THE ＧＬＯＢＡＬＩＺＡＴＩＯＮ ＆ ＧＯVＥＲＮＡＮＣＥ ＰＲＯＪＥCＴ， ＨＯＫＫＡＩＤＯ ＵＮＩＶＥＲＳＩＴＹＷＯＲＫＩＮＧ ＰＡＰＥＲ ＳＥＲＩＥＳThe Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping
in the 1990s
Ⅲ−１０

S. Neil MacFarlane,＊

The University of Oxford

Paper for the Symposium, The Role of the United Nations in International

Politic - A Historical Re-examination from the Member States’ Perspectives-,
20-21 December 2003.
＊

None of these papers should be cited without the author’s permission.

The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the 1990s
S. Neil MacFarlane
Department of Politics and International Relations
The University of Oxford
20 December 2003.
In this presentation, I am principally interested in what the connection is between
theorisation about international cooperation and the practice of peace operations in the
1990s. I begin with a brief comment on the differences between historical andpolitical science approaches to the subject of international relations. I follow with a
discussion of the major theoretical questions that underlie the practice of peace
support. I then move on to a general review of practice after the end of the Cold War.
And I conclude with a number of observations of the relationship (or lack of it)
between international relations theory and this element of multilateral practice.
History and Political Science
Concerning the differences between historians and political scientists, as I understandit, historians ask what happened and why, with regard to discrete events and processes.
They are not particularly interested in theory (that is to say, generalised statements
about cause and effect). Indeed, they may be suspicious of such attempts. Every casehas specific qualities that are essential in understanding why things turned out the way
they did. That makes the effort to compare suspect from the outset. From thisperspective, the wisdom of making universal generalisations is questionable. On theother hand, such generalisations may be useful in organising historical analysis, insuggesting places that the historian might fruitfully go, what questions he might ask,
and what he might fruitfully look for in seeking to understand a particular sequence of
events.
The political scientist (or at least those who work in the tradition of American
positivism), in contrast, is interested in identifying general causal propositions or
theories. The historical record is valuable to the political scientist in confirming or
disconfirming these general deductive propositions. Inductive analysis assists inrefining hypotheses as a basis for greater analytical and predictive traction. In thisrespect, while, for the historian, historical analysis is an end in itself and has intrinsic
value, for the political scientist it is a means to an end. Historical analysis provides
background information for systematic efforts to comprehend social process.
Theoretical Perspectives
The most fundamental theoretical problem in this sphere concerns the phenomenon ofinternational cooperation itself. Following Robert Keohane, I take cooperation tomean the adjustment of policy and/or behaviour to take into account the preferencesof others. The literature on international relations strikes non-specialists as somewhat
odd in its treatment of cooperation in that it puzzles over whether cooperation is,indeed, even possible. This seems a stupid question. We see cooperation all around us.
However, the cooperation we see generally occurs in small groups in which there is asignificant degree of trust. Alternatively, cooperation takes place on the basis ofshared rules that are enforced by traditionally or legally constituted authorities.

1That is the problem in IR. The international system is widely deemed to be anarchic,in the sense of having no recognised authority that is in a position to lay down the law
to others and to enforce that law. It is also pluralistic, comprising a large number ofstates. These states are sovereign, in the sense that they exercise control over whatgoes on within their borders (internal sovereignty) and their right to do so isrecognised by other states (external sovereignty). The interests of states arguably
derive from this anarchic and pluralistic structure of sovereign states, and the uneven
distribution of power within it.
This understanding of the international system is widely shared (if to varying degrees
and with differing emphases) by most of the theoretical traditions in international
relations. But what implications do these propositions have for the state behaviour andfor their propensity to cooperate, not least in the quest for peace?
Neorealism
There are three principal theoretical perspectives on international cooperation. The
first is the neorealist version. Neorealists and, for that matter, realists generally accept
that, given the absence of authoritative and effective enforcement mechanisms in theinternational system, states essentially have to rely on themselves for security. Allother things being equal, the rational response to this situation is to maximise power.
Efforts to accumulate power in turn threaten other states, creating competition for
power and the security dilemma. In short, this is not a particularly promising
environment for co-operation between states.
The structure of international relations (anarchy, pluralism), and the consequent state
preoccupation with power, impose significant limits on interstate cooperation. To
survive, states must emphasise their own interests. In so doing, where cooperative
endeavours interfere with the pursuit of egoistic interest, the latter will carry the day.
This is the problem of cheating or defection. Second, even where, in absolute terms, astate gains from cooperating with others, it is not absolute gains that matter; relative
gains are what counts. In the competitive environment of the state of nature, actors
must be permanently preoccupied with where they stand vis-à-vis other actors. It
doesn’t matter whether we are both better off as a result of our cooperation. If you
gain twice as much as I do, then I am weaker relative to you than I was before webegan to cooperate. And so again, I will refuse to cooperate or I will not continue tocooperate.
This is not to say that no cooperation is possible. States can and do cooperate on
discrete matters where they have strong mutual interests. This is the essence ofalliance theory. But neorealism suggests that such cooperation will be limited in both
extent and duration. Alliances disappear when the threat that occasions theirformation is eliminated or disappears.
It bears mention that this is a highly static and pessimistic account of international
relations. There is no meliorist or reformist agenda. Things are the way they are. They
cannot be changed. And indeed, from a prudential perspective, the effort to reform thesystem might carry greater costs than benefits.

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There is one other implication directly relevant to the analysis of peace-keeping
operations, now as then. Power is a scarce resource. States do not squander it lightly.
That is, they are unlikely to invest significant resources in circumstances where vitalinterests are at stake.
There are obvious empirical problems with this approach. First, the approach takes noaccount of the emergence on non-state actors and their apparently growing role in
influencing outcomes in international relations. Second, it doesn’t adequately accountfor the degree of state compliance with norms and rules even when these run counter
to immediate egoistic interests. For example, most states abide by most international
treaties most of the time. And they frequently pay a price for doing so. Third, it fails
to account for the breadth and durability of cooperation in international relations. The
numbers of multilateral organisations have grown exponentially in the post-WorldWar II era. Their functional coverage has broadened dramatically. “One glance at theannual Yearbook of International Organization should be enough to convince all but
the most sceptical observer of the extent to which our lives have become increasingly
entwined with multilateral international organizations.”1 Fourth, specific examples,such as the failure of NATO to disappear, appear to be direct challenges to theconception of alliance cooperation as partial and of limited duration. Something elsemust be at work here.
Realists are not stupid people, and they have an answer to this problem. Not
surprisingly, it rests of the distribution of power in the system. Particularconfigurations of power can foster cooperation, because cooperation is in the interestof the most powerful. This is the point of departure for various forms of hegemonicstability theory. Here, the argument is that hegemons seek to organise international
relations in such a way as to benefit from them, and to sustain their dominance of thesystem. They sponsor the institutions, and they define the underlying principles. The
institutions and principles are backed up by the hegemon’s power to persuade andpower to punish.
Hegemonic power, in other words, limits both problems (defection and relative gains)just identified and explains the depth and breadth of international cooperation underconditions of anarchy. Institutions that benefit the hegemon thrive; those that don’t
wither. Such approaches may have considerable value in explaining the evolution ofcooperative institutions in the West during the Cold War. They may also go somedistance in explaining post-Cold War phenomena, such as the persistence of NATO(it survived because the United States has sought to use it for purposes different fromthose on the basis of which it was founded in 1949, not least to prevent the emergenceof an independent European security institution). However, they are of little value in
explaining the emergence of cooperative arrangements in defiance of the hegemon –for example, the Kyoto Protocol, the Ottawa Convention on Land Mines, and thetreaty establishing the ICC.
Neoliberalism

1

From Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, Introduction,” in idem., US
Hegemony and International Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.2-3.

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Problems such as these have occasioned alternative attempts to explain cooperation
theoretically. One is the neoliberal version propounded by Robert Keohane.
Neoliberals accept the point of departure of realism. They see international relations
as a system of interaction amongst rationally acting monolithic actors – states. Thesestates seek to maximise their individual gains. However, neoliberals see the potential
for durable cooperative behaviour to be substantially greater than do neorealists. Thisis because multilateral institutions enhance communication, stabilise expectations, andenhance predictability. In other words they foster a social context for atomistic states
where states come to know each other. The repeated experience of cooperation – andthe gains therefrom – will cause states not so much to redefine their interests orpreferences, but to reconsider the means by which they pursue these interests. The
widening net of cooperative relations also creates possibilities for punishing statesthat do not abide by the rules. Defection in one issue area may carry costs in others.
Moreover, institutions cast a shadow on the future. If a state cheats or defects from aregime, other states will be reluctant to cooperate with it and it will therefore bedifficult for the defector to reap gains from cooperation in the future. In other words,
while short term perceived interests might suggest non-cooperation, the longer termcosts of defection might favour trading off short term gains against longer term ones.
Most neoliberals would agree that hegemony is necessary for the establishment ofcooperative institutions. However, as states develop the habits of cooperation, as
expectations are stabilised, and as states learn the benefits of collaboration, theymaydevelop interests in the persistence of institutionalised cooperation even as power
relations change.
Although this account of international cooperation does provide a reasonablycompelling basis for contesting neorealist arguments regarding defection, this leaves
open the question of relative gains. Here the obvious point to make is that a state’s
sensitivity to the problem of relative gains is likely to vary across issue areas. On
many issues (e.g. environmental cooperation or cooperation on health issues),differential gains are likely to have little impact on the power position of the state.
Nigeria stands to gain more than America through effective cooperation in the effort
to control malaria, but this differential will have little effect on America’s willingness
to cooperate, because Nigeria’s relative gain in this respect has little effect on
America.
Matters become somewhat more complex in the area of economic cooperation (forexample, free trading regimes), since economic power is fungible. States can translate
economic gains into useable force. It stands to reason, therefore, that states would be
more sensitive to relative gains in this area of cooperation. However, such things taketime. Damage to the state’s relative power position is slow and there is time to adjust.
In such circumstances, states may trade off longer term relative losses against shortterm absolute gains for some time. We see this arguably in the evolving SinoAmerican trading and investment relationship.
This brings me finally to the area of security cooperation. Most would agree that
relative gains issues, and the impediments they pose to interstate cooperation arelikely to be particularly strong in security. In the first place, military power is a scarce
resource. It tends to be used in pursuit of clear state interests. Secondly, mistakes cancause severe damage. To illustrate – let us assume that India and Pakistan had both4

joined the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and that India had honoured its
obligations while Pakistan had cheated and developed a nuclear weapon. The result
would have been a substantial and possibly fatal erosion of India’s power-political
position in South Asia. Not surprisingly, neither state chose to participate in thissecurity cooperation regime. In this respect, both neoliberalism and neorealism
provide little hope for substantial multilateral security cooperation, a point of obvious
relevance to the peace and security role of the UN.
Classical Liberalism
Before moving on to peacekeeping, I should mention a third variant of theory
concerning cooperation, which contests the point of departure of both realism andneoliberalism. Classical liberal theory rejects the notion that relations between states
are inherently conflictual. Indeed, they would argue that growing interdependence
among states reduces the potential for interstate conflict. Moreover, the essential
focus of liberalism is the individual, not the state. Normatively, the focus of liberal
theory is on the maximisation of individual freedom and welfare. States are not ends
in themselves. They are means to ends. The fundamental challenge for liberals indomestic politics is to create a system of domestic governance that enhancesindividual capacities to pursue their own preferences.
Classical liberals recognise that the international context may affect the capacity tocreate and maintain domestic governance that promotes individual freedom. So theliberal challenge in international relations is to create and sustain an international
system that promotes the freedom of individuals and their capacity to maximise theirindividual potential. The contradictions and conflicts between states are the result offaults in their design and construction. Peace is, therefore, possible if both states andinstitutions are properly designed or reformed.
The domestic level was well covered in the work of Immanuel Kant, and his later
disciples (e.g. Michael Doyle). Since (as they maintain) democratic states do not fighteach other, the problems of peace and security would be resolved if all states were
democratic. Theoretically, what is interesting here is that the distribution of power
does not matter; what matters is expectations. The expectation is that, since
democratic states, ceteris paribus, are internally focused and welfare-oriented, they
will not act aggressively unless they feel threatened. Since other democratic states are
similarly focused and oriented, they will not appear to be threatening.
On the other hand, the agenda regarding non-democratic states is implicitly aggressive.
They stand in the way of peace and therefore should be fixed. This crusading message
is clearly evident in Woodrow Wilson’s notion that the world had to be made safe fordemocracy by externally based efforts to reform of non-democratic states. It also
appears clear in current discussion of what is going on in Iraq.
At the level of international institutions, the liberal project has leaned towards thecreation of institutions that will contain if not resolve the problem of war. In theextreme, this implies the creation of a world government, the functions of which
would closely parallel those of domestic governments. Hence Kant proposed theestablishment of a liberal federation. Less ambitiously, liberal thinking leads naturally
to the concept of collective security. Here, the idea is that all states participating in the5system would commit themselves to the proposition that if one state were attacked, all
the others would defend the victim of aggression. In such circumstances, war would
disappear, because no single state could hope to prevail over all the others.
At both the domestic and international levels, the liberal normative agenda isinherently meliorist or reformist, if not utopian. Moreover, in some respects it is acosmopolitan rather than a pluralist agenda. For liberals, human beings are entitled todignity and respect because they are human beings. This suggests that we all have adegree of obligation to each other. And so, concern for the fate of individuals within
other states is not merely instrumental (the quest for peace); it is essential.
This suggests a fundamentally different take on sovereignty. Sovereignty has no
intrinsic value; states enjoy sovereign rights to the extent that they respect the rightsof their citizens. If they don’t, their sovereignty is correspondingly diminished.
Liberal solidarism also suggests a different take on the use of military power. The
notion that we may be obliged to promote and defend the basic rights of individuals
within other states adds a further dimension to the interventionist thrust of liberal
normative theory.
Before going on to consider the contemporary practice of the use of power in pursuitof peace, it is worth pointing out several problems with this liberal view ofinternational politics. In the most general sense, despite its claims to universality, it is
not and never has been universally accepted. Nor is there any clear evidence that it iscoming to be so. Many outside the West see the focus on the individual as corrosiveof the community. It is not obvious why others should accept its claim to universality,
since it is a product of a specific historical experience (that of Enlightenment andmodernising Europe). Many newer states (and not so new ones – e.g. China) arecontent with the Westphalian dispensation – cuius rex, eius religio, and see little meritin a post-Westphalian liberal reform of the states system, or for liberal reform of theirown states. Many in the West consider militarised solidarism to be a recipe forpermanent conflict if not chaos, since Western impositions will be resisted.
More specifically, the empirical record of collective security is not encouraging.
There are two major episodes. One is the experience of the League of Nations, where,
perhaps unfortunately, states were not willing to sacrifice short term interests forlonger term milieu goals. The result was the discrediting of the League and of theidealist moment in interwar international politics.
The second concerned the operation of the principle of collective security within the
United Nations. The one Cold War case where the UN as an organisation mandated aforceful response to an act of interstate aggression was the collective actioncommanded by the United States in Korea. The only reason that it proceeded under
UN Security Council auspices was that the Soviet representative on the Security
Council was boycotting Council sessions. Once he came back, that window wasclosed.
Summary
I suppose the key point to conclude with is that while neorealism and neoliberalism
differ substantially on general prospects for multilateral cooperation in international6relations, they agree that prospects for cooperation in the area of security (beyond
alliances of convenience in the face of imminent threats) are poor, largely because of
the salience of relative gains. In contrast, the liberal tradition has a fundamentallymore optimistic view of the potential for interstate cooperation in pursuit of peace,and in pursuit of liberal values.
The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping
The Cold War
This brings me to the practice of peacekeeping and its relation to theory in the 1990s.
A preliminary few words are needed, however, on the Cold War period, to serve as abasis for comparison. At its inception, the United Nations reflected a curious blend ofliberalism and realism. On the one hand, the United Nations was organised with the
purpose of collectively managing international security. The Charter outlawed
aggression (2.4), and (in Chapter VII) laid out the legal basis for international
response to threats to international peace and security. In its apparent effort to outlaw
aggressive war, the Charter follows directly in the liberal tradition of the League of
Nations.
On the other hand, and responding to defects in the League, the Charter adds a
decidedly realist twist. It recognised that collective responses to threats tointernational peace and security were unlikely to be effective if decision-making
power were spread equally across the membership, and so it was concentrated in thehands of the states that were most powerful at the time the Charter was drafted, thepermanent members of the Security Council. And, since such responses were unlikely
to be effective without consensus among the most powerful, the Charter provided vetopowers to those five states. The emergence of bipolarity – in conjunction with theveto – largely explained the weakness of the UN’s role in international security formuch of the period from 1950 to 1985. The absence of effective international security
cooperation is easily covered, not surprisingly, by realist approaches; systemiccompetition between the two superpowers and their allies precluded any significant
collective decision-making in the Council or collective action by the United Nations
in responding to threats to international peace and security.2
Realism also does pretty well in explaining such peace keeping as did emerge. In
Suez in 1956, for example, the two superpowers found themselves with a crisis not of
their own making and with substantial prospects for escalating into a serious
confrontation that neither wanted. The insertion of UNEF provided a means of
avoiding that outcome. Likewise, in the Congo, the insertion of ONUC allowed thesuperpowers to avoid a potentially costly competitive intervention in an area of
marginal strategic importance to them.
Where these conditions did not hold, the capacity to respond collectively to threats tointernational peace and security was very limited. The absence of any effort to deal
with the intervention in Hungary, the Vietnam Wars, the Nigerian civil war, the2

It is unsurprising in this context that realists of the Cold War era had little if anything to say about thepeacekeeping activities of the United Nations in the effort to regulate the system of international
security. See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill,1979).

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intervention in Czechoslovakia, the repeated crises in the Middle East in the 1960s
and 1970s, the various post-independence civil conflicts in Southern Africa, the IranIraq War, and the auto-génocide in Cambodia, are illustrative.
It also bears mention that – where they were permitted – UN peace-keeping
operations were, in military terms, distinctly unambitious. UN-based multilateral
military deployments generally occurred in conditions of suspension of hostilities
with the consent of the parties. They were not mandated under Chapter VII.
Traditional deployments generally occurred along lines of contact and after
disengagement. They were intended to provide reassurance that hostilities might not
inadvertently or advertently resume. In other words, they were there to maintain andenhance a stable military environment while the parties sought to resolve their disputeby political means. Blue helmets were lightly armed, so as not to seem threatening.
Their mandate stressed impartiality. Their rules of engagement permitted the use offorce only in self-defence.
The fundamental point is clear. As realist theory would predict, in a highly
competitive international system, the potential for multilateral cooperation in
addressing conflict within the international system is distinctly limited.
The Post-Cold War Era
If bipolarity and superpower competition imposed significant constraints on security
cooperation during the Cold War, then one might expect the disappearance of thesestructures to open up substantial space for multilateral efforts to promote international
peace and security, as well as other humane values. On the other hand, if the problem
is deeper – that prospects for such cooperation are inherently low as a result ofanarchy and pluralism – then one might expect that change in the distribution of
power would not create a substantial momentum towards international (ortransnational) liberalism.
It is useful to begin here by asking how peace operations in the post-Cold War era
differed from UN operations during the Cold War.
If we accept the definition of traditional peacekeeping outlined above, the operationsof the 1990s showed variation along all of its axes. In a number of instances, theoperations were not organised and managed by the UN Secretariat, but instead werebased on coalitions of the willing or on regional arrangements (Chapter VIII or not).
UN or UN-mandated forces were deployed into situations where there was nosuspension of hostilities or where ceasefires were fragile and often broken. Lines ofseparation were often incomplete and unstable. Consent was also often incomplete
and unstable. A broad array of tasks were added, from peace enforcement toprotection of relief and humanitarian assistance providers. Many operations came toinclude substantial human rights monitoring and electoral assistance components. In
weak or failed states, peace operations expanded to include post-conflict peacebuilding tasks. The expansion of tasks implied the engagement of larger numbers ofcivilian personnel and agencies, creating real challenges of coordination. The
cohabitation of peace operations with substantial humanitarian assistance delivery
brought peacekeepers into much more sustained contact with non-governmentalorganisations, complicating the coordination problem further. In extremis, as in8

Kosovo and East Timor, the UN took on a substantial role in the administration of
war-torn territories, effectively assuming sovereign authority.
Many of these expansions or changes reflected liberal commitments. In a number ofcases (e.g. Haiti, Sierra Leone), the overthrow of democratic regimes was ultimately
defined as a threat to international peace and security. Others (e.g. Somalia, Bosnia)
reflected a solidarist concern to address violations of basic human rights (e.g. the rightto humanitarian assistance). Still others addressed the protection needs of displaced
persons (e.g. the safety zones resolutions in northern Iraq and also Bosnia). In theextreme, the UN mandated interventions to rescue human beings in peril.
The message one gets, in short is a transition from realist to liberal behaviour. And
this transition posed a substantial challenge to key principles of the Westphalianinternational system. Notably, these peace operations largely concerned not interstate
conflict (which largely disappeared in the post-Cold War era), but internal affairs
normally considered within the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign states. Secretaries
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan explicitly challenged the principle ofsovereignty as traditionally construed. Boutros-Ghali averred in 1992 that the time ofabsolute sovereignty had passed. Kofi Annan, following Francis Deng, suggested thatsovereignty should be redefined in terms of responsibility. To the extent that a state
met its responsibilities in the protection of its citizens, it enjoyed sovereign rights. To
the extent that it could not or would not meet these responsibilities, it didn’t.
Several qualifications are, however, necessary. First, in numerous instances where
human beings were equally at risk, the UN or coalitions mandated by the UN did notintervene. Rwanda comes to mind, as does the Congo and Chechnya. In contrastingcases where liberal interventions did occur with those where, in equally or morecompelling circumstances it did not, one is driven to the conclusion that commitmentsof substantial military resources depended on the level of perceived interest of majorstates. Where this interest was not evident (as in Rwanda) and/or where the humanrights agenda conflicted with the power-political interests of major states (as in
Chechnya), forceful peace operations did not occur, or, as in Kosovo, they did occur
but outside the UN mandating machinery (as in Kosovo).
Second, and relatedly, examination of UN Security Council processes and mandates
suggests considerable discomfort among some powers with the entire idea ofintervention in the sovereignty of other states. This discomfort is even morewidespread in the General Assembly. Most of the resolutions mandating the actions
mentioned above specify the unique circumstances justifying the action, and,
consequently, that the action should not be taken to be a precedent for the future.
They also tend to reaffirm the sovereignty of the target state, suggesting discomfort
with any implication that the principle of sovereignty and the associated principle ofnon-intervention are in question. Efforts to generalise a right (or obligation) tointervene on humanitarian grounds, such as those of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, have been adamantly (and effectively) resisted.
In short, we can see the evolution of peace operations in terms of a contestation
between realist and liberal visions of international relations. The former emphasise thepluralism of international politics, the significance of the sovereign rights of states,
and the constraints on the potential for cooperation in such a system, particularly in9the realm of security. The latter privilege the individual rather than the state and arewilling to qualify sovereignty in terms of the willingness of capacity of states to fulfil
their basic commitments to their citizens. They take a fundamentally more optimist
and reformist view of international relations, and conceive a far broader role forinternational organisations in addressing issues of human security.
For structural reasons, there was little space for the elaboration of liberal agendas ininternational politics during the Cold War. At the end of the Cold War, many felt thatthe space for international cooperation in the quest for peace had been substantiallyexpanded. This was because they assumed that the basic cause of the weakness ofcooperation in this sphere was the nature of the Cold War distribution of power.
Bipolarity and superpower competition precluded more ambitious efforts to securedurable systemic peace. And, indeed, the expanding agenda of peace operations in the
1990s suggests that there is some truth in this perspective.
However, the experiences of peace operations in the 1990s suggest that thistheoretical interpretation is only partly true. The rather bumpy and incomplete recordof the post-Cold War era suggests that the distribution of power may not be the realissue. Instead, the underlying issue that explains so much of the difficulty encounteredby the UN in its response to the security dilemmas of the post-Cold War era is, in fact,
the pluralism of international relations and the egoistic behaviour of the states thatcomprise it.

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