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William Hare:
Assessment of Knowledge on Impacts of
Climate Change – Contribution to theSpecification of Art. 2 of the UNFCCC

Externe Expertise für das WBGU-Sondergutachten"Welt im Wandel: Über Kioto hinausdenken.
Klimaschutzstrategien für das 21. Jahrhundert"
Berlin 2003

Externe Expertise für das WBGU-Sondergutachten"Welt im Wandel: Über Kioto hinausdenken. Klimaschutzstrategien für das 21. Jahrhundert"
Berlin: WBGUISBN 3-936191-03-4
Verfügbar als Volltext im Internet unter http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_sn2003.html
Autor: William Hare
Titel: Assessment of Knowledge on Impacts of Climate Change – Contribution
to the Specification of Art. 2 of the UNFCCC
Potsdam, Berlin 2003
Veröffentlicht als Volltext im Internet unter http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_sn2003_ex01.pdf

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© 2003, WBGUAssessment of Knowledge on Impacts of Climate Change –Contribution to the Specification of Article 2 of the UNFCCC: Impacts
on Ecosystems, Food Production, Water and Socio-economic Systems

Mr. William Hare
Visiting Scientist
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research
Potsdam, Germany

November 2003

Acknowledgments
Claire Stockwell and Kathrin Gutmann are thanked for the excellent work done helping
to research and edit this report.

2

1.

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 5
UNFCCC A RTICLE 2 – PREVENTING DANGEROUS ANTHROPOGENIC INTERFERENCE....... 5
WHAT MAY CONSTITUTE DANGEROUS ANTHROPOGEN IC INTERFERENCE WITH THE
CLIMATE SYSTEM? ........................................................................................................... 62.

ECOSYSTEMS, BIODIVER SITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE ......................... 9
PROCESSES CAUSING LOSS OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM DAMAGE........................ 11
CLIMATE CHANGE AND CO2 EFFECTS ON SPECIES AND ECOSYSTEMS............................. 14
PROJECTED EFFECTS ON SPECIES AND ECOSYSTEMS ....................................................... 19
Impacts on coastal wetlands..................................................................................... 21
Impacts on animal species ........................................................................................ 21
Impacts on ecosystems.............................................................................................. 22

3. IMPACTS ON FOOD PROD UCTION, WATER, AND SOCIO-ECONOMICSYSTEMS........................................................................................................................ 53
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 53
CONTEXT : FINDINGS OF THE S ECOND AND THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORTS..................... 54
FOOD PRODUCTION AND AGRICULTURE ........................................................................ 61
Climate change and food security assessments ........................................................ 64
Global Agro-Ecological Assessment (GAEZ Study)................................................. 71
Discussion and Summary .......................................................................................... 72
WATER R ESOURCES ....................................................................................................... 75
Discussion and Summary .......................................................................................... 76
SOCIO- ECONOMIC DAMAGES .......................................................................................... 79
Discussion and Summary .......................................................................................... 81
4.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................... 84
ECOSYSTEMS IMPACTS ................................................................................................... 84
Impacts on coastal wetlands..................................................................................... 84
Impacts on animal species ........................................................................................ 85
Impacts on ecosystems.............................................................................................. 86
AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IMPACTS................................................................ 87
WATER IMPACTS ............................................................................................................ 87
SOCIO- ECONOMIC EFFECTS ............................................................................................ 88
CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................ 89

5.

APPENDIX: TEMPERATURE SCALE............................................................. 90

6.

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 92

3

List of Figures
FIGURE 1 - PROPORTION OF THE GLOBAL N UMBER OF BIRDS , MAMMALS , F ISH AND
PLANTS SPECIES THAT ARE CURRENTLY THREATENED WITH EXTINCTION ................ 12
FIGURE 2 - PATHWAYS BY WHICH C LIMATE CHANGE AFFECT S SPECIES AND E COSYSTEMS15
FIGURE 3 - COMPARISON OF HEMISPHERIC AND LONG-T ERM L OCAL TEMPERATURE SERIES................................................................................................................................... 18
FIGURE 4 - COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM DECADAL RATES OF C HANGE ............................. 18
FIGURE 5 - IMPACTS ON C OASTAL WETLANDS .................................................................. 24
FIGURE 6 – IMPACTS ON ANIMAL SPECIES ......................................................................... 26
FIGURE 7 – IMPACTS ON E COSYSTEMS............................................................................... 29
FIGURE 8 - REGIONAL IMPACTS ON C ROP PRODUCTION .................................................... 66
FIGURE 9 - COMPARISON OF POTENTIAL C ROP YIELDS PROJECTIONS FOR 2050S AND 2080S................................................................................................................................... 67
FIGURE 10 - GLOBAL RISK OF HUNGER ............................................................................. 69
FIGURE 11 - MILLIONS AT RISK IN 2050S AND 2080S : HUNGER, M ALARIA, WATERSHORTAGE AND FLOODING ........................................................................................ 69
IGURE
F
12 - GAINS AND LOSSES IN PRODUCTION POTENTIAL UNDER CLIMATE CHANGE.. 74
FIGURE 13 - CLIMATE DAMAGES OR BENEFITS AS A FUNCTION OF T EMPERATURE ........... 84

List of Tables
TABLE 1 - E COSYSTEMS FUNCTION WITH LINKS TO G OOD/S ERVICES AND POSSIBLE
SOCIETAL VALUE....................................................................................................... 10
TABLE 2 - PROCESSES DRIVING SPECIES ENDANGERMENT AND EXTINCTION .................... 13
TABLE 3 - R ESPONSE AND IMPACTS OF C LIMATE C HANGE ON SPECIES AND E COSYSTEMS 17
TABLE 4 - E COSYSTEM EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE....................................................... 20
TABLE 5 - E COSYSTEM IMPACTS........................................................................................ 32
TABLE 6 - C OMPARISON OF SECOND AND T HIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT FINDINGS ............ 55
TABLE 7 - A GRICULTURAL EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ................................................. 62
TABLE 8 - RISK OF HUNGER - AFRICA ............................................................................... 66
TABLE 9 - SUMMARY OF S CENARIOS USED IN G LOBAL F OOD S ECURITY ASSESSMENT...... 70
TABLE 10 - MILLIONS AT RISK .......................................................................................... 70
TABLE 11 - MALNOURISHED C OUNTRY G ROUP AND CLIMATE C HANGE ........................... 71
TABLE 12 - GLOBAL MEAN TEMPERATURE INCREASE FOR ECHAM4 S CENARIOS ............ 72
TABLE 13 - DEVELOPING C OUNTRY C HANGES IN RAIN F ED C EREAL PRODUCTIONPOTENTIAL 2080S FOR THREE C LIMATE MODELS ...................................................... 72
TABLE 14 - WATER RESOURCE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ........................................... 78
TABLE 15 - POPULATION WITH POTENTIAL INCREASE IN WATER STRESS .......................... 78
TABLE 16 - SCENARIO TEMPERATURES ............................................................................. 79
TABLE 17 - OTHER MARKET SECTOR EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE .................................. 83
TABLE 18 - GLOBAL T EMPERATURE SCALES USED IN THIS REPORT .................................. 91

4

1. Introduction
The purpose of this report is to compile and summarise the present knowledge on impactsof climate change as a basis for a consideration of what may constitute dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system under Article 2 of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). An attempt will be made toassociate projected global mean surface temperature and/or sea level changes withspecific identified impacts and effects in order to assist a discussion on theoperationalization of Article 2. The main emphasis will be on ecosystem effects, foodproduction, water resources, and sustainable development. Whilst the starting point forthis work will be the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Third
Assessment Report (IPCC TAR), it will be heavily supplemented by the underlying
scientific literature used in the TAR as well as more recent studies published since theconclusion of the TAR in September 2001.
The organization of the report is as follows. In this section the context for the current
assessment is outlined including background information on Article 2 of the UNFCCC,
the WBGU tolerable window and the broad findings of the IPCC TAR. Section 2, on
ecosystems, biodiversity and climate change, will review a range of projected impacts on
ecosystems and species. Section 3 summarizes projected effects on food security, watersupply and economic activities. Section 4 will briefly summarize the information
presented in this report.
UNFCCC Article 2 – preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference
The ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,as specified in its Article 2, is the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations at levels
that “would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.
Such levels should be achieved “within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems toadapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and toenable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner” (UN 1992). It can beseen that Article 2 has several interrelated elements, which may be linked to other partsof the Convention. Article 3.3 is of particular relevance here, relating, as it does, to theapplication of the precautionary principle in the face of scientific uncertainty.
Under Article 2, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations at some arbitrary level is
not the objective per se, as is sometimes assumed, but rather at a level that would“prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. There is no
specific reference to the manner in which this stabilization should be achieved. It is
open, for example, as to whether greenhouse gas concentrations would rise above theultimate stabilization level before falling back, provided that in the end interference withthe climate system is prevented. The second part of Article 2, in effect, establishes a setof criteria and general requirements for the timeframe in which greenhouse gas
concentrations must be stabilized. In other words, one could identify levels of impacts on
the areas mentioned that resulted in, for example, threats to food production and work5

backwards to compute concentrations of greenhouse gases and/or the time profile of theseconcentrations that would prevent these impacts from occurring.
Article 2 requires that greenhouse gases be stabilized in such a way and within atimeframe that ecosystems can adapt naturally, food production is not threatened and that
economic development is able to proceed in a sustainable manner. Put another way, if
stabilization were achieved in such a way that all of these requirements were met, then it
could be said that dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system had been
prevented, provided that no other interference with the climate system was being caused
that could be classified as dangerous. If one or the other element were not met, then there
would be a breach of the Convention’s objective.
It may be useful to note at the outset that Article 2 talks of prevention of “dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” and is not necessarily limited todangerous climate changes per se. In theory at least, dangerous anthropogenic
interference could relate to a variety of human induced changes in the totality of theclimate system, which people and/or governments could consider dangerous. Examples
of such issues could include, for example, the risk of ice sheet instability or irreversible
decay. If, for example, the West Antarctic Ice sheet turned out to be very sensitive toglobal warming, it is conceivable that its collapse could be triggered by levels ofgreenhouse gases that did not result in immediate threats (within the next decades tocentury) to any of the categories of effects cited in Article 2. Nevertheless, such a risk,
with the entailed 6-7 metres of sea level rise over centuries to millennia, would beconsidered by many as dangerous (O'Neill and Oppenheimer 2002).

What may constitute dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system?
To date, the UNFCCC itself has not attempted to define what may cons titute dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system or what acceptable limits may be to
impacts on ecosystems, food production or economic development.
Nevertheless, over the past decade or so several groups have sought to identify acceptable
limits to climate change. There have been two broad approaches, often combined. One isbased on a “bottom up” assessment of the projected impacts of climate change on
ecosystems, agriculture and other sectors. The other is based on a “top down” appro ach
which focuses on avoiding greater changes than are thought to have occurred in thecurrent and the last few interglacial periods. The objective of this approach is, in effect,to keep the climate system away from situations (greenhouse gas concentrations) where
the projected temperatures are either not known from earlier warm periods or areassociated with past periods of rapid and abrupt change.
Based on a review of estimated impacts on ecosystems, as well as comparison ofprojected climate changes with “normal climatic changes” of the past (e.g. over the6

Holocene and not periods of abrupt damages associated with glacial termination), the
WMO/ICSU/UNEP Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG), in 1990, identified
two main temperature indicators or thresholds with different levels of risk (Rijsberman
and Swart 1990). It was argued that an increase of greater than 1.0°C above preindustrial levels “may elicit rapid, unpredictable and non-linear responses that could leadto extensive ecosystem damage” with warming rates above 0.1°C/decade likely to lead to
rapidly increasing risk of significant ecosystem damage. Furthermore, a 2.0°C increase
was determined to be “an upper limit beyond which the risks of grave damage toecosystems, and of non- linear responses, are expected to increase rapidly”.
Corresponding indicators for sea level rise were also developed. It was argued that rates
of sea- level rise of less than 20mm/decade “would permit the vast majority of vulnerable
ecosystems, such as natural wetlands and coral reefs to adapt with rates beyond thisleading to rapidly rising ecosystem damage” (Rijsberman and Swart 1990: viii) . The
AGGG felt that limiting total sea level rise to a 50 cm increase above 1990 global mean
sea-level could “prevent the complete destruction of island nations, but would entail large
increases in the societal and ecological damage caused by storms”. This assessment was
based on the scientific knowledge available before the IPCC First Assessment Report was
concluded in 1990.
In 1995, the WBGU used a “top down” approach to determine an upper limit or“tolerable window” of warming. Adding 0.5°C to the estimated difference between the
recent, pre-industrial Holocene and the warmest period of the last interglacial, the WBGU
arrived at a tolerable warming window (relative to pre-industrial temperatures) of 2°C(WBGU 1995). This limited additional future warming to around 1.3°C, relative to theestimated 1995 global mean temperatures. Above this limit, it was argued, was a risk of“dramatic changes in the composition and function of today’s ecosystems” (WBGU
1995: 7).
At a political level, the European Union’s Environment Council agreed in 1996 that
global temper atures should not be allowed to exceed 2°C above pre-industrial levels(European Community 1996):“Given the serious risk of such an increase and particularly the very high rate ofchange the Council believes that global average temperatures should not exceed
2 degrees (Celsius) above pre-industrial level and that therefore concentrationlevels lower than 550 (parts per million of) CO2 should guide global limitation
and reduction efforts. This means that the concentrations of all greenhouse gases
should also be stabilised. This is likely to require a reduction of emissions ofgreenhouse gases other than CO2 , in particular CH4 and N 2 0.”
The Environment Council based this decision on a consideration of the IPCC Second
Assessment Report and the impacts identified therein, which in general were for a
doubling of CO2 above pre-industrial levels.

7

The IPCC itself has not directly addressed the question of what might be dangerous
climate change and has seen its role as limited to providing policy relevant but not policy
prescriptive advice. In the lead up to the Second Assessment Report, the IPCC held aworkshop in Fortaleza, Brazil in 1994 on the issue of Article 2, however the results ofthis were inconclusive, except for the reaffirmation by scientists that they did not see arole for themselves as a group in defining the limits of Article 2.
In its Third Assessment Report the IPCC made several efforts to provide scientific advice
that could be used by policy makers in relation to Article 2. Chapter 19 of the Working
Group II report, which attempted to synthesize the other chapters in this working groupreport, identified five “reasons for concern” that could be used to “aid readers in making
their own determination about what is ‘dangerous’ climate change” (Smith et al. 2001:
915) :
1) The relationship between global mean temperature increase and damage to or
irreparable loss of unique and threatened systems;
2) The relationship between global mean temperature increase and the distribution of
impacts;
3) The relationship between global mean temperature increase and global aggregate
damages;4) The relationship between global mean temperature increase and the probability of
extreme weather events;
5) The relationship between global mean temperature increase and the probability oflarge-scale singular events such as the breakup of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet or thecollapse of the North Atlantic thermohaline circulation.
The present report will provide information relevant to factors one to three, with the lattertwo reasons for concern being beyond the scope of this report.
The Synthesis Report of the IPCC TAR sought to answer nine policy relevant questions
developed in consultation with the UNFCCC, several aspects of which were relevant to
Article 2. The most pertinent to the present work are from questions three and six in thesynthesis report:

Question 3: “What is known about the regional and global climatic, environmental, and socioeconomic consequences in the next 25, 50, and 100 years associated with a range of greenhousegas emissions arising from scenarios used in the TAR (projections which involve no climate
policy intervention)? To the extent possible evaluate the ...Projected changes in atmosphericconcentrations, climate, and sea level … impacts and economic costs and benefits of changes inclimate and atmospheric composition on human health, diversity and productivity of ecologicalsystems, and socio-economic sectors (particularly agriculture and water) ...” (IPCC 2001: 8).
Question 6: “How does the extent and timing of the introduction of a range of emissions reduction
actions determine and affect the rate, magnitude, and impacts of climate change, and affect the
global and regional economy, taking into account the historical and current emissions? What is
known from sensitivity studies about regional and global climatic, environmental and socioeconomic consequences of stabilizing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (in8carbon dioxide equivalents), at a range of levels from today’s to double that level or more, taking
into account to the extent possible the effects of aerosols?” (IPCC 2001: 19).

Though there were attempts, in various drafts of the IPCC TAR, to associate specificglobal mean temperature increases with defined impacts, by the time the report was
finalized most of these examples were reduced to quite general statements in thesummaries for policy makers of Working Group II and the Synthesis Report. However,the full Synthesis Report does contain several tables outlining identified impacts fortemperature bands in each of the areas relevant to this paper. Whilst there are limitations
to these tables, notably that the temperature bands associated with specific impacts areoften too large and hence lose some precision, such as is possible given all otheruncertainties, they will be used as the starting point for the analysis in each of thesections of this report. Indeed, this may provide the best and most coherent way ofshowing transparently how the analysis presented in this paper builds upon, extends ordiverges from the conclusions of the TAR authors.

2. Ecosystems, Biodiversity and Climate Change
Ecosystems and their species form the fabric of life on the Earth and provide a very wide
range of services to humanity. The IPCC TAR has summarized these and in any event
they are well known (Table 1). Unfortunately, given the large human pressures andimpacts on species and ecosystems, rapid climate change probably could not happen at aworse time in the history of the biosphere (Soulé 1992). Due to these pressures species
are becoming extinct at a rate 100-1000 times greater than is considered normal overevolutionary time. As a consequence conservation biologists have labelled the current
epoch the sixth major extinction event in the history of the planet (Chapin et al. 2000;
Novacek and Cleland 2001). The causes of this are anthropogenic in origin, principally
the modification or destruction of habitats, pollution, hunting, resource use, and theintroduction of exotic species. Large fractions of extant species groups are classified as
endangered (see Figure 1).
Species extinction results in loss of biodiversity and often changes in the structure andfunction of ecosystems. There is a large risk that many of the ecosystem services
identified in Table 1 could be adversely effected by species loss. However, the ability to
predict which species are the most important is very often quite limited (National
Research Council 1999; Chapin et al. 2000).

9

Table 1 - Ecosystems Function with Links to Good/Services and Possible Societal Value
Function
Production

Goods/Service
Value– FoodDirect– Fiber (timber and non-wood products)– Fuel– Fodder

Biogeochemical cycling– Nutrient cycling (especially N and P
absorption/deposition)– Carbon sinks

Mostly indirect, although future values haveto be considered

Soil and water
conservation– Flood and storm control– Erosion control– Clean water– Clean air– Water for irrigation– Organic matter or sediment export– Pollution control– Biodiversity

Mostly indirect, although future values haveto be considered

Animal-plant interactions – Pollination– Animal migration– Biodiversity

Mostly indirect, future, bequest, andexistence values have to be considered

Carrier

Mostly indirect and existence, but bequest
may have to be considered– Landscape connectivity– Animal migration– Biodiversity– Aesthetic/spiritual/cultural service

Source: Compiled from information in Figure 5-1 of Gitay et al. (2001).

Although it is clear that climate change is only one of several pressures on ecosystems,
and often not the most immediate (Sala et al. 2000), one must also consider that theinteraction between human activities and their effects on ecosystems and species is likely
to exacerbate the effects of climate change. For a number of ecosystems and species it
seems clear that if non-climatic pressures are successfully relieved but climatic ones
grow, there is still a substantial likelihood of major losses or extinctions in the coming
century (and in some cases several decades).
Significant and systematic effects have been observed on a very wide range of species
and ecosystems globally which have been attributed to climate change (McCarty 2001;
Walther et al. 2002; Parmesan and Yohe 2003; Root et al. 2003). Space does not permit
elaboration of these findings here: it is sufficient to note that a large majority ofobservational studies reveal changes consistent with expected effects of climate change.
The rest of this section examines the basic processes leading to climatic impacts on
species and ecosystems followed by a review of the projected effects of climate change
on a range of species and ecosystems. The starting point for this review is the IPCC
Third Assessment Report findings, particularly those of Working Group II, however themain effort is to attempt to estimate the effects of climate warming on a sample of species
and ecosystems drawn from the literature. Thus a substantial volume of publications and10

reports not reviewed in the TAR, but which are relevant to an assessment of climate
effects on ecosystems, were sought out and reviewed. Much literature has been
published since the TAR or was not available to the authors at the time of its writing (alarge selection of this is listed in the Appendix to the IPCC Technical Paper on Climate
Change and Biodiversity (Gitay et al. 2002) ). This sample will be representative of thewide range of impact studies in the literature at present, but is by no meanscomprehensive.
The IPCC Third Assessment Report reviewed the impacts of climate change on wildlife
and ecosystems in various chapters of the Working Group II Report. Chapter 5 of thatreport (Gitay et al. 2001) is the main locus of this review. It covered the effects of global
climate change on the terrestrial biosphere, wildlife in ecosystems, grasslands, savannas,
and deserts, forests and woodlands, lakes and streams, inland wetlands, and arctic andalpine ecosystems. 1 In addition to the material found in Chapter 5, Price et al. (2000) 2
prepared supplementary information. The impacts of climate change on coastal zones
and marine ecosystems were reviewed in a separate chapter and much additional material
on Arctic and Antarctic ecosystems were reviewed in the polar chapter. In addition, theregional chapters of this report (Africa, Asia, Small Island States, North America, Latin
America, Australia and New Zealand, and Europe) provide a lot of additional material on
ecosystems and species effects not covered in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 19 attempted asynthesis of the findings of the complete Working Group II Report (Smith et al. 2001).
A huge volume of literature is reflected in the TAR assessment and it is neither desirable
nor feasible to reconstruct this, hence, the effort here has focused on identifying key
findings and studies which can provide the basis for an assessment of the projected
impacts of climate change on species and ecosystems by degrees of projected warming or
sea level rise. Nevertheless, substantial effort has been made here to at least verify thereviews cited in relevant chapters of the TAR that relate to this objective.
Processes causing loss of biodiversity and ecosystem damage
Climate change is expected to affect ecosystems and species in a variety of different
ways. In this section the general processes, by which increased CO2 and climate change
affect species and ecosystems, are outlined. Specific examples are discussed in the later
sections that deal with specific classes of species and ecosystem types.

1
2

See http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/196.htm.
See http://www.usgcrp.gov/ipcc/html/ecosystem.pdf.

11Figure 1 - Proportion of the Global Number of Birds, Mammals, Fish and Plants
Species that are Currently Threatened with Extinction

Source: Figure 2 from Chapin et al. (2000).

The species that are most vulnerable to extinction from whatever cause are those withrestricted ranges, fragmented distribution within their range, low populations, reducing
range, decreasing habitat within the range, and/or which are suffering population declines(Price et al. 2000). Species with quite restrictive habitat requirements are mostvulnerable to extinction (Pimm et al. 1995). Where climate change is projected to reduce
habitats of such species there is likely to be the greatest extinction risks. Examples fromthe IPCC TAR include the Bengal tiger and its habitat in the Sundarbans and several
mountain dwelling species from Africa and Central and South America. In the case of
the Sundarbans, this World Heritage listed mangrove and forested wetland habitat isprojected to be reduced substantially as a consequence of sea level rise. Potential
migration routes for many of the area-dependent species are blocked by human activities(ADB 1994).
Table 2 summarizes an array of factors known to drive the processes of species
endangerment and extinction. Climate change is one of the pressures that is or is likely to
act to increase species vulnerability now and in the future. However, it will often, if not
usually, act in combination with the other pressures described below. Habitat
fragmentation caused by destruction of habitat, infrastructure or disturbance is likely to
exacerbate the effects of climate change by reducing the migration and dispersal abilityof species (Malcolm et al. 2002b). Pollution may also reduce the ability of species tocope with the stresses of rapid climate change (Hojer et al. 2001).

12

Table 2 - Processes driving Species Endangerment and Extinction
Process
Conversion of natural lands toother uses

Explanation
This is the main threat to ecosystems and wildlife. 80% of the earth’s
forests are already cleared or degraded and a sizeable fraction of theremainder is threatened.

Habitat fragmentation

This can be caused by agricultural land use and infrastructure such as
roads, railways and urban areas. Habitat fragmentation threatens the longterm viability of wildlife population as:• Species often require large areas to survive in the long term. At
present, a number of large birds and mammals have range
requirements greater than the remaining habitat area. Thismeans that in the longer term they are likely to decline due tothe effects of accidents, inbreeding or climate change.

••

Fragmentation is in effect a barrier to the dispersal andmigration of species in response to natural disturbances or
climatic changes.
Invasion by exotic species such as new predators is easier.

Habitat degradation

Human use of habitats for natural resource extraction or recreation can
introduce exotic predators (e.g. cats, dogs), plant pathogens, disturb water
courses or water quality or disturb breeding environments by noise or
physical disturbance.

Hunting and extraction or use
of natural resources

Hunting, harvesting, culling or inadvertent killing of wildlife is a
substantial threat in many, if not most, regions. Threats arise in a variety
of ways:• Hunting and harvesting is often not sustainable and has, in thepast, led to extinctions or stock collapses. Well known
historical examples include the extinction of the great Auk andthe passenger pigeon. In recent years, hunting in Europe has led
to a decline in the European Robins populations. In developing
countries wildlife populations adjacent to expanding urban areas
will most likely not be sustained.
• By-catch losses are often significant.
• Culling of wildlife because of actual or perceived competition
with human activities.
• Hunting can result in pollution of wetlands.

Wildlife tradeThis can place considerable pressure on populations and species and has
caused substantial damage to large mammals such as elephants,rhinoceros, and tigers.

Pollution

Pollutants have been detected in many species throughout the world.
Pollution has been implicated in the decline of a number of species
through:• Direct poisoning.
• Indirect effects, due to longer-term exposure to pollutants, on
reproduction, behaviour and survival.
• The elimination or modification of habitat.

Exotic species

Introduced species have caused substantial damage to local species andpose a threat to substantial numbers of mammals and birds.

13

Process
Climatic change

Explanation
Climate is an important determining factor of the distribution range of
ecosystems and species. Future projected rates of change appear to
exceed previously observed ones, giving rise to concerns as to the abilityof species and ecosystems to adapt to projected changes without
significant loss or disruption.

Synergistic effects of climatechangeClimate change is likely to act synergistically with many of the otherfactors mentioned in this table. Habitat fragmentation and loss will
inhibit species abilities to migrate in response to climate changes. Exotic
species invasion may be facilitated by a combination of habitat
degradation and climate change, yielding negative effects on the endemic
species. Human responses to climate change may exacerbate threats tobiodiversity, by, for example, preventing inland movement of coastal
wetlands or as a consequence of increased pesticide use resulting fromenhance pest activity in changed climatic conditions.

Extreme climatic events

Extreme climatic events and changes in the pattern of weather andclimate events can cause large-scale losses of species and damages toecosystems.

Source: This table has been compiled based on the review of Gitay et al. (2001) and (Hughes 2000).

One of the important processes to bear in mind, when considering biodiversity loss andecosystem decay, is the observation that species, or populations of species, that havesurvived large scale loss of their habitat in the past may still face extinction (Cowlishaw1999). Species often require large areas of habitat to be able to weather stochastic events
such as droughts and disease outbreaks, avoid the problems of small gene pools or otherenvironmental pressures and thus survive in the long-term.
Climate change and CO2 effects on species and ecosystems
Projected anthropogenic climatic change and increases in CO 2 are expected to result inlarge changes in ecosystems globally and to add significantly to the pressure on species
from the human activities outlined in Table 2. In a general sense, species respond to
warming by moving their ranges upwards and polewards. Within this general pattern
however, the range and complexity of responses expected is quite large. Nevertheless,these can be broken down into a finite list of classes of responses or impacts, which aresummarized in Table 3. Examples of some of the potential impacts and risks are also
given. Hughes (2000) provides a very useful schematic of the ma in pathways by whichclimate change and increases in CO 2 can result in negative impacts on species andecosystems (see Figure 2). Increasing CO2 concentrations impact on plant species
directly affecting growth, nutrient uptake, and water use efficiency.

14

Figure 2 - Pathways by which Climate change affects Species and Ecosystems
Source: Figure 2 of Hughes (2000) . Reference numbers in this figure refer to the original publication by
Hughes.

CO2 (and other greenhouse gases) induced climate changes will result in changes intemperature, the precipitation regime and the frequency and intensity of extreme events.
Species response can be divided into four groups – changes in physiology, phenology,
distribution and in situ adaptations. The various responses ultimately lead to changes in
species interaction and consequently, to changes in ecosystem structure and composition.
Changes in the frequenc y and intensity of extreme events as a consequence of climatechange, including El Niño cycles, are likely (Easterling et al. 2000) and will have large
effects upon species and ecosystems (Parmesan et al. 2000). Average climate changes
may not be as important as the changes in extremes of weather and climate in triggering
shifts in species and/or major changes in ecosystems. To date, few studies have taken
this into account in projecting the effects of climate change on species.
Beyond the details of what mechanisms and processes will drive species and ecosystem
responses to climate change, is the apparent fact that the rate of global mean surface
temperature change projected over the next century appears quite unprecedented, at least
during the Holocene and perhaps for much longer. The maximum rate of global meanchange consistent with the range of estimates for the transition from the last glacial

15maximum to the Holocene (also known as Termination I) is around 0.01oC/decade 3. A 35o C warming to 2100 is thus about 25-45 times faster than the highest rates of change atthe end of the last glacial over several thousand years.
In relation to century scale changes, it would appear that changes with rates of more than
0.1o C/decade are quite unusual. If one compares the maximum trends in temperature
over varying time periods in ice core data and in proxy and instrumental records, it isapparent that the maximum rates of change drop rapidly with increasing averaging
period. Figure 3 compares a local long-term temperature series with three hemispheric or
global average records for the period 1861-2001. As would be expected the local
temperature series shows much larger variability. In Figure 4 rates of change intemperature are calculated from the individual time series, over all possible trend periods
in each record and then the maximum rate for each trend period found. For example, themaximum trend in temperature over all 30-year periods in the Mann et al. (1999) 1000year record is 0.2oC/decade, whereas for the central England record it is close to
0.5o C/decade. For a 100-year trend period, the maximum rate of change observed is lessthan 0.1o C per decade for all records, excepting projected changes over the next century.
The projected rates of change, in relation to the ability of plants and animals are to move,
migrate or adapt over the next century worry many scientists (Overpeck et al. 1992;
Malcolm et al. 2002b). During the last deglaciation, even widespread and dominant
species became extinct (Jackson and Weng 1999) and there is concern that projected rates
of climate change exceed the observed rates of change in the past (Davis and Shaw 2001;
Malcolm et al. 2002b). Whilst attempts have been made to model migration andmovement of plants under climate change, present methodologies remain problematic(see discussion in Gitay et al. (2001)). Although there is a general consensus thatprojected rates of climate change are very likely to exceed the migrational capacity of
species in at least the mid- and high- latitudes, too little is known to be able to fully
quantify this problem.

3

In the somewhat extreme case that Termination I was associated with an 8o C change in global averagetemperature over a period of 7,000 years as may be inferred from the Vostok record published by (Petit etal. 1999).

16

Table 3 - Response and Impacts of Climate Change on Species and Ecosystems
Response or impact

Examples of effects and risks• Changes in distribution of species, ecosystemboundaries, and biomes

Poleward or upward shift of aquatic and terrestrial biota (McCarty 2001;
Walther et al. 2002; Root et al. 2003). Risk that insufficient altitudinalrange with suitable habitat exists for mountain species to migrate(Theurillat and Guisan 2001). Risk that rate of change exceeds migratory
capacity of species (Malcolm et al. 2002b).

• Changes in phenology of biotic and abiotic processes
and events

Earlier flowering of plants and budding of trees, earlier egg laying in birds.
Risk of asynchronous timing of events between species with tightsynchronization requirements e.g. late arrival of migratory birds after peakof food availability has passed (Both and Visser 2001; Visser andHolleman 2001).
Changes from grassland or savannah to woodlands, or from moist tropicalforest to drier woodlands. Risk of loss of habitat for ungulates with
reduction in savannah and invasion with woody plant species (Bond andMidgley 2000).

• Changes in structure of plant communities• Changes in species composition and diversity

Loss of climatically suitable habitat for species may frequently lead torange reductions, population fragmentation and reduced genetic diversity.
Risk of major species loss in some regions and risk of ecosystem structuralchanges or loss if key species disappear (Kerr and Packer 1998; Midgley etal. 2002).

• Changes in animal and plant population dynamics andstructure

Changes in competitive balance between species affecting ecosystem
structure and composition.

• Changes in Net Primary Productivity (NPP), Net
Increased CO2 and warmer temperatures will lead to changes, often
Ecosystem Productivity (NEP), Net Biome Productivity increases, in NPP, with the balance of ecosystem productivity NEP and(NBP)
NBP being determined by the precipitation changes (Cramer et al. 2001).
Risk in some ecosystems of reduction in NPP, NEP or NBP with warmingin the coming century (White et al. 2000a; Friedlingstein et al. 2001).
• Changes in carbon and nutrient cycling

Changes in NPP, NEP and NBP affect global carbon cycle with increasing
CO2 likely to enhance the terrestrial uptake of carbon (Lucht et al. 2002).
Risk of positive feedback from climate change to terrestrial carbon cycle(White et al. 2000a; Friedlingstein et al. 2001).

• Changes in litter, forage and wood quality

Increase atmospheric CO2 , whilst enhancing plant growth may at the sametime results in less nutrient content in leaves (Tuchman et al. 2002), forage(Lenart et al. 2002) and crops (Reyenga et al. 1999). Kanowski (2001)
finds that increased CO 2 will reduce the food quality of rainforest trees fortree dwelling marsupials, which is likely to reduce their abundance in the
future.

• Changes in water-use efficiency with elevated CO2

Could increase the drought resistance of plant species and with differential
response between species, change the competitive balance between
components of ecosystems (Bond and Midgley 2000).

• Increase in frequency and/or intensity of disturbance(e.g., fires)

Increased fire frequency in Mediterranean ecosystems as a consequence ofchanged drought intensity or frequency leading to shifts in vegetation
structure (Parmesan et al. 2000; White et al. 2000b; Mouillot et al. 2002;
Walther et al. 2002).

• Changes in water flow and level leading to loss of
Changes in water regime (flow, duration and extent) can negatively affectaquatic habitats, waterfowl, riparian forests, recreational the habitats and breeding possibilities of many species. Risk of loss ofopportunities, eutrophication
cold freshwater fish species and of major reductions in breeding habitats
for ducks and other waterfowl (Sorenson et al. 1998).
• Increased pests and diseases

Changes in climate in the boreal forests could lead to a greater frequency
of pest outbreaks affecting boreal tree species (Ayres and Lombardero
2000; Volney and Fleming 2000).

Note: This table is compiled in part from Figure 5-1 from Gitay et al. (2001), with the examples
drawn from the literature.

17

Figure 3 - Comparison of Hemispheric and Long-Term Local Temperature SeriesComparison of temperature time series
1.5

1Anomaly oC wrt 1961-1990

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

Central England Time series 1659-2001
Folland/Jones 1861-2001 global surface temperature-1.5

Northern Hemisphere Jones 1856-2001 data
Northern Hemisphere land proxy record Jones (1998)

-2
1860

1870

1880

1890

1900

1910

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

-2.5
Year ADThis graph compares the central England temperature series with a global mean and northern hemispheresurface instrumental record and a 1000 year proxy record for the northern hemisphere land surface for theperiod 1861-2000.
Figure 4 - Comparison of Maximum Decadal Rates of Chang eComparison of maximum decadal rates of temperature change and projectedchanges to 2099
HadCM2 scenario GG2 ensemble member
1990-2099
0.5

Jones 1861-2001 Northern Hemisphere record
Mann (1999) AD 1000 - AD 1980 Northern
Hemisphere proxy record

oC/decade

0.4

Max Central England before 1950

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

A

This graph compares the maximum rates of change observed for different trend periods for threetemperature records with a HadCM2 GCM projection for the period 1990-2099.

18

Projected effects on species and ecosystems
Table 4 from the IPCC TAR Synthesis Report is an attempt to summarize the findings ofthe IPCC TAR in relation to the impacts of climate change on ecosystems and species. It
also attempts to place temperature-warming bands on the identified impacts for coral
reefs, coastal wetlands and terrestrial ecosystems. What becomes apparent fromexamination of this table is that the risk of significant damages exists at low levels ofwarming. A detailed examination of the literature used in the TAR and that has been
published subsequently adds substantial specificity to this picture.
Rather than present the analysis of the literature on the projected effects of climatechange on ecosystems and species in a narrative format the results are presented in a tableformat. This facilitates cross comparison with similar systems in different regions as wellas maintaining the compactness of this report. Table 5 details the results of the analysis
here for a large number of projected impacts on species and ecosystems under quite
different climate scenarios. An attempt has been made to reduce all of the scenarios usedin the various studies cited to an estimated change in global mean surface temperaturesthat would correspond to the contemporary generation of climate models. This has been
done using the simple climate model MAGICC 4.1 and the downscaling programme,
SCENGEN of Wigley, Raper, Hulme and others (Hulme et al. 1995; Raper et al. 2001;
Wigley and Raper 2001) 4 . Details are given in the table for each case.
Based on the analysis documented in Table 5 an attempt has been made to map the
projected level of impact for different levels of warming graphically in (Figure 5-7).
These figures attempt to associate some level of risk, loss or impact with a range oftemperature increases. Five categories of risk were used in constructing the figures. Less

4

The programmes and references are available at
http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/cas/wigley/magicc/installation.html

19

Table 4 - Ecosystem effects of climate change
2025

2050

2100

405–460 ppm
0.4–1.1°C

445–640 ppm
0.8–2.6°C

540–970 ppm
1.4–5.8°C

1.4-3.2°C

2.0-6.4°C

5–32 cm

9–88 cmMore extensive coral bleachingand death (high confidenced).

More extensive coralbleaching and death (highconfidenced).
Reduced species
biodiversity and fishyields from reefs(medium confidenced).

Coastal wetlands and Loss of some coastal wetlands toshorelines [WGII TAR sea-level rise (medium
Sections 6.4.2 & 6.4.4] confidenced).
Increased erosion of shorelines(medium confidence d).

More extensive loss of coastal
wetlands (medium confidenced).
Further erosion of shorelines(medium confidenced).

Terrestrial ecosystems Lengthening of growing season[WGII TAR Sections in mid- and high latitudes; shifts
5.2.1, 5.4.1, 5.4.3,
in ranges of plant and animal
5.6.2, 16.1.3, & 19.2] species (high confidenced).e,f

Extinction of some endangered
species; many others pushedcloser to extinction (highconfidenced).

Further loss of coastal
wetlands (medium
confidenced).
Further erosion ofshorelines (medium
confidenced).
Loss of unique habitats
and their endemic species(e.g., vegetation of Caperegion of South Africa
and some cloud forests)(medium confidenced).

CO2 concentration a
Global mean
temperature change
from the year 1990 b

Global mean
1.0-1.7°C
temperature change
from the years 18611890 (average) 5
Global mean sea-level 3–14 cm
rise from the year
1990 bEcosystem Effects c
Corals [WGII TAR
Increase in frequency of coral
Sections 6.4.5, 12.4.7, bleaching and death of corals& 17.2.4](high confidenced).

Increase in net primary
productivity of many mid- andhigh-latitude forests (medium
confidenced).

Increase in net primary
productivity may or may notcontinue.

Increase in frequency of
Increase in frequency of
Increase in frequency of
ecosystem disturbance by fire and ecosystem disturbance by fireecosystem disturbance byinsect pests (high confidenced). and insect pests (highfire and insect pests (highconfidenced).
confidenced).
Ice environments
Retreat of glaciers, decreased sea- Extensive Arctic sea-ice
Substantial loss of ice[WGI TAR Sections ice extent, thawing of some
reduction, benefiting shipping
volume from glaciers,2.2.5 & 11.5; WGII
permafrost, longer ice-free
but harming wildlife (e.g., seals, particularly tropical
TAR Sections 4.3.11, seasons on rivers and lakes (high polar bears, walrus) (medium
glaciers (high11.2.1, 16.1.3, 16.2.1, confidenced).f
confidenced).
confidenced).
16.2.4, & 16.2.7]
Ground subsidence leading to
infrastructure damage (highconfidenced).
No climate policy interventions. Source: IPCC TAR Synthesis Report Technical Summary Table 3-2. *Refer tofootnotes a-d accompanying Table 7 in this report. Note f: These effects have already been observed and are expected
to continue [TAR WGII Sections 5.2.1, 5.4.3, 16.1.3, & 19.2].

5

Using Folland et al.(2001) global temperature data set.

20

Impacts on coastal wetlands•

Below a 1oC increase the risk of damage is low for most, but not all systems.

•

Between 1-2o C moderate to large losses appear likely for a few systems. Of mostconcern are threats to the Kakadu wetlands and the Sundarbans of Bangladesh,both of which may suffer 50% losses at less than 2o C:•-

Inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List for both its outstanding
natural and cultural values, Kakadu is regarded as one of the great
wetlands of the world;-

Also on the World Heritage list and renowned as the largest intact
mangrove wetland system in the world, the Sundarbans is the soleremaining home of the Royal Bengal tiger (Panthera tigris tigris).
Spanning about 1 million km2 , 62% of which is in Bangladesh and theremainder in West Bengal, India, this region is home to a wide variety andgreat number of species.

Between 2-3o C, it is possible that the Med iterranean, Baltic and several migratory
bird habitats in the US experience a 50% loss. In this range it seems likely that
there could be the complete loss of Kakadu and the Sundarbans.

A key issue is the inertia of sea level rise, which makes the assig nment of risk to different
temperature levels misleading. Should, for example, sea level rise by 30cm in the
coming decades to a century (threatening Kakadu), the thermal inertia of the ocean issuch that an ultimate sea level rise of 2-4 times this amount may be inevitable even if
temperature stops rising. The prognoses for wetlands in this context is not clear, as many
damages are linked to the rate of sea level rise compared to the accretion and/or
migratory capacity of the system. A major determinant of the latter will be humanactivity adjacent to, or in the inland catchments of the wetland system.
Impacts on animal species
Figure 6 summarizes estimated effects on a range of animal species. Along with theinformation in Table 5 one could conclude the following:•

Below 1o C warming, there appears to be a risk of extinction for some vulnerable
species in southwestern Australia and to a lesser extent in South Africa. Range
losses for species such as the Golden Bower bird in the highland tropical forestsof North Queensland Australia and for many animal species in South Africa arelikely to become significant and observable.

21

•

Between 1-2o C warming, large and sometimes severe impacts appear possible forsome Salmonid fish habitats in the USA, the Collared Lemming in Canada, South
African animals and for Mexico’s fauna. Extinctions in southwestern Australia
seem very likely and possibly South Africa and Mexico for the most vulnerable
species. In general, many endangered species are pushed closer to extinction.
Mid summer ice reduction in the Arctic ocean seems likely to be at a level thatwould cause major problems for polar bears at least at a regional level.

•

Between 2-3oC large to severe impacts appear likely for Mexican fauna, many
South African animals, the Collared Lemming in the Arctic (which would havebroad implications for arctic ecosystems), Salmonid fish in Wyoming, with thelikelihood of extinctions in Mexico and South Africa. In Hawaii, extinction ofseveral Hawaiian Honeycreeper has been predicted for about a 2.8-3.2oC
increase. In this range the Golden Bower bird's range would be reduced by 90%.

•

Above 3oC, large impacts begin to emerge for waterfowl habitat in the Prairie
Pothole region. The collared lemming range is reduced by 80%, very large
reductions are projected for Arctic sea ice cover particularly in summer which islikely to further endanger polar bears. Extinction of the Golden Bower bird ispredicted in this temperature range. In Mexico very severe range losses for many
animals are projected, as is the case also in South Africa, with Kruger nationalpark projected to lose two thirds of the animals studied. The likelihood of the
impacts identified above will continue to grow with higher temperatures.

Impacts on ecosystems
Figure 7 shows the impacts projected for a range of ecosystems including tropical forests,
alpine systems in Australia and Europe, the Fynbos and Succulent Karoo in South Africa
and, in the marine domain, coral reefs. With the information in Table 5, one may find thefollowing conclusions:•

Between present temperatures and a 1o C increase, three ecosystems appear to bemoving into a high risk zone - highland tropical forests in Queensland, Australia,
the Succulent Karoo in South Africa and coral reefs. Increased fire frequency andpest outbreaks may cause disturbance in boreal forests and other ecosystems.

•

Between 1-2o C the Australian highland tropical forest, the Succulent Karoobiodiversity hot spot, coral reef ecosystems and some Arctic and alpine
ecosystems are likely to suffer large or severe damage. The Fynbos will
experience increased losses. Coral reef bleaching will likely become much more
frequent, with slow or no recover, particularly in the Indian Ocean south of theequator. Australian highland tropical forest types, which are home to many
endemic vertebrates, are projected to halve in area in this range. The Australian
alpine zone is likely to suffer moderate to large losses. The substantial loss of22

Arctic sea ice likely to occur will harm ice dependent species such as the polar
bears and walrus. Increased frequency of fire and insect pest disturbance is likely
to cause increasing problems for ecoystems and species in the Mediterranean
region. Moderate to large losses of boreal forest in China can be expected.
Moderate shifts in the range of European plants can be expected and in Australia
moderate to large number of Eucalypts may be outside out of their climatic range.
•

Between 2-3o C coral reefs are projected to bleach annually in a number of reef
locations. At the upper end of this temperature band, the risk of eliminating the
Succulent Karoo and its 2800 endemic plants is very high. Moderate to large
reductions in the Fynbos can be expected, with the risk of significant extinctions.
In the highland tropical forests of northeastern Australia “catastrophic loss” orrainforest vertebrates has been predic ted Australian mainland alpine ecosystems
are likely to be on the edge of disappearance. European alpine systems will at or
above their anticipated tolerable limits of warming with some vulnerable species
close to extinction. Severe loss of boreal fores t in China is projected and large
and adverse changes are also projected for many systems on the Tibetan plateau.
Large shifts in the range of European plants seem likely and a large number of
Eucalypt species may expect to lie outside of their present climatic range.
Moderate to large effects are projected for Arctic ecosystems and boreal forests.
Within this temperature range there is a likelihood of the Amazon forest suffering
potentially irreversible damage leading to its collapse.

23

Figure 5 - Impacts on Coastal Wetlands

Australia, Kakadu region: Loss of, or serious damage to, Kakadu World Heritage
listed wetlands (30cm,1.7oC - range of 1.2-3.1oC) (9)No significant effect(less than 5%)
Small impact (ca 510%)

Bangladesh, Sundarbans: Progressive loss of mangrove forest and wetlands,
including habitat of Bengal tiger (75% loss at 2-3.5oC) (8)Moderate loss (ca10-20%)

European wetlands: Mediterranean coast (31-100% loss for 2.4-4.4oC warming in
2080s) (7)Large loss (20-50%
or greater)
Severe loss (50% or
more)

European wetlands: Baltic coast (84-98% for 2.6-4.4oC warming in 2080s) (6)European wetlands: Atlantic coast (0 to 17% loss for 2.6-4.4oC warming in 2080s)(5)
USA: Delaware - Loss of 21% ca. 2.5-3.5oC warming - 100 year floods occurring 34 times more frequently (4)USA: Loss of important foraging, migratory and wintering bird habitat at four sites(20- 70% loss for ca. 2.6oC warming) (3)
USA: Southern New England- extensive loss of wetlands if sea level rise greaterthan 6mm/yr (2)Global assessment: Low - progressive coastal wetland loss with increasing
warming (5.7% for ca. 3.4oC warming) (1b)Global assessment: High - progressive coastal wetland loss with increasing
warming (22.2% for ca. 3.4oC warming) (1a)
0

24

1

2

3

4

5

6

Notes: All examples are described in more detail in Table 5 - Ecosystem Impacts.
(1a) Global assessment: Based on the Nicholls et al.(1999) assessment using the high estimate of wetland loss (22.2% in 2100 for around a 3.4o C
warming). A linear extrapolation used to calculate 50% loss, which is likely to very much overestimate the temperature at which this would
occur.
(1b) Global assessment: As above but for low estimates (5.7% loss by 2100) with linear extrapolation to 50%, which is likely to radicallyunderestimate the at which this would occur.
(2)
USA, southern New England: Based on Donnelly and Bertness (2001b) with assumption that a 5o C increase (3-5oC range) by 2100 is
associated with a 6mm/yr increase in sea level rise and an 80% (extensive) loss of wetlands.
(3)
USA, migratory bird habitat: Based on Galbraith et al. (2002). The graph shown is for the average range of losses at the four sites that lose
intertidal habitat for all warming and sea level rise scenarios - Willapa Bay, Humboldt Bay and northern and southern San Francisco Bay.
The average losses at these sites in 2100 for the 2.6oC scenario is 44 % (range 26% to 70%) and for 5.3oC is 79% (range 61% to 91%). The
latter point is used to scale the average losses with temperature, which increases the temperature sligtly for a given loss compared to the
2.6oC scenario. The Delaware bay site loses 57% of intertidal habitat for the 2.6oC (34 cm sea level rise) but gains 20% in the 5.3oC (77cm
sea level rise scenario). Whilst the Bolivar flats site loses significantly by the 2050s for both scenarios (38-81%) it gains by the 2100s forboth scenarios.
(4)USA, Delaware: Based on Najjar et al. (2000) assuming 21% loss at 3.5oC warming with linear extrapolation to 50%. A linear extrapolation
used to calculate 50% loss, which is likely to very much overestimate the temperature at which this would occur.
(5)
European wetlands - Atlantic coast: Based on IPCC WGII TAR Table 13-4 which is based new runs using the models described by Nicholls
et al.(1999) with a linear extrapolation of the high range 17% loss with 4.4o C warming to higher loss rates. This is likely to very muchoverestimate the temperature at which this would occur.
(6)
European wetlands- Baltic coast: As above with linear extrapolation of high range 98% loss with 4.4o C warming.
(7)
European wetlands- Mediterranean coast: As above with a linear extrapolation of high range 100% loss with 4.4o C warming.
(8)
Bangladesh, Sundarbans: Based on Qureshi and Hobbie (1994) and Smith et al. (1998) with sea level rise and temperature relationship (for2100) drawn from Hulme et al. (1999b). This produces very similar results to an estimate based on “average” model characteristics. Somemodels project higher sea level rise and others lower. Assumed relationship is 15% loss for 1.5oC (range 1-1.5oC) and 75% loss 3.5oC(range 2-3.5oC).
(9)Australia, Kakadu region: This estimate is highly uncertain. In the WGII TAR report Gitay et al. (2001) assert that the wetlands “could be
all but displaced if predicted sea-level rises of 10–30 cm by 2030 occur and are associated with changes in rainfall in the catchment andtidal/storm surges” (p308). Here it is assumed that a 30cm sea level rise displaces 80% of the wetlands and that the sea level rise vs.
temperature relationship is drawn from Hulme et al. (1999b) from the HadCM2 and HadCM3. Note that the estimate range from recent
models is 1.2-3.1oC for a 30cm sea level rise.

25

Figure 6 – Impacts on Animal Species

Mexico: Range reduction for many species with likely severe
ecological perturbations ( 5-19% of species lose 50% or moreof range with 1.9-2.4oC warming) (5)No significant
effect (<5%) orvery low risk
USA: Reduction in range of coolwater, salmonid fish in
Wyoming habitat (4)Small impact (510) or low risk

USA: Reduction in range of coolwater, salmonid fish in Rocky
Mountains (3)Moderate impact(10-20%) or
moderate risk eg
local extinction

USA: Waterfowl breeding population reduction (overall reduction
in waterfowl abundance and wetland extent) in the Prairie Pot
Hole region - breeding population reduction 45% for ca 3.3oC
warming (2)Large impacts (2050%) or significant
risk of extinction
Severe impacts(>50%) or high riskof extinction

Arctic: Reduction in range of keystone arctic mammal - Collared
Lemming: 50% reduction in range for 1.7-2.2oC global increase
above 1861-1890 (1)01

See notes below:

26

2

3

4

Figure 6 – Impacts on Animal Species continued:

USA, Hawaii: Predicted extinction of honeycreepers (12)Australia: Large range reduction (50%) for majority (>80%) butterfly
species with 2.9oC warming (11)No significant
effect (<5%) orvery low risk

Australia: Catastrophic loss of endemic verterbrates from highland
tropical rainforests for around 3oC warming(10)Small impact (510) or low risk

Australia: Predicted extinction of golden bower bird in highland tropicalrainforests (90% range loss with 3oC warming) (9)Moderate impact (1020%) or moderate risk
eg local extinction

Australia: Very large range reduction or elimination of 3 species offrogs and 15 species of endangered mammals in Dryandra forest ofsouth western Australia (8)Large impacts (2050%) or significant
risk of extinction

South Africa: Predicted extinction of four species (1.9-3.1oC by 2050s
wrt 1861-1890) (7)Severe impacts(>50%) or high riskof extinction

South Africa: 78% of 179 animal species studied experience range
contraction - 29 endangered or vulnerable species suffer 50% or more
reduction in range (1.9-3.1oC by 2050s wrt 1861-1890) (6)01

See notes below:
27

2

3

4

Notes: See Table 5 for more details
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)
(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)

Canadian Arctic, collared lemming: Based on data in Kerr and Packer (1998) with conversion of local temperatures to global mean based on a range of thecurrent AOGCMs; mid-range used. Interpolation is used to estimate range reductions based on data in Kerr and Packer (1998).
USA, waterfowl population Prairie Pot Hole Region: Based on data in Sorenson et al. (1998) with interpolation of data.
USA, reduction of Salmonid fish habitat in Rocky Mountains: Based on data in Keleher and Rahel (1996) with extrapolations to 5% and 10% reductions.
June, July, August temperatures ‘upscaled’ to global by associating projected JJA temperatures from a range of GCMs for the USA with global mean
temperatures using MAGICC/SCENGEN. This is obviously quite uncertain given that temperature changes in the region are likely to be quite different
from the USA average, with mountainous regions likely to experience amplification of trends for the continental averages.
USA, reduction of Salmonid fish habitat in Wyoming: Based on data in Keleher and Rahel (1996) with extrapolations to 50% reduction. Upscaling oftemperatures as in (3).
Mexico: Highly indicative interpretation of results of Peterson et al. (2002) for range reductions. The 50% range reduction level is associated with theupper end of their warming scenario, which corresponds to 2.4o C warming above 1861-1890 and this range reduction applies to up to 19% of the entire
Mexican fauna. Between present temperatures and 2.4o C a linear scaling is used here. Note that there is projected to be a severe risk of extinction for up to
several tens of fauna species (0-2.4% of species lose 90% of range for 1.9-2.4o C warming).
South Africa, range reductions of large number of animals: Highly indicative only, interpretation of results of Erasmus et al. (2002) for range reductions in
the 29 endangered species projected to experience 50% or more range reductions with a warming of 2.4o C (1.9-3.1oC range) (above 1861-1890). The scaleassumes that a 50% reduction in the range of these species occurs with 3.1o C. Lower reductions are linearly scaled from 1990 temperatures.
South Africa, predicted extinctions: Highly indicative only interpretation of results of Erasmus et al. (2002) for extinctions projected for a 2.4o C increase(1.9-3.1oC range). The scale used assumes that there is a 100% chance of extinction with a 3.1o C increase, zero probability at current temperatures, and thelikelihood of extinction increase linearly.
Australia, south west Dryandra forest: Based on Pouliquen-Young and Newman (1999) as cited by Gitay et al. (2001). Assumed that “very large” range
reduction meant a 90% reduction, that the loss of range scale was linear for the present climate to a warming of 1.1o C (above 1861-1890), and that 90%
reduction occurs at 1.1o C.
Australia, predicted extinction of Golden Bower bird of highland tropical forests, north east Queensland: Based on (Hilbert et al. 2003) and using range
reduction of 90% with a 3oC warming and linear interpolation for range losses between 1990 (0.6oC and 0% range loss) and this level.
Australia, “catastrophic” loss of endemic vertebrates from rainforest in highland tropical rainforests: Based on (Williams et al. 2003) and with similar
scaling as above.
Australia, large range reduction in range of butterfly species: Based in (Beaumont and Hughes 2002) with risk of large range reductions for large numbersof species linearly increasing from zero at 0.6oC to 50% loss for 80% of species at 2.9oC.
USA, predicted extinction for honeycreepers in montane forests of Hawaii: Based on (Benning et al. 2002) with risk of extinction to 90% at 3.2oC

28

Figure 7 – Impacts on Ecosystems

No significant
effect (<5%) orvery low risk

Alpine ecosystems, southeastern Australia: (ca 90%
loss for 3.8oC warming) (5)Small impact (510) or low risk

Alpine ecosystems, Europe:
38% of species losing 90%
of range by 4.5oC (4)Moderate impact(10-20%) or
moderate risk eg
local extinction

Arctic, Tundra ecosystem:
global loss of 57% with
3.8oC warming (3)Large impacts(20-50%) or
significant riskof extinction

Arctic/Boreal, Boreal
woodland/Taiga 44% loss
by 3.8oC warming (3)Severe impacts(>50%) or highrisk of extinction

Arctic, Canadian Low Arctic
Tundra - 77% loss with
3.3oC warming (2)Boreal forests, China:
Reduction in extent of boreal
forest (70% reduction for ca.
2.8oC warming) (1)
0

1

2

29

3

4

5

Figure 7 – Impacts on Ecosystems continued:

Coral reefs- global assessment: Projected annual bleaching by 1.7-2.3oC warming (13)Coral reefs - Indian Ocean: extinction risk with 1.4oC warming (12)Plant diversity threat, Australia: Eucalypt species out of climatic range (50% of species
out of current thermal range with 2.7-3.2oC warming) (11)Plant diversity threat, Europe: Changes in plant biodiversity with risk of extinction (32%of sampled areas in Europe in 2050 no longer have species in them that are present
now for 2.4oC warming) (10)No significant
effect (<5%) orvery low risk

Tropical forests, Amazon: risk of collapse and/or major loss of species (9)Small impact (510) or low risk

Moderate impact(10-20%) or
moderate risk eg
local extinction
Large impacts(20-50%) or
significant riskof extinction
Severe impacts(>50%) or highrisk of extinction

Tropical forests, Highland tropical forests - Australia, Queensland: - 50% loss of areawith about a 1.8oC warming, catastrophic loss of verterbrates 2.6-3oC. (8)Biodiversity Hot Spot, Fynbos , South Africa: Range loss and risk of extinction ofendemic plants in Fynbos biome. Projected to lose 51-61% of area, with 10% ofendemic Proteaceae species suffering complete range loss. (7)Biodiversity Hot Spot, Succulent Karoo , South Africa: Severe risk of extinction projected to lose 80% of range for 1.9-2.4oC warming. Virtual disappearance at 3.44.3oC with likely extinction of its 2800 endemic plants. (6)

0

30

1

2

3

4

Notes: Details of each example are to be found in Table 5 - Ecosystem Impacts.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)

(7)

(8)
(9)
(10)

(11)
(12)
(13)

Boreal forests, China: Based on Ni (2001) with linear scaling of loss of boreal forest in China with temperature.
Arctic, Canadian Low Arctic Tundra: Loss of area is 77% with 3.3oC warming based on (Malcolm et al. 2002b) and linearly interpolated from zero at 0.6oC.
Arctic/Boreal, Boreal woodland/Taiga and Arctic Tundra: Loss of ecosystems respectively 44% and 57% with 3.8oC warming and scaled linearly from zero at 0.6oC
warming. Based on (Neilson et al. 1997)
Alpine ecosystems, Europe: Highly indicative measure of risk only. Scale is percentage of alpine species losing 90% of their range with linear scaling of the estimated
38% losing this level with a warming of about 4.7o C (range 3.3-4.7°C). This is done only to provide a visual picture of increasing risk with temperature, which is one of
the main findings of the literature for this region (see Table 5 - Ecosystem Impacts).
Alpine ecosystems, south eastern Australia: Assumes 90% reduction with a warming of 3.8o C (above 1861-1890) with linear scaling of area loss from present climate.
Busby (1988) found that the alpine zone would be confined to only 6 peaks for a warming of 1.7-3.8o C.
Biodiversity Hot Spot, Succulent Karoo , South Africa: Based on Midgley and Rutherford at http://www.nbi.ac.za/frames/researchfram.htm. The scale is likelihood of
extinction of the 2800 plants endemic to the Succulent Karoo ecosystem, where it is assumed that the systems will no longer exist with 100% certainty with an increase of
2.4o C and that the likelihood of extinction scales linearly upward from zero at current temperatures.
Biodiversity Hot Spot, Fynbos , South Africa: Based on Midgley et al. (2002) and linear scaling loss of the area of Fynbos with temperature from zero at present up to
61% loss of area with a 2.4o C increase (above 1861-1890). Ten percent of endemic Proteaceae species are projected to suffer complete loss of range, and hence are also
very likely to become extinct with a 51-61% area loss in Fynbos.
Tropical forests, Highland tropical forests - Australia, Queensland : Based on results of Ostendorf et al. (2001), Hilbert et al. (2001), Williams et al. (2003) and Hilbert etal. (2003)with linear scaling of area losses with local temperature increase. Across results from different assessments this produces fairly consistent estimates.
Tropical forests, Amazon: This is speculative drawing on the work of Cowling et al. (2003) and Cox et al. (2003) and assuming that there is a 50% risk of collapse
with a warming of 2.4oC. See discussion in Table 5 and footnote XX and Note (1) at the end of this table.
Plant diversity threat, Europe: Based on Bakkenes et al. (2002) with scale being fraction of plant species occurring at present within a grid cell in Europe that no longer
appear with given level of warming. Assumes linear scaling with temperature increase above the present. As such is indicative only of increasing risk with temperature,
the risk being that of extinction or severe range reduction. The absence of plants from a grid cell in 2050 does not imply that the species is globally extinct, only that it is
no longer climatically suited to that region. The higher the fraction of species displaced in the model is a measure of the ecological dislocation caused by rapid warming
and for some species is indicative of the rising level of extinction risk.
Plant diversity threat, Australia: Based on Hughes et al. (1996). Scaled number of species out of climatic range with temperature above present.
Coral reefs - Indian Ocean: Based on the work of who predicts extinction of reef sites in the southern Indian Ocean for warming in the range 0.9-1.4°C. It is assumed
that there is a 90% chance of extinction at a temperature increase of 1.4oC.
Coral reefs - global assessment: Based on results of Hoegh-Guldberg (1999). For both models used and all reefs studied, annual bleaching occurred by 2040s. Scale ischance of a major bleaching occurring in a decadal period e.g. 10% corresponds to 1 year per decade, 50% to five year out of 10 and 100% to annual bleaching. Scaling
is from 0.4o C above 1861-1890 as unusual bleaching began in the 1980s with annual bleaching occurring at 2.3o C above 1861-1890.

31

Table 5 - Ecosystem Impacts

Ecosystem

RegionImpactArcticecosystems

ArctisMajor range reduction
for a keystone arctic
species, the collared
lemming, with likely
large negative impacts
on Arctic ecosystems.
Range reduction
50%
80%

Arcticecosystems

ArctisGlobal mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6

1.7-2.2°C 7
3.3-4.5°C 8

Substantial reductionof sea ice area andpossible complete lossof summer sea ice in
the Arctic ocean by
end of 21 st century, or
earlier depending on
scenario, with major
implications for ice
dependent species.
Reduction in annual
ice cover
15-20%
2°C
40-50%4°C
Mid summer ice cover
reduction
50%
1.5-2°C

Comments

Causal Chain

The Collared Lemming (Dicrostonyx groenlandicus) is basic part of the foodchain and a major food source for a number of predators – birds and mammals(Kerr and Packer 1998). Twenty-five mammals in Canada have their northward
range movement limited by the Arctic ocean (See also TAR WGII Section
5.4.3.2). The temperature scenarios used were for a 2, 4 and 6oC local meanannual warming9. The percentage reductions in range cited are interpolated fromthe data in Table II of Kerr and Packer (1998). Temperatures in the Arctic
region are known to be warming rapidly, with the rate of warming appearing toincrease recently

Arctic mammal distribution is closely
correlated with temperature and anumber of mammals are adapted tosurvive in colder climates. Warming
is projected to lead to their northwardmigration, assuming habitat
availability. The Arctic ocean places
a limit on the extent of thispossibility.

Sea ice area, extent and thickness have been declining in recent decades, with theperennial cover being lost at a rate of 9% per annum over the period 1978-2000(Comiso 2002b). A strong correlation has been observed between warming andice losses (Comiso 2002a). Record losses were reported by for sea extent andarea in 2002 (Serreze et al. 2003). The HADCM3 model predicts a further 1520% (40-50%) reduction in annual ice cover for a 2°C (4°C) increase in global
mean temperature above 1861-1890 (Gregory et al. 2002). A much larger
proportional reduction in summer ice is projected, with a loss of 50% by the2050s corresponding to a global mean warming of around 1.5-2°C (Gregory et
al. 2002). Johannessen et al. (2002), using ECHAM4 and HADCM3 with a
new sea ice observed data set, predict for summer a “predominantly ice-free
Arctic Ocean” by the end of the 21 st century. Their mid summer ice loss
projections of 30-60% by the 2050s, depending on scenario, are similar to thoseof Gregory et al. (2002). Amongst other effects this could be expected to haveprofound implications for arctic and sub arctic marine biodiversity and would
affect, almost certainly negatively, polar bear populations (Stirling et al. 1999;
Stirling 2000).

Arctic sea ice responds rapidly towarming on a timescale of years
rather than decades. Polar bears are
dependent on sea ice for hunting and aloss of sea ice is very likely to reducethe viability of bear populations(Stirling et al. 1999). An ice free
Arctic ocean in summer would also
lead to very large changes in themarine biota with negative
consequences for ice dependent
species.

6

Above 1861-1890 average unless otherwise stated. See Appendix on temperature scale.
Local temperature increase scenarios are converted to global mean using average of nine recent GCMs upscaled from the Canadian Arctic region using SCENGEN. The scaling used is 1.86°C local increase per degree of
global mean increase calculated with the A1B-MESSAGE scenario, with the range set by the inter-model standard deviation of 0.3°C/°C. Using the full range of models available in SCENGEN produces a lower scaling,
however examination of the scaling for the higher Arctic region of Canada, which is what would apply under the range reductions cited in the table, indicates a higher scaling factor (2.07 °C/°C with inter-model standard
deviation of 0.42°C/°C). This would tend to slightly lower the upper end of the global temperature range (e.g. the range would be 1.5-2.1°C for a 50% loss and 2.9-4.2°C for an 80% loss.
8
The maximum local warming of 6°C produced a range reduction of 78%. The local temperature increase corresponding to an 80% reduction is estimated from a 2nd order polynomial regression on the data in Table II of
Kerr and Packer (1998). A linear extrapolation would produce a slightly lower temperature increase.
9
The baseline for this warming is assumed to be 1961-1990 as the observed distribution of the mammals was regressed against historical means annual temperatures.
732

Ecosystem

RegionImpactArcticecosystems

Arctis –globalassessment

Global loss of area oftundra ecosystem
40-57%

Arcticecosystems

Arctis Canada

Large reductions intundra and taiga
projected. Estimatedfuture rate of changeof climate exceeds
known past changes.
Loss of area of
Canadian Low Arctic
Tundra75-77%13(19% loss of species
estimated)

Global mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6

1.3-3.8°C 10

2.2-3.3°C 14

Comments

Causal Chain

Large losses of tundra ecosystem are projected for a range of future climate
scenarios taking into account the effects of CO2 increases. Projected ecosystemarea losses are drawn from the assessment of Neilson et al. (1997) prepared forthe IPCC Regional Impacts report 11. Here only the results from climate models
and scenarios used in the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) are cited.
Results for the scenarios drawn from climate models reviews in the IPCC First
Assessment Report (FAR) are not used here, as the models are older and less12
reliable .

Warming causes the northwardmigration of Tundra and other highlatitude ecosystems. The tundra inparticular has its migration limited by
the Arctic ocean. The rate of required
migration is found to be higher than
known from past climatic changes.

Malcolm et al. (2002b) estimated migration rates for biomes globally in response
to climate change using several GCMs and two vegetation models. They foundthat high latitude and Arctic ecosystems (boreal forests, taiga) needed very highmigration rates to keep up with projected rates of climate change. Tundrasystems in particular experienced large area losses in this assessment. In a
related study, Malcolm et al. (2002a) found that several high latitude and arctic
ecosystems were particularly vulnerable to rapid change under each of themodels examined15. These systems included the Canadian Low Arctic tundra,
Boreal Taiga, East Siberian Taiga, Russian coastal tundra, as well as several
boreal forests. Species loss in response to the loss of area of ecosystems wasestimated using established species-area relationships. Such estimates may beconservative (Seabloom et al. 2002). For the Canadian Low Arctic tundra,
where an average 76% area loss was projected, the corresponding species loss
was estimated to be around 19%.

Warming causes the northwardmigration of Tundra and other highlatitude ecosystems. The tundra inparticular has its migration limited by
the Arctic ocean. The rate of required
migration is found to be higher than
known from past climatic changes.

10

Based on the transient scenarios used by Neilson et al. (1997), which were with reference to 1961-1990 and are described as having global mean surface temperatures increases in the range 1-3.5°C by the time of CO2
doubling.
11
See Table C-1 in Neilson et al. (1997) for the full range of results.
12 Some literature uses the full range including the IPCC First Assessment Report (FAR) scenarios, which in general produce somewhat different results (see Table 2 of Kittel et al. (2000)) showing a reduction in area of 40
to 67% for the tundra)
13
Malcolm et al. (2002b) for range of BIOME3 and MAPSS projections under the climate scenarios assumed.
14 Malcolm et al. (2002b) base their projections on HadCM2 scenarios with and without sulphur and on the ECHAM4 scenario without sulphur for the period of 2070-2099. These scenarios have a global warming range,
relative to 1961-1990 of 1.9-3.0°C, to which added the warming from 1861-1890 of around 0.3°C to the base period (see their footnote 2 for further details).
15
The global vegetation models MAPSS and BIOME3 were used to model the equilibrium distribution of generalized plant types for the present and future projected climates. At larger spatial scales these kinds of models
perform reasonably well (Pearson and Dawson 2003)
15
Differences between present distributions and projected future distributions were analysed to estimate the rate of migration required for biome types to keep pace with the projected climate changes. Migration rates werecomputed taking account physical barriers and human land use. A general pattern observed was a “front” of very rapid migration rates at higher northern latitudes, where climate changes are expected to be most rapid.
BIOME3 and MAPSS use ecological, hydrological and physiological processes to describe the distribution of species.

33

Ecosystem

RegionImpactBoreal Forests

Eurasia andNorth
America

Significant losses of
boreal forests andassociated carbon
stocks projected.
Releases of carbon
60-90GtC after 100
years

Global mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6

2.8°C 16

Boreal Forests

Eurasia andNorth
America

Losses of boreal forest
and woodlands
Boreal forests
1036% - 10% increase
1.3-3.8°C
Boreal10
woodland/Taiga
1.3-3.8°C
36-44%

Boreal Forests

China

Reduction of boreal
forest area in China.
70%

2.8°C

18

Comments

Causal Chain

Kirilenko and Solomon (1998) use a transient scenario to assess the effects ofclimate changes on a number of major ecosystem types taking into accountdifferent rates of potential plant migration and also agricultural land demand.
They find a large release of carbon from this system due to transient effects, ofthe order of 60-90 GtC after 100 years, using average migration rates and taking
into account agriculture. Kirilenko et al. (2000) examine the implications ofchanges in the variability of climate for the boreal forests, finding that increased
variability slightly reduces the amount of forest loss.

Whereas tree dieback and loss canoccur very quickly due todisturbances, regrowth is significantly
slower (Kirilenko and Solomon 1998;
Kirilenko et al. 2000). Several model
projections for changes in highlatitude vegetation and confirm thatthese ecosystems will be far fromequilibrium in the future due to therapid climate change (Brovkin et al.
2003). The changes are likely to beabrupt and there is a significant
positive feedback to climate warmingwith the changes in vegetation andsnow cover projected.
See above

Using the BIOME3 and MAPSS equilibrium vegetation models large potential
losses of total area of boreal forest and woodland are projected (Neilson et al.
1997). Changes to the boreal forests (not including woodland/Taiga) are in therange of a 36% decrease to a 16% increase, whereas the boreal woodland/Taiga
has a projected decrease in the range 36% to 44%17. Climatic pressure on the
boreal woodland/Taiga is clear also from the work of Malcolm et al. (2002a). In
this latter work, which is based around the same models but a narrow range ofclimate scenarios (see footnote 14), a number of Taiga regions are identified as
being particularly and fairly consistently at risk. Using the LPJ dynamic
vegetation model Kittel et al. (2000) find the largest rates of change at thepresent southern limits of the boreal forests in central and western Eurasia .
Large reductions in the area of boreal forests in China are projected using
BIOME3 (Ni 2002). Ni found “dramatic changes in geographic patterns, with
70% reduction in area and disappearance of almost (sic) boreal forests innortheast China.” Climate projections from the Hadley model (Johns et al.
181997) for the period 2070-2099 were used relative to a 1931-1960 base period,to estimate changes in ecosystems and carbon storage in China. The atmospheric
CO2 in the model was increased to 500 ppmv in 2070-2099 from 340 ppmv inthe base period. A reduction in carbon storage in China’s boreal forests is
projected, however other work by (Ni J 2001) and Ni et al. (2000) show thatcarbon storage should increase in China as a whole.

16

Warming causes poleward shift ofmany ecosystems and the boreal
forests experiences pronounced
pressure in this direction.19

Kirilenko and Solomon (1998) use projected climate change from a CO2 doubling scenario of Manabe et al. (1992). Table B-1 of the IPCC Special Report on the Regional Impacts of Climate Change (Watson et al. 1998)
indicates that at the time of CO2 doubling, around 2050, the Manabe et al. (1991; 1992)scenario projects a warming of 2.2°C, with respect to 1990.
17
See Table C-1 of Neilson et al. (1997) and using only the IPCC Second Assessment Report scenarios for climate changes at the time of CO2 doubling. The results for the scenarios drawn from First Assessment Report
are not used.
18
Ensemble average of the HadCM2 scenarios forced with IPCC IS92a emissions including the effects of sulphur emissions for the period 2070-2099. Data from the IPCC DDC website.
19
For strengths and weakness of bioclimatic envelope models see Footnote 3.

34

Ecosystem

RegionImpactAlpine andmountain

Europe Alps

Large range decrease
for alpine species.

Alpin e andmountain

Europe –Alps

Percentage of species
with greater than 90%
range loss:
3.2%
17.7%
38%
Risk of extinction ofhigh alpine and nival
plant species.

Global mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6

1.5-2°C 20
2.4-3.3°C21
3.3-4.7°C22

Likely tolerable limit 1.2-2.4°C23
for most alpine andnival species but could
be exacerbated by land
use changes in many
areas.
Disappearance ofsome categories ofvulnerable plants andsubstantial further
range reduction ofmany other species.
Alpine mountain

Asia –
TibetanPlateau

2.4-4.3°C24

Large scale changes to 2.8°C18
environment ofTibetan plateau andacceleration ofdesertification.

Comments

Causal Chain

Three local warming scenarios (1.5, 3, and 4.5°C) with respect to the present
climate (assumed to be 1990, as plant distributions are calibrated on the current
climate) show a number of impacts. A few plant extinctions (1-3) are projectedin the study area (Guisan and Theurillat 2000). Perhaps more importantly thestudy shows very large range decreases (90%) for 3.2%, 17.7% and 38% of
species for each of the three temperature scenarios respectively (see Table 1 ofGuisan and Theurillat (2000)). Whilst the authors caution that these are not to betaken as accurate predictions their results do provide a basis for assessing the
major likely direction of changes.
The IPCC TAR found, based in part on the work of Theurillat and Guisan(2001), that a local warming of 3-4°C was most likely not to be within the range
25
species could tolerate. The IPCC TAR also found that in the European Alpsthe literature suggested that most alpine and nival species seem likely to able tocope with a local warming of 1-2°C. Some isolated orophytes living at the topsof mountains and some nival species are projected to lose area or disappear. By
far the greatest negative ecological impacts appear to be in the upper elevations
or true alpine zone. Theurillat and Guisan (2001) argue that species restricted to
low mountain tops or whose range is limited by soil and other factors to small
areas are likely to be “severely endangered by extinction.” They argue thatwhilst the maintenance of traditional land use is essential to reduce the effects ofwarming, it is likely that other land uses will reduce the resilience of the alpine
system to climate change.

The highest alpine species, whose
ranges are restricted to the alpine
zone, would experience a reduction insuitable bioclimatic zone due towarming and topography ofmountains, where suitable physicalhabitat area declines rapidly withaltitude.

A large reduction in the temperate desert, alpine steppe, desert, and ice/polar
desert are projected using the equilibrium vegetation model BIOME3 driven by aclimate scenario derived with the HadCM2 model (Ni 2000). With the projectedwarming it can also be expected that there will be a large increase in the coldtemperate conifer forest, temperate shrubland/meadows, and temperate steppe,along with a general north-westward shift of all vegetation zones. Continuous
permafrost would mostly disappear. With the expansion of permafrost free
regions this would accelerate desertification of the Tibetan plateau (Ni 2000).

Warming of the high altitude plateau
of Tibet causes a reduction in thecoldest bioclimatic type and inpermafrost. There are special highattitude biomes that would besubstantially reduced with warming.
Other ecosystems would expand.

20

High Alpine and nival species are
restricted in range and warming will
reduce that range. Where species areendemic to a mountain or range ofmountains and bioclimatic zone rises
then there is likely to be substantial
pressure on vulnerable species.
Suitable habitat declines with altitude.

A 1.5°C local temperature increase converted to global mean using the average of nine recent GCMs downscaled to the European Alpine region using SCENGEN. The regional to global scaling used is 1.39°C/°C with therange set by the inter-model standard deviation of 0.3°C/°C. The scaling factors using all 17 models in SCENGEN are not very different from the 9 model estimate. The base period is assumed to be 1990 hence 0.6°C is
added to the global temperature to estimate the increase with respect to 1861-1890.
21
A 3°C local temperature increase converted as in footnote 20 to a global mean increase.
22
A 4.5°C local temperature increase converted as in footnote 20 to a global mean increase.
23

A 1-2°C local temperature increase converted to the global mean as in footnote 20.
A 3-4°C local temperature increase converted to the global mean as in footnote 20
25 See IPCC TAR WGII TAR 13.2.1.4. Mountains and Subarctic Environments http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/500.htm (Kundzewicz et al. 2001).
24

35

Ecosystem

Alpine mountain

RegionAustralia

ImpactGlobal mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6

Major reduction andultimate loss of Alpine
zone in southeastern
Australia andconsequent loss ofendemic species.
Confinement of thealpine bioclimaticzone to six peaks.

1.7-3.8°C26

Likely elimination ofnorthern alpine
bioclimatic zone

2.1-4.1°C

27

Confinement to
4.0-8.1°C 28
isolated mountain topsin Tasmania

Alpine mountain

Australia

Major reductions insnow area withnegative impacts onsnow dependent
species.
18-66%
39-96%

0.9-1.9°C 29
1.2-4.0°C 30

Comments

Causal Chain

regions this would accelerate desertification of the Tibetan plateau (Ni 2000).
The scenario used by Ni (2000) is based on the HadCM2 model with anemissions scenario that includes sulphur and was constructed with a base periodof 1931-1960 compared with 2070-2099. The effects of increased CO2
concentrations were accounted for, with a CO2 level of 500 ppmv being used in
the projection period years and 340 ppmv in the base period.
The alpine zone in southeastern Australia appears to be one of the more
vulnerable ecosy stems. The IPCC TAR assessment for Australia (IPCC TARWGII Chapter 12 (Pittock et al. 2001)) found that: “Warming of 1°C would
threaten the survival of species currently growing near the upper limit of theirtemperature range, notably in some Australian alpine regions that already arenear these limits.” This confirmed the findings of the 1998 IPCC Regional
Impacts assessment report, which found that the Australian alpine region was
one of the most vulnerable systems in the region. This risk was first identified in1988 by Busby who estimated that a warming of around 2-3°C in southern
Australia would result in the confinement of the alpine zone to only six peaks,
with a “dramatic effect on the survival of the majority of the present alpine
species”. More recent bioclimatic modelling by (Brereton et al. 1995) confirmed
the overall assessment of Busby (1988). Based on lapse rate considerations,
there is a substantial risk that, for a warming above about 3°C over 1990 levels,the northern Alpine zone would no longer exist and that before this many of theendemic species to the Australian zone in this region would become extinct inthis region (Hughes 2003).

Projections for the Australian Alps indicate a major loss of snow coverage withwarming (Whetton et al. 1996).31 The most recent scenarios for southern
Australia are warmer than the 1996 scenarios - 0.6-3.4°C by 2030 as opposed to
0.3-1.3°C and 0.8-5.2°C by 2070 as compared to 0.6-3.4°C (CSIRO 2001),
indicating a larger loss of snow area.32

26

The geography of this region is suchthat there is very limited scope toattitudinal migration. Using standard
lower troposphere lapse rates the risein the Alpine bioclimatic zone withtemperature can be calculated withincreasing mean temperat ure (Petersand Darling 1985) . The present
estimate is based on the geography ofthis Alpine region and its bioclim atic
zonation. Much of the region isprotected as a national park, hence
land use pressures as such are not themain determinant of the future of thisregion.

Projected climate change results inwarming and changes in circulation
which reduces snow precipitation andthe period in which snow cover can be
maintained,

Based on Busby (1988) assuming that the scenario used has a base period of 1975-1984 and that the local temperature increases of 2-3°C is with respect to this period. These regional temperature increases are scaled to an
estimated corresponding global mean temperature increase using 0.985°C/°C with an inter-model standard deviation of 0.194°C/°C obtained using 9 recent models and the SCENGEN programme (REFS). Note that theregional definition over the Australian Alpine region using SCENGEN is very coarse. Choosing slightly different regions or using the full range of models in the SCENGEN utility does not change the range fundamentally.
27
Estimate based on a lapse rate in the range of 0.6-0.8°C/100m and using Mt Kosciuszko at 2200m as the highest point in the northern alpine zone with the rise from the beginning of the Alpine zone at 1800 m in the 1980s
to 2200m defining the local temperature increase required to eliminate the northern Alpine zone. The same regional to global scaling is used as in footnote 26. Note that using a scaling for a slightly narrower and more
northerly region but still covering the Mt Kosciuszko area would reduce the range to 2-3.9°C.
28
Estimate based on a lapse rate in the range of 0.6-0.8°C/100m and estimating rise of current Alpine zone in Tasmania, which starts at about 800m to 1500 metres, leaving a few peaks above this level. The regional
downscaling used those for southeastern Australia from SCENGEN as these were most consistent with the CSIRO scenarios for southern Australia and Tasmania. The scaling used was 0.874 °C/°C with an inter-model
standard deviation of 0.184 °C/°C. The grid cells available from SCENGEN over Tasmania are mostly ocean and may underestimate the warming locally in Tasmania. If that had been used the scaling used was 0.652°C/°C
with an inter-model standard deviation of 0.192 °C/°C producing a range of warming from 5-12.2°C.

36

Ecosystem

RegionImpactAlpine mountain

Australia

Endangerment andpossible extinction of
species.
Likely extinction in
the wild of themountain pygmy
possum due tocomplete loss of its
bioclimatic zone.

Alpine mountain

Australia

Large range reductionof the Alpine tree frog
in Eastern Australia
51-89%

Global mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6

1.2-1.7°C 33

3.1-4.6°C 34

Comments

Causal Chain

A number of vertebrates and plants are limited to the Alpine zone and require theseasonal occurrence of snow (Hughes 2003). Three mammals (dusky
antechinus, broad-toothed rates and the mountain pygmy possum), whose
abundance increases with altitude, are adversely affected by loss of snow (Greenand Pickering 2002; Hughes 2003). The bioclimatic zone occupied by the highly
endangered Mountain pygmy-possum (Burramys parvus) is estimated to be lostwith a local warming of 1°C (Brereton et al. 1995). Invasion of the high plainsof the Alpine zone with sub alpine, woody species would lead to a substantialchange in the landscape. Distributions of trees are limited to be zones where theaverage temperature of the warmest month is greater than 10°C.

The Australian Alpine zone has a very
limited altitudinal range, being
essentially plateaus, and hence
beyond a certain temperature increase,
upwards altitudinal migration is
impossible. The Pygmy possum(Burramys parvus) is limited to about
10km 2 of habitat. Given this situation
climate change is clearly a longerterm pressure on this species,
however there are intensive efforts
being made to maintain this species insitu. Loss of snow cover would most
likely mean, or at least contribute verystrongly to, the extinction of thepygmy possum in the wild.
Warming will reduce the frog’s range
according to estimates with abioclimatic model. Land use changepressures occur but most of thepresent range lies within protectedareas. Hence clim ate change is likely
to put very strong adverse pressure on
the species.

The Alpine tree frog (Litoria verreauxii alpina) is one of the species threatenedby climate change. Using a bioclimatic model BIOCLIM Brereton et al. (1995)
estimated that a 3°C warming would reduce the frog’s range by 51-89%35. The
range of the Alpine tree frog is thought to be limited to several national parks(Kosciusko National Park; Namadgi National Park; Alpine and Buffalo National
Parks) and some public forests36. Range losses have already occurred at lower
Alpine plateaus such as Mt Baw Baw. Whilst drought has been linked to theselosses, there is no final assessment of the causes of this range reduction.
Management issues in public forests as well as in the protected areas mentioned
above have a direct bearing on the species vulnerability. It is clear, however thatclimate change is likely to have a determining influence in the longer term.

29

Original projections for 2030s are with respect to 1990 hence an offset of 0.6°C is added to obtain the range of increase wrt to 1861-1890.
30 Original projections for 2070s are with respect to 1990 hence an offset of 0.6°C is added to obtain the range of increase wrt to 1861-1890.
31
See also CSIRO (1996). Note that the CSIRO has produced new scenarios (CSIRO 2001), which in general predict higher warming than the 1996 scenarios.
32
New snow cover projections have been released recently (Hennessy et al. 2003) which project larger losses of snow cover than those shown here.
33
The regional temperature increases of 1°C is scaled to an estimated corresponding global mean temperature increase using 0.874°C/°C with an inter-model standard deviation of 0.184°C/°C obtained using 9 recent models
and the SCENGEN programme assuming that the baseline climate is 1961-1990. The 1989 CSIRO scenario used for this work was not available. If the baseline was 1990, then the global mean temperature increase above
1861-1890 would be 1.5-2°C.
34
The regional temperature increases of 3°C is scaled to an estimated corresponding global mean temperature increase using 0.874°C/°C with an inter-model standard deviation of 0.184°C/°C obtained using 9 recent models
and the SCENGEN programme assuming that the baseline climat e is 1961-1990. The 1989 CSIRO scenario used for this work was not available. If the baseline were 1990, then the global mean temperature increase above
1861-1890 would be 3.9-4.6°C.
35
Bioclimatic models such as BIOCLIM tend to overestimate species ranges (Hughes 2003).
36 See http://ea.gov.au/biodiversity/threatened/action/frogs/17.html.

37

Ecosystem

RegionCoastal Wetlands Global

Coastal wetlands

Australia

ImpactProgressive coastal
wetland loss withincreasing warming.
0-2.3%37
1.8-10.5%38
5.5-22.2%39

Loss or serious
damage to Kakadu
World Heritage listed
wetlands.

Global mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6

1.4-1.5°C 40
2.4°C
3.3-3.4°C

1.2-3.1°C 41

Comments

Causal Chain

The greatest losses of coastal wetlands are projected in the Mediterranean andBaltic region, with large losses also in the Sundarbans (Nicholls et al. 1999).
Significant losses on the Atlantic coast of Central and North America and thesmaller islands of the Caribbean are also projected. The climate scenarios used in
the study were the result of greenhouse gas only runs with the HadCM2 and the
HadCM3 models forced by greenhouse gas emissions approximating the IS92a
scenario, which produces a warming of around 3-3.1°C by the 2080s. Resulting
sea level rise from these models was 40-41 cm by the 2080s relative to the 19611990 mean sea level (Hulme et al. 1999a).
The topography of the wetlands for the Kakadu regions appears to lead to an
especially vulnerable situation. A sea level rise of 10-30 cm combined with
rainfall changes and increased tidal surges is postulated to severely reduce thefreshwater wetlands of this region. The authors of the ecosystem assessment in
the IPCC TAR argue that these wetlands could “be all but displaced if predicted
sea-level rises of 10–30 cm by 2030 occur and are associated with changes inrainfall in the catchment and tidal/storm surges” (Gitay et al. 2001) (WGII TAR
Chapter 5, p 308). Associating these sea level increases with a global meansurface temperature change is difficult (see footnote 41). Sea level will result insaltwater intrusion and shoreline erosion, with the loss of some coastalmangroves (with colonization along creeks as the tidal zone expands), extensive
loss of paperbark trees (Melaleuca spp.) in the wetland, and ultimately
replacement of freshwater wetlands by saline mudflats (Eliot et al. 1999). These
vegetation changes would results in adverse changes in the abundance of wildlife
such as Magpie Geese and long-necked turtles, which are hunted by theaboriginal owners of Kakadu. Gitay et al. (2001) point to the loss of large areasof freshwater wetlands further to the west, in the Mary river, as a consequence ofsalt water intrusion (Mulrennan and Woodroffe 1998). The possibility t hat theprocesses that drive the vulnerability of the Kakadu wetlands to sea level rise
could extend to much larger regions with similar low lying character in the
monsoonal tropic is raised but not explored in the TAR.

Model based assessment of thevulnerability of each region to sea
level rise taking into account local
factors.

37

The vulnerability of the wetlands of
Kakadu, and of other river systems in
the region, arises as these areas lie
within 0.2-1.2m of high water level.
The coast is largely mangroves withinland fringing salt flats of low
productivity and diversity. Behindthese lie low ridges that form a barrier
to salt water intrusion onto the low
lying flood plains, below the inland
escarpment some 100km from thecoast. Sea level rise is postulated tolead to the retreat of the mangrovezone and the inland spread of the tidal
zones of the creeks of the region,
penetrating into the freshwater zone
(Gitay et al. 2001) and (Bayliss et al.
1997).

These results are for a sea level rise of about 12cm in the 2020s with respect to 1961-1990. The range is the highest and lowest estimates taking into account a number of factors and using the sea level rise scenarios fromthe HadCM2 and HadCM3 models – see Table 10 of Nicholls et al. (1999).
38
These results are for a sea level rise of about 24-25cm in the 2050s with respect to 1961-1990.
39
These results are for a sea level rise of about 40-41cm in the 2080s with respect to 1961-1990.
40
See Table 1 of Hulme et al. (1999a) for an overview of the results of these scenarios.
41
Estimated warming at the time of sea level rise of 10-30cm (above 1990) being reached based on HadCM2 projections (Hulme et al. 1999a). Note that associating sea level increases of 10-30cm (or any increase) with aparticular global mean surface temperature change at a particular time in the future is difficult and highly problematic due to the long-term character of sea level rise and its response to global warming. Regional sea levelchanges are also likely to be different from the global mean changes. More fundamentally sea level rise due to the thermal expansion of the ocean arising from increased heat input due to elevated levels of greenhouse gases
and the response of ice sheets occurs over a long time period. Indeed centuries are required for the ocean to come into full equilibrium with change levels of radiative forcing. As a consequence the sea level rise expressed at
any point in time is a fraction of that which is likely to occur for the full response to elevated greenhouse gas concentrations. One way to characterize the response is estimate the warming, which if held constant, would
result in a commitment to a certain sea level rise. This is also fraught with difficulties not the least of which is the very broad range of uncertainty in sea level rise estimates. From this point of view warming to date, if

38

Ecosystem

RegionImpactCoastal wetlands

EuropeLoss of coastal
wetlands in Atlantic
Baltic andMediterranean coasts
for the 2080s.
Atlantic coast
0 to 17%42
Baltic coast
84 to 98%
Mediterranean coast
31 to 100%

Coastal Wetlands USA

Extensive loss of
wetlands in southern
New England

Coastal Wetlands USA

Wetland losses in
Delaware.
21%

Global mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6

2.6-4.4°C 43

3-5°C 45

>2.5-3.5°C 46

Comments

Causal Chain

Projections for coastal wetland losses for the 2080s in the European region
indicate that the Baltic and Mediterranean coasts are most vulnerable. Theseestimates are based on new runs of the model described by (Nicholls et al. 1999),
whose global results are shown below. See IPCC WGII TAR Table 13-4 for thefull results. These were constructed using the four preliminary IPCC SRES
marker scenarios and roughly span a temperature increase relative to 1990 of
2.0-3.8°C with a central estimate of sea level rise of 36-42cm44. The range oflosses shown opposite is the result of sea level rise uncertainty, which is larger
than the range mentioned in the preceding sentence, and uncertainty in relation to
the response of wetlands. Nevertheless the WGII TAR Chapter 13 notes that
under the high scenario wetlands in the Baltic and Mediterranean would be
eliminated which “could have serious consequences for biodiversity in Europe,
particularly for wintering shorebird and marine fish populations” (Kundzewicz etal. 2001).

Model based assessment of thevulnerability of each region to sea
level rise taking into account local
factors.

Recent rates of sea level rise of about 2mm/yr along with local subsidence rates
of about 1mm/yr have led to the displacement of high marsh species with lessrich cordgrass (Donnelly and Bertness 2001a). It is expected that if current rates
of sea level rise continue then high coastal marshes will be further displaced bycordgrass in the coming century. Higher rates of sea level rise than around
2mm/yr, as projected for next century, will cause the cordgrass to drown andthere will be extensive overall loss of wetlands in southern New England. Local
accretion rates are in the range of 2-6mm/yr. Sea level rise of around or greaterthan 6 mm/yr could be anticipated to result in large wetland losses. Warming in
the range of 3-5°C in 2100 (above 1861-1890) could be expected to produce
local sea level rise rates above 6mm/yr. It should be noted that associating a
specific temperature increase with a rate of sea level rise is difficult anduncertain, nevertheless a warming rate as above would most likely lead to a rateof sea level sea level rise sufficient to overwhelm the adaptive capacity of themarshes.
Sea level rise projected for 2100 would reduce Delaware’s land area by 1.6% andlikely cause loss of around 21% of the wetlands in the area (Najjar et al. 2000). 47
This loss of wetland area occurs for a local sea level rise of about 70cm of which
about 20cm is due to local effects.48 As consequence of the projected sea level

Sea level rise in excess of accretion
rates will results in the loss of
wetlands. High marshes wheninvaded frequently with saltwater are
replaced by cordgrass. If the rate ofsea level rise exceeds the accretion
rates possible regionally then total
loss of wetland occurs.

Rate of sea level rise exceed capacityof marshes and wetlands to adapt
given estimates of potential accretion
rates and other factors. As much ofmaintained could already mean a commitment t o a sea level rise of 30cm or more. At the other extreme one can simply associate the range of sea level rise estimates with the time a which they occur under a range of
scenarios. In this case an estimate of global mean warming at the time of the sea level rise of interest can be made, although it suffers from the inadequacy described above. The IPCC TAR estimates that sea level rise overthe coming century would be in the range of 0.8 cm-8 cm/decade. A 10-30 cm global sea level rise would correspond to a warming in the range of 1-3°C. The range of GCM models available with temperature and sea level
rise projections available on the IPCC Data Distribution Centre website indicate that at the time of a 10 cm sea level rise global mean warming is likely t o be in the range 0.9-1.3°C. For a 30cm sea level rise the range wouldbe 2-2.8°C (above 1961-1990). The 1961-1990 mean is around 0.3°C above 1861-1890.
42
The higher losses are associated with the higher temperatures and sea level rise. See the general discussion in footnote 41.
43This the approximate range of global mean temperature increases associated with the losses of coastal wetlands in the European assessment. The temperature increases are for the year 2100 (not the 2080s) and are withrespect to 1861-1890. See footnote 44 for the source.
44
See Table 3-9 of IPCC WGII TAR Chapter 3 (Carter et al. 2001) for a summary of these scenarios, but noting that the SRES A1 scenario was split into three markers in the final SRES scenario set up. This resulted in theupper end of the A1 range having a higher warming than the A2 scenario but this was not included in the scenarios for European sea level rise and coastal wetland loss.
45 See level rise rates above 2mm/yr may well result from temperature increases less than this.

39

Ecosystem

RegionCoastal Wetlands USA

Coral Reefs

GlobalImpactSignificant loss ofimportant foraging,migratory andwintering bird habitat
at five sites in theUSA.
20-70%49

Global mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6

2.6°C 50

Annual or almost
1.7-2.3°C 51
annual bleaching by
2040 with negative
implications for coral
reefs and for coral reef
biodiversity, and forcommunities
dependent on reef
based resources.

Comments

Causal Chain

This loss of wetland area occurs for a local sea level rise of about 70cm of which
about 20cm is due to local effects.48 As consequence of the projected sea level
increase, current 100-year floods are projected to occur 3-4 times more
frequently. Under current rates of sea level rise (around 2mm/yr), high coastal
marsh species are being displaced by low-marsh species like cordgrass. Over thelast century, cordgrass has been able to keep pace with or surpass rates of SLR of
2 to 6 mm/year, however local sea level rise of around 6 mm/yr or greater ispossible for the warming range projected for 2100. Rates of change of thismagnitude could lead to the drowning of cordgrass communities and extensive
loss of coastal wetlands in southern New England. Given the inertia of sea levelrise, the warming that actually causes this sea level rise would be less andcorrespondingly, a warming at this level would result in much greater sea level
rise in the 22 nd and following centuries.

given estimates of potential accretion
rates and other factors. As much of
the area affected is undeveloped
inland migration of some of thewetlands may be possible.

The effects of two temperature and sea level rise scenarios ( 2°C and 4.7oC
temperature increase above 1990 with a corresponding increase in sea level riseof 34 cm and 77cm by 2100) on migratory shore bird habitat is estimated by(Galbraith et al. 2002). The results are complex in that whilst all sites loss
substantially in all scenarios by 2050 and all but one site lose substantially by2100 for the 2oC scenario, two sites (Bolivar flats and Delaware) gainsignificantly by 2100 in the high scenario. Major losses are projected at foursites - Willapa Bay, Humboldt Bay, San Francisco Bay, and Delaware Bay by
2100 for the 2oC scenario, which could threaten their ability to support current
populations of shorebirds. The worst losses are where existing sea walls
constrain inland migration of the habitats. The 34cm case is for a global
temperature increase of 2oC (above 1990) and is assessed as having a 50%
probability (Titus and Narayanan 1996). The 77cm sea level rise is associatedwith a temperature increase of 4.7oC and assessed as having a 5% probability(Titus and Narayanan 1996).
Bleaching frequency increases with temperature and the crossing of local
bleaching thresholds. Hoegh -Guldberg (1999) investigated the relationshipbetween seasonal sea surface temperature anomalies and coral reef bleaching
events historically. He found a strong relationship between periods of hightemperature and bleaching events. The temperature thresholds in several reef
locations for bleaching varied by species and location. Using scenarios driven
by IS92a or similar from the ECHAM4 and CSIRO-MkII models anddownscaled to each location he found that the frequency of bleaching is likely toincrease in the future for most reefs. For both models by the 2040s bleaching is

Most severe losses occur where
coastal topography is steep or where
infrastructure prevents inland
migration of wetlands. The
assessment model accounts for abilityof local sedimentation rates topreserve intertidal flats in the context
of sea level rise. Local topographic
features including current humaninfrastructure are included. In the
Bolivar flats case it is assumed that allareas above the current extreme highwater mark would be protected by
new infrastructure.
An apparent threshold of seasonaltemperature increases is found to exist
that varies by reef location. Whencrossed coral reefs bleach and may
take many years to recover. The
temperature threshold for the same
species varies across its geographic
range, indicating that acclimation has
occurred over the long term.

46 This is the global mean increase in temperature that corresponds to rates of sea level at or above 6mm/yr.
47
Under the scenarios used by Najjar et al. (2000) the sea level rise used here corresponds in time to a global mean temperature increase of around 3.5°C above 1861-1890. Using the HadCM2 model driven by the IPCC
IS92a emissions including sulphur aerosols. The other model used in the Najjar et al. (2000) work, the Canadian Climate Centre (CCC) model, has a warming of about 4°C for the same period (2095).
48 The sea level rise projections, using the IS92a scenario, are drawn from the IPCC SAR WGI Chapter on changes in sea level rise, with a local component of 2mm/yr. See Table 1 of Najjar et al. (2000) for details of the
scenarios used.
49
Range of losses for the 2oC scenario for all sites except Bolivar flats which gains by 1.8%.
50This is the temperature at the time of the sea level rise assumed in this study. See footnote 41.

40

Ecosystem

RegionImpactGlobal mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6

based resources.

Coral Reefs

Indian
Ocean

Risk of local
0.9-1.4°C 52
extinction of coral reefby 2010-2025 formany coral reefs in the
Indian Ocean between
10-15°S

Freshwater
systems

USA –Prairie Pot
HoleRegionMajor reduction inwaterfowl breeding
population andwetland extent.
Breeding population
25%
45%

Freshwater
systems

USA –
Rocky
Mountains

Large reductions inhabitat for cold water
Salmonid fish
Rocky Mountains.

2.5°C
3.6°C

Comments

Causal Chain

increase in the future for most reefs. For both models by the 2040s bleaching is
projected to occur (or nearly) annually for all of the reef sites. No account istaken of changes in El Niño frequency or intensity.
Sheppard (2003) estimated bleaching rates based on observed bleaching patterns
from record 1998 bleaching events. Bleaching threshold varies by reef location
for the same species across its range. Local extinction risk is diagnosed whencoral bleaching is estimated to occur every five years. Reefs north and south of
the 10-15°S band have later “extinction dates”. Sheppard notes “the fact thatmost sites between 0o and 15 o south will have a 1 in 5 probability annually of
suffering a month as warm as that of 1998 within 10–15 years means that severalof the world’s poorest countries, for which reefs provide essential resources will
be affected soonest”. The HadCM3 scenarios closely match for the 2020s the
scenarios from the HadCM2 model (Hulme et al. 1999a).

occurred over the long term.

The Prairie Pothole Region is the most important breeding area for waterfowl inNorth America (Sorenson et al. 1998). The wetlands appear to be moresensitive to temperature increase than to precipitation changes. Both of theclimate models used project a major increase in drought conditions. Under the
Hadley model transient scenarios, the drought severity gradually increases frommild average drought in May in the 2020s, to moderate average drought in the
2050s corresponding to global mean temperature increases of 2.2 and 3.3°C
respectively.53 Under this model bird breeding numbers are reduced from theaverage 5 million in the 1955-1996 period by 25% and around 45%. There isalso projected to be loss of wetland quality, with less open water area preferredby ducks.
Habitat changes as a consequence of warming for Salmonid fishes were
estimated for a range of local summer warmings for June, July and August (15°C) (Keleher and Rahel 1996). Suitable habitats were mapped as those withsummer temperature (JJA) less than 22°C, which is known to be suitable for
Salmonid fish species. The corresponding global mean temperature changes are

51

The mechanism is very similar to that
described in Hoegh-Guldberg (1999).
Sheppard (2003) defines theextinction date of coral locally as theyear in which the probability of
bleaching approaches 20%. With
bleaching at frequencies of more than
five yearly, recovery appears unlikely.
The lethal level of temperature during
the warmest month is defined withrespect to those temperatures
observed to be lethal during the 1998
bleaching events. Small increase in
acclimation of the corals would
significantly extent the period before
extinction occurred (raising this tohigher temperatures).
Wetlands are sensitive to an increasein temperature and summer drought.
Large increases in precipitation would
be necessary to offset the effects ofincreased temperature.

Increases in stream water temperature
estimated to reduce suitable range.

Temperature increase range of the models used for the decade of the 2040s above either 1861-1890 for the ECHAM4 models or 1890-1900 for the CSIRO model. Estimated from the data in the IPCC DDC archived dateset for the CSIRO and ECHAM models forced by IS92a, with and without aerosols.
52 Range of warming from the HadCM3 model used by Sheppard (2003) for the period 2010-2025. See http://ipcc-ddc.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru_data/visualisation/visual_index.html for graphical comparison with other scenarios
and also Table 1 of Hulme et al. (1999a).
53
These temperatures, 2.2°C and 3.3°C are those cited by Sorenson et al. (1998) for the global mean temperature increase for the 2020s and 2050s from the UM Meteorological Office/Hadley model runs cited (Murphy
1995; Murphy and Mitchell 1995). It is assumed here that they are with respect to 1961-1990, although this is not stated in the paper, except in so far as the base period for bird estimates is 1955-1996. More recent HadCM2
and HadCM3 scenarios indicate lower warming levels for these years – 1.5°C and 2.4°C (wrt 1861-1890) respectively (Hulme et al. 1999a).

41

Ecosystem

RegionImpact17%
50%
72%
Wyoming
14%
43%

Freshwater
systems

Biodiversity
Hotspot

USAsouthern
Appalachian
MountainsSouth
Africa –Succulent
Karoo

Substantial reductionin habitat, and a muchsmaller reduction inabundance, of trout
species.
Abundance
10% brook trout
24% rainbow trout
Habitat80%

Global mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]654
0.8-1.0°C
1.8-2.4°C
2.7-3.8°C
1.3-1.7°C
2.7-3.8°C

1.1-2.3°C

55

Very large range
reduction and possible
complete loss of
Succulent Karoo withlikely extinction ofmany, if not most, of
the 2500 plants
endemic to the region.
Range Reduction
5680%
1.9-2.4°C
57100%
3.4-4.3°C

Comments

Causal Chain

Salmonid fish species. The corresponding global mean temperature changes arein the range 0.8°C-3.8°C.54 Salmonid range reductions for this span oftemperature increases were in the range 17% to 72% for the Rocky Mountainhabitats. For the Wyoming habitats the range reductions were smaller - 7 to43%.

Individual model of fish life cycle coupled to GIS database of streams insouthern Appalachian Mountains with scenarios for warming in summer
produced complex pattern of changes. An overall decline in abundance of Brook
trout (10%) and rainbow trout (24%) is projected (Clark et al. 2001). Lower
elevations were projected to experience largest losses. The warming scenarios
applied were for a 1.5-2.5°C increase in summer water temperature above 19771982, which corresponds to a global mean increase of around 1.1-2.3°C above
1861-1890.55

Warming of freshwater streams
combined with changes in stream
flow reduce suitable habitats, butabundance changes are linked to acomplex set of negative and positiveeffects on the lifecycle of the fish.
Warning water alone increases
abundance.

The Succulent Karoo contains the richest arid flora on the planet and hosts
around 2500 endemic plants. Climate change appears to a first order threat tothese species. Two Climate Models, HadCM2 and CSM model downscaled to
local grid and with bioclimatic model of species at high resolution (Midgley etal. 2003). (Hannah et al. 2002) estimate that the Succulent Karoo could lose
more than 80% of its range by 2050 with the future bioclimatic region being far
from its present range. A range loss of 80% is likely to lead to very large levelsof extinction in the longer term. The IPCC TAR WGII reported that Rutherford
et al. (1999a) estimated the complete loss of the Succulent Karoo for a warmingof 3-4°C.57 Complete loss of range would imply major biodiversity losses.

Projected increase aridification in thiswinter rainfall region will reduce theclimatically suitable zone for many ofthe endemic species. Land use effects
do not appear to be decisive. It seems
unlikely that the species of this region
would be able to migrate to the
Agulhas plain. This much further tothe south and east and would involvemigration across the Cape Fold
Mountains.58

54

As before the global mean changes were estimated using SCENGEN for nine recent models downscaled to a broad region covering the Rocky Mountains and Wyoming for the June/July/August period using the SRES
A1B-AIM marker scenario. The model mean for this was 1.73°C JJA increase per degree global mean surface temperature increase, with an inter-model standard deviation of 0.31°C/°C. The latter was used to define therange for each estimate. Note that using other scenarios produces different scalings, which would increase the range shown here.
55
Estimated using SCENGEN for nine recent models downscaled to a broad region covering the southern Appalachian Mountains for the June/July/August period using the SRES A1B-AIM marker scenario. The model
mean for this was 1.67°C JJA increase per degree global mean surface temperature increase, with an inter-model standard deviation of 0.40°C/°C. The latter was used to define the range for each estimate. The offset fromthe 1977-1982 global mean to 1861-1890 was estimated to be 0.37°C using the Folland and Anderson (2002) data set. Note that using other scenarios may produce different scalings, which would increase the range shown
here.
56
As the projected range reduction is based on the HadCM2 scenario for the 2050s, this temperature range is estimated using the HadCM2 range for both sulphate and greenhouse gas only ensemble average in 2050s
accessed from http://ipcc-ddc.cru.uea.ac.uk calculated from model generated increase in 2050s relative to 1961-1990 (1.6-2.1°C) plus the observed increase from 1860s (0.32°C). An alternative approach, which would yielda larger range is to assume that the range reduction would occur at around the same local temperature increase in any model and to take the range of models or the standard deviation of the inter model estimates for this ratio.

42Ecosystem

RegionImpactBiodiversity
HotspotSouth
Africa –Fynbos or
Cape
Floristic
Province

Very large range
reductions for the
Fynbos biome, which
would threaten manyof its 5600 endemic
species.
Range Reduction
51-61%

Mammals andbirds

MexicoLarge range losses for
species projected.
90% or more loss
0-45 species
50% or more loss
93-355 species

Global mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6

1.9-2.4°C

1.9-2.4°C

56

56

Comments

Causal Chain

The Fynbos is a unique and extremely rich region and forms the smallest of thesix flora kingdoms. It is projected to lose 51-61% of its area for a warming in
the range 1.9-2.4°C. As a consequence about one third of the species suffer“complete range dislocation” by the 2050s (Midgley et al. 2002).59 In otherwords unless the species can migrate they will become extinct. Around 10% of
the 330 endemic Proteaceae species are projected to suffer complete range loss.
A high -resolution bioclimatic modeling approach was used driven with three
GCM scenarios (HadCM2) with and without aerosols, and the CSM scenario
without sulphur. HadCM2 produced the lowest global temperature increase(Midgley et al. 2002). Range dislocation is used as indicator of extinction risk
(Midgley et al. 2003).

Warming moves the suitablebioclimatic region south and east and
upwards. The effects are expected tobe mitigated by the topographic
complexity of the mountains in theregion which provide more
opportunity for suitable habitat toremain. For many of the most at risk
Proteaceae species land use change
has less effect than climate change
due to the projected altitudinal shift ofspecies (Midgley et al. 2003). In thehigher regions over 50% are in
reserves (Rouget et al. 2003).
The most serious effects were
projected for the flatlands in the northof Mexico and the Chihuahuan desert.
This was caused by more drastic
range reductions than in themountainous regions (Peterson 2003).

Large numbers of species appear to be at risk in Mexico. Using an ecologicalniche model with three classes of species dispersal abilities the effects of climatechange in Mexico on all of its 1,870 mammal, butterfly and bird species wasestimated for the 2050s (Peterson et al. 2002). The climate scenarios used werebased on the HadCM2 model with two different emissions and corresponded to
global mean warming in the range 1.7-2.4o C (above 1861-1890). With range loss
being a powerful predictor of species extinction, these results are quite
concerning for the future of a large number of species in Mexico.

There are different ways to do this. If it is assumed that the range reduction (80% or more) occurs at local temperature increase associated with the HadCM2 range and one takes the standard deviation of the model range
used here, then the minimum global mean temperature at which this would occur is around57
Baseline is 1961-1990 (Midgley 2003), e.g. 3.3-4.6°C above 1861-1890 average.
58
Rutherford et al. (1999a) and see http://www.nbi.ac.za/climrep/5.htm.
59
See also http://www.nbi.ac.za/climrep/6.htm.

43

Ecosystem

RegionImpactMangroves

Bangladesh

Losses of forests andwetlands in
Sundarbans.
Area lost
15% - 10 cm SLR
40% -25cm SLR
75% -45cm SLR
100% -60-100cm SLR

Mediterraneansystems

EuropeIncreased drought risk
is likely to cause
major vegetation
changes.

Global mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6

1-1.5°C 60
1.5-2.5°C
2.0-3.5°C
3.0-4°C

1.3-3.8°C 62

Comments

Causal Chain

concerning for the future of a large number of species in Mexico.
The IPCC identified the mangrove forests and wetlands of the Sundarbans as aunique entity threatened by climate change and sea level rise. Known as thelargest intact mangrove wetland system in the world it is the sole remaining
home of the Royal Bengal tiger (Panthera tigris tigris).61 A diverse plant flora
grows in the region and the forest is known to support 425 species of wildlife –49 mammal species, 315 bird species, 53 reptiles and 8 amphibians. Sea level
rise is predicted to result in the progressive loss of the mangrove forest andwetlands, including habitat of Bengal tiger (Qureshi and Hobbie 1994; Smith etal. 1998). Estimates of loss for a given level of sea level rise are drawn from thefollowing sources. An estimate of impacts for a 45cm sea level rise was made in
Chapter 2 of an Asia Development Bank report (Qureshi and Hobbie 1994).
Smith et al. (1998) estimated the loss for 1 metre of sea level rise, which
provided the basis for the estimates made in the IPCC TAR WGII Chapters 11
and 19 (Lal et al. 2001; Smith et al. 2001). Other values are interpolated using
the results from these reports (See also World Bank (2000)).

Recent droughts and associated tree mortality in Spain have indicated that sometree species that are important to Mediterranean ecology are at present close to
the edge their ability to cope with drought stress (Martinez-Vilalta and Pinol
2002; Ogaya et al. 2003). Projections of the effects of future climate change
indicate a substantially increased risk of tree mortality for some evergreen
species such as the Holm oak (Quercus ilex) due to increased temperature andextended droughts (Martinez-Vilalta et al. 2002). Holm oak is an important
species to the Mediterranean landscape. Forest currently dominated by it could
be invaded by other species (Pinus latifolia) that are more resistant to drought
and temperature changes. A strong threshold effects is observed in themodelling, which is supported by observed effects during the severe 1994
drought in the region. If the drought periods extend beyond 3 months there is asudden increase in tree mortality.63

60

Freshwater systems and forests would
become inundated, impairin g the
growth and reproduction of species
that rely on fresh water. With the
productivity of the system declining,
the closed canopy forests would be
replaced by shrubs and bushes,leading to loss of species.

Tree mortality exhibits a strong
dependence in the length of the dry
period or drought rather thantemperature. A strong threshold
effect is observed not far above
present day water stress levels.

As pointed out in footnote 41 these estimates are difficult. The range of temperatures here are those corresponding to the global mean surface temperature increase at the time at which the sea level rise is reached under arange of scenarios taking into account a range of models.
61
It spans about 1 million km 2, 62% of which is in Bangladesh and the remainder in West Bengal, India.
62
Local summer (June/July/August) temperature increase of 1.5, 3 and 4.5°C relative to 1999-2000 converted to global mean increase using SCENGEN. The scaling factors used were 1.855°C/°C with an inter-model
standard deviation of 0.424°C/°C.
63
The model used treats drying as synonymous with death, however Holm oak is capable of resprouting. However the authors note that Holm oak seems to be very close to it’s water stress limit under present climate
conditions and that trees that are forced to resprout every few years will be at a competitive disadvantage in relation to undamaged trees. See Figure 2 of Martinez-Vilalta et al. (2002) for the threshold response-44Ecosystem

RegionImpactMediterranean
ecosystems

EuropeIncreased fire
frequency as aconsequence ofclimate change
projected to leadecosystem shift toshrub dominatedlandscapes.

Montane Cloud
Forests

HawaiiPlant species

EuropeGlobal mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6
1.9-2.4°C 64

Comments

Causal Chain

Increased drought and water stress predicted for the north western Mediterranean
region are likely to lead to large changes in fire frequency, which in turn is likely
to lead to large changes in vegetation (Mouillot et al. 2002). Using a dynamic
vegetation model SIERRA and climate scenario Mouillot et al. (2002) projectedthat there would be increased fire frequency with reduction in ret urn period forforests from 72 to 62 years and for shrub lands from 20 to 16 years. The
warming scenario was an annual increase locally of about 2.4o C relative to 19601997 (the summer period warmed by about 4.0-4.8°C) with precipitation
decreases in the Mediterranean region (Gregory and Mitchell 1995). The
increase fire frequency led to changes in vegetation structure in the model.

Increased frequency of drought
projected under warming scenarios in
the region leads to increase fire
frequency and water stress. This
leads to consequential changes in thevegetation, shifting it to shrublands
from woodland/forest. Dense forestand grasslands in particular decline infavour of low shrub and high shrubs.65

Predicted extinction of 2.8-3.2°C 66
three species of
Hawaiian
Honeycreepers.

Climate change is predicted to act synergistically with past land use changes andavian malaria risk, to substantially reduce or eliminate the viable habitat ofseveral Hawaiian honeycreepers (Drepanidae) (Benning et al. 2002). The
honeycreepers live in montane tropical forests, which has been confined tohigher elevations as consequence of past agricultural land clearance. Above thisforest the high elevation area are subject to use for pasture. An introduced
mosquito whose upward range is limited by temperature honeycreeper at lower
altitudes would be subject to attack and mortality from avian malaria. While
past land use change has led to endangerment these pressures are not predicted tomake the species extinct.

Severe risks projected 2.4°C 67
for biodiversity.
About one third or
more of the species
present in 1990 innearly half (44%) of
the European land area
are projected todisappear from theseareas by 2050 due tothe movement of their
bioclimatic zone.

The bioclimatic zones occupied by species are projected to move with climatechange. The IMAGE 2 climate model and the EUROMOVE bioclimaticenvelope model have been used to estimate the changes in biome suitability fornearly 1400 plant species in Europe. The historical climate envelope for these
species was determined for these species and then the effects of climate changeon their distribution in 2050 projected (Bakkenes et al. 2002). Drier and morearid regions are found to be the most vulnerable to change – south western
Europe, central European Russia and the Ukraine. Less than 50% of current
species are projected to remain in situ in Spain, southwestern France, the BlackSea coast and Byelorussia. The lowlands of Germany, Belgium and The
Netherlands are likely to keep 70-80% of their species, however someendangered species may disappear.

Warming of the atmosphere ispredicted to lead to rising cloud basearound the mountains. This would in
principle displace montane forest
upwards, however migration islimited by the upper elevation landuse. Rising temperatures at thepresent elevation range of thehoneycreeper would lead to anincrease risk of contracting avian
malaria.
Warming and other climate changes
will lead to the movement of suitablebioclimatic zones for many species.
The EUROMOVE models establish
the bioclimatic envelope for the
species studied and then estimate how
this will change after climate change.
The actual migration of species inorder to tracking the movement of
their bioclimatic zones is uncertain fora number of reasons. It is by nomeans clear that all of the species
whose bioclimatic zones move awayfrom current locations will be able tore-establish successfully.

64

A 2.4°C local warming with respect to 1960-1997 is upscaled to a global mean estimate with SCENGEN using scaling factors of 1.373/°C with an inter-model standard deviation of 0.199°C/°C for the northwest
Mediterranean region. The period 1960-1997 is about 0.38°C warmer than 1861-1890. Whilst the study uses the climate scenario of the UKTR model (and earlier Hadley transient scenario) upscaling the local warming (asthis is given in the paper) to the global mean gives a better idea of the uncertainty range involved.
65 For the scenario (S2) involving changes in both rainfall and temperature. See Figure 6 of Mouillot et al. (2002).
66
A 2°C local warming upscaled to a global mean estimate with SCENGEN using scaling factors of 0.851°C/°C with an inter-model standard deviation of 0.073°C/°C for the equatorial Pacific region assuming the local
increase is with respect to 1990.

45

Ecosystem

RegionImpactGlobal mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6
2.9-3.4°C68

Protected areas

AfricaProtected areas

North
America

Major adverse
consequencespredicted for Malawi’s
Lengwe National Park
(and for Malawi in
general). It is unlikelythat it would be able tosupport large
populations ofungulates if climatechange produces moredrought conditions
and consequentdegradation of habitat.
High altitude plant
4-8°C 69
species in
Yellowstone nationalpark may not copewith climate change
arising from adoubling of CO2
concentration.

Comments

Causal Chain

Projected climate changes in the Malawi region are estimated to have adverse
effects on wildlife (Mkanda 1996, 1999). Recent drought periods were used as
an analogue to future projected changes by comparing the droughts of 1979/80
and 1991/92 with several GCM projections. Mkanda (1996; 1999) found that
there was little difference between the projected effects of the different GCM
scenarios for a doubled CO2 climate. The increased evapotranspiration causedby higher temperatures outweighed the benefits of increased precipitation inthese scenarios. Consequently it is predicted that land and vegetation quality islikely to be much degraded by climate changes in the future, with the possibilityof a “vicious cycle developing” with poor ground caused by climate change
driving further soil degradation and reduced habitat quality.

Increase temperatures lead to more
frequent drought conditions in thisregion. Increased precipitation
projected in some scenarios does notappear sufficient to compensate forincreased evapotranspiration.

Complex changes are projected for the vegetation of the Yellowstone nationalpark as a consequence of projected climate change. The range of high elevation
species is reduced and some species disappear from the region(Bartlein et al. 1997). Bartlein et al. (1997) argue that the rates of change
projected may exceed the ability of species to migrate as rates of change exceed
those evident from the paleorecord. An early generation GCM from the
Canadian Climate Centre (CCC) was used for this scenario. A global mean
warming of 3.5°C was estimated for doubling of CO2 concentrations (Boer et al.
1992). When downscaled to the Yellowstone region this produced a warming ofabout 10°C in January and July. Such warming for this level of global meanchange in this area are not generally found in the most recent generations ofcoupled ocean atmosphere GCMs. As these seasonal warming levels were used
to drive the assessment of vegetation effects, the global mean estimates here are
upscaled using the recent generation of AOGCMs. It should also be noted that
there is most of the current generation of models project a decrease in summer
rainfall (model average -9%/°C global warming) in this region whereas the CCC
model used had little change. Such a reduction would exacerbate many of theeffects cited by Bartlein et al. (1997).

Warming and increased summer
drought stress, with consequent
increase in fire frequency, lead to
substantial changes in vegetation.
The later generation of climate
models predict a reduction in summer
rainfall on average, which would
exacerbate the problems identified.

67

The scenario used was computed with the IMAGE 2.0 driven by the IPCC IS92a scenario, which generated a global increase of 1.8°C above 1990 by 2050. As before the 1990 climate is assumed to be about 0.6°C
warmer than the 1861-1890 period.
68
The global mean warming was calculated using SCENGEN. The local temperature increase scenarios used by Mkanda (1999) of 3.1-3.8°C to the global level upscaled using the scaling factors 1.123°C/°C with an intermodel standard deviation of 0.25°C. Whilst Mkanda used early generation GCM scenarios a check against the projections from the current generation of models indicates that these are not inconsistent. Combined with hisfindings that the scenarios he used produced relatively robust results (increased temperatures tended to outweigh the effects of increased rainfall projected from two of the three GCMs he used.
69
This is the range of global mean temperature increases upscaled using SCENGEN from a warming of 10°C in January and in July in this region, as used in the Bartlein et al. (1997) analysis. The CCC model used as thebasis for the scenario of Bartlein et al. (1997) has a global mean warming of 3.5°C, however more recent generation AOGCMs do not produce such pronounced warming in this region.

46

Ecosystem

RegionImpactGlobal mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6
1.9-3.1°C 70

Protected areas

South
AfricaLoss of two thirds ofanimal species studied
in Kruger NationalPark.

Protected areas

Switzerland

Many protected areas
would no longer besuitable for a large
numbers of theirpresent forest species.
Proportion of reserves
not suitable for present
forest species
40-50%
0.9-1.5°C 71
70-80%
1.4-2.8°C 72

Comments

Causal Chain

The bioclimatic range of many animals presently within Kruger National Parkare projected to move outside of the park boundaries (Erasmus et al. 2002).
Migration of these animals in order to track the range shift may be problematicdue to land use pressures in the regions adjacent to the park (Erasmus et al.
2002).

In general there an eastward shift inranges are projected with warming.
Large movements of the bioclimatic
zones of many animal species areprojected to occur. Extensive range
shifts are also projected for plant
species in the region (Rutherford et al.
1999b). Substantial and growing land
use and population pressures are very
likely to cause major problems for
migration of animals tracking climate
induced movement of their ranges(Erasmus et al. 2002).
Climatic warming will lead to upward
altitudinal movement of bioclimatic
zones.

Based on lapse rate considerations, Kienast et al. (1998), assess the effects ofincreasing temperatures on mountain forest communities. 73 Twenty-nine out of
109 reserves have enough altitudinal range to survive a 500-metre change in
effective climatic zone (a 2-2.8o C increase) and 12 areas have enough range tosurvive a 250 metres change (1-1.4o C increase). However 50 reserves (46%)
cannot take a 250m gain and 18 areas have only enough altitude to survive a
250-metre range change. Calculations using degree-days yield similar results.
Authors point to many limitations of the study including no dynamicalassessment of changes, no account taken of land use changes etc.74

70

A 2-3°C temperature increase in South Africa with respect to 1960-1989 is converted to a global mean with respect to 1861-1890 using average of nine recent GCMs downscaled to the European Alpine region using
SCENGEN. The regional to global scaling used is 1.191°C/°C with the range set by the inter-model standard deviation of 0.114°C/°C. The scaling factors using all 17 models in SCENGEN are not very different from the 9model estimate. Within the paper the climate scenario is not detailed and references are made to it warming South Africa by 2°C and by 2.5-3°C. If 2°C then the global warming range is 1.9-2.2°C and 2.5-3°C then therange is 2.2-3.1°C. The full range is included here.
71
A 1-1.4°C local temperature increase with respect to 1931-1970 converted to a global mean with respect to 1861-1890 using average of nine recent GCMs downscaled to the European Alpine region using SCENGEN.
The regional to global scaling used is 1.39°C/°C with the range set by the inter-model standard deviation of 0.30°C/°C. The scaling factors using all 17 models in SCENGEN are not very different from the 9 model estimate.
The base period is 1931-1970, which is about 0.26-0.28°C warmer than 1861-1890.
72
A 2-2.8°C local increase above 1931-1970 converted to global mean as in footnote 71.
73
Authors use an adiabatic lapse rate of 0.55°C/100m.
74
The authors also used a spatially explicit forest simulator with four climate scenarios: moderate or strong temperature increases and current levels or a 15% increase in precipitation. The model area includes not only thereserves but also the entire Swiss forest inventory. For temperature increases only the model supports vegetation shifts along altitudinal lines, however with warmer and wetter conditions, model results indicate thatvegetation shifts may not be as ‘dramatic’. The model did not consider the effects of CO2 fertilization. For strengths and weakness of bioclimatic envelope models see Footnote 3.

47

Ecosystem

RegionImpactSpeciesconservation

Australia

Large range reduction
in range of butterfly
species>20% range decline
54% of species>50% range decline
83% of species

Speciesconservation

South
AfricaPredicted local
extinction of fouranimal species andlarge range reductionsof greater than 50%
for 29 endangered
species. 140 species(78%) projected toexperience various
levels (4-98%) of
range contraction.

Speciesconservation

Australia

Dramatic range
reduction ordisappearance offrogs, and endangered
mammals and plantsfrom Dryandra forest
ecosystem insouthwestern
Australia.

Global mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6

1.2°C 75
2.9°C 76

1.9-3.1°C

70Comments

Causal Chain

Large range reductions are projected for many butterfly species in Australia as aconsequence of project ed climate change. Using the bioclimatic envelopemodel BIOCLIM the range changes for 24 species of butterflies were examined
for a range of four climate change scenarios for the 2050s (Beaumont andHughes 2002). The climate scenarios used were based on the results of sevenclimate models running under the IPCC SRES scenarios, with regional estimatesover Australia (Hulme and Sheard 1999) – see footnotes 75 and 76. Changes in
species distribution were estimated using the temperature and precipitation
changes for grid cells over Australia. One of the main findings is that evenspecies with wide climatic ranges could be very vulnerable to climate change.
The proportion of species suffering large range contractions increases rapidly
with temperature. The larger the warming the smaller is the proportion of a
species current range that lies within the projected future range in the 2050s. For75
a small increase of global mean temperature of 1.2°C this proportion is 66%,76
whereas for a larger global mean warming of 2.9°C , this falls to less than 22%.

Changes to temperature andprecipitation result in geographic
shifts in the suitable bioclimatic zones
for butterfly species. The model
projects the change in bioclimatic
range from the 1961-1990 period to
the 2050s. The ability of species tot rack these geographic changes is notmodelled. It is known that many of
the Australian butterfly species have
limited dispersal ability or cannot
migrate (Beaumont and Hughes
2002). Land clearance and habitat
fragmentation appears likely topresent barriers to dispersal andmigration.
Large range shifts are predicted as aconsequence of climate change,
mostly in an easterly direction acrossthe region. Fragmentation of thelandscape in the region as aconsequence of human activities
means the projected range shifts may
not be realized in practice. Range
reductions projected are likely tounderestimate the actual overall lossof range for the same reasons.
Reductions in range size are likely toincrease the risk of local extinction.

“Profound impacts” are projected for many animal species in South Africa fromclimate change (Erasmus et al. 2002). A bioclimatic envelope model approach
was used to study the response of 179 animal species – 34 birds, 19 mammals,
50 reptiles, 19 butterfly and 57 other invertebrates in South Africa – under ascenario involving a 2-3°C increase above 1960-1989 mean temperature (as wellas precipitation changes) (Erasmus et al. 2002). There were four projected local
extinctions (see Table 2 of Erasmus et al. (2002)). The vast majority of species
are projected to experience range reductions of the order of 4-98%. As aconsequence of land use pressures and habitat fragmentation the ability ofanimals to track climate change by moving their range is open to doubt.
Erasmus et al. (2002) point out that “theoretical range shifts into transformed
landscapes may mean local extinction”. The range reductions projected areconservative and appear likely to underestimate the overall reductions, as
landscape transformation is not accounted for in the model.
“Dramatic decreases in range” (IPCC TAR WGII 12.4.2 (Pittock et al. 2001))
are projected for most species studied in the Dryandra forest ecosystem insouthwestern Australia for quite small warming levels. Effects include thedisappearance of frogs, and endangered mammals and plants (Pouliquen-Young
and Newman 1999). A bioclimatic envelope model was used to estimate theeffects of temperature and rainfall changes using a regional climate model at
125km resolution. The forested studied is part of a larger systems in south
western Australia that has been identified as one of 25 global biodiversity hot
spots (Myers et al. 2000). Three species of frogs, 15 species of endangered or
threatened mammals, 92 varieties of the plant genus Dryandra, and 27 varietiesof Acacia were modelled. For 0.5°C warming above 1990 all frogs and mammal

75

Bioclimatic envelope is estimatedempirically and then climate change
scenario superimposed.78 Unsuitablesoils and land use patterns several
limit migration potential.

The scenario used is the B1 -low of Hulme and Sheard (1999), which produces warming over Australia in the range 0.8-1.4°C warming wrt to 1961-1990. This scenario has a global mean warming for the 2050s of 0.9°C
wrt 1961-1990 or 1.2°C wrt the 1861-1890 base period.
76
The scenario used is the A2-high of Hulme and Sheard (1999), which produces warming over Australia in the range 2.1-3.9°C warming wrt to 1961-1990. This scenario has a global mean warming for the 2050s of 2.6°C
wrt 1961-1990 or 2.9°C wrt the 1861-1890 base period.

48

Ecosystem

RegionImpactGlobal mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6

All frogs and mammal
species studied would
be restricted to small
areas or disappear
1.1°C 77
Two thirds ofDrvandra tree species
and all of the Acacia
species projected todisappear from theregion.
Temperate
forests andwoodlands

Temperate
forests andwoodlands

Australia

New
Zealand

Causal Chainof Acacia were modelled. For 0.5°C warming above 1990 all frogs and mammal
species studied would be restricted to small areas or disappear. Under warmingof 2°C two thirds of Dryandra tree species and all of the Acacia species modelledwould disappear from the region.

2.6°C

Australian eucalypt
species outside current
thermal range.
25%
1.1-1.3°C 79
40%
1.9-2.2°C 80>50%
2.7-3.2°C 81

Risk of extinction of
New Zealand kauri
tree.

Comments

4.8-7.5°C 83

Under the assumed warming scenarios the present bioclimatic zones of eucalypt
species move significantly. As a result “within the next few decades many
eucalypt species will have their entire present day populations exposed totemperatures and rainfalls under which no individuals currently exist” (Hughes
et al. 1996). Using a bioclimatic model (Hughes et al. 1996) find that of the 819
species of Eucalyptus examined for their climatic range (mean annual
temperature and rainfall), 53% have ranges spanning less than 3°C , 41% having
a range of less than 2°C , and 25% have a range of less than 1°C . In relation torainfall, 23% have ranges spanning less than 20% of the variation in meanannual rainfall. Although actual climatic tolerances of many species are wider
than the climatic envelope they currently occupy, substantial changes in the tree
flora of Australia may be expected (Hughes et al. 1996).
Empirical, isolation and subsequent extinction feared (Mitchell and Williams
1996). A risk of extinction is identified in the TAR: “For example, Mitchelland Williams (1996) have noted that habitat that is climatically suitable for the
long-lived New Zealand kauri tree (Agathis australis) under a 4°C warming
scenario would be at least 150 km from the nearest extant population. Theysuggest that survival of this species may require human intervention andrelocation.”

77

The present distribution of species ismapped against
Empirical bioclimatic estimates of
species range for temperature rainfall
and other factors with superimposed
temperature and rainfall scenarios.82
Migration of species is not modelled.

Warming causes bioclimatic zone ofkauri to move away from existing
locations.

Adjusted to 1861-1890 from 0.5°C above 1990.
For strengths and weakness of bioclimatic envelope models see Footnote 3.
79
This the global mean temperature range corresponding to a warming over Australia of 1°C upscaled using SCENGEN. The scaling factors used of 1.161°C/°C (with a standard deviation of 0.121°C/°C) is the average of 9
recent AOGCMs computed choosing SCENGEN cells minimizing the area of oceans surrounding Australia as the impact being examined is for land surface. Although it is not clear what the base period is for the climate
data an extensive data resource was used by the authors to map current eucalypt distributions against temperature and precipitation. In this context a conservative assumption is to use the 1961-1990 reference period.
80
As for footnote 79 but for a 2°C local warming.
81
As for footnote 79 but for a 3°C local warming82
For strengths and weakness of bioclimatic envelope models see Footnote 3.
83
Assuming the 4°C local increase is with respect to 1990 and using SCENGEN as described above to obtain a local to global scaling for the South Island of New Zealand of 0.769°C/°C and an inter-model standard
deviation of 0.193°C/°C.
7849

Ecosystem

RegionImpactTropical Forests

Australia

Loss of 50% of thehighland rainforest
habitat in the World
Heritage listed tropicalrain forests in North
Queensland. These
highlands host most of
the more than 60
endemic vertebrates ofthis region.

Tropical Forests

Australia“Predicted extinction”
of Golden Bower bird
and other species
similarly confined toupland and highlandareas of the wet
tropical forests ofNorth Queensland.
Range loss
>60%
90%
98%

Tropical Forests

Australia“Catastrophic” loss ofendemic rainforest
vertebrates projected.

Global mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6
1.6-1.8°C 84

Comments

Causal Chain

The tropical rainforests of North Queensland, Australia supports 566 species to
Warming causes rise in bioclimatic
terrestrial vertebrates or 28% of the Australian total. Sixty-five are regionalzone. No assessment is made ofendemics, most of which are hosted by the highland tropical forests within theeffects of elevated CO2 .
region. Using a neural network bioclimatic model to project the effects ofchanges in precipitation and climate it has been found that large reductions inhighland rainforest is likely in the wet tropics of North Queensland, Australia(Hilbert et al. 2001). Lowland mesophyll vine forest is projected to increase inareas but upland complex notophyll vine forest response depends on
precipitation. Highland rainforest (simple notophyll and simple mesophyll vine
fern forests and thickets) decreases for all rainfall scenarios for a 1°C increase intemperature. This habitat hosts many of the endemic vertebrates of the regionand severe, adverse consequences have been predicted for many of these (seebelow).
Climate change is predicted to lead to the extinction of the Golden Bower bird
which is confined to upland and highland areas (Hilbert et al. 2003). Range
losses for this species are projected to be approximately 90% with a 2°C
warming and a 10% decrease in rainfall. This scenario is consistent with recent
model estimates of climate change for the region (Walsh and Ryan 2000).
Whilst the overall change in rainfall is uncertain, it is likely that there will be anincrease in dry season severity and variability in rainfall (Walsh and Ryan 2000).
.

The bioclimatic zone of the Golden
Bower bird is extirpated withincreasing temperature.

Severe loss of rainforest vertebrate species is projected in the highland tropicalforests of the region as consequence of warming. Williams et al. (2003)
examined a wide range of species and found a risk of catastrophic loss of theendemic vertebrates of the forest above 300 metres:“Extinction rates caused by the complete loss of core environments are likely to
be severe, nonlinear, with losses increasing rapidly beyond an increase of 2 °C,
and compounded by other climate-related impacts”.
Most of the rainforest in the region is confined to above 300 metres altitude.
Mountains in the region are no higher than about 1600 metres. Of the 600
vertebrate species in the region 83 are endemic, 72 of these are restricted to therainforest and 62 of these confined to the montane forests above 600 metres
altitude.

Verterbrates confined to high altitude
zones are projected to run out ofsuitable habitat with increasing
temperature.
Williams et al. (2003) argue that theresults for the wet tropics of Australia
have broad implications for montane
and higland tropical forests. These
often are very diverse with large
numbers of endemic species and may
be “severely threatened by climatechange” (Williams et al. 2003).

84

1.6-1.8°C
2.6-3.0°C 85
3.6-4.2°C 86>2.6-3.0°C 85

84

Assuming the 1°C local increase is with respect to 1990 and using SCENGEN as described above to obtain a local to global scaling for the Wet Tropics area of 0.917°C/°C and with an inter-model standard deviation of
0.072°C/°C.
85
Assuming the 2°C local increase is with respect to 1990 and applying the same scaling factors as in footnote 84.
86
Assuming the 3°C local increase is with respect to 1990 and applying the same scaling factors as in footnote 84.

50

Ecosystem

RegionImpactGlobal mean surface
temperature above preindustrial[°C]6

Tropical Forests

AmazonRisk of collapse oftropical forests in the
Amazon.

1.4-2.4°C 87

Tropical Forests

AmazonProjected “dramatic”
loss of species
viability in eastern
Amazonia withrefugial areas
remaining in thewestern zone of the
Amazon basin

1.5-2.8°C 89

Comments

Causal Chain

altitude.
Several studies have identified a risk of a climate change induced collapse of the
Amazon rainforests. A firm probability statement cannot yet be made as to thelikelihood of this coming about, however the seriousness of the risk and is large
consequences mean that this needs to be taken seriously.88 Based in part on a
climate scenario driven by the HadCM3L model Cowling et al. (2003) argue thatthe feedbacks that maintained the stability of the Amazon in the past glacial andinterglacial climatesi cannot be maintained in the future and that there is likely to
be a positive feedback effect which amplifies local drying and warming. As aconsequence, Cowling et al. (2003) argue that there is a threshold “at which
tropical ecosystems exceed their capacity for internal/external feedback effects
compensating of the deleterious effects of warming on tropical plants,” but thatlocating this is very difficult. They speculate that the climate system,
temperature, is very close to this threshold at present. Jones et al. (2003) reporton the estimated carbon cycle feedback effects of climatic warming, updating theearlier work of Cox et al. (2000). An abrupt increase in the land source of CO2
as a consequence of warming and the pattern of climate change in the scenario
occurs, reaching 7GtC/yr in 2001, principally from loss of soil carbon andAmazon tropical forest dieback. Apart from the drastic biodiversity loss
implications such a feedback would amplify the warming considerably. See Note
1 at the end of this table for a further brief discussion on the Amazon and climatechange issue.

change” (Williams et al. 2003).
One of the critical mechanisms is theeffect of vegetation feedbacks onregional climate. Anthropogenic
climate change leads to higher
temperatures and in creased
respiration, which leads to abreakdown of water recycling within
the Amazon basin. As rainfall
declines this contributes to further
vegetation dieback. In addition to themechanism identified by Cowling etal. (in press), it seems likely that the
habitat fragmentation-climate-forest
fire feedback identified by Lauranceand Williamson (2001) will act toexacerbate any purely climate change
induced propensity of vegetation loss.

The Amazon basin and its rainforests host a substantial fraction of the world’s
biodiversity. Climate change is projected to lead to loss of species in parts of the
Amazon (Miles 2002; Miles et al. 2003). Under a “standard” scenario90 withwarming by the 2080s of 2.5°C wrt 1990 29% of species are projected to have“no viable distribution”. Under a “reduced impact scenario”, with warming of
1.2°C by this time, 13% had no viable distribution projected. Dispersal or
migration in many of these cases would have to occur over hundreds ofkilometres for species to reach appropriate new bioclimatic zones.

The effects of climate change were
estimated using bioclimatic modellingof plant species in the Amazon. This
took account of tolerance of plants toextreme climate values, barriers tomigration and dispersal, and lags in
species response to climate change.

Note [1]: A major caveat on these results is that they are based on the HadCM3 climatic projections for the Amazon region and the TRIFFID
vegetation/terrestrial carbon cycle model. The main driver of the collapse is the increasing El Nino like warming pattern for sea surface
87

This estimate of when an instability threshold may be approached in the Amazon is highly uncertain and most likely model dependent. The range chosen here is global mean warming for the HadCM3 model forced by the
IS92a emissions scenarios for the period 2020s and 2050s (Hulme et al. 1999a). These time periods are chosen as the earliest period in which significant changes can be seen in Amazon rainforest cover and the time atwhich a reduction of around 20-25% has occurred in the modeling by Cox et al. (2003). See their Figure 6.
88
Cox et al. (2003) conclude that whilst the mechanisms that could lead to a dieback of the Amazon are qualitatively understood “we are still a long way from being able to estimate the probability of such an ecologicalcatastrophe occurring.”
89
Scenarios used warm globally be between 1.2 and 2.5°C by 2095.
90
Miles used the HadCM2 model for the assessment. It produces results within the range simulated by both the ECHAM4 and CSIRO MkII models for the Amazon region. The two main scenarios were a) Standard Impact
based on the IPCC IS92a emission scenario. The standard scenario has a 2080s global mean temperature increase of ca 2.5°C w.r.t 1961-1990 and b) a Reduced Impact scenario of half this increase. Both are downscaled to
the region.

51

temperatures projected by the HadCM3 model as greenhouse gases increase (Cox et al. 2003). Whilst some models show this as well it is not auniversal feature. Nevertheless, the HadCM3 model has one of the best associations between current observed and modelled patterns of climate inthis region. It was shown by Cramer et al. (2001) in a comparison of six dynamic vegetation models, and more recently in a review of the carbon
cycle implications of projected climate (Cramer et al. 2003), that the vegetation feedbacks are model dependent. In particular the climate model andTRIFFID produce larger climate changes and larger, and qualitatively different vegetation responses than other models.
In spite of these uncertainties are several reasons for inclusion of this example. The main mechanism as described in the last column is likely to be
driven, in addition to climate change, by land clearance in the Amazon. There is now a well established link between forest fires, habitat
fragmentation and climate changes and extreme ENSO events in the Amazon (Laurance and Williamson 2001; Laurance et al. 2001; Nepstad et al.
2001; Cochrane and Laurance 2002). In other words there is likely to be a synergistic effect between forest fragmentation and deforestation andhuman induced climate change, should the latter lead to more ENSO like climatic conditions in the region. None of the models so far include these
combined effects. Inclusion of such effects and processes would likely reduce the resilience of vegetation to warming and drying. Secondly, it
seems likely that future climate change will produce more El Niño like conditions. It is known that there are substantial releases of carbon from theAmazon during ENSO years (Tian et al. 1998), which also occurs for the global biota (Jones et al. 2001). It is clear from the work of Tian et al.
(1998) that the Amazon forest can switch from a sink to a source quite. Thirdly, smoke from biomass burning can inhibit rainfall over the Amazon(Rosenfeld 1999) implying a further and so far unmodelled feedback which would excarbate any tendency to drying and increase fire frequency.
Fourthly, it is sometimes argued that the Amazon forest was substantially reduced in area during the last glacial and expanded with more equable
climates in the early Holocene and hence a global warming reduced reduction would not be much different from what may have happened in thepast. Based on a detailed analysis of available paleorecords Colinvaux et al. (2000) conclude that the Amazon forests retained their integrity
throughout the last glacial period. This is supported by the modelling of Cowling et al. (2001; Cowling et al. 2003) with the indication that there
feedback effects that help the forest cope with cooler and warmer periods. However recent work Cowling et al. (2003) indicates that these feedback
processes could be overwhelmed by the climate changes projected by the models used. Finally, as a risk assessment exercise, the results of Cox etal. (2000), Cowling et al. (2003) and Cox et al. (2003), present a prima facie risk, that has yet to be eliminated by definitive modelling or otherassessments.

52

3. Impacts on Food Production, Water, and Socio-economic
systems
Introduction
Article 2 is quite specific in relation to the general need to “ensure that foodproduction is not threatened”. However, it does not make mention of whether thisshould be the case regionally as well as globally. As will be seen from theinformation presented below this would have a substantial bearing on aninterpretation of Article 2. Whilst current assessments indicate that global aggregate
agricultural production may not be adversely affected up 2-3o C warming, this is not
the case for a number of regions. Indeed, the questions of who will be adversely
affected by climate change and who will make the “cruel choices”91 between the costsof mitigation and the damages to be borne by climate change are amongst the key
political issues involved in the resolution of the questions embodied in Article 2 andits implementation.
The other part of Article 2, dealt with here, relates to the need for policy action to betaken “within a timeframe sufficient to enable economic development to proceed in asustainable manner”. Differing interpretations of this requirement have been made,with a dominant ‘economic’ one relating to the concept that if abatement action is to
be rapid then economic growth would be reduced and resources diverted from othersustainable development needs. Another interpretation is that rapid climate change
itself may threaten sustainable development in some regions and some sectors. The
focus here is on information relevant to the latter question.
In general, the results presented below account for adaptation possibilities in each of
the sectors considered. Only in cases where there are identified limitations toadaptation or where adaptation options have not been included, specific reference will
be made to this issue.
With the emphasis in this report on brevity and on salience to a consideration of
impacts at different temperature levels, the information below will be drawn largely
from only a few studies of global impacts and effects based on a few GCMs. Whilst
every attempt will be made to place these in the context of general findings orqualifications made in the IPCC TAR, the reader should be aware that the overall
literature is rich, complex and sometimes divergent. In general, all of the literature
chosen for use here is consistent with the broad findings of the TAR and where it isnot, the reasons for this are specifically addressed. Space limitations militate against
explanation of processes leading to impacts and effects and hence the discussion will
focus on results only except to the extent necessary for clarity of exposition. The
reader is referred to the underlying literature for an understanding of the processes
mentioned below.

91

Phrase used by a key negotiator from a very large industrial country to describe the process ofdeciding upon the ultimate limits to climate change and the trade-off between the economic andpolitical costs of emission abatement and climate protection targets.

53

Context: Findings of the Second and Third Assessment Reports
Projected climate change effects on the sectors considered here were examined indetail in the Second Assessment Report (SAR) of the IPCC (1995) and in the IPCC
Regional Impacts report of 1997. The IPCC TAR in many cases explicitly reviewed
the findings of these reports in its assessment of the literature. With few exceptions,
the TAR confirms the general findings of the earlier assessments, however
quantitative assessments have often changed. 92 Table 6 cross compares broad areasof the findings from the Second and Third Assessment Reports. 93 It gives a clear
picture of the consistency between the findings of the 1995 and 2001 assessments.
Consistency of these assessments, based as they are on quite different literature anddifferent models at different stages of development, appears to add confidence to theoverall findings of the IPCC TAR.
One of the main conclusions of the IPCC TAR, which strengthens the earlier SAR
assessment, is in relation to the vulnerability of developing countries at low levels ofwarming (less than 2o C). It is likely that global increases in temperature would
produce net economic losses in many developing countries for all magnitudes ofwarming and these losses would be greater the higher the warming. This conclusion
is reflected in each of the sectors discussed below, where many developing countries
are seen to have large projected damages at low levels of warming, even though
global aggregate market impacts are estimated as small or positive, up to a few o C
warming. This is particularly true for agriculture and water resources where it is clearthat some regions are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change.

92

It is important to bear in mind that more recent impact assessments have used transient scenarios
generated with coupled Atmosphere Ocean General Circulation Models (AOGCMs) rather than, as
was the case in the SAR, doubled CO2 equilibrium scenarios run with Atmosphere General
Circulation Models (AGCMs) with stylised (slab or mixed layer oceans). In general, the transient
scenarios produce less extreme results at specific time periods in the future than the equilibrium
scenarios.
93
Space does not permit doing this for the Regional Impacts report, which contains much additional
information, however the most salient findings of this report are repeated, in one form or another, in
the IPCC Working Group II TAR Report.

54

Table 6 - Comparison of Second and Third Assessment Report Findings
Category

IPCC Second Assessment Report 94

IPCC Third Assessment Report 95

Vulnerability“People who live on arid or semi-arid lands, in lowlying coastal areas, in water-limited or flood-prone
areas, or on small islands are particularly vulnerable toclimate change” (p. 29).

"The effects of climate change are expected to be greatest in developing countries in terms ofloss of life and relative effects on investment and the economy. For example, the relative
percentage damages to GDP from climate extremes have been substantially greater indeveloping countries than in developed countries” (WGII-SPM p. 8).
“The projected distribution of economic impacts is such that it would increase the disparity inwell-being between developed countries and developing countries, with disparity growing forhigher projected temperature increases (medium confidence)” (WGII-SPM p. 8).
Africa: “Increases in droughts, floods, and other extreme events would add to stresses onwater resources, food security, human health, and infrastructures, and would constrain
development in Africa (high confidence).” “Significant extinctions of plant and animal species
are projected and would impact rural livelihoods, tourism, and genetic resources (medium
confidence)” (WGII-SPM p. 14).
Asia: “Extreme events have increased in temperate and tropical Asia, including floods,
droughts, forest fires, and tropical cyclones (high confidence).” “Sea level rise and anincrease in intensity of tropical cyclones would displace tens of millions of people in lowlying coastal areas of temperate and tropical Asia; increased intensity of rainfall would
increase flood risks in temperate and tropical Asia (high confidence)” (WGII-SPM p. 14).
Latin America: “Loss and retreat of glaciers would adversely impact runoff and water supply
in areas where glacier melt is an important water source (high confidence).” “Floods anddroughts would become more frequent with floods increasing sediment loads and degrade
water supply in some areas (high confidence).” “Increases in intensity of tropical cyclones
would alter the risks to life, property, and ecosystems from heavy rain, flooding, storm surges,
and wind damages” (WGII-SPM p. 15).

94

Conclusions cited are from the Summary for Policy Makers of Working Group II of the Second Assessment Report adopted in Montreal, October 1995 unless otherwise
stated. Where reference is made to WGII Technical Summary or to sections of the report it should be noted that these have not been approved in detail by governments.
95
Conclusions are from Summary for Policy Makers of the Working Group II Report (WGII-SPM) and the Synthesis Report (SR-SPM) of the Third Assessment Report
adopted at Geneva in February 2001 unless otherwise stated. Where reference is made to the full Synthesis Report or other sections of the IPCC TAR it should be noted thatthese have not been approved in detail by governments. The confidence levels are those assigned by IPCC WGII under its scale of uncertainties. See footnote 99 d.

55

Small Islands: “Populations that inhabit small islands and/or low-lying coastal areas are atparticular risk of severe social and economic effects from sea-level rise and storm surges.
Many human settlements will face increased risk of coastal flooding and erosion, and tens of
millions of people living in deltas, in low-lying coastal areas, and on small islands will facerisk of displacement. Resources critical to island and coastal populations such as beaches,
freshwater, fisheries, coral reefs and atolls, and wildlife habitat would also be at risk” (SR–SPM p. 12).
Health“Climate change is likely to have wide ranging andmostly adverse effect on human health, with significant
loss of life” (p. 35).
“Indirect effects of climate change include increases in
the potential transmission of vector-borne infectious
diseases (e.g., malaria, dengue, yellow fever, and someviral encephalitis) resulting from extensions of thegeographical range and season for vector organisms”(pp. 34-35).
“Projections ... indicate that the geographical zone ofpotential malaria transmission in response to world
temperature increases at the upper part of the
IPCC-projected range (3-5o C by 2100) would increase
from approximately 45% of the world population toapproximately 60% by the latter half of the next
century. This could lead to potential increases inmalaria incidence (on the order of 50-80 million
additional annual cases, relative to an assumed global
background total of 500 million cases), primarily intropical, subtropical, and less well-protected
temperate-zone populations” (p. 36).

“Overall, climate change is projected to increase threats to human health, particularly in lower
income populations, predominantly within tropical/subtropical countries” (SR–SPM p. 12).
“Climate change can affect human health directly (e.g., reduced cold stress in temperate
countries but increased heat stress, loss of life in floods and storms) and indirectly throughchanges in the ranges of disease vectors (e.g., mosquitoes), water-borne pathogens, water
quality, air quality, and food availability and quality (medium to high confidence)” (SR–SPM
p. 12).
“Climate-related health effects are observed. Many vector-, food-, and water-borne infectious
diseases are known to be sensitive to changes in climatic conditions. Extensive experience
makes clear that any increase in floods will increase the risk of drowning, diarrheal andrespiratory diseases, water-contamination diseases, and—in developing countries—hunger
and malnutrition (high confidence)” (Synthesis Report p. 56).
“Heat waves in Europe and North America are associated with a significant increase in urban
mortality, but warmer wintertime temperatures also result in reduced wintertime mortality. In
some cases health effects are clearly related to recent climate changes, such as in Sweden
where tic k-borne encephalitis incidence increased after milder winters and moved northward
following the increased frequency of milder winters over the years 1980 to 1994” (Synthesis
Report p. 56-57).
Latin America: “The geographical distribution of vector-borne infectious diseases would
expand poleward and to higher elevations, and exposures to diseases such as malaria, dengue
fever, and cholera will increase (medium confidence)” (WGII-SPM p. 15).
Africa: “Extension of ranges of infectious disease vectors would adversely affect humanhealth in Africa (medium confidence)” (WGII-SPM p. 14).

56

Asia: “Human health would be threatened by possible increased exposure to vector- borne
infectious diseases and heat stress in parts of Asia (medium confidence)” (WGII p. 14).
Small Islands: “Many tropical islands are now experiencing high incidences of vector- andwater-borne diseases that are attributed to changes in temperature and rainfall regimes, which
may be linked to events such as ENSO, droughts, and floods. In the Pacific, there is growing
evidence that outbreaks of dengue are becoming more frequent and appear to be strongly
correlated with the ENSO phenomenon” (IPCC WGII Chapter 17 p. 864).
“Climate change will cause some deterioration in air quality in many large urban areas,
assuming that current emission levels continue (medium to high confidence)” (IPCC WGII
Chapter 9 p. 453)
“In areas with limited or deteriorating public health infrastructure, and where temperatures
now or in the future are permissive of disease transmission, an increase in temperatures (alongwith adequate rainfall) will cause certain vector-borne diseases (including malaria, dengue,
and leishmaniasis) to extend to higher altitudes (medium to high confidence) and higher
latitudes (medium to low confidence)” (IPCC WGII Chapter 9 p. 453).
“In some settings, the impacts of climate change may cause social disruption, economic
decline, and displacement of populations. The ability of affected communities to adapt to suchdisruptive events will depend on the social, political, and economic situation of the country
and its population. The health impacts associated with such social-economic dislocation andpopulation displacement are substantial [high confidence; well-established]” (IPCC WGII
Chapter 9 p. 454).
Agriculture“Recent studies support evidence in the 1990
assessment that, on the whole, global agricultural
production could be maintained relative to baseline
production in the face of climate change modeled by
GCMs at doubled-equivalent CO2 equilibrium
conditions. However, more important than global foodproduction—in terms of the potential for hunger,
malnutrition, and famine—is the access to andavailability of food for specific local and regional
populations” (WGII Technical Summary).

Europe: “There will be some broadly positive effects on agriculture in northern Europe(medium confidence); productivity will decrease in southern and eastern Europe (medium
confidence)” (Synthesis Report p. 128).
North America: “Some crops would benefit from modest warming accompanied byincreasing CO2 , but effect would vary among crops and regions (high confidence), including
declines due to drought in some areas of Canada’s Prairies and the U.S. Great Plains, potential
increased food production in areas of Canada north of current production areas, and increased
warm temperate mixed forest production (medium confidence). However, benefits for crops
would decline at an increasing rate and possibly become a net loss with further warming(medium confidence)” (Synthesis Report p. 128).

57

“At broader regional scales, subtropical and tropicalareas—home to many of the world’s poorest people—
show negative consequences more often than temperateareas. People dependent on isolated agricultural
systems in semi -arid and arid regions face the greatest
risk of increased hunger due to climate change. Manyof these at-risk populations live in sub-Saharan Africa;
South, East, and Southeast Asia; and tropical areas of
Latin America, as well as some Pacific island nations”(WGII Technical Summary).

Latin America: “Yields of important crops are projected to decrease in many locations evenwhen the effects of CO2 are taken into account; subsistence farming in some regions could bethreatened (high confidence)” (Synthesis Report p. 128).

“... many of the world’s poorest people - particularly
those living in the subtropical and tropical areas anddependent on isolated agricultural systems in semi-arid
and arid regions are most at risk of increased hunger”(p. 33)

Small Island States: “Limited arable land and soil salinization makes agriculture of small
island states, both for domestic food production and cash crop exports, highly vulnerable toclimate change (high confidence)” (WGII-SPM p. 17).

“Increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide
concentrations may raise the carbon-nitrogen ratio of
forage, thus reducing its food value” (p. 30).

Asia: “Decreases in agricultural productivity and aquaculture due to thermal and water stress,
sea-level rise, floods and droughts, and tropical cyclones would diminish food security inmany countries of arid, tropical, and temperate Asia; agriculture would expand and increase inproductivity in northern areas (medium confidence)” (Synthesis Report p. 128).
Africa: “Grain yields are projected to decrease for many scenarios, diminishing food security,
particularly in small food-importing countries (medium-high confidence)” (WGII-SPM p. 14).

Australia and New Zealand: “The net impact on some temperate crops of climate and CO2changes may initially be beneficial, but this balance is expected to become negative for someareas and crops with further climate change (medium confidence)” (WGII-SPM p. 15).
“Climate change represents an additional pressure on the world’s food supply system and is
expected to increase yields at higher latitudes and lead to decreases at lower latitudes. These
regional differences in climate impacts on agricultural yield are likely to grow stronger overtime, with net beneficial effects on yields and production in the developed world and net
negative effects in the developing world. This would increase the number of undernourishedpeople in the developing world (medium confidence).” (IPCC WGII Chapter 9 p. 454).
“Agricultural yields will increase for most crops as a result of increasing atmospheric CO2
concentration. This effect would be counteracted by the risk of water shortage in southern andeastern Europe and by shortening of growth duration in many grain crops as a result of
increasing temperature. Northern Europe is likely to experience overall positive effects,
whereas some agricultural production systems in southern Europe may be threatened [medium
confidence, established but incomplete evidence]” (IPCC WGII Chapter 13 p. 643).

Human
infrastructure“Climate change and resulting sea level rise can have anumber of negative impacts on energy, industry andtransportation infrastructure; human settlements; theproperty insurance industry; tourism; and cultural

Asia: “Sea level rise and an increase in intensity of tropical cyclones would displace tens of
millions of people in low-lying coastal areas of temperate and tropical Asia; increased
intensity of rainfall would increase flood risks in temperate and tropical Asia (highconfidence)” (WGII-SPM p. 14).

58

systems and values” (p. 34).

confidence)” (WGII-SPM p. 14).

“Protection of many low-lying island states (e.g., theMarshall Islands, the Maldives) and nations with large
deltaic areas (e.g., Bangladesh, Nigeria, Egypt, China)
is likely to be very costly (High Confidence).”(Executive Summary of Chapter 9).

Small Islands: “The projected sea level rise of 5mm yr-1 for the next 100 years would cause
enhanced coastal erosion, loss of land and property, dislocation of people, increased risk fromstorm surges, reduced resilience of coastal ecosystems, saltwater intrusion into freshwater
resources, and high resource costs to respond to and adapt to these changes (high confidence)”(WGII-SPM p. 17).

“Adaptation to sea-level rise and climate change will
involve important tradeoffs, which could include
environmental, economic, social, and cultural values(High Confidence)” (Executive Summary of Chapter
9).

Europe: “In coastal areas, the risk of flooding, erosion, and wetland loss will increase
substantially—with implications for human settlement, industry, tourism, agriculture, andcoastal natural habitats. Southern Europe appears to be more vulnerable to these changes,
although the North Sea coast already has high exposure to flooding [high confidence]” (IPCC
WGII Chapter 13 p. 644).

“In some societies, resettlement, for example, would
lead to dislocation of social and cultural groups andmight even involve the loss of cultural norms andvalues...” (Chapter 9.6.3.3).
Water resources“Relatively small changes in temperature andprecipitation, together with the non-linear effects on
evapotranspiration and soil moisture, can result in
relatively large changes in runoff, especially in arid andsemi -arid lands. High-latitude regions may experience
increased runoff due to increased precipitation,
whereas runoff may decrease at lower latitudes due tothe combined effects of increased evapotranspirationand decreased precipitation. Even in areas wheremodels project a precipitation increase, higher
evaporation rates may lead to reduced runoff” (WGII
Technical Summary).
“Climate change ... can have major impacts on regional
water resources” (p. 32).
“The quantity and quality of water supplies already areserious problems today in many regions...making
countries in these regions particularly vulnerable to any“Climate change will exacerbate water shortages in many water-scarce areas of the world.
Demand for water is generally increasing due to population growth and economic
development, but is falling in some countries because of increased efficiency of use. Climatechange is projected to substantially reduce available water (as reflected by projected runoff) inmany of the water-scarce areas of the world, but to increase it in some other areas (medium
confidence) …. Freshwater quality generally would be degraded by higher water temperatures(high confidence), but this may be offset in some regions by increased flows” (SR-SPM p.
12).
“Projected climate change would exacerbate water shortage and quality problems in many
water-scarce areas of the world, but alleviate it in some other areas. … Climate change is
projected to reduce streamflow and groundwater recharge in many parts of the world but toincrease it in some other areas (medium confidence)” (Synthesis Report p. 72).
Africa: “Changes in rainfall and intensified land use would exacerbate the desertification
processes. Desertification would be exacerbated by reduction in the average annual rainfall,
runoff, and soil moisture in countries of west African Sahel, and northern and southern Africa(medium confidence). Increases in droughts and other extreme events would add to stresses onwater resources, food security, and human health, and would constrain development in the59additional reduction in indigenous water supplies” (p.
32).
“Experts disagree over whether water supply systems
will evolve substantially enough in the future tocompensate for the anticipated negative impacts ofclimate change on water resources and for potential
increases in demand” (p. 32).
“… The impacts, however, will depend also on theactions of water users and managers… In somecases —particularly in wealthier countries withintegrated water-management systems —these actions
may protect water users from climate change at
minimal cost. In many others however—particularly
those regions that already are water-limited—
substantial economic, social, and environmental costs
could occur. Water resources in arid and semi-aridzones are particularly sensitive to climate variations
because of low-volume total runoff and infiltration andbecause relatively small changes in temperature andprecipitation can have large effects on runoff” (WGII
Technical Summary).

region (high confidence)” (Synthesis Report p. 130).
Asia: “Water shortage— already a limiting factor for ecosystems, food and fiber production,
human settlements, and human health— may be exacerbated by climate change. Runoff andwater availability may decrease in arid and semi -arid Asia but increase in northern Asia
(medium confidence)” (Synthesis Report p. 130).
Europe: “Summer runoff, water availability, and soil moisture are likely to decrease insouthern Europe, and would widen the gap between the north and south (high confidence).
Flood hazards will increase across much of Europe (medium to high confidence); risk would
be substantial for coastal areas where flooding will increase erosion and result in loss of
wetlands” (Synthesis Report p. 130).
Australia and New Zealand: “Water is likely to be a key issue (high confidence) due toprojected drying trends over much of the region and change to a more El Niño-like averagestate” (Synthesis Report p. 130).
North America: “Snowmelt-dominated watersheds in western North America will experienceearlier spring peak flows (high confidence) and reduction in summer flow (medium
confidence); adaptive responses may offset some, but not all, of the impacts on water
resources and aquatic ecosystems (medium confidence)” (Synthesis Report p. 130).
Small Islands: “Islands with very limited water supplies are highly vulnerable to the impactsof climate change on the water balance (high confidence)” (Synthesis Report p. 130).

60

Food Production and Agriculture
Apart from the uncertainty of future climate changes, the impacts of climate change
on food production and agriculture depend on a range of factors. These include thevulnerability of agricultural activities, regions and populations to changes in climate
and the capacity of these systems to adapt to the changes. Where vulnerability is highand adaptive capacity low there is likely to be the highest sensitivity to climate
effects.
Relevant factors in determining the response of agricultural systems to climatechange include:•

Rate and magnitude of changes in temperature and extremes oftemperature. In the mid- latitudes increases in temperature, particularly
increases in minimum temperature, can raise crop production providing
water availability is not compromised. In the tropics crops are often close
to thermal optimums, thus reductions rather than increases in production
may result from increased temperatures.
Changes in precipitation amounts and seasonality, drought, ENSO andother extreme event frequency, intensity and duration. If increased
temperatures are accompanied by sufficiently increased precipitation,
given that rising temperatures lead to elevated evaporation rates, crop
yields may increase. Otherwise crop production may fall. Changes inextreme events are likely to influence crop production quite substantially(Mearns et al. 1997; Phillips et al. 1998; Rosenzweig et al. 2001) either
directly or through changes in pest abundance and prevalence. Few
attempts have been made to model extreme event effects on agricultural
production.
Effects of CO2 fertilization on crop and grass production and yield.
Increased CO2 may increase water use efficiency of crops but is also likely
to reduce the nutrient quality of the crops.
Socio-economic conditions of rural populations and their access tomarkets, technology and resources needed for adaptation or for theacquisition of replacement food resources. Typically, in poor regions it isexpected that farmers and those directly dependent on rural land activities
will be most vulnerable to climate change.

•••

Taken from the IPCC TAR Synthesis Report (TAR SYR), Table 7 summaries thefindings of the IPCC TAR and attempts to place temperature-warming bands on
impacts and effects. Other findings from the IPCC TAR, for which a temperature
increase may be associated with changes in agricultural production, include:•

Agriculture in mid- latitude countries is expected with medium confidence tobenefit for a warming of “a few degrees”98 (2.6- 3.6o C above 1861-189096 ).
Over 3-4o C warming, there is low to medium confidence in a general decline
in mid- latitude crop production along with quite pronounced drops inproduction elsewhere, leading to higher food prices (TAR SYR 4.2).

96

Unless otherwise noted temperature increases in this section will be cited with respect to the 18611890 average – see also Appendix I below.

61

Table 7 - Agricultural effects of climate change
Effect (change)
CO2 concentrationa

2025
405–460 ppm

2050

2100

445–640 ppm

540–970 ppm

Global mean temperature 0.4–1.1°Cchange from the year
1990b

0.8–2.6°C

1.4–5.8°C

Global mean temperature 1.0-1.7°Cchange from the years
1861-1890 (average) 97
Global mean sea-level
3–14 cmrise from the year 1990b

1.4-3.2°C

2.0-6.4°C

5–32 cm

9–88 cm

Agricultural Effectsc
Average crop yieldsg
Cereal crop yields increase in Mixed effects on cereal yields General reduction in cereal[WGII TAR Sections
many mid- and high-latitude in mid-latitude regions. More yields in most mid-latitude
5.3.6, 10.2.2, 11.2.2, 12.5, regions (low to medium
pronounced cereal yield
regions for warming of more
13.2.3, 14.2.2, & 15.2.3] confidenced).
decreases in tropical andthan a few 98 °C (low to
Cereal crop yields decrease in subtropical regions (low to
medium confidenced).
most tropical and subtropical medium confidenced).
regions (low to medium
confidenced).

Extreme low and highReduced frost damage totemperatures [WGII TAR some crops (highSection 5.3.3]
confidenced).
Increased heat stress damage
to some crops (highconfidenced).
Increased heat stress inlivestock (high confidenced).
Incomes and prices[WGII TAR Sections
5.3.5-6]

Effects of changes in extreme Effects of changes in extreme
temperatures amplified (high temperatures amplified (highconfidenced).
confidenced).

Incomes of poor farmers inFood prices increase relative
developing countries decrease to projections that exclude(low to medium confidenced). climate change (low to
medium confidenced).

No climate policy interventions. Source: Table 3-3 and references from IPCC TAR Synthesis Report with the addition of therow headed ‘Global mean temperature change from the years 1861-1890 (average)’. Summarized versions of the original notes
a-d associated with these tables appear below.99 Note g - these estimates are based on the sensitivity of the present agricultural
practices to climate change, allowing (in most cases) for adaptations based on shifting use of only existing technologies.

97

Using Folland et al. (2001) global temperature data set.
This term is not defined in Synthesis Report and nor is it defined in the Working Group II Report
Summary for Policy Makers. Chapter 19 of the WGII TAR does define a range – see Appendix I of
this report. In the Final Government Distribution of the Synthesis Report, which is the version uponwhich the final negotiated report is based and is prepared by the IPCC Lead Authors, “few” is definedas 2-3o C above 1990. The removal of this specific definition was initiated and insisted upon by Saudi
Arabia, amongst others, at the IPCC plenary where this report was adopted. Given this context “few”
will be interpreted here in the original sense of the lead authors of the report. In terms of the 18611890 reference period, adopted in this report as surrogate for pre-industrial temperatures 2-3oC above
1990 corresponds to an increase of 2.6-3.6oC.
99 a. The ranges for CO2 concentration are estimated for the six illustrative SRES scenarios, with theranges for minimum and maximum values estimated for the 35 SRES projections of greenhouse gas
emissions. See WGI TAR Section 3.7.3.
b. The reported ranges for global mean temperature change and global mean sea-level rise correspondto the minimum and maximum values estimated with a simple climate model for the 35 SRES
projections of greenhouse gas and SO2 emissions. See WGI TAR Sections 9.3.3 and 11.5.1.
98

62

•
•
•

•

•

•

•

•

In the tropics and some subtropical regions (mostly developing countries),
cereal crop yields are projected to drop with even minimal changes intemperature (TAR SYR Section 4.2).
With low to medium confidence, it is expected that income of poor farmers
will decline above a warming of 1.5-2o C.
Above around a 2.5-3o C warming, it is estimated, with low confidence, that
there will be a general increase in food prices. One study cited in the TAR(Parry et al. (1999) – see below) found prices to increase above around 1.6o C
in the 2020s, however results in this temperature range are generally mixed.
A review of the implications for rice production in Asia found that climatechange is likely to seriously threaten sustained food production, withtemperature increases above 2.6o C outweighing the positive effects of CO2
increases (WGII Chapter 11.2.2.1 (Lal et al. 2001)).
Australian crop yields were estimated to increase up to 1.6-2.6o C and thendecline with higher temperatures, with it being noted that drops in rainfall
caused rapid decreases in crop yield. It was reported that the most recent
scenarios show reductions in rainfall over much of Australia. In the case ofAustralia, global mean warming in the range of 2.3-2.6o C,100 has been
projected to results in crop yields changing in the range of –3% to +3%, but
significant areas in the west and the south would experience reductions. At
higher temperatures, 4.2o C in the 2080s, entire areas are projected to be out of
productio n, particularly in southwestern Australia (IPCC WGII TAR, Chapter
12 (Pittocket et al. 2001)).
In general, for a global warming of about 2o C European crop production is
expected to increase, with a few exceptions in the south of Portugal and Spainand in the Ukraine where decreases are estimated (IPCC WGII TAR, Chapter
13 (Kundzewicz et al. 2001)).
In the USA, it was estimated that agricultural welfare would increase up to
about 2o C and then decline at an increasing rate with the magnitude anddirection of changes in rainfall being a decisive factor (IPCC WGII TAR,
Chapter 15.2.3.1. (Cohen et al. 2001)).
Large drops in the yield of maize and sugarcane are projected for small island
countries for doubled CO2 conditions (IPCC WGII TAR, Chapter 17.2.8(Nurse et al. 2001)).

c. Summary statements about effects of climate change in the years 2025, 2050, and 2100 are inferredfrom IPCC Working Group II’s assessment of studies that investigate the impacts of scenarios otherthan the SRES projections, as studies that use the SRES projections have not been published yet.
Estimates of the impacts of climate change vary by region and are highly sensitive to estimates ofregional and seasonal patterns of temperature and precipitation changes, changes in the frequencies or
intensities of climate extremes and rates of change. Estimates of impacts are also highly sensitive toassumptions about characteristics of future societies and the extent and effectiveness of future
adaptations to climate change. As a consequence, summary statements about the impacts of climatechange in the years 2025, 2050, and 2100 must necessarily be general and qualitative. The statementsin the table are considered to be valid for a broad range of scenarios. Note, however, that few studies
have investigated the effects of climate changes that would accompany global temperature increases
near the upper end of the range reported for the year 2100.
d. Judgments of confidence use the following scale: very high (95% or greater), high (67–95%),
medium (33–67%), low (5–33%), and very low (5% or less). See WGII TAR Box 1-1.
100
SRES B2 and A1 scenarios; (Hulme and Sheard 1999).

63

More qualitatively a number of general conclusions were reached:••••

Climate change is likely to exacerbate degradation of land and water
resources.
Elevated CO2 combined with higher temperatures is likely to significantly
reduce the protein and nutrient content of important cereal crops and of
forage.
Increased pest outbreaks with significant negative impacts on crop production
seem likely for many crops and regions. Very few studies have included
changed pest activity under climate change.
Africa appears to be particularly at risk of increased hunger due to poverty
and intrinsic vulnerability to climate change.

To look at this picture more closely attention will be focused on the findings of two
recent global assessments. The first, published in 1999 by Parry and co-workers, wasassessed in the IPCC TAR and its results were also presented in a synthesis of a rangeof impacts by Parry et al. (2001). Using the methodology and models from this work
Arnell et al. (2002) compared the effects of an unmitigated emission scenario (IS92a)and concentration stabilization at 550 and 750 ppmv CO2 scenarios with the HadCM2
GCM on a number of sectors including agriculture. The second is the Global AgroEcological Assessment for Agriculture in the 21st Century (also known as the GAEZ
study) authored by Fischer et al. (2002) under the auspices of IIASA and the FAO. 101
This used a methodology built from a detailed bottom up, national level review ofagricultural systems and was driven by several GCMs, including ECHAM4 and
HadCM2.
Climate change and food security assessments
Several quantitative estimates of likely global impacts of climate change on foodsupply and the risk of hunger have been made over the last decade (Parry and Carter
1989; Rosenzweig and Parry 1994). In the 1994, study three early GCMs – the GISS,GFDL and UKMO models – were driven by an equilibrium CO2 scenario for an
increase of CO2 from 330 to 550 ppmv in 2060. As is usual in these studies
continued increases in crop yield and increase arable land availability were assumed.
The results were strongly dependent on whether or not a CO2 fertilization effect on
crop yield was included and on the assumed level of adaptation. Under the first levelof adaptation only small changes to the existing system were assumed. In this casethe number of additional people at risk of hunger increased by 10-60% (60-350
million extra people at risk). These estimates decreased significantly when thesecond level of adaptation was assumed, which represented in the words of theauthors, "a fairly optimistic assessment of the world's response to the changed
climatic conditions tested.”
Parry et al. (1999) used two of the latest generation of AOGCMs from the Hadley
Centre which were driven by the IPCC IS92a emissions scenario to produce timedependant projections of future climate (see Table 9 below for an outline of the basic
features of these scenarios of relevance here). Two kinds of adaptatio n were101

IIASA, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; FAO, Food and Agriculture
Organisation.

64

incorporated: farm level measures and economic adjustment effects. Geographically
explicit crop models were used covering over 70% of the world’s current wheat,maize and soybean production area, however less than half the rice growing regions
were included. The crop models were driven using the effects of increased CO2 andthe projected climate changes from the model scenarios. Caution was expressed inrelation to the assumed enhanced growth effects of CO2 on crops included in themodels, which the authors noted had not been verified in field conditions.
Consequently, there is a risk that the positive yield effects assumed were
overestimated (an issue also noted by Darwin and Kennedy (2000)).
Future increases in arable land were based on FAO data and did not account for theeffects of climate change, an issue discussed in detail by Ramankutty et al. (2002)).
The latter study finds that projected climate change is likely to increase the area ofarable land suitable for crop production overall, with increases principally located in
the Northern Hemisphere. However, the tropics (mainly Africa, northern SouthAmerica, Mexico and Central America and Oceania) are likely to experience small
reductions in suitable area. This general finding is confirmed in the IIASA study.
Ramankutty et al. (2002) also point out that much of the land, that is at present or
may become climatically suitable for agriculture in the future, is also under valuable
forest cover.
Figure 9 shows a comparison of the results of these scenarios for two different time
periods, the 2050s and 2080s (see explanation beneath figure), when temperatures are
expected to have exceeded 2o C by a significant margin. The HadCM3 model
produces more extreme results than the HadCM2 model, notably for large parts of theNorthern Hemisphere. Whereas crop yields increase in these regions by the 2050s
under some of the ensemble members 102 of the HadCM2 scenarios, under the
HadCM3 scenario, which is drier and warmer than the HadCM2 scenarios, large areas
in North America, Russia and eastern Europe experience reductions. By and large,
crop yields are down in developing countries, under both models, with HadCM3
showing the most severe changes. In the 2050s, HadCM2 indicates that India is theworst affected of the developing countries with reductions of the order of 5-10%,
whereas HadCM3 implies smaller damages in the range 0-2.5%. HadCM3 indicatesthat western Africa will experience the worst changes in the 2050s. By the 2080s,
HadCM3 indicates larger damages in India (2.5-5% losses) and large losses insouthern Africa. Figure 8 graphically demonstrates the range of effects projected by
the different models and demonstrates that in general the regions at risk of production
reductions are common to the two models, with the exception of North America.
However, the quantitative scale of the reductions varies significantly.
In interpreting the results of this study it is important to bear in mind the uncertainties
in this work. Apart from climate change itself, the question of whether and to what
extent the CO2 fertilization effect benefits production, the availability of irrigationwater, trends in demand and the range of adaptation possibilities are all significant(Parry et al. 1999). Nevertheless, the overall changes and reductions in some regionstranslate to additional people at risk of hunger, with increasing temperatures tending
to increase the number at risk (see Figure 10 below). Africa emerges from this study
102

Multiple runs of these complex models driven with the same emissions scenarios produce different
results due to the ‘natural’ variability in the model climate system.

65as a region particularly at risk from climate change under either of the models and has
the largest share of the additional people at risk of hunger (see Table 8 below).
Figure 8 - Regional Impacts on Crop Production

Source: Figure 7 of Parry et al. (1999: S65). Shaded boxes are the HadCM3 results and the lines are
the range of the HadCM2 ensemble results.
Table 8 - Risk of Hunger - Africa
Model

ImpactHadCM22080s temperature
increase above 18611890 average
3.4o C

HadCM33.3o C

Africa: 70 million more people at risk of hunger.
Globally: 125 million more at risk of hunger.

Africa: 55-65 million more people at risk of hunger.
Globally: 80 million more at risk of hunger.

Note: Compiled from data in Parry et al. (1999).

66

Figure 9 - Comparison of Potential Crop Yields Projections for 2050s and 2080s

Potential change in national cereal yields for the 2050s and 2080s, compared to 1990, for temperature
increases of around 2.4o C and 3.3-3.4o C respectively compared to 1861-1890 for the HadCM2 andHadCM3 scenarios. The HadCM2 scenarios are for an ensemble of four members and the HadCM3
for a single scenario. Source: Figure 5 of Parry et al. (1999: S61).

67

Whilst the Parry et al. (1999) assessment provides insight into the risks faced fromfuture climate change at different time periods into the future, it does not directly
enable a comparison of risks at different levels of warming at different time periods inthe future. Subsequent work by Parry et al. (2001) analysed projected effects at
different temperature levels for the 2050s and 2080s. Known widely as the “Millions
at Risk” paper, it provides a meta-analysis of several impact areas and enables somerough estimates to be made of impacts at different levels of warming at different
times in the future. Perhaps most significantly, it also illustrates some of the
dynamics of changing vulnerability over time and the interaction of this withprojected climate changes. Levels of adaptive capacity are assumed to vary withtime, with rising economic wealth being associated with higher levels of adaptive
ability and greater resilience to climate change. One of the main drawbacks with thiswork, however, is that it is based essentially on one AOGCM, the HadCM2 model.
Where possible, results from other models will be compared with the effects of the
HadCM2 projections in order to at least provide a feel for the uncertainties involved.
For the food security issue, the data embodied in Figure 11 (based on the HadCM2
model climate projection) was used to estimate the levels of additional risk of hunger
at warming of 1o C, 2o C, 2.5o C and 3o C, which are tabulated in the third column ofTable 10. 103 For the 2050s, warming of 1-2.5o C is estimated to produce an additional
hunger risk of 4-7 million (this can be compared with the HadCM3 based estimate ofclose to 40 million people for around a 2.4o C increase in 2050). Under the HadCM2
scenario, increasing temperatures in this time period are not projected to change thenumber at risk dramatically, as climate change is not projected to affect prices
significantly in the 2050s. During this period, production in North America still
increases (Parry et al. 1999). Over the following 30 years, there is an increase by afactor of 5-7 in the number at risk, as can be seen from the rapidly rising curve forhunger on the right hand side of Figure 11. At the maximum of the temperature scale
for the 2080s, around 3.4-3.5o C warming, the total number at risk of hunger are in therange 75-100 millions. The HadCM3 projections are higher for this period, on theorder of 125 million (see Figure 10). This reflects an increasing sensitivity to climatechange during this period and an increased population in vulnerable regions.

103

For convenience, the results of the other impact areas assessed – health, flooding and water shortage arepresented in the graph. However only the water shortage issue is discussed, as the other issues are beyond thescope of the present paper.

68Figure 10 - Global Risk of Hunger

Source: Figure 6 (c) of Parry et al. (1999: S64). Shaded boxes are the HadCM3 results and the lines
are the range of the HadCM2 ensemble results.

Figure 11 - Millions at Risk in 2050s and 2080s: Hunger, Malaria, Water Shortage and FloodingThis graph shows the estimated millions at risk associated with global mean warming levels above the
1961-1990 average based on the studies describe in Parry et al. (2001) which were driven by anensemble of scenarios from the HadCM2 model. An error band of one standard deviation around themean is shown, with the solid lines indicating model results and the dotted lines being inferred fromthese results. Source: This figure is a version of Figure 1 of Parry et al. (2001) taken from the web
document “Defining critical climate change threats and targets: Discussion of the figures from Global
Environment Change 11:3(2001):1-3” by the same authors, downloaded from www.jei.uea.ac.uk,
February 2002, Jackson Environment Institute, School of Environmental Sciences University of East
Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ United Kingdom.

69

Table 9 - Summary of Scenarios used in Global Food Security Assessment
Summary of scenarios

1961-90

HadCM2Temperature change (o C)
Temperature change wrt
1861-1890
Precipitation change (%)
Sea-level rise (cm)
CO2 (ppmv)

2020s

2050s

2080s

0
0.3

1.2
1.5

2.1
2.4

3.1
3.4

0
0
334

1.6
12
441

2.9
25
565

4.5
41
731

HadCM3Temperature change (o C)
0
1.1
2.1
3.0
Temperature change wrt
0.3
1.4
2.4
3.3
1861-1890
Precipitation change (%)
0
1.3
2.4
3.2
Sea-level rise (cm)
0
12
24
40
CO2 (ppmv
334
433
527
642
Source: Based on Table 1 of Hulme et al. (1999a) describing scenarios with the HadCM2 andHadCM3 model driven by the IS92a scenario with no aerosol forcing and used by Parry et al. (1999).
The offset from 1961-1990 temperatures to 1861-1890 is with the Folland et al. (2001) global
temperature data set.
Table 10 - Millions at Risk
2050s
Temperaturein 2050s above 1861-1890(above 1961-1990)
1o C (0.7o C)
2o C (1.7o C)
2.5o C (2.2o C)

Malaria

Hunger

163
224
227

Water shortage Coastal flooding

4
7
7

1228
2358
2675

12
26
32

2080s
Temperature in 2080s above
1861-1890(1961-1990)
1o C (0.7o C)
1.5o C (1.2o C)
2o C (1.7o C)
2.5o C (2.2o C)
3o C (2.7o C)
3.4o C (3.1o C)

Malaria

Hunger

101
165
212
250
277
291

Water shortage Coastal flooding

10
21
33
49
67
84

149
562
2427
3117
3245
3473

1
8
19
36
57
79

Data estimated from figures in Parry, et al. (2001) using data-extractor software. Temperatures inparentheses are relative to 1990, the temperature base year used by Parry et al. (2001). These figures
should be treated as indicative only, as they are based on visual interpolation using a graphical data
digitising programme.

70

Global Agro-Ecological Assessment (GAEZ Study)
The IIASA/FAO assessment of agriculture over the next century (Fischer et al. 2001)
produced qualitatively similar results to that of the Parry et al. (1999) assessment.
Taking into account land suitability, population growth and other factors and aclimate change scenario that brings around a 3o C warming in the 2080s, developing
countries as a group suffer production losses. A large group of about 40 developing
countries with a current population of 2 billion people, including around 450 million
undernourished inhabitants, is projected to lose substantially, whilst about half thedeveloping country group gain. Details of the projections for the group of developing
countries experiencing malnourishment problems are found in Table 11. The 78
countries presently at some level of risk are divided into three groups.
Under the ECHAM4 climate scenario (see Table 12), a 3o C warming by the 2080s
results in projected declines in cereal production, although at a world average level
the volume of production is estimated to be sufficient to meet future needs.
Developed countries as a whole are projected to experience a small loss in rain- fed
cereal production. Within this picture 17 countries gain, though only two countries,
Russia and Canada, enjoy 90% of the gain. The majority encompassing 60% of the
population of the developed country group, including Belgium, the Czech Republic,
France, Hungary, Romania, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the
USA are projected to lose under this scenario (Fischer et al. 2001).
Table 11 - Malnourished Country Group and Climate ChangeGroup

Population

Proportion of
population
undernourished

Number ofcountries in groupI
5-20%
undernourished

2.1 billion

12%28
Includes China

II
20-35%
undernourished

1.5 billion

25%

III
More than 35%
undernourished

440 million

50%

27
Includes India with
60% of theundernourished
23
Most sub-SaharanAfrican countries

Number ofcountries
negatively
affected
11

19 with over
80% ofundernourished10

Impact-10% decreasein cereal
production.
China gains
Food deficit
doubled

Decrease inproduction
6 gainsubstantially

Compiled from Fischer et al. (2001: 27).

Within the developing country group, 65 countries are projected to experience
production losses valued at US$56 billion in 1995 terms. These losses equate to 16%of the agricultural GDP of these countrie s (Fischer et al. 2001: 26). Africa appears tobe the biggest loser in these scenarios, with 29 countries projected to suffer
production losses. Kenya and South Africa are, however, projected to gain
substantially from climate change. In Asia, China gains substantially whilst India
loses (Fischer et al. 2001: 27). Overall Fischer et al. (2001) identify 40 “losing
countries” with a total population close to 2 billion and an undernourished group of
about 450 million. In these countries the gap between food production and supply is

71

projected to double under climate change, “drastically” increasing the number
suffering from under nourishment (Fischer et al. 2001: 28).
A cross comparison of the projected effects of different climate changes projected by
the ECHAM4, HadCM2 and the CGCM1 models (Carter et al. 2001) is shown in
Table 15. It is clear that there is a wide range of results, with ECHAM4 projecting
losses at the lower end of the other two model estimates. For the developing
countries as a group ECHAM4 projects a potential cereal production increase of 23
million tons per year affecting 3.7 billion people. The other two models project
losses in the range of 63 to 226 million tonnes per year, affecting 3.3 to 5.5 billion
people respectively.
Table 12 - Global Mean Temperature increase for ECHAM4 Scenarios
ECHAM42020s
C above
1861-1890

2050s
C above
1861-1890o

Greenhouse gas only
Greenhouse gases plus aerosols

2080s
C above
1861-1890

o

1.5
1.3

o

2.5
1.7

3.0
NA

Note: Estimated with data from the IPCC DDC web site104 for the ECHAM 4 scenarios for increases
with respect to 1961-1990 average and converted to the 1861-1890 reference period using the observed
increase in global mean temperature from this period to 1961-1990 (Folland et al. 2001), an offset ofabout 0.3o C. The scenario with aerosols was used only for the 2020s and not for other time periods in
the GAEZ study.

Table 13 - Developing Country Changes in Rain Fed Cereal Production Potential 2080s for
Three Climate Models
ClimateModel
ECHAM4
HADCM2CGCM1

Number of countries
Ga
40
52
25

N
34
27
26

L
43
38
66

Projected population
2080 (billions)
G
N
L
3.1
0.9
3.7
3.2
1.2
3.3
1.1
1.1
5.5

Change in cereal production
potential (million tons)
G
N L
Total
142
–2 –117
23
207
3
–273
–63
39
3
–268
–226

Notes: a. G = countries gaining +5% or more; N = small change of –5 to +5%; L = countries losing –5% or more. This tables shows the number of developing countries projected to experience gains, nochange or losses in cereal production potential on current cultivated land and potentially cultivatableland in the 2080s. Source: Table 5.28, Fischer et al. (2002: 105). ECHAM 4 refers to the AOGCM of
the Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, HadCM2 to that for the Hadley Centre in the UK and
CGCM1 to that of the Canadian Climate Modelling Centre.

Discussion and Summary
It seems very likely that the pattern of some regions and countries gaining and others
losing is a robust feature of the impacts of climate change over the next century.
Many studies indicate that developing countries are likely to lose as a whole, relative
to the developed nations. India is projected to experience significant losses, withquite large areas of current cropland losing significant productivity.
Few estimates have been made of the overall macroeconomic consequences ofprojected agricultural effects of climate change for developing countries. In many104

http://ipcc-ddc.cru.uea.ac.uk/asres/scenario_home.html.

72

countries of Africa and Asia, the agricultural sector represents a large share of theeconomic activity. This share is projected to remain large over the next fifty years or
so, thus grounds for concern exist about the possible impacts of macroeconomic
shocks from climate change on vulnerable countries. One of the few computable
general equilibrium assessments published, projected large, even “violent changes inthe economic and social structure,” as a consequence of climate shocks (Winters et al.
1998: 16). Though the basis for the study was the old GCM scenario results of
Rosenzweig and Parry (1994), it does point to some major and apparently underexamined risks, particularly for African countries.
Within countries there will be regions that gain substantially and regions that lose.
The results of the GAEZ study provide an insight into this issue. Figure 12 shows therelative change in productivity of cereal cropping regions for the ECHAM4 scenario
in the 2080s (3o C) for developed and developing countries. The specific examples ofIndia, China, the USA and Russia are also given as an illustration of these twogroups.
For the developed countries, it can be seen that whilst gains outweigh losses theregions in which losses occur represent a large fraction of the total current crop area.
Although the area negatively impacted in Russia is small (the Russian case isdiscussed further below). Developed countries will not be immune to large effects ofclimate change on their agricultural sectors. As the example of Australia, cited above,
indicates, warming of the order of 4o C is likely to put entire regions out of
production, with lesser levels of warming causing substantial declines in the west andthe south.

73

Figure 12 - Gains and Losses in Production Potential under Climate Change

Gains and losses in cereal crop productivity in current cultivated areas under the ECHAM4 model inthe 2080s. Source: Figure 5.4 of GAEZ study (Fischer et al. 2002: 70).

From the point of interpreting these assessments in relation to Article 2, it seems thatthe following points might be made:•Warming of around 1o C produces relatively small damages when measured
from the point of increased risk of hunger and/or under nourishment (around
10 million more at risk) over the next century. In this temperature range
nearly all developed countries are projected to benefit, whilst many
developing countries in the tropics are estimated to experience small but
significant crop yield growth declines relative to an unchanged climate.

•At all levels of warming, a large group of the poor, highly vulnerable
developing countries is expected to suffer increasing food deficits. It is
anticipated that this will lead to higher levels of food insecurity and hunger inthese countries.

•

Under the Parry et al. (2001) analysis moving from 1o C to 2o C warming
triples the number of people at risk of hunger in the 2080s.

•

A 2o C warming and above, is associated with increasing risk. Under the Parryet al. (2001) analysis, this risk increases 4-5 fold from the 2050s to the 2080s(for the same temperature). In this temperature range many developed
countries may still gain, although warning signs in the literature caution that
this may not be robust for all regions or even in aggregate terms. It appears
that agricultural production in developed countries is finely balanced in this74

temperature range between the effects of increased temperature and changes
in precipitation. The effects are very sensitive to the precipitation scenarios,
which vary considerably between the GCMs. Parry et al. (1999) call attention
to the effect of the HadCM3 scenarios, which are ‘drier’ than HadCM2 inmany regions and which indicate production losses in North America, Russia
and Eastern Europe.
•

Two recent papers illustrate the uncertainty in this area, which is critical to theglobal food balance. Alcamo et al. (2003) find that, in relation to climate
impacts on Russia, uncertainty exists as to whether agricultural production
would increase. This is contrary to previous published estimates. For a global
mean temperature increase of 1.3-1.5o C their crop production estimates range
from a 9% reduction to a 12% gain. A new assessment was done for US
agriculture by Reilly et al. (2003). It found a more positive aggregate
response to future climate warming than previous estimates, even with very
high warming levels in 2100. As with most such work, the effects of pests
and of extreme events do not appear to have been evaluated and both models
used in the Reilly et al. (2003) work are relatively ‘wet’ for North America
compared to others.

•

For a 2.5o C warming by the 2080s, the Parry et al. (1999) analysis indicates45-55 million extra people at risk of hunger. The number at risk rises very
rapidly with increasing temperature.

•

With 3o C warming by the 2080s, the GAEZ study projects that a very large
number of people, 3.3-5.5 billion, will be living in countries or regions
expected to experience large losses in crop production potential. Results hold
across a range of climate models. The Parry et al. (2001) work places thenumber at risk in this temperature range on the order 65-75 million.

•

For a 3-4o C warming, the upper end of the Parry et al. (2001) analysis, theadditional number at risk are in the range 80-90 million for the HadCM2
scenario and of the order of 125 million under the HadCM3 scenario.

•

Global assessments with a full range of the most recent coupled AOGCMs
have yet to be published and there appear to be no recent transient scenarios
used at the global level to assess warming above 3-3.5o C warming. There arefew studies at the global level that have included an estimation of the effect ofchanges in extreme events or El Niño frequency or intensity (Rosenzweig etal. 2001).
Water Resources

The impacts of projected climate change on water resources appear to be significant,with the general picture from the TAR being that existing water stressed regions arelikely to be more stressed in the future as a consequence of climate change. As
previously done, the summary table from the TAR Synthesis Report is reproduced
below (Table 14) and indicates a wide range of effects. The focus here is on water
stress, as this is a key impact projected to affect large numbers of people in the future.
In addition, threshold behaviour is projected as a consequence of the interplay
between climate change effects, socio-economic trends and limits to adaptation
capacity (Arnell 2000; Jones 2000). From Table 14 it can be seen that for many75

water-distressed regions global mean temperature increases above around 1.5o C leadto decreases in water supply.
Based on the “Millions at Risk” paper of Parry et al. (2001) and that of Arnell et al.
(2002), which use different stabilization levels, a short analysis of the relationshipbetween increases in global mean temperature and the risk of water shortage is done.
Table 15, from Arnell et al. (2002), summarizes the risks of water shortage for
unmitigated emissions, and stabilization at 550 and 750 ppmv CO2 for three different
time period – 2020s, 2050s and 2080s – with the associated increase in global mean
temperature above 1861-1990.105 One of the main messages from this is that after the
2020s the number at risk rises rapidly with temperature and that reduction of theincrease in temperature, at lower stabilization levels reduces the risk substantially.
One of the very interesting aspects of the result of the Parry et al. (2001) analysis is
the way in which risk changes with the projection period. The shape of thetemperature response curves in the 2050s is quite different from that in the 2080s.
Risk rises rapidly with any temperature increase in the 2050s, whilst in the 2080s, risk
initially rises quite slowly (Figure 11). A 1o C increase in the 2050s is associated with
an impact almost ten times larger than in the 2080s, whereas the level of risk arecomparable in both periods for a 2o C or higher warming (see Table 10). As
temperature increases in the 2080s period from around 1.0o C above 1861-1990106 toaround 2o C, the number at risk increases about five fold. One of the major reasonsfor this is the increased water scarcity problem for major mega-cities in Asia
estimated for this time period. Table 15 can also be cross-compared with Table 10
and with Figure 11 from the “Millions at Risk” paper of Parry et al. (2001), with thisfigure clearly showing a threshold of major increase in risk in the 2080s.
Discussion and Summary
There are several points that should be mentioned and considered when viewing theresults of these assessments. Firstly, the number of people living in water stressedcountries, defined as those using more than 20% of their available resources, is
expected to increase substantially over the next decades irrespective of climatechange. Particularly in the next few decades population and other pressures are likely
to outweigh the effects of climate change (see, for example, the discussion ofVorosmarty et al. (2000) for the period to 2025), although some regions may be badly
affected during this period (see, for example, the analysis for China for 2030 by
Aiwen (2000)). In the longer term, however, climate change becomes much more
important. Secondly, exacerbating factors such as the link between land degradation,
climate change and water availability are in general not yet accounted for in the105

The stabilization scenarios are those of Mitchell et al. (2000) with the estimated scenario
temperatures for the three periods concerned tabulated in Table 16. Note that in the paper of Arnell etal. (2002) these scenarios are reproduced in Figure 3, however the figure caption may be in error
where it states that the temperature increase is with respect to 1990. Examination of the Mitchell et al.
(2000) paper indicates that the increases in Figure 3 of Arnell et al. (2002) are with respect to the
1961-1990 mean, a difference of about 0.3o C. In relation to water shortage such a difference in the
2080s corresponds to large changes in affected populations. For example, at 1.5o C warming (above
1861-1990) the number at risk is around 600 million. At 1.8o C warming this number increases toaround 1,500 million.
106
Note the base period of temperatures for the graph is 1961-1990 and that the offset to 1861-1990 isaround 0.3o C based on Folland et al. (2001).

76

global assessments. Available studies on this issue indicate substantial negative
effects for Africa (Feddema 1998; Feddema 1999; Feddema and Freire 2001).
Thirdly, one should be aware that regional impacts in arid and semi- arid areas arelikely to be much larger, relatively, than the aggregate estimates of global
assessments may imply (see for example Ragab and Prudhomme (2002)). Finally, in
relation to the results described, it must be borne in mind that the HadCM2 scenarios,
the primary scenarios used in the Arnell et al. (2002) and Parry et al. (2001) work,
generate much larger impacts in the 2050s than other comparable models (see Table
4-6 of section 4.5.2 of Chapter 4 of the WGII TAR: 413). Hence, although the shapeof the damage functions to be seen in Figure 11 might be correct, the scale ofnumbers at risk could be significantly lower.
Interpreting the results discussed above from the point of view of Article 2 may imply
the following:
•

•

•

•

•

1o C of warming or below may still yield high levels of additional risk,
particularly in the period to the 2020s and 2050s, with this risk decreasing due
to the increased economic wealth and higher adaptive capacity projected forthe coming century. For the 2020s, most of the current GCMs imply a levelof risk of additional number of people in water shortage regions in the range
400-800 million for around a 1o C warming. 107
1.5o C of warming produces quite different but nevertheless substantial levelsof risk in the different time periods under the Parry et al. (2001) analysis, witha peak in the 2050s at over 1,500 million, declining to around 500 million in
the 2080s.
A major threshold change in risk occurs in the Parry et al. (2001) analysis in
moving from 1.5o C to 2-2.5o C, with the numbers rising from close to 600
million to between 2.4-3.1 billion. As explained earlier, this is driven by thewater demand of megacities in Indian and China in their model.
2o C warming and above produces consistently very high levels of additionalrisk at all time periods under the HadCM2 scenarios. The range of risk for thecurrent array of models in the 2050s is in the range 662 million to around 3
billion.
Above 2.5o C warming the level of risk begins to saturate in the range of 3.13.5 billion additional persons at risk.

Clearly one of the major future risks identified in the Parry et al. (2001) andArnell et al. (1999; 2002) work is that of increased water demand from megacities in India and China in the 2080s. It is not clear whether or to what extent
additional water resource options would be available for these cities and hence, towhat extent this finding is robust. If such a thresho ld does exist in reality then its
resolution, absent a reduction in warming, may have broad implications forenvironmental flows of water in major rivers of China, India and Tibet should themega-cities of India and China seek large scale diversion and impoundments offlows in the region.

107

See Table 4.6 of the WGII TAR Chapter 4: 213.

77

Table 14 - Water resource effects of climate change
Effect2025
CO2 concentrationa
405–460 ppm
Global mean temperature 0.4–1.1°Cchange from the year
1990b
Global mean temperature 1.0-1.7°Cchange from the years
1861-1890 (average)5Global mean sea-level
3–14 cmrise from the year 1990b
Water Resource Effectsc
Water supply [WGIIPeak river flow shifts fromTAR Sections 4.3.6 &spring toward winter in
4.5.2]
basins where snowfall is an
important source of water(high confidenced).
Water quality [WGIITAR Section 4.3.10]

Water demand [WGIITAR Section 4.4.3]

Extreme events [WGITAR SPM; WGII TAR
SPM]

2050
445–640 ppm
0.8–2.6°C

2100
540–970 ppm
1.4–5.8°C

1.4-3.2°C

2.0-6.4°C

5–32 cm

9–88 cm

Water supply decreased in Water supply effects
many water-stressed
amplified (highcountries, increased in some confidenced).
other water- stressedcountries (highconfidenced).

Water quality degraded by Water quality degraded byhigher temperatures. Water higher temperatures (highquality changes modified by confidenced).
changes in water flow
Water quality changes
volume. Increase inmodified by changes insaltwater intrusion into
water flow volume (highcoastal aquifers due to sea- confidenced).
level rise (medium
confidenced).
Water demand for irrigation Water demand effects
will respond to changes in amplified (highclimate; higher temperatures confidenced).
will tend to increase demand(high confidenced).

Water quality effects
amplified (highconfidenced).

Increased flood damage due Further increase in flood
to more intense precipitation damage (high confidenced).
events (high confidenced). Further increase in drought
Increased drought frequency events and their impacts.
(high confidenced).

Flood damage several-foldhigher than “no climatechange scenarios.”

Water demand effects
amplified (highconfidenced).

No climate policy interventions. Note: Refer to notes a-d accompanying Table 7 above. Source: Table 3.4of IPCC TAR SYR: 72.

Table 15 - Population with Potential Increase in Water StressYear No climate Unmitigated Temperatureorchange aemissionsabove
period (Millions) (Millions) 1861-1890

S750

Temperature
above(Millions) 1861-1890

S550(Millions)Temperatureabove
1861-1890

1990 1710
0.6o C
0.6o C
0.6o Co2020s 5022
338–623
1.2 C
242
1.0°C
175
0.8o Coo2050s 5914
2209–3195 2.2 C
2108
1.5 C
1705
1.2o Coo
2080s 6405
2831–3436 3.2 C
2925
2.0 C
762
1.5o C
Source: Table II of Arnell et al. (2002): 424 with scenario temperatures added (see Table 16).
a
Number of people in countries using more than 20% of their resources. Increase in stress means areduction in resource availability by more than 10%. The range in estimates for the unmitigatedscenario reflects the range between the four ensemble partners.

78

Table 16 - Scenario Temperatures
Scenario

2020s
o
C
above
1861-1890 average

2050s
o
C
above
1861-1890
average

2080s
o
C
above
1861-1890
average

IS92a
S750
S550

1.2
1.0
0.8

2.2
1.5
1.2

3.2
2.0
1.5

Note: Estimated temperatures for the IS92a, stabilization at 550 and 750 ppmv CO2 scenarios from
HadCM2 model Mitchell et al. (2000) used in the study by Arnell et al. (2002). See footnote 105.

Socio-economic damages
Owing to the large range of results in the literature, as well methodological issues
such as accounting for risk aversion and distributional issues, the IPCC TAR found it
difficult to reach very firm conclusions on the quantitative estimation of the socioeconomic damages of climate change.
Table 17 reproduces the relevant summary table from the IPCC TAR SYR. Some of
the key, heavily negotiated, agreed 108 conclusions are repeated verbatim below:109“The effects of climate change are expected to be greatest in developing countries interms of loss of life and relative effects on investment and the economy. For
example, the relative percentage damages to GDP from climate extremes have been
substantially greater in developing countries than in developed countries.” (WGIITAR SPM Section 2.8)
“More people are projected to be harmed than benefited by climate change, even for
global mean temperature increases of less than a few degrees (low confidence).”“Notwithstanding the limitations expressed above, based on a few publishedestimates, increases in global mean temperatures would produce net economic losses
in many developing countries for all magnitudes of warming studied (lowconfidence), and losses would be greater in magnitude the higher the level ofwarming (medium confidence).”“In contrast an increase in global mean temperature of up to a few degrees Celsius
would produce a mixture of economic gains and losses in developed countries (lowconfidence), with economic losses for larger temperature increases (medium
confidence).”
110

108

The texts of Summaries for Policy Makers are negotiated line by line by Governments and, in effect, usually reflect a
consensus between different governmental views and those of the IPCC Convening Lead Authors present. It has rarely
happened that the IPCC Chair has permitted a conclusion to be changed by governments to the extent that CLAs present can nolonger associate themselves with it. More commonly contested conclusions are reduced in specificity, generalized or plain‘watered down’ under pressure from governments who disagree with the drafts prepared by the lead authors and reviewed threetimes by governments and experts. In the case of the conclusions cited here some governments vigorously contested the drafts
prepared by the Lead Authors. After lengthy negotiations the final text is different from that proposed by the Lead Authors, withthe final emphasis on the mixture of economic losses and gains reflecting a feeling that presenting net aggregate figures was
misleading as it did not say who would benefit and who would lose. From the studies cited, it was clear than even for low levelsof warming there were developed countries that would suffer net losses and within countries significant sectors would lose
whilst others gained.
109
Quotes are from the TAR SYR unless noted otherwise.
110
The proposed text from the lead authors originally attempted to include temperatures in this statement, however as noted
earlier such references were deleted. Originally the text said: “In many developed countries, net economic gains are projected
for global mean temperature increases up to roughly 2o C (medium confidence). Mixed or neutral net effects are projected in

79

“The projected distribution of economic impacts is such that it would increase thedisparity in well-being between developed countries and developing countries, withdisparity growing for higher projected temperature increases (medium confidence).
The more damaging impacts estimated for developing countries reflects, in part theirlesser adaptive capacity relative to developed countries [7.2.3]” (WGII TAR SPM
Section 2.8).

Chapter 19 of IPCC TAR WGII has a very useful discussion on the estimation of
economic damages and benefits to which the reader is referred, 111 some of the key
points are:
•
•
•
•
•

Impact estimates are highly sensitive to inequity aversion or risk aversion
assumptions, with the greater the aversion to risk or inequity the higher theestimated damage costs (see, for example, Tol (2001)).
Current market estimates of damage are lower than in the Second Assessment
Report due to the inclusions of better adaptation estimates.
Non-market damages are likely to be quite high.
Global aggregate estimates are very sensitive to the weights given to different
regions (see, for example, the discussions in Fankhauser and Tol (1997; 1998)
and Azar (1999)).
The shape of the climate damage function in relation to future temperaturechange is quite uncertain. Whether or not the damages from climate change
rise rapidly or slowly with increasing temperature is a quite fundamental
concern for policy.

Figure 13 below (reproduced from IPCC WGII TAR Chapter 19) shows a range of
estimates for global aggregate damages and gives an impression of the uncertainty
and divergence in global aggregate damage estimates. The curve of Mendelsohn etal. (2000) is essentially flat up to a global mean warming of 6o C warming, which isquite interesting given that this a change in magnitude the same as, but 60-120 times
faster than, the transition from a full glacial to interglacial climate. Tol’s curves showquite different shapes depending on the equity assumptions underlying the global
aggregation of regional damage estimates (Tol 2002). Equity weighted estimatesalmost completely eliminate the substantial benefits for a warming in the range of 13o C, with net damages above about 1.5o C warming and a roughly linear increase indamages thereafter. The Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) curves are quite non-linear andshow steepening damages as temperature rises.
Another way to look at this issue is with respect to the question of what are the rangesof temperature associated with reductions in world GDP. From the examination of
the Nordhaus and Tol model outcomes (depicted in Figure 13), it is estimated that a
1% reduction may occur within a 2.5-3.6o C warming or possibly never, a 2%
reduction for temperatures between 3.2-6.5o C or possibly never and a 5% reduction
for temperature increases between 4.6-5.6o C.

developed countries for temperature increases in the approximate range of 2 to 3o C, and net losses for larger temperature
increases (medium confidence).” Whilst the confidence interval placed on the first conclusion was changed after referral back to
the original literature, the temperature references were changed only to reflect the decision described in footnote 98.
111
See IPCC TAR WGII Chapter 19: 941-5.

80

The pattern of regional impacts seems to have greater consistency than the global
aggregates. Most of these studies show that Africa and India lose significantly from asmall warming. Tol (2002) estimates an African loss of about 4% of GDP for a 1o C
warming (over 1990) and about a 1.7% loss for India. 112 Similarly Nordhaus andBoyer (2000) indicate substantial losses (4-5%) for their benchmark warming of
2.5o C (inferred to be above 1900). In one out of two broad scenarios, Mendelsohn etal. (2000) estimate smaller losses for a 2o C warming (0.25-0.5%) for India, and in therange 0.5-1% loss, or greater for much of Africa. Their other scenarios find benefits
in most places. It is worth noting that under their model, the very large benefits to
Russian agriculture computed for a 2o C warming tend to be decisive in determining
the global aggregate effects at this level of warming.
Finally, it appears that very few analyses have been conducted across the full range of
uncertainties in the parameters and assumptions underlying model based estimates ofclimate damages and benefits. Recently Tol (2003) exp lored this issue, publishing aMonte Carlo simulation for his FUND model, which was used to compute the damage
curve described above. He found a non- zero probability of very negative effects insome regions. It is worth repeating some of his own discussion, coming, as it does,from one of the more prominent modellers in this area:“Suppose that climate change is worse than expected. Suppose that the impacts ofclimate change are worse than expected. Suppose that a lot of money needs to be
spent on building sea walls and curing malaria. Suppose that agricultural yields are
disappointing and storms and floods damage roads and houses. In a fragile
economy, this means that economic growth is halted. It means that investment andpast savings are diverted from enhancing productivity and preventing further
havoc to restoring damage. It means that the economy grows more fragile. Itmeans that climate change can do even more damage, making the economy yet
more fragile” (281).
“Can climate change cause a poverty trap? Recurring natural disasters candefinitely contribute to poverty trap … Estimates of the impact of climate changesuggest that they can be worth a couple of percent of GDP, particularly in poor
regions. Climate change seems likely to cause poverty traps in some places, andwith some non- negligible change at a regional scale” (281).
Discussion and Summary
From the point of view of Article 2 and its interpretation, it seems that the tentative
conclusions one might draw from the above would include:
•

•

112

For a 1o C warming a significant number of developing countries appear likely
to experience net losses, which range as high as a few % of GDP, whilst mostdeveloped countries are likely to experience a mix of damages and benefits,with net benefits predicted by a number of models.
For a 2o C warming the net adverse effects projected for developing countries
appear to be more consistent and of the order of a few to several percentage
points of GDP depending upon the model. Regional damages for someSee Table VII of Tol (2002).

81•developing countries and regions, particularly in Africa, may exceed several
percentage points of GDP.
Above 2o C the likelihood of global net damages increases but at a rate that isquite uncertain. Apart from the results of Mendelsohn et al (2000), the effects
on several developing regions in the literature appear to be in the range of 35% for a 2.5-3o C warming, if there are no adverse climate surprises. Global
damage estimates are in the range of 1-2% for 2.5-3o C warming, with someestimates increasing substantially with increasing temperature. If major
identified risks such as thermohaline shutdown or non- linear feedbacks in the
carbon cycle eventuate, then the damages could be very high. Regionally,
there is very little evidence that the pattern of increasing damages to many
developing countries would reverse and most indicates a continuing increasein net damages. Africa seems to be consistently amongst the regions withhigh to very high projected damages.

82

Table 17 - Other market sector effects of climate change
Effects

2025

2050

2100

CO2 concentrationa
405–460 ppm
Global mean temperature
0.4–1.1°Cchange from the year 1990b

445–640 ppm
0.8–2.6°C

540–970 ppm
1.4–5.8°C

Global mean temperature
1.0-1.7°Cchange from the years 18615
1890 (average)

1.4-3.2°C

2.0-6.4°C

Global mean sea-level risefrom the year 1990b

5–32 cm

9–88 cm

3–14 cm

Other Market Sector
Effects c
Energy [WGII TAR Section Decreased energy
Energy demand effects
7.3]
demand for heating
amplified (highbuildings (highconfidenced ).
dconfidence ).
Increased energy demandfor cooling buildings(high confidenced ).
Financial sector [WGII
Increased insurance
TAR´Section 8.3]
prices and reduced
insurance availability(high confidenced ).
e
Aggregate market effects
Net market sector losses Losses in developing[WGII TAR Sections 19.4- in many developing
countries amplified
5]
countries (low(medium confidenced ).
dconfidence ).
Gains diminished and
Mixture of market gains losses amplified inand losses in developed developed countries
countries (low(medium confidenced ).
dconfidence ).

Energy demand effects
amplified (highconfidenced ).

Effects on financial
sector amplified.

Losses in developing
countries amplified(medium confidenced ).
Net market sector
losses in developed
countries from warmingof more than a few °C(medium confidenced ).

No climate policy interventions. Refer to footnotes a-d accompanying Table 7 and footnote e. Aggregate market
effects represent the net effects of estimated economic gains and losses summed across market sectors such as
agriculture, commercial forestry, energy, water, and construction. The estimates generally exclude the effects ofchanges in variability and extremes, do not account for the effects of different rates of change, and only partiallyaccount for impacts on and services that are not traded in markets. These omissions are likely to result inunderestimates of economic losses and overestimates of economic gains. Estimates of aggregate impacts arecontroversial because they treat gains for some as cancelling losses for others and because the weights that areused to aggregate across individuals are necessarily subjective. Source: Table 3-5 of IPCC TAR SYR: 74.

83

Figure 13 - Climate Damages or Benefits as a Function of Temperature

Note: This figure is drawn from figure 19-4 IPCC WGII TAR Chapter 19 and shows several examplesof aggregated global monetary damage functions as a percentage of world GDP from three prominent
economists. ‘Output’, ‘population’ and ‘equity’ refer to the weightings used in making the aggregate
assessments. See text for references. Note that temperature increase is with respect to 1990. One
needs to add 0.6o C to convert to an estimate of increases above 1861-1890.

4. Summary and Conclusions
The results of the foregoing analysis are difficult to synthesize into a simple picture
without losing many of the caveats and qualifications required. Nevertheless anattempt will be made here but the reader is urged to also examine the underlying
arguments in the preceding sections. The summary here will focus on conclusions
that can be drawn in relation to projected impacts at different levels of global mean
temperature increase above 1861-1890, which is here used as the proxy for the preindustrial climate. Bear in mind that there has been a global mean warming of around
0.6oC since that time.
Ecosystems impacts
Impacts on coastal wetlands•

Below a 1o C increase the risk of damage is low for most systems.

•

Between 1 and 2o C warming moderate to large losses appear likely for a few
vulnerable systems. Of most concern are threats to the Kakadu wetlands of84

northern Australia and the Sundarbans of Bangladesh, both of which may
suffer 50% losses at less than 2o C and are both on the he UNESCO World
Heritage List.
•

Between 2-3o C, it is possible that the Mediterranean, Baltic and several
migratory bird habitats in the US experience a 50% or more loss. In thisrange it seems likely that there could be the complete loss of Kakadu and the
Sundarbans.

A key issue is the inertia of sea level rise, which makes the assignment of risk todifferent temperature levels misleading. Should, for example, sea level rise by 30cm
in the coming decades to a century (threatening Kakadu for example), the thermal
inertia of the ocean is such that an ultimate sea level rise of 2-4 times this amount
may be inevitable even if temperature stops rising. The prognoses for wetlands inthis context is not clear, as many damages are linked to the rate of sea level risecompared to the accretion and/or migratory capacity of the system. A major
determinant of the latter will be human activity adjacent to, or in the inland
catchments of the wetland system.
Impacts on animal species•

Below 1o C warming, there appears to be a risk of extinction for some highly
vulnerable species in south-western Australia and to a lesser extent in South
Africa. Range losses for species such as the Golden Bower bird in thehighland tropical forests of North Queensland Australia and for many animal
species in South Africa are likely to become significant and observable.

•

Between 1 and 2o C warming, large and sometimes severe impacts appear
possible for some Salmonid fish habitats in the USA, the Collared Lemmingin Canada, many South African animals and for Mexico’s fauna. Extinctionsin the Drayandra forest of south-western Australia seem very likely. There isan increasing risk of this in South Africa, Mexico for the most vulnerable
species and for especially vulnerable highland rainforest vertebrates in North
Queensland, Australia. Mid summer ice reduction in the Arctic ocean seems
likely to be at a level that would cause major problems for polar bears at least
at a regional level.

•

Between 2-3o C large to severe impacts appear likely and there are several
predicted extinctions in the literature. These include towards the upper end of
this temperature increase range several Hawaiian Honeycreepers, the Golden
Bower bird of the highland tropical rainforest of North Queensland Australia
and four species in South Africa. In general large impacts are projected for
Mexican fauna, many South African animals, the Collared Lemming in the
Arctic (which would have broad implications for arctic ecosystems), Salmonid
fish in Wyoming. Perhaps the most worrying projection is for the“catastrophic loss” of endemic rainforest vertebrates of the highlandrainforests of North Queensland, Australia. These would be experiencing
rapidly increasing losses of their core environments in the upper end of thiswarming range.

85•Above 3oC, large impacts begin to emerge for waterfowl populations in the
Prairie Pothole region in the USA. In the Arctic the collared lemming range
is reduced by 80%, very large reductions are projected for Arctic sea ice coverparticularly in summer that is likely to further endanger polar bears.
Extinction of the Golden Bower bird is predicted in this temperature range andthere seems to be a very high likelihood that large numbers of extinctions
would occur amongst the 65 endemic vertebrates of the highland rainforests ofNorth Queensland, Australia. In Mexico very severe range losses for many
animals are projected, as is the case also in South Africa, with Kruger nationalpark projected to lose two thirds of the animals studied.

Impacts on ecosystems•

Between present temperatures and a 1o C increase, three ecosystems appear to
be moving into a high risk zone - coral reefs, the highland tropical forests in
Queensland, Australia, the Succulent Karoo in South Africa. Increased fire
frequency and pest outbreaks may cause disturbance in boreal forests andother ecosystems.

•

Between 1-2o C the Australian highland tropical forest, the Succulent Karoobiodiversity hot spot, coral reef ecosystems and some Arctic and alpine
ecosystems are likely to suffer large or even severe damage. The Fynbos ofSouth Africa will experience increased losses. Coral reef bleaching will likely
become much more frequent, with slow or no recovery, particularly in the
Indian Ocean south of the equator. Australian highland tropical forest types,
which are home to many endemic vertebrates, are projected to halve in area inthis range. The Australian alpine zone is likely to suffer moderate to large
losses and the European Alpine may be experiencing increasing stress. The
substantial loss of Arctic sea ice likely to occur will harm ice dependent
species such as the polar bears and walrus. Increased frequency of fire andinsect pest disturbance is likely to cause increasing problems for ecosystems
and species in the Mediterranean region. Moderate to large losses of boreal
forest in China can be expected. Moderate shifts in the range of European
plants can be expected and in Australia moderate to large number of Eucalypts
may be outside out of their climatic range.

•

Between 2-3o C coral reefs are projected to bleach annually in many regions.
At the upper end of this temperature band, the risk of eliminating the
Succulent Karoo and its 2800 endemic plants is very high. Moderate to large
reductions in the Fynbos can be expected, with the risk of significant
extinctions. Australian mainland alpine ecosystems are likely to be on theedge of disappearance. European alpine systems will at or above theiranticipated tolerable limits of warming with some vulnerable species close to
extinction. Severe loss of boreal forest in China is projected and large andadverse changes are also projected for many systems on the Tibetan plateau.
Large shifts in the range of European plants seem likely and a large number of
Eucalypt species may expect to lie outside of their present climatic range.
Moderate to large effects are projected for Arctic ecosystems and boreal

86forests. Within this temperature range there is a likelihood of the Amazon
forest suffering potentially irreversible damage leading to its collapse.

Agriculture and food security impacts
Many studies indicate that developing countries are likely to lose as a whole, relative
to the developed nations. India, for example, is projected to experience significant
losses, with quite large areas of current cropland losing significant productivity. At
all levels of warming, a large group of the poor, highly vulnerable developing
countries is expected to suffer increasing food deficits. It is anticipated that this willlead to higher levels of food insecurity and hunger in these countries. Developed
countries will not be immune to large effects of climate change on their agricultural
sectors.
•

Warming of around 1o C produces relatively small damages when measured
from the point of increased risk of hunger and/or under nourishment (around
10 million more at risk) over the next century. In this temperature range
nearly all developed countries are projected to benefit, whilst many
developing countries in the tropics are estimated to experience small but
significant crop yield growth declines relative to an unchanged climate.

•

Warming from 1o C to 2o C warming triples the number of people at risk ofhunger in the 2080s.

•

Between 2-3oC warming the risk of damage begins to increase significantly.
Whilst developing countries may still gain in this temperature range theliterature indicates that production is finely balanced in this temperature range
between the effects of increased temperature and changes in precipitation.
‘Drier’ models show losses in North America, Russia and Eastern Europe
whereas ‘wetter’ models show increases. One study shows rapidly risinghunger risk in this temperature range with 45-55 million extra people at risk ofhunger by the 2080s for 2.5oC warming which rises to 65-75 million for a
3oC warming. Another study shows that a very large number of people, 3.35.5 billion, may be living in countries or regions expected to experience large
losses in crop production potential at 3oC warming.

•

For a 3-4o C warming, in one study the additional number at risk of hunger isestimated to be in the range 80-125 million depending on the climate model.
In Australia a warming of the order of 4o C is likely to put entire regions out of
production, with lesser levels of warming causing substantial declines in thewest and the south.
Water impacts

The number of people living in water stressed countries, defined as those using morethan 20% of their available resources, and is expected to increase substantially overthe next decades irrespective of climate change. Particularly in the next few decades
population and other pressures are likely to outweigh the effects of climate change,
although some regions may be badly affected during this period. In the longer term,
however, climate change becomes much more important. Exacerbating factors such87

as the link between land degradation, climate change and water availability are in
general not yet accounted for in the global assessments.
•••

Around 1o C of warming may entail high levels of additional risk in someregions, particularly in the period to the 2020s and 2050s, with this risk
decreasing due to the increased economic wealth and higher adaptive capacit yprojected for the coming century. For the 2020s the additional number ofpeople in water shortage regions is estimate to be in the range 400-800.
Between 1-2o C warming the level of risk appears to depend on the time frame
and assumed levels of economic development in the future. One study for the
middle of this temperature range has a peak risk in the 2050s at over 1,500
million, which declines to around 500 million in the 2080s.
Over 2oC warming appears to involve a major threshold increase in risk. One
study shows risk increasing for close to 600 million people at 1.5oC to 2.4-3.1
billion at around 2.5o C. This is driven by the water demand of mega-cities inIndia and China in their model. In this study the level of risk begins tosaturate in the range of 3.1-3.5 billion additional persons at risk at 2.5-3oC
warming.

One of the major future risks identified by two studies is that of increased water
demand from mega-cities in India and China. It is not clear whether or to what
extent additional water resource options would be available for these cities andhence, to what extent this finding is robust. This may have broad implications forenvironmental flows of water in major rivers of China, India and Tibet should themega-cities of India and China seek large-scale diversion and impoundments offlows in the region.
Socio-economic effects•••

For a 1o C warming a significant number of developing countries appear likely
to experience net losses, which range as high as a few % of GDP. Most
developed countries are likely to experience a mix of damages and benefits,with net benefits predicted by a number of models.
For a 2o C warming the net adverse effects projected for developing countries
appear to be more consistent and of the order of a few to several percentage
points of GDP depending upon the model. Regional damages for somedeveloping countries and regions, particularly in Africa, may exceed several
percentage points of GDP.
Above 2o C the likelihood of global net damages increases but at a rate that isquite uncertain. The effects on several developing regions appear to be in
the range of 3-5% for a 2.5-3o C warming, if there are no adverse climate
surprises. Global damage estimates are in the range of 1-2% for 2.5-3o C
warming, with some estimates increasing substantially with increasing
temperature.

If major identified risks such as thermohaline shutdown or non- linear feedbacks
in the carbon cycle eventuate, then the damages could be very high. Regionally,
there is very little evidence that the pattern of increasing damages to many
developing countries would reverse and most indicates a continuing increase in88

net damages. Africa seems to be consistently amongst the regions with high tovery high projected damages.

Conclusions
It seems clear from this partial review of the available literature that the risks arisingfrom projected human induced climate change increase significantly with increasing
temperature. Below a 1oC increase the level of risk are low but in some case notinsignificant particularly for highly vulnerable ecosystems. In the 1-2oC-increase
range risks across the board increase significantly and at a regional level are often
substantial. Above 2oC the risks increase very substantially involving potentiallylarge extinctions or even ecosystem collapses, major increases in hunger and water
shortage risks as well as socio-economic damages, particularly in developing
countries.

895. Appendix: Temperature scale
The analysis in this paper focuses on determining the projected impacts of climatechange associated with increases above the pre- industrial average global temperature(approximated by 1851-1880 average). One of the main reasons for using thisbaseline is that the temperature limit of the WBGU tolerable window is specified withrespect to the pre- industrial atmosphere.
In most cases the IPCC has used the base year of 1990 for its analyses of projected
effects, whereas the literature uses a variety of different base periods or years (forexample, the 1961-1990 climatology is often used). By and large the projected
temperature increases presented in the TAR are with respect to 1990, which isthought to be about 0.6°C warmer than the pre-industrial average (Folland et al.
2001). Most contemporary GCM scenarios start from the pre- industrial period andhence their changes in climate, in effect, are with respect to the assumed state of the
pre-industrial atmosphere and climate system. Often, the changes in climate statistics
computed by these models are reported with the respect to a standard 30- year mean
climatology of 1961-1990. A thirty- year averaging period is used as this eliminates
most of the year-to-year variability in global mean temperature. Many recent impact
studies are based on the change in the GCM climatology between a future period e.g.
2050s (30 year average around 2050) and the 1961-1990 average climatology fromthe model, applied to the observational mean of the 1961-1990 period. The 19611990 average temperature is about 0.3°C less than the 1990 global averagetemperature.
To further complicate matters, rather than specify a temperature range for an impact
many of the IPCC TAR assessments from Working Group II are reported with respect
to a temperature range classification of “small” (less than 2°C above 1990), medium(2-3°C above 1990) and “large” (greater than 3°C above 1990). 113 It should be notedwith respect to the latter that the IPCC states that a “2°C warming from 1990 to 2100
would be a magnitude of warming greater than any that human civilization has everexperienced. Thus, “small” does not necessarily mean negligible.”114
As a consequence of these and other factors, there often needs to be a conversion
from the reported impact or effect (which may also be estimated with respect to a
local temperature increase against a different base period) to a scale with respect topre-industrial. Table 18 outlines the overall scales used to convert the different baseperiods or classifications mentioned above to a pre- industrial temperature increase.

113

It should be noted that this was in response to pressure principally from the Saudi Arabiandelegation at the IPCC Working Group II Plenary in Geneva in February of 2001 and was resisted bymost of the lead authors of the relevant chapters of Working Group II. In the end, after many hours ofnegotiation, the contact group chair, then IPCC Chair Bob Watson, concluded that a consensus could
only be reached with the adoption of the above classification.
114
Chapter 19 of the IPCC WGII TAR: 957.

90

Table 18 - Global Temperature Scales used in this Report
Increase above Increasepre-industrial above 1990
temperaturetemperature
°C
°C
0.0
-0.6
1.0
0.4
1.6
1.0
2.0
1.4
2.6
2.0
3.0
2.4
3.6
3.0
4.0
3.4
4.6
4.0
5.0
4.4
5.6
5.0
6.0
5.4
6.6
6.0
7.0
6.4
7.6
7.0
8.0
7.4

Above 19611990 averagetemperature
°C
-0.3
0.7
1.3
1.7
2.3
2.7
3.3
3.7
4.3
4.7
5.3
5.7
6.3
6.7
7.3
7.7

IPCC TAR
classification

Small
Small
Small
Small
MediumMediumMedium
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large

Placing sea level rise on a common scale is an altogether more complex task andthere has been no attempt here to do this in a general sense. Each exa mple where an
impact is linked to a specific sea level rise is taken on its own and where possible
converted to global mean temperature range using available information as describedin a footnote or textual explanation.

91

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