Qualia and the Brain-synopsis- with 7 Figures and 2 tables
Ken Mogi
Sony Computer Science Laboratory Inc.
Takanawa Muse Bldg. 3-14-13, Higashigotanda
Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo, 141-0022 Japan
Tel +81-3-5448-4380 Fax +81-3-5448-4273
e-mail kenmogi@csl.sony.co.jp
http://www.csl.sony.co.jp/person/kenmog.html (Office)http://www.qualia-manifesto.com(The Qualia Movement)

The concept of qualia describes the unique properties that
accompany our senses. It is an essential concept when we try tounderstand the principle that bridges the neural firings in ourbrain and our perception. The idea of qualia is also of crucial
importance when we try to study the functions of the brain froman objective point of view. Qualia must be part of themathematical formulation of information we use to understandthe function of the brain.
1. Introduction
We perceive the world through our senses. If you go out inthe garden on a summer morning and look up into the sky, theblackish blue color comes into your mind. When you see
morning dew on the leaves, you become aware of their roundshape and the sheen on their surface. Putting your finger on thedew, you feel a sensation of coolness on the skin. Sniff theleaves, and you smell the distinctive scent of the plant. Then you
realize that all the while, you have been bombarded with the1

auditory sensation of the sparrow singing on the roof...Thecharacteristic qualities that accompany these sensations have beencalled "qualia". It is a patent fact that we perceive the world
through a collection of qualia. Any attempt to understand therelation between the mind and the brain would be impossible
without incorporating qualia in its framework.
On the other hand, we find the brain to be a tremendously
complex and well-made molecular machine. The action potentialconsists of the inward flow of Na+ ion through the membrane. At
the synapses, neurotransmitters such as glutamate and GABA are
released into the synaptic cleft. The substances produced near the
nucleus are transported to the synapses on the track of
microtubules that extend through the axon. The gene regulationin the nucleus plays an essential role in the functional
specification of the neurons, and is believed to play a role in theformation of long term memory. An orchestrated system of
biomolecules of unimaginable complexity underlies the neuralactivity in the brain.
The various sensations that occur in our mind areaccompanied by various qualia. In contrast, the brain is acomplex molecular machine. How are these two worlds related toeach other? What is the neural correlate of qualia? This is thecentral question of the so-called mind-body problem.
The question of qualia is not a solely philosophical one. The
origin of qualia, ultimately, should be regarded as part of thenatural law, just as the laws of physics or chemistry. Even fromthe functionalist's point of view, qualia would prove essential inunderstanding the principle of information processing in thebrain, as I argue below. For example, one cannot hope toconstruct a computer that thinks like a human unless we
implement qualia. Qualia should be an integral part of the2

concept of information when we try to describe the function of
the brain.
Despite its crucial importance in understanding the brain,
the enigma of qualia is a deep one. How profoundly difficult the
problem of qualia is testified by the words of Francis Crick, in
his book The Astonishing Hypothesis.
The reader might accept all this but could well complain that
I have talked all around the topic of consciousness, with more
speculation than hard facts, and have avoided what, in the longrun, is the most puzzling problem of all. I have said almost
nothing about qualia--the redness of red--except to brush it to one
side and hope for the best.
The quest for a solution of the enigma of qualia, the mostdifficult and important scientific puzzle that confronts humanity,
is just beginning.

2. The neuron doctrine in perception

One of the central questions that concerns us is tounderstand how our perception is related to the neural firings inthe brain. In 1972, Horace Barlow of Cambridge University
applied the neuron doctrine to the problem of perception. Barlow
suggested that the characteristics of our perception is specified by
the nature of neural firings in our brain only. That is to say, nomatter what mechanisms are involved, the properties of our mind
is to be determined by the neural firing state only. This seems to
be a reasonably sound starting point, judging from the3experimental clues available today.
"Response selectivity" is a concept of central importance inneurophysiology. For example, in the primary visual cortex (V1),
we find neurons that selectively responds to a bar with a certain
orientation. In areas MT, V4, IT, we find neurons that respondto motion, color (in the context of "color constancy"), and form.
As we go to the higher visual area, we find neurons with more
complex response selectivities, and larger receptive fields. The
objective of the single unit recording study can be defined as thedetermination of the response selectivity of a particular neuron.
One idea that emerges is to assume that when a neuron witha response selectivity to a particular visual feature fires, theperception of that feature occurs. For example, when a neuron
selectively responsive to a bar slanted by 45 degrees to the rightfires, the perception of the slanted bar would be incurred. Whena neuron selectively responsive to a "face" fires in area IT, theperception of a "face" is invoked, and so on.
Unfortunately, there is a fundamental flaw in this line ofargument, which becomes apparent when one tries to answer thefollowing question. "When a neuron selectively responsive to afeature A fires, how does the brain (or the subject) know that it isselectively responsive to feature A?" The visual feature space isvast and complex. The fact that a neuron fires vigorously to aparticular feature A does not necessarily mean that the neuron has
a response selectivity to feature A only. In fact, in order toconfirm the response selectivity of a neuron, every possible
visual feature should, in principle, be presented to the neuron. Of
course this is impossible. Moreover, our perception is constructedbased on the neural firings at a particular psychological moment.
(This is what the neuron doctrine dictates). It is impossible, justbased on the firing of the neurons at a particular time, to establish
the response selectivity of a a particular neuron. The reason for4this being that response selectivity is based on the idea of an"ensemble", a set of stimulus-response relations which is at theheart of an statistical approach.
In general, as we go higher up the visual system, the moredifficult it becomes to define the response selectivity of aparticular neuron in an operational manner. This contradicts theidea that the neurons in the higher visual areas play a crucial rolein our perception through their response selectivity. Even in thecase where our perception is evoked by the successive neuralfirings from the lower visual areas to the higher visual areas, thesignificance of the neurons in higher visual area becomes
obscure, if indeed the response selectivity plays an essential rolein perception.
From these considerations, I conclude that response
selectivity cannot be the foundation for the relation between
neural firing and perception. Some other bridging principle(s)should come into the picture.
3. Mach's principle in Perception
Ernst Mach (1838-1916) was a physicist, philosopher,
psychologist who had a great influence on Albert Einstein in his
development of the theory of relativity. "Mach's principle" statesthat the mass of a particle is determined by its relation to all theother particles in the universe. If there was only one particle in
the universe, it is meaningless to question how large its mass is.
In general, the properties of an individual is determined by its
relation to other individuals in the system.
A similar line of thought is relevant when we consider how
our perception is formed through the neural firings in our brain.
Namely, a neural firing plays a particular role in our perception,
not because it is selectively responsive to a visual feature, but
5because the neural firing is related to other neural firings in thebrain in such a way that the particular role in perception isendowed on the neural firing in question. We shall call this idea
"Mach's principle in perception".
For example, suppose a neuron in area IT fired, and aperception of "rose" is invoked in our mind. In this case,perception of the "rose" is invoked not because the neuron
selectively responds to the presentation of a rose, but because theneural firing in question is endowed with the property of "rose"through its relation to other neural firings in the brain.
Specifically, the cluster of neural firings connected by interaction
through action potentials that is initiated in area V1 and leads up
to the neural firing in area IT codes the perception of "rose". It ismeaningless to consider a single neural firing in isolation andassess its significance in perception, even if the response
selectivity of that neuron could be established unequivocally.
In this picture, a percept (element of perception) is coded
not by a single neural firing, but by a cluster of interactionconnected neural firings. This is the bridging principle that is
consistent with the neuron doctrine in perception, and Mach's
principle in perception. A percept is coded non-locally. Neuralfirings in spatially distant areas of the brain are integrated into acluster through their mutual interactions, and form a percept. The
distinction between the excitatory and inhibitory connections now
becomes important. Specifically, it appears that only excitatory
connections are included explicitly in the cluster of neural firings
that forms a percept. Inhibitory connections influence theformation of percepts indirectly. For example, in the color
constancy mechanism, inhibitory inputs from surrounds will leadto a non-formation of a percept of a color in the center. Inhibitory
connections have significance in that they can "veto" theformation of a percept. However, inhibitory connections are not6included explicitly in the cluster of neural firings that forms apercept. In order to see the intuitive meaning of this arrangement,
consider a white bar in a black surround. In order that the whitebar is a bar, it is necessary that the area surrounding the bar isblack, rather than white. If the surround was white, then the bar
would not be a bar! So the surround contributes to the formationof a white bar by not being white. However, the black surround
does not constitute an explicit part of the percept "white bar".
The above picture gives some hints to the solution of somelong-standing problems in visual perception. One of them is theso-called "binding problem". The various visual features, such as
form, motion, color, and texture are represented in spatiallyseparate cortical areas. Yet we are able to perceive these features
as integrated into one visual object. For example, even though
the features "rose", "moving rightward", "red", "velvety" arecoded in areas IT, MT, V4, and V2 respectively, we have theintegrated perception of "red velvety rose moving rightward".
Several solutions, including the ideas "convergence zone" and"synchronous firing" are being proposed. However, none of them
are immune from some fundamental difficulties. In order toarrive at a rudimentary solution of the binding problem, we needto go back to the very foundations of the neural correlates ofperception. Namely, we need to adopt the idea that a percept is tobe represented as a cluster of interaction-connected neural firings,
which are spatially distributed among the various cortical areas.
Now suppose the percept "red" is invoked by a cluster ofneural firings that extends from area V1 up to area V4. Under
such circumstances, the qualia of "redness of red", whatever wemay name it, should be specified by the spatio-temporal patternof the neural firings which belong to the cluster, and by nothingelse. This is a direct consequence of our assumption that thenature of our perception is determined by the characteristics of7the neural firings that sustain it (the neuron doctrine inperception).
Namely, the picture emerges that thecorrespondence between a particular pattern of cluster of neuralfirings, and the qualia invoked by it, is given in an a priori
manner. Namely, we assume that the correspondence between theneural firing patterns and qualia is one to one, and there is noarbitrariness involved in it. Of course, one could argue that there
is no guarantee that the correspondence is one to one. But thenthere is also no plausible reason to assume otherwise.
This above idea is of a fundamental importance. A natural
law in the conventional sense is complete if it succeeds in
predicting the spatio-temporal pattern of neural firings in thebrain with a full precision. It is yet another type of natural law,which determines what kind of qualia is invoked in our
perception once the spatio-temporal pattern of neural firings inthe brain is given. As the correspondence between the firing
pattern and qualia is one to one, it should be regarded as a kindof natural law, although of a rather different character from theconventional natural laws.

4. Interaction Simultaneity

Our perception is organized under a certain spatio-temporalorder. For example, the space-time structure in which our visual
perception occurs is different from that in which our auditory
perception occurs. In audition, we don't have the massive parallel
processing organized in an spatial order as in the case of vision.
The "modality" of senses are marked by differences in the spatiotemporal structures that characterize them. Such differences
between the modalities are usually taken for granted, and neural8

mechanisms of perception is discussed on top of them. That may
be effective as a phenomenological and intermediate method of
description. However, ultimately, the difference between thesensory modalities should be derived, from the first principles,
based on the nature of the spatio-temporal patterns of the neuralfirings that sustain vision, audition, taste, smell, and touch.
How is our psychological time constructed?
AlbertEinstein, in his first paper of relativity theory published in 1905,
statedOne thing should be remarked here. Such a mathematicaldescription is physically meaningless unless the way we constructtime is made clear. All our judgments about time is one about
events that occur simultaneously.
What kind of mechanism determines the nature ofsimultaneity in our mind, namely the nature of psychological"now"?
Let us start from the neuron doctrine in perception. Namely,
we assume that knowledge about the firing neurons is necessary
and sufficient to determine the content of perception. The
concept of "interaction simultaneity" dictates how to determine
the nature of psychological time in a way consistent with theneuron doctrine. Under the principle of interaction simultaneity,
when a neural firing and another neural firing are connected byinteraction (i.e., action potential propagation and subsequent
synaptic interaction), these are considered to be simultaneous
events. It takes a finite length of time (say 5 milliseconds) for theeffect of a neural firing to propagate to a postsynaptic neuron.
However, under the principle of interaction simultaneity, thesefiring events should be regarded as "simultaneous". We call thetime parameter thus constructed "proper time" and write it as τ.
9When the presynaptic neuron fires at time t, and the postsynaptic
neuron fires at time t+∆t (as a result in part of the EPSP causedby the presynaptic firing), we assign the same proper time τ tothe pre- and postsynaptic events.
Interaction simultaneity is derived from a more fundamental
principle, that of "causality". Here, "causality" is taken to meanthat given the state of the system at proper time τ, we are able toderive the state of the system at a slightly later time τ + ∆τ. We
need to use the proper time τ in order to describe the dynamical
evolution of the neural network in a causal way.
Interaction simultaneity is based on the idea that if we are toderive the properties of our perception from neural firings, weshould not adopt the position where we "observe" the neuralfirings from "outside the brain". If we observe the brain fromoutside, we can describe the dynamical evolution of the neuralnetwork with any desired temporal accuracy. We may, forexample, describe the release and diffusion of neurotransmittersat synapses with submillisecond temporal resolution. However,under the neuron doctrine in perception, only the neural firing
enter explicitly in our perception. Therefore, properties of ourperception should be obtained without resorting to the idea of an
outside observer. Thus, it becomes necessary to adopt the
principle of interaction simultaneity.
We can obtain some interesting conclusions about the natureof psychological time. Firstly, the psychological "present" has afinite duration, when measured by the physical time t. The
duration corresponds to the transmission delay present when thecluster of interaction-connected neural firings is formed. This
could be of the order of ~ 50 ms. In other words, there is a "unit"of the psychological time, with a duration of ~50ms. Despite theexistence of such a finite duration of the "moment", the flow ofpsychological time is shown to be smooth. Specifically, the10displacement between the adjacent "moments" can be madearbitrarily small. This in turn mean that there is an "overlap"
between adjacent moments of psychological time. A particularneural firing is shared by the neighboring moments ofpsychological time.
Libet reported that in order that we become conscious of apercept, neural firing of at least 500 milliseconds is required.
Such a property of conscious perception may ultimately be linked
to the idea outlined above.

5. Causality and Twistor

Interaction simultaneity is concerned with the constructionof the psychological time. This in turn is part of a more general
problem, namely, how our perceptual space-time structure
emerges from the neural firings in our brain. "Causality" is
expected to be a leading principle here. Namely, our perceptual
space-time structure is constructed in such a way that within thatframework, it becomes possible to describe the dynamical
evolution of the neural network in a causal way.
Penrose's "twistor" is a hint for the mathematical structure to
be developed from such an approach. Penrose constructs a"twistor space" separately from the physical space-time. The
trajectory of light is represented as a straight line in physicalspace. In twistor space, it is mapped to a point. The trajectory oflight represents the world-line along which causal interaction
propagates. In twistor space, the set of points in physical spacetime that are connected by the interaction (which is represented
by the trajectory of light) is mapped into a point. The twistor
space is in a sense a more fundamental framework for natural law
11than physical space-time itself. Penrose writes
We should think of twistor space as the space in terms ofwhich we should describe physics.
We cannot apply the twistor formalism directly to neuralnetwork. However, the basic idea of the twistor approach,namely to regard the causal relation between the individuals as
more fundamental than the individuals themselves, corresponds
to our arrangement of regarding the cluster of interactionconnected neural firings as the percept, that is, the elementary
unit in perception. The nature of our perception is ultimately
determined by the dynamics of the neural network. Accordingly,
the cluster of interaction-connected neural firings functions not
only as an element of perception, but also as an element in the
dynamics of neural network. In order to describe such a
dynamics, we would need a mathematical structure similar to thatof twistor space. The twistor formalism is consistent with theprinciple of interaction simultaneity outlined in the previous
section, and is indeed a natural mathematical embodiment of theprinciple.
An intriguing possibility is that a twistor-like space can beconstructed to describe the dynamics of a neural network, and thespace thus constructed corresponds to our perceptual space-time.
If such a picture is found to be the case, our mind would inhabit
the twistor-like space that describes the dynamics of neuralnetworks. Of course, at present this is merely a conjecture.

126. New Concept of Information.

Shannon opened up the new field of information theory in
his seminal 1948 paper. In this paper, he states as follows.
The fundamental problem of communication is that of
reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately amessage selected at another point. Frequently the messages havemeaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according to somesystem with certain physical or conceptual entities. Thesesemantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to theengineering problem. The significant aspect is that the actual
message is one selected from a set of possible messages. The
system must be designed to operate for each possible selection,
not just the one which will actually be chosen since this is
unknown at the time of the design.
Information theory that was developed following Shannon's
initiative is mathematically a subset of probability theory. The
relevance of probability theory in the elucidation of themechanisms of perception is a limited one. We have seen that
response selectivity, which is based on the concept of"ensemble", cannot be the foundation for the neural correlates ofperception. By the same token, information theory, or probability
theory in general, cannot explain the neural origin of perception
per se. Shannon's approach is relevant when we consider suchproblems as the efficient coding of message sent through achannel where a certain level of noise is present. Such a question
is precisely where probability theory finds its powerfulapplication. In the brain, information theoretic approach in theabove sense would be relevant to the analysis of peripheral
13receptors, such as the retina. However, information theory, or
probability theory in general, has limited relevance, if at all, tothe more central information processing, where our perception
and thinking take place.
If any definition of information is to be relevant to thefunction of the brain, it should reflect the dynamics of the neuralnetwork. It is not sufficient to treat the spike trains as an abstract
collection of bits. We should start from the effect that a particularfiring pattern has on the postsynaptic neurons. We should ask
what kind of postsynaptic firing pattern is generated as a result.
In other words, the concept of information should be "embedded"in the dynamics of neural networks.
I conjecture that qualia should be included in themathematical formula of information as is relevant to thefunctions of the brain. This conjecture is justified in view of theimportant role played by qualia in the cerebral information
processing.
For example, we can perceive "a red velvety rose" as an
object located in a position in the visual field. How the brain
does it is the so-called "binding problem". As far as we areconcerned, this integration is possible, because each visualfeature "red", "velvety", "rose" has distinct qualia, and there is no
possibility of mixing them up. Suppose these features wererepresented by abstract numbers, such as "3", "7", "-1". Then it
would be quite difficult, if not impossible, to "integrate" them inthe unity of a single object!
The neural mechanism underlying the generation of themeaning of words is expected to be similar to the mechanism
underlying the generation of percept accompanied by qualia.
Namely, the meaning of words are determined by the relation
between the neural firings in Wernicke's area, which is supposed
to be responsible for semantic processing.
14

Under usual circumstances, we can make a distinction
between our perception of an external object and the mental
imaging of an object. Also, it is easy to separate the percept
corresponding to an object that is "here and now" from thememory of an object encountered in the past. Such
differentiations of percepts may seem self-evident. However, it isuseful to remember that all these percepts are invoked by neuralfirings, and all neural firings are basically the same physicalphenomenon, no matter what aspects of our perception theymight be coding for. Significantly, the differentiation of percepts
stated above appears as the difference in qualia associated withrespective percepts. A percept corresponding to an object "hereand now" is accompanied by a very vivid, conspicuous qualia. In
contrast, when we remember an object that we encountered in thepast, the accompanying qualia is of a more abstract, subdued
nature. We tend to take such distinctions for granted. At the endof the day, these percept are invoked by neural firings in thebrain. How are the remarkably different qualia generated fromthe collection of neural firings in the brain? How is the
structuring of our perception, such as "inside the self" vs "outside
the self", "present" vs "past" made possible? This is a question
central to the remarkable information processing capability that isexhibited by our brain.
7. The Future of Qualia Research
Qualia are unique properties of our perception. It is difficult
to convey to others how we feel when we munch a peach.
However, beyond any reasonable doubt, qualia accompanying
our senses are caused by the neural firings in the brain. Ourchance of studying qualia in an objective manner lies in therelation between qualia and the neural firings.
15

Qualia is a crucial concept when we try to understand thenature of information processing in our brain. If we are tounderstand the nature of processes occurring in the brain, wemust construct a new concept of information, something that isdifferent from Shannon's statistical construction of information.
The concept of information to come should be embedded in the
dynamics of neural network, reflect the interaction between theneurons, and include qualia as a natural ingredient of its
mathematical structure.
Of course, no matter how the objective understanding of theprinciple of information processing in the brain is advanced, themystery of our perception, and the qualia accompanying it, islikely to remain. The fundamental enigma, namely, the origin ofself-consciousness and the uniqueness of personality willprobably never be dissolved. However, we may say without
much venturing that the time has come, when qualia are to beliberated from the studies of philosophers, and to become asubject of an empirical science. The difficulties that we face inthe binding problem, and the neural mechanism of the semantics
of language, cannot be dissolved without tackling theneurophysiological mechanism underlying qualia.
Qualia are central to our research program to study the
relation between mind and brain as a field of empirical science.
The experimental and theoretical study of qualia is too important
to be ignored. As I close this article, it is fitting to refer to thewords of Michael Faraday, whose pioneering work opened awhole new world of electromagnetism.
Nothing is too wonderful to be true, if it be consistent withthe laws of nature.

16

Acknowledgements
I thank Horace Barlow for critical reading of the manuscript.
References
Barlow. H. B. (1972) Single units, sensation: a neuron doctrine
for perceptual psychology? Perception 1, 371-394.
Chalmers, D. The Puzzle of Conscious Experience. Scientific
American, December, (1995)
Crick, F. (1994). in The Astonishing Hypothesis. (Simon andSchuster)
Einstein, A. (1905) Zur Elektodynamik bewegter Körper. Ann.
der Phys. 17, 891-921.
Libet, B. (1985) Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role ofconscious will in voluntary action. Behav. Brain Sci. 8, 529-566
Penrose, R. (1994) in Shadows of the Mind. Oxford University
Press, and (1989) in Emperor's New Mind. Oxford University
Press.
Shannon, C.E. A mathematical theory of communication. Bell
System Technical Journal 27, 379-423, 623-656 (1948)

17

Neural Firing in
the Brain

Perception

Figure 1
The neuron doctrine in perception (Barlow 1972) states thatour perception is determined by, and only by, the pattern ofneural firings in the brain. From this view point, the core of themind-brain problem lies in finding the correspondence principle
between the neural firings in the brain and our perception.

18

ColorForm

TextureIntegration

MotionVisual Field
Figure 2
The various visual features are coded in spatially separate
areas of the cortex. For example, color is coded in area V4,
texture in area V2, and motion in area MT, and the form in area
IT. We have the integrated perception such as "a red flower withfluffy texture in the middle is moving to the right". In order toachieve this, the various visual features represented in the cortex
should be somehow bound. This is the so-called "binding
problem".
19

time

MotionMotionConvergence
Zone
Color

Color
Form

Form

time

time

(b) Synchonous firing(a) Convergence Zone

Figure 3
Two schemes are at present proposed as the solution to thebinding problem. In "convergence zone" theory, the visualfeatures represented in multiple areas of the cortex are"integrated" in the "convergence zone" somewhere in the cortex.
One obstacle stands in the way of implementing this idea. The
problem of combinatorial explosion, namely, the possibility of
combination of visual features leading to the shortage of coding
capacity in the brain (sometimes called the yellow Volkswagen
problem) should be accounted for. The other idea, that thesynchronous firings of neurons in the cortex code for the visualfeatures bound into one object, is not without its own difficulties.
Among the difficulties are the ambiguity associated with thedefinition of synchronicity in a neural network where the timerequired for transmission of action potentials is finite. Anotherdifficulty is how the visual features could be bound when there
are multitude of objects within a small visual area, as in the caseof marbles with various colors scattered over the visual field .
20

VisionAudition

Smell

Taste

Touch

Figure 4
The apparent distinction between the modalities of senses,
such as vision, audition, taste, touch, and smell is one of themost remarkable properties of our perception. The unique natureof qualia associated to each modality, and the spatio-temporal
structures that accompany them, should ultimately be explainedby the nature of the neural firings in the respective cortical areasthat sustain each modality.

21

Our perception is directly invokedby the neural firings in the brain. A
non-firing neuron is as good as nonexistent as far as perception isconcerned. The characteristics of ourperception should be explained by
the nature of neural firings only.

The Neuron Doctrineof Perception

In perception, the significance of afiring neuron is determined by its
relation to other firing neurons atthat
psychologicalmoment.
(Response selectivity cannot be theultimate bridging principle between
the neural firings and perception.)

Mach's Principle in
Perception

Principle of Interaction
Simultaneity

The neural firings connected byinteraction are simultaneous. Thereis no passage of proper time τ along
the world line of interaction.

A priori correspondenceof qualia

Interaction-connected cluster ofneural firings constitute a percept.
To a particular pattern of neuralfiring,aparticularqualiacorresponds. In other words, there isa one to one correspondence between
neural firing pattern and qualia in ana priori manner.

Table 1
Basic assumptions

22

time
action potential
velocity

Neuron A`

t

dτ=0

c BA

Neuron B

axon
length LBA

t =t +

LBA

cBA

t+

space

LBA

c BA

=τ

Figure 5
Under the principle of interaction simultaneity, the neuralfirings connected by interaction via the synapse are considered tobe simultaneous. The time parameter thus constructed is called
the proper time. In reference to the firing event of a particular
neuron A, the presynaptic firings that produced EPSP in neuron
A, and the postsynaptic firings that are influenced by the firing of
neuron A, are considered to be simultaneous. The principle ofinteraction simultaneity is derived from the assumption of
causality.

23

time

dτ = 0light cone

space
twistor space
physical space-timetimedτ = 0space
perceptual space-time
physical space-time(in which neurons
are embedded)

Fig.6
The twistor space is constructed on the basis of the causal
relation between points in the physical space-time, and is more
fundamental to the natural law than the physical space-time itself.
In a similar manner, the perceptual space-time is constructedfrom the interaction of neural firings based on the causal
relations.
24Within the "self"

Past

Image withinthe "self"

Memory of thingsin the "Past"

Outsidethe "self"

Looking at objects
outside the "self"
at present

Present

Figure 7
Qualia plays an essential role in the structuring of ourperception. For example, vivid qualia accompany our perception
when we are looking at an object which is outside the "self" atpresent. In contrast, less vivid qualia accompany our perceptionof something within the "self" (i.e., mental imagery) or in thepast (i.e., memory). Qualia thus reflect the structuring of
information processing in our brain within the context of
topological distinction between self and non-self, and thetemporal distinction of present and past.
25

Definition of Information

Foundation of Perception

Conventional Concept ofInformation(Statistical Picture)

Shannon type

Response Selectivity

New Concept ofInformation(Interaction Picture)

Unknown(Twistor-likemathematicalframework?)

Interaction-connectedneural firings(qualia)

Table 2
Conventional and New concept of Information

26