CHANGING DRIVERS
The Impact of Climate Change on Competitivenessand Value Creation in the Automotive Industry

Duncan Austin
Niki Rosinski
Amanda Sauer
Colin le Duc

CONTENTS

Executive Summaryiii

Section 1. The Context
1. Climate Change and the Automotive Industry

3

2. Lower-Carbon Technologies and Competitiveness in the Automotive Industry

13

Section 2. The Analysis
3. Current Carbon Profiles of Leading OEMs27

4. Value Exposure Assessment

33

5. Management Quality Assessment

43

6. Aggregate Results and Implications for Value Creation

53

Section 3. The Companies
BMW Group

61

DaimlerChrysler

62

Ford Motor Company

63

General Motors

64

Honda Motor Company

65

Nissan Motor Company

66

PSA Peugeot Citroen

67

Renault

68

Toyota Motor Company

69

VW Group

70

Endnotes

71

Disclaimer: Although information in this report has been obtained from and is based upon sources the authors believe to be reliable,
the authors do not guarantee its accuracy and it may be incomplete and condensed. Neither the information nor any opinion expressed inthis report constitutes an offer, or an invitation to make an offer, to buy or sell any securities or any options, futures or other derivatives
related to such securities.

World
Resources
InstituteExecutive Summary
The purpose of this report is to help investors make better informed decisions regarding
automotive company stocks in light of emerging “carbon constraints”—policy measures designed to mitigate climate change by limiting emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2)and other greenhouse gases. This report explores how carbon constraints in global
automotive markets may affect value creation in 10 leading automotive companies
between now and 2015, a timeframe in which major technological and policy changes
are possible. The Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) assessed are BMW,
DaimlerChrysler (DC), Ford, GM, Honda, Nissan, PSA, Renault, Toyota and VW—theworld’s largest independent automotive companies. The geographical scope of theassessment is the United States, European Union and Japanese markets, which together
account for nearly 70 percent of current global sales.
This report is the result of collaboration between SAM Sustainable Asset Management(SAM)—a Zurich-based independent asset management company specializing in sustainability-driven investments—and the World Resources Institute (WRI)—an environmental research and policy organization based in Washington D.C. Drawing on therespective strengths and expertise of the two organizations, the report analyzes both
the risks and opportunities of carbon constraints, and then estimates the combined
implications for OEMs’ future earnings. The report is explicitly forward-looking, focusing
on the main factors affecting OEMs’ exposure to carbon constraints, and drawing on thelatest publicly available information about the 10 assessed OEMs.
MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Emerging carbon constraints could significantly impact the automotive industry, primarily through pressure to increase the fuel economy or lower the CO2 emissions intensityof vehicles. As carbon constraints take hold, OEMs able to produce vehicles with lower carbon emissions could see global market share increase and financial performance improve.
In contrast, OEMs that produce more carbon-intensive vehicles may have diminished ability
to compete in global markets with adverse consequences for their shareholder value.
Carbon constraints are already in place in major automotive markets. The European
Union and Japan have both made strong commitments to lower the CO2 emissions rates ofvehicles. To date, the United States has made less of a commitment. However, debate overfederal Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards continues, while a 2002
California law seeks to regulate vehicle CO2 emissions for the first time. As an indicator of
growing pressure in this area, over 60 percent of global vehicle sales in 2002 occurred incountries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol.

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CHANGING DRIVERS

A large number of lower-carbon technologies are emerging that may transform theindustry. Further modifications to the conventional internal combustion engine (ICE) platform to improve carbon performance will be introduced but diesel engines, hybrid electricvehicles (HEVs), and fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) are all set to challenge the traditional gasoline-ICE vehicle. However, there is much uncertainty regarding which technology(ies) will
emerge as winner(s). OEMs face a considerable challenge not only in developing new technologies, but also in devising an innovation strategy that is robust across multiple possible
technology pathways. Developments in lower-carbon technologies over the next decade havethe potential to alter significantly the competitive balance within the industry.
OEMs are differently positioned to respond to the challenges of carbon constraints. Thisis because of differences regarding:❙segment mix (e.g., 49 percent of DC’s 2002 sales in US, EU and Japanese markets werelight trucks compared to only 3 percent for VW).

❙

carbon intensity of models (e.g., the average GM sports utility vehicle (SUV) emits 41
percent more carbon emissions per kilometer (km) traveled than the average Honda
SUV).

❙

geographic distribution of sales (e.g., GM and Ford are dependent on sales in the UnitedStates while PSA and Renault primarily sell vehicles within the European Union).

The structure of each OEM’s product portfolio largely determines its current “carbon intensityof profits.” OEMs with a high carbon intensity of profits rely on high carbon-emitting vehicles to generate profits and create shareholder value, and face a harder task in responding
to carbon constraints.
OEMs are also differently positioned by virtue of their innovation and R&D choices andtheir overall management quality regarding carbon constraints. Through internal development choices and external partnerships and alliances, OEMs have different access to newtechnologies that may come to dominate the market. Carbon constraints could accelerate
the need for lower-carbon technologies, raising the significance of OEMs’ plans for developing these technologies.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
For this report, we performed two complementary analyses:iv

SAM & WRI❙

A Value Exposure Assessment identifies the risks of carbon constraints in terms of theestimated costs for each OEM to meet new CO2 emissions standards by 2015.

❙

A Management Quality Assessment identifies the opportunities for OEMs to capitalize
on carbon constraints and enhance their competitiveness, by virtue of their superior
management quality and focus on lower-carbon technologies.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The results of the separate assessments are illustrated in Figure ES.1. Risks are presented
in terms of average additional cost per vehicle in 2015 (lower costs are better). The upsidestrategy opportunities are expressed as a qualitative score between 0 and 100 (higherscores are better). OEMs in the top right quadrant can be considered “lower carbon leaders”
with below average exposure to risks and above average management quality with regard tolower carbon technologies.
FIGURE ES.1. QUANTIFICATION OF THE RISKS (Value Exposure) AND OPPORTUNITIES(Management Quality) OF CARBON CONSTRAINTS
$-

Honda

ToyotaNissanVW$200
Additional costs per vehicle

D EC R EASI N G R I SK FR O M C AR B O N C O N STR AI N TS

Renault

PSA

$100

$300

GM
Ford

$400

DC
$500

$600

BMW
40

50

60

70

80

90

Management Quality Index
I N C R EASI N G O PPO R TU N I TY FR O M C AR B O N C O N STR AI N T S
Note: The lines indicate industry averages in each category.

Several findings are of note:❙

OEMs vary considerably with respect to both value exposure and management quality
around carbon constraints. This indicates that carbon constraints have the ability to
influence competitive balance within the industry.

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CHANGING DRIVERS❙

Honda is the OEM that has the lowest value exposure. It faces the least immediate risk
from carbon constraints as the current high fuel efficiency of its vehicles implies only
minimal costs to meet new standards. Toyota emerges as the clear leader on carbonrelated management quality with a strong position in all three technologies that will be
key for long-term competitiveness.

❙

Renault and Nissan are also strongly positioned with better than average management
quality scores and lower than average expected costs from carbon constraints.

❙

PSA and VW are two other OEMs that have lower than average value exposure, while DC
has above average management quality with regard to carbon constraints.

❙

BMW stands out as having the greatest value exposure, though this may be somewhat
misleading. BMW is the smallest of the 10 OEMs reviewed and produces exclusively premium (and high cost) vehicles. Consequently, BMW should have a greater ability to passon those costs to consumers than do other OEMs.

❙

PSA has the weakest management strategy regarding carbon constraints, which may
limit its ability to exploit opportunities even though it faces low expected costs.

❙

Ford and GM both have above average value exposure and below average management
quality regarding climate risks. Their value exposure is driven principally by the relatively low fuel efficiency of their current vehicle mix. While much of this is due to their leadership in the carbon-intensive segments of the US market, which may not face immediate constraints, their current bias towards heavy vehicles coupled with below average
positioning on hybrid and diesel technology may limit their near-term competitiveness in
non-US markets.

A key challenge for analysts is to determine the implications of these findings for shareholder value creation. Consequently, we translate the results of both the Value Exposureand Management Quality assessments into changes in forecasted EBIT (Earnings before
Interest and Taxes) for the period 2003 through 2015. EBIT is a foundation for valuation
estimates in this sector and so changes in an OEM’s EBIT offer useful insight into possible
changes for overall Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) and thus shareholder value.
Converting our cost estimates and management quality scores into EBIT figures sets our
results in the context of existing and projected business performance. Though this adds
confounding factors to our initial results (e.g., differences in existing EBIT margins acrossOEMs), it nonetheless represents the basic challenge facing investors: to understand the
additive effect that carbon constraints may have on each OEM’s financial position.
The combined results presented in Figure ES.2 show the range of possible effects on EBIT, interms of percentage changes from business-as-usual EBIT projections. The upper limits
reflect the results from the Management Quality Assessment alone, which captures the opportunity for OEMs, while the lower limits are results from the Value Exposure Assessment alone,which reflect risks. The points indicate the combined impact of both assessments on EBIT.

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FIGURE ES.2. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CARBON CONSTRAINTS FOR DISCOUNTED EBIT
(2003–2015) BASED ON VALUE EXPOSURE AND MANAGEMENT QUALITY ASSESSMENTS
Percentage change in discounted EBIT relative to baseline

15%

10%

5%

0%

-5%

-10%

-15%
ToyotaRenault

Nissan

Honda

DC

VW

PSA

BMW

GM

Ford

Combining value exposure and management quality scores into a single EBIT measure(shown as points in ES.2) again reveals wide variety in values across OEMs—from a possible increase in discounted EBIT of 8 percent to a decrease of 10 percent. Toyota appears
best positioned, while Ford has the weakest result.
While the findings refer primarily to carbon constraints, they also shed light on how OEMs
may perform in response to other pressures that would lead consumers or regulators tovalue fuel economy more highly (e.g., energy price rises or renewed energy security concerns). Indeed, consumer and policy responses to energy market shocks may play out considerably more rapidly than the steady progress in carbon regulations envisaged in thisreport, potentially making manufacturing adjustments more awkward. If so, the impacts on
OEMs—whether positive or negative—may be more extreme than reported here.

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SECTION I

THE CONTEXTClimate change is a relatively new issue for the automotive industry, and one that may
have significant financial impacts for the sector. Climate change policies are already inplace in several major automotive markets and appear likely to spread, forcing OEMs tolower the carbon emissions profile of new vehicles. At the same time, new technology
options in various states of development offer the potential to meet new carbon constraints while increasing profitability. Carbon constraints thus create a combination ofrisk and opportunity for OEMs.
Chapter 1 describes recent developments and policy impacts around the climate change
issue in the United States, the European Union and Japan. The chapter also explains
how climate change may impact important value drivers and create new management
challenges.
Chapter 2 outlines the most likely technology options available to OEMs to respond tocarbon constraints. Because it is not clear which technology option(s) will emerge as
winner(s), this chapter also identifies strategic partnerships between OEMs that might
point to future changes in the industry’s structure.

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Chapter 1

Climate Change and theAutomotive Industry

SUMMARY
Efforts to prevent climate change have already led to policies in the European Union andJapan to constrain carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from vehicles. Similar restrictions
look likely in other markets, including potentially the United States. Over the next
decade, these carbon constraints will become a defining force for the automotive industry. Carbon constraints are likely to influence conventional value drivers within the automotive sector and will create significant challenges for senior managers. OEMs wellpositioned to deal with new carbon constraints could find themselves with a competitive
advantage over those who are unable to adapt to new rules and market conditions.
1.1 CLIMATE CHANGE AND EMERGING CARBON CONSTRAINTS
Carbon constraints are emerging
in major automotive markets…

Several of the world’s major automotive markets are adopting policies to reduce vehiclerelated carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. These “carbon constraints” will push automotive
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) to produce vehicles that emit fewer CO2 emissions per kilometer (km) traveled. The European Union and Japan already have programs inplace that call for significant CO2 reductions over the next decade. Even in the UnitedStates, which has resisted raising fuel economy standards through most of the 1990s, there
are signs that vehicle sales will be affected by carbon constraints in the future. A 2002
California law seeks to regulate vehicle CO2 emissions and other states have indicated aninterest in following California’s lead.
The emergence of carbon constraints in automotive markets reflects ongoing concerns
about the threat of climate change and the scale of vehicles’ contribution to the atmospheric buildup of CO2, the principal greenhouse gas (GHG).

… because of concerns aboutclimate change…

The latest scientific evidence indicates that human activities are leading to increased accumulations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, which are altering the Earth’s climate
patterns at unnatural rates. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has
found that global average temperatures rose by 0.6° Celsius over the last century,1 and that“most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities.”2
The IPCC predicts further increases in the Earth’s average surface temperature ranging
from 1.4° to 5.8° Celsius by 2100.3 A changing climate could lead to unpredictable andcostly consequences, including rising sea levels, spread of infectious diseases into newareas, and altered incidence and location of extreme weather events such as hurricanes,
monsoons, and droughts.

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BOX 1.1. Cars and Climate Change: Tracing the Connection
While CO2 emissions arise at nearly every stage of a motor vehicle’s life—including
extraction of raw materials and manufacturing of component parts—it is the combustionof gasoline and diesel fuels during vehicle use that accounts for the greatest share ofvehicle-related CO2 emissions. (See Figure.)
EMISSIONS FROM THE LIFE CYCLE OF A TYPICAL VEHICLE

Fuel production(19%)
Vehicle Use(75%)
Materials (4%)
Assembly (2%)

Source: Derived from Weiss et al., 2000.

Consequently, emissions from vehicle use are where effective climate policies are most
likely to focus and where OEMs have the greatest scope to establish a competitive advantage over their rivals. While CO2 emissions can be reduced at the assembly stage—assome OEMs are showing—potentially much greater reductions are possible in the “usephase.” Based on a 1996 Toyota Camry rated at 28 mpg, a 5 percent reduction in use
phase emissions will save 3.75 metric tons of CO2 over the vehicle’s lifetime (3 metrictons from avoided gasoline combustion and 0.75 metric tons from avoided fuel production). In contrast, a 5 percent reduction in assembly-related emissions will save only 0.1
metric tons of CO2 per vehicle.
The figure is also revealing of the different approaches taken by regulators around theworld. Climate-related policies in the European Union, Japan, Canada, Australia andCalifornia have targeted the 94 percent of emissions directly or indirectly associated withvehicle use. In contrast, the US Administration’s voluntary climate program encourages
OEMs to reduce assembly-related emissions that make up just 2 percent of overall lifecycle emissions.

Though much uncertainty remains regarding climate trends and the severity of potential
impacts, the threat of climate change has prompted concern and action at national andglobal levels. The most conspicuous policy step has been the Kyoto Protocol, which isintended to initiate a long-term process of reducing global GHG emissions.4 As of October
2003, 111 countries had ratified the Protocol, including those responsible for 60 percent of
2002 global vehicle sales.5 A notable exception is the United States, which has rejected theProtocol out of concerns about the economic costs it may impose and because it fails tocover key developing countries that will be major emitters in the future.6

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CHAPTER 1

Regardless of the Kyoto Protocol’s fortunes, concern about climate change is unlikely toabate. Economic growth in the near term will increase emissions of CO2 and other GHGs,
while increasing prosperity will intensify demand for environmental protection. As businessleaders at the World Economic Forum in Davos noted in 2000, “climate change is the greatest global challenge facing humankind in the 21st century.”7… and because of vehicles’
contribution to the climate change
problem.

The automotive sector is a major source of CO2 emissions and thus an obvious target forpolicy efforts. Emissions of CO2 result primarily from the burning of fossil fuels, including
gasoline and diesel. The transportation sector accounts for 30 percent of CO2 emissions in
the industrialized economies of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment) and about 20 percent worldwide.8 In the United States, which leads the world
in total CO2 emissions from the transport sector, light-duty vehicles (i.e., cars and trucks)
contribute about 20 percent of all US CO2 emissions.9 (See Box 1.1 for the sources of CO2
emissions over the life cycle of a vehicle.)
Projections indicate that emissions from vehicles will grow significantly. The global fleet
has been growing at a rate of about 16 million vehicles per year since 1970 and by 2025 is
expected to reach 1 billion vehicles on the road.10 Energy demand for transportation is projected to grow by 2.5 percent per year between 1999 and 2020, a higher pace than is
expected for energy demand overall.11
The automotive industry is increasingly aware of the need to lower the carbon emissions of
its vehicles. The World Business Council on Sustainable Development’s Mobility Project identifies as one of the “grand challenges” for a sustainable future the need to “drasticallyreduce carbon emissions from the transportation sector.”12 All but two of the OEMs analyzed
in this report are members of the Project.13

The most significant carbon
constraints target emissions
generated during vehicle use.

The bulk of automotive-related CO2 emissions occur during vehicle use. Thus, fuel economy
and CO2 emissions standards offer the best prospect for reducing vehicles’ contribution toclimate change. (See inside back cover for details on the relationship between fuel economy
and CO2 emissions standards.) This type of carbon constraint is already in place in some of
the world’s major automotive markets.
❙

In the European Union, dialogue between regulators and the automotive industry tradeassociation (Association des Constructeurs Européens d’Automobiles, or ACEA) inspired
a voluntary commitment from the industry to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars
by 25 percent relative to 1995 levels by 2008. This would bring emission rates to a levelof 140 g CO2 per km traveled, or approximately 39 miles per gallon (mpg). Depending on
early progress, ACEA may extend the target to 120 g CO2/km (or 46 mpg) by 2012.

❙

In Japan, new legislation requires fuel economy improvements in cars of 23 percent
beyond 1995 levels by 2010. Specific targets vary with vehicle weight but extend to
125 g CO2/km (44 mpg).

❙

In Canada, the government has proposed a target of improving vehicle fuel efficiency by
25 percent by 2010 as part of its Climate Change Plan.14

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CHANGING DRIVERS❙

In Australia, the automotive industry has responded to the government’s challenge toimprove fuel economy by announcing a voluntary commitment to improve fuel economy
by 18 percent by 2010.15

To date, the United States has taken no comparable action to regulate vehicle emissions in
response to the climate change challenge. Although the Corporate Average Fuel Economy(CAFE) standard for light trucks was moderately tightened in 2003 – to improve light truck
fuel economy by 7 percent by 2007 – the fuel economy standard for cars remains fixed atthe 27.5 mpg (201 g CO2/km) level first set in 1990. Moreover, the US Congress has repeatedly rejected bills proposing higher fuel economy standards and has shown no willingness
to take action on climate change.
However, carbon constraints may emerge in at least parts of the US automotive market overthe next decade. A 2002 California law requires the Californian Air Resources Board toadopt rules to achieve the “maximum feasible reduction” in GHG emissions from cars andlight trucks. The regulations will go into effect in 2006, but will give OEMs until 2009 tocomply. Though not a national law and still subject to challenge in court, this initiative
could have profound implications for OEMs. California accounts for one out of eight new US
vehicle registrations16 and other states, most notably New York, have expressed an interestin following California’s lead.
Other policies may reduce
automotive-related GHG emissions.

Though fuel economy or CO2 emissions standards offer the best prospect for reducing carbon emissions from the automotive sector, a wide range of complementary policies designed
to lower the climate change impact of cars could affect OEMs. Placing a price on CO2 emissions through direct taxation of emissions or by instituting a carbon cap-and-trade program
would increase fuel costs and encourage consumers to purchase more fuel-efficient vehicles. Tax credits or penalties based on a vehicle’s fuel economy or technology are anotherpolicy option for reducing GHGs. For instance, the United States now imposes certain tax
penalties on “gas-guzzlers,” while some local jurisdictions give preferential treatment tocleaner-technology vehicles in various ways, including lower taxes as well as access to road
space (e.g., high occupancy lanes) and parking. Many governments have sought to advance
automotive technology through government-industry partnerships. Such partnerships could
help new lower-carbon technologies become viable in the marketplace.

Carbon constraints overlap withenergy security concerns andenergy price risks.

Carbon constraints also interact with well-established efforts (e.g., CAFE) to improve vehicle fuel economy that have been motivated by energy security concerns and questions about
the long-term supply of hydrocarbons. In this report, we focus on the impetus to improvefuel economy for reasons of climate change. However, the findings are also relevant for considering how OEMs would perform in response to other pressures that would lead consumers
or regulators to value fuel economy more highly (e.g. significant energy price rises orenhanced energy security concerns). Indeed, while carbon regulations can be expected todevelop at a measured pace (as regulators pay heed to OEMs’ operating constraints), history has shown that movements in energy markets can be more sudden. Steep price rises maylead to rapid changes in consumer preferences, as occurred in the 1970s, and accelerate
policy developments. In such circumstances, the possible impacts on OEMs, whether positive or negative, may be more extreme than those reported here.

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CHAPTER 1

Will emerging markets embracecarbon constraints?

While this report focuses on automotive markets in developed countries, a key issue for theindustry is whether other countries that constitute major emerging automotive markets will
embrace carbon constraints as part of their development path. Though the mature automotive markets of the United States, European Union and Japan accounted for nearly 70 percent of global vehicle sales in 2002, emerging markets will account for most of the growthin the industry in coming years, given the pace of income and population growth.17
Developing countries’ share of global automotive sales is projected to rise from 24 percent
in 2000 to 49 percent by 2020.18 Consequently, emerging markets hold the key for sales andprofit growth over the next two decades and OEMs wanting to be global players will need toensure that they are positioned to sell appropriate models.
Of all emerging markets, China captures the most attention. Vehicle sales have been surging in recent years alongside rising personal incomes. Recent sales growth rates haveexceeded 56 percent per year.19 Moreover, there is extraordinary growth potential. In 2001,
vehicle ownership in China was 13 vehicles per 1,000 persons, compared with 779 per
1,000 in the United States.20
Though the Kyoto Protocol, which China has ratified, does not require China to make CO2
reductions before 2012, the growing prominence of the Chinese economy means that it willalmost certainly face future CO2 reduction obligations. However, a number of more immediate factors suggest that fuel economy will be an important feature of the developing
Chinese vehicle market. First, China has relatively small domestic oil reserves. The country
is already a net importer of oil even though its car ownership rates are 1/60th of those in the
United States. This should encourage a focus on fuel-efficient vehicles as a way to minimize
future energy dependency. Second, low average income of less than $1,000 per year willsteer Chinese consumers towards smaller vehicles and will ensure that a relatively highvalue is placed on fuel economy.21 Third, in a bid to alleviate China’s serious air quality
problems, the government has set a goal of matching European vehicle emissions standards for conventional air pollutants by 2010.22 Improving fuel economy will help to meetthis goal. Finally, high population density and crowded cities should support demand for thesmall, or “smart”, cars increasingly seen in Japanese and European cities.
While it remains to be seen exactly how China and other emerging markets develop, OEMs
will need to be mindful of influences that directly or indirectly encourage more fuel-efficientand less carbon-intensive vehicles.

Investors will need to monitor
the development of carbon
constraints.

The likely cumulative effect of the above developments suggests that concern about climatechange will exert a significant influence over the industry in the next decade. This influence
will increasingly be felt in all major markets, with key uncertainty about developments in
the United States. As concerns about climate change mount, so too will investors’ attention
to companies’ management of new carbon-related risks and opportunities. Companies wellpositioned to handle these constraints will find themselves with a competitive advantage
over those who are unable to adapt to new market conditions and rules.
Given the growing importance of climate-related policies, automotive analysts may follow
other financial market actors in wanting to know more about the risks and opportunities of

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emerging carbon constraints. Under the recent Carbon Disclosure Project, 35 major institutional investors (representing over $4 trillion in assets) signaled their concern about thepossible impacts of climate change for companies’ financial performance by asking theworld’s 500 largest quoted companies to disclose investment-relevant information on their
GHG emissions.23 The project concluded that carbon constraints could have a differential
impact on companies’ financial performance. It also found that most investors currently
suffer from a significant information deficit on the topic.

1.2 CARBON CONSTRAINTS AND VALUE CREATION IN THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR
Carbon constraints will affect theindustry’s traditional value
drivers.

Carbon constraints constitute new sources of risk and opportunity that investors and managers will have to consider alongside existing industry fundamentals. In particular, carbon
constraints could influence OEM competitiveness and profitability by affecting the industry’s
traditional value drivers. Conventional valuation models will need to be updated to reflect
these new pressures.
The traditional value model for the automotive industry is based on supply and demand
forces, which in turn determine sales volumes, pricing, margins and profitability.24 (SeeFigure 1.1.) In addition to these tangible drivers, a number of intangible value drivers—
such as brand, innovation and product quality—are increasingly viewed as importantsources of competitive advantage and value creation. Intangible assets may represent asmuch as 50 percent of an OEM’s market value.25

The automotive sector is a mature,
low-growth industry.

Automobile manufacturing is a mature industry with current annual growth rates averaging
around only 2 percent per year across all global markets. The sector’s transition into a stable, low-growth industry is evident in the consolidation of 52 OEMs in 1964 into 12 today,26
with further consolidation expected due to fundamental structural problems, such as production overcapacity.
The automotive industry is highly capital-intensive. To compete, OEMs must achieve significant economies of scale, which in turn raises barriers to entry and exit. The combination of
low sales growth and high entry/exit barriers ensures marked rivalry and competitive pressure within the sector. This manifests itself in excessive additions to overall capacity, as
each OEM tries to recoup large fixed costs through high sales volumes. The result is global
production overcapacity, currently at around 30 percent, which puts pressure on pricing andmargins, and erodes OEM value.
In mature, low-growth markets, OEMs can increase sales only by taking market share fromanother firm. In this “zero-sum game” environment, competitive advantages tend to be
temporary. An important means of securing short-term advantage is through innovation.
Successful innovation in the form of new models or technologies allows first-mover advantages, such as pricing power and higher margins. As a result, maintaining innovation
capacity is essential for competitiveness in the automotive industry.

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FIGURE 1.1. THE INFLUENCE OF CARBON CONSTRAINTS ON VALUE DRIVERS IN A
TYPICAL AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR VALUATION MODEL
Profitability and Shareholder Value

Sales, pricing, margins

Tangible Value Drivers

Intangible Value Drivers

Cost structure

Brand

New models

Innovation

Product segmentation

Alliances

Capacity

Customer

Cyclicality

Human capital

GDP per capita

Product quality

Operational gearing

Supply chain

Value drivers that may be affected by carbon constraints.
Source: Adapted from Deutsche Bank (2002).

Carbon constraints will complicate existing industry dynamics. While the influence of carbon constraints could permeate throughout the business, the following are some of theways in which carbon constraints could affect key value drivers, positively or negatively:❙ Innovation
Maintaining innovative capacity is critical in the automotive industry as new models andtechnologies are a source of differentiation and competitive advantage. Carbon constraints
add a new element to the innovation challenge. Leadership in lower-carbon technologies
could translate into first-mover advantages of stronger pricing power and higher margins
and create handsome payback on R&D outlays. New technologies could also be sold or
licensed to others in the industry. Alternatively, falling behind in the development of lowercarbon technologies could see R&D expenditures go unrewarded. This awareness has led toa genuine race within the industry to develop lower-carbon technologies and bring them tomarket.

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CHANGING DRIVERS❙ Brand
As homogenization of vehicles increases, OEMs compete more and more on non-manufacturing factors such as brand. Strong brands induce higher consumer loyalty, support higher
prices and generate higher margins. Environmental quality can be an important componentof brand and being viewed as a leader on climate change could enhance brand equity.
Alternatively, losing ground to rivals in the development of lower-carbon technologies could
undermine an OEM’s brand value.
❙ New models
The development and launch of new models is key for maintaining the sales volumes
required to recoup the industry’s high capital costs. OEMs increasingly employ “platform
strategies” (i.e., use a common platform and powertrain for several different vehicle models) to enhance economies of scale and provide flexibility. Key components of platforms,
such as engine design, remain stable for many years. To accommodate increasingly strict
emission standards across all markets, OEMs must anticipate and address concerns related
to climate change at multiple stages of production, including R&D, design and pre-production. Failure to address carbon constraints at these early stages could compromise a newplatform’s long-term viability in markets that subsequently adopt carbon constraints. Inturn, this could harm sales growth and profitability.
❙ Product segmentation
OEMs rely to varying degrees on different segments of the automotive market for their sales
and profits. OEMs that depend on market segments featuring carbon-intensive (i.e., fuelinefficient) vehicles, such as sports utility vehicles (SUVs), may be more exposed to emerging carbon constraints. Subsequent pressure to differentiate into less carbon-intensive segments to reduce the overall carbon intensity of the company’s product portfolio could
diminish profitability, given that most OEMs have derived less profit from the less carbonintensive segments.27 However, OEMs that can generate profits in lower-carbon (i.e., fuelefficient) segments could benefit from this transition.
❙ Cost structure
Carbon constraints could raise costs across all stages of the business, from R&D anddesign to production. OEMs may have to make changes to vehicle manufacture, from relatively minor changes to engines and transmission systems to potentially more radical
changes such as moving to new powertrains. The recent CAFE increase for light trucks of
1.5 mpg over 3 years is expected to cost DC, Ford and GM $1.57 billion in aggregate.28
Moreover, the race to develop lower-carbon technologies will put further pressure on R&D
budgets. Overall, cost increases associated with rising fuel economy requirements could
lead to higher retail prices and lower sales relative to a business-as-usual scenario.
However, even if new standards impose absolute costs across the industry, some OEMs may
gain competitive advantage by facing smaller cost increases than their competitors.
Carbon constraints create new
management challenges.

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Given these influences, carbon constraints also constitute a critical new management challenge for OEMs. Senior managers will have to consider the new dynamics created by carbon
constraints alongside current industry trends. (See Box 1.2 for an example of how carbon
constraints may exacerbate current trends in the US light truck market).

CHAPTER 1

BOX 1.2. Carbon Constraints as a Competitive Factor in the US Light Truck Market
Over the last decade, light trucks, including sports utility vehicles (SUVs), have been a
crucial source of profits for DaimlerChrysler (DC), Ford and GM (collectively known as the“Big Three”). However, the light truck segment is becoming increasingly competitive asother OEMs develop models and as segment sales plateau. Moreover, given the high CO2emissions of light trucks, the segment provides a good example of how carbon constraints
pose an additional challenge for OEMs over and above existing industry dynamics.
In the early 1990s, DC, Ford and GM introduced new lines of light trucks—the SUV andthe minivan—especially designed as passenger vehicles. Because these passenger vehicles were classified as light trucks by the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program, they only needed to meet an average fuel economy of 20.7 mpg, permitting more
powerful engines and progressively greater weight and size. American consumers quickly
adopted these vehicles and light truck sales grew from 34 percent of the US market in1990 to approximately 50 percent in 2001.
The Big Three enjoyed significant pricing power and high margins as consumers gravitated towards these larger vehicles. Moreover, high margins and profitability from thesesegments persisted for an unusually long period, as foreign OEMs initially dismissed
demand for SUVs as a passing fad. Crucially, profits from the light truck segment concealed a structural weakness in the businesses of the Big Three—a growing inability toearn profits on small and medium passenger car segments, owing to stiff competition
from non-US OEMs.
The Big Three’s advantage in the light truck segment is now disappearing. The apparent
permanence of demand for SUVs, minivans and pickups has drawn in other OEMs, evenas demand growth starts to plateau. The result is growing capacity, increased competition and inevitable erosion of market share for the segment’s pioneers. Worse, the strong
bias towards light trucks in their product portfolios leaves the financial outlook of the Big
Three particularly exposed to developments in these segments. Deutsche Bank estimatesthat over 70 percent of Ford’s and GM’s profits come from these segments. With theirpassenger cars earning little or no profits, the Big Three have resorted to aggressive
efforts to maintain light truck sales by offering ever larger incentives and discounts, further eroding profitability.
On top of these existing industry dynamics, dependence on light trucks leaves the Big
Three unusually exposed to carbon constraints. While margins and profitability in the lighttruck segment are expected to fall, the overall carbon intensity of these vehicles is expected to remain relatively unchanged in the near future. As a result, these OEMs are particularly exposed to the recent tightening of CAFE standards for light trucks or to proposals toharmonize CAFE standards for passenger cars and light trucks. Moreover, even if US regulators do not require further CO2 reductions before 2015, the Big Three may find it challenging to compete in foreign markets that are increasingly adopting carbon constraints orvalue fuel economy for other reasons. The particular circumstances of the US market—
high average income, low fuel prices and low fuel economy standards—has encouraged
design and engineering choices that may make it harder for US OEMs to compete in global
markets, even as non-US OEMs account for a growing share of US sales.

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Decreasing Risk fro m Car bo n Co nstraints

FIGURE 1.2. THE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE OF CARBON CONSTRAINTS

Low Risk — Low Opportunity

Low Risk — High Opportunity

High Risk — Low Opportunity

High Risk — High Opportunity

Increasing O pportunity fro m Car bon Constraints

A successful business strategy in a carbon-constrained market will be one that can maintain or enhance profitability from sales of progressively less carbon-intensive (more fuelefficient) vehicles. Invariably, the management challenge will require both minimizing therisks and capitalizing on the opportunities noted above. Schematically, delivering value toshareholders in a carbon-constrained world will require that OEMs move into the top rightquadrant (“low risk/high opportunity”) of Figure 1.2. Indeed, under carbon constraints, thiswould be the only sustainable position for OEMs in the long term.
Not only are OEMs at different positions today with regard to this challenge, but the direction of immediate business plans may be inconsistent with moving to a more sustainable
position. OEMs whose current business models envisage further growth in high carbonemitting vehicles may face growing tension between profit goals and pressures to meet carbon constraints. In contrast, other OEMs may have plans for sales growth, product development and branding that are consistent with the demands of carbon-constrained markets.
The management challenge for all OEMs is to incorporate carbon reduction plans into thebusiness and ensure that they are aligned with traditional profitability goals. In turn, thisrequires that carbon concerns become central to mainstream business planning.

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CHAPTER 2

Chapter 2

Lower-Carbon Technologies andCompetitiveness in the Automotive
Industry

SUMMARY
In carbon-constrained markets, OEMs face the twin challenge of producing vehicles that
emit less carbon while continuing to create value for shareholders. To meet carbon constraints, OEMs can turn to a wide range of “lower-carbon technologies” including alternative fuels, improvements to existing combustion engines (gasoline and diesel) anddevelopment of new engine types (e.g., hybrid and fuel cell technology). These technologies vary in terms of their carbon reduction potential and the degree to which they canpenetrate the market by 2015. We find that “incremental technologies”, diesel andhybrids will be the key technologies to deliver CO2 reductions up to 2015.
In addition, some lower-carbon technologies have the potential to alter the long-termcompetitive balance within the industry, as OEMs that are early movers on these technologies could develop important market niches, reap the benefits of brand differentiation and establish de facto standards that competitors will have to follow. The key technologies in this regard are diesel, hybrid, and fuel cell technology.
A complicating factor is the uncertainty regarding which technology(ies) will become themarket standard(s). Consequently, OEMs face not only the R&D challenge of producing
lower-carbon technologies, but also the management challenge of being prepared tosucceed no matter which technologies emerge as most important. The latter in particular puts pressure on R&D budgets. To control expenditures, many OEMs are now engaged
in research partnerships and alliances around lower-carbon technologies. If carbon
constraints accelerate the emergence of new standard technologies in the industry,
OEMs could win or lose depending on the expertise developed internally or through partnerships.
2.1 LOWER-CARBON TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS
Lower-carbon technologies differ
in their implications for OEMs’
financial performance.

Developing and introducing lower-carbon technologies will be vital for meeting carbon constraints, but lower-carbon technologies differ in their implications for OEMs’ financial performance. While some technologies represent only minor modifications to vehicle design andproduction, other lower-carbon technologies could exert a strong influence on the long-termcompetitive dynamics in the sector.

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BOX 2.1. Reducing Carbon Emissions through Alternative Fuels
Numerous programs around the world have sought to introduce less carbon-intensive, or“alternative” fuels into automotive markets, including ethanol, methanol, propane (LPG),
compressed natural gas (CNG), and biofuels. While the use of these fuels could lower CO2
emissions by as much as 30 percent compared to gasoline, such fuels constitute only aminiscule proportion of the transport fuel market. Alternative fuels made up less than 0.2
percent of overall transport fuel use in the United States in 2002. An obvious problem isthe enormous advantage enjoyed by gasoline and diesel, with an established refining,transport and delivery infrastructure. This will continue to make it difficult for alternative
fuels to enter the marketplace. Even by 2025, alternative fuels are expected to contributeonly 1.5 percent of light-vehicle fuel consumption within the United States.
Internationally, 97 percent of transport fuel is expected to be oil-based in 2020.
Moreover, OEMs in the automotive industry are unlikely to be able to derive competitive
advantage from fuel choice per se, so much as from the in-vehicle technology that will
have to accompany any significant fuel switch. This may require coordination and collaboration with energy companies and several such research partnerships have already been
formed.
Sources: M.Q. Wang (2001); US Energy Information Administration (EIA), Alternatives to Traditional
Transportation Fuels (2000); EIA, Annual Energy Outlook, 2003 (2003); and International Energy Agency, World
Energy Outlook 2002 Forecast (2002).

In seeking to reduce vehicle CO2 emissions, OEMs can pursue two complementary strategies: (i) produce vehicles that use lower-carbon “alternative” fuels; or (ii) increase vehicle
fuel economy for a given fuel type. In practice, important barriers to adoption of alternative
fuels (including lack of infrastructure) make it unlikely that fuel switching will yield significant carbon reductions between now and 2015. In addition, switching to alternative fuels is
not an area where automotive manufacturers have particular expertise or the ability toderive competitive advantage, which lies more with fuel producers. (See Box 2.1 for more
information on alternative fuels.)Instead, a more natural focus for OEMs is to develop new technologies—particularly engine
technologies—that are capable of reducing carbon emissions. Using the traditional gasoline-ICE platform as the baseline for today’s new vehicles, we group into four main categories the main lower-carbon technologies that are expected to be developed between now
and 2015:

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“Incremental technologies” (including advanced gasoline-ICE technologies)❙

Diesel (or compression-ignition) technology❙

Hybrid technology❙

Fuel cell technology

CHAPTER 2

FIGURE 2.1. CONTRIBUTIONS OF LOWER CARBON TECHNOLOGIES TO CO2 REDUCTIONS AND
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE THROUGH 2015
Key sources of CO2
reduction through 2015

Key sources of competitive
advantage through 2015

DieselIncremental
Technologies

Fuel Cells
HybridElectric

These technologies differ in the degree to which they permit OEMs to meet carbon constraints and/or serve as the basis for competitive advantage. (See Figure 2.1.) For example,
while incremental technologies may play a significant role in helping OEMs to meet carbon
constraints, they offer little scope for enhanced profitability. In contrast, while fuel cells
may deliver few actual carbon reductions through 2015, they represent a major and potentially disruptive advance in the automobile’s evolution that could reward technology leaderswith competitive advantage. Hybrid and diesel technologies lie somewhere in between these
extremes. Investors need to be aware of both how technologies can contribute to near-term
carbon reductions and whether they can confer long-term competitive advantage.

2.1.1 Achieving CO2 Reductions through 2015
Lower-carbon technologies differ
in their potential to reduce vehicle
CO2 emissions before 2015.

Failure to meet voluntary or mandatory carbon constraints could result in diminished sales
or even financial penalties for OEMs. Consequently, investors will need to monitor whether
and to what extent OEMs are introducing technologies that will permit them to meet carbon
constraints on schedule. Figure 2.2 shows the relative potential for “well-to-wheel” reductions in CO2 emissions of key lower-carbon technologies.29
Adding incremental technologies to the standard gasoline-ICE platform reduces carbon
emissions to 70 percent of those from a 1996 reference vehicle.30 Beyond that, thehybridization of either gasoline or diesel engines leads to savings of a further 25 to 30 percent. CO2 savings from fuel cells depend on fuel choice. Gasoline-based fuel cells that permit on-board conversion of gasoline into hydrogen and which are likely to be the only viableoption before a hydrogen fueling infrastructure can be established, yield less well-to-wheelsavings than hybrids. Using hydrogen derived from natural gas offers small further reductions, but only if fuel cells use hydrogen derived from renewable energy will the well-towheel CO2 emissions effectively be eliminated.
Not all of these technologies will be immediately available. In practice, the smaller gains
associated with incremental technologies could penetrate the market relatively quickly to

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FIGURE 2.2. WELL TO WHEEL CARBON EMISSIONS FROM LOWER CARBON TECHNOLOGIES
Near-term

Conventional ICE
Advanced Gasoline ICE
Advanced Diesel
Gasoline Hybrid
Diesel Hybrid

Fuel Cell (gasoline)
Fuel Cell (hydrogen from natural gas)
Fuel Cell (hydrogen from renew ables)
Long-term
0%10%

20% 30%40% 50% 60%

70% 80%90%100%

Relative CO2 em issions (as percentage of em issions
from a 1996 baseline vehicle)
Source: Weiss et al. (2003).

generate significant carbon savings across an OEM’s product portfolio through 2015. In
contrast, while diesel hybrids and hydrogen-based fuel cells could ultimately generate muchgreater carbon reductions per vehicle, the lower expected penetration of these technologies
by 2015, especially for fuel cells, implies less carbon reductions from these sources during
the timeframe of this study.
In addition, though this assessment considers the technologies in isolation, the viability ofthe more advanced technologies is sensitive to the success or failure of nearer-term
improvements. The greater the fuel savings are that can be achieved through near-term
advances (e.g., incremental technologies or gasoline hybrids), the smaller are the incremental benefits from moving on to fuel cells subsequently.

2.2.2 Deriving Competitive Advantage through 2015
Some lower-carbon technologies
could create enduring competitive
advantage for OEMs.

Engine technology is a key component of global platforms and therefore can be an important source of competitive advantage. Certain lower-carbon technologies based on newengine types offer the potential for significant change in global automotive markets that
could create important and enduring competitive advantage for leading OEMs, for several
reasons:❙

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Brand differentiation. Leadership in a key lower-carbon technology could enhance brandequity, thereby lifting pricing power and margins.

CHAPTER 2TABLE 2.1. Lower Carbon Technologies as a Source of Competitive Advantage
through 2015
Incremental
Technologies

Diesel (CI)
Technology

HybridTechnology

Fuel Cell
Technology

Potential for branddifferentiation
Potential to set de facto
standards
Disruptive potential

Low potential

Limited potential

Strong potential❙

De facto standards. First movers in lower-carbon technologies may define industry
standards and be in a strong position to capitalize on this advantage through technology licensing, early profits and a proprietary learning curve.

❙

Disruptive potential. Some lower-carbon technologies hold the potential to alter fundamentally the competitive balance in the automotive industry. A key example would be
fuel cell technology, which could lead to a convergence of transport and energy industries.

Based on these criteria, Table 2.1 identifies diesel, hybrid and fuel cell technology as thelower-carbon technologies that hold most potential to become a source of competitive advantage for OEMs through 2015. Even if these technologies yield fewer actual CO2 reductions
through 2015, they could influence competitive balance within the industry for many years
after.

2.2 REVIEW OF KEY LOWER-CARBON TECHNOLOGIESThe following section reviews key lower-carbon technologies in more detail. Not all of thetechnologies will be relevant in all markets at all points in time. (See Figure 2.3.) The internal combustion engine is likely to continue to be the dominant platform through 2015 acrossall markets, with scope for diesel to grow further in the European market and to penetrate
the US market. Facing carbon constraints, many OEMs will steadily “hybridize” their productportfolio over time, coupling electric motors and batteries with both gasoline and diesel
engines. Given the technological and economic challenges, fuel cells are unlikely to emerge
as a significant technology option before 2015, but remain the long-term goal for the industry as a whole. Policy developments in different markets will influence technology decisions.

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FIGURE 2.3. LOWER CARBON TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP

US, EU, JAPAN

Fuel Cell

HybridDieselIncremental Technologies

JAPAN

EU

US

EU

(US)

US, EU, JAPAN

2005

2005
Diesel standards
in Japan and EU(EURO IV)

2007
CAFE standard forlight trucks and Tier 2emissions standards in US

2010

2008
First phase ofEU’s ACEA
agreement

2010
Weight-based CO2
standards in Japan;
EURO V diesel standards

2015 +

2012
Possible second
phase of
ACEA agreement

2.2.1 Incremental Technologies
Context“Incremental technologies” offer
immediate low-cost opportunities
for fuel economy gains.

A number of incremental technologies could be introduced to raise fuel economy beyond thelevel associated with the standard gasoline-ICE vehicle. In many cases, these technologies
are already developed and well understood.31 The technologies likely to be introduced include:❙

Engine technologies such as direct fuel injection, variable valve timing and cylinder
deactivation❙

Transmission technologies, such as improved automatic and continuously variabletransmissions❙

Vehicle technologies, such as drag reduction, integrated starter-generators and weight
reduction

OEMs are already introducing these technologies and touting the fuel economy benefits. For
example, GM claims that its new “Displacement on Demand” cylinder deactivation technology will improve fuel economy by 8 to 25 percent.32

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CO2 Reduction Potential
The individual impact of many incremental technologies is small. Continuously variabletransmissions may reduce fuel consumption by 4 to 8 percent; variable valve timing by 1 to
8 percent.33 However, the combined effect of introducing several of these technologies into avehicle model could quickly add up. In addition, some imminent technologies could have alarger impact. By operating at high pressure, advanced direct-injection gasoline engines
increase energy efficiency and can reduce CO2 emissions by 20 percent compared to standard gasoline engines. Direct injection engines are likely to become standard over the next
decade.
Potential for Competitive Advantage
Incremental technologies, including advanced gasoline engines, are unlikely to be the foundation for competitive advantage for OEMs because of their piecemeal nature and the factthat they are broadly understood in the industry. Thus, there is limited potential for branddifferentiation or to set de facto standards. Some technologies may generate specific customer appeal, such as continuously variable transmission with its ability to deliver asmoother ride, but it will be difficult for an OEM to establish or maintain a competitive
advantage on the basis of such a technology.

2.2.2 Diesel (Compression Ignition) Technology
Context
Diesel technology is wellunderstood but faces challenges
outside Europe.

The compression-ignition engines used to combust diesel fuel allow OEMs to produce more
powerful and durable vehicles with potentially lower carbon emissions. Diesel engine vehicles are already commonplace in the European automotive market, where they make up
nearly 40 percent of current sales, largely on the back of preferential tax treatment fordiesel fuel.34 Again, the technology is relatively well developed with key suppliers (e.g.,
Bosch and Delphi) set to introduce third-generation diesel systems in 2006. Operating ateven higher pressures than today’s diesel engines, these systems will further enhance the
combustion process and reduce CO2 emissions.35
The key challenge for diesel manufacturers will be their ability to meet clean air standards.
The United States, European Union and Japan are all committed to stricter air quality standards for emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and particulate matter (PM), which diesel
engines emit in greater quantities than gasoline engines. Stringent Japanese air pollution
regulations, coupled with strong government support of hybrid technology, make it unlikelythat diesels will make significant inroads into the Japanese market. In the United States,
pending Tier 2 emissions regulations could similarly restrict OEMs’ ambitions to introduce
diesels, though the introduction of low-sulfur fuel in 2006 may make diesels a feasible
option. Even in Europe, where the current standard is more lax, the new EURO IV standards
may challenge OEMs.
Another obstacle for the US market is winning consumers over to diesel. Consumers familiar
with the loud and sooty diesel cars of the 1970s may be skeptical and OEMs will likely haveto invest resources to educate and persuade consumers that the modern diesel engine is

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significantly more sophisticated than its predecessors. DC and VW are currently marketing
diesel engine vehicles in the United States. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether regulators and consumers will favor diesel outside of the European market.
CO2 Reduction Potential
As a fuel, diesel is more carbon-intensive than gasoline on a per unit basis. However, diesel
can be used with compression-ignition (CI) engines, which are 20 to 40 percent more efficient than the spark-ignition (SI) engines required to combust gasoline.36 As a result, adiesel vehicle emits 10 to 30 percent fewer CO2 emissions per km traveled than a comparable gasoline-fueled vehicle.
Potential for Competitive Advantage
The competitive importance of diesel will be determined by a variety of factors, including
growth in the European market and uncertainty about diesel introduction in North America.
Currently, some 90 percent of global diesel sales are in Europe.37 Diesel sales accounted for
40 percent of total European vehicle sales in 2002, up from 35 percent a year earlier, due tohigh fuel prices and improved affordability.38 Diesel may reach an estimated 50 percent
market share in Europe by the end of this decade. This makes diesel crucial for access toand profitable growth in the European market. Importantly, diesel already offers OEMs asource of differentiation, which is reflected in a pricing premium of approximately €200 per
engine over gasoline-based vehicles.39 In the United States, if clean diesel technology canmeet regulatory standards and win over consumers, early movers could gain a competitive
advantage.

2.2.3 Hybrid Technology
Context
Hybrid technology will become
mainstream over the next decade.

Hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) have drivetrains that combine an electric drive (consisting ofan electric motor and some form of electricity storage, typically a battery) with a fuel-basedengine (e.g., an internal combustion engine). However, HEVs may use onboard electrical
power to varying degrees. “Full hybrids” permit some actual propulsion using electric power,
whereas “mild hybrids” may limit use of the electric motor to regenerative braking or vehicle idling.40
HEVs are already being sold in Japan and the United States. US sales are likely to reach
54,000 in 2003 and could rise to 872,000 by 2013.41 Moreover, given stricter emissions regulations and energy security concerns around the world, HEVs could potentially account for
10 percent of global market share by 2010.42 Genuine competition around HEVs is alreadyappearing. DC, Ford and GM have all announced plans to introduce HEVs—some of which
will only be mild hybrids—even as Toyota and Honda are bringing their second-generation
hybrids into the marketplace.
The key challenges for OEMs seeking to mainstream HEVs will be to overcome higher costs
and ensure profitability. HEVs currently sell for $3,000 to $4,000 more than conventional
equivalents, which impedes efforts to benefit from economies of scale at this stage.43

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CO2 Reduction Potential
HEVs have the potential to reduce well-to-wheel CO2 emissions by 50 percent compared to
today’s diesel and gasoline engines.44 HEVs could also benefit from the difficulties diesel
may confront in meeting clean air regulations and overcoming negative perceptions in the
United States. There is less ambiguity about HEVs’ environmental impact. Even in Europe,
where diesel is a mainstay technology, hybridization will probably be necessary as OEMs
approach the 140 g CO2/km target and the 120 g CO2/km target that may follow. Incentives
in Japan look certain to accelerate hybrid uptake in that market.
Potential for Competitive Advantage
The combination of promising growth prospects, the potential to set de facto industry standards and enhanced brand equity is expected to turn HEVs into a key for competitivenessacross major automotive markets through 2015. The eagerness with which the Big Three
have publicized plans for hybrid models in response to the pace-setting by Honda andToyota signals this as an area where OEMs will compete in the future.

2.2.4 Fuel Cell Technology
Context
Fuel cells represent the long-term
goal, but face formidable
economic and technologicalobstacles.

Fuel cells are electrochemical devices that convert a fuel’s energy directly into electricalenergy. They represent the long-term goal for the industry. The prospect of highly efficient
vehicles consuming hydrogen and emitting only water constitutes a major advance in vehicle technology that could greatly shrink the environmental footprint of the automobile.
However, given the technology’s complexity, fuel cells remain extremely costly. To competewith existing technology, costs for fuel cells will have to fall from their current cost of$2,500 per kilowatt produced to $50 per kilowatt.45 Despite significant investments and thefast pace of development, it is highly uncertain whether OEMs will be able to bring costs
down to this level within the next decade. Similarly, the development of a hydrogen infrastructure will face considerable physical and regulatory challenges. The cost of establishinga large-scale hydrogen infrastructure in the United States comparable to current gasoline
networks is estimated at over $100 billion, and will require significant collaboration
between OEMs and energy companies.46
CO2 Reduction Potential
Fuel cells powered by hydrogen offer the promise of zero-carbon vehicles, if the hydrogencan be produced from renewable sources of primary energy, such as solar or wind. Currently,
however, more than 90 percent of hydrogen is produced by industrial processing of naturalgas, a fossil fuel.47 Hydrogen can also be derived from on-board conversion of traditional
fuels, but this too generates CO2 emissions. With significant hydrogen production fromrenewable sources unlikely over the next decade, well-to-wheel CO2 reductions from fuel cellvehicles (FCVs) will be comparable to those promised by hybrids for the foreseeable future.48

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Potential for Competitive Advantage
Having raised unrealistic market expectations in the late 1990s, OEMs are now understandably cautious about prospects for large-scale introduction of fuel cells. However, they cannot afford to discount the possibility that such an important and potentially disruptive technology will eventually enter the marketplace. Therefore, establishing a strong position infuel cells is a key strategic challenge for OEMs today and one that is expected to grow inimportance through 2015. The potential to recoup development costs sooner than competitors by setting industry standards has triggered a genuine race in the automotive industry
around fuel cell technology. As a result, leadership in fuel cell technology may be central for
long-term competitiveness in the industry.

2.3 TECHNOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY AND THE ROLE OF PARTNERSHIPS
OEMs are already taking different
positions on lower-carbon
technologies, which could
influence how they fare undercarbon constraints.

While carbon constraints exert significant influence on current innovation within the industry, there is great uncertainty regarding the engine technology(ies) that will emerge as market standard(s) in the coming years. Uncertainty is compounded by the fact that emission
standards, technology and fuel preferences differ across markets. The choice of which technologies to pursue is a vital one for OEMs.
To maintain a competitive position in an environment of uncertainty, OEMs have an incentive to explore a broad range of technologies and pursue different learning paths. Doing so,though, places a significant burden on innovation capacity and R&D budgets. Each OEM
will have to pursue and manage a minimum of three main technology pathways that provide scope for competitive advantage—diesel, hybrid and fuel cell technology—as well as
keep up with incremental advances.

Partnerships permit innovation atlower cost.

To reduce innovation costs, OEMs are increasingly engaged in research partnerships, oralliances, around lower-carbon technologies. Given the strategic importance of lower-carbon
technologies for the industry in general, these “tie-ups” are of increasing significance andcould signal the shape of future industry consolidation.49
Alliances and partnerships help OEMs in several ways:50❙

Enhanced cost competitiveness through economies of scale and cost leadership

Some partnerships seek to generate economies of scale to improve the cost basis of lowercarbon technology, thus reducing the time needed to cover development costs and/or to
improve the operating margin of new vehicles. A good example is the recent tie-up between
Toyota and Nissan around HEVs. The partnership aims to put Toyota and Nissan in a strong
position to be able to recover development costs and bring down production costs througheconomies of scale earlier than competitors. As an initial project, Nissan will be installing a
hybrid system currently under development by Toyota into its vehicles to be sold in the
United States in 2006. Volume is expected to reach approximately 100,000 units within the
5-year period that follows. The Nissan tie-up is expected to contribute to Toyota’s global
sales objective of 300,000 HEVs annually through its dealerships by 2007. If successful,
this partnership would be a significant milestone for mass-commercialization of HEVs.

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CHAPTER 2❙

Enhanced access to technology and markets through partners

Some partnerships aim to fill a gap in an OEM’s technology portfolio without relying solely
on its own R&D resources. With key markets increasingly displaying preferences for lowercarbon technologies, this type of partnership allows an OEM to retain market access, or
position itself for future growth. US and Japanese OEMs are increasingly partnering with
European OEMs that have diesel expertise to grow market share in Europe through diesel
technology. For instance, Toyota has teamed up with PSA in the Czech Republic to develop a
joint vehicle platform, including small diesel engines supplied by PSA. This strengthens
Toyota’s access to the growing European diesel market.
❙

Enhanced ability to set de facto standards

Increasingly, OEMs strive to establish de facto standards for lower-carbon technologies. This
type of partnership holds potential for reducing costs and enhancing brand differentiation.
Establishing de facto industry standards helps to bring down development and component
costs by allowing for economies of scale. In addition, setting de facto standards allows
OEMs to capitalize on a first-mover advantage, including enhanced pricing power and setting the pace of technology development. New technologies can also be licensed to otherOEMs. For example, as early as 1993, DC forged an alliance with fuel cell producer Ballard
to build up a leading position in fuel cell technology. Ford subsequently joined the alliancein 1998. The partnership covers a broad range of technology options, including fuel cells
that operate directly on hydrogen rather than fossil fuels as well as reformer technology toenable hydrogen storage on board the vehicle, one of the key obstacles to commercializationof fuel cell technology in automobiles. The DC-Ford-Ballard alliance holds significant potential to establish industry standards and thereby establish a strong competitive position in
the emerging market for fuel cell technology.
Partnerships can also be a challenge. Among other things, partnerships involve revealing
strategically important know-how, learning to cooperate effectively despite crucial differences in corporate culture, and managing conflicts of interest arising from multiple partnerships among OEMs. Nonetheless, partnerships have become a feature of the modern
automotive industry. (See Table 2.2.)

TABLE 2.2. Selected OEM Partnerships in Key Lower Carbon Technologies
Technology

DieselPartnership Members

Possible Benefits of Partnership

Lead Technology
Developer

PartnerOEM(s)

AccessEconomiesof Scale

PSA

Ford

x

x

Renault

Nissanxx

De facto
Standards

ToyotaBMWxx

HybridToyotaNissan (DC)

x

x

x

Fuel Cell

Toyota

GM

x

x

x

Ballard

DC/Fordxx

x

Notes: Brackets indicate possible future partnerships.

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Critically, through their internal innovation and external partnerships, OEMs have taken different positions with regard to new technologies. Some have hedged their bets, while others
have chosen to specialize and develop expertise in one particular area. Table 2.2 gives an
overview of internal expertise and key partnerships around lower-carbon technologies. With
the notable exception of Honda, all OEMs have entered into a partnership on at least one of
the key lower-carbon technologies, but some companies have developed considerably broader portfolios than others. The implication of these different positions is explored further in
Chapter 5.

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THE ANALYSIS
In view of the growing carbon constraints on automotive markets, a key challenge for
sector investors and OEM managers is to quantify the impact of carbon constraints oncompetitiveness. In Chapters 3 to 6, we analyze how carbon constraints could affect theshareholder value creation of 10 leading OEMs: BMW, DC, Ford, GM, Honda, Nissan, PSA,
Renault, Toyota and VW. The geographical focus is the US, EU and Japanese markets,
which account for nearly 70 percent of current global sales. The time period analyzed isfrom 2003 to 2015.
Carbon constraints create both risks and opportunities for OEMs. Risks principally takethe form of possible increases in costs to meet new standards and/or loss of market
share to more fuel-efficient producers. Opportunities lie in the potential to develop successful strategies to reduce carbon emissions that translate into technological leadership, enhanced market share and greater profits.
Risks and opportunities for OEMs are analyzed in the ensuing chapters as follows:
Chapter 3 quantifies the Current Carbon Profiles of OEMs. With distinctive product portfolios and geographical focuses, each OEM starts from a unique position in responding
to carbon constraints.
Chapter 4 presents the results of a Value Exposure Assessment, which quantifies thepossible costs to OEMs of meeting new carbon constraints.
Chapter 5 presents findings from a Management Quality Assessment, which analyzes
each OEM’s potential ability to benefit from carbon constraints by developing and commercializing the lower-carbon technologies that will be key for long-term competitiveness.
Chapter 6 aggregates the findings and explores their implications for OEMs’ future
earnings.

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CHAPTER 3

Chapter 3

Current Carbon Profiles of Leading
OEMs

SUMMARYIn producing different vehicles for different markets, OEMs vary substantially in the carbon emissions associated with their product portfolios. Some OEMs rely heavily for sales
and profits on vehicles that emit relatively high amounts of CO2, while other OEMs derive
the bulk of their profits from vehicles that are less carbon-intensive. By measuring the“carbon intensity” of current sales and profits, it is possible to assess each OEM’s initial
exposure to emerging carbon constraints. All else being equal, OEMs that earn a relatively large proportion of their profits from carbon-intensive segments will find carbon
constraints more challenging. Of course, differing consumer preferences and regulatory
attitudes to carbon constraints across major markets must also be taken into account.
PSA, Renault and VW stand out as deriving over 90 percent of current profits from vehicles of low or medium carbon intensity. On the other hand, GM and Ford currently earnover 70 percent of total profits from vehicles that emit more than 270 g CO2/km (lessthan 20.5 mpg).
3.1 FACTORS AFFECTING THE CARBON INTENSITY OF OEMS
OEMs whose profits comeprimarily from carbon-intensive
segments will be more challenged
by carbon constraints.

OEMs rely to differing extents on sales of high carbon-emitting vehicles to generate current
profits. Hence, the “carbon intensity of profits” varies across the industry. All else being
equal, OEMs with high carbon intensity of profits will find carbon constraints more challenging than OEMs with lower carbon intensity of profits.
The assessment in this chapter provides a snapshot of where OEMs are today with regard tolight-duty vehicle carbon emissions. It is based on the latest publicly available information
about sales volumes and carbon intensity of each OEM’s light vehicle models. (See Box 3.1
for information on data sources.) The data highlight that OEMs are starting from different
points when it comes to addressing carbon constraints. Past business decisions and current
product mix give each company its own unique carbon intensity of sales and profits, andhence exposure to carbon constraints.

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BOX 3.1. Data Sources
The analysis in Chapter 3 is based on a dataset developed by SAM and WRI for thisreport. Sales data are from US and European editions of Automotive News and the Japan
Automobile Dealers Association, which only includes domestic production in Japan. Dataon fuel efficiency were obtained from the US Environmental Protection Agency andDepartment of Energy for US sales, from the German Federal Motor Transport Authority for
EU sales, and from various company and industry data sources for Japanese sales.
OEM sales data include sales from subsidiaries in proportion to their ownership stakes.
Hence, for example, a share of Mitsubishi’s sales are included in DC’s sales and similarly
for Mazda and Ford. In addition, the figures reflect the current cross-ownership between
Renault and Nissan. Renault owns 44 percent of Nissan while Nissan owns 15 percent ofRenault. Hence, in some of the charts, Renault is shown as having sales in the UnitedStates and Japan, which essentially reflect Renault’s share of Nissan’s sales.
Finally, CO2 emissions rates and fuel economy figures refer to “on road” rather than test
results. On road levels are considered to be a more accurate representation of the emissions rates and fuel economy realized in practice compared to official tests, which tend
to underestimate emissions levels and overestimate fuel economy performance.
A number of overlapping factors influence the carbon emissions associated with OEMs’
product portfolios:

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SAM & WRI❙

The three main automotive markets demand different vehicle types. Regional differences in government regulations, demographics, transport infrastructure and consumer
preferences create differential demand in the various markets. (See Figure 3.1.) For
example, in Europe and Japan, high fuel prices and smaller, more congested roads
result in a strong consumer preference for small and midsized vehicles. In the UnitedStates, a greater share of light duty vehicle sales is made up of larger vehicles, including SUVs and pickups.

❙

OEMs’ sales are differently distributed across the three main markets. For example,
PSA’s sales are exclusively in Europe while the primary market for DC, Ford and GM is
the United States. The Japanese companies are heavily invested in both Japan and theUnited States. (See Figure 3.2.)❙

OEMs produce different mixes of vehicles. With different geographical focuses, OEMs
concentrate on different vehicle segments. Nearly half of the vehicles that the US-based
OEMs sell are light trucks, such as minivans, SUVs and pickups. In contrast, cars makeup more than 90 percent of sales for PSA, VW and BMW. (See Figure 3.3.)❙

CO2 emissions rates vary across segments according to vehicle size and weight. The
global average CO2 emissions rate for a midsized car was 198 g CO2/km (28 mpg) in
2002, while the average SUV emitted more than 300 g CO2/km (less than 18 mpg). (SeeCHAPTER 3

FIGURE 3.1. SHARE OF MARKET SALES BY SEGMENT, 2002

FIGURE 3.2. OEMS’ SALES BY MARKET, 2002

100%
Subcompact
Compact
Medium

Japan

Large
MinivanSUV
US

Pickup

Percentage of 2002 sales

EU

80%
US
60%

Japan
EU

40%
20%
0%
BMW

0%

20%

40%
60%
80%
Percentage of 2002 sales

Ford

GM Honda Nissan PSA Renault Toyota VW

Notes: Sales for each OEM include ownership share of their subsidiaries’ sales.
Excludes sales outside of US, EU and Japan.

Note: Based on sales of the OEMs analyzed in this report.

FIGURE 3.3. SHARE OF GLOBAL SALES BY SEGMENT, 2002

FIGURE 3.4. AVERAGE CO 2 EMISSIONS RATES BY SEGMENT, 2002

100%

350
Pickup80%

SUV
Minivan60%

LargeMedium40%

Compact
Subcompact

20%

Carbon Emissions Rate (g CO2/km)

Percentage of 2002 sales

DC

100%

300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Subcompact Compact

MediumLarge

Minivan

SUV

Pickup

DC

GM

rd

ta

Fo

To

yo

nd

a

an

Ho

ult

ss
Ni

W

na

BM

Re

PS
A

VW

0%

Note: OEMs ordered by increasing share of light truck sales.

FIGURE 3.6. RELATIVE CO 2 INTENSITY OF OEMS IN SUV SEGMENT

a
nd
Ho

ta
yo
To

Ni

ss

an

-20%
VW

A
PS

ult
na

ta
Re

yo
To

a
Ho
nd

VW

GM

rd
Fo

an
ss
Ni

DC

W

-20%

-10%

DC

-10%

0%

W

0%

BM

10%

10%

rd

20%

20%

Fo

30%

GM

Percentage difference in carbon
emissions rate from industry average

40%

BM

Percentage difference in carbon
emissions rate from industry average

FIGURE 3.5. RELATIVE CO 2 INTENSITY OF OEMS IN MIDSIZED CAR SEGMENT

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CHANGING DRIVERS

Figure 3.4.) On average, the emissions rates of SUVs and pickups are approximately
twice those of subcompact and compact vehicles.
❙

CO2 emissions rates can also be substantially different within segments. Emissions
rates for midsized cars vary by 50 percent across OEMs and by 40 percent for SUVs. (SeeFigures 3.5 and 3.6.) In the midsized car segment, BMW and DC’s vehicles have thehighest carbon intensity, reflecting the luxury vehicles that the two OEMs produce in thissegment. Within the SUV segment, Ford and GM’s models are currently the most carbonintensive, while Nissan, Toyota and Honda produce SUVs of lower than average carbon
intensity. Some of this difference is due to the greater concentration of the former OEMsin the full-size SUV market, and may change as the latter release larger and heavier
SUVs.

3.2 THE CARBON INTENSITY OF SALES
The carbon intensity of sales
differs among OEMs.

Given the above factors, vehicles sold by OEMs in 2002 exhibit markedly different average
CO2 emissions rates. In other words, OEMs had different levels of “carbon intensity ofsales”. (See Figure 3.7.) Virtually all of PSA’s sales consist of vehicles whose carbon emissions are less than 200 g CO2/km (greater than 27.5 mpg). In contrast, DC, Ford and GM are
the main sellers of high carbon-intensity vehicles.
Not all of the difference in carbon intensity of sales is due to the concentration of OEMs indifferent markets. For example, DC and Ford are among the top four OEMs by vehicle carbon
intensity in all three markets. (See Table 3.1.) Similarly, Honda’s and Nissan’s fleets have
below average carbon intensity in all three markets.

FIGURE 3.7. CARBON-INTENSITY OF OEM’S SALES, 2002
100%

Share of total sales

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
PSA

VW

Honda

BMW

NissanToyotaVehicles of:Notes:
High: Greater than 270 g CO2/km (less than 20.5 mpg).
Medium: 200 - 270 g CO2/km (20.5 - 27.5 mpg).
Low: Less than 200 g CO2/km (greater than 27.5 mpg).
Boundaries for high, medium and low categories were informed by the current CAFE standards for cars and light trucks,
rounded slightly for convenience.

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Renault
Low Intensity

GM

Ford
Medium Intensity

DCHigh Intensity

CHAPTER 3

TABLE 3.1. Average CO 2 Emission Rates per Vehicle for Each OEM by Region, 2002
United States

European Union

Japan

OEM

g CO2/km

Mpg

g CO2/km

Mpg

g CO2/km

BMW

251

22.0

214

25.8

—

Mpg
—

DC

282

19.6

234

23.6

230

24.0

Ford

295

18.7

196

28.2

212

26.0

GMa

293

18.8

181

30.6

143

38.6

Honda

214

25.8

174

31.8

174

31.7

Nissan

242

22.8

159

34.8

185

29.8

PSA

—

—

166

33.2

—

—

Renaultb

242

22.8

149

37.1

185

29.8

Toyota

245

22.5

180

30.7

200

27.6

VW

220

25.1

179

30.7

—

—

Notes: Increasing CO2 emissions rates (g CO2/km) correspond to decreasing fuel economy (mpg).
a. GM’s sales in Japan represent less than 8,000 sales of Suzuki and Isuzu vehicles, which reflect GM’s ownership stakes in these companies.
b. Renault’s figures for the United States and Japan represent sales of vehicles by Nissan, in which Renault has
a 44 percent ownership stake.

3.3 THE CARBON INTENSITY OF PROFITS
Because some segments of the vehicle market are more profitable than others, the carbon
intensity of profits differs from the carbon intensity of sales. However, attributing profits tomarket segments is complicated by the large fixed costs in the industry and by significant
general expenditures on such things as R&D and advertising. Table 3.2 presents estimatesof the profitability of segments for each OEM.51

OEMs differ in their reliance on
carbon-intensive segments togenerate profits.

TABLE 3.2. Estimated Share of Profits by Vehicle Segment for Leading OEMs
BMW

DC

Ford

GM

Honda

NissanPSA

Renault

ToyotaVW

Subcompact

2

1

1

1

1

—

—

6

1

3

Compact

39

4

2

1

5

5

32

27

6

16

Medium

3

30

10

9

46

34

61

48

16

68

Large

34

39

9

17

—

18

3

9

23

10

MiniVan

—

3

5

—

21

3

4

10

11

2

SUV

22

18

33

30

26

28

—

—

23

1

Pickup

—

5

40

42

—

12

—

—

20

—

Source: SAM Research based on WestLB, Deutsche Bank Research, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers and Schroder Salomon Smith Barney.

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FIGURE 3.8. CARBON-INTENSITY OF OEM’S PROFITS, 2002
100%

Share of total profits

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
PSA

Renault

VIW

Honda

NissanBMW

ToyotaVehicles of:

Low Intensity

DC

GM
Medium Intensity

Ford
High Intensity

Notes:
High: Greater than 270 g CO2/km (less than 20.5 mpg).
Medium: 200 - 270 g CO2/km (20.5 - 27.5 mpg).
Low: Less than 200 g CO2/km (greater than 27.5 mpg).
Boundaries for high, medium and low categories were based on the current CAFE standards for cars and light trucks,
rounded slightly for convenience.

Using these profit figures and the CO2 emissions rates of the different segments, we canillustrate the relative carbon intensity of profits. (See Figure 3.8.) Again, PSA and Renault
are least dependent on more carbon-intensive vehicles to generate profits, but Ford and GM
derive more than 70 percent of their profits from high carbon-emitting vehicles, because
their profits are disproportionately attributable to light truck sales.
The assessment in this chapter is a snapshot of where OEMs find themselves today.
Naturally, data on current sales and fuel economy only indicate the current status of wherecompanies are—not how they can, and will, respond to carbon constraints. The next two
chapters contain forward-looking assessments that take account of different possible
development paths in different markets and the abilities for companies to respond to carbon constraints through innovation and strategic decision-making.

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CHAPTER 4

Chapter 4

Value Exposure Assessment

SUMMARY
It will cost OEMs different amounts to produce the less carbon-intensive vehicles
required to meet emerging carbon constraints in the three main automotive markets. By
combining OEM-specific data on sales and fuel economy with cost estimates for incremental technologies, hybrids and diesels, we estimate the overall cost each OEM will
incur to meet alternative potential standards for fuel economy or carbon emissions
between now and 2015.
Because OEMs’ product mixes differ with respect to carbon-intensity levels, the costs
incurred in meeting new standards will vary across the industry. WRI estimates thatcosts per vehicle will range from $650 for BMW to less than $25 for Honda.
OEMs could see returns on these costs in two ways. First, some OEMs will have to spend
less than others and so should become more price-competitive in the marketplace andenjoy higher sales. Second, consumers may perceive additional value from the introduction of lower-carbon technologies, independent of impacts on CO2 emissions. For
instance, diesel and hybrid technologies both offer non-carbon-related attributes that
consumers may be willing to pay extra for. In addition, the fuel savings generated bymost of the technologies referred to in this chapter outweigh the incremental manufacturing costs. If consumers were to value these fuel savings at the time of purchase,OEMs could recover their full costs.
4.1 OVERVIEWThe Value Exposure Assessment seeks to answer the following question:❙

What costs do OEMs face in meeting higher fuel economy standards in 2015, given theirinitial sales levels and vehicle mix?

In all three main automotive markets covered in this report—the United States, European
Union and Japan—governments have committed to higher fuel economy or CO2 emission
standards in the coming years. These standards will require OEMs to make potentially costly
changes to vehicle specifications and sales mix. The costs incurred by each OEM will varydepending on its product portfolio and the current sales-weighted average fuel economy ofits fleet, and on the costs of achieving CO2 reductions for different vehicle types. The Value
Exposure Assessment aims to quantify the range of costs that carbon constraints may
impose on OEMs over the next 12 years.

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This chapter gives an overview of the analysis. More details on the methodology andassumptions are available in a separate Appendix accompanying this report.52

4.2 METHODOLOGY
We developed a methodology to estimate the cost that each OEM will incur to meet different
possible carbon constraints between now and 2015. In our analytical model, each OEM ischaracterized by its 2002 sales and fuel economy levels and has access to three main categories of lower-carbon technologies—incremental technologies, diesel, and hybrid technology. Fuel cell technology is ignored in this analysis because it is unlikely to contribute toactual CO2 reductions before 2015.53
The model calculates the lowest-cost combination of technologies that an OEM must add toits existing vehicle fleet to ensure that it meets the specified new standards. Separate
analyses are done for the US, EU and Japanese markets and then aggregated to produce anoverall cost estimate for each OEM.
Because of uncertainties about the future regulatory environment, we assess sensitivity todifferent levels of carbon constraint that may emerge by 2015. In addition, we explore different market penetration rates for diesel and hybrid technologies because of uncertainties
regarding their technological development and acceptance by regulators and consumers.
Though the main analysis does not take into account inevitable changes in sales and vehicle mix over the next decade, it provides a quantitative insight into the magnitude of costs
that each OEM might face in order to improve the carbon intensity of its vehicles. In addition, Section 4.4 describes potential changes in sales that might arise from efforts to lower
carbon intensity.

4.2.1 Carbon Constraint Scenarios
While significant carbon
constraints are in place in Europe
and Japan, the outlook for theUnited States is more uncertain.

To reflect uncertainty about future carbon constraints, we analyzed two different levels ofemissions standards (“high” and “low”) for each market for 2015. (See Figure 4.1.) These
scenarios aim to bracket possible developments in each market.
For the European Union and Japan, future standards have already been signposted throughvoluntary agreements and regulations. In the United States, scenarios reflect much greater
uncertainty. The United States recently tightened its CAFE standards for light trucks to 22.2
mpg (249 g CO2/km) from 20.7 mpg (267g CO2/km). However, fuel economy standards forpassenger cars may not change before 2015. Bills proposing tighter standards for passenger cars have repeatedly been rejected by the US Congress, while both the Administration
and Congress have shown little willingness to introduce policies to address climate change.
On the other hand, some recent developments argue for the possibility of significantly
tighter carbon constraints for passenger cars by 2015. California has passed a law that will
regulate CO2 emissions from vehicles by 2009, and other states have shown interest inemulating this approach. In addition, continued energy security concerns may advance
CAFE standards by 2015.

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CHAPTER 4

The details of the scenarios used for each market are described in Section 4.3. Predicting
which of these, or other, scenarios is likely to occur is inherently difficult, given the manyfactors that may influence the setting of carbon constraints between now and 2015.
Consequently, we weigh high and low scenarios equally. We also report results for individual
scenarios in the figures in Section 4.3.

FIGURE 4.1. CURRENT AND FUTURE CARBON CONSTRAINTS IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN
EU

US

Japan

g CO2/km

300

200

100
Current fleet
emissions rate

Possible carbon
constraints in 2015

Current fleet
emissions rate

Possible carbon
constraints in 2015

Current fleet
emissions rate

Possible carbon
constraints in 2015

Existing regulations (low scenarios)
Note: Current fleet emissions rate reflects emissions rate of vehicles sold in 2002.

More stringent regulations (high scenarios)

4.2.2 Characterization of OEMs
OEMs may be limited in theircapacity to adjust segment mixes
in response to carbon constraints.

Each OEM is characterized in terms of vehicle sales in seven separate segments for each of
the three main markets. OEMs have different initial levels of carbon intensity for each segment in each market. One limitation of the analysis is that vehicle sales by company and bysegment are kept constant at 2002 levels. This assumes that consumers will continue tobuy the same types of vehicles from the same OEMs. In practice, of course, an obvious
response to carbon constraints is for OEMs to adjust segment mix to produce relatively more
low-emissions vehicles.
However, there are a number of reasons to expect that OEMs may be constrained in changing their segment mix. First, decisions about vehicle type are dominated by expectations
regarding the use of the vehicle, such as passenger and load requirements, type of driving,
etc. This limits substitution possibilities. Second, even where there is interest in fuel efficiency, survey results show that consumers would prefer to buy more fuel-efficient versionsof their current vehicle rather than to switch to a more fuel-efficient vehicle type.54 Third,
the commitment to platforms and the time lags associated with production changes limit
OEMs’ ability to move rapidly in or out of segments.
In addition, a review of OEMs’ near-term production plans reveals that some OEM fleets will
become more carbon-intensive in the near future as they move to larger or more luxurious
vehicles. Hence, holding segment mix constant at 2002 levels may underestimate cost
impacts for some OEMs. Finally, some implications for sales and margins are reviewed in
Section 4.4.

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4.2.3 Technology Costs
Costs of lower-carbon technology
will vary across segments andOEMs.

Between now and 2015, OEMs will have access to three core types of CO2-reducing technologies (incremental technologies, diesel and hybrid technology). These technologies will
have different costs in terms of dollars required to generate a given reduction in CO2. In
addition, the costs of a given technology will vary across different vehicle segments (e.g.,
hybridization may be more expensive in pickups than smaller cars) and in some cases by
OEM (e.g., Toyota and Honda should be able to add hybrid technology at lower cost thanother OEMs).
Cost information on incremental technologies forms the basis of our estimates. We used
cost data from a recent National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study addressing both existingand emerging technologies that should be readily available by 2015.55 The underlying cost
data reflect both capital and operating costs required to improve fuel economy. For suchtechnologies, capital expenditures are expected to account for approximately one third of
total costs. For incremental technologies, costs are assumed to be equal across all OEMs,
given the well-understood and relatively well-developed nature of those technologies. In
practice, though, some OEMs may have small near-term advantages in this area because ofexisting expertise in conventional ICE technology.
These cost curves are modified in certain sub-scenarios by introducing diesel and hybrid
powertrains as additional CO2-reducing technologies. For most OEMs, costs are lower inscenarios where diesel and hybrid technology is available.56 Availability of diesel and hybrid
technologies differs by market. For example, diesel, which is already established in Europe,
appears in all sub-scenarios for the European Union but is ignored in Japan. Also, while it isassumed that incremental technologies can be applied to all vehicles, ceilings are placedon the adoption rate of diesel and hybrid technologies, reflecting likely production and market constraints on their penetration over a 12-year period. (See Table 4.1.)
TABLE 4.1. Maximum Assumed Diesel and Hybrid Penetration Rates in 2015,
by Market
MarketDiesel penetration rate (%)

Hybrid penetration rate (%)

US

20

15

EU

65

15

Japan

—

30

Moreover, for hybrid and diesel technology, we assume that manufacturing costs vary
among OEMs according to level of expertise with these technologies. Using results from theManagement Quality Assessment in Chapter 5, we ranked OEMs in terms of their expertisewith diesel and hybrid technologies. Leaders in each group were assumed to be able toimplement the new technology at a 5 percent cost reduction, while laggards were assumed
to incur a 5 percent cost penalty. (See Table 4.2.)

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CHAPTER 4

TABLE 4.2. Ranking of OEMs by Technological Leadership
Leader
(5% cost reduction)

Neutral

Laggard(5% cost penalty)

Diesel

PSA, VW

DC, Renault (Nissan),Toyota, BMW

Ford, GM, Honda

HybridHonda, Nissan (Renault),
ToyotaDC, Ford, GM

BMW, Peugeot, VW

Technology

Source: Management Quality Assessment. See Chapter 5.

4.3 MARKET-SPECIFIC RESULTS
Costs for each OEM were determined for the United States, European Union and Japan.
Results from each market are described below.

4.3.1 United States
For the United States, we evaluated two scenarios of equal weight. The low scenario was
based on the conservative assumption that no further changes are made to CAFE standards
over the next 12 years beyond the recent tightening for light trucks. This raises standards by
1.5 mpg for light trucks by 2007 to 22.2 mpg (249 g CO2/km).
In the high scenario, fuel economy standards rise to 33 mpg and 25 mpg (167 g CO2/km
and 221 g CO2/km), respectively, for cars and light trucks. These represent standards that
the NAS finds will maximize net economic and social benefits and can be achieved using
available or nearly available technologies.57 Though a significant increase over today’s standards, they still fall well below current standards in the European Union and Japan.
Furthermore, these standards are in line with the levels that would be achieved in 2015 if
the current CAFE increase of 1.5 mpg over 3 years for light trucks were extended at thesame rate for all vehicles over this time frame.
Though there has been debate about the future structure of the CAFE program, we assumed
that the distinction between imported and domestic vehicles disappears by 2015 for bothscenarios. In addition, we assumed that the distinction between cars and light trucks would
persist, but that the light truck category would expand upwards to include several large
models of SUVs and pickups that currently are exempt from CAFE standards.
The costs of meeting a stricter CAFE standard vary widely among companies, because of thedifferent vehicle mix and initial levels of average fuel economy. (See Figure 4.2.) Costs also
vary significantly between the high and low scenarios. Ford, GM, BMW and DC incur thegreatest additional costs per vehicle. Honda is virtually unaffected in either scenario.

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FIGURE 4.2. COST PER VEHICLE OF MEETING HIGHER CAFE STANDARDS IN THE
UNITED STATES

Additional cost per vehicle

$800

$600

$400

$200

$0

Ford

GM

BMW

DC

VW
High scenario

NissanToyotaHonda

Low scenario

Notes: OEMs not shown do not have sales in the United States. Figures represent the costs of altering today’s vehicles tomeet the standards assumed for 2015.

4.3.2 European Union
For Europe, we evaluated a low scenario reflecting the first step of the ACEA agreement(140 g CO2/km) and a high scenario in which CO2 emissions standards are tightened to the
120 g CO2/km rate that is the potential next phase of the agreement.
To date, the industry has not disclosed the working structure of its voluntary commitment,
creating marked uncertainty for investors about its financial implications. For this analysis,
we assumed in both scenarios that the target would eventually be binding on each OEM’s
fleet. A binding target reflects the strong interest of EU regulators in seeing the agreement
succeed and their likely willingness to step in if it does not. If so, it is plausible to imagine
a system that places equal responsibilities on individual OEMs, whether it requires each tomeet the standard through emissions reductions in its own fleet or whether the standard
can be met through some form of trading among OEMs of CO2 reduction credits. However,until the structure of the agreement is fully disclosed, investors will remain uncertain about
the financial consequences for OEMs: while a CAFE-like structure of a single target for each
OEM would reward companies currently producing vehicles that are the least carbon-intensive, a structure based on proportionate reductions from current starting points would havethe opposite effect.58
An important feature of the European market is the already high level of market penetrationof diesel vehicles. In 2002, diesels accounted for 40 percent of sales and in the diesel scenario, this level could increase to as much as 65 percent by 2013. This preference for diesel
is due mainly to favorable tax treatment.

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CHAPTER 4

FIGURE 4.3. COST PER VEHICLE OF MEETING LOWER CO 2 EMISSIONS STANDARDSIN THE EUROPEAN UNION$1,400Additional cost per vehicle$1,200$1,000
$800
$600
$400
$200
$DC

BMW

Ford

Toyota

GM

VW

Honda

PSA

NissanHigh scenario

Renault

Low scenario

Note: Figures represent the costs of altering today's vehicles to meet the standards assumed for 2015.

Again, costs vary significantly by OEM. (See Figure 4.3.) DC and BMW have the highest
additional costs per vehicle in both scenarios. Renault, Nissan and PSA stand out as having
little or no new additional costs in either scenario. Note that the high figures represent
manufacturing costs only. If OEMs rely on diesel technology to lower carbon intensity—as is
expected—it is likely that they could recoup all or most of these costs given the price premium that currently exists for diesel technology.

4.3.3 JapanFor Japan, we evaluated a low scenario based on the 2010 standards, which a majority ofvehicles are already in compliance with. In the high scenario, the recent rate of mandated
fuel economy improvements was extended to 2015. This implies a 46 percent increase infuel economy by 2015 relative to 1995 levels. Although this standard seems quite stringent,
the implied trajectory of improvement is below that required to achieve the government’s
goal of fleet average fuel economy of 48 g CO2/km (115 mpg) by 2025. Moreover, given thenumber of vehicles that exceed the 2010 standard already, such a target seems feasible.
The Japanese government has established a clear preference for hybrid over diesel technology. Thus, we assume that only incremental and hybrid technologies will be adopted by 2015.
Again, costs fall on OEMs to different degrees. (See Figure 4.4.) Ford and Nissan would
incur the greatest additional costs if more stringent CO2 emissions standards were enacted
in Japan. There are virtually no costs incurred in the low scenario.

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FIGURE 4.4. COST PER VEHICLE OF MEETING LOWER CO 2 EMISSIONS STANDARDSIN JAPAN

Additional cost per vehicle

$800

$600

$400

$200

$0
NissanFord

DC

ToyotaHonda

High scenarioGM
Low scenario

Notes: OEMs not shown do not have sales in Japan. Figures represent the costs of altering today’s vehicles to meet the standards
assumed for 2015.

4.4 AGGREGATE RESULTS AND FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
4.4.1 Aggregate OEM Costs to Meet Carbon Constraints
Total costs to meet carbon
standards in the major global
automotive markets differ
substantially among OEMs.

The financial impacts for the separate markets were aggregated to identify the overall costfor each OEM to meet new standards in the markets in which it competes. (See Figure 4.5
and Tables 4.3 and 4.4.) Because OEMs have different product mixes with different carbonintensity levels, the costs incurred in meeting new standards will vary across the industry.
Our analysis shows that costs of compliance per vehicle will range from nearly $650 for
BMW to less than $25 for Honda.
Although mid- to long-term competitiveness in the industry will rest heavily on the successful development and commercialization of diesel, hybrid and fuel cell technologies, ouranalysis indicates that the majority of the near-term carbon reductions are achieved byless-heralded incremental technologies that are already available.
It is uncertain to what extent OEMs will be able to pass on cost increases to customers.
In the current atmosphere of highly competitive pricing, the scope to pass on costs may besignificantly limited. Consequently, cost increases could translate directly into lower EBIT
margins. This is the simplest interpretation of these results and the one that is used toanalyze overall findings in Chapter 6.
However, while production cost increases are the most immediate manifestation of new
carbon constraints, two related impacts discussed below may affect OEMs’ value creation
potential: (i) scope for relative cost changes to influence sales volumes (up or down); and(ii) potential for all OEMs to benefit from perceived extra value of vehicles that are more
fuel-efficient.

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FIGURE 4.5. ESTIMATED COSTS PER VEHICLE TO MEET CO 2 EMISSIONS STANDARDS BY 2015
$700

Additional cost per vehicle

$600
$500
$400
$300
$200
$100
$0
BMW

DC

Ford

GM

VW

NissanToyotaPSA

Renault

Honda

Renault$122

Toyota
$102

VW
$119

TABLE 4.3. Estimated Costs per Vehicle to Meet CO 2 Emissions Standards by 2015, by market

US

BMW
$267

DC
$257

Ford
$380

GM
$399

Honda
$2

EU

$807

$984

$455

$289

JP

—

$279

$287

—

$649

$459

$403

$377

AverageNissan
$122

PSA
—

$175

$54

$82

$3

$314

$210

$23

$340

—

$340

$190

—

$24

$172

$82

$79

$170

$195

Notes: Average costs per vehicle reflect sales-weighted averages of costs in individual markets. Renault is attributed sales in US and Japan because of its 44 percent
stake in Nissan.

TABLE 4.4. Estimated Total Costs to Meet CO 2 Emissions Standards by 2015, by market ($millions)

US

BMW
$69

DC
$642

Ford
$1,333

GM$1,869Honda$3

Nissan
$50

PSA
—

EU

$502

$957

$757

$336

JP

—

$10

$18

—

Total

$571

$1,609$2,107$2,205

Renault$40

Toyota
$177

VW
$59

$32

$19

$18

$123

$170

$3

$202

$554

—

$98

$254

—

$53

$192

$170

$141

$634

$613

Note: Renault is attributed sales in US and Japan because of its 44 percent stake in Nissan.

4.4.2 Implications for Sales
Fuel economy improvements could
alter demand patterns forvehicles.

Though vehicle pricing is currently very competitive, if the industry as a whole is facingpressure to lower carbon intensity, it is likely that average vehicle prices will rise as OEMstry to recoup costs. Moreover, over a 10-year period, there is ample scope for OEMs to raise
vehicle prices: since 1970, the average amount that US consumers have been willing tospend on a new vehicle has increased by $229 each year.59

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However, the combined efforts of OEMs to recover costs through higher prices may create
new incentives for customers to switch to new vehicle segments and/or manufacturers. For
example, if the full costs are passed on to consumers with a markup to cover overheads anddealer margins, we found that efforts to improve fuel economy in the US might lead to a$540 increase in the average price of an SUV, but only a $280 increase in the average priceof a compact car. Though customers’ choice of vehicle type is influenced by many factors,
changes in relative price could alter relative sales growth in segments over time.
Similar effects hold for consumers’ choice among models produced by different OEMs. For
example, the price of an average vehicle sold in the United States by Ford (which had thelowest fleet average fuel economy in 2002) would rise by $800 in the high scenario, while
the price of an average vehicle sold by Honda (which has the highest average fuel economy)
would rise by a mere $5. To recoup costs, Ford will have to raise the price of its vehicles bymore than the average OEM, while Honda will have to raise its price by only a negligible
amount, and by considerably less than the average OEM. Consequently, one would expect
Ford’s sales to suffer, while Honda’s might increase. These sales impacts would further
influence OEMs’ earnings and profits.

4.4.3 Scope for Higher Margins from Enhanced Fuel Economy
Fuel economy improvements
create more valuable cars.

Though fuel economy improvements initially entail higher production costs, these improvements generate fuel savings that more than offset those costs. For example, for US sales asa whole, meeting fuel economy standards in the high scenario leads to an average sales
price increase of $587 per car in the US market. However, improved fuel economy produces
fuel cost savings of $913 in the first 5 years of ownership (the typical ownership period for
new vehicle buyers), more than offsetting the increase in vehicle purchase price.60 If consumers were to recognize the full value of fuel savings, they would perceive vehicles withimproved fuel economy as more valuable than existing models that are otherwise comparable. In turn, this might offer OEMs an opportunity to capture some of the value created byfuel savings in the form of higher prices, thereby increasing margins. The challenge forOEMs is to find ways to effectively market fuel savings in a carbon-constrained world. In the
United States, OEMs have long maintained that consumers do not value fuel economy highly. However, in countries where fuel prices are higher and/or incomes are lower, fuel economy
is a more important component of the buying decision.
Even if consumers do not value fuel economy, consumers may value some of the otherattributes offered by major new technologies, such as the durability of diesel or theadvanced safety systems that hybrids may permit. Diesel engines in Europe already command a price premium of €200 above the additional costs of diesel engines relative togasoline engines. It is conceivable that hybrid-related features will offer similar non-environmental benefits to consumers. If so, this would create additional opportunities for OEMs
to lower overall costs or derive profit through meeting carbon constraints.

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CHAPTER 5

Chapter 5

Management Quality Assessment

SUMMARY
Offsetting the risks, emerging carbon constraints create opportunities for OEMs toenhance their competitiveness by developing vehicles that produce fewer carbon emissions. The degree to which OEMs succeed in this depends on the quality of management
decisions made with regard to lower-carbon technologies. One challenge for managers
is to establish leadership in one or more lower-carbon technologies that may be vital for
future profits. In addition, given that most OEMs compete in more than one of the threemajor automotive markets, each of which has its own technology preferences, anotherchallenge is to ensure that the strategy for reducing carbon emissions is robust, or balanced, across the multiple technology pathways outlined in Chapter 2.
In this chapter, we analyze each OEM’s strategic positioning and quality of managementwith regard to carbon constraints. The strength and robustness of an OEM’s strategy forlowering carbon emissions depends on a set of six key management competencies.
Toyota, DC and Renault-Nissan have the strongest overall management quality scores
across all lower-carbon technologies, though some other OEMs have strong positions inindividual technologies.
5.1 OVERVIEW
The Management Quality Assessment seeks to answer the following question:❙

Which OEMs have the strongest potential to capitalize on their investments in lower-carbon technologies and so benefit from carbon constraints?

In Chapter 2, we identified diesel, hybrid and fuel cell technology as key sources for futurecompetitive advantage. The actual development of these technologies is only part of thechallenge facing OEMs. OEMs also have to commercialize, market and mass produce thesetechnologies if they are to reap the full rewards. Consequently, an OEM’s ability to capitalize
on carbon constraints depends on a wide range of management attributes regarding lowercarbon technologies, beyond just technological development capabilities.
By virtue of their market exposure, past management decisions and financial resources(among other factors), OEMs exhibit different levels of management quality with respect tolower-carbon technologies. The stronger an OEM’s overall management capabilities in thisarea, the more likely it will be able to benefit from carbon constraints. While some OEMs
have strong capabilities in one or two lower-carbon technologies, a few exhibit strength
across all three technologies. Given uncertainties about the development of these technolo-

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gies, and their acceptance by consumers and regulators in different markets, a strong management strategy across all three technologies may be advantageous.
This chapter gives an overview of the analysis. More details on the results for individualOEMs can be found in Section 3.

5.2 METHODOLOGY
The analytical framework we used to assess lower carbon management quality is based ona management competence model developed by SAM Research. For the purpose of thisreport, SAM Research’s standard competence model was adapted to focus on OEMs’ ability
to derive competitiveness through strategies to achieve lower carbon intensities (or “lowercarbon strategies”). The quality of such strategies is driven by a core set of managementcompetencies, including strategic, financial, governance, customer and product, human,and process. (See Table 5.1.)
The Management Quality Assessment focuses on the three technologies—diesel, hybrid andfuel cell technology—that are most likely to form the basis for long-term competitive
advantage. We believe that there is less scope for an OEM to establish a competitive edge
TABLE 5.1. Management Competencies Relevant for Assessing Lower Carbon Strategies
Competence

Business CaseCore Indicators

Strategic

Alignment of lower carbon strategy to business strategy enhances strategic co-ordination and isessential to derive competitiveness from lower carbon technologies

Level of strategic commitment
Level of strategic coordination
Targets
Milstones

Financial

Ability to fund development and commercialization of lower carbon technologies is a key driver for
turning lower carbon strategy into a competitive advantage

Cash position
Level of R&D Expenditure
Capital structure
Access to capital
Investor relations

Governance

Setting de facto standards in lower carbon technologies allow OEMs to capitalize on first moveradvantages, such as enhanced pricing power

Ability to set de facto standards
Market share
License to operate

Customer & ProductIntroducing a lower carbon technology ahead of competition holds strong potential for competitiveness, including brand equity.

Ability to derive brand equity
Margins
Market share
Cross-selling
Customer feedback

Human

Access to technology and ability to capitalize on intellectual capital through partnerships is essential
for deriving competitiveness from lower carbon technologies

Number of patents
R&D headcountPartnerships

Process

The ability to generate economies of scale allows to compensate development costs ahead of peers

Economies of scale
Process efficiency
Production flexibility
Industrial ecology

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FIGURE 5.1. STRUCTURE OF MANAGEMENT QUALITY ASSESSMENT

Overall Management Quality Score(Diesel, Hybrid, F uel Cell)

Total Score

Technology
ScoresCompetence
ScoresManagement Quality
Diesel Technology

Strategic

Financial

Management Quality
Hybrid Technology

Governance

CustomerandProduct

Management Quality
Fuel Cell Technology

HumanProcess

through lower-carbon technologies based on advanced gasoline engines and incremental
technologies, given the mature stage of development of these technologies and widespread
understanding of these technologies.
The full set of competencies was assessed and evaluated for each of the three lower-carbon
technologies. The six competencies were scored for each technology using a simple scoring
system of 0 (Low), 1 (Medium), and 2 (High). The scores for the individual competencies
were then aggregated (equally weighted) into a management quality score for each lowercarbon technology. In turn, the technology-specific scores for diesel, hybrid and fuel cell
technology were aggregated (equally weighted) into an overall management score to provide
an indication of overall management strength. (See Figure 5.1.)
Finally, though Nissan and Renault are treated as separate OEMs elsewhere in the report,
they received the same management quality scores. This reflects their close alliance andthe expected increasing level of integration and strategic coordination between the twoOEMs over the next decade.

5.3 MAIN RESULTS
Company-specific information on management quality and strategic positioning can befound in Section 3 of this report. The following provides an overview of relative strategic
positioning with regard to lower-carbon technologies.
OEMs differ in the overall strengthof their lower-carbon strategies.

By combining scores across technologies, we derive an overall score for lower-carbon strategy for each OEM. (See Figure 5.2.) Toyota, DC and Renault-Nissan appear to have thestrongest current management quality with regard to lower-carbon technologies. At the

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FIGURE 5.2. MANAGEMENT QUALITY ASSESSMENT: ALL LOWER-CARBON TECHNOLOGIES
100
90

Management Quality Index

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ToyotaDC

RenaultNissan

Honda

Ford

GM

VW

BMW

PSA

Note: Management quality score for BMW reflects its activities regarding the hydrogen-powered internal combustion engine.

other end of the scale, PSA and BMW display the weakest management positioning regarding lower-carbon technologies.
OEMs display different strengths indifferent technologies.

Besides overall strength, an OEM’s current strategy with regard to carbon constraints may
be more or less robust (or balanced) across alternative technology pathways. Based partly
on prevailing regulatory regimes in their most important markets, OEMs have developed different preferences for lower-carbon technologies. Figure 5.3 reflects the strategic choices
made by OEMs. While most European OEMs display a strategic bias toward diesel, US-based
OEMs focus on fuel cell technology. Toyota and Honda show most bias toward hybrid technology. Renault-Nissan stands out among OEMs as having one of the more balanced lowercarbon strategies, reflecting the alliance’s strategic fit and competitive potential.

5.4 TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC RESULTS
5.4.1 Management Quality in Diesel Technology
Process competence andcustomer competence will be
crucial for capitalizing on diesel
technology.

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Diesel is a relatively cheap and well-established lower-carbon technology. As a result,financial and technology development competencies are of increasingly less competitive relevance. Rather, the management challenge will be to maintain margins in the face ofincreasing competition through strong reputation, economies of scale, and flexibility of production. Consequently, management quality is reflected in a strong diesel sales base, highdiesel margins, and cost leadership.

CHAPTER 5

FIGURE 5.3. RELATIVE ROBUSTNESS OF MANAGEMENT QUALITY ACROSS
LOWER-CARBON TECHNOLOGIES
100
90

Management Quality Index

80
70
60
50
40
30
Diesel 20
Hybrid
10
Fuel
Cell
0
BMW

DC

Ford

GM

Honda

PSA

RenaultNissan

Toyota

VW

Note: Management quality score for BMW reflects its activities regarding the hydrogen-powered internal
combustion engine.

European OEMs are morecompetitive in diesel.

VW’s and PSA’s market leadership in diesel is clearly reflected in their high management
quality scores. (See Figure 5.4.) Among the non-European OEMs, Toyota and Ford appear tobe the most interesting. Toyota has recently stepped up its efforts in diesel due to a moreaggressive push into Europe, where diesel is key for growth, and in preparation for meeting
new Tier 2 air quality standards in the United States from 2007 onwards. By cooperatingwith PSA, Ford may have an opportunity to improve its diesel capabilities quickly by leveraging economies of scale. As a result, Ford’s process competence regarding economies ofscale is a key driver for its management quality score.
The following examples highlight some of the factors explaining OEMs’ different positions
on diesel technology:
Leading edge: VW
Diesel has been a strategic priority for VW for some time, and accounts for nearly 50 percent of the OEM’s European sales.61 This puts VW in a strong position to benefit from further
diesel market growth over the next decade, especially in Europe. Moreover, VW´s European
market leadership in diesel provides the company with significant brand equity. As a result,
VW commands a higher price premium on its diesel sales relative to peers. Large global
platforms and a modular strategy will provide for economies of scale and put VW in astrong position to strengthen margins.

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FIGURE 5.4. MANAGEMENT QUALITY ASSESSMENT: DIESEL TECHNOLOGY
100
90Management Quality Index

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
VW

PSA

DC

RenaultNissan

Toyota

BMW

Ford

GM

Honda

Note: Renault and Nissan receive the same management quality assessment scores to reflect the expected levelof integration and strategic coordination between the two OEMs over the next decade.

Catching up: Ford
Ford is quickly expanding its diesel sales base, especially in Europe. Given that Ford iscatching up with peers rather than leading, the company is unlikely to derive differentiation
and brand equity from diesel technology. While this may limit upside potential of margins
for diesel options, Ford may benefit from cost advantages due to the recent partnership with
PSA that aims to establish a low-cost diesel platform.
Low profile: Honda
Realizing that diesel is a prerequisite for profitable growth in the European market, Honda
only recently introduced a diesel option. Honda may temporarily offset its lack of scale
through flexibility but may be at a structural disadvantage in the longer run. This is compounded by the fact that Honda avoids working through partnerships. This might limit
Honda’s ability to generate a competitive advantage in diesel.

5.4.2 Management Quality in Hybrid Technology
Financial, governance, andcustomer competencies will be
important for capitalizing on
hybrid technology.

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Given the nature of HEVs as a relatively immature, emerging lower-carbon technology, themain challenges center around high development costs and lack of customer acceptance.
As a result, the strategic management challenge is to quickly recoup development costs
and to grow a strong customer base. Accordingly, key characteristics of management quality
are the ability to forge strategic partnerships as well as moving faster up the learning
curve. These factors increase the potential to set de facto standards.

CHAPTER 5

FIGURE 5.5. MANAGEMENT QUALITY ASSESSMENT: HYBRID TECHNOLOGY
100
90Management Quality Index

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ToyotaHonda

RenaultNissan

DC

Ford

GM

PSA

VW

BMW

Note: Renault and Nissan receive the same management quality assessment scores to reflect the expected levelof integration and strategic coordination between the two OEMs over the next decade.

Japanese OEMs have a strong
strategic position in hybrid
technology.

In contrast to Europe, the Japanese government has long expressed a preference for hybrid
technology over diesel. This has allowed Japanese OEMs to establish early-mover advantages that are reflected in their management quality scores. (See Figure 5.5.) In addition,
because of uncertainty regarding future technology pathways in the United States, USbased OEMs have recently stepped up their hybrid development. This is reflected in theslightly above average level of management quality. However, their ability to derive competitiveness from hybrid technology is still limited compared to their Japanese counterparts,
who are the dominant players in this technology.
Leading edge: Toyota
Past management decisions have allowed Toyota to keep key technological knowledge inhouse while at the same time establishing partnerships that could generate economies ofscale. As a result, Toyota has established a unique competitive position in hybrid technology, which is reflected in its current 90 percent share of the global market for HEVs. In particular, the recent tie-up with Nissan indicates that Toyota is close to setting a de facto
industry standard in hybrid technology. Having been the first to market with HEVs, Toyota is
well ahead of competition in terms of organizational learning. Moreover, by building up astrong customer base for advanced vehicle technology, Toyota is starting to capitalize on its
early market experience. Toyota can be expected to continue to invest aggressively in hybrid
technology, further separating the company from its rivals, including Honda. While Honda’s
engineering expertise in hybrid technology is among the strongest in the industry, its reluctance to enter into partnerships similar to the Toyota-Nissan tie-up may limit its ability to

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CHANGING DRIVERS

capitalize fully on investments in lower-carbon technologies, for example through setting defacto standards and economies of scale.
Catching up: GM
GM has only recently changed its strategy on hybrid technology. By introducing a wide rangeof hybrid or near-hybrid options, GM seems to be building up an opportunistic hedge position against a potential uptake of HEVs, especially in the US market. While GM is well positioned to bring down costs for hybrid technology by virtue of its size, the lack of market
experience with hybrid technology may turn out to be a structural disadvantage relative tothe early movers.
Low profile: BMW
Reflecting the company’s cautious position on hybrid technology, BMW has not taken any
visible strategic steps regarding HEVs. While BMW´s strong cash flow in principle provides acomfortable position from which to fund hybrid technology development, resource allocation
seems to be limited to research activities rather than a systematic commercialization strategy. Moreover, lack of scale may put BMW at a structural disadvantage to generate a premium on capital-intensive hybrid options.

5.2.4 Management Quality in Fuel Cell Technology
Financial, governance and humancompetencies will be key forcapitalizing on fuel cell
technology.

Because it is still early days for fuel cells, a range of technology issues remain to beresolved. This will require continued financial and R&D commitment. Importantly, the challenge is to bring the technology to the market ahead of rivals in order to recoup development costs and benefit from first-mover advantages. The key aspects of management quality on fuel cells are strong institutional and human R&D capacity, resource allocation andthe ability to work through strategic partnerships.

Two key partnerships areadvancing fuel cell technology.

As a result of these challenges, relative strategic positioning with respect to fuel cells isdetermined primarily by two main partnerships that have developed: DC-Ford-Ballard andToyota-GM. These tie-ups are designed to provide partners with a head start as the market
for FCVs emerges. (See Figure 5.6.) Their strategies differ slightly. While DC and Ford areoutsourcing development and future production of fuel cells to Ballard Power Systems,
Toyota is working on a proprietary technology. If successful, this could be the source of valuable licensing revenue as other OEMs utilize the technology.
Based on the competence evaluation, the two dominant OEMs in this area are Toyota and
DC. Given that BMW is not visibly pursuing fuel cell technology as a powertrain option, we
have considered their efforts to commercialize a hydrogen-powered internal combustion
engine. In an environment of uncertainty around the emergence of fuel/technology pathways, a hydrogen-powered ICE could prove a viable alternative to fuel cells. This explains
the relatively high score of BMW in Figure 5.6.

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FIGURE 5.6. MANAGEMENT QUALITY ASSESSMENT: FUEL CELL TECHNOLOGY
100
90Management Quality Index

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Toyota

DC

GM

Ford

BMW

Honda

RenaultNissan

VW

PSA

Notes: Renault and Nissan receive the same management quality assessment scores to reflect the expected levelof integration and strategic coordination between the two OEMs over the next decade. Management quality score
for BMW reflects its activities regarding the hydrogen-powered internal combustion engine.

Leading edge: DC
DC has made fuel cell technology a cornerstone of its technology leadership strategy, forging an early partnership with Ballard, a leading supplier of fuel cells. This alliance, which
now includes Ford, holds considerable potential to set de facto technology standards. Thisputs DC in a strong position to capitalize on its development costs through first-moveradvantages. Moreover, DC has centralized its fuel cell R&D activities at the corporate level,strengthening strategic coordination and efficiency of resource allocation.
Catching up: Renault-Nissan
Nissan is aggressively pursuing fuel cell technology. Through its alliance with Renault,
Nissan is in a good position to leverage its technology expertise (reflected in a large numberof patents) with significant funding. Moreover, industrial synergies and the emergence of
joint global platforms may put Renault-Nissan in a strong position to commercialize fuelcell technology in the longer term.
Low profile: PSA
Having reviewed its strategy on fuel cells, PSA has decided that it is too early for a strategic
engagement. This suggests that PSA is significantly reducing resource allocation to fuel cell
technology. As a result, PSA works mainly through publicly sponsored European research
programs. This approach diminishes opportunities for PSA to derive competitive advantage
from fuel cell technology.

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CHAPTER 6

Chapter 6

Aggregate Results and Implications for
Value Creation

SUMMARY
This chapter outlines the implications of the separate risk and opportunity assessments
described in Chapters 4 and 5 for OEM profitability and value creation. We translate theprevious findings into changes in discounted EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes), a
foundation for financial valuation in the sector.
Results show that OEMs are very differently positioned with respect to both the risks andopportunities presented by carbon constraints. Toyota emerges as the most strongly
positioned company, while Ford and GM appear least well placed to respond to carbon
constraints.
6.1 AGGREGATE RESULTS
Chapters 4 and 5 respectively assess OEMs’ positioning regarding risks and opportunities
from new carbon constraints. The Value Exposure Assessment in Chapter 4 estimates thecosts in dollars that carbon constraints could impose on OEMs. The Management Quality
Assessment in Chapter 5 ranks OEMs on their potential to capitalize on carbon constraints.
Combining the two results provides a two-dimensional matrix upon which OEMs can bemapped. (See Figure 6.1.) Risk reflected by the Value Exposure Assessment is measured on
the vertical axis, while opportunity captured by the Management Quality Assessment ismeasured on the horizontal axis. The top right quadrant (low value exposure – high management quality) represents better than average performance on both criteria.
Several findings are of note:❙

OEMs vary considerably with respect to both value exposure and management quality
around carbon constraints. This indicates that carbon constraints have the ability to
influence competitive balance within the industry.

❙

Honda is the OEM that has the lowest value exposure. It faces the least immediate risk
from carbon constraints as the current high fuel efficiency of its vehicles implies only
minimal costs to meet new standards. Toyota emerges as the clear leader on carbonrelated management quality with a strong position in all three technologies that will be
key for long-term competitiveness.

❙

Renault and Nissan are also strongly positioned with better than average management
quality scores and lower than average expected costs from carbon constraints.

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FIGURE 6.1. QUANTIFICATION OF THE RISKS (Value Exposure) AND OPPORTUNITIES(Management Quality) OF CARBON CONSTRAINTS
$-

Honda

ToyotaNissanVW$200
Additional costs per vehicle

D EC R EASI N G R I SK F ROM CARBON CONST RAI NT S

Renault

PSA

$100

$300

GM
Ford

$400

DC
$500

$600

BMW
40

50

60

70

80

90

Management Quality Index
I N C R EASI N G O PPO R TU N I TY FR O M C AR B O N C O N STR AI N TS
Note: The lines indicate industry averages in each category.

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SAM & WRI❙

PSA and VW are two other OEMs that have lower than average value exposure, while DC
has above average management quality with regard to carbon constraints.

❙

BMW stands out as having the greatest value exposure, though this may be somewhat
misleading. BMW is the smallest of the 10 OEMs reviewed and produces exclusively premium (and high cost) vehicles. Consequently, BMW has a greater ability to pass on
costs to consumers than do other OEMs.

❙

PSA has the weakest management strategy regarding carbon constraints, which may
limit its ability to exploit opportunities even though it faces low expected costs.

❙

Ford and GM both have above average value exposure and below average management
quality regarding climate risks. Their value exposure is driven principally by the relatively low fuel efficiency of their current vehicle mix. While much of this is due to their lead-

CHAPTER 6

ership in the carbon-intensive segments of the US market, which may not face immediate constraints, their current bias towards heavy vehicles coupled with below average
positioning on hybrid and diesel technology may limit their near-term competitiveness in
non-US markets.
Section 3 of the report contains more details on each OEM’s position.

6.2 THE IMPLICATIONS OF CARBON CONSTRAINTS FOR SHAREHOLDER VALUECREATION
A key challenge for analysts is to determine the implications of these findings for earnings,
return on invested capital (ROIC) and thus shareholder value creation. In this section, we
translate the results of the Value Exposure and Management Quality assessments intochanges in forecasted EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) for the period 2003 to 2015.
EBIT is a foundation for valuation estimates in this sector and so changes in an OEM’s EBIT
offer useful insights into possible changes for overall shareholder value.
Converting our cost estimates and management quality scores into EBIT figures sets our
results in the context of existing and projected business performance. Though this adds
confounding factors to our initial results, it nonetheless represents the basic challenge facing investors: to understand the additive effect that carbon constraints may have on each
OEM’s financial position.
Value Exposure translates into
reductions in EBIT.

As the results of our Value Exposure Assessment are denominated in dollars, it is relatively
easy to integrate these into existing financial valuation models. Carbon-related costs will
increase the costs of goods sold and so reduce EBIT.
We developed a simple model based on the SAM Sustainability DCF (Discounted Cash Flow)model to forecast the impacts of value exposure for each company’s discounted EBIT fromthe period 2003 to 2015.62 (See column 1 of Table 6.1.) Information on recent years’ costand EBIT margins was combined with SAM and Deutsche Bank forecasts for sales growthand changes in EBIT margins to derive a baseline EBIT forecast. This baseline reflects
important differences in OEMs’ fundamental business performance. For example, someOEMs, like GM and Ford, are expected to see slower than average sales growth in the coming years as others compete for their profitable SUV segment. Additionally, some OEMs,
such as BMW and Toyota, are expected to retain higher EBIT premiums because of such factors as brand and quality.
We then applied our cost estimates to see how they would alter the baseline discounted
EBIT value. Translating cost estimates into EBIT changes the rankings of companies withregard to risks. BMW improves its performance notably. While BMW faces the highest estimated cost per vehicle to meet carbon constraints, as a premium OEM that enjoys higher
than average price margins, it should have a greater ability to tolerate new costs than doother OEMs. This ensures that the EBIT implications of its value exposure are less damaging
than the cost-only figures would suggest.

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In contrast, GM and Ford’s slightly higher than average cost per vehicle estimates lead tosignificant reductions in their EBIT forecasts. As noted above, this is driven in part byunderlying assumptions about the current financial position of these OEMs. With bothOEMs’ sales growth and EBIT margins currently lower than the industry averages, GM and
Ford can tolerate additional costs less well.
Management Quality could affectmultiple financial metrics.

While management quality is extensively analyzed by investors, it is a very difficult concept
to integrate into financial valuation models. In practice, good management quality will tend
to permeate throughout the income statement and balance sheet rather than appearing discretely in certain places. Each analyst has their own preferred method of reflecting management quality within valuation models.
Good management quality regarding carbon constraints could have a positive impact on anumber of financial variables, including increases in:❙

EBIT margin (e.g., if a successful carbon strategy leads an OEM to produce new vehicles
that confer higher pricing power)❙

return on invested capital (ROIC) (e.g., if a successful development strategy allows an
OEM to recover its R&D costs more quickly)❙

sales (e.g., if an OEM can be first-to-market with a new lower-carbon technology thathas mass customer appeal).

Though it is possible to identify such links, it is difficult to gauge the magnitude of impactthat good management quality might have on specific variables.
As an indication of how analysts might use these results, we translate scores from theManagement Quality Assessment into changes in EBIT margins in order to integrate themwith the results of the Value Exposure Assessment. We assumed that the OEM with thestrongest management quality (i.e., Toyota) would see its projected EBIT margin increase by
20 percent, while the OEM with the weakest management quality (i.e., PSA) would see no
TABLE 6.1. Potential Impact of Carbon Constraints for Discounted EBIT,
2003–2015 (percentage change from baseline EBIT forecast)56

SAM & WRI

Impact of Value
Exposure Assessment(risk)

Impact of Management
Quality Assessment(opportunity)

Combined
Impact

BMW

-4

1

-3

DC

-6

7

1

Ford

-14

4

-10

GM

-11

3

-7

Honda

0

3

3

Nissan

-1

4

3

PSA

-2

0

-2

Renault-2

6

4

Toyota

-2

10

8

VW

-3

2

-1

CHAPTER 6

FIGURE 6.2. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CARBON CONSTRAINTS FOR DISCOUNTED EBIT
(2003–2015) BASED ON VALUE EXPOSURE AND MANAGEMENT QUALITY ASSESSMENTS
Percentage change in discounted EBIT relative to baseline

15%

10%

5%

0%

-5%

-10%

-15%
ToyotaRenault

Nissan

Honda

DC

VW

PSA

BMW

GM

Ford

change in its projected EBIT margin. For the remaining OEMs, changes in EBIT margin lay inbetween these two extremes based on their relative management quality scores.63
Integrating this strategy premium into the EBIT forecast reveals a significant upside effect,reflecting the potential to establish a competitive advantage through lower-carbon strategies. (See column 2 of Table 6.1.)
These combined results are presented in Figure 6.2 to show the range of possible effects on
EBIT, in terms of percentage changes from business-as-usual EBIT projections. The upper
limits reflect the results from the Management Quality Assessment alone, while the lower
limits are results from the Value Exposure Assessment alone. The points indicate our estimate of the combined impact of both assessments on EBIT.
Combining value exposure and carbon strategy scores into a single EBIT measure demonstrates once again that carbon constraints could significantly affect the competitive balance within the industry. Changes in EBIT forecasts range from a 8 percent increase to a 10
percent decrease. Toyota appears best positioned, while Ford has the weakest result.

6.3 MAIN CONCLUSIONS
Though the shape of future carbon constraints and the stringency with which they will be
enforced are uncertain, there is every indication that they could have a profound effect on
the competitive balance in the industry.
In the short term, carbon constraints could present the industry with new cost burdens thatvary among OEMs. In particular, we find that BMW (with estimated costs of $649 per vehicle) may have to spend twenty-five times more per vehicle to meet carbon constraints than
Honda ($24 per vehicle). Some of these costs could be recouped by price premiums for

SAM & WRI

57

CHANGING DRIVERS

diesels and hybrids, both of which offer additional attributes that drivers may value. Even
more of these costs could be recouped if more consumers were to account properly for fuelcost savings, though this tendency varies from market to market.
In the mid- to long term, carbon constraints will also create opportunities by raising thecompetitive significance of vehicle and engine technologies that offer improved fuel efficiency. This is an area in which OEMs are very differently positioned. Toyota stands out as
best-positioned on these issues overall. In contrast, BMW and PSA are in the weakest positions. Certain OEMs show additional strengths and weaknesses with respect to particular
lower-carbon technologies.
While the findings refer primarily to carbon constraints, they also shed light on how OEMs
may perform in response to other pressures that would lead consumers or regulators tovalue fuel economy more highly (e.g., energy price rises or renewed energy security concerns). Indeed, consumer and policy responses to energy market shocks may play out considerably more rapidly than the steady progress in carbon regulations envisaged in thisreport, potentially making manufacturing adjustments more awkward. If so, the impacts on
OEMs—whether positive or negative—may be more extreme than reported here.

58

SAM & WRISECTION 3

THE COMPANIESSAM & WRI

59

CHAPTER 7

BMW faces the highest value exposure of the OEMs and a lower than averagemanagement quality score. These results translate into changes in estimated EBIT
of -3% through 2015. The combined impact on EBIT is muted compared to other
OEMs with similar value exposure results because of the high margins BMW
commands as a premium brand. This will make it easier for BMW to recoup costs.

DECREASING RISK FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTSBMW Group

BMW
INCREASING OPPORTUNITY FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTSVALUE EXPOSURE

FIGURE 1
Value Exposure Relative to Peer Average

Premium strategy generates high carbon intensity.
Additional cost
per vehicle
($’s)

BMW

Average

800
600
400
200
n.a.

0
US

EU

Japan

TOTAL

MANAGEMENT QUALITY *FIGURE 2Management Quality on Lower-Carbon
Technologies Relative to Peer Average
BMW

Investments in lower-carbon technologies hold potential to create brand equity.

Average

DieselHybridFuel Cell

0

20

40

60

80

BMW faces the highest costs in the industry for its 2002 fleet to meet higher fuel economy
standards in the European Union and United States. (See Figure 1.) However the impact ofthese costs on EBIT is muted due to the higher margins BMW earns as a premium brand.
BMW currently derives an estimated 37 percent of global profits from vehicles that emit
more than 270 g CO2/km (less than 20.5 mpg), with an estimated 30 percent of total profits
coming from the US market, especially in larger cars. In light of the increasing importanceof the US market for BMW, especially in the light truck segment, carbon intensity of profits
is on the rise. Recently, BMW started to diversify into smaller, lower-carbon segments.
However, the potential to reduce carbon intensity of profits through sales in smaller carssuch as the Mini or the forthcoming 1-series is limited due to strong sales in larger cars,
with the 3-series continuing to be the top-selling model. Plans to introduce hydrogen
options for some selected models face significant market barriers. BMW’s hydrogen-basedcars are not expected to be profitable over the next decade and hold little potential to lower
the carbon intensity of profits.

100

BMW shows above average management quality in hydrogen-powered internal combustion
engine technology, a lower-carbon technology equivalent to fuel cells. (See Figure 2.) In particular, BMW is set to derive significant brand value from its focus on the hydrogen-poweredinternal combustion engine due to strong alignment with its premium strategy. Given the
combination of a high cash position, strong cash flow and high R&D spending, BMW would
be generally well placed to allocate resources to the development and commercialization oflower-carbon technologies. However, it seems that BMW lacks hedging in hybrid technology
and fuel-cell propulsion technology, which could prove a disadvantage. Moreover, lack ofscale may prove a structural challenge for the commercialization of lower-carbon technologies in general.

Management Quality Index*

Since BMW is not visibly pursuing fuel cell technology as a powertrain option, the evaluation in this category reflects thecompany’s efforts regarding the commercialization of a hydrogen-powered internal combustion engine.

SAM & WRI

61

CHANGING DRIVERS

High sensitivity to carbon constraints combined with high potential to derivecompetitiveness from diesel and fuel cell technology translates into changes
in estimated EBIT of +1% through 2015.

DECREASING RISK FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTS

DaimlerChrysler

DC

INCREASING OPPORTUNITY FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTSVALUE EXPOSURE

FIGURE 1
Value Exposure Relative to Peer Average

Chrysler turnaround is driving carbon intensity.
Additional cost
per vehicle
($’s)

$984

DC

Average

EU

Japan

TOTAL

800
600
400
200
0
US

MANAGEMENT QUALITYFIGURE 2Management Quality on Lower-Carbon
Technologies Relative to Peer AverageDC

Ability to streamline global platforms is a challenge.

Average

DieselHybridFuel Cell

0

20

40

60

Management Quality Index

62

SAM & WRI

80

DC faces the second highest costs in the industry for its 2002 fleet to meet higher fueleconomy standards in the United States, European Union and Japan. (See Figure 1.) The
cost exposure is created mainly by light trucks in the US market, which account for an estimated 80 percent of profits at Chrysler. Overall DC currently derives an estimated 45 percent of global profits from vehicles that emit more than 270 g CO2/km (less than 20.5
mpg). The challenge for DC is to combine a turnaround at both Chrysler and Mitsubishi withlower carbon growth in its main markets. However, DC’s profitability continues to be dominated by Chrysler, where turnaround is dependent on the SUV and pickup segment, which
will increase carbon intensity of profits. At the same time, margins will come under pressure from increased competition in this segment. In addition, DC’s plans to steer Chrysler
from the mainstream market into the premium segment is likely to further heighten carbon
intensity of profits.

100

Lower-carbon technology is a key aspect of DC’s overall technology leadership aspirations
and a cornerstone of its global strategy. DC is among the leading OEMs in both diesel andfuel cell technology and is looking to strengthen its management focus on hybrid technology. (See Figure 2.) In particular, DC’s investment in fuel cell technology offers strong potential to derive competitiveness through setting de facto standards as well as brand equity. A
key for translating technology leadership into competitive advantage will be DC’s ability to
streamline its global platforms by turning around both Chrysler and Mitsubishi. However,weak cash flow and turnaround efforts at Chrysler and Mitsubishi might limit resources
available for development of key lower-carbon technologies.

CHAPTER 7

A high sensitivity to carbon constraints combined with below average potential
to derive competitiveness from non-fuel cell technologies translates to a change
in estimated EBIT of -10% through 2015. The low EBIT value is also influenced bypoor current financial conditions.

DECREASING RISK FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTS

Ford Motor Company

Ford

INCREASING OPPORTUNITY FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTSVALUE EXPOSURE

FIGURE 1
Value Exposure Relative to Peer Average

Revitalization features a carbon-intensive product line-up.
Additional cost
per vehicle
($’s)

Ford

Average

800
600
400
200
0
US

EU

Japan

TOTAL

Ford faces relatively high costs for its 2002 fleet to meet higher fuel economy standards in
the United States, European Union and Japan. (See Figure 1.) Accounting for an estimated
70 percent of profits in 2002, the United States is Ford’s most important market. The US
market also determines Ford’s carbon intensity of profits, with an estimated 80 percent of
US profits derived from sales of light trucks. This structural bias in the higher-carbon segments leaves Ford exposed to both carbon constraints and shrinking margins in the lighttruck segment. The carbon intensity of its product portfolio is not expected to change soon
since the revitalization plan is largely built around increased sales of SUVs and pickups.
Apart from light trucks, Ford expects a 30 percent contribution to its profitability target of$7 billion by mid-decade from its Premier Automotive Group (PAG), which includes Volvoand Land Rover, among others. As with light trucks, profits derived from these premiumand luxury segments are expected to remain relatively carbon-intensive. This situation iscompounded by the fact that Ford is currently not in a position to offset carbon-intensive
profits in light trucks with its passenger vehicle business, which shows low or negative
profitability.

MANAGEMENT QUALITYFIGURE 2Management Quality on Lower-Carbon
Technologies Relative to Peer Average

Scale and strategic alignment of lower-carbon technologies will be critical.
Ford

Average

DieselHybridFuel Cell

0

20

40

60

80

Ford is among the leading OEMs in fuel cell technology and, along with GM and DC, iscatching up with peers in hybrid technology. (See Figure 2.) Ford’s management quality infuel cell technology is largely dictated by its alliance with Ballard and DC and the potential
for this partnership to generate economies of scale. However, to fully capitalize on key lowercarbon technologies, Ford will have to realize better economies of scale from its large platforms. Moreover, Ford’s broad portfolio of lower-carbon technologies contrasts with increasingly limited resources due to weak cash flow and restructuring efforts. As a result, Ford will
have to enhance strategic coordination by further rationalizing its portfolio of lower-carbon
technologies.

100

Management Quality Index

SAM & WRI

63

CHANGING DRIVERS

A high sensitivity to carbon constraints combined with below average potential
to derive competitiveness from non-fuel cell technologies translates to a change
in estimated EBIT of -7% through 2015.

DECREASING RISK FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTS

General Motors

GM

INCREASING OPPORTUNITY FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTSVALUE EXPOSURE

FIGURE 1
Value Exposure Relative to Peer Average

Profitability focuses narrowly on carbon-intensive segment.
Additional cost
per vehicle
($’s)

GM

Average

800
600
400
200
$0

0
US

EU

Japan

TOTAL

MANAGEMENT QUALITYFIGURE 2Management Quality on Lower-Carbon
Technologies Relative to Peer Average
GM

Capitalizing on a strong bet on fuel cell technology will be key.

Average

DieselHybridFuel Cell

0

20

40

60

Management Quality Index

64

SAM & WRI

80

GM faces above average costs for its 2002 fleet to meet higher fuel economy standards in
the United States, while in the European Union and Japan it faces lower than average costs.
(See Figure 1.) Although the United States and European Union are GM’s main markets, theUnited States accounts for virtually all profits. GM’s strong bias in the light truck segment
is reflected in its carbon intensity of profits as well as carbon intensity of sales in the US
market. Over 70 percent of GM’s profits are derived from vehicles that emit more than 270 g
CO2/km (less than 20.5 mpg). GM’s dependence on a very narrow and carbon- intensive
segment of the market (SUVs and pickups) makes the company vulnerable to both tighter
emissions standards and increased competition in the light truck segment. Similar to Fordand DC, GM’s margins are expected to come under further pressure while the structure of
the product line-up and thus carbon intensity of profits remain unchanged. GM would be ina better position than Ford and Chrysler to turn around its passenger vehicle businessbecause of a more favorable cost structure. However, it is unclear whether GM can derivemuch profitability from its lower-carbon segments.

100

GM’s efforts on lower-carbon technology focus primarily on fuel cell technology. While GM
recently started to catch up with its peers in hybrid technology, strategic alignment andorganizational integration seem to be lacking compared to fuel cell technology. Despite
strong access to all key lower-carbon technologies through affiliates, suppliers and partnerships, GM’s ability to capitalize on its expertise in diesel technology appears to be significantly lower than its peers. (See Figure 2.) Given the strong strategic bet on fuel cell technology, the challenge for GM will be to fully capitalize on its investment through setting defacto standards, brand equity and economies of scale.

CHAPTER 7

Honda Motor Company
DECREASING RISK FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTS

Very low sensitivity to carbon constraints combined with high potential to derivecompetitiveness from hybrid and fuel cell technology give Honda an estimated EBIT
change of +3% through 2015.

Honda

INCREASING OPPORTUNITY FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTSVALUE EXPOSURE

FIGURE 1
Value Exposure Relative to Peer Average

Top-class fuel efficiency enhances corporate brand and global competitiveness.

Additional cost
per vehicle
($’s)

Honda

Average

800
600
400
200
$2

0

US

EU

Japan

TOTAL

FIGURE 2Management Quality on Lower-Carbon
Technologies Relative to Peer Average
Honda

MANAGEMENT QUALITY
Leveraging expertise in lower-carbon technology will be crucial.

Average

DieselHybridFuel Cell

0

20

40

60

80

Honda’s costs to meet higher fuel economy standards across its fleet are the lowest of the
10 OEMs assessed. (See Figure 1.) Honda’s main markets are the United States and Japan,
with the former contributing an estimated 90 percent of global profits in 2002. While Honda
is expected to continue to depend heavily on the US market, the company aims to expand inEurope and especially Asia. Honda has taken the view that top-class fuel efficiency contributes significantly to its corporate brand and enhances its global competitiveness. This isclearly reflected in relatively low carbon intensity across all segments. In 2002, Honda
derived an estimated 70 percent of profits from vehicles that emitted less than 270 g
CO2/km (greater than 20.5 mpg). In contrast to peers with significant presence in the US
market, Honda has no plans yet to push into the highly carbon-intensive segment of large
pickups. In combination with Honda’s diesel-based expansion in Europe, this will help tofurther decarbonize profits relative to its peers.

100

Honda systematically aligns lower-carbon technologies with its global expansion strategy.
Honda’s lower-carbon technology strategy is underpinned by a very strong cash position andhigh R&D spending. While Honda shows a low profile in diesel technology, it is among theleading OEMs in hybrid technology. (See Figure 2.) Moreover, Honda is aggressively pushinginto fuel cell technology. While Honda’s engineering expertise across all key lower-carbon
technologies is among the strongest in the industry, its reluctance to enter into partnerships
may limit its ability to capitalize fully on investments in lower-carbon technologies, forexample through economies of scale or setting de facto standards. Still, Honda is deriving
significant brand equity from lower-carbon technologies, in particular from its early commercialization of HEVs.

Management Quality Index

SAM & WRI

65

CHANGING DRIVERS

High sensitivity to carbon constraints combines with high potential to derivecompetitiveness from diesel and hybrid technology thanks to its alliance with
Renault and its tie-up with Toyota. This position translates into an increase inestimated EBIT of +3% through 2015.

DECREASING RISK FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTS

Nissan Motor Company
Nissan

INCREASING OPPORTUNITY FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTS

FIGURE 1
Value Exposure Relative to Peer Average

VALUE EXPOSURE“Nissan 180” increases carbon intensity.

Additional cost
per vehicle($’s)

NissanAverage

Japan

TOTAL

800
600
400
200
0
US

EU

Nissan faces lower than average costs for its 2002 fleet to meet higher fuel economy standards in the United States and Europe, but higher than average costs in Japan. (See Figure1.) In 2002, Nissan derived an estimated 75 percent of its profits from sales in the UnitedStates. However, less than a third of global profits are from vehicles that emit more than 270
g CO2/km (less than 20.5 mpg). Following the launch of the Renault-Nissan alliance in 1999,
Nissan embarked on a Revival Plan, based on cost reduction and restructuring, which has
been successfully completed. Since 2002, Nissan has been implementing a new 3-year business plan, the “Nissan 180”, aimed at 1 million unit sales, 8 percent operating margin, andzero automotive debt. The “Nissan 180” depends heavily on further growth in the UnitedStates, which is expected to be driven largely by sales in the light truck segment. In June
2003, Nissan laid the foundation for this expansion by opening a new plant dedicated to production of the Titan, its first full-size pickup. Increased US sales in light trucks are expected
to alter the distribution of global profits across segments in favor of pickups and SUVs. As aresult, Nissan’s global profits will become more carbon-intensive in the near term.

MANAGEMENT QUALITY *FIGURE 2Management Quality on Lower-Carbon
Technologies Relative to Peer Average
NissanIndustrial synergies are likely to leverage technology expertise.

Average

DieselHybridFuel Cell

0

20

40

60

Management Quality Index

66

SAM & WRI

80

100

Recent strategic moves show Nissan’s ability to align its expansion strategy with a lowercarbon technology strategy. For instance, the recent tie-up with Toyota regarding hybrid
technology holds strong potential for Nissan to capitalize on its investment in this key
lower-carbon technology. Moreover, Nissan is well positioned to benefit from further growthin the diesel market through alliance partner Renault. (See Figure 2.) The alliance with
Renault puts Nissan in a strong position to establish a competitive advantage by leveraging
considerable in-house technology expertise through industrial synergies and improved cash
situation. Further, global joint platforms should enable Nissan to bring down costs for key
lower-carbon technologies.

*

To reflect the expected increasing level of integration and strategic coordination over the next decade, we treat alliancepartners Renault and Nissan as one organization for assessment of management quality in key lower-carbon technologies
through 2015.

CHAPTER 7

PSA Peugeot Citroen
DECREASING RISK FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTS

PSA faces the third lowest value exposure of the OEMs assessed. However, aside
from expertise in diesel, the company exhibits below average management quality
in non-diesel technologies. This translates into a change in estimated EBIT of -2%
through 2015.

PSA

INCREASING OPPORTUNITY FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTS

FIGURE 1
Value Exposure Relative to Peer Average

VALUE EXPOSURE
Diesel focus keeps carbon intensity low.

Additional cost
per vehicle
($’s)

PSA

Average

800
600
400
200
n.a.

0

US

n.a.
EU

Japan

TOTAL

FIGURE 2Management Quality on Lower-Carbon
Technologies Relative to Peer Average
PSA

MANAGEMENT QUALITY
Partnerships are essential.

Average

DieselHybridFuel Cell

0

20

40

60

80

PSA displays low sensitivity to carbon constraints. (See Figure 1.) Europe is PSA’s mostimportant market, accounting for an estimated 90 percent of profits. The carbon intensity ofprofits is low, with an estimated 93 percent of profits derived from vehicles that emit lessthan 200 g CO2/km (more than 27.5 mpg). Increasingly, growth is expected to come largely
from emerging markets in Central Europe, Asia, and Latin America. In addition, a re-entry
into the US market cannot be ruled out. A strong diesel bias combined with a broad model
line-up in the smaller segments provide the basis for low carbon intensity of profits. Further
European growth in diesel is expected to translate into higher margins for PSA as it enjoys ahigher diesel price premium than most European competitors. Increasing sales of smallercars jointly developed with Toyota will further help to reduce the carbon intensity of profits.
In addition, PSA has no plans to strengthen its position in the carbon-intensive luxury segment. As a result, PSA’s carbon intensity can be expected to remain at the low end of thepeer group.

100

Although it recently announced plans to commercialize hybrid technology, PSA’s lower-carbon technology strategy is very focused on diesel. As a result, PSA shows above averagepotential to derive competitiveness from its investment in diesel technology. (See Figure 2.)
PSA has already established a temporary lead over its competitors in particulate filter technology. A key for PSA’s ability to achieve its longer-term goal of cost leadership in diesel
technology will be management of partnerships that provide economies of scale. While PSA
has started to catch up on hybrid technology, it remains to be seen whether it will manage
to forge a partnership that can strengthen its position. Moreover, PSA displays a low profile
in fuel cell technology. Relatively low R&D spending and cash position may also constrain
PSA’s competitive position in lower-carbon technologies.

Management Quality Index

SAM & WRI

67

CHANGING DRIVERS

Renault
Low sensitivity to carbon constraints combined with high potential to derivecompetitiveness from diesel and hybrid technology from its alliance with Nissantranslates into a projected impact on estimated EBIT of +4% through 2015.

DECREASING RISK FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTS

Renault

INCREASING OPPORTUNITY FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTSVALUE EXPOSURE

FIGURE 1
Value Exposure Relative to Peer Average

A European focus contributes to a low-carbon product line-up.
Additional cost
per vehicle($’s)

Renault

Average

Japan

TOTAL

800
600
400
200
0
US

EU

Note: Renault’s exposure in the US and Japan are a result of
its 44 percent ownership in Nissan.

MANAGEMENT QUALITY *FIGURE 2Management Quality on Lower-Carbon
Technologies Relative to Peer Average
Renault

Strategic coordination with alliance partner generates low-carbon benefits.

Average

DieselHybridFuel Cell

0

20

40

60

Management Quality Index

68

SAM & WRI

80

Renault faces virtually no costs to meet higher CO2 emissions standards in Europe. (SeeFigure 1.) With an estimated 90 percent of profits, Europe is Renault’s most important market. However, the company aims to produce 50 percent of vehicles outside Western Europe
by 2010, with a focus on emerging markets. The alliance with Nissan is expected to boost
international expansion of the Renault brand while improving the cost basis through sharing of platforms, technology and capacity. Renault starts from one of the lowest carbon profiles in the industry, with an estimated 81 percent of global profits derived from vehicles
that emit less than 200 g CO2/km (more than 27.5 mpg). This profile complements Nissan’sline-up, which is somewhat more carbon-intensive due to its exposure in the US light truck
segment. The low carbon profile of Renault’s product line-up is driven by its European focus
and a strong presence in the small, compact, and midsized segments, which include
Renault’s most popular models (such as Twingo, Kangoo, and Clio) and account for approximately 50 percent of sales. Since profits are expected to continue to be generated largely
from lower-carbon segments, Renault shows low sensitivity to carbon constraints.

While high management quality in hybrid technology is largely provided by alliance partner
Nissan, Renault contributes management quality in diesel. (See Figure 2.) Thanks to a relatively high sales base and price premium in diesel technology, Renault is well placed tobenefit from further growth in the diesel market. Meanwhile, the alliance with Nissan gives
Renault strong access to other important lower-carbon technologies, such as hybrid andfuel cell technology. Together, Renault and Nissan are in a strong position to establish acompetitive advantage by leveraging considerable in-house technology expertise throughindustrial synergies. Starting in 2006, joint global platforms with Nissan will enable
Renault to generate economies of scale in lower-carbon technologies.

100*

To reflect the expected increasing level of integration and strategic coordination over the next decade, we treat alliancepartners Renault and Nissan as one organization for assessment of management quality in key lower-carbon technologies
through 2015.

CHAPTER 7

Toyota Motor Company
ToyotaDECREASING RISK FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTS

Below average sensitivity to carbon constraints combines with high potential
to derive competitive advantages from investments across the full range oflower-carbon technologies to translate into changes in estimated EBIT of +8%
through 2015.

INCREASING OPPORTUNITY FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTSVALUE EXPOSURE

FIGURE 1
Value Exposure Relative to Peer Average

Carbon intensity of global profits is on the rise in the near term.
Additional cost
per vehicle($’s)

ToyotaAverage

Japan

TOTAL

800
600
400
200
0
US

EU

MANAGEMENT QUALITYFIGURE 2Management Quality on Lower-Carbon
Technologies Relative to Peer Average
ToyotaStrong diversification in lower-carbon technologies creates unique competitive
potential through 2015.

Average

DieselHybridFuel Cell

0

20

40

60

Management Quality Index

80

Toyota faces below average costs to meet higher fuel economy standards in all three mainmarkets. (See Figure 1.) Toyota’s 2010 Global Vision aims to increase worldwide market
share from 10 percent today to 15 percent over the next decade. Growth is expected to begenerated by a continued focus on its core markets of the United States and Japan, combined with a push into emerging markets such as China. In the short term, Toyota’s expansion in the United States will be dominated by increased sales in full-size light trucks, andthe company is currently building up production capacity for this segment. Given an aggressive push into this segment, light trucks are likely to account for a larger share of Toyota’s
future profitability than the current estimated 45 percent. Consequently, carbon intensity of
Toyota’s global profits is on the rise in the near term. However, Toyota has the potential topartly offset this rise in carbon intensity by expanding its small-vehicle business in Europe,
especially through highly efficient diesel vehicles.

100

Toyota’s potential to capitalize on the full range of lower-carbon technologies clearly distinguishes it from its peers. (See Figure 2.) Early on, Toyota systematically aligned its lowercarbon technology (Eco-Project) with its global expansion strategy. Given its strong capital
structure, Toyota is in a unique position to continue to invest aggressively in lower-carbon
technologies. Past strategic moves put Toyota in a particularly strong position in fuel celland hybrid technologies, where its dominance could impact competitive balance across theautomotive industry. Toyota is also quietly emerging as a leader in diesel technologies. As aresult, the company is well positioned to derive a higher return on investments in key lowercarbon technologies. Also, its strength in all three technologies will give Toyota flexibility inadapting to future regulatory and consumer preferences in different markets.

SAM & WRI

69

CHANGING DRIVERS

A low downside exposure to carbon constraints combined with management
quality weakness in non-diesel technologies translates into an estimated EBIT
change of -1% through 2015.

DECREASING RISK FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTS

VW Group
VW

INCREASING OPPORTUNITY FROM CARBON CONSTRAINTSVALUE EXPOSURE

FIGURE 1
Value Exposure Relative to Peer Average

A low-carbon product line-up holds strong potential for balanced growth.
Additional cost
per vehicle
($’s)

VW

Average

800
600
400
200
n.a.

0
US

EU

Japan

TOTAL

MANAGEMENT QUALITYFIGURE 2Management Quality on Lower-Carbon
Technologies Relative to Peer Average
VW

Strengthening position beyond diesel will be key.

Average

DieselHybridFuel Cell

0

20

40

60

Management Quality Index

70

SAM & WRI

80

VW faces below average costs to meet lower carbon emissions standards in the US and EU
automotive markets. (See Figure 1.) With a product structure that is fuel-efficient relative topeers across market segments, VW is well positioned to build up a balanced portfolio ofgrowth without increasing carbon intensity. In 2002, an estimated 67 percent of global profits were derived from vehicles that emitted less than 200 g CO2/km (greater than 27.5
mpg). While expansion in the United States will be largely driven by SUVs such as the
Touareg, increased carbon intensity of US-derived profits is expected to be offset by a strong
structural sales base in the midsized and compact segments in Europe. Moreover, expansion
plans include a systematic introduction of highly efficient, direct-injection diesel and gasoline engines throughout all segments. By 2005, VW plans to have completed the introduction of direct-injection options throughout all engine families. This systematic incremental
approach holds strong potential to keep carbon intensity stable while growing the businessacross all segments.

100

VW´s lower-carbon technology strategy focuses on advanced internal combustion engines,
with a historic priority on diesel. As a result, management quality is clearly dominated by
VW’s industry-leading position in diesel technology. (See Figure 2.) This strong position indiesel not only generates significant brand equity and market leadership in Europe, it also
will help enable VW to capitalize on diesel technology in other markets, including the UnitedStates, where the company is pursuing a first-mover strategy. Leadership in diesel contrasts
with VW’s cautious position in hybrid and fuel cell technology. While this stance reduces
short-term costs, the need to catch up with peers at a later stage might put VW at a competitive disadvantage. If it can overcome this challenge, VW would be well positioned togenerate economies of scale in lower-carbon technologies by virtue of its high-volume global platforms.

ENDNOTES

NOTES
1.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis—Summary for
Policymakers: A Report of Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC,
2001 p.2).

2.

IPCC (2001) p.10.

3.

IPCC (2001) p.13.

4.

The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
At http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.

5.

Based on data from Automotive News, 2003 Global Market Data Book (Detroit: May 26, 2003).

6.

Letter from President Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts.
At http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html.

7.

“Business leaders say climate change is our greatest challenge,” Davos Annual Meeting 2000 (January 27, 2000).
At www.weforum.org.

8.

Malcolm Weiss, et al., On the Road in 2020: A Lifecycle Analysis of New Automobile Technologies (Cambridge MA: MIT,
October 2000).

9.

US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Light Duty Automotive Technology and Fuel Economy Trends:
1975 through 2001 (Washington D.C.: Office of Transportation and Air Quality, September 2001 p.i).
These refer to “vehicle use” emissions only.

10. American Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA), World Motor Vehicle Data 1993 (AAMA, Washington, D.C., 1993
p. 23) and AAMA, Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures 1996 (AAMA, Washington, D.C., 1996 p. 44).
11. US Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Outlook, 2003 (Washington D.C.: US Department ofEnergy, DOE/EIA 0484).
12. World Business Council on Sustainable Development, The Sustainable Mobility Project: July 2002 Progress Report (Geneva,
Switzerland: WBCSD, 2002 p.15). At http://www.wbcsdmobility.org/publications/progressrpt_july2002.asp.
13. The exceptions are BMW and PSA.
14. Climate Change Plan for Canada. At http://www.climatechange.gc.ca/plan_for_canada/plan/summary.html.
15. Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries, Voluntary Code of Practice - Reducing the Fuel Consumption of New Light
Vehicles (Canberra, Australia: April 15, 2003). At http://www.autoindustries.com.au/code_reducing_fuel.php.
16. Ward’s Communications, Ward’s Motor Vehicle Facts & Figures 2002 (Southfield, Michigan: 2002 p.38).
17. Automotive News (2003) p. 47 and UNEP/SustainAbility, Driving Sustainability — Can the Auto Sector Deliver Sustainable
Mobility? (London: 2001 p. 21).
18. Autelligence, “Weekly Insight: The Expanding Global Market” (London: September, 27 2003).
At http://www.autelligence.com.
19. Asia Pulse, “China’s Car Sales Growth Expected to Last for 5 Years,” (Sydney: September 22nd, 2003).
20. EIA (2003) p. 34.
21. World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003 (Washington D.C.: World Bank) and Kelly Sims Gallagher,“Foreign Technology in China’s Automobile Industry: Implications for Energy, Economic Development, and theEnvironment” China Environment Series (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Issue 6).
At http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/2-feature_1.pdf.
22. National Academy of Sciences, Personal Cars and China (Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, 2003 p. 4).
23. Carbon Disclosure Project, Carbon Finance and the Global Equity Markets (London: February 2003).
At http://www.cdproject.net.
24. See, for example page 14 of Deutsche Bank AG, The Drivers: How to navigate the auto industry (Frankfurt: July 2002).
25. P.C. Kalafut, Invisible Advantage: How intangibles are driving business performance (Perseus Publishing: 2003).
26. Deutsche Bank (2002) p. 13.
27. Deutsche Bank (2002) p. 28.
28. Environmental Protection Agency, Economic Analysis of New CAFE Standards for Light Trucks (Washington DC: April,
2003).
29. “Well-to-wheel” analysis considers energy use and GHG emissions on a total systems basis, from well to tank(i.e., fuel production) and tank to wheel (operation of the vehicle itself).
30. Malcolm Weiss et al, Comparative Assessment of Fuel Cell Cars (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2003 p. 29).

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71

CHANGING DRIVERS

31. National Research Council, Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards(Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 2002 p. 42).
32. General Motors, “Displacement on Demand” on their website at
http://www.gm.com/automotive/gmpowertrain/tech/dod/overview.htm.
33. National Research Council (2002).
34. Lee Schipper, et al, “Diesels in Europe: Analysis of Characteristics, Usage Patterns, Energy Savings and CO2 Emissions
Implications,” Journal of Transport Economics and Policy (Bath, UK: May 2002, vol. 36 Part 2 pp. 305-340).
35. Edmund Chew, “Siemens, Bosch Fuel Diesel War,” Automotive News Europe (June 2nd, 2003).
36. M.Q. Wang, GREET 1.6 (beta) Fuel Use and Emissions Model (Argonne Illinois: Argonne National Laboratory,
Center for Transportation Research, 2001).
37. Deutsche Bank (2002), p. 63.
38. Schroder Salomon Smith Barney, “Diesel Market Update,” Equity Research: Europe (2002 p. 4).
39. Deutsche Bank (2002), p. 63.
40. David Friedman, A New Road: The Technology and Potential of Hybrid Vehicles (Cambridge, MA :The Union of Concerned Scientists, 2003).
41. J.D. Power and Associates, “Hybrid Electric Vehicle Sales Expected to Increase Dramatically Over the Next Decade”,
Press Release, May 28th, 2003.
42. Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA), The Hydrogen Economy: How Far and How Fast? (Cambridge MA: 2003 p.
18).
43. David L. Greene and Andreas Schafer, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from U.S. Transportation(Arlington, VA: Pew Center for Global Climate Change, 2003 p. 17).
44. Weiss et al. (2003).
45. Greene and Schafer (2003) p. 27.
46. Lance A. Ealey and Glenn A. Mercer, “Tomorrow’s Cars, Today’s Engines,” The Mckinsey Quarterly (2002, Number 2).
At http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com.
47. CERA (2003) p. 5.
48. Weiss et al. (2003).
49. McKinsey (2002).
50. NikkoSalomonSmithBarney, Auto Industry: 2000 Global Equity Research — Auto Manufacturers (June 27, 2000).
51. SAM Research based on WestLB, Deutsche Bank Research, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers and Schroder Salomon
Smith Barney.
52. Appendix to Changing Drivers: Details on the Methodology, Assumptions and Results for the Value Exposure Assessment(Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 2003). At http://capmarkets.wri.org.
53. The position that OEMs have developed with regard to fuel cells for the period following 2015 will of course be an
important determinant of competitiveness in the long term and forms part of the Management Quality Assessment
in Chapter 5.
54. JD Power and Associates, Interest in Hybrid Technology is High, Especially Among Women (Agora Hills, CA: March 6,
2002).
55. National Research Council (2002).
56. For some OEMs, the presence of diesel and hybrid technologies makes no difference because their vehicles are alreadyvery efficient and need only minor modifications to meet new carbon constraints.
57. National Research Council (2002).
58. This issue is explored in more detail in the Appendix available at http://capmarkets.wri.org.
59. John DeCicco, Feng An and Marc Ross et. al, Technical Options for Improving the Fuel Economy of U.S. Cars and Light
Trucks by 2010-2015 (Washington D.C.: The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, 2001 p. 49). The figure isin real 2000$.
60. This is for an assumed gas price of $1.45 per gallon over the period of 2003 through 2008.
61. Schroder Salomon Smith Barney (2002), p. 7.
62. The simple discounted cash flow model used to generate these results is available for download ateither http://capmarkets.wri.org or http://www.sam-group.com/changingdrivers.
63. Sensitivity to these assumptions can be tested in the simple DCF model available for download.

72

SAM & WRI

CHAPTER 7

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank the many individuals who helped in the production of this report.
We are grateful to a number of financial analysts who reviewed the report or provided
helpful comments including: in the United States, Steve Girsky and Maryann Keller; inEurope, Kamran Baig, Thomas Besson, Christian Breitsprecher, Clive Wiggins, Henrik Lierand Lars Ziehn; and in Japan, Kunihiko Shiohara and Tatsuo Yoshida. We also received
helpful comments and advice from Feng An, KG Duleep, David Friedman, David Greene,
Jason Mark, Martina Otto and Robert Repetto. We particularly thank Justin Adams for his
fresh perspectives and feedback.
The SAM authors would like to thank their colleagues Alois Flatz, Thilo Goodall, Davide
Rima and Markus Moor for their helpful contributions.
The WRI authors are grateful for the generous input of their colleagues Phil Angell,
Andrew Aulisi, Liz Cook, Navroz Dubash, Suzy Greenhalgh, David Jhirad, Nancy Kete, Chris
Lagan, Bill LaRocque, and Lee Schipper. We also thank Moeko Saito and Anand Rao for
their research assistance. We are also grateful to the SC Johnson Foundation, the Oak
Foundation and the Surdna Foundation for their generous financial support. Finally, we
thank Hyacinth Billings, Kristina Bonner, Karen Holmes, Donna Lomangino and Maggie
Powell for their help with the editing and production of the report.
While recognizing the contributions of those mentioned above, the authors bear sole
responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Duncan Austin is Senior Economist in the Sustainable Enterprise Program at World
Resources Institute.
Niki Rosinski is Senior Sustainability Analyst for Energy & Mobility at SAM Research Inc.
Amanda Sauer is an Associate in the Sustainable Enterprise Program at World Resources
Institute.
Colin Le Duc is Head of Research Operations at SAM Research Inc.

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73

Equivalence of Fuel Economy Levels (in miles per gallon)
and Carbon Emissions Rates (in grams of CO2 per kilometer)
for Gasoline-fueled Vehicles

A Note on Metrics and Terms
Different markets use different metrics to capture
the emissions rates and fuel economy of vehicles.
European and Japanese standards are expressed interms of grams of CO2 per kilometer (g CO2/km),
while US CAFE standards are expressed in terms of
miles per gallon (mpg).
Because all carbon embodied in a vehicle's fuel isemitted as CO2, for a specific fuel a given
emissions rate implies a given fuel economy level,and vice-versa. The figure shows the conversion
between carbon-intensity and fuel economy
metrics for a gasoline-fueled vehicle.

Carbon Intensity(g CO2/km)
100

50
120

45

40

140

160

35

180

Carbon-intensity
decreases and fueleconomy increases

30

200
220

As one of the metrics (mpg) has distance as anumerator and the other (g CO2/km) has distanceas a denominator, the two have an inverse
relationship. A higher fuel economy (in terms ofmpg) translates into a lower emissions rate (interms of g CO2/km).
Because this report focuses on the climate impactof vehicles, we generally use g CO2/km as ourprimary metric, though we revert to mpg when
explicitly referring to policies based primarily on
fuel economy (e.g., US CAFE standards). In allcases, the alternative figure is provided inparentheses afterwards. Similarly, in referring tovehicle performance, we primarily use "carbonintensive" and "carbon-emitting" terms rather
than "fuel-efficient". With the inverse relationshipa "more carbon-intensive" or "high carbonemitting" vehicle is a "less fuel-efficient" one.

Fuel Economy
(mpg)

25

240

260

280

20

300
320

340

360

15
380

400

Carbon-intensity
increases and fueleconomy decreases.

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