Sustainable Development in West Africa:
Beginning the Process

A Collaborative Study of
The Stockholm Environment Institute — Boston
andEnvironnement et Développement du Tiers-MondeCharles Heaps, SEI-Boston
Stephen Humphreys, ENDA-TM
Eric Kemp-Benedict, SEI-Boston
Paul Raskin, SEI-Boston
Youba Sokona, ENDA-TM

June 1999
Published by the Stockholm Environment Institute - Boston CenterStockholm Environment Institute - Boston Center
11 Arlington Street
BostonMA 02116-3411
USA
Tel: (617) 266 8090
Fax: (617) 266 8303
Email: seib@tellus.org
http://www.seib.org

Environnement et Développement du Tiers-Monde
B.P. 3370 54 Rue Carnot
Dakar
SenegalTel: +221 822 5983
Fax: +221 821 7595
Email: energy2@enda.sn
http://www.enda.sn©Copyright 1999 by the Stockholm Environment Institute.
No parts of this report may be reproduced in any form without written permission from thepublisher.

Table of Contents
1.

THE REGION AND THE CHALLENGE ___________________________________________ 1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4

2.

CURRENT PATTERNS__________________________________________________________ 7
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7

3.

THE UEMOA STATES: AN OVERVIEW ______________________________________________ 1
INTEGRATING THE REGION _______________________________________________________ 3
PLANNING ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION _______________________________________________ 5
BRACING FOR THE FUTURE _______________________________________________________ 6

DEMOGRAPHY _________________________________________________________________ 7
ECONOMY ____________________________________________________________________ 8
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT _________________________________________________________ 10
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE _______________________________________________________ 11
WATER _____________________________________________________________________ 15
ENERGY AND AIR POLLUTION ____________________________________________________ 17
LAND_______________________________________________________________________ 20

A CONVENTIONAL DEVELOPMENT SCENARIO ________________________________ 23
3.1 SCENARIO METHODS ___________________________________________________________ 23
3.2 A CONVENTIONAL DEVELOPMENT SCENARIO FOR WEST AFRICA _________________________ 24
3.3 SUMMARY OF THE SCENARIO_____________________________________________________ 25
3.4 DEMOGRAPHY ________________________________________________________________ 26
3.5 ECONOMY ___________________________________________________________________ 26
3.6 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT _________________________________________________________ 27
3.7 AGRICULTURE ________________________________________________________________ 29
3.8 WATER _____________________________________________________________________ 32
3.9 ENERGY AND AIR POLLUTION ____________________________________________________ 34
3.10 LAND_______________________________________________________________________ 37

4.

TOWARD SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AFRICA ____________________ 39
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4

INDICATORS AND SUSTAINABILITY ________________________________________________ 39
POLICY IMPLICATIONS __________________________________________________________ 40
NEXT STEPS _________________________________________________________________ 44
CONCLUSIONS ________________________________________________________________ 46

REFERENCES ______________________________________________________________________49
ANNEX: SCENARIO HIGHLIGHTS ___________________________________________________53
ANNEX NOTES ____________________________________________________________________ 81Table of Tables
TABLE 2-1. POPULATION AND GDP________________________________________________________ 7
TABLE 2-2. STRUCTURE OF GDP AND EMPLOYMENT___________________________________________ 9
TABLE 2-3. DEBT AND TRADE ___________________________________________________________ 10
TABLE 2-4. SOCIAL INDICATORS _________________________________________________________ 10
TABLE 2-5. AVERAGE DAILY CALORIC INTAKE IN 1994 ________________________________________ 13
TABLE 2-6. SELF-SUFFICIENCY RATIOS FOR CROP COMMODITIES IN 1994 __________________________ 14
TABLE 2-7. SELF-SUFFICIENCY RATIOS FOR LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS IN 1994 _________________________ 15
TABLE 2-8. ANNUAL RENEWABLE WATER RESOURCES IN 1995 __________________________________ 15
TABLE 2-9. ANNUAL WATER WITHDRAWALS IN 1995 _________________________________________ 17
TABLE 2-10. TOTAL FINAL CONSUMPTION AND TOTAL PRIMARY SUPPLY OF ENERGY IN 1995 ___________ 17
TABLE 2-11. ELECTRIC POWER CONSUMPTION AND HYDROELECTRIC SUPPLY IN 1995_________________ 18
TABLE 2-12. LAND USE AND POTENTIALLY CULTIVABLE LAND IN 1994 ____________________________ 20
TABLE 3-1. ENERGY RESERVES IN THE SCENARIO ____________________________________________ 36
TABLE 4-1. SUMMARY OF CONVENTIONAL DEVELOPMENT SCENARIO INDICATORS ___________________ 39

Table of Figures
FIGURE 1-1. THE UEMOA COUNTRIES _____________________________________________________ 2
FIGURE 2-1. YIELD PER HARVEST OF CEREALS _______________________________________________ 12
FIGURE 2-2. YIELD PER HARVEST OF ROOTS AND TUBERS ______________________________________ 13
FIGURE 3-1. REGIONAL OVERVIEW OF THE SCENARIO _________________________________________ 25
FIGURE 3-2. INCOME DISTRIBUTION CURVE _________________________________________________ 28
FIGURE 3-3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HUNGER LINE AND THE HUNGRY POPULATION___________ 29
FIGURE 3-4. WATER RESOURCES PER CAPITA IN THE SCENARIO __________________________________ 33

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

1

1. The Region and the Challenge
The challenge of sustainable development is to harmonize economic, social andenvironment objectives. For development to be sustainable, it must address the aims andaspirations of today while passing on robust and resilient environmental and socioeconomic systems to future generations. The quest for sustainable development poses
new challenges for science and policy. The concern for both socio-economic andbiophysical aspects of development requires that we transcend a sectoral focus to adopt aholistic viewpoint of socio-ecological systems that is sensitive to the multiple linkages andinteractions among environmental and societal issues. The concern for the future requires
a long-range time horizon that considers the implications of today's conditions in trends
over the coming decades — where are we going? It also puts on the collective agenda
the question of vision — where do we want to go? — and action — how do we get there?
The transition to sustainable forms of development will be a long and complex process.
The objective of this project is to help launch that process in West Africa. Specifically, itfocuses on the countries in the UEMOA region, the Union Economique et Monetaire
Ouest Africain. The study is the first to assess current patterns of development andresource use in the region, with a view to evaluating the sustainability of current practices
into the future. After setting the context for the issue of sustainable development in theregion in the first chapter, the second chapter provides a country-by-country profile of thehistorical trends and current state of a range of development indicators: social, economic,
resource and environmental. The third chapter presents a Conventional Development
scenario, a possible picture of the region in 2025 assuming current trends, typicalassumptions about economic growth and demographic change, and no major new policies
to address the challenge of sustainable development challenge. The final chapter
discusses the strategic implications of this initial analysis, the need to consider alternative
scenarios and policies, and the next steps in the process of advancing sustainable
development in West Africa.
1.1

The UEMOA States: an Overview

The UEMOA is a regional governmental organization consisting of the Francophone West
Africa states — Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal
and Togo1. These countries are situated in the north-western part of Sub-Saharan Africa(Figure 1-1). The UEMOA region covers a wide range of ecological zones, from thehumid south to the arid north. The northern parts of Mali and Niger extend into the
Sahara, while large areas in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal are in the Sahel — thetransitional region between the desert to the north and the wetter areas to the south.
Because of the special constraints imposed by the drier climate, it is useful to distinguishthese four Sahelian countries from the wetter humid countries to the south — Benin, Côte
d’Ivoire and Togo.
1

Guinea-Bissau descended into civil war shortly after joining the UEMOA and is excluded from thisstudy.

2

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

The Sahelian region is dominated by areas with erratic rainfall and fragile soils. Movingfrom the south to the north, the land becomes progressively less suitable for settled
agriculture, and in the drier part of the countries, agricultural production is dominated by
pastoralist livestock production. Three of the four Sahelian countries — Burkina Faso,
Mali and Niger — are landlocked, while Senegal has access to the coast on its westernborder. For the landlocked countries the restricted access to international markets is acommon constraint on development (Snrech, 1995). The lack of direct access to the coast
is exacerbated by the decline of the road network in Togo. Prior to the 1990s, Togo had awell-developed system of roads that connected the Sahelian countries to the coast, but thishas deteriorated as a result of political crisis. The humid region along the southern coastof West Africa is relatively favorable for agricultural production, although the soils are
low in phosphorous (World Bank, 1996b).
Figure 1-1. The UEMOA Countries

The UEMOA countries are all at or near the bottom of most tables of global development
indicators, with Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso experiencing some of the lowest per capita
incomes in the world. West African has experienced considerable political turmoil,
although the UEMOA countries have largely avoided the worst ravages of war
experienced by such neighbors as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, and Algeria. Stability insome UEMOA countries is related to the long-term dominance of a single political group.
Others, notably Mali and Burkina Faso, have recently experienced serious political unrest
and are in a stage of consolidation. The long term prospects for stability in the region are
difficult to predict.

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

3

The UEMOA region is rich in energy, mineral and natural resources, although current
levels of exploitation are low and monetary benefits are often directed outside the region.
The region’s institutional and administrative capacity is weak as is its transport,
communications and other infrastructure. To take a single example, there is less than one
telephone line per one hundred people. Population in the region is expanding at an annual
rate of about 3%. While growing in recent years, GDP has not kept pace with population
growth. Standards of living in the region are falling as a result. West Africa is dependent
largely on agricultural production for both domestic food needs and export revenue.
However, the productivity of this sector is at risk from desertification. The industrial
base, which is the primary focus of governmental development efforts, remains weak.
Underdevelopment and stagnation of the region are not inevitable. There is great scopefor improving and accelerating the development process in a manner that is informed by aconcern for the environment and for the conservation of resources. It is important that theregion determine its own path for sustainable development and not allow theenvironmental issues of industrialized countries to dominate the agenda. For example,
while regional energy consumption is the lowest in the world and air pollution levels are
not high, they both will rise as the economy grows. The challenge is to fashion a regionspecific strategy that avoids the environmental degradation and resource depletion that
accompanied industrial development in the past.
This is an opportune moment for rethinking the developmental paradigm in the UEMOA
states. The wave of democratization and economic liberalization in Africa in the 1990s,
despite setbacks, could provide a context for building environmental considerations into
economic growth and social development in the region. A major impetus for this has its
roots in the Earth Summit of 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, which underscored the seriousness ofenvironmental problems facing Africa in the near future, particularly desertification(UNCED, 1992). These issues have captured the attention of the global community. The
challenge is to ensure that actions to address them will contribute to, rather than obstruct,local and regional development. Sustainability and development must be mutually
reinforcing objectives in the African context and, in particular, in West Africa its poorest
region.
1.2

Integrating the Region

A large and growing body of opinion holds that regional cooperation, with a view toeventual integration, is the optimal approach to sustainable development in West Africa. In
a region of great geographical and social diversity, geopolitical boundaries only rarely
correspond to cultural and ecological zones. The causes of environmental degradation
tend to be common across West Africa’s various shared ecosystems: extensive farming, aloss of fallow area, demographic pressure, water-management complications and farmerherder conflicts. The nation-state has not yet succeeded in bringing either stability or
coherent development in the region. Reconceptualization of development as a regionwide challenge reveals enormous potential for market expansion, infrastructure integration
and resource exploitation.

4

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Regionalism has a long history in West Africa. In pre-colonial times, the area was repletewith trans-regional trading routes between the Sahel and the Coast, before often arbitrary
frontiers solidified into linguistic and commercial barriers. The old trade routes persist to
some extent in the informal economic sectors of West Africa, despite stringent bordercontrols and exorbitant excise taxes. In contemporary West Africa, various regional
formations have emerged. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
a comprehensive and ambitious effort at integration, rewrote its basic treaty in 1993.
Hampered by the divergent economies and histories of the Anglophone and Francophone
nations under its umbrella, ECOWAS’ impact has so far been more visible on regional
security issues. In the health sector, the Francophone OCCGE (Organisation de
Coordination et de Cooperation pour le lutte contre les Grandes Endémies) and theAnglophone West African Health Community (WAHC) are soon to join forces. There are
two organizations for managing the river basins of the Senegal and Gambia rivers: theOMVS (Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve Sénégal) and the OMVG
(Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve Gambie). The CILSS (Comité permanentinter-état de lutte contre la sécheresse dans le Sahel) addresses drought issues, and, alongwith the Club du Sahel, has produced a number of significant texts examining the potential
for sustainability across the region, particularly with a view to stemming the tide ofdesertification in the region.
The UEMOA was created in 1994 from the UMOA (Union Monetaire Ouest Africain) andthe CEAO (Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest), uniting thecountries of the CFA Franc monetary zone. The UEMOA exercises some regulatory
authority in regional fiscal issues, and is expected eventually to assume greater regulatory
powers akin to its counterpart in Europe, the European Union. The UEMOA is
potentially the most significant entity for promoting trans-regional action for sustainable
development, although the body does not focus explicitly on this goal at present. Itsconstitutional treaty of 1994 emphasizes the principle of subsidiarity, establishes a
supranational commission modeled on that of the EU and outlines five major objectives:
•
•
•
•
•

encourage competition in an open and competitive market within a reasoned
juridical environment;
achieve convergence between policy and macro-economic policy indicators;
create a common market;
coordinate sectoral policies;align budgetary policies.

In addition, a number of legislative mechanisms are stipulated including a prohibition on
the introduction of new protectionist barriers between member states and measures forsurveillance of the alignment of economic policy with a provision for sanctions.
UEMOA’s concern with monetary and economic matters to date — an orientation whichreflects the notion that economic integration is the key to regional integration — will
support regional investment in industry, agriculture, transport, communications and energy
infrastructure. In the future, it is critical that the principles of sustainability becomeSustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process5

explicit in the UEMOA, just as it is essential that other regional bodies working insustainable development align themselves with the UEMOA.

1.3

Planning Environmental Action

The emergence of environmental issues in the last twenty years has significantly influenced
development ideas in the region. Before Rio there was a perception of conflict between
development and environmental goals, since conventional economic expansion demanded
exploitation of the environment. However, Agenda 21, drawing on the Brundtland report(WCED, 1987), noted that in order to satisfy current needs and preserve resources for the
future, new modes of development were needed. With the breakdown of colonial models
of wealth extraction and exploitation of the natural resource base, the principle ofsustainability was strikingly appropriate to the African context where the environment is avulnerable and crucial element of development. One result is that African states areactively engaged in the formulation and implementation of the UN Conventions on
biodiversity, climate change and desertification. Although these efforts are conductedprimarily at the national level at present, concerted regional action offers enormous
potential.
Since Rio, all the UEMOA states have embarked on a process of elaborating National
Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs). An important aspect of these plans is a National
Action Plan (NAP) to combat desertification, as required by the UN Convention to
Combat Desertification (CCD). A number of states have completed their NEAP and havegone on to the implementation phase. The NEAPs and NAPs constitute statements bythese countries of their intent to pursue an ecologically balanced course in the future.
While the general trend is towards an acceptance of sustainable development objectives,problems arise at the national administrative level. For example, responsibility for NEAPs
and NAPs generally lies with the Ministries for the Environment rather than for
Development, and coordination between the different departments is not always
transparent.
The Convention to Combat Desertification encourages local participative action. Ideally,
the implementing bodies will provide a framework for the coordination of local actions
and the exchange of relevant information. Desertification is a major environmental issue inthe UEMOA countries, four of which are Sahelian, and ultimately measures taken tocombat it will alter the agricultural, land-use and energy-use systems of the area, which
will in turn affect the systems of food production and wealth distribution. These long term
development impacts should be monitored and integrated into the planning of any scenario
for the future of the region.
Another major regional concern is global climate change. The greenhouse gas emissions ofcountries of the region are insignificant in global terms; the major sources of emissions
that do exist are from land-use changes and deforestation. However, West Africa, andparticularly the Sahel, is one of the areas most vulnerable to climate change due to its

6

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

propensity for drought and desertification, and its dependence on subsistence agriculture.
The region is likely to experience increases in extreme events such as drought anddesertification, along with increasing average rainfall in the humid regions, although it is
not yet possible to predict these effects with high scientific confidence (IPCC, 1996;
Hulme et al., 1995). Properly designed and implemented, the region could benefit frominitiatives to mitigate climate change, particularly the Global Environmental Fund (GEF)
and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). These are intended to contribute tosustainable development while mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. African countries are
exploring how best to engage with the CDM, but the uncertainty surrounding its design
and implementation prevent a definitive determination at this time of its potential
contribution to regional development.
1.4

Bracing for the future

The importance of a coherent approach to development and the environment for thecountries of the UEMOA region cannot be overstated. However, these twin aspects ofsustainable development remain largely isolated from one another at present. Despite theapparent stasis in development since independence, West African society and culture
thrives and features many traditional forms of sustainable production, which are merely
invisible to the eyes of conventional developers. This study exposes some of the limits of
conventional development thinking in the light of their long-term unsustainability. It will
be for a future study to better approach the reality of the often hidden modes of living andproducing which may provide the basis for a sustainable development path into the future.
A key to a sustainability transition in the region is to transcend the limits of the nationstate to consider opportunities for the region as a whole. A regional approach is an
important means to achieve sustainable development in West Africa, since environmental,
economic and social conditions are shared without reference to geopolitical boundaries.
The challenges are great, but so are the opportunities for fashioning a form ofdevelopment that is true to the West African heritage as well as the principles ofsustainability. This study, we hope, will help lay the groundwork.

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

7

2. Current Patterns
The previous chapter surveyed the broad challenges facing West Africa as it seeks to meetthe dual goals of social development and environmental protection. Now we look in
more detail at the historical trends and current state of a range of social, economic,
resource and environmental indicators.
2.1

Demography

Populations in the region have been growing rapidly over the past decades compared to
the world average (Table 2-1). Between 1994 and 1995, in the region as a whole
population grew at close to the average rate for Africa, around 3% per year, twice theaverage rate for the world as a whole. The growth rates in individual countries varied
from 2.6% per year in Senegal to 3.4% per year in Niger. Over the thirty-year period
from 1965 to 1995, population in the region more than doubled. A central concern today
and in the future is how to meet the needs of the rapidly growing population while
maintaining the natural resource base on which livelihoods in the region depend.
Table 2-1. Population and GDP
GDPPPP
GDPPPP
Population
growth rate
(billion per capita(ave. ann., %) Urbanization (%)IN$)(IN$/cap)
Population (millions)
1965
1990
1995
1990-1995
1980
1995
1995
1995
Benin
2.3
4.7
5.4
2.9
25
31
10.0
1,842
Burkina Faso
4.5
9.1
10.5
2.9
8
27
8.0
759
Cote d'Ivoire
3.9
11.7
13.7
3.2
35
44
23.6
1,721
Mali
4.5
9.2
10.8
3.2
18
27
5.9
546
Niger
3.1
7.7
9.2
3.4
12
17
6.4
702
Senegal
3.3
7.3
8.3
2.6
36
42
14.2
1,708
Togo
1.5
3.5
4.1
3.0
23
31
4.6
1,128
UEMOA
23
53
62
3.1
23
32
73
1,173
Africa
289
629
719
2.7
34
1,165
1,619
World
3,086
5,282
5,687
1.5
40
46
33,416
5,876
Sources: Population from UN (1997), Urbanization from WRI (1996), GDP from World Bank (1998) andSESRTCIC (1997).

As the regional population has grown, it has also become more urbanized, from 23% of
the regional population in 1980 to 32% in 1995, compared to just under 50% for theworld overall (Table 2-1).
There has also been a general migration in the region from the north to the south, bothwithin countries and within the region. The migration is driven in part by the greater
economic opportunities in these countries, especially in the cities (Snrech, 1995), by
population growth and also by the climatic conditions in the arid northern part of theregion, which are prone to desertification and are less suitable for agriculture. Adding to8Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

the pressure, over the past three decades the region has been drier than average, as rainfall
in the Sahel has been lower than the long-term average (UNEP, 1997). These migration
patterns are placing increasing stress on resources, ecosystems and human infrastructure,
particularly in cities and coastal areas.
2.2

EconomyAs shown in Table 2-1, average income varies considerably across the region, from around$550 per capita in Mali to over $1,800 per capita in Benin.2 In every case, the average
income is smaller than the average for Africa as a whole, and considerably below theworld average. Accordingly, a large proportion of private consumption is devoted tobasic necessities — in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Senegal, between 35% and 50% ofprivate consumption expenditure is for food (World Bank, 1998), highlighting thevulnerability of the region's peoples to fluctuations in commodity prices. By comparison,in the wealthier industrialized countries, around 10% of private consumption expenditureis for food. Average incomes are noticeably lower in the landlocked Sahelian countries
compared to the humid countries or Senegal. The average income for the humid countries
is about $1,650, while that of the landlocked Sahelian countries is $670 and for Senegal isabout $1,710, reflecting the geographical development constraints outlined in Section 1.1.
In recent decades, the economies of the region have stagnated, as average per capita
income levels have been declining in real terms. Fiscal policies in the region havecontributed to this situation. All seven of the UEMOA states share the same currency, the
CFA franc, which is guaranteed by the French franc at a fixed rate of exchange, andadministered by the BCEAO (Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest), theindependent central bank of the UEMOA. While this arrangement protects it from thespeculative pressures that can be wrought upon the currencies of small countries, it also
makes the region's economies vulnerable to changes in the value of the franc. In theseventies and early eighties as the economies in the region slumped, the CFA rose in value
alongside the strong franc. This led to capital flight, decreasing foreign investment anddeclining exports. Finally, in January 1994, the CFA was cut to half its former value by
the BCEAO at the behest of the international monetary bodies. After the devaluation, real
GDP throughout the zone has increased for the first time in over ten years, inflation has
been checked and exports have become competitive and profitable, although thedevaluation inflated national debts. Devaluation was only a first step in building aneffective economic base for the development of the UEMOA states.
As shown in Table 2-2, agriculture plays an important role in the regional economies,
reflecting the low level of development in the region. Between 60% and over 90% of theeconomically active population is engaged in agriculture, higher than the roughly 50%
average for the world as a whole. The contribution of agriculture to GDP is also much
2

Currencies are expressed in common units adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP). The PPP
approach, in which prices of a common “basket of goods” are compared across countries, gives a more
realistic picture of relative incomes than the more commonly used market exchange rates (MER) (WRI,1998).

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

9higher than the world average, 31% compared to 11%, and is higher than the 21% for
Africa as a whole. In contrast, industry contributes only about 20% to the total
production from the region, compared to around 30% both for Africa and for the world asa whole. Much of the agricultural production is at a subsistence level, emphasizing thevulnerability of the population to land degradation and other environmental impacts.
Table 2-2. Structure of GDP and employment

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA
AfricaWorld

Industry as % Services as Agriculture asof GDP% of GDP% of GDP
1995
1995
1995
12
54
34
27
39
34
20
50
30
17
37
46
17
44
39
18
62
20
21
41
38
19
50
31
31
47
21
33
56
11

Population
Employed inIndustry (%)
1994
8
2
10
2
4
7
10
5
10
30

Population
Population
Employed in
Employed inServices (%)
Agriculture (%)
1994
1994
28
63
6
92
30
60
12
86
6
90
16
77
25
66
16
79
26
64
20
50

Note: Employment as a percentage of economically active population; UEMOA averages weighted by
GDP in PPP terms.
Sources: Distribution of GDP by country from WRI (1998), for Africa and World from Raskin et al.
(1998); Employment from World Bank (1997, 1998).

In most of the countries agricultural products are the most important exports. In Benin,
Burkina Faso and Mali, cotton is one of the principal exports; both Burkina Faso and Mali
export livestock; Côte d’Ivoire exports cocoa and coffee; and in Senegal the main exports
are fish and groundnuts. In Niger and Togo the most important exports are mineral ores
— uranium and phosphates — while the second most important exports are agricultural
products. This reliance on a limited range of food and basic commodity exports makes the
UEMOA countries vulnerable to price fluctuations in international commodity markets.
The region’s rich mineral endowment remains only minimally exploited. At current rates
of extraction, the important mineral resources of Niger and Togo will last many decades.
Estimated uranium resources in Niger (WEC, 1995) would last more than 100 years atcurrent rates, and phosphorous resources in Togo (Mobbs, 1996) another 50 years.
The trade picture in the region is mixed. The value of aggregate exports exceeds imports,
as shown by the negative resource gap for the region in Table 2-3. (The resource gap —net imports as a percentage of GDP — is a measure of the degree to which a country
relies on imports rather than its own resources to meet domestic demand.) However,there is considerable variation between countries. In each of the Sahelian regions, imports
exceed exports, by as much as 8% of GDP in Mali. Furthermore, a more complete pictureof the economic situation in the region must also include the debt burden carried by thecountries. Côte d’Ivoire, the largest exporter in the region, also has the highest level ofexternal debt, accumulated during a boom period in the late 1970s (World Bank, 1996a;
ENDA-TM, 1995). As shown in Table 2-3, the total debt for the region as whole10

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

exceeds regional GDP, and service on the debt amounts to around 20% of export receipts.
As a result, while there is net income from trade, it is currently used to service the region's
debt payments, constraining investment in the region.
Table 2-3. Debt and trade
Resource Gap Net Exports Less
Debt Service (% Total Extern.
(Net Imports as Debt Service (as %of Exports)
Debt (% of GDP)
% of GDP)of GDP)
1996
1996
1996
1996
Benin
7
72
(3)
1
Burkina Faso
11
51
5
(6)
Cote d'Ivoire
26
184
(10)
(2)
Mali
18
114
8
(12)
Niger
17
78
7
(10)
Senegal
16
71
5
(9)
Togo
11
103
(3)
(0)
UEMOA
21
121
(2)
(7)
Note: Resource gap calculated as the difference of imports and exports of goods and services (frombalance of payments) as a percentage of GDP.
Source: World Bank (1998)

2.3

Human Development

All countries in the region suffer from dire poverty and the inadequate provision of basic
needs. This is reflected in the social indicators shown in Table 2-4. The table shows
average life span, infant mortality rates, the percentage of the population with access tosafe water, the literate percentage of the adult population, and the incidence of chronic
undernutrition. Where available, historical values are also shown.
Table 2-4. Social indicators
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA
AfricaDev. Countries
World

Life Expectancy
Infant Mortality (per(years)1000 live births)
1960
1995
1960
1996
37
54
179
84
36
46
186
82
39
52
165
90
35
47
209
134
35
48
191
191
37
50
172
74
39
50
182
78
37
49
55
46
62
149
65
50
63
129
60

Safe Water (%)
1980
1995
50
35
78
20
72
37
53
50

Adult Literacy (%)
1970
1995
10
37
8
19
16
40
7
31
6
14
15
33
23
52

51
48

55
70
78

Hunger (%)
1970
1995
36
18
66
37
24
19
45
30
48
32
24
30
30
27
41
28
35
34
35
20
25
16

Hunger (millions)
1970
1995
1.0
1.0
3.6
3.8
1.3
2.7
2.5
2.9
2.0
2.9
1.0
2.5
0.6
1.1
12
17
128
247
940
873
940
898

Note: Hunger in 1970 for the world set to the value for developing countries.
Sources: Life expectancy, infant mortality and adult literacy from UNDP (1998); safe water from WorldBank (1998); hunger FAO (1996b, 1997a); values for Africa and the world in 1995 from Raskin et al.
(1998); except for hunger, values for developing countries from UNDP (1998); for hunger, value fordeveloping countries in 1995 is from Raskin et al. (1998).

While there is considerable spread across the region, all the UEMOA country indicators
are below the world average, and in general below those for Africa and for the developing
countries as a whole. This is reflected in the composite UNDP Human Development
Indicator, where the UEMOA countries are ranked between 144 and 173 out of 174

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

11

countries reported (UNDP, 1998). Nevertheless, as shown on Table 2-4, for nearly every
indicator in nearly every country there has been improvement, often substantial over thelast few decades. For example, in every country except Senegal, the incidence of hunger
as a percentage of the population dropped between 1970 and 1995. However, the decline
was not enough to offset the effects of population growth: so that while hunger decreased
as a percentage of the population, it increased in absolute numbers by over 40%.
The low levels of development shown by the social indicators are consistent with the low
average incomes shown earlier in Table 2-1. The average indicators are also affected by
the distribution of income within countries. Data on income distribution for the region are
scarce. Figures are only available for Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Senegal, where the ratio of
the average expenditure of the lowest-earning 20% of the population to that of thehighest-earning 20% varies from around 0.05 to 0.15 (higher figures reflect more
equitable distribution), compared to 0.13 for Africa as a whole and 0.11 for North
America (Raskin et al., 1998) .
2.4

Food and Agriculture

Agriculture in West Africa remains a predominantly subsistence activity, although it is
becoming progressively more market-oriented (Snrech, 1995). Due to a combination of
economic, institutional and climatic factors, the rapid growth in crop production of theGreen Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s was largely confined to South Asia and Latin
America, while Sub-Saharan Africa saw little change (Conway, 1997). One factor
contributing to the difference is that the most important food crops for the Saheliancountries — drought-tolerant cereals like sorghum and millet — were not an initial focus
of Green Revolution research. Average cereal yields in the UEMOA countries haveremained nearly constant between 1961 and 1995, compared to the rapid growth for theworld as a whole (Figure 2-1). Although new varieties of sorghum and millet have beendeveloped, adoption of the new plants has been slow. The vulnerability of effected
populations and the risky nature of agricultural production in semi-arid areas makes
farmers less willing to spend their limited resources on new approaches (FAO/ICRISAT,
1996). Production of millet is still mostly concentrated on traditional varieties and few
farmers apply fertilizer (because of high costs and limited availability) or adopt practices toimprove conservation of soil moisture. Allocation of resources is probably limited by theperceived higher benefits from investments in areas other than land conservation. As aresult of the relatively constant yields, increases in agricultural production have comeabout by extension onto previously uncultivated land and through a shortening of fallow
times, leading to potential conflicts over land use and increased land degradation.

12

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Figure 2-1. Yield per harvest of cereals
3

World
UEMOA

tonnes per hectare

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Source: FAO (1996a).

One of the major changes that drove the world growth in cereal yields since 1960 was the
expansion of irrigation. In the UEMOA region, crop production is almost entirely on
rainfed land, and rainfall in the region is erratic. As shown on Sheet F-7 in the Annex,
only a small percentage of current cropland is irrigated. Also shown on Sheet F-7 are
historical changes in the area of irrigated cropland, which has grown substantially in somecountries in the region. Combined with the current low levels of irrigation, this suggeststhat considerable potential may exist for further expansion. Realizing the potential,
however, will require large investments in a region where capital is scarce, and could leadto conflicts over the use of scarce water resources, as discussed in Section 2.5.
In the humid countries, roots and tubers contribute a comparable amount of calories todiets as cereals (Table 2-5). In contrast to the historical yield trends for cereals, thegrowth in yields of roots and tubers in the UEMOA region has been comparable to theworld average, although regional yields remained well below global average yields(Figure 2-2). Also, cereal crops that have received more research attention, such as riceand maize, contribute more to total cereal production in the humid countries than in the
Sahelian ones. In Côte d’Ivoire, where rice is an important component of diets, rice yields
have increased by roughly a factor of 2 between 1961 and 1995, comparable to theincrease in average cereal yields for the world.

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

13

Table 2-5. Average daily caloric intake in 1994

Source: FAO (1996a).

Figure 2-2. Yield per harvest of roots and tubers

Source: FAO (1996a).

As seen in Table 2-5, average daily caloric consumption ranges from around 2,000 to
2,300 kcalories per capita. The FAO estimates that if the populations in the regions are tohave an adequate supply of food, average consumption must at least be between 2,700 and
2,860 kcalories per capita per day (FAO, 1996c). Average consumption is well below thisminimum level, in keeping with the high levels of hunger shown in Table 2-4. As a result,to meet the basic food requirements of the region in the future, the amount of foodavailable must increase faster than population, with implications for agricultural
productivity, land and water use, and trade.
Animal products, such as meat and fish, contribute little to total diets in the region, but
livestock production is important for sustenance and income in some parts. In thelandlocked Sahelian countries, livestock contributes significantly to exports. Production is

14

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

livestock management has been associated in the past with land degradation anddesertification, but recently it has become widely accepted that traditional pastoralist
management practices are well adapted to conditions in the arid Sahel, and are effective atconserving land resources in these difficult environments (Behnke and Scoones, 1992; deHaan et al., 1997). However, the mobility that is essential to the traditional agricultural
systems is being constrained by country boundaries and by rules of land tenure.
Moreover, as population growth and increased pressure from reduced fallow periods
places pressure on existing cropland, farmers are settling permanently on what was once
wet-season grazing for pastoralist herders, leading to over-use of land, and conflicts
between herders and farmers (de Haan et al., 1997). These pressures can lead to landdegradation, which in turn increases the risks of drought, and causes increased poverty
and migration (World Bank, 1996a).
Livestock production also takes place in the wetter parts of the region, but as the climate
becomes more humid, disease is an increasingly important limiting factor. One of the mostimportant animal diseases in Africa is trypanosomiasis, which is carried by the tsetse fly.
Trypanosomiasis can be lethal for both livestock and people (when it is called “sleeping
sickness”). Because of trypanosomiasis, it is estimated that cattle densities are up to 70%
below their potential in humid regions of Africa, and around 37% below their potential in
sub-humid areas. Trypano-tolerant breeds of cattle are found throughout the UEMOA
region, but they are generally smaller and less valuable to farmers than the non-tolerant
breeds, a factor which has limited their widespread adoption (FAO, 1998).
Trade in crops is shown in Table 2-6, and trade in livestock products is shown in Table
2-7. As seen in Table 2-6, most countries are close to self-sufficiency in the main
components of diets — cereals, roots and tubers. However, Senegal imports a significant
amount of cereals, and is a net importer of crop commodities. Senegal is also a net
importer of livestock products, due to imports of milk products. The landlocked Saheliancountries are net importers of crop products (although Burkina Faso and Mali export
some oil crops); they are all close to self-sufficiency in livestock products, and all export
some meat.
Table 2-6. Self-sufficiency ratios for crop commodities in 1994
Other
Roots &
Cereals Oil Crops
Crops
Tubers
Total
Benin
0.84
2.05
0.35
1.00
0.85
Burkina Faso
0.95
1.04
0.96
0.99
0.96
Cote d'Ivoire
0.72
1.25
1.46
1.00
1.11
Mali
0.97
1.10
0.45
0.86
0.80
Niger
0.94
0.96
0.78
1.00
0.90
Senegal
0.63
1.06
0.70
0.87
0.71
Togo
0.89
1.19
0.69
1.00
0.90
Note: Self-sufficiency ratio is given by 1+(Net Exports)/Requirements. This may differ from the ratio
Production/Requirements because of stock changes and statistical discrepancies.
Source: Based on FAO (1996a).

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

15

Table
1994 2-7. Self-sufficiency ratios for livestock products in 1994
Fish
Meat
Milk
Total
Benin
0.72
0.86
0.68
0.79
Burkina Faso
0.60
1.10
0.89
0.97
Cote d'Ivoire
0.40
0.99
0.26
0.62
Mali
0.97
1.13
0.92
0.99
Niger
0.71
1.09
0.96
1.00
Senegal
1.29
0.95
0.45
0.88
Togo
0.45
0.96
0.59
0.71
Note: Self-sufficiency ratio is given by 1+(Net Exports)/Requirements. This may differ from the ratio
Production/Requirements because of stock changes and statistical discrepancies.
Source: Based on FAO (1996a).

Fish contribute little to dietary calories in the region, especially in the landlocked Saheliancountries, as shown in Table 2-5; however, in Senegal they are an important source ofexport earnings. Generally, fisheries in the UEMOA region are considered to be either
fully or over-exploited, indicating that there is little possibility for expanding production
from this source in the future (FAO, 1997c). Overfishing in the region may also lead to
reduced catches in the future unless stocks are allowed to regenerate. However, there ispotential for expanding aquaculture production, especially in Senegal and Togo (FAO,
1997b), although this has implications for water and land use and, unless carefully
controlled, may have impacts on the sensitive ecology of coastal regions. Note however,that when carefully implemented, aquaculture can help alleviate pollution problems fromcertain agricultural land practices (FAO, 1997b).

2.5

Water

By some measures, renewable water resources in the region appear relatively abundant.
One measure, the use-to-resource ratio (given by total water withdrawals divided by theavailable renewable resources), provides an overall gauge of the average pressure on
available resources. A value as low as 0.10 for this measure may indicate the onset ofstress (Raskin et al., 1997). As shown in Table 2-8, values for this measure range from0.01 to 0.03 for the UEMOA countries, indicating no generalized stress for the region.
Table 2-8. Annual renewable water resources in 1995

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo

Internal Resources(km3)
GroundSurface
Total
2
9
10
8
38
39
20
40
3
0
8
19
6
6

10
18
77
60
4
26
12

Cross-border
Coefficient
flows (km3)of Variation
Total
Dependency
of Precip.
16
0.60
0.06
0
0.00
0.06
1
0.01
0.05
40
0.40
0.13
29
0.89
0.14
13
0.33
0.12
1
0.04
0.07

Use /
Resource
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.01

Use /
Internal
Resource
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.04
0.20
0.05
0.01

Sources: Internal resources and cross-border flows (FAO, 1995); coefficient of variation (Raskin et al.,1997); use-to-resource ratios based on (FAO, 1995).

16

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

However, looking beyond the picture painted by this measure, the situation appears lessfavorable. As shown in Table 2-8, an important issue for some countries, especially Niger,
is their dependency on outside water resources, as measured by the dependency ratio, theratio of outside flows to total resources. In Niger, nearly all of the total renewable
resources originate outside of the country. Most of the external resources are supplied by
the Niger river (FAO, 1995), which crosses the extreme southwestern part of the country.
This high degree of dependency makes Niger vulnerable to future reductions in crossborder flows should other countries increase their consumption, with implications for
future conflicts over water resources. Such conflicts are already a familiar concern in otherparts of the world such as North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia.
In addition, the low values for the use-to-resource ratio shown in Table 2-8 may be more areflection of low levels of access to water than of abundance, since withdrawals fordomestic uses are small, between 4 and 17 cubic meters per capita, compared to theestimated minimal requirements for basic needs of 18 cubic meters per capita annually(Gleick, 1996). Furthermore, the use-to-resource ratio does not reflect the strong
variation in the availability of water in the region, both in time and in space. Water
supplies in both Mali and Niger are concentrated in the southwestern part of the country,
limiting the availability of water in large parts of those countries. In the Sahelian countries
most of the rivers are temporary, and rainfall is erratic and very localized (FAO, 1995).
When the rains do come, they are hard and brief, which leads to an irregular supply ofwater for crops, and which can compact the soil surface and lead to soil loss from runoff.
The tasks of using the available water efficiently, retaining the soil, and reducing the riskof crop failure from insufficient rainfall, are challenges faced annually by the region’s
farmers. There is strong inter-annual variation as well, as measured by the coefficient ofvariation of precipitation (Table 2-8). A value for this indicator above 0.06 may reveal astress condition (Raskin et al., 1997). The values for all of the UEMOA countries except
Côte d’Ivoire meet or exceed this threshold.
Finally, it is worth noting the likely effect of future increases in industrial and urban
development and the expansion of irrigated agriculture. For example, irrigated agriculture
currently accounts for 87% of water withdrawals in the region (Table 2-9), even though
only about 2% of the cropland in the region is irrigated (Sheet F-7). This illustrates thepotentially huge increases in withdrawals that may occur as irrigated agriculture expands.
Without careful planning, the increased competition for scarce water resources caused bythese effects will increase the level of water stress faced by subsistence households.

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

17

Table 2-9. Annual water withdrawals in 1995
Contribution to Withdrawals (%)
Total
Agricultural Domestic
Industrial (km3/year)
Benin
64
22
14
0.2
Burkina Faso
80
20
0
0.4
Cote d'Ivoire
67
24
9
0.9
Mali
98
1
1
2.5
Niger
84
14
1
0.7
Senegal
91
6
3
1.4
Togo
26
63
11
0.1
Total
87
10
3
6.1
Source: FAO (1995).

2.6

Energy and Air Pollution

The total final consumption and total primary supply of fuels in the region are summarizedin Table 2-10. They clearly show the dominance of biomass, the dependency on oil
imports, and the generally low levels of development of modern energy resources (naturalgas, coal, crude oil and hydropower).
Table 2-10. Total final consumption and total primary supply of energy in 1995
TJ
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Togo
Total
TJ
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
Total

Crude Oil-Petroleum
3,647
4,914
32,777
8,618
4,052
25,983
9,706
89,697

Crude Oil
90,27530,346
120,621

Petroleum
3,727
7,027
(33,089)
9,710
4,775
9,295
11,132
12,577

Total Final Consumption
Natural Gas Electricity Hydropower
872
708
8,037
944
1,217
1,883
2,708
1,373
1,883
15,859Total Primary Supply
Coal
Natural Gas Electricity Hydropower
901
10
266
169
3,506
803
1,765
665
1,883
197
1,078
22
1,765
1,883
3,020
4,597
Coal
-

Biomass
65,84568,940106,345
73,94845,63456,057
26,837
443,606

Total
70,36474,562
147,159
83,51050,903
86,631
37,916551,045

Biomass
65,84568,940106,345
73,94845,63456,057
26,837
443,606

Total
70,47376,243
167,206
84,461
52,83997,77839,069588,069

Notes: Total primary supply = production + imports – exports; 1 TJ=1012 Joules.
Sources: Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal from IEA (1997). Others based on EIA (1998) and ENDA-TM(1995).

The low level of development of modern fuels is reflected in the relatively low levels ofelectricity consumption (Table 2-11). Electricity demand per capita ranges from around
20 kWh per capita in Burkina Faso to 160 kWh per capita in Côte d’Ivoire, compared toan average of 390 kWh per capita for Africa as a whole, and 1,884 kWh per capita on
average for the world. In Côte d’Ivoire only around 20% of the population has access toelectricity, while in Mali the figure is as low as 5% (World Bank, 1998). Most energy
needs are met from biomass fuels, such as wood, charcoal and agricultural residues, which

18

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

contribute from around 65% to over 90% of total final demand, with biomass demand
being dominated by the consumption of the household and informal sectors. The levels
are generally higher than the 60% supplied by biomass for Africa as a whole, and muchhigher than the 13% worldwide. Petroleum products are the second largest category ofenergy consumption, reflecting their importance in the transport, industrial, household andelectricity generation sectors. It is also worth noting the importance of both animal andhuman power in providing transportation services in the region.3 In summary, the energy
picture reflects the chronic poverty in the region.
Table 2-11. Electric power consumption and hydroelectric supply in 1995
kWh/cap
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA
Africa
World

44
19
160
27
38
89
93
72
391
1884

Hydroelectric
(%)
0
38
44
85
0
0
2
0
22
24

Sources: Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal from IEA (1997). Others from EIA (1998).

Largely as a result of the widespread use of biomass as a fuel, emissions of greenhousegases and other air and water pollutants arising from energy combustion from the region
remain small — at most 0.1 tonnes of carbon per capita per year (Sheet P-4), compared toaround 5 tonnes per capita per year in North America (Raskin et al., 1998). However,they are likely to grow substantially in the future. Indeed, even environmentally-soundeconomic development will inevitably require a large increase in the consumption andproduction of energy and other resources. Increases in emissions of these pollutants will,
therefore, be necessary for meeting social development targets. Nevertheless, it will be
important for the countries in the region to be well informed about climate issues, so as tobe able to position themselves to take advantage of the technology transfer and otherinvestment opportunities that may arise from the post-Kyoto negotiations on combatingclimate change.
Localized pollution problems are likely to be a more pressing concern in West Africa.
One example is the adverse health effects associated with indoor air pollution from theburning of biomass fuels. The burning of these fuels on traditional stoves is associatedwith a range of serious health impacts, including respiratory infections in young children,
low birth weights of babies, adverse pregnancy outcomes, lung and heart disease, andcancer (Smith, 1993). A transition to sustainable development in West Africa requires a
move away from the traditional use of biomass fuels in households and towards electricity
3

Trypanosomiasis limits the use of draft animals in the more humid parts of the region.

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process19

and cleaner-burning fuels including, where necessary, greater use of fossil fuels.
Moreover, heavy reliance on biomass fuels is associated with land degradation anddeforestation, and these pressures can be expected to increase with growing population.
The contribution to electricity production from hydroelectric plants is shown in Table
2-11. In Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and especially in Mali, hydroelectric power
contributes significantly to the total supply. There is currently no hydropower generationin Niger, but an estimated 2,000 GWh could be produced each year by damming the Niger
river (ENDA-TM, 1995). However, so far the low cost of imported electricity from
Nigeria has made the project uneconomical (ENDA-TM, 1995). If the price of electricity
from Nigeria were to increase, however, the project may become more attractive,
potentially leading to conflicts over the use of cross-border river flows. As an indigenous
and renewable energy resource, hydropower offers the benefits of reducing fuel importdependency and air pollution relative to fossil fuel-fired generating options. The benefitsof hydropower are conditional, however. Its renewability is only approximate sincereservoir siltification gradually erodes the resource potential, and the construction oflarge-scale hydroelectric facilities can cause significant disruption to local communities
and ecosystems. Potential impacts include disturbance of the spawning grounds of
migratory fish; flooding of natural habitats and displacement of populations; alteration of
local hydrological patterns; and risks of catastrophic flooding from dam failure (Raskin
and Margolis, 1995).
Most of the remaining electrical consumption is met from imports or from oil-fired plants.
Imports are especially important in Benin, where around 98% of electricity is imported;
Niger, where around half the electricity consumed is imported, mostly from Nigeria; andTogo, where imports are around 80% of total final consumption.
Some of the UEMOA countries have reserves of crude oil and natural gas. Benin
produces crude oil, all of which is exported. At current rates of extraction, and without
additional discoveries, the estimated reserves would last for another 16 years. Both Côte
d’Ivoire and Senegal are net importers of crude oil, which they process in domestic
refineries. Current reserves within Côte d’Ivoire will last another 19 years at current
extraction rates. Figures for oil reserves in Senegal and Niger are not available, although
oil and gas exploration in the countries is continuing actively (ENDA-TM, 1995; MBendi
Information Services, 1999). Côte d’Ivoire is a net exporter of refinery products, while
Senegal imports about 37% of total final consumption. Both countries use a substantial
amount of petroleum for transportation, amounting to around 14% of total final
consumption in Côte d’Ivoire and 24% in Senegal. Both Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal also
have natural gas reserves. In 1995, Côte d’Ivoire was not producing any gas; the mostimportant gas field in the country, containing around 15 cubic kilometers, was yet to be
developed (ENDA-TM, 1995). The plan was to use the gas primarily in a new gasburning electric power plant, intended to go into service in 1996, and at least some gaspowered electric plants are now in service there (Africa Info, 1998).

20

2.7

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Land

The distribution of land in each country is shown in Table 2-12. Land use is given for thearea under the built environment, agricultural land (cropland, grazing land and forest),
protected land and a residual category called “other land.” In the region as a whole,
population densities are low compared to other regions of the world. However, thisaggregate figure is misleading since large tracts of land in the region are poorly suited tohigh population densities. The large land area in Mali and Niger under the Sahara isreflected in the high proportion of "other" land and the low amount of potentiallycultivable land. In Niger, especially, the low percentage of land area that is potentiallycultivable, just 5% of the total, is indicative of the current and potential pressures arisingfrom the growing population.
Table 2-12. Land use and potentially cultivable land in 1994
Millions of ha

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Togo
Total

Built
Environment
0.4
0.7
0.9
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.3
4.0

Cropland
1.9
3.6
3.7
2.5
3.6
2.4
2.4
20.1

Pasture andForestGrazing
Unprotected Protected
0.4
2.8
0.3
6.0
12.0
0.9
13.0
9.3
0.8
30.0
11.7
0.1
10.4
2.5
0.0
5.7
5.0
1.3
0.2
0.9
0.0
65.8
44.2
3.4

Other
Protected
0.8
2.7
2.0
4.0
8.4
2.2
0.6
20.7

Other
4.5
1.6
2.1
73.0
101.1
2.2
1.0
185.4

Potentially
Cultivable
Total(% of total)
11.1
28
27.4
34
31.8
35
122.0
11
126.7
5
19.3
35
5.4
38
343.6
15

Sources: Built environment (estimate, based on Heaps et al., 1998); cropland, pasture, total forest andtotal land area 1994 figures from FAO (1996a); total protected land and protected forest from WCMC
(1998a, b); potentially cultivable land from Alexandratos (1995).

In Burkina Faso and Senegal, the most important land cover is forest, which accounts foraround 20% of the land area in the countries. Forest is also significant in Côte d’Ivoire,
where it covers 17% of the total area. However, Côte d’Ivoire has suffered rapid
deforestation, largely as a result of logging, with much of the forest replaced by plantation
crops (FAO, 1997d). It has lost, on average, 7.7% of the forest area each year between
1980 and 1990 (WRI, 1998).4 Between 1990 and 1995 the rate appears to have slowed
considerably, to just 0.6% per year on average. This may reflect a decline in the quality of
the wood being produced, perhaps as a result of overexploitation of forest resources(Millington et al., 1994). Forest area has also been lost at high rates in Benin and Togo,
where deforestation rates exceeded 1% per year on average between 1980 and 1990, andbetween 1990 and 1995.
Different types of soil degradation have occurred in each of the UEMOA countries todifferent degrees. Deforestation in Côte d’Ivoire was mentioned above. In the Saheliancountries, where livestock production plays an important role in agriculture, land has been
degraded as a result of overgrazing. Over one million hectares in Burkina Faso has been
overgrazed to the point where it is no longer productive, and an additional million
4

The area under forest given by WRI (1998) is 5.5 million hectares, about one-half the 11 million
hectares recorded here. This illustrates the great uncertainty and range of definition of forest area. The
definition used for this study includes area from which forest cover has been removed, but which is
expected to be reforested in the near future (FAO, 1997).

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process21

hectares, nearly 20% of the grazing area, has been degraded to some degree, although it
can still be used for livestock production.5 In Mali, the area of overgrazed land, nearly allof which is still estimated to be productive, is half the total grazing area, while in Niger theovergrazed area is almost equal to the reported area of grazing land. In Senegal, around 3
million hectares of cropland, more than the current total cropland area, has been degradedthrough loss of nutrients to the point where it is no longer productive, and an additionalarea, between one-half and one million hectares, while still productive, is affected bysalinization. The degradation has been the result of processes that are not only still
continuing — extensive agricultural expansion, loss of fallow area, intensified use ofgrazing lands and fuelwood collection — but can be expected to increase in the future as
populations grow. The result is not inevitable, but avoiding it will require concerted
action. As mentioned in Chapter 1, several countries in the region have now producedplans for action — national environmental action plans (NEAPs) and national action plans(NAPs) to combat desertification. Measures being considered for the plan in Senegal, forexample, include a review of the tenurial system and programs for soil conservation,
improved farming practices, afforestation and agro-forestry (UNEP, 1997).

5

Soil degradation estimates are based on the digital version (GRID/UNEP, 1991) of the GLASOD soil
degradation map (Oldeman et al., 1991).

22

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

23

3. A Conventional Development Scenario
Beyond considering current environment and development problems, the concept ofsustainable development asks that we look well into the future to evaluate the impacts ofcurrent practices and policies on the lives of coming generations. It asks also that we
consider the competing needs of different sectors of society for available resources. To
examine the requirements for a transition to sustainable development we need to take thelong view and adopt an integrated systems perspective. While the future cannot be
predicted with any certainty, scenarios can be constructed that illustrate the possible paths
the region may follow and provide guidance in the formulation of policies and actions for atransition to sustainable development.
3.1

Scenario Methods

The long-range future is inherently unpredictable. Scenario analysis helps to clarify thepossibilities and to identify strategies for sustainability. Development scenarios areplausible stories about how society and the environment might unfold over the coming
decades. A broad range of alternative futures for the 21st Century are possible, allconsistent with current conditions and trends (Gallopin et al., 1997). The trajectory ofregional development will depend on a complex set of external economic and politicalfactors. But it will also depend on critical policies, actions and choices of people in theregion and in the international community as they respond to changing global,
technological and institutional conditions.
The analysis in this study was developed with the assistance of the PoleStar system, asoftware tool to aid the generation and evaluation of alternative development scenarios.6
PoleStar is both a comprehensive, flexible and easy-to-use accounting framework for
mounting economic, resource and environmental information, as well as being a scenariobuilding tool for examining alternative development scenarios.
PoleStar is applicable at national, regional and global scales. The user customizes data
structures, modeling relationships, time horizons, and spatial boundaries — all of which
can be expanded or altered easily in the course of an analysis. The system accepts
information generated from formal models, from existing studies, or any other sources theuser wishes to draw upon.
An application generally begins with the current accounts, a snapshot of the current stateof affairs. Current accounts and scenarios are developed through a series of linked
modules. In the Pop, GDP, Income module, demographic and economic data andassumptions are entered. The module can also be used to examine income distribution andpoverty issues. These macroeconomic variables set the scale of activity within the sectoral
6

The PoleStar System was developed by SEI-Boston. More information is available on the internet at
http://www.seib.org/polestar.html where the software can be downloaded.

24

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

modules. Then, scenarios are developed to explore alternative futures. Finally,
environmental and resource pressures are computed and can be compared to user-definedsustainability criteria.
3.2

A Conventional Development Scenario for West Africa

In forging a regional development paradigm for transition to sustainability, a full range ofalternative visions and scenarios will need to be articulated, analyzed and widely
discussed. Such a comprehensive exploration is beyond the scope of this study. Instead,as a first step, we offer a Conventional Development Scenario (CDS) in the hopes ofproviding a baseline for beginning such a process. The scenario suggests where current
trends and development policies may be leading, and the problems and risks of a“business-as-usual” future (Raskin et al., 1996). The CDS illustrates the problem of
unsustainability. It is a point of departure for beginning a discussion of alternative
scenarios for achieving sustainability goals and a baseline for policy discussions. The
scenario is not a prediction. Indeed, the utility of the scenario approach is that it helps us
to understand uncertainty and to formulate policies that can influence future patterns ofdevelopment.
The time period of the CDS is 30 years, from 1995 to 2025. At the global level, theconventional development story is characterized by continuity, globalization andconvergence. That is, it envisions a future in which institutions and technology evolve
without major surprises, the world's economy and society become progressively more
integrated and standards of living rise everywhere. The industrial regions evolve withoutmajor change in institutions and values, and developing regions gradually approach thismarket-driven model. Consumerism, structural adjustment, and liberal democracy
eventually dominate, spurred by the continued development and global diffusion of
information technology in an increasingly integrated world economic system.
The scenario is by no means simply an extrapolation of past trends. Indeed, for Africa thescenario is an optimistic story of economic take-off for the region as stagnation is
overcome, and an era of “modernization” and growth emerges. For example, economic
growth rates in the region are assumed to be higher than in the past, and agricultural yields
rise faster than before. These changes are associated in the scenario with a growing
industrial base, a gradual shift from subsistence to commercial agriculture and theevolution of effective governance systems. Despite these changes, and to some extent
because of them, pressures on resources grow and inequity within West African nations
persists. A key feature of this market-led scenario is the absence of a comprehensive andcoordinated policy effort to address social and environmental issues.
It is useful to consider a specific quantitative illustration of the CDS. To do so, we draw
on mid-range projections and long-range assumptions from international organizations andmajor studies. In particular, the CDS relies on the Reference scenario developed for
Africa by the recent work of the Global Scenario Group, an international andinterdisciplinary body engaged in the exploration of alternative futures and their policy
implications (Raskin et al., 1998; Heaps et al., 1998). The illustrative CDS for theSustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

25

UEMOA region is described and discussed below. The results are collected in a series oftables and graphs in the Annex.
3.3

Summary of the Scenario

An overview of the scenario for the UEMOA region as a whole is presented in Figure 3-1.
Relative to 1995 values, population more than doubles between 1995 and 2025. Income,
expressed as GDP per capita, increases by about 1.5 times, a departure from recent
decades of economic stagnation in the region. In combination with the large increase inpopulation, this implies a considerable expansion of total economic output, by a factor of
more than three over the course of the scenario. These increases in population, income
and total economic output lead to increasing environmental pressures. As incomes andpopulations increase, the demand for food also increases, by a slightly higher factor than
population alone, reflecting an increase in food consumption per capita. The incidence of
hunger as a percentage of the population decreases, but due to the rapid increase inpopulation, in absolute numbers the hungry population increases over the scenario, by
more than 1.5 times.
The growth in economic output and population, combined with rising incomes, leads to a
sharp increase in primary energy requirements. However, energy needs grow less rapidly
than GDP, so that aggregate energy intensity drops over the course of the scenario.
Water withdrawals grow significantly, but by far less than GDP, largely due to structuralshifts in which industry accounts for a progressively greater share of water use while thegrowth in irrigated cropland slows. Since water intensity per dollar of economic output islower for industrial withdrawals than for agriculture, the aggregate intensity decreases. As
a result of expanding population and agricultural production, land devoted to settled areas(the “built environment”), cropland and rangeland increase over the course of the scenario.
These increases are, in part, at the expense of forests, whose areas decrease sharply overthe scenario (Figure 3-1). These issues are explored in more detail below.
Figure 3-1. Regional overview of the scenario
4

1995
2025

3

2

1

0
Population

GDP per
CapitaGDP

Food
DemandHungerPrimary
EnergyWater

Forest Area

26

3.4

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Demography

In the scenario, population in the region more than doubles between 1995 and 2025
following mid-range projections of the UN (1997). As shown on Sheet D-1, thepopulation growth rate for the region over the scenario time-frame, at an average annual
rate of 2.6%, is slightly higher than for Africa as a whole, and considerably higher than the
average growth rate for the developing countries of 1.4%. There is considerable variation
among the countries of the region, ranging from 1.9% per year in Côte d’Ivoire to 3.0%
per year in Niger over the course of the scenario.
All else equal, the growing population will require more services and resources, withproportionate pressure on the environment. However, environmental and resource stressis compounded by the growth in per capita incomes. While partially offset by thepenetration of more efficient and cleaner technologies in the course of economic
development, the net effect is progressively greater pollution and pressures on land andwater resources, as we shall see below.
As populations grow in the region, they also become more urbanized, as rural people aredrawn to the economic opportunities in the cities (Snrech, 1995). Urbanization trends inthe scenario (Sheet D-2) are taken from UN projections (WRI, 1996). In the region as awhole, urbanization continues to increase rapidly, from 32% of the population in 1995 to
55% in 2025, compared to an increase from 15% to 32% over the previous thirty years.
By comparison, 76% of OECD populations currently reside in urban areas. Urbanization
increases are greatest in the landlocked countries, where the degree of urbanization is thelowest today.
Combining the urbanization trends with the population growth in the scenario, urban
populations increase by a factor of 3.7 by 2025 for the region as a whole, and by as muchas 4.5 in Niger. This level of expansion of cities implies an immense challenge for theprovision of urban infrastructure and services. In the past, the rising urban population incoastal countries has expanded into the surrounding forest land, leading to deforestationand other kinds of land degradation. This trend can be seen especially in Benin and Togo
World Bank, 1996b). In the absence of policies designed to mitigate these impacts,
degradation can be expected to continue and accelerate.
3.5

EconomyEconomic trends in the scenario are based on those for Africa in the mid-range scenario of
the IPCC (1992) which in turn is based on World Bank projections. Growth in GDP,
shown in Sheet E-1, is between 4% and 5% per year on average, higher than the average
for all developing countries, and higher than the world average. In the scenario, economic
growth takes off as the region experiences high growth rates that are sustained over
several decades.7 However, since populations are also growing, income — defined here
7

A more recent World Bank baseline economic growth scenario for Sub-Saharan Africa has GDP
increasing at a little over 4% per year on average between 1992 and 2020, within the range of rates
assumed here (World Bank, 1997). The assumptions are also comparable to medium-term economic

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process27

as GDP per capita — grows less rapidly, at an average annual rate of under 2% (Sheet E3). These rates are significantly lower than in developing regions generally and for theworld as a whole, and average incomes in the region remain well below the current
developing country average. However, the income growth rates assumed in the scenario
are higher than those of past decades for the region, which were discussed in Section 2.1.
As economies grow over the course of the scenario, their structure shifts, consistent withthe conventional development assumptions of the scenario (Sheet E-2). The countries in
the region gradually converge toward the pattern seen in the industrialized nations as
average income increases. The share of GDP contributed by agriculture declines over thecourse of the scenario, from 32% in 1995 to 21% in 2025 for the region as a whole.
However, agricultural value added increases in absolute terms, more than doubling
between 1995 and 2025. The service sector is an important component of GDP in severalof the countries in the base year, exceeding the agricultural contribution to GDP in all thecountries except Mali. In the scenario the share from services grows, from 50% in 1995
to 60% in 2025 (the OECD figure is 65% today). The share of industry remains roughly
constant, though in absolute terms industrial output increases significantly, at the samerate of growth as GDP, leading to a more than three-fold increase by 2025.
The rising share of industry and services in total GDP relative to agriculture reflects anassumed shift in production and export activities in the scenario. The current emphasis on
agricultural products and primary goods in trade changes gradually toward an increasing
contribution of manufactured goods and services. As discussed in later sections, this trend
is reflected in the scenario in changing trade patterns for agricultural products, and forsome primary products.
3.6

Human Development

There are many measures of human development and poverty, each drawing attention todifferent basic needs. Several were presented in Table 2-4: access to clean water, infantmortality, average life expectancy, adult literacy and hunger. In the scenario, the incidenceof hunger is used as a representative indicator of a nexus of poverty issues.
Several factors influence the level of poverty in a scenario. All else equal, as population
increases, the population in poverty also increases. Countering this, as average income
increases, poverty decreases. But it is not sufficient to consider changes in population andaverage income alone. The distribution of income must also be taken into account. For
given assumptions on population and average income, if income distribution becomes
more equal, poverty decreases. On the other hand, if income distribution becomes lessequal, poverty increases.

projections, in which GDP growth for the individual countries in the region varies from over 4% per year
to more than 6% per year (World Bank, 1996a).

28

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

National income distributions are typically concentrated at low incomes with thecharacteristic shape shown in Figure 3-2. Income distribution curves in the scenario are
specified by average income, population and a measure of income inequality representing
how skewed the curves are. One such measure that we shall refer to is the ratio of theaverage income of the lowest-earning 20% of the population to that of the highest-earning
20%.
Figure 3-2. Income distribution curve

MedianMean

IncomeIn the scenario, in keeping with conventional development assumptions, income inequality
is assumed to follow the trends seen in industrialized countries, where in recent decades
income distributions have become more unequal (WRI, 1998). In the United States, there
has been a trend of steadily increasing income disparity since the 1960s (USBC, 1997),
and in the scenario income inequality in the region converges gradually toward the U.S.
pattern (Sheet S-1). Under these assumptions, the ratio of the average income of thelowest-earning 20% of the population to that of the highest-earning 20% decreases from
0.12 to 0.09 on average for the region, compared to the decrease from 0.09 to 0.07 for theU.S.
In order to translate income distributions into the number of people suffering from hunger,
we introduce a “hunger line,” as illustrated in Figure 3-3. The hunger line represents aminimum income level at which a person is barely able to meet minimum dietaryrequirements. This is analogous to the concept of the poverty line, a minimum income or
expenditure level at which a person is barely able to meet his or her basic needs. National
poverty lines are adopted in many countries, including some in the UEMOA region. For

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process29

developing countries the World Bank poverty line of $1 per day is commonly used.
National poverty lines tend to increase with increasing average income (Ravallion et al.,1991). The same is true for the hunger lines in the scenario, with the rate of increase
based on observed patterns for a large set of developing countries (Heaps et al., 1998).
The increase in hunger lines may be due to decreased access to informal sources of food,and the erosion of traditional sources of material support in the process of modernization.
Both of these processes are consistent with the conventional development story of the
scenario.
Figure 3-3. The relationship between the hunger line and the hungry population# of Hungry

Hunger Line

IncomeIn the scenario, the net result of growing average incomes coupled with increases inincome inequality is that the incidence of hunger as a percentage of the population drops
in every country, with the regional figure declining from 28% to 21% between 1995 and2025 (Sheet S-2). However, because of population growth, the absolute number of thehungry population increases over the scenario period by 65%, from 17 million to 28
million.8

3.7

Agriculture

Requirements
In the scenario, agricultural production is driven by changing food requirements andagricultural trade patterns. As a result of population growth and changes in diets driven
8

If income inequality is left at 1995 levels, rather than increasing, as assumed in the scenario, then thehungry population would still rise, but at a slower rate, from 17 million in 1995 to 22 million in 2025.

30

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

by growing average incomes, requirements for agricultural commodities grow faster thanthe population. In the scenario, the demand is met either through domestic production or
through trade. In some countries, the level of net imports increase, reflecting
environmental constraints that are likely to limit the expansion of agriculture in areas
where land and water resources are scarce.
Changing dietary patterns in the scenario are shown on Sheet F-1. They follow a general
pattern seen throughout the world, that as incomes increase, people consume more, and at
the same time consume more animal products (Leach, 1995; Bender, 1997). As a result,average caloric intake increases from 2,231 to 2,422 kcalories per day (Sheet F-1).
However, in every country of the region average consumption in 2025 still falls below theaverage for Africa as a whole, and below the estimated minimum levels, ranging from2,700 and 2,860 kcalories per day, which are required for food security (FAO, 1996c).
These figures are consistent with the persistent hunger in the scenario.
The growth in average caloric intake and the shift toward greater meat consumption leads
to considerable increases in the demand for animal products over the course of the
scenario. By 2025, total demand for meat and milk products increases to over three times
current values (Sheet F-2). Requirements for fish also increase over the course of the
scenario (Sheet F-3). However, local fisheries are already stressed in the base year, andadditional requirements are assumed to be met largely through increased trade andthrough increased aquaculture production. Pressures on fisheries are assumed tomoderate the growth in the demand for fish, which increase at a slower rate than for meatand milk products, by a factor of 2.5 between 1995 and 2025. Crop requirements also
increase more rapidly than population. As will be discussed below, in the scenario an
increasing proportion of livestock is fed from feedlots, which leads to a rising demand forcrops for feed. Combined with the demand for food crops, total crop requirements
increase by 2.4 times over current levels.
Trade
Requirements for agricultural products can be met either through domestic production or
through trade. The countries in the region are currently close to self-sufficiency in themost important components of their diets, but do import some agricultural products.
Historically, farmers have been able to increase production to keep pace with rapid
increases in food demand. In the scenario, this general pattern continues in the UEMOA
region. For each crop, the degree of self-sufficiency — the ratio of production torequirements — of importing countries gradually increases over time. Net exporters
either maintain or increase their level of exports, although at a slower rate than domestic
demand. However, it is not possible to maintain these assumptions for Niger and Togo,
where increasing production leads to unsupportable pressures on land resources, despite
the increases in agricultural productivity described below. The implications for overall
trade balances are reflected in the aggregate self-sufficiency ratios — total crop
requirements over total production — reported in Sheet F-4.

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

31

Livestock Seafood Production
Traditional livestock production systems gradually give way to more commercial
operations over the course of the scenario. In the scenario there is a shift toward stallfeeding in the humid countries and in the wetter areas of the Sahelian countries.
Historically, such a shift has been seen across the world as rising incomes make relatively
labor-intensive herding systems uneconomic (Leach, 1995). In the scenario, this transitionis also assumed to occur in response to increasing pressures on grazing land. The trend
toward stall feeding is reflected in the increasing fraction of meat production from feedlots
as shown on Sheet F-2.
At the same time, the amount of meat or milk produced per hectare of grazing land
increases by around 2.8% per year on average between 1995 and 2025. This aggregate
figure is affected by several factors. First, improvements in the quality of herds andchanges in herding practices will increase production per hectare. Second, decreases inthe tsetse population are expected as a result of land-clearance for expanding settlements(Crosson and Anderson, 1992), allowing an increase in the herd density on grazing landsin the humid and sub-humid parts of the region. Third, increased use of crop residues andfodder relative to grazing land are reflected in increased meat production per hectare.
Evidence for such a trend is given by a study of five Sub-Saharan African countries,
including Mali and Niger, which suggests a trend for livestock systems to become lessdependent on grazing land and more reliant on crop-derived feed resources (Alexandratos,
1995). Despite the increase in productivity and the shift toward feedlots, grazing land
expands by 20% in the region over the course of the scenario to meet the sharp increase in
the demand for livestock products (Sheet F-2).
In the coastal countries, especially Senegal, seafood remains an important commodity. In
the scenario, production increases from around 600 ktonnes per year in 1995 to over
1,100 ktonnes in 2025 (Sheet F-3). This is slower than the growth in domestic
requirements, since ocean fisheries are already over-fished to some degree in 1995. As aresult, all countries see a decline in self-sufficiency in seafood and fish. Nevertheless, total
fish and seafood production almost doubles over the scenario, an increase of around 2.2%
per year on average. This is slightly higher than the rate of increase over the past few
decades (2.0%). Given the existing pressure on the region’s ocean fisheries, much of theincrease in production is assumed to be met through aquaculture.
Crop Production
Due to increases in agricultural productivity, the requirements for cropland grow more
slowly than those for crop products, by a factor of 1.3 versus a factor of 2.4 between 1995
and 2025 (Sheet F-6). Productivity increases come from increasing yields per harvest, andalso from a slight increase in the degree of multiple cropping. As discussed in Section 2.4,
cereal yields in the region have been almost constant over the past 30 years, while theaverage yield for the world doubled. In the scenario, cereal yields in the region finallybegin to increase in the context of overall commercialization and modernization. Yields
double between 1995 and 2025 (Sheet F-5), approaching the current world average.
Yield improvements are due to greater use of new crop varieties, increases in inputs, such

32

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

as irrigation water and fertilizer, and other changes, such as improved soil and water
conservation methods.
The changing agricultural practices are correlated to the spread of commercial agricultural
production in the scenario. Over time, a larger proportion of farmers are able to risk
planting the higher-yielding varieties of crops and paying for higher levels of inputs, suchas irrigation water and fertilizer. In addition, fallow times are shortened somewhat and thelevel of multiple cropping increased. These changes lead to increased cropping intensity,
the ratio of the area of land harvested each year to the total area of cropland.
Over the course of the scenario, irrigated areas increase in all countries (Sheet F-7).
However, with the exception of Niger and Togo, the increase is less than for total
cropland, as rainfed farmland expands more rapidly than irrigated areas. Increases in
irrigated area in the CDS take historical trends into account. Between 1961 and 1990,
irrigated area grew considerably in Côte d’Ivoire, but the growth has recently shown signsof slowing. In the scenario, growth resumes, but at a slower rate than in previous
decades. In Benin and Burkina Faso, irrigated areas continue to grow at close to thehistorical rates. In Niger and Togo, the severe limits on the expansion of arable land areassumed to lead to slightly higher rates of expansion than would be indicated by recent
trends.
In the scenario, the increases in agricultural production have both social and environmental
impacts. On the social side, they have implications for income distribution. The benefits of
the improved crop varieties are likely to initially accrue to the larger farmers, while mostsubsistence farmers will be unable to take the risks of introducing new varieties, or paying
for the higher inputs required. However, use of the new varieties can be expected togradually spread, a pattern seen in other countries during the Green Revolution (Conway,
1997). In terms of environmental issues, the expansion of irrigated agriculture, and theintensification of the crop and livestock production systems can be expected to lead toincreased land degradation and greater pressure on water resources.
3.8

Water

Withdrawals
The expected expansion of industrial, agricultural and urban areas, discussed earlier, have
implications for water consumption. In the scenario, total water withdrawals for theregion increase by 50% (Sheets P-1 and P-2). The largest increase is in industrial water
withdrawals, which grow by nearly four times between 1995 and 2025. The drivers ofwater demand increases are population for domestic use, value added for the industrial
sector, and the area of irrigated cropland for agriculture. Demand grows faster than thesedrivers since water-use intensities — the amount of water per capita, per dollar value
added and per hectare of harvested irrigated land — also increase.
The increase in intensity is a result of the assumption that the countries of the region
gradually converge toward the technological and managerial practices of industrialized
regions in the course of development. In households and the service sector, as incomesSustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process33

and levels of material consumption increase, withdrawals also increase per capita. This is
assumed to occur both because of increased access to clean water for domestic use, and as
a result of greater penetration of water-consuming devices. Nevertheless, domestic
withdrawals per capita remain low: in Mali, for example, average withdrawals forhouseholds and the service sector are only around 5 cubic meters per capita, compared tothe estimated 18 cubic meters per capita required for basic needs (Gleick, 1996),
indicating a persistent lack of access for much of the population. In the industrial sector,
as production patterns shift gradually toward those of the industrialized countries, water
withdrawals per dollar of output increase slightly. Finally, as yields rise on irrigated land,so does the water intensity of agricultural withdrawals.
Water Stress
Despite increasing water demand, withdrawals remain small compared to the renewable
resources, which are assumed to remain at their 1995 levels throughout the scenario. As
shown in Sheet P-3, the average use-to-resource ratio for the region increases only from0.02 to 0.03. The level in all countries remains well below the level of 0.1 that may
indicate the onset of water stress (Raskin et al., 1997). However, this seeming abundancein fact reflects the persistent lack of access for much of the population and the continuing
low level of development of the regional economies in the scenario. Ultimately, water
resources are likely to hamper conventional patterns of development. To see this, notethat a figure of 1,700 cubic meters per capita per year has been suggested as a “barrier” todevelopment (Falkenmark et al., 1989). That is, when values fall below this level, water
scarcity becomes a constraint. Three of the eight countries — Burkina Faso, Niger andTogo — are below that figure in 2025 (Figure 3-4).
Figure 3-4. Water resources per capita in the scenario
12

External
Internal

1000 m3 / capita / year

10
8
6
4
2
0
1995 2025

1995 2025

Benin

BurkinaFaso

1995 2025

Cote d'Ivoire

1995 2025

1995 2025

1995 2025

1995 2025

Mali

Niger

SenegalTogo

It is important to note that the scenario assumption that useable water supplies remain attheir 1995 levels may be questionable. In particular, this assumption implies that no majorchanges occur that might restrict flows from neighboring countries. Were this assumption

34

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

to be violated, Benin, Mali, Niger and Senegal could see their supplies considerably
reduced, and may experience water stress. Furthermore, both the increasing industrial
water consumption and the greater use of chemical fertilizer on irrigated land could lead toincreased water contamination. These effects are not explicitly considered in the scenario,
but could potentially restrict the available supplies in the country. Similarly, the likely
regional impact on water resources of long-term global climate change are poorly
understood and have yet to be quantified.
3.9

Energy and Air Pollution

DemandEnergy demand in the scenario grows by a factor of 2.7 between 1995 and 2025, as boththe populations and economies of the region grow (Sheet En-2). As a result, importdependence on refined petroleum products and electricity increase (Sheet En-1).
However, patterns of energy consumption remain far from those of the industrializedcountries. In per capita terms, annual energy consumption in the region reaches only 11
GJ by 2025, compared to nearly 140 GJ for the industrialized countries in 1995. Biomass
use continues to dominate energy demand, and even increases in absolute terms, as
populations and incomes rise, implying greater pressures on land resources and increasinglevels of air pollution.
Following patterns in other parts of the world, household and service sector energy use
rises with income. This effect is tempered by a shift away from inefficient traditional
biomass fuels to more efficient fuels such as petroleum products, natural gas andelectricity. The net effect is a slight increase in energy consumption per capita.
Considering industrial consumption, as the industrial sector grows and diversifies, thescenario reflects a general shift toward more capital-intensive and energy-intensive
industries, and away from labor-intensive ones. As a result, industrial energy intensities
also rise. In agriculture, as well, energy intensities rise as mechanization graduallyreplaces human and draft power on farms.
The changing patterns of energy consumption in transportation are more complex. Freight
intensities, expressed as energy consumed per tonne-km of freight hauled, decline slightly
over the course of the scenario. This occurs as freight transport practices (vehicles,
infrastructure, vintages, etc.) increase towards the level of efficiency seen in industrializedcountries. Over the scenario time-frame, tonne-km per dollar of GDP also falls, following
a general pattern seen around the world, perhaps reflecting the increasing share of
economic value added deriving from services that require little transportation.
Conversely, passenger transport energy intensities, expressed as energy used per
passenger-km traveled, increase over the course of the scenario. The increase is due
mainly to the rise in automobile use relative to buses as incomes increase, but also to a
declining number of passengers per automobile (the load factor). Along with increasing
passenger intensities, passenger-km per capita also increases as incomes rise.
With both passenger and freight transport requirements increasing by a factor of morethan three over the scenario, the growth in the transport sector will require large

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

35

investments to improve road, air and other transport infrastructures. At the same time, thetransport sector will be a cause of increasing levels of pollution, particularly in congested
urban areas. Nevertheless, in global terms, the region’s transport sector remains small: by2025 per capita transport requirements are still only approximately 5% of current percapita transport requirements in North America.
The net result of the individual sectoral changes is that aggregate intensity — energy
consumption per dollar of GDP — declines in every country (Sheet En-2), with domesticenergy consumption continuing to dominate total final demand.
Production and Trade
Currently, all of the countries produce some electricity, although most are net importers.
Only Mali is entirely self-sufficient, although Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal areclose to self-sufficiency. In the scenario, these patterns persist. However, in Côte
d’Ivoire, which imported only 2% of its electricity in the base year, it is assumed that thenatural gas fields that were being developed for electricity production in 1995 aredeveloped and running by 2025, allowing the country to be self-sufficient in electricity
generation. As a result of these trade patterns, combined with rising demand, electricity
imports increase in the scenario, as shown in Sheet En-1.
Demand for refined petroleum products rises in the scenario as a result of rising sectoral
demand and requirements for oil-fired electricity generation. Most of the countries in theregion are now entirely dependent on imports, a pattern that continues in the scenario.
Only one country in the region, Côte d’Ivoire has active refining capacity, which is used toprocess both imported and domestically produced crude oil.9 In the scenario, Côte
d’Ivoire maintains the same level of trade relative to production as in 1995. Net
petroleum imports are shown on Sheet En-1.
Biomass production increases in absolute terms in every country, despite decreasing as ashare in total final demand. Overall, biomass consumption increases by a factor of 2.5 forthe region between 1995 and 2025. Thus, in spite of a gradual transition to modern fuels,
the CDS tells a story of continued reliance on biomass for the majority of households withall of the adverse social and environmental impacts that implies, such as exposure toharmful indoor air pollutants, the burden on women and children of collecting increasingly
scarce firewood and increasing pressures on wood resources.

9

In 1995 Senegal also produced some refined petroleum products. However, the refinery has since been
converted to a terminal, and now all petroleum products are imported (MBendi Information Systems,
1999).

36

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Reserves
There is considerable uncertainty about the potential for oil production in the UEMOA in
the future. Two countries — Benin and Côte d’Ivoire — have been producing crude oilsince the late 1970s and early 1980s, and subsequent exploration in Côte d’Ivoire has
identified further oil and gas reserves (ENDA-TM, 1995; MBendi Information Services,
1999). Some oil fields have been discovered in Senegal, and exploration is continuing, butcurrently production is small, amounting to less than one percent of imports. None of theother four countries produce crude oil, and in Burkina Faso, Mali and Togo there are no
known reserves. However, recent exploration in Niger has identified potential oil fields.
The amount available is unknown, and exploration is continuing (MBendi Information
Services, 1999). Given the uncertainties for future production, in the CDS oil reserves areheld at their 1995 levels. With this assumption, crude oil production in the region is
expected to slow or stop between 1995 and 2025, and the countries are assumed toexhaust their reserves by 2025, as shown in Table 3-1. Over the scenario period, all ofcountries in the region remain dependent on oil and are likely to becoming increasingly
vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices, as global supplies of crude oil become
increasingly scarce (see for example, Raskin et al., 1998). Benin, which is an exporter of
crude oil in the base year, loses export income from sales of crude oil.
Table 3-1. Energy reserves in the scenario
Country
Benin
Cote d'Ivoire
Niger
Senegal

Fuel
Crude Oil
Crude OilNatural Gas
Coal
Uranium
Crude OilNatural Gas

Reserves
1995
2025 Unit
3.7
0.0 Mtonnes
6.8
0.0 Mtonnes
3
14.0
3.5 billion m
70
55 Mtonnes
343
256 ktonnes
Unknownn/a3
5.6
1.7 billion m

In 1995, both Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal had some natural gas reserves. Senegal is selfsufficient in natural gas production in 1995, and continues to be self-sufficient throughout
the scenario. In the scenario Côte d’Ivoire develops its natural gas reserves for electricity
production.
Niger is the only country in the region producing coal and uranium in the base year. The
reserves of each are ample, and in the scenario Niger continues to meet all of its demandfor coal from its domestic reserves, and to export uranium at the same rate as in the baseyear.
Air Pollution
The shift toward conventional fuels leads to higher emissions of greenhouse gases (SheetP-4). However, they remain well below those of the industrialized countries, with regionalemissions per capita in 2025 of just 0.3 tonnes of CO2, compared to 11 tonnes of CO2 forthe industrialized countries in 1995. Non-greenhouse gas emissions are a more pressing
concern. Local and indoor air pollution increases in line with increasing biomass use, inSustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process37

spite of the gradual shift toward modern non-biomass fuels. Emissions from the transport
sector increase in line with the large growth in that sector, a situation that, if unaddressed,
is likely to create increasing urban air quality concerns.
3.10

Land

Nearly all of the topics discussed in earlier sections have implications for land use, andgenerally they point to greater pressure on land resources. Population growth alone, in
the absence of other factors, would lead to greater pressure. Compounding this, growing
urbanization and an expanding infrastructure leads to expansion of the built environment
and increased land degradation close to cities, while population growth in the coastal
regions increases the pressures on coastal environments. In addition, despite theincreasing urbanization and the growing role played by industry in the region, thelivelihood of much of the population remains tightly bound to the land. The increases inagricultural production, both from expansion into new land and intensified use of existing
land, lead to land pressure and degradation. Other factors are likely to acceleratedegradation processes. These include the competition for scarce land resources between
different agricultural producers — herders, subsistence farmers and commercial farmers— and increasing degradation from the increase in the population in poverty, arising fromuncertain land tenure and the necessary focus on immediate needs. Finally, increased
exploitation of wood resources places additional pressure on land resources.
In the scenario, built environment increases as incomes and populations rise, more thandoubling in area over the course of the scenario (Sheet P-5). The area of built
environment required per capita is assumed to increase gradually, by about 10% over thecourse of the scenario. The increase comes in part from the expansion of human habitats,but also from increases in the area of other kinds of built land, such as paved roads andindustrial sites.
The expanding built environment encroaches on existing cropland, forest and grazing land,
as well as “other” land not in one of the explicit categories. In addition, croplandcontinues to be lost through degradation, amounting to 2.6 million hectares, or 13% of theoriginal cropland area, by 2025. At the same time that agricultural land is being lost
through these processes, in most countries requirements for cropland and grazing land areincreasing. The area that is lost, as well as the additional area, must be converted fromother existing land uses, such as forest and “other” land. In the past, the most importantcause of deforestation in the region has been expanding cropland. To reflect this in the
scenario, new cropland is converted from forest. Grazing land also expands into forested
areas, and to some extent into “other” land.
As a consequence of these changes, the area under forests continues to seriously diminish
in the region. As shown on Sheet P-5, forest area drops by 30% between 1995 and 2025,
or about 1.2% per year on average for the region. In some countries the rate of decrease
even exceeds the historical rate (Sheet P-7), reflecting the higher pressures placed byurban and agricultural expansion, and a rapidly growing population. Particularly striking
is the accelerating rate of deforestation in Burkina Faso and Senegal, due to the38

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

considerable expansion in agricultural land. The loss of forest area has both social andenvironmental consequences. On the social side, the loss of forest resources impacts
people at low income levels who rely on forest products for subsistence or for some of
their income. It also impacts the sustainability of traditional shifting cultivation practices,which need to leave areas of forest fallow for as much as a decade, to replenish nutrientsin the soil. It also leads to serious loss of biodiversity and the depletion of biomass
resources.

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

39

4. Toward Sustainable Development in West Africa
4.1

Indicators and Sustainability

The Conventional Development Scenario paints a picture of regional patterns over the
next several decades under “conventional” development assumptions. In many ways, it
tells an optimistic story of rapid growth and modernization of the economies of the region.
In the context of increasing economic globalization, regional consumption and production
patterns gradually move toward the standards of industrialized countries, while thescenario also assumes that institutions of governance become progressively more effective
and the region enjoys an era of relative peace and security.
Nevertheless, in addition to these optimistic development assumptions, the scenario bears
a disquieting message, as well. Certain environmental and social conditions that werealready problematic in 1995 persist or worsen — dire poverty, inefficient energy use,
inadequate water services and land pressure. Moreover, the story of “convergence” inthe scenario should not be read as an assumption of fast approaching parity between theregion and industrialized countries. Even if the optimistic rate of income growth assumed
in the CDS are sustained, it will take around 200 years before average incomes in theregion reach the present day average seen in North America. Important trends in the
scenario are summarized in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1. Summary of conventional development scenario indicators
Indicator
Population
GDP per capita

1995
62
1,173

2025
133
1,904

Unit or Quantity
Million$ PPP/capita

Trend
Near doubling (2.6%/year)
Significant growth (1.6%/year)

Hunger

17
(28%)

28
(21%)

MillionIncreasing absolute hunger,
decreasing as percentage

Deforestation
Cropland degradation
Biomass Reliance
Biomass Energy Use
Oil Dependency

304
227
81
444
80%

499
87
73
1,121
87%

Accelerating deforestation
Slowing but serious
Gradually decreasing
Increasing pressure on resources
Increasing dependency

CO2 Emissions
Water Stress

10
0.02

40
0.03

kha/yrkha/yr% of final demand
PJ
Imports as % of non-biomass
primary energy
Mtonnes/yr
Use-to-resource ratio

Increasing, but very low
Low, but lack of access continues

See Annex for notes on figures.

In spite of the scenario’s relatively optimistic vision of growing economies and average
household incomes, it remains in many ways a bleak vision of the development prospects
in the region. While poverty decreases as a fraction of the population, the absolute
number of people in hunger increases more rapidly in the thirty years of the scenario thanin the twenty-five years between 1970 and 1995. At the same time, the environment is

40

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

progressively degraded through loss of forests and other ecosystems, degradation ofarable land and local pollution around burgeoning cities.
In the energy sector, growing demand for biomass energy aggravates pressure on forest
resources. Petroleum demand grows almost four-fold, deepening the region's dependency
on oil imports. Nevertheless, even under the robust economic assumptions of the CDS,West Africa does not emerge as a significant contributor of greenhouse gases, as energy
consumption per capita remains relatively low.
The persistence of absolute poverty, rapid population growth and increasing resource
scarcity in the scenario could lead to social friction and conflict over increasingly scarce
resources. In fact, such conflict could undermine the assumption of steady economic
growth. In other words, long-range social, economic and environmental sustainability ishighly uncertain under conventional development premises.
4.2

Policy Implications

The survey of indicators indicates that the CDS is not a development pathway compatible
with sustainability. The scenario assumes "policy-as-usual", that is, an absence ofintegrated and coordinated efforts to meet sustainability goals. It provides a baseline
reference for exploring the actions required for a transition to an alternative sustainable
development scenario in the future.
Policy-making for the long term is not straightforward in Africa, even among the relatively
stable UEMOA states. One of the CDS assumptions is the evolution of effective
governance. This is not only a precondition of sustainable development, it is also a sinequa non for sustained effective long-term policy making. Even if stability is assumed,
there is a sense of “emergency” to much planning in the area in the face of demographic
change, economic vulnerability, security concerns and the threat of drought. Policy
inevitably tends to concentrate on survival in the short term rather than development in thelong term. Under these conditions, and given the unpredictability of many of the factors
involved, finding the breathing space to construct credible and viable long-term policy
strategies is indeed a challenge. Our purpose here is simply to raise questions that may beof use for those policy-makers who assume that challenge.
4.2.1 Priority Areas for Policy-Makers
Among the areas deserving of special attention are the high incidence of hunger, thecontinuing reliance on inefficient energy resources (particularly biomass), the continuing
under-development of water resources, and the potential for resource conflict. Although
the CDS brings these areas into focus, it should be borne in mind that they are likely tofigure in virtually any conceivable scenario for this thirty year period. Indeed, in a more
pessimistic, historic-trend scenario they would appear even more pressing.

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

41

Hunger
The increase in absolute poverty in the region is perhaps the most unsettling feature of the
scenario. The decrease in the fraction of population in hunger does not disguise asituation of increasing poverty. Although the distributional inequality in UEMOA statesremains below US levels, the exceedingly low average income levels and the lack of eventhe rudimentary redistribution net that exists in the industrialized countries together
magnify the extent of the crisis. In West Africa the problem is not so much the size of thegap between rich and poor, as the extent of the poverty affecting a majority on thebottom.
A clear policy goal should be the radical alteration of the existing agricultural production
systems that, as the scenario shows, are not efficient enough or improving sufficiently
quickly to meet the needs of the rising population. Considerable and speedy evolution
towards intensification must be targeted, but such an overhaul is not attainable without anappreciable boost in external support.
Eventually, some form of effective social security system will need to be introduced toalleviate poverty. Such an initiative is both practically and politically difficult however,and ultimately dependent on political will at the national level. Furthermore, public
spending on social welfare in Africa is currently subject to the international climate which
is not presently supportive of such measures. Other steps may be taken, however, toensure that the resilient informal networks of distribution and food supply that currently
keep many of the poorest in West Africa from starving do not succumb to modernizingpressures. Taxation, social welfare, education and health care policy can all profit from aclose examination of the existing “informal” networks by which West African societies
have internalized various forms of social security. The question is how to make thesesystems compatible with the new demands of “modern” social structures in order toreinforce, rather than criminalize or uproot these systems.
EnergyAnother troubling aspect of the scenario is the projected increase in biomass use, by afactor of 2.5 for the region between 1995 and 2025 in the CDS. This absolute increase
occurs in spite of the decreasing share of biomass in the regional energy balance. The
continued reliance on increasingly scarce biomass fuels will have undesirable impacts bothon human development and the environment. The major factor in forest depletion today ischanges in land-use, but fuel requirements already are a significant factor, and the two
combined in the future may be explosive. In the meantime, the international conventions
on desertification, climate change and biodiversity all indicate growing internationalpressure to further protect and extend forests. Such conflicting demands on this resource
can have a directly negative impact on the populations closest to them, as has already been
seen in Mali in the 1980s (Ribot, 1998).
Two policy approaches come into play here: energy system modernization and forest
management. Energy requirements grow by a factor of 2.7 for the region between 1995
and 2025 in the CDS. To improve the quality and efficiency of energy available to the42

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

average West African user, the provision of electricity and modern fuels would have toincrease to meet this demand and displace the predicted 73% met by biomass. At thesame time, prices will have to decrease for the user, presumably as economies of scale
come into play. A diversification of energy sources would allow a demand-driven increase
in alternative sources of energy. Renewable energy sources are a possibility that havealready been explored with some success throughout the UEMOA region. The Sahelcountries in particular have exceedingly high insolation rates, ideal for large-scale
introduction of solar power. Pro-active policy measures in East Africa, in particularZimbabwe, have met with a certain success in disseminating this energy resource and these
could be emulated and extended in the UEMOA states. Finally, with wise energy policies,
the region can avoid replicating the energy inefficient path of conventional Northern
development by promoting end-use efficiency and demand management.
In terms of large-scale generation, hydroelectric power is a possibility although its
exploitation in the region has to date been limited. Given the interactive nature of thewater systems in the region, a regional approach to construction and distribution ofhydropower would be the most rational. The issue is fraught with complications however,not least of which is concern about water constraints in the future. Any attempt toimprove large-scale electricity generation in the region would require a diversified but
highly coordinated policy, regional in nature, and taking account of the trade conditions(in petroleum and other fossil fuels) between the UEMOA states and their neighbors. It is
worth noting that one of the UEMOA states’ neighbors has considerable water resources(Guinea) while others have large crude oil deposits (Nigeria and Gabon). The current
trading conditions make the proximity of these major resources all but irrelevant to theregion. Another consideration requiring research is the viability of increasing the numberof regional refineries.
Forest-management policy has advanced in recent years, with forest protection,
management and renewal schemes emerging throughout the region. At present, however,there is tension between the international drive to maintain forests and the local need to
exploit them. Research is needed to determine how the increasing need for cleared land,for both settlement and agriculture, can be aligned with the continued high demand forfuelwood on the one hand and plans to preserve and renew forest land on the other.
Without clear and coordinated policy in this area, conflict is likely.
Water
Water withdrawals in the CDS are small relative to water resources in the UEMOA states,
but this reflects inadequate access for much of the population and underdevelopment
rather than an a priori abundance of freshwater sources. The indications are that, in orderboth to grant access to water to the population at large and to feed the increasing demandsof irrigation, industry and power generation, a strategic long-term policy for water use andinfrastructure must be devised. The current under-exploitation of water resources has theadvantage of allowing such a policy to be conceived and executed in a timely manner,
rather than being imposed upon an already unsustainable system.

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

43

Water exploitation is emerging as a major potential source of conflict for the next century.
Africa has some experience of the dangers of confrontation over the use of sharedresources in the Congo basin, and the continuing tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea
over control of the upper Nile (Okidi 1994). West Africa has not yet experienced suchconflicts, but there too the resource is not shared equally by all countries. A regional
approach to water exploitation would allow maximal efficiency and head off potential
conflict. The UEMOA provides an important regional forum for water development. It
provides a structure for water allocation between states, resource development andecosystem protection, which could help West Africa avoid water conflicts that may deepenin the years to come. Water sharing should become a priority for negotiation in the near
future, if it is to become a strong foundation for regional development.
Other Issues
Two further critical areas of policy concern are the rapid urbanization rate and populationdriven land pressures. The latter has long been recognized as a major cause for concern
by African policy-makers, but reform has been hampered in the past by the complicationsof traditional land ownership arrangements, inherited colonial structures and the demandsof a modernizing economy. It will become increasingly urgent to overcome these
difficulties, as vying pressures for land use contribute to land degradation and settlement
tensions. Likewise, the rapid growth of cities will require coherent urban planning, whichtoday is minimal. At the same time, efforts can be made to improve economic conditions
in rural zones to lessen rural-urban migration.
4.2.2 Further Indications from the Conventional Development Scenario
The CDS suggest numerous other areas where policy-makers can move early to anticipate
and influence the trajectory of the region’s development. These include building on
existing industrial potential (identifying and supporting nascent viable industries);increasing efficiency in the agricultural sector (irrigation, commercial agriculture,
increasing crop yields and intensity, etc.); shifting the export base from primary materials
to manufactured goods and services; and investing in an infrastructure with the capacity tosupport increasing demands in industry, agriculture, transport and communication.
In the case of transport it is worth noting the increased passenger transport energy
intensity projected by the conventional development scenario, due to increasing
automobile use and falling load factors. Integrated transport planning can head off thispotential problem early on. Regarding communications and information technology,
Senegal, which enjoys the highest rate of main telephone lines per capita and the lowest
fault rate in sub-Saharan Africa (with the exception of South Africa), offers a promisingmodel. The important role of communication and information technology in modern
development suggests that pro-active policy to develop this area will be important tobuilding a thriving private sector.
Consideration should also be given to oil and mineral reserves policy. Outside the
UEMOA countries, West Africa is rich in reserves and further exploration may well prove
fruitful. The negotiation of favorable trade agreements in petroleum and minerals from

44

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

neighboring producers is an important policy objective. Forging favorable oil and mineralarrangements will not be easy considering the history of foreign influence over oil
exploration and exploitation, but the development of regional capacity for exploiting andrefining regional oil and mineral wealth would take considerable pressure off the huge
import bill that these energy sources run up now and, according to the CDS, in the future.
In the CDS, the level of international economic integration and trade increases. There is,however, a great difference between predominantly intra-regional trade (where eachcountry trades with the others according to the principal of comparative advantage) andinter-regional, in which case the countries within the region tend to be in competition witheach other. While currently limited, increased intra-regional would help shield the
UEMOA countries from international price changes and currency fluctuations. The use ofa shared currency allows the UEMOA zone to operate essentially as a large domestic
market. A common, or at least integrated, trading policy would also lay the groundworkfor more coherent and coordinated policy on water and mineral resources.
The fate of the informal economy under conventional development scenarios is anotherimportant policy matter. Currently, the informal sector thrives throughout West Africa
and contributes to about a third of the GDP. The workings of this sector need to bethoroughly studied and understood so that its pivotal role in the livelihoods of so many inthe region can be successfully nurtured.
4.2.3 Policy Implications for the International Community
The scenario’s bleak vision of increasing hunger and worsening environmental problems in
the region, in spite of optimistic economic growth assumptions, highlights the fact that thepolicy implications of the scenario apply not just to decision makers in the region, but tothe international community as a whole. While policy makers in West Africa can do muchto address the issues highlighted above, ultimately a new development paradigm will be
required in which industrialized nations commit to alleviating poverty and promoting
development in West Africa on an unprecedented scale. While this is not the place todiscuss the implementation of such a program, it might include debt forgiveness, improved
terms of trade and new forms of technology transfer. All such efforts will need to go
beyond the limited aid and trade arrangements of recent decades.
4.3

Next Steps

The Conventional Development Scenario is based on the convergence of the region’s
development trajectory toward that of the industrialized world. The three basic
assumptions for West Africa are of a growing industrial base; a gradual shift fromsubsistence to commercial agriculture; and the evolution of effective governance systems.
None of these conditions are guaranteed, and in fact the recent history of the region does
not give good grounds for faith in any of them. However, as the preceding discussion
made clear, the vision of the future presented by the CDS is not a prediction of aninevitable future for the region. Rather, it is provided as a baseline scenario to guide
future decision-making. By focusing attention on a concrete set of issues, we hope it will

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process45

help to place sustainability issues on the agenda of relevant international, regional andnational organizations and other stakeholders. By looking decades into the future, itbrings potential problems to bear on policy discussions today, providing a starting point
for building a regional vision of sustainable development. In this role, the CDS can benefit
from further refinement through the addition of better information and data, and morethorough analysis of key issues. It can also provide a starting point for constructing
alternative normative scenarios for the region, to help examine the prospects forinnovative development strategies for moving toward sustainable patterns of development.
4.3.1 Refining the CDS
The Conventional Development Scenario developed for this study is intended as a firstorder analysis with the aim of catalyzing further sustainability assessment and policy
discussion in the region. Ideally, the assessment and discussion processes will be mutually
reinforcing as the range of issues covered by the scenario is both expanded and refined,
and as better sources of data are brought to light. Two areas needing elaboration in the
CDS were mentioned in the policy discussion above — intra-regional trade (both between
the UEMOA countries and more generally within West Africa) and the role of the informal
economy. Incorporating these explicitly in future scenarios would facilitate an explorationof different development paths, in which trade patterns and the relative importance of theformal and informal economies appear as scenario variables.
Other issues could benefit from further analysis. Some of the most pressing concern landuse, whether for the provision of biomass fuel, urban expansion or agricultural production.
Land-use dynamics in the region are complex, affected by the wide range of agroecological zones that are present, as well as both traditional and formal rules for land
management that exist in the region. Elaboration of these issues is a priority for futurescenario enhancement. Also, the energy analysis, while benefiting from sectoral-level
information, was treated at an aggregate level in this report, due to the limitations ofenergy sector statistics for the region. In particular, accurate and up-to-date data
describing biomass consumption and production patterns in the region are scarce.
Improving energy statistics in the region is no small matter and will require investment inenergy surveys, capacity-building within government ministries and other initiatives.
4.3.2 Alternative Visions
The Conventional Development Scenario presents one vision of a possible future for theregion. Ultimately, however, there is no development scenario for these countries that canbe called “conventional”. The region will have to innovate and forge its own style ofdevelopment based on the sustainable use of its resources and existing systems of
production and trade networks. In terms of policy, the great challenge facing thesecountries is to identify which of its existing structures, productive systems and industries,
trading relations, legal infrastructures and regulations to keep and reinforce, and which tojettison.

46

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

In making these decisions, development need not be equated to the “Westernization” ofsociety. In the West African context there are surely other models awaiting definition.
Indeed, many of the basic conditions driving development historically in industrial
countries are no longer applicable. On the one hand, developing societies today are
subject to constraints — environmental and commercial — that were unknown in the past.
On the other hand, certain opportunities exist to developing societies today that were
unavailable a century or two ago. For example, the spectacular improvements in
information technologies and the accessibility of information imply that centralization ofpolicies and decision-making processes are no longer necessary to development, andindeed may prove a hindrance. The CDS illustrates the problems of applying conventional
development models for West Africa. What remains is to find desirable and feasible
alternatives.
The magnitude of the task of constructing alternative scenarios should not be
underestimated. The problematique of sustainable development in the UEMOA countries
is quite different and considerably more challenging than in other more developed parts of
the world. In the UEMOA countries, almost all of which figure among the world’s “least
developed countries”, the primary concern is not to curb or alter “development” but togenerate and direct it — the creation of systems of production and distribution which willmeet the needs of burgeoning populations, and lift the majority out of their current
conditions of poverty and privation. This is an already many-faceted task involving thepolitical and legal spheres as much as the economic. However, as these social goals aremet, environmental issues — which are of secondary importance today — will increase inimportance and urgency. If social development is to continue, the environmental base on
which it rests must be protected in the long-term.
The challenge is to set long-term achievable objectives, at a time when pressing short-term
problems demand immediate attention, and to develop workable policies that will allow a
productive economy to grow and flourish sustainably. Alternative scenarios, reflecting abrighter future for the region, may very well require fundamental transitions in thedevelopment process. Vision and determination will be necessary to find ways around thedaunting problems that face the region to at least improve the prospects for the majority of
inhabitants, for whom, to judge by the relatively optimistic scenario presented here, thefuture does not yet look bright enough.
4.4

Conclusions

This report, with its first cut analysis of a Conventional Development Scenario andpreliminary scan of policy priorities, is but a first step on the long road to creating a visionof sustainable development for West Africa. If there is to be a transition to a more
prosperous and environmentally resilient mode of development in the region, sustained
initiatives will be required at national and regional levels. These must include acommitment to building the institutional and human capacity for integrated sustainable
development assessment and policy analysis.

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process47

An inclusive process of dialogue, debate and discussion is key to mobilizing popularsupport and the political will necessary for a sustainable path of development. The tradeoffs between competing objectives and the balance between alternative social visions willneed to be considered by a spectrum of affected stakeholders in an open and democratic
decision-making process. As a first step, a policy dialogue should be launched to promoteawareness of the critical issues raised by this report and to consider follow-up actions. An
outcome of a policy dialogue could be the examination of scenarios that go well beyond
the scope of the CDS. Since West Africa faces many issues that require coordinatedinternational action, it would make good sense for a policy dialogue to take place at theregional level.
To advance down the road of sustainable development, significant effort will be required
to build the human, institutional and scientific capacity in the region to support discussions
and decision-making with analysis, information and solutions. Ultimately, it is clear that
fundamental changes will be required in policy making, both within the region and theinternational community. Only then can the concept of sustainable development begin to
move from rhetoric to a practical basis for action. Although the challenge is substantial,
the reward is no less than a better future for the region’s peoples.

48

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

49

References
Africa Info. 1998. “Industries Energetiques” for Cote d’Ivoire. Available from:http://africa-info.ihost.com/pages/ci/eco038.htm; INTERNET.
Alexandratos, N. (ed.). 1995. World Agriculture: Towards 2010. Chichester, U.K.: John
Wiley and Sons.
Behnke, R. H. and I. Scoones. 1992. Rethinking Range Ecology: Implications for
Rangeland Management in Africa. Overseas Development Institute.
Bender, W. H. 1997. “How Much Food Will We Need in the 21st Century?” Environment
39(2), pp. 7-11, 27-28.
Conway, G. 1997. The Doubly Green Revolution: Food for All in the 21st Century.
London: Penguin Books.
Crosson, P. and J. R. Anderson. 1992. Resources and Global Food Prospects: Supply and
Demand for Cereals to 2030. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. World Bank
Technical Paper No. 184.
de Haan, C.. H. Steinfeld and H. Blackburn. 1997. Livestock & the Environment: Findinga Balance. Available from
htp://www.fao.org/waicent/FaoInfo/Agricult/LXEHTML/tech/title.htm.
Energy Information Administration (EIA) .1998. World Energy Database, (electronic
distribution). Washington, D.C.: DOE/EIA.
Environnement et Développement du Tiers-Monde (ENDA-TM). 1995. l’Energie en
Afrique: Situation Energetique de 34 Pays. Dakar: ENDA-Editions.
Falkenmark, M., J. Lundqvist and C. Widstrand. 1989. “Macro-scale Water Scarcity
Requires Micro-scale Approaches,” Natural Resources Forum. November.
Fischer, G. 1993. Personal Communication.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 1995. Irrigation in
Africa in Figures/l’Irrigation en Afrique en Chiffres. Rome: FAO.
______. 1996a. FAOSTAT PC. Rome: FAO.
______. 1996b. “Food, Agriculture and Food Security: Developments Since the World
Food Conference and Prospects,” Technical Background Document 1, Volume 1, to
the World Food Summit. Rome: FAO. Available from:http://www.fao.org/WFS/final/e/volume1/t1-e.htm; INTERNET.
______. 1996c. Sixth World Food Survey. Rome: FAO.
______. 1997a. Mapping Undernutrition. Rome: FAO.
______. 1997b. Review of the State of World Aquaculture. Rome: FAO. FAO Fisheries
Circular No. 886 FIRI/C886(Rev.1).
______. 1997c. Review of the State of World Fishery Resources: Marine Fisheries.
Rome: FAO. FAO Fisheries Circular No. 920 FIRM/C920.
———. 1997d. State of the World’s Forests 1997. Rome: FAO.
———. 1998. “Helping People to Live With Trypanosomiasis—One of the Greatest
Constraints to African Agricultural Development,” News & Highlights, 28 May

50

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

1998. Rome: FAO. Available from: http://www.fao.org/News/1998/980506-e.htm;
INTERNET.
Food and Agriculture Organization/International Crops Research Institute for the SemiArid Tropics (FAO/ICRISAT). 1996. The World Sorghum and Millet Economies:
Facts, Trends and Outlook. Available from: http://www.cgiar.org/icrisat;
INTERNET.
Gallopin, G. A. Hammond, P. Raskin and R. Swart. 1997. Branch Points: Global
Scenarios and Human Choice. Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm Environment
Institute. PoleStar Series Report No. 7.
Gleick, P. H. 1996. “Basic Water Requirements for Human Activities: Meeting Basic
Needs,” Water International 21, pp. 83-92.
Global Resource Information Database/United Nations Environment Program(GRID/UNEP). 1991. Global Assessment of Human Induced Soil Degradation(GLASOD): Global Digital Database. Nairobi: GRID.
Heaps, C., E. Kemp-Benedict and P. Raskin. 1998. Conventional Worlds: Technical
Description of “Bending the Curve” Scenarios. Boston: Stockholm Environment
Institute-Boston. PoleStar Series Report No. 9.
Hulme, M., D. Conway, P. M. Kelly, S. Subak and T. E. Down. 1995. The Impacts of
Climate Change on Africa. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 1992. 1992 IPCC Supplement.
Geneva: World Meteorological Organization.
______. 1995. IPCC Greenhouse Gas Inventory Reference Manual: IPCC Guidelines for
National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. Vol. 3. Bracknell, UK: IPCC.
———. 1996. Climate change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate
Change. Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
International Energy Agency (IEA). 1997. Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries,
1960-1995 (electronic distribution). Paris: OECD.
International Road Federation (IRF). 1992. World Road Statistics 1987-1991. Geneva,
Switzerland: International Road Federation.
Leach, G. 1995. Global Land & Food in the 21st Century: Trends & Issues for
Sustainability. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute. PoleStar Series
Report No. 5.
MBendi Information Services. 1999. MBendi AfroPaedia. Available from:http://www.mbendi.co.za; INTERNET.
Millington, A. C., R. W. Critchley, T. D. Douglas and P. Ryan. 1994. Estimating Woody
Biomass in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
Mobbs, P. M. 1996. “The Mineral Industry of Togo.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Geological
Survey — Mineral Information.
Okidi, C. O. 1994. Environmental Stress and Conflicts in Africa: Case Study of Drainage
Basins. In Ecopolicy No. 6, Nairobi: ACTS Press.

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

51

Oldeman, L., R. Hakkeling and W. Sombroek. 1991. World Map of the Status of HumanInduced Soil Degradation: An Explanatory Note. Second revised edition. Nairobi:
United Nations Environment Program.
Raskin, P., M. Chadwick, T. Jackson and G. Leach. 1996. The Sustainability Transition:
Beyond Conventional Development. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute.
PoleStar Series Report No. 1.
Raskin, P., G. Gallopin, P. Gutman, A. Hammond and R. Swart. 1998. Bending theCurve: Toward Global Sustainability. Boston: Stockholm Environment InstituteBoston. PoleStar Series Report No. 8.
Raskin, P., P. Gleick, P. Kirshen, G. Pontius and K. Strzepek. 1997. Water Futures:
Assessment of Long-range Patterns and Problems. Background Document for the
SEI/United Nations Comprehensive Assessment of the Freshwater Resources of theWorld. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute.
Raskin, P., R. Margolis. 1995. Global Energy in the 21st Century: Patterns, Projections
and Problems. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute. PoleStar Series Report
No. 3.
Ravallion, M., G. Datt and D. van de Walle. 1991. “Quantifying Absolute Poverty in theDeveloping World,” Review of Income and Wealth 37(4), p. 345.
Review of Policies in the Traditional Energy Sector (RPTES). 1995. Regional Report:
Senegal-Gambia-Burkina Faso-Mali-Niger. Maastricht.
Ribot, J. C. 1998. Integral Local Development: Authority, Accountability And
Entrustment in Decentralized Natural Resource Management. Washington, D.C.:
The World Bank. Working paper, RPTES.
Smith, K. R. 1993. “Fuel Combustion, Air Pollution Exposure, and Health: The Situationin Developing Countries,” Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 18, pp.
529-66.
Snrech, 1995. Preparing for the Future: A Vision of West Africa in the Year 2020.
CILSS; Club du Sahel; CINERGIE.
Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries(SESRTCIC). 1997. SESRTCIC InfoBase. Available from: http://www.sesrtcic.org;
INTERNET.
Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI). 1993. G2S2: Greenhouse Gas Scenario System.
Database and User Guide. Boston: Stockholm Environment Institute-Boston.
United Nations (UN). 1997. Annual Populations 1950-2050 (1996 rev., electronic
distribution). New York: United Nations.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). 1992. Agenda
21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development. New York: United
Nations.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 1996. Human Development Report,
1996. New York: Oxford University Press.
______. 1998. Human Development Report, 1998. New York: Oxford University Press.

52

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). 1997. Global Environmental Outlook-1.
Available from: http://www.grida.no/GEO1; INTERNET.
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (USBC). 1997. Historical
Income and Poverty Tables (Table H-4). Washington, D.C.: United States Bureauof the Census. Available fromhttp://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/index/html; INTERNET.
World Bank. 1996a. Trends in Developing Economies. Washington, D.C.: The WorldBank.
______. 1996b. Toward Environmentally Sustainable Development in Sub-SaharanAfrica: A World Bank Agenda. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
______. 1997. World Development Indicators (electronic distribution). Washington, D.C.:
The World Bank.
______. 1998. World Development Indicators, 1998. Washington, D.C.: The WorldBank.
World Bank. 1998. How do Sub-Saharan African Utilities Compare?. Working Paper
available from: http://www.worldbank.org; INTERNET.
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). 1987. Our Common
Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC). 1998a. Global Forest Information
Service World Tables. Cambridge: WCMC. Available from:http://www.wcmc.org.uk; INTERNET.
______. 1998b. Global Protected Areas Summary Statistics. Cambridge: WCMC.
Available from: http://www.wcmc.org.uk; INTERNET.
World Energy Council (WEC). 1995. 1995 Survey of Energy Resources. 17th Edition.
London: World Energy Council.
World Resources Institute. 1992. World Resources 1992-93. Washington, D.C.: World
Resources Institute.
———. 1996. World Resources 1996-97 Database Diskette. Washington, D.C.: World
Resources Institute.
______. 1998. World Resources 1998-99. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

Annex: Scenario Highlights
DEMOGRAPHY
Sheet D-1. Population
Sheet D-2. Urbanization
ECONOMY
Sheet E-1. GDP
Sheet E-2. Structure of GDP
Sheet E-3. Income
SOCIETY
Sheet S-1. Income Distribution
Sheet S-2. Hunger
ENERGY
Sheet En-1. Primary Energy Requirements
Sheet En-2. Final Fuel Demand
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
Sheet F-1. Diets
Sheet F-2. Meat and Milk Requirements and Production
Sheet F-3. Fish Requirements and Production
Sheet F-4. Crop Requirements and Production
Sheet F-5. Cereal Yields
Sheet F-6. Cropland
Sheet F-7. Irrigation
Sheet F-8. Potential Cultivable LandENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURE
Sheet P-1. Water Withdrawals by Country
Sheet P-2. Water Withdrawals by Sector
Sheet P-3. Water Stress
Sheet P-4. Carbon Emissions
Sheet P-5. Land Use by Land Type
Sheet P-6. Land Use by Region
Sheet P-7. Deforestation
Sheet P-8. Fertilizer Consumption

53

54

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process55

Sheet D-1. Population
Growth Rates
Togo
SenegalNiger
Mali
Cote d'Ivoire
Burkina Faso
Benin
0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

% / year

30

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo

millions of people

25

20

15

10

5

0
1970

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA
AfricaDeveloping
OECD
World

1995

Population (millions)
1995
2025
5.4
12.3
10.5
23.5
13.7
24.4
10.8
24.6
9.2
22.4
8.3
16.9
4.1
8.8
62
133
719
1,454
4,382
6,630
913
1,015
5,687
8,039

Growth Rate(%/yr)
95-25
2.8
2.7
1.9
2.8
3.0
2.4
2.6
2.6
2.4
1.4
0.4
1.2

2025

Index
(1995=1)
2025
2.3
2.2
1.8
2.3
2.4
2.0
2.1
2.1
2.0
1.5
1.1
1.4

56

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sheet D-2. Urbanization

100

1965
1995
2025

Percent

80
60
40
20

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA
AfricaDeveloping
OECD
World

Urbanization (%)
1965
1995
12
31
5
27
23
44
13
27
7
17
33
42
11
31
15
32
21
34
n/a
37
n/a
76
36
45

2025
52
66
64
50
36
62
52
55
54
56
84
61

Togo

Senegal

Niger

Mali

Cote
d'Ivoire

Burkina
Faso

Benin

0

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

57

Sheet E-1. GDP

300

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo

250billions

200
150
100
50
0
1995

2025

GDP (billion US$)Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA
AfricaDeveloping
OECD
World

MER
1995
2.1
2.3
9.9
2.7
1.9
4.8
1.3
25
475
5,310
22,09428,205

PPP
1995
2025
10.0
38.0
8.0
30.0
23.6
70.6
5.9
22.5
6.4
26.5
14.2
48.5
4.6
16.6
73
253
1,165
3,958
13,12940,825
18,49339,05633,416
83,117Growth Rate(%/yr)
95-25
4.6
4.5
3.7
4.6
4.8
4.2
4.4
4.2
4.2
3.9
2.5
3.1

Index
(1995=1)
2025
3.8
3.8
3.0
3.8
4.1
3.4
3.6
3.5
3.4
3.1
2.1
2.5

58

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sheet E-2. Structure of GDP
2025

80%

80%
60%

Togo

Senegal

Niger

Togo

Senegal

Niger

0%
Mali

0%
Cote d'Ivoire

20%

Mali

40%

20%

Burkina
Faso

Agriculture

Cote d'Ivoire

40%

Industry

BurkinaFaso

60%

Services

Benin

Share of GDP

100%

Benin

Share of GDP

1995
100%

Share of GDP (%)
1995
2025
Country
Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services
Benin
34
12
54
22
13
66
Burkina Faso
34
27
39
22
27
51
Cote d'Ivoire
30
20
50
19
20
60
Mali
46
17
37
29
17
54
Niger
39
17
44
25
17
58
Senegal
20
18
62
14
19
68
Togo
38
21
41
24
21
55
UEMOA
32
19
50
21
19
60
Africa
21
31
47
15
31
54
Developing
18
37
44
11
35
55
OECD
6
29
65
3
26
71
World
11
33
56
7
31
63

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process59

Sheet E-3. Income
3,500

Benin
Burkina Faso

US$ per capita (PPP)

3,000

Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
Senegal

2,500
2,000
1,500

Togo

1,000
500
1995

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA
AfricaDeveloping
OECD
World

Growth Rate
GDP per capita(%/yr)(1995 US$ PPP)
1995
2025
95-25
1,842
3,098
1.7
759
1,278
1.8
1,721
2,893
1.7
546
917
1.7
702
1,183
1.8
1,708
2,872
1.7
1,128
1,895
1.7
1,173
1,904
1.6
1,619
2,722
1.7
2,996
6,157
2.4
20,249 38,472
2.2
5,876 10,339
1.9

2025

Index
(1995=1)
2025
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.6
1.7
2.1
1.9
1.8

60

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sheet S-1. Income Distribution

Distributional Equity
0.18

Cote d'Ivoire
Niger
SenegalOther UEMOA
AfricaWorld
United States

0.16
0.14
L20%/H20%

0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
1990

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA (pop. weighted)
Africa (pop. weighted)
United States
World (pop. weighted)

2000

2010

Distributional Equity(L20%/H20%)
1995
2025
0.11
0.09
0.11
0.09
0.15
0.10
0.11
0.09
0.16
0.11
0.05
0.05
0.11
0.09
0.12
0.09
0.13
0.09
0.09
0.07
0.15
0.10

2020

2030

Gini Coefficient
1995
2025
0.42
0.46
0.42
0.46
0.37
0.43
0.42
0.46
0.36
0.42
0.54
0.55
0.42
0.46
0.42
0.46
0.42
0.46
0.45
0.48

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

61

Sheet S-2. Hunger

30

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo

millions of people

25

20

15

10

5

0
1970

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA
AfricaDeveloping
OECD
World

1995

Incidence (% of population)
1970
1995
2025
36
18
15
66
37
27
24
19
15
45
30
22
48
32
23
24
30
24
30
27
20
41
28
21
35
34
25
35
20
13
n/a
1
1
25
16
11

2025

Incidence (millions)
1970
1995
2025
1.0
1.0
1.8
3.6
3.9
6.2
1.3
2.6
3.7
2.5
3.2
5.5
2.0
2.9
5.1
1.0
2.5
4.0
0.6
1.1
1.8
11.9
17.2
28.1
128
247
361
940
873
893
n/a
12
8
940
898
917

Index (1995=1)
1970
2025
1.0
1.8
0.9
1.6
0.5
1.4
0.8
1.7
0.7
1.8
0.4
1.6
0.5
1.6
0.7
1.6
0.5
1.5
1.1
1.0
n/a
0.7
1.0
1.0

62

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sheet En-1. Primary Energy Requirements

1,800

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Togo

1,500

PJ

1,200
900
600
300
0
1995

2025

1995

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA

Total (PJ)
70
76
167
84
53
98
39
588

Intensity(MJ/$PPP)
7.1
9.6
7.1
14.3
8.2
6.9
8.5
8.1

Crude Oil
90.3
30.3
121

Coal

Total (PJ)
197
228
424
255
174
286
112
1,677

Intensity(MJ/$PPP)
5.2
7.6
6.0
11.3
6.6
5.9
6.8
6.6

Crude Oil
285.6
286

Coal

1.8
2

Natural Gas Hydropower
0.3
3.5
0.8
1.9
0.0
2
5

Biomass
65.8
68.9
106.3
73.9
45.6
56.1
26.8
444

Petroleum
3.7
7.0(33.1)
9.7
4.8
9.3
11.1
13

Electricity
0.9
0.0
0.2
0.7
0.2
1.1
3

8.4
8

Natural Gas Hydropower
1.2
24.5
11.5
3.6
7.1
0.1
32
16

Biomass
177.4
196.2
206.5
208.7
139.6
131.5
61.0
1,121

Petroleum
15.0
30.8(104.3)
43.2
22.8
146.1
46.7
200

Electricity
4.9
0.0
3.2
1.0
4.5
14

2025

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

63

Sheet En-2. Final Fuel Demand

1,600

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Togo

1,400
1,200

PJ

1,000
800
600
400
200
0
1995

2025

1995

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA

Percent of Total
Total (PJ)
70
75
147
84
51
87
38
551

Intensity(MJ/$PPP)
7.1
9.4
6.2
14.2
7.9
6.1
8.2
7.6

Total (PJ)
197
221
342
251
165
242
107
1,525

Intensity(MJ/$PPP)
5.2
7.4
4.8
11.1
6.2
5.0
6.5
6.0

Petroleum
5
7
22
10
8
30
26
16

2025

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA

Electricity
1
1
5
1
2
3
4
3

Natural Gas
20

Biomass
94
92
72
89
90
65
71
81

Percent of Total
Petroleum
7
10
30
15
12
38
38
22

Electricity
2
1
10
2
4
5
5
4

Natural Gas
30

Biomass
90
89
60
83
85
54
57
73

64

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sheet F-1. Dietsaverage daily kcal/capita

3,000

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire

2,500

Mali

2,000

Niger
Senegal

1,500

Togo

1,000
500
1995

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA
AfricaDeveloping
OECD
World

Avg. Daily Consumption(kcal/capita)
1995
2025
2,320
2,524
2,366
2,574
2,296
2,498
2,094
2,278
2,144
2,332
2,264
2,463
2,036
2,215
2,231
2,422
2,322
2,526
2,534
2,748
3,327
3,397
2,683
2,850

2025

Share from Animal
Products (% cal)
1995
2025
4
5
4
5
4
5
9
12
5
7
9
12
5
7
6
8
7
10
12
14
29
29
16
17

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process65

Sheet F-2. Meat and Milk Requirements and Production

Milk and Meat Requirements
9,000

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Togo

7,500

ktonnes

6,000
4,500
3,000
1,500
0
1995

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Togo
UEMOA

2025

Requirements
Fraction of Meat from(ktonnes)
Production (ktonnes) Self-Sufficiency Ratio
Feedlots (%)
1995
2025
1995
2025
1995
2025
1995
2025
143
488
108
424
0.76
0.87
45
49
313
993
297
970
0.95
0.98
0
25
282
758
179
600
0.63
0.79
20
33
681
2,235
666
2215
0.98
0.99
0
16
410
1,425
429
1425
1.05
1.00
15
36
501
1,512
329
1224
0.66
0.81
3
9
75
242
56
147
0.75
0.61
4
37
2,404
7,653
2,064
7,004
0.86
0.92
n/a
n/a

66

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sheet F-3. Fish Requirements and Production

Fish Requirements
2,000

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogoktonnes

1,500

1,000

500

0
1995

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Togo
UEMOA

2025

Requirements(ktonnes)
Production (ktonnes)
1995
2025
1995
2025
50
139
39
97
13
35
7
15
186
408
71
96
68
193
65
179
4
11
2
5
275
691
378
691
46
121
16
25
640
1,599
578
1,108

Self-Sufficiency Ratio
1995
2025
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
1.0
0.9
0.6
0.4
1.4
1.0
0.4
0.2
0.9
0.7

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

67

Sheet F-4. Crop Requirements and Production

Crop Requirements
80

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo

million tonnes

60

40

20

0
1995

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA

Requirements (million
tonnes)
1995
2025
4.4
11.6
4.1
10.4
10.6
21.3
4.1
10.5
4.2
11.6
4.0
8.9
2.0
4.8
33
79

2025

Production(million tonnes)
Self-Sufficiency Ratio
1995
2025
1995
2025
4.0
10.7
0.9
0.9
3.7
9.9
0.9
1.0
12.0
23.2
1.1
1.1
3.4
9.4
0.8
0.9
3.4
7.1
0.8
0.6
2.7
7.2
0.7
0.8
1.7
2.8
0.8
0.6
31
70
0.9
0.9

68

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sheet F-5. Cereal Yields
2.5
Benin
Burkina Faso

tonnes / hectare-yr

2.0

Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger

1.5

Senegal
Togo

1.0

0.5

1995

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA
AfricaDeveloping
OECD
World

Harvest Yield(tonnes per ha)
1995
2025
1.0
2.1
0.8
1.7
1.1
2.1
0.8
1.6
0.3
0.7
0.8
1.6
0.7
1.5
0.6
1.4
1.2
2.3
2.5
3.7
4.3
5.7
2.8
4.1

2025

Cropping Intensity(harvests/yr)
1995
2025
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.1
1.1
1.5
1.5
2.8
2.8
1.0
1.0
0.6
0.6
1.5
1.4
0.9
0.9
1.0
1.0
0.6
0.6
0.8
0.8

Annual yield(tonnes/ha-yr)
1995
2025
1.0
2.0
0.8
1.8
1.2
2.4
1.2
2.5
0.9
1.8
0.8
1.6
0.4
0.9
0.9
1.9
1.0
2.0
2.5
3.7
2.5
3.3
2.2
3.3

Index
(95=1)
2025
2.2
2.2
2.0
2.0
2.1
2.1
2.2
2.1
1.9
1.5
1.3
1.5

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process69

Sheet F-6. Cropland

30

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo

million hectares

25
20
15
10
5
0
1995

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA
AfricaDeveloping
OECD
World

2025

Growth Rate
Index
Total Cropland(%/yr)(1995=1)(million ha)
1995
2025
95-25
2025
1.9
3.0
1.6
1.6
3.6
5.1
1.2
1.4
3.7
4.8
0.8
1.3
2.5
3.7
1.3
1.5
3.6
3.9
0.2
1.1
2.3
3.6
1.4
1.5
2.4
2.7
0.3
1.1
20
27
1.0
1.3
186
255
1.1
1.4
770
867
0.4
1.1
412
410
0.0
1.0
1,450
1,534
0.2
1.1

70

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sheet F-7. Irrigation
Irrigated Cropland
100

Benin
Burkina Faso
Côte d'Ivoire

80

Mali

thousand ha

Níger
Senegal

60

Togo

40

20

0
1960

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Togo
UEMOA

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

Irrigated Cropland Growth Rate
Index
Fraction of Cropland(thousand ha)(%/yr)(1995=1)
Irrigated (%)
1995
2025
95-25
2025
1995
2025
10
19
2.1
1.9
0.5
0.6
24
37
1.4
1.5
0.7
0.7
73
82
0.4
1.1
2.0
1.7
79
87
0.3
1.1
3.2
2.4
66
76
0.5
1.1
1.8
2.0
71
77
0.3
1.1
3.0
2.2
7
14
2.5
2.1
0.3
0.5
330
393
0.6
1.2
1.6
1.5

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

71

Sheet F-8. Potential Cultivable Land
PCL per Capita

Cropland / PCL
100

2.5

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire

80
Cropland Area / PCL (%)

PCL hectares / capita

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

Niger
Senegal

60

Togo

40

20

0.0

0

1995

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA
AfricaDeveloping
OECD
World

Mali

2025

PCL
(million hectares)
1995
2025
6.2
5.6
18.9
17.5
22.0
21.3
26.8
26.2
11.9
11.5
13.5
12.7
4.2
3.5
104
98
1,077
1,024
2,772
2,626
1,267
1,254
4,812
4,649

1995

PCL per capita(ha/cap)
1995
2025
1.1
0.5
1.8
0.7
1.6
0.9
2.5
1.1
1.3
0.5
1.6
0.7
1.0
0.4
1.7
0.7
1.5
0.7
0.6
0.4
1.4
1.2
0.8
0.6

2025

Cropland/PCL
(%)
1995
2025
30
54
19
29
17
22
9
14
30
34
17
28
58
76
19
27
17
25
28
33
33
33
30
33

72

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sheet P-1. Water Withdrawals by Country
10,000Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo

million m

3

8,000

6,000
4,000

2,000

1995

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA
AfricaDeveloping
OECD
World

Withdrawals(million m3)
1995
2025
152
400
405
796
855
1,488
2,522
3,307
692
1,108
1,358
1,907
113
320
6,096
9,326
billion m3
167
255
2,319
3,375
936
1,059
3,699
5,044

2025

GrowthRate
Index(%/yr)(1995=1)
95-25
2025
3.3
2.6
2.3
2.0
1.9
1.7
0.9
1.3
1.6
1.6
1.1
1.4
3.5
2.8
1.4
1.5
1.4
1.3
0.4
1.0

1.5
1.5
1.1
1.4

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process73

Sheet P-2. Water Withdrawals by Sector

100%

Industrial
Domestic
Agricultural

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
1995

Withdrawals
3

SectorAgricultural
Domestic
Industrial
Total(million m )
1995
2025
5,308
6,964
607
1,691
181
671
6,096
9,326

2025

GrowthRate
Index(%/yr)(1995=1)
95-25
2025
0.9
1.3
3.5
2.8
4.5
3.7
1.4
1.5

74

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sheet P-3. Water Stress

0.06

1995
2025

Use/Resources

0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01

Use / Resources Import Dep.
Country
1995
2025
(%)
Benin
0.01
0.02
60
Burkina Faso
0.02
0.05
0
Cote d'Ivoire
0.01
0.02
1
Mali
0.03
0.03
40
Niger
0.02
0.03
89
Senegal
0.03
0.05
33
Togo
0.01
0.03
4
UEMOA
0.02
0.03
n/a

Use / Internal
COV ofRes.
1995
2025 Precip.
0.01
0.04
0.06
0.02
0.05
0.06
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.04
0.06
0.13
0.20
0.32
0.14
0.05
0.07
0.12
0.01
0.03
0.07
0.03
0.07
n/a

Togo

Senegal

Niger

Mali

Cote
d'Ivoire

Burkina
Faso

Benin

0.00

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process75

Sheet P-4. Carbon Emissions
12

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo

million tonnes of carbon

10

8

6

4

2

0

1995

2025

Mtonnes of Carbon fromfossil combustion
Annual per capita (t)Country
1995
2025
1995
2025
Benin
0.1
0.3
0.01
0.02
Burkina Faso
0.1
0.6
0.01
0.03
Cote d'Ivoire
1.2
4.1
0.09
0.17
Mali
0.2
0.9
0.02
0.04
Niger
0.1
0.7
0.02
0.03
Senegal
0.8
3.2
0.10
0.19
Togo
0.2
1.0
0.06
0.11
UEMOA
2.8
10.8
0.05
0.08

Annual per Dollar
GDPPPP (kg)
1995
2025
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.05
0.06
0.03
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.06
0.07
0.05
0.06
0.04
0.04

76

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sheet P-5. Land Use by Land Type

100%

Other
Protected
PastureForestCropland
Built Environment

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
1995

Land Type
Built Environment
Cropland
ForestPastureProtected
Other
Total

Land area(million ha)
1995
2025
4.0
9.6
20.1
26.7
47.7
32.7
65.8
77.3
20.7
20.7
185.4
176.6
343.6
343.6

2025

GrowthRate
Index(%/yr)(1995=1)
95-25
2025
2.9
2.4
1.0
1.3
-1.2
0.7
0.5
1.2
0.0
1.0
-0.2
1.0
0.0
1.0

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

77

Sheet P-6. Land Use by Region
1995

2025

100%

100%

80%

80%

60%

60%

40%

40%

20%

20%

0%

0%

Other
Protected
PastureForestCropland

Togo

Senegal

Niger

Mali

Cote
d'Ivoire

Burkina
Faso

Benin

Togo

Senegal

Niger

Mali

Cote
d'Ivoire

Burkina
Faso

Benin

Built

1995
Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Togo
UEMOA

Built

Cropland
17
13
12
2
3
12
45
6

Forest
28
47
32
10
2
33
16
14

Pasture

3
2
3
1
0
3
5
1

Forest
12
34
27
8
1
12
0
10

Pasture

8
6
6
1
1
6
12
3

Cropland
27
19
15
3
3
19
49
8

4
22
41
25
8
30
4
19

Protected
7
10
6
3
7
11
12
6

Total Area
Other
(million ha)
41
11.1
6
27.4
7
31.8
60
122.0
80
126.7
11
19.3
19
5.4
54
343.6

2025
Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Togo
UEMOA

Built

Protected
7
7
24
10
39
6
31
3
9
7
43
11
3
12
23
6

Other
39
7
7
54
78
8
25
51

78

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sheet P-7. Deforestation
Forest Area
14000

1995
2025

thousand hectares

12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
Benin

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA

BurkinaFaso

Coted'Ivoire

Mali

Average Annual Rate
1980-1990 1990-1995 1995-2025
-73
-60
-59
-31
-32
-119
-651
-31
-46
-105
-114
-90
1
0
-24
-44
-50
-131
-24
-19
-29
-927
-304
-499

Niger

SenegalTogo

Area Lost
Area Lost (% of 1995
(kha)
forest area)
1995-2025 1995-2025
1773
57
3568
28
1392
14
2704
23
707
28
3939
63
884
100
14967
31

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

79

Sheet P-8. Fertilizer Consumption

750

Benin
Burkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo

thousand tonnes

600
450

300
150

1995

Country
BeninBurkina Faso
Cote d'Ivoire
Mali
Niger
SenegalTogo
UEMOA

Consumption(thousand tonnes)
1995
2025
17
86
23
119
63
236
21
98
1
4
20
79
11
40
157
663

2025

GrowthRate
Index(%/yr)(1995=1)
95-25
2025
5.5
5.0
5.6
5.1
4.5
3.7
5.3
4.7
4.3
3.5
4.7
4.0
4.4
3.6
4.9
4.2

80

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process81

Annex Notes
Sheet D-1. Population: 1995 and scenario populations are from the mid-range 1996
revision of the UN population projections (UN, 1997).
Sheet D-2. Urbanization: Urbanization in 1995 and in the scenario from the 1995
revision of the UN projections for urban and rural areas (WRI, 1996).
Sheet E-1. GDP: GDP calculated from population and GDP per capita.
Sheet E-2. Structure of GDP: 1995 figures for all countries except Côte d’Ivoire arefrom SESRTCIC (1997), Côte d’Ivoire from World Bank (1997). In the scenario,
agricultural GDP per capita approaches the base-year average for the industrializedcountries as average incomes approach the base-year average for the industrializedcountries, following an approach described in Heaps et al. (1998). Degree of convergenceis small, since average incomes remain small compared to the industrial country averagethroughout the scenario. Similarly, industry share approaches that of the industrializedcountries in 2025 as average income approaches the industrial country average in 1995.
Service sector calculated as balance.
Sheet E-3. Income: GDP per capita at market exchange rates (MER) in 1995 are takenfrom World Bank (1997) for all countries except Benin. For Benin, the MER value istaken from SESRTCIC (1997). Ratios of PPP to MER in the base year are estimatedfrom World Bank GNP data (1997). GDP figures are given in US dollars adjusted forpurchasing power parity (PPP). Scenario assumptions are described in the text and basedon IPCC growth rates (IPCC, 1992). The IPCC growth rates are based on market
exchange rates (MER). Examining patterns across countries, the PPP conversion factors
tend to approach the MER values as GDP per capita approaches that of the industrializedcountries. This trend is captured in the scenario through an algorithm that relates growth
rates in PPP terms to growth rates in MER terms (Heaps et al., 1998).
Sheet S-1. Income Distribution: 1995 values for income inequality are available for only
three countries — Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Senegal (World Bank, 1998). The other four
countries are assigned the average value of the Gini coefficient for Africa in the base year
(Raskin et al., 1998). National income distributions are assumed to be lognormal, basedon a cross-sectional analysis described in Heaps et al. (1998). In the scenario, changes inincome inequality follow trends seen in industrialized countries.
Sheet S-2. Hunger: 1995 figures are based on FAO estimates of the incidence of chronic
undernutrition. (FAO, 1997a). The FAO figures are from a 1990-92 survey ofdeveloping countries. They are brought forward to 1995 by assuming the absolute
number of hungry is constant between 1991 and 1995 in all countries except Senegal.
This has the effect of reducing the percentage of the population hungry in 1995 relative to
1991. In Senegal, where the percentage has increased historically, the percentage of the
population hungry in 1995 is set equal to the FAO value, so in absolute size the hungry
population in 1995 is larger than in 1991. Scenario figures follow from the scenario
assumptions for population, GDP per capita and income inequality, as outlined in the text.
Figures for 1970 for the UEMOA countries are taken from FAO (1997a).

82

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

Sheets En-1. Primary Energy Requirements: 1995 data are based on figures from
ENDA-TM (1995), IEA (1997), EIA (1998) and a regional report for five West Africancountries as part of the Review of Policies in the Traditional Energy Sector (RPTES,
1995). IEA balances are available for three countries: Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal.
For the four countries with no IEA balances, electric generation and trade are from EIA.
Scenario values determined by final fuel demand (Sheet En-2), trade and fuel mix. Selfsufficiency in electricity generation is kept at 1995 levels in all countries except Côte
d’Ivoire (see text). The electrical generation mix is kept at 1995 levels in the scenario in
all countries except Côte d’Ivoire, where the natural gas share increases from 0% to 21%.
Based on figures from ENDA-TM (1995), natural gas production in Côte d’Ivoire isassumed to be 700 million cubic meters per year by 2025.
Sheet En-2. Final Fuel Demand: 1995 data based on the sources listed for Sheet En-1.
Note that in Senegal there is a substantial amount of biomass use (15 PJ, 36% of biomass
TFC) recorded for “transformation, non-specified” in the IEA tables. This consumption is
assigned to industry in the analysis.
For Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, biomass
estimates are from RPTES. 1992 values brought forward to 1995 assuming constantconsumption per capita. For Togo, per capita biomass use in 1995 was set to the averagevalue for the other countries. Petroleum consumption for the countries without IEAbalances is based on figures from ENDA-TM, with values brought forward to 1995
assuming constant intensities per dollar GNP. For transportation energy demand in 1995
in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, IEA totals are split between passenger and freighttransport based on the relative values for Africa for the study described in Raskin et al.
(1998), which were based on data from WRI (1992) and IRF (1992). Mode shares (e.g.,road, rail, air) for both passenger and freight transport were based on the same source.
The scenario trends for energy demand are based on assumptions about changing sectoral
consumption, although sectoral-level detail in the base year is available for only three
countries — Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. For these three countries, the scenario
analysis is carried out for domestic uses (households and the service sector combined),industry and transportation. The small amount of energy consumption by agriculture wasincluded with industry. For the other four countries, changing energy consumption
patterns are estimated from an aggregate energy intensity, given by total energy
consumption for the country per dollar of GDP. Trends in the aggregate intensity, andchanges in fuel mix, are based on a sector-level analysis carried out for Africa as a whole(Raskin et al., 1998; Heaps et al., 1998). The sectoral trends assumed here for Benin,
Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal (described in Section 3.9) are also based on that study. In thethree countries where sectoral data are available, the mix of fuels used to meet industrial
and transportation energy demand is held at 1995 levels in the scenario. In the domestic
sector, the share of biomass declines over the course of the scenario as average incomesrise — reflecting an income-based transition to modern fuels. In the four countries withno sectoral-level data, the share of biomass in total final consumption drops between 1995
and 2025.
Sheet F-1. Diets: 1995 values are based on 1994 figures from FAO (1996a). Daily
consumption is the amount available for consumption, not necessarily the amount actuallyconsumed. In the scenario, consumption per capita increases with income, using an

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

83

elasticity of 0.16. The elasticity is based on an analysis for Africa as a whole described in
Raskin et al. (1998), where consumption per capita increased with income following alogistic (s-shaped) curve. This leads to a 2% increase in every country between 1995 and2025. Shares of different crops in total crop-derived calories are kept at base-year levels.
Shares of meat and milk increase relative to fish in total animal-derived calories, as
explained in the text.
Sheets F-2…4. Agricultural Requirements and Production: 1995 values are fromFAO (1996a). A full set of food balances and land-use accounts for 1995 is unavailable,
so 1994 figures are used. The self-sufficiency ratio is calculated as production divided byrequirements. The difference between production and requirements in the base year is thetotal of net exports plus net additions to stocks. Meat includes eggs; milk includes all
products derived from milk. Fraction from feedlots is the fraction of total production incaloric terms. Fish includes all seafood. Scenario assumptions are outlined in the text.
Sheet F-5. Cereal Yields: 1995 values are 1994 figures from FAO (1996a), as described
for Sheets F-2…4. Annual yield defined as total annual production per unit area ofcropland. Harvest yield is production per unit area per harvest. Cropping intensity, ameasure of multiple cropping, is given by:cropping intensity = annual yield harvest yield .
The index shown in Sheet F-5 is for annual yield. Cereal yields roughly double in the
scenario between 1995 and 2025. Some of the increases in yields and cropping intensities
come from a shift to irrigated land. Depending on the crop, harvest yields on irrigatedland in the base year are between 2.0 and 4.4 times those on rainfed land, with yield ratios
based on data for Africa from Fischer (1993). Based on the same source, cropping
intensities on irrigated land are 1.5 times those on rainfed land. Scenario assumptions foryield increases are based on Leach (1995).
Sheet F-6. Cropland: 1995 values are 1994 figures from FAO (1996a), as described for
Sheets F-2…4. Changes in the scenario are the result of scenario values for agricultural
demand and trade, and productivity changes for individual crop commodities, as reported
in Sheet F-5, and aggregate demand and trade figures reported in Sheet F-4.
Sheet F-7. Irrigation: 1995 values are 1994 figures from FAO (1996a), as described for
Sheets F-2…4. Historical values, 1961-1996, are from FAO (1996a) Note thatfluctuations in the historical data may reflect changes in classification of irrigated areas, asmuch as actual changes in area. Scenario values are based in part on historical trends.
The values for Niger and Togo were adjusted in combination with agricultural selfsufficiency ratios and feedlot fractions to mitigate land-use change impacts.
Note that estimates of irrigation potential can vary considerably from source to source,
posing difficulties for assessing the reasonableness of the irrigated area expansion in the
scenario. The irrigated areas in 2025 are all well below the potential area recorded in the
FAO’s Irrigation in Africa in Figures (FAO, 1995). However, this may be optimistic: thegrowth in irrigated areas for the region as a whole — by 20% over 1995 values —84

Heaps, Humphreys, Kemp-Benedict, Raskin, Sokona

exceeds the potential increase of 11% for Africa as a whole estimated by Leach (1995)
based on potential irrigated area increases from Fischer (1993).
Sheet F-8. Potential Cultivable Land: Potential cropland (PCL) is the area of croplandplus the area of potential arable land currently under other land cover. Total potential
cropland area for each country is from Alexandratos (1995), and is assigned to forest andgrazing land in proportion to their areas in the base year. PCL is lost in the scenario fromdegradation and conversion to other land uses. Cropland degradation rates are estimatedusing land areas calculated from a 0.2°×0.2° gridded data set. The data set is based on thedigital version of the GLASOD soil degradation map (Oldeman et al., 1991) produced by
GRID/UNEP (1991). The GLASOD study covered roughly the 45 years following theSecond World War, so the rates are estimated by dividing the total degraded area by 45
years. Values range from 3 kha/year in Côte d’Ivoire to over 70 kha/year in Burkina Faso.
However, the estimated rates for Burkina Faso and Senegal lead to a large loss ofcropland compared to the total cropland area (60% and 40%, respectively). For these twocountries it is assumed that the high historical loss rate will be moderated as land-usepressures grow, so the fraction of cropland area lost through degradation was set at 17%,
the average rate for Africa in Raskin et al. (1998). Loss of cropland compared to total
cropland area in other countries ranges from 2% in Côte d’Ivoire to 17% in Mali.
Sheets P-1, 2. Water Withdrawals: 1995 values based on FAO (1995). Sectoral
withdrawals calculated as the product of drivers and intensities, where the intensity iswater withdrawals per unit change in the driver. Values prior to 1995 brought forward to1995 assuming constant intensities. For domestic withdrawals the driver is population(Sheet D-1); for agricultural withdrawals it is harvested irrigated area (Sheets F-5,7); forindustrial withdrawals it is industrial value added (Sheet E-1, 2). Scenario intensities are
based on trends for Africa in Raskin et al. (1998), where intensities approached the futureindustrialized countries’ average as average income approached the 1995 industrializedcountries’ average.
Sheet P-3. Water Stress: Resources are from FAO (1995). Water stress indicators aretaken from Raskin et al. (1997). The use/resource ratio is total freshwater requirements
divided by renewable freshwater resources, including river flows from adjacent countries,
with a level of 0.1 indicating a possible onset of stress. Import dependence is the ratio ofwater from external flows to total renewable resources, with a level of 15% indicatingstress. The coefficient of variation of precipitation is a measure of the inter-annual
variation in precipitation, with a level of 0.06 indicating stress.
Sheet P-4. Carbon Emissions: Emissions computed from fossil fuel consumption andemission factors based on IPCC (1995). Emission factors kept at 1995 levels in the
scenario. Land-use emissions are not included due to their uncertainty.
Sheets P-5, 6. Land Use: 1995 figures for cropland, pasture, forest and total area are
1994 figures from FAO (1996a) as described for Sheets F-2…4. Built environment isestimated based on an average built environment per capita for Africa from Fischer(1993). Total protected area and protected forest area is from WCMC (1998a,b).
Protected forest land is included with protected land. “Other” is calculated as a balance.

Sustainable Development in West Africa: Beginning the Process

85

There is little detailed information on land-use dynamics in the region. In the scenario it isassumed that no single land-use type, such as forest land, was lost at a disproportionately
rapid rate relative to other land uses as a result of expanding built environment andgrazing land. In the scenario, built environment is assumed to expand into cropland,grazing land and forest in proportion to the area of each of these land-use types in the baseyear. Historically, forest land in the region is generally lost to agricultural land: historicalpatterns of forest change in Africa are consistent with the forest being lost to expanding
subsistence farming (FAO, 1997d); data for Côte d’Ivoire also indicate that forests havebeen converted to the production of commercial crops (FAO, 1997d). In the scenario,
cropland is assumed to expand only into forest, consistent with these historical patterns.
Grazing land expands into forest and “other” land in proportion to the available area underthese two land-use types. Degraded cropland (see notes to Sheet F-8) is converted to“other” land.
Sheet P-7. Deforestation: Average annual rates from 1980-1990 and 1990-1995 arebased on forest area figures from WRI (1998). Estimates of forest area from different
sources can vary greatly, depending on the definition of forested land and themethodology used to arrive at the estimate. Both the definition and the methodology
behind the WRI figures differ from those used for the 1995 forest areas in this study(Sheets P-5, 6), and the 1995 forest areas from the two sources also differ. The
FAOSTAT land-use data are used for this study because they provide a complete accountof land area in a given year. However, the WRI data, which are based on data compiledby the FAO’s Forestry Programme, are intended to be comparable between years, while
the FAOSTAT land-use data may vary from year to year due to changing land
classification (WRI, 1998). For this reason, the WRI figures are used to estimate
historical deforestation rates.
Sheet P-8. Fertilizer Consumption: The amount of fertilizer is the total domestic
consumption of manufactured fertilizer (i.e., chemical-based fertilizer, as opposed to dung,crop residues etc.). 1995 values are from FAO (1996a). Scenario intensities (application
per harvested hectare) are based on trends for Africa as a whole (Raskin et al., 1998). In
that report, trends in intensities were estimated based on changes in yields. Yield
increases are associated in part with higher fertilizer inputs, and a cross-sectional
regression of yields versus fertilizer intensity reflected the increase. The regression curve
was used to estimate fertilizer intensities in Raskin et al. (1998).