Cua, et al., was approved on third and final
reading on 2 June 2020 and was transmitted to, and received by, the Senate on 3 June 2020. In the Senate, thefollowing counterpart bills on FIST were filed: (i) SB No. 1594 filed by Sen. Imee R. Marcos on 11 June 2020, (ii) SB
No. 1596 filed by Sen. Manuel “Lito” M. Lapid on 15 June 2020, and (iii) SB No. 1652 filed by Sen. Ralph Recto on 6
July 2020. On 24 September 2020, the Committees on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies and Committee
on Ways and Means jointly filed SB No. 1849, under Committee Report No. 116, in substitution of SB Nos. 1594,
1596 and 1652. On 10 November 2020, the Senate approved on third and final reading SB No. 1849. (Status of thebills as of 16 November 2020; discussion is based on HB No. 6816 and SB No. 1849.)

13

Rep. Act No. 9182, amended by Rep. Act No. 9343.

14

As defined under Rep. Act No. 9474, or the “Lending Company Regulation Act of 2007.”

Source: FIST Bill

2. Legal basis of policy tools deployed during the pandemic
The imposition of various types of community quarantines in the countrycompelled the NG to secure additional funds to promptly address the vast
deleterious effects of COVID-19. In line with its mandate to maintain pricestability, promote financial stability and work closely with the NG, the BSP
deployed its available tools to help raise funds for the NG. Thus, the BSP
displayed its commitment and readiness to support the NG’s effort to mitigate
the adverse impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Some of the extraordinary tools
deployed are the following:
2.1 Direct purchase of GS from the NG
Section 89 of the BSP Charter authorizes the BSP to make direct provisional
advances, with or without interest, to the NG to finance expendituresauthorized in its annual appropriation, subject to certain limitations. Pursuant
to this authority, BSP extended provisional advances to the NG, through theBTr, by executing an RRP involving GS amounting to ₱300 billion. Based on theagreement, BTr will buy back the GS from BSP for the same amount, at zerointerest, after three months, extendible by another three months as the MB
may allow.

Legislative Initiatives, Milestones and Legal Basis of Policy Tools Deployed During the Pandemic

The transaction was consummated on 27 March 2020 and was set to expire on
29 June 2020. Upon BTr’s request, the MB approved on 4 June 2020 the extensionof the RRP for another three months under the same terms, set of GS and setof documentation. Hence, the new maturity date of the agreement is on 27
September 2020. The NG bought back the GS and paid the BSP ₱300 billion on
29 September 2020.
2.2 Purchase of GS in the open market
To achieve the objectives of national monetary policy, the BSP is authorized under
Section 91 of the BSP Charter to buy and sell GS in the open market for its own
account. In line with BSP’s mandate and powers under Sections 3, 5 and 91 of
the BSP Charter, as well as Section 4 of Bayanihan I,15 the MB approved on 7 April
2020 BSP’s purchase of GS to be undertaken from April to June 2020 based on
BTr’s auction schedule. These purchases amounted to about ₱500 billion.
2.3 Remittance of dividends to the NG
The amendments introduced in BSP’s Charter include additional BSP
capitalization of ₱150 billion. Under Section 2 of the BSP Charter, the increase incapitalization shall be funded solely from the declared dividends of BSP in favorof the NG. Thus, any and all declared dividends shall be applied as payment
for BSP’s increase in capitalization. However, considering the extraordinary
circumstances the Philippines is facing, the MB decided to defer the applicationof BSP’s dividends for 2019 to its capital and to remit instead to the NG ₱23billion dividends to support the latter’s programs during the pandemic. The BSP
remitted the said dividends in two tranches amounting to ₱20 billion and ₱3billion on 26 March 2020 and 28 September 2020, respectively, through a direct
credit to the Treasurer of the Philippines.
2.4 Provisional advances to the NG
On 24 September 2020, pursuant to its authority under Section 89 of the BSP
Charter, the MB approved the request of the NG for a new tranche of provisional
advances from the BSP amounting to ₱540 billion. The interest-free loan shall beevidenced by a promissory note to be issued by the NG in favor of the BSP with amaturity date of 29 December 2020.

15

BSP Charter, § 3 provides for BSP’s responsibility and primary objective while § 5 of the same law provides for
BSP’s corporate powers. Also, Bayanihan I, § 4 provides for the President’s authority to ensure availability ofcredit to the production sectors of the economy and to allocate cash, fund, investments, including unutilized or
unreleased subsidies and transfers, held by any GOCC, among other temporary emergency powers.

81

3. Moving forward
The BSP is cognizant of the need to maintain the safety and stability of thefinancial system amid the COVID-19 crisis. Apart from adopting monetary
policies, the BSP has been closely working with the NG in crafting legislative
measures to stimulate economic recovery, including providing liquidity support
to assist FIs in their lending operations and in performing their role of efficiently
mobilizing savings and investments.
With the benefit of Filipino people in mind, the BSP is prepared to use the fullrange of monetary policy and regulatory measures to fulfill its price and financial
stability objectives under the law. For the first time in Philippine history, the
BSP invoked Section 89 of the BSP Charter to extend advances to the NG by
executing an RRP and loan agreement. The MB also approved the setting of anannual interest rate ceiling of 24 percent on all credit card transactions effective
3 November 2020, pursuant to the Philippine Credit Card Industry Regulation
Law.16 This is the first time that the MB exercised its authority to place a limit oninterest rates since these ceilings were lifted by Circular No. 905 in 1983. Theseare extraordinary measures the BSP adopted to help the Filipino people copewith this pandemic.
Quoting BSP Governor Benjamin E. Diokno, “We are one government. We are
one Filipino nation. And we, at BSP, shall support all efforts to fight this once-ina-lifetime pandemic and keep the economy afloat. BSP has been and is ready toemploy the necessary tools in its arsenal to address the impact of COVID-19 whilestaying true to its mandate.”
Moving forward, BSP will continue to closely work with the NG in crafting policies
and measures with a whole-of-government approach for the country’s economic
recovery, sustained growth and development.

16

Rep. Act No. 10870 (2016).

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

References
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. (2020, September 24). Ceiling on Interest or Finance Charges for Credit Card Receivables. BSP Circular No. 1098, series of 2020.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. (2020, April 22). Frequently asked questions (FAQ) II on the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Section 4(aa) of Republic Act (R.A.) or the “Bayanihan to Heal As One Act.” BSP
Memorandum No. M-2020-028.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. (2020, April 6). Frequently asked questions (FAQ) on the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Section 4(aa) of Republic Act (R.A.) or the “Bayanihan to Heal As One Act.” BSP
Memorandum No. M-2020-018.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. (2020, May 18). Frequently asked questions (FAQ) III on the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Section 4(aa) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 11469, Otherwise Known as the “Bayanihan to
Heal As One Act.” BSP Memorandum No. M-2020-042.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. (2020, June 1). Frequently asked questions (FAQ) IV on the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Section 4(aa) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 11469, Otherwise Known as the “Bayanihan to
Heal As One Act.” BSP Memorandum No. M-2020-045.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. (2020, March 26). BSP To Remit P20 Billion Dividends To Fight COVID-19 (Media release). http://www.bsp.gov.ph/publications/media.asp?id=5336
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. (2020, September 25). BSP sets ceiling on credit card charges (Media release). http://www.bsp.gov.ph/publications/media.asp?id=5521
House Bill No. 6795. (2020). Government Financial Institutions Unified Initiatives to Distressed Enterprises for Economic Recovery Act. 18th Cong. 1st Sess.
House Bill No. 6816. (2020). Financial Institutions Strategic Transfer Act. 18th Cong. 1st Sess.
House Bill No. 7749. (2020). Government Financial Institutions Unified Initiatives to Distressed Enterprises for Economic Recovery Act. 18th Cong. 2nd Sess.
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Section 4(aa) of Rep. Act No. 11469, Otherwise Known as the “Bayanihan to Heal As One Act.”
Inter-Agency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases. (2020). Omnibus Guidelines on the Implementation of Community Quarantine in the Philippines with Amendments as of July 16, 2020.
Official Gazette. https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2020/07jul/20200716-omnibus-guidelines-on-the-implementation-of-community-quarantine-in-the-philippines.pdf
Mapa, D. (2020, August 6). GDP growth rate drops by 16.5 percent in the second quarter of 2020; the lowest starting 1981 series. Philippine Statistics Authority. https://psa.gov.ph/press-releases/id/162842
Moss, D. (2020, August 14). Once Upon a Time, Debt Monetization Sounded Crazy. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-08-13/philippines-central-bank-is-close-to-monetizing-debt- andthat-s-ok
Rep. Act No. 7653. (1993). New Central Bank Act. §§ 2, 3, 89, 92.
Rep. Act No. 11211. (2019). An Act Amending Rep. Act No. 7653, Otherwise Known as “The New Central Bank Act”, and for Other Purposes. §§ 1, 2, 37.
Rep. Act No. 11469. (2020). Bayanihan to Heal As One Act I. §§ 1, 3, 4(aa), 9.
Rep. Act No. 11494. (2020). Bayanihan to Recover As One Act II. §§ 4 (x), (z), (aa), (bb), (uu), (bbb), (ccc), (ddd), (uuu).
Senate Bill No. 1594. (2020). Financial Institutions Strategic Transfer Act. 18th Cong. 2nd Sess.
Senate Bill No. 1596. (2020). Financial Institutions Strategic Transfer Act. 18th Cong. 2nd Sess.
Senate Bill No. 1652. (2020). The Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) Act of 2020. 18th Cong. 2nd Sess.
Senate Bill No. 1849. (2020). Financial Institutions Strategic Transfer Act. 18th Cong. 2nd Sess.

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

1. The role of the Philippine Payment and Settlement System(PhilPaSS) during the COVID-19 pandemic
The PhilPaSS1 is a fully automated facility that enables the payment of highvalue and retail transactions and settlement in Philippine pesos throughthe demand deposit accounts (DDAs) of the system participants. It is areal-time gross settlement (RTGS) system designed to address relatedrisks and achieve safe, uninterruptible, final and irrevocable settlement offinancial transactions. In addition to electronically transferring funds among
participating financial institutions, participants are able to manage their DDAs
online through the system.

Financial transactions that settle in PhilPaSS include:•

Payment instructions initiated directly by participants for customer payments,
government collections and other interbank transactions.

•

Transactions with the BSP such as deposits, withdrawals, payment ofsupervisory fees, deposits of maturing loan obligations, settlement ofinvestments in BSP’s short-term liability products and fees collected foronline application of foreign currency denominated loans.

•

Transactions through other financial infrastructures that provide essential
services to the banking public such as those made through automatedteller machines (ATMs), automated clearing houses (ACHs) and checks aswell as settlement of government securities trade transactions (allowing forcompliance with international standards on delivery versus payment) andof the Philippine peso leg of US dollar trades (international standards on
payment versus payment).

By minimizing payment and settlement risks through PhilPaSS, the BSP is able toprovide safe and efficient payment and settlement systems for Filipinos (3rd pillarof the BSP), and enhance the availability, convenience, efficiency and integrity offinancial transactions (2nd pillar of financial stability) as well as of financial markets(1st pillar of monetary stability).

1.1 Adjustments on the operations of PhilPaSS and of its participants
During the community quarantine period, the Payments and Settlements Office(PSO) ensured continuing operations of PhilPaSS while complying with directives
to reduce exposure of personnel (both from the BSP and from the participating
financial institutions or FIs) to health risks. These included:1.

Initially, a skeleton force operating in two separate sites, and eventual
successful installation of efficient and secured work-from-homearrangements for PSO personnel while servicing the Filipinos albeit within
reduced business hours; and2.

Procedures to electronically submit requests to continually process
documents and communicate with PSO’s Help Desk were established.

The public was constantly kept abreast with the availability of the PhilPaSS andthe above arrangements through various advisories and BSP memoranda.
Source: BSP*

Jay M. Dizon is the Deputy Director of the Payment System Oversight Department (PSOD) of the Financial
Supervision Sector. Anna Marie B. Lagman (Bank Officer V), Remedios C. Macapinlac (Officer-in-Charge) and Marie
Joyce C. Elevado (Acting Deputy Director) are from the Payments and Settlements Office (PSO)

1

The PhilPaSS is operated by the BSP through its Payments and Settlements Office (PSO).

1.2 Relief measure extended to PhilPaSS participants
As the Philippine economy strives to recover from the severe effects of thecoronavirus pandemic, it was critical that FIs continue to be able to effectively
provide financial services and promote the digitalization of payment services.
With this, the BSP extended a temporary waiver of fees for fund transfer

Payments and Settlement Systems:
Anchors of Financial System Resilience and Stability in the Time of COVID-19
transactions made through PhilPaSS beginning 1 April 2020 until the end of
the year.2 The measure is intended to provide further support for the efficient
operations of FIs and foster a supportive environment within which BSPsupervised entities can extend improved financial intermediation services to the
public. In its memorandum to banks, the BSP encouraged the participants of thesystem to actively disseminate to the public the available ACHs and PhilPaSS as
facilities to electronically transfer funds to target recipient-accounts maintainedwith other banks participating in the network, thereby providing Filipinos a wide
range of digital payment channels.

Source: Payments and Settlements Office2

Under the following BSP memoranda:
M-2020-027 dated 21 April 2020 – waiver of fees until the end of the enhanced community quarantine (ECQ) on
30 April 2020
M-2020-035 dated 28 April 2020 – extension of waiver until 15 May 2020 in line with the extension of the ECQ
M-2020-041 dated 15 May 2020 – extension of waiver until 29 May 2020 in line with the modified ECQ
M-2020-044 dated 29 May 2020 – extension of waiver until 11 June 2020 in line with BSP’s guidelines under the
General Community Quarantine
M-2020-048 dated 05 June 2020 – extension of waiver until the last business day of year 2020

85

1.3 Volume and value of transactions in PhilPaSS pre- and post-COVID
In the first semester of 2020, there was an increase of almost 80 percent in thevalue of the total transactions that settled in PhilPaSS compared with the same
period in 2019. While the volume increased only by 2 percent during the period,
the value of these transactions increased to ₱244 trillion, an average of ₱2 trillion
per day versus the average of only ₱1.2 trillion per day in the first semester of
2019. (Table 8.1)

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The large increase in the value of transactions that settled in PhilPaSS during thefirst half of 2020 versus the same period in 2019 was mainly due to the surge
in the value of monetary operations of almost 160 percent. These transactions
accounted for about 70 percent of the value of the total transactions. Although
the Philippine peso-US dollar trades declined during the period by 13 percent
and other fund transfers directly initiated by financial institutions fell by almost 40
percent, these accounted for only 10 percent and 6 percent of the total value oftransactions, respectively.
In terms of volume, monetary operations account for only about 5 percent of
the total number of transactions that settled in PhilPaSS. The total volume oftransactions in PhilPaSS increased during the period mainly due to the increase
in interbank transfers of customer payments initiated directly by FIs. However,
the increase in customer payments was negated by the decline in the number ofpeso-dollar trades (which dropped by 7 percent and accounted for 15 percent
of total transactions), government securities (which fell by almost 10 percernt
and make up 7 percent of total transactions), and transactions made through the
BSP’s central financial accounting system (which declined by almost 30 percent
and accounted for 7 percent of the total number of transactions).
1.4 Updates on the next-generation PhilPaSS
The BSP shall implement by year 2021 a next generation RTGS system to be
named as the PhilPaSSplus. Replacing the 17-year old PhilPaSS, the PhilPaSSplus
shall provide more comprehensive functionalities to better service larger numbers
and varying types and complexities of financial transactions and reduce data
redundancy. In addition, the PhilPaSSplus shall use the latest technology to
improve risk reduction, increase security levels, provide more complete data
or information, provide for flexible liquidity management, increase provisions
for business continuity and standardize the communication message format
using the ISO 20022 international standard. The push for interoperability will
significantly improve the end-to-end payer-to-payee processes among FIs andprepare as well for the goals for the efficiency of cross-border payments which is
now a priority for the G20.

The BSP began designing the new system last December 2019. Notwithstanding
the pandemic, the PSO continued to pursue the design based on the set timelines
with ongoing intensive, albeit virtual, coordination with the service provider,
BSP units involved, and all financial institutions and third-party payment service
providers (TPPSPs) that participate in PhilPaSS, on schedule for the Go-Live dateof the PhilPaSSplus in June 2021.
Also in 2019, BSP’s Monetary Board required all FIs and TPPSPs that transmit to
the RTGS system, electronic instructions in their systems and/ or infrastructures
used to transmit such payment instructions, to implement the ISO 20022
standard. Even amidst the COVID situation, the BSP, still in coordination with
its external stakeholders, successfully established the ISO 20022 Rulebook
for the Philippine financial industry and ensured to on-board stakeholders
through several virtual user briefings and active dissemination of advisories andguidelines. Through the Task Force on the implementation of the ISO 20022
standard, the BSP shall continue to ensure compliance with BSP’s roadmap,
parallel to the timelines of the launch of the PhilPaSSplus.

2. The National Retail Payment System: A conduit for the
adoption of a safe, efficient and reliable retail payment system
The result of the diagnostic study conducted by the Better Than Cash Alliance(BTCA) in 2015 using 2013 payments data called for revolutionary changes in theway retail payment systems in the country were structured and governed.3 Theshare of digital payments in the Philippines then was only about 1 percent of thetotal volume of payment transactions. This extremely low adoption of electronic
payment services motivated the BSP to push the National Retail Payment System(NRPS) regulatory framework forward, targeting the share of digital payments
to reach 20 percent by 2020 (BTCA, 2019) and 50 percent by 2023. The BSP
envisioned the NRPS to pave the way for a safe, efficient, reliable and inclusiveelectronic retail payment system in the country.
3

The Better Than Cash Alliance (BTCA) is a partnership of governments, companies and international organizations
that accelerates the transition from cash to digital payments to advance the sustainable development goals(SDGs). The goals are a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet and improve the lives andprospects of everyone, everywhere. These were adopted by all United Nations member states, including thePhilippines, in 2015.

Payments and Settlement Systems:
Anchors of Financial System Resilience and Stability in the Time of COVID-19

Seen from a broad perspective, the adoption of the NRPS was in response toa pressing need for channels that can provide the efficiency required by anemerging Philippine economy and at the same time allow Filipinos to benefit
from the safety, reliability and fitness of digital infrastructure in delivering
financial services even to far-flung communities beyond the reach of traditional
brick-and-mortar facilities. At the core of the NRPS framework are governanceprinciples and standards that set a level playing field for the banks and non-banke-money issuers and require them to pursue interoperable payment services.
The BSP recognizes that interoperability is instrumental in accelerating economic
growth as interlinked payment services enable the smooth and efficient flow offunds in support of productive activities that fuel economic advancement.
Indeed, the NRPS led to the following transformative changes in retail payments:i.

Improvement in system governance with the creation of the Philippine
Payments Management, Inc. (PPMI) as the governing body under the NRPS.4

ii.

Establishment of the Philippine Electronic Fund Transfer System andOperations Network (PESONet), which allows crediting of funds to theaccount of the payee on the same banking day the sender made the transfer.
PESONet is the rail used for the EGov Pay, which is an electronic payment
facility that allows individuals and businesses to digitally pay taxes, licenses,
permits and other obligations to the government. The EGov Pay uses theLand Bank of the Philippines (LBP) LinkBiz Portal through which the payers
can access this payment facility.

iii.

Creation of InstaPay, which is a real-time electronic fund transfer system.

Fund transfers via InstaPay can be done with the use of QR codes which havebeen made interoperable following the BSP’s policy requiring the adoption of
a National QR Code Standard dubbed “QR Ph” by the industry. The Person-toPerson (P2P) QR Ph was launched in November 2019.

4

A payment system management dody (PSMB) is a private industry-led governing body that is duly recognized by
the BSP to develop and enforce rules and agreements pertaining to members’ clearing and settlement activities
in accordance with the NRPS Framework and BSP regulations.

87

As of end-August 2020, PESONet has 62 participating institutions while InstaPay
has 47 participants. The increasing participation of thrift banks, rural banks
and electronic money issuers (EMIs) is a sign that the country’s retail payment
ecosystem is becoming more inclusive. These smaller institutions cater to theneeds of the unserved and underserved communities.
The abovementioned initiatives have yielded remarkable results. The followthrough diagnostic study carried out by the BTCA in 2019 reveals that the shareof digital payments in the Philippines as of end-2018 has increased to around 10
percent in volume and 20 percent by value (BTCA, 2019).
Interestingly, these advances in the country’s retail payment system wereachieved before the COVID-19 pandemic, which underscored even more the needfor digital payment services around the world. The digital fund transfer rails thatcame after the adoption of the NRPS have been certainly helpful in ensuring thatmoney circulation continues and remains efficient amid the pandemic. Realizingthat digital payment services are critical in these times when making transactions
face to face entails deadly health hazards, the BSP has adopted further measures
to encourage use of these contactless services.

3. The BSP’s regulatory response against the pandemic

5

Even as the NRPS prepared the country against this rare but disruptive pandemic
with deep adverse economic impact, the BSP took additional steps to ensurethat digital payment services helped in controlling COVID-19 transmissions while
alleviating the plight of the most vulnerable sectors.
3.1 Suspension of fees and charges imposed on electronic transactions
The BSFIs were urged to suspend the charging of all fees imposed on the useof online banking platforms or electronic money, including those for InstaPay
and PESONet services.6 This call was aligned with the BSP’s relief measure that
also waives the transaction fees on interbank fund transfers done through the
PhilPaSS. With this relief measure, the BSP-supervised Financial Institutions(BSFIs) were strongly encouraged to extend such a relief to the users of digital
5

The enhanced community quarantine (ECQ) and stringent social distancing measures over the entire Luzon,
including the National Capital Region (NCR), were imposed by the national government on 17 March 2020.

6

See BSP Memorandum No. M-2020-008 dated 14 March 2020.

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funds transfer services and ATMs.7 Apart from easing the financial burden on
Filipino households, the waiver of electronic funds transfer fees aimed to promote
the use of digital payment and financial services since these minimize physicalcontact associated with the spread of COVID-19.
There were 30 BSFIs that agreed to waive the fees for PESONet and InstaPaytransactions. Twenty-eight (28) of them were banks and two (2) were non-bankEMIs. These BSFIs have extended the waivers until either 30 September 2020 or
31 December 2020, with some maintaining the extension until further notice.
3.2 Relief measure waiving the filing, processing and licensing fees forelectronic payment and financial services (EPFS)8•3.4 Continued collaboration with key stakeholders
Strategic partnerships with key payment system stakeholders are continuously
being pursued to sustain the country’s momentum in digitizing payments.
•

QR Ph for P2M payments. The QR Ph adoption is expected to deepen withthe availability of the Person-to-Merchant (P2M) QR Ph in the near term.
This facet of the QR Ph implementation is expected to advance the BSP’s
financial inclusion agenda since it will attract the small unbanked vendors
and their customers to own a transaction account in order to experience theconvenience of using P2M QR Ph in settling their transactions.

•Bills payment. The bills payment initiative aims to eliminate theinefficiencies associated with the current fragmented bills payment
mechanisms that require a biller to enter into a bilateral arrangement witha PSP in order to collect from the clients of the PSP through electronicmeans. Upon its implementation, the billers will be capable of collectingfrom their customers even if the PSPs of the billers are different from thoseof the customers.

•

Direct debit. A direct debit arrangement allows a customer to authorize
payees to pull funds directly from his account. Having such anarrangement shall enhance customers’ management of recurring payments
and shall aid payees streamline collection efforts and receive expectedcash inflows on time.

•

Affordable fees on micro transactions. Together with PPMI, the BSP is working
to reduce the cost of doing digital payments in order to encourage theconsumers to shift from cash-based to digital transactions.

Cognizant of the critical role of electronic banking and digital payment services inpreventing the spread of COVID-19, the BSP has suspended the charging of filing,processing and licensing fees related to the grant of EPFS licenses.
The waiver of such fees aims to encourage BSFIs to offer safe, efficient andreliable digital channels that support critical payment use cases such as social
benefit transfers, remittances and payments to billers including merchants,
suppliers and the government.
3.3 Payment system oversight amid the COVID-19 outbreak
The BSP implemented essential oversight interventions to sustain the smooth
flow of funds in the economy despite some efficiency deterrents caused by
the pandemic.
•

Requirement to adopt response plans. The BSP required the critical operatorsof payment systems (OPS) and the payment service providers (PSPs) toadopt appropriate response mechanisms to ensure the health and safety of
their employees and customers, while continuing the delivery of essential
financial services to the general public.9 Such intervention was essential inensuring that clearing and settlement services remain robust and capable ofaddressing potential disruptions owing to the pandemic.

7

See BSP Memorandum No. M-2020-031 dated 25 April 2020.

8

See BSP Memorandum No. M-2020-033 dated 27 April 2020.

9

See BSP Memorandum No. M-2020-006 dated 11 March 2020.

Surveillance of retail payment transactions. In order to ensure that retailpayment systems are responsive to the needs of the public despite theimposition of community quarantines, the BSP monitored the volume andvalue of payment transactions that are done through ATMs and checks, andthose coursed through PESONet and InstaPay.

Payments and Settlement Systems:
Anchors of Financial System Resilience and Stability in the Time of COVID-19

3.5 Participation in webinars promoting digital payments
The BSP has actively supported information campaigns that promote wider
adoption of digital payments. With the goal of deepening digital financial literacy,
key officers of the BSP participated as speakers in various fora and webinars suchas those hosted by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department ofTourism (DOT), Department of Education (DepEd) and the Union Bank of thePhilippines (UBP).

89

4. COVID-19’s impact on retail payments based on empiricalsupportThe BSP noted that the volume and value of ATM withdrawals plunged by almost
30 percent and 25 percent, respectively, in the first 45 days of the enhanced
community quarantine (ECQ) compared with same period prior to the ECQ.
A similar trend was seen in check payments, with the volume declining by 70
percent and value shrinking by 60 percent. The lowest volume and value of ATM
withdrawals and check payments, year to date, were observed in April 2020 when
the ECQ was in effect for a full month (Figure 8.2).

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

In contrast, there was a sustained rise in the volume and value of electronic fundtransfers via PESONet and InstaPay during the same period. A total of 13.7 million
transfers worth ₱325 billion of combined PESONet and InstaPay transactions wererecorded for the first 45 days under ECQ. These numbers represent a substantial
upswing of 20 percent in volume and 25 percent in value compared with thesame time span before the ECQ (Figure 8.3).
The greater use of PESONet and InstaPay for retail payments reflects the naturaltendency and the increasing preference of the public for digital payment services,being the most practical, convenient and secure means for transferring funds.
At the same time, the BSP’s regulatory actions helped move things along faster.
For example, the quarterly volume and value of both InstaPay and PESONettransactions grew more notably when the payment service providers heeded the
BSP’s call to waive the fees on these electronic funds transfer services (Figure 8.4).

Source: Bancnet and Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC)		

Source: Bancnet and Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC)Payments and Settlement Systems:
Anchors of Financial System Resilience and Stability in the Time of COVID-19

Meanwhile, the upward trajectory in digital retail payments data remained evenafter the community quarantine was relaxed from ECQ to general community
quarantine (GCQ) starting June 2020. The PESONet and InstaPay payments leapedin volume to 51.2 million amounting to₱862.3 billion as of the quarter ending 30 June 2020. This represents a
122 percent growth in volume and 59 percent increase in value from thepreceding quarter.
It is notable that PESONet has helped ensure that the vulnerable sectors
efficiently and safely received the government’s financial assistance during thecommunity quarantines. In particular, PESONet was used by the Development
Bank of the Philippines to distribute the Social Security System’s (SSS) small
business wage subsidy (SBWS) under the national government’s social
amelioration program (SAP) to 3.4 million employees who were affected by the
ECQ. It was also used in the deployment of amelioration to some beneficiariesof the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps). PESONet will further play animportant role in the deployment of social benefits. Starting October 2020, the
SSS will release its members’ benefits and loans through PESONet participatinginstitutions. There are around 2.77 million pensioners who will depend on
PESONet to safely and efficiently receive their SSS benefits.
The consistent progressive development in InstaPay and PESONet usage shows
the sustainable impact of the BSP’s regulatory actions.

5. COVID-19’s impact on remittances and remittance service
providersRemittances have been a growth driver of the Philippine economy, fueling bothhousehold income and consumption. The remittance market in the Philippines
is sustained mainly by the influx of workers in urban centers across the country
and by remittances from overseas Filipinos (OFs). In 2019, the Philippines was91

the fourth largest destination for international remittances, posting transactions
worth US$33.5 billion which accounted for 9.3 percent of the country’s grossdomestic product (GDP) and 7.8 percent of its gross national income (GNI).
A substantial portion of the OF remittances is in the form of cash coursed
through banks. Remittances worth US$30.1 billion flowed into the country fromboth land-based workers (US$23.6 billion) and sea-based workers (US$6.5 billion)
in 2019. About 78.4 percent of these inflows came from the United States (US),
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Japan, United Arab Emirates (UAE), United Kingdom(UK), Canada, Hong Kong, Germany and Kuwait.
In the Philippines, remittance inflows are facilitated through remittance channels(RCs) which are under the supervision of the BSP. RCs offer an efficient means of
payment and money transfer even to distant communities, hence the RCs’ specialrole in advancing financial inclusion.
The outbreak of the COVID-19 and the corresponding measures undertaken
to combat its spread pose challenges to the remittance market. In the past,
remittances have been counter-cyclical as migrant workers send more money
home during crises. However, the COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented
global crisis that resulted in economic recessions across the world, affecting theemployment of migrant Filipino workers.
During the implementation of community quarantines, the money remittancebusinesses were among the essential services allowed to operate. Based on asurvey conducted by the BSP in May 2020, the RCs in the country remained
mostly operational, albeit at varying operating capacity (BSP, 2020). Despite theircontinuous operation, however, the RCs experienced notable business slowdown.
Majority of them reported a volume decline in April compared with the previous
month as well as with the same month the year before. The declines covered
both on- and off-shore sources. At least half of the respondents suffered adecline by more than 20 percent10 (Figures 8.5 and 8.6).

10

The National Capital Region was put under the community quarantine on 15 March 2020 followed by adeclaration of ECQ for the entirety of Luzon on 17 March 2020.

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines		

Source: BSP (2020)		Source: BSP (2020)

Payments and Settlement Systems:
Anchors of Financial System Resilience and Stability in the Time of COVID-19

The volume and value of international remittance transactions have likewise
declined on the back of closures of international corridors and quarantine
measures imposed by different countries particularly the US, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Japan, UAE, UK, Canada, Hong Kong and Kuwait where most OFs arelocated. As of end-May 2020, the number of displaced OFWs was 323,537 andthis figure is projected to increase as the crisis lingers (Nakpil, 2020).
The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the importance of business continuity
plans and the need for innovative strategies enabling digital business operations.
Digitalization is key to sustaining business operations even in times of major
business disruptions. This observation is drawn from the survey responses ofa few RCs that reported a rise instead of a downturn in business. Majority ofthese RCs are banks and virtual currency exchanges (VCEs) that employ online
remittance platforms that allow customers to remotely make a remittance.11 It is
worth noting that the adoption of digital remittance platforms among the RCs
in the country has yet to grow. The survey reveals that about 48 percent of theRCs do not use a digital platform; for those who do, only 30 percent or less of thetotal remittances they have processed using digital channels.

93•

Cooperative oversight. The responsibilities of the BSP interrelate with thoseof other regulators. For instance, there are financial activities that involve twolinked settlements, such as the delivery of a security against payment of cash,
where the security settlement is under the regulatory ambit of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) while the money settlement is subject tooversight by the BSP. In this context, the PSOF allows the BSP to engage incooperative oversight to address the need for comprehensive regulation
over interrelated financial market infrastructures (FMIs).

•

Designation of payment systems. Through the adoption of a risk-based
oversight approach, the framework focuses supervision over designatedpayment systems. Designation of payment systems shall be conductedby the BSP, taking into account relevant information gathered from its
monitoring activities. The critical information that shall form the bases ofdesignation include: industry market share of a payment system; natureand complexity of transactions being processed by the system; andinterdependence with other payment systems or FMIs. A designatedpayment system shall be classified as either:

The foregoing data and survey results suggest that the Philippine remittanceindustry still lags in adopting digital platforms, constraining the RCs’ services
during the pandemic. This concern can be addressed through proper
collaboration between the BSP and the remittance industry to ensure that theneeds of the sector are taken into account in the BSP’s broader initiatives toenhance the adoption of digital payments in the country.

–

Systemically important payment system (SIPS) – a payment system thatposes or has the potential to pose systemic risk that could threaten thestability of the national payment system; or–Prominently important payment system (PIPS) - a payment systemthat may not trigger or transmit systemic risk but could have a major
economic impact or undermine the confidence of the public in thenational payment system or in the circulation of money.

6. Strengthening payment system oversightThe operator of a designated payment system and its participants, which
include banks, non-bank e-money issuers and critical service providers,are subject to closer oversight in view of the importance of the designatedsystem in the broader national payment system. The BSP can revoke thedesignation of a payment system under justifiable circumstances.

The BSP’s thrust of encouraging innovative digital payment services comesalong with its mandate of safeguarding the efficiency and safety of the national
payment system. In this regard, the BSP has issued a payment system oversightframework (PSOF) that sets out the BSP’s approach to governing payment
systems in accordance with the National Payment Systems Act. Currently, the BSP
is developing an action plan which will ensure smooth implementation of the
PSOF12 with the following key provisions:11

A virtual currency exchange (VCE) service refers to the conversion or exchange of fiat currency or other value intoa virtual currency (VC), or the conversion or exchange of VC into fiat currency or other value. A VC refers to any
type of digital unit that is used as a medium of exchange or a form of digitally-stored value created by agreement
within the community of VC users.

12

See BSP Circular No. 1089 dated 7 July 2020.

•

Measures to avert disruption in payment systems. When a threat to thesafety, efficiency and reliability of a designated payment system exists due to
weaknesses in governance by the operator of a designated payment system,
the BSP shall appoint, without need for prior court hearing, a manager ofrecognized competence in the payments field to administer the operation ofa designated payment system.

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7. Conclusion
The BSP’s efforts in overseeing and developing payment systems throughcontinuous collaborative engagement with the payment services industry andother stakeholders have proven to be worthwhile endeavors in building thenational payment system’s resilience against extraordinary adverse scenarios suchas the COVID-19 pandemic.
The enhancement of the country’s RTGS system is one of the major initiatives of
the BSP to provide a more robust infrastructure to cater to the fast increasing
requirements of the financial industry and further support the goal of making thecountry’s payment and settlement system more safe, efficient and inclusive while
facilitating integration across domestic and global payment systems.
Moreover, the reforms championed by the BSP under the NRPS prior to thepandemic (i.e., 2015-2019) enabled the country’s payment system in general
to withstand market stresses. Nevertheless, most remittance companies, which

represent an important segment of the payment system, have to integrate digitaltransformation in their business strategies in order to enhance their resilienceagainst extreme business disruptions such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
Despite improvements in payment system safety and efficiency following theestablishment of the NRPS, the BSP had to carry out supplemental regulatory
actions to boost the system’s strength against extraordinary sources of stress.
The BSP’s actions in response to the pandemic have contributed to the greateruse of contactless means of payment, particularly the PESONet and InstaPay
services, which have been critical in controlling COVID-19 transmission.
As the country’s payment system continues to evolve against the backdrop of
the COVID-19 pandemic, the BSP shall continue to be dynamic and responsive inpursuing its goal of promoting wider adoption of digital payment services. The
digital shift has proven to be more than helpful in overcoming the health crisis
and in mitigating its pervasive impact on the economy.

References
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. (2020, May 6). Report on the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on the Philippine remittance industry.
Massaly, K., Ricart, R., Bambawale, M., Totapally, S., and Bhandari, V. (2019). The state of digital payments in the Philippines.
Better Than Cash Alliance (BTCA).
Nakpil, D. (2020, 30 May). 1 million OFWs seen to be displaced until end of 2021 – Labor dep’t. CNN Philippines. https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/5/30/one-million-overseas-Filipino-workers-displaced-.html (Accessed 11 June 2020).

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1. Background
Whether one calls it a black swan or a gray rhino, the COVID-19 pandemic has
undoubtedly brought transformational changes in financial services. In late
February to early March 2020, some governments started to impose community
lockdowns and implement social distancing to slow down the spread of the virus.
Soon after, more national governments followed suit as countries began to face
the realities of a pandemic. These measures restrained travel, economic and social
activities, creating a major dent to the global economy.

this chapter also tackles the policy directions aimed at helping the industry faceheadwinds and uncertainties.

Amid strict social distancing measures and mobility restrictions, BSPsupervised financial institutions (BSFIs) must rethink their business models andstrategies to sustain the delivery of core financial services while coping withthe ensuing challenges. These include capacity constraints, technology andnetwork issues as well as the onslaught of COVID-19-related cyberthreats andattacks. The Technology Risk and Innovation Supervision Department (TRISD)
of the BSP is at the forefront of proactively monitoring the digital and cyberenvironment surrounding BSFIs. This is in line with TRISD’s mandate of fostering
responsible digital innovation, sound technology and cyber risk managementof BSFIs. The department’s mandate has become even more crucial amid theglobal pandemic situation.
This chapter provides insights on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic
to the technology risks, cybersecurity posture and digital transformation
initiatives of the BSFIs, including non-bank e-money issuers (EMIs)1 and virtual
currency exchanges (VCEs)2 . It also discusses the BSP’s initial and ongoingpolicy and supervisory responses to manage risks while harnessing unforeseen
opportunities. It covers the range of supervisory tools deployed, the results ofthe baseline survey on the impact of COVID-19, constraints faced by the BSP and
the BSFIs, realizations and lessons learned, and action plans to keep the BSFIs
resilient in these turbulent times. As the BSP and the BSFIs work together andpursue innovative strategies to safely transition towards the new economy,*

Maricris A. Salud (Deputy Director), Jovelyn M. Hao (Manager) and Cris Benson S. Leuterio (Bank Officer V) arefrom the Technology Risk and Innovation Supervision Department (TRISD).

1

E-money issuers are non-bank institutions registered with the BSP as a money transfer agent under Sec. 4511N of
the MORNBFI. (Please spell out acronym)

2

VC exchange refers to an entity that provides facility or services for the conversion or exchange of fiat currency to
VC or vice versa.

Source: TRISD Staff, Summary of Banks with Authority to Provide EPFS, August 2020

2. Pre-COVID-19 digital financial services landscapeOver the years, the BSP pursued responsible digital transformation of thefinancial services industry as an innovative tool to expand the reach offinancial inclusion in the country. It offered beneficial opportunities andservices to the unbanked and underbanked segments of our society. In
addition, technology adoption enabled financial institutions to ramp up
operational agility, tap a wider customer base and provide modern financial
services in line with market demands.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the establishment of financial touchpoints
through electronic payment and financial services (EPFS) continues to acceleratesince electronic banking started way back in the early 2000s. These include onsite
and offsite automated teller machines (ATMs), mobile point-of-sale devices andonline channels such as internet and mobile banking platforms/applications.
However, EPFS adoption remains at the emerging phase as only 134 out of 547
banks, or roughly 24.5 percent, have embarked on EPFS as of December 30, 2019

Continuity of Core Financial Services and Cybersecurity Implications(Figure 9.1). Of the 134 banks, 61 banks, or 45.5 percent, offer internet or mobilebanking while only five banks offer fully digital end-to-end products.

3. COVID-19 pandemic: The unexpected catalyst for digitalfinancial services
For the financial services industry, the COVID-19 pandemic has become theunexpected catalyst for the increased adoption of digital financial services.
Since the start of the enhanced community quarantine (ECQ) period in March
2020, mobility restrictions have driven consumers to utilize online banking/financial services instead of the usual over-the-counter (OTC) and ATM services.
Meanwhile, the national government through the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) also relied on tech-enabled financial services for the“contactless release” of financial assistance under the social amelioration program(SAP).

Source: TRISD Staff, BSFI Survey on Digital Account Opening

Our data shows that from 17 March to 30 April 2020, around 4.151 million digital
accounts were opened among banks and non-bank electronic money issuers(Figure 9.2). Accounts opened per day averaged to 113,300 from April 16 to
30 corresponding to a 39 percent increase from the previous month’s figures.
InstaPay and PESONet transactions likewise posted record increases in the same97

period. Indeed, Filipinos have taken advantage of digital-centric supervised
institutions capable of delivering fully digital customer onboarding processes,
online payments and remittance and other tech-enabled financial services.
Such numbers reveal that this is an excellent opportunity to bolster the digital
foothold as more people are exploring and getting more comfortable with theonline methods of payment. In a study (Laforga, B., 2020) conducted by Visa,around 70 percent of Filipinos who used digital payment channels during the
lockdown will likely continue to do so. In a related study (Agcaoili, 2020) doneby YouGov in July 2020, 75 percent of Filipinos believe it is important for small
businesses to have an online presence. These positive developments can add
about 1 percentage point to the annual gross domestic product (GDP) of matureeconomies and more than 3 percentage points to those of emerging economies
like the Philippines (Boston Consulting Group, 2019).
Globally, the pandemic is yielding promising benefits for digital transformation.
In the World Retail Banking Report 2020 (Capgemini and Efma, 2020), more thanhalf (57 percent) of Capgemini surveyed customers now prefer internet banking,up from 49 percent before COVID-19. Customers are also favoring mobilebanking apps in these times of social distancing, with the figure rising to 55
percent, compared with 47 percent previously.
To gauge the preparedness of BSFIs to deal with this pandemic, the BSP-Financial
Supervision Sector gathered insights from the top 20 banks, including theirsubsidiaries, and 28 EMIs/VCEs. The survey showed that almost 85 percent of
the respondents have already integrated their digital initiatives in their businessroadmap while the rest are still updating their strategy or use cases. Nonetheless,only 14 respondents or 21.9 percent, all of which are EMIs/VCEs, believe thatthey have always been operating a digital business while 34 respondents, or 53.1
percent, mostly EMIs/VCEs, mentioned that above 75 percent of all their criticalclient-oriented activities can be done digitally. Figure 9.3 shows that most banks
still lean largely towards traditional modes of financial services delivery whileEMIs/VCEs have more digitally-focused business models.

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Source: TRISD Staff, Results of the Baseline Assessment on the Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic to theRegulated FinTech Industry and Critical Operators of Payment Systems, September 2020; SPRD Staff, Top 20
UKBs-Baseline Survey-Working File, July 2020

Most EMIs3/VCEs positioned themselves as digital entities in the hope ofincreasing market share, agility and customer satisfaction by more than 60
percent. In terms of readiness, Figure 9.4 shows the number of financial services
offered by the respondents’ digital channels that can be completed without
requiring customers to visit the service providers’ branches or offices.
Similar to the results of the consumer survey conducted by Capgemini, thebaseline survey shows an increasing number of Filipino customers who preferto do financial transactions from the comfort of their homes, leading to the risein digital sign-ups and transactions. This trend prompted financial institutions
to accelerate their digital onboarding projects and fast-track the developmentof key functionalities in digital channels such as acceptance of remote checkdeposits, placements of investments and other financial transactions.
3

Availment of loans offered in e-money platforms of EMIs is made possible through partnership with credit
granting institutions who fully bear the credit risks.

Source: TRISD Staff, Results of the Baseline Assessment on the Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic to theRegulated FinTech Industry and Critical Operators of Payment Systems, September 2020; SPRD Staff,
Top 20 UKBs-Baseline Survey-Working File, July 2020

Continuity of Core Financial Services and Cybersecurity Implications

4. Anticipating a more dynamic cyberthreat landscapeWith the massive shift to digital financial services along with the public’s overallsensitivities brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, cyberthreat actors
remain unrelenting in carrying out their cybercriminal activities. These range
from phishing attempts and fake websites that lure clients to defraud or give out
sensitive information to cyber-espionage or man-in-the-middle attacks in remote
work environments. Undoubtedly, the COVID-19 pandemic set into motion the
dynamic uncertainties in the cyberthreat landscape.
As depicted in Figure 9.5, phishing emails and malicious websites exhibited
increasing trend since January 2020 as confirmed by the BSP’s surveillance
reports4 on the heightened cyberthreat level. Amidst the global COVID-19
pandemic, the threat posed by malicious websites was the first to gain
momentum, reaching its peak at the onset of the ECQ period. When malicious
websites started to dwindle, cyberthreat actors turned to phishing emails where it
peaked in April within the ECQ period. On a positive note, phishing emails

and malicious websites tapered off towards the end of the ECQ period, with
figures even lower than January levels. This downward shift could indicate thatcountermeasures deployed by the BSP and the BSFIs during the ECQ were
working as intended. However, it may also signify that cyberthreat actors aremost likely just changing their tactics.
Looking at the global landscape, Figure 9.6 tracks the Philippine trend formalicious websites, with its peak in middle to late March as cited in a reportby the FS-ISAC (2020). This corresponds to the height of the global pandemic,
when fraudsters and scammers were quick to exploit the novelty of the situation,
setting up to an average of 66 financially-themed, high-risk domains per day.
Nonetheless, the number of malicious websites eventually plummeted in thelight of countermeasures by the domain name registrars as well as increased
takedowns by organizations.

Source: FS-ISAC Report, 16 April 2020
Source: TRISD Staff, TRISD Issue No. 3: Surveillance Report on COVID-19 Themed Cyber-Attacks
4

Based on surveys sent to chief information security officers of select BSFIs to gather weekly and/or monthly data
pertaining to key control measures and relevant statistics on COVID-19-themed cyberattacks throughout the ECQ
and GCQ periods.

99

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

4.1 Initial industry responses
Figure 9.7 outlines the top threats at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic aswell as the cybersecurity measures and controls adopted by BSFIs. Launchingof targeted cybersecurity awareness campaigns was the top countermeasure
undertaken by BSFIs in response to COVID-19-themed cyberthreats. Twentynine or 85 percent of all respondents have initiated cyber awareness campaigns
aimed at their clients, employees and key stakeholders. While considered a nontechnical control, awareness programs serve as highly effective tools to combat
phishing and social engineering attacks. The campaigns utilized all social
media channels (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, Twitter), emails, SMS reminders andwebsite advisories.

BSFIs likewise intensified surveillance and monitoring of these cyberthreats,
primarily through their security operations centers (SOC). This is further
supplemented by tighter network controls such as stringent firewall settings,
endpoint protection and whitelisting of websites/applications, among others.
4.2 Securing remote work arrangements
In order to support continued operations of mission-critical functions andprovide financial services to their clients, BSFIs have adopted remote work
arrangements in the wake of the ECQ. Such work arrangements normally entail
the use of digital collaboration tools, connection to remote BSFI networks
and use of personal devices by the remote workforce. While remote work
arrangements are expected to alter business processes and structures, failure
to appropriately secure the entire workflow, such as the use of unsecured
communication channels or unmanaged use of personal devices, may introduce
new cybersecurity threats and risks. In this regard, the BSP has advised the BSFIs
and the public to undertake necessary measures to securely manage work-fromhome (WFH) arrangements.
4.3 The big shift to zero-trust operational modelWith the prevalence of remote work arrangements, security is no longer confinedwithin an institution’s technology infrastructure as it now extends to an array of
endpoints being accessed by its remote workforce. IT and security professionals
are faced with the hard truth – cybersecurity is more daunting than ever as thenumber of threat vectors become overwhelmingly massive.
In order to minimize the risks, BSFIs should reconsider their cybersecurity
strategies and assess the feasibility of shifting to a zero-trust operationalmodel. This means that access to BSFI resources will have to be continuously
verified and authorized by implementing security protocols such as multi-factor
authentication (MFA) and biometric technologies. BSFIs should evaluate whether
implementing zero-trust identity and access management procedures canaddress the growing cyber risks in the post COVID-19 setup.

Source: TRISD Staff, TRISD Issue No. 1: Surveillance Report on COVID-19 Themed Cyber-Attacks

Continuity of Core Financial Services and Cybersecurity Implications

4.4 Protecting the last mile
At the heart of digital transformation and heightened cyberthreats are thefinancial consumers who are at the receiving end of both the advantages ofdigital platforms as well as the risk of cyberfraud attacks. In dealing with new
digital customers as well as existing clients trying out digital financial services forthe first time, BSFIs understandably focus on making these platforms easier to
use and providing customer service and technical support to ensure customer
buy-in and loyalty. On the other hand, increased exposure to these digitalplatforms also makes financial clients the primary targets of cyberfraudsters.
Thus, it is imperative that BSFIs also equip their financial consumers with the righttools, information and know-how not only to properly use these digital financial
channels but also to avoid being victims of cyberfraud and scams.
As part of their consumer protection programs, BSFIs should carry out continuing
education and cybersecurity awareness campaigns to advise financial clients on

		

BSP Official Facebook Page

101

cyberhygiene and safe computing practices in using the institutions’ electronic
financial products and services. Said programs should be constantly updated toaddress emerging threats and risks as well as the changing needs and prioritiesof the consumers. In cases where financial consumers fall prey to the evolving
tactics of cyberthreat actors and fraudsters, consumer redress mechanisms should
be in place to guide the reporting, notification and availing of recourse options torecoup or minimize losses.
Since the start of the ECQ, the BSP has rolled out cybersecurity awarenesscampaigns targeting the BSFIs and the banking public focused on COVID-19themed cyberfraud and scams. These cover topics ranging from tips on how to
avoid becoming a victim, security tips on WFH arrangements and continuous
reminders on keeping personal financial information confidential. To ensure wider
reach and catch public attention, infographic advisories (Figure 9.8) were posted
on BSP’s social media handles namely, Facebook, Instagram and Twitter during
and after the ECQ.

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

4.5 Advancing cyber resilience amid the pandemic
The onset of the pandemic – with all the attendant operational constraints,
economic challenges and the incessant battle to keep cyberthreats at bay – hasunderscored the importance of an effective technology and cybersecurity risk
management system. Moreover, the crisis also highlighted the value of a riskbased and targeted approach to ensure that strategies, control measures andresponses are commensurate to the nature, degree and magnitude of the threats
involved. For instance, a security awareness campaign and education program
designed for a specific client profile (e.g., millennials or young professionals) –with specific focus on the types of threats and risks facing them – would be amore effective countermeasure compared to generic advisories sent to all clients
irrespective of their profiles and needs. Likewise, depending on the volume andexposure to high-risk activities/transactions, robust and multi-layered security
defenses such as MFA controls may be necessary to limit the ability of attackers
to carry out the fraud. On the other hand, BSFIs with significant exposure andinterconnection with payment gateways and networks may need to invest in
sophisticated fraud management systems that can flag transactions with unusual
spikes or irregular patterns vis-à-vis the established customer profile or attributes
as well as new forms of financial crime.

be inevitable in a crisis scenario, anticipation of these issues, development of a
mitigation plan or strategy and implementation of compensating controls will
help minimize disruption.

5. A closer look at the impact of COVID-19 on fintech firms
As the companies try to cope with these turbulent times, most of them
have no choice but to unleash their survival instincts. The boards and senior
managers of these firms believe that the pandemic has caused minor impact
on their corporate governance practices. The companies have carried out theirstockholders’ and board meetings via teleconference, as allowed by the rulesof the Securities and Exchange Commission (2020). Their independent control
units have also conducted virtual walkthroughs and audits and have not reported
issues due to the pandemic.

As highlighted in BSP Circular No. 982 (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 2017),
sustained situational awareness and threat monitoring capabilities in thischanging and uncertain landscape are key enablers for BSFIs to instituteappropriate countermeasures as threats and risks arise. Like the call of thenational government to unite in this battle against COVID-19, all BSFIs must
collaborate and work together to have a collective, coordinated and strategic
response to proactively manage emerging and persistent cyberthreats.
To achieve cyber resilience in the midst of a pandemic, BSFIs must include cyberrelated attacks and incidents in their business continuity planning process. Apartfrom cybersecurity concerns, BSFIs’ business continuity readiness has been put tothe test during the pandemic, severely challenging their operational capabilities.
If improperly managed, the increased demand for digital financial services
and remote working arrangements may take a toll on the BSFIs’ technology
infrastructures and systems. Other issues that may be encountered during the
ECQ period include the unavailability of key IT or operations personnel andcritical third-party service providers (TSPs). Although service degradation may

Source: TRISD Staff, Results of the Baseline Assessment on the Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic to theRegulated FinTech Industry and Critical Operators of Payment Systems, September 2020

With economic contraction and changes in consumer behavior, EMI/VCE firms
have redefined their strategies by (a) introducing virtual platforms or newContinuity of Core Financial Services and Cybersecurity Implications

products that can minimize face-to-face contact; (b) heavily refocusing on
areas that can drive growth; and (c) forging meaningful partnership. Some of
their innovative ideas include the increase in wallet limit, partnership with thevarious government units for the distribution of relief and subsidies including
SAP and integration of payment portals to facilitate the continuous flow offunds. Amid these creative concepts, the pandemic still hurt some of the EMIs/
VCEs due to closure of branches or temporary suspension of bitcoin exchanges,
isolated adoption of “no work, no pay” schemes, including the retrenchment of
employees, and postponement of store openings. Collectively, these challenges
made them realize the importance of introducing new products suitable tothe new normal, strengthening business continuity framework and pursuing
digitalization initiatives. This way of thinking is also the gist of a Harvard Business
Review article (Guillen, M., 2020) that highlighted the importance of pivoting tobusiness models conducive to short-term survival along with long-term resilienceand growth. It emphasized the need for disintermediation by going directly tothe buyer’s buyer, supported by changes in marketing, logistics and information
technology, particularly e-commerce platforms.
The adverse effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on their key business lines not
only led to the dramatic shift in strategic direction, but also revealed the stateof the EMI/VCE industry. Financial and operational impact on fintech firms varies
depending on the market niche they are in, variety of products and level ofdigitization initiatives. Essentially, respondents with retail customers and delivery
services did well during the pandemic while those catering to enterprises, travel(including ride-hailing services) and entertainment suffered a major dent to theiroperations. Respondents whose consumers rely on OTC transactions were also
negatively affected.
For the rest of 2020, respondents expect to rebound owing to the transition5
to a relaxed community quarantine in Metro Manila effective June 1, 2020. With
the reopening of the economy and government’s thrust encouraging Filipinos touse cashless transactions, a number of fintech firms showed a positive businessoutlook. On the flip side, respondents with affected target markets and whose
customers primarily rely on OTC transactions foresee less favorable businessprospects for the year.
5This is a shift from modified enhanced community quarantine to general community quarantine

103

5.1 Rethinking innovative solutions amid the pandemic
To brace for the extreme effects of the COVID-19 health crisis, EMIs/VCEs are (a)gearing towards new product developments that meet the demand of customers
under the new normal; (b) monitoring controllable expenses; and (c) veering awayfrom traditional marketing activities that would require physical contact withpeople. To attract potential customers, they are boosting marketing campaigns
in social media and Google advertisements. Respondents that employ OTC
channels have been working to integrate with banks to facilitate digital fundingof e-wallets.
As the continuity of operations is on the line, respondents look at succession
planning differently. More than ever, they adopted evaluation methods that rated
leaders based on their ability to (a) keep succession plans on track with readynow successors; (b) re-allocate trained people to other parts of the organization;and (c) manage the gap brought about by limitations of third-party outsourced
providers. A case in point is an EMI that adjusted its hotline operating hours
and reassigned some internal manpower to complement a TSP for call center
operations at the height of the ECQ.
Given the restricted mobility in the supply chain, certain respondents experienced
some downtimes or degraded service level with their critical TSPs. Despite
these, the early interventions of the respondents such as vendor assessments,
heightened monitoring of key risk indicators and execution of their contingency
plans paid off. Thus, EMIs and VCEs were able to surmount the pandemic
challenges and contribute to greater stability of the financial system.
5.2 The challenging path to digital transformation
The path to digital transformation is not a smooth journey for both banks
and EMIs/VCEs. For one, cultural resistance within their organizations remains
a primary hurdle that may take considerable time, effort and resources toovercome. Over-reliance on legacy technology and insufficient in-house skills
continue to confront banks, limiting their opportunities to leverage digitalplatforms and services. Replacing outdated platforms entails a certain amountof downtime while insufficient skills can delay the deployment of IT projects. On
the other hand, EMIs/VCEs find that limited budgets and inadequate internet
connectivity are major hurdles to reaching their target markets. Likewise, the104

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

environment for digital financial services to flourish, the BSP granted
regulatory reliefs, including relaxed Know-Your-Customer (KYC) requirementsthat paved the way for more convenient digital onboarding of clients. The
BSP took a step even further by waiving applicable license fees for BSFIs whowish to offer electronic payment and financial services. This is supplemented
by policy issuances urging BSFIs to augment their existing capabilities andimplement appropriate strategies to address the increasing demand for
digital financial services.

government also needs to step up its efforts to support the digital transformation
initiatives of BSFIs. For instance, updating revenue regulations that are attuned
to a digital business model (i.e., allowing for electronic documents as proof ofrevenue and adoption of e-invoicing) would greatly propel the use of technology
among BSFIs.
Investing in the right technology and tools, involving all departments indeveloping the strategy and investing in staff training are the identified critical
success factors towards digital transformation. Partnering with fintech firms may
also be a viable option to fast-track digital transformation as noted in a reportby the European Banking Authority (2018). Although the report was made before
the pandemic, forging partnerships with fintech firms can enable BSFIs to quickly
innovate and ramp up their digital transformation initiatives.

b.

Vigorous cybersecurity measures. As a key supervisory priority, the BSP
intensified its cyber surveillance efforts through daily monitoring of major
cyber incidents and disruptions, and initiating routine surveys on COVID19-themed cyberthreats and attacks. The BSP likewise published several
policy issuances with strong emphasis on employing vigorous and multilayered cybersecurity controls and measures to ward off evolving threats. As
cyberthreats span various industries and organizations, the BSP reinforced
collaboration and active engagement with key stakeholders, including
law government agencies. Specifically, the BSP sought assistance fromthe Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation
to facilitate the investigation of cases directly referred by BSFIs and thesubsequent prosecution and imposition of penalties in accordance with the“Bayanihan to Heal as One Act.” As cybercriminals face the full consequencesof the law, the BSP hopes that these measures serve as effective deterrent
and warning that will contribute to further deepening overall cyber resiliencein our country.

c.

Dynamic consumer protection mechanisms. True to its mandate as achampion of the financial consumers, the BSP pursued concrete steps sothat consumer welfare remains protected and digital financial needs are met
especially amid the pandemic. The BSP pushed for the temporary suspensionof fees and charges imposed by BSFIs on the use of online and e-money
platforms as a way of helping customers transact digitally. Consequently,
the BSP embarked on focused and aggressive cybersecurity awarenesscampaigns to alert and warn financial consumers of emerging cyberthreats
and scams. BSFIs were likewise advised to ramp up their customer service
and redress mechanisms to protect consumers and minimize fraud losses.

6. BSP’s COVID-19 regulatory response and initiatives
Ahead of the government’s imposition of the ECQ, the BSP has issued several
policies reminding BSFIs to put in place COVID-19 pandemic response plans.
Such plans were meant to primarily safeguard the health and safety of BSFIs’
employees and customers as well as address operational challenges while
ensuring that basic financial needs of the public are being met. On top of thesepolicy measures, the BSP facilitated the practical needs of the BSFIs such as
securing IATF IDs and RapidPasses for their mission-critical personnel.
Initially, daily surveys were sent to the BSFIs to gather critical information on thestatus of their operations indicating their working arrangements during the ECQ
period, working hours, extent of operational capacity, number of opened/closed
branches and other relevant data. These critical information were fed into thesupervisory processes of the BSP, allowing supervisors to promptly identify andact upon areas of key concerns. Figure 9.10 lists down the menu of supervisoryand policy responses undertaken by the BSP to address COVID-19-related
concerns and issues covering three key priorities, as follows:a.

Conducive environment for digital innovation. The degree and level ofexecution of digital transformation and technology innovation spell thedifference between BSFIs who survive or even thrive in this pandemic
situation and those who do not. To further stimulate and provide a conducive

Continuity of Core Financial Services and Cybersecurity Implications

				

105

Source: TRISD Staff, TRISD Initiatives and Deliverables, September 2020

7. Post-pandemic reality: Technology innovation andcybersecurity in the new economy
As the financial services industry navigates the new economy, new uncertainties
and difficulties loom in the horizon. As daunting as the future may seem, the BSP
shall continue to forge ahead and undertake policy and supervisory responses
touching on the following key areas whose first letters spell “COVID”:-

COnducive environment for digital innovation;-

VIgorous cybersecurity measures; and-Dynamic consumer protection mechanisms.

While it seems paradoxical to coin BSP’s policy and supervisory responses after
the very problem that confronts us, it is only by facing COVID-19 challenges
head on can the industry progress towards lasting stability and recovery. The
BSP had done this through baseline assessments of COVID-19’s impact to the
BSFIs and their financial clients as well as thorough surveillance of the operating
and cyberthreat environment. From providing the necessary regulatory reliefs
to fostering greater digital innovation, issuing coherent cybersecurity andtechnology policies, to ramping up cyber awareness campaigns for financial
consumers, the BSP made sure that supervisory actions were risk-informed, datadriven and intelligence-led.

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

The changing landscape compels BSFIs to rethink their business models andstrategies as well as redesign their financial products and services suitable
to the new normal environment. BSFIs should stand ready to harness digitaltransformation opportunities while observing sustained vigilance against
cyberthreat actors. More than ever, the BSP and the BSFIs should go theextra mile in protecting and ensuring the interest and well-being of thefinancial consumers.

Indeed, these are extraordinary times where the BSP and BSFIs are called upon tocollaborate more closely and pursue pioneering and cohesive solutions so that
financial services remain safe, innovative and resilient as the industry smoothlytransitions to the new economy.

References
Agcaoili, L. (2020, August 16). 7 of 10 Pinoys prefer online SME presence. The Philippine Star. https://www.philstar.com/business/2020/08/16/2035558/7-10-pinoys-prefer-online-sme-presence
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (2017, November 9). BSP Circular No. 982 dated 9 November 2017 on Enhanced Guidelines on Information Security Management. http://www.bsp.gov.ph/regulations/regulations.
asp?type=1&Yr=2017
Boston Consulting Group. (2019, May 28). How cashless payments help economies grow. https://www.bcg.com/publications/2019/cashless-payments-help-economies-grow.aspx
Capgemini and Efma (2020). World retail banking report 2020. https://worldretailbankingreport.com/resources/world-retail-banking-report-2020/
European Banking Authority. (2018, March 7). Report on the impact of fintech on incumbent credit inst models. https://eba.europa.eu/file/28458
FS-ISAC. (2020, April 16). High risk domains with a COVID-19 and financial theme. https://www.fsisac.com/hubfs/Resources/FSISAC-HighRiskDomains-COVID19Theme-TLPWhite.pdf
Guillen, M. (2020, July 7). How businesses have successfully pivoted during the pandemic. Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2020/07/how-businesses-have-successfully-pivoted-during-the-pandemic(Accessed August 17, 2020)
Laforga, B. (2020, July 16). Visa expects payments industry to retain 70 percent of lockdown users after emergency ends. BusinessWorld. https://www.bworldonline.com/visa-expects-payments-industry-to-retain70-of-lockdown-users-after-emergency-ends/
Securities and Exchange Commission. (2020, March 16). Memorandum Circular No. 06-2020. https://www.sec.gov.ph/sec-issuances/memorandum-circulars/by-year/
Wikipedia.org. Financial technology. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_technology

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1. Financial inclusion: An urgent agenda for the new economy
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas advocates financial inclusion to promote astrong economy and a high quality of life for all Filipinos. With inclusion, moreindividuals and businesses use financial services to help them earn income, build
wealth, manage risks and recover from downturns. In turn, when many people
use these services, the economy and the financial system become more resilientand sustainable. Financial service providers are able tap a wider and more diverse
client base, improving the stability of the institutions and the system. Economic
growth is sustained as the broader segments of businesses and the population
become productive and resilient economic agents.
As a policy agenda, financial inclusion emerged from the microfinance movement
which recognized the latent creditworthiness of the entrepreneurial poor. With
the appropriate product and credit methodology, microfinance proved to bea viable undertaking. The recognition of microfinance in the General Banking
Law of 2000 (RA 8691) and the BSP’s enabling rules and regulations led to its
mainstreaming in the banking system. As of end-2019, 154 banks were engaged
in microfinance, making outstanding loans of ₱27.3 billion to 2.4 million of ourcountry’s microentrepreneurs.
Expanding the premise of microfinance, financial inclusion recognizes that
individuals – especially the poor – and their enterprises need a range of financial
services. In order to provide these services, financial institutions must see andunderstand this market segment.
The initial product that can be the first step toward financial inclusion is atransaction account – a convenient means to store, receive and move funds.
While not many Filipinos are able to save, almost everyone makes paymenttransactions, whether as a sender or receiver. Providing universal access to a safe,
convenient and affordable means of payment, through a transaction account,should therefore be an initial goal of financial inclusion. This way, even a lowincome individual can take part in the digital economy and benefit from theefficiencies and opportunities in digital payments.
*

Charina B. De Vera-Yap (Director), Rachel B. Barbosa-Salva (Bank Officer V), Golda P. Cainglet (Bank Officer IV),
Leana Marie C. Cerrero (Bank Officer II), Sarah L. Padilla (Bank Officer V), Ellen Joyce L. Suficiencia (Director),
Rochelle D. Tomas (Deputy Director) and Valerie Anne I. Valero (Bank Officer II) are from the Center for Learning andInclusion Advocacy.

The BSP’s steady efforts to promote financial inclusion and digital payments havestarted to bear fruit. Based on the results of the 2019 Financial Inclusion Survey,
account ownership among adult Filipinos grew from 23 percent in 2017 to 29
percent in 2019, equivalent to 5 million Filipinos opening an account within the
two-year period. More important, account ownership among the poorest almost
doubled from just 14 percent in 2017, well below the 23 percent national averagethat year, to 27 percent in 2019, closer to the national average.
The improvement in account ownership has been largely driven by the uptakeof e-money accounts which leaped from just 1 percent in 2017 to 8 percent in2019. In parallel, the share of accountholders who use their account for paymenttransactions – such as fund transfers and bills payment – has also more thandoubled to 39 percent in 2019 from only 18 percent in 2017. These figures,
already encouraging as they are, do not yet reflect the developments driven by
the COVID-19 pandemic which demonstrated in the clearest terms the benefits
and necessity of digital payments.
1.1 Building the foundations of inclusion for the digital economy
At the height of the restrictions on people’s movements imposed during the
pandemic, the country saw a spike in digital onboarding and digital payments.
More than 4 million new accounts were opened through digital channels, andnew online sign-ups and app downloads for digital financial services (DFS) fromJanuary to April 2020 doubled from the same period the previous year. InstaPay
and PESONet transactions also followed suit, surging both in volume and value.
In terms of the number of transactions, InstaPay and PESONet respectively
increased by 84 percent and 24 percent in April and May, when the Enhanced
Community Quarantine (ECQ) was in full effect. PESONet, in particular, saw a325-percent increase in the month of May alone.
The ready and rapid shift by consumers and businesses to digital payments
when the pandemic hit would not have been possible without the foundations
laid by the BSP for inclusive digital finance over the last four years. With the riseof mobile phone ownership, internet users and digital natives in the country,
the BSP issued a series of policies designed to harness the full potential of
digital technology to bridge the inclusion gaps and provide access, cost andconvenience that have long kept many Filipinos at the fringes of the formal
financial system.

Financial Digital Rails and Financial Inclusion

Recognizing that a transaction account is the gateway to digital finance, the BSP
has sought to democratize account ownership by introducing the basic deposit
and restricted accounts. The no-frills Basic Deposit Account (BDA) was designed
to make a transaction account accessible, affordable and within reach by certain
segments of the population. These include those who only have a barangay
certificate as proof of identification and who are unable to meet the minimum
maintaining balance of a regular deposit account. The BDA has seen impressive
uptake since it was introduced in 2018. As of the first quarter of 2020, 4.5 million
depositors had such accounts with 120 banks, a significant growth from only
339,000 depositors in 2018.
Complementing the BDA is the expansion of cash-in and cash-out (CICO) points
such as cash agents and dressed-down bank branches or branch-lite units (BLUs),
which are crucial to helping people with no bank accounts make the transition
from cash-based to digital transactions. Cash agents in particular have grownin number exponentially, with at least 17,000 operating nationwide to date.
Located in neighborhoods, communities and public places such as wet markets,
cash agents and BLUs provide convenient, friendly and accessible channels forfinancial transactions. For instance, the market vendor or microentrepreneur neednot make time-consuming and costly trips to the bank, but instead may deposit
their day-to-day earnings or withdraw cash for business expenses at their nearest
agent.
The third pillar of the inclusive digital finance policy put in place by the BSP
was the National Retail Payment System (NRPS), which laid the groundwork forinteroperable digital payment rails. InstaPay and PESONet were launched under
the NRPS, enabling any account-to-any account small value fund transfers.
Through these digital payment rails, people can now easily send money to a
family member, pay bills, settle fees and make purchases with just a few taps on
their phone. BSP also worked closely with industry partners to launch QR Ph, thenational QR code standard, to promote digital payments particularly among small
merchants and vendors. In making digital payments available, affordable andconvenient for payment transactions, account ownership becomes a necessity not
only for those with extra money to save but for anyone who sends, receives andpays money, no matter how small.

109

These foundations for an inclusive digital finance ecosystem have proven vital in
the face of community quarantines against the pandemic. Amid the restrictions
on physical mobility and face-to-face interactions, people and businesses havebeen turning to digital channels for their daily financial activities. They have done
so with ease due to the availability of e-wallets, mobile and online banking, andother contactless modes of payment.
The BSP therefore intensified coordination with various government agencies
to support and facilitate the adoption of digital payments by various sectors,
particularly the low-income households and the informal workers. The BSP
worked closely with the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
to implement the account-based distribution of emergency cash subsidies under
the second tranche of the Social Amelioration Program (SAP). As a result, 7.3
million SAP beneficiaries had opened transaction accounts by the first week ofAugust 2020. Prior to that, the BSP and DSWD also partnered to convert limitedpurpose cash cards, used in the distribution of cash grants under the Pantawid
Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), into full-service transaction accounts.
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) also collaborated with the
BSP to promote financial inclusion and digital payments in the labor sector. On 3
August 2020, the DOLE issued Labor Advisory No. 26-20 which aims to promote
the use of transaction accounts in the payment of wages of private sector workers
and employees, including the domestic helpers or kasambahays.
The BSP is also coordinating with the Department of Transportation (DOTr) to
implement the Automated Fare Collection System (AFCS), which aims to promote
cashless fare payments in the transport sector, particularly rail and roads. The two
agencies are working together to develop the rules and infrastructure to enable
any transport media (e.g., smartcards such as Beep, EMV payment cards andother form factors like QR code) to be used in any bus, train or PUV equippedwith an AFCS card reader.
Beyond promoting the use of digital payments by the vulnerable sectors, the
BSP supports the development of the digital infrastructure critical to expanding
the reach and scope of digital finance. One such infrastructure is the Philippine
Identification System (PhilSys), which aims to provide every Filipino a reliable

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

digital ID. The PhilSys will not only address the lack of acceptable ID but alsosignificantly reduce the cost of client onboarding and other financial transactions
through its e-KYC feature. The BSP is actively developing useful applications for
PhilSys to promote financial-inclusion as the appointed chair of the Interagency
Committee on Use Cases, a body created by the PhilSys Policy and Coordination
Council, of which the BSP is also a member.
As the country weathers the impact of the pandemic and prepares for its aftereffects, the challenge now is how to sustain the momentum of this great digital
shift to enhance the breadth and depth of financial inclusion in the country.
1.2 Financial inclusion as a pillar of social and economic resilience
To deliver its goals of broad-based economic growth, financial inclusion should
support the agriculture sector and the micro, small and medium enterprises(MSME). These sectors provide income and employment to majority of the
population and a significant contributor to the country’s productivity. Yet, despite
their strategic economic importance, the MSME and agriculture sectors continue
to face the twin challenges of limited access to finance and insufficient incomes.
According to data, loans to MSMEs amount to only 6.1 percent and 8.8 percent of
total loans in the banking system and total businesses, respectively.1 A Philippine
Statistics Authority (PSA) report indicated that farmers and fisherfolk recorded
the highest poverty incidence among the basic sectors in 2018 at more than 30
percent and 25 percent, respectively.2
These conditions were exacerbated by community quarantines, causing morethan half of MSMEs surveyed to record zero sales and even stop operations,3
according to a poll by the Inter-Agency Task Force for the Managementof Emerging Infectious Diseases. To a lesser, but still notable degree, theagriculture sector also suffered losses from the pandemic, with producers
from CALABARZON, CAR and Central Luzon heavily affected.4 The restrained
movement of goods across borders also forced farmers to sell at bargain prices,with excess supply either given away or left to spoil.5
1

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. (2019). Financial Reporting Package.

2

Philippine Statistics Authority. (2018). Poverty Among the Basic Sectors in the Philippines. Retrieved from http://
www.psa.gov.ph/poverty-press-releases/nid/162541

3Inter-Agency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases – Technical Working Group for
Anticipatory and Forward Planning (IATF – TWG for AFP). (2020, May). We Recover As One. Accessed from https://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/We-Recover-As-One.pdf

4

IATF TWG We Recover As One Report. (2020). Retrieved from http://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/
uploads/2020/05/We-Recover-As-One.pdf. To assess the economic outcomes of the ECQ, NEDA, on behalf of the
IATF-TWG for AFP, launched three separate surveys from April 5 to April 8. There are 389,859 respondents for the
consumer survey, 6,863 respondents for the agriculture sector survey and 44,097 respondents from the micro,
small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) for the industry/services sector survey.

5

Experiences of Center for Agriculture and Rural Development Mutually Reinforcing Institutions (CARD MRI)
farmer-clients. Philippine Daily Inquirer. (2020, April 06). Looking beyond the outbreak. Retrieved from https://business.inquirer.net/294206/looking-beyond-the-outbreak

Aware of these sectoral problems, the BSP introduced temporary regulatory relief
for MSMEs such as: the inclusion of their new loans in the computations of banks’e-reserve requirements; temporary reduction in the credit risk weights of MSME
loans; and zero risk weights for MSME loans with government guarantee, among
others. Moreover, the BSP is taking additional steps through a three-pronged
approach, in line with its financial inclusion mandate, to put in place a moresustainable and longer-term solution.
The first of these is the promotion of innovative financing mechanisms. Under
this approach, the BSP supports the development of supply chain financing (SCF),
which allows businesses to turn receivables and inventory flows as well as supply
chain relationships to working capital. Through SCF products such as reverse
factoring, MSMEs with no credit history may secure favorable terms of bankfinancing based on the creditworthiness of their large corporate buyers. Similarly,
already on-going is the ADB-supported agriculture value chain financing (AVCF)
being piloted in five rural banks across the country6 . Guided by BSP Circular No.
908 in 2016, the participating banks have identified and are starting to financefarmer groups and agribusinesses based on value chain analysis of pre-identified
commodities. Lessons from the pilot project will be used as inputs to policies,
bankers’ toolkits and training programs.
The second approach is the improvement of digital and financial
infrastructure by addressing the risks and cost issues that have made lending
to MSME and agriculture a high-risk and low-margin proposition. As such,
BSP has advocated the passage of critical legislations for market-enabling
infrastructures. These include the Philippine Identification Systems Act (RA11055), or PhilSys, as the country’s digital ID platform that will facilitate
onboarding and digital finance innovations, and the Personal Property Security
Act (RA 11057), or PPSA, that will encourage the use of inventories, crops
and other non-real property assets of MSMEs as acceptable loan collateral.
Complementing the PPSA is the proposed bill to strengthen the warehousereceipt system which aims to support farmers and agribusinesses in securingbank loans and managing commodity price fluctuations.
The BSP is also working with Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
to develop a credit risk database (CRD) for the Philippines that uses financial
and non-financial data (e.g., type of industry/sector, business location, etc.) as
well as default-related information (e.g., record on arrears, bankruptcy, etc.)
to build statistical models that can be used to predict the creditworthiness of
6

Rural Bank of San Leonardo in Luzon; Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina in Visayas; and Producers Bank; 1st Valley Bank;and Rizal MicroBank in Mindanao.

Financial Digital Rails and Financial Inclusion

MSMEs. Similarly, the BSP actively promotes the credit surety fund (CSF), a credit
enhancement scheme which aims to give MSMEs access to non-collateral bankfinancing by way of surety cover issued jointly and severally by the parties of theCSF.7 Likewise, the BSP facilitates the organizational development and capacity
building of CSF cooperatives all over the country.
Finally, the BSP’s third approach is bridging the information and data gap for
more evidence-based policy-making and address information asymmetry in themarket. A key initiative is the demand-side survey of MSMEs, jointly conductedby the BSP and ADB, which seeks to augment existing statistics and come up
with a more comprehensive profile and segmentation of MSMEs. As the survey
determines key constraints to MSME development and growth, results can leadto a more detailed and updated assessment of the sector. Towards the same goal,
the BSP is also facilitating strategic partnerships in the industry. For instance, theNegosyo Center of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) partnered with
Microfinance Council of the Philippines, Inc. (MCPI), and Alliance of Philippine
Partners for Enterprise Development, Inc. (APPEND) to facilitate information
sharing. This will enable Negosyo Centers to refer clients to various financing
providers and help microfinance institutions (MFIs) design products and services
appropriate to MSMEs’ needs.
As the country pushes for a swift post-pandemic economic revival, the BSP is fullycommitted to support the MSMEs and the agriculture sector as priority targets
of its financial inclusion efforts. In supporting these strategic sectors which havebeen left even more vulnerable in this pandemic, we will build a more resilient,sustainable and inclusive new economy.

and their network of fintech partners to pivot towards more efficient and safer
digital solutions. Such an environment underscores the indispensable need for
consumers to be digitally literate. Developing the competence and confidenceof consumers to transact within the digital finance ecosystem will allow themto continue enjoying convenient and accessible, yet contactless and cashless,financial services. Such competence will enable Filipinos to carry on with muchneeded productive activities, thus mitigating the economic impact of the ongoingcrisis and supporting a faster and more inclusive recovery.
The BSP defines digital literacy as a competency in relation to financial literacy.
Financial literacy is the level of knowledge about financial concepts that are
useful for a person to make financial decisions. On the other hand, digital literacy
is the ability of a consumer to use a variety of DFS with self-assurance and full
trust in their benefits. Digital literacy, in the context of financial services, has thefollowing dimensions7:•

Knowledge of DFS: Consumers are aware of the existence of DFS, understandhow they are used and can compare pros and cons of each product type;•

Awareness of DFS Risks: Consumers understand potential pitfalls of DFS
usage, such as phishing, spoofing, personal data theft, hacking and othercyber risks;•

Digital Financial Risk Control: Consumers are able to secure their transactions
from cyber risks attendant to DFS through appropriate cyber hygiene
practices, such as strong password protection, multi-factor authentication,
data privacy standards and cybersecurity protocols;•

Knowledge of Redress Procedures: Consumers know their basic rights as DFS
users, and what to do when they encounter usage errors, or fall victim tocyber fraud and abuse.

2. Digital literacy as a core competency in the new economy
The unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic has changed the global financial
landscape forever. The more resilient and agile DFS that can be accessed
conveniently through mobile phones and computers at a relatively low cost are
emerging as the default way of doing business. These DFS, which encompass
online account opening, money transfers, e-payments solutions and othertech-enabled financial transactions, reduce or even totally eliminate the needfor face-to-face interactions. This new reality is compelling financial institutions

111

Even without the pandemic, digital literacy is a necessary skill in the 21st century.
Lacking the skill, consumers will find it hard to cope with the exponential
digitalization of industries, the increasing complexity of financial systems, thevariety of digitally accessible and inter-linked financial products and services, andthe myriad of DFS providers and platforms available in the market. All these were
7

Morgan, P., Huang, B. and Trinh, L. (2019). The Future of Work and Education for the Digital Age: The Need toPromote Digital Financial Literacy for the Digital Age. G20 Japan Policy Paper. Retrieved from https://www.g20insights.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/t20-japan-tf7-3-need-promote-digital-financial-literacy.pdf

112

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippinesborn out of advances in technology – the internet, social media, cloud computing,big data analytics, blockchain technology, biometric identification, among others.
As financial systems and services evolve with technology and become the normin this new economy, so should consumers’ capacities to take advantage of theirfull benefits. Digital literacy accords consumers with the aptitude and skills toadapt and thrive in this digital era.

sentiment analytics, these campaigns are designed for delivery through social
media platforms and traditional media engagements. Campaign assets and key
messages are freely shared with fintech and banking industry associations for use
in their own information drives. This unified set of messages, when amplified by
BSP together with key partners and stakeholders, increases recall and resonates
more widely among Filipino consumers.

2.1 BSP digital literacy program: Objective, implementation strategy andpartnership framework

The program relies on multi-sectoral partnerships, with the BSP taking lead. The
Bank welcomes technical support from development partners, and practices
collaborative program implementation with major banking associations, fintech
associations, cybersecurity expert groups and financial institutions with highly
digitized operations. By engaging like-minded partners, the BSP optimizes
opportunities and channels to spread digital literacy and cybersecurity messages,
bringing all stakeholders closer to achieving the shared goal of a cash-lite society.

The BSP recognizes the need to build the digital literacy of Filipino consumers.
Surveys show that Filipino adults lack awareness and trust in DFS due to fears ofhacking, data privacy and loss of money. Internet banking and mobile banking
significantly lag behind other modes of transactions for all types of accounts.8
The BSP digital literacy program thus addresses the knowledge gaps behindconsumers’ uncertainty toward DFS. This program supports the policy objectiveof digital financial inclusion and forms part of the broader financial education
advocacy of the BSP.
Through the digital literacy program, consumers are informed and educatedabout DFS; reduce their vulnerability to usage errors, scams and frauds; mitigate
risk of loss and costly mistakes; ensure positive customer experiences andoutcomes; and protect consumer welfare. The long-term objective is to increase
consumer trust and confidence in the digital finance ecosystem. Consisting ofstrategic communication campaigns, the program encourages massive usage of
DFS by consumers across all sectors – individuals, corporations, businesses andgovernment institutions.
One component of the digital literacy program is the #SafeAtHome withe-payments campaign, which encourages banked and newly-banked consumers
to try e-payment solutions such as PESONet and InstaPay during the pandemic
and beyond. Another component is the cybersecurity awareness campaign, which
ensures that consumers remain vigilant in observing cyber hygiene practices
to protect their accounts and online transactions. Informed by consumer
8

BSP. (2019). Financial Inclusion Survey. Retrieved from http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/
publications/2019/2019FISToplineReport.pdf

To date, the program’s communication campaigns are gaining ground. Basedon social media scanning, the most engaged posts on PisoLit’s Facebook
and Instagram pages are reminders to try e-financial transactions, followedby saving tips and money management messages. Content on security inusing e-payments prove salient on PisoLit’s Twitter feed. PisoLit is the BSPmanaged, financial education-focused account on social media, and used as
the primary delivery channel for the #SafeAtHome with e-payments campaign.
Press releases related to e-payments, cyber hygiene and other digital literacy
messages also enjoy wide coverage by traditional media and online news sites,with a height of 138 total pick-ups at one point. The BSP continues to spreadthese messages, and will recalibrate as needed to ensure their relevance during,and even after the pandemic.
2.2 BSP financial education partnerships: Digital literacy hand-in-handwith financial literacy

Digital literacy is among the competencies that the BSP aims to cover in its
financial education programs. Financial education, the systematic process ofacquiring financial literacy enables people to better manage their financial lives

and optimize the benefits of accessing financial services. Digital literacy andFinancial Digital Rails and Financial Inclusion

113

financial literacy become more important as more Filipinos get on board thedigital financial platforms, particularly those who are less informed and educated.
The need for these competencies is even more pronounced amidst the economic
effects of COVID-19.

teachers through programs that integrate financial literacy concepts, skills andbehaviors in the basic education curriculum for all grade levels, as well as inregular trainings for teachers’ personal and professional development. Digital
literacy is among the key messages promoted in all these programs.

With or without a pandemic however, the BSP considers financial education a
key component of building an inclusive financial system. Through it, the BSP
hopes to raise generations of financially literate Filipinos with confidence to
use a range of financial services, including DFS; and capable of making prudent

Given the new norm of online learning, the BSP is pivoting its financial education
activities toward virtual delivery. For example, the BSP FinEd Stakeholders Expo,
originally designed as an annual gathering of financial education partners andadvocates, has been transformed into webinars to be livestreamed on social
media. Similar redesigns are ongoing for capacity building trainings of partners
and financial literacy sessions for target audiences, so that they can be delivered
using online platforms and digital learning tools. Other modules are being
devised to be conducted by trainers already onsite in low-income communities
such as fisherfolk villages that lack internet connectivity. The BSP is preparing todevelop an e-learning platform focused on financial literacy, anticipating that the
future of education will largely be shaped online.

The BSP approach to promote financial education is characterized by strategic
partnerships. The partnership framework is anchored on the principles ofobjective compatibility, shared responsibility and maximized resources. Together
with selected institutional partners from the public and private sectors, the
BSP implements scalable, sustainable programs with multiplier effects thathave potential to exponentially expand reach. Specific audiences are targeted,
clear terms of engagement are established and key performance indicators
are agreed upon. The BSP collaborates with partners in developing audiencespecific modules, enabling financial education trainers and developing evaluation
mechanisms. BSP partners include government institutions, industry associations,foundations of financial institutions and other non-profits whose advocacies on
financial education, financial inclusion or consumer protection are aligned with
their corporate social responsibility objectives.

2.3 Digital literacy, financial literacy and financial healthfinancial plans, building reserves, accumulating assets, managing debt andexercising their rights and responsibilities as financial consumers. The underlying
objective is to establish a financially healthy and economically empowered
Filipino citizenry contributing productively to the Philippine economy. Sucha citizenry is vital for the country to overcome the negative effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic on the livelihoods and financial status of individuals,
households and businesses.

Ongoing programs are focused on sustained, scalable and measurable provisionof financial education sessions for targeted sectors. When fully institutionalized,
these financial education programs are estimated to reach millions of audiences,
particularly overseas Filipino workers; civil servants and members of the armed
forces; and underbanked sectors such as MSMEs, fisherfolk and beneficiaries
of government’s cash transfer programs. Special focus is given to learners and

The BSP is pursuing digital literacy alongside financial literacy to help Filipinos
achieve financial health. Financially healthy persons can prudently manage dayto-day needs; have the farsightedness to prepare for the future of their families;
are resilient in coping with effects of external shocks; and are able to takeadvantage of opportunities that allow them to meet financial goals.9 These are
the same behaviors critical for Filipinos to survive the COVID-19 pandemic.
As the pandemic pushes Filipino consumers towards greater DFS usage, it also
makes them realize the importance of prudent money management. The lack ofdigital literacy and financial literacy could lead to distress. The BSP considers the
pandemic a teachable moment. There is urgent need to elevate digital literacy
and financial literacy to guide the Philippine population towards better financial
decision-making and behavior.
Financial health, just like physical health, takes time, effort and discipline to build,and it has to be nurtured throughout a person’s lifetime. Digital literacy andfinancial literacy are lifelong habits that must be cultivated. Consumers’ ability
to access and use DFS will continue to serve as crucial foundations in keeping
9

Center for Financial Services Innovation. (2017). Beyond Financial Inclusion: Financial Health as a Global
Framework. Retrieved from https://finhealthnetwork.org/research/global-financial-health-framework/

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Filipinos financially healthy in the new economy. The BSP will continue to provide
the supportive policies, programs and enabling environment to build a financiallyhealthy citizenry as the economy recovers after the pandemic.

3. Building consumer trust through consumer protection
Consumer protection is crucial in promoting a digital financial ecosystem. A
consumer that has access to information that accurately represents the natureand structure of the digital product or service, its terms and conditions, as wellas its fundamental benefits and risks is empowered to make informed decisions
and participate in a digital financial economy. Along with financial educationand financial inclusion, having in place a consumer protection framework that
inculcates market discipline and provides an effective redress mechanism isan essential ingredient for the financial empowerment and building of trust of
consumers in the financial system.
The BSP’s statutory commitment under the New Central Bank Act, as amended,
to promote broad and convenient access to high quality financial services
is implemented by Circular No. 1048 Series of 2019, which spell out BSP
regulations on financial consumer protection (FCP Framework). Geared towards
enhanced financial consumer welfare and promotion of financial inclusion,
the FCP Framework establishes the guidelines and expectations from BSPsupervised financial institutions (BSFls) to institutionalize consumer protection
as an integral component of corporate governance and culture as well as
risk management.10 Included in FCP is the implementation of market-conduct
regulatory approach towards consumer protection which comprises both onsite and off-site assessment of the compliance by BSFIs with financial consumerlaws and regulations11.
Recognizing the rights of financial consumers and to ensure their protection
as enablers of smooth and orderly functioning of the financial system, the BSP
created the Consumer Empowerment Group (CEG) under Center for Learning andInclusion Advocacy (CLIA). The CEG is tasked to lead the formulation of policies,
regulations and standards that will promote fair conduct business for the financial
10

BSP. (2019). BSP Regulations on Financial Consumer Protection; Guidelines and Procedures Governing theConsumer Assistance and Management System of BSP-Supervised Financial Institutions; and Amendments to the
Manual of Regulations for Banks and Non-Bank Financial Institutions. Circular 1048. Retrieved from http://www.
bsp.gov.ph/downloads/regulations/attachments/2019/c1048.pdf

11

BSP. (n. d.). Market conduct regulation. Retrieved from http://www.bsp.gov.ph/about/advocacies_fin_fcag.asp

sector as well as and provide a venue for the public to seek redress against BSFIs.
With this, the CEG implements the BSP’s consumer assistance mechanism (CAM),
an avenue provided by the BSP for financial consumers to escalate their concerns
against BSFIs when they feel aggrieved by its conduct, products and services, andoverall handling of their complaints. The CAM is also a tool used by the BSP toensure that BSFIs are responsive to the concerns of their clients.
3.1 Consumer protection during the pandemic times: Complaints data
The implementation of the ECQ in March 2020 resulted in major disruptions in
the economy as well as the daily life of Filipinos. Access to traditional financial
services were hampered, and many consumers found it hard to pay back financial
loans and obligations as emergency expenses rose and incomes fell. Of theapproximately 8,000 complaints escalated to the CEG from January to June 2020,
about 30 percent were pandemic-related and necessitated urgent handling. The
complaints ranged from issues that pertain to lending and credit card, and overhalf were complaints about internet and mobile banking channels.
In order to mitigate the effect of the pandemic, the BSP encouraged financial
consumers to use e-payment services such as PESONet and InstaPay to comply
with mobility/physical distancing restrictions, reduce COVID-19 infection risks andpartially address difficulties of providing cash supply to ATMs and bank branches.
3.2 Challenges and concrete actions to provide effective recourse
Taking decisive, transparent and timely actions to protect and empower financial
consumers in the Philippines based on their right to complain were among
the challenges faced during the pandemic period. There was a clear need for
coordination between the BSP and BSFIs to address urgent issues such as theavailability of cash in ATMs, access to banks, deferment of loan and credit card
payments, and check clearing.
With mounting financial consumer concerns and limitation in mobility, a blend of
consumer protection strategies was adopted by the industry. Financial institutions
ensured that secure and fast IT systems and technology will support handlingof financial consumer concerns from home while safeguarding the privacy ofcomplaints data and correspondence. The BSP strengthened its coordination withindustry associations such as the Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP)and Credit Card Association of the Philippines (CCAP) to ensure that clients areprovided clear information relative to assistance/relief measures and banking

Financial Digital Rails and Financial Inclusion

services, and that complaints channels remain accessible to the public during
the ECQ. The BSP’s consumer assistance mechanism continued to operate underalternative working arrangements and prioritized processing of COVID-19 related
financial concerns.
The BSP also focused on developing and implementing a communication plan to,among others, empower financial consumers and inform them of the availabilityof the BSP’s consumer assistance mechanism and advisories. The Bank aimed
to educate consumers about emerging financial consumer concerns, including
e-payments and online financial transactions to reduce their vulnerability to risks
of fraud and scams.
3.3 Consumer protection under the new economy: Chatbot and capacity
building
As the BSP made essential strides in developing the digital payments landscapein the country which facilitated transactions and economic activity during
the pandemic, it is also gearing up with a more effective and efficient redress
mechanism. As part of the BSP’s advocacy to promote consumer protection,
as well as its thrust to make use of technological advances in improving
the performance of its functions, the BSP aims to strengthen its handlingof complaints from the public through an enhanced consumer assistancemanagement system (CAMS) with chatbot functionality.

115

The chatbot, now named BSP Online Buddy or BOB, improves the managementof financial consumer concerns and expands the reach of the consumer
assistance mechanism to more Filipinos. The chatbot will not only automate
repetitive and manually laborious tasks but will also democratize access to
BSP through wider channels and enrich the visibility of customer experienceand business practice through the intelligence gathered from the CAMS. The
chatbot will bring the BSP closer to the people. Using artificial intelligence andmachine learning, it will respond to consumers concerns in real-time and cut the
turnaround time in responding to financial consumer concerns.
Buoyed by these anticipated benefits, the BSP is moving to retool and build
the capacity of the consumer assistance team to handle and manage thechatbot, better monitor customer experience and strengthen market conduct
supervision. Aware that the BSP can learn from the industry as well as othersupervisory agencies, the team ensures that the processes and solutions are well
documented to facilitate exchange of knowledge and experience to push forward
the technological progress needed to support strengthened financial consumer
protection in the digital age.
While this pandemic brought up new challenges for the banking industry, it has
also created opportunities that the BSP can tap to further improve its services
and deliver on its mandate. As we move towards the new economy, the BSP willcontinue to focus on digital financial services while ensuring that consumers’ trust
will remain in the banking industry through effective consumer protection.

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References
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. (2019). Financial inclusion dashboard (as of 4th quarter 2019). http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/
Publications/2019/FIDashboard_4Q2019.pdf
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. (2019). Financial inclusion survey. http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/
publications/2019/2019FISToplineReport.pdf
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. (2019). BSP regulations on financial consumer protection; guidelines and procedures governing theconsumer assistance and management system of BSP-supervised financial institutions; and amendments to the manual of
regulations for banks and non-bank financial institutions. Circular 1048. http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/regulations/attachments/2019/c1048.pdf
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. (n. d.). Market conduct regulation. http://www.bsp.gov.ph/about/advocacies_fin_fcag.asp
Center for Financial Services Innovation. (2017). Beyond financial inclusion: Financial health as a global framework. https://finhealthnetwork.org/research/global-financial-health-framework/
Inter-Agency Task Force Technical Working Group. (2020). We recover as one report. http://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/
uploads/2020/05/We-Recover-As-One.pdf.
Morgan, P., Huang, B., & Trinh, L. (2019). The future of work and education for the digital age: The need to promote digital financial
literacy for the digital age. [G20 Japan policy paper.] https://www.g20-insights.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/t20-japantf7-3-need-promote-digital-financial-literacy.pdf
Philippine Daily Inquirer. (2020, April 6). Looking beyond the outbreak. https://business.inquirer.net/294206/looking-beyondthe-outbreakPhilippine Statistics Authority. (2018). Poverty among the basic sectors in the Philippines. http://www.psa.gov.ph/poverty-pressreleases/nid/162541

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The COVID-19 pandemic has upset organizational arrangements in human resource (HR) management, information technology (IT), management audit, procurement
process and communication strategies. Suddenly, the future of work is here. In navigating the new and changing terrain, organizational models need to adapt management
practices and culture to new technologies. They should also continue to uphold ethical standards and values, foster growth-enabling skillsets and fulfill fundamental
aspirations for affirmation and well-being at the workplace, even if physically disconnected. This chapter presents case studies on how five BSP units — Human Resources,
Information Technology, Management Audit, Procurement Office and Communications Office — adapted their organizational support systems and processes to cope withthe unprecedented challenges presented by the pandemic.

1. HR lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic
Jayzle D. Ravelo1
Caution, adaptability and resilience characterized the BSP’s HR response to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Following reports on the Philippines’ first suspected caseof COVID-19 in January 2020, the BSP monitored the situation more closely, thesame way it did when the H1N1 pandemic hit across the world in 2009. As casesin different countries outside of China began to rise, the BSP’s vigilance escalated
as it saw fit to impose restrictions on official business trips, cancel institutional
events and strongly discourage employees’ personal travels.
But the events that followed were unprecedented. On 12 March 2020, the BSP
Governor announced his self-quarantine and the two-day work suspension at the
BSP’s Head Office and Security Plant Complex. The two premises were disinfected
as a precautionary measure against the spread of the virus. This was after
Governor Diokno and other government officials were exposed to a confirmed
COVID-19 case. On the second day of the suspension, President Duterte declareda state of national calamity on account of COVID-19 and imposed an enhanced
community quarantine (ECQ) for a month in the National Capital Region and therest of Luzon. In varying degrees, restrictions on movement have been extended
up to this day.
1

Jayzle D. Ravelo is the Managing Director of the Human Resource Sub-Sector.

1.1 The BSP’s experience in telecommuting
COVID-19 pandemic forced organizations to participate in a nationwide
experiment on the viability of work-from-home (WFH) as a primary work
arrangement during the lockdown. The following are some of the key insights on
the BSP’s experience in telecommuting:a. Risk management structures
A key aspect of the BSP’s COVID-19 response is the presence of a formal
structure that deals with risk management and interdepartmental coordination.
An organization design strategy that the BSP has adopted is the provisionof an in-house capability to deal with various governance issues such as risk
management and business continuity, which tend to be overlooked with toomuch focus on operations or delivery of services. The BSP’s Risk and Compliance
Office (RCO) takes on these two main functions and advises management on
ways to deal with various types of risk and crisis situations, such as a pandemic.
Through the RCO’s knowledge of risks and organizational resiliency, the BSP wasable to plan for contingencies crucial to the BSP’s response to the pandemic.
Noting too that the COVID-19 pandemic is an exceptional risk for which
the responses have not been codified in organizational resiliency manuals,
it was necessary to constitute an ad hoc COVID-19 task force. The IncidentManagement Team and the Task Force, which are headed by the Deputy
Governor of the Corporate Services Sector and composed of the heads ofunits in charge of functions involving risk and compliance, human resource

Case Studies in Organizational Support for Alternative Work Arrangements

management, security and transport, legal, health and wellness service and the
BSP Employees’ Association, have helped ensure that the crucial information
and actions of critical units are discussed, addressed and conveyed to all BSP
employees in a timely manner.
b. Organizational adaptability
Until this year, the BSP was not very keen on exploring WFH arrangements.
Working remotely was a glove that did not seem to fit the demands of public
service and the nature of governmental functions being performed by the BSP.
As it turned out, WFH was inevitable, as the government-imposed lockdown
in Metro Manila and the entire Luzon compelled business and government
agencies, the BSP included, to suddenly shift to remote work arrangements.
The sudden change brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic pressed the BSP
to modify its preconceived notions and traditional work structures for many
years. Adaptability has been a BSP core competency, such that the necessity of
being able to respond to uncertainty and change has been inculcated in every
employee. Thus, within weeks from the start of the lockdown, BSP employees
were able to adapt to the new work arrangements. In fact, in a survey conductedby the Human Resource Sub-Sector on work arrangements during the ECQ, morethan 60 percent of department heads said that they were able to complete 75100 percent of their work deliverables despite the sudden shift to remote work.
c. Balancing service and employee well-being
Even as WFH became the rule and working onsite the exception (resorted tomainly for frontline and mission-critical services), there are areas of operations
that still require personnel to be at the workplace. These include currency
production, cash servicing, market operations, payment systems operations andsecurity services. For these class of employees, it is necessary for HR to recognize
and address their fears and concerns.
Through the efforts of the BSP COVID-19 Task Force, precautions to avoid virustransmission were immediately put in place. Personal protective equipment (PPE),
vitamins and sanitizing alcohol were distributed. More intensive cleaning anddisinfection of premises were carried out more frequently, and advisories and119

reminders on frequent handwashing, physical distancing and other protocols toprevent infection were communicated through email and posted in conspicuous
places in BSP offices.
Because government restrictions forced food services and public transportation
to cease operations, it was also deemed necessary to provide employees withfood and shuttle services. Hazard pay was also given to the members of theskeleton work force.
To allay the concerns of employees on how COVID-19 would impact theirincomes and ability to meet emergency expenses, the BSP assured employeesthat salaries and benefits would be paid continuously. It added that flexibility
would be adopted in the procedures for attendance monitoring, as basis forpay. Institutionalized allowances and bonuses were also released earlier thanschedule. These measures are anchored on the view that employee productivity
improves when their basic needs (i.e., physiological and safety) are met in atimely and efficient manner (e.g., without the burden of complying with tediousadministrative procedures).
d. Long distance supervision and the empowerment of line managers
WFH arrangements are unfamiliar to most BSP employees, especially thesupervisors whose more common tools for overseeing their staff are face-toface meetings and one-on-one checkups. The sudden “disconnection” fromcolleagues, both real and perceived, necessitated the adoption of online forms
of interaction such as Microsoft Teams, Cisco Webex or Zoom as well as learning
asynchronous communication and looking for substitutes to casual officeconversations that serve as helpful venues for knowledge sharing and resolving
minor operational issues.
Webinars on managing remote employees were also set up for supervisors, just
as soon as online tools for making remote work possible, such as Office 365, weremade available to BSP employees.
Going through the adjustments, policies governing WFH were kept broad enoughto cover and accommodate the different requirements of the various functions

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within the BSP. The policies also took into account the situation of employees athome, such as those with children needing care or home schooling in view of theschool closures.
The BSP also made sure that psychological services are available to employees,
as the vanishing boundaries between work and personal life could take a toll on
mental and emotional health, resulting in burnout.
1.2 Role of HR
HR’s most important role, especially in these recent months, is to help theworkforce adapt to changes. Key to supporting the staff and achievingorganizational goals amid the challenges brought by COVID-19 are HR
interventions that drive continuity, focus and connectivity.
As medical experts do not foresee the pandemic slowing down just yet, the HR,
in collaboration with the BSP COVID-19 Task Force, shall remain proactive inassessing, acting on, and adjusting as necessary to the needs of its greatest asset– its employees. The aim is to enable them to work effectively and efficiently,
especially at this time of global health crisis.

2. Management systems audit process in changing times
Maria Rossette R. Martal, Angelito B. Lopera,
Emmie-Lou Siongco-Aquino and Ryan P. Cureg2
As part of the BSP service excellence program in 2003, the Systems and Methods
Office (SMO) led the bankwide initiative to design, develop, implement andimprove management systems (MS) covering the various operations of the BSP.
The systems that were developed, approved and implemented followed the ISO
90013 , ISO 140014 and ISO 450015 standards. Certification of the approved MS tointernational standards requires the conduct of internal audit, otherwise known in
the BSP as independent quality assessment (IQA). The assessment is conducted
2

Maria Rossette R. Martal (Deputy Director), Angelito B. Lopera (Bank Officer V), Emmie-Lou Siongco-Aquino(Deputy Director) and Ryan P. Cureg (Acting Deputy Director) are from the Systems and Methods Office (SMO).

3

International standard for Quality Management Systems (QMS)

4International standard for Environmental Management Systems

5

International standard for Occupational Health and Safety Management Systemon all departments and offices with existing MS once a year based on ISO 190116 .
It is part of SMO’s mandate to ensure an integrated enterprise-wide effort todevelop and maintain efficient systems and procedures. The IQA also aims toprovide recommendations to promote business effectiveness and efficiency while
striving for innovation flexibility and integration with technology.
The SMO has embarked on an agile operations methodology from process
documentation to execution starting 2019. To realize this vision, SMO invested inbuilding the capacity of its technical personnel by hiring training providers andbenchmarking on best practices, including the Union Bank of the Philippines
Scrum Masters. Equipped with good training, the SMO design team was able tomap the end-to-end process of SMO in which IQA process is but one process
ready for automation.
SMO further strengthened its core by acquiring a tool that would help the BSP
automate its processes in support of the BSP’s strategy map 2020-2023 on
digital transformation. These efforts enabled the office to respond to challenges
brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. Along the journey, SMO experienced
handicaps in accessing data, resource persons and infrastructure. However, theoffice overcame these limitations, thanks to the skill and technical competenceof its personnel and their capability to adapt to any given situation.
Faced with extraordinary circumstances, the general welfare of BSP’s personnel
is of paramount concern, thus regular “Health Check” of the workforce becamea habit. The SMO also continued to operate under extraordinary circumstances
while undertaking unconventional measures.
1.

Review of the work plan – This is where the four pillars of business
continuity program – assessment, preparedness, response and recovery –shall be of utmost benefit. Thus, SMO reassessed its work program for theyear and made adjustments taking into consideration available manpower
and other resources.

2.

Resource planning – As the SMO accounts for its manpower resources,
the office also makes an inventory of personnel skill sets and match thesewith the amended work plan, ensuring the adequacy of competent technicalpersonnel to deliver the organization’s targets.

6

International Guidelines for Auditing Management Systems

Case Studies in Organizational Support for Alternative Work Arrangements

3.

4.

5.

Benchmarking and best practices – Since the BSP is transitioning to a newwork environment with a totally different atmosphere, the SMO looked at
how other offices and industry practitioners implement and transition to the“new economy arrangement” (NEA). Our third-party auditors and certifyingbody partners served as reliable benchmarks on innovative auditing practices
such as the conduct of “remote audits” and “capability assessments”(feasibility of conducting remote audit). Apart from industry partners, theinternet, by way of news feed and articles, also became an abundant sourceof best practices in coping with the pandemic.
Policies and procedures – SMO continues to review and enhance its internal
policies, guidelines and procedures. The office continued with plans to (a)adapt end-to-end process approach to quality management system (QMS)
design and development; (b) employ risk-based approach to auditing; and(c) enforce the enhanced IQA process that includes the conduct of “remote
auditing” which was initially planned for implementation in the regional
offices and branches. All these revisions or adoption of new practices,of course, adhere to existing internal policies related to NEA, document
information classification guidelines, use of e-signature and use of mobile
platforms, among others. The SMO also reinforced internal policies onreporting status of deliverables through the weekly work plan and weekly
accomplishment reports.
Leveraging technology – Manual activities of review and collaboration,and the printing and release of communications, were replaced with theuse of applicable tools in Microsoft Office 365. Face-to-face meetings havebeen replaced by virtual meetings through Microsoft Teams, Zoom, Webex
and other authorized online platforms. IT resources, mobile platforms
and cloud technology were extensively used in the conduct of meetings,
interviews and audits.

Transitioning to the “new normal” is a work in progress but SMO continuously
improves its systems by soliciting feedback from stakeholders on relevant
issues and challenges. Moreover, SMO constantly fosters an atmosphere of
consultation and participation among its personnel to solicit the best ideas thatwill enable SMO to adjust its systems and procedures in a calibrated manner untila sustainable and reliable level is reached. Instead of merely minimizing risks
involved during these trying times, SMO opted to also seize the opportunities
that come along with the crisis.

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3. Overcoming the pandemic: Responses, challenges andlessons in procurement
Ana Theresa B. del Rosario-Buen, Elvira B. Villanueva,
Lord Eileen A. Sison-Tagle and Cassey E. Ferrer-Palmos7
Procurement in the Philippines is governed by a set of laws and regulations,8
settled jurisprudence and conventional practices. Shaped by years of curbingsome excesses, preventing graft and corrupt practices and supplier favoritisms,
procurement is undertaken with stiff compliance with procedures and theapplication of non-discretionary criteria. Straightforward as it may seem, each andevery successful procurement is a result of rigid processes and subprocesses.
3.1 Pre-pandemic
In the BSP, the last quarter of 2019 saw the completion of year-long preparation,planning, budgeting and approval processes for items and projects to bepurchased by end-user departments. The 2020 budget and annual procurement
plan (APP) had been approved, and the departments were gearing up for a shift
to cash-based budgeting where the items in the APP, except for authorized multiyear projects, had to be procured, implemented, completed and paid for within
the current year, without crossing over to the next. For the first time in years, the
BSP instituted a uniform deadline for filing of programmed purchase requisitions(PRs) in the first quarter of 2020, which is a marked change from the continuous
filing of PRs that perpetually stretch until the last day of December.
In December 2019, the BSP hosted its Procurement Opportunities Fair, an annual
gathering of suppliers, contractors and consultants keen to provide goods andservices to the country’s central monetary authority.
Insofar as emergency preparedness is concerned, included in the BSP’s 2020
annual procurement plan are the following: emergency survival “Go Bags,”
emergency hard hats, PPE, complete set fire-fighting suit with self-contained
breathing apparatus (SCBA), evacuation chair/stair chair glider, circular saw,
7

Ana Theresa B. del Rosario-Buen (Director), Elvira B. Villanueva (Deputy Director), Lord Eileen A. Sison-Tagle(Deputy Director) and Cassey E. Ferrer-Palmos (Deputy Director) are from the Procurement Office (PrO).

8

Rep. Act No. 9184 (2003) or the Government Procurement Reform Act, and its 2016 Revised Implementing Rules
and Regulations primarily govern procurement in the Philippines.

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

rescue tripod, remote area lighting system, spine board with head immobilizer
and spider strap, rescue helmet with head lamp and visor, various medicines andsupplies, fire suppression systems and maintenance and upgrade of BSP facilities.
Every year, the BSP sets aside a ₱25-million contingency fund in the approved
budget for emergency response during natural calamities, such as earthquakes,
typhoons, volcanic eruptions9 and the like.
Still, despite careful planning and preparation for a wide range of natural
emergencies and calamities, nobody foresaw a public health emergency of
immense proportion.
3.2 State of public health emergency
The year started with two confirmed COVI9-19 cases involving Chinese nationals
entering the country, one of whom was registered as the first death due tothe coronavirus outside China on 2 February 2020. A month after, on 8 March
2020, the President declared a state of public health emergency throughout thePhilippines, following the first officially reported case of local transmission of
COVID-19 in the Philippines. Soon after, on 14 March 2020, the President placed
the National Capital Region and other cities and municipalities under community
quarantine10 to take effect on 17 March 2020. To serve the best interest of the BSP
and the public, on 12 March 2020, the BSP Governor issued a memorandum to all
BSP officials and employees on precautionary measures to control the spread of
COVID-19 disease.
3.3 Emergencies emerged: Competitive market and scarcity of supplies andresources
i. Incident Management Team supplies
The Incident Management Team (IMT) is charged with the management andaddressing emergencies in the BSP. In responding to the pandemic, the IMT was
the first to file PRs to contain and mitigate the transmission of COVID-19 within
its workforce and to mobilize assistance in the provision of basic necessities to
9

On 12 January 2020, the Taal Volcano erupted after laying dormant for 43 years. BSP’s inventory of N95
facemasks was exhausted as these facemasks were distributed to the workforce.

10

Enhanced community quarantine (ECQ) was declared over the entire island of Luzon until 12 April 2020.
Following this, a memorandum circular was issued by the Executive Secretary implementing, among others, workfrom home arrangement for the Executive Branch and the suspension of mass public transport services and otherbusinesses that do not render critical services.

employees reporting for work at the BSP as part of the skeleton work force.
When the President declared a state of public health emergency throughout thePhilippines in March, the Procurement Office (PrO) was already purchasing 7,000
pieces of N95 face masks through negotiated procurement in emergency cases.
Said emergency procurement was completed in one day. Seven days thereafter,
the IMT filed a PR for various canned goods (i.e., tuna, corned beef, luncheon
meat, sausage), 1,500 packs of instant noodles, 1,800 bottles of 500ml purified
drinking water, 55 sacks of well-milled rice, 600 bars of germicidal/anti-bacterial
soap, 3,000 sachets of shampoo, 300 pieces of pail, 300 pieces of ladle, 15 ricecookers, 200 pieces of mattresses, 100 pairs of pillows, 3,000 pieces of troclosene
sodium tablets and 300 bottles alcohol-based hand sanitizers.
It was a challenge to scout for supplies. Most of suppliers’ offices were closed
during the period of quarantine. To continuously process the emergency
requirements, PrO checked suppliers’ office details in the yellow pages and social
media (e.g., Facebook, Instagram), and negotiated directly with the manufacturers(e.g., mattress, mixed fruits) through personal contacts and referrals.
On average, procurement of the emergency items was completed and executedin two days. For basic commodities that can normally be bought from grocery
stores, the IMT picked up the item by paying in cash as the sale of basic goods isavailable only until supplies last.
ii. Health, medicines and tests supplies
The Health and Wellness Department (HWD) filed emergency PRs for 5,000 pieces
of multi-vitamins A, C, E and Zinc and 20,000 pieces of Ascorbic Acid tablets,and one lot for reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) tests
for COVID-19 for BSP-head office and Security Plant Complex (SPC) personnel.
The long-established partnership with medicine suppliers within the Malate area
in Manila area expedited the procurement of medicines. The RT-PCR COVID-19
tests, which underwent negotiations with Philippine Red Cross (PRC), wascompleted in 58 days in view of the delays encountered by PRC in the submissionof eligibility documents (i.e., omnibus sworn statement, income/business tax

Case Studies in Organizational Support for Alternative Work Arrangements

123

return and signed terms of reference).

breaches that could have caused loss of service and/or damage to properties.

Even after the downgrading of community quarantine levels, PrO further
processed HWD’s emergency PRs for 30,000 pieces of cloth face covering,
COVID-19 IgM/IgG antibody (Ab) rapid testing services for the BSP head
office and SPC, various medicines (e.g., oral rehydration salts, cetirizine
dihydrochloride, paracetamol tablet) and RT-PCR testing services for BSP
regional offices and branches.

Compared with other industries in the market, many suppliers in the IT industry
were open during the community quarantine to supply and deliver the needs of
BSP. However, the difficulties often lie in the submission of updated documents.

iii. Facilities and maintenance
The Facilities Management and Engineering Department (FMED) filed PRs for
44,000 liters of diesel fuel for generator sets and motor vehicles in the BSP
head office as well as for disinfection of BSP buildings by misting. Immediateprocurement of said requirements was necessary to mitigate and prevent lossof life due to the threat of COVID-19 and the possible transmission among
employees and visitors at the BSP. In view of the NEA, PRs for solid polycarbonate
clear panels, sneeze barriers, elongated toilet seat covers and installationof sensor-type hand sanitizers were filed and processed under negotiatedprocurement in emergency cases to prevent the exposure of BSP’s front-linersand employees. Acrylic panels were installed at various counters within the BSP
head office premises.
iv. Information technology requirements
To ensure continuing services to BSP stakeholders and to meet the demands ofwork-from-home arrangements, laptops, video and audio soundbars for videoconferencing, Microsoft Windows 10 Professional (WinPro 10) operating licenses
and Symantec Endpoint Encryption licenses were immediately procured. Without
the version updates and upgrades that keep the PC environment safe and stablefor business uses, the BSP would not have upgraded the main operating systemof its PCs (Windows OS) due to compatibility issues, and this may have leftthe endpoint PCs vulnerable to malware attacks, application flaws and security

v. Transportation and other services
The Inter-Agency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious
Diseases (IATF-EID) Omnibus Guidelines on the Implementation of theCommunity Quarantine in the Philippines states that during the implementationof general community quarantine (GCQ), public transportation will only beavailable at 50 percent capacity, hence it would be challenging for the BSP
workforce to use public transportation. Also, based on Department of Health(DOH) Administrative Order No. 2020-0015 dated 27 April 2020 (Guidelines on
the Risk-based Public Health Standards for COVID19 Mitigation) on the minimum
requirements for offices and workplaces, the employer is required to provide
adequate shuttle services for its workforce to prevent infection and exposure ofvulnerable individuals. The Security Services Department (SSD) filed its PR fortransportation services for BSP employees at the head office and SPC. The shuttle
service contract is for a period of six months, renewable at the option of the BSP.
In total, 21 buses were contracted for the BSP head office and three buses wereallotted for SPC.
The BSP also hired 20 outsourced drivers to ensure the continuous
operations of mission-critical functions at the BSP, and to provide transportation
requirements to the BSP’s skeleton workforce for six months.
3.4 Procurement amidst work stoppage
i. Manual to online processes
The constraints in mobility of people and transport, limitations in the conductof face-to-face meetings and the inability of bidders to submit the required
documents, did not put BSP’s procurement to a standstill. To enable continuous
procurement of crucial requirements, procurement advisories and guidelines

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

were instantly drafted and issued.

administrative units in the regional offices and branches.

In April, the Bids and Awards Committees (BAC), the PrO and the Information
Technology Office (ITO) and its departments had deliberated on and finalized
the BSP Interim Guidelines on the Conduct of Procurement Activities During theEnhanced/General Community Quarantine and Similar Work Situations even
before the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) issued Resolution No.
09-2020 on 7 May 2020. The most salient feature of the said interim guidelines
is the submission of secured bids online or through email. On 5 May 2020, theBACs, through the PrO, referred the BSP Interim Guidelines to the GPPB-TechnicalSupport Office for evaluation and consequent approval, if warranted. In line with
this, the BAC-Secretariat – Head Office, issued an advisory dated 9 May 2020
containing the detailed instructions on the conduct of procurement activities by
the BACs through online platforms. Consequently, said advisory was disseminatedto prospective and participating bidders.

The pandemic also brought to fore some lawful practices that were previously
not maximized – the use of electronic documents and electronic signatures. The
e-commerce law took effect on 19 June 2000 but this has not been fully utilized
in government agencies, including the BSP, which preferred physical copies of
documents with hand signatures over electronic ones. With high dependence inonline modes of communication, the acceptability of electronic documents andelectronic signatures in procurement and biddings has gained wider traction.

On 25 June 2020, ITO issued the certification stating that the BSP has thecapability to implement the electronic submission of bids pursuant to Section
4.2 of GPPB Resolution No. 09-2020. Shortly thereafter, on 6 August 2020, theGovernor approved the BSP Guidelines in the Conduct of Procurement Activities
during a State of Calamity. The same was issued through Office Order No. 20200982, series of 2020, and took effect on 21 August 2020.
ii. Documentary requirements of bidders
Emergency procurement in the BSP was fast-tracked with the adoption of astraight-through form, the Authority and Proof of Purchase (APoP). First usedby the PrO in 2020 for the procurement of N95 masks, the APoP is a one-page
document containing all the relevant details of processing, such as the written
confirmation of the emergency sought to be addressed,11 the recommendationby the procuring office or unit and the approval of the purchase by the duly
authorized Head of Procuring Entity (HoPE) and the contract documents
evidencing the purchase. Years prior to the pandemic, the conduct of
emergency procurement had been delegated to the PrO in the head office, theDepartment of General Services (DGS) in the BSP Security Plant Complex and the11

The requirement for a written confirmation of emergency by the Head of Procuring Entity before undertaking
negotiated procurement-emergency cases was removed under GPPB-NPM No. 003-2020 dated 23 March 2020.

Other adopted measures were:a.

Instead of face-to-face meetings, pre-bid conferences are conducted thru
video conferencing;b.

Required formalities in documents, such as notarization, apostille andcertified true copies, can be accomplished after the emergency had ceased
but before payment; andc.

Payments for bidding documents, bid security and performance andwarranty securities can be made online.

3.5 Procurement under new economy arrangements: Moving forward goals
The COVID-19 pandemic, despite its dire consequences, accelerated theprogress of procurement processing, making it faster and responsive.
Procurement under the BSP’s new economy arrangements has adapted well in
coping with the emergency. It is very likely that the new-found efficiencies of thecurrent processes will become the norm even after the public health emergency
had ceased.

Case Studies in Organizational Support for Alternative Work Arrangements

4. Accelerated innovation and digitalization
Archellis A. Villena, Raul A. Andag and John L Regala12
Before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the BSP Chief Information Officer(CIO) presented the plan for a digitally-transformed BSP at the BSP strategicplanning conference on 28 November 2019. In the CIO’s opening statement, theneed for agile adjustment amid rapid technological changes was emphasized,
including changes in people, culture, organization and processes. A month
later, the Information Technology Office (ITO) organized an IT strategic planning
conference to produce the information systems strategic plan (ISSP) for 20202023. The plan was critical in the implementation of the ITO’s response to theimpact of COVID-19.13
After the nation adopted stricter measures in response to the pandemic, the BSP,
in turn, through the Governor’s direction14 , implemented different alternative
work arrangements, e.g., work-from-home (WFH), skeleton force, among others,
to ensure continued and uninterrupted operations and services.
Demand for ICT resources before and during the enhanced community
quarantine (ECQ) has not only increased rapidly but also went beyond the usual
ICT requests. The first few weeks of the ECQ has accelerated the innovation anddigitalization initiatives of ITO, such as the implementation of cloudification
initiatives and initial deployment of digital signatures using BSP public key
infrastructure, with close monitoring and heightened alerts in the areas of cyberand IT security.
This surge in ICT demand across BSP during the ECQ with the majority of the
BSP workforce adopting WFH arrangement added to the constraints on timeand available IT and manpower resources. To meet such demands, the ITO
implemented an “IT triage”15 to fulfill the ICT-related request of business users.
ITO prioritized technical support for mission-critical departments and offices
12

Archellis A. Villena (Director), Raul A. Andag (Deputy Director) and John L Regala (Director) are from theInformation Technology Office (ITO).

13

The ISSP 2020-2023 defines the BSP’s information systems strategy for the next four years, with transitory
activities that will eventually lead to the envisioned target states. The ITO laid out its blueprint to streamline
application systems, enable cloudification of IT infrastructure and strengthen cybersecurity capabilities. A
governance system for IT was issued to provide a framework for effective governance in the implementation ofidentified projects in the ISSP.

14

Memo to All BSP Employees from the Office of the Governor signed and dated 14 and 16 March 2020.

15

Triages in IT means “the assigning of priority order to projects on the basis of where funds and other resources
can best be used, are most needed, or are most likely to achieve success.” Kevin Miller. Release Triage: Managing
Your IT Emergency Room With A 4-Step Process. https://www.20creek.com/mba-guide-to-it/episode-30.html,
https://www.pluralsight.com/resource-center/guides/it-er-management.

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with further focus on those that directly support essential central banking
operations expected to be available during ECQ, while also prioritizing critical
BSP internal operations.
4.1 BSP’s adoption of cloud services – Office 365 (O365)
The BSP, as part of the ITO’s strategic direction on digital transformation, finallyadopted full cloud services into its ICT portfolio in the latter part of 2019. Pilot
deployment activities for selected BSP users were done from the fourth quarterof 2019 to February 2020 before the bankwide rollout, when the migration of
BSP users is in full swing. The initial deployment of O365 services covered cloudbased communication tools that were significantly more responsive to WFH.
With cloud services providing a simpler deployment model, it enabled more BSP
personnel to enjoy mobile computing and teleworking capabilities.
Beyond Outlook for email and Teams for real-time communication andcollaboration, other enhancements in technological capabilities introduced byO365 are as follows:•

Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) – The average number of devices per person
was projected to reach 4.3 in 2020 (Waring, 2014). This can be consideredan accurate forecast given the ubiquity of mobile devices that can be owned
by a single individual. Managing devices now boils down to who is using
the device. In the BSP’s setting, the use of O365 applications and services
on any supported device is possible so long as an employee’s identity isauthenticated on the device.

•

Personal Cloud Storage – It is common practice for employees to store files
on portable USB storage or forward these to personal e-mails if they needto continue their work outside the office. However, this has the unintended
consequence of placing data on a non-standard medium. With O365 nowpart of the BSP’s managed mobile environment, OneDrive, as its bundledservice for personal and shared cloud storage, was allowed for bankwide use
to hurdle the constraints of remotely accessing working files residing in onpremise systems.

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Electronic Submission and Receipt of Bids (e-bidding) with O365 – The
Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) released an issuance16
authorizing government agencies to employ e-bidding until the modernizedPhilippine Government Electronic Procurement System becomes operational.
The BSP CIO issued a certification to the GPPB on 25 June 2020 to attest the
BSP’s capability to implement the electronic submission and receipt of bids.

Service provisioning of the foregoing for users is still subject to prerequisites
and vetting of respective department or office head per prescribed policy andguidelines.17 The expansion of O365 services for cloud-based group storage toreplace on-premise network drives is the next feature being explored. But with
BYOD and OneDrive, the BSP must update its Data and Information Classification(DIC) inventories and formulate information security policies that factor in
the cloud environment. The IT Security Group (ITSG) is currently reviewing
and validating effectiveness and adequacy of O365’s cloud security controls,particularly the built-in access and information security features while the BSP’s
DIC and information security policies are being updated.
4.2 The new economy arrangements (NEA)
The NEA was introduced as a means for the organization to adapt to the current
global situation post-ECQ. The ITO ran a survey from 28 May to 19 June 2020 togather information on planned work arrangements, among others, to be adopted
by the BSP under the NEA. Table 11.1 shows the results as expressed by the headsof departments and offices as the targeted respondents, with the major issues
raised and the ITO’s observations and recommendations.
The data gathered will be used as inputs for an IT strategic program thatwill support the NEA, to be considered in the update of the ISSP 20202023. This update will also accelerate the strategies of the ITO to realize
its target states faster and support the ITO’s roadmap towards a digitallytransformed organization.

16

GPPB Resolution No. 09-2020 dated 20 May 2020.

17

Mobile Device and Teleworking WFH Policy dated 7 April 2020, and Guidelines on the Use of OneDrive
Application under Office 365 dated 2 June 2020.

Source: Internal (MS Forms) survey with BSP Dept/Office Heads

4.3 Cyber resilient institution
With the surge in BSP employees working from home and the demand forremote connectivity increased, the BSP’s cyberthreat landscape changed as wellas its cyberrisks expanded. In response, the ITO conducted the following initialand continuing activities:i.

Performed security hardening of laptops issued to BSP mission-critical
departments and offices to support the alternative work arrangements;ii.

Promoted secure remote communication practices by issuing advisories tofacilitate secure conference calls; andiii.

Close monitoring of cyberthreats from threat intelligence sources, andthrough collaboration with internal BSP business units, other government
agencies and central banks, to proactively mitigate cyberthreats and executea timely response to cyberattacks.

Moreover, the ITSG submitted a proposed cybersecurity management planfor the NEA, which provides strategic direction for the BSP towards building acyberresilient institution while continuously carrying out its mandate under the
new work arrangements.

Case Studies in Organizational Support for Alternative Work Arrangements

The cybersecurity initiatives are aligned with the ISSP 2020-2023 and industryaccepted international standards18 following the principles of security in theinformation technology and the BSP Risk Management Framework. The said
initiatives are grouped under the following strategies:i.

Immediate Adaptive Cybersecurity Defense Implementation that needs to be
fast-tracked to support the immediate requirements of remote users;ii.

Cybersecurity Resiliency Initiatives include technology based-initiatives thatwould address identified cyberrisks to bolster the existing security defensesof the BSP while maintaining its adaptive cyberdefense strategy; andiii.

Cybersecurity Capability Build-up provides for the continuous improvementof cybersecurity processes while leveraging on its human capital.

Continuous cybersecurity process improvement enables a holistic approach in
mitigating identified cyberrisks, optimizing the value of technology and using
an end-to-end solution in resolving similar, related or transversal risks. No setof controls can achieve complete security, and additional management action ispivotal in monitoring, evaluating and improving the efficiency and effectivenessof cybersecurity controls to support the BSP’s strategic objectives.

18

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 IT – Security Techniques – Information Security Management Systems Requirements
ISO/IEC 27002:2013 IT – Security Techniques – Code of Practice for Information Security Controls
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Risk Assessment Methodology
ISO 31000:2018 Risk Management Principles and Guidelines127

5. BSP’s communication: Sustained issues management mode
Elisha Garcia-Lirios19
The BSP has stepped up to the unique communication challenges of the
COVID-19 pandemic by delivering timely, comprehensive and reliable messages
on a wide range of its initiatives. These aim to provide a steadying hand to thefinancial system and reinforce whole-of-nation efforts to bolster the economy
amid the global health emergency. Guided by the Office of the Governor, the
BSP’s communication team switched to “sustained issues management mode”
as it addressed emerging mainstream and social media concerns amid the BSP’s
commitment to price stability and financial stability while looking after thewelfare of its personnel.
While much of the banking system referred to the start of the COVID-19 crisis
as of 17 March 2020, or when the ECQ was first declared in the island of Luzon,
the BSP Communication Office (CO) actually began its crisis communications
work a week earlier—the day the Philippines recorded its first case of COVID-19
infection. This started a series of messages that continued through much of
the ECQ and the community quarantines that were declared in the months that
followed. As in any crisis, communication needed to be cautious, measured andupdated with the latest information from within and outside the organization.
The second weekend of March was to become the last “normal” weekend formany at the BSP, especially for the Bank’s Incident Management Team (IMT)and Corporate Services Sector (CSS). The IMT and the CSS would provide key
information support and overall leadership in the BSP’s COVID-19 response. It
was important for the BSP to show its thought leadership in managing policy
responses to the unprecedented global predicament. Within a period of two
weeks from the declaration of the first community quarantine, the BSP would
unveil a set of measures to support the national government in its fight against
the virus and cushion its negative effects on the larger economy. These wereannounced in quick succession in the early days of the crisis, with much of thelead coming from the Office of the Governor.20
19

Ms. Elisha Garcia-Lirios is the Acting Director of the Communications Office.

20

Key initiatives included a cumulative 175 basis points cut in policy rates, a reduction in the reserve requirement
ratio of banks, opening of a window for purchases of government securities in the secondary market, a reverse
repurchase agreement and advance dividends to the national government. The policy rate was reduced fourtimes in four months to 2.25 percent—by 25 bps on February 6, and by 50 bps each on March 19, April 16 andJune 25, 2020.

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It was important for the CO to create a comprehensive information material
that would underscore the multi-faceted approach that the BSP had taken in
addressing the pandemic and in making its actions immediately known to andeasily understood by the public. A categorized, summarized and easily updated
format was needed for ease of access, readability and understandability. Fromlargely maintaining institutional trust, the CO’s main tasks would expand
overnight to include reassuring the public of the BSP’s presence, active
participation and timely responses to the COVID-19 crisis while grappling withchallenges related to personnel, IT equipment, connectivity and safe platforms
through which team members could coordinate and share information.

quarantine periods through online video conference calls with industry
associations, social and civic organizations, academic groups and media
companies. The BSP maintained its presence as the country’s primary economic
content provider on various topics that affected the public through GBED Talks,a twice-a-month press chat with the BSP press corps and broadcast media
representatives. Through these long-form types of interactions, the BSP was
better able to articulate its stance while soliciting comments and clarifications
from specific interest groups, either through an open forum or a question-andanswer session. These platforms have also helped the BSP improve the media andthe public’s long-term knowledge and understanding of central banking issues.

5.1 Engagement with the public

5.2 Communication lessons from the ongoing crisis

Social media emerged as a crucial venue for communication amid the
pandemic. As the primary regulator of the financial system, the first order of
each day for the CO would be to inform banks of BSP services that are available
to them such as day-to-day treasury, check clearing and cash requirements
during the initial community quarantine. The CO came out with a series ofsocial media cards on available banking services during the quarantine period
as well as on the important role of bank personnel in keeping the economy
functioning amid the pandemic.

Open and clear messaging

The infographic on the BSP’s initiatives was continuously updated and served
as a transparency measure on the BSP’s coherent and immediate responses tothe crisis. An example is the digital payment requirements of a population that
had been “locked down.” The CO helped disseminate information on the zerotransaction costs for interbank fund transfer payment facilities, InstaPay and
PESONet,21 issued consistent reminders on the availability of this facility throughmainstream media and promoted healthy electronic banking practices throughthe BSP’s social media accounts.
There was also a need to continue dialogue with business groups and assure
the public of the BSP’s continuing work in other aspects of central banking.
Thus, the Governor continued to deliver speeches during the various community
21

Initiative led by the BSP and the Philippine Payments Management, Inc.

Narratives from the pandemic evolved fairly quickly from addressing theimmediate requirements of analysts, bankers and financial market participants
to providing the information needs of the general populace. While the former
needed assurance that the government continued to function well and would
ably provide for the country’s needs, the latter solicited responses for their mostbasic needs—the safety of bank deposits and the welfare of families. For both,the overarching theme has been to consistently convey confidence and trust in
the BSP’s actions (Checkley and Piris, 2020).
Maintaining public trust through various initiatives that underscore its integrity
and competence remained at the heart of BSP communication, whether in a crisis
or not. Recognizing the BSP’s importance as a credible source of informationon the economy, it was important for the CO to gain the support from various
sectors operating within the BSP. This partnership helped expedite the processingof interview requests and public inquiries, many of which were complex in nature.
Efforts to improve coordination among agencies involved in the supervision offinancial institutions, as well as within the Philippines’ economic team, should
also be noted. A united stance is vital to assure the public of cooperation andunderstanding among agencies belonging to the Financial Stability Coordinating
Council or the Development Budget and Coordination Committee (DBCC),
particularly in media events with specialized audiences.

Case Studies in Organizational Support for Alternative Work Arrangements

129

Audience-centered communication

Paths to greater preparation

During a crisis, it is paramount to acknowledge the importance of audience
perception. Differences in perception could lead to exaggerated responses thattrigger possible flight or fight reactions (Jabal, 2018). There may even be irrational
reactions to unusual situations that many may consider unfamiliar, such as themonths-long lockdown in the country. Thus, open and clear communication is at
the center of efforts to reduce uncertainty, assuage fears, provide alternatives andexpress empathy.

The support and authority given by the Office of the Governor have provencrucial in ensuring that internal and external communication would remain
consistent during the COVID-19 pandemic and even afterwards. To operationallystrengthen the team during the pandemic (Sieliezienieva and Bondarenko, 2019),
the CO was provided authority to vet specific communication materials meant for
public consumption.

Communication materials should contain the correct amount of relevant
information for specific audiences. The Bangko Sentral aims to meet therequirements of the public by offering solutions that fit the problem. Thistranslates to sticking with available facts and choosing to wait for confirmed
policy initiatives before transmitting these to the public.
A large part of the CO’s task involves translating technical central banking jargon
into easily understandable and relatable content on mass media.22 The CO’s
media relations team continued to ensure that media requests for interviews
and different forms of engagement were pursued during the pandemic period,
including unprecedented media access to the Governor himself through amessaging application.
With the pandemic also came fake news and unfounded assertions on
mainstream media, social media and various informal chat groups. After verifyingthat these allegations were either false or misleading, the BSP issued formal
advisories or social media cards with the correct information to prevent theirfurther spread.
For credit rating agencies, economists, bankers, foreign investors and othercentral banks, the BSP sought targeted opportunities to discuss policy initiatives
it had taken during the pandemic. These came in the form of online meetings,
speeches and written messages focused on specific areas of concern.
22

Different communication modes were utilized – audio, video and QR codes on social media cards; consistent andscheduled advisories; news summaries and features on central bankers.

Another area where the CO may strengthen itself further is in establishingprotocols among different units of the BSP to ensure that reporting lines andresponsibilities are clear especially during time-sensitive crisis situations. This
will be addressed through the identification of subject matter experts within the
BSP, as well as a review of existing policies to reduce procedural constraints,
improve decision making and hasten the finalization, release and disseminationof messages.
There will be a continuing need for the matrix of messages that is easily
adaptable for use across all platforms and customized according to different
audiences, both in and outside of the BSP. There will also be demand for sets offrequently asked questions about BSP issues, mandates and advocacies.
Sustained monitoring of media exposure, including frequency and content,
will serve in providing analysis on the effectiveness of BSP messages, theidentification of areas for improvement and the formulation of recommendations
to further strengthen the BSP’s communication capabilities.
Lastly, the BSP will be served well by an honest assessment of its own
performance in the communication realm. This would entail evaluating theeffectiveness of communication materials, channels and initiatives, and truly learn
from challenges that the institution encountered during the pandemic.

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References
Checkley, C. and Piris, A (2020). Public communication during a financial crisis. IMF Monetary and Capital Markets, Special Series on COVID-19. https://www.imf
org/~/media/Files/Publications/covid19-special-notes/en-special-series-on-covid-19-public-communication-during-a-financial-crisis.ashx
Jabal, R. (2018, February 20). Communicating risks: Engaging people during crisis and public emergencies. [Conference presentation]. National Information
Convention, Davao City.
Sieliezienieva, V. and Bondarenko, N. (2019, May 22). Crisis communications for the central bank. [Conference presentation]. Annual Research Conference on
Central Bank Communications.
Waring, J. (2014, October 16) Number of devices to hit 4.3 per person by 2020. Mobile World Live. https://www.mobileworldlive.com/featured-content/homebanner/connected-devices-to-hit-4-3-per-person-by-2020-report/

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1. Introduction
A crisis is a time of extreme difficulty that necessitates making hard decisions.
An economic crisis, regardless of scale and origins, ultimately requires
resources and a strategic response. The current COVID-19 pandemic hasrevealed enduring vulnerabilities that would test the suitability of domestic
policies. Economies lacking governance structures that are adept at policymaking will tend to suffer deeply.
A crisis, therefore, underlines the necessity of forward planning. Pressing
questions confronting policymakers during a crisis pertain to the paceand strength of near-term recovery as well as the likely medium-term
repercussions. Thus, acting decisively in the early phase of any crisis is criticalin changing its course and severity. Even if favorable pre-crisis conditions offer
policy flexibility, the policy space will eventually get tighter if a crisis drags
longer than anticipated. Conditions could rapidly deteriorate, and no economy
could afford to have its “immune system” seriously compromised. That may
generate serious socioeconomic and political difficulties that could not beeasily undone. Thus, crisis mitigation and crisis resolution require adroitness
in understanding its fundamental cause, contextualizing it within the rapidlychanging and uncertain operating environment, and assessing available andsuitable policy levers for implementation.
Central bank policies are indispensable facets of macroeconomic crisis response
actions. Bolstering the capacity for policy maneuvers during downturns requires
monetary policy to work in lockstep with financial policy framework for crisis
prevention and resolution (Blanchard and Summers, 2017). This is to prevent theimmediate illiquidity risk from turning into a perilous insolvency crisis. A healthysynergy with fiscal policy is likewise necessary to ensure that future monetary
actions will not be dominated by fiscal concerns.
Even if an ideal mix of policy levers exists, real-world application is still fraught
with challenges, especially for emerging market economies (EMEs) that arevulnerable to the vagaries of the global economy. Deterioration in economic
conditions can trigger the financial amplification effects that can precipitate
sudden stops. Thus, no economy can let its guard down. Market surveillance andpreparation of the policy arsenal need to be sharpened even more. Lost lives andlivelihood are too big a price to pay for inaction and haphazard policy actions.
*Eloisa T. Glindro (Deputy Director), Marites B. Oliva (Bank Officer V) and Lilia V. Elloso (Bank Officer V) are from theCenter for Monetary and Financial Policy. The authors acknowledge the contribution of Mari-Len R. Macasaquitand Maria Jannie Luiza C. Baluyan of the International Relations Department (IRD).

2. Unconventional monetary policies: a fundamental rethinkor a fundamental caveat?
The 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) has profoundly changed the thinking about
central banking. Many central banks in advanced economies provided massive
bridge financing to sectors that have been previously outside their ambit. Manyof the unconventional monetary policy (UMP) measures have not yet been fully
unwound when the COVID-19 pandemic struck. While the jury is still out on
the effectiveness of UMP, the severity of the economic impact of COVID-19 has
prompted many central banks, including those from EMEs, to cross the Rubiconand embrace unorthodox measures, setting a precedent for future monetary
policy commitments.
Maintaining price stability conducive to economic growth and welfare constitutes
the core of central bank mandate. Stable prices safeguard the real purchasing
power of money and facilitate long-term planning and effective functioning ofmarkets. To achieve this policy objective, adjusting the short-term interest rateis the standard monetary policy taken by central banks. They do so throughdomestic open market operations and standing credit and deposit facilities.
Other conventional monetary policy measures include direct instruments such as
reserve requirements and lender of last resort to distressed financial institutions.
The advent of liberalization, financial globalization and digitalization has had
deep implications on the conduct of monetary policy. As financial crises become
more frequent, securing financial stability has become an equally essential policy
pillar of central banks and financial supervisors. Monetary policy anchored on
price stability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving financial
stability. Financial instability can diminish the traction of monetary policy as what
happens during periods of deep economic contraction. Siklos (2014) emphasized
the need to rethink the general view that price stability and small output gaps are
sufficient to guarantee financial system stability.
In an economic crisis where conditions can rapidly deteriorate, lending rates
may be slow to adjust due to risk premia or reluctance to lend, resulting in credit
rationing. The inertia in reviving credit intermediation may progressively drive
policy rates to its effective lower bound1 (Papademos, 2006). Cutting rates below
a certain threshold could reduce credit supply, especially new productive loans,
if lower interest rate margins erode bank profits and net worth. Moreover, if
1

Not necessarily the zero-lower bound as there are jurisdictions with negative policy rates already.

Forward Planning for Strategic Crisis Response

133banks are constrained to reduce deposit rates below a threshold, monetary policy
is unable to shift consumption to the present, suppressing the “intertemporal
substitution channel” (BIS, 2019a).
A relevant question to ponder is whether there is an optimal sequence in the
deployment of crisis policy response measures. Thus far, the world has seen
diverse approaches to attendant risks and challenges. There are no hard andfast rules because an economic or financial shock has differential impact acrosseconomies. Initial conditions and policy flexibility differ. Monetary policy is now,
more than ever, faced with non-neutral policy trade-offs in the face of multiple
secondary shocks at play.
A small emerging market economy like the Philippines is invariably affectedby developments in the global economy and the global financial system. Now
that the world is simultaneously suffering from the onslaught of the COVID-19
pandemic, EMEs need to tread carefully. Korinek and Mendoza (2014) andMendoza (2010) made an insightful study on the dynamics of sudden stop, which
is highly relevant in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic. They found a patternof strong real exchange rate appreciation prior to sudden stop episodes, after
which the real exchange rate collapses and a gradual recovery ensues. Such
dynamics were not evident in advanced economies. They also observed marked
asymmetry in the distribution of macroeconomic aggregates during sudden
stops, a characteristic not evident during episodes of sudden large capital inflows
and economic expansions. Moreover, they found that the fall in total factor
productivity accounts for a sizeable drop in output during a sudden stop rather
than a decline in measured capital and labor.
Capital outflows were peaking around March 2020 with portfolio debt and equity
investments reaching US$83.3 billion in March 2020, the largest since the GFC (IIF,
2020a). Nonetheless, capital flows eased at US$15.1 billion inflows in July 2020,
although equity flows (excluding China) posted only marginal gains (IIF 2020b).
Two stylized facts characterize the eve of the pandemic. First, global sectoral
debt has risen since the GFC, with governments and non-financial corporates
exhibiting stronger uptrends (Figure 12.1). Second, emerging markets have hadhigher reserve adequacy than they did prior to the GFC (Davis, 2020) as shown in
Figure 12.2. The incidence of sudden stop and debt upsurge resulting from the
COVID-19 shocks may not be apparent yet as the world has yet to see the full
extent of the fallout. However, the duration and depth of the crisis could trigger
another wave of capital outflow and increase in debt as economic recovery
prospects still stand on shaky ground.

Source of basic data: Global Debt Monitor Database of the Institute of International Finance (as of July
2020)

Reproduced from Scott Davis (2020), Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Source of basic data: World Bank

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

A close look at UMPs. UMPs pertain to unorthodox tools deployed by central
banks when conventional monetary policy tools are insufficient to addressa problem at hand. UMP measures specifically aim to manage the cost andavailability of financing for a particular sector such as banks, households andnon-financial corporations (Smaghi, 2009). Many of the UMPs are already in the
toolkit of central banks. They become unconventional, in breadth and scale, when
they serve as the primary mechanism for achieving the central banks’ objectives(RBA, 2020).
There are three broad categories of UMP measures as expounded in Smaghi(2009) and Ishi et al. (2009): liquidity easing, credit easing and quantitative easing.
Liquidity easing is a conventional measure of central banks, but it becomes
unconventional when liquidity provision is stepped up to cover a wider range of
foreign exchange and domestic financial markets. Meanwhile, credit easing is the
direct or indirect provision of credit by central banks to a certain market segment
to address liquidity shortages and spreads primarily due to credit markets
breakdown. Quantitative easing seeks to affect the level of long-term rate offinancial assets mainly through changing the market for risk-free assets. The box
article differentiates among the different UMP measures.
A new variant of UMP measure is the setting of negative interest rate policy(NIRP), which was first adopted by Denmark in 2012.2 With deflationary spirals
taking hold and conventional measures reaching their limits, NIRP is seen toresuscitate lending, push inflation up and revive economic activity (RBA, 2020).
Another but less straightforward UMP is forward guidance, which is essentiallythe communication of policy intentions. It could be calendar-based or have
explicit commitments on specific policy actions. The idea is to influence privatesector expectations of future policy rates and inflation, with the idea that suchexpectations affect current period activity. According to Moessner et al. (2015),
the policy is time-inconsistent because once the crisis is over, the central bankhas no incentive to deliver on generating inflation.
Based on the database compiled by Ishi et al. (2009) and IMF COVID-19 tracker,
more UMPs were actively deployed during the GFC (Figure 12.3) when selected
Asian economies more actively used measures to ease domestic liquidity andforeign exchange liquidity (Figure 12.4). Several months into the COVID-19
pandemic, more domestic-liquidity-easing and credit-easing measures (Figures
12.5) have been deployed.
2

Negative policy interest rate was first implemented in Denmark in July 2012 followed by Switzerland in December
2014, Sweden in February 2015 and Japan in September 2016 (BIS, 2020b). While the main refinancing operations
rate of the ECB is set at 0%, the deposit facility rate is currently at -0.5%. The negative deposit facility rate began
in June 2014 at -0.1% (ECB, 2020).

Different Types of Unconventional
Monetary Policy Measures
Liquidity easing becomes unconventional when liquidity provision is undertaken
on a massive scale. Examples are expansion of existing lending facilities toprovide sufficient liquidity to a wider range of financial markets, loweringcosts over longer horizons and expansion of the range of accepted collateral tosupport illiquid financial intermediaries. These provide confidence to financial
institutions on access to liquidity, enabling them to continue the provision of
credit to firms and households.
Credit easing can generally be conducted through the purchase of commercial
papers, corporate bonds and asset-backed securities of targeted borrowers. In
the case of quantitative easing, an example is the direct purchases of government
securities to lower the benchmark market interest rates and boost economic
activity. This is typically undertaken when policy rate is near zero. Otherwise,
the balance sheet of central banks will expand larger than necessary, thereby
increasing their risk exposure.
Another policy to deal with the effective lower bound is the negative interest
rate policy, which represents a cost for placing excess reserves with the central
bank. Some countries implement this measure to thwart deflationary currency
appreciation. This was found to be effective in dealing with effective lower
bound and could influence the expectation on future rates (BIS, 2019a). The
policy has been adopted in a number of central banks such as Japan, Sweden,
Denmark, Switzerland and the European Central Bank (ECB).* Sweden’s
Riksbank has moved the interest rate from negative territory to zero by end-2019.
Forward guidance essentially encompasses communication of central bank policy
stance and the views surrounding it. What is unconventional is that it entails
commitment to a particular policy, conditional on specific economic conditions(RBA, 2020).
Sources: Smaghi (2009); Ishi et al. (2009); RBA (2020); BIS (2019a, 2019b).
* While the main refinancing operations rate of the ECB is set at 0%, the deposit facility rate is currently at -0.5%.

Forward Planning for Strategic Crisis Response

Note: The number of measures should not be interpreted as a precise gauge of the magnitude ofpolicy responses.
Source: For GFC period: Ishi, et al. (2009), except for Japan which is based on Kuroda (2014) andNakaso (2017). There are no reported measures for Thailand. For COVID-19 period: identified by theauthors based on IMF (2020a), accessed in October 2020 and IMF Global Financial Stability Report:
Bridge to Recovery, October 2020

Note: The number of measures should not be interpreted as a precise gauge of the magnitude ofpolicy responses.
Source: Ishi, et al. (2009), except for Japan which is based on Kuroda (2014) and Nakaso (2017). There
are no reported measures for Thailand

135

Note: The number of measures should not be interpreted as a precise gauge of the magnitude ofpolicy responses.
Source: Identified by the authors based on IMF (2020a), accessed in October 2020. IMF Global
Financial Stability Report: Bridge to Recovery, October 2020

The implementation of UMPs, however, is not without caveats. Liquidity risk may
be elevated if the private sector and the government expect the central bankto intervene whenever risk spreads increase. The ensuing moral hazard andmispricing or risks have serious ramifications on financial stability (BIS, 2019a).
UMPs could also hinder the resumption of normal market functioning as central
bank operations may substitute or interfere with them (Smaghi, 2019). For
instance, if the central bank implements UMPs that directly deal with the nonfinancial private sector (i.e., central bank purchase of privately issued securities),
the central bank is undertaking credit risk which is supposed to be the role ofbanks. In addition, this could lead to allocative distortions, not only in terms ofsector (e.g., tourism, airline industry vs. manufacturing, retail trade), but also
in terms of size (e.g., micro, small and medium enterprises vs. big firms) andgeography (e.g., firms in Metro Manila vs. firms in Cebu or Davao).

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3. Complementarity of monetary, macroprudential andexchange rate measures in crisis alleviation
The literature on economic policies and objectives suggests that there is a logicalor natural correspondence between instruments and objectives (Blanchard etal., 2014). Monetary policy is for price stability objective, foreign exchange (FX)intervention is for excessive exchange rate movements and macroprudential
measures (MPMs) are for financial stability concerns. Central banks have turned
to FX intervention with the aim of buffering the economy from exchange
rate shocks, and to macroprudential policies to address specific pockets offinancial risks. This mapping has helped enhance monetary policy’s credibility inmaintaining price stability.
In the presence of multiple shocks, simultaneous and coordinated deploymentof policy measures is indispensable. As the nexus between the economy andfinancial markets becomes more intertwined, macroprudential policies play a
crucial complementary role in responding to changes in “domestic financial
conditions and global financial shocks” (Adrian and Gopinath, 2020). The
availability of macroprudential measures, capital flow measures and regulatory
relief and forbearance measures are important underpinnings of a robust crisis
response framework.
The BSP’s reliance on MPMs is not misplaced and resonates with the trend
among other EMEs, especially in Asia. In Bergant et al. (2020), the authors findthat MPMs can lower the volatility of GDP growth, domestic credit and exchange
rates, thereby relieving monetary policy of the burden of adjustment. A relaxationof macroprudential tools can help the financial system absorb the impact of theshock and ease a credit crunch that might have otherwise amplified the effect on
the real economy. Such relaxation, however, is possible only if macroprudential
buffers are in place, and useful only if the easing of the available buffers is
expected to relieve stress or remove binding constraints on the provision of
credit to the real economy (IMF, 2014; IMF, 2017)

The IMF-WB (2020) maintains that if conditions allow, the loosening of different
types of tools can relieve stressors. Where the countercyclical capital buffer(CCyB) has already been activated, it can be relaxed to support the flow ofcredit to the economy and provide additional capacity to lend through a period
of increased credit risks. Where the CCyB is not available, banks should be
encouraged to use the capital conservation buffer (CCB).
Consideration can also be given to a relaxation of systemic risk buffers that aredesigned to protect against macroeconomic risks. For example, banks shouldbe able to make use of their high-quality liquidity assets under the liquidity
coverage ratio (LCR) to counter liquidity stress in local currency. A relaxation ofreserve requirements (in domestic currency) can help alleviate liquidity pressuresin banks. Foreign currency reserve requirements can be relaxed to mitigate FX
funding pressures. Where countries have introduced additional LCR requirements
in FX, they can allow banks to use the buffer, or loosen the requirement. A
relaxation of sectoral tools (such as caps on loan-to-value ratios) can also be
considered to support the provision of credit to households and firms.
At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, most countries have enacted emergency
measures aimed at supporting the flow of credit to the real economy while
mitigating the build-up of risks from asset quality deterioration (IMF-World
Bank, 2020). These measures include: (i) prudential regulatory and supervisory
measures to support banks in facilitating credit to the real economy; (ii) measures
supporting borrowers and loan restructuring; (iii) operational and business
continuity measures; and (iv) measures to strengthen payment systems. Box
Article 2 provides a snapshot of the central banks’ policy responses during the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Thus far, national policy measures around the world have targeted the use ofavailable bank capital and liquidity buffers. The aims are to support affectedborrowers, promote balance sheet transparency and maintain operationaland business continuity of banks as well as payment systems. However, somedeveloping countries have fewer options at their disposal due to limited policy
buffers, weaker implementation capacity and less-sophisticated regulatory

Forward Planning for Strategic Crisis Response

frameworks. When EMEs face capital outflows during and after a crisis, foreignexchange intervention can help stem capital flight. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) has spearheaded efforts to develop conceptual and quantitativemodels under the integrated policy framework to provide guidance on how
the tools can be deployed to address central bank objectives (Adrian and
Gopinath, 2020).

4. Fiscal limits and the specter of fiscal dominance
Many EMEs have been able to undertake countercyclical fiscal and monetary
policy over the past decade to stabilize economies, with little threat of fiscal
dominance. Improvements in fiscal policy in EMEs appear to have increased theeffectiveness of monetary policy (Montoro et al., 2012).3 Nonetheless, monetary
policy cannot afford a benign neglect of fiscal policy. During crisis, deficits anddebts take center stage as internal sources of funds plummet while expenditure
requirements for social amelioration and recovery efforts rise. The dilemma
between financing crisis mitigation and resolution measures and addressing debt
vulnerabilities becomes heightened.

Wyplosz (2020) provides an argument to the contrary. He notes that for OECDeconomies which have long data span since the 1960s, the sustainability
condition appears to hold for only about 49.7 percent of the time, with large
standard deviation. The risk of procyclical policy going forward requires carefulconsideration, given the depth of the economic contraction from the ongoingpandemic. Availability of financing is inadequate to sidestep the confidence issue
that may arise from lack of long-term fiscal consolidation. When r – g < 0 is thenorm, it is difficult to determine the threshold when debt dynamics becomes
explosive (Ostry et al., 2011).
Applying the simple debt sustainability condition to selected Asian economies
with available comparable interest rate data, r – g < 0 holds most of the time
(Figure 12.6). This, however, should be viewed with caution due to the very small
observation set.

Monetary policy always has fiscal implications. At the effective lower bound,monetary policy is also effectively the fiscal policy (Orphanides, 2018). While
government debt financing by the central bank serves as a crisis management
tool, it cannot be used as a permanent solution. It cannot substitute for thenecessary fiscal adjustment. Otherwise, it increases the risk profile of the central
bank’s balance sheet, which could reduce financial soundness and financial
independence of the country’s monetary authority (Smaghi, 2019).
Public debt sustainability is largely contingent on the government’s commitment
to honor its current and future debt obligations (Debrun et al., 2019). Highpublic debt is generally regarded as costly because of future fiscal costs andcrowding out of capital. However, in the current environment of low interest
rates, Blanchard (2019) posits that the fiscal costs are not large, and the welfare
costs are probably small. He expounds that since r – g < 04 appears to be “thenorm rather than the exception,” debt can just be rolled over to support growthand new debt pays for the interest. Hence, the debt-to-GDP ratio will decline overtime without the need to raise taxes ever.
3

Stronger fiscal positions were found to be weakly associated with lower equilibrium real interest rates, andsmaller deficits with lower inflation.

4

r and g are the nominal interest and growth rate of nominal GDP, respectively.

137

Authors’ computation
Sources of basic data: IMF-International Financial Statistics, Reuters
Interest rate is the 10-year Treasury bond rate

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Moreover, most Asian economies generally have stable government debt-toGDP (Figure 12.7) and small deficits in primary balance-to-GDP (Figure 12.8)
prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. It would, therefore, be prudent for thosewith moderate debt levels to keep them as such. At the same time, access to			Source of basic data: IMF Fiscal Monitor

better financing terms must be used to address deep economic challenges
and invest in the future (Boone and Buti, 2019). Dealing with lingering
structural problems in taxation policy is equally important in pursuingequitable growth and development.

Forward Planning for Strategic Crisis Response

			

139

Source of basic data: IMF Fiscal Monitor

5. The political and economic challenge of the policy
normalization process
Given that current market conditions are shaped by expectations on future
policy trajectory, clarity about the return from the crisis policy regime to longestablished policy framework is pivotal and requires a finer balancing act. On one
hand, premature withdrawal of support stymies recovery efforts and runs therisk of precipitating another downturn. On the other hand, a protracted periodof support beyond what is reasonable for the economy creates dependency

and reduces incentives for the resumption of normal market conditions. The
importance of consistent and dependable policy coordination, clear messaging
and accountability are now, more than ever, critical in weaning the economy off
the extraordinary policy support (Glindro et al, 2020a).
The socioeconomic gaps laid bare by the COVID-19 pandemic call for deliberate
and focused reforms in the modernization of the health system to ensure efficientpublic health infrastructure and logistics system and resilient crisis preparedness
framework; systematic arrangement for expeditious assistance to the most

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

vulnerable; and meaningful support for the restoration of economic activities
and employment. Since the credibility of governments and institutions is at stake
during crisis episodes, accountability and governance safeguards are paramount.
Digital technology will be key to the strengthening of the government’s
monitoring and evaluation systems for policy actions (Diokno, 2020). Without
these capacities, governments may not adequately assess how its policies
affect the people and risk placing a disproportionate burden of the health andeconomic impacts of the pandemic on the vulnerable (Evans, 2020).
Central banks with both price and financial stability objective also face particularchallenges amid policy conflicts. For instance, fast-rising inflationary expectations
may prompt a central bank to increase policy rates. However, if credit conditions
are precariously tight and the recovery process is still incomplete or weak, raising
policy rate may just worsen financial conditions. As such, price and financial
stability communication requires a finer balancing act in times of crisis – keeping
market participants and the public informed, advising caution and promoting
mitigating actions with clarity of purpose.
When conventional measures are significantly blocked, non-standard measures
can offer support. While the unwinding of conventional measures is contingent
on the medium- and long-term outlook for price stability, that of unconventional
measures would depend on the impairment of the monetary policy transmission
through the financial system and financial markets (Trichet, 2013).

6. Time for global reset of the international financial order?
Some experts have sounded a clarion call for the redefinition of the international
financial architecture and monetary systems. They consider the existing financial
safety nets woefully inadequate should the pandemic deepen amid brewing
geopolitical tensions.
Enlargement of global financial safety nets (GFSNs). For a long time, theIMF has been the only available source of financing for majority of the world’s
countries. Since the GFC, GFSNs have grown, encompassing regional financial
arrangements, bilateral currency swaps, bilateral short-term loans, crisis lending
programs of multilateral development banks, repo agreements and central bankhedging instruments as shown in Figure 12.9 (Mühlich et al., 2020).

Source: Mühlich et al. (2020).

The COVID-19 pandemic may require significant increase in lending volumes
from the IMF and regional fund, especially for developing and emerging
economies. Segal and Gerstel (2020) of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS)5 reported that international financial institutions (IFIs) haveapproved US$117 billion in COVID-19-related support since 27 January 2020as summarized in Table 12.1. The IMF has approved US$77.1 billion, including
emergency assistance and precautionary lines of credit, while the multilateraldevelopment banks (MDBs) have approved a total of US$39.3 billion. Regional
Financing Arrangements (RFAs) have not been a significant source of funding ona global scale to date.6
Among IFIs, MDBs have disbursed far more than the IMF. The lower disbursementby the IMF has been attributed to the precautionary nature of flexible credit line
5

The CSIS Economics Program tracks commitments, approvals and disbursements by major international financial
institutions (IFIs) to meet the massive financing needs generated by the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic
fallout.

6

Among the RFAs, only the Arab Monetary Fund has approved and disbursed financial support to four of its
member countries in response to the current crisis. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Latin
American Reserve Fund have both announced institutional commitments to support their members, but
European countries have not yet tapped ESM financing. The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization Agreementand Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development have not announced any COVID-19-related programs.

Forward Planning for Strategic Crisis Response(FCL) arrangements with Colombia, Chile and Peru. The FCL is a lending program
introduced in 2009 to mitigate external shocks and support market confidence ineconomies with strong economic fundamentals.

Source: Data collected by CSIS based on public release through 19 June 2020.
a/ IMF data include Chile’s, Colombia’s and Peru’s Flexible Credit Line Programs and debt relief for 25
of its poorest members approved by the Executive Board on 13 April 2020.

In terms of geographical distribution, IFI approvals have been largest for theAmericas although disbursements made to Africa and Asia/Oceania have been
larger.7 Support from new MDBs has been noteworthy. The Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank, or BRICS Bank, pledged
US$10 billion each. The AIIB consists of eight programs with co-financing
arrangements with other regional MDBs.
A new global Marshall Plan. In a commentary, Goldin and Muggah (2020)
argue for a global Marshall plan to sustain governments and societies. Theynote that not all economies have sufficient resources and policy firepower tosustain COVID-19 support for any great length of time. The pandemic can worsen
inequality within and between countries, and halt the pace of globalization. At
the same time, it could accelerate the 4th industrial revolution and change thefuture of work. On one hand, it could foster the growth of new digitally-enabledbusiness models that are seen to be more sustainably inclusive. On the other
hand, the transformation could also diminish the comparative advantage of lower
labor costs in low-income countries.
7

To date, IFIs have approved US$54.7 billion in funding for the Americas, reflecting the three IMF precautionary
FCLs; US$20.2 billion for Africa; US$19.8 billion for Asia/Oceania; US$17.7 billion for Eurasia; and US$3.8 billion for
the Middle East (US$0.8 billion of announced IFI support is not targeted at a specific region).

141

On 1 May 2020, the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) of G-20 nations
became operational. The program is a time-bound suspension of bilateralgovernment loan repayments for 76 International Development Association(IDA) countries and least developed countries (LDCs). After December 2020,
the countries will have to pay the deferred principal and interest over three
years.8 The DSSI translates into savings of US$11 billion in principal and interest
payments to bilateral official creditors and US$7 billion due to multilateral official
creditors for 2020. These represent approximately half of the estimated US$35.3
billion of external debt service payments across the DSSI-eligible countries due
in 2020. Non-eligible middle-income countries, which have significantly higher
external debt and are expected to incur larger deficits, are expected to pay
US$422.9 billion in debt service in 2020, of which only 22 percent is due to official
creditors (Nye and Rhee, 2020). This is a potential stress point to watch out for.
Until a new “global Marshall Plan” becomes politically feasible at the multilaterallevel, economies that can consolidate and re-anchor efforts to fortify defenses
through purposeful structural reforms must do so as soon as practicable. A
reputation and record of stability-oriented policies are critical underpinnings of a
resilient crisis preparedness framework.
An EME global safe asset. The domestic government bond can lose its safeasset status during episodes of flight-to-safety. Thus, there is a need to increase
the supply of safe assets (Brunnermeier and Huang, 2018; Gourinchas and Jeanne,2012). Given that the accumulation of foreign reserves for precautionary purpose
tends to be costly, Brunnermeier and Huang (2018) propose the issuance ofsovereign bond-backed securities. The proposal entails pooling many sovereign
bonds by a special purpose vehicle (SPV) and dividing the pool into several
tranches. Pooling can raise the size of the senior tranche bonds, providing avenue
for diversification. Even as the sovereign bond of an emerging economy mightlose its safe-asset status after an adverse shock, a senior bond supported byseveral sovereign bonds does not. Hence, capital outflows are minimized. In their2012 paper, Gourinchas and Jeanne warned that while increasing the supply ofsafe assets can lessen financial instability, the arbitrage opportunities between
safe assets might create more volatility. Thus, some form of global insurance isstill warranted.

8Participation of private sector creditors in the DSSI is still uncertain.

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

7. Conclusion
Building buffers during good times has become a policy mantra. Its value
resonates clearly in any crisis mitigation and resolution efforts. However, whengood times roll, exuberance makes it easy to take for granted the dangers andforget about the possibility of implosion or slow-burn from a truly exogenous
shock like the COVID-19 pandemic. The policy approach of governments andcentral banks is largely shaped by initial macroeconomic conditions and the
evolving sociopolitical milieu during the crisis period. The initial phase of thecrisis, if not resolutely addressed, becomes a trigger for damaging economic andsocial fissures.
Proactive and forward-looking policies aimed at rebuilding confidence andshutting down the adverse feedback loop of low economic growth, financial
fragility and fiscal crisis are fundamental elements of crisis preparedness. It istherefore imperative to have in place credible and comprehensive measures topursue growth-enhancing policies, promote responsible fiscal position, support
distressed financial institutions and mend financial position of households andcorporates. The central banks, especially in EMEs, cannot engage in prolonged
intervention in the government debt market without undermining central bankcredibility (Carstens, 2020). The whole of government has the moral responsibility
to protect its citizens and sustain the economic lifeblood for current and future
generations through strategic direct measures and far-sighted reforms thatreinforce institutional strength and maturity. To quote Goldin and Muggah(2020) “the COVID-19 pandemic provides a turning point in national and global
affairs. It demonstrates our interdependence and that when risks arise, we turn togovernments, not the private sector, to save us.” Strong institutions are neededto effectively address risks and carry out the reform imperatives.

Central Banks’ Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic
Mari-Len R. Macasaquit and Maria Jannie Luiza C. Baluyan

The COVID-19 crisis posed an unprecedented challenge that prompted central
banks and monetary authorities across the globe to implement urgent policy
measures. To arrest further economic downturn and liquidity strains, central
banks took both conventional and extraordinary measures as they also steppedup asset purchases, increased credit support for firms and households, andadopted macroprudential and regulatory forbearance.
1. Policy rates and reserve requirements
Many central banks cut benchmark interest rates from January to June 2020
(Figure 12.1). The United States Federal Reserve (US Fed) led the charge with
two off-cycle rate reductions, bringing key yields close to zero, holding its
benchmark interest rate near zero through 2022. The Bank of England (BOE)
slashed its main rate to a record low of 0.1 percent, while the Bank of Canada(BOC) lowered its key interest rate by 150 basis points (bps) to 0.25 percent. The
Bank of Korea (BOK) likewise cut its base rate by a cumulative 75 bps to 0.5
percent. Asian economies such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand also cut
monetary policy rates at a cumulative 75 bps to 100 bps in the first six months ofthe year.

Source: Bank for International Settlements

Forward Planning for Strategic Crisis Response

To complement the cuts in policy rate, a few central banks like the US Fed andBank Negara Malaysia (BNM) lowered their reserve requirement during theonset of the pandemic. In March, BNM slashed its statutory reserve requirement(SRR) Ratio by 100 basis points to 2 percent, while US Fed eliminated its reserve
requirements for all depository institutions.
2. Asset purchases
During the first quarter of 2020, central banks announced various long-term
government asset purchases as part of their crisis management measures. To
help keep the markets functioning, the US Fed and the Bank of Japan (BOJ)
announced unlimited purchases of government bonds while the BOC launched
an asset purchase program (APP)10 for the first time and only specified a lower
bound of CA$5 billion (US$3.7 billion) a week. Moreover, Canada’s central bankestablished purchase programs for assets issued by municipal entities and local
public authorities. To restore confidence and contain the widening of sovereign
spreads, the European Central Bank (ECB) expanded its ongoing APP bycommitting to purchase an additional €120 billion (US$135.2 billion) in private
and public assets by end-2020 and subsequently allocating €1.35 trillion (US$1.52
trillion) to private and public asset purchases under the newly establishedpandemic emergency purchase program (PEPP). PEPP is an expansion of the
APP, which includes the purchase of sovereign debt, covered bonds, corporate
bonds, commercial paper and asset-backed securities.

143

a. Short-term funding markets
Various central banks boosted their short-term operations through facilities
with maturity of less than 12 months to address initial liquidity shortages and tounlock market freezes. The US Fed, the BOC and the BOJ increased the amountof repurchase agreements offered and likewise lengthened their maturity.
The US Fed also encouraged the use of its discount window and intervened
to prevent funding strains on primary dealers by lending against investment
grade debt. To relieve funding pressures on money market mutual funds, theFed lent to depository institutions against assets purchased from those funds.
Meanwhile, the ECB provided banks with bridge liquidity operations until theJune allotment of the targeted long-term refinancing operation, and the BOE
and the BOC activated their contingent term repo facilities. The People’s Bankof China (PBOC) injected 80 billion yuan (about US$11.3 billion) into the market
through seven-day reverse repos. BI lengthened its repo tenor while the BNM
boosted liquidity through its reverse repo operations and SRR adjustments.
b. Long-term funding markets

In Asia, to ease liquidity stress in their respective financial markets, the Bankof Thailand (BOT) purchased government bonds in excess of THB 100 billion(US$3.2 billion) from 13-20 March 2020 to ensure the normal functioning of
the government bond market. On the other hand, as of end-June 2020, Bank
Indonesia (BI) bought a total of IDR 397 trillion (US$27 billion) in government
bonds directly from the finance ministry to fund the nation’s economic recovery
program, and participated in the purchase of a second bond worth IDR 123
trillion (US$8.5 billion), which would fund loans for small- and medium-sizedenterprises (SMEs).

Central banks also deployed long-term lending facilities, with maturity ofover 12 months. The US Fed, BOJ and BOE established targeted lending
programs to provide funds to banks, conditional on loan extensions to SMEs.
The US Fed also reactivated the term asset-backed securities loan facility, andestablished a paycheck protection program liquidity facility against payrollloans guaranteed by the Treasury. The ECB introduced additional pandemic
emergency longer-term refinancing operations while BOC lengthened thematurity of its lending operations with repos of up to two years’ maturity.
In Asia, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) allocated up to US$60
billion of funding to banks through a new MAS US dollar facility as well as the
MAS Singapore dollar facility for environmental, social and governance (ESG)
loans. The BOT set up a THB 70-100 billion (US$2.2-3.2 billion) corporate bondstabilization fund to invest in high-quality, newly issued bonds by corporates
to assist in debt rollover.

3. Liquidity support

c. Swap lines

Temporary liquidity support measures were also implemented by a numberof central banks, in line with their price and financial stability mandate. These
include credit guarantee schemes, subsidized term funding and the creation ofvehicles to acquire loans to support the continued operations of, and relieve theburden on, SMEs.

Many central banks also established, reactivated and renewed existing swap
lines with counterparts. In March 2020, the BOJ, BOC, US Fed and ECB, in
coordination with the Swiss National Bank, enhanced the provision of US
dollar liquidity by lowering the pricing on the standing US dollar liquidity
swap arrangements by 25 basis points. The US Fed also offered a swap facility
to central banks with no existing swap lines through a new repo facility
called FIMA (foreign and international monetary authorities), which will

10

A non-standard monetary policy measure that involves large-scale purchases of government bonds to lower theinterest rates or bond yields, support the monetary policy transmission mechanism and provide the amount ofpolicy accommodation needed to ensure price stability.

144
2

BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

allow monetary authorities to enter into repurchase agreements with the US
Fed. In Asia, BOT and BOJ established a liquidity swap facility in Thai baht tocomplement an existing swap arrangement in Japanese yen, while BOK renewed
its three-year bilateral swap line with BI.
4. Macroprudential and regulatory forbearance
Monetary authorities and prudential supervisors granted various forms of relief
measures, relative to established regulatory requirements, to reduce the burden
to the banking sector and their clients (Figure 12.11). The US Fed encouraged
depository institutions to use their capital and liquidity buffers to lend. The
ECB Banking Supervision allowed institutions to operate temporarily below
the Pillar 2 guidance, the capital conservation buffer and the liquidity coverage
ratio. Meanwhile, Canada’s Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions
lowered the domestic stability buffer for domestic systemically importantbanks or D-SIBs. Central banks in the Asian region likewise issued several
regulatory forbearance measures to alleviate pressure and help banks mitigate
the impact of the pandemic. The measures come in the form of lifting of fees,
relaxation of reportorial requirements, extension of regulatory deadline, easingof loan terms as well as capital and liquidity requirements. Other measures
include suspension of banks’ dividend payments for a year, flexibility in theclassification requirements and expectations on loss provisioning for nonperforming loans.

Sources: IMF Policy Tracker, Bank for International Settlements and official websites of the various
central banks

Forward Planning for Strategic Crisis Response

145

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Kuroda, H. (2014). The practice and theory of unconventional monetary policy.[Speech] International Economic Association (IEA)17th World Congress. https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/press/koen_2014/data/
ko140608a1.pdf.
Mendoza, E. (2010). Sudden stops, financial crises, and leverage. American Economic Review, 100(5),1941-66. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.100.5.1941.
Moessner, R., Jansen, D., & de Haan, J. (2015). Communication about future policy rates in theory and practice: A survey. DNB Working Papers 475, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. https://www.dnb.nl/
en/news/dnb-publications/dnb-working-papers-series/dnb-working-papers/working-papers-2015/dnb322945.jsp.
Mohanty, M.S. (2012). Fiscal policy, public debt and monetary policy in EMEs: An overview. Bank for International Settlements No. 67. https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap67a_rh.pdf.
Montoro, C., Takats, E. & Yetman, J. (2012). Is monetary policy constrained by fiscal policy? In Bank for International Settlements (Ed.). Fiscal policy, public debt and monetary policy in emerging market economies,
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Mühlich, L., Fritz,B., Kring, B. & Gallagher, K. (2020). The global financial safety net tracker: Lessons for the COVID-19 crisis from a new interactive dataset. Boston University. Global Development Policy Center. GEGIPolicy Brief 010. https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2020/04/GEGI-GDP_PolicyBrief_FInal.pdf
Nakaso, H. (2017). Evolving monetary policy: The Bank of Japan’s experience. [Speech] Federal Reserve Bank of New York Central Banking Seminar. https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/press/koen_2017/data/
ko171019a1.pdf.
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Orphanides, A. (2018). Independent central banks and the interplay between monetary and fiscal policy. International Journal of Central Banking, 54. https://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb18q2a10.pdf.
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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Effective communication, forecasting and strategic policy coordination playsignificant roles in the BSP’s response to the COVID-19 health crisis. The
health risks brought about by the pandemic and the quarantine measureschallenged the BSP’s conventional approach to these activities. Nevertheless,the monetary authority adapted quickly to the challenges brought about by
the coronavirus outbreak.

Achieving clarity in communicating the BSP’s new policy measures. The
COVID-19 pandemic required the BSP to act swiftly and decisively and to deploy
certain non-standard measures such as:•

The repurchase (repo) agreement with the NG through the Bureau of theTreasury (BTr)1;

In this chapter, we discuss the BSP’s communication, forecasting andintergovernmental coordination experiences amid the ongoing COVID-19 crisis,
focusing on the unprecedented challenges that it faced and its response.

•

Purchase of government securities (GS) in the secondary market (openmarket operations);•

Remittance of dividends amounting to ₱20 billion to support the NG
programs, even if the BSP is no longer required to remit cash dividends to
the NG and instead revert the amount as BSP equity; and•The expansion of eligible assets deemed compliant with the BSP’s reserve
requirements to include newly-granted loans to encourage lending to micro,
small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and large enterprises.

1. Communication during crisis
The BSP has taken into consideration lessons from prior crises in formulating
its policies and processes, including its communication practices. The COVID-19
pandemic changed the ways in which the BSP communicates with its target
audiences as well as with the broader public. The need to observe isolationand social distancing presented a unique challenge as emerging limitations
on personnel, IT equipment and online connectivity and security all required
adjustments in the ways people and organizations interact and communicate witheach other.
Amid abrupt changes, central banks and other government institutions had tocommunicate early and often to address immediate market concerns, allay panicand encourage public cooperation. The BSP has stepped up to the challenge by
delivering accurate, timely and easy-to-understand messages on a wide range ofcentral bank initiatives.
1.1 Managing communication challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic
Amid the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, the BSP has so far identified three major
communication challenges, as follows: (1) achieving clarity in communicating the
BSP’s new policy measures (e.g., extraordinary liquidity-easing and regulatory
relief measures); (2) improving the relatability of messages to reduce market
uncertainty; and (3) underscoring the BSP’s complementary role in the national
government’s (NG) pandemic response.
*

Charday V. Batac (Bank Officer V), Eduard Joseph D. Robleza (Bank Officer V), Jasmin E. Dacio (Bank Officer V), Lara
Romina E. Ganapin (Acting Deputy Director) and Dennis M. Bautista (Deputy Director) are from the Department Of
Economic Research (DER). This chapter was prepared by the DER, with contribution of Jan Christopher G. Ocampo
and Cherrie F. Ramos of the Economic and Financial Forecasting Group (EFFG), under the supervision of DER
Director Dennis D. Lapid, Monetary Policy Sub-Sector (MPSS) Assistant Governor Iluminada T. Sicat, and Monetaryand Economics Sector (MES) Deputy Governor Francisco G. Dakila, Jr. The DER also acknowledges contribution of
Acting Director Elisha G. Lirios of the Communication Office.

However, the effectiveness of these non-standard measures depends on how
clearly and credibly the BSP was able to explain to its stakeholders what thepolicy interventions entail and what they intend to achieve. In particular, the
BSP needed to clarify, through clear and repeated messaging, that the repo
agreement with the NG and the GS purchases in the secondary market essentiallycomplements the NG’s broad-based health and fiscal programs in mitigating
the impact of the COVID-19. They are not akin to quantitative-easing measures
aimed at reducing market interest rates as were done by other central banks.
This was to allay market concerns over a potential expansion in the BSP’s balance
sheet and the monetary base, which could trigger public expectations of higher
inflation in the future.
The BSP also responded to the challenge by identifying suitable communication
channels and formats to reach a wide and diverse audience, such as the use ofsocial media cards and infographics. It also considered the use of appropriate
vocabulary and tone so that it can make its explanations more intelligible to thegeneral public.
1

This is the first time since the creation of the BSP in 1993 (RA 7653, as amended by RA 11211) that a provisional
advance has been requested by the NG and granted by the BSP.

The Role of Strategic Policy Coordination and Communication

149

Improving the relatability of messages to reduce market uncertainty. The
first objective of crisis communication prior to or during a panic episode should
be to transmit confidence (Checkley and Piris, 2020). Thus, at the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic, the BSP immediately sought to intensify its communication
activities so that it can address emerging market concerns related to price andfinancial stability. By enhancing its communication approaches in terms of format,
content, language and timing, and aligning them with the public’s informationneeds and level of understanding, the BSP was able to improve the impact ofits messages. This enabled the BSP to respond quickly and more effectively to
key issues such as the availability of financial services and qualifications on loan
payments moratorium.
The BSP’s core communication team, the Communication Office (CO), wasimmediately tasked to come up with statements to be issued to its stakeholders.
These statements were aimed primarily at stabilizing financial market sentimentby emphasizing the BSP’s firm commitment to the effective discharge of its
mandates even amid the unprecedented crisis.
As the primary regulator of banks and other financial institutions, the BSP had toensure the public of continued banking services despite the implementation ofquarantine protocols. The first order of each day for the CO would be to informbanks of BSP services that are available to them via the release of advisories,
particularly those posted on the BSP’s official social media pages. BSP-supervised
financial institutions (BSFIs) rely on these announcements for their day-to-day
treasury, check clearing and cash requirements during the initial enhanced
community quarantine phase (Lirios, 2020).
The BSP also assured the public of the continued provision of essential banking
services while ensuring the safety of bank personnel. The BSP published a seriesof social media cards on available banking services during the quarantine.
In March 2020, the BSP released a special social media card recognizing theimportant role of BSFIs in keeping the economy afloat during the health crisis.
Meanwhile, the passage of the Bayanihan to Heal as One Act resulted in inquiries
from the media and the general public on issues related to the moratoria onloans and payment extensions. The BSP responded to these concerns throughSource: Official BSP Facebook page

timely issuances of easy-to-understand advisories in its social media accounts
and the BSP website. The media also helped the BSP in amplifying key messages
on its efforts to relieve the burden on borrowers.
To complement the basic financial services offered by BSFIs and to ensure thecontinuity of payment transactions, the BSP encouraged the use of contactlesse-payment services and electronic money (e-money). The BSP, as well as thePhilippine Payments Management, Inc., would lead banks in declaring zerotransaction costs for interbank fund transfer payment facilities, such as InstaPay

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

and PESONet (Lirios, 2020). The BSP launched campaigns on both traditionaland social media platforms to promote online payment facilities as well as otherelectronic banking services as convenient, safe and secure alternatives to face-toface cash or check transactions.

by private pollster Pulse Asia showed that only about 27 percent of surveyed
Filipinos possess wide or sufficient degree of knowledge about the BSP as agovernment agency. Nevertheless, public trust in the BSP was fairly high witha “big trust” score of 66 percent while 30 percent of the respondents were
unsure, and the remaining 4 percent have “small or no trust” in the agency. The
level of public awareness and public trust is crucial in effective communication,
particularly during crises when the effectiveness of policy responses depend
largely on the confidence of the public on policymakers.
1.2 Communication lessons learned and preparing for the next crisis
The ability to cope with unique communication challenges was one of theimportant lessons that the BSP had learned during this period. By identifying
and assessing the communication challenges amid the health crisis, the BSP
was able to identify several communication practices that could be useful in thedevelopment of a stronger crisis communication framework.
In particular, responding to the information needs and preferences of a varied
set of audiences required coherent and clear messaging. During the pandemic,
the BSP also adapted quickly to necessary changes in communication practices
and increased its flexibility to respond effectively and promptly to emerging
developments and new information.

Source: Official BSP Facebook page

Underscoring the BSP’s complementary role in the NG’s pandemic response.
The BSP also pointed out in its communications that monetary policy is not
the only game in town to combat the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The BSP had consistently highlighted in its messages that medical and fiscal
policy interventions should remain at the forefront of the NG’s response to
the pandemic because of its nature as a shock to health and incomes. The
BSP’s extraordinary liquidity measures and regulatory relief efforts for financial
institutions only complement the NG’s broader fiscal and health initiatives tomitigate the impact of the pandemic on Filipino households and businesses.
Communication on the complementary role of the BSP’s policy and regulatory
relief measures such as the repo agreement with the NG and the purchase of
GS in the secondary market proved to be a challenge for the BSP due partly to
low public awareness on the institution’s mandates. A public perception survey2
2

Survey conducted from 3 to 8 December 2019

Delivering clear and coherent messaging. As much as the pandemic
required a different mindset in terms of communication priorities, the BSP’s
mandates were unchanged. Thus, upholding public trust through various
initiatives that underscore the BSP’s integrity and competence remained at thecore of BSP’s communications.
Preserving the BSP’s credibility amid an uncertain environment requiresthat the audience understands the rationale behind the policy decisions andregulatory measures implemented. Addressing the concerns of ordinary
citizens and engaging them in relevant issues are important for enhancing
public awareness and appreciation of the BSP’s policies and actions. Throughthe BSP’s strategic use of different communication formats during the crisis, it
was able to reach its audiences more effectively. For instance, the CO simplified
some of its communication materials and used the Filipino language in somesocial media posts to enable the BSP to reach a broader audience. Meanwhile,user-friendly explanations about economic concepts and infographics toThe Role of Strategic Policy Coordination and Communication

151

explain the BSP’s policy actions improved public engagement with the BSP’s
communication materials.

communication remains at the core of the BSP’s efforts to minimize uncertainty,
assuage fears, provide alternatives and express empathy.

In order to ensure information accuracy, the BSP also monitored and responded
proactively to the propagation of “fake news”. As argued by Trichet (2008),“central banks are prudent in their communication to always preserve their
credibility in all circumstances.” However, the proliferation of false information,
particularly in social media sites and communication applications (i.e., Viber,
Messenger) posed a risk to public trust on the BSP. Hence, amid a noisy social
media environment, the BSP exerted efforts to monitor and verify posts andinformation on social media and various communication apps. The CO, inparticular, responded actively to relevant public concerns by issuing advisories
for mainstream media, social media posts and internal e-mail alerts to BSP
employees (Lirios, 2020). Through the release of internal advisories, such as
alerts against online scams and SIM card fraud attacks, the BSP was able tocontribute to the improved awareness of its employees on relevant publicconcerns and emerging risks. Tapping the potential of its employees by
equipping them with timely and consistent information on important central
bank issues and ways to address these challenges helps the BSP in information
dissemination. Since BSP employees receive the same internal information fromone source, they tend to have the same understanding of key public issues. This,in turn, helps them to communicate confidently and consistently, in line with the
BSP’s intended messaging.

The CO came up with audience-centered initiatives during the pandemic. These
include (1) audio, video and QR codes on its social media cards for the generalpublic; (2) new content disseminated via corporate email that regularly provided
advisories, news summaries and features on central bankers for BSP personnel;
and (3) unprecedented access to the Governor himself through a messaging
application for the media. To be able to monitor messages and comments
on social media more closely, the CO also initiated the daily task of collating
comments and classifying them into possible issues that may be forwarded toconcerned BSP departments (Lirios, 2020).

Focusing on stakeholders’ needs. Throughout the crisis, the BSP has had toaddress the immediate information and data requirements of analysts, bankers
and financial market participants as well as the queries from the general
populace. Regardless of the audience profile, the CO has worked to ensure
consistent messaging, designate appropriate spokespersons, confirm facts,
disseminate timely information to varied audiences, relay feedback to relevant
departments, promote greater understanding of BSP responsibilities and speak
clearly at all times.
During the health crisis, the BSP was also able to look more closely into thesuitability of its existing communication platforms and align them with the uniquepreferences of various audiences. The COVID-19 pandemic raised the importanceof recognizing the basic information needs of the general public, particularly on
issues such as the protection of deposits, access to overseas remittances and how
to avail oneself of concessions from banks. For these issues, transparent and clear

Meanwhile, as the BSP’s communications also target external stakeholders, theGovernor and senior officials of the BSP accepted invites to online meetingsand hosted virtual conference calls with various investors, fund managers andcredit rating agencies. The BSP also accommodated foreign media interviews,
particularly those that are intended to discuss the BSP’s policy responses to the
COVID-19 crisis. From March to July 2020, the Investor Relations Office (IRO)of the BSP was able to organize a total of 20 meetings, mostly virtual calls andteleconferences between investors and the BSP, and other economic agency
officials. During the same period, the IRO was able to coordinate 22 media
engagements, including interviews with Bloomberg, CNBC, Wall Street Journal,
Nikkei, Financial Times, Euromoney and The Banker.
The BSP, through its International Relations Department, also conductedvirtual meetings and held collaborative events with other central banks as well
as regional and multilateral institutions such as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), Executives’ Meeting of Asia-Pacific Central Banks(EMEAP), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and the Bankfor International Settlements (BIS). The BSP acknowledges the importance of
maintaining open dialogue with these stakeholders as investors, foreign market
analysts and other external audiences refer to the reports of these institutions to
obtain a more objective view of the state of the Philippine economy.
Virtual fora were also hosted by the BSP for the local business community,
diplomatic corps and the broader public through live video streaming in social
media accounts of the economic and infrastructure agencies. These allowed the
BSP to present timely and relevant updates and outlook on the macroeconomy,

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measures pursued by the government in general to address the negative
impact of the pandemic on economic activity and the government’s economic
recovery plan.

containment measures across countries in March 2020 that the pandemic would
have deeper health and economic repercussions, requiring far larger and more
drastic government measures to save lives and preserve livelihoods.

Meanwhile, despite the absence of face-to-face interaction amid the quarantine,
the BSP was still able to conduct online learning sessions via webinars foreducators, who can transmit the knowledge they have gained to their students
and other members of their communities. Through the Economic and Financial
Learning Center (EFLC), the BSP organized eight webinars from 25 June to
end-July, with 1,457 participants. The BSP also launched a program dubbed as“Keeping in Touch while Keeping Distance” under new normal arrangements(NNA) to ensure the provision of information concerning economic andfinancial matters. The program aims to sustain the BSP’s delivery of services tostakeholders while ensuring the safety and well-being of its personnel amid the
pandemic. The program redesigned the delivery of learning and materials on
economic education to the public through the use of different digital platforms
such as web-based and online learning sessions for targeted audiences.

Understanding the nature of the macroeconomic shock caused by the pandemic
and forecasting its effect over the short and medium term are critical to guiding
the BSP’s policy response. Armed with this knowledge, the BSP has employed aportfolio of models in its forecasting and policy analysis system. This approachprovides the flexibility to use models that are appropriate for a specific problem
or question. There is also sufficient scope to incorporate expert judgment by thestaff and decisionmakers to complement the models in the toolkit.

2. Challenges to macroeconomic modelling and forecasting
during the crisis
Macroeconomic forecasting during normal times is already confronted withsignificant uncertainty. Turbulent periods such as the COVID-19 pandemic makethe task even more difficult. Most, if not all, macroeconomic models employedby central banks and other policy institutions are not designed to directly capture
the impact of public health outcomes and government responses to curb ahealth crisis, along with its effects on consumer and business sentiment, on
macroeconomic variables.
Initially, the baseline outlook and alternative scenarios used to assess the possible
impact of COVID-19 outbreak on the Philippine economy were based on past
episodes of health crises, such as the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
in 2003 and the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) in 2015. The analysis
considered mainly external channels such as the impact on trade, remittances,foreign investments and tourism. However, it became evident upon confirmationof local transmission of the virus and upon the implementation of strict

Ross and Ross (2020) outline the means by which conventional macroeconomic
forecasting can overcome the limitations imposed by a pandemic. First, highfrequency and other granular data can be used to estimate the short-term impactof the pandemic at the industry level. This part also looks at how quarantine
measures imposed by governments have affected specific industries. The
second step involves aggregating the high-frequency information to estimate
the impact of demand and supply shocks. Assumptions on the impact of fiscal
and monetary policy measures along with global economic developments arealso set in this step. Finally, the estimated aggregate demand and supply shocks
are incorporated into a macroeconomic model to generate forecasts of key
macroeconomic variables, such as gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation,over the medium term. The BSP has adopted a similar process to generatemacroeconomic forecasts during these very uncertain times. Nonetheless,these forecasts are still subject to considerable amount of uncertainty given the
evolving nature of the pandemic.
Similarly, the global projection model (GPM) network took the view that the
pandemic will have a significant atypical impact on global growth prospects. The
COVID-19 crisis was modelled as a combination of shocks to potential output andthe output gap, with larger weight given to the former.3 Shocks were introduced
rather than adjusting the calibration of the model to reflect the possible shortterm nature of the pandemic.
3

GPMN, June 2020 forecasts

The Role of Strategic Policy Coordination and Communication

2.1 Significant uncertainty and the role of judgment
Central banks, including the BSP, recognize uncertainty in monetary policy
formulation and have adopted different tools to communicate it, such as the
publication of fan charts as well as the use of forecast ranges rather than point
estimates for inflation and other key major macroeconomic variables.
An evaluation of the Bank of England’s fan charts for GDP and inflation showedthat the forecasts following the global financial crisis (GFC) understated theprobability of low GDP outturns and high inflation outturns (BOE-IEO, 2015).
This indicates that existing methods that directly factor uncertainty into theprojections tend to under-predict extreme events such as the case of the
COVID-19 health crisis.
The uncertainty that COVID-19 brings to the macroeconomic outlook is
particularly significant. Its economic impact has been unprecedented in terms ofscale with deeper-than-expected output contraction in most parts of the worldin the first half of 2020. It will not be uncommon to see downward revisions
in the growth forecasts of monetary authorities and the private sector alike in		Source: Bloomberg

153

the coming months. At the same time, COVID-19 will figure considerably inthe downside risks to growth and inflation in many countries, including thePhilippines. Moreover, the resurgence of the virus (i.e., second wave) in many
parts of the world that have successfully curbed the epidemiological curve earlier
in the year has threatened the economic recovery that is just beginning to takeshape by dampening consumer and business sentiments.
Prior to the start of 2020, private analysts surveyed by Bloomberg expected
Philippine GDP to grow by more than 6 percent in 2020 from the year before.
However, the expectations were revised downwards as the pandemic wore on.
The median forecast for the annual change in GDP fell initially to minus 2.3
percent following the release of the first-quarter 2020 GDP data in May 2020 and
subsequently to minus 6 percent after the release of the second-quarter 2020
national accounts in August 2020. The sharp drop in the median forecast was also
accompanied by a higher dispersion among the individual forecasts, reflecting
the increased uncertainty confronting forecasters. Meanwhile, although inflation
expectations for 2020-2022 remained within the government’s target range, themedian forecast for 2020 dipped closer to the low end of the target range due tothe decline in oil prices (Figure 13.3).

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Multilateral institutions also revised downwards their forecasts of global
economic activity at an unprecedented scale. The IMF, United Nations and WorldBank (WB) projected world GDP for 2020 to grow by 2.5-3.3 percent in their
publications last January 2020. These forecasts were subsequently downgraded to
declines of 3.2-5.2 percent after several months due to the severity of the impactof the pandemic on the world’s major economies (Figure 13.4).

Sources: IMF. World Economic Outlook Update. January 2020 and June 2020.
United Nations. World Economic Situations and Prospects. January 2020 and May 2020.
World Bank. Global Economic Prospects. January 2020 and June 2020.

Pohlman and Oliver (2020) attribute the sudden and massive adjustments in the
expectations of forecasters to (i) the speed of the impact of the pandemic and thesubsequent responses of policymakers; (ii) how the pandemic has undermined
the reliability of available economic data; and (iii) the process learning from thefield of epidemiology. While the divergence in economic forecasts could narrow
down in subsequent quarters as analysts’ understanding of how the virus has
affected economic conditions, a return to the pre-pandemic levels of consensus
among forecasters could be unlikely. Moreover, forecasts are more likely updated
at a higher frequency but with a lower degree of confidence as more informationon the impact of the pandemic emerges.

2.2 Use of high-frequency indicators
The BSP uses a range of nowcasting models for GDP growth and its components
to assess the near-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on domestic
economic activity. These models depend on high-frequency indicators, such as
the Purchasing Manager’s Index (PMI), volume of production in manufacturing,
electricity sales, government disbursements and other economic and financial
variables. To assess the impact of the lockdown, the BSP has also used inputoutput (I-O) tables to determine the loss in the gross value added in the different
sectors due to the quarantine measures. The nowcasts, together with external
judgment from technical staff, are then incorporated as initial conditions for the
BSP’s medium-term forecasting models.
However, the COVID-19 pandemic had posed a challenge on the generationof reliable data used for monitoring and forecasting. The implementation ofquarantine measures prevented or delayed the timely collection and releaseof important official statistics, which could introduce further uncertainty to
the macroeconomic forecasts. The BSP, for example, could not conduct its
expectations surveys of businesses and consumers in the second quarter of2020 as prevailing quarantine measures restricted the mobility and availability of
employees and respondents. The monitoring of price statistics by the Departmentof Agriculture (DA) and Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) were also
hampered by the lockdown. Data on other relevant indicators such as tourist
arrivals and spending were also suddenly unavailable or considerably delayed
given the shutdown of airports and tourism-related establishments.
2.3 Ensuring the availability of and access to relevant and timely data
The analysis of the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences underscores theimportance of ensuring the availability of and access to information during crises.
For the BSP and other central banks, statistical data and related analysis are a
critical element in most functions such as monetary policy formulation, financial
supervision, macroprudential policy, payment systems oversight and lender-oflast-resort functions. They are also often both a user and a producer of statistical
data series.
Results of media analytics indicate that there have been numerous efforts in thePhilippines to provide information on COVID-19 and the responses associatedwith different government agencies, LGUs, the academe as well as the media.
However, information was sometimes inconsistent, incomplete, or vague (InterAgency Task Force Working Group, 2020).

The Role of Strategic Policy Coordination and Communication

For its data requirements, the BSP continues to coordinate with othergovernment agencies as well as the private sector. Key economic indicators andanalytical reports provided by statistical authorities and policymaking bodies
including the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), the National Economic andDevelopment Authority (NEDA) and the Department of Finance (DOF), among
others, allow the BSP to form reasonable assumptions for its data-dependent
monetary policymaking process. The BSP has also worked closely with the private
sector, particularly BSFIs, to gather data and reports that could help in theassessment of the status of the domestic financial system.
Meanwhile, the unprecedented nature of the crisis and the lags in the publicationof official statistics presented the opportunity to use non-traditional data sources		

Source: Google Mobility Reports

155such as Google’s Mobility Reports (Figure 13.5) and price statistics from online
grocery stores. The BSP’s access to accurate information on public health aswell as mobility reports, in addition to the usual key macroeconomic indicators,
played a critical role in its swift and decisive policy responses to the pandemic.
The mobility indicators were incorporated in the generation of the sectoral
nowcasts for GDP growth as they provided insights on how economic activity
had evolved following the loosening of virus containment measures. In particular,
the data show a marked decline in mobility as the pandemic struck beginning inMarch 2020. This suggests that Filipinos have preferred to stay at home amid thequarantine measures, which could have implications on households’ propensity
to spend and firms’ investment decisions going forward.

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

3. Coordination among fiscal, monetary and regulatory
authorities during crisis and in the unwinding phase
The heterogenous regional and local impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has
important consequences for the government’s policy responses and crisis
management strategy. The varied sectoral effects of the crisis underscore theneed for stronger intergovernmental coordination and societal cooperation.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2020)
characterized the dimensions of the heterogeneous effects of the COVID-19
pandemic into health or social impact, economic impact and fiscal impact:4•

Health or social impact. Some regions such as poor urban areas tend tohave higher COVID-19 caseloads and mortality rates than in other areas.

•

Economic impact. Regional economic exposure to the pandemic varies
based on the location’s exposure to global value chains and specialization in
specific industries such as tourism and foreign trade.

•

Fiscal impact. The impact of the crisis on subnational finance—i.e., increased
expenditures and reduced revenues—is not uniform but expected to belong-lasting.

Government agencies and local government units (LGUs) are responsible forthe critical areas of health care, disease containment measures and provisionof social services, among others during the pandemic. Meanwhile, fiscal andmonetary authorities are mandated to craft policies that would complement
the government’s health and social welfare responses to the pandemic. Sincesuch responsibilities are shared among the different levels of the government,
coordinated efforts are crucial.
Among policymakers, coordination helps in establishing the distinction as wellas the complementarity between monetary and fiscal measures as well as otherregulatory initiatives. However, when there is a growing nexus between fiscal
and monetary policies, central banks need to maintain their independence
and credibility, particularly during periods of elevated uncertainty. This canbe achieved through (1) fiscal sustainability and (2) central banks’ focus on its
primary mandates (Carstens, 2020).
4

OECD. OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus, The Territorial Impact of COVID-19: Managing the Crisis AcrossLevels of Government. 16 June 2020

Fiscal sustainability must be assured to avoid perceptions that the central bank ismonetizing the debt and thus endangering its price stability objectives. Achieving
fiscal sustainability requires strong intertemporal fiscal strategies (i.e., effective
public expenditure management, sound revenue policies) and ample support toboost the country’s growth potential.
Meanwhile, central banks need to ensure that their policy actions are made in thecontext of the framework that supports their mandates. To address the economic
impact of the pandemic, the BSP has justifiably adjusted monetary policy settings
to support growth amid benign inflation outlook. At the same time, its mandates
do not preclude it from working closely with fiscal authorities in a whole-ofgovernment approach to address the socioeconomic impact of the pandemic.
The NG’s Philippine Program for Recovery with Equity and Solidarity (PHPROGRESO)5 embody this coordinated, whole-of-government approach tocombatting the pandemic, with clearly delineated objectives and responsibilities
for the different government agencies and institutions. Line agencies are in
charge of implementing emergency support for vulnerable groups as well as the
procurement and distribution of resources needed to fight the consequences of
the COVID-19 health crisis. Meanwhile, fiscal and monetary authorities are tasked
to ensure ample liquidity and funding to help finance the relevant initiatives
to keep the economy afloat. Congress is also involved, as it is enjoined to passnecessary legislation to support the NG’s economic recovery plan.
3.1 BSP’s participation in DBCC meetings during the quarantine period
Interagency coordination meetings have become more frequent amid the
pandemic, signifying the importance of coherent policymaking among thecountry’s economic managers. For its part, the BSP has continued to actively
participate in various meetings of the Development Budget Coordination
Committee (DBCC) and its subcommittees. As a resource institution, the
BSP provides recommendations on the set of medium-term macroeconomic
assumptions to be adopted by the DBCC, including those on inflation, Dubai
crude oil prices, peso-dollar exchange rate, interest rates and trade in goods
and services, among others (DBM, 2020). These assumptions, in turn, are5

Put together by the country’s economic managers including the NEDA and DOF, PH-PROGRESO or the Philippine
Program for Recovery with Equity and Solidarity refers to the NG’s recovery plan amid the COVID-19 pandemic.
The program includes four pillars namely, (1) emergency support for vulnerable groups; (2) resources to fight
COVID-19; (3) fiscal and monetary actions; and (4) economic recovery plan. Given the comprehensive natureof the program, it involves a number of line agencies such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI),
Department of Agriculture (DA), Philippine Health Insurance Corp. (PhilHealth), Social Security System (SSS),
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
and the BSP.

The Role of Strategic Policy Coordination and Communication

used as inputs in the generation of domestic growth projections by the NEDA
and the fiscal program by the DOF, culminating in the crafting of the annual
national budget.
Aside from its participation in intergovernmental meetings, the BSP also
contributes to various DBCC publications, in line with the BSP’s thrust to promotetransparency and accountability. Finally, the BSP has also participated in online
press briefings organized by the DBCC to address press queries relating to the
BSP’s macro assumptions and policies.
3.2 Coordination between the BSP and its other stakeholders
Through strong coordination with other government agencies, the BSP was able
to draw the boundaries of its responsibilities while ensuring the public of its solid
support for the NG’s comprehensive response against the COVID-19 outbreak. By
establishing its clear role as an independent central bank, the BSP also received
timely and extensive support from international financial institutions such as the
IMF, the Asian Development Bank and the BIS. Meanwhile, information exchange
on how other central banks are responding to the effects of the COVID-19 crisis
has also served as a learning platform for monetary authorities.
The BSP also coordinated closely with the private sector, particularly withbanking industry groups, to ensure the availability of withdrawal and payments
services despite the implementation of lockdowns in many parts of the country.
The BSP maintained constant communication with the Bankers Association of
the Philippines, Chamber of Thrift Banks and Rural Bankers Association of thePhilippines for the banking industry’s cash requirements during the pandemic(BSP, 2020). Moreover, through regular information exchanges with BSFIs, the
BSP was able to respond more effectively to the banking needs of the generalpublic and assess the soundness of the domestic banking industry.
3.3 Coordinated efforts to transition to the “new normal” state
Recognizing the importance of coordinated efforts during the pandemic as wellas in the recovery phase, the government formed the IATF Technical Working
Group for Anticipatory and Forward Planning (IATF-TWG-AFP). The group, which
consists of the BSP along with other government institutions6 and individuals
from the private sector and academe, aims to characterize how the “new normal”
6

Led by NEDA, the IATF-TWG-AFP consists of the following: BSP; Departments of Science and Technology, Tradeand Industry, Education, Health, Budget and Management, Finance, Agriculture, Tourism, and Information andCommunications Technology; National Intelligence Coordinating Agency; and University of the Philippines
Resilience Institute.

157

would affect each segment of the population. Based on this, the TWG will
recommend programs and strategies to promote confidence in the health systemthrough data analytics, recommend initiatives to rebuild consumer and business
confidence and to adapt to a “new normal” state of economic activities.
Meanwhile, building on the work of the IATF-TWG-AFP, the NEDA-led Task Groupon Recovery is leading the formulation and monitoring of the government’s“Recharge PH” program.7 The program aims to refocus, sharpen the design
and accelerate the implementation of programs under the 2020 General
Appropriations to mitigate the effects of the pandemic and help the domestic
economy recover from the sharp GDP contraction in the second quarter of2020. The subtasks groups (STGs) created under the program will ensure thecomplementation and convergence of efforts of government agencies and othertask groups and provide coordinated recommendations to the National Task
Force on COVID-19 (NEDA, 2020).
Bringing government agencies and LGUs under one umbrella to organize relief
and recovery initiatives would help the NG save time, resources and effort.
However, despite the government’s concerted policy response against the healthcrisis, near-term and long-term challenges remain which would crucially dependon the evolution of the pandemic.

4. Conclusion
Strategic communications, forecasting and solid intergovernmental coordination
complement sound policymaking. Fiscal policies need to be sustainable andresponsive to the pandemic shock, without jeopardizing future economic growth.
Governments may create intertemporal fiscal strategies, managing future
spending and crafting sound revenue policies. At the same time, the government
should implement structural reforms to buoy potential growth rates, minimize
the closure of healthy businesses and orient fiscal policies towards investment,
maintaining global supply chains and protecting free trade. (Carstens, 2020).
Meanwhile, central banks need to remain credibly focused on maintaining
macroeconomic stability, with actions consistently in line with price and financial
stability mandates.
7

The Recharge PH Program is to be implemented within 2020 and into 2021 and will be reflected in the Updated
Philippine Development Plan 2017-2020

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Nevertheless, the COVID-19 pandemic has taught policymakers that policy ismost effective when it is clearly understood and believed by the public. For
the BSP, coherent and credible information about the considerations behindmonetary policy decisions, including explanations and forecasts on inflation andeconomic activity, help in enhancing the public’s understanding and appreciationof monetary policy and in anchoring inflation expectations. For central bankcommunications to be credible, messaging needs to be consistent and clearlyaligned with policy actions and the agency’s mandates. Consistent and credible

messaging, in turn, requires strong coordination within the institution as well as
among various external stakeholders, including other government agencies andthe private sector.
Moving forward, an optimal exit strategy should be one that is induced bya favorable macroeconomic environment (Carstens, 2020). Nevertheless,such scenario can only be attained through careful planning, solidintergovernmental coordination and credible communication which encourages
whole-of-society cooperation.

References
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. (2020, March 16). The BSP assures the public of continuing banking services [Media Release]. http://www.bsp.gov.ph/publications/media.asp?id=5311
Carstens, A. (2020, May 28). Countering COVID-19: The nature of central banks’ policy response [Opening Remarks]. UBS High-level Discussion on the Economic and Monetary Policy Outlook, Zurich, Switzerland.
https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp200527.htm
Checkley, L.C. and Piris, A. (2020, April 29). Public communication during a financial crisis. IMF Monetary and Capital Markets, Special Series on COVID-19. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLs/covid19special-notes#:~:text=The%20Special%20Series%20notes%20are,Executive%20Board%2C%20or%20IMF%20management
Department of Budget and Management. (2020, May 13). DBCC revisits medium-term macroeconomic assumptions and fiscal program amid the COVID-19 pandemic [Press Release]. https://www.dbm.gov.ph/index.php/
secretary-s-corner/press-releases/list-of-press-releases/1655-dbcc-revisits-medium-term-macroeconomic-assumptions-and-fiscal-program-amid-the-covid-19-pandemic
Department of Finance. (2020, May 17). We will rise as one [Brochure]. https://www.dof.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/We-Will-Rise-As-One-brochure-as-of-May-17-2020.pdf
Giles, C. (2020, July 9). Fast economic data is like fast food — tempting but bad for you. The Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/366653da-fc7b-4f3d-bf2f-ef95dfc18041.
Independent Evaluation Office (2015). Evaluating forecast performance. Bank of England.
Inter-Agency Task Force Technical Working Group for Anticipatory and Forward Planning (2020, May). We recover as one. https://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/We-Recover-As-One.pdf
Lirios, E.G. (2020, August). Central bank communication during the COVID-19 pandemic. [Unpublished internal document] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
National Economic and Development Authority (2020, August 8). NEDA-led task group prepares “Recharge PH”, whole-of-society approach paramount in recovery plan [Media release]. https://www.neda.gov.ph/nedaled-task-group-prepares-recharge-ph-whole-of-society-approach-paramount-in-recovery-plan-neda/
Noble, L.W.T. (2020, August 14). BSP warns vs 1-year debt moratorium. BusinessWorld. https://www.bworldonline.com/bsp-warns-vs-1-year-debt-moratorium/
Ocampo, J.C.G. Macroeconomics forecasting during the COVID-19 pandemic. [Manuscript submitted for publication under the BSP Working Paper Series]. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2020, June 16). The territorial impact of COVID-19: Managing the crisis across levels of government. OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus. http://www.
oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-territorial-impact-of-covid-19-managing-the-crisis-across-levels-of-government-d3e314e1/
Pohlman, A. and Reynolds, O. (2020, May 18). Why economic forecasting is so difficult in the pandemic. Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2020/05/why-economic-forecasting-is-so-difficult-in-the-pandemic
Pulse Asia Research, Inc. (2019, December 3-8). Ulat ng Bayan Report. [Survey]
Ross, C.P. and Ross, S.Y. (2020, May 26). Forecasting the economy during COVID-19. Program on Financial Stability. Yale School of Management. https://som.yale.edu/blog/forecasting-the-economy-during-covid-19.
Trichet, J. (2008, January 16). A few remarks on communication by central banks [Keynote address]. 25th HORIZONT Award Ceremony, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2008/
html/sp080116_1.en.html

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1. Introduction
The impact of shocks on the economy can be either temporary or long-lasting.
Temporary shocks can either require stabilization policy or simply facilitate
markets’adjustment back to equilibrium. For example, transitory disturbancessuch as supply or demand shocks necessitate management tools, including
monetary policy, which can be adjusted to help achieve objectives such as pricestability.
On the other hand, long-lasting shocks can be structural, for which a rethinkingof the current ways of doing things would be more advisable. For instance, whenmacroeconomic and financial disturbances reach a scale and complexity that alter
the structural relationships between key economic variables, authorities may needto embark on a delicate balancing act of anchoring long-term expectations while
flexibly addressing the crisis at hand. In this case, it would be crucial for central
banks to be mindful of the hierarchy between the two key elements of monetary
policy strategy: objective and conduct (Coeure, 2013). A credible central bankwith a firm and stable commitment to its monetary policy objective can employ
flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy to address specific economic shocks.
For instance, the US Fed, confronted with the effective zero lower bound, resorted
to massive asset purchases or quantitative easing (QE) to provide the muchneeded monetary stimulus for the US economy (Fernandez, 2015). Thus, nonconventional monetary policies such as the quantitative easing (QE) employedby the Fed in the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC) would not result inunanchored market expectations. However, such policies can still be viewed by
the market as a departure from the established strategies of monetary policy.
Numerous conventional and non-conventional policies have been implemented
in response to the multitude of shocks to the global economy in the last century.
•*

The abandonment of the Gold Standard by then US President Franklin
Roosevelt in response to the economic collapse in the wake of the Great
Depression in the 1930s paved the way for activist Keynesian policies,
particularly increasing economic output by boosting aggregate demandthrough government deficit spending in times of low private investment
or consumption.
The author thanks and acknowledges Ms. Micaela G. Alvarez (Acting Bank Officer VI, ODG MES) and Mr. Justin
Ray Angelo J. Fernandez (Bank Officer V, DER) for their assistance in the research, analysis and preparation of thisconcluding chapter.

•In the aftermath of the GFC, the US Federal Reserve (Fed), in an attempt
to stimulate economic activity while restrained by the zero lower bound,embarked on unconventional monetary policy involving large-scale purchaseof securities from the market to increase money supply and encourage
lending and investment.

Likewise, the Philippine economy was not spared from significant shocks in the
recent decades. In 1997, even as the contagion that developed into the Asianfinancial crisis (AFC) exposed systemic vulnerabilities in the country’s domestic
economy, specifically on the financial system, external payments and fiscal
imbalances, policy makers mitigated the impact of the crisis through measures
to enhance transparency, conform prudential regulations with international
standards and adopt administrative regulations to strengthen the banking andfinancial sectors (Alburo, 1999).
In 2008, since the impact of the GFC on the Philippine economy is relatively
subdued due to less exposure of the country’s financial markets to derivatives
and structured products (Guinigundo, 2009), the BSP employed conventionalmonetary policy measures such as policy rate reductions and liquidity-enhancing
measures. However, to promote stability in the banking sector and. boost
consumer confidence in banks, deposit insurance per account was doubled from₱250,000 to ₱500,000 a few months after the onset of the crisis.
This year, the global economy, including that of the Philippines suffered
the unprecedented shock of a health crisis brought about by the COVID-19
pandemic. Almost all the countries in the world are affected by the virus. The
public health emergency is not expected to last forever, but central bankers needto think of new ways to respond to the effects of the pandemic while remaining
committed to their mandate. There is a need to reassess the speed of monetary
actions. In the past, calibrated and measured actions took into consideration theimpact of previous policy actions on the economy. The current shock requires
a fast response. In terms of risk management, authorities must prepare for the
worst scenario.

Conclusion: Central Banking in the New Normal

161

Traditionally, central banks have generally focused on three main objectives orfunctional roles, namely: 1) maintain price stability subject to a monetary regime
in operation; 2) promote financial development and safeguard financial stability;and 3) achieve stability and support the government’s financing needs duringcrises (Goodhart, 2010).
Over time, the balance between these tasks has shifted in favor of the first twofunctions. However, the recent unfolding of COVID-19 pandemic has once again
underscored the role of central banks as agents of macroeconomic stability
during crisis periods. The health emergency has turned out to be unlike anyother crisis we have observed in recent history. While the pandemic is foremost a
global health crisis, the necessary measures to contain the spread of the deadly
virus have severe economic and financial consequences. Thus, it has morphed
into a two-pronged health and economic crisis (Berglof & Farrar, 2020).
First, the pandemic has quickly escalated to what Baldwin and Weder di Mauro(2020) refer to as “everybody’s problem.” Total positive cases as of 31 August2020 has reached 25.2 million, affecting more than 188 countries worldwide.1
To contain further transmission of the virus, most of these countries have
imposed lockdown and social distancing measures. These disruptive steps haveinevitably led to immediate financial and economic difficulties.
The impact of the pandemic was first felt in forward-looking financial markets.
Global financial markets experienced sharp volatility when the World HealthOrganization officially declared the coronavirus outbreak a pandemic on 11
March 2020. Shortly thereafter, the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility
Index (VIX), which is also known as the fear index, sharply increased to 82.7 on 16
March 2020 relative to its end-December 2019 value of 13.78 (Figure 14.1).
The pandemic and the lockdown measures implemented have dragged theglobal economy into a recession. In its latest World Economic Outlook (WEO)
dated June 2020, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its global growth1

Coronavirus Resource Center. Johns Hopkins University. https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html

Source: CBOE

forecasts, projecting a contraction of 4.9 percent in 2020 compared with its
projection of a 3 percent decline last April 2020. Recovery is expected to be very
gradual and highly contingent on the successful containment of the coronavirus.
Meanwhile, the World Bank (WB) envisions a 5.2 percent contraction in global
GDP for 2020, the deepest global recession in decades.2
Second, the pandemic could potentially have more persistent and lingering
effects on the economy. In the absence of a cure or vaccine, households andbusinesses will continue to face considerable uncertainty and downside macrorisks. These include fear of further job losses or business failures, and thepossibility of a renewed escalation of the outbreak that requires some lockdown
measures to be reimposed. Moreover, the pandemic could trigger morepermanent and structural changes in the labor market. According to Haldane(2020), the pandemic has shifted relative prices that incentivize firms to invest in
machines instead of people, thereby potentially lowering employment and labor
2This is based on WB’s latest Global Economic Prospectus released last June 2020.

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

productivity. Eventually, lower income for households and firms can be translated
to a greater incidence of loan defaults and depressed consumption which could
threaten financial stability and trigger a further economic recession. Likewise, thepandemic could have a more permanent impact on key sectors such as tourism,
hospitality and retail. Concerns over COVID-19 transmission could force these
sectors to restructure or completely change their business models.
The unprecedented nature of the pandemic has forced central banks all over theworld to take sweeping measures to ensure sufficient liquidity, restore market
confidence, alleviate financial market stress and support economic activity. Thisability to marshal a series of forceful and timely responses makes central banks
effective crisis managers (Rajan, 2020). For instance, during the GFC, central banks
were at the forefront of lowering interest rates aggressively and resorting to nonconventional monetary tools such as quantitative easing to help contain systemicrisks and successfully avert a global financial meltdown.

2. Impact on the Philippines
The Philippines was one of the first countries in Asia to impose lockdowns andrestrictive containment measures. The national government (NG) quickly placed
the major parts of the country under enhanced community quarantine (ECQ) on
16 March. Data on mobility trends as of 25 August 2020 indicate that the country
had the largest decline in visits to the workplace and the most significant increasein the length of time that people stayed at home among other countries in
ASEAN-4 (Figure 14.2).

However, the unique character of the pandemic poses unfamiliar challenges
for central banks and raises important issues about the conduct of monetary
policy in these challenging times. These issues touch on economic, intellectual
and institutional aspects of central banking which Borio (2019) refers to as a
triple challenge.
It is therefore imperative that central banks bring these issues to the fore ofpolicy agenda. Efforts to develop guidelines or frameworks on effective crisis
response would not only enhance central banks’ ability to manage economies
during tail events but also enable them to successfully navigate this so-called“new normal,” which the pandemic has ushered in. This book aims to contributeto this effort by sharing the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ (BSP) experience in
responding to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Source: Google Mobility Data3 .

Likewise, based on the COVID-19 government response stringency index, thePhilippine’s national government (NG) implemented the strictest lockdown
response compared to other Asian countries.4 The index for the Philippines
peaked at 100 index points from 22 March to end-April 2020 and remain elevated
at 70.4 index points as of 25 August 2020 (Figure 14.3).

3

Note: Figure 14.2 shows the percent change in visits to the workplace and length of stay at homes compared tothe baseline period since the declaration of a pandemic outbreak by WHO on 11 March 2020. The baseline is themedian value from the 5-week period 03 Jan – 06 Feb 2020.

4This index is a composite measure of different metrics, each taking a value between 0 and 100. A higher scoreindicates a stricter government response (i.e., 100 = strictest response).

Conclusion: Central Banking in the New Normal

163

Asian economies, India (-23.9 percent) suffered the largest decline, followed by
Malaysia (-17.1 percent) and the Philippines (Figure 14.4). The pandemic has so
far brought immediate disruptions in economic activities across the region, as
evident in the decline in tourism flows, disruption in air travels and weakening
consumer and business confidence. Several countries imposed lockdowns,
community quarantines, stay-at-home orders, temporary business closuresand travel restrictions or prohibitions to contain the virus. Beyond the direct
disruptions caused by travel and mobility restrictions, interruptions in normal
business operations, contraction in demand as well as breaks in supply chain
connectivity may also be caused by measures introduced by governments. These
measures aim either to mitigate the spread of the pandemic or to avert supply
shortages of medical and food supplies for the domestic market.

Source: Thomas Hale, Sam Webster, Anna Petherick, Toby Phillips and Beatriz Kira (2020).
Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, Blavatnik School of Government.

2.1 Impact on the real economy
The pandemic and lockdown measures imposed by the NG adversely affected
domestic economic activity. The country technically entered a recession as GDP
contracted by 16.5 percent in the second quarter of 2020 from the same period
the previous year. This is the largest decline ever recorded since the 10.7-percent
drop in 1984.
Domestic demand, which has been the main driver of the country’s growth,
sharply declined due to the historic drop in consumption (-15.5 percent), capitalformation (-54.6 percent) and total exports (-37.0 percent). These were partly
offset by higher government spending (+22.1 percent) and lower imports (-40.0
percent). On the production side, industry (-22.9 percent) and services (-15.8
percent) registered their biggest drops in history. Meanwhile, agriculture (+1.6%)
recovered slightly after declining in the first quarter of 2020.
Most ASEAN countries are seeing their growth forecasts this year revised
downward. A synchronized deep downturn in 2020 is taking place, in bothadvanced economies, emerging market and developing economies. Among the

Sources: Various Statistical Agencies and Bloomberg

2.2 Impact on domestic financial markets
Concerns over the pandemic and ECQ were quickly reflected in key domestic
financial markets. The Philippine Stock Exchange Index (PSEi) sharply declined
to an eight-year low of 4,623.42 points on 19 March from 7,815.26 points on 31
December 2019 (Figure 14.5).

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

A temporary increase in risk premium in the local debt markets was also
observed. The Philippines’ 10-year bond yield slightly increased to 5 percent
on 2 April. While the yield eased to 4.5 percent on 8 April, it remained slightly
elevated relative to the 4.4 percent yield last 31 December 2019. Credit spreads
in the dollar funding markets also followed a similar trend. The Emerging Market
Bond Index or EMBI for Philippine (debt) spreads rose sharply from 69 basis
points (bps) on 31 December 2019 to 302 bps on 23 March before moderating toaround 200 shortly thereafter. (Figures 14.6 and 14.7).

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Bloomberg

Conclusion: Central Banking in the New Normal

165

Meanwhile, the domestic currency remained broadly stable amid the COVID-19
pandemic. From its 31 December 2019 level of ₱50.64 per US dollar, the peso
appreciated to ₱48.85 in late June. This is in stark contrast to a depreciation ofmost Asian currencies against the US dollar during the height of the pandemic(Figures 14.8 and 14.9).

Source: Bloomberg
Source: Bloomberg

The sharp increase in financial market volatility was felt across all countries in
the region, particularly from March to April 2020. Foreign exchange volatility
increased sharply for ASEAN-4 economies (consisting of the Philippines,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand), with the Indonesian rupiah exhibiting thelargest volatility. It is worth noting that the Philippine peso was the least volatile
among the four currencies. A similar trend was observed in the equities market,
as volatility in equities increased sharply for all ASEAN-4 economies during thesame period (Figures 14.10 & 14.11).

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Bloomberg

3. The impact of the BSP’s COVID-19 response
Recognizing the unprecedented nature of the pandemic’s economic and financial
shocks, the BSP undertook timely and decisive measures to ensure adequate
domestic liquidity, shore up market confidence and sustain the flow of credit
to support growth. These measures include a mix of monetary policy tools andregulatory relief and forbearance.
In particular, the BSP has reduced the policy rate four times in 2020, bringing
the cumulative rate reduction to a total of 175 bps. Likewise, the reserve
requirement ratio (RRR) of universal and commercial banks (UKBs), as well as
non-bank financial institutions with quasi-banking functions, was reduced by
200 basis points from 14 percent to 12 percent in April 2020.5 In accordance with
its charter, the BSP also provided bridge financing to the national government
and participated in the secondary market for government securities. However,
the ample monetary policy space meant that the BSP has not had to resort to
5 The RRR was already previously cut by 600 bps in 2018-2019.

non-conventional measures to combat the dire economic implications of the
COVID-19 pandemic. The bridge financing is subject to limits as stipulated in the
BSP charter while the purchase of government securities is provided for under the
BSP’s powers under open market operations.
As mentioned in the earlier chapters, the BSP has also introduced regulatory
relief and forbearance in the form of relaxation of regulations for BSPsupervised financial institutions (BSFIs). This aims to ease the impact of thepandemic on banks and other financial institutions and ensure they canmaintain their financial health.
While the full impact of the BSP’s response on the real economy remains tobe seen, initial assessments indicate that the its quick and forceful monetary
response resulted in an observed easing and improvement in domestic
liquidity conditions.

Afterword. Central Banking in the New Normal

167

Table 14.1 presents an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on key financial market
variables to assess the impact of the BSP’s asset purchases on domestic financial
markets. This exercise tests for the equality of means of selected financial market
variables between the pre-asset-purchase period (13-23 March) and the postasset-purchase period (24 March-8 April).6 7

Source: BSP Staff Estimates

The results indicate the following:••

PSEi and PSEi volatility. After the BSP’s asset purchases, the PSEi tended
upwards, increasing by roughly 306.28 points compared with the start of
the quarantine. This translates to a recovery of about 30.2 percent, andshows the PSEi quickly recouping its losses during the start of the quarantine
period. While the volatility of the PSEi may have increased, the index has
stabilized at a much a higher level than the 8-year low experienced before
the asset purchases.8
Peso exchange rate and peso volatility. The Philippine peso strengthened
vis-à-vis the US dollar, appreciating by roughly 0.70 pesos post asset
purchase. The volatility likewise decreased by around 8 percent since thestart of quarantine.

6

The government announced the lockdown on 13 March while the announcement of BSP’s asset purchase wasmade on 24 March.

7

An ANOVA was conducted to compare a difference in means in key financial market variables before and after
the announcement of the BSP’s asset purchases on 23 March 2020. The sample period started on 12 March 2020,
when quarantine measures were imposed.

8

The PSEi fell by almost 18 percent to 4,373 points a day after it halted trading momentarily, an 8-year low relative
to the present index which is at 5,700 points.

•

Interbank call loan rate (IBCL). The IBCL declined by roughly 0.575 percent
and contracted by around 2 percent since the asset purchases. This suggeststhat the lending rates between banks have eased which may have potentiallyencouraged greater lending among banks.

•

5-Year credit default swap (CDS). The credit default swap decreased by
40.76 suggesting an improvement in market conditions as investors are lesswary of investments defaulting vis-à-vis before the BSP’s asset purchases. As
such, it appears that the BSP’s measure was able to quell the increasing risk
aversion before the asset purchases at the beginning of quarantine.

•

Emerging market bond index (EMBI-PH) and Philippine 10-yearbond yield. The EMBI for the Philippines decreased by 36.72 whilethe 10-year bond yield also declined by 0.512, indicating an easing of
liquidity conditions.

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Overall, the results appear to suggest that the BSP’s interventions were able
to calm the market and ease domestic liquidity conditions. This is seen in
the lowering of the loan rates between banks, the strengthening of the PSEi,
decreasing of the CDS and the recent appreciation of the Philippine peso.

4. Lessons
The initial success of the BSP’s timely and aggressive policy actions affirms its
crucial role as a crisis manager. Nonetheless, the country continues to grapple
with the pandemic and its associated risks. Thus, from a policy perspective it
would be useful to take stock of the potential implications of the BSP’s recent
actions and highlight key lessons from this experience that could be usefulgoing forward.
Lesson 1: Act fastFirst, the severity of the pandemic’s potential impact on the economy provided
a clear case for swift, timely and decisive policy responses. A study by Correia
et. al. (2020) using data from the 1918 flu pandemic in the United States, foundthat cities that acted first with quick and unprecedented policy actions such as
lockdowns and contract tracing, among others, eventually had higher potential
outcomes relative to those cities that did not respond immediately.
In terms of central banking, monetary policy can help mitigate the socioeconomic
fallout from the pandemic and prevent them from developing into a long-term
economic slump, by playing three key essential roles, namely: 1) to ensure thatthe overall monetary stance is sufficiently accommodative; 2) to stabilize market
function and ensure the smooth transmission of monetary policy to the economy;
and 3) to maintain ample central bank liquidity is required, especially to maintaincredit provision (Lane, 2020).
The idea that temporary downturns can permanently damage an economy’s
productive capacity, also known as hysteresis effect, recently gained widespread
support in the aftermath of the GFC (Yellen, 2016). Hysteresis can operate
through several channels. Unemployment can cause human capital or skills todeteriorate. In the presence of nominal rigidities and constraints on monetary
policy, a temporary shock can create conditions for slow recoveries or evenpermanent stagnation (Acharya et al., 2016; Pissarides, 1992). Moreover, Wee(2016) showed that recessions can permanently change skilled young workers’
search behavior, causing them to stay in careers in which they have a comparative
disadvantage. This mismatch eventually causes a permanent misallocation.
Likewise, Bianchi et al. (2014) find that declines in research and development
during recessions can explain the persistent effects of cyclical shocks on growth.
Accordingly, the timing of monetary policy matters significantly for long-term
outcomes. In particular, accommodative policy early in a recession can prevent
hysteresis from occurring, thereby enabling swift economic recovery. In contrast,
delayed interventions may lead to the existence of multiple steady states thatwould prevent an economy from reverting to full employment.
In line with these principles, the BSP’s intervention was geared at restoring
confidence in the markets, ensuring sufficient liquidity and preventing liquidity
strains that could potentially lead to bankruptcies, defaults and lay-offs, which inturn could leave long-lasting scars on the country’s growth potential.
Lesson 2: Strengthen defense
Second, sound macroeconomic fundamentals are always the best line ofdefense against economic shocks. The Philippines entered this crisis with asolid macroeconomic footing. In 2019, real GDP grew at 5.9 percent, making
the country one of the fastest-growing economies in Asia. This also extended
the Philippine economy’s streak to over 20 years of uninterrupted broadbased growth.
Growth was accompanied by a manageable inflation environment. Year-to-date
inflation for 2019 averaged 2.5 percent. More recently, inflation settled at 2.3
percent in the second quarter of 2020 which is within the NG’s inflation target
range of 3 percent ± 1 percentage point (ppt) for the year.
The sound and stable condition of Philippine banks has also been one of theanchors of the domestic economy. The reforms put in place by the BSP alongwith the banks’ commitment to improve their ability to manage operational risks
have resulted in significant improvements in the quality of domestic banks’ assets
and loan portfolios as well as strong capitalization.
The country also enjoyed a manageable external payments position before thepandemic started. The Philippines’ international reserves rose from US$18.5
billion in 2005 to US$87.8 billion in 2019. Likewise, the country’s external debt

Afterword. Central Banking in the New Normal

metrics steadily improved, with the significant decline in the external debt-toGDP ratio from 57.3 percent in 2005 to 21.4 percent as of end-March 2020
All of these provided the economy resilience to soften the economic andfinancial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. This also puts the economy ina strategic position to revert to its growth trajectory once the pandemic is
successfully contained.
More importantly, the country’s sound macroeconomic fundamentals provided
the BSP with ample policy space to aggressively respond to the pandemic
without losing its focus on its core mandates of safeguarding price andfinancial stability.
Lesson 3: Stay focused
Third, keeping prices low and stable is still the heart of monetary policy. Pursuingprice stability remains the primary and fundamental objective of monetary policy
and should be a key consideration when undertaking market interventions duringcrisis periods (Noyer, 2011; IMF, 2020).
Placing primacy on price stability allowed central banks to resolve the time
inconsistency problem associated with the monetary policy process and graincredibility as independent institutions. These key elements allowed central banks
to contribute towards greater overall stability and effective crisis management.
Successful anchoring of inflation expectations enhanced central banks’ flexibility
to respond aggressively when needed during crisis situations.
While the economic landscape is gradually evolving, along with central banks’
functions, the consensus remains among policymakers that monetary policy
contributes best to desirable socioeconomic outcomes by promoting low andstable inflation.
Lesson 4: Act together
While central banks’ recent actions have put them at the forefront of crisis
management, the current pandemic requires a well-coordinated mix of policy
responses. Fiscal policy and monetary policy need to go hand in hand.
First, the pandemic is primarily a public sector crisis. This means that the
problems associated with the crisis can be tackled more directly by fiscal policy
while monetary policy can only address the secondary shocks or the financial

169

repercussions of the pandemic. For instance, massive fiscal stimulus and structuralreforms are needed to improve healthcare systems and improve research on
finding a cure for the coronavirus (Roach, 2020). Moreover, targeted fiscal
responses such as cash handouts and expanded unemployment benefits can help
improve the welfare of affected workers and households by ensuring that they
have continued means to purchase goods and services (Frydman & Phelps, 2020).
Over time, sustainability will require some long-term measures to be in placesuch as improved healthcare, education and training, and capacity building.
In other words, while central bank interventions can provide support during timesof crisis, these must be accompanied by fiscal and structural reforms to enhancetheir effectiveness in helping the economy get back on track (Lagarde, 2020).
Second, allowing central banks to take on broader public policy goals could
potentially overburden monetary policy (Orphanides, 2013). Overburdening ofmonetary policy may eventually diminish and compromise the independence ofcentral banks, which in turn could reduce the effectiveness of central banks tomaintain price stability and limit their ability to contribute to crisis management
going forward.
This is important because it recognizes the limits and the potential trade-offs ofmonetary policy. Carstens (2020) argues that while the measures implemented by
the central bank have been necessary and have shown initial success, these bringmajor challenges going forward in the form of a significant overlap between
fiscal and monetary policy. Central bank balance sheets are bound to growconsiderably this year, in tandem with a massive increase in public debt. This puts
central banks at risk of losing their independence.
Moreover, central bank support can potentially lead to moral hazard. Central
bank actions can be taken as implicit bailout which incentivizes market agents
to take excessive risks. The excessive reliance on central bank policies could
likewise exacerbate underlying systemic problems and hinder needed structuraladjustments (Group of Thirty, 2015).
All these lessons need to be taken into account to ensure that the efficacy ofmonetary measures, particularly during crisis periods, are maximized while theassociated costs are minimized.

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

5. Conclusion
The current pandemic has underscored the BSP’s central role as an agent ofmacroeconomic stability during periods of crisis. In response to the pandemic,
the BSP undertook unprecedented measures to ensure liquidity in the financial
markets and provide support to the real economy.

Towards this end, the BSP has been circumspect in ensuring stability inthis challenging time without losing focus on its primary mandates ofsafeguarding price and financial stability and preserving its hard-earned
credibility and independence.

While these measures are necessary and appear to have had initial success, thefull extent of the pandemic and its implications on the economic landscaperemain unknown. Given this uncertainty, it is important to be aware of the limits
and trade-offs associated with central bank policies to ensure that the BSP’s longterm objectives are not compromised.

Moving forward, the BSP remains attentive to challenges of the “new normal” andthe rapidly evolving economic and financial landscape. It stands ready to deploy
necessary policy measures as warranted by evidence-based assessment of overall
economic conditions.

References
Acharya, S., Bengui, J., Dogra, & K., Wee, S. (2018). Slow recoveries and unemployment trap: Monetary policy in a time of hysteresis. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, No. 831. August 2028.
Alburo, F. (1999, December). The Asian financial crisis and Philippine responses: Long-run considerations. The Developing Economies, 37(4), 439-59.
Berglof, E. & Farrar, J. (2020, March 26). The Covid-19 pandemic: A letter to the G-20 leaders. Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Bianchi, F., Kung, H., and Morales, G. (2014, December). Growth, slowdowns, and recoveries. Working Paper 20725. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Borio, C. (2019, December). Central banking in challenging times. BIS Working Paper No. 326.
Borrio, C. (2019, January 24). Claudio Borrio Interview with Capital. BIS Speeches.
Carstens, A. (2020, May 27). Countering Covid-19: The nature of central banks’ policy response. UBS-High Level Discussion on the Economic and Monetary Policy Outlook, Zurich. Bank of International Settlements.
Coeure, B. (2013). Monetary policy in the crisis – Confronting short-run challenges while anchoring long-run expectations. [Speech]. Journees de l’AFSE 2013 – La crise de l’Union Economique et Monetaire (UEM): Enjeux
theoriques et perspectives de politique economique. Universite d’Orleans. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/ html/sp130517.en.html
Fernandez, JRA. (2015). US quantitative easing and Philippine capital inflows: The role of US long-term interest rates. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Review.
Frydman, R. & Phelps, E. (2020, March 23). Insuring the survival of post-pandemic economies. Project-Syndicate.
Goodhart, C. (2010, November 25). The changing role of central banks. BIS Working Papers No. 326.
Group of Thirty (2016). The evolving role of central banks. In Fundamentals of central banking: Lessons from the crisis. Washington, D.C.
Guinigundo, D. (2011). The impact of the global financial crisis on the Philippine financial system – an assessment. In The global crisis and financial intermediation in emerging market economies, Vol. 54 (pp. 317-342).
Bank of International Settlements. http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap54s.pdf
Haldane, A. (2020, June 30). The second quarter [Speech]. Online webinar organized by Bank of England.
Hale, T. et al. (2020). Oxford COVID-19 government response tracker. Blavatnik School of Government.
International Monetary Fund (2010, May 27). Central banking lessons from the crisis. Report from the IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department,.
International Monetary Fund (2020, June) World Economic Outlook Update.
Koenig, E. (2020, April 16). Monetary policy in time of pandemic. Dallas Fed Economics. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Lane, P. (2020, June 24). The ECB’s monetary policy response to the pandemic: Liquidity, stabilization, and supporting recovery [Speech] Financial Center Breakfast Webinar organized by Frankfurt Main Finance.
Orphanides, A. (2013, June 20-21). Is monetary policy overburdened? 12th BIS Annual Conference, Lucerne.
Pissarides, C. (1992). Loss of skill during unemployment and the persistence of employment shocks. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(4), 1371–1391.
Rajan, R. (2019, July 31). Central banks are the fall guys. Project-Syndicate.
Roach, S. (2020, March 19). The false crisis comparison. Project-Syndicate.
Yellen, J. (2016, October 14). Macroeconomic research after crisis [Speech]. 60 th Annual Economic Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston Massachusetts.

17 1

AFTERWORD
When planning for this book began in June 2020, the intention was to chronicle
the BSP’s policy decisions during the COVID-19 pandemic. The unprecedented
crisis called for an unprecedented response, and the entire government, including
the BSP, acted promptly and decisively.
More than year since, the BSP’s actions proved to be in the right direction. The
economy is gradually recovering as the mass vaccination program quickened andwidened its scope. Mobility restrictions are being relaxed.
Bolstered by years of resolute reforms, the whole-of-government response
helped the domestic economy remain resilient against the adverse effects of the
global pandemic.
The country’s macroeconomic situation remains generally intact as evidenced
by the improvement in gross domestic product (GDP), within-target inflation
projection over the policy horizon, ample financial-system liquidity, and robust
external payments position. At the same time, the banking system continues tobe sound and stable amid the pandemic.

The numbers speak
The country’s strong macroeconomic fundamentals before the pandemic
shielded the economy against the onslaught of COVID-19.
As expected, the Philippines was not spared from the global economic slowdown.
The country’s real or inflation-adjusted output contracted by 17 percent in thesecond quarter of 2020, the lowest since 1981.
The strict lockdown and mobility measures imposed to curb the spread of thevirus in March 2020 crimped productive activity. The unemployment rate rose to
17.6 percent in April 2020.
Nonetheless, BSP was able to keep inflation low and stable, averaging only
2.6 percent throughout 2020 despite severe typhoons and supply distribution
bottlenecks. Thanks to the benign inflation environment and well-anchoredinflation expectations, the BSP managed to take decisive and prompt monetary
policy actions that kept financial markets functioning and the system liquid.

On the external front, the overall balance of payment position (BOP) in 2020reflected the effects of the disruptions in global demand and supply chains. The
country posted a BOP surplus of US$16.0 billion in 2020, driven by net inflows
in the current account amounting to US$11.1 billion as imports significantly
dropped.
Despite the crisis, the government continued to build up the gross international
reserves, capping 2020 with US$110.1 billion in reserves, equivalent to 12.3
months of imports.
More than a year later, the country is now gradually seeing positive results of
the implementation of data-driven policies. After five quarters of economic
contractions, GDP grew by 12.0 percent in the second quarter of 2021. The
momentum continued the following quarter when output rose 7.1 percent,despite the reimposition of stricter quarantine measures in August and
September. For the first three quarters of 2021, the country’s economic expansion
averaged 4.9 percent, within the government’s target GDP growth of 4-5 percent
for the year.
The unemployment rate declined to 8.1 percent in the first three quarters of theyear, from 10.4 percent in 2020. The employment level for the said period has
already exceeded the average employment level in 2019, before the onset of thepandemic.
Meanwhile, inflation averaged 4.5 percent in the first ten months of 2021,
mainly caused by supply-side factors, including the rise in world oil prices andsupply disruptions brought about by weather disturbances and African Swine
Fever.
While the inflation path is seen to remain above the target range of two percent
to four percent up to October 2021, it is projected to settle within the inflation
target range before the end of the year as the non-monetary measures of thegovernment will help moderate the impact of supply bottlenecks. Inflation
expectations remain firmly aligned with the baseline projection path for 20222023.
As domestic activity gradually resumed, the country’s current account and thebalance of payments for January to June 2021 reverted to a deficit amid strong

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

imports of raw materials and capital goods for productive purposes, indicating a
pickup in economic activity ahead.
Nonetheless, the gross international reserves as of October 2021 remain ample
at US$107.9 billion, equivalent to 10.8 months’ worth of imports of goods
and payments for services. The GIR is supported by improving inflows of cash
remittances from overseas workers and business process outsourcing.
However, business sentiment remained cautious due to the highly transmissibledelta variant of the coronavirus, reimposition of lockdowns, and rising inflation
rate due to supply constraints.
By contrast, consumer confidence is gradually improving based on the third
quarter 2021 Consumer Expectations Survey. The optimism stemmed fromexpectations of improvements in job creation, additional income sources,
speedier vaccine rollout, and provision of financial assistance.
In the first semester of 2021, the banking system displayed solid footing. Banks
continued to grow their assets, deposits, and capital while posting sufficient
capital and liquidity buffers, net profit, and ample loan loss reserves.
The total assets of the banking system rose by 6.9 percent year-on-year to ₱19.9
trillion as of August 2021. The asset expansion, which was largely funded bydeposits, enabled the banking system to support the country’s financing needs
and to deliver relevant financial products and services during the pandemic.
As expected, the gross non-performing loans (NPL) ratio of the banking systemincreased, reaching 4.5 percent as of August 2021 from 2.8 percent a year ago.
However, loan-loss provisioning remained adequate as banks reported an NPL
coverage ratio of 83.5 percent for the period.
The banking system remains well-capitalized, with capital adequacy ratio at 17.2
percent as of second quarter of 2021. This is well above the 10-percent minimum
threshold set by the BSP and the 8-percent international standard. Based on the
results of BSP’s regular and ad hoc simulations, the banking system is reasonably
well-capitalized and well-provisioned. Hence, banks will be able to continue
lending to support the economy.
Credit activity has also started improving as it posted an increase of 2.7 percent
in September 2021, the second month of growth after more than a semester ofdeclines that started in December 2020. The improvement in outstanding loansof the banking system reflects the modest recovery in banks’ overall lending
attitudes along with improved economic prospects owing to the gradual lifting of
pandemic containment measures.
Lending activity is projected to improve further in the coming months in viewof the accelerated vaccination program and calibrated reimposition of granularquarantine restrictions only where absolutely necessary. According to thePhilippine Banking Sector Outlook Survey for the first semester of 2021, majorityof respondent banks expected double-digit growth in their loans over the next
two years. Banks continued to lend or grant financial relief to their borrowers
based on the latest data on new loans granted and restructured loans for thesemester ending June 2021.

Digital transformation
The health crisis has presented unique opportunities for financial institutions
to hasten digital transformation. Households and businesses are now finding iteasier and more convenient to use cashless transactions particularly in making
payments.
About a fifth of the country’s retail payments already takes place digitally as ofend-2020, up from ten percent in 2018 and only one percent in 2013. The key
drivers include the greater digitalization of payments to merchants (up 47.8
percent) and person-to-person fund transfers (up 18.1 percent), as well as thefull digitalization of the disbursement of government salaries as of the end-2020.
Meanwhile, digital transactions made up 26.8 percent of total transaction value in
2020, higher than the 20-percent share in 2018.
Basic deposit accounts (BDAs) and e-money accounts grew significantly. Fromfour million accounts in 2019, the number of BDAs opened almost doubled to 7.4
million accounts as of the second quarter of 2021.1 The amount of deposits inthe basic accounts stood at ₱4.9 billion held in 137 banks. From 2019 to 2020, thenumber of active e-money accounts grew by 93 percent from 17.9 million to 34.7
million accounts, or an increase of 16.8 million. E-money accounts are offeredby 61 electronic money issuers (EMI). It is estimated that around 19 million new
accounts were opened from 2019 to 2020, based on the increase in BDA ande-money accounts.
1

BDA data as of Q2 2021 is preliminary.

173

Last year, the BSP launched the Digital Payments Transformation Roadmap(DPTR) for 2020-2023. It aims to transform the country into a cash-lite society
through digitalization of payments and increase the number of Filipinos withaccess to financial services. At the same time, BSP intends to make available moreinnovative and responsive digital financial products and services. Recent datasuggest increased utilization of electronic platforms.   
Cashless transactions and contactless payments are an integral part of the
DPTR and BSP’s financial inclusion agenda. They are also key planks of the new
economy because they make possible safer banking and financial transactions for
consumers and enterprises amid the health crisis.
Use of digital payment channels has grown. PESONet transaction volume andvalue which grew by 31 percent and 41 percent, respectively, compared to levels
in October 2020. From the 4.9 million transactions amounting to ₱293 billion lastyear, PESONet transactions reached 6.5 million worth ₱412.4 billion in October
2021.
Like PESONet, InstaPay transactions also saw a notable boost over the past year.
From 29.8 million transactions in October 2020, InstaPay volume grew by 41
percent and reached 41.9 million transactions in October 2021. In terms of value,
InstaPay transactions recorded an increase of 79 percent from ₱142.6 billion to₱254.7 billion for the same reference month.
The significant year-on-year rise in the volume and value of digital paymentssuggests a growing shift towards digital payment channels from the traditional
payment instruments such as ATM cash withdrawals and checks. While digital
payments are on the rise, the volumes of both “off-us” ATM cash withdrawals2
and check transactions decreased by two percent during the past year.
The introduction of QR code-enabled payments was a big step toward
onboarding even the small players because it requires less expensive
infrastructure—only a smartphone and internet access are needed.
The use of QR code payments was bolstered with the development of
the National QR Code Standard, dubbed as “QR Ph.” The move accords with
the BSP’s drive to transform the fragmented QR-driven payment services into
interoperable payment solutions, making digital payments more accessible,
affordable, and ubiquitous throughout the country.
2“off-us” withdrawals refer to transactions using ATMs are operated by a different bank; distinct from “on-us”
withdrawals when ATMs used belong to the same bank that issued ATM card

The BSP launched the QR Ph for person-to-person payments or “QR Ph
P2P,” which primarily catered to remittances and payments within the informal
sector, in November 2019. Less than two years later, in October 2021, it rolled out
QR Ph for person-to-merchant payments or “QR Ph P2M” to expand the coverageof the system.
The latest move enables merchants, such as department stores, pharmacies,
supermarkets, hardware stores, and restaurants, to accept e-payments. QR Ph
P2M also makes bills payments faster and more convenient.
Since the P2M use-case covers a large end-user base—both individuals andbusinesses—the benefits gained when merchant payments are digitalized could
have far-reaching societal impacts. Through this platform, the BSP expects
to extend the reach of digital payments to micro and small enterprises which
comprise over 98 percent of registered businesses in the country and employ
about two thirds of the labor force. Hence, QR Ph P2M will not only drive greateruse of digital payments but will also advance the BSP’s goal of financial inclusion
by providing more opportunities for micro and small businesses to grow.
Last June, the BSP issued the open finance framework, a key enabler for digitaltransformation and financial inclusion by promoting consent-driven data
portability, interoperability, and collaborative partnerships between financial
institutions and fintech players.  The move implements a key element of the BSP’s
digital banking framework, introduced in November 2020, to hasten payments
digitalization and financial inclusion. The digital banking category will include
banks that offer financial products and services that are processed end-to-end
through a digital platform and/or electronic channels with no physical branches.

Economic recovery through policy coordination and legislative support
All these gains were achieved with the whole-of-government approach inaddressing the crisis. For its part, the BSP implemented temporary and timebound policy measures to support the economy. The BSP’s policy and liquidityeasing measures have injected into the financial system the equivalent of 12.8
percent of the country’s full-year nominal GDP for 2020 as of October 2021.
First were measures to boost market confidence on availability of low-costcredit resources, such as cuts in the policy rate and the reserve requirement.

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BSP UNBOUND: Central Banking and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

The lower policy rates were meant to nudge banks to reduce their own lending
rates, thereby promoting credit-taking activities. Meanwhile, the lower reserve
requirement is intended to increase the volume of loanable funds.
Second were extraordinary liquidity measures to the national government (NG)to help fund the pandemic-response measures. These included provisional
advances to the Bureau of Treasury (Btr), purchases of government securities inthe secondary market, and remittance of advance dividends to the government.
Third were regulatory and operational relief measures to maintain the stability of
the financial system and ensure public access to financial services. These included:(1) counting loans to micro, small, and medium enterprises as compliance to thereserve requirement; (2) increasing the single borrower’s limit; and (3) raising theceiling for real-estate loans to promote bank lending.
On the legislative front, the government passed bills that would foster a stronger
and faster economic rebound while limiting the scarring effects of the pandemic
on the economy. Among these are the passage of the Financial Institutions
Strategic Transfer (FIST) Act and the Corporate Recovery and Tax Incentives forEnterprises (CREATE) Act.
Meanwhile, the proposed Government Financial Institutions Unified Initiatives toDistressed Enterprises for Economic Recovery (GUIDE) bill aims to strengthen thecapacity of government financial institutions, such as the Philippine Guarantee
Corporation, Land Bank of the Philippines, and the Development Bank of thePhilippines, to assist micro, small, and medium enterprises cope with the effects
of COVID-19.

Recognition
For actions to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, BSP received the “Best Systemicand Prudential Regulator in Asia Pacific” award from the Asian Banker in October
2020.
BSP also received the 2020 Gold Standard Award for Country and Trade
Promotion for its efforts to ensure that the international investment community
sees a truthful and transparent picture of the Philippine economy. The award wasgiven by industry body Public Affairs Asia on 8 December 2020.
The research arm of The Economist Group, the Economic Intelligence Unit, which
focused on financial inclusion in the COVID-19 response, likewise recognized
the country’s initiatives to mitigate the adverse economic impact of the current
global health emergency.
Moreover, despite the challenges caused by the pandemic, market analysts
remain confident in the Philippine economy. They continue to expect the country
faces favorable medium-term growth prospects based on the stable outlook
affirmed by majority of major credit rating agencies.3
To be fair, credit for these achievements belongs not only to the BSP but tothe entire government, to reiterate what was said earlier: solid fundamentals
allowed the country to weather this pandemic while evidence-based policies andmeasures paved the way for gradual recovery a year after.
Looking ahead, the BSP will continue to support the economy for as long asnecessary to ensure the country’s strong and sustainable economic recovery. It
will also remain vigilant against any emerging risks to the outlook for inflationand growth and will adjust its policy settings as needed.
The BSP remains steadfast in achieving its mandate of maintaining low andstable inflation to safeguard the Filipinos’ purchasing power, ensuring an efficient
payments and settlements system, and safeguarding the country’s financial
system.
It is imperative that everyone works together as one nation with the sharedobjective of sustaining the economic recovery.

3Standard & Poor’s Global affirmed BBB+ rating with stable outlook on 27 May 2021, Rating and Investment
Information, Inc. affirmed BBB+ rating with stable outlook on 22 April 2021, Moody’s affirmed Baa2 with stable
outlook on 16 July 2020, and Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd affirmed the Philippines’ credit rating of “A-” witha “stable” outlook on 6 September 2021. Assessment by Fitch Rating on 12 July 2021 indicates a slight decline in
the country’s credit rating outlook from BBB stable to BBB negative. According to Fitch, this was due to downside
risks to the country’s medium-term growth prospects and possible challenges associated with unwinding theexceptional policy response to the health crisis and restoring sound public finances as the pandemic recedes.

175

INDEX
10-point socioeconomic agenda - 34
4Ps - See Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program
4th industrial revolution - 141
		

A

		
account ownership - 108
ACH - See automated clearing house
ACPC- See Agricultural Credit Policy Council
adaptability - 119
AFC - See Asian Financial Crisis
AFCS - See Automated Fare Collection System
African swine flu - 64
AGFP - See Agricultural Guarantee Fund Pool
Agricultural Credit Policy Council - 61, 79
Agricultural Guarantee Fund Pool - 61
agriculture value chain financing - 110
AIIB - See Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
Alliance of Philippine Partners for Enterprise
Development, Inc. - 111
Allowing the Full Entry of Foreign Banks in the Philippines(RA No. 10641) - 58
Allowing the Infusion of Foreign Equity in the Capital of Rural
Banks (RA No. 10574) - 58
Amending Republic Act Number 7653, Otherwise Known as“The New Central Bank Act” (RA No. 11211) - 60, 76
analysis of variance - 167
ANOVA - See analysis of variance
APoP - See Authority and Proof of Purchase
APPEND - See Alliance of Philippine Partners for Enterprise
Development
ASEAN - See Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASF - See African swine flu
Asian Financial Crisis - 3, 13, 19, 23, 29, 40, 68, 80, 160
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank - 141
asset and credit booms - 3
asset management companies - 80
asset purchases - 142, 143
Association of Southeast Asian Nations - 13, 151, 162, 163, 165
asynchronous communication - 119
ATM - See automated teller machine
Australia - 60
Authority and Proof of Purchase - 124
automated clearing house - 84, 85
Automated Fare Collection System - 109
automated teller machine - 35, 62, 63, 84, 88, 89, 96
AVCF - See agriculture value chain financing
		

B

		
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas - 21, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 40, 41,
42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64,
65, 66, 70, 71, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90,
91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109,
110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124,
125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 136, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154,
155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 162, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170
active promotion of Philippine Identification System
		(PhilSys) to advance financial inclusion - 110
adoption of monetary aggregate targeting framework - 28
annual procurement plan - 121
Bayanihan II provisions on credit and lending - 78
Center for Learning and Inclusion Advocacy - 114
Charter - 44, 76, 79-81
communication challenges amid the COVID-19
		
pandemic - 148-149
communication lessons from the pandemic 		128-129, 150-151
Communication Office - 127, 149
Consumer Empowerment Group - 114
coordination among fiscal, monetary and regulatory		authorities - 156-157
Corporate Services Sector - 118, 127
COVID-19 Task Force - 119-120
development of systemic risk crisis management		framework - 71
digital transformation plan - 125
dividends to the National Government - 33
Economic and Financial Learning Center - 152
emerging impacts of monetary measures - 51
financial market operations sub-sector - 42, 43
Financial Supervision Sector - 60, 62, 63, 64, 97
FinEd Stakeholders Expo - 113
fixed duration of monetary adjustment measures - 53
HR adaptation during the pandemic - 118
impact of COVID-19 response - 166-167
impact of liquidity enhancing operations - 48
impact of prudential and regulatory measures on the		financial system - 62-64
impact on financial markets of asset purchases - 167
impact on inflation of monetary policy - 45
impact on interest rates of monetary policy - 51
inflation forecast to remain within government
		target - 50
infographics - 148
information systems strategic plan - 125
Information Technology Office - 124, 125, 126
initial issuance of BSP securities - 54
initiatives to advance cyber resilience and		innovation - 102-106
initiatives to develop the National Retail Payments		
System - 86-88

initiatives to mitigate impact of COVID-19 - 32-35
Interim Guidelines on the Conduct of Procurement
		
Activities During the ECQ/GCQ and Similar Work		
Situations - 124
International Relations Department - 151
introduction of New Economy Arrangements to adapt to		pandemic - 126-127
introduction of the Basic Deposit Account - 109
Investor Relations Office - 151
issuance of memoranda on frequently asked questions
		
about salient provisions of Bayanihan I - 77
launch of targeted cybersecurity awareness		
campaigns - 100-101
legal basis of policy tools - 80-81
lessons from COVID-19 policy response - 168-169
limits and trade-offs arising from policy response to the		pandemic - 170
limits of central bank intervention - 52
macroeconomic modelling and forecasting during the		pandemic - 152-155
mainstreaming of microfinance in the banking
		system - 108
Monetary Board - 33, 41, 43, 44, 60, 79, 86
monetary policy easing - 41
Office of Systemic Risk Management - 71
overview of monetary responses to COVID-19 - 40
Payments and Settlements Office - 84, 86
performance of the National Retail Payments System during		the pandemic - 89-93
policies to promote financial consumer protection - 114-115
policy developments prior to the pandemic - 58-60
potential impact of policy response - 44
price stability as primary mandate - 55
proactive role in monitoring digital and cyber environment
		surrounding regulated financial institutions - 96-99
procurement policies and plans before the		pandemic - 121-124
promotion of credit surety funds - 111
promotion of digital literacy as a core competence in the		
new economy - 111-113
provisional advances to the national government 		
44, 79, 81
prudential and regulatory relief measures during the		pandemic - 60-61, 144
public trust - 150
purchases of government securities - 33, 43, 134
recalibration of monetary tools - 54
rediscounting - 43
reduction in reserve requirement - 42
regulatory relief for banks in disaster-hit areas - 30
reliance on macroprudential measures in reaction to		
multiple shocks - 136

176

INDEX
remittance of dividends to the national		government - 44, 81
repurchase agreements with Bureau of Treasury - 70
response to COVID-19 pandemic - 21
restructuring and recapitalization in 1993 - 29
Risk and Compliance Office - 118
role and participation in PhilPass - 84-86
social media cards - 128
strengthening oversight of the payments system - 94
Systems and Methods Office - 120, 121
Technology Risk and Innovation Supervision		
Department - 62, 96
uncertainty and its impact on supervision and prudential		
policy - 65-66
use of conventional monetary policy measures in response		
to 2008 global financial crisis - 160
Bank for International Settlements - 59, 70, 151, 157
Bank Indonesia - 143, 144
Bank Negara Malaysia - 143
Bank of Canada - 142, 143
Bank of England - 142, 143, 153
Bank of Japan - 143, 144
Bank of Korea - 142, 143, 144Bankers Association of the Philippines - 114, 157
Banks - 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 19, 21, 22, 24, 28, 29, 30, 33, 42, 43, 44,
48, 51,52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69,
70, 77, 78, 79, 80, 84, 85, 87, 88, 91, 93, 96, 97, 103, 104, 108,
109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 125, 127, 128, 129, 132, 133, 134,
135, 136, 137, 140, 142, 143, 144, 149, 151, 153, 156, 157, 160,
162,166, 167, 168, 169
See also BSP-supervised financial institution
net income of the banking system - 64
Philippine banking system - 58, 62
Banking Sector Outlook Survey - 60
Banking Sector Risk Analysis - 62
Basel committee on banking supervision - 58, 59, 68, 69
Basic Deposit Account - 109
Bayanihan I - See Bayanihan to Heal as One Act of 2020
Bayanihan II - See Bayanihan to Recover as One Act of 2020
Bayanihan to Heal as One Act of 2020 (RA No. 11469) - 31, 32, 64,
76, 77, 81, 104, 149
Bayanihan to Recover as One Act of 2020 (RA No. 11494) - 31, 32,
77, 78, 79
BCP - See business continuity plan
BDA - See Basic Deposit AccountBeep - 109
Better Than Cash Alliance - 86, 87
BI - See Bank Indonesia
bid-to-cover ratios - 51
bilateral short-term loans - 140bills payment - 88biometric technologies - 100
BIS - See Bank for International Settlements

black swan - 23, 31, 96
Bloomberg - 43, 151, 153
BLUs - See branch-lite units
BNM - See Bank Negara Malaysia
BOB - See BSP Online Buddy
BOC - See Bank of Canada
BOE - See Bank of England
BOJ - See Bank of Japan
BOK - See Bank of Korea
bonds - 54, 55, 59, 60, 63, 134, 141, 143
BPO - See business process outsourcing
branch-lite units - 109
BRICS Bank - 141
Bring Your Own Device - 125
BSFIs - See BSP Supervised Financial Institutions
BSP - See Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
BSP Online Buddy - 115
BSP Supervised Financial Institutions - 3, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66,
87, 88, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 114, 149, 155,
157, 166
See also universal and commercial banks, thrift banks,rural and cooperative banks and non-banks with quasibanking functions
adoption of Philippine Financial Reporting Standards - 60
beneficiary of regulatory forbearance - 166composition - 59, 64
comprehensive baseline survey - 62
continuing operations during community quarantine - 149
cybersecurity measures and controls - 100
dealing with new digital customers - 101
encouraged to offer digital channels - 33
exclusion of loans affected borrowers from past-due		and non-performing classification - 61
financial relief to borrowers - 61
grace period on the settlement of outstanding 				rediscounting obligations with the BSP - 61
government support for digital transformation - 104
growth in financial assets during pandemic - 64
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic - 62, 105
information exchanges with BSP - 157
intensified monitoring of risks and vulnerabilities - 65
need to invest in fraud management systems - 102
rethinking of business models due to pandemic - 96, 106role in financial consumer protection - 114
role in generating data on financial system - 155
staggered booking of allowance for credit losses - 61
survey by BSP of top banks - 97
suspension of fees on use of online banking platforms and		digital payment platforms - 87, 88
withdrawal of relief measures - 66
BSRA - See banking sector risk analysis (under banks)
BTCA - See Better Than Cash Alliance
BTr - See Bureau of Treasury

Bureau of the Treasury - 21, 42, 44, 54, 70, 76, 80, 81, 148
burnout - 120
business continuity plans - 2, 58, 62, 120
business models - 162business process outsourcing - 59		C		

CALABARZON - See Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal and Quezon
CAM - See consumer assistance mechanism
Canada - 91, 93
capital - 2, 3, 5, 8, 14, 20, 21, 28, 34, 40, 44, 58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 65,
70, 72, 79, 81, 110, 127, 133, 136, 137, 141, 144, 163, 168
capital adequacy ratio - 59, 64
CAR - See capital adequacy ratio
cash agents - 113
cash-in and cash-out points - 109
Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal and Quezon - 110
CCyB - See countercyclical capital buffer
central banks - 2, 8, 21, 22, 29, 44, 53, 54, 55, 58, 60, 126, 129, 132,
134, 136, 142, 143, 148, 151, 152, 154, 156, 157, 160, 161, 162,
169
See also Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Bank of England,
Bank Indonesia, Bank Negara Malaysia, Bank of Canada,
Bank of England, Bank of Japan, Bank of Korea, European
Central Bank, Federal Reserve Bank, People’s Bank ofChinaasset purchase program - 143
crisis management frameworks - 2
dealing with capital outflows during and after a		crisis - 137
hedging instruments - 140
international comparisons of responses to the		COVID-19 pandemic - 142
main functional roles - 161
need for consistent messaging for credible		communication - 158
need to maintain independence and credibility amid		
growing nexus between fiscal and monetary		
policy - 156
reserve cuts and asset purchases in response to pandemic		in different countries - 143
resorting to unconventional monetary policies - 134
rethinking of role in advanced economies after 2008 global		
financial crisis - 132risks from unconventional monetary policies - 135
timing of exits from stimulus or easing strategies - 22
Central Luzon - 110
CFPs - See Contingency Funding Plans
Chamber of Thrift Banks - 157
Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index - 161
China - 6, 12, 68, 69, 118, 122, 133, 143

177

INDEX
CICO points - See cash-in and cash-out points
Cisco Webex - 119commercial papers - 60, 134
Common Equity Tier 1 - 64
communication - 2, 7, 22, 24, 30, 54, 55, 66, 71, 86, 112, 115, 118,
127, 128, 129, 134, 140, 148, 149, 150, 151, 157, 158
community quarantine - 31, 76, 80, 88, 91, 109, 110, 127, 163
See also lockdown
Enhanced Community Quarantine - 33, 35, 61, 62, 63, 64, 69,
		76, 77, 89, 90, 91, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 108,		114, 115, 118, 119, 125, 126, 127, 162, 163
General Community Quarantine - 76, 91, 123
Modified ECQ - 76, 77
Modified GCQ - 76complex banking groups - 59
conglomerates - 59, 60
Congress - 66, 76-78, 156
consolidated supervision - 59
consumer assistance mechanism - 114
consumer loans - 59
consumer protection - 114, 115
contactless modes of payment - 109
containment measures - 7, 58, 152, 155, 156, 162Contingency Funding Plans - 64
Coronavirus Disease 2019 - 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
28, 31, 32, 34, 35, 40, 42, 44, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 60, 62, 63, 65,
68, 69, 70, 71, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 87, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94,
96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 111, 113, 114, 115,
118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129, 132, 133, 134,
136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154,
156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 162, 165, 166, 169
amplified economic uncertainties - 12
and global unemployment - 13
and global output loss - 13
as “pink flamingo” rather than “black swan” - 31
as a contributing factor to decline in economic
		activity - 15
as a global crisis requiring global response - 68
as a turning point in national and global affairs - 142
as a unique crisis - 28
as an example of epidemic-causing diseases - 6
as theme for cyberfraud and scams - 101
Bayanihan to Heal as One Act or RA 11469 - 32
central bank responses compared to global financial		crisis - 134
compared to the Asian financial crisis - 13early toll on the Philippine economy - 69
fiscal position of Asian governments before the		pandemic - 138
global economic impact - 13
global impact - 7
impact on Philippine economy - 19
impact on small emerging economies - 133
international comparisons - 19
lessons for policy makers in communication - 158

lingering economic impact - 8
macrofinancial linkages and inters-sectoral effects - 22
mortality rate compared to Spanish flu - 7
need for a new global Marshall Plan - 141
need for increase in IMF lending and regional funds for		developing and emerging economies - 140
performance of Philippine peso during pandemic - 165
permanent impact on tourism, hospitality and retail		
sectors - 162
Philippine government’s four-pillar economic		
strategy - 21
Philippine labor market - 19, 20
preference for targeted measures as response to		pandemic - 24
revelation of vulnerabilities that test domestic
		policies - 132
revelation of weak policies or programs in the		Philippines - 23
socioeconomic gaps revealed by the pandemic - 139
corporate bond stabilization fund - 143
cost-push forces - 30
countercyclical capital buffer - 59, 136
countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy - 137
COVID-19 - See Coronavirus Disease 2019
CRD - See credit risk databasecredit - 3, 4, 8, 14, 20, 21, 22, 32, 33, 34, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49,
52, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 69, 70, 77, 78, 81, 108,
110, 111, 114, 129, 132, 134, 135, 136, 140, 142, 143, 151, 166,
167, 168
credit demand - 52
credit easing - 134
credit risk database - 110
credit risk-weighted assets - 65
credit underwriting standards - 59
credit surety fund - 111
crisis, economic and financial - 3, 4, 8, 28, 160, 132, 161
See also Asian financial crisis and global financial 				crisiscrisis lending programs of multilateral development		banks - 140
crisis management framework - 2
crisis preparation - 2
cross-border activities - 59, 62, 69
CSF - See credit surety fundcurrency - 3, 4, 8, 21, 22, 46, 47, 84, 93, 96, 119, 134, 136, 140, 165
currency swaps - 140
cyber-espionage - 99
cybercriminal - 99
cyberhygiene and safe computing practices - 101
cybersecurity and operational risks - 43
cybersecurity awareness - 100, 101, 104, 112
Cybersecurity Capability Build-up - 127
cybersecurity measures and controls - 100

Cybersecurity Resiliency Initiatives - 126, 127cyberthreat - 99, 101, 105, 106, 126
		D

D-SIBs - See domestic systemically important banks
DA - See Department of Agriculture
DBCC - See Development Budget Coordination Committee
DBP - See Development Bank of the Philippinesde-risking - 69
debt - 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, 19, 21, 22, 23, 28, 42, 54, 55, 70, 78, 113, 133,
137, 138, 141, 142, 143, 156, 164, 168, 169
debt crises - 3, 4, 8
debt financing - 137
debt monetization - 54, 55
Debt Service Suspension Initiative - 141
debt upsurge - 133
debt-to-GDP - 138
external debt - 3, 28, 141
public debt - 3, 21, 25, 137
public debt sustainability - 137
Declaration of Public Health Emergency (Presidential 		Proclamation No. 922) - 34
Department of Agriculture - 30, 79, 154
Department of Education - 89
Department of Finance - 77, 155, 157
Department of Health - 78, 123
Department of Labor and Employment - 20, 109
Department of Social Welfare and Development - 97, 109
Department of Tourism - 89
Department of Trade and Industry - 30, 89, 111, 154
Department of Transportation - 109
DepEd - See Department of Education
deposits - 33, 42, 44, 59, 61, 62, 63, 84, 109, 132, 133, 160
deposits-to-GDP - 63
Development Bank of the Philippines - 78, 79, 91
Development Budget Coordination Committee - 31, 128, 156, 157
DFS - See digital financial services
digital accounts - 63, 97
digital finance - 108, 109, 110, 111, 112
digital financial platforms - 63, 113
digital financial services - 108, 111, 112, 113
digital literacy - 111, 112, 113
digital payments - 62, 63, 65, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 108, 109, 115
digital remittance platforms - 93
digital transactions - 34, 88, 109
digital transformation - 94, 96, 97, 101, 103, 104, 106, 120, 125
digital-centric supervised institutions - 97
Diokno, Benjamin - 21, 81, 118, 140
direct debit - 88
documentary stamp tax - 77, 78

178

INDEX
DOF - See Department of Finance
DOH - See Department of Health
DOLE - See Department of Labor and Employment
domestic helpers - 109
domestic operations system - 43
domestic systemically important banks - 59, 62, 144
DOT - See Department of Tourism
DOTr - See Department of Transportation
DSSI - See Debt Service Suspension Initiative
DST - documentary stamp tax
DSWD - See Department of Social Welfare and Development
DTI - See Department of Trade and Industry
Duterte administration - 32, 34
Duterte, Rodrigo - 118
		E		

e-bidding - 126
e-commerce law - 124
e-payments campaign - 112
e-wallets - 103, 109
earnings before interest and taxes - 70
EBIT - See earnings before interest and taxes
Ebola virus disease - 6, 7, 31
ECB - See European Central Bank
ECL - See expected credit loss
ECQ - See Enhanced Community Quarantine(under community quarantine)
EDYRF - See Exporters Dollar and Yen Rediscount Facility
effective lower bound - 132, 134, 137
EGov Pay - 87
elderly - 5, 34
electronic documents - 104, 124
electronic money issuers - 63, 87, 88, 93, 96, 97, 98, 103
electronic payment and financial services - 33, 61, 88, 96, 104
electronic retail payment system - 86
Electronic Submission and Receipt of Bids - 126
electronic transactions - 87
EMEAP - See Executives’ Meeting of Asia-Pacific Central Banks
emerging market economies - 4, 13, 21, 53, 60, 63, 132, 133, 136,
137, 141, 142, 167
EMEs - See emerging market economies
EMIs - See electronic money issuers
employee productivity - 119
EMV payment cards - 109
endogenous risks - 68
enhanced risk assessment - 62
enterprise survey - 63
environmental, social and governance - 143
EPFS - See electronic payment and financial services
epidemics - 6, 7, 31
ESG - See environmental, social and governanceestimated probability of default - 64
European Central Bank - 44, 134, 143, 144
exchange rate - 4, 19, 21, 28, 45, 46, 47, 50, 133, 136, 156, 167

Executives’ Meeting of Asia-Pacific Central Banks - 151
exogenous risks - 68
exogenous shocks - 30
expected credit loss - 59, 60
Exporters Dollar and Yen Rediscount Facility - 43
extraordinary liquidity measures - 43		F		Facebook - 100, 101, 112, 122
fake news - 129, 151
fake websites - 99
FCL - See flexible credit line
FCP - See financial consumer protection
financial consumer protection - 80, 114, 115
financial crises - 3, 4
financial globalization and digitalization - 132
financial health - 21, 113, 166
financial inclusion - 108, 110
Financial Inclusion Survey - 108
financial institutions - 2, 22, 30, 33, 40, 43, 58, 77, 84, 86, 98, 108,
111, 112, 113, 128, 132, 134, 142, 149, 150
See also BSP-supervised financial institution
Financial Institutions Strategic Transfer (FIST) Act - 22, 34, 80
financial literacy - 111
financial market infrastructures - 93
financial market volatility - 40, 165
financial markets - 2, 4, 12, 21, 22, 40, 42, 44, 58, 68, 69, 70, 84,
134, 136, 140, 143, 160, 161, 163, 167, 170
financial stability - 53, 68
Financial Stability Board - 70
Financial Stability Coordinating Council - 71, 128
Financial Stability Policy Committee - 71
Financial Stability Report - 69
financial system - 2, 6, 7, 8, 20, 21, 22, 24, 31, 34, 40, 42, 45, 48, 51,
53, 58, 59, 60, 62, 66, 68, 70, 71, 76, 81, 103, 108, 113, 114,
127, 128, 132, 133, 136, 140, 155, 160
total resources of the financial system - 59
fintech firms - 102, 103, 104
fiscal policy - 20, 21, 22, 40, 45, 52, 53, 54, 55, 132, 137, 150, 169
FIST - See Financial Institutions Strategic Transfer (FIST) Act
fixed-income securities - 59, 141
flexible credit line - 140, 141
FMIs - See financial market infrastructures
foreign banks - 29, 58
foreign exchange - 21, 46, 58, 61, 65, 134, 136, 137
foreign exchange intervention - 21
foreign exchange liberalization reforms - 58
Foreign Investment Act of 1991 - 29
forward guidance - 134
forward planning - 132
FSB - See Financial Stability Board
FSCC - See Financial Stability Coordination Council
FSPC - See Financial Stability Policy Committee
FX - See foreign exchange		G		

G-20 - 141
GCQ - See general community quarantine
GDP - See gross domestic product
General Banking Law of 2000 (RA No. 8791) - 80, 108
Germany - 69, 91
GFC - See global financial crisis
GFIs - See government financial institutions
GFIs Unified Initiatives to Distressed Enterprises for Economic
Recovery Act - 79
GFSNs - See global financial safety nets
global financial crisis - 4, 12, 13, 19, 22, 23, 29, 53, 58, 68, 70, 71,
72, 132, 133, 134, 140, 153, 160, 162, 168
global financial safety nets - 140
Global Health Security (GHS) Index - 31, 34, 140
global Marshall Plan - 141
global projection model - 152
global recession - 68, 161
global sectoral debt - 133
GOCC - See government-owned-or-controlled corporations
Google’s Mobility Reports - 155
government financial institutions - 34, 77, 79
Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) Unified Initiatives toDistress Enterprises for Economic Recovery - 34, 79
government response stringency index - 162
Government securities - 33, 42, 43, 44, 45,51, 54, 76, 80, 81, 82, 84,
148, 150
primary GS auctions - 43, 51
Government Service Insurance System - 20, 77, 78
government-owned-or-controlled corporations - 34, 80
GPM - See global projection model
Great Depression - 31, 68, 69, 160
gross domestic product - 5, 7, 19, 21, 32, 40, 45, 47, 63, 69, 70, 91,
97, 136, 137, 138, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 161, 163, 168
GS - See government securities
GSIS - See Government Service Insurance System
GUIDE Bill - See Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) Unified
Initiatives to Distress Enterprises for Economic Recovery
Guidelines on Sound Credit Risk Management - 59, 60		H		

hazard pay - 119
high-frequency indicators - 154
high-quality liquid assets - 59, 64, 136
Hong Kong - 91, 93
hospitality - 162
HQLA - See high-quality liquid assets
Human Resource (HR) - 118, 119, 120
hysteresis - 168
		

179

INDEX
I		

IATF Technical Working Group for Anticipatory and Forward
Planning - 157
IATF-EID - See Inter-Agency Task Force for the Management ofEmerging Infectious Diseases
IATF-TWG-AFP - See IATF Technical Working Group for 		
Anticipatory and Forward Planning
IBCL - See interbank call loan
IDA - See International Development Association
IFIs - See international financial institutions
IMF - See International Monetary Fund
Incident Management Team - 118, 122, 127
inclusive digital finance - 108, 109
Indonesia - 142, 165
inflation - 4, 19, 21, 22, 28, 29, 30, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 49, 50, 51,
53, 54, 55, 69, 72, 134, 148, 152, 153, 156, 158, 168, 169
inflation expectations - 21, 41, 44, 53, 55, 153, 158, 169
inflation targeting - 19, 30, 55
Information Systems Strategic Plan - 125-27
input-output (I-O) tables - 154
Instagram - 100, 101, 112, 122
InstaPay - 35, 61, 62, 63, 87, 88, 90, 91, 94, 97, 108, 109, 112, 114,
128, 149
Inter-Agency Task Force for the Management of Emerging
Infectious Diseases - 110, 123interbank call loan - 45, 167interest rate - 30, 41, 44, 45, 46, 54, 58, 65, 81, 132, 134, 137, 142
interest rate ceiling - 81
interest rate corridor - 44, 45, 54, 58
interest rate response to monetary policy - 51
negative interest rate policy - 134
real interest rate - 45
short-term interest rates - 43, 45
International Development Association - 141
International Disaster Database - 4
international financial institutions - 140
international financial order - 140
International Monetary Fund - 8, 12, 13, 21, 31, 69, 70, 134, 136,
137, 140, 151, 154, 157, 161, 169
Islamic Banking Act (RA No. 11439) - 60
ISO 20022 - 86
ISSP - See Information Systems Strategic Plan
		

J

		
Japan - 19, 60, 91, 93, 110, 134, 143
Japan International Cooperation Agency - 110
JICA - See Japan International Cooperation Agency
		K		

Keynes, John Maynard - 14
Keynesian policies - 160
Know Your Customer - 61, 104, 110
Kuwait - 91, 93
KYC - See Know Your Customer		Llabor - 13, 19, 20, 22, 23, 109, 133, 141, 161
Land Bank of the Philippines - 78, 79, 87
large enterprises - 42, 61, 148
Laws - 29, 31, 32, 58, 60, 64, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 104, 108, 109,
110, 149
Allowing the Full Entry of Foreign Banks in the Philippines		(RA No. 10641) - 58
Allowing the Infusion of Foreign Equity in the Capital of		
Rural Banks (RA No. 10574) - 58
Amending Republic Act Number 7653, Otherwise Known as		“The New Central Bank Act” (RA No. 11211) - 60, 76
Bayanihan to Heal as One Act of 2020
		(RA No. 11469) - 31, 32, 64, 76, 77, 81, 104, 149
Bayanihan to Recover as One Act of 2020
		(RA No. 11494) - 31, 32, 77, 78, 79
General Banking Law of 2000 (RA No. 8791) - 80, 108
Islamic Banking Act (RA No. 11439) - 60
Liberalizing the Entry and Scope of Operations of Foreign		Banks in the Philippines (RA No. 7721) - 29
Philippine Identification System Act
		(RA No. 11055) - 109, 110
Providing for the Regulation and Supervision of Payment
		
Systems (RA No. 11127) - 60
Special Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002 (RA No. 9182) - 80
Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and		Management System (RA No. 10121) - 31
Strengthening the Secured Transactions Legal Framework in		the Philippines (RA No. 11057) - 110
The National Payment Systems Act (RA No. 11127) - 60
The New Central Bank Act (RA No. 7653) - 29
LBP - See Land Bank of the Philippines
LCR - See liquidity coverage ratio
LDCs - See least developed countries
least developed countries - 141
legislative initiatives - 76-80
LGUs - See local government units
Liberalizing the Entry and Scope of Operations of Foreign Banksin the Philippines (RA No. 7721) - 29
liquidity - 2, 3, 8, 20, 21, 24, 32, 33, 34, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50,
51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 70, 80, 81, 86,
134, 136, 142, 143, 144, 148, 150, 156, 160, 162, 166, 167, 168,170
domestic liquidity - 21, 32, 42, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54,
		55, 58, 60, 134, 166, 168
liquidity absorption - 42, 54
liquidity buffers - 58, 64
liquidity coverage ratio - 59, 61, 64, 136
liquidity easing - 134
liquidity support - 143
liquidity-enhancing measures - 42, 43, 45, 48, 160
minimum liquidity ratio - 59, 61, 64
loan - 6, 8, 30, 32, 45, 58, 59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84,110, 114, 136, 141, 143, 144, 149, 162, 167, 168
by economic activity - 63
defaults - 162
extended to the corporate sector - 65
lending rates - 43, 45, 51, 63, 132, 167
moratorium - 78
portfolio - 59, 63, 64, 78
quality - 30, 58, 59, 64
loans-to-GDP - 63
local government units - 31, 154, 156, 157
lockdown - 7, 20, 31, 40, 41, 42, 51, 54, 58, 60, 63, 68, 96, 97, 118,
119, 129, 154, 157, 161, 162, 163, 168
long-term funding markets - 143long-term negotiable certificates of time deposits - 59
LTNCTD - See long-term negotiable certificates of time deposits		M		M3 - 49, 52
macroeconomic stability - 40, 52, 55, 157, 161, 170
macroprudential measures - 29, 136, 144
Malaysia - 142
malicious websites - 99
managing remote employees - 119
man-in-the-middle attacks - 99
management systems audit - 120
market confidence - 21, 24, 32, 40, 42, 51, 53, 66, 141, 162, 166
market sentiment - 40, 42, 44, 51, 52, 149
MAS - See Monetary Authority of Singapore
MCPI - See Microfinance Council of the Philippines, Inc.
MDBs - See multilateral development banks
MECQ - See modified ECQ

180

INDEX
MEM - See multi-equation model
MERS - See Middle East respiratory syndrome
Messenger app - 151
Metro Manila - 35, 40, 69, 103, 119, 135
MGCQ - See modified GCQ
micro transactions - 88
micro, small and medium enterprises - 20, 21, 30, 33, 34, 42, 61,
63, 64, 77, 78, 79, 110, 111, 113, 148
microfinance - 108, 111
Microfinance Council of the Philippines, Inc. - 111
Microsoft Teams - 119, 121
Middle East respiratory syndrome - 31, 152
MLR - See minimum liquidity ratio
mobile banking - 96, 97, 108, 109, 111, 112, 114, 121, 125
Monetary Authority of Singapore - 143monetary policy - 21, 22, 28, 30, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 51, 52, 53,
54, 55, 81, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 140, 142, 150, 152, 153,
154, 156, 158, 160, 162, 166, 168, 169
complementarity with macroprudential and exchange rate		
policy - 136
easing - 40, 41, 44, 52, 53
limits of - 52
money - 24, 44, 45, 48, 59, 61, 63, 76, 87, 91, 93, 96, 97, 104, 108,
109, 111, 112, 113, 132, 143, 149, 160
money multiplier - 45, 48
money services businesses - 59
moral hazard - 135, 169
MPMs - See macroprudential measures
MSMEs - See micro, small and medium enterprises
multi-equation model - 45
multi-factor authentication - 100, 111
multilateral development banks - 140, 141N		

National Bureau of Investigation - 104
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
Council - 31
National Economic and Development Authority - 155, 157
National Government - 29, 31, 32, 33, 40, 43, 44, 51, 52, 53, 55, 76,
79, 80, 81, 148, 150, 156, 157, 162, 163, 168
National Payment Systems Act - 93
National Retail Payment System - 86, 87, 94, 109
natural disasters - 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 28, 29, 30, 31
NBFI - See non-bank financial institution
NBQBs - See non-banks with quasi-banking functions
NDF - See non-deliverable forward
NEA - See new economy arrangement
NEDA - See National Economic and Development Authority
negative interest rate policy - 134

Negosyo Centers - 111
net stable funding ratio - 59, 64
New Central Bank Act - 33, 40, 60, 76, 114
New Development Bank - 141
new economy arrangement - 52, 121, 123, 126
new normal - 53, 103, 106, 121, 152, 157, 162, 170
next generation RTGS - 86
NG - See National Government
non-bank financial institution - 33, 59, 87, 88, 93, 96, 97, 166
non-banks with quasi-banking functions - 33, 42, 59, 77, 78,
80, 166
non-deliverable forward - 59, 70
non-performing assets - 22, 66, 80
non-performing loan - 59, 60, 64, 66
non-stock savings and loan associations - 59, 77
nowcasting models - 154
NPAs - See non-performing assets
NPL - See non-performing loan
NPL coverage ratio - 64
NRPS - See National Retail Payment System
NSFR - See net stable funding ratio

O

OECD - See Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment
Office 365 - 119, 121, 125, 126
OFWs - See overseas Filipino workers
OMO - See open market operations
online banking - 61, 87, 97, 109
open market operations - 23, 42, 43, 132, 148, 166
operational resilience - 58
operational risk-weighted assets - 65
Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment - 24, 137, 156
organization design strategy - 118
output gap - 45, 47, 152
overnight reverse repurchase (RRP) - 41
overseas Filipino workers - 20, 77, 91, 93
overseas remittances - 59, 151

P		

P2M - See Person-to-MerchantP2P - See Person-to-Person
Pacific Ring of Fire - 29
PAMPh - See policy analysis model for the Philippines

pandemics - 3, 6, 7, 8, 12, 31, 34
See also Coronavirus Disease 2019
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program - 91, 109
pawnshops - 59, 77
paycheck protection program liquidity facility - 143
payment system oversight framework - 93
PBOC - See People’s Bank of China
People’s Bank of China - 143
Person-to-Merchant - 88
Person-to-Person - 87
Personal Cloud Storage - 125
Personal Property Security Act - 110
personal protective equipment - 32, 119, 121
Peso - 42, 43, 46, 48, 61, 70, 84, 86, 156, 165, 167, 168
Peso Rediscount Facility - 43
PESONet - 35, 61, 62, 63, 87, 88, 90, 91, 94, 97, 108, 109, 112, 114,
128, 150PFRS 9 - See Philippine Financial Reporting Standards
PH-PROGRESO - See Philippine Program for Recovery with Equity
and Solidarity
PhilGuarantee - 78
Philippine Credit Card Industry Regulation Law(RA No. 10870) - 81
Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010
(RA No. 10121) - 31
Philippine Financial Reporting Standards - 59, 60
Philippine Guarantee Corporation - 61, 78
Philippine Identification System Act (RA No. 11055) - 109, 110
Philippine National Police - 104
Philippine Payment and Settlement System - 61, 84, 85, 86, 87
Philippine Payments Management, Inc. - 87, 88, 149
Philippine Program for Recovery with Equity and
Solidarity - 31, 32, 156
Philippine Red Cross - 122
Philippine Statistics Authority - 19, 20, 110, 155
Philippines - 5, 6, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 40, 45, 58,
59, 60, 62, 76, 78, 81, 86, 87, 89, 91, 97, 110, 111, 114, 118, 120,
121, 122, 123, 127, 128, 133, 153, 154, 157, 160, 162, 163, 164,
165, 167, 168
domestic financial markets during the pandemic - 163
strictest lockdown response - 162vulnerability to natural disasters - 29
PhilPaSS - See Philippine Payment and Settlement System
PhilPaSSplus - 86
PhilSys - See Philippine Identification System Act
phishing - 99, 100, 111
pink flamingo - 31

181

INDEX
PIPS - See Prominently important payment system
PisoLit - 112
PMI - See Purchasing Manager’s Index
policy analysis model for the Philippines - 45, 47
policy rate - 19, 33, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 50, 51, 134, 140, 142, 143,
160, 166
PPE - See personal protective equipment
PPMI - See Philippine Payments Management, Inc.
PRC - See Philippine Red Cross
price stability - 19, 53, 55, 80, 127, 132, 136, 140, 156, 160, 161, 169
price statistics from online grocery stores - 155
primary balance-to-GDP - 138
procurement - 79, 118, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126
profitability - 58, 62, 64
prominently important payment system - 93
Providing for the Regulation and Supervision of Payment Systems(RA No. 11127) - 60
provisions on credit losses for loans and financial assets - 64
prudential measures - 61
PSA - See Philippine Statistics Authority
PSOF - See payment system oversight framework
psychological services - 120
Pulse Asia - 150
Purchasing Manager’s Index - 154Q		

QE - See quantitative easing
QR code - See quick response code
quantitative easing - 21, 44, 54, 60, 134, 148, 160, 162
quick response code - 35, 109
		R		

RCBs or R/CBs - See rural and cooperative banks
RCs - See remittance channels
RDPs - See remote desktop protocols
real economy - 22, 45, 66, 68, 70, 71, 136, 163, 166, 170
real estate stress test - 59
real-time gross settlement - 84, 86, 94
recession - 4, 8, 12, 13, 19, 21, 28, 31, 40, 68, 69, 76, 91, 161, 162,
163, 168
recovery plan - 32, 152, 156
rediscounting - 33, 43
reform - 23, 28, 29, 34, 35, 68, 71, 142
regional financial arrangements - 140
regulatory relief - 21, 33, 53, 58, 60, 61, 62, 65, 142, 144, 148, 150

by Asian central banks - 60
need for timely withdrawal - 53
provision in Bayanihan II law - 78
remittances - 19, 91, 93
remote auditing - 121
remote desktop protocols - 43
remote work arrangement - 119
repo - See repurchase agreement
repurchase agreement - 33, 44, 70, 76, 140
reserve requirement - 33, 42, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 60, 61, 63,
78, 110, 132, 136, 142, 143, 148, 166
resilience - 2, 6
REST - See real estate stress test
retail - 23, 42, 43, 61, 63, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 103, 135, 162
reverse factoring - 110
reverse repurchase agreements - 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 52, 54, 76,
80, 81
RFAs - See regional financial arrangements
Rice Tariffication Law - 64
risk - 6, 8, 21, 24, 29, 31, 32, 33, 51, 53, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66,
68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 80, 86, 93, 96, 99, 101, 102, 103, 105, 110,
112, 114, 118, 121, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 151, 160,
164, 167, 169
See also uncertainty
risk aversion - 69, 71, 72, 167
risk governance - 60
risk premium in the local debt - 164risk-based supervision - 59
systemic risk analysis - 69, 70, 71
risk-weighted assets - 59, 65
Roosevelt, Franklin - 160
RR - See reserve requirement
RRP - See reverse repurchase agreements
RTGS - See real-time gross settlement
rural and cooperative banks - 42, 59
Rural Bankers Association of the Philippines - 157
Russia - 69
RWA - See risk-weighted assetsS

safe-haven currencies - 70
SAFr - See Supervisory Assessment Framework
SAP - See social amelioration program
SARS - See severe acute respiratory syndrome
Saudi Arabia - 69, 91, 93

SBCorp - See Small Business Corporation
SBL - See single borrower’s limit
SBWS - See small business wage subsidy
SCF - supply chain financing
Schengen - 69
SEC - See Securities and Exchange Commission
secondary market - 43, 45, 51, 54, 148, 150, 166
Securities and Exchange Commission - 77, 79, 93
security operations centers - 100
severe acute respiratory syndrome - 12, 31, 58, 152
SHC - See special holding company
Short-term funding markets - 143
Singapore - 60, 91, 93, 143
single borrowers limit - 61
SIPS - See systemically important payment systemskeleton work force - 119
Small Business Corporation - 77, 78, 79
small business wage subsidy - 91
SMS or short messaging service - 100
SOC - See security operations centerssocial amelioration program - 91, 97, 103, 109
social distancing - 23, 58, 62, 69, 96, 97, 148, 161
social engineering attacks - 100
Social media - 128, 129, 148, 149, 151
Social Security System - 20, 77, 78, 91
South Korea - 60
sovereign bond-backed securities - 141
Spanish flu - 7
special holding company - 79
Special Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002 (RA No. 9182) - 80
SRCM - See systemic risk crisis management
SSS - See Social Security System
state of national emergency - 76
state of public health emergency - 34, 122
Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction andManagement System (RA No. 10121) - 31
Strengthening the Secured Transactions Legal Framework in thePhilippines (RA No. 11057) - 110
sudden stops - 3, 4, 8, 132, 133
Supervisory Assessment Framework - 60
supply chain financing - 110
supply-side shocks - 30
swap lines - 143
Swine Flu - 58, 64
Swiss National Bank - 143
systemic shock - 69
systemically important payment system - 93
		

182

T

targeted lending programs - 143
targeted liquidity and lending operations - 33
TBs - See thrift banks
TDF - See term deposit facility
telecommuting - 118
See also work-from-hometerm deposit facility - 33, 42, 43, 44, 54
Thailand - 142, 143, 165
The National Payment Systems Act (RA No. 11127) - 60
The New Central Bank Act (RA No. 7653) - 29
Third-party Payment Service Providers - 86
thrift banks - 42, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 87
time deposits - 63
tourism - 7, 20, 77, 135, 152, 154, 156, 162, 163
transaction account - 88, 108, 109
Treasury bills - 43, 51
Treasury bonds - 43
treasury single account - 44
TSA - See treasury single accountTwitter - 100, 101, 112
Typhoon Belt - 29

U		
UBP - See Union Bank of the Philippines
UK - See United Kingdom
UKBs or U/KBs - See universal and commercial banks
UMP - See unconventional monetary policy
uncertainty - 2, 8, 12, 13, 14, 17, 21, 24, 32, 40, 41, 42, 53, 69, 70,
112, 119, 129, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 161, 170
unconventional monetary policies - 132, 134, 135
unemployment benefits and insurance - 20
Union Bank of the Philippines - 89, 120
United Kingdom - 69, 91, 93
United Nations - 29, 154
United States - 12, 13, 19, 69, 71, 86, 91, 93, 144, 160, 168
universal and commercial banks - 33, 42, 44, 45, 49, 51, 52, 59, 166
US - See United States
US Dollar Trades - 84, 86
US Federal Reserve Bank - 44, 142, 143, 160
		

V

		
VCEs - See virtual currency exchanges
Viber - 151
virtual conference calls - 151
virtual currency exchanges - 93, 96, 97, 98, 102,103
virtual private networks - 43
VIX - See Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
VPN - See virtual private networks		W		

WB - See World Bank
weighted monetary operations rate - 44, 45
WFH - See work-from home
WHO - See World Health Organization
WMOR - See weighted monetary operations ratework-from home - 23, 84, 100, 101, 118, 119, 123, 125
World Bank - 136, 151, 154, 161
World Health Organization - 68, 161

world oil market - 69
World Retail Banking Report - 97		Z		zero-trust operational model - 100