Working Paper 1999:13

Burden Differentiation:
Fairness Principles and Proposals
The joint CICERO-ECN project on sharing the burden of greenhouse gas
reduction among countries

Lasse Ringius, Asbjørn Torvanger, and Arild Underdal
February 2000

CICERO
Center for International Climate
and Environmental Research
P.B. 1129 Blindern
N-0318 Oslo, Norway
Phone: +47 22 85 87 50
Fax: +47 22 85 87 51
E-mail: admin@cicero.uio.no
Web: www.cicero.uio.no

CICERO Senter for klimaforskning
P.B. 1129 Blindern, 0318 Oslo
Telefon: 22 85 87 50
Faks: 22 85 87 51
E-post: admin@cicero.uio.no
Nett: www.cicero.uio.no

Working Paper 1999:13
Burden Differentiation: Fairness Principles and Proposals

Abstract
This report is the second working paper of the joint CICERO (Center for International Climate andEnvironmental Research, Oslo) and ECN (Netherlands Energy Research Foundation) project ‘Rules
for Burden Differentiation of Greenhouse Gas Reduction’. The funding of this research project by
the Research Council of Netherlands is gratefully acknowledged. We are grateful to our ECN
partners Remko Ybema, Jaap Jansen and Frank Ormel, and to Benito Müller, for useful comments
and suggestions.
Beginning in the late 1980, a series of international negotiations has been conducted with theexplicit objective of preventing a negative change of the global climate system due to increasing
concentrations of anthropogenic greenhouse gases in the earth’s atmosphere. These on-goinginternational negotiations therefore aim at the provision of an international public or collective goodby a group of countries.
The international public good in question − protection of the global climate system − is to beprovided through a process of international negotiated cooperation. The good therefore is notprovided by a single predominant actor who either supplies the good to itself and others, or who
uses its power – understood in an economic or military sense – to force others to assist in providing
the good. But, unsurprisingly, finding a way to distribute the costs within the group of countries
involved has been a major obstacle in these negotiations. International negotiators have, in otherwords, been faced with the challenge of reaching an agreement on burden sharing among countries.
In this context, burden sharing refers to the way in which a group of countries benefiting from apublic good agrees to share the costs of providing that good. In the future, it will be important thatinternational climate negotiations succeed to distribute the costs of protecting this international
public good in a way that is widely seen as fair and just. Thus, developing a burden sharing schemethat is generally recognized as ‘fair’ is an essential condition for agreement on policy measures.
Chapter 2 in this report makes a first attempt to identify those fairness and justice principles that are
widely accepted by states and seem relevant for burden differentiation in future international climate
policy negotiations. As this report points out, it seems quite clear that in order to be acceptable to a
critical mass of parties a burden sharing scheme will have to combine two or more principles offairness. No single principle can meet the full range of requirements. This report discusses inparticular three different notions; equality, equity and exemption. Those notions or principles, if
translated into operational rules that can be widely accepted by states, seem to create a normative
platform upon which a fair burden sharing agreement could be fleshed out. Moving from theory topractice, chapter 3 presents a summary analysis of burden differentiation proposals and methods
presented by governments in the course of the recently completed negotiations resulting in the
Kyoto Protocol. It shows that there is a rather broad-based support for indicators applying theegalitarian principle as well as the ‘polluter pays’ principle. There also seems to exist a need to
distinguish those real national economic and natural resource circumstances that are responsible forlarge part of the observed emissions asymmetries existing across countries. Chapter 4 offers a briefsummary of implications for the design of more specific burden sharing rules.

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Contents
1

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................72

ANALYSIS OF FAIRNESS PRINCIPLES RELEVANT FOR BURDENDIFFERENTIATION ..........................................................................................................8
Principles, formulas and indicators...................................................................................8
The role of fairness principles in international negotiations........................................8
Principles of distributive fairness.......................................................................................9
Notions of ‘rights’ ...............................................................................................................14
Inclusion of Damage Costs in Burden Sharing Rules .................................................15
Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................15

2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
3
3.1
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.1.4
3.1.5
3.1.6
3.1.7
3.1.8

BURDEN SHARING PROPOSALS AND METHODS PRESENTED
DURING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL NEGOTIATIONS .........................................16
Review of differentiation proposals from the AGBM negotiations ..........................16
Group: Need-based convergence ....................................................................................19Group: ‘Guilt’, interpreted as historical responsibility................................................21
Group: Multi-criteria formulae ........................................................................................22
Group: Fossil fuel dependency ........................................................................................23
Group: Menu-approach ....................................................................................................24
Group: Sectoral approach ................................................................................................25
Group: Capacity (GDP per capita) .................................................................................26
Group: Cost-effectiveness .................................................................................................28

4

CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................29

5

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................31

List of Tables
TABLE 1. SELECTED EQUITY PRINCIPLES AND RELATED BURDEN SHARING RULES ................................................................... 10
TABLE 2. KEY PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY ........................................................................................................................................ 11
TABLE 3. DOMAINS OF DIFFERENT PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS ...................................................................................................... 14
TABLE 4. GROUPING OF BURDEN SHARING PROPOSALS FROM THE AGBM PROCES .................................................................... 17
TABLE 5 SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS FOR BURDEN-SHARING METHODS MADE BY PARTIES IN THE AD HOC GROUP ON THE
BERLIN MANDATE (AGBM) NEGOTIATIONS. ..................................................................................................................... 18
TABLE 6. THE FRENCH CONVERGENCE PROPOSAL ...................................................................................................................... 20

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1

Introduction

This report consists of the two chapters. In chapter 1 we analyze fairness principles relevant forburden differentiation. In chapter 2 we present a survey of burden sharing proposals and methods
presented during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations.1 The report ends with an attempt at identifying
the critical requirements that a burden sharing scheme will have to meet.
The survey and assessment build on contributions from recent academic literature. In relation to theassessment of fairness principles, some useful literature references are Ringius et al. (1998), Rose etal. (1997), Rose (1992), and Barrett (1992). A number of papers and reports have focused on
methods for initial distribution of tradable quotas (e.g. grandfathering). The analysis in chapter 2
focuses on two main questions. First, can we identify any widely shared principles of fairness, and if
so which? Second, could these principles serve as useful keys in future climate policy negotiations?
In chapter 2, seventeen specified proposals for burden sharing suggested by governments in the
Kyoto protocol negotiations are presented in a catalogue style. Proposals advocating flat-rate (equal
percentage) emission reductions are not included. As the range of the proposals is wide, we have
tried to find a suitable organizing principle for the survey. The first option was to try to identify one
or more fairness principles supported by the proposals. However, since such principles rarely are
explicitly formulated, identifying fairness principles that support specific proposals turned out to be ademanding task. Moreover, there is no simple one-to-one relation between fairness principles andequity formulae. Thus we ended up with 8 categories of proposals based on important common
features, where the category name reflects the main feature.

1

In this report we use the concepts burden differentiation and burden sharing interchangeably. Most burden sharing
schemes will involve some kind of differentiation.

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2

Analysis Of Fairness Principles Relevant For
Burden Differentiation

2.1

Principles, formulas and indicators

When examining issues of justice and fairness in burden sharing, it is important that different
concepts and notions are defined and used in a consistent and systematic manner. We propose todistinguish between three different levels of analysis: (i) general principles of fairness and justice, (ii)burden sharing formulae or rules, and (iii) criteria or operational indicators developed with specificreference to the particular problem at hand. These distinctions are based on different levels of
normative content, levels of generality or specificity, and degree of formalization andoperationalization.
By principles of fairness and justice we refer to generally acknowledged norms of justice andfairness. Such principles are general in the sense that they are assumed to be valid across a wide
range of issue-areas and at different levels – from interpersonal to international relations. If
translated into more specific burden sharing rules or formulas, these general principles can bebrought to bear on particular policy problems, such as global climate change.
Burden sharing formulas or rules are explicitly specified functions that generate a specific scheme ofobligations when fed with appropriate input data. In this context, such formulas will most often be
used to determine ‘national emissions entitlements, or changes from the status quo’ (Parson andZeckhauser, 1995:99). Burden sharing formulas and rules therefore reflect, more or less explicitly,
one or more fairness principles. In addition, they identify one or more operational indicators.
Operational criteria or indicators specify precisely the kind of ‘hard’ data that are to be used toestimate costs (obligations) and/or benefits in a given context. (Changes in) CO2 emissions per
capita and GDP per capita are two of the most frequently used indicators in connection with burden
sharing rules in the climate policy area.

2.2

The role of fairness principles in international negotiations

The interest in burden sharing formulas is premised on two basic assumptions. One is that thenegotiating behavior of at least some of the parties is to at least some degree based on normative
considerations concerning distributive fairness or justice. In its weakest form this seems to be a safe
assumption; a quick look at the arguments exchanged in international negotiations would strongly
indicate that at least some actors pay some attention to norms of fairness. To conclude that suchnorms provide important clues to understanding behavior we must, however, demonstrate not onlythat they are sometimes invoked but also that they are recognized as important decision premises fora critical mass of significant actors even when their implications are not in one’s own favor, or atleast serve to strengthen the motivation of parties who invoke them. This is a non-trivial and muchstronger claim. Negotiation theory most often assumes that actor behavior is motivated primarily by
self-interest, and that general principles of fairness are invoked only to promote or defend one’s own
interests. In this study we take a more moderate position. More precisely, we assume that actor
behavior is based primarily, but not exclusively, on self-interest. Considerations of fairness will, we
believe, serve (a) as a source of motivational strength for actors who consider themselves being
treated ‘unfairly’; (b) as a framework of soft constraints upon the pursuit of self-interest, and (c) as
decision premises in situations where self-interest provide no clear guidance. This is certainly far
from claiming that actors behave exclusively or even primarily according to what March and Olsen
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Burden Differentiation: Fairness Principles and Proposals(1990) label ‘the logic of appropriateness’. What we do assume is only that notions of distributive
fairness are sufficiently salient in the minds of decision-makers to warrant systematic analysis as
criteria that parties use to evaluate alternative policy options.
Now, for burden sharing formulas to serve as premises for international agreements it is not
sufficient to demonstrate that a critical mass of actors do in fact recognize the validity of suchnorms. Norms of fairness can be a source of conflict as well as a platform for agreement. Notions offairness can provide a basis for an international regime only if there is a certain minimum ofconsensus among its members about what is fair and what is unfair; a critical mass of actors must, inother words, subscribe to the same norms. For global regimes meeting this latter requirement can bea tall order indeed. Again, we take an intermediate position. Studying international negotiations we
can observe that there are at least some rather general norms that are frequently invoked and very
rarely disputed – at least on principled grounds. We shall assume that these do indeed constitute a
soft core of widely, though perhaps not universally, accepted ideas about distributive fairness. This iscertainly not to suggest that international diplomacy has come up with anything even remotely
resembling a precise consensual formula for distributing costs and gains; at best we are talking about
a rather loose and elastic framework. Moreover, in most cases more than one principle canlegitimately be invoked, and quite often the implications of the most salient principles will diverge.
To resolve such conflicts one could either work towards some differentiation of domains or assign
relative ‘weights’ to various principles. Although frequently used, neither of these tools has beendeveloped into a precise and generally applicable formula. As a consequence, there will in mostcases be ample scope for (interest-based) bargaining within a rather wide zone of legitimate
arguments. It also follows that normative ‘clout’ will be generated particularly where salient
principles converge. Our first priority should therefore be to search for burden sharing rules locatedat the intersection between two or more salient principles.
Which principles can serve as a basis for burden sharing agreements?
Assuming that norms of distributive fairness ‘matter’ and that a soft core of widely accepted
principles exists, the next question becomes which principles belong to this ‘core’? Unfortunately,
there is a surprising dearth of systematic empirical research addressing this question. What follows
below should therefore be read as a rather tentative interpretation of the scant evidence available tous at this stage.

2.3

Principles of distributive fairness

Some studies have identified a fairly large number of distributive fairness principles and rules for the
distribution of costs or benefits (Table 1, p. 9, gives some prominent examples). Some analysts (seee.g. Rose et al., 1998) in addition distinguish among different types of principles: principles
concerned primarily with the initial allocation of behavioral obligations (allocation-based criteria),
principles concerned primarily with the final costs of measures (outcome-based criteria), andprinciples primarily concerned with the fairness of the process of, or institutional arrangement for,allocation as such (process-based criteria). Since some of these typologies seem to operate atdifferent levels of generality, the overall picture can be somewhat confusing.
In this section we will adopt a different approach. Instead of making another comprehensive
inventory of principles or criteria for burden sharing we will try to identify a few basic norms thatseem – on the basis of the evidence we have from other similar instances – to constitute the core on
which most of the discussion is focused. Each of these basic norms raises a set of sub-questions.
Answers to these sub-questions provide a basis for formulating more specific rules or criteria. We
will indicate how some of the basic principles can spawn multiple specific criteria. Nevertheless, ourprincipal objective in this section is limited to identifying the main general principles from which

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such formulas are derived. Our focus will be limited to substantive (as distinguished fromprocedural) principles. Moreover, we will make no attempt to examine the legal status of various
principles or rules; our question is simply whether and to what extent they can serve as consensualpremises for international agreements on climate policy measures.
Table 1. Selected Equity Principles and Related Burden Sharing Rules
Interpretation

Example of implied burden sharing rule

Egalitarian

Every individual has an equal right topollute or to be protected from pollution

Allow or reduce emissions inproportion to population

Sovereignty

All nations have an equal right to pollute or
to be protected from pollution; current levelof emissions constitutes a status quo right

Allow or reduce emissions proportionallyacross all countries to maintain relativeemission levels between them

Horizontal

Countries with similar economic
circumstances have similar emission rights
and burden sharing responsibilities

Equalize net welfare change across countries(net cost of abatement as a proportion of GDP
is equal for each country)

VerticalThe greater the ability to pay the greater the
economic burden

Net cost of abatement is directly correlatedwith per capita GDP

Polluter pays

The economic burden is proportional toemissions (eventually including historicalemissions)Share abatement costs across countries inproportion to emission levels

Equity principle

We interpret available evidence as indicating that the norms of distributive fairness that actors relate
to in international negotiations constitute a rather complex framework, combining at least threedifferent notions: equality, equity and exemption. Let us first try to specify each of these notions andthen explore how they are combined.
Equal obligations
The default option in international negotiations seems to be the norm that all parties should haveequal obligations. In saying that this is the default option we do not imply that it is the one mostfrequently used. Rather, we suggest that this is where discussions will normally start, and that theburden of proof tends to rest with anyone who wants to argue for a differentiated approach. The
principle of equal obligations is open to different interpretations. One important question is whether
obligations should be defined in absolute or relative terms. Given the range of variance in size andcapabilities among countries, the former is hardly a serious option in negotiations on global regimes(except for procedural obligations and some commitments to ban completely the release of “nonessential” substances). Attention therefore tends to focus on obligations defined in terms of relative
contributions. In the context of pollution control this typically translates into standardized
regulations of the format ‘all parties shall reduce emissions of substance S by X per cent relative to agiven baseline (emission level at time to)’. The first LRTAP regulations dealing with ‘acid rain’ aregood examples. In the climate change negotiations many governments initially argued in favor of
applying such a ‘flat rate’ or across-the-board approach to all industrialized countries.22Note, though, that the proponents of flat rate reductions did not necessarily argue that this principle would yield thefairest distribution of costs. For at least some parties, considerations of political feasibility seem to have been at least as
important, one main argument being that bargaining over differentiated obligations would prove intractable and lead into
prolonged deadlock.

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The principle of equal obligations has a firm normative basis if all parties involved are equal in all
relevant respects. This condition is, however, never met in global negotiations. Even in a morenarrow regional setting we will often find a substantial range of variance along importantdimensions. When the range of variance exceeds a certain threshold (and the issue is not one ofestablishing a complete ban on certain activities), parties most often shift from the principle of equalobligations to some notion of equity.
EquityThe common denominator for equity norms is that costs and/or benefits be distributed in (rough)proportion to actor scores on some dimension considered to be important.3 A fairly large number ofsuch dimensions can be identified, but in international negotiations attention seems to focus
primarily on two. One is the role of each party in creating a problem or providing a good. If someparties have played a significantly or ‘disproportionably’ larger role than others have in causing aproblem – e.g. through emissions – it seems fair that they should also take a corresponding
responsibility for ‘cleaning up the mess’. Similarly, if some parties have contributed more to aparticular good, it seems fair that they get a corresponding share of the benefits, everything else
constant. The other dimension refers to the consequences that a particular obligation or project
would have for the various parties. A common notion of fairness requires that burdens be shared insome proportion to capacity and that scarce goods be distributed in proportion to needs. This gives
us a matrix with four key principles, summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Key principles of equity
Object to be distributed
Focus on↓Cause of state of problem
Consequences for actors

Costs (obligations)‘Guilt’, responsibility (forcausing the problem)
Capacity (ability to pay)
{Benefit derived from project}

Benefits (goods)
Contribution (to solving problem
or providing good)
Need

Burden sharing is, of course, a matter of distributing costs. However, as we shall see criteria for
distributing costs can be derived indirectly also from principles pertaining to the distribution of
benefits. We therefore need to examine both columns.
The principle of ‘guilt’ says, in essence, that the costs of solving or alleviating a problem should be
distributed in proportion to a party’s share of responsibility for causing that problem. This norm
finds substantial support in previous conventions. Thus, in a somewhat different form it was one of
the cornerstones of agreement concluded at the first global conference on the environment in
Stockholm in 1972. It is also the backbone of the Polluter Pays Principle (although this principle
was initially applied to international environmental problems primarily as a policy tool forenhancing efficiency rather than as a norm of fairness). Applied to the climate change issue theprinciple of guilt would imply that countries with the largest emissions per capita would have to
make the largest cutbacks (other things being equal). In the climate change negotiations thedeveloping countries have based much of their argumentation upon this norm (see e.g. the Brazilian
proposal, described in chapter 3).

3Note that also the principle of equity imply equal obligations in cases where actor scores on these dimensions are equal
or close to equal.

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The principle of capacity requires that costs be distributed in proportion to ‘ability to pay’. The
conventional yardstick for determining capacity would be wealth measured in terms of GDP/cap.
If the benefits derived from a particular project vary substantially, the idea might come up that costs
be distributed in proportion to (expected) benefits. Applied to problems of global environmental
change, however, this notion would tend to run against other salient principles. More specifically, it
would often lead us to impose the heaviest costs upon the most vulnerable countries. These would
often be poor ‘victims’ of pollution emitted by richer and more fortunate countries. We therefore
expect the idea of distributing abatement costs in proportion to benefits – although often referred toin everyday life – to be overruled by other norms in this particular context. We have bracketed thisprinciple in table 2 to indicate that we expect it to be subordinate to the other principal norms.
The corresponding equity norms for distributing benefits would be the principles of contribution andneed, respectively. The former says that a party’s share of a certain good should be proportional toits contribution to ‘producing’ that particular good. Applied to pollution issues this norm most oftentranslates into an argument that countries should be given credit for past achievements in terms ofemission reductions.
In the climate change context the principle of need is the more salient and interesting of the two. It
can be translated into somewhat different burden sharing rules, but a minimal requirement is that all
human beings be granted the ‘pollution permits’ needed to secure basic human needs, including adecent standard of living. The most simple and ‘primitive’ rule building upon this requirement would
be that all individuals be given equal pollution ‘permits’ (allowing for some period of adjustment).
More ‘sophisticated’ rules would take into account the fact that even though all human beings may
have equal rights to the benefits of the global commons, differences in living conditions related toe.g. climate and natural resource endowments may well justify differentiation of pollution ‘permits’.
The principle of need allows and even requires such differentiation if it is based on differences in(basic) human needs. The latter interpretation says that emissions needed to secure a decent
standard of living are permitted while emissions stemming from the production or consumption of‘luxury’ goods should be subject to restrictive measures if total emissions exceed a certain threshold.
The norm that pollution ‘permits’ be based on needs has been invoked not only by developing
countries; in somewhat different interpretations it is also the basic principle behind the early French
proposal and the EU Triptych approach.4
Norms requiring that the distribution of costs or benefits be related to the role that actors haveplayed in causing a problem or creating a common good are conditional in the sense that they are
considered compelling only when certain conditions are fulfilled. Consider, for example, theprinciple of ‘guilt’. Two recurring questions are whether ‘guilt’ presumes intent or at least knowledge
about the harmful consequences of one’s behavior. In the context of international environmental
diplomacy, the consensual answers seem to be that an actor can be considered ‘guilty’ without(proof of) malicious intent, but not if he could not have known – on the basis of the state of(scientific) knowledge at the time – that his behavior was causing (substantial) damage.5 Moreover,for ‘guilt’ to serve as key to burden sharing one would normally require that an actor has thecapacity required to fulfill the obligations derived from the principle; it would not be fair to demandof someone something he cannot deliver (without intolerable sacrifice). Thus, ‘guilt’ becomes a
4

In the Triptych approach the concept of ‘need’ is, though, given a rather liberal interpretation, extending far beyond basic
human needs, including also what is considered necessary in order to sustain major economic activities on ‘reasonably
equal’ terms.
5
Subjective ignorance or ‘good faith’ does not necessarily qualify for acquittal; the critical question is whether the‘objective’ state of knowledge at the time warranted serious concern. Note that even when ‘objective’ ignorance can justify
past behavior that is now considered harmful, it does not (necessarily) justify the continuation of that behavior beyond theperiod of ignorance. New knowledge may well imply new obligations.

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relevant notion only for regulating behavior that is not inextricably linked to the fulfillment of basic
human needs.
The same questions about intent and knowledge can be raised also with respect to the principle of‘contribution’. Can, for example, a country (like France) claim credit for emission reductions
obtained as an unintended side-effect of measures undertaken for purposes that have nothingwhatsoever to do with climate change? There is no consensual answer to the latter kind ofquestions, but the prevailing mood seems inclined to require at least some element of positive intent
before accepting claims for ‘credit’. In this respect, the principle of ‘contribution’ seems to be subject
to stricter requirements than the principle of ‘guilt’.
In moving from the level of general norms and principles to burden sharing formulas a host of otherquestions will have to be answered. One of these pertains to the specification of the notion of‘proportionality’ – a defining characteristic of ‘equity’. A strict interpretation would require a linear
relationship between a party’s score on the criterion in question and its obligation to contribute. Thisis, however, not the interpretation we would expect to find in international environmental
negotiations. Instead of continuous differentiation we would expect parties to be sorted into a small
set of discrete categories (such as e.g. industrialized vs. developing countries). Norms of equity
would then be applied to differentiate obligations between but not within categories. Furthermore,
instead of cardinal scale linearity we would expect differentiation to be made in terms of a crude –and perhaps not entirely consistent – ordinal scale. Even a cursory glance at the reports from theclimate change negotiations would suffice to indicate that we are dealing with such modified
interpretations of proportionality.
A second question deals with time horizons. Any application of notions such as ‘guilt’ or‘contribution’ requires that we specify at what time or for what period these variables are to bemeasured. Does ‘guilt’ accumulate, and if so for how long? Can ‘credit’ for past achievements beclaimed only for a certain time period? Similarly, how do we balance present against future ‘needs’?
If regulations require substantial and costly change of behavior how much time should be allowed
for adjustments? These are the kinds of questions for which the general principles themselvesprovide no clear answers. Since the actual distribution of obligations and abatement costs may
depend significantly on the time horizon adopted, we can easily understand why these questions
often become subject to hard interest-based bargaining. As the climate change negotiations clearly
indicate, consensus at the level of general principles is no guarantee that parties will also reachagreement on specific formulas.
A related, but analytically different, question is whether to frame regulations as static or dynamic
instruments. A dynamic regime includes provisions for reassessment at specified intervals, whereas astatic regime does not. In practice, the difference may not be all that great. No regime is designed foreternity, and at some point reassessment will occur whether explicitly provided for or not. The
distinction nonetheless tends to be important; quite often at least some actors – particularly thosesubject to the most demanding obligations – would like to obtain an explicit promise from theirpartners that the distribution will be reconsidered and changed if scores on the critical variables
change. In the climate change negotiations this concern has been expressed primarily in a demand –most strongly articulated by the US – that also developing countries undertake a commitment tocontribute, at least at some future point where they presumably will enjoy a higher level of prosperity(and thus have acquired greater ‘capacity’) and contribute more to world emissions (‘guilt’).
Exemption
Particularly in a global setting, the range of variance in terms of the dimensions such as ‘guilt’ or‘capacity’ is most often so great that even the notion of soft proportionality would lead to ‘unfair’burdens upon the poorest ‘victims’. When the latter threshold is reached, attention tends to shift

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from norms of equity to the simple principle of exemption; more precisely, exemption from any
substantive obligation for which a party is not (fully) compensated. We see this pattern clearly in the
global climate change negotiations. Even those who argue that developing countries should make acommitment to contribute, at least in the future, do accept that (temporary) exemptions are required
for the poorest countries. Any pressure upon these countries to sign would at this stage have to be arequest for moral support rather than material contributions involving net costs.
Combining principles
In the analysis above we have assumed that the three basic notions of fairness have different
domains. The principle of equality applies within groups or subsets that are considered sufficiently
homogenous in important respects. The principle of equity applies where the critical differences
exceed that threshold – except for the most ‘disadvantaged’ parties, from whom no material
contribution will be required. The general structure of this framework is summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. Domains of different principles of fairness
Principle
Equal obligations
EquityExemption

DomainRelevant differences ≤ x
x < relevant differences ≤ yRelevant differences > y(assumption: x<y)Now, in multilateral negotiations this specification of domains could easily lead to inconsistentprescriptions, with the ‘solution’ depending on exactly which comparisons are made. This problem ismost often resolved by defining a more or less arbitrary baseline that can be used as a generalstandard of reference, and/or by defining a small set of groups (e.g. developed vs. developing
countries) and then apply the principle of equal obligations within each group and one of the otherprinciples to differentiate between groups.
It remains, then, to determine the critical thresholds (indicated by ‘x’ and ‘y’ in table 3).
International diplomacy has produced no general and precise guidelines, leaving again aconsiderable scope for hard bargaining. Even so, we suggest that in order to qualify as ‘fair’ a burden
sharing formula will have to correspond to this general format. Moreover, within the domain ofequity, it will have to differentiate obligations according to the principles outlined above – notnecessarily responding to all, but at the very least to one. What gives these principles clout in the
climate change context is the fact that their implications to a large extent converge. In particular, theprinciples of ‘guilt’, ‘capacity’ and ‘need’ all place the bulk of responsibility for mitigation measuressquarely with the wealthy, industrialized countries.

2.4

Notions of ‘rights’

In discussions about the distribution of costs or benefits reference is sometimes made to ‘rights’. In
legal discourse, a ‘right’ usually refers to a claim that can be justified by law (and upheld in court). In
international negotiations it seems that claims are often framed in terms of ‘rights’ in order to bolster
their moral status; while a ‘principle’ or ‘norm’ has to be justified, a ‘right’ speaks largely for itself
and translates more immediately into a corresponding duty. In practice, however, this broader
notion of ‘rights’ becomes hard to distinguish from that of ‘principles’.
There seems to be two basic notions of rights that are often invoked in international environmental
negotiations. One refers to what might be called basic human rights, including the right to a ‘decent’
standard of living and to a ‘healthy’ environment. The notion of basic human rights is rarely, if ever,14

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explicitly challenged. On the other hand, there is no general consensus on precise specifications.
This kind of rights is clearly relevant to the global climate change negotiations. It often serves as apillar of the principles of need and also for the norm of exemption for the most disadvantaged
parties. The other category may be referred to as acquired rights. Such notions play a prominent rolein negotiations on resource management. For example, in international fisheries management‘historic catch’ is often considered an important criterion for distributing quotas. Within OPEC
‘historic production volume’ serves a similar function. In the climate change negotiations, the socalled ‘grandfathering’ principle considers current emissions as a claim justified by established usage
and custom. Again, the basic idea seems to be broadly accepted, but in this case subject to certain
conditions about the legitimacy of the behavior in question, and to how a particular position was
acquired. Most importantly, only legitimate behavior can serve as a basis for claiming ‘rights’. In thecontext of climate change past emissions will probably not be accepted as a legitimate basis forclaiming ‘rights’ to continue polluting since it collides head on with the principle of guilt. Bartschand Müller (2000) choose another approach since they combine grandfathering with equal per
capita emissions (invoking the Need equity principle) in a universal burden sharing formula.
Records of past emissions would, though, probably be accepted as a relevant parameter when it
comes to determining time for adjustment. Moreover, a country’s current emission level is an
important determinant of adjustment costs.

2.5

Inclusion of Damage Costs in Burden Sharing Rules

In the analysis above, we have – with one exception – considered principles of burden sharing
without considering the distribution of damage costs. This has been a deliberate choice, based on
two main reasons. One is that as long as we focus only on the costs of controlling emissions ofgreenhouse gases, the only direct link would be a rule suggesting that costs be distributed inproportion to (expected) benefits. However, as those who stand to gain the most from abatement
measures are likely to be poor, developing countries, this rule would – if it were applied to theclimate change problem – run counter to the principles of guilt and capacity. In such a clash, it
seems clear that the latter would prevail. The other reason is that even if the general rule of
distributing costs in proportion to benefits were to be applied, the present state of knowledge about
who will be affected how much by human-induced climate change is much too poor to serve as aconsensual basis for negotiations about distributive schemes. This situation is not likely to change
substantially over the next 5-10 years.
Damage costs would, however, be most relevant to schemes of compensation (for damage thatcannot be prevented) or adaptation assistance. The notion of compensation is intimately linked to
the notion of damage or harm. A fair scheme of compensation would therefore have to differentiate
the allocation of benefits on the basis of harm. With regard to the distribution of costs, however, theprinciples that we have analyzed above would apply also when ‘burdens’ are extended to include
also the costs of compensation.

2.6

Conclusion

This brief overview indicates that decision-makers have a real menu for choice. No single principle
stands out as the clue to distributive fairness. We can therefore expect at least most of these, andperhaps others as well, to be invoked with some legitimacy in particular contexts. We now turn tothe climate change negotiations themselves in order to see which principles and more specificburden sharing rules have in fact been suggested. These negotiations started with the so-called Berlinmandate from the first Conference of Parties to the Climate Convention in Berlin in the spring of
1995. Our survey ends with the Kyoto Protocol of December 1997.

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Burden Differentiation: Fairness Principles and Proposals

3

Burden Sharing Proposals and Methods
Presented During The Kyoto Protocol
Negotiations
6

In this survey we employ two sources. The first is proposals from the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin
Mandate (AGBM) process that was initiated by the Berlin Mandate at the first Conference of theParties (COP1) to the UNFCCC in the spring of 1995, and ended up in the Kyoto Protocol in
December 1997.7 From this negotiation process we identified and selected all proposals that implied
some type of differentiation of targets. Consequently we left out all proposals for flat-rate targets (i.e.
where parties should reduce their emissions by the same percentage). Altogether this came to 17
proposals made by a single party or groups of parties. The second source is the European
Community’s Triptique approach for differentiation of targets among its member states. The
proposals are presented in a catalogue style.

3.1

Review of differentiation proposals from the AGBM
negotiations

Based on common features among the proposals we have organized the 17 proposals from the
AGBM process into 8 groups. In addition there were numerous proposals based on flat percentage
reductions. These are, however, not examined further in this report. The grouping is shown in Table
4, where the proposals are given a reference number. The main common feature of a group of
proposals is emphasized. One of the features to be considered is the explicit or implicit reference toone or more fairness principles. Furthermore, a more detailed summary of the reviewed proposals isshown in table 5. Here we specify operational criteria as well as basic principles. We should like topoint out that in some cases the arguments submitted or criteria proposed are compatible with morethan one principle of fairness. In particular, it is often difficult to distinguish arguments pertaining toneed from arguments invoking (basic) rights. Moreover, it is often hard to determine whether
arguments in favor of convergence towards a common level of emissions per capita is based (only)
on the notion of need or (also) on considerations pertaining to capacity. The overview below should
be read with this caveat in mind. Having said that, we would like to add that we take some comfort
in the fact that when such ambiguity occurs the principles in question will pull largely in the same
direction, meaning that they can be expressed in similar (perhaps even identical) operational rules.

6

This survey of differentiation proposals builds on Torvanger and Godal (1999).
An interesting survey of possible methods for differentiation from the early phase of the negotiations is found in UNFCCC (1996),
FCCC/AGBM/1996/7. This document was prepared for the 4th AGBM meeting in Geneva in July 1996.

7

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Table 4. Grouping of burden sharing proposals from the AGBM proces
Group
Convergence

Historical responsibility
Multi-criteria formula
Fossil fuel dependency

Menu approach
Sector approach
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita

Cost-effectivenessProposals
1. France
2. Switzerland
3. EU
4. Brazil
5. Brazil-RIVM
6. Norway
7. Iceland
8. Australia
9. Iran
10. Japan I
11. Japan II
12. EU’s Triptique approach
13. Poland et al.
14. Estonia
15. Poland and Russia
16. Korea
17. New Zealand17

Table 5 Summary of proposals for burden-sharing methods made by parties in the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) negotiations.
ProposalWhenproposed

Fairness principle

Main features

Indicators
CDE

FranceDec. 96

Need (rights) (undifferentiated)

Switzerland

Dec. 96

EU
BrazilMar. 97
May 97

Need (rights) (+ equal obligations
for parties with similar per capita
emissions)
Need (rights)
Guilt (polluter pays)

Brazil-RIVM

Nov. 98

Guilt (polluter pays)

NorwayIceland
Australia

Nov. 96Jan. 97
Jan. 97

Need, guilt and capacity
Need, guilt and capacity
Need (rights), capacity, and guilt

IranMar. 97

Mixture; need + acquired rights

Japan I

Dec. 96

Equal obligations

Japan II

Oct. 97

Equal obligations, modified by guilt

The Netherlands
Poland et al.

1997
Mar. 97

Need, on a sector-specific basis
Guilt and capacity

Estonia
Poland and theRussian Fed.
South Korea

Mar. 96
Aug. 95

Guilt and capacity
Capacity and guilt

Feb. 97

Guilt and capacity

New ZealandNov. 96

Not specified

1

Progressive burdens
compared to emissions.
Convergence
Progressive burdens
compared to emissions.
Convergence
Convergence
Burdens correspond to
cumulative emissions
Burdens correspond to
cumulative emissions
Multi-criteria formula
Multi-criteria formula
Unweighted set of 5
indicators
Unweighted set of 8
indicators
Parties can choose 1
out of 2 indicators
Parties can choose 1
out of 3 indicators
Multiple set of indicators
Unweighted set of 4
indicators
Two possible indicators
Unweighted set of 7
indicators
Unweighted set of 3
indicators
Global least cost(equal marginal costs)

CDE/
Pop

CDE/
GDP

GDP/
Pop

ΣCDE

CDEexp/
CDEtotdPop/d
t

EXP/
FF

X

X

CDE/
km2

Other

X

(X)

X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

RE/TE
X

(Proj.)(Proj.)
X

X

X

More1

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

(X)

X
X

X

X

More2

X

Eq. marg.
abatem.
costs

Economic growth, historical share, dependency on fossil fuels income, access to renewable energy, defence budget, population growth, special circumstances, and international trade share.
Net emissions from sinks per capita and per unit of territory, and energy per capita.
Abbreviations: CDE: level of CO2 equivalent emissions; CDE/Pop: CO2 equivalent emissions per capita; CDE/GDP: CO2 equivalent emissions per gross domestic product; GDP/Pop: gross domestic product per capita; Σ
CDE: the cumulative historical emissions contributing to global warming; CDEexp/CDEtot: the share of emissions resulting from production of goods for export (primarily the energy intensive industrial sector) relative tototal national emissions; dPop/dt: population growth; EXP/FF: fossil fuel intensity of export; CDE/km2: CO2 equivalent emissions per square kilometre of a country’s territorial basis; RE/TE: a country’s consumption ofrenewable energy compared to total energy consumption in the country; (Proj): projected; (X): subsidiary to X, i.e. X is the main criterion, but (X) could also be taken into consideration.
Polluter pays: share abatement costs across countries in proportion to emission levels.
Equal obligations: reduce emissions proportionally across all countries.
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Burden Differentiation of Greenhouse Gas Abatement: Fairness Principles and Proposals

From table 5 we can see that at least 10 of the 17 proposals refer to the principle of guilt(polluter pays), at least 8 build on the principle of capacity, and at least 8 refer to theconcept of need (or, in an alternative interpretation, some notion of ‘rights’). Moreover,
we can see that all proposals invoking the norm that burdens be distributed in proportion
to capacity also refer to the principle of guilt, and that at least 8 out of the 10 proposals
invoking the principle of guilt also include the notion of capacity. At the level of basic
principles, this indicates a fairly high degree of consensus, at least when we take into
account that we are talking about negotiations with global participation. At the same time
we can see, however, that different operational rules are in some cases ‘derived’ from thesame principle. For example, the principle of guilt is sometimes related to emissions per
capita, sometimes to emissions per unit of GDP, and in one proposal to emissions per unitof territory. Moreover, we can see that the pattern of divergence is not a random one;thus, it is hardly by accident that Japan refers to emissions per capita and per unit of GDP,
while Russia finds the notion of emissions per unit of territory a more attractive option.
This all suggests that it will be primarily at the level of more specific burden sharing rulesthat most of the really hard bargaining will occur.
The catalogue format chosen for the review of differentiation methods proposed during
the AGBM negotiation process is the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Name and reference of proposal.
Who made the proposal, when, and on what occasion.
The main features of the proposal.
Summary. Could the method potentially be helpful for future negotiations, possibly ina further developed version.
In addition EU’s Triptique approach is included.

3.1.1

Group: Need-based convergence

The principal common feature of proposal 1 (France), 2 (Switzerland), and 3 (EU) is
convergence of per capita emissions over time. This means that those countries that havehigh 1990 per capita emissions must reduce their emissions more than countries that haverelatively low per capita emissions. In the long run, by year 2100 according to the French
proposal, all countries would meet at the same per capita emission level.

1. Francea)b)c)French contribution to the AGBM before EU developed a joint position. Source:
FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1, p. 25.
thFrance prepared the following proposal in December 1996 for the 6 session of theAGBM, Bonn, 3-7 March 1997.
The French proposal is based on a reduction in emissions to reach an atmosphericconcentration of 550 ppmv of CO2 as a future goal, and has a “per capita”
approach as the main element for burden sharing. According to IPCC’s second
assessment report, this concentration level can be obtained if average per capita
level of CO2 and other GHGs emissions are in the range of 1 to 2.7 tons of carbon
equivalent within the Annex I Group by the end of the next century. On this basis,
France proposes that burdens should be distributed so that the emission pathways
converge to similar per capita or per unit of GDP levels by the end of the next
century. Numerically, the proposal is designed as follows:

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E i , 2010 = E i , 2000

9 / 10× Χ 1 / 10

Where:
Ei,2010 = carbon dioxide equivalent emissions in year 2010 for country i
Ei,2000 = carbon dioxide equivalent emissions in year 2000 for country i
X = Emission goal per capita for all countries in 2100

The resulting commitments in 2010 given some levels of per capita emissions in year 2000
are shown in 5.
Table 6. The French convergence proposal
Per capita emission in2000
3 teC/cap
4 teC/cap
5 teC/cap
6 teC/cap

Per capita emission objective
for 2010
2.8-2.9 teC/cap
3.7-3.8 teC/cap
4.5-4.6 teC/cap
5.3-5.4 teC/cap

Average percentage
reduction 2000-2010
5,0%
6,3%
9,0%
10,8%

The burdens are in other words defined so that countries with high per capita
emissions must undertake a larger percentage reduction in emissions.
d)

The French proposal is interesting as a method of implementing a long-term
atmospheric stabilization target, and due to its focus on convergence of per capita
emissions in all countries. But, even with 100 years time horizon the proposal
might seem idealistic when aiming for complete convergence.

2. Switzerland
a)
b)
c)

d)

Switzerland. Source: FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1.
th
The Swiss proposal was prepared in December 1996 for the 5 session of the
AGBM in December 1996.
The Swiss proposal addresses the emissions of CO2, CH4 and N2O and targets a
10% reduction of the total GHG emissions of Annex I Parties by the year 2010
compared to the 1990 levels. It states that countries should be grouped in
categories differentiated by increments of 5 tons of annual CO2-equivalentemissions per capita. Burdens should then be distributed so that countries with thehighest CO2-emissions would be obliged to achieve the biggest emission reduction.
The proposal opens for adjustments to this rule if a Party has a large energyintensive exporting industrial sector.
The Swiss proposal is in general simple to handle. It shows some similarities to the
French proposal. Exactly how the different groups of emitters shall be treated ishowever not explicitly defined.

3. EU
a)
b)

Framework compilation of proposals from Parties for the elements of a protocol oranother legal instrument. Source: FCCC/AGBM/1997/2, p. 31.
France and Spain made the proposal, in submission by the EU. The proposal wasthprepared for the 6 session of the AGBM, Bonn, 3-7 March 1997.

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Working Paper 1999:13
Burden Differentiation of Greenhouse Gas Abatement: Fairness Principles and Proposalsc)d)Annex I Parties would adopt greenhouse gas emissions paths converging eventually
to similar levels of emissions per capita or per unit of GDP leading to an overall
emissions reduction within specified time frames.
This proposal is difficult to evaluate since the level of specification is low.

3.1.2

Group: ‘Guilt’, interpreted as historical responsibility

The main common feature of proposal 4 (Brazil) and 5 (Brazil-RIVM) is the emphasis on
historical responsibility for global warming, in terms of accumulated contribution toradiative forcing or temperature increase in the atmosphere since the industrial revolution.

4. Brazil
a)
b)
c)
d)

e)

The Brazilian contribution to the AGBM.
Source: FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1/Add.3, p. 3.
thBrazil prepared the following proposal in May 1997 for the 7 session of theAGBM, Bonn, 31 July-7 August 1997.
The proposal for burden sharing is designed so that Parties receive a burden that
corresponds to the same Party’s responsibility for contributing to climate change.
In order to quantify this contribution, cumulative historical emissions needs to be
estimated, which together with the state of the art knowledge in the natural sciencefield can produce relevant information for this criterion. The proposal is designed
in order to be applied to all Parties, including developing countries.
This proposal is interesting since it includes accumulated historical emissions by acountry and calculates the its responsibility in terms of atmospheric warming. One
limitation is that only fossil fuel based CO2, CH4 and N2O is included.
Responsibility of the present generation for past emissions when global warming
was unknown is a disputable principle.

5. Brazil-RIVM
a)
b)

c)

The Brazilian proposal and other options for international burden sharing. Source:
Berk and Elzen, (1998).
The Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and the Environment(RIVM) at the COP-4 in Buenos Aires, November 1998 presented the proposal.
The proposal is in general a technical revision of the previous Brazilian proposal,
giving suggestions for elements that could be improved.
After the proposal was presented at the AGBM in August 1997, Berk and Elzen(1998) at the RIVM, carried out a more in depth study of the technical parts of the
proposal, which was presented as a discussion paper in Buenos Aires, 1998.
Among the conclusions it is worth mentioning that the technical methodology inthe original Brazilian proposal was incorrect and needed to be improved. It
overestimated the contribution of the Annex I to temperature change relative to
non-Annex I. It would be preferable to use a multi-gas approach, including all
sources and sinks. Furthermore, it seemed preferable to estimate the contribution
to concentrations or radiative forcing rather than temperature changes. Finally they
considered it more equitable to use the per capita contribution rather than using
the absolute contribution to temperature or concentration increase.

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Burden Differentiation of Greenhouse Gas Abatement: Fairness Principles and Proposalsd)This is an improved version of the Brazilian proposal under number 4. Someweaknesses are reduced due to new data and better models, making the method
preferable to the original Brazilian proposal.

3.1.3

Group: Multi-criteria formulae

The Norwegian (no. 6) and Icelandic (no. 7) proposals are to a large extent overlapping.
They are multi-criteria rules containing indicators for Ability to pay (GDP per capita),
Egalitarian (emissions per capita), and ‘energy efficiency’ (emissions per unit of GDP).
Deviations from average value (of the group of countries) of one or more of these
indicators generate a burden above the average percentage emission reduction required in
the group.
Norwaya)
Norwegian contribution to the AGBM negotiation process.8thb)
Norway prepared the following proposal in November 1996 for the 5 AGBM
session in Geneva in December 1996.
c)
A formula considers a Party’s percentage reductions of greenhouse gas emissions
based on the three indicators: CO2 equivalent emissions per unit of GDP (indicatorfor emission intensity), and GDP per capita and CO2 equivalent emissions per
capita are included to induce an equitable outcome. The formula is:
Yi = A[x(Bi/B)+y(Ci/C)+z(Di/D)]
Where Yi is percentage reduction if emissions for Party i. Bi is CO2 equivalentemissions per unit of GDP for country i, and B is the equivalent average for thegroup of countries (i.e. the Annex I countries). Likewise Ci and C are GDP per
capita for country i and for the average of the group, and Di and D are CO2
equivalent emissions per capita for country i and the average of the group. x, y andz are weights that add up to one. A is a scale factor to ensure that the desired
overall reduction in emissions for the group of countries is achieved.
The Norwegian multi-criteria formula is relatively simple, but has quite some
capacity built into it to handle countries with different emission, population andeconomic development structures, in particular due to its multi-criteria nature.
However, it is a top-down approach of a relatively static approach. Thus is notsensitive to differences between economic sectors as driving forces for emissions
and potential for future reduction of emissions.

d)7. Iceland
a)
b)
c)
-

Submission made by the Government of Iceland to the UNFCCC, AGBM.
Source: FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1, p. 28.
thIceland prepared the following proposal in January 1997 for the 6 session of theAGBM, Bonn, 3-7 March 1997.
The Icelandic proposal is expressed as a formula consisting of the following four
elements.
9
GHG emission intensity (measured per capita) (+)

8

FCCC/AGBM/1996/MISC.2/Add.2, p. 25. The formula was developed in a research project documented in
Torvanger et al. (1996).

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GDP per capita (+)
Level of GHG emissions (+)
Share of renewable energy sources (-)

All GHGs should be included; counting both sources and sinks. The proposal does not
specify the weights of each element, nor the aggregate reduction in emissions for all
Parties. In a later proposal by Iceland dated October 1997 the criteria “level of GHG
emissions” is replaced by “CO2 emissions in industrial processing as a share of party’s
total CO2-emissions (-)”.
d)
This proposal is very similar to the Norwegian proposal, the main difference being
inclusion of the share of renewable energy sources as a fourth component.

3.1.4

Group: Fossil fuel dependency

The most important common feature of proposal 8 (Australia) and 9 (Iran) is dependency
of income on fossil fuel exports. In addition both proposals include economic growth andpopulation growth.
8. Australia
a)
b)
c)

Further submission by Australia, dated 15 January 1997.10
The Australian paper is dated 15 January 1997.
The Australian proposal for burden differentiation is to be applied to all Annex B
countries and includes all GHGs, all sources and sinks. The following set of criteria
should be used in order to ensure equal percentage changes in per capita economic
welfare across Annex B Parties from mitigation action:o Projected population growth. (-)
o Projected real GDP per capita growth (-)
o Emission intensity of GDP (+)
o Emission intensity of exports (-)
o Fossil fuel intensity of exports (-)d)

The Australian proposal is relatively complex since there are 5 criteria that need tobe quantified, and since two of them deals with projected figures. The method is
not specified in detail; however, it is only meant to function as a framework fornegotiations.

9. Irana)b)c)-Main elements for inclusion in a protocol or another legal instrument. Submitted
by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Source: FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1, p. 30.
thIran prepared the following proposal for the 6 session of the AGBM, Bonn, 3-7
March 1997.
The proposal contains a list of criteria that could be considered whendifferentiating burdens. These criteria are:Economic growth
Historical share

9

The following notation is used throughout the document. (+) indicates that the criteria is positively
correlated to the size of the burden. E.g. in the Icelandic proposal, the higher the emissions per capita are, thelarger should the Party’s burden become.
10
FCCC/AGBM/1996/MISC.2/Add.2, p. 3.

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Working Paper 1999:13
Burden Differentiation of Greenhouse Gas Abatement: Fairness Principles and Proposals- Dependency on income from fossil fuels- Access to sources of renewable energy- Defense budget- Population growth- Special circumstances- Share in international trade
There are no specifications on how each element should count.
d)

The proposal is vague. It contains some unique indicators, such as defense budget.

3.1.5

Group: Menu-approach

Even if there are a number of differences between the two Japanese proposals 10 (Japan I)
and 11 (Japan II), they have one important common feature, namely the menu-approach.
According to these proposals a country may choose one of two or three options that makeits emission reduction commitment smallest. The proposals also imply a well-defined
upper constraint on commitments.
10. Japan I
a)
b)
c)

-

d)

Japan; Proposals on the elements to be included in the Draft Protocol to the
UNFCCC. Source: FCCC/AGBM/1996/MISC.2/Add.4, p. 3.
th
The Japanese proposal was prepared 9 December 1996 for the 5 session of the
AGBM in December 1996.
The Japanese proposal is to be applied to all Annex I countries, other Parties are to
take voluntary measures. The proposal gives an Annex I Party the possibility tochoose one out of two paths.
To maintain its anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide over a five year period
at an average yearly level not more than p tons of carbon per capita, orTo reduce its anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide over a five year period at
an average yearly level of not less than q per cent below the level of the year 1990.
The Japanese proposal is original in the way that Parties can choose between twocompletely different criteria. Although the values of the parameters p and q not are
specified, it seems that Parties with high per capita emissions could benefit using
the second strategy, were as low per capita emitters could benefit from the firststrategy.

11. Japan II
a)
b)
c)

Japanese proposal as presented in FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1/Add.6, p. 13.
thThis Japanese proposal was submitted in October 1997 for the 8 session of theAGBM, Bonn, 22-31 October 1997.
The Japanese proposal covers the gases CO2, CH4 and N2O. In general, each Annex
I country shall reduce emissions by 5% in the first budget period (2008-2012)
compared to 1990 levels. However, countries with the following conditions may
apply any one of the following alternative reduction rates:(a) For a country of which emissions per GDP in 1990 (A) are less than the emissions
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Alternative reduction rate (%): = 5% × (A/B)(b) For a country of which emissions per capita in 1990 (C) are less than the emissions
per capita of all Annex I countries in 1990 (D):Alternative reduction rate (%): = 5% × (C/D)(c) Similar alternative reduction rate for countries with high population growth must
be developed.
Under no circumstance shall any country’s emissions exceed its 1990 levels.
d)This Japanese proposal would effectively reduce emissions from Annex I to lessthan 5% as many countries by definition have lower than average emissions withrespect to one of the two variables described above or population growth. Hence,
there will be extensive use of the alternative reduction rate options.

3.1.6

Group: Sectoral approach

Among the proposals we have listed, EU’s Triptique approach is unique due to thebottom-up approach, where the economy is divided into three sectors. Thus there are noother proposals in this group.
12. EU’s Triptique approacha)
The Triptique approach was developed by Block et al. (1997) at the University of
Utrecht.
b)
The methodology for this burden sharing key was developed on the request of theNetherlands Presidency. The motivation for the request was to develop a methodfor distributing emission commitments across members of the European
Community.
c)
The main motivation for the approach was to develop a method that would take
into account the differences in emission-producing activities across the member
states. It is important to note that the approach not only determines the
distribution of commitments but also the aggregate level of emissions from themember states. As a first step in the Triptique approach, emissions were divided inthree groups.
•
Emissions from electricity generation•
Emissions from the internationally oriented energy-intensive industries•
Emissions from other domestic sectors
Emissions are in general treated differently across the groups, but equally acrossthe member states. No other greenhouse gas (GHG) than carbon dioxide isincluded in the analysis.
The electricity-generating sector showed large variation across the states regarding
emissions of CO2. First of all, the total consumption (and production) of electricity
in the EU was set to be limited to a growth rate of 1% per year, instead of the 1.5%
that was used as the conventional wisdom projection. Some extra allowance was
11given the cohesion countries. Carbon dioxide emissions were then to be
distributed taking into account;minimum percentages for the penetration of renewable energies
and combined heat and power (CHP)
limitation of oil and coal use
11

Consisting of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland.

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use of nuclear power according to national preferences
remainder to be supplied using natural gas

The energy-intensive part of the industrial sector was allowed to increase
12
production at a constant rate across all countries. The same energy efficient
improvement rate was also applied across the member states for this sector, leading
to a fixed reduction factor for CO2 emissions for all countries.
13

Emissions from the domestic sectors were distributed on a per capita base. The main
rule was that emissions per capita should converge to the same level across all
countries at a certain point in the future (e.g. 2030) that is 20 or 30% lower than in
1990. The allowance in 2010 was then calculated using linear interpolation between
actual figures in 1990 and desired level in 2030. The emission levels were only
corrected for variations in natural climate across the countries.
d)

It is important to remember that the above method is only applied in order tocalculate a particular distribution of burdens. How a country satisfies commitments is
entirely up to the country itself. This method is one of the few that has actually beenused in practice in this field, and should therefore be considered as a possible tool for
future burden sharing. However, it is also important to be aware of the relative
homogeneity across the members of the European Community in terms of economic
structure and output, historical and present responsibility for possible climaticchanges, abatement costs and vulnerability to climate changes. For this reason, it isdifficult to predict how well this method can be adapted to a broader group ofcountries.

3.1.7

Group: Capacity (GDP per capita)

The common feature of proposal 13 (Poland et al.), 14 (Estonia), 15 (Poland and theRussian Federation), and 16 (Korea) is the focus on the GDP per capita as an important
indicator for distributing commitments. GDP per capita can be interpreted as a proxyvariable for Ability to pay. In addition some of these proposals, but not all, have areference to emissions per capita and/or contribution to global emissions.

13. Poland et al.
a)
b)
c)
d)

Framework compilation of proposals from Parties for the elements of a protocol oranother legal instrument. Source: FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1, p. 75.
The proposal was prepared on behalf of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Poland andth
Slovenia for the 6 session of the AGBM, Bonn, 3-7 March 1997.
Each Annex I Party should have some flexibility in adopting emission reduction
objectives. The following criteria should be used for this purpose:
GDP per capita;
Contribution to global emissions;
Emissions per capita and/or emission intensity of GDP.
This proposal is difficult to evaluate due to a low level of specification.

12

Consisting of the following industries: building materials, chemical, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, pulp
and paper, refineries, coke ovens (if they were not a part of the iron and steel industry), gasworks and otherenergy transformation branches, where electricity generation is excluded.
13
Consisting of households, services, light industry, agriculture and transportation.

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Burden Differentiation of Greenhouse Gas Abatement: Fairness Principles and Proposals

14. Estonia
Possible features of a protocol or another legal instrument. Estonia.14
rd
The Estonian proposal was prepared 15 January 1996 for the 3 session of theAGBM, Geneva, 5-8 March 1996.
The Estonian proposal should be applied to a “basket” of gases including sinks.
The main criteria for differentiation could be GDP per capita. In addition it opens
for the incorporating of a Party’s contribution to global warming.
This proposal is difficult to evaluate due to a low level of specification.

a)
b)
c)

d)

15. Poland and the Russian Federation
a)
b)
c)

d)

UNFCCC, Implementation of the Berlin Mandate, Poland and Russia.
Source: FCCC/AGBM/1995/MISC.1/Add.1, p. 54.
The proposal was prepared by Poland and the Russian Federation in August 1995nd
for the 2 session of the AGBM in Geneva 30 October-3 November 1995.
The proposal states that the criteria used to distribute reduction commitments
should reflect social, economic and some climatic parameters relevant in thecontext of sustainable development. The following criteria were mentioned:
GDP per capita;
Amount of anthropogenic emissions, first of all of carbon dioxide and methane, percapita and per unit of territory;
Amount of sinks and net emissions per capita and per unit of territory;
Levels of production and consumption of energy per capita.
The proposal contains similar elements to the ones described above, except for theconsideration of a country’s territorial area.

16. Korea
a)

b)
c)

d)
14

A proposal on the Elements in a Draft Protocol or Amendment of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by theGovernment of the Republic of Korea. Source:
FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1/Add.1, p. 13.
th
The following proposal was prepared by Korea in February 1997, for the 6 sessionof the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM), Bonn, 3-7 March 1997.
The Korean proposal focuses on three principles that all should be consideredwhen distributing emission reduction commitments: burden sharing based onequity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,
cost effectiveness and harmony with economic development and an open
international economic system. The equity principle is to be taken care of by
distributing emission allowances across Annex I Parties according to cumulativeemissions of GHGs since the industrial revolution to a certain target year. The
burdens should also be connected to a country’s capability measured in terms ofgross domestic product (GDP) per capita and based on the elasticity of emissionsof GHG in terms of GDP.
The method contains elements that are common to other proposals, but does notdefine the exact key for burden sharing.

FCCC/AGBM/1996/7, p. 15.

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3.1.8

Group: Cost-effectiveness

New Zealand (no. 17) has supplied the only proposal in this group. The special feature ofthis proposal is the emphasis on cost-effectiveness. According to the proposal
commitments should be distributed so as to equalize marginal abatement costs acrosscountries.
17. New Zealand
a)
b)
c)

d)

Greenhouse gas stabilization: Principles to guide the formulation of possible targets& policies and measures. Source: FCCC/AGBM/1996/MISC.2/Add.4, p. 15.
th
New Zealand prepared the following proposal in November 1996 for the 5session of the AGBM in December 1996.
The key element of the New Zealand position is that emissions reductions shouldbe achieved at global least cost. A least cost approach does not neglect equity;rather, a least cost approach improves the prospects of finding an equitableoutcome acceptable to all. If differentiated commitments are considered it isimportant that this is on the basis of a simple principle that reduces the disparity
between Parties in terms of abatement costs implied by uniform targets. One
possible option would be to aim to share commitments in a manner consistent withthe outcome expected if marginal costs were equalized. Clearly there are a range ofoptions which could reduce cost disparities.
The New Zealand proposal focuses on designing a protocol that ensures a global
least cost solution, but not on burden sharing as an issue separated from costeffectiveness.

In the next and final chapter we sum up the survey of proposals and experience from thenegotiation process in terms of implications for future design of burden sharing rules.

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4

Conclusions

Let us now try to summarize this analysis by addressing two key questions: First, what are
the basic principles of fairness that a burden sharing rule will have to satisfy in order toserve as a basis for a global agreement? This is a question about necessary conditions; weare not suggesting that consistency with any one particular principle or combination ofprinciples constitutes a sufficient condition. Second, assuming that no magic formula offairness will by itself be sufficient to produce agreement, we have to ask what are theadditional criteria a specific burden sharing rule and formula will have to meet in order tobe adopted.
The answer to the first of these questions can, it seems, be summarized as follows: First, noburden sharing rule that is incompatible with all the three main principles of equity
relevant to this particular case – the principles of ‘guilt’, ‘capacity’ and ‘need’ – will be
accepted. More precisely, a burden sharing rule must be consistent with (a) the general
pattern of differentiation outlined in table 2, and (b) with at least one of the three main
equity principles – probably with more than one. Second, no rule that is clearly
incompatible with the principle of ‘need’ – interpreted in terms of basic human needs –will be politically feasible. A rule may violate softer interpretations of ‘need’, but thedemand that burden sharing rules respect basic human needs stands even if it runs into
conflict with the principles of guilt and/or capacity. Beyond this, it is hard to establish –on ethical grounds – a clear hierarchical order of fairness norms. Moreover, as we haveseen, all three are invoked in actual proposals and supported by important groups ofactors. Third, in the absence of one unique ‘trump’, a burden sharing rule should somehow
combine at least two and preferably all three of the main equity norms, plus allow for
exemptions. No rule deriving the distribution of obligations from one single principle islikely to be adopted. We should, in other words, be looking for a more complex formula.
Fourth, all rules that are ‘dominated’ by some other rule may be eliminated. An option
dominates another if, and only if, it is superior according to at least one of the criteria
applied and at the same time inferior with respect to no other criterion (principle) in that
set. For each ‘dominated’ rule at least one alternative exists that is unambiguously
superior.
Taken together, these propositions provide some guidance. However, even though therange of politically feasible burden sharing rules is reduced, we are still left with anuncomfortably large set of options (in fact, the number is infinite!). In this particular case
we are in the fortunate situation that all the three equity principles to a large extent pointin the same general direction. This means that different formulae may well yield similar
substantive implications, applied to this particular case. To the extent that different
formulae lead to similar conclusions, one may argue that in so far as actors are concernedwith material consequences it does not matter much which of the formulae in question isadopted. This observation suggests that as we move on to develop specific rules, it will bea good idea to examine to what extent their practical implications converge. In theabsence of a clear hierarchy of norms, a distribution that can be justified by reference tomultiple principles or rules will, other things being equal, prevail in a contest with one
that has a narrower normative basis.
The latter proposition ‘helps’ by suggesting that the choice of one burden sharing ruleinstead of another need not be all that important in terms of practical consequences. It
does not, however, help us choose. Let us therefore move on to explore whether we cannarrow the range of politically feasible rules further by introducing additional criteria that

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are not derived from basic principles of fairness. There are at least two sets of such criteriathat should be examined; one has to do with the logic of ‘realpolitik’, the other withconcerns of operational feasibility.
In section 2.2, we assumed that actor behavior would be motivated primarily by selfinterest, with considerations of fairness acting as motivational sources, soft constraints
and/or as clues where interests provide no clear guidance. The basic implication of thisassumption is that no burden sharing rule that runs counter to the vital interests of pivotal
parties or coalitions of parties can be adopted. This is obviously a most important
constraint, but it also one that is hard to specify. One challenge is to specify precisely
where the critical threshold lies. What exactly is meant by ‘run counter to vital interests’?
How much is an actor prepared to sacrifice for the benefit for ‘fairness’? Clearly, all equity
principles require that some contribute more than others, in absolute as well as relative
terms. In general form they do not, however, specify exactly how much more, nor do theytell us what is the maximum net loss that an actor will be prepared to accept to meet
norms of fairness. The conventional assumption in negotiation theory is that the latter
threshold is zero, i.e. that an actor will be prepared to contribute more than others if
salient norms of fairness so require, but not to accept a net loss in absolute terms. Thismay be an overly strict assumption, but we prefer to err on the side of caution and shalltherefore take it as our point of departure. The other challenge is do determine who are‘pivotal’ actors or groups of actors. A pivotal actor is one without whom others would not
be willing or able to undertake a particular project. Determining pivotality can be a rather
complex exercise, taking us through multiple steps of analysis, and also lead to complex
conclusions (e.g. long lists of combinations of actors) (cf. Underdal, 1998). For our
purposes it seems sufficient to work with a more sweeping and simplistic requirement. To
cut a complex story short, we shall assume that in so far as negotiations focus on
obligations only for the industrialized countries, there are three pivotal actors orconstellations of actors: the US, the EU, and Japan + a weighted majority of the remaining
15
OECD countries). For negotiations on a global scheme of commitments, we shall assume
that, in addition, the G-77 and any coalition including China + India or two other major
developing countries (e.g. Brazil and Indonesia) are pivotal constellations.
In addition to these political constraints, there are a number of operational requirements
to be considered as we move on to develop specific rules and criteria. Listed in decreasingorder of importance, we suggest first of all that a formula should be universally applicable,
i.e. refer to variables that can be used to describe all prospective partners in theagreement. Second, it should be easy to translate into operational indicators and feed withreliable data or at least data that are not seriously contested. Third, simplicity is desirable(although substantive validity must – in principle – have priority over operational costs).
Fourth, the formula should be framed so that it allows for future refinement andadjustment. These are considerations that we will deal with in greater depth in the nextstage of this project.

15

Weights are assigned on the basis of greenhouse gas emissions.

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5

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