CICERO WP 2000:1
ECN-C—00-013

BURDEN DIFFERENTIATION:

CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF BURDEN SHARING
RULES

Asbjørn Torvanger
Lasse Ringius

CICERO
Center for International Climate
and Environmental Research
P.O. Box 1129 Blindern
N-0318 Oslo, Norway
Phone: +47 22 85 87 50
Fax: +47 22 85 87 51
E-mail: admin@cicero.uio.no
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CICERO Senter for klimaforskning
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Telefon: 22 85 87 50
Faks: 22 85 87 51
E-post: admin@cicero.uio.no
Nett: www.cicero.uio.no

Tittel: Burden differentiation: Criteria forevaluation and Development of burden sharing
rules

Title: Burden differentiation: Criteria forevaluation and Development of burden sharing
rules

Forfatter(e): Asbjørn Torvanger, Lasse Ringius
CICERO Working Paper 2000: 1
11 siderFinansieringskilde: ECN (Netherlands Energy
Research Foundation)
Prosjekt: ECN Byrdefordeling
Prosjektleder: Asbjørn Torvanger
Kvalitetsansvarlig: ECN, Arild Underdal
Nøkkelord: byrdefordeling, klimapolitikk,
internasjonalt samarbeid, evalueringskriteria

Author(s): Asbjørn Torvanger, Lasse Ringius
CICERO Working Paper 2000: 1
11 pages
Financed by: ECN (Netherlands Energy
Research Foundation)
Project: ECN Burden sharing
Project manager: Asbjørn Torvanger
Quality manager: ECN, Arild Underdal
Keywords: burden sharing, climate policy,
international cooperation, evaluation criteria

Sammendrag: Artikkelen drøfter ni kriteria forevaluering av reglar for byrdefordeling iklimaavtaler. Tre kriteria er basert på
rettferdsprinsipps, medan dei seks andre kriteria
tek utganspunkt i krav til praktisk bruk. Ut frå
desse kriteria får dei to sektor-baserte reglane forbyrdefordeling, ”Multi-sector Convergence
Approach” og ”Triptych” (som er brukt til
byrdefordeling innan EU), høgast poengsum.
Denne studien er ein del av eit samarbeidsprosjekt
mellan nederlanske ECN og CICERO om
utvikling av metodar for byrdefordeling iframtidige klimaavtaler. ”Multi-sector
Convergence Approach” er også utvikla i sameprosjekt.

Abstract: This article discusses nine criteria forevaluation of potential Burden Sharing Rules(BSRs) in climate policy agreements. Three of thecriteria reflect fairness principles while six ofthem are operational requirements. These criteria
are useful for identifying potential BSRs that
could be promising in future climate policy
negotiations. The two sector approaches, Multisector Convergence Approach and Triptych,
received the highest score according to the criteriapresented in this article. The Multi-sector
Convergence Approach was developed in the
joint ECN (Netherlands Energy Research
Foundation) and CICERO(Center forInternational
ClimateandEnvironmental
Research – Oslo) project on burden sharing inclimate policy agreements. This is a sectororiented approach that comprises convergence ofper capita emissions to the same level for all
countries, and has a global coverage. The
Triptych approach has been employed by theEuropean Union for their internal differentiationof national abatement targets. Sector approaches
have some specific advantages in linking burden
sharing to the economic structure of countries.
This indicates that the Multi-sector Convergence
Approach could play a useful role in climate
policy negotiations among a larger group ofcountries, and could encourage developing
countries to take on greenhouse gas abatementtargets.

Språk: Engelsk

Language of report: English

Rapporten kan bestilles fra:
CICERO Senter for klimaforskning
P.B. 1129 Blindern
0318 OsloThe report may be ordered from:
CICERO (Center for International Climate andEnvironmental Research – Oslo)
PO Box 1129 Blindern
0318 Oslo, NORWAY

Eller lastes ned fra:
http://www.cicero.uio.no

Or be downloaded from:http://www.cicero.uio.noCONTENTS
1. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF BURDEN SHARING RULES .......................................... 1
1.1 RELEVANT FAIRNESS PRINCIPLES IN BURDEN SHARING ................................................................. 2
1.2 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................................................... 3
2. EVALUATION OF BURDEN SHARING RULES FROM THE CLIMATE POLICYNEGOTIATIONS .................................................................................................................................. 4
2.1 CHOICE OF BSRS FROM THE CLIMATE POLICY NEGOTIATIONS ........................................................ 4
France.............................................................................................................................................. 4
Japan................................................................................................................................................ 5
Norway............................................................................................................................................. 5
Brazil/RIVM ..................................................................................................................................... 5
Triptych............................................................................................................................................ 5
Multi-sector Convergence Approach ............................................................................................... 6
2.2 EVALUATION OF THE BSRS ............................................................................................................ 6
3. DISCUSSION OF CRITERIA........................................................................................................ 10
4. CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................. 10
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT................................................................................................................... 11
REFERENCES..................................................................................................................................... 11

LIST OF TABLESTABLE 1. EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR BURDEN SHARING RULES (BSRS) .................................... 1
TABLE 2. EVALUATION OF BURDEN SHARING RULES (BSRS) WITH RESPECT TO FAIRNESSPRINCIPLES AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................... 7

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Burden differentiation: Criteria for evaluation and development of burden-sharing rules

1. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF BURDEN SHARING RULES
This article focuses on the policy feasibility and political acceptability of burden sharing rules(BSRs). In particular, the article aims to identify a number of criteria for assessment of thepolicy feasibility and political acceptability of proposals for BSRs that might be introduced
into the global climate negotiations. A primary objective of a BSR would be to garner further
participation in a climate policy agreement. Evaluation criteria may be applied to existing
BSRs as well as to proposals for new BSRs. Like a set of guidelines, they may be used toevaluate the policy feasibility and political acceptability of BSRs.
Burden sharing negotiations involving both industrialized and developing countries can beseen as an interactive process where proposals for BSRs are put on the negotiation table,
details of the proposals are negotiated, and the parties, in particular the developing country
parties, decide if they are willing to accept a burden sharing arrangement and take on the
resulting abatement commitments. The issue of timing, for instance in terms of ‘graduation’schemes or other approaches to triggering developing country involvement, is not treated inthis article (see for example the discussion in Berk and Elzen, 2001).
After a summary of key principles in burden sharing, the article focuses on the operational
requirements of BSRs. The article first discusses if it is at all possible to identify empiricalindicators and quantitative data that can be coupled to individual BSRs. An important issue isthe extent to which the necessary empirical indicators and quantitative data are available. The
article then discusses to what extent individual BSRs have universal applicability, could
easily be made operational, are simple or complex, could undergo future refinements, would
give room for flexibility, and would allow for taking country-specific circumstances into
account. These criteria are important in the assessment of feasibility and acceptability of
individual BSRs. The proposed evaluation criteria are numbered from A – I, and summarizedin Table 1.

Fairnessprinciples

Operational
requirementsA) ‘Need’B) ‘Capacity’C) ‘Guilt’D) Universal applicabilityE) Easy to make operationalF) Simplicity
G) Allows for future refinements
H) Allows for flexibilityI) Allows for country-specificcircumstances

Table 1. Evaluation criteria for burden sharing rules (BSRs)

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Burden differentiation: Criteria for evaluation and development of burden-sharing rules

1.1 Relevant Fairness Principles in Burden Sharing
It seems appropriate to construct BSRs that are based on at least one of the three principles offairness: need, capacity, or guilt, respectively.1 According to the guilt principle, the costs ofundertaking measures to alleviate the climate problem − i.e. the abatement costs − should be
distributed in some proportion to the degree to which actors are responsible for the climate
problem. The principles of need and capacity are concerned with the impact of measures onactors (as opposed to their contribution to the problem). The first principle would distributethe costs in accordance with actors’ legitimate need for economic development, whereas thesecond principle would distribute the cost in accordance with actors’ ability or capacity to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, where a conventional yardstick is wealth measured as GDP
per capita. Individual BSRs may build on one or more of these key principles of equity.
However, in order to receive widespread support, any BSR intended to have an impact oninternational negotiations concerned with the environment and natural resources would
probably need to combine at least two, and preferably three, of these principles.
It is useful to briefly consider the kind of data that would be relevant to apply these three
general principles of fairness in a BSR. In the case of the first principle stressing actors’ guiltin regard to a problem, we would need data that document to what degree individual actors
have contributed to global warming. Data on the past and present greenhouse gas emissions of
the various actors would be sufficient. Evidently, however, an important issue is
responsibility for the problem. If nations were seen as the responsible actors, then national
data and statistics on greenhouse gas emissions per capita would be sufficient. But if instead
economic sectors were considered responsible, it would be necessary to acquire data on sector
contributions of greenhouse gases. Based on analysis of emissions by sectors, a BSR mightprescribe that burdens should be differentiated or weighted differently at the sector level.
Obviously, there are different ways to translate the principle of need into BSRs and different
kinds of data and statistics would be needed. If we assume that all individuals have an equal
right to economic welfare, and therefore an equal right to emit greenhouse gases into theatmosphere, then the international distribution of abatement costs and climate commitments
should be in accord with population size in individual countries. But if we are only concernedwith basic needs, which makes it necessary to distinguish between what reasonably
constitutes basic needs as opposed to non-basic or more luxury needs, the amount ofgreenhouse gas emissions produced by the fulfillment of these fundamental needs would haveto be determined. Greenhouse gas emissions caused by the fulfillment of more excessive
needs would be subject to restrictive measures. While both agreeing on basic needs − apolitically sensitive issue − and determining corresponding emissions could be a complex
undertaking, it seems that it would not present insurmountable difficulties. Of course, anotherpossibility is to adopt the approach taken in the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) − it distinguishes between developed countries, countries with economies
in transition, and developing countries − and determines emission allowances for each of thethree key groups.
In case of the principle stressing capacity and ability to pay, it would be necessary to apply
data that make it possible to document and compare differences in economic wealth acrosscountries. An obvious candidate for an indicator of wealth would be GDP per capita, possibly
GDP adjusted for Purchasing Power Parities (PPP). An alternative could be to attempt to
distribute abatement targets so as to equalize abatement costs as a percentage of GDP across1

For a discussion, see Ringius, Torvanger and Underdal (1999).

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Burden differentiation: Criteria for evaluation and development of burden-sharing rules

countries. GDP and GDP per capita have limited value as measures of wealth to compare
nations and people, but it is hard to find better alternatives that are readily available.

1.2 Operational Requirements
The first operational requirement is that a BSR should be universally applicable. Rules thatcan be applied to all, or almost all countries, are clearly more attractive than rules that are
only partially applicable because the latter raise thorny questions about supplementary rules,
exemptions, or both. In these situations it becomes necessary to distinguish between thoseactors that should be bound by a rule and those who should not. Apart from the technicaldifficulties of making such distinctions between countries operational, rules that are notuniversally applicable may give rise to opportunistic bargaining behavior and self-serving
strategies, creating additional difficulties and challenges to attempts to differentiate country
commitments.2 However, it is likely that well-designed BSRs that allow for exemptions basedon clear and undisputable criteria do not give rise to such disputes.
The degree to which individual BSRs can be made operational is another important issue toconsider when assessing their policy feasibility. In some cases it will be possible to identify
empirical indicators and quantitative data that can be coupled to individual BSRs in astraightforward manner. It is likely that these rules would be widely supported. Reliable andcomparable data will be important. Indicators and statistics that are internationally approved
might be more readily accepted than those that are not approved internationally. At the sametime it will be important that internationally accepted indicators and statistics do not differ
significantly from those actors use, especially those who are pivotal to achieve agreement on
proposals for international burden sharing. A related issue is to what degree necessary
empirical indicators and quantitative data are available. Evidently, insufficient data would
hamper the use of a BSR that would be based upon this information. Even an otherwise
promising BSR − e.g. one that combines several key principles of fairness − might receive
insufficient support should there be a scarcity of relevant data for operational purposes.
It should be expected that BSRs that are relatively simple to make operational would besuperior to those that are more complex. Basically, both the depth and the breadth of the data
increase complexity. Thus, there are many ways in which complexity could be increased (orreduced): when the need for data amounts increases (decreases); when many (few) types ofdata are necessary (e.g. emissions per capita, emissions per produced unit of value, emissions
at sector levels), when the time dimensions are extended (shortened), etc. In some cases thedata operations in themselves might add complexity. Furthermore, if large amounts of dataneed to be processed, this might create opportunity for selfish manipulation by actors.
It would seem self-evident that opportunities to adjust and refine the operationalization of
burden sharing rules would be advantageous. Because the knowledge base regarding global
warming is still evolving, it seems certain that new issues (as e.g. the cooling effect ofparticulates) could have an impact on our understanding of the global climate system andaccordingly on the operationalization of BSRs and the need for refinement of theiroperationalization (e.g. refinement of GWP-values).3 But although a built-in opportunity forrefinement is advantageous, it would be unattractive if it reduces the extent to which a BSR
could be made operational in order to address more current issues in global climate
2

One interesting example is the allocation of oil production quotas within the OPEC, see Gault,
Spierer, Bertholet and Karbassioun (1999).
3
GWP is Global Warming Potential, which is a measure of the radiative forcing of a greenhouse gas
relative to CO2 (carbon dioxide). Thus CO2 has a GWP equal to 1.

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Burden differentiation: Criteria for evaluation and development of burden-sharing rules

negotiations. The extent to which refinement and adjustment of BSRs would mean that pastburdens would be recalculated and reassessed and, in particular, that future climate
commitments could and would be adjusted retroactively, is a potentially critical issue.
Yet another issue concerns flexibility. A BSR that allows for flexibility seems relatively more
attractive, for example if national circumstances change unexpectedly at some point in the
future. One flexibility feature is to allow for rolling over from one budget period (such as the
Kyoto target period 2008-12) to the next budget period (2013-17).
A final issue concerns inclusion of country-specific circumstances. These might include
criteria (e.g. inertia factors) such as structure of national energy supply system, structure of
the national economy, and dependence on fossil fuel exports, population density, andpopulation growth.

2. EVALUATION OF BURDEN SHARING RULES FROM THE CLIMATEPOLICY NEGOTIATIONS
2.1 Choice of BSRs from the climate policy negotiations
We have chosen proposals from France, Japan, Norway, Brazil/RIVM, and Triptych as thefirst candidates for testing the above evaluation criteria. In addition we have included theMulti-sector Convergence Approach developed by ECN and CICERO.4 The first fiveproposals were singled out after a two-step selection process from a large number of
proposals that were made during the negotiations leading up to the Kyoto Protocol in
December 1997.5 In the first step, proposals that advocated a non-differentiated, symmetricapproach – that is, equal percentage reductions of greenhouse gas emissions across countries– were left out along with proposals that were not sufficiently specified to be operationalized.
In the second step, the proposals that seemed most promising in future negotiations were
singled out based on criteria such as political feasibility, simplicity and reliability, regional or
global relevance, and the potential for further development of the method. A short descriptionof the six proposals follows.

FranceThe French proposal is based on a reduction in emissions to reach an atmosphericconcentration of 550 ppmv of CO2 as a future goal, and has a “per capita” approach as themain element for burden sharing.6 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change’s (IPCC) second assessment report, this concentration level can be obtained if
average per capita level of CO2 and other GHGs emissions are in the range of 1 to 2.7 tons ofcarbon equivalent within the Annex I group by the end of the next century.7 On this basis,
France proposes that burdens should be distributed so that the emission pathways converge tosimilar per capita or per unit of GDP levels by 2100. The burdens are in other words definedso that countries with high per capita emissions must undertake a larger percentage reductionin emissions.

4

Confer Jansen et al. (2001).
Confer Ringius, Torvanger and Underdal (1999) and Torvanger and Godal (2000). RIVM is anacronym for Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and the Environment.
6
Ppmv = parts per million by volume.
7
Annex I are industrialized countries as defined by the UNFCCC.
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Burden differentiation: Criteria for evaluation and development of burden-sharing rules

Japan
During the Kyoto Protocol negotiations Japan submitted two burden sharing proposals, where
the second proposal is the most interesting from our perspective. According to this proposal
each Annex I country shall reduce emissions by 5% in the first budget period (2008-2012)
compared to 1990 levels. However, countries with less than average Annex I emissions
measured per unit of GDP or per capita receive a target that is lower than 5% in the same
proportion as the deviation from the average of the Annex I group. A country is free to choose
the emissions per unit of GDP option or the emissions per capita option. In addition there is aprovision for alternative reduction rates for countries with high population growth.

NorwayIn this proposal a formula considers a Party’s percentage reductions of greenhouse gas
emissions based on three indicators: CO2 equivalent emissions per unit of GDP, GDP per
capita, and CO2equivalent emissions per capita. The formula is employed to calculate acountry’s burden as a deviation from the joint reduction target of a group of countries (e.g.
Annex I). The value of each indicator is compared to the average of the group. If a country
has a higher than average value on an indicator it receives a relatively larger burden, and viceversa. Finally, the weighted sum of the three indicators is calculated to find a country’s
burden.

Brazil/RIVM
The original proposal by Brazil is designed so that Parties receive a burden that corresponds
to the same Party’s responsibility for contributing to climate change. In order to quantify thiscontribution, cumulative historical emissions are estimated. The proposal could be applied to
all Parties, including developing countries. The Dutch institute RIVM developed an improved
version of the Brazilian proposal, making this method preferable to the original Brazilian
proposal.8 The Brazilian proposal overestimated the contribution of the Annex I group totemperature change relative to non-Annex I, which is amended in the Brazil/RIVM version.
Furthermore, all major greenhouse gases (including all sources and sinks) are included in the
improved version. Rather than contribution to temperature changes the contribution toconcentrations or radiative forcing is estimated. Finally, Brazil/RIVM considers it more
equitable to use per capita contribution rather than absolute contribution.

TriptychThis method has been employed for the differentiation of emission reduction and stabilization
targets within the EU as part of meeting the commitments defined by the Kyoto Protocol. The
main motivation for the approach was to develop a method that would take into account thedifferences in emission-producing activities across the member states. The approach not only
determines the distribution of commitments but also the aggregate level of emissions from themember states. In the first step the three sectors electricity generation, internationally oriented
energy-intensive industries, and domestic sectors were identified. The total consumption (andproduction) of electricity in the EU was set to be limited to a growth rate of 1% per year.
Some extra allowance was given the cohesion countries.9 CO2 emissions were then distributed
taking into account minimum percentages for renewable energies and combined heat andpower (CHP), limitation of oil and coal use, use of nuclear power according to national
preferences, and the remainder to be supplied using natural gas. The energy-intensive part ofthe industrial sector was allowed to increase production at a constant rate across all countries.
The same energy efficient improvement rate was also applied across the member states for
8‘Brazil/RIVM’ denotes this newer version that was presented by RIVM at the 4th Conference ofParties to the Climate Convention (COP4) in Buenos Aires in November 1998.
9
Consisting of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland.

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Burden differentiation: Criteria for evaluation and development of burden-sharing rules

this sector. Emissions from the domestic sectors were distributed on a per capita base.10 The
main rule was that emissions per capita should converge to the same level across all countries
at a certain point in the future (e.g. 2030). The emission levels were only corrected forvariations in natural climate across the countries.

Multi-sector Convergence Approach
The Multi-sector Convergence Approach has many similarities with the region-oriented
Triptych approach, but has a global coverage.11 Also, the Multi-sector Convergence Approachcontains more sectors than Triptych, which makes it more flexible and allows for morecountry-specific circumstances. The sectors specified are power, households, transportation,industry, services, agriculture, and waste. The starting point for each country is its sector
levels of per capita emissions in the base year (2010). Non-binding sector emission standards
for each sector – expressed in per capita terms – are determined at the global level for both abase year, a convergence year (e.g. 2100) and intermediate target years. For the base year,
these standards have been set equal to the world average sector GHG emissions per capita inthat year. Subsequently, an annual reduction norm per sector has been set – expressed in apercentage per year – in order to derive sector emission standards in the years thereafter. Next
per capita emission standards at the sector level have been added up to obtain the global per
capita emission standard at the aggregated level. This implies that a country can freely
distribute its mitigation efforts across sectors as long as the national reduction target is met.
Finally, these non-binding sector emission levels are added up and multiplied by total
population in order to determine national emission mitigation targets for the countries andyears concerned. This framework for negotiating national GHG emission mitigation targets
can be fine-tuned by including so-called allowance factors. These factors can be defined ascountry-specific circumstances resulting in variances of sector emissions among countries thatare virtually impossible to influence by the governments concerned, at least in the short andmedium run.
The BSRs are shown in the first row of Table 2. A BSR can often be categorized as either a
top-down or a bottom-up approach. Top-down methods tend to apply more aggregate
indicators − for example emissions per capita and GDP per capita. Weighting of indicators
may be used, sometimes even rather explicitly, in mathematically phrased formulas. Bottomup approaches, on the other hand, take into account sector contributions of greenhouse gases,
cluster economic sectors together (e.g. domestic sector; export-oriented sector), and develop
allowances at sector level. The Triptych and the Multi-sector Convergence Approach are thebottom-up methods among the six BSRs, while the other proposals, including the Norwegianone, exemplify top-down BSRs. One potential advantage of bottom-up methods is that key
people in the economic sectors concerned potentially will be more involved and feel more
responsible than in the case of top-down approaches. But the data requirements are usually
lower for top-down methods than for bottom-up methods.

2.2 Evaluation of the BSRs
We are now in a position to evaluate the six BSR approaches according to criteria A - I. In
Table 2 the proposals are scored on each criterion, by attributing either ‘+’ for criterion
satisfied, ‘-’ for criterion not satisfied, or ‘0’ for inconclusive. Each criterion is weighted andthe total score of the BSR is calculated by adding up the weighted scores. The applied weights
10

Consisting of households, services, light industry, agriculture and transportation.
A comprehensive presentation of the Multi-sector Convergence Approach is found in Jansen et al.
(2001).

11

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Burden differentiation: Criteria for evaluation and development of burden-sharing rules

are 1, 2, and 4. To reflect the importance of the two fairness principles ‘need’ and ‘capacity’,
they are each weighted as 4. The third fairness principle, ‘guilt’, is given a weight of only 2
since we believe that too much weight on ‘guilt’, especially in historical terms (that is,
responsibility for historical greenhouse gas emissions), will be less acceptable forindustrialized countries. Also, data and methodological uncertainties related to determining
historical guilt are likely.
Note that a ‘-’ means that the score on this criterion is subtracted from the total score. For
instance, a ‘-’ with weight 2 contributes minus 2 to the total score. There are separate total
scores for fairness principles and for operational requirements.
Criteria

BSR type
Fairnessprinciples

WeightFranceJapan

NorwayBrazil/RIVM

Triptych

T

T

T

T

B

Multi-sector
Convergence
ApproachB

Top-down (T)Bottom-up (B)A) ‘Need’

4

+

+

+

+

+

+

B) ‘Capacity’

4

0

0

+

+

+

+

C) ‘Guilt’

2

-

-

-

+

-

-

2

2

6

10

6

6

Sum, principles
D) Universal
applicabilityE) Easy to make
operational

2

+

0

-

+

0

+

2

+

+

+

0

0

-

F) Simplicity

1

+

+

0

-

0

0

G) Allows for futurerefinements

1

+

0

0

+

+

+

H) Allows forflexibilityI) Allows forcountry-specificcircumstances
Sum, operational requirements
Total evaluation,
principles/operational requirements

1

0

+

+

0

+

+

2

-

+

+

-

+

+

4
2/4

6
2/6

3
6/3

0
10/0

4
6/4

4
6/4

Operational
requirements

Table 2. Evaluation of burden sharing rules (BSRs) with respect to fairness principles
and operational requirements1212

Where ‘+’ means criterion satisfied, ‘-’ means criterion not satisfied, and ‘0’ means inconclusive.
The total evaluation or score is the sum of the weighted score for each criterion. Note that a ‘-’ meansthat the score on this criterion is subtracted from the total score. Thus a ‘-’ with weight 2 contributes
minus 2 to the total score.

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The operational criteria D, E and I are given twice the weight (2) of the other operational
criteria. This is because it is important for a BSR to be able to handle both industrialized anddeveloping countries in future climate policy negotiations. Criterion E is important sincereliance on uncertain or contentious data would make a BSR less feasible and undermine thecredibility of the approach. Finally, in terms of criterion I, a BSR must allow for countryspecific circumstances to play a role in burden sharing negotiations among countries withlargely different economic development and economic structure circumstances. The sum of
all weights is 19, and the maximum achievable score is 10/9 (score on fairness
principles/score on operational requirements).
The maximum score may not be attainable in practice due to potential conflicts between someof the criteria, leading to some trade-offs between them. One example is criterion F(simplicity) and criterion I (allows for country-specific circumstances), where there is likely
to be a trade-off such that a simple BSR is only to a limited degree able to allow for countryspecific circumstances, and vice versa. Table 2 shows that Japan is the only BSR where boththese criteria are satisfied. Another example is a potential trade-off between F (simplicity) andH (allowance for flexibility). Such potential conflicts may be of less importance innegotiations since a BSR, for example, may be characterized as simple along one dimension
but not along another dimension, and that simplicity of one type is not necessarily in conflictwith flexibility. Furthermore, flexibility may also have more than one dimension. Thus BSRs
and actual negotiations have many facets that cannot be fully represented in a simple format
as in Table 2.
Ybema et al. (2000) includes preliminary findings on BSR design.13 Comparing the findings
on relevant criteria for evaluation of BSRs the report mentions taking into account countryspecific characteristics, which are similar to our criterion I, and the need for transparency andsimplicity, which correspond to our criterion F. In addition, the report emphasizes that
economic structure characteristics should be an important factor to be taken into account,which implies a sector (i.e. bottom-up) approach.
Let us evaluate the six approaches according to each of the different criteria, starting withFrance.14

FranceThe per-capita approach of the French proposal implies that it is supported by the fairness
principle ‘need’. The ‘guilt’ principle is not supported, whereas one can argue that the‘capacity’ principle to some extent is supported due to differing starting points in per capita
emissions and related differing trajectories to convergence in per capita emissions. In terms of
the operational criteria it has universal applicability, is easy to make operational, simple, andshould allow for future refinements. However, its flexibility is limited, and there is noallowance for country-specific circumstances, except to a limited extent in terms of different
starting points of per capita emissions. The net score then comes to 2/4.

Japan
In terms of score on the evaluation criteria there are some similarities between France andJapan. Since the Japanese proposal contains a reference to per capita emissions and aconsideration for countries with higher than average population growth, it is supported by the‘need’ fairness principle, and to some extent by the ‘capacity’ principle. The proposal is easy
13This is another report from the joint ECN and CICERO project on burden sharing in climateagreements.
14
A more detailed description of the four proposals from the climate negotiations and Triptych can befound in Ringius, Torvanger and Underdal (1999).

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to operationalize as long as GDP is accepted as a measure of wealth, is simple, and allows forsome flexibility and country-specific circumstances such as emissions per unit of GDP and
per capita. It is questionable if the proposal can have a universal applicability due to its
limited flexibility, and the scope for future refinements seems limited. Altogether the score is
2/6.

NorwayThe Norwegian proposal is supported by the ‘need’ fairness principle since lower than
average emissions per capita means lower than average burden. Likewise the proposal is
supported by the ‘capacity’ principle since a higher than average GDP means a higher than
average burden. The proposal receives positive scores on operationalizability (since the datarequirements are quite limited), allowance for some flexibility (since the weights of theindicators can be changed), and allowance for some country-specific circumstances (in termsof the set of three indicators included in the proposal). We consider the proposal not to beflexible enough to include developing countries, so criterion D is not satisfied. In terms of
simplicity and allowance for future refinements, the score is rather inconclusive. In sum thescore is 6/3.

Brazil/RIVM
In the Brazilian proposal, countries receive a burden that corresponds to their cumulative
historical emissions, and is thus supported by the ‘guilt’ fairness principle. In the newer
version of the proposal revised by RIVM, the focus is on per capita contribution to global
warming so there is an element of the ‘need’ fairness principle. To some extent ‘capacity’ isalso supported since only industrialized countries are given national abatement targets
according to this scheme. The score on operational requirements is weaker. The method canbe expanded to give abatement targets to all countries of the world, and it allows for futurerefinements. On the other hand, the method is not easy to operationalize due to data andmodel requirements. Thus the method is relatively complicated, and there is no allowance forcountry-specific circumstances. Altogether the score is 10/0.

Triptych
The Triptych method employed to establish a basis for distributing national abatement targets
among member states of the European Union is supported by the ‘need’ fairness principle
since it builds on characteristics of three economic sectors in a country and emissions in abase period. There is also some concession to ‘capacity’ since the ‘cohesion’ countries inSouthern Europe are given weaker targets than other EU member states. In terms ofoperational requirements, the method allows for future refinements, flexibility and countryspecific circumstances. However, the method’s score on universal applicability, simplicity
and operationalizability is lower. In sum the score is 6/4.

Multi-sector Convergence Approach
The Multi-sector Convergence Approach supports the ‘need’ fairness principle due toconvergence of national per capita emissions in some future target year. To a large extent the‘capacity’ principle is supported since transition economies and developing economies aresuggested as allowance factors. This implies that countries that are undergoing the process oftransition to a market economy are given a relatively lower burden, and that developing
countries only gradually take on binding commitments to restrict their greenhouse gas
emissions. The score on operational requirements is similar to the Triptych approach, but withtwo exceptions due to the method’s universal applicability and the larger data requirementthat complicates the task of making it operational. Altogether the score is 6/4, equal to
Triptych’s score.

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Burden differentiation: Criteria for evaluation and development of burden-sharing rules

3. DISCUSSION OF CRITERIA
Since the theoretical maximum score is 10/9, we conclude that no single BSR was capable ofmeeting all or even the large majority of criteria. According to the simple evaluation
procedure summarized in Table 2, the Multi-sector Convergence Approach and the Triptych
approach get the highest total score because they are both supported by two fairness principles
and receive a relatively good score on operational requirements. Next are the Brazil/RIVM
and Norwegian proposals. Brazil/RIVM has the highest score on fairness principles. Norway
has the highest score on operational requirements. The score on fairness principles is at leastas high as the two sector approaches, but the score on operational requirements is lower.
Japan is next, followed by France. They have the same scores on fairness principles, but
France has the lowest score on operational requirements. Obviously these results are
dependent on the weights of the criteria, and other possible criteria would yield different
results. Nonetheless, the results give an indication of which proposed BSRs seem mostpromising in future climate policy negotiations according to the criteria selected in this article.
Torvanger and Godal (2000) compared the outcome of the Japanese, the French, and theNorwegian proposals, and found that Japanese came closest to the Kyoto Protocol outcome,followed by the French and Norwegian proposals.15 Brazil/RIVM, Triptych and the Multisector Convergence Approach were not included. This stands in contrast to the present study
where Japan and France received the lowest scores. The Norwegian proposal fares relatively
well in both studies. This could indicate that our proposed evaluation criteria are notconsistent with the implicit criteria defined by the negotiation outcome manifested in the
Kyoto Protocol. This said, we should remember that no specific burden sharing method was
employed in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. The burden differentiation and provisions
defined by the Protocol were rather an intricate political deal made among sovereign states
and regional groups of states based on information on and beliefs about costs of reducing theiremissions, other national circumstances, and each state’s willingness to reduce its emissions.
Finally, the sector approaches (Multi-sector Convergence Approach and Triptych) got thehighest score according to our criteria, which should indicate some potential in future climate
policy negotiations. After all, the European Union has successfully employed the Triptych
approach in its internal differentiation of emission reductions targets.16

4. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed nine evaluation criteria for burden sharing rules (BSRs). Three concern
fairness principles, and six concern operational requirements. Based on the relevance andimportance of the evaluation criteria chosen it is suggested that potential BSRs that score highon these criteria should be promising in future climate policy negotiations, at least in terms ofproving a fruitful initial reference point for the negotiations. Thus the criteria can givevaluable hints for designing new BSRs.
We should take note that the set of criteria chosen in most cases yields only limited and small
differences in score among the BSRs analyzed. Furthermore, there are probably other sets ofcriteria (and aggregation methods to calculate the total score) that would be even better suited
to identify the most promising BSRs. Consequently we should still keep an open mind about
including new criteria or substituting old criteria for new ones.

15
16

Confer Table 9 in Torvanger and Godal (2000).
See Ringius (1999).

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CICERO Working Paper 2000: 01
Burden differentiation: Criteria for evaluation and development of burden-sharing rules

The sector approaches, such as the Multi-sector Convergence Approach, got the highest scoreaccording to the criteria. Sector approaches allow for a better translation between the BSR
and different circumstances at the sector level, and vice versa, than top-down based BSRs.
This indicates that sector-based BSRs could play a useful role in climate policy negotiations
among a larger group of countries, and could potentially also be helpful to incite developing
countries to take on greenhouse gas abatement targets.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We thank Michel den Elzen, Heleen Groenenberg, Jaap Jansen, Marcel Kok, Jos Sijm, Tora
Skodvin, Brandt Stevens, Arild Underdal and ZhongXiang Zhang for valuable comments, and
Lynn P. Nygaard for excellent editing and language assistance. The Burden Sharing study
project was financed by the Dutch National Research Programme on Global Air Pollution andClimate Change, as well as by own contributions of the participating research institutes.

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