Climate Change
ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OF THE
FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT,
NATURE CONSERVATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
Research Report 201 41 255
UBA-FB 000412

01
03

Evolution of commitments
under the UNFCCC:
Involving newly
industrialized economies
and developing countries

byNiklas Höhne
Carolina Galleguillos
Kornelis Blok
Jochen HarnischDian Phylipsen
ECOFYS GmbHOn behalf of the Federal Environmental Agency

UMWELTBUNDESAMTThe publisher does not accept responsibility for thecorrectness, accuracy or completeness of the information,or for the observance of the private rights of third parties.
The contents of this publication do not necessarilyreflect the official opinions.

Publisher:

Federal Environmental Agency (Umweltbundesamt)
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14191 Berlin
Tel.: +49/30/8903-0
Telex: 183 756
Telefax: +49/30/8903 2285
Internet: http://www.umweltbundesamt.de

Edited by:

Section I 2.7
Dr. Rolf Sartorius

Berlin, Februar 2003

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Berichts-Kennblatt
1. Berichtsnummer
2.
3.
UBA-FB
4. Titel des Berichts
Weiterentwicklung der Verpflichtungen des UNFCCC: Einbeziehung von Schwellenländern und Entwicklungsländern
5. Autor(en), Name(n), Vorname(n)Höhne, Niklas
Dr. Harnisch, Jochen
Dr. Phylipsen, Dian
Prof. Dr. Blok, Kornelis
Galleguillos, Carolina
6. Durchführende Institution (Name, Anschrift)
ECOFYS GmbH
Eupener Straße 59
50933 Cologne
Germany
Tel. +49 221 510 907 0

8. Abschlussdatum
31.12.2002
9. Veröffentlichungsdatum
7.1.2003
10. UFOPLAN-Nr.
201 41 255
11. Seitenzahl
87

7. Fördernde Institution (Name, Anschrift)
12. Literaturangaben
61

Umweltbundesamt
Postfach 33 00 22
D-14191 Berlin

13. Tabellen und Diagramme
13
14. Abbildungen
14

15. Zusätzliche Angaben-/16. Kurzfassung
Diese Studie hat zum Ziel, Hintergrundinformationen zum Thema zukünftiger Verpflichtungen unter der Klimarahmenkonvention (UNFCCC) in übersichtlicher Form bereitzustellen. Insbesondere wird darauf eingegangen, wie Schwellenländer und Entwicklungsländer mit in das Verpflichtungsregime einbezogen werden können. Dazu werden bereits existierende Ansätze zur Einbeziehung von Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern
identifiziert, bewertet und weiterentwickelt.

17. Schlagwörter
Klimarahmenkonvention, UNFCCC, Kyoto Protokoll, zukünftige Verpflichtungen, internationale Klimapolitik, Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien

18. Preis

19.

20.

iv

Evolution of commitments / DM 754

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Report Cover Sheet
1.
4.
5.

6.

7.

Report No.
2.
3.
UBA-FB
Report Title
Evolution of commitments under the UNFCCC: Involving newly industrialized economies
and developing countries
Autor(s), Family Name(s), First Name(s)8. Report Date
Höhne, Niklas
31.12.2002
Dr. Harnisch, Jochen
Dr. Phylipsen, Dian
9. Publication Date
Prof. Dr. Blok, Kornelis
7.1.2003
Galleguillos, Carolina
Performing Organisation (Name, Address)
ECOFYS GmbH
10. UFOPLAN-Ref. No.
Eupener Straße 59
201 41 255
50933 Cologne
Germany
11. No. of Pages
Tel. +49 221 510 907 0
87Sponsoring Agency (Name, Address)
12. No. of Reference
61
Umweltbundesamt (Federal Environmental Agency)
Postfach 33 00 22
13. No. of Tables, Diagrams
D-14191 Berlin
13
Germany
14. No. of Figures
14

15. Supplementary Notes-/16. Abstract
This study has as objective to provide the history and background information on theevolution of commitments under the UNFCCC in a structured manner, where the involvement of newly industrialized economies and developing countries in further commitments under the UNFCCC is of particular concern. For this purpose, existing approaches to further commitments are identified, assessed and further developed.

17. Keywords
Climate Change Convention, UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, future commitments, international climate policy, equity principles
18. Price

19.

20.

v

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Evolution of commitments / DM 754

SUMMARY
International negotiations have lead to first steps in combating climate change with the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. Under the Protocol, industrialized countries have to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions byaround five per cent between 2008 and 2012 compared to 1990 levels. It is however broadly
recognized that further steps are necessary to stabilize the climate in the long term.
Therefore, this study has as objective to provide the history and background information on
the evolution of commitments under the UNFCCC in a structured manner, where the involvement of newly industrialized economies and developing countries in further commitments under the UNFCCC is of particular concern. For this purpose, existing approaches to further
commitments are identified, assessed and further developed.
The starting point is a detailed overview of the current commitments of states under the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and the relation of these commitments to the reduction necessary to reach a stabilization of the climate. While the reduction of global emissions below
1990 levels within a few decades is necessary to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at
relatively low levels, most business-as-usual scenarios show increasing emissions, particularly in developing countries.
As a next step, the study includes a discussion of the preconditions and specific difficulties
relating to further commitments. These include first the rules of the negotiation process (e.g.
that decisions have to be made by consensus) and the history of the negotiations on this
topic. Although it was agreed that the negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol should only
include a discussion on commitments for industrialized countries, some industrialized countries wanted to broaden this mandate, but failed until Kyoto. Also the negotiations after Kyoto
on future commitments were always deferred over the question, whether to include commitments for developing countries. Furthermore, the magnitude and scope of the necessarychanges necessary to combat climate change, the inertia of the climate system and the scientific uncertainties make it difficult to reach agreement. And lastly, differences in national circumstances and the resulting positions towards commitments are major obstacles.
A separate chapter discusses the equity principles that are embedded in the Convention andthat are used in the context of further commitments. We conclude that it is essential that a
future approach to commitments satisfies the equity principles ‘need’ (allowing economic development to satisfy basic needs), ‘responsibility’ (those should act that caused the problem:
polluter pays) and ‘capability’ (those should act that have the economic capacity: ability topay).
A survey and literature search of approaches to further commitments reveals that many approaches are available that either describe a particular aspect of commitments (e.g. how to
distribute emission rights between a group of countries) or a complete climate commitment
regime with all its detail. From this variety of approaches we identified the issues that are
relevant in the discussion on further commitments: Should there be a step-by-step approachor a comprehensive approach that is guided by a long-term stabilization target? Should all
countries receive the same type of commitment (as e.g. in the Kyoto Protocol) or should several types of commitments exist in parallel (as e.g. the limitation of emissions per gross domestic product for some countries)? Should there be quantified national emission reduction
targets or non-quantified targets such as policies and measures? If quantified targets arechosen, what is the stringency of target? What are the consequences if the commitment is not
met? Which countries participate and when? How can political agreement be build? All of theabove questions have to be answered to describe a complete approach to future commitments.
The study includes also a first snapshot of the views on future commitments among a limited
number of delegates to the UNFCCC process. The interviewed delegates see the issue as
fundamental, but did not have fully developed opinions or concepts. There is a feeling of needfor action on the one hand but mistrust on the other. We conclude that more creative thinking,discussion and education are needed.
The focus of this study is to compare the most prominent approaches to commitments. We
selected eight approaches covering a broad range of options not prejudging that there couldvi

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Evolution of commitments / DM 754

be additional options. Where necessary, we extended them into complete global commitment
regimes, as to be able to compare them on the same grounds. These illustrative cases include:•

Continuing Kyoto assuming that more and more countries join the group countries withbinding absolute emission reduction targets.

•

Intensity targets assuming that all countries reduce their greenhouse gas intensity(greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP) at the same rate.

•

Contraction and Convergence assuming converging per-capita emissions of all countries to equal levels.

•

Global Triptych approach deriving national targets from bottom-up sectoral targets (CO2from energy only).

•

Multi-sector convergence approach deriving national targets from converging percapita sectoral targets.

•

Multistage approach (FAIR) assuming that countries participate in the commitment regime in four stages, ‘graduating’ from one to the next.

•

Equal mitigation cost assuming that targets are set distributing the economic burden
equally over all countries, base on an agreed model.

•

Coordinated policies and measures assuming that countries are obliged to implementcertain coordinated policies and measures.

After a first consideration of these illustrative cases we included additional new ideas, howsome of those proposals could be modified to increase their effectiveness and acceptability.
These include:•

Extended global Triptych deriving national targets from bottom-up sectoral targets covering all relevant greenhouse gases and sources.

•

New multistage approach assuming as a first stage to commitments a pledge for sustainable development and as further stages quantitative emission limits.

•

Performance targets deriving dynamic national targets from dynamic sectoral targets
based on emissions per unit of output.

All illustrative cases are described in full detail, including any assumptions. For all approaches, the allowed emissions of all countries are modeled. Subsequently, we assess theapproaches with respect to common assessment criteria to test their suitability for the international negotiation process. The criteria include:
Environmental criteria•

Environmental effectiveness: Can the approach reach stringent global emission targets
to safeguard the fulfilment of the ultimate objective of the Convention?

•

Encouragement of early action: Are countries that do not yet have binding commitments encouraged to keep emissions as low as possible?

Political criteria•

Equity principles: Are the three equity principles need, capability and responsibility covered?

•

Agreement with fundamental positions of all major constituencies: Could the approach be acceptable for all constituencies given their current positions?

Economic criteria•

Accounting for structural differences between countries: Are national circumstances
accounted for?

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Minimizing adverse economical effects: Does the approach allow distribution of commitments so that the global costs are minimized and gives countries sufficient flexibility toreach their commitments?

Technical criteria•

Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol: Is the approach compatible with the existing international structures of the Convention and the
Kyoto Protocol?

•

Moderate political and technical requirements of the negotiation process: Is the approach simple and requires a low number of separate decisions by international bodies
and are all necessary data and tools available and verifiable?

Comparing the different approaches across the different criteria is a subjective task, which
depends on the judgment, whether an approach meets the criterion, and the weight given to
the individual criteria. The Table S1 below provides an attempt for such a comparison. The
eight criteria are evaluated for each approach and rated ‘completely not met’ (--), ‘mainly notmet’ (-), ‘neutral’ (0), ‘mainly met’ (+) and ‘completely met’ (++). ‘/’ denotes that the criterion
may or may not be fulfilled depending on the specific variation of the approach. As an attempt
to further condense the assessment, always two criteria are grouped together to four generalcriteria (environmental, political, economic and technical). The first column of Table S1 provides a possible weighting for these general criteria. A further condensation of the ratings,
however, is left to the reader.

Intensity targets

New multistage

Performancetargets

3

+

0

++

+

++

+

0

+

+

++

+

Environmental effectiveness

++

+

++

++

++

++

++

0

++

++

+

Approach
Criterion

Environmental criteria

Coordinated
Policies andmeasures
Extended
global Triptych

Continuing
Kyoto

Equal mitigation cost

PossibleweightingContraction
and convergence
Global Triptych (CO2
only)
Multi-sector
convergenceapproachMultistage
approach(FAIR)

Table S1. Indicative assessment matrix for the qualitative comparison of the approaches

Encouragement of early action by Parties that do not yet
have binding commitments
Political criteria
3

-

-

++

0

+

/

--

++

0

+

+

0

0

0

+

0

++

0

0

+

++

0

Equity principles

+

0

+

+

+

++

0

-

+

++

+

0

+

-

+

0

+

-

0

+

+

0

0

0

-

+

+

+

++

-

++

+

++

/

/

--

+

+

+

++

-

++

+

++

+

+

+

+

+

+

++

-

+

+

+

++

0

++

0

0

+

-

0

0

+

0

++

+

+

+

+

+

+

0

+

+

+

++

-

++

-

-

+

--

-

-

+

-

Agreement with fundamental
positions of major constituencies
Economic criteria
2
Accounting for structural differences between countries
Minimizing adverse economic
effects
Technical criteria
1Compatibility with UNFCCC
and Kyoto Protocol
Moderate political and technical requirements of the negotiation process

Note: ‘--' criterion completely not met, ‘-' criterion mainly not met, ‘0’ neutral, ‘/’ depends on the specificvariation of the approach, ‘+’ criterion mainly met, ‘++’ criterion completely metviii

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From the comparison of the approaches, we draw the following conclusions:
Several approaches are available that would lead to emissions consistent with stringent
environmental goals. For all approaches, reductions additional to those in the Kyoto Protocol
are necessary.
Significant reductions by industrialized countries are necessary for all these approaches
in the order of cutting emissions more than in half by 2050 and continuing to decrease toleave some room for increasing developing country emissions and still to reach stringent environmental goals.
Early involvement of developing countries is needed inducing deviation from current
business-as-usual paths. This can be achieved through emission limitation and reduction targets, but also through an enhanced sustainable development approach and through positive
spillover of emission reductions from developed countries to developing countries. Not manyof the existing approaches encourage early action by countries that are not yet participating.
A good mix of several elements could be a compromise with a higher chance of being
accepted since all constituencies find elements of their concern in such mixed approach.
Differentiation not solved: No generally acceptable approach is available how to differentiate targets within a group of countries although many indicators and approaches are available.
Continuing Kyoto without any changes or additions would be an obvious option for futurecommitments. Stringent environmental goals can, however, only be reached if current Annex I
countries decrease their emissions more than for the first commitment period (2008 to 2012)
and if developing countries deviate from their business-as-usual paths at an early stage. In
this system a method to differentiate the targets for the participating countries is to be found.
Taking on absolute emission targets may be difficult for some developing countries due to theuncertainty in the development of the emissions. To help these countries, relatively small additional changes in the rules could be introduced such as ‘price caps’ (additional permits at a
fixed price) or slightly looser compliance mechanisms.
Intensity targets can play a role in future commitments as one form of target for a particulargroup of countries, possibly in parallel to other types of targets for other countries. If it is applied to all countries, the global emission intensity (Emissions per GDP) has to decrease rapidly (2%-4% per year) in order to reach stringent environmental goals. If equal percentage
reductions in emission intensity are agreed for a group of countries, those are in advantagethat have higher economic growth. Agreeing on differentiated intensity reductions is more difficult than absolute reductions, since it involves country specific knowledge of the relationshipbetween emissions and GDP, which also may evolve with time.
Contraction and convergence, where per-capita emissions converge, is intriguing due tothe simplicity of the approach. Since major reductions in emissions are necessary it is likely,that in the long run under any regime per-capita emissions will converge to a very low level.
The question is on which path. The simplicity of the approach is also the major disadvantage:
The approach does not account for the structural differences of countries and their ability todecrease their emissions. For stabilization levels of 450 or 550 ppmv CO2, per-capita emissions have to decrease below the current world average. Also many developing countries
would have to decrease emissions below their business as usual path and only a few least
developed countries could sell for as short period of time easily earned emission allowances
to developed countries.
The Triptych approach has potential as a method to differentiate emission reduction targets
between members of a group of countries. The extended version presented here also can
accommodate the emission structure of developing countries and includes forestry and nonCO2 greenhouse gas emissions. Such differentiation approach can produce a starting point
for a negotiation between the countries of that group.
Multi-stage approaches will be the future of the climate regime, but there are many possibilities on types of stages and thresholds for moving into a next stage. The current two stages(Annex I and Non Annex I) could be extended. As one promising criteria to move to a furtherix

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stage would be the emissions per capita. As a first stage, a well-defined commitment to sustainable development could increase the acceptability for developing countries.
The multi-sector convergence approach is describing a complete set of rules for a futureclimate regime defining in essence the path on which sectoral per-capita emissions converge.
A major downside of the approach is that sectoral activities are not necessarily directly related
to the population.
Equal mitigation costs: Setting targets so that mitigation costs are equal for all participating
countries (e.g. a percentage share of the GDP) seems to be, from a theoretical point of view,a fair option. In practice, however, it may be impossible to agree on a model or calculation
method for calculating the cost of countries. It is therefore not a realistic option.
Policies and measures can also be a part of a mix. Especially for newly entering countries,
policies that combine development and environment objectives are very attractive and could
form a first stage of commitments.
From the overall report we make the following recommendations:Start an informal, international dialogue process to educate a discussion and to build trust
among delegations outside of the formal negotiations, bringing together scientists and policy
makers to discuss the science of climate change (stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations, range of uncertainties) and possible actions (absolute and intensity targets, form andstringency, sustainable development approach). Such trust building and educating dialogue
could help to unblock the official negotiations on future commitments.
Build trust by action: The perception by most developing countries, that Annex I countries
do not take sufficient action, blocks the discussion on future commitments. This leads to the(almost trivial) recommendation, that Annex I countries have to build trust by actively reducing
emissions, getting involved in the CDM and making available the agreed funds. This also includes working with the USA to find ways of their participation as well as the clear communication of actions taken and results achieved to date. In any case, strong efforts by developed
countries are likely to also have reducing effects on developing country emissions (positive
spillover).
Stress the need for significant reduction in Annex I countries in the long term: This andother analyses show that in all scenarios that lead to ambitious long-term goals, industrializedcountries have to reduce emissions significantly until 2050, otherwise no room is available formoderately increasing developing country emissions. Efforts should focus on actions that reduce emissions not only temporarily in the short-term but sustainably in the long run. A clear
statement by developed countries to this effect could be a signal to developing countries.
Build upon existing system, but be creative: Most approaches can be build upon the existing system that is already agreed by the international community: Legally binding emission
targets for some countries, inclusion of all greenhouse gases in a basket, commitment periods, emissions trading, limited use of forestry activities, incentives for developing countries toparticipate e.g. through CDM. The structure allows to build in creative new approaches. E.g.
emission intensity targets could be integrated in a further development of the Kyoto Protocol,
if so desired.
Support early involvement (not necessarily ‘participation’) by all countries: Our analysis
shows that the way emissions are shared depends to a large extent on the business-as-usual
path that is chosen for the analysis. Sustainable development of all countries, not including
policies aimed directly at the climate, is equally important for low emissions as reductions induced by commitments under the UNFCCC. Unconstrained business-as-usual emissions of
Non-Annex I Parties will foreclose certain options for stabilization. All efforts have to be madeto enable developing countries to develop in a sustainable way. Further thoughts are necessary how development along such a sustainable path way can be achieved, e.g. use of thecurrently available tools, such as the financial cooperation, CDM or additional investment programmes. Additionally, initial further commitments for developing countries could take theform of a pledge for enhanced sustainable development or targets that allow economic growth
but limit emissions at the same time.
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Work together with the Group of 77 and China to break the deadlock: The G77 stands asa group in the international negotiations and is likely to do so in the near future, although theinterests of the members of the group are diverse. In the past, efforts by some developing
counties to break out of the group to take on commitments have failed, mainly due to the opposition within the G77. Currently, it seems unlikely that only some developing countries takeon commitments. One way to overcome this problem could be to agree on a total indicative
target for the G77 and let the group decide itself which members have to take which action.
Let countries place themselves in groups: Until the present some industrialized countries
stated the general condition of ‘meaningful participation of developing countries’, but did not
differentiate, which of the developing countries are expected to act. Indicators, that would define when a country has to take on climate commitments, are available (greenhouse gas
emissions, emissions per GDP, GDP per capita, human development index, vulnerability etc.)
but no single one, or combination, is generally acceptable to all countries. Collection of dataon such indicators can support a process in which countries are asked to place themselves in
one of a number of groups, e.g. ‘binding target’, ‘voluntary, non-binding target’, ‘No need toact’. Such process would have to take into account the structure of the G77 as explained
above. Publicly available indicators and political pressure could move countries to place
themselves in a certain group.
Allow diverse forms of targets: Several forms of targets are available. In a diverse world
possibly many different approaches need to be available to account for the diverse needs of
all countries. One way to accomplish this would be the ‘menu approach’ to let (newly entering)groups of Parties choose the appropriate form of their target from options such as absolutetargets, GDP intensity, certain policies and measures. The form of the target is not significant
as long as it is ensured that the targets are stringent enough.
Focus on forms of targets allow developing country economic growth but limit emissions: Absolute targets are seen by developing countries as capping their economic growth.
Intensity targets are intending to provide such flexibility but may not do so, if they are set stringently or emission intensive activities increase that do not contribute much to the GDP. ‘Performance targets’, that are dynamic as intensity targets, but relate to the activity level not theGDP, or the Triptych approach could provide room for economic growth in activities to agreater extent but limit emissions per level of activity. Technology standards also do not limit
activities but limit only the specific emissions. Also the pledge for sustainable development
focuses on the development first and is therefore attractive.
Focus long-term discussion on the lost options: If greenhouse gas concentration levels,for example on 450 or 550 ppmv CO2, or maximum levels of climate change, such as 2°C
temperature rise, cannot be agreed, a discussion could be framed around questions such as‘At what level of global emissions in the year 2020 do we loose the option to stabilize concentrations at 450 ppmv CO2?’. Answers could lead to the definition of an intermediate global
emission target, for e.g. 2020, from which it would still be possible to reach several concentration levels.
Be prepared to evaluate targets of other countries: From the procedural point of view,
there are at least two ways to agree on commitments: Countries propose targets for themselves, all evaluate each others proposals and then start to negotiate. Alternatively, a chairman or another person with the political responsibility makes a proposal based on a scientifically credible formula and the following negotiations will provide for the exceptions to particular national circumstances. Countries need to have the analytical capacity to evaluate theproposals by other countries. If a government is supporting the chairman, it must have thecapacity to make a scientifically based proposal.
To reach agreement on future commitments in the international climate negotiations will not
be an easy task. There are however a large number of approaches available and it seems
possible that a mix of several approaches can lead to a compromise. The most important at
this moment seems to be to provide information and to stimulate a discussion on the scientific
as well as on the policy level. The authors would welcome, if this report would contribute tosuch a discussion.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
In den internationalen Verhandlungen zum Klimawandel hat sich die Staatengemeinschaft mit
der Klimarahmenkonvention und mit dem Kyoto-Protokoll auf erste Schritte zur Reduktion vonTreibhausgasemissionen geeinigt. Mit dem Kyoto-Protokoll gehen Industrieländer die Verpflichtung ein, ihre absoluten Emissionen um rund fünf Prozent zu senken. Es ist jedoch allgemein anerkannt, dass weitere Verpflichtungen und eine Ausweitung der Gruppe der reduzierenden Staaten nötig sind, um das Klima langfristig zu stabilisieren.
Die vorliegende Studie hat deshalb zum Ziel, Hintergrundinformationen zum Thema zukünftiger Verpflichtungen unter der Klimarahmenkonvention (UNFCCC) in übersichtlicher Formbereitzustellen. Insbesondere wird darauf eingegangen, wie Schwellenländer und Entwicklungsländer mit in das Verpflichtungsregime einbezogen werden können. Dazu werden bereits existierende Ansätze zur Einbeziehung von Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern identifiziert, bewertet und weiterentwickelt.
Ausgangspunkt ist ein detaillierter Überblick, welche Verpflichtungen für Staaten unter der
Klimarahmenkonvention und dem Kyoto Protokoll bereits bestehen und in welchem Verhältnis
sie zu den nötigen Reduktionen stehen, die eine Stabilisierung des Klimas gewährleisten
würden. Während die Stabilisierung bei niedrigen Treibhausgaskonzentrationen die Reduktion der globalen Treibhausgasemissionen unter das Niveau von 1990 in wenigen Jahrzehnten
erfordert, beschreiben die meisten Referenzszenarien stark ansteigende Emissionen, insbesondere in Entwicklungsländern.
Als nächster Schritt werden die Grundvoraussetzungen und spezifischen Schwierigkeiten
beschrieben, die im Hinblick auf zukünftige Verpflichtungen zu berücksichtigen sind. Dazu
gehören zunächst die Regeln des internationalen Verhandlungsprozesses (z.B. dass Entscheidungen im Konsens gefällt werden müssen) und die Verhandlungsgeschichte. Obwohl
in der Vorverhandlung zum Kyoto-Protokoll festgelegt wurde, lediglich neue Verpflichtungen
für Industrieländer zu verhandeln, gab es Bestrebungen von Seiten einiger Industrieländer,das Mandat auch auf einige Entwicklungsländer auszuweiten, die jedoch bis Kyoto gescheitert sind. Auch in den folgenden Verhandlungen wurde das Thema der zukünftigen Verpflichtungen immer wieder über die Frage vertagt, ob Entwicklungsländer in Zukunft strengere
Verpflichtungen erhalten sollten. Des weiteren tragen auch das Ausmaß und der Umfang dernötigen Maßnahmen zur Reduktion des Klimawandels, die Trägheit des Klimasystems unddie wissenschaftliche Unsicherheiten dazu bei, dass sich eine Einigung auf zukünftige Verpflichtungen schwierig gestaltet. Nicht zuletzt sind die unterschiedlichen wirtschaftlichen undsozialen Ausgangssituationen und Interessen der Staaten zu nennen, die zu sehr gegensätzlichen politischen Positionen führen.
Ein separates Kapitel dieser Studie befasst sich mit den Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien, die in der
Klimakonvention verankert sind und die im Zusammenhang mit zukünftigen Verpflichtungengenannt werden. Wir kommen zum Schluss, dass ein zukünftiges System von Verpflichtungen mindestens die folgenden drei Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien erfüllen muss: ‚Bedürfnis’ (Zugeständnis der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, um Grundbedürfnisse zu befriedigen), ‚Verantwortung’ (Derjenige der den Schaden verursacht muss handeln: Das Verursacherprinzip) und‚Leistungsfähigkeit’ (Derjenige muss handeln, der dazu wirtschaftlich in der Lage ist: Das
Leistungsfähigkeitsprinzip).
Eine Bestandsaufnahme zum Thema der zukünftigen Verpflichtungen ergibt, dass vielfältigste
Ansätze vorhanden sind, die entweder Teilaspekte abdecken (z.B. beschreiben wie Emissionsrechte innerhalb einer Gruppe von Staaten verteilt werden könnten) oder ein komplettes
Regime beschreiben. Von dieser Vielfältigkeit motiviert werden die Gesichtspunkte herausgearbeitet, die für eine Entscheidung über zukünftige Verpflichtungen relevant sind: Sollte es ein
Ansatz sein, der Schritt für Schritt vorgeht oder ein Ansatz, der umfassend und langfristig
ausgerichtet ist, in dem er auf ein konkretes Stabilisierungsziel hinarbeitet? Sollten allen Staaten die gleiche Art von Verpflichtungen zugeordnet werden (wie zum Beispiel die des Kyoto
Protokolls) oder sollten verschiedene Arten von Verpflichtungen parallel existieren (wie zum
Beispiel auch die zusätzliche Begrenzung der Emissionen pro Bruttoinlandsprodukt für einige
Länder)? Sollten die Verpflichtung quantifiziert im Sinne von Emissionsreduktionszielen odernicht quantifiziert im Sinne von spezifischen Klimaschutzmaßnahmen sein? Im Falle vonquantifizierten Zielen, wie streng sollten diese Ziele sein? Was passiert wenn die Verpflichxii

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tungen nicht eingehalten werden? Welche Länder nehmen teil und wann? Wie kann der Prozess der politischen Einigung unterstützt werden? All diese Fragen müssen beantwortet werden, um ein System zukünftiger Verpflichtungen umfassend zu beschreiben.
Als einen weiteren Schritt haben wir eine erste Momentaufnahme der Ansichten von Delegierten der internationalen Klimaverhandlungen zu zukünftigen Verpflichtungen zusammengestellt. Die Befragten schätzten dieses Thema als sehr wichtig ein, hatten aber zumeist nochkeine komplette Meinung oder detaillierte Konzepte parat. Auf der einen Seite sprach man
sich für rasches Handeln aus, auf der anderen herrschte eine Stimmung des Misstrauens.
Dies lässt die Schlussfolgerung zu, dass neue Ideen, Diskussion und Austausch nötig sind.
Der Schwerpunkt dieser Studie ist der Vergleich der wichtigsten Ansätze zu zukünftigen Verpflichtungen, der im folgenden näher beschrieben werden soll. Acht Ansätze wurden ausgewählt, um ein möglichst breites Spektrum abzudecken, ohne sich jedoch auf diese sieben
festzulegen. Falls die Ansätze nur Teilaspekte beinhalteten, wurden sie zu umfassenden
Verpflichtungsregimen erweitert, um sie verglichen zu können. Diese veranschaulichenden
Fälle sind:•Weiterführen des Kyoto Protokolls ohne Änderung der Regeln, so dass mehr undmehr Länder in die Gruppe der reduzierenden Länder aufrücken und absolute Emissionsreduktionsziele erhalten.

•

Begrenzung der Treibhausgasintensität, alle Länder müssen ihre Treibhausgasintensität (Emissionen pro Bruttoinlandsprodukt) um die gleiche Rate senken.

•

Verringerung und Konvergenz, Pro-Kopf-Emissionen konvergieren für alle Länder.

•

Globaler Triptych-Ansatz, nationale Emissionsziele werden aus sektoralen Zielen abgeleitet (nur energiebezogenes CO2).

•

Multisektorkonvergenz-Ansatz, nationale Emissionsziele werden aus konvergierenden
sektoralen Pro-Kopf-Zielen abgeleitet.

•

Mehrstufen-Ansatz (FAIR), vier verschiedene Stufen von Verpflichtungen werden von
neu hinzukommenden Ländern nacheinander durchlaufen.

•

Ausgeglichene Vermeidungskosten, Emissionsreduktionsziele werden mit Hilfe eines
allgemein akzeptierten Modells auf die Staaten verteilt, so dass die wirtschaftliche Belastung in jedem Land gleich ist.

•

Koordinierte Maßnahmen, Staaten müssen bestimmte festgelegte Maßnahmen zu
Emissionsreduktion umsetzen.

Nach einer ersten Analyse der obengenannten Fälle wurden neue Ideen hinzugefügt, um diemögliche Akzeptanz und Effektivität der Ansätze zu verbessern:•

Erweiterter Triptych-Ansatz, nationale Emissionsziele werden aus sektoralen Zielen
abgeleitet, wobei alle relevanten Treibhausgase und Sektoren berücksichtigt werden.

•

Neuer Mehrstufen-Ansatz, als erste Stufe der Verpflichtungen für neue Staaten steht
die Verpflichtung nachhaltige Entwicklung zu betreiben, gefolgt von Stufen der absoluten
Emissionsminderung.

•

Leistungsziele, dynamische Emissionsziele abgeleitet aus dynamischen sektoralen Zielen basierend auf Emissionen pro Produktionseinheit.

Alle Fälle werden im Detail und mit allen Annahmen beschrieben. Wo möglich, werden die
Emissionsrechte der einzelnen Länder unter den verschiedenen Fällen berechnet. Anschließend werden die Fälle nach folgenden einheitlichen Kriterien bewertet:Ökologische Kriterien•

Sichert positive Umwelteffekte: Können mit dem Ansatz ehrgeizige globale Ziele erreicht werden, die die Einhaltung des langfristigen Ziels der Klimarahmenkonvention ermöglichen?

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Evolution of commitments / DM 754

ECOFYS•

Anreize für frühzeitige Umsetzung: Ermutigt der Ansatz Staaten dazu, frühzeitig Emissionen so niedrig wie möglich zu halten?

Politische Kriterien•

Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien: Sind die drei Prinzipien Bedürfnis, Verantwortung undLeistungsfähigkeit beachtet worden?

•

Prinzipiell akzeptabel aus Sicht wichtiger Akteure: Könnte der Ansatz von den wichtigsten Staaten unterstützt werden?

Ökonomische Kriterien•

Berücksichtigung strukturelle Unterschiede: Werden die unterschiedlichen nationalen
Umstände explizit im Ansatz berücksichtigt?

•

Minimiert nachteilige wirtschaftliche Effekte: Sind die nötigen Verpflichtungen so verteilt, dass die globalen Kosten minimiert sind und der Ansatz Raum für eine individuelle
nationale Umsetzung lässt?

Technische Kriterien•

Mit der Klimarahmenkonvention und dem Kyoto-Protokoll vereinbar: Ist der Ansatz
kompatibel mit den existierenden internationalen Strukturen der Klimarahmenkonvention
und des Kyoto-Protokolls?

•

Moderate politische und technische Anforderungen im Verhandlungsprozesses: Ist
der Ansatz einfach, sind nur eine begrenzte Anzahl von Entscheidungen der verhandelnden Parteien nötig und sind alle nötigen Daten und Berechnungsmethoden verfügbar undüberprüfbar?

Ein Vergleich der Ansätze über die Bewertungskriterien birgt subjektive Entscheidungen auf

Mögliche Wichtung

Weiterführen desKyoto Protokolls

Begrenzung derTreibhausgasintensität

Verringerung und
Konvergenz

Globaler Triptych
Ansatz (nur CO2)

Multisektorkonvergenz-Ansatz

MehrstufenAnsatz (FAIR)

Ausgeglichene
Vermeidungskosten

Koordinierte Maßnahmen

Erweiterter Triptych Ansatz

Neuer Mehrstufen
AnsatzLeistungsziele

Tabelle S1: Bewertungsmatrix für den qualitativen Vergleich der Ansätze

3

+

0

++

+

++

+

0

+

+

++

+

Sichert positive Umwelteffekte

++

+

++

++

++

++

++

0

++

++

+

AnsatzKriteriumÖkologische Kriterien

Anreize für frühzeitige Umsetzung
Politische Kriterien
3

-

-

++

0

+

/

--

++

0

+

+

0

0

0

+

0

++

0

0

+

++

0

Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien

+

0

+

+

+

++

0

-

+

++

+

0

+

-

+

0

+

-

0

+

+

0

0

0

-

+

+

+

++

-

++

+

++

/

/

--

+

+

+

++

-

++

+

++

+

+

+

+

+

+

++

-

+

+

+

++

0

++

0

0

+

-

0

0

+

0

++

+

+

+

+

+

+

0

+

+

+

++

-

++

-

-

+

--

-

-

+

-

Prinzipiell akzeptabel aus derSicht wichtiger AkteureÖkonomische Kriterien2Berücksichtigung struktureller
Unterschiede
Minimiert nachteilige wirtschaftliche Effekte
Technische Kriterien
1
Mit Klimarahmenkonvention
und Kyoto Protokoll vereinbar
Moderate politische und technische Anforderungen im Verhandlungsprozess

Bemerkung: ‘--' Kriterium vollständig nicht erfüllt, ‘-' Kriterium nicht erfüllt, ‘0’ neutral, ‘/’ von der Ausgestaltung des Ansatzes abhängig, ‘+’ Kriterium erfüllt, ‘++’ Kriterium vollständig erfüllt
xiv

ECOFYS

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zwei Ebenen: Die Entscheidung, ob ein Kriterium für einen Ansatz zutrifft, und das Gewicht,
das jedem einzelnen Kriterium zugeordnet wird. In Tabelle S1 wird ein solcher Versuch unternommen. Die acht Kriterien wurden für alle Ansätze mit ‚vollständig nicht erfüllt’ (--), ‚nicht
erfüllt’ (-), ‚neutral’ (0)‚ erfüllt’ (+) oder ‚vollständig erfüllt’ (++) bewertet. Das Zeichen ‚/’ zeigt
an, dass eine Bewertung davon abhängt, wie der Ansatz im Detail ausgestaltet ist. Um die
Bewertung zu verdichten, werden jeweils zwei Kriterien zu vier allgemeinen Kriterien zusammengefasst (ökologisch, politisch, ökonomisch und technisch). Die erste Spalte enthält zudem eine mögliche Wichtung der allgemeinen Kriterien. Eine weitere Verdichtung und Bewertung bleibt dem Leser überlassen.
Folgende Schlussfolgerungen werden aus dem Vergleich gezogen:
Mehrere Ansätze stehen zur Verfügung, die Emissionen minimieren könnten, um ehrgeizige langfristige Ziele zu erreichen. Unter allen Ansätzen sind Reduktionen zusätzlich zu den
im Kyoto-Protokoll festgeschriebenen nötig.
Erhebliche Reduktionen in Industrieländern sind nötig, mindestens eine Halbierung derEmissionen bis 2050 und nachfolgend eine weitere Reduzierung, um ausreichend Raum fürleicht ansteigende Emissionen für Entwicklungsländer zu lassen und gleichzeitig ehrgeizige
langfristige Ziele zu erreichen.
Frühzeitige Einbindung von Entwicklungsländern ist nötig, um Emissionen unter die heute angenommenen zukünftigen Werte zu senken. Dies kann durch Emissionsminderungsziele
erreicht werden, aber auch durch einen Ansatz, der verstärkt auf nachhaltige Entwicklung
setzt, oder durch den positiven Einfluss von Emissionsreduktionen in Industrieländern auf
Emissionen in Entwicklungsländern. Nur wenige der hier betrachteten Ansätze motivieren zu
frühzeitigem Handeln in Abwesenheit von Reduktionszielen.
Eine gute Mischung von wichtigen Elementen verschiedener Ansätze könnte der Weg
zu einer Lösung sein, da sich viele Teilnehmer in einem solchen gemischten Ansatz wiederfinden können.
Das Problem der Staffelung von Emissionsminderungszielen ist nicht gelöst. Mehrere
Methoden und Indikatoren stehen zur Verfügung, Emissionsminderungsziele zwischen Ländern innerhalb einer Gruppe zu bestimmen. Keine Methode ist jedoch generell akzeptiert.
Eine Weiterführung des Kyoto-Protokolls ohne eine Änderung der Regeln wäre das
offensichtliche Instrument zu zukünftigen Verpflichtungen. Ehrgeizige langfristige Ziele
können erreicht werden, aber nur wenn Industrieländer erheblich striktere Ziele nach 2012
erhalten und Entwicklungsländer frühzeitig Emissionen unter die heute angenommenen
zukünftigen Werte zu senken. Eine Methode, Emissionsreduktionsziele zwischen Ländern zu
staffeln muss noch entwickelt werden. Die Unsicherheiten in der Hochrechnung derzukünftigen Emissionen könnten ein Hindernis für Entwicklungsländer sein, absolute
Emissionsreduktionsziele zu akzeptieren. Um diesen Ländern entgegenzukommen, könnten
relativ kleine Änderungen wie ein Preislimit für Emissionsrechte oder etwas gelockerte
Regeln im Falle der Nicht-Erfüllung eingeführt werden.
Limitierung der Treibhausgasintensität kann als eine besondere Art von Emissionsreduktionszielen, möglicherweise zusammen mit absoluten Zielen, eine Rolle spielen. Für den Fall,das solche Ziele für alle Staaten angewandt werden, müsste die globale Emissionsintensität(Emissionen pro Bruttoinlandsprodukt) stark zurückgehen (2%-4% pro Jahr), um ehrgeizige
langfristige Ziele zu erreichen. Wenn Reduktionen der Emissionsintensität für alle Länder um
dieselbe Prozentzahl vorgeschrieben werden, profitieren die Länder, die ein überdurchschnittlich hohes Wirtschaftswachstum erreichen. Einigung über Intensitätsziele könnte schwieriger
sein als bei absoluten Zielen, da Kenntnis der länderspezifischen Beziehung zwischen Emissionen und Bruttoinlandsprodukt notwendig ist.
Verringerung und Konvergenz (konvergierende Pro-Kopf-Emissionen) ist ein faszinierender
Ansatz, hauptsächlich durch seine Einfachheit. Unter jeglichem Ansatz werden auf lange
Sicht Pro-Kopf-Emissionen auf einem sehr niedrigen Niveau konvergieren. Die entscheidende
Frage ist aber auf welchem Pfad. Die Schlichtheit des Ansatzes ist jedoch auch sein größter
Nachteil: Strukturelle Unterschiede zwischen Staaten können nicht berücksichtigt werden. Um
die Stabilisierung der CO2-Konzentration bei 450 oder 550 ppmv zu erreichen, müssen die
Pro-Kopf-Emissionen auf ein Niveau unter dem jetzigen Weltmittel sinken. Zudem müssten
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viele Entwicklungsländer Ihre Emissionen unter den vorhergesagten Werten halten. Nur die
kleine Gruppe der am wenigsten entwickelten Länder könnte für kurze Zeit relativ einfachverdiente Emissionsrechte verkaufen.
Der Triptych-Ansatz ist eine sehr leistungsfähige Methode, in einer objektiven Weise Emissionsreduktionsziele auf Länder einer Gruppe aufzuteilen. Die erweiterte Version, die hiervorgestellt wurde, beinhaltet nun auch die Emissionssektoren, die insbesondere für Entwicklungsländer relevant sind. Ergebnisse eines solchen Ansatzes können Ausgangspunkt fürpolitische Verhandlungen sein.
Der Mehrstufen-Ansatz beschreibt einen generellen Rahmen der die Grundlage für ein zukünftiges Klimaregime bilden könnte. Die Einzelheiten können jedoch vielfältig ausgestaltet
werden. Die jetzigen zwei Stufen (Annex I und Nicht-Annex I) könnten erweitert werden. Ein
Grenzwert für Pro-Kopf-Emissionen empfiehlt sich als ein Kriterium, um auf eine nächste Stufe zu rücken. Die Akzeptanz von Entwicklungsländern könnte erhöht werden, wenn als ersten
Stufe eine wohldefinierte Verpflichtung zur nachhaltige Entwicklung gewählt würde.
Der Multisektorkonvergenz-Ansatz beschreibt eine komplettes Regelwerk für ein Klimaregime, in dem Pro-Kopfemissionen auf einem bestimmten Pfad konvergieren. Als Nachteil ist
zu werten, dass Emissionen bestimmter Sektoren nicht unbedingt mit der Bevölkerungszahl
korrelieren.
Ausgeglichene Vermeidungskosten als Methode, um Emissionsreduktionsziele auf Länder
aufzuteilen, ist auf den ersten Blick eine faire Lösung. Die technische Umsetzung über ein
allgemein anerkanntes Modell scheint jedoch unrealistisch.
Koordinierte Maßnahmen können Teil eines gemischten Ansatzes sein. Speziell für neu
hinzukommende Länder ist es attraktiv, entwicklungspolitische Maßnahmen mit Klimaschutzmaßnahmen zu verbinden.
Aus den hier angestellten Überlegungen geben wir die folgenden Empfehlungen:Ein internationaler, inoffizieller Dialog könnte neue Informationen in die Diskussion tragen
und Vertrauen unter den Delegierten fördern. Ein solcher Dialog würde Wissenschaftler sowie
politische Entscheidungsträger an einem Tisch versammeln, um die wissenschaftlichen
Grundlagen (Stabilisierung der Treibhausgaskonzentrationen und Unsicherheiten) und mögliche Ansätze (absolute Ziele, Emissionsintensität, Ansatz der nachhaltigen Entwicklung) zu
diskutieren. Ein solch informierender und vertrauenbildender Dialog könnte Schwung in die
festgefahrenen offiziellen Verhandlungen bringen.
Vertrauen bilden durch Handeln: Die Ansicht der meisten Entwicklungsländer, dass Annex-I-Länder (Industrieländer) ihre Emissionen nicht ausreichend reduzieren, blockiert die
Diskussion über zukünftige Verpflichtungen. Dies führt zu der (fast trivialen) Empfehlung,dass Annex-I-Länder dieses Vertrauen zurückgewinnen können, in dem sie aktiv Emissionen
mindern, aktiv am Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) teilnehmen und die vereinbarten
Gelder bereitstellen. Dazu gehört auch, sich gegenüber den USA für eine Umsetzung vonKlimaschutzmaßnahmen einzusetzen sowie die national umgesetzten Maßnahmen und Erfolge klar zu kommunizieren. Es scheint sicher, das Emissionsreduktionen in Industrieländern
langfristig auch zu niedrigeren Emissionen in Entwicklungsländern führen wird.
Betonung der Notwendigkeit signifikanter Emissionsreduktionen in Industrieländern
auf lange Sicht: Wie bereits andere Studien zeigt auch diese, dass unter allen Szenarien die
Industrieländer ihre Emissionen bis 2050 signifikant reduzieren müssen, um Raum für wachsende Emissionen von Entwicklungsländern zu lassen und um gleichzeitig ehrgeizige umweltpolitische Ziel zu erreichen. Anstrengungen müssen unternommen werden, Emissionen
langfristig nachhaltig zu senken. Eine klare Äußerung der Industrieländer dahingehend wäre
ein Signal für Entwicklungsländer.
Kreativ auf dem existierenden System aufbauen: Die meisten Ansätze können in das existierende System des Kyoto Protokolls eingebettet werden: Bindende Emissionsreduktionsziele, bezogen auf eine Gruppe von Gasen, Verpflichtungsperioden, Emissionshandel, begrenzte Nutzung natürlicher Senken, Anreize für Entwicklungsländer durch z.B. CDM. Die Struktur
ist flexibel, kreative neue Vorschläge aufzunehmen. Intensitäts-Ziele, zum Beispiel, könnten
integriert werden, falls erwünscht.
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Unterstützung frühzeitiger Einbeziehung (nicht unbedingt „participation“) aller Länder:
Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie zeigen, dass die Art und Weise, wie Emissionsrechte verteilt
werden, sehr stark von den Annahmen des Referenzszenarios abhängen. Nachhaltige Entwicklung für alle Länder, direkte Maßnahmen zum Klimaschutz ausgenommen, ist ebenso
wichtig für niedrige Emissionen wie Emissionsreduktionen, die durch Verpflichtungen unter
der Klimarahmenkonvention hervorgerufen werden. Uneingeschränkter Emissionszuwachsvon Entwicklungsländern würde gewisse Stabilisierungsziele unerreichbar machen. Alle Anstrengungen müssen unternommen werden, Entwicklungsländern zu ermöglichen, sich nachhaltig zu entwickeln. Mehr Analyse ist notwendig, wie solch ein nachhaltiger Entwicklungspfad
beschritten werden kann, zum Beispiel durch die existierenden Kanäle der technischen Zusammenarbeit und des Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) oder durch zusätzliche Investitionsprogramme. Zusätzlich könnten Entwicklungsländer als ersten Schritt sich zu nachhaltiger Entwicklung verpflichten oder Emissionsreduktionsziele annehmen, die gleichzeitig
Emissionen begrenzen und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung erlauben.
Zusammenarbeit mit der Gruppe der 77 und China: Die Entwicklungsländer haben sich inden internationalen Verhandlungen zu einer festen Gruppe, die G77, zusammengeschlossen,obwohl die Interessen der einzelnen Mitglieder der Gruppe sehr unterschiedlich sind. Staaten
der G77, die in der Vergangenheit versucht hatten, freiwillig Verpflichtungen zu übernehmen,
sind gescheitert, meist an der Opposition innerhalb der G77. Es erscheint daher unwahrscheinlich, dass einzelne Staaten der G77 Verpflichtungen übernehmen würden. Eine mögliche Lösung wäre es, der G77 ein Gesamtziel zu übertragen, dass dann innerhalb der Gruppe
aufgeteilt wird.
Einteilung in Gruppen von Staaten selbst: In der Vergangenheit wurde oft von Seiten derIndustrieländer der Ruf nach „wirksamer Beteiligung“ von Entwicklungsländern laut, ohne
dass differenziert wurde, genau welche Länder handeln sollten. Indikatoren, die anzeigen
würden, welche Länder Verpflichtungen übernehmen sollten, sind vorhanden (Emissionen,
Emissionen pro BIP, BIP pro Kopf, Entwicklungsindices etc.), aber kein einzelner oder keine
Kombination der Indices ist allgemein akzeptiert. Vergleichbare Daten könnten einen Prozess
unterstützen in dem sich Staaten selbst in Gruppen einteilen, wie zum Beispiel „Bindende
Ziele“, „Freiwillige nichtbindende Ziele“ und „Keine Ziele“. Ein solcher Prozess müsste die
Struktur der G77 berücksichtigen. Annerkannte, öffentliche, vergleichbare Daten und politischer Druck könnten Länder dazu bewegen sich einer bestimmten Gruppe zuzuordnen.
Zulassen verschiedener Arten von Zielen: Viele verschiedenen Arten von Zielen stehen zu
Verfügung. Unter 180 Staaten könnte es von Nöten sein, verschiedene Arten von Zielen
zuzulassen, um die nationalen Gegebenheiten der einzelnen Staaten berücksichtigen zu können. Es wäre zum Beispiel möglich, dass in einem „Menu Ansatz“ (neu hinzukommende)
Staaten sich eine Art von Ziel von einer Liste möglicher Ziele aussuchen könnten (z.B. absolute Emissionsreduktionsziele, Intensitätsziele, bestimmte Klimaschutzmassnahmen). Die Art
der Verpflichtung ist nicht ausschlaggebend, solange die Strenge ausreichend ist.
Konzentration auf Ziele, die Emissionen begrenzen und Entwicklung begünstigen: Absolute Emissionsziele werden von Entwicklungsländern oft als eine Begrenzung des Wirtschaftswachstums angesehen. Intensitätsziele sollten eine solche Flexibilität erlauben, können aber ebenso strikt sein, wenn sie sehr hohe Reduktionen verlangen oder wenn Emissionen in Bereichen steigen, die wenig zum BIP beitragen. „Leistungsziele“, die dynamisch sindwie Intensitätsziele, werden aber auf Aktivitätsdaten und nicht auf das BIP bezogen. Der Triptych-Ansatz erlaubt Wachstum in der Produktion, und limitiert Emissionen pro Produktionseinheit. Technologiestandards begrenzen ebenfalls nur spezifische Emissionen. Des weiteren
konzentriert sich der Ansatz der nachhaltigen Entwicklung zunächst auf Entwicklung und nicht
in erster Linie auf Klimaschutz und ist deshalb attraktiv.
Diskussion möglicher entgangener Stabilisierungsoptionen: Falls maximale Konzentrationsniveaus wie 450 oder 550 ppmv CO2 oder Maximalwerte für Klimaänderungen, wie 2°C
Erderwärmung, nicht abgestimmt werden können, so könnte man eine Diskussion um das
Thema führen: „Bei welchem Niveau globaler Emissionen in 2020 ist die Option bei 450 ppmv
zu stabilisieren außer Reichweite?“. Antworten auf diese Frage könnten zu einem mittelfristigen Zwischenziel für globale Emissionen führen, von dem aus verschiedene Konzentrationsniveaus erreicht werden können.
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Ziele anderer Staaten beurteilen können: Formal könnten zukünftige Verpflichtungen auf
mindestens zwei Arten zustande kommen: Staaten tragen konkrete Ziele vor, alle Staaten
beurteilen die Ziele der anderen und starten Verhandlungen. Als Alternative könnte ein(e)Vorsitzende(r) Ziele für die einzelnen Staaten vorschlagen, basierend auf einem wissenschaftlichen, transparenten System. Dieser Vorschlag würde in den anschließenden Verhandlungen den einzelnen nationalen Unterschieden angepasst. In beiden Fällen müssen Länder
die Ziele anderer Länder beurteilen können. Regierungen, die die Vorsitzende / den Vorsitzenden stellen, müssen in der Lage sein einen solchen wissenschaftliche transparenten Vorschlag zu machen.
Eine Einigung auf zukünftige Verpflichtungen in den internationalen Klimaverhandlungen ist
keine einfache Aufgabe. Es liegen jedoch mehrere potenzielle Ansätze vor und es scheintmöglich, aus einer Mischung verschiedener Ansätze einen Kompromiss zu bilden. Zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt besteht jedoch zunächst ein großer Informations- und Diskussionsbedarf auf
der wissenschaftlichen wie auch auf der politischen Ebene. Es ist im Sinne der Autoren wenndiese Studie zu einer solchen Diskussion beiträgt.

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Contents
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 2
2. THE NEED FOR THE EVOLUTION OF COMMITMENTS ....................................... 2
2.1 Current commitments under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol ........... 3
2.2 Science demands emission reductions ........................................................ 6
3. SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES IN AGREEING ON FURTHER COMMITMENTS......... 10
3.1 The international negotiation process......................................................... 10
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.1.4

The rules of negotiations under the UNFCCC ........................................ 10
History of the negotiation process on commitments ............................... 11
Increasing Annex I................................................................................... 12
Further differentiation in the Convention and in other international
agreements ............................................................................................. 13
3.2 Magnitude and scope of necessary changes ............................................. 14
3.3 Inertia of the climate system......................................................................... 14
3.4 Inertia of the socio-economic system ......................................................... 15
3.5 Decisions under uncertainty ........................................................................ 15
3.6 National circumstances................................................................................. 16
3.7 Positions of Parties related to future commitments .................................. 19
European Union ..................................................................................................... 21
4. EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS.................................................................................. 21
4.1 Agreed priniciples of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol...................... 22
4.2 Equity principles related to national commitments considered under
the UNFCCC ................................................................................................... 23
4.3 Conclusion on equity considerations.......................................................... 24
5. CURRENT APPROACHES FOR COMMITMENTS................................................ 25
5.1 Approaches proposed to date ...................................................................... 25
5.1.1 Official commitments ............................................................................... 25
5.1.2 Additional options for commitments proposed for and after Kyoto ......... 25
5.2 Issues relevant for deciding on future commitments ................................ 28
5.3 Conclusions for the following sections....................................................... 31
6. ELABORATION AND ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING APPROACHES ................. 32
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 32
6.2 Continuing Kyoto ........................................................................................... 34
6.2.1 Description .............................................................................................. 34
6.2.2 Quantified results .................................................................................... 35
6.2.3 Assessment with respect to the criteria................................................... 36
6.3 Intensity targets ............................................................................................. 37
6.3.1
6.3.2

General remarks on intensity targets ...................................................... 37
Description .............................................................................................. 39xix

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6.3.3 Quantified results .................................................................................... 39
6.3.4 Assessment with respect to the criteria................................................... 39
6.4 Contraction and convergence ...................................................................... 41
6.4.1 Description .............................................................................................. 41
6.4.2 Quantified results .................................................................................... 41
6.4.3 Assessment with respect to the criteria................................................... 43
6.5 Global Triptych............................................................................................... 44
6.5.1 Description .............................................................................................. 44
6.5.2 Quantified results .................................................................................... 45
6.5.3 Assessment with respect to the criteria................................................... 46
6.6 Multi-sector convergence approach ............................................................ 47
6.6.1 Description .............................................................................................. 47
6.6.2 Quantified results .................................................................................... 48
6.6.3 Assessment with respect to the criteria................................................... 48
6.7 Multistage approach (FAIR) .......................................................................... 49
6.7.1 Description .............................................................................................. 49
6.7.2 Quantified results .................................................................................... 50
6.7.3 Assessment according to the criteria ...................................................... 51
6.8 Equal mitigation cost..................................................................................... 52
6.8.1 Description .............................................................................................. 52
6.8.2 Assessment with respect to the criteria................................................... 52
6.9 Coordinated Policies and measures............................................................ 53
6.9.1 Description .............................................................................................. 53
6.9.2 Quantification of results........................................................................... 54
6.9.3 Assessment with respect to the criteria................................................... 55
6.10 Preliminary conclusions of the comparison of approaches ..................... 56
7. NEW APPROACHES .............................................................................................. 57
7.1 Extended global Triptych .............................................................................. 57
7.1.1 Description .............................................................................................. 57
7.1.2 Quantification of results........................................................................... 58
7.1.3 Assessment according to the criteria ...................................................... 59
7.2 New multistage: first sustainable development then emission limits ..... 59
7.2.1 Description .............................................................................................. 59
7.2.2 Quantitative results.................................................................................. 60
7.2.3 Assessment according to the criteria ...................................................... 62
7.3 Performance targets ...................................................................................... 63
8. COMPARISON OF APPROACHES AND CONCLUSIONS................................... 66
8.1 Quantitative comparison............................................................................... 66
8.2 Qualitative comparison ................................................................................. 66
8.3 Conclusions from the comparison .............................................................. 68
9. SOME CURRENT VIEWS ....................................................................................... 71
10. RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................... 73
10.1 Recommendations for action ....................................................................... 73
10.2 Recommendations for the design of an agreement ................................... 73xx

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10.2.1 Participation............................................................................................. 73
10.2.2 Process.................................................................................................... 74
10.2.3 Form and stringency of targets ............................................................... 75
10.3 Recommended further research .................................................................. 75
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 77
APPENDIX A CALCULATION DETAILS ................................................................... 81
APPENDIX B MEASURES OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ........................................ 86xxi

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INTRODUCTION

The objective of this report is to provide the history and background information on evolutionof commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC), in particular involving newly industrialized economies and developing countries infurther commitments under the UNFCCC as well as to further analyze existing approaches,develop new approaches and to make recommendations on future steps. It intends to help
shape a German position in the international negotiations on this issue.
The reader should bear in mind that this work intends to provide useful background information for the negotiations. The analysis can provide helpful insights on targets, for example,
whether to use absolute emission targets or dynamic ones and possible levels. The elaboration of such theoretical approaches may however not be capable to replace entirely the “realnegotiations” on the targets that will take place on the international level.
There were two occasions during the international negotiations on climate change where
quantitative commitments were agreed: The commitments by countries as inscribed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol are a result of the negotiations before and in Kyoto 1997. During
the negotiations the form of the targets was agreed (binding emission limits), but the stringency of the target was based partly on Parties’ choices. At a late point in the negotiations in
Kyoto, Parties were asked to provide proposals for their individual targets. These targets were
finally adopted with only minor changes (see UNFCCC 2000). Similarly, four years later, Parties were asked to provide their country specific limits for the use of forest management activities in official submissions. For most Parties, these levels were accepted with a package ofagreements in Bonn 2001.
This project, of which this is the final report, was initiated October 2001. It produced an interim
report in April 2002 and was finalized in December 2002.
This final report is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a discussion why further commitments under the UNFCCC are necessary. The current commitments are compared toemission limits needed to reach the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations. In chapter 3, the specific difficulties in agreeing further commitments are discussed. In chapter 4, theequity principles are discussed that are embedded in the Convention and that are used in thediscussion on further commitments. Chapter 5 provides an overview of the approaches tofurther commitments that have been proposed in the past and lists the issues that are relevant in the discussion on further commitments. Chapter 6 elaborates on, and assesses, a limited but representative number of approaches. Chapter 7 provides ideas for new approaches
or refines existing ones. Chapter 8 provides conclusions on all the considered approaches.
Chapter 9 provides a discussion of some selected views of delegates to the climate negotiations on the topic of future commitment. Finally, chapter 10 provides some recommendations
for the future.

2.

THE NEED FOR THE EVOLUTION OF COMMITMENTS

This chapter provides an overview of the commitments ofcountries under the UNFCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol. The expected development of emissions under these commitments
is compared to emissions paths,
that could successfully prevent
dangerous interference with theclimate system.

“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related
legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may
adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climatechange, to ensure that food production is not threatened andto enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable
manner.”Box 1. Article 2 of the UNFCCC
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2.1 CURRENT COMMITMENTS UNDER THE UNFCCC AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOLThe United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has the ultimate
objective to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system (see Box 1).
To reach this goal, the UNFCCC builds upon the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities of Parties. Accordingly, for the purpose of differentiating the obligations or commitments under the Conventions (and later the Kyoto Protocol), countries are
Table 1. Members of Annex I and their commitment under the Kyoto Protocol

Country

Member ofAnnex I

Member ofAnnex II

Economy intransition

Commitment inscribed in Annex
B (in the EU burden sharing
agreement)108
92 (87)****92 (92.5)
92
94
95
92
92 (79)9292
92 (100)
92 (100)
92 (79)92 (125)94110
92 (113)92 (93.5)
94
To be negotiated92
92
92
92 (72)9292 (94)100
101
94
92 (127)
92
100
92
92
92 (115)92 (104)
92
****
100
92 (87.5)
93

Australia
X
X
Austria
X
X
Belarus
X
X
Belgium
X
X
Bulgaria
X
X
CanadaX
X
Croatia
X*
X
Czech Republic
X*
X
Denmark
X
X
Estonia
X
X
European Community
X
X
FinlandX
X
FranceX
X
Germany
X
X
GreeceX
X
Hungary
X
X
Iceland
X
X
Ireland
X
X
Italy
X
X
Japan
X
X
Kazakhstan
X**
X
LatviaX
X
LiechtensteinX*
Lithuania
X
X
Luxembourg
X
X
MonacoX*
Netherlands
X
X
New Zealand
X
X
NorwayX
X
PolandX
X
Portugal
X
X
Romania
X
X
Russian Federation
X
X
Slovakia
X*
X
Slovenia
X*
X
Spain
X
X
SwedenX
X
Switzerland
X
X
TurkeyX***
UkraineX
X
United Kingdom
X
X
United States of America
X
X*: Added to Annex I at the third conference of the Parties in Kyoto 1997 (COP 3)**: Added at COP7 only for the purpose of the Kyoto Protocol (see FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.4, section V.C)***: Deleted from Annex II by decision 26/CP.7****: No limit specified. Country had not ratified the Convention when Kyoto Protocol was adopted

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divided into three groups (see also Table 1 and Figure 1):•

Parties included in Annex II to the Convention encompass the countries that were members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1992.

•

Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (Annex I Parties) encompass both thecountries that were members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1992, and countries with "economies in transition" (EITs), that is, theRussian Federation and several other Central and Eastern European countries.

•

Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (Non-Annex I Parties) encompass thosecountries that are not member of Annex I, including all newly industrialized countries anddeveloping countries.

Under the Convention, all Parties have certain general commitments (Article 4.1, UNFCCC):
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

To prepare national inventories of greenhouse gas emissions
To implement measures to mitigate climate change
To promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that reduce greenhouse gas emissions
To preserve sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases
To cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change
To promote and cooperate in research on climate change
To exchange information related to climate change
To promote and cooperate in education, training and public awareness related to climate change
To report information related to the above in “national communications”

In addition to those general commitments, certain groups of countries have additional obligations or rights:•

Annex I Parties are to take the lead in modifying longer-term trends in emissions byadopting national policies and measures with the non-legally binding aim of returning theirgreenhouse gas emissions individually or jointly to 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Article
4.2, UNFCCC).

•

The Parties included in Annex II have the further commitment to provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country
Parties in complying with their obligations (Article 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, UNFCCC).
Annex I
Liechtenstein
MonacoOECD

Annex II
Australia
CanadaIcelandJapanNew Zealand
NorwaySwitzerland
United States of America

Economies in transition(EITs)
Belarus
Croatia
Kazakhstan*
Russian Federation
UkraineEuropean Union
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
FinlandFranceGermany
GreeceIreland

Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
SwedenUnited Kingdom

EU
ApplicantsCzech RepublicHungary
PolandSlovakia

Bulgaria
Estonia
LatviaLithuania
Romania
Slovenia

TurkeyKorea

MexicoCyprusMalta*: Added to Annex I only for the purpose of the Kyoto Protocol at COP7

Figure 1. Country groups
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Economies in transition are allowed a certain degree of flexibility in implementing theircommitments (Article 4.6, UNFCCC). For example, several of those countries have chosen a base year other than 1990.

•

Parties not included in Annex I are eligible for funding for the implementation of their general commitments (Article 11, UNFCCC). The general commitments as described above
are interpreted weaker than for Annex I Parties. For example, the required content of theregular reports (‘national communications’) is less stringent and its submission is less frequent. The guidelines for the preparation of national communications for Non-Annex I
Parties do not speak of ‘policies and measures’ but of ‘steps taken or envisaged to implement the Convention’.

The Kyoto Protocol, adopted 1997, adds new commitments for Annex I Parties and confirms
the general commitments from the Convention for Non-Annex I Parties without modifying
them.
With the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I Parties agreed to reduce aggregated emissions of carbon
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) jointly by at least 5 per cent in the period 2008
to 2012 relative to 1990 levels. Individual developed nations have individual limitation or reduction targets as provided in Table 1.
To a certain extent, countries can reach their targets by trading emissions with other countries
or by implementing emission reduction projects in other Annex I countries (Joint Implementation) or in developing countries (Clean Development Mechanism), which do not have quantified targets themselves.
Countries may also choose to implement the commitments jointly as a group. The European
Union has chosen to do so and has internally negotiated other national targets (see Table 1)that will be the basis for the assessment of their individual compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.
While the “Annex I” was used in the Convention as a vehicle to differentiate the commitments
related to only one Article, the division between Annex I and Non Annex I Parties has developed since into a very rigid divide (see also chapter 3.1.3). With the Kyoto Protocol, this division has been further manifested. The Kyoto Protocol did not define a new group of countries(sometimes referred to as “Annex B Parties”), it rather updated Annex I by adding those countries that applied to be included and those whose geographical borders changed as well as
deleting those that had not ratified the Convention at the time of adoption of the Kyoto Protocol.
The term “commitments” is often used as referring only to the quantified emission limitationcommitments inscribed in the Kyoto Protocol for Annex I Parties. While developing countries
do not have quantified emission limitation commitments, these countries are nevertheless an
integral part of the commitment regime under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol in many
ways (see also Grubb et al. 2001):
First, developing countries have commitments, e.g. related to the implementation of policies
and measures and regular reporting (see above). Several developing countries report major
efforts to reduce their emissions (UNFCCC 2001). For example, the CO2 emissions per unit ofGross Domestic Product (carbon intensity) in China has decreased substantially during the1last decade as described in NRDC (2001) and Müller (2002) and as can be seen in Figure 2.
Second, the Kyoto Protocol provides with the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) an incentive for developing countries to be active in the implementation of climate friendly projects.
Third, the Marrakech accords include a series of decisions aimed at the involvement of developing countries. A framework on capacity building in developing countries sets out the scopeof, and provides the basis for action on, capacity building related to the implementation of the
1

Part of the decrease is due to growth in the emission-extensive services sector. In addition, questions
have been raised about the calculation of the emissions and the GDP. A substantial decrease in carbon
intensity is however very likely.

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Convention. A framework on transfer of technology has been adopted to develop meaningful
and effective actions to increase and improve the transfer of and access to environmentallysound technologies and know-how. A new special climate change fund, a least developed
country fund and an adaptation fund have been established to mobilize additional resources
for the involvement of developing countries.

1.4
China

Kg CO2 / US$

1.2

USA

1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Year

Figure 2. Emission intensity of the USA and China in kg of CO2 from fossil fuel burningper US$ using 1995 prices and purchasing power parities (Source IEA 2001)
2.2 SCIENCE DEMANDS EMISSION REDUCTIONS
The previous chapter 2.1 provided an overview of the current commitments by Parties. The
following chapter considers the question whether these are sufficient to reach the ultimate
objective of the Convention.
The UNFCCC has the ultimate objective to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration at a levelthat would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system (see also
Box 1). Two aspects are important: the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations andthe prevention of dangerous interference.
First we consider how emissions and the climate would develop without further climate commitments and how that relates to the ultimate objective of the Convention. The intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its Third Assessment Report and in its Special
Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES, 2001) has laid out possible future emissions paths
and their resulting effects on the climate under the assumption that no additional measures
specifically targeted to climate change would be implemented. As shown in Figure 3, under all
considered scenarios, global emissions rise at least until the middle of the this century. Resulting concentrations of the major greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (CO2) do not stabilize
within the next century. CO2 concentrations in 2100 are estimated to range from 500 to 900
ppmv. The resulting increase in the global average surface air temperature by the end of thenext century is estimated to be between 1.4°C and 5.8°C, depending on the emission scenario and the climate model used.

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Figure 3. Possible future emissions, concentrations, temperature change and sea level
rise (IPCC 2001a)
The IPCC refrains from making judgements about what constitutes “dangerous” interference
since such advice could not be based exclusively on objective science. The IPCC however
made a general statement about the timing of the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations: “Stabilization of atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 450, 650 or 1000 ppmv would require global anthropogenic CO2 emissions to drop below 1990 levels within a few decades,
about a century or about two centuries, respectively and continue to decrease steadily thereafter.”
For any stabilization level, global emissions of CO2 have to be reduced below 1990 levels in
the order of 50% and ultimately drop to very low levels since the carbon is circulated between
the air, biomass and oceans. It is the cumulative emissions that ultimately determine the concentration level. Table 2 provides some examples of stabilization paths from the IPCC Third
Assessment Report.
Stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations includes both, the stabilization of CO2 concentration and the stabilization of the concentration of other greenhouse gases. Historic emissions have increased the CO2 concentration from 280 ppmv to currently 360 ppmv. CO2, CH4
and N2O together produce today an amount of radiative forcing that is equivalent to the forcing of CO2 alone at roughly 400 ppmv (400 ppmv CO2eq.). Stabilizing the CO2 concentrations
at 450 ppmv and concentrations of the other gases at similar levels would lead to a radiative
forcing equivalent to a concentration 550ppmv of CO2 alone (550 CO2eq ppmv).
Table 2. Level and timing of required global emission reductions (Source: IPCC 2001d,
table 6-1)
WRE CO2 stabilization profiles

Accumulated CO2
emissions 2001 to
2100 (GtC)

Year in which
global emissions
peak

Year in which
global emissions
fall below 1990 level

450
550
650
750
1000

365-735590-1135
735-1370
820-1500
905-1620

2005-20152020-2030
2030-2045
2040-2060
2065-2090<2000-2040
2030-2100
2055-2145
2080-2180
2135-2270
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The Council of Ministers of the European Union made a political judgment on what constitutes“dangerous” interference: It agreed that “global average temperatures should not exceed 2
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial level and that therefore concentration levels lower than2
550 ppm CO2 should guide global limitation and reduction efforts” (EC 1996). Substantial
emission reductions are necessary to reach this stabilization level.
In addition to the absolute level of concentrations, also the rate of change is important. Many
ecosystems can adapt to changes in climate. In the past, species always migrated or adapted
to new circumstances. Such adaptation however, can only occur at a certain rate of change.
The effect of rates of change on impacts a matter of active research. Early results have suggested that rates of change exceeding the ability of ecosystems to migrate would be particularly damaging (see IPCC 2001b, chapters 5 and 19).
At present, there is no common perception of the long-term goals of climate policy and whichaspects (concentrations, temperature change, rate of change, other impacts) are relevant forthe definition of a long-term target and how dangerous interference with the climate systemshould be avoided (see also O’Neill & Oppenheimer 2002).
As a next step we consider, where greenhouse gas emissions originate historically and how
they will be distributed in the future:
Figure 4a shows the historic emissions from Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties of the CO2,
3
CH4 and N2O in CO2 equivalents. Figure 4b shows in addition to the historic emissions also
the expected future emissions according to the A1B scenario of the IPCC SRES (one scenario in the middle of the range with a decline in emissions after 2050).
Within the margins of uncertainty, the following conclusions can be drawn from that data:•

Annex I countries are responsible for 80% of the cumulative CO2 emissions for fossil fuelsfrom 1900.

•

The sum of Annex I countries’ emissions is stable over the last 10 year, an increase bysome OECD countries is compensated by decrease in the economies in transition. No extreme growth in emissions is expected in the future.

•

Emissions of Non-Annex I Parties are increasing rapidly. CO2 emissions from fossil fuels
are expected to supercede those of Annex I in the next decades.

•

Deforestation activities have contributed largely to the CO2 emissions of developing countries. (Values shown here are considered to be at the high end of the possible range.)•

Non-Annex I countries have a higher share of emissions from CH4 and N2O than Annex I
Parties. Emissions of those gases are largely due to agricultural activities.

Currently only Annex I Parties have binding emission limitations and major growth in emissions is expected in Non-Annex I countries. Considering possible future emission paths, it canbe concluded that the current commitments in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol will not be
sufficient to reach ambitious long-term targets such as stabilization at 450 or 550 ppmv
CO2eq concentrations. The Kyoto Protocol is only a first step towards the ultimate objective of
the Convention. Eventually participation of all major countries will be required. The question iswhen and how.
Industrialized countries are on the one hand responsible for most of the problem should takethe first step in reducing emissions. On the other hand, their efforts can only be effective, if
also developing countries’ emissions do not grow indefinitely.

2Technical note: Climate models, which take into account greenhouse gases other than CO2 and use
an average climate sensitivity, may predict a temperature increase higher than 2°C for a stabilization of
CO2 concentrations at 550 ppmv, see also figure 5.

3

Fossil and industrial CO2 from Marland et al. (2001), Land-use change from and Houghton (1999), CH4
and N2O from EDGAR (2001), scaled from HYDE (1999) for the years 1890 to 1975, fluorinated gases
are own estimates.

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7

Emissions in Gg CO2eq.

3Annex Ix 10

F-gases
N2O
CH4Forestry CO2
Fossil CO2

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1900

1910

1920

1930

1940

7

Emissions in Gg CO2eq.

3

1950
Year

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Non-Annex I

x 10

F-gases
N2O
CH4Forestry CO2
Fossil CO2

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1900

1910

1920

1930

1940

1950
Year

Figure 4a. Historic emissions of Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties (Source: see text)
7

Emissions in Gg CO2eq.

6Annex Ix 10

F-gases
N2O
CH4Forestry CO2
Fossil CO2

5
4
3
2
1
0
1900

1920

1940

1960

1980

7

Emissions in Gg CO2eq.

6

4

2020

2040

2060

2080

2100

2020

2040

2060

2080

2100

Non-Annex I

x 10

5

2000
Year

F-gases
N2O
CH4Forestry CO2
Fossil CO2

3
2
1
0
1900

1920

1940

1960

1980

2000
Year

Figure 4b. Historic and future emission of Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties underthe IPCC SRES A1B scenario
Developing countries object to restrictions to their economic growth, since they are only to a
relatively small part responsible for the problem. On the other hand, reaching the ultimate objective of the convention is only possible developing countries ‘get it right the first place’,
meaning that these countries do not first become large polluters and then reduce emissions.
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Keeping emissions of Non-Annex I countries at a low level does not necessarily have to beensured by assigning emission limitation targets to developing countries. Emission reduction
efforts by developed countries will have an effect on emissions of developing countries (spillover). In the past mainly the negative ‘leakage’ was considered, that is that emission intensive
activities would migrate from industrialized countries (with emission limits) to developing
countries (without emission limits). But there is currently an ongoing scientific debate whether
the positive effects would outweigh the negative by far, in that innovative technologies andpolicies are developed, introduced and used in developing countries, decreasing their emissions (Grubb et al. 2002).
The report of the global dialogue “Climate OptiOns for the Long term” (COOL) organized by
the RIVM in the Netherlands (Berk et al. 2001) argues that the long term options have to be
kept within reach. Under the uncertainty of climate change, actions have to be implemented
today, so that lower stabilization targets are still reachable. “In order to keep the option of stabilizing CO2 concentrations at 450 ppmv open, major developing countries (like China andIndia) will need to start participating in global greenhouse gas emission control at much lower
levels of income than did the developed countries at the time of signing the UNFCCC. If thegroup of countries adopting quantified commitments after the first commitment period would
be limited to middle income developing countries and these countries would initially only takeon efficiency improvements targets, and if this would set a precedent for relatively poor, but
major developing countries like India and China, CO2 stabilization levels of 550 ppmv or lower
may be out of reach.”Participants of the COOL process also stressed the importance of reaching agreement internationally at an early stage. The international regime for climate change drives national policies but only with a delay. Resulting national policy drives changes in greenhouse gas emissions again with a delay.

3.

SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES IN AGREEING ON FURTHERCOMMITMENTS
The following chapter provides some background information relevant to future commitments
and an overview of the specific difficulties in agreeing on future commitments.
3.1 THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION PROCESS
3.1.1 The rules of negotiations under the UNFCCC
Under the UNFCCC, countries negotiate as sovereign states. The system is based on voluntary cooperation. No enforcement mechanism other than political pressure can convince a
country to start negotiating or to be bound by an agreement and consequently comply with its
commitments. Thus, a country will only take on a commitment that it is considering reasonable.
Any decision under the UNFCCC is taken by consensus, meaning none of the 186 Parties
objects. Attempts to change this rule have failed in the past because any voting rules would
also have to be agreed upon by consensus.
Consequently, the text that is agreed sometimes formulated vaguely to accommodate everyone. Such unclear agreement needs clarification at later date. Hence, more and more different topics are being discussed and a complicated structure of topics evolves.
Reaching agreement is only possible if a) all countries are willing to reach a decision and b)
the chairman proposes a balanced package of decisions on the most important topics. If the
package is accepted, it cannot be changed, since changing one item would lead to requests
to change other items as well.
These rules have to be kept in mind when considering future commitments and decisions
thereon.
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3.1.2 History of the negotiation process on commitments
The Convention, in Article 4.2(a) and (b),states that Annex I Parties shall adopt
and implement policies and measures toreturn their greenhouse gas emissions in2000 to 1990 levels. A review of theadequacy of those paragraphs wascalled for to take place at COP 1 and asecond review not later than 31 December 1998, and thereafter in regular intervals determined by the COP, until theobjective of the Convention is met (seeBox 2).

“The Conference of the Parties shall, at its firstsession, review the adequacy of subparagraphs[4.2] (a) and [4.2] (b) above. Such review shall be
carried out in the light of the best available scientific information and assessment on climate change
and its impacts, as well as relevant technical, socialand economic information. Based on this review,
the Conference of the Parties shall take appropriate
action, which may include the adoption of amendments to the commitments in subparagraphs (a) and(b) above. […] A second review of subparagraphs(a) and (b) shall take place not later than 31 December 1998, and thereafter at regular intervals
determined by the Conference of the Parties, until
the objective of the Convention is met;”

The first review at COP 1 (1995) concluded that Article 4.2(a) and (b) were
not adequate. With the “Berlin Mandate”,
the COP initiated a process to
Box 2. Article 4.2 (d) of the UNFCCC
strengthen the commitments of Annex I
Parties without introducing any newcommitments for Non-Annex I Parties. The negotiations of the Ad-hoc Group on the Berlin
Mandate (AGBM) resulted in the Kyoto Protocol and its binding quantified reduction targets
for Annex I Parties.
The second review of adequacy was discussed at COP 4 (1998). No agreement was reached
due to a divergence over whether this discussion would apply to commitments for developing
countries. At COP 5 (1999), the Group of 77 and China proposed to amend the agenda item
title from “review of the adequacy of Article 4.2(a) and (b)” to read "review of the adequacy of
implementation of Article 4.2(a) and (b)". This clear shift to exclude a discussion on commitments for developing countries was not accepted. No agreement was reached and the issue
was deferred to COP 6. Due to more urgent matters and no movement in Parties positions,again no agreement was reachedat COP 6 and later at COP 7.
Article 3.9: “Commitments for subsequent periods for
Parties included in Annex I shall be established inamendments to Annex B to this Protocol, which shall be
adopted in accordance with the provisions of Article 21,
paragraph 7. The Conference of the Parties serving as themeeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall initiate theconsideration of such commitments at least seven years
before the end of the first commitment period referred toin paragraph 1 above.”
Article 9.1: “The Conference of the Parties serving as themeeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall periodicallyreview this Protocol in the light of the best available scientific information and assessments on climate change andits impacts, as well as relevant technical, social and economic information. Such reviews shall be coordinated withpertinent reviews under the Convention, in particular thoserequired by Article 4, paragraph 2(d), and Article 7, paragraph 2(a), of the Convention. Based on these reviews, theConference of the Parties serving as the meeting of theParties to this Protocol shall take appropriate action.”
Article 9.2: “The first review shall take place at the second session of the Conference of the Parties serving as themeeting of the Parties to this Protocol. Further reviews
shall take place at regular intervals and in a timely manner.”Box 3. Review of the Kyoto Protocol

At COP 8 in November 2002, theissue of adequacy of commitments could again not be resolved and was deferred. However, the issue of developing
country commitments was raisedin the context of the negotiations
on a ‘Delhi Declaration’, which
was to become the main outcomeof the conference. Members of
the Umbrella group, excluding theUSA, stressed the need for global
participation in order to meet theobjective of the Convention. The
EU called for a dialogue to kick of
a process for future action andstating explicitly that such dialogue would not be about developing country commitments. Still,some developing countries interpreted this (intentionally or inadvertently) as calls for developing
country commitments and rejected inclusion of any reference
to future actions in the declaration. The final Delhi Declaration
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Evolution of commitments / DM 754

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does not refer to the future. It was welcomed and supported by the G77 and the USA, while
the EU and Japan and Canada and the Central Group- eleven (CG11, most economies intransition included in Annex I) voiced their disappointment. However, Japan and the EU mentioned in the final plenary that they have seen signs that the divide on future commitments
could be overcome in the near future. COP 9 in November 2003 will provide the next official
opportunity.
The Kyoto Protocol itself demands review of commitments within two Articles. In Article 3, theArticle on the quantified commitments for Annex I Parties (see Box 3), the review of commitments for Annex I Parties as inscribed in Annex B shall be initiated in 2005. Article 9 of the
Kyoto Protocol calls for a general review of the Protocol coordinated with the review of theConvention, starting at the second meeting of the Parties to the Protocol, which could be in
2004. Figure 5 summarizes the past and future steps in the discussion on commitments.
The Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol can be amended by the Conference of the Parties serving
as the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (COP/MOP) by consensus or, if all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, by a three-fourth majority (Article 20.3) but only with the writtenconsent of the Party concerned (Article 21.7).
The Convention asks for its continuous review until its objective is met, which probably would,
in order to be reached, also include commitments for developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol also is reviewed periodically, not only commitments of Annex I Parties but also the Protocol as a whole. Two formal options exist: A separate Protocol of Non-Annex I Parties is
adopted or the Kyoto Protocol is amended to include commitments for countries that are notincluded in Annex I.
1992

COP1 1995
COP3 1997

Convention: Annex I 1990 levels in 2000
First review of adequacy at COP1
Second review of adequacy at in 1998
COP 1: First review launches AGBM process
Kyoto Protocol adopted

COP4 1998

Second review:No agreement whether the issue includes commitments for developing
countries - issue deferred

COP5 1999
COP6 2000

G77 proposal: “review of adequacy of the implementation”
No agreement - issue deferred
No agreement - issue deferred

COP7 2001

No agreement - issue deferred

COP8 2002

No agreement on adequacy - issue deferred
Implicit discussion of commitments under Delhi declaration

COP/MOP2 2004?
2005

Discussion of adequacy ofcommitments of the Kyoto Protocol
Initiation of consideration of future commitments
for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol

Figure 5. Overview of the negotiating history on commitments
3.1.3 Increasing Annex I
While the “membership” to Annex I was originally designed to be quite flexible under the Convention (see Box 4), increasing Annex I in practice is more difficult.
Two steps are involved for a Party wishing to be included in Annex I: A notification by that
Party to be bound by Article 4.2 (a) and (b) and a decision by the Conference of the Parties toamend the Annex by consensus or, if all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, by athree fourth majority (Article 15.3)
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Evolution of commitments / DM 754

ECOFYSFor the purpose of the Kyoto Protocol, a “Party included in Annex I” is already that Party thathas only taken the first step, that of a notification (see Box 5).
In Kyoto 1997, the Conference of theParties decided to amend the list of Annex I by those countries that had applied.
These include Croatia, Czech Republic,
Liechtenstein, Monaco Slovakia andSlovenia.

“(f) The Conference of the Parties shall review,not later than 31 December 1998, available information with a view to taking decisions regarding
such amendments to the lists in Annexes I and II as
may be appropriate, with the approval of the Party
concerned;(g)
Any Party not included in Annex I may, in
its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approvalor accession, or at any time thereafter, notify the
Depositary that it intends to be bound by subparagraphs [4.2] (a) and [4.2] (b) above. The Depositary
shall inform the other signatories and Parties of any
such notification.”

In Marrakech 2001, after several years of
discussion, the Conference of the Parties
agreed to delete Turkey, as requested,from Annex II of the Convention. It did
however not agree to add Kazakhstan,
as requested, to Annex I. It recognizedthat Kazakhstan would become a Party
included in Annex I for the purpose of theBox 4. Article 4.2 (f) and (g) of the UNFCCC
Kyoto Protocol, since it made the notification, but will continue to be a Party notincluded in Annex I for purposes of the Convention.

Including Kazakhstan in Annex I was seen by some developing countries as a door to commitments for all developing counties. Including Kazakhstan was seen as a prece“’Party included in Annex I’ means a Party indent putting pressure on other developing
cluded in Annex I to the Convention, as may be
countries to join Annex I and to take onamended, or a Party which has made a notification
further commitments. Since the COP has
under Article 4, paragraph 2(g), of the Convento agree the amendment by consensus,
tion.”
those opposing developing countries sucBox 5. Article 1.7 of the Kyoto Protocol
cessfully blocked the formal inclusion of
Kazakhstan in Annex I.
3.1.4 Further differentiation in the Convention and in other international agreements
In addition to the well defined differentiation into Annex I, Annex II, EITs and Non-Annex I
Parties, the Convention includes further criteria for differentiation between countries without
further specifying countries that satisfy those criteria:•

Equitable and appropriate contributions by each of the Parties to the global effort(UNFCCC 4.2a)•Countries particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change such as small islandstates, countries with low-lying coastal areas, countries with arid and semi-arid areas,
forested areas and areas liable to forest decay, countries with areas prone to natural disasters, countries with areas liable to drought and desertification, countries with areas ofhigh urban atmospheric pollution, countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including
mountainous ecosystems (UNFCCC 4.8)•

Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated energyintensive products (UNFCCC 4.8, 4.10)•

Land-locked and transit countries (UNFCCC 4.8)

The group of least developed countries has a special status under the Convention. This groupis understood to include those countries that are designated as such by the United Nations
General Assembly. In implementing their commitments, all Parties shall take full account of
the special situation of least developed countries with regard to funding and transfer of technologies (UNFCCC 4.8). Least developed countries may choose the timing of the submissionof their initial national communications at their discretion (UNFCCC 12.5). With the Marrakech
accords an expert group on least developed countries was established to advise on the13

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preparation and implementation strategy for national adaptation programmes for action (decision 29/CP.7).
It may be worth mentioning that the Montreal Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer
differentiates two distinct groups of Parties: Industrialized countries and those developing
countries operating under Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol. Those two groups have different
phase-out schedules for the production and consumption of ozone depleting substances. “Article 5 countries” can apply for funding under the multilateral fund of the Montreal Protocol(UNEP 2000).
The World Trade Organization (WTO) also divides countries in “developed” and “developing”
countries. No WTO definitions are available, members rather announce for each individual
agreement under the WTO whether they are “developed” or “developing” countries. Other
members can challenge the decision of a member to make use of provisions available to developing countries. In some WTO agreements, these provisions provide developing countries
with longer transition periods before they are required to fully implement the agreement. Developing countries can also receive technical assistance. The WTO also recognizes as leastdeveloped countries those countries, which have been designated as such by the United Nations (WTO 2002).
3.2 MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF NECESSARY CHANGESThe Montreal Protocol is often presented as a good example of international environmental
policy. Countries have reached an agreement how the phase out the chemicals that contribute to the depletion of the ozone layer.
To mitigate climate change, however, is a larger problem by orders of magnitude: Whileozone depleting substance were produced by a limited number of companies and are used ina limited number of applications, for most of which alternatives are available, mitigation ofclimate change affects virtually all areas and aspects of life. Energy is driving most economic
processes. The use of energy is closely linked to the individual behavior of the consumers. By
far more drastic changes are needed to solve the climate change problem than were required
to stop ozone depletion. Some compared the magnitude of the change needed to solve climate change with the magnitude of the change of the industrial revolution.
3.3 INERTIA OF THE CLIMATE SYSTEM
One particular difficulty in the process ofagreeing on commitments is the time lag
between the emissions and their effects
on the climate. To further describe thistime lag we need to consider the causeeffect chain which leads from emissionsof greenhouse gases to changes in climate as provided in Figure 7: emissionsof greenhouse gases, precursors andaerosols change the concentration ofthese and other gases in the atmosphere. Changed concentrations influence
radiative forcing. Changed radiative forcing influences the global-average surface
temperature. The absolute change intemperature, as well as the rate of itschange, influences the sea level andother parameters such as precipitation
and related damages.
Many greenhouse gases, once emitted,
are only slowly removed from the atmosphere. The decay model for CO2 as used
for the IPCC calculations of the global

Emissions N2O
Emissions CH4Emissions CO2...

Concentrations N2O
Concentrations CH4
Concentrations CO2...

Radiative forcing

Temperature /climate change

Impacts

Figure 6. Simplified cause effect chain fromemissions to effects of climate change
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warming potentials assumes relatively fast decay in the first 100 years (70% of CO2 is removed within 100 years) but slow decay afterwards (20% still remain in the atmosphere after
650 years). For other greenhouse gases, lifetimes range from 12 (methane) to 50 000 (CF4)years. The resulting radiative forcing causes changes in the global-average surface temperature again with a certain time delay. If one is considering only the changes is temperature
due to a pulse emission of CO2 for example, the maximum effect on temperature is only
reached 20 to 50 years after the emissions. Changes in sea level will occur even thousandsof years after concentrations have stabilized at a higher level. Figure 7 illustrates the different
time scales of change involved for stabilization of CO2 concentrations.
If the damages due to climate change can only be observed with a considerable time delay,
the benefits of emission reductions can also only be noticed with a substantial delay. This
also makes it difficult to attribute responsibility for climate change to certain sources or countries. This long-term problem is difficult to solve in a world dominated by political 4- or 5-year
cycles.

Figure 7: Generic illustration of the time scales involved for stabilization of CO2 concentrations at any level between 450 and 1000 ppmv (Source IPCC 2001d, figure
SPM-5)
3.4 INERTIA OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM
Not only the climate system is slow in its response, also the effects of policies and the change
in technical systems occurs at a slow rate. For example, some technologies once installed are
only replaced very slowly. Power stations are in operation for 20 to 30 years. The stock ofbuildings is maintained for sometimes longer than 100 years. The basic pattern of the transport infrastructure can last even longer. Technology replacements can be delayed by ‘locked
in’ systems that have competitive market advantages due to available support systems andinfrastructure. Early decision are needed on the infrastructure to avoid such a lock-in.
3.5 DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY
The uncertainty about the magnitude of climate change and the causes has been an obstacle
to reaching agreement on how to deal with this problem. The most disputed factor is the climate sensitivity, i.e. the increase in global-average surface temperature, if the CO2 concentration would rise to twice the pre-industrial level. Typical values for the climate sensitivity range
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Evolution of commitments / DM 754

from 1.5 to 4.5 °C. This range has not been narrowed despite substantial research efforts foralmost two decades. (The evolution of this range is further discussed by J. Sluijs, 1997).
Given this uncertainty, the temperature change in 2100 under a stabilized CO2 concentration at 450 ppm
could be between 1°C and 2.2°C4(see figure 7).
Related to the above is the uncertainty of the magnitude of the influence of anthropogenic emissions on
the observed temperature increase.
The IPCC in its Third Assessment
Report (IPCC 2001a) has stronger
than before characterized the human
influence on the climate: It stated that“most of the observed warming overthe last 50 years is likely to havebeen due to increase in greenhousegas concentrations”, which in turnare due to anthropogenic emissions.
In the past, these uncertainties havebeen subject of intensive debate andhave fueled arguments of the skepFigure 8. Possible temperature change at differtics of climate change. Often the inent levels of concentrations (source: IPCC
fluence of the sun is quoted as a ma2001d)
jor contributor to the observed warming or the IPCC process is questioned as whole. Most of these concerns receive high visibility
in the press but, if followed up, often turn out to not to be based on reviewed science(Rahmstorf 2002). These debates,
however, have been used by somecountry representatives as an argument to delay significant action.

Figure 9. Optimal carbon dioxide emissions strategy, using a cost-effectiveness approach (source:
IPCC 2001c)

These uncertainties have also
made it difficult to agree on a certain concentration level, e.g. 350,
450, 550, 650 ppmv, that would
avoid dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. One option to overcome thisdifficulty is referred to as hedging
strategy (IPCC 2001c, chapter 10,
here figure 9): define an intermediate global goal for 2020 that allows
reaching any possible long-term
goal, and at a later date, e.g. in
2020, define the long-term goal.

3.6 NATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
One important consideration in the further development of commitments is the differences innational circumstances of countries. Those differences have lead to the grouping of Annex I
and Non-Annex I. Different starting positions result in different responsibilities and capabilities

4

The changes in temperature are derived taking the CO2 concentrations as given in the x-axis of the
diagram and assuming in addition emission and increased concentrations of other greenhouse gases.

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and therefore different political positions. The following section provides some relevant indicators for the national circumstances with numerical data summarized in Table 3.
The structure of the greenhouse gas emissions depends on the economic structure of thecountry and the potential for renewable energy. In most developed countries, emissions fromfossil fuel use are dominant, including emissions from electricity production, industrial production, transport as well as commercial and domestic use of energy. Significant differences between countries may occur due to the different potentials for renewable energy. For example,
Iceland’s economy is almost entirely based on renewable energy.
Emissions from sectors other than energy may also be important to some countries. New
Zealand’s emissions, for example, are dominated by those of sheep. For developing countries
the differences due to different sectoral activities are even more pronounced: For example,
Singapore has very low emissions of CH4 and N2O while in the Group ‘Rest of Southern Africa’ fossil CO2 emissions only account for very small share of the total greenhouse gas emissions.
The amount of greenhouse gas emissions per capita varies considerably between
0.6 tCO2eq./person to 25 tCO2eq./person (for CO2, CH4, N2O from fossil fuels, industry anddeforestation). The Annex I average is 15 tCO2eq./person, for Non-Annex I 4 tCO2eq./person
and for the world 7 tCO2eq./person.
Accordingly, the reduction options and related costs as well as the expected growth in emissions differ substantially among countries, depending on, e.g., the state of development, theefficiency of the use of resources and energy.
The historic responsibility for climate change may be considered as important factor sinceCO2 stays in the atmosphere around 100 years. The historic responsibility is dependant on
the past emission path of the country. Countries with an early industrial revolution (mainly inEurope) bear a relatively high historic responsibility, while most developing countries bear arelatively low responsibility.
The state of development and, with it, the economic capabilities of a country, determine thepotential to mitigate climate change, the potential development of future emissions as well as
the potential to adapt to climate change. Table 3 provides the gross domestic product basedon purchase power parities per capita as indicator. The range of values is considerable. For
many developing countries, the national debt can also be used as an indicative parameter.
Vulnerability to climate change depends on a) the geographic condition and b) the economic
potential to cope with the possible negative effects of climate change. The appropriate indicator for the vulnerability of a country to climate change is a subject of research. The least developed countries are generally the most vulnerable. As an example, Hurricane Mitch in 1998
caused the GDP of Honduras to drop by 80%.
Some developing countries are dependent on the export of natural resources, including fossil
fuels. For those countries, measures taken to use less fossil fuels may have a significant effect on the economy.
Public awareness of climate change is also an important parameter to gain support for climate
policies. For some countries, environmental problems are high on the public agenda, while formany developing countries the improvement of the quality of life is the most important concern.

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ECOFYS

Table 3. Indicators for the difference in national circumstances

Code Region

Fossil andCH4Industrial Forestry CO2
CO2(Gg CO2eq)(Gg CO2)
1995
1995(Gg CO2)1995

N2O(Gg CO2eq)
1995

All GHG(Gg CO2eq)
1995

Population(1000 persons)1995

GHG per GDPppp per
capitacapita(t CO2(1000
eq./person) US$/person)
2000
1995

USA USA

5 411 800

30 477835 445472 906

6 750 628

267 020

25.28

EUEuropean Union

3 261 3909 207

349 365394 159

4 014 122

371 937

10.79

21.63

Japan
Eastern Europe
EEU(Annex I)
Russian FederaRUS
tion
RAI Rest of Annex I

1 282 155

2 447

60 64529 926

1 375 173

125 472

10.96

23.69

1 585 830

4 780

274 053

123 865

1 988 529

171 801

11.57

6.51

1 901 114

10 355498 071

64 113

2 473 653

148 097

16.70

6.83

970 1142 543

265 447

194 9431 433 047

62 995

22.75

25.20

TUR Turkey
Rest of Eastern
REE Europe and former USSR
ARG Argentina

184 874164

25 46940 848251 355

61 2764.10

6.06

593 3931 947

147 578

56 883799 801

93 272

8.57

3.28

128 472

13 31686 62467 269295 683

34 768

8.50

12.01

BRA Brazil

276 699368 980

301 555

243 797

1 191 031

159 346

7.47

6.79

JNP

31.81

COL Colombia

70 15841 14953 69921 289186 295

38 542

4.83

5.59

MEX Mexico

366 860

29 61098 43964 377559 286

91 145

6.14

7.91

VEN Venezuela
Rest of Latin
RLA
America
EGY Egypt

143 50775 19149 41422 838290 950

21 844

13.32

5.34

250 887

248 850

146 446

118 273764 457

134 245

5.69

4.20

100 274

4 589

27 28419 464151 61262 282

2.43

3.17

ZAF

South Africa

301 036

5 111

53 60423 547383 298

37 470

10.23

9.06

NGA Nigeria
Rest of North
RNA
AfricaRest of Southern
RAS
AfricaPersian Gulf
GLF
StatesRest of Middle
RME
East
CHN China

84 13338 01770 00733 474225 63198 9522.28

0.91

187 893

32 37784 70771 714376 692

94 551

3.98

3.33

94 252396 618325 836

280 509

1 097 215

403 454

2.72

1.06

423 799924

87 256

11 027523 006

22 700

23.04

11.48

532 817

10 722

96 06877 946717 554

129 406

5.54

4.56

3 894 139

109 552966 560

539 547

5 509 797

1 227 170

4.49

4.26

IND

India

888 881

101 872655 471

256 699

1 902 923

933 665

2.04

2.26

Indonesia
Korea, Republic
KOR
of (South)
MYS Malaysia

245 446

207 506

214 71466 595734 260

197 464

3.72

2.68

424 8032 147

27 287

12 284466 52244 949

10.38

16.03

97 96894 37224 361

12 316229 01620 108

11.39

8.42

PHL

Philippines

51 94758 90544 49220 071

175 41468 354

2.57

3.75

SGP Singapore

83 449

0

1 118

923

85 491

3 321

25.74

24.92

THA Thailand

172 332

32 21573 091

23 650301 288

58 610

5.14

5.96

RAA Rest of Asia

274 007261 786

387 158

184 530

1 107 481

479 193

2.31

1.62

IDN

Annex I

14 597 277

59 973

2 308 495

1 320 762 18 286 507

1 208 597

15.13

19.64

Non-Annex I

9 687 152

2 135 756

4 022 769

2 229 024 18 074 701

4 454 812

4.06

3.53

Global total

24 284 429

2 195 729

6 331 264

3 549 786 36 361 208

5 663 409

6.42

6.81

Notes: For data sources and regional split see Appendix A. “Forestry CO2“ is taken from the EDGAR 3.2
database and includes only direct emissions from deforestation and not the full IPCC source category“land-use change and forestry”. “All emissions” includes the sum of the four previous columns.

Due to the different national circumstances, countries with similar conditions and interest
formed more or less tight groups for the purpose of negotiating jointly in the international process:Within Annex I, there are some high consumption and high growth countries, such as theUSA, Canada or Australia, whose emissions steadily increased over the last years. Together
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with New Zealand, Norway, Island, Ukraine, Russia and Japan, they form the ‘UmbrellaGroup’. This loosely organized group is now weakened, due to the withdrawal of the USA
from the Kyoto Protocol.
The European Union acts as a group due to its political integration process. The EU combinescountries with decreasing trend (e.g. United Kingdom, Germany) and increasing trend (e.g.
Spain, Greece). Those eastern European states that wish to accede to the European Union
have formed the CG11 to act collectively.
Non-Annex I countries with their diverse national circumstances, and therefore sometimes
opposite interests, are joint to the ‘Group of 77 and China’ or ‘G77’. This group represents theinterests of all developing countries, most of which have the common difficulty of having
scarce resources available for the international negotiations. Within the G77, small islandstates (e.g. Marshall Islands, Tuvalu) fear loss of their territory due to sea level rise and haveformed the Alliance of Small Island States, AOSIS. Oil producing countries (e.g. Saudi Arabia,
Qatar) fear loss of their income and act accordingly. Rapid developing countries like China
fear a constraint to development. The group of the least developed countries can receive
special benefits under the Convention and more and more act as a group.
3.7 POSITIONS OF PARTIES RELATED TO FUTURE COMMITMENTS
Group of 77 and China
In the past, the general and very strong position of the Group of 77 and China has been, thatno further commitments are accepted at least until the developed countries have demonstrated to take the lead in combating climate change. This can be observed from the negotiation history on the topic of the adequacy of commitments (see chapter 3.1.2). Last at COP 8(November 2002), the G77 was not willing to enter any dialogue on new commitments for developing countries, since emissions of developed countries continue to increase, the Kyoto
Protocol has not entered into force and the flow of financial assistance and technology transfer to developing countries is not satisfactory.
This position is also apparent in other items under discussion: During the negotiations of the
Kyoto Protocol, the delegation of Brazil proposed to differentiate the commitments of Annex I
Parties according to their historic responsibility for climate change. This proposal was overtaken by the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, but the scientific and methodological aspects
were referred to the SBSTA for its consideration. At SBSTA 14 in June 2001, the proposal
was to hold a workshop to assess new research results and to broaden the participation in the
research especially by developing country experts. Fearing that this agenda item would eventually lead to developing country commitments, China, India and Saudi Arabia proposed thatsuch workshop should be held as late as possible. Positions were firm and a final agreement
to hold the workshop one and a half years later (before SBSTA 17 in November 2002) was
only reached in the last minute in the SBSTA plenary. Similarly, discussions were difficult at
SBSTA 17. An agreement was again reached only in the last minute. Brazil was able to join
the G77 to support a continuation of the discussion. Further consideration was deferred, however, to SBSTA 20 (June 2004) and 23 (November 2005).
Another example is the discussion on the further consideration of the Third Assessment Rethport of the IPCC. The SBSTA, at its 15 session, considered how the findings of the report
would feed into the negotiating process. Many Parties argued that the findings and their consequences for the negotiating process should be discussed at a workshop. China was not infavor and Saudi Arabia was very strongly opposing to discuss any matters that related to the
future. Only the making of the report and the uncertainty of the information should be discussed. Again a final agreement could only be reached to hold such workshop in the very lastminute when some modifications were made to the draft conclusions that isolated Saudi Arabia. Discussion at following sessions of the SBSTA ware equally cumbersome.
Under the discussion of policies and measures, cautious care is taken by some developing
countries, that after each mention of the term ‘policies and measures’ the words ‘by Parties
included in Annex I’ is added. Also the new guidelines for the preparation of national communications for Non-Annex I Parties mostly refer to ‘steps taken or envisaged to implement theConvention’ and not to ‘policies and measures’.
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Alliance of small island states (AOSIS)The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is a part of the G77 and associates itself with theG77 position on future commitments, also for political reasons to avoid a splitting of the group.
Individual members of AOSIS stressed, in particular at COP 8 in November 2002, that theultimate objective of the Convention provides a basis for a long-term plan and that urgent action is needed by all Parties. It was urged that the impasse between Annex I and Non-Annex I
would be resolved.
Kazakhstan
As a state of the former Soviet Union and an economy in transition, Kazakhstan applied tohave its name added to the Annex I of the Convention (see Chapter 3.1.3). One incentive forthis application could be the access to the mechanisms with a relatively modest limitation ofemissions as for other economies in transition. Some developing countries opposed to suchinclusion.
Argentina
At COP4 in 1998, Argentina offered to be bound by a target for the first commitment period
once the COP implements such an option for developing countries that wish to participate in
the Kyoto Mechanisms (see Box 6). That target was provided not in absolute terms but as afunction of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
The major reason for a target as a function of the GDP was the unavailability of a solid estimate of the GDP and therefore projected emissions in 2010. The recent economic decline inArgentina has shown that indeed such predictions have to be treated with care.
After the submission of the national communication, the national government has changed“The Republic of Argentina, in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, bearing in mind its differentiated responsibilities, its right to a sustainable socio-economic development and the characteristics proper to its particular production system and emission generating structure, and in its condition as Non-Annex I country under the Convention, and Non-Annex B country under the Kyoto Protocol, voluntarily commits itself to ensurethat its net anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions shall not exceed an amount that is termed 'emission target'.
The compliance period for the said target shall be the period 2008-2012, and it shall be applicableto the annual emission average for that period.
The target shall be equal to the product of an index multiplied by the square root of the five-year
average Gross Domestic Product corresponding to the commitment period. The index is established at
151.5. This value implies an effective reduction in Argentina's greenhouse gas emissions relative tothe emissions estimated for the most likely scenarios, resulting from projections that do not contemplate intervention measures, and that are estimated at between 2% and 10%.
The calculation of the Gross Domestic Product shall be based on market prices and expressed in
1993 pesos, according to the Republic of Argentina's statistical records of national accounts.
Greenhouse gas emissions shall be considered as aggregate emissions and expressed in metric tonsof carbon equivalent, in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Kyoto Protocol. In the context of this commitment, greenhouse gases means those included in Annex A of the said Protocol.
Emissions shall be those originating in the sectors and source categories described in Annex A of
the above-mentioned Protocol, plus the net changes in greenhouse gas emissions from sources andremovals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land use change and forestry activities. In thiscontext forestry means afforestation, reforestation and deforestation.
The emission and sequestration of greenhouse gases shall be calculated in accordance with themethodology adopted by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
The present commitment shall constitute a binding international commitment once the Conferenceof the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change implements a new
option that may enable Non-Annex I countries which, like the Republic of Argentina, wish to assume
an emission target, to participate in the mechanisms established in Articles 4, 6 and 17 of the Kyoto
Protocol and after this Protocol became in force.”
Box 6. The voluntary commitment by Argentina as in a revision to its initial national
communication 199920

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ECOFYSand the economy is going through a severe crisis. The voluntary approach by Argentina was
opposed by some developing countries. The COP also never implemented such an option fordeveloping countries that wish to participate in the Kyoto Mechanisms. The offer by the Argentinean government is therefore outdated (see also WRI 2002).
India
As the host of COP 8 in November 2002, The Prime Minister of India, Mr. Atal Bihari Vjpayee,stressed that the contribution of developing countries to increased greenhouse gas
concentrations is low and will stay low for several decades to come. A call for developing
country commitments would be “misplaced” as Indian per-capita emissions are below theworld average, the per capita income and greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP are low
compared to those of Annex I countries. It was stressed that the only equitable form for the
future would be one based on equal per-capita rights.
South Korea
South Korea is currently defining its position on the issue of evolution of commitments. It
seems certain that a target of different form than that of Annex I Parties is preferred. A target
expressed in terms of greenhouse gas emissions per GDP has been discussed.
USA
During the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol, the USA was opting for further involvement ofdeveloping countries. Any such idea was rejected by the G77 with reference to the mandateof the AGBM process, which explicitly excludes further commitments for developing countries.
After Kyoto, the USA continued to request ‘meaningful participation’ of developing countries.
President George W. Bush announced in March 2001 that he rejects the Kyoto Protocol calling it ‘fatally flawed’. A major argument is the apparent ‘exclusion’ of developing countries,
naming specifically China and India. Another argument was the high costs involved for the
USA to reach these targets. The USA has presented an alternative target for the USA, measures in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) intensity, i.e. emissions per unit of GDP. The GHG
intensity should decrease by 18% in the next 10 years, which is equivalent to 2% annually.
Some observers pointed out that this target would be close to the business-as-usual development of the USA.
A change in the position of the USA towards developing country commitments first emergedat SBSTA 15 (June 2002) and became clear at COP 8 in November 2002: The USA is now
no longer calling for developing country commitments and is not supporting the call for aprocess to discuss the future, but instead stresses the need of economic development for all
countries in order to be able to tackle climate change.
European Union
The European Union has been a strong supporter of the theme that developed countries
should take the lead to combat climate change and did not call explicitly for actions by developing countries in the past. At COP 8 in November 2002, the EU stressed the progress towards meeting its commitments and called for a dialogue to kick off a process for future action
to achieve the ultimate goal of the Convention. Although the EU stressed explicitly that it does
not want to impose reductions targets on developing countries with such a dialogue, many
developing counties interpreted the EU position as such, either having misunderstood theposition or interpreting it this way deliberately.

4.

EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS

The international climate negotiations are based on the voluntary participation and cooperation of countries. In the absence of a supranational enforcement institution, any solution or
agreement must be considered equitable by all participants. Probably, the most inequitableoutcome of all would be reaching no agreement at all.
Equity or fairness is a subjective issue. US President George W. Bush for example called the
Kyoto Protocol an unfair means of addressing climate change. On the other hand, Ambassador Raul Estrada, who chaired the negotiations that lead to the Kyoto Protocol, compared the21

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burden of emission reduction for developed countries (“environmental debt”, Byrne 1998) withthe burden of external debt services for developing countries. Comparing the amounts would
lead to a different interpretation of fairness.
This chapter first describes the principles that are agreed in the Kyoto Protocol, then elaborates on the equity principles used for sharing of emission reductions and finally draws conclusions for the following chapters.
4.1 AGREED PRINICIPLES OF THE UNFCCC AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOLThe UNFCCC, in its Article 3, provides five principles that should guide the negotiations andrelated actions by Parties:
1. The most prominent and often quoted principle is that Parties should protect the climate“on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. Following from that developed countries “should takethe lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”
2. As a second principle, the special circumstances of developing country Parties, especiallythose that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and of
those Parties that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under theConvention, should be given full consideration.
3. Thirdly, countries should take precautionary measures. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason
for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal
with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest
possible cost.
4. Sustainable development is mentioned as the fourth principle. Actions to protect the climate system should be appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party and should
be integrated with national development programmes, taking into account that economic
development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change.
5. Cooperation is the fifth principle. Measures taken to combat climate change, including
unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination ora disguised restriction on international trade.
The agreement on principles has been the key to reaching agreement on several issues during the negotiations in the past. Often opinions are diverse, discussions complicated and on
many inter-linked issues at the same time (see also chapter 3.1.1). For many Parties, especially those that participate in the negotiations with limited resources, the agreement on clear
principles is seen as priority. Once appropriate principles are agreed, there seems the besome certainty that the fine detail will be developed accordingly.
One example is the agreement on the issue that the use of the Kyoto mechanisms should be
supplemental to domestic action. For several years it seemed difficult to reach an agreement
on how to define what “supplemental to domestic action” means. Some Parties insisted on aquantitative limit of the use of the mechanisms (e.g. 50% of the emissions reduction effort
should be achieved at home), some others were against quantitative limits. An agreement
was reached in Marrakech 2001 through a package of a) the inclusion of the principle that
Parties should “reduce emissions in a manner conducive to narrowing per capita differences
between developed and developing country Parties”, and b) no quantitative limit of the use of
the mechanisms.
Another example for the use of a principle is the agreement in Marrakech 2001 on the use of
the land-use, land-use change and forestry activities for the targets agreed in the Kyoto Protocol. The finally agreed decision begins with a list of principles (e.g., the treatment of theland-use, land-use change and forestry activities be based on sound science). The text that
follows in that decision aims at the implementation of these principles.
In these cases, agreeing on principles made it possible that a consensus was reached. Although the discussion on principles is sometimes difficult, because it is an abstract discus22

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ECOFYSsion, the concept of agreeing on principles may provide a path to reaching a general agreement also in the future.
4.2 EQUITY PRINCIPLES RELATED TO NATIONAL COMMITMENTS CONSIDERED
UNDER THE UNFCCC
One aspect of the commitments of Parties under the UNFCCC is the question how to shareemission rights or reductions among countries. Looking at issues as a pure distribution problem, equity principles can lead the way to some distribution rules. Many studies on the evolution of commitments (Rose et al. 1998, Philibert & Pershing 2001, Berk & Elzen 2001, Ringius
et al. 2002, IEO 2001) start with a list of equity principles and assign to each principle an allocation rule (distribution of a resource according to equity):•

The egalitarian principle (all human beings are equal) would lead to equal per capita
emission entitlements.

•

The principle of sovereignty (all countries are sovereign states) would lead to emission
entitlements related to the share of emissions of that country in a base year.

•

The principle ability to pay would lead to emission limitation or reduction efforts related tothe size of a measure for wealth (e.g. the Gross Domestic Product, GDP).

•

The polluter pays principle would lead to emission limitation or reduction efforts correlated
to current emissions or historic contributions to climate change.

Equity principles may be included in a commitment regime not only at the question how to
distribute the emission rights. For example the principle of polluter pays can be incorporated
through accordingly differentiating commitments, but also through the choice of the point intime when a Party starts to take on binding commitments. Therefore, equity principles arepresent at different aspects of a commitment regime.
Further, proposals for future commitments are usually based on several different equity principles at the same time and not only on a single one. For example, an approach that does notrecognize the need for development to satisfy basic human needs will have no prospects ofbeing successful no matter how the emission rights are shared.
A similar view is described by the ECN/CICERO project of global differentiation (Ringius et al.
2002). The authors identified four key equity principles, which can be applied to climate commitment regimes as a whole (summarized in Table 4). A climate commitment regime should
preferably satisfy all of these principles. The principles are grouped in one dimension as focusing on the cause of the problem or on the consequences. They are grouped along anotherdimension whether a cost or a benefit is distributed. The principle of responsibility means thatthe burden (cost of mitigation) should be distributed according to the responsibilities of theactors to the problem (cause). The principle of capacity means that the main cost should lie
with those that have the most resources. The principle of need means that developing countries are granted the possibility of development to satisfy basic human needs. The principle ofcontribution leads to giving those countries credit that “produce” more reductions.
Table 4. Key principles of equity (Ringius et al. 2002)

Focus
on

Cause of current
state of problem
Consequences foractorsObject to be distributed
Costs (obligations)Benefits
Responsibility (for causing theContribution (to solving the
problem)problem or providing the good)
Capacity (ability to pay)

Need

Another source, the report of the COOL dialogue (Berk et al. 2001), concludes that “equity
aspects would be an important element of future differentiation of commitments, but that itshould not become an overriding issue. In looking for acceptable climate change regimes it
seems wise not to focus on any single equity principle, but instead to look for approaches
embracing different equity principles.“23

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4.3 CONCLUSION ON EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS
We conclude that it is essential that future commitments satisfy certain equity principles.
Agreeing on principles and incorporating those into explicit future decisions may be difficult,but also may provide a path to reaching agreement.
For this study, we want to move away from the relatively narrow application of equity principles only to the distribution of the emission rights. Instead, we will asses in chapter 6 several
commitment regimes (including their approach to the distribution of emission rights) to threeequity principles which can be derived from the Convention and which are based on the ones
used by Ringius et al. (2002): ‘need’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘capability’.
The principle of ‘need’ refers to the fact that countries that are less developed have to satisfy
their basic human needs and need to have opportunities for higher economic development
than other countries, preferably in a sustainable manner. This principle is included in the ultimate objective of the Convention (Article 2, see Box 1), which mentions that economic development should be able to proceed in a sustainable manner. It is further included in the Convention’s fourth principle (Article 3.4), which notes that economic development is essential for
adopting measures to address climate change.
The principles ‘responsibility’ refers to the aspect that those countries should reduce emissions more that are responsible for the problem (polluter pays); it can be defined in terms ofcurrent emission or historical emissions. The principle ‘capability’ refers to the aspect thatthose countries should act that have most resources (ability to pay). These two principles arederived directly from the first principle of the Convention (Article 3.1), which states that countries should act according to their ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities’.
It is assumed that any proposed approach to future commitments must at least satisfy all
those three equity principles in at least one aspect of their design in order to be successfully
agreed.

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5.

CURRENT APPROACHES FOR COMMITMENTS

This chapter provides an overview of the approaches to climate commitments that have been
agreed or that were proposed by Parties or in scientific literature. In the first section, the different approaches are described. The second section lists the relevant aspects that need tobe considered in the discussion on further commitments.
5.1 APPROACHES PROPOSED TO DATE
5.1.1 Official commitments
In this section, those types of commitments are described that are either agreed within thenegotiation process or that have been officially proposed by a Party for itself.
Convention
The Convention provides for two types of commitments:
First, there are the commitments that are formulated in a very general sense, such as the implementation of policies and measures, support of research and provision of regular reports,
which hold for all Parties. Due to their very general and unspecific nature, compliance is difficult to assess.
Second, there is the “semi-quantified” commitment, the carefully worded return of Annex I
emissions individually or jointly to 1990 levels by 2000. Annex I Parties shall adopt national
policies “recognizing that the return by the end of the present decade [1990’s] to earlier levelsof emissions […] would contribute to the modification of long term trends” (4.2(a)). Annex I
parties shall report information on these policies and measures “with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels” (4.2(b)). Note that the word ‘stabilization’ was avoided
and the a return to earlier emission levels is referred to. Due to this indirect formulation, thiscommitment is interpreted as non-binding.
Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol defines a new type of commitments: Quantified emission limitation or reduction commitments (QELRC) for individual Annex I Parties. The levels of these targets werenegotiated on an ad-hoc basis (see chapter 2). The reductions are legally binding. The concept of national reduction targets originates from the approach that was also used in theMontreal Protocol.
Voluntary commitments by Parties
Kazakhstan has voluntarily applied to be a member of Annex I and Argentina had offered (butdid not insist) to be bound by a target which is expressed as a function of the GDP (see chapter 3.7). While these countries are or have been voluntarily active, the targets would nevertheless be binding once agreed by the COP.
5.1.2 Additional options for commitments proposed for and after Kyoto
A variety of approaches and elements of approaches have been proposed both by Parties
during the negotiations of the AGBM process before Kyoto (Torvanger & Godal, 1999) andlater in the open literature. These approaches are listed in the following section.
Convergence
During the AGBM process (1996), France proposed a formula for Annex I targets in 2010
based on eventually converging global per-capita emissions by 2100. The EU also proposed
in 1997 that emission paths should eventually converge to similar per capita or per GDP levels, without specifying a timeframe or level.

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The Global Commons Institute presented the ‘Contraction and Convergence’ approach in1996 (Meyer 2000): Governments would agree to a global emission path that leads to stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations (‘contraction’). Each year's ration of this global
emissions budget is shared out so that every country converges linearly on the same allocation per inhabitant by an agreed date, for example by 2030 (‘convergence’). Emissions trading
would be allowed.
At the Center for Science and Environment, New Delhi, India, A. Agarwal (1999) proposed
convergence of per-capita emissions and discussed several at different ultimate levels ofsuch per-capita entitlements.
Increasing participation / multistage
While the Global Commons Institute proposed that all countries participate from the beginning(sometimes with growth targets), countries could be required to participate only when certain
thresholds are exceeded.
As a further refinement, Den Elzen et al. (1999, 2001) proposed participation in several
stages in the FAIR model (Framework to Asses International Regimes for differentiation ofcommitments). Countries that satisfy certain criteria “graduate” into the next stage. First countries have no commitments, later a de-carbonization target (decreasing emissions per GDP),then stabilization of emissions and lastly reduction of emissions. A global emission path isdefined that would lead to stabilization of concentrations. The levels of reductions are assigned to participating countries so that a defined emission path is met.
J. Onigkeit (2000) proposed a similar stage approach: At the first stage there are no commitments, at the second stage there is a freezing of per capita emissions once an income
threshold is met, and lastly per-capita emissions have to be reduced once the global averageis reached.
Historic responsibility
During the AGBM process, Brazil proposed a method to share emission reductions among
Annex I countries, the “Brazilian Proposal”: In essence, a total reduction target for Annex I isdefined and the emission reduction effort among countries is shared according to their historic
responsibility for climate change. The historic responsibility is measured as the impact of acountries’ emissions on the global-average surface air temperature increase. An interesting
feature of the proposal is that the target was not accounted in terms of emissions (i.e. in Gt
CO2 equivalent) but in “effective emissions”, defined as the effect of the emission on the temperature (i.e. in °C).
The concept of contributions to climate change is under scientific discussion (Den Elzen &Schaeffer 2002, Höhne & Harnisch 2002). The scientific and methodological aspects of the
proposal are still discussed in the SBSTA (see also 3.7). An information sharing process to5assess contributions to climate change has been launched.
The delegation of Brazil did not provide a new proposal after the negotiations of the Kyoto
Protocol how this concept could also be applied to more countries than those included in Annex I. The proposed methodology allows only sharing emission reductions between participating countries, increasing emission targets cannot be accommodated. If this approach is applied also to developing countries reducing below a business as usual level instead of reducing below the current level could be applied.
Berk and Den Elzen (1999, 2000) assessed and modified the methodology proposed by Brazil and applied on a global scale using the FAIR model. The historic responsibility is applied
as a burden sharing key for reducing countries.
Multiple criteria for differentiation
During the AGBM process several criteria were proposed by several countries that could be
used to differentiate commitments: Emissions/GDP, GDP/capita, Emissions/capita, contribution to global emissions, share of renewable energy sources, industrial emissions as share of
5

Further information is available at http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/unfccc_assessment/

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total CO2 emissions, projected GDP, projected population, emissions intensity of exports, fossil fuel intensity of exports, dependency of income on fossil fuels, defense budget, share ininternational trade, emissions per unit of territory, energy production/capita, energy consumption/cap. Some countries provided formulas with these criteria as variables to calculate emission allowances (see also Torvanger & Godal 1999). Another option is to use the share ofcontributions to the UN budget as agreed by the general assembly (Babiker & Eckaus, 2000)
Intensity target
An alternative to an absolute national targets is an emission target as a function of the GDP(see also Argentina’s voluntary target in 5.1.1).
The World Resource Institute in Baumert et al. (1999) sees potential benefit from targets relative to the GDP, since they would foster the decoupling of greenhouse gas emissions andeconomic development.
The USA has proposed a greenhouse gas intensity target as alternative to its target under the
Kyoto Protocol. The USA would reduce its emissions per GDP by 18% during the next 10
years (USA 2002a, b).
Triptych: Sectoral targets aggregated to a national target
The Triptych approach takes into account explicitly the different technological starting pointsof countries. It defines certain emission limits for individual sectors and adds the resulting sectoral emissions to a national total.
The Triptych approach was first proposed 1997 (Blok et al. 1997, Phylipsen et al.1997, 1998,
Groenenberg et al. 2001) and served as the basis for the EU internal negotiations on how toshare the Kyoto target amongst its members. The Triptych approach covers three sectors (asa ‘triptych’ originally is a painting in three parts). For the heavy industry, a limit of heavy industry growth and an efficiency improvement is defined applicable to all countries. For the sectorof electricity production, a limit of electricity production growth and the shares of fossil, CHP,
renewables, nuclear and gas are set. For the domestic sector a date is set when per capita
emissions of that sector converge. The resulting total of all three sectors is the allowance ofthe country. Compliance with this target does not depend on the actual emissions of the sectors, the approach is just used to set the national total target.
Sectoral targets combined with convergence
A more elaborate implementation of the Triptych concept with ultimately converging percapita emissions is the Multi-sector Convergence Approach developed by the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research Norway (CICERO) and the Energy Research Center of the Netherlands (ECN) (Jansen et al. 2001). For seven sectors, it defines
global per capita emissions standards to which each country’s sectoral per-capita emissions
have to converge. The resulting total of all sectors is the allowance of the country. It allows foradjustments for countries with special national circumstances.
Equal cost
During the AGBM process, New Zealand proposed to differentiate the emission reduction as
to equalize marginal abatement costs without providing a specific methodology.
Other modeling groups provide cost estimates of different differentiation options as well as
differentiation according to equalized costs (Rose et al. 1989, Abare 1995, Babiker & Eckaus,
2000).
Coordinated policies and measures
During the discussions towards the Kyoto Protocol the alternative to emissions limitation or
reduction targets was the agreement on coordinated policies and measures. The most prominent option would have been a common tax on CO2. Other coordinated policies could include
research and development, elimination of climate adverse subsidies or generally agreed energy efficiency standards.

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Other approaches
The PEW center (Claussen & McNeilly 1998) presented an approach to divide countries inthree groups: “Must act now”, “could act now”, “should act now, but differently”. The distinction
is based on the three indicators growth (in CO2 emissions), standard of living (GDP) and opportunity (energy consumption per GDP). No further detail is given how these countries
should act.
Philibert & Pershing (2001) proposed targets that could be binding if they were met (so that
excess credits could be sold), while they would be non-binding, if not met. As advantage,
such targets would not be associated with a risk of high cost if not achieved, they only provide
an opportunity and incentive to join a commitment regime.
5.2 ISSUES RELEVANT FOR DECIDING ON FUTURE COMMITMENTS
Considering the approaches listed above, it becomes apparent, many ideas exist how commitments could develop in the future. But not all approaches cover all aspects that would define a complete global commitment regime. For example the Brazilian proposal was originallydesigned for Annex I. To apply “the Brazilian proposal” to future commitments of all countries,
several assumptions have to be made, such as which countries participate and by how muchthe total emissions should be reduced.
In the following section we, therefore, distill the different aspects that are needed to fully characterize an approach and summarize them in Figure 10. These dimensions could be used tostructure a discussion on future commitments. In describing these issues in this section, someconsiderations may be repeated that have already been described in the preceding section.
Step by step vs. comprehensive long-term approach?
With the Kyoto Protocol, a first step was taken to reach the ultimate objective of the Convention (stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations). A next round would define further steps.
Such an incremental approach derives targets based on current possibilities and therefore
focuses on the sharing of the burden of emission reductions.
As alternative, a comprehensive approach would define rules and criteria for the long term. It
could derive a global emission path from a long-term environmental goal. Emission rights
would be shared among countries according to well-defined criteria and rules. There would becertainty under which conditions a country would have to participate and with which commitment. The rules would be reviewed at regular intervals, but the general concept would be
kept. Such approach would focus on the sharing of resources, since it divides the available
emission space into shares for individual countries. An example for such a comprehensive
approach would be ‘Contraction & Convergence’.
Some participants of the COOL dialogue (Berk at al. 2001) argued for a comprehensive approach since an incremental approach could lead to the failure to reach an ambitious stabilization target.
A mix of both approaches is also possible.
Will there be “one size fits all” or several types of commitments?
Under the Kyoto Protocol, for Annex I countries have the type of commitment of binding reductions in absolute emissions, Non-Annex I countries have non-quantified commitments. A
straightforward option would be to apply the type of commitment of Annex I countries to othercountries. But some countries may not accept this type of targets as it is too restrictive andcould turn out to restrict economic growth. They could however accept other types of targets.
A climate regime could include several types of targets in parallel. There could be a catalogueof commitments or formulas in the future. The Parties could choose the commitments that suitthe national circumstance and capabilities best, as log as it is ensured that the global emissions are limited or reduced to the appropriate level.
It is likely that any approach will include exceptions since national circumstances are so diverse. The rules under the Kyoto Protocol include several exceptions to ensure the continued
participation of all Annex I countries: Iceland (emissions from single projects), Australia
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Evolution of commitments / DM 754(emissions from land-use change and forestry), increased allowances for forest management
for Japan and the Russian Federation.
National emission targets or non-quantified targets?
On the one hand, targets could be expressed in quantitative form as emission limitation or
reduction targets as for Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol. Questions relating toquantified targets are discussed further below.
Targets could be also be expressed around policies and measures as an option, which canbe applied in parallel to quantified targets. These non-quantified targets could include thegeneral commitments as given in the Convention. Here, general actions need to be implemented, but details are not specified. Another option is to agree on certain common and coordinated policies and measures that all or some Parties have to implement. Examples aretaxes or energy efficiency standards.
What if the commitment is not met?
The commitments can be either legally binding or non-binding. Legally-binding targets would
have enforceable consequences if they are not met, while not complying with non-binding
targets would have no consequences.
As a proposal in-between, quantified targets could be for some countries binding if they aremet, but at the same time non-binding if they are not met. If a country under such a target
overachieves its target, it could sell emission allowances to other countries with legally binding targets. However, that country has to face no consequences if its emissions are higher
than the target. In such a system has to ensure that a country is not selling allowances if it isunlikely to meet its target.
Legally binding quantified emissions limitation targets can be made more flexible and lessrestrictive, if excess emissions can be ‘borrowed’ from future commitment periods, restored infuture commitment periods with a certain ‘interest rate’ (as in the Kyoto Protocol) or an additional number of credits can be bought at a fixed price (see also price cap).
Who participates and when?
A separate question is that of who participates in the commitment regime and when. One option is that all participate, some with growth targets (as in ‘contraction and convergence’). Participation could also be on a voluntary but binding basis (the Kazakhstan case). Alternatively,a threshold for the participation could be set that defines when a country has to participate.
Such threshold could be calculated using following indicators or a combination of them:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Emissions
Emissions/capita
Emissions/GDP
GDP/capita
Cumulative emissions
Contribution to temperature increase
Human development index

For example, all those countries have to participate, whose GDP per capita or GHG emissions per capita are above a certain level.
The commitment system could also include several stages of commitments. If a country supercedes a thresholds, it would “graduate” into the next commitment stage (Den Elzen 2001).
It could be argued to include the major emitting countries, as the 28 most emitting countries
are responsible for 80% of global GHG emissions (see also Appendix A). On the other hand,
Annex I countries are responsible for half of the global GHG emissions with only 20% of the
global population.
How can political agreement be built?
A whole different set of questions develops around the ways to build a political global consensus. Meetings of scientists and policy makers from all countries on this topic such as the
COOL dialogue would be a way forward. Benito Müller (2001) proposed a way to numerically29

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find a compromise between two proposals based on the population that is supporting the proposals. Further elaboration, however, of this complex issue of building an international consensus it is beyond the scope of this report.
How should national emission targets be set?
What is the type of the target?
First, it needs to be defined what is limited or reduced by the commitment. The main alternatives include absolute national emission (Kyoto Protocol) or emissions expressed as a function of the GDP (intensity targets).
It also needs to be defined which sectors are included in the target: Energy, industrial processes, solvents, agriculture, waste as well as land-use change and forestry. The Kyoto Protocol includes those sectors but treats land-use change and forestry in a different manner. Further, it needs to be decided which gases are included. The Kyoto Protocol includes CO2, CH4,
N2O, HFCs, PFCs, SF6. A scientific debate is ongoing whether a comprehensive climate
strategy should also include ozone precursors and/or aerosols (Hansen 2000). This includes
also a discussion on ways to compare effects of different greenhouse gases using global
warming potentials (as in the Kyoto Protocol) or any other means (e.g. Godal & Fuglestvedt
2002, O'Neill 2000)

Step by step approach orcomprehensive long-term approach?
Will there be one size fits all or several
types of commitments?

National emissions
targets or nonquantified target?

How to set nationalemissions targets?

What if the commitment
is not met?

Who participates
and when?
How can apolitical
agreement be
built?

How to set national emission targets?
What is the type of the target?
• Absolute or• Dynamic/relative
targets

Which sectors
and gases areincluded in thetarget?

Is emissions
trading
allowed? Witha price cap?

What is the stringency of the target?
• Reductions below reference (1990 or
BAU) either flat rate (grandfathering)or differentiatedDifferentiation criteria– Historical emissions, Population, GDP,…
– Several sectoral targets added to anational target (Triptych, bottom-up)• Convergence towards anabsolute long-term target
applicable for all countries,
e.g. x kg CO2 /cap

Figure 10. Dimensions of deciding on new commitments
If quantitative targets are set, mechanisms such as those applied in the Kyoto Protocol could
be allowed: Emissions trading, the clean development mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation.
To add further flexibility, a limit on the maximum price per permit, a ‘price cap’ could be set: In
the event that costs to reach the target are unexpectedly high, additional permits could be
introduced into the market at a price that had been fixed in advance. The revenue from these
permits would be ‘recycled’, i.e. redistributed among the participants, or used to achieve
6
emission reductions. This would allow for certainty of the maximum costs. Since an emissions trading regime with a price cap is in between a free emissions trading system (certainty
on the emissions target, uncertainty on the cost) and a tax (certainty on the cost, uncertainty
on the emissions target) it is sometimes referred to as a ‘hybrid’ instrument.
What is the stringency of the target?
Basically two options exist to define the stringency of a target. Either a) the target based on areference, e.g. the current level of emissions (grandfathering) or a business as usual case,and defines a percentage reduction from it, or b) the level of the target is converging to an
absolute allowance, defined as a share of that country of a global limit.
6

The concept of a price cap is equivalent to a fixed financial penalty for excess emissions over assigned
amount at the end of the commitment period. A cap at the price of zero would be equivalent to a target
that is non-binding if it is exceeded.

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For the option a), either all participants reduce at the same flat rate or they reduce at different
rated (differentiated), taking into account specific circumstances of individual Parties. Differentiated reductions could be assigned according to differentiation criteria. Possible differentiation criteria include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Current or historic emissions
Contribution to temperature increase
Population
GDP or other measure of welfare or income
Geographic area
Reduction potential
Costs or benefits of reductions
Sectoral benchmarks
Several sectoral targets added to a national target (Triptych, bottom-up)

The individual reductions could be tuned so that a global emission target is reached.
For option b), long-term targets could be assigned that are applicable for all countries without
use of a reference (e.g. a certain amount of emissions per GDP or per capita as for the ‘contraction and convergence’ approach). To avoid abrupt changes in emission allowances fromthe present to such long-term target, the allowances would converge over time toward thattarget.
Flexibility
Current targets of the Kyoto Protocol are absolute, binding emission targets. Recently, many
actors (e.g. developing countries and the United States of America) have called for more
flexibility in the targets such as those included in the Kyoto Protocol. Several of the issues
discussed above are perceived as options for providing such flexibility: targets that are expressed as a function of the GDP, caps on the maximum price in an emissions trading system, the non-binding nature of commitments if they are exceeded or borrowing from futurecommitment periods or exceptions for particular cases.
It is argued that, on the one hand, flexibility can lead to broader participation in the regime. On
the other hand, too much flexibility in the worst case can lead to targets very close to business as usual or to a symbolic policy.
5.3 CONCLUSIONS FOR THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS
The categorization described above can be used to focus a discussion of commitments. In
order to describe a complete regime, all of the above questions have to be answered.
Since the elements and concepts are diverse, a comparative assessment of the approaches
can only be made when selecting the most prominent approaches and bringing them to similar level. This is described in the following chapter.

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6.

ELABORATION AND ASSESSMENT OF EXISTINGAPPROACHES
6.1 INTRODUCTION
As described in the earlier chapter 5, many concepts exist related to future commitments ofParties. But not all those ideas are fully developed or cover all aspects defining a complete
global commitment regime.
In the following chapter we, therefore, select seven types of approaches and extend them tosuch a global commitment regime. The approaches are described in full detail, including theassumptions made in the extension. We also model the allowed emissions of countries underthese approaches and subsequently assess the approaches with respect to common assessment criteria to test their suitability for the international negotiation process.
Selected approaches
For further comparative analysis, the following illustrative cases were selected:•

Continuing Kyoto: The most straight forward option would be to continue the current
system without changes, assuming that more and more countries join the group of reducing countries which receive binding absolute emission reduction targets.

•

Intensity targets: As illustrative case it is assumed that all countries reduce their greenhouse gas intensity (greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP) at the same rate.

•

Contraction and Convergence: The approach introduced by the Global Commons Institute assumes that per capita emissions converge to equal levels.

•

Global Triptych approach: In this approach a national target is derived from bottom-up
sectoral targets, which are based on specific considerations of the emission development
and reduction potential of the sectors.

•

Multi sector convergence approach: Similar to the previous approach, a national target
is derived from sectoral targets. This approach assumes converging per capita emissions
for seven different sectors.

•

Multistage approach (FAIR): Using the approach proposed in the FAIR model, it is assumed that countries participate in the commitment regime in 4 stages, ‘graduating’ from
one to the next.

•

Equal mitigation cost: The targets are distributed among countries distributing the economic burden equally over all countries, based on an agreed model.

•

Coordinated policies and measures: It is assumed that countries do not receive quantitative emission limitation or reduction targets, but are obliged to implement certain coordinated policies and measures.

These illustrative cases were chosen to cover the broad range of options proposed to date
without prejudging how realistic or successful they could be. Elements of the approaches
could be used in parallel, e.g. under a continued Kyoto Protocol, some countries receive also
intensity targets, while others concentrate on policies and measures. However, we here analyze these cases separately to draw from the results for a discussion on new approaches.
Basic assumptions
The calculations of the emissions limits for all approaches are calculated for common assumptions. If not stated otherwise the assumptions include the following (see also Appendix A):
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•

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•

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The parameters of the illustrative cases (e.g. the reduction level) were chosen as to ensure that
global emissions in 2020 are +27% above 1990 levels for the total of CO2, CH4 and N2O emissions
in CO2 equivalents, if possible. The choice of this level was based on the following: Several emission paths could lead to stabilization of CO2 concentrations at 450 ppmv. A path slowly decreasing
as of 2010 would lead to emissions in 2020 around +10% above 1990 levels. A path with increasing
emissions to peak in 2020 and to rapidly decrease afterwards would lead to emissions in 2020
around +40% above 1990 levels. The target was chosen to lie in the top third of the range, as toensure that 450 ppmv still can be reached. In absence of stabilization scenarios of CH4 and N2O inthe literature, this percentage increase was applied to the total of CO2, CH4 and N2O emissions in
CO2 equivalents.
Emission inventory figures from the EDGAR 3.2 database (EDGAR 2001) for 1990 and 1995 wereused as the basis. Energy and industrial emissions as well as from forestry for CO2, CH4 and N2O
are included. For major Annex I countries, emission data from the national submissions to the
UNFCCC was used.
The business a usual path of emissions was calculated from the emission growth rates of the regions of the IPCC SRES scenario A2 applied to the emission estimates of the inventories. The resulting global emission levels in 2020 are +67% above 1990 levels. The A2 scenario is in the middle range of the SRES scenarios for the timeframe 1990 to 2010. The choice to use the A2 scenario
is however arbitrary. The sensitivity of the results to other scenarios is analyzed in the particularcases. If the other SRES scenarios were used, total global emissions would range between +25%
to +72% above 1990 levels.
The GDP values for 1990 and 1999 were taken from the World Bank as provided in IEA 2001 in
1995 US$ using purchasing power parities. Future values were derived from the IPCC SRES scenario A2, which provides GDP growth for four world regions. The GDP growth rate of the region
was applied to individual countries within that region by applying the average annual growth rate
between 1990 and 1999 of the individual countries, linearly de- or increased so that the total GDP
increase of the groups matches the total increase as provided in the A2 scenario. (For more information on indicators for human wealth see Appendix B.)
Resulting emission allowances were aggregated for the group of countries as provided in Appendix A. Quantitative results are provided in Table 10.

Assessment criteria
The discussion of all illustrative cases is based on common assessment criteria. These criteria arise from the intention to strive for an ‘optimal’ approach that is likely to be agreed successfully. The criteria also take into account earlier assessments (Berk & den Elzen 2001,
Philibert & Pershing 2001). The following assessment criteria were used:
Environmental criteria•

Environmental effectiveness: The optimal approach must ensure that stringent global
emission targets are reached to safeguard the fulfilment of the ultimate objective of theConvention. Accordingly, it should include greenhouse gas emissions from all importantsources and sectors and avoid leakage (the transfer of emissions to other countries instead of the reduction). It should promote for ancillary benefits of the emission reductions
and should provide certainty of the emission levels on the global level as well as for participating Parties.

•

Encouragement of early action: Since major reductions of global greenhouse gases
emissions are needed to reach the ultimate objective of the Convention, it is necessarythat all Parties avoid unnecessary emissions. The optimal approach would encouragecountries that do not yet have binding commitments to keep emissions as low as possible.

Political criteria•

Equity principles: Three equity principles should be covered by the optimal approach toa certain extent in order to be successful (for the selection see also chapter 4):-

It should allow that countries to develop economically to satisfy their basic humanneeds and that this development should be geared towards sustainability (principle of
need)

-

It should require those countries to take on a burden that have the economic ability to
pay and to undertake action (principle of capability)
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It should require those countries to take on a higher burden in reducing emissions
that pollute more (principle of responsibility).

Agreement with fundamental positions of major constituencies: Since the international negotiation process is based on decisions by consensus, the optimal approach
would have to be acceptable for all constituencies. This means that the approach is perceived as not posing unproportional burden to some countries, while favoring others. It
should also rely not on only one group’s position but be a compromise of all proposed
approaches. Assessment of this criterion is based on the current positions.

Economic criteria•

Accounting for structural differences between countries: Since starting positions ofcountries are very diverse, the optimal approach would take these differences explicitly
into account.

•

Minimizing adverse economic effects: The optimal approach would require a distribution of reductions so that the global costs are minimized. The optimal approach would
also give participating sovereign nations sufficient flexibility to reach their commitments,
tailored to their national needs and priorities. Such an approach would avoid being prescriptive in the action but leaving room for the implementation of the target, e.g. reducing
emissions in different sectors, or reducing emissions of different gases, etc. In addition,
the optimal approach would ensure that participating countries have certainty on the inferred costs of taking on commitments.

Technical criteria•

Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol: The optimal
approach would be compatible with the existing international structures of the Convention
and the Kyoto Protocol as to benefit from the international negotiations that have takenplace to date. Institutions and structures implemented for the use of the Kyoto Mechanisms could be utilized.

•

Moderate political and technical requirements for the negotiation process: Since theinternational negotiation process is based on decisions by consensus, the optimal approach should be simple and require a low number of separate decisions by international
bodies. In addition, all necessary data and tools should be available and verifiable. If data
is not available, there should be the opportunity that it can be collected and verified in the
future. If the approach requires a calculation method, these should also be available andverifiable. Finally, the optimal approach would allow that the implementation of the targets
can be monitored and verified.

Potential conflicts between these criteria exist. E.g. a very simple approach (such as converging per capita emissions) would be relatively easy to negotiate but cannot explicitly address
the national circumstances of individual countries. Complex formulas for future commitments,
which can accommodate particular national circumstances, may be difficult to negotiate. Consequently, the ‘optimal’ approach may not be available. It will always be a compromise thatsatisfies the above criteria only partly.
The following text provides the description and assessment of the approaches with respect tothese criteria. A comparative assessment is contained in chapter 8.
6.2 CONTINUING KYOTO
6.2.1 Description
As a first illustrative case it is assumed that the commitment regime is continued as under the
Kyoto Protocol: binding absolute emissions limitation targets. We made the following assumptions and selected the parameters as to ensure that the total emissions in 2020 reach the goalof global emissions being 27% above 1990 levels.

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The group of reducing countries (currently Annex I) reduces emissions by –20% below
the 2010 assigned amount until 2020 (average of 2018 to 2022). Intermediate targets
would be set for the period 2013 to 2017. The reductions have to be shared among thecountries possibly differentiated. A universal reduction is assumed here for the calculations.

•

Non-Annex I Parties emissions develop according to the business as usual path until
2010. After 2010, Non-Annex I countries can move to the group of decreasing countries if
their GDP per capita in 2010 above 7000 US$/person. If the GDP per capita is lower than
this threshold, emissions follow the business as usual path. Each 10-year step this is continued. The threshold for participation in the year 2010 of 7000 US$/person, which can becompared with the assumed Annex I average for 2010 of 23000 US$/person, the NonAnnex I average for 2010 of 4600 US$/person and the global average for 2010 of 8000
US$/person.

6.2.2 Quantified results
Table 10 provides the results for the case ‘Continuing Kyoto’ based on the assumptions described above. Emissions include the three major greenhouse gases, including industrial andforestry sources.
In order to reach the global environmental goal, the most advanced developing countries
would participate in 2020, i.e. would be assigned an emission target. For the given assumptions these would include Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, the Persian Gulf states,
South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Since all reducing countries are assumed todecrease emissions at the same percentage, the required reductions for newly participating
countries result in abrupt changes in the emission trend: increasing emissions until 2010 todecreasing emissions between 2010 and 2020. Provisions would have to be included to prevent this effect. Total global emissions would be limited to an increase of +27% compared to1990 levels (see Figure 11), CO2 concentrations would be at 480 ppmv CO2eq in 2010.

Non-Annex I

45 000 000

Annex I

40 000 000
35 000 000
30 000 000
25 000 000
20 000 000
15 000 000
10 000 000
5 000 000

2 100

Time (years)

2 080

2 060

2 040

2 020

2 000

0
1 990

Glonbal emissions (Gg CO2 eq)

50 000 000

Figure 11: Global emissions under the ‘continuing Kyoto’ case
The results are very sensitive to the choice of the threshold when Non-Annex I Parties would
join Annex I. A decrease in the threshold for participation has a large effect if it leads to theinclusion of a large country. If the threshold is decreased to include also China, the participating countries would have to reduce 7% per decade instead of 20% to reach the same global
emission goal in 2020. If China were not included and Annex I countries would reduce emissions by 10% per decade, the total global emission would be +36% above 1990 levels.

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The results are also very sensitive to the choice of the ‘business as usual’ scenario in terms ofemissions and GDP growth. Keeping all parameters constant and changing only the SRESBAU scenario, total global emissions in 2020 could range between +2% and +33% of 1990
levels.
Another line of reasoning could be that some Annex I countries are granted an increase inemissions under the Kyoto Protocol. Due to the specific national circumstances Australia may
increase emissions by 8%, Iceland by 10% in 2010 above 1990 levels. The EU has internallyshared the –8% reduction among its Member States and has granted Portugal, for example,
an increase in emissions of +27% in 2010 compared to 1990 levels. In this illustrative case,newly participating countries could therefore also receive growth targets. This interpretation
would further increase the global total emissions in 2020 or would lead to further reductions
by the current Annex I countries.
6.2.3 Assessment with respect to the criteria
Environmental criteria
Environmental effectiveness: Under this illustrative case, the system would eventually include all major developing countries but only when their GDP (and possibly emissions) arealready relatively high. Only if Annex I countries decrease emissions substantially and all major developing countries participate at an early stage, stringent global stabilisation paths could
be reached such as 450 - 550 ppmv. The ‘Leakage’ of emissions (emissions reductions inparticipating countries at the cost of emission increase in non-participating countries) could
occur in this illustrative case: Emission intensive economic activities could be moved from aparticipating country (reducing its emissions) to a non-participating country (increasing its
emissions, which are not limited). This is limited to a certain extent because this leakage
would increase the economic activity to possibly exceed the participation threshold.
Encouragement of early action: Non-participating countries have incentives to decrease
their emissions by participating in the CDM. There could be however the incentive not to participate in the CDM and not to take early action, since the targets are based on the emission
level in 2010 or later. Therefore, some countries may prefer not to sell cheap emission reduction, “low hanging fruits”, in the CDM.
Political criteria
Equity principles: The principle of allowing for sustainable economic growth (need) is covered in this approach through the stepwise increase of participation once certain economic
development is reached. The stepwise increase of participation based on an economic indicator also covers the principle of capability (ability to pay) to a certain extent. Calculating targets
as percentage of emissions in previous years may be against the principle of responsibility(polluter pays). Assigning differentiated targets and not the same percentage reductions to allparticipating countries would increase the coverage of the principles capability and responsibility.
Agreement with fundamental positions of all major constituencies: Most Parties haveagreed to the principles embedded in the Kyoto Protocol. The USA, as a major constituency,
has rejected the Protocol and seeks more flexible structures. China has announced that it iswilling to participate in the commitment regime once it reaches the economic development of
the Annex I Parties. A major obstacle is that some developing countries would have to join thegroup of Annex I countries, which is currently unacceptable for the Group of 77 and China.
Economic criteria
Accounting for structural differences between countries: The use of only one criterion todecide when countries participate (GDP per capita) and assigning the same reduction target
to all participating Parties does account for only the one structural differences between countries. Assigning different reduction levels to the reducing countries (as provided in the Kyoto
Protocol) could introduce further acknowledgement of the structural differences of countries.
Furthermore, exceptions could be made for very particular circumstances (also as provided
for in the Kyoto Protocol, e.g. the exclusion of small projects from the accounting under certain circumstances).
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Minimizing adverse economic effects: If emissions trading is applied, it is ensured thatmarginal abatement costs are comparable in all participating countries, that reductions occur
where they are the most economically efficient. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
will ensure that emission reduction potential in non-participating countries is also used. Parties can reduce emissions across sectors and gases and also outside of their territory. Participating countries, however, have low certainty of the total cost related to meeting their targets. Absolute binding targets may not be attractive for some developing countries, since often the future emissions cannot be predicted with certainty. Therefore, absolute targets could
lead to a high economic burden (if economic development was faster than expected) or to alarge surplus of emission allowances (if economic development was lower than expected).
Flexibility additional to that in the Kyoto Protocol, such as e.g. the opportunity purchase additional emission allowances at a fixed the price, could be accommodated (see also section
5.2).
Technical criteria
Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol: This illustrative
case builds upon the structure agreed in the Kyoto Protocol and is therefore compatible with it
and can make use of its processes and institutions. Emissions trading and the CDM could
continue to operate.
Moderate political and technical requirements of the negotiation process: Agreements
such as this illustrative case would fully retain the negotiation effort that has been invested in
the current structure and institutions of the Kyoto Protocol. Countries have gained experiencein the negotiations on such targets in the Kyoto Protocol and will again do so soon for the target for Kazakhstan for example. The necessary decisions on the level of the reductions, theirdifferentiation among countries and the point at which a specific country has to participate
may be cumbersome, but have been overcome in the past. No technical requirements additional to those embedded in the Kyoto Protocol would need to be met. Due to the legally binding nature of the targets, emissions have to be calculated, reviewed and verified. The operation of such system is currently under preparation or is in part already operating: Emission
inventories are reported in detail and reviewed by expert review teams, national registries foremissions trading are being developed. These requirements would also have to be met by the
newly participating countries.
Conclusions
Continuing the system of the Kyoto Protocol would be an obvious option for future commitments. Stringent environmental goals can, however, only be reached, if current Annex I countries decrease their emissions more than for the first commitment period (2008 to 2012) and if
some developing countries receive emission targets at an early stage. A method to differentiate the targets for the participating countries is not included in this approach. Further, taking
on absolute emission targets may be difficult for some developing countries due to the uncertainty in the development of the emissions.
6.3 INTENSITY TARGETS
6.3.1 General remarks on intensity targets
In a second illustrative case, targets are defined in terms of a reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions per GDP (GHG intensity). Before describing the actual illustrative case, some general remarks on intensity targets are made in this section.
The reduction in the GHG intensity is the sum of two components: a reduction (or increase) of
emissions and an increase (or reduction) of GDP. For example, a 5% reduction in the GHG
intensity could be achieved by a 2% decrease in emissions plus a 3% increase in GDP. If
emissions decline, the percentage decrease in GHG intensity is usually greater than the percentage decrease in absolute emissions, since the GDP usually increases over time.

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Explaining the same fact differently is to describe theEmissions target year Emissions base year=
⋅ Reduction
intensity target as “grandGDPtarget year
GDPbase year
fathering x growthsweetener
GDPtarget year
x reduction”(See Müller
⋅ Reduction
Emissions target year = Emissions base year ⋅2001b and Box 7). The absoGDPbase year
lute level of allowed emissions in the target year under
an intensity target is based
Box 7. The absolute level of allowed emissions in theon the levels of a base year
target year under an intensity target(grandfathering). Further thatlevel is increased proportional to the economic growth (growthsweetener) and decreased by areduction factor.
Including the GDP in the equation takes account of the fact that economic activity is the major
driver of emissions. For most countries the relationship between GDP and national emissions
is significant. The question is: how exactly do emissions and GDP relate to each other:
Using the intensity target as described above uses a linear relationship between GDP and emissions. If GDP inEmissions = C ⋅ GDP α
creases by 1%, emissions also increase by 1% (α=1 in
Box 8). But not all emissions of a country are closely reBox 8. Relationship between
lated to monetary economic activity. For this reason Aremissions and GDP
gentina, in its voluntary target announced in 1999 (seealso section 5.1.1), did not choose a linear relationshipbetween emissions and GDP, but related emissions to the square root of the GDP (equivalentto α=½ in Box 8). A 1% increase in GDP increases the emissions only by roughly ½%. Thiswas based on the fact that agricultural emissions in Argentina are not well correlated with theGDP.
As a consequence, intensity targets should ideally take into account the relationship between
GDP and emissions. It also depends on the historic relationship of the GDP to the emissions,
whether an intensity target provides more or less certainty about the available surplus or debit
in the commitment period than an absolute target. If emissions are linked very closely to theGDP, an intensity target provides the advantage that the future emission intensity can beforecasted with some certainty, possibly with more certainty than the absolute emissions. If
the emissions are only loosely correlated with the GDP, an absolute target may be more appropriate since the absolute level of emissions may be forecasted with more certainty.
Intensity targets are perceived as providing this flexibility and allowing for more emissions if
the economy is growing faster than expected. Almost unconstrained economic development
can be pursued under an intensity target that is close to the business-as-usual GHG intensity
development. If, however, significant reductions in the GHG intensity below business-as-usual
are required, an intensity target can be equally restraining as an absolute target. An intensity
target is only more flexible if unexpected economic developments occur.
If equal reductions in GHG intensity are set for several countries, the one with higher economic growth is in advantage. For any GHG intensity target, a country that is increasing economic activity, e.g. in the financial services sector, without significantly increasing emissions,is in advantage over a country that is increasing economic activity in an emission intensive
economic sector, e.g. energy-intensive heavy industry.
Another issue is the case of economic decline, where the emission intensity usually tends toincrease (GDP declines faster than emissions). If in such a case the intensity target is set witha strict link between emissions and GDP (i.e. α=1), unexpected economic decline makes thetarget more difficult to reach. If however the intensity target is set with a weaker link between
emissions and GDP than it actually occurs (e.g. the extreme case: α=0, absolute target), unexpected economic decline makes the target easier to reach.
International emissions trading would be possible under GHG intensity targets but would haveto be treated with care. Under absolute targets, the total allowance is known before the commitment period (the assigned amount), but under intensity targets, it is know only after the38

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commitment period. One option would be to trade only after the commitment period (ex-post
trading) once the GDP value and the respective level of allowed emissions in the target year
are known. Such ex-post trading is however seen as less effective compared to trading before
the end of the commitment period (ex-ante trading). This second option would also be possible under GHG intensity targets with uncertainty about the total allowance.
Another option, which is not considered further here, would be to set an absolute target, butlink it loosely to the GDP, e.g. that the absolute target is increased by x% if the GDP inadvertently would have grown faster than y%.
6.3.2 Description
For this illustrative case, the intensity targets are applied as follows: We assume that, until
2010, emissions of Annex I Parties develop according to their Kyoto targets, while emissionsof Non-Annex I Parties follow the business as usual path. From 2010 to 2020 onwards, allcountries reduce their GHG intensity by 3% per year as to ensure that global total emissions
would be only +27% higher in 2020 than in 1990. A uniform reduction of the GHG intensity isapplied to all countries. In the multistage approach (section 6.6) intensity targets are applied
for some countries and absolute targets for others. As for other approaches, emissions trading could be allowed and targets would be of legally binding nature.
6.3.3 Quantified results
The calculations for the case ‘Intensity targets’ are based on the same set of data used for the
first case ‘Continuing Kyoto’. Table 10 provides the results for the case ‘Intensity targets’. Under this illustrative case most Parties would be required to reduce absolute emissions after
2010.
These results are highly sensitive to the assumption on the GDP growth for individual countries. The global GHG intensity decreases as business-as-usual according to the IPCC SRES
scenarios between 0.4% and 3.3% per year from 2010 and 2020. Depending on the business-as-usual path, a uniform decrease between 1.7% (scenario B2) and 4.3% (scenario
A1B) per year in GHG intensity would be sufficient to reach the given global reduction level ofglobal emissions +27% above 1990. In addition, results are significantly different, if the GDP
of individual countries is not based on purchase power parities but based on exchange rates
or expressed in local currencies. Alternatively, other indicators for the economic developmentof a country could be used (see also Appendix B).
6.3.4 Assessment with respect to the criteria
Environmental criteria
Environmental effectiveness: Under GHG intensity targets, the absolute future emission
levels are not fixed, leaving uncertainty whether a global stabilization path can be reached.
Intensity targets for all countries alone would have to be set at high percentages to reachstringent concentration levels. However, hot air could be introduced, if an equal rate of GHG
intensity reduction in applied to all countries and a country’s business-as-usual GHG intensity
reduction is higher than the applied rate.
Encouragement of early action: As for the earlier case, assigning targets based on theemission levels of 2010 or later is an incentive to increase emissions until then to be granted
a higher targets once participating. Early action is not explicitly encouraged.
Political criteria
Equity principles: Intensity targets can allow for economic growth. Almost unconstrained
development can be pursued, if the intensity target is close to the business-as-usual GHG
intensity development. If, however, significant reductions in the GHG intensity below businessas usual are required, an intensity target can be equally stringent as an absolute target. An
intensity target is only more flexible if unexpected economic developments occur. Applying
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GHG intensity reduction target equally to all countries may not satisfy the principle of need.
Care also has to be taken in the case of economic decline. If reductions in GHG intensity are
equal for all countries, the principle of capability (ability to pay) is violated, since countries withhigher economic growth have to reduce emissions less. The principle of responsibility is notsatisfied, if equal GHG intensity reduction rates are introduced. Only differentiating the GHG
intensity reductions for the different countries could lead to satisfying the principles of need,capability and responsibility.
Agreement with fundamental positions of all major constituencies: This type of target
has been proposed by the USA as alternative to the Kyoto Protocol and had earlier been proposed by Argentina. Other countries have not yet voiced their positions on this type of target.
Economic criteria
Accounting for structural differences between countries: For intensity targets, differencesin economic structure and the economic growth would have an additional influence on thetarget. An equal reduction in GHG intensity could account even less for the structural differences of countries than equal absolute reductions, especially for countries where the GDP is
not well correlated to the emissions.
Minimizing adverse economic effects: Intensity targets are often seen as avoiding reductions at high cost, if economic growth exceeds expectations. Participating countries could
have some additional certainty on the inferred cost compared with the ‘continuing Kyoto’case, if the GDP is well correlated with the emissions and therefore the amount of credits
available is more certain. Allowing emissions trading ensures, as in the other cases, that marginal abatement costs are comparable in all participating countries.
Technical criteria
Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol: Intensity targets
could be integrated into the commitment regime under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, for some countries or for all. Emissions trading could be applied, but with care.
Moderate political and technical requirements of the negotiation process: This form oftarget is new to the negotiation process and rules to set such targets would require additional
negotiation time. The intensity targets may be more difficult to negotiate than absolute targets,since they involve an explicit judgment of the relationship between emissions and the GDP. A
reduction percentage and an elasticity has to be agreed. Further, several methodologies
could be applied for the calculation of the GDP. It could be expressed in local currency, basedon exchange rates or on purchase power parities. For many developing countries, the GDP
does not cover the informal sector. For centrally planned economies, the GDP growth rates
are sometimes challenged as being overestimated. Resulting growth rates would differ significantly. However, whether the GDP is calculated in local currency, based on exchange rates
or on purchase power parities is only relevant if drastic changes occur (like a crash of one
currency used) or a target of one country is compared to that of another. The International
Monetary Fund has established rules and review procedures for the calculation of the GDP. In
addition to reviewing GHG emission inventories, the calculation of the GDP would need to bereviewed and verified to assess compliance with legally binding intensity targets. Such review
is likely to be more difficult than reviewing inventories of greenhouse gas emissions alone.
Conclusions
A 2% to 4% decrease in GHG intensity per year on average over all countries would be required to reach stringent environmental goals. Intensity targets would always have to be differentiated, since the relationship between emission and GDP will be different in all countries.
The differentiated intensity targets may be more difficult to negotiate than differentiated absolute targets, since a reduction and an elasticity has to be agreed. The judgment of the stringency of the target involves also an explicit judgment of the relationship between emissionsand GDP. More variables influence the emission intensity (all activity data, all emission factors and also the activity in emission extensive sectors). This makes it more difficult to agree
on intensity targets than on absolute targets.

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6.4 CONTRACTION AND CONVERGENCE
6.4.1 Description
Converging per capita emissions has been proposed by several groups (see chapter 5.1.2).
The most simple implementation would be that per capita emission allowances would converge linearly until a certain year. The ‘Contraction and Convergence’ approach by the Global
Commons Institute (Meyer 2000) is slightly more sophisticated: In a first step, a global emission path is agreed for each future year that leads to a long-term global stabilization level:‘contraction’ (here 450 ppmv CO2). In a second step, the global emission limit for each year isshared among all countries so that per-capita emissions converge: ‘convergence’ (here by2050). Emissions trading would be allowed as to balance out shortages in supply and demand of emission allowances.
To reach any stabilization level, global per capita emissions have to decrease below the current world average and even below the current Non-Annex I average. Connecting the converging per capita emissions to a stabilization path (as in this approach) leaves more room forgrowing developing country emissions in the shorter term.
6.4.2 Quantified results
The calculations for the case ‘contraction and convergence’ are based on the same set ofdata as the first case ‘Continuing Kyoto’. In addition, population data were used by the UN
population division as provided in WRI (2000). As of 2050 the population is assumed constant.
The original contraction and convergence approach includes only energy related and industrial CO2 emissions. The illustrative case presented here is based on converging emissions ofenergy, industry and forestry CO2 as well as CH4 and N2O. We assume that, until 2010, emissions of Annex I Parties develop according to their Kyoto targets and emissions of Non-Annex
I Parties follow the business as usual path. From 2010 onwards, all countries participate, percapita emissions converge from 2010 to 2050 to the level of 3.1 tCO2eq./person and decrease further to 2.1 tCO2eq./person in 2100 (Figure 13).
Currently per capita emission levels differ considerably between countries ranging from
2 tCO2eq./person in India to 25 tCO2eq./person in the USA (based on the EDGAR databasefor the three major greenhouse gases and including also emissions from forestry in 1995)(see also Table 3). The Annex I average is 15 tCO2eq./person, Non-Annex I 4 tCO2eq./person
and the global average is 6 tCO2eq./person.
A stabilization path was chosen as to reach 450 ppmv CO2, global total emissions would be+28% higher in 2020 than in 1990 (Figure 12).
The changes in emissions under this illustrative case are provided in Table 10. Under theseassumptions some Parties would be allowed to increase emissions from 2010 to 2020 (e.g.
Egypt, India, China and Malaysia), but all major developing countries would have to reduce
their emissions as of 2010 below the business as usual path. Only some smaller states inAfrica and Asia would be allowed to increase the emissions above business as usual. The
Philippines would be an example, where emissions would also be allowed to increase abovebusiness as usual mainly due to population growth. For most countries, the reductions would
result in an abrupt change in the emission trend.
Due to the low per capita emission level required to reach the stringent global goal, the possible transfer of easily earned emission allowances could be relatively low. Only a few countries
would receive more emission allowances than their business-as-usual path in 2020. Using theassumptions as described, the ‘demand’ of allowances (sum of differences between business-as-usual and target for countries that have to reduce emissions) could only be met in2020 to only around 30% to 10% by the ‘free supply’ (sum of the differences between target
and business-as-usual for countries that may increase emissions) for most business-as-usual
path. To the extremes, the demand could be met to 100% (B2) or 8% (A1FI).
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These results are sensitive to the fact that in this illustrative case the three major greenhousegases from all sectors were included. For most developing countries, emissions from forestry
as well as emissions of CH4 and N2O are significant. The average inhabitant of an Annex I
country in 2000 emitted 3.5 times more CO2, CH4 and N2O together, but 6 times more CO2than an average inhabitant of a Non-Annex I country. Additional sensitivity is due to the
choice of the business-as-usual path. Such choice has an influence on the statement whether
developing countries would need to reduce emissions below their respective business-asusual path. The calculation methodology applied here is based on a middle range scenario fora large group of countries. The path of individual countries could differ significantly from thepath used here. Under the different IPCC SRES scenarios, Annex I countries have to reduce
emissions between 76% and 81% of the 1990 level by 2020.
50 000 000

Non-Annex I

45 000 000

Annex I

Global emissions (Gg CO2eq)40 000 000
35 000 000
30 000 000
25 000 000
20 000 000
15 000 000
10 000 000
5 000 000

2 100

2 090

2 080

2 070

2 060

2 050

2 040

2 030

2 020

2 010

2 000

1 995

1 990

0

Tim e (years)

Figure 12: Global emissions under ‘contraction and convergence’

Emissions per capita (tCO2eq./person)

30
Annex I
25

Global total
Non-Annex I

20
15
10
5
0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100

Figure 13: Converging per capita emissions under the ‘contraction and convergence’42

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6.4.3 Assessment with respect to the criteria
Environmental criteria
Environmental effectiveness: This illustrative case would include all countries as of 2010.
By choosing the stabilisation path, stringent concentration levels could be reached such as
450 - 550 ppmv CO2. There would be certainty over the level of allowed global emission.
However, this approach would imply abrupt changes in the emission trend of many Parties,
including major developing countries. Leakage would be avoided since all countries would
participate.
Encouragement of early action: Since ultimately all countries are required to reach equal
per-capita emission levels, early action before 2010 is rewarded since less reductions will benecessary. This approach is one of the few that encourages early action.
Political criteria
Equity principles: The principle of allowing economic growth (need) is covered for the least
developed countries. These countries can increase emissions and could even sell unused
emission allowances. Most developing countries and all developed countries would be restricted in their path of emissions as of 2010. The principle of capability (ability to pay) is not
explicitly addressed. The principle of responsibility (polluter pays) is addressed partly throughthe fact that those countries that have higher emission levels must reduce emissions more.
The historic responsibility of countries is however not taken into account. A newly industrialized country with currently high per capita emissions (e.g. South Korea) has to reduce emissions by the same amount as an industrialized country with the similar level of per capita
emissions (e.g. France).
Agreement with fundamental positions of major constituencies: Most developing countries have clearly indicated their preference for the convergence of per capita emissions. The
G77 and China has succeeded to introduce related language in the Marrakech Accords in thecontext of the use of the mechanisms: “reducing emissions in a manner conducive to narrowing per capita differences between developed and developing country Parties”. However,some developed countries are strictly opposed to the concept of per-capita emissions. For
example, reporting emissions per capita in national communications was excluded from therequirements for the preparation of national communications upon request of those Parties.
Economic criteria
Accounting for structural differences between countries: The only criterion for the differentiation of targets would be the current level of per capita emissions. Since no other criteria
are considered, this approach is not considering all structural differences of countries.
Minimizing adverse economic effects: If emissions trading is allowed, marginal abatement
costs are comparable in all participating countries. As in the other cases, emission reductions
would occur where they can be obtained for a low price. Countries have low certainty of theinferred costs that are due to their targets. As in the previous cases, countries can reduce
emissions across sectors and gases and also outside of their territory.
Technical criteria
Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol: This illustrative
case of converging emissions could be built upon the structure agreed in the Kyoto Protocol.
All countries would participate with a certain emission limitation or reduction target.
Moderate political and technical requirements of the negotiation process: This approach
is simple and transparent and can be explained easily. Agreement on such an approach
would involve the decision on the convergence year and the convergence level (through a
global stabilization path), possibly also a decision on which gases and sectors to include. This
low number of decision would make it relatively easy to reach an agreement from a purely
process point of view. The current system of reporting and reviewing GHG inventories would
have to be expanded to all countries. In other approaches, it is possible that some countries,
e.g. least developed countries, do not have detailed reporting obligations. Under Contraction
and Convergence especially these countries would want to participate, because they would
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be allowed to sell emission rights. They would therefore have to fulfil detailed reporting requirements.
Conclusions
The contraction and convergence approach is intriguing due to the simplicity of the approach.
It also is one of the few approaches that encourage early action by countries that are not yet
part of the commitment regime. The simplicity of the approach is also the major disadvantage,that it does not account for the structural differences of countries and their ability to decrease
their emissions. For stabilization levels of 450 or 550 ppmv CO2, per-capita emissions have todecrease below the current world average and many developing countries would have to decrease emissions below their business as usual path. Only a few least developed countries
could sell for a short period of time easily earned emission allowances to developed countries.
6.5 GLOBAL TRIPTYCH
6.5.1 Description
As the next illustrative case, the Triptych approach is discussed as one example of those approaches that derive national targets based on sectoral considerations (bottom-up). Anotherexample of this type, the multi-sector convergence approach, is described in the following
section.
The Triptych approach is a method to share emission allowances among a group of countries.
The Triptych approach as such does not define, which countries should participate. It was
originally developed to share the emission allowances within the European Union. It has been
extended here to the global scale, bearing in mind that it could be applied to any group or
subgroup of countries.
In the Triptych approach, three broad categories of emissions are distinguished: The power
sector, the group of energy-intensive industries and the ‘domestic’ sectors. The selection ofthese categories is based on a number of differences in national circumstances raised in thenegotiations that are relevant to emissions and emission reduction potentials: differences instandard of living, in fuel mix for the generation of electricity, in economic structure and thecompetitiveness of internationally-oriented industries.
The emissions of these three categories are treated differently: For each of the categories areasonable emission allowances is calculated, in the light of the relevant national circumstances. The allowances of the categories are added up to a national allowance for eachcountry. Only one national target per country is proposed, no sectoral targets, to allow countries the flexibility to pursue any cost-effective emission reduction strategy.
In the power sector, CO2 emissions differ greatly from country to country due to large differences in the shares of nuclear power and renewables and in the fuel mix in fossil-fuel-fired
power plants. The potential for renewable energy is different for each country, as is the casefor the public acceptance of nuclear energy. To calculate the emission allowance for the
power sector of a country, assumptions about the future electricity generation is made (herefrom the WEC/IIASA scenarios, WEC 1995) and limits are set in how this electricity may begenerated: Minimum requirements are set for the share of renewables and combined heatand power in total electricity production, a limit is set for the allowed shares of solid and liquid
fossil fuels. Nuclear power in 2020 is allowed at the same share of as it occurred in 1990. The
resulting emissions are the limits of that country.
7

The activities of the internationally-oriented energy-intensive industry differ substantiallybetween countries. Countries with a high share of (heavy) industry will have relatively higher
7

According to the IPCC methodology emissions from electricity generation are attributed to the electricity-producing sector only, i.e. not to the sector consuming the electricity. For both the domestic sector
and the industry, therefore, only emissions due to use of fuel are included and not the emissions fromelectricity generation.

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CO2 emissions than countries that focus primarily on light industry or services, even if theemission reduction potential is relatively small. This sector includes the internationally oriented industry where competitiveness is determined by the costs of energy and of energy
efficiency improvements: building materials industry, chemical industry, iron & steel industry,
non-ferrous metals industry, pulp & paper industry, refineries, coke ovens, gasworks andother energy transformation industries (excluding electricity generation). To calculate a country’s emission allowance for this sector, physical production growth rates are used together
with annual efficiency improvement rates for each country (both derived from the rates distinguished for various regions in the WEC scenario, WEC 1995), taking into account potential
newcomers. The resulting emissions are used as the sectoral allowance for the industry sector.
The ‘domestic’ sectors comprise the residential sector, the commercial sector, transportation, light industry and agriculture. They are treated as one separate category for a number ofreasons. First, countries are assumed to be more homogeneous in these sectors. Second,emission reductions can be achieved by means of national measures. Third, emissions in thiscategory are assumed to be correlated with the number of people that live in dwellings, havea workplace, transport themselves, i.e. with population size. To calculate the emission allowance for the domestic sectors, it is assumed that in the long run emissions in the domestic
sectors will converge (in 2030) due to a convergence of the standard of living (e.g. number ofcars, number of appliances) and a reduction in existing differences in energy efficiency.
The emission allowances of the three categories are added to obtain one national target. It is
important to note that the targets are fixed before the commitment period based on assumptions about the production growth. Whether the assumed production growth really occurs is
not relevant.
In principle the Triptych approach is a mixture of basing emission rights on the current levels
and convergence of per capita emissions: For the power sector and the industrial sectors,
limits are introduced to improve the emissions per unit of production, while for the domestic
sectors, convergence is applied.
The approach is applied here to all major emitting countries. Emissions trading would be allowed among countries with emissions reduction targets. Targets would be of a legally binding nature.
6.5.2 Quantified results
The current analysis is a further elaboration of the work done by Phylipsen, Bode and Blok
(1998) for the burden sharing among EU Member States for 2010 and by Groenenberg,
Phylipsen and Blok (2001) for the burden sharing in 50 countries (Annex I and non-Annex I) in
2015.
The following assumptions have been made:•The triptych analysis only covers energy-related CO2 emissions, based on the same setof data as the first case ‘Continuing Kyoto’. Population data used are the same as in thethird case ‘per capita convergence‘ (from the UN population division as provided in WRI2000).

•

Production growth rates and energy efficiency improvement rates for the heavy industry(in physical terms) are not available from SRES scenarios, and are derived from (WEC,
1995). Growth figures are taken from the ‘ecologically driven scenario’, meaning lower
production growth rates and higher energy & material efficiency improvement rates are
assumed than in a business as usual development. Electricity production growth rates are
based on WEC/IIASA.

•

For the power sector, minimum requirements for renewable energy are set at 20% of2020 electricity generation, and for CHP at 30%. Coal and oil use for power generation islimited to 70% of 1990 levels.

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For the internationally-oriented energy-intensive industry, the efficiency improvements are derived from the rates distinguished for various regions in the WEC scenario(WEC 1995).

•

For the domestic sector, the per capita emissions are set to converge linearly until 2030
to the level of 3 t(CO2)/cap, i.e. 30% below the average per capita emissions in the EU in
1990.

•

The analysis includes all Annex I countries and all non-Annex I countries for which data
were available. For the countries not included in the analysis, a business as usual emission path has been assumed up to 2020.

Total Annex I CO2 emissions in the elaborated Triptych approach in 2020 are 34% below
1990 emissions. Non-Annex I emissions grow with to 230% compared to the 1990 level (forindividual country or region data, see Table 10). For the world as a whole, emissions increase
with 27% compared to 1990 levels.
For the given assumptions, the Triptych approach leads to substantial reductions from 1990
levels for the OECD countries (excluding Mexico). Even larger reductions are needed fromcountries with carbon intensive industries such as the Eastern European states and former
states of the Soviet Union. In contrast most developing countries would be able to increase
their emissions substantially. The fact that for some countries the allowance under Triptych ishigher than the business as usual path in Table 10 is due to the fact that the values for the
triptych approach includes only CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and are based on different
assumptions for production growth.
The sensitivity of the results is the largest for the assumption on future growth rates for electricity production and heavy industry. Further, the choice of the convergence year for the domestic sectors is important for the outcome.
6.5.3 Assessment with respect to the criteria
Environmental criteria
Environmental effectiveness: Depending on how the Triptych criteria are set, stringent
global emission goals can be reached. In the present analysis, with all major countries included, the emissions of the world as a whole are consistent with a stabilisation path, even if
CO2 from forestry and non-CO2 emissions develop according to business as usual. Similar
triptych criteria could be developed for CO2 emissions from forestry as well as CH4 and N2O
and other greenhouse gases (see also chapter 7.1).
Encouragement of early action: Early action in the domestic sectors is rewarded, since
emissions of these sectors will eventually converge and less reduction will be necessary toreach the per capita convergence level. For the power sector and the industrial sector, assigning targets based on future emission levels may be an incentive to increase emissions
until then to be granted a higher targets once participating.
Political criteria
Equity principles: The principle of allowing economic growth (need) is addressed in this approach. Countries are allowed to grow in terms of electricity production and industrial production, but have to improve their production efficiency. The targets are set in a way that they canbe reached with increasing implementation of energy efficient and renewable energy technology without prescribing reduction measures. The principle of capability (ability to pay) is not
explicitly addressed. The principle of responsibility (polluter pays) is addressed through thefact those countries that have higher emission levels in the domestic sector must reduce
emissions more. The historic responsibility of countries is not explicitly taken into account.
Agreement with fundamental positions of all major constituencies: Most developing
countries have clearly indicated their preference for the convergence of per capita emissions.
However, some developed countries are strictly opposed the concept of per capita emissions.
The combination of the convergence of the standard of living attractive to developing coun46

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tries (in the domestic sectors) with the flexibility for growing emissions (in industry and electricity production) could be attractive to many countries as a compromise solution.
Economic criteria
Accounting for structural differences between countries: Structural differences are taken
into account explicitly at a sector level. The differences in the standard of living, in future
population growth, in fuel mix for power generation, in the economic structure and energy efficiencies and projected future changes in economic structure are taken into account. A major
downside of the original Triptych approach is that the choice of sectors is based on the emissions structure of industrialised countries. For developing countries emissions of other sectors
and gases may be more important (see also section 7.1)
Minimizing adverse economic effects: Electricity production and industrial production may
grow, but efficiency has to be improved. This way, emission targets will largely be compatible
with the existing technical emission reduction potentials in the various countries. Allowing
emission trading introduces an additional degree of economic effectiveness, as for the othercases. Although based on sectoral considerations, a national target is provided instead ofseveral sectoral targets, to allow countries the flexibility to pursue cost-effective emission reduction strategies. Parties can reduce emissions across sectors and, if emission trading and
CDM is allowed, also outside of their territory.
Technical criteria
Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol: The Triptych
approach is essentially a method to differentiate emission targets among countries before acommitment period. As such it can be part of the structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.
Moderate political and technical requirements of the negotiation process: The Triptych
approach is relatively complex compared to some of the other approaches. The concept of
the Triptych approach can nevertheless be explained easily. Countries have to agree on the
Triptych criteria applicable to all countries, such as the convergence level of the domestic
sectors and changes in the fuels mix for electricity generation. Further, the approach requires
a set of scenarios, including expected growth rates of production in the various sectors. The
countries themselves could provide these. There is, however, the incentive to provide highgrowth scenarios. This problem could be overcome by applying adjustments after the commitment period, if the projected growth rate was considerably higher than the actual one orusing the actual production growth rate (see also performance targets, section 7.3). Once thetargets are defined, the requirements regarding verification of the implementation of the targets are the same as for the Kyoto Protocol.
Conclusions
The Triptych approach is a method to differentiate emission reductions among countries
based on technological considerations on the sector level. In its original form it is based on
the emission structure of developed countries and accommodate the emission profiles of developing countries to a lesser extent. Extension to include CH4 and N2O as well as land-use
emissions would improve the approach (see 7.3). Major downside of the approach is its complexity and the necessity of projections of production growth rates.
6.6 MULTI-SECTOR CONVERGENCE APPROACH
6.6.1 Description
The Multi-sector Convergence Approach by the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research Norway (CICERO) and the Energy Research Center of the Netherlands(ECN) (Jensen et al. 2001) is another approach that defines national targets based on sectoral considerations.
The approach provides a full set of rules for a commitment regime, based on the convergenceof sectoral per-capita emissions. It distinguishes seven sectors:
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Power
Industry
Transport
Households
Services
Agriculture
Waste

At the global level, sector emission standards, expressed in per capita terms, for a convergence year are developed starting with the global average in the base year and applying anannual mitigation rate to that standard.
Starting point for the determination of emission limitation target for each sector in a country is
its sector levels of per-capita emissions in the base year (2010). The per-capita sector emission levels for each country in intermediate target years are obtained by geometric interpolation between the actual national sector emission levels in the base year and the global sector
emission standards of the convergence year. Finally, these sector emission levels are added
up and multiplied by total population in order to determine national emission mitigation targets
for the countries and years concerned. This total target is relevant and not the separate sectoral targets.
Countries with relatively low per capita emission levels have the right to economic development without any emission limitation constraints up to some defined point, the so-called
graduation threshold. Low-emission countries with emissions exceeding the graduationthreshold in some future emission accounting (budget) period are granted a pre-set adjustment period. After this period has lapsed, they are due to take on commitments to meet thetargets consistent with the above rules. More country-specific elements, such as countryspecific emission factors or population density can be included if desired.
6.6.2 Quantified results
Based on the model that is provided by CICERO/ECN on their web site, we provide someexample calculations. For this analysis, the annual mitigation standards per sector have been
set such as to lead to a level of 450 ppmv (according to the model corresponding to an emission level of 33% above 1990 levels in 2020). The convergence year is set at 2050, and theadjustment period for newly participating countries has been set at 5 years. Table 5 provides
the mitigation rate applied to the global average in the base year to derive the global emission
standard in the convergence year (the knobs to tune the model). Table 10 provides the resultsof allowed emissions under these assumptions for the multi sector convergence approach(fluorinated gases and forestry emissions are not included).
Table 5. Mitigation rate applied to the global average in the base year to derive theglobal emission standard in the convergence year
SectorPower
Industry
Transport
Households
Services
Agriculture
Waste

Convergence rate (%/yr)
-6%
-5%
-3%
-4%
-3%
-3%
-4%

6.6.3 Assessment with respect to the criteria
Environmental criteria
Environmental effectiveness: The multi-sector convergence approach defines nationalemission limits based on a global stabilization goal. Accordingly, stringent global emission
goals can be reached.
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Encouragement of early action: Early action in the sectors is rewarded, since emissions ofthese sectors will eventually converge and less reduction will be necessary to reach the percapita convergence level.
Political criteria
Equity principles: The principle of allowing economic growth (need) is addressed in this approach, since countries only participate if they have reached a certain graduation level (defined in terms of emissions per capita). The principle of capability (ability to pay) is not explicitly addressed. The principle of responsibility (polluter pays) is addressed through the graduation criteria based on per-capita emissions and the fact those countries that have higher
emission levels must reduce emissions more. The historic responsibility of countries is nottaken into account.
Agreement with fundamental positions of all major constituencies: Most developing
countries have clearly indicated their preference for the convergence of per capita emissions.
However, some developed countries are strictly opposed the concept of per capita emissions.
Economic criteria
Accounting for structural differences between countries: For all countries, per capita
emissions of the different sectors have to converge. This neglects however, that some countries have more industrial activity of a certain kind per inhabitant than other countries. For individual countries the sectoral targets may be stringent or loose, depending on the national
circumstances and the share of the industrial activity per inhabitant. However, detailed rules
for adjustments for specific national circumstances are provided in the approach.
Minimizing adverse economic effects: Although based on sectoral considerations, a national target is provided instead of several sectoral targets, to allow countries the flexibility to
pursue cost-effective emission reduction strategies. If emissions trading is allowed, marginal
abatement costs are comparable in all participating countries. Parties can reduce emissions
across sectors and, if emission trading and CDM is allowed, also outside of their territory.
Technical requirements
Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol: The multisector convergence approach can be built upon the current structure of the UNFCCC and the
Kyoto Protocol.
Moderate political and technical requirements of the negotiation process: The multisector convergence approach is relatively complex compared to some of other approaches.
Especially the detailed rules for the exceptions are difficult. The essence of the approach is,
however, explained easily. The establishment of the targets does not require large amounts ofdata. Once the targets are defined, the requirements regarding verification of the implementation of the targets are the same as for the Kyoto Protocol.
Conclusions
The multi-sector convergence approach describes a full system of future targets in all thenecessary detail. In essence, it is describing on which path per-capita emissions converge. A
major downside of the approach is that it uses per-capita emissions at a sectoral level for different industrial and agricultural activities, while these activities may not be directly related topopulation.
6.7 MULTISTAGE APPROACH (FAIR)
6.7.1 Description
Several approaches can be found in the literature that are based on the increasing participation of countries in the commitment regime. One of the most sophisticated is the multistage
approach by den Elzen et al. (1999, 2001) using the FAIR model. This approach is a combination of several of the approaches described above.
In the multistage approach, countries participate in the commitment regime in several stages:
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No commitments: Countries follow the business as usual path•

Decarbonization: Countries receive GHG intensity targets (emissions per unit of GDP)differentiated per GDP per capita level•

Stabilization: Countries are required to stabilize their absolute emissions•

Reduction: Countries are required to reduce their absolute emissions.

Countries graduate into these stages if they exceed a certain threshold, e.g. GDP per capita.
Each 5-year period the system is reviewed and countries can graduate into the next step.
A global emission ceiling for each 5-year step is chosen as to ensure the stabilization of CO2
emissions at a certain level. Countries in the first three stages follow their path as defined inthose stages. The remaining global emission allowances (difference between the global
emission ceiling and the emissions of countries in stages 1 to 3) are shared among the countries in the ‘reduction’ stage. The extent of the individual reductions can be shared among the
reducing countries according several ‘differentiation keys’ such as the contribution to total
emissions or the contribution to the temperature increase (see the Brazilian proposal).
As for the other approaches, emissions trading would be allowed among countries with emissions reduction targets. CDM would be a means for countries to participate that do not haveemission reduction targets. The targets would be legally binding.
6.7.2 Quantified results
For this illustrative case, we use the individual country data as for the previous illustrative
cases (see Table 10) and not the FAIR model itself. The Fair model is publicly available but
only provides aggregated data for 17 world regions.
As we consider here only emissions until 2020, we model only the first step of this approach:
We assume that, until 2010, emissions of Annex I Parties develop according to their Kyoto
targets and emissions of Non-Annex I Parties follow the business as usual path. A stabilization path is chosen, which results in global emission levels for 2020 which are at +28% compared to 1990 levels as in the other cases. From 2010 onwards, all Non-Annex I Parties receive a GHG intensity reduction target of -3% annually until 2020. The remaining available
emission allowances are shared among Annex I countries according to their relative contribution to current emissions, i.e. all Annex I countries reduce emissions at the same percentage
rate.
An important element of the multistage approach is that the emission allowances of the reducing countries (in stage 4) are dependant on the emissions of all other countries: The reducing
countries share the emission allowances that remain, taking the global emission limit minus
the emissions of the countries at stage 1 to 3. Accordingly, if emissions of these other countries are relatively high, only limited or even no emissions are left for the reducing countries(in stage 4).
In this illustrative case, the parameters have to be set in a way, so that a reasonable amountof allowances are available for the reducing countries (here Annex I): For that it is necessary
that, all countries automatically graduate to step 2 and receive a GHG intensity reduction target of relatively high 3% per year, which for most countries is more stringent than business as
usual. If another SRES scenario is used (such as the A1B scenario with higher economic
growth), a GHG intensity reduction target of 5% for those countries would have resulted insimilar emission limits for the reducing countries (here Annex I).
The range of the business-as-usual decline in the greenhouse gas intensity is wide, as already noted for the illustrative case for intensity targets.
Under the given assumptions, all Non-Annex I countries participate as of 2010 but in total with
only a minor reduction. To reach the global emission limit of +28% above 1990 levels in 2020,
the Annex I countries, therefore, have to reduce emissions to a large extent. The exact ratioof the effort of Annex I countries and Non-Annex I countries depends on the parameters,
which have to be chosen carefully, as well as on the underlying business as usual scenario.
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6.7.3 Assessment according to the criteria
Environmental criteria
Environmental effectiveness: By agreeing on the absolute level of global emission for every
5-year step, stringent global stabilization levels could be reached such as 450 - 550 ppmv
CO2. These stringent paths could, however, only be reached together with early graduationand stringent GHG intensity targets at stage 2, otherwise no emissions are available for the‘reducing’ Parties. If the GHG intensity targets for the countries in stage 2 are set lower thanthe business-as-usual development, ‘hot air’ could be introduced. Leakage would be avoided
since all countries would participate.
Encouragement of early action: This approach also assigns targets based on the emission
levels of 2010 or later, which is an incentive to increase emissions to be granted a higher targets once participating. However the approach is flexible to also define a threshold of per capita emissions to graduate into a next stage instead of a threshold based on per capita income,which would be an incentive to encourage early action.
Political criteria
Equity principles: The principle of promoting sustainable development and allowing economic growth is covered for those countries that are in a low state of development. Rapidly
developing countries would be restricted in their path of emissions as of 2010 with an intensity
target. The principle of capability (ability to pay) is included through the threshold when countries participate in the regime. The principle of responsibility (polluter pays) is addressed
through the choice of the differentiation key, i.e. the distribution of the required reductions
among the reducing countries. The historic responsibility of countries can also be incorporated into this differentiation key.
Agreement with fundamental positions of major constituencies: The notion of countries
gradually phasing into a reduction regime would seem to be acceptable to many countries. In
order to reach stringent target, all major countries would have to participate as of 2010 with
GHG intensity targets. This may be unacceptable to some developing countries.
Economic criteria
Accounting for structural differences between countries: The national circumstances canbe accommodated at several places in the multistage approach. The threshold for participation can be differentiated according to income or other criteria. The reductions in stages 2 to 4
can be differentiated, taking into account the structural differences.
Minimizing adverse economic effects: Emissions trading can ensure – as in other approaches – that marginal abatement costs are comparable in all participating countries. The
participating countries have low certainty of the inferred costs that are due to the targets thatthey need to comply with. As for the other approaches, countries can reduce emissions
across sectors and gases and also outside of their territory.
Technical criteria
Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol: The multi stage
approach can be built upon the structure agreed in the Kyoto Protocol: The notion of gradually
increasing the group of countries that reduce emissions is built into the Convention. It is a
step-by-step approach, but at the same time has the long-term perspective through the definition of a global stabilization path.
Moderate technical and political requirements of the negotiation process: This approachcombines many ideas into one system. The operationalization of such system would require
several decisions on the thresholds and on the global reduction targets. Setting generic rules
such as the global emission ceiling and participation thresholds for all countries could be considered difficult but possible. These rules would, however, have to be updated regularly as toensure that the agreed global reduction path is met. If the multistage approach makes use of
the GDP as an indicator for when countries participate, questions would arise on the calculation of the GDP, such as the use of local currency, based on exchange rates or on purchasepower parities as well as its review. As for other approaches, emissions have to be calculated, reviewed and verified due to the legally binding nature of the targets. While such proc51

ECOFYS

Evolution of commitments / DM 754

ess is in development or operation for Annex I Parties, it would have to be broadened to include all Parties as of stage 2.
Conclusions
Since the multistage approach can combine many ideas, it could be a framework for a compromise. Discussion on the threshold for moving into a next step or the exact emission targets
would have to be agreed, but the general concept of several stages seems promising.
6.8 EQUAL MITIGATION COST
6.8.1 Description
The following illustrative case describes the allocation of emission reductions so that all Parties have the same economic burden of mitigating climate change. It could also be extended
to include mitigation and adaptation costs, although calculating the costs of adaptation would
be even more difficult than calculating the costs of mitigation. Such concept could be implemented in various ways, e.g. choosing emission reduction targets so that all participating
countries have the same percentage reduction in GDP (see e.g. Babiker & Eckaus 2000).
Assuming that such an approach would be chosen, countries would have to agree on a modelthat would calculate the inferred cost of reduction targets ex-ante. Targets for absolute emissions in the commitment period would be chosen and fixed before the commitment period, ina manner that the economic burden is the same for all participating countries. These targets
would be binding, even if experience in the commitment period would show that the real cost
would be different than those calculated ex-ante. Or they could be adjusted taking into account the real developments.
For this case we assume that after 2010 all countries participate. Emissions trading would beallowed; targets would be legally binding. For this illustrative case, no attempts were made inthis study to provide quantitative results.
6.8.2 Assessment with respect to the criteria
Environmental criteria
Environmental effectiveness: Depending on the individual target chosen, it would be possible that stringent overall targets are reached. Possibly, some countries could agree to more
stringent targets than with other approaches if the costs are distributed fairly, knowing that all
countries have a comparable economic burden and no competitive advantage.
Encouragement of early action: Early action would not be rewarded: Targets would bebased on the emission levels when the country starts to participate. Any action that has takenplace before the point of participation would not be counted as economic burden and would
therefore be to the disadvantage of the country.
Political criteria
Equity principles: Under this approach, all countries would be limited in their economic
growth. The concept of need would be violated if all countries (rich and poor) have the same
economic burden. Only if the costs of adaptation to the effects of climate change are included,
this approach would cover the full costs. The principle of capability (ability to pay) would only
be included, if the economic burden is defined as reduction related to the GDP, assigninghigher cost to those countries with higher GDP, i.e. a progressive reduction rate. The principleof responsibility (polluter pays) is not addressed, if not violated for some countries: Countries
with large inexpensive reduction potential (many developing countries) would have to reduce
emissions substantially. The historic responsibility of countries is not considered.
Agreement with fundamental positions of all major constituencies: Parties differ in how
they view the problem of climate change: Some Parties view it primarily as an economic problem to be dealt with in an economic way, while other Parties focus on the environmental as52

ECOFYS

Evolution of commitments / DM 754

pects. This fundamental difference in view could make it difficult for some Parties to agree on
the concept of equal cost.
Economic criteria
Accounting for structural differences between countries: The model, with which the inferred costs are calculated, would take into account the structural differences of countries,
depending on the amount of detail included in the model. The specific emission structure andreduction potentials and related costs would be considered.
Minimizing adverse economic effects: It is the aim of the approach to minimize global costs
and to share these costs equally among countries. Countries would have high certainty of theinferred costs that are due to their targets. In addition, as for other approaches, emissions
trading will ensure that marginal abatement costs are really comparable in all participating
countries. As for the other approaches, countries can reduce emissions across sectors andgases and also outside of their territory.
Technical criteria
Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol: This approach
could be built upon the structure agreed in the Kyoto Protocol, agreeing that all countries participate and agreeing on emission reduction targets for all countries according to the calculations of the inferred costs.
Moderate technical and political requirements of the negotiation process: This approach
would be based on the assumption that the economic burden of reduction targets can be calculated in a way that satisfies all involved Parties. All countries would have to agree on amethod to calculate costs, on a detailed model for the calculations. An extensive review process would have to support such a process. The amount of negotiation time would be consid8
erably high with uncertainty whether agreement could be reached at all.
Conclusions
In summary, the approach of assigning targets based on equal cost seems to be a powerfulsolution at first sight, but the difficulties in overcoming the technical requirements for its implementation make it a rather theoretical approach.
6.9 COORDINATED POLICIES AND MEASURES
6.9.1 Description
In this illustrative case we assume that all Parties agree on a set of coordinated policies anmeasures that have to be implemented by all Parties. Several studies discuss the effectiveness of policies and measures (e.g. Grubb 2001) and mostly conclude that “coordinated actions among countries and sectors may help to reduce mitigation cost, address competitiveness concerns, potential conflicts with international trade rules, and carbon leakage” (IPCC
2001c, SPM).
Such coordinated portfolio of measures could include the following elements:
Coordinated fiscal measures: Energy or carbon taxes are a matter of international discussion, some countries have already implemented such taxes on the national level. Since taxes
influence the competitiveness of companies active on the international market, coordination
would make the implementation more effective and acceptable.
Coordinated efficiency standards: Emission efficiency standards (emissions per kWh electricity, per tonne of steel, per vehicle-km, per number of cattle) could impose a climate rele8

One example of an international negotiation process agreeing on a complex model for the assigning
targets is the RAINS model. This model is used as a basis within UNECE to set national targets foremissions of trans-boundary air pollutants such as NOx or SO2.

53

Evolution of commitments / DM 754

ECOFYS

vant constraint without limiting economic development. These standards, if internationallyagreed, could also reduce trade barriers.
As alternative to the prescribed coordinated measures, a list of ‘good practice’ examples
could be provided as menu for developing countries. This would provide for flexibility on theside of the implementing country.
We here discuss this option of coordinated policies and measures in isolation from otherforms or commitments such as emission limitation or reduction targets, although both could
be implemented in parallel.
6.9.2 Quantification of results
In this section, we illustrate possible implications of such polices at the example of coordinated efficiency standards for electricity generation. A ‘best practice’ emission standard isderived from technology information. Subsequently, the difference between the current average of countries and the standard is calculated.
The assumptions used for the calculations are as follows:•

Data on electricity generation by fuel type and the associated emissions have been takenfrom (ECOFYS 2002). For countries for which no data were available, data were derived
from the World Energy Outlook (IEA 2000). For South Korea data are from (Phylipsen
2000).

•

Best practice efficiency for coal-fired power plants and gas-fired power plants is assumed
to be 45% and 57% respectively (Phylipsen et al., 2000).

Table 6 shows the results for the analysis for best practice standards for coal-fired power
plants and gas-fired power plants. The resulting CO2 intensity of electricity generation (CO2emissions per kWh of electricity generated), distinguishing between coal and gas, are shown
compared to the best practice technology (=100%).
Table 6. Difference of the CO2 emissions per kWh of electricity generated compared tothe best practice efficiency standards (=100%) for several countries or groups
CoalElectricity
Electricity CO2 emis- Emission
Comparisions
factorproduced
produced
son toBAT
GWh
Gg
kg/kWhGWh
USAEuropean Union
Japan
Eastern Europe(Annex I)
Russian Federation
Rest of Annex I
TurkeyBrazilLatin America
AfricaMiddle East
China
India
South Korea

Gas
CO2
Emisemission
sions
factorGg

kg/kWhComparison
to BAT

Source1733592756473
185242

1636511666120173757

0.94
0.88
0.94

126%
117%
125%

581950341645172496320654
127852
74346

0.55
0.37
0.43

156%
106%
122%

-

-

-

-

115578

62487

0.54

153%

267175
33744
5000
39000
20400025000
863000339000256090
41437
6000
38000
19400021000
1035000
400000

0.96
1.23
1.20
0.97
0.95
0.84
1.20
1.18

127%
163%
160%
130%
126%
112%
159%
157%

76093
25427
85000
59000
159000
7000
28000

31975
11112
52000
38000
80000
4000
14000

0.42
0.44
0.61
0.64
0.50
0.57
0.50

77247

68546

0.89

118%

43063

20410

0.47

119%
124%
173%
182% WEO for
1997
142%
162%
141%
Phylipsen
134%
2000

From Table 6 it can be observed, that the efficiency in electricity production, in CO2 emissions
per kWh produced, differs substantially among countries. Data quality differs widely among
54

ECOFYSECOFYS

Evolution of commitments / DM 754

countries and regions and complete consistent datasets are not available. It can, however, be
concluded that not all developing countries have low standards. The efficiency for coal fired
power plants in South Korea and Middle East is in the range of that of the USA and Western
Europe. No examined country fulfills the best practice standard.
In order to calculate the effect on absolute national emissions of a coordinated measure that
requires implementation the best practice technology, not only total electricity generation by
fuel type would be needed, but also the expected growth rates by fuel type for each region,
compared to a business as usual development. This calculation is not provided here.
6.9.3 Assessment with respect to the criteria
Environmental criteria
Environmental effectiveness: For this illustrative case specific policies and measures would
be implemented but no absolute cap would be set on emissions. It is uncertain whether aglobal emission goal could be reached. Requirements on the relative emissions (e.g. per kWhelectricity) are set through e.g. the implementation of efficiency standards. The environmental
effectiveness of this illustrative case has to be ensured by designing a comprehensive package of policies to avoid unconstrained emission growth in some sectors.
Encouragement of early action: Action taken before an official commitment would be rewarded once policies and measures would have to be implemented. Assigning targets basedon energy efficiency standards, for example, rewards early action, since such early action
reduces the distance between the actual standard and the best practice emission level.
Political criteria
Equity principles: The principle of allowing economic growth to satisfy basic human needs isaddressed in this approach. The efficiency standards, e.g., result in the implementation ofmodern technology (if standards are set sufficiently stringent) and do not constrain the absolute production. The absence of absolute emission caps leaves room for economic growth.
The principle of capability (ability to pay) is not addressed. The principle of responsibility (polluter pays) is addressed to some extent, since countries with high relative emissions have to
reduce more than countries with low relative emissions levels. The historical responsibility ishowever not taken into account.
Agreement with fundamental positions of major constituencies: During the negotiations
the EU has always labored for including specific policies and measures. The USA has been
one of the strongest opponents on this issue. The implementation of policies and measures
could be a promising approach acceptable to developing countries. Although currently major
developing countries work against any policies and measures for Non-Annex I countries, suchapproach could be attractive to developing countries in the future, since it reduces emissions
without compromising the room to grow.
Economic criteria
Accounting for structural differences between countries: The implemented policies andmeasures generally focus on specific sectors therefore take into account structural differences between countries. In this regard, it makes a difference whether an efficiency target isset for e.g. the electricity sector as a whole, or for gas-fired and coal-fired power plants separately, as is done here. In the latter case, structural differences are accounted for. The emission structure or reduction potential is explicitly considered. On the other hand, certain prescribed policies may be effective for one country, but may be ineffective for another country oreven seen as inappropriate. For a full policies and measures regime, a balanced portfolio has
to be designed to account for structural differences between countries.
Minimizing adverse economic effects: For emission standards, the burden on the countries
depends on their currently implemented standard and may differ substantially. Therefore
marginal costs may vary between countries. Emissions trading could not be applied to equalize marginal abatement costs. The absence of an absolute cap on emissions provides flexibility to countries and room to grow. However, there is no flexibility to reduce emissions in othersectors through the implementation of other measures than those that are prescribed.
55

ECOFYS

Evolution of commitments / DM 754

Technical criteria
Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol: The implementationof policies and measures to limit the emissions of greenhouse gases is required according to
the Convention, for Annex I countries as well as non-Annex I countries. The structure or binding emission limitation or reduction targets and associated possibility of emissions trading as
introduced by the Kyoto Protocol would not have to be maintained.
Moderate technical and political requirements of the negotiation process: For a full policies and measures regime, countries would have to agree on a large balanced portfolio of
measures. For example, efficiency standards would have to be agreed for a large variety of
sectors. Other policies such as taxes would have to be agreed. This large number of decisions could be difficult to handle by the negotiation process. In addition, the effectiveness ofthe policies and measures would need to be assessed. In the assessment of the energy efficiency, a number of issues would need to be settled, e.g. corrections for heat extraction (for
CHP and district heating) and corrections for the regional climate. In addition, statistics would
need to be sufficiently reliable. Substantial technical work would be needed.
Conclusions
Coordinated policies and measures can be applied to supplement an emission limitation regime. Given the current regime it seems unlikely that policies and measures would be applied
as the only form of commitment.
6.10 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMPARISON OF APPROACHESAs a full set of conclusions on the comparison of all different approaches is contained in chapter 8, this section only contains some preliminary conclusions, that have lead to the selectionof the new approaches described in chapter 7:
None of the approaches considered so far accounts for structural differences between countries in a satisfactory manner, differentiating commitments within a group of countries poses a
problem. Of the considered approaches, the Triptych approach considers the national circumstances to the largest extent, but applied in its original form on developing countries, this approach has also some shortcomings.
Approaches that combine several ideas can accommodate many aspects and have a higher
chance of being accepted since all constituencies find elements of their concern in the mixed
approach. Accordingly, the scores for mixed approaches under equity are relatively high. A
key for a potentially successful regime could therefore be that it provides a well-balanced mix
of approaches.
Providing opportunities for economic growth instead of capping it is a major concern of developing countries when considering targets. Of the considered approaches, only intensity targets are usually seen as providing such flexibility. Other creative ways need to be developed
to make targets cap emissions but not growth.
Further, not many approaches encourage early action. For the considered approaches, only
converging per capita emissions and the policies and measures approach provide an advantage to those countries that have acted before they had commitments.
As the main problems are the lack of solutions for differentiation, a need for a good mix ofapproaches and the need for acceptable targets that allow economic growth, we further
elaborate in the next section an extended global Triptych approach, a new multistage approach and ‘performance targets’.

56Evolution of commitments / DM 754

ECOFYS

7.

NEW APPROACHES

The previous sections have shown that there are quite a number of approaches to futurecommitments available, some more, some less comprehensively developed, all with advantages and disadvantages. In this chapter, additional new ideas are presented, how some ofthose proposals could be modified to increase their effectiveness and acceptability. These
include an extended Triptych approach, further discussion on a staged approach, and the
new concept of ‘performance targets’.
7.1 EXTENDED GLOBAL TRIPTYCH
The original triptych approach was developed to share emission reductions between members of the European Union. The Triptych approach therefore builds upon the emissions
structure of those countries and does not include emissions of CH4 and N2O as well as CO2
emissions from forestry. For developing countries, however, these emissions are of higher
relevance than for developed countries. We have therefore adapted the Triptych approach toalso include these gases and sectors.
7.1.1 Description
For the power sector, the energy intensive industry and the domestic sectors, the approachhas been applied unchanged as described in chapter 6.5. In addition, the following new categories were added:
Emissions of CH4 and N2O from the energy sector are assumed to be proportional to energy consumption. Therefore, we have assumed the same changes in emissions as calculated for CO2 emissions from energy for each country in the original Triptych approach.
Emissions from industry (CO2, CH4 and N2O) and CO2 emissions from the “non-energyuse” category are assumed to be proportional to the growth in production in the industrial sectors. Emissions from industry are therefore assumed to grow with the same rates as assumed
in the original Triptych approach for industrial production.
Emissions from agriculture include CH4 emissions from animals, animal waste, rice production, agricultural waste burning and savanna burning as well as N2O emissions from fertilizer
use, animal waste management, agricultural waste burning and savanna burning. One option
would be to let emission may grow in relation to production indicators for e.g. meat, rice, etc,
and then reduced according to a certain technical emission reduction percentage. This acknowledges the differences in economic structure within the agricultural sector. At this moment we do not have the data to do so for all countries. However, Groenenberg (2002) madesuch an analysis at the regional level using 17 regions. She also assessed the technical reduction potentials for each of the different categories of emissions. Based on these analyses,
she concluded that the growth in activity would be outweighed by the effect of the reduction
measures, leading to a stabilization of the emissions from these categories. Therefore, wehave assumed a stabilization of agricultural emissions at the 1990 levels.
9

Emissions from forestry include CO2 emissions from deforestation. We have assumed parcapita emissions from forestry to converge in 2050 to a level of zero, assuming that by thattime, forest cut down or burnt will be replaced (somewhere within the country) by new forests.
Assuming that emissions per capita converge to zero allows countries with high population
10
growth to reduce emissions at a later date.

9

Net emissions from the IPCC source category “land-use change and forestry” should ideally be used,
including afforestation, reforestation and deforestation and emissions from soils. These were however
not available.

10

Due to high population growth assumed, Persian Gulf states may even increase forestry emissions
between 1990 and 2020.

57

Evolution of commitments / DM 754

ECOFYS

Emissions from waste (landfill sites, wastewater treatment) are assumed to be proportional
to population size. Therefore a per-capita convergence approach is used, assuming a reduction of emission per capita through the implementation of technical measures. Convergenceof per-capita emissions will occur in the year 2030.
7.1.2 Quantification of results
Table 7 includes the relative changes in emissions under the original Triptych approach (CO2from energy use in the power, industrial and domestic sectors), as well as the additional sectors. Comparing the first and the last column one can observe that including the additional
sectors with the given assumptions decreases the relative change in emissions between 1990
and 2020. Non-Annex I countries as a group can under this approach increase emissions ofCO2, CH4 and N2O less as they could increase CO2 emissions under the original Triptych approach.
Table 7. Changes in emissions between 1990 and 2020 under the extended global Triptych approach
Original Triptych(CO2 from energy
only)
1990

Industry

Agriculture

Deforestation%

Mt CO2eq%

Mt CO2eq%

Mt CO2eq

3655 65%2232 70%
793 75%1035 68%825 44%598 75%272 199%
123 49%162 166%
662 203%

509
128
20
220
504
88
4
31
13
14

332 65%83 65%
15 75%
152 69%224 44%70 80%
9 199%
15 49%
21 166%41 303%

194
297
90
70
64
50
15
4.5
4.9
49

172 88%
246 83%75 84%
56 79%
47 74%
43 86%
23 154%
3.0 67%
8.5 172%
77 157%

457
454
23
237
213
295
61
46
126
393

457
454
23
237
213
295
61
46
126
393

303

531 175%27

47 175%27

41 150%110

110 100%

35

299

343 115%29

33 115%17

27 161%40

40 100%

169
198
2373
604
155
238
60

238
310
5614
3371
728
229
115

141%
157%
237%
558%
469%
96%
192%

50
50
312
105
75
8
13

71 141%78 157%738 237%
585 558%
353 469%
7 96%
25 192%17
23 135%11
16 142%
113 183 162%30
48 160%25
35 140%23
37 164%
7.9 11.0 140%

10
65
898
637
122
18
10

10
65
898
637
122
18
10

42 123%
234 248%0
40 123%
10 248%2.2
116653 201% 1016 2045 201%

-

3304

%

Mt CO2eq

5605
3204
1057
1521
1859
801
137
251
97
218

34
94

Waste

Total

2020 Change 1990 2020 Change 1990 2020 Change 1990 2020 Change 1990 2020 Change1990 2020 Change Change

Mt CO2eq
USA
EU
JPN
EEU
RUS
RAI
TUR
REE
ARG
BRA
COL
MEX
VEN
RLA
EGY
ZAF
NGA
RNA
RAS
GLF
RME
CHN
IND
IDN
KOR
MYS
PHL
SGP
THA
RAS
ROW

CH4 and N2Ofrom energy%

Mt CO2eq

%

230
104
31
33
52
41
5
2.5
10
45

110 48% 68%
71 69% 74%
23 73% 76%
25 78% 72%
29 57% 50%
23 55% 81%
12 237% 169%
2.8 110% 57%
9 89% 124%
41 92% 130%

26 75%

28

26

93% 147%8.9

5.8 66%8.2

8.1

99% 114%

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

0.6
7.2
127
102
218
1.5
93

0.7 114%
5.7 79%80 63%
76 75%
156 72%
0.9 60%76 82%

2.7
9
129
117
27
10
2.7

6.0
15
218
198
42
9
4.7

223%
155%
169%
170%
153%
97%
174%

2.9 133% 0.10 0.10 100%
17 152%73
73 100%43

27 64%

0.6
8

0.7 116% 123%
11 143% 160%

-

-

-

-

-

-

100%
29
18 62%
100% 7.0 3.6 52%
100% 2.0 1.0 50%
100% 4.8 2.2 45%
100% 9.0 4.3 47%
100% 1.8 1.1 63%
100%
100% 0.11 0.06 52%100%
28
19 70%
100% 465 330 71%

-

-

53
Annex I 14184 9410 66% 1473 885 60% 780 661 85% 1740 1740 100%
Non
8397 19353 230% 1745 4069 233% 342 530 155% 2547 2547 100% 1129
Annex I
Global22582 28763 127% 3218 4953 154% 1123 1191 106% 4286 4286 100% 1182
total

-

-

140%
144%
196%
308%
231%
101%
130%

- 180%

30 56%

496

295

805 71%

399

591 148% 192%

835 71%

895

886

58

59%

70%

99% 123%

ECOFYS

Evolution of commitments / DM 754

7.1.3 Assessment according to the criteria
The approach has not been modified except emissions of CH4 and N2O as well as CO2 emissions from forestry were included. The assessment is therefore largely the same as describedin chapter 6.5. Only the structural differences are better accounted for in this extended global
Triptych:
Structural differences are taken into account explicitly at a sector level. The differences in thestandard of living, in future population growth, in fuel mix for power generation, in the economic structure and energy efficiencies and projected future changes in economic structure
are taken into account. In addition, the emissions of CH4 and N2O as well as CO2 emissions
from forestry are considered, therefore covering all major emission sectors of developing anddeveloped countries.
In conclusion, the Triptych approach is a method to differentiate emission reductions among
countries based on technological considerations on the sector level. In its extended form it
accommodates the emission profiles of developed and developing countries to a better extent. Major downside of the approach is still its complexity and the necessity of projections of
production growth rates.
7.2 NEW MULTISTAGE: FIRST SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT THEN EMISSION
LIMITSThis section further elaborates on the idea that countries participate in climate commitments
in several stages. Currently there are the stages Annex I, with quantified commitments, and
Non-Annex I, with a general commitment but without quantified commitments. Several approaches with additional steps were proposed.
For example, the FAIR model (see section 5.1.2 and 6.6) implements four stages: No commitments, decarbonization, stabilization and reduction. In this case, the commitments for all
stages are defined in a quantitative way as intensity targets, absolute stabilization targets orabsolute reduction targets.
Alternatively – and that is what we analyze in this section – the first commitment of a newly
entering country could be a ‘soft’ commitment such as the pledge to phase out inefficientequipment or the clear commitment to sustainable development (see also WRI 2002). Thisway, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ commitments are combined in one approach.
7.2.1 Description
For this staged approach, we assume the following stages:•

Stage 1- No commitments: Countries with low level of development do not have climate
commitments. At least all least developed countries would be in this stage. (Representation of this stage in a model: countries follow their business as usual path according to
IPCC SRES A2 scenario)•

Stage 2 - Pledge for sustainable development: Countries with higher level of emissions
per capita commit in a clear way to sustainable development. The environmental objectives should be built into the development policies. Requirements for such a sustainable
pathway could be defined, e.g., that inefficient equipment is phased out and requirements
and certain standards are met for any new equipment or a clear deviation from the current policies depending on the countries. The implementation of such sustainable development pathway has to be monitored and verified. The additional cost could be born by
the country itself or by the countries in stage 4. (Representation of this stage in a model:
countries follow their emission path according to the sustainable IPCC SRES scenario
B1. This stage is invoked at 5 tCO2eq/cap, slightly below the current world average.)•

Stage 3 - Moderate absolute target: At even higher levels of per capita emissions, countries may voluntarily commit to a moderate target for absolute emissions. The emission
level may be increasing, but should be below a business as usual. An incentive to take on
59

ECOFYS

Evolution of commitments / DM 754

a voluntary target would be the possibility to participate in emissions trading. A ‘safetyvalve’ could allow a deviation from the target if economic growth has been higher than
expected. The additional cost could be born mainly by the country itself with limited contributions by the countries in stage 4. (Representation of this stage in a model: countries
follow their emission path 10% per 10 years below the sustainable IPCC SRES scenario
B1. This stage is invoked at 8 tCO2eq/cap.)•

Stage 4 - Absolute reduction: Countries in the highest stage have to reduce absoluteemissions substantially until a sustainable per-capita level is reached. (Representation ofthis stage in a model: countries reduce emissions every 10 years by 20% based on theemissions at the beginning of that 10 year period until 2 tCO2/cap is reached. This stage
is invoked in 2010 at a threshold of 14 tCO2eq/cap, the Annex I average in 2010. This
threshold decreases gradually to 6 tCO2eq/cap in 2100.)Thresholds for graduating into different groups are defined in terms of greenhouse gas emissions per capita. The threshold defined as emissions per capita is an incentive to keep emissions low, in order not to move to the next stage. As alternative to rigid threshold levels, countries could be asked to position themselves in one of the stages and/or exceptions could be
made.
Countries can only move to higher stages and not to lower ones, even if per-capita emissions
fall below the threshold for the stage a country is in. This ensures, that a country that had very
high emissions in one point in time, will have to reduce to the sustainable level of per capita
emissions. Countries that never reached the stage 4 can continue to emit at a higher level,
than those countries that reached stage 4. For this illustrative case, the threshold forparticipation in stage 4 is at least 6 tCO2eq./cap, while countries at stage 4 have to reduce to
2 tCO2eq./cap.
All current Annex I countries would be automatically at stage 4. For all other countries, every
10 years it is reviewed whether a country moves up a step. Newly entering countries can only
move to stage 2 or 3, not directly to stage 4 as to ensure a gradual phase-in of commitments.
Based on the data for 2010 it will be judged whether countries move up a stage for the next
10 years.
7.2.2 Quantitative results
The emission paths of individual countries are modeled as described above for all individual
countries, based on the same data as for chapter 6. Due to the associated uncertainties infuture emissions and the difficulty to model stage 2 (pledge for sustainable development) in a
simple way, these results should be seen as indicative. The consequences for individual
countries may be different under different assumptions.
Under this approach, some countries move to stage 3 and immediately to stage 4 (reduction)in 2020. For the described parameters these are Venezuela, South Africa, Persian Gulf
states, Republic of Korea and Singapore. Immediately jumping on stage 3 are Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Malaysia.
After the initial placement, only a few countries move to a higher stage, e.g. Argentina moves
to stage 4 as of 2020, Mexico as of 2030. Most other countries stay one stage from the start,e.g. India stays on stage 1 until 2090 and China on stage 2 until 2100: Once a country is on asustainable path, emissions do not grow as fast and current per-capita emission levels of Annex I countries are not reached.
The resulting total emissions in 2020 are +33% above 1990 levels and would lead to approximately 510 ppmv CO2 in 2100. The emission paths are shown in Figure 14. The results
are dominated by assumption of very low emissions under sustainable development. We here
assumed that emissions follow the path of the IPCC SRES B1 scenario (see also Figure 3,
page 7), which describes a reduction in global emissions as of 2050. With stage 3 assigningfurther reductions, global emissions decrease fast in the second half of the century. If the B2
scenario is used as the sustainable path instead of B1, global emissions as of 2050 would behigher, but more countries would have moved to higher stages. Further, the choice of theemissions until 2010 changes the starting positions of countries. Using the A1FI scenario for60

Evolution of commitments / DM 754

ECOFYSthe business as usual path, which has moderate growth rates until 2020, total emissions in2020 are +29% above 1990 levels, scenario A1B would lead to 43% above 1990 levels in
2020. Changes in the threshold parameters only lead to significant changes in global emissions, if a large country is moved to a higher or lower stage.

Global emissions (Gg CO2 eq.)50 000 000
45 000 000

Non-Annex I

40 000 000

Annex I

35 000 000
30 000 000
25 000 000
20 000 000
15 000 000
10 000 000
5 000 000
2 100

2 090

2 080

2 070

2 060

2 050

2 040

2 030

2 020

2 010

2 000

1 995

1 990

0

Time (years)

Figure 14: Global emissions under the new multi stage approach
Table 8: Stages for the new multistage approach (rounded average if more than one
country in a group)
Data for
Determines commitment in
USA
European Union
Japan
Eastern Europe (Annex I)
Russian Federation
Rest of Annex I
Rest of Eastern Europe andformer USSR
Argentina
BrazilColombia
MexicoVenezuela
Rest of Latin America
Egypt
South Africa
Nigeria
Rest of North Africa
Rest of Southern Africa
Persian Gulf States
Rest of Middle East
China
India
Indonesia
Korea, Republic of (South)
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
ThailandRest of Asia
Annex I
Non-Annex I
Global total

2010
2020

2020
2030
4
4
4
4
4
4

2030
2040
4
4
4
4
4
4

2040
2050
4
4
4
4
4
4

2050
2060
4
4
4
4
4
4

2060
2070
4
4
4
4
4
4

2070
2080
4
4
4
4
4
4

2080
2090
4
4
4
4
4
4

2090
2100
4
4
4
4
4
4

2100
2010
4
4
4
4
4
4

4
4
4
4
4
4

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

3
3
2
3
3
2
1
3
1
2
1
3
2
2
1
1
3
3
1
3
2
1

3
3
2
3
4
2
1
4
1
2
1
4
3
2
1
2
4
3
1
4
2
1

4
3
2
3
4
2
1
4
1
2
1
4
3
2
1
2
4
3
1
4
3
1

4
3
2
4
4
2
1
4
1
2
1
4
3
2
1
2
4
3
1
4
3
1

4
3
2
4
4
2
2
4
1
2
1
4
3
2
1
2
4
3
1
4
3
1

4
3
2
4
4
2
2
4
1
2
1
4
3
2
1
2
4
3
1
4
3
1

4
3
2
4
4
2
2
4
1
2
1
4
3
2
1
2
4
3
1
4
3
1

4
3
2
4
4
2
2
4
1
3
1
4
3
2
1
2
4
3
1
4
3
1

4
3
2
4
4
2
2
4
1
3
1
4
3
2
2
2
4
3
1
4
3
1

4
3
2
4
4
2
2
4
2
3
1
4
3
2
2
2
4
3
1
4
3
1

4
2
2

4
2
2

4
2
2

4
2
2

4
2
2

4
2
2

4
2
2

4
2
2

4
2
2

4
2
2

61

Evolution of commitments / DM 754

ECOFYS

Table 9: Per capita emissions for the new multistage approach

USA
European Union
Japan
Eastern Europe (Annex I)
Russian Federation
Rest of Annex I
Rest of Eastern Europe
and former USSR
Argentina
BrazilColombia
MexicoVenezuela
Rest of Latin America
Egypt
South Africa
Nigeria
Rest of North Africa
Rest of Southern Africa
Persian Gulf States
Rest of Middle East
China
India
Indonesia
Korea, Republic of (South)
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
ThailandRest of Asia

2 010
2 020
2 030
2 040
2 050
2 060
2 070
2 080
2 090
2 100
tCO2eq tCO2eq tCO2eq tCO2eq tCO2eq tCO2eq tCO2eq tCO2eq tCO2eq tCO2eq
20.06
15.08
11.50
8.93
7.01
5.61
4.49
3.59
2.87
2.30
10.14
8.21
6.73
5.60
4.71
3.77
3.01
2.43
2.06
1.90
9.55
7.85
6.58
5.57
4.75
3.80
3.04
2.43
1.94
1.94
13.35
11.00
9.19
7.75
6.62
5.30
4.24
3.39
2.71
2.25
18.97
15.58
12.97
10.88
9.25
7.40
5.92
4.74
3.79
3.03
18.17
13.60
10.33
7.99
6.23
4.99
3.99
3.22
2.61
2.12

Annex I
Non-Annex I
Global total

8.50

7.93

6.23

5.18

4.39

3.73

2.77

2.36

2.11

2.00

10.83
10.52
6.25
8.02
17.70
7.77
3.03
14.75
2.63
4.76
3.13
24.65
6.53
5.13
2.43
4.49
15.72
13.52
2.80
37.76
6.95
2.43

12.05
10.65
7.15
9.22
18.61
8.11
3.96
18.36
2.90
5.59
2.82
25.99
7.19
6.40
2.87
5.14
16.68
12.07
3.11
39.72
7.66
2.28

12.31
8.60
7.09
9.85
13.41
6.84
4.60
13.74
3.00
5.88
2.06
17.85
7.30
7.09
3.26
5.19
13.09
10.75
3.16
30.92
8.37
2.09

9.26
7.61
7.46
10.47
9.88
6.19
4.82
10.37
2.94
6.15
1.81
12.75
7.48
7.50
3.50
5.12
10.51
9.36
3.10
25.04
7.90
1.91

7.06
7.38
7.62
8.13
7.44
5.52
5.09
7.98
2.90
5.80
1.66
9.20
6.09
7.03
3.78
4.58
8.64
7.32
3.12
20.72
6.61
1.74

5.65
6.13
7.04
6.50
5.95
4.84
4.71
6.38
3.28
5.56
1.68
7.36
5.21
6.09
4.17
4.02
6.91
5.67
3.28
16.57
5.12
1.68

4.52
5.11
6.35
5.20
4.76
4.27
4.16
5.11
3.66
4.97
1.69
5.89
4.32
5.15
4.57
3.47
5.53
4.31
3.44
13.26
3.87
1.62

3.62
3.76
5.30
4.16
3.81
3.64
3.58
4.09
4.10
4.44
1.72
4.71
3.55
4.32
5.00
2.90
4.42
3.14
3.68
10.61
2.88
1.60

2.89
2.85
4.43
3.33
3.05
3.16
3.01
3.27
4.61
3.71
1.77
3.77
2.88
3.57
5.47
1.83
3.54
1.39
4.01
8.49
1.97
1.55

2.31
2.07
3.64
2.66
2.44
2.81
2.49
2.61
5.12
2.99
1.82
3.01
2.34
2.94
4.29
1.83
2.83
1.39
4.33
6.79
1.97
1.59

13.89
4.81
6.49

10.97
5.30
6.26

8.78
5.09
5.67

7.14
4.92
5.24

5.86
4.48
4.67

4.72
4.13
4.21

3.80
3.79
3.79

3.07
3.51
3.45

2.51
3.27
3.16

2.14
2.81
2.72

7.2.3 Assessment according to the criteria
Environmental criteria
Environmental effectiveness: Under this approach, stringent long-term goals can bereached, but only if industrialized countries decrease emissions significantly in the next 50
years and developing countries move very soon (best even as of 2010) at least to a sustainable emission pathway, which is considerably lower than an average business-as-usual
pathway. If this stage 2 is not successful, the thresholds ensure that countries need to reduce
their emissions through limitation targets. The prospect of having to apply an emission limitation target is an incentive not to increase emissions until the threshold. Therefore also leakage is not the interest of countries that do not yet have targets.
Encouragement of early action: Setting the threshold for moving into higher stages using
per capita emissions encourages early action by countries, since it avoids moving to higher
steps and to stricter targets. Having low per-capita emissions in this system always is anadvantage.
Political criteria
Equity principles: Economic growth for developing countries (principle of need) is supported
since no restrictions apply until a certain emission per capita level is reached. Developing
countries with already high per capita emissions would be restricted in their path of emissions
as of 2010. The principle of capability (ability to pay) is only implicitly included in that Annex I
countries have to reduce emissions considerably. The principle of responsibility (polluterpays) is addressed through the per-capita emissions threshold. The historic responsibility ofcountries is incorporated in the way that countries that once reached high per capita emis62

ECOFYS

Evolution of commitments / DM 754

sions have to reduce their emissions fast, and countries that never reached high per-capita
emission levels do not have to undertake large reductions.
Agreement with fundamental positions of all major constituencies: The notion of countries gradually phasing into a reduction regime would seem to be acceptable to many countries. In addition, the concept of sustainable development is generally agreed, although possibly because it is a very vague concept. An essential question will be, who will pay for thisphase of sustainable development. In order to reach stringent target, all major developing
countries would have to participate as of 2010. This may not be acceptable to some of thosedeveloping countries.
Economic criteria
Accounting for structural differences between countries: Participation is differentiatedaccording to per capita emissions, reductions are equal for all countries. The particular economic structure or emission reduction potentials of a country is not considered here, but could
be build into the approach. E.g. the reduction levels of the countries in stage 4 could be set
individually to account for the national circumstances.
Minimizing adverse economic effects: The second step, pledge for sustainable development, is economically effective for developing countries, because efforts for development are
joint with possibly small additional efforts for climate. Those countries have the freedom toimplement any sustainable policy as long as emissions stay below a certain threshold. As forother approaches, the participating countries have low certainty of the inferred costs that are
due to the targets that they need to comply with. If emissions trading is allowed, it can ensurethat marginal abatement costs are comparable in all participating countries. In the emission
reduction stages, countries can reduce emissions across sectors and gases and also outsideof their territory, as for other approaches.
Technical criteria
Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol: This approach
can be built upon the structure agreed in the Kyoto Protocol: The notion of gradually increasing the group of countries that reduce emissions is built into the Convention. Elements toachieve sustainable development are included in the system in the principles of the Convention as well as in the financial mechanisms and the CDM, assisting developing countries todevelop in a sustainable way. These programmes would however have to be enhanced toachieve the necessary significant changes in emission pathways. Further, the reductions by
the countries in stage 4 would also have to be more stringent than those agreed in the Kyoto
Protocol.
Moderate political and technical requirements of the negotiation process: This approachcombines many ideas into one system. The implementation of such a system would require
several decisions on the thresholds and how to set emission reduction targets in stages 3 and4. Setting generic rules for participation thresholds for all countries and emission reduction
could be considered as difficult but possible. These rules would have to be updated regularly.
As for other approaches, emissions have to be calculated, reviewed and verified due to thelegally binding nature of the targets.
Conclusions
It can be concluded that with this approach stringent long-term goals can be reached, if industrialized countries decrease emissions significantly in the next 50 years and developing countries move very soon (best even as of 2010) to a sustainable emission pathway or a higher
step. It remains uncertain whether the step of pursuing sustainable development is effective.
7.3 PERFORMANCE TARGETS
This section briefly introduces the concept of ‘performance targets’, a new form to formulate
emission limitation or reduction targets. Performance targets are ‘dynamic’ as they define anamount of allowed emissions relative to a unit of production of the most important sectors in acountry (e.g. tonnes of steel or kWh of electricity). These individual targets are aggregated to63

ECOFYS

Evolution of commitments / DM 754

one total national target. The total allowed emissions depend on several variables (e.g. tonnes of steel or kWh of electricity), which are only known during the target year.
The approach of performance targets is borrowing the idea of the Triptych approach to define
one national target based on different sector targets. Only the total national emissions in thetarget year are relevant, not the emissions in the different sectors. The performance target is
not prescribing where the emissions have to be reduced, it describes only a total bnational
limit.
The Triptych approach is however static, it defines a fixed limit of absolute emissions before
the commitment period. Performance targets are dynamic as GHG intensity targets (emissions per GDP), absolute emissions may vary depending on the level of production that actually occurs.
The targets for the sectors are defined as improvement in the ‘performance’, i.e. emissions
relative a measure of the activity. This could be an improvement in CO2 emissions per kWhelectricity produced or improvement in CO2 emissions per tonne of steel produced or improvement of CH4 emissions per head of sheep.
An advantage of dynamic targets is, that they provide flexibility in the case the economy develops unexpectedly. The level of absolute emissions is adjusted according to the development of a variable. For intensity targets, this variable is the GDP, but for some countries
emissions may not change proportionally to the GDP. For performance targets, this variable isthe unit of production, which is closer related to emissions than the GDP. An unexpectedchange in the economic development would change the activity rate and therefore the allowed emissions as well as real emissions in the same way. Whether the target is reached or
not is more independent of unexpected economic developments than for absolute targets andfor intensity targets.
With this approach only the emission performance of an activity is capped, not the activity
itself. Therefore, such targets allow for economic growth (increased production of steel), but
require improvements in the production process making them attractive to developing counties, which exhibit a rapid increase of their economic activity. However, performance targets
do not provide incentives for efficient material use or savings in electricity. A decline in activity(intended as a emission reduction measure or unintended due to economic decline) is
counted to the favour of the country. As the total amount of emissions is not fixed, it is uncertain whether a particular environmental goal can be reached.
For performance targets, a limited amount of additional data have to be collected compared toabsolute emission targets. For many sectors, the performance, i.e. the emission factor, is an
input to the calculation of the emissions, e.g. the CO2 emissions from cement production arecalculated based on the amount of cement produced. These emission factors are estimatedand are reviewed. For fuel combustion, emissions are usually calculated based on theamount of fuel used and not on the activity (e.g. amount of electricity produced). However, theactivity rate, is needed to assess the quality of the emission estimates and is in some cases
available. Still, for some categories, the indicators for the activity are rarely available, e.g.
person-km in the transport sector or square meters of heated space in the households. In any
case, it would be beneficial to have comparable statistics on the parameters for all countries,
also for the review of the emission inventories.
The total performance target is defined as the sum of several sectoral targets, as in the Triptych approach. There are several options to split the total emissions into categories. The split
should be along the source categories in which the emissions are reported. The IPCC Guidelines for national greenhouse gas inventories, the reporting standard, define a large numberof source categories, but for most countries only 20 are “key source categories”, the mostimportant ones. Performance targets could be applied for those key source categories or only
for the five globally most important, or only the five most important for the country together
with absolute targets for the other categories.
With performance targets it may also be easier to differentiate the stringency of targets between countries than for absolute targets. For all major source categories, a percentage reduction in the emission factor could to be agreed. This equal reduction could be applied to all
countries. Alternatively, a formula could be set so that the emission factors converge. As in all
64

ECOFYS

Evolution of commitments / DM 754

other approaches, exceptions could be made. The judgment, whether these reductions are ahigh or low burden, is much easier than for absolute emissions or emission intensity, because
the emission factors depend only on a few variables, while the absolute emissions and theemission intensity depends on may variables.
We here only briefly introduced the concept of performance targets. This idea still needs to be
developed into a full approach but warrants further analysis.

65Evolution of commitments / DM 754

ECOFYS

8.

COMPARISON OF APPROACHES AND CONCLUSIONSIn this chapter contains the comparison of approaches that were described and assessed in
the in chapter 6 and 7 as well as the resulting conclusions.
8.1 QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON
Table 10 provides a comparison of the results obtained from the quantification of the different
approaches for different regional groups. All results are based on the same data (see 6.1 andAppendix A), except the Triptych and multi-sector convergence approach.
The results presented in Table 10 are one snapshot out of the diverse possibilities to quantify
the approaches. The results could be varied along two dimensions: Varying the business-asusual scenario (the IPCC SRES A2 scenario is used here) and varying the parameters
needed for the individual approaches, such as for example participation thresholds or convergence years. Any variation along these dimensions can change the results considerably. Further, the results obtained for the triptych approach and the multi-sector convergence approach are based on different data than the other approaches. Accordingly, these results
should be viewed as indicative.
Under all approaches, Annex I countries have to reduce emissions considerably. Most approaches have some free parameters that allow adjusting the balance of Annex I reductions
versus Non-Annex I reductions. In this comparison the multi-sector convergence approach
results in the lowest emissions for Annex I countries, because it includes a period of no action
for newly participating developing countries.
Only a few Non-Annex I countries under a few approaches can follow their business as usual
path. The group of these countries may vary with the choice of the parameter. Under mostapproaches, also Non-Annex I countries have to reduce emissions below business as usual
paths, to ensure that ambitious global environmental goals are met.
8.2 QUALITATIVE COMPARISON
Comparing the different approaches across the different criteria is a subjective task, which
depends on the judgment, whether an approach meets the criterion, and the weight given to
the individual criteria. Table 11 provides an attempt for such a comparison. The eight criteria
are evaluated for each approach and rated ‘completely not met’ (--), ‘mainly not met’ (-), ‘neutral’ (0), ‘mainly met’ (+) and ‘completely met’ (++). ‘/’ denotes that the criterion may or may
not be fulfilled depending on the specific variation of the approach. As an attempt to further
condense the assessment, always two criteria are grouped together to four general criteria(environmental, political, economic and technical) using the rules described below. The firstcolumn of Table 11 provides a possible weighting for these general criteria. A further condensation of the ratings, however, is left to the reader.

66

Evolution of commitments / DM 754

ECOFYS

Table 10. Changes in total greenhouse gas emissions (allowances) from 1990 to 2020 forgroups of countries (1990=100%, includes CO2, CH4 and N2O for fossil fuels and forestry,
except global Triptych)

USA

GlobalMultiMultiContrac- Triptych
sectorExtendedContinustage(CO2
Intensity tion andglobalconveringapproachtargets converfrom
Triptych
gence
Kyoto
(FAIR)
genceenergyapproach
only)
138%
74%
83%
85%
65%
47%
88%
68%

European Union

118%

74%

76%

82%

70%

49%

87%

74%

74%

Japan
Eastern Europe(Annex I)
Russian Federation
Rest of Annex I

139%

75%

75%

83%

75%

50%

89%

76%

75%

94%

76%

81%

68%

68%

45%

75%

72%

64%

92%

63%

79%

66%

44%

41%

74%

50%

63%

140%

80%

89%

93%

75%

51%

94%

81%

80%

TurkeyRest of Eastern
Europe and former USSR
Argentina

141%

80%

89%

121%

199%

178%

94%

169%

80%

120%

115%

104%

102%

49%*

59%*

104%

57%*

104%

224%

129%

223%

158%

166%

223%

124%

195%

Brazil

210%

133%

167%

165%

203%

167%

130%

Colombia

232%

232%

179%

190%

Mexico

248%

135%

183%

173%

Venezuela
Rest of Latin
America
Egypt

271%

271%

182%

198%

235%

210%

206%

193%

266%

266%

226%

223%

South Africa

266%

140%

154%

161%

Nigeria
Rest of North
AfricaRest of Southern
AfricaPersian Gulf
StatesRest of Middle
East
China

245%

245%

183%

252%

242%

234%

195%

198%

206%

206%

151%

236%

313%

163%

202%

212%

287%

191%

221%

226%

224%

India

227%

227%

Indonesia
Korea, Republicof (South)
Malaysia

213%

Philippines
Singapore
ThailandRest of Asia
Rest of the
World

189%

Annex I

119%

73%

81%

80%

66%

47%

84%

70%

71%

Non-Annex I

227%

196%

182%

189%

230%

301%

182%

192%

211%

Global total

167%

127%

126%

128%

127%

133%

128%

123%

133%

Region

BAU
(IPCC
SRES
A2)

261%

179%
175%

251%

183%

New
Multistage
74%

185%
227%

147%

215%

182%

240%

295%*

206%

217%

382%

226%

266%

240%

154%

431%

183%

245%

195%

233%

431%*

151%

195%

141%*

284%*

202%

140%*

267%

213%

157%*

293%*

221%

144%*

254%

196%

176%

237%

205%

196%

196%

222%

186%

222%

558%

294%

186%

308%

227%

213%

164%

187%

469%

294%

164%

231%

213%

360%

205%

277%

232%

96%

170%

277%

101%

282%

236%

147%

213%

183%

192%

213%

130%

185%

196%

196%

138%

197%

290%

163%

246%

181%

123%

246%

123%

226%

263%

158%

195%

198%

248%

195%

160%

232%

188%

157%

205%

115%

114%

228%

196%

138%

157%

166%
180%

201%

Note: Bold and green are those values that are equal or above the business as usual path.
*: The Triptych approaches are based on different data resulting for some countries in higher emissions
than the business-as-usual. Further: REE includes Kazakhstan only, GLF includes Saudi Arabia only,
RME includes Iran only, ‘Rest of the world’ includes all countries not covered above.
The multi-sector convergence approach is based on different data: REE includes Kazakhstan only, RLA
includes Bolivia only, RSA includes Tanzania only, GLF includes Kuwait and Saudi Arabia only, RME
includes Iran and Yemen only.

67Evolution of commitments / DM 754

ECOFYS

Intensity targets

New multistage

Performancetargets

3

+

0

++

+

++

+

0

+

+

++

+

Environmental effectiveness

++

+

++

++

++

++

++

0

++

++

+

Approach
Criterion

Environmental criteria

Coordinated
Policies andmeasures
Extended
global Triptych

Continuing
Kyoto

Equal mitigation cost

PossibleweightingContraction
and convergence
Global Triptych (CO2
only)
Multi-sector
convergenceapproachMultistage
approach(FAIR)

Table 11. Indicative assessment matrix for the qualitative comparison of the approaches

Encouragement of early action by Parties that do not yet
have binding commitments
Political criteria
3

-

-

++

0

+

/

--

++

0

+

+

0

0

0

+

0

++

0

0

+

++

0

Equity principles

+

0

+

+

+

++

0

-

+

++

+

0

+

-

+

0

+

-

0

+

+

0

0

0

-

+

+

+

++

-

++

+

++

/

/

--

+

+

+

++

-

++

+

++

+

+

+

+

+

+

++

-

+

+

+

++

0

++

0

0

+

-

0

0

+

0

++

+

+

+

+

+

+

0

+

+

+

++

-

++

-

-

+

--

-

-

+

-

Agreement with fundamental
positions of major constituencies
Economic criteria
2
Accounting for structural differences between countries
Minimizing adverse economic
effects
Technical criteria
1Compatibility with UNFCCC
and Kyoto Protocol
Moderate political and technical requirements of the negotiation process

Note: ‘--' criterion completely not met, ‘-' criterion mainly not met, ‘0’ neutral, ‘/’ depends on thespecific variation of the approach, ‘+’ criterion mainly met, ‘++’ criterion completely met
Rules used for combining two criteria:‘++’ and ‘++’ equals ‘++’‘++’ and ‘+’ equals ‘++’‘++’ and ‘0‘ equals ‘+’‘++’ and ‘-‘ equals ‘+’‘++’ and ‘--‘ equals ‘0’‘+’ and ‘+’ equals ‘+’‘+’ and ‘0’ equals ‘0’‘+’ and ‘-’ equals ‘0’‘0’ and ‘0’ equals ‘0’‘/’ is treated as ‘0’

8.3 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE COMPARISON
From the comparison of the approaches, we draw the following conclusions:
Several approaches are available: Several approaches to future commitments are available
that would lead to emissions consistent with stringent environmental goals. For all approaches, reductions additional to those in the Kyoto Protocol are necessary.
Significant reductions by industrialized countries are necessary: For all these approaches, significant emission reduction by industrialized countries (in the order of cutting
emissions more than in half by 2050 and continuing to decrease) are necessary as soon as
possible to leave some room for increasing developing country emissions and still to reachstringent environmental goals. For same global emission limit, emission allowances for industrialized countries are lower under a global Triptych approach than under contraction andconvergence, because the Triptych approach allows emissions of Non-Annex I countries togrow considerably. Emission allowances for industrialized countries are even lower under themulti-sector convergence approach, because sectoral emissions converge on a per-capita
basis resulting in major reductions in those countries with high industrial activity and relatively
low population.
Early involvement of developing countries is needed: If per-capita emissions in developing countries reach current levels of industrialized countries, stringent stabilization goals
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would be out of reach. Even more, early deviation from current business-as-usual paths ofdeveloping countries is necessary. This can be achieved through emission limitation and reduction targets, but also through an enhanced sustainable development approach andthrough positive spillover of emission reductions from developed countries to developing
countries. Not many of the existing approaches encourage early action by countries that are
not yet participating. In fact, basing emission reductions on levels in the future is counterproductive to early action. A threshold for participation in emission limitation targets defined as
per-capita emissions would encourage early action to stay beneath this threshold.
A mix as compromise: Every approach has advantages and disadvantages. Converging per
capita emissions for example is straightforward, but probably unacceptable for some countries. Those approaches that mix several elements receive good marks in the assessment
and have a higher chance of being accepted since all constituencies find elements of theirconcern in the mixed approach. A good mix of approaches can be the key to finding a broadly
acceptable solution.
Forms of targets that allow economic growth and limit emissions: If developing countries
agree to further commitments, these must be designed to avoid a restriction of economic
growth as much as possible to be politically acceptable but at the same time have to limit
emissions. The approach to aim as a first step for enhanced sustainable development accommodates this concern. Intensity targets are seen as allowing growth, but they can be as
restrictive as absolute targets if they are set at stringent levels. They only allow additionalemissions, if unexpected growth occurs. The Triptych approach is a method to accommodate
growth in production and shares emission allowances accordingly between countries. Even
more, ‘performance targets’ limit only specific emissions without limiting the activities themselves. In all cases the balance has to be found between allowing economic growth and keeping emissions at a low level.
Differentiation not solved: No generally acceptable approach is available how to differentiate targets within a group of countries. Many indicators are available, including the historicalresponsibility (Brazilian Proposal). Differentiation on the basis of an economic model equalizing the abatement costs among countries may not be realistic. No magic rule is available how
to adequately account for structural differences between countries. For intensity targets, thedifferentiation is more difficult than for absolute targets, since it involves also the knowledge
on the relationship between emissions and GDP. The Triptych approach is a method thatspecifically accommodates the structural differences by defining differentiated levels of national emissions based on sectoral considerations. Performance targets may not need differentiation between countries.
The following conclusions can be drawn for the approaches that were analyzed in this study:
Continuing Kyoto without any changes or additions would be an obvious option for futurecommitments. Stringent environmental goals can, however, only be reached if current Annex I
countries decrease their emissions more than for the first commitment period (2008 to 2012)
and if developing countries deviate from their business-as-usual paths at an early stage. In
this system a method to differentiate the targets for the participating countries is to be found.
Taking on absolute emission targets may be difficult for some developing countries due to theuncertainty in the development of the emissions. To help these countries, relatively small additional changes in the rules could be introduced such as ‘price caps’ (additional permits at a
fixed price) or slightly looser compliance mechanisms.
Intensity targets can play a role in future commitments as one form of target for a particulargroup of countries, possibly in parallel to other types of targets for other countries. If it is applied to all countries, the global emission intensity (Emissions per GDP) has to decrease rapidly (2-4% per year) in order to reach stringent environmental goals. If equal percentage reductions in emission intensity are agreed for a group of countries, those are in advantage thathave higher economic growth, which are at present some Asian states. Agreeing on differentiated intensity reductions is more difficult than absolute reductions, since it involves country
specific knowledge of the relationship between emissions and GDP, which also may evolvewith time.
Contraction and convergence, where per capita emissions converge, is intriguing due to thesimplicity of the approach. Since major reductions in emissions are necessary it is likely, that69

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in the long run under any regime per-capita emissions will converge to a very low level. The
question is on which path. The simplicity of the approach is also the major disadvantage: The
approach does not account for the structural differences of countries and their ability to decrease their emissions. For stabilization levels of 450 or 550 ppmv CO2, per-capita emissions
have to decrease below the current world average. Also many developing countries would
have to decrease emissions below their business as usual path and only a few least developed countries could sell for as short period of time easily earned emission allowances to developed countries.
The Triptych approach has potential as a method to differentiate emission reduction targets
between members of a group of countries. The extended version presented here also can
accommodate the emission structure of developing countries and includes forestry and nonCO2 greenhouse gas emissions. Major downside of the approach is its relative complexity
and the necessity of projections of production growth rates. Still, such differentiation approach
can produce a starting point for a negotiation between the countries of that group.
Multi-stage approaches will be the future of the climate regime, but there are many possibilities on types of stages and thresholds for moving into a next stage. The current two stages(Annex I and Non Annex I) could be extended. As one promising criteria to move to a further
stage would be the emissions per capita. As a first stage, a well-defined commitment to sustainable development could increase the acceptability for developing countries.
The multi-sector convergence approach is describing a complete set of rules for a futureclimate regime defining in essence the path on which sectoral per-capita emissions converge.
A major downside of the approach is that sectoral activities are not necessarily directly related
to the population.
Equal mitigation costs: Setting targets so that mitigation costs are equal for all participating
countries (e.g. a percentage share of the GDP) seems to be, from a theoretical point of view,a fair option. In practice, however, it may be impossible to agree on a model or calculation
method for calculating the cost of countries. It is therefore not a realistic option.
Policies and measures can also be a part of a mix. Especially for newly entering countries,
policies that combine development and environment objectives are very attractive and could
form a first stage of commitments.

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9.

SOME CURRENT VIEWSThis chapter intends to provide a first snapshot of the views on future commitments among
delegates to the UNFCCC process. It is based on only a limited number of interviews (seven)and therefore is not to be seen as representative overview, but rather as an indicator of theimportant topics. In total seven delegates from Burkina Faso, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Norway,
UK and USA were asked to provide their personal views on the question of future climate
commitments. Interviews were held mostly during the session of the subsidiary bodies in July
2002. This chapter summarizes the results.
Implementation of existing commitments: Being asked very openly about the issue of future commitments, interviewees from developing countries always first stress the need for
implementation of the existing commitments as a prerequisite of beginning a discussion on
future commitments. First, trust has to be built, that the promised emission reductions are met
and the promised financial support for developing countries is provided. This trust is currently
not felt by most developing country interviewees. On the question on how the trust could bebuild, some mentioned 10 to 15 year technical cooperation programmes, CDM or other cooperation and, not at last, an active role of the USA (see below). One interviewee did not see aneed to talk about the issue of future commitments now, since it is a “hypothetical issue”. In
his view, even a scientific discussion would not accelerate the process.
USA participation: All interviewees stressed with high importance that the withdrawal of the
USA from the Kyoto Protocol is blocking any progress on the question of future commitments.
It was seen as a prerequisite that the USA (and all other Annex I Parties) demonstrate serious
action before a meaningful discussion on further commitments, especially for Non-Annex I
Parties can start.
In the current situation, the USA could follow two strategies: Either it is proactive in the discussions on future developing country commitments, with the intention that all countries receive acceptable targets. Or the USA could be passive on the question of future commitments, as no agreement would also mean no new target for the USA. One interviewee speculated that the USA is currently following the latter option.
Long term goals: Industrialized country interviewees generally first stressed the importanceof long term goals, such as stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations, when being asked
broadly about future commitments. Some felt that a discussion on long term goals is necessary, because a step-by-step process without the long-term view would result in targets not
ambitious enough to solve the climate change problem. Such a long-term discussion would
not necessarily have to lead to an agreement on a specific concentration target (such as
450 ppmv CO2), but would guide the choice of next steps.
On the other hand some interviewees mentioned that a discussion on ultimate concentrationlevels would be a “non-starter”. Due to the uncertainty involved, it would be impossible toagree on a level and a discussion would be unproductive. It was mentioned that some developing countries are frightened already by a discussion on concentration levels (without agreeing on a level), because they fear that such discussion would, in their view, lead automaticallyto immediate commitments for developing countries. Another argument against setting stabilization targets is that AOSIS could not agree to any stabilization target, since under all feasible
options, they would agree to unacceptable damages to their countries.
The idea of setting a global intermediate target for, e.g., 2020 or 2030, from which it would still
be possible to reach several different concentration targets, seemed very attractive to many
interviewees. Such intermediate target could evolve from a discussion on the long term goals,
but could take into account the present uncertainties associated with any long term goal.
From such intermediate global target, targets for individual countries could be derived.
Form of commitment: Many interviewees mention greenhouse gas intensity targets (emissions per GDP) as a very attractive option, also because the USA recently proposed such atarget. It is seen as providing the necessary flexibility. It seems that the interviewees see it asa currently politically attractive option, also for “cosmetic” reasons (An increase in absolute71

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emissions can be expressed as a decrease in emission intensity). But no detailed analysis on
implications of intensity targets has been made.
Others, however, do not favor intensity targets since they are seen as providing insufficientcertainty on the total level of allowed emissions.
For yet others, the form of the target is not relevant, as long as the targets are set stringent
enough to be credible. Any form of target can be set to be a stringent target.
Almost all interviewees think that several forms of targets could and will coexist, e.g. absolutetargets for developed countries and intensity targets for newly entering countries.
Differentiation of commitments: Setting different levels of targets for participating countries
was seen as a difficult task and no interviewee had concrete proposals or formulas for differentiation. Sectoral approaches, as the Triptych approach, were considered less attractive,
since seen as complicated.
Participation: It was broadly agreed that in some point in time all countries will have climate
commitments. But only a few options were mentioned to decide who and when.
One interviewee mentioned that the terms Annex I and Non-Annex I have become very rigid
and so loaded, that possibly new names of groups of countries could help to overcome this
divide. There could also be more than two groups.
Others mentioned that some countries could graduate into Annex I, but no satisfactory indicator for such graduation could be mentioned. Indicators such as emissions per GDP, GDP per
capita and emissions per capita do all favor some and disadvantage other countries.
An alternative view is that there should be no intentions to split the group of 77 and China.
The group always has acted as a group and will resist any attempt to be split. One option was
mentioned as a promising one: to give an overall target to the group of G77 and let the groupdecide how to distribute it among its members.
Process: It was mentioned, that a new round of negotiations under the UNFCCC could belaunched on this issue. Such process would be guided by scientific analysis on the design of
new targets.
One interviewee described a process building on the experience of the past negotiations:First, the form of the target is agreed. Then the chairman of the negotiations, who has thepolitical responsibility, makes a proposal how to differentiate the targets, based on transparent scientific analysis. Third, political negotiations modify this proposal, taking into accountspecial national considerations.
Another view was that the UNFCCC process as such is not capable of providing an agreement, since decision making by consensus provides room to disrupt the process. For a global
11
solution, the maybe 15 largest emitters could separately meet and agree on a solution.
Completeness of the concepts: A general impression was that the interviewed delegates
see the issue as fundamental, but did not have fully developed opinions or concepts. There isa feeling of need for action on the one hand but mistrust on the other. Many open questions
remain and more creative thinking, discussion and education are needed.

11

For largest emitters see Appendix A.

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10.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the previous chapters of this report, the authors in this chapter formulate recommendations that aim at a successful agreement on global action against climate change thatis acceptable to all countries. First, recommendations for action by the German Federal Environmental Agency (Umweltbundesamt) and the German Federal Environment Ministry (Umweltministerium) are provided. Further, recommendations for the design of an international
agreement and, finally, issues for further research are identified.
10.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
Start an informal, international dialogue process: In the formal UNFCCC process, the issue of future commitments has been blocked in the last years, due to the call for developing
country participation, the uncertainty of the entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol and thewithdrawal of the USA. But there is a great need for research, information sharing and discussion on this fundamental issue on the scientific side as well as on the policy maker side.
To prepare for the negotiation in the formal UNFCCC process, an informal, international dialogue could be organized to educate a discussion and to build trust among delegations. Suchdialogue should bring together scientists and policy makers to discuss the science of climatechange (emissions to concentrations, stabilization, range of uncertainties) and possible actions (absolute and intensity targets, form and stringency, sustainable development approach). Germany has a credible role in the international process and could actively initiate
and support such a dialogue. To build trust, the focus should be on “finding global solutions
for the long-term problem of climate change” and not on “developing country commitments”.
Build trust by action: One of the main agreements of the climate change convention is that
Annex I countries have to take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The perception by most developing countries, that Annex I countries do not take sufficient action, blocks
the discussion on future commitments. This leads to the (almost trivial) recommendation, that
Annex I countries have to build trust by actively reducing emissions, getting involved in the
CDM and making available the agreed funds. This also includes working with the USA to findways of their participation. In any case, strong efforts by developed countries are likely to also
have reducing effects on developing country emissions (positive spillover).
Communication of the achieved results: Part of the trust building needs to be the communication of action taken and results achieved to date. It is often difficult to assess the quantitative importance of climate policies versus that of other factors (e.g. the effect of the German
unification) for the path of emissions. Disentangling the various effects is not a straightforwardtask and common approaches and formats are recommendable. The European Union could
take an initiative on this point in supporting the development of methodologies for the assessment of climate policy.
Stress the need for significant reduction in Annex I countries in the long term: This andother analyses show that in all scenarios that lead to ambitious long-term goals, industrializedcountries have to reduce emissions significantly until 2050, otherwise no room is available formoderately increasing developing country emissions. Efforts should focus on actions that reduce emissions not only temporarily in the short-term but sustainably in the long run. A clear
statement by developed countries to this effect could be a signal to developing countries.
10.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DESIGN OF AN AGREEMENT
10.2.1 Participation
Support early involvement (not necessarily ‘participation’) by all countries: The IPCC
Special Report on Emission Scenarios (IPCC 2000) illustrates the diverse paths global emissions could take irrespective of climate policies. Our analysis shows that the way emissions
are shared depends to a large extent on the business-as-usual path that is chosen for the
analysis. Sustainable development of all countries, not including policies aimed directly at the73

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climate, is equally important for low emissions as reductions induced by commitments under
the UNFCCC. Unconstrained business-as-usual emissions of Non-Annex I Parties will foreclose certain options for stabilization. All efforts have to be made to enable developing countries to develop in a sustainable way. Further thoughts are necessary how such a sustainable
path way can be achieved, e.g. use of the currently available tools, such as the financial cooperation, CDM or additional investment programmes. Initial further commitments fordeveloping countries could take the form of a pledge for enhanced sustainable development
or targets that allow economic growth but limit emissions at the same time (see above).
Work together with the G77 to break the deadlock: The G77 stands as a group in the international negotiations and is likely to do so in the near future, although the interests of themembers of the group are diverse. In the past, efforts by some developing counties to breakout of the group to take on commitments have failed, mainly due to the opposition within theG77. Currently, it seems unlikely that only some developing countries take on commitments.
One way to overcome this problem could be to agree on a total indicative target for the G77
and let the group decide itself which members have to take which action.
Let countries place themselves in groups: Until the present some industrialized countries
stated the general condition of ‘meaningful participation of developing countries’, but did not
differentiate, which of the developing countries are expected to act. Indicators, that would define when a country has to take on climate commitments, are available (greenhouse gas
emissions, emissions per GDP, GDP per capita, human development index, vulnerability etc.)
but no single one, or combination, is generally acceptable to all countries. Collection of dataon such indicators can support a process in which countries are asked to place themselves in
one of a number of groups, e.g. ‘binding target’, ‘voluntary, non-binding target’, ‘No need toact’. Such process would have to take into account the structure of the G77 as explained
above. Publicly available indicators and political pressure could move countries to place
themselves in a certain group.
10.2.2 Process
Focus long-term discussion on the lost options: A discussion on greenhouse gas concentration levels, for example on 450 or 550 ppmv CO2, or maximum levels of climate change,such as 2°C temperature rise, may be difficult and an agreement on a specific level may be
impossible, given the uncertainties involved. However, a discussion on the long-term perspective would inform the direction of next steps. A discussion could be framed around questions
such as ‘At what level of global emissions in the year 2020 do we loose the option to stabilize
concentrations at 450 ppmv CO2?’. Answers could lead to the definition of an intermediate
global emission target, for e.g. 2020, from which it would still be possible to reach several
concentration levels. Further analysis on this subject is necessary (see section 10.3).
Build upon existing system, but be creative: International negotiations are very time consuming and only ten years after the Convention was agreed, the rules for the next step, theKyoto Protocol, are set. Most approaches can be build upon the existing system that is already agreed by the international community: Legally binding emission targets for some countries, inclusion of all greenhouse gases in a basket, commitment periods, emissions trading,limited use of forestry activities, incentives for developing countries to participate e.g. throughCDM. That does not mean that the system is rigid. The structure allows to build in creative
new approaches. E.g. emission intensity targets could be integrated in a further developmentof the Kyoto Protocol, if so desired. Another idea could be a separate Protocol for a special
sector, e.g. a non-deforestation protocol. Such new protocol could build upon the Kyoto Protocol or be based on the Convention. Links to the Conventions on biodiversity and desertification could be extended.
Be prepared to evaluate targets of other countries: From the procedural point of view,
there are at least two ways to agree on commitments: Countries propose targets for themselves, all evaluate each others proposals and then start to negotiate. Alternatively, a chairman or another person with the political responsibility makes a proposal based on a scientifically credible formula and the following negotiations will provide for the exceptions to particular national circumstances. Countries need to have the analytical capacity to evaluate the74

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proposals by other countries. If a government is supporting the chairman, it must have thecapacity to make a scientifically based proposal.
10.2.3 Form and stringency of targets
Allow diverse forms of targets: The concept of absolute emission targets may be appropriate for some countries, but less appropriate for others. Intensity targets may help some but
harm others. Several forms of targets are available. In a diverse world possibly many different
approaches need to be available to account for the diverse needs of all countries. Also thisanalysis showed that approaches that mix different proposals incorporate more issues important to the stakeholders and therefore have a higher chance of being agreeable. One way toaccomplish this would be the ‘menu approach’ to let (newly entering) groups of Parties
choose the appropriate form of their target from options such as absolute targets, GDP intensity, certain policies and measures. The form of the target is not significant as long as it isensured that the targets are stringent enough. Many forms of targets (absolute emissions,
intensity targets, policies and measures) can reach stringent environmental objectives, aslong as they are set at the appropriate level. This, however, stresses the need to have thecapability to be able to evaluate a variety of targets (see above).
Focus on forms of targets allow developing country economic growth but limit emissions: Absolute targets are seen by developing countries as capping their economic growth.
Intensity targets are intending to provide such flexibility but may not do so, if they are set stringently or emission intensive activities increase that do not contribute much to the GDP. ‘Performance targets’, that are dynamic as intensity targets, but relate to the activity level not theGDP, or the Triptych approach could to a greater extent provide room for economic growth inactivities but limit emissions per level of activity. Technology standards also do not limit
activities but limit only the specific emissions. Also the pledge for sustainable development
focuses on the development first and is therefore attractive.
Explore forms of targets that allow evaluating the stringency easily: The evaluation of
the stringency of absolute reduction targets is relatively difficult, because many variables influence the total absolute emissions. The stringency of differentiated intensity targets may be
more difficult to evaluate, since a specific reduction and the relationship between emissionsand GDP has to be evaluated. The evaluation of ‘performance targets’ would involve judgment on more separate sectors per country but the judgment of these reductions would beeasier than for total emissions or emission intensity, because these emission factors dependon only a few variables. A drawback is that these targets are more complex and depend partly
on statistical data that are not generally available. Nevertheless, the advantages in terms ofnegotiations may be so large, that further exploration is justified.
Further develop a mix of indicators to set the stringency of targets: Many indicators andformulas have been proposed to differentiate emission reduction targets between countries toadapt them to their national circumstances. For example, reductions have been proportional
to historical emissions, GDP or any combinations of those and other indicators. Another example is the Triptych approach, which defines limitation or reduction parameters for all sectors that are applied equally for all countries. No ideal method to differentiate the targets isavailable and further efforts have to be made to develop a transparent and simple formula.
10.3 RECOMMENDED FURTHER RESEARCH
Analysis on form and stringency of targets as well as criteria for participation: Several
forms of targets are available, but limited analysis is available on some of these. E.g. intensity
targets currently seem to be very attractive, but implications and applicability is not studied indetail. Also no simple formula can be provided for differentiating emission reduction targets
among countries. Further criteria for participation in the regime are not generally accepted. A
tool for such analysis could be the following:
Country by country future commitment model: Current models to analyze future commitment regimes represent the world in geographical regions and cannot provide information on
individual countries. E.g. the FAIR model has 17 world regions. In this report we analyzed
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data for individual countries. As a next step, an interactive model for the analysis of commitments could be developed that can provide individual country data. It would also include a
database on country specific data such as emissions of at least CO2, CH4 and N2O, as well asGDP, human development index and an indication of the vulnerability to climate change. This
would be crucial in the analysis of proposals by individual countries during the negotiations.
Consider ‘spillover’ in commitment calculations: Current models for evaluating futurecommitments usually take a business-as-usual path and calculate a reduction below thatlevel. These business as usual paths of different countries are treated independently. But it islikely that actions by some countries have significant effect on the emissions of other countries. Emissions of other countries could be increased by “leakage”, the migration of emission
intensive activities to countries which have no targets. But emission paths of other countries
would also be decreased if e.g. new technologies, developed and commercialized in industrialized countries, are used in developing countries. Action at one point in time changes thebusiness-as-usual path of all countries for the next point in time. Recent work (Grubb et al.
2002) suggests that the positive effects could outweigh the negative ones. A next generationof models to analyze future commitments should take these linkages into account.
Develop an intermediate global target for 2020 including all greenhouse gases: For thestabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations at low levels, global emissions may not increase above certain levels in the near future. Such levels are known for CO2, but to a lesser
extent are analyzed for the other greenhouse gases CH4 and N2O. The share of these gases
to total greenhouse gas emissions is larger for developing countries than for developed countries. Further research is necessary to develop intermediate global emission targets for all
greenhouse gases (in e.g. 2020) that would allow a stabilization of CO2 concentrations at 400,
450, 500, 550, 600, 650 ppm (and respective levels for the other greenhouse gases). This
analysis would be free of a value judgment whether one should act now or later.
Elaborate on ‘sustainable development’: A pledge for sustainable development was proposed as one first step for some developing countries towards commitments. If such an approach should be further pursued, it would be necessary to define more precisely how it
should be designed. In addition, it would also merit further research on which coordinatedmeasures could lead to global sustainable development.

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Ecofys, 2002, Database of sources of CO2, prepared for the IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme. For documentation see: Hendriks, C.A, A.S. van der Waart, C. Byers, D. Phylipsen,
M. Voogt, Y. Hofman, 2002, Building the cost curve for CO2 storage: sources of CO2, IEA
Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme, forthcoming.
EDGAR, 2001, Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research, Version 3.2, RIVM,
from http://www.rivm.nl/env/int/coredata/edgar/ in December 2001
EC 1996. Communication on Community strategy on climate change. Council conclusions,25-26 June 1996.
Godal, O. & J. Fuglestvedt 2002, Testing 100-year global warming potentials: impacts oncompliance costs and abatement profile, Climatic Change 52: 93-127
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Groenenberg, H., D. Phylipsen, K. Blok, 2001, ‘Differentiating commitments world wide: global
differentiation of GHG emissions reductions based on the Triptych approach-a preliminary
assessment’, Energy Policy, vol.29, issue12, pp 1007-1030, 2001
Groenenberg 2002, “development and Convergence – A bottom up analysis for the differentiation of future commitments under the Climate Convention”, PhD thesis, University of
Utrecht, ISBN 90-393-3189-8
Grubb, M.; J.C. Hourcade, S. Oberthuer, 2001, Keeping Kyoto, Climate Strategies Report,
www.climatestrategies.org
Grubb, M., C Hope & R. Fourquet 2002, Climatic implications of the Kyoto Protocol: the contribution of international spillover, Climatic Change 54: 11-28.
Hansen et al. 2000, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 97, 9875
Höhne, N., J. Harnisch 2002, “Evaluating indicators for the relative responsibility for climatechange - alternatives to the Brazilian proposal and global warming potentials” in: Van Ham,
Baede, Guicherit & Williams-Jacobse (eds) “Non-CO2 Greenhouse gases”, pp 371 - 376, Milpress, Rotterdam, ISBN 90-77017-70-4
Houghton, R.A. 1999, The annual net flux of carbon to the atmosphere from changes in landuse 1850-1990. Tellus 51B:298-313.
HYDE, 1999, History Database of the Global Environment, Version 2.0, RIVM, fromhttp://www.rivm.nl/env/int/hyde/index.html in December 2001
Meyer, A. 2000, 'Contraction and Convergence - The Global Solution to Climate Change',
Global Commons Institute, Schumacher Briefing No.5, see also http://www.gci.org.uk/
Natural Resource Defense Council 2001, Second Analysis Confirms Greenhouse Gas Reductions in China, NRDC report available at http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/achinagg.asp
IEA 2001, CO2 emissions from fuel combustion, 1971 – 1999, highlights, 2001 Edition, International Energy Agency.
IEA, 2000, World Energy Outlook 2000, International Energy Agency, Paris
IEO 2001, International Energy Outlook 2001, Energy Information Administration, Office ofIntegrated Analysis and Forecasting, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC 20585,
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2000, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios,
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, United Kingdom
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2001a, Climate Change 2001: The scientific basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report. Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge, United Kingdom, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/tar/index.htm
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2001b, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report.
Cambridge
University
Press:
Cambridge,
UnitedKingdom,availableat
http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/tar/index.htm
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2001c, Climate Change 2001: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment Report. Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, United Kingdom, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/tar/index.htm
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2001d, Climate Change 2001; Synthesis report.
Cambridge
University
Press:
Cambridge,
UnitedKingdom,availableat
http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/tar/index.htm
Jansen, J.C., J.J. Battjes, J.P.M. Sijm, C.H. Volkers, J.R.Ybema, 2001a, The Multi-sector
convergence approach, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research Norway(CICERO) and the Energy Research Center of the Netherlands (ECN), CICERO WP 2001:4
Jansen, J.C., J.J. Battjes, J.P.M. Sijm, C.H. Volkers, J.R.Ybema, A. Torvanger, L. Ringius, A.
Underdal 2001b, Sharing the burden of greenhouse gas mitigation, Final report of the joint78

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CICERO-ECN project on the global differentiation of emissions mitigation targets amoung
countries, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research Norway (CICERO)
and the Energy Research Center of the Netherlands (ECN), May 2001
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2001, from http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/trends/trends.htm
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available
atwww.wolfson.ox.uk/~mueller
Müller, B., A. Michaelova, C. Vrolijk 2001b, “Rejecting Kyoto”, Climate strategies,
http://www.climate-strategies.org/
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Vol. 44 Issue 4, p.427.
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80Evolution of commitments / DM 754

ECOFYSAPPENDIX ACALCULATION DETAILSEmission inventory figures from the EDGAR 3.2 database (EDGAR 2001) for 1990 and 1995
were used as the basis. Energy and industrial emissions as well as from forestry for CO2, CH4
and N2O were included. For major Annex I countries, the emission data from the national
submissions to the UNFCCC were used. The business a usual path was calculated from theemission growth rates of the regions of the IPCC SRES scenario A2 applied to the emission
estimates of the inventories.
The GDP values 1990 and 1999 were taken from the World Bank as provided in IEA 2001 in
1995 US$ using purchasing power parities. Future values were obtained based on the IPCC
SRES scenario A2, which provides GDP growth for four world regions. The GDP growth rateof the group of countries was applied to individual countries by applying the average annual
growth rate between 1990 and 1999 of the individual countries, linearly de- or increased sothat the total GDP increase of the groups matches to total increase as provided in the A2
scenario.
Exceptions:
EU: CO2 emissions 1990 to 1999 ware taken from the Third National Communication of theEU.
USA: Emissions from 1990 to 2000 were taken from the draft 2002 inventory submission to
the UNFCCC.
Argentina: The GDP growth rate was taken as provided by the Worldbank(http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/arg_aag.pdf) 1990 to 2000 as +4.3% annually.
China: CO2 Emissions have decreased from 1995 to 2000 according to the IEA statistics (IEA
2001). The percentage decrease given in IEA (2001) from 1990 to 1999 was applied to theabsolute value of 1990 emissions as provided by the EDGAR database. This leads to substantially lower emissions for China. In addition the growth rate of the GDP between 1990 and1999 was 9.6% annually. For the future years a 7% increase was the base for the calculations.
Groups of countries
01: USAUSA

02: EU

European Union

Austria
Finland
GreeceLuxembourg
Spain

Belgium
FranceIrelandNetherlands
Sweden03: JPN

Japan

04: EEU

Eastern Europe (Annex I)

Belarus
Croatia
LatviaRomania
Ukraine05: RUS

Bulgaria
Estonia
Lithuania
Slovakia

Denmark
Germany
Italy
Portugal
United Kingdom

Czech RepublicHungary
PolandSlovenia

Russian Federation81

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06: RAI

Rest of Annex I

Australia
Liechtenstein
NorwayCanadaMonacoSwitzerland

07: TUR

Turkey08: REE

Rest of Eastern Europe and former USSR

Albania
Macedonia (FYROM)
Georgia
Moldova
Uzbekistan

Armenia
Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of
Kazakhstan
Tajikistan

09: ARG

Argentina

10: BRA

Brazil

11: COL

Colombia

12: MEX

Mexico13: VEN

Venezuela

14: RLA

Rest of Latin America

Aruba
Netherlands Antilles
BelizeBarbados
Costa Rica
Dominica
Falklands Islands (Malvinas)
GuatemalaHonduras
St Kitts & Nevis (St Christopher)
Martinique
Peru
El Salvador
Trinidad and Tobago
British Virgin Islands

Aruba
Antigua and Barbuda
BermudaBouvet Island
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Guadeloupe
French Guinea
Haiti
St Lucia
Nicaragua
Puerto Rico
Suriname
Uruguay
Virgin Islands (US)

15: EGY

Egypt

16: ZAFSouth Africa

17: NGA

Nigeria

18: RNA

Rest of North Africa

Algeria
Sudan

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Tunisia

Iceland
New ZealandBosnia & Herzegovina
Azerbaijan
Kyrgyzstan
Turkmenistan

Anguilla
BahamasBolivia
Chile
Cayman Islands
Ecuador
GrenadaGuyanaJamaicaMontserrat
PanamaParaguay
Turks & Caicos Islands
St Vincent & The Grenadines

Morocco82

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19: RAS

Rest of Southern Africa

AngolaBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)
Comoros

BurundiBotswana
Cameroon
Cape Verde

Djibouti
Ethiopia
GuineaEquatorial Guinea
Liberia
Mauretania
Malawi
Niger
SenegalSomalia
Seychelles
Tanzania, United Republic of
Zimbabwe

Eritrea
Gabon
GambiaKenya
Madagascar
Mozambique
MayotteReunionSt Helena
Sao Tome & Principe
Chad
UgandaBenin
Central African Republic
Congo
Democratic Republic ofCongo (former Zaire)
Western Sahara
Ghana
Guinea-Bissau
LesothoMali
Mauritius
Namibia
RwandaSierra Leone
Swaziland
Togo
ZambiaQatar

Saudi Arabia

CyprusIsraelOman

Iran, Islamic Republic of
JordanSyrian Arab RepublicHong Kong

Macau

20: GLF

Persian Gulf States

KuwaitUnited Arab Emirates

21: RME

Rest of Middle East

Bahrain
Iraq
LebanonYemen

22: CHN

China

China
Taiwan23: IND

India

24: IDN

Indonesia

25: KOR

Korea, Republic of (South)

26: MYS

Malaysia

27: PHL

Philippines

28: SGP

Singapore

29: THA

Thailand83

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30: RAA

Rest of Asia

Afghanistan
Bangladesh

Afghanistan
BhutanBrunei
Cocos (Keeling) Islands
French Polynesia (Tuamotu &Marquesas)
Korea, Democratic People's
Republic of (North)Marshall Islands
Myanmar (former Burma)
New Caledonia
Northern Mariana Islands
Papua New Guinea
Sri Lanka
Tonga
Vietnam

Cambodia (former Kampuchea)
Cook Islands
Guam
Lao Peoples Democratic Republic
Micronesia, Federated States of
Nauru
Niue
Pakistan
Samoa
Timor Timur (East Timor)
TuvaluWallis & Futuna

American Samoa
Britisch Indian Ocean Terr.
(Chagos)
Christmas Island (Australia)
Fiji
Kiribati
Maldives
Mongolia
Nepal
Norfolk Island
Palau
Solomon Islands
Tokelau
Vanuatu

Major emitting countries
Source: EDGAR 3.2 database (EDGAR 2001) for 1995, includes energy and industrial emissions as well as from forestry for CO2, CH4 and N2O
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Country
United States of America
China
Russian Federation
India
Japan
BrazilGermany
Indonesia
CanadaUkraineUnited Kingdom
MexicoFranceItaly
Australia
PolandKorea, Republic of (South)
Iran, Islamic Republic ofSouth Africa
Saudi Arabia
Spain
Thailand
Argentina
Venezuela
Pakistan
Kazakhstan
TurkeyMalaysia

Total GHG
emissions
1995
Gg CO2eq6750628
52466672473653
1902923137517311910311075628734260693434690767666068559286527320516964503032471907466521403146383297334054320682301287295682290949271204260358251355229016

AccumulaShare oftive share of
globalglobal emisemissions
sions
19%
19%
14%
33%
7%
40%
5%
45%
4%
49%
3%
52%
3%
55%
2%
57%
2%
59%
2%
61%
2%
63%
2%
64%
1%
66%
1%
67%
1%
68%
1%
70%
1%
71%
1%
72%
1%
73%
1%
74%
1%
75%
1%
76%
1%
77%
1%
77%
1%
78%
1%
79%
1%
80%
1%
80%

84

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ECOFYS

Major emitting countries sorted by emissions per capita
Source: EDGAR 3.2 database (EDGAR 2001) and WRI (2000) for 1995, includes energy andindustrial emissions as well as from forestry for CO2, CH4 and N2O
Country
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

United Arab Emirates
Qatar
BahrainBrunei
Gabon
Australia
Singapore
United States of America
New Zealand
Luxembourg
KuwaitCanadaNorwaySaudi Arabia
Azerbaijan
Trinidad and Tobago
Antigua and Barbuda
Ireland
Russian Federation
Bulgaria
Kazakhstan
Finland
Bolivia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Turkmenistan
Belgium
Denmark

Emissionsper capita
tCO2 eq / cap
56.47
44.18
34.24
33.91
29.32
28.03
25.74
25.28
24.70
24.12
23.64
23.41
19.98
18.30
17.27
17.05
16.85
16.71
16.70
16.52
15.77
15.07
14.97
14.48
14.43
14.31
14.30
14.15

Total GHG
emissions
1995
Gg CO2eq
124 793
24 210
19 0939 981
31 588503 033
85 4916 750 628
90 6859 813
39 949693 435
86 898334 054130 622
21 526
1 108
60 3092 473 653
140 415260 359
76 954111 020149 498
21 44158 370144 241
73 912

Accumulative
share of global
emissions
0%
0%
0%
0%
1%
2%
2%
21%
21%
21%
21%
23%
23%
24%
25%
25%
25%
25%
32%
32%
33%
33%
33%
34%
34%
34%
34%
34%

85

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ECOFYSAPPENDIX B

MEASURES OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

The following text is taken from the IPCC special report on emission scenarios (IPCC 2001,
box 3-1):
On Measures of Human and Economic Development
Writing 220 years ago in The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith noted that: “whatever the soil,
climate, or extent of territory of any particular nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual output fundamentally depends on its human resources – the skill, dexterity, and judgement of its labour” (Smith, 1970). Although economists recognized the importance of land,
labor, and capital in explaining economic growth and national wealth, in the post-World War II
period national well-being has usually been measured by GDP or gross national product(GNP). GDP is defined as the monetary equivalent of all products and services generated in agiven economy in a given year. GNP equals GDP plus the net balance of international payments to and from that economy. Few questions were asked about the underlying resourcebase for GDP growth and whether or not it was sustainable. Further, since GDP does not reflect all economic transactions it does not provide a full measure of human well-being. Nevertheless, GDP is very widely used because it is universally accepted as the monetary indicatorof all products and services generated in a given economy within a given year.
Environmental and Social Modifications to GDP
More recently, several new approaches have been developed to address the inherent shortcomings of GDP measures. These include “green” national accounts that incorporate the roleof the stocks and flows of renewable and non-renewable resources, and the related conceptof genuine savings (UN, 1993). “Green” GDP is the informal name given to national income
measures that are adjusted for the depletion of natural resources and degradation of the environment. The types of adjustment made to standard GDP include a measure of the user costsof exploiting natural resources and a value for the social costs of pollution emissions. In termsof measuring the sustainability of development, the green accounting aggregate with the mostpolicy relevance is “genuine saving.” This represents the value of the net change in assetsthat are important for development – produced assets, natural resources, environmental quality, foreign assets, and human resources, which include returns to education and raw laborand the strength and scope of social institutions. Human resources turn out, not unexpectedly, to be the dominant form of wealth in the majority of countries (World Bank, 1997a).
Purchasing Power Parities
A further problem arises in international comparisons, in which economic indicators are converted from local currencies into a common currency, such as dollars. Traditionally, market
exchange rates are used to make these conversions. In theory, exchange rates adjust so thatthe local currency prices of a group of identical goods and services represent equivalent value
in every nation. In practice, such adjustments can lag far behind changing economic circumstances. Policies, such as currency controls, may further distort the accuracy of market-based
rates. Moreover, many goods and services are not traded internationally so market-based
exchange rates may not reflect the relative values of such goods and services, even in theory.
An alternative approach is based on estimates of the purchasing power of different currencies. The International Comparison Project compared prices for several hundred goods andservices in a large number of countries. On the basis of this comparison, the relative values of
local currencies are adjusted to reflect PPP (see UNDP, 1993). In effect, the PPP currency
values reflect the number of units of a country’s currency required to buy the same quantity ofcomparable goods and services in the local market as one US dollar would buy in an “average” country. The average country is based on a composite of all participating countries. In
1996 the World Bank initiated the ranking of countries by GDP converted at PPP rates; theeffect was to reduce the income spread between the poorest and richest countries (WRI,
1997a).

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UN Human Development Index
The UN has tried to address the shortcomings of GDP by developing The Human Development Index (UNDP, 1997). This index, produced since 1990, combines three factors to measure overall development:-

Income as measured by real GDP per capita at PPP to represent command over resources to enjoy a decent standard of living.

-

Longevity as measured by life expectancy at birth.

-

Educational attainment as measured by adult literacy and school enrolment.

The UN has also developed other measures, such as the Gender-related Development Index(GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) to assess conditions such as genderequality.

87