Bull. Hiroshima Inst. Tech. Research Vol. 54（2020）39-47

ArticleSaussure and Fixed Codes

Naoki ARAKI ＊（Received Oct. 31, 2019）

Abstract
According to Roy Harris, Saussure bases his theory of language on circuit de la parole, whichis called speech circuit. If Harris is right, then we will need telementation and a fixed code forspeech circuit to be realized in linguistic communication. But Harris insists that it is doubtful
whether telementation and a fixed code are plausible for successful communication. Nevertheless,this assumption has been passed on since ancient times down to the present day in various forms.
So if telementation and a fixed code contradict real communication, then modern linguistics will beforced to be drastically rewritten somehow or other.
Key Words: speech circuit, telementation, fixed code, metaphor

is in the brain of one (person), call him A, where

Introduction[…] concepts, are associated with representations

Every theory has its own assumption. Saussure’sof linguistic signs or acoustic images, […]. […] atheory of language is no exception. What is thegiven concept triggers in the brain a corresponding

assumption of Saussure’s theory? According toacoustic image: […] the brain transmits to the organs

Harris, it is circuit de la parole (speech circuit as heof phonation an impulse corresponding to that

calls it). The speech circuit is based on telementation

image; then sound waves are propagated from A’s

and a fixed code, both of which are head and tail ofmouth to B’s ear […]. Next, the circuit continues in B

the same coin. How have these two ideas emerged

in inverse order: from ear to brain […] in the brain,

in intellectual history? They have their roots inthe psychological association of this image with theAristotle, whose explanation of metaphor, however,corresponding concept. If B speaks in turn, this new

makes us skeptical about fixed codes. In any case,act will follow—from his brain to A’s—exactly thethey have been passed on down to the present

same progression as the first, and will pass throughday. If Harris is right, how can modern linguistics

the same consecutive phases … (Saussure, 1922: 28;

guarantee the validity of its research on language?

author’s [Harris’s] translation).

1. Telementation(Harris 1978: 142)

Here, between A and B, A’s thought can beFirst of all, Harris takes up Saussure’s ‘speech
circuit’:transferred from A to B and vice versa. So Harris
calls Saussure’s ‘speech circuit’ a ‘telementational
process.’ The model of communication by Saussure

The starting point of the circuit [circuit de parole]is also called the ‘transport studies’ model (Harris＊ epartment of Information Systems and Management, Faculty of Applied Information Science, Hiroshima Institute of Technology,
D
Hiroshima 731-5193, Japan. E-mail: araki@cc.it-hiroshima.ac.jp― 39 ―Naoki ARAKI

function of linguistic communication but a necessary

1978: 142).
According to Harris, the ancestry of Saussure’s

condition of linguistic communication; and an‘speech circuit’ model of communication is theimmediate corollary is that no communication‘translation theory’ of understanding by John Locke:

system which is not used for telementation
counts as a language. This dogmatic Cartesian

For Locke, understanding what you hear anotherdistinction between language and other modes ofman says is simply a mirror image of what happens

communication survives into the twentieth century

when you express an idea aloud by speaking. Hencein some surprising theoretical guises. It underlies,

the expression ‘translation theory’ of understanding.

for example, psychological theories of children’s

Understanding is explained as translating back into

language acquisition such as Vygotsky’s, which

ideas what had previously been translated fromassumes that up to a certain stage in the child’s

ideas into sounds. Men talk, says Locke, ‘only thatdevelopment ‘thought’ and ‘speech’ are independent,

they may be understood; which is then only done

and that ‘true’ language is acquired at the nexal

when, by use or consent, the sound I make by the

point when ‘thought becomes verbal and speechorgans of speech excites in another man’s mind who

rational’.

(Harris 1987b: 30)

hears it the idea I apply to it in mine when I speakit’ (Locke, 1690).

Moreover, the telementation model, Harris(Harris 1983: 153-154)

insists, is taken over by a transformationalist fifty
According to Harris, Descartes also takes
telementation to be not merely the normal function

years after the publication of Saussure’s Cours delinguistique générale (1916):

of linguistic communication but a necessar ycondition of linguistic communication, and moreover,[…] linguistic communication consists in the

Descartes thinks that no communication systemproduction of some external, publicly observable,

which is not used for telementation counts as aacoustic phenomenon whose phonetic and syntactic

language:structure encodes a speaker’s inner, private thoughts
or ideas and the decoding of the phonetic andTwo point s about Desca r tes’ posit ion on

syntactic structure exhibited in such a physicalanimal behaviour are worth emphasizing in thephenomenon by other speakers, in the form of anpresent context. The first is its connexion with

inner private experience of the same thoughts or

the traditional Western assumption that linguistic

ideas (Katz 1966: 98).

(Harris 1978: 143)

communication involves a process of telementation.
In effect, Descartes presents a more rigorous andMoreover, Saussure’s telementation theory of

intransigent formulation of the telementational

communication, Harris says (Harris 1990d: 27-28),

doctrine than any of his predecessors. He is highly

has been passed on to the present day as in Denes

critical of compromises (such as Montaigne’s)and Pinson (1963: 4-7), Katz (1966: 103-4), Chafe

which would attribute to animals a lesser form

(1970: 15), and Cairns and Cairns (1976: 17-18).

of telementation, based on the supposition that

Thus, according to Harris, telementation has been

animals might have ‘languages’ which humanthe key concept in linguistics. But Harris points out

beings simply do not understand. For Descartes,that telementation has just an implicit assumption.

whatever form animal communication may take itcannot constitute linguistic communication because
animals do not have minds, and consequently haveno thoughts which could possibly be the subject ofNext, we shall consider fixed codes, which are anassumption of telementation.

2. Fixed Codes

telementational transference from one member of

A s we h ave s e en , a cc ord i ng t o H a r r i s ,the species to another. To maintain this, clearly, is

Saussure adopted telementation as his theory of

to take telementation to be not merely the normal

communication. Telementation is the theory which― 40 ―

Saussure and Fixed Codes

explains communication as the transference ofMoore and Carling say the same thing as this,thoughts from one person’s mind to another person’s

pointing out that Saussure’s langue (a fixed code) ismind. Furthermore Harris points out that ‘This

shared by language users:

simple scenario [telementation] assumes that A and B
are speaking the same language (Harris 1990d: 26)’:

Saussu re a rg ued that la ng uage could be
separated from local instances of language in use

Speech communication, on this view, is essentiallyand viewed as a system, self-contained and common

a process of telementation, or thought-transference.

to all language users. That system Saussure

The same thoughts may be transferred from A’s

called ‘langue’; the task of the linguist he saw as

mind to B’s or from B’s mind to A’s via exactly thecharacterising ‘langue’—the linguistic system [asame linguistic procedures;

fixed code] which language users might be said to(Harris 1990d: 27)

share. (Moore and Carling 1982: 64)

Here Harris says that the ‘speech circuit’ modelOnce Saussure’s idea is accepted, Harris claims,

assumes the same language, that is, a fixed code:

then extra-linguistic factors are eliminated from[…] if speech communication is a telementational

communication:

process, it demands a fixed code which A and B
share. If A and B do not share this fixed code, […]Now if that is indeed the right way to look atthen speech communication between them must at

language, then of course it follows that the material

some point break down, […] circumstances in which linguistic activity takes(Harris 1990d: 30)

place are of no significance. How such circumstances
Also, Harris insists from a different viewpoint

vary cannot affect, except in superficial andincidental ways, the nature of what is taking place,thatsince it is always the internalized system [the[…] once any theorist adopts a telementation

fixed code] of sound-meaning correlations which

theory of communication, […] the inevitable result

determines what can take place. The theory ofis that it leaves only one option open for explaining

language itself implicitly dismisses communication

what a language is. The only option open is to

as a mere by-product of something more permanent

construe a language as a fixed code, the fixed codeand more basic, the system of linguistic knowledge

known to both A and B.

[the fixed code]. (Harris 1990d: 28-29)(Harris 1978: 143)

So Harris summarizes the relationship between a

Harris says the same thing as the above fromtelementation theory and a fixed code as follows:

another different perspective again:[…] construing a language as a fixed code is[…] if speech communication is a telementation

demanded by the internal logic of Saussure’s speechprocess, it demands a fixed code which A and B

circuit [telementation model of communication].

share. If A and B do not share this fixed code, […]Unless the code is fixed, then invoking linguistic

then speech communication between them must

knowledge simply does not explain how speech

at some point break down, [...] So the theoreticalcommunication works. Given any utterance by A,

assumption must be that, somehow or other, those

it is essential that B must not only recognize this

who manage to communicate with each otherutterance as an example of the words A intended

via speech share and operate a fixed code, […]to pronounce, but must also attach to those words

The fixed code is their common language. In thisthe same meaning as A does. Otherwise speechsense, languages take priority over speakers, andcommunication between A and B necessarily breaks

over speech: linguistics is thus envisaged as adown. science primarily concerned, both in general and in(Harris 1990d: 29)― 41 ―Naoki ARAKI

particular cases, with analysing languages, which in

his Cours de linguistique générale should have beenturn are assumed to be the fixed codes underlying

incomprehensible:

all successful speech communication.
(Harris 1990d: 30)

The failure to deal with it [linguistic innovation]
has a particular irony, since the development ofThen, what does the fixed-code theory bringabout?

linguistics has been heavily dependent on the
introduction of new terminology, and Saussure’s
Cours [de linguistique générale] itself is a case in[…] the fixed-code theory leads straight to what

point. The work should have been incomprehensible

may be called the ‘paradox of inquiry’. […] A asks

if the theory of communication it advances is‘How many sides has a quadrilateral?’ and B replies

correct.

(Harris 1990d: 34)‘Four’. If A and B share the same fixed code, thenA must already know the answer to the question;

Moreover, if Saussure’s idea of telementation andwhereas in the alternative case A’s question is one

fixed codes is correct, linguistic misunderstanding

which it is impossible for B to understand correctly.

will not happen between one person and another.

It makes no difference in principle whether or

In other words, misunderstanding takes place innot ‘four’ is the right answer, or how the word

linguistic communication because we do not havequadrilateral is defined. The point is that a fixed-

the same common fixed code.

code theory of speech communication must attribute

Also, telementation and a fixed code cannot

exactly the same linguistic knowledge to A and B if

explain why we understand puns, which arecommunication is to be successful. On this theory,

relevant to polysemy and homonymy. To add one

therefore, it is impossible for anyone to come tomore example, Saussure’s theory of communication

know the meaning of a word by asking anothercannot elucidate the mechanism of irony, which

person. But this conclusion is paradoxical, since

is very common in our daily life. Needless to say,asking the meaning of a word is commonly held totelementation and a fixed code cannot explain evenbe a normal and unproblematic function of speech

why we understand jokes. As Harris rightly points

communication; and furthermore this function

out, it is a bitter joke that if Saussure is right, thenis generally regarded as essential for the usual

his lecture, Cours de linguistique générale will beprocesses of language-learning.(Harris 1990d: 32-33)

incomprehensible to readers.
Furthermore, the fixed-code theory poses a

More over, H a r r i s i n s i st s t h at i f s pe echquestion of how la langue comes into existence:

communication is based on a fixed code, then[…] if speech communication is indeed based

linguistic innovation will be impossible:

on a fixed code shared by speakers and hearers[…] if the speech circuit depends on the operation

it becomes extremely difficult to explain in anyof a fixed code then innovation becomes a theoreticalplausible way how the fixed code comes to be

impossibility. If A attempts to introduce a new

established in the first place. […] The larger theword, B will certainly fail to understand it sincecommunity the less chance there is that any two

ex hypothesi the word is not part of the code they

individuals will have had the same opportunity toshare. On the other hand, if either A or B canacquire exactly the same set of correlations between

introduce innovations which are communicationallyforms and meanings for purposes of communication.

successful, then the code is not fixed.

[ …] In other words, the fixed code with which(Harris 1990d: 34)

A operates is presumably the unique product of
A’s individual linguistic experience, […] But thisFurthermore, Harris ironically says that if

conclusion contradicts the telementational account ofSaussure’s theory of communication is correct, thenspeech communication itself; for we are left without― 42 ―

Saussure and Fixed Codes

the essential guarantee that A and B share one andcalculation; nor are they models held up for purposes

the same fixed code. of exemplification or emulation.

(Harris 1990d: 33)

Moreover, the speech circuit depending on a fixedcode produces conflict between the demands of a
fixed code and the possibility of linguistic change.
Furthermore, it seems either that linguistics

Next, we shall consider Aristotle’s fixed-codetheory, which is the predecessor of Saussure’s.

3. Metaphor

cannot deal with real languages or that if it does itcannot be dealing with fixed codes:(Harris 1990d: 37)

Furthermore, according to Harris, Aristotle
implicitly admits that a fixed-code theory, on which
Saussure’s theory is based, contradicts his own idea

If linguistics deals with synchronic speech-systems(or étas de langue in Saussurean terminology), andthat words are associated with concepts, explaining
metaphor (in his Poetics):

these systems are fixed codes, then they do notcorrespond to ‘languages’ in the everyday sense inMetaphor is transference of an alien term:

which English, French, and German are reckoned totransference from genus to species, from species

be the languages typically spoken by most people

to genus, from species to species, or by analogy. Iborn and brought up in, say, the United Kingdom,

mean by “from genus to species,” for example, “ThisFrance, and Germany. These are not fixed codes,

is my ship standing here”; lying at anchor is a kindwhatever else they may be, because they areof standing. “From species to genus” is exemplified

manifestly not uniform. Smith’s English may not bein “Odysseus did a thousand splendid deeds”; forthe same as Brown’s English. The French spoken by

thousand, which is used here instead of many, is

Dupont may differ from the French spoken by Duval.

a species of many. “From species to species” isSuch differences may affect not only pronunciation

exemplified in “drawing off his life with the bronze”

but grammar and vocabulary as well. Yet Smith isand “cutting with the tireless bronze”; drawing off

a native speaker of English, just as Brown is; andmeans cutting, and cutting means drawing off, both

Dupont is a native speaker of French, just as Duvalbeing species of “taking away.”

is. Thus it appears prima facie either that linguistics

Analogy means that the second term stands tocannot deal with languages like English, French, andthe first in the same relation as the fourth to theGerman; or if it does it cannot be dealing with fixed

third. (And sometimes people add that to which thecodes.

term supplanted is relative.) For example, a cup is(Harris 1990d: 35)

to Dionysus what a shield is to Ares; one can speak
Furthermore, according to Harris, it is wrong

therefore of the cup as “the shield of Dionysus,” andthat most linguists assume that idealizations inof the shield as “the cup of Ares.” Again, old age islinguistics (including a fixed code) are necessary

to life as evening is to day: one speaks therefore ofwhen they study languages:

evening as “the old age of day” or as Empedocles put
it; and one can speak of old age as “the evening, or

The fixed code and the homogenous speechsunset, of life.” There are cases where some of thecommunity, it is claimed, are merely theoreticalterms have no name, but metaphor by analogy canidealizations, which it is necessary for linguistics

still be used. For example, to scatter seed is to sow,

to adopt, just as other sciences adopt for theoreticalbut here is no name for what the sun does with its

purposes idealizations which do not correspondfire. However, this action is to the sun what sowing

to the observable facts . [ …] They [the ideal

is to seed, and so we have the expression “sowing

speech community, the ideal language, and thethe god-created flames.”

ideal speaker-hearer] are neither abstractions to

There is also another way of using metaphor. One

which items and processes in the real world may

can call the thing by an alien name and then denybe regarded as approximating for purposes of

it an attribute peculiar to the name. This would be― 43 ―Naoki ARAKI

the case if you spoke of the shield not as “the cup ofwill consist in demonstrating its systematicity (genus

Ares” but as “the wineless cup.”to species, species to genus, etc.). Aristotle does not(Aristotle 2003: 482-483)

apparently see—or is not prepared to admit—that
his first three categories of transfer are actually

So metaphor not only denies Aristotle’s idea [aspecial cases of the fourth and most general:

fixed code] that words are associated with concepts

analogy. For if this were admitted, the systematicity

but also calls into question Saussure’s fixed-code

would disappear, and one would be left with atheory.

conclusion intolerable to fixed-code theorists; namely,

Harris comments on Aristotle’s account ofthat the fixed code is not actually fixed. For users
alter its name-thing correlations at will, as it tickles

metaphor as follows:

their fancy to do so.(Harris 1998: 89-90)

It is no coincidence that Aristotle, who was thefirst scholar to make any serious attempt to explain

By the way, according to Harris, Saussure’s

metaphor, was also one of the founders of a fixed-‘speech circuit’ leads to his distinction between overt

code theory of languages. For from a fixed-code

verbal behaviour, la parole and la langue, which isperspective, metaphor is an aberration. It involves

the system of arbitrary conventions constituted byan ‘improper’ use of words. It applies terms to cases

pairings between signifiés (concepts) and signifiants

where they are not strictly or ‘literally’ applicable. It(sound images). Furthermore, Harris points out

is a semantic deviation.

that Aristotle also attempts to treat metaphor as a

It is significant that Aristotle’s account ofmatter of parole (use), not of langue (a fixed code):

metaphor occurs in his Poetics, which alreadyclassifies it implicitly as characteristic of a rather

Aristotle’s location of this discussion in the

exceptional kind of discourse. His explanation

Poetics also suggests that (to put the matter withconstitutes the first known attempt to formulate adeliberate anachronism) he wants to treat metaphor

theory of semantic transference:as a matter of parole, not of langue. Which is anotherfavourite segregationalist escape route for dealing

Metaphor consists in giving the thing a namewith recalcitrant ‘data’. This might be plausible if itthat belongs to something else; the transference

were only poets or other eccentrics who indulged

being either from genus to species, or fromin such linguistics perversities. But what is evenspecies to genus, or from species to species, or on

more disturbing for fixed-code semantics is thatgrounds of analogy. (Poetics 21) (Harris 1998: 89)

apparently deviations like metaphor can eventuallyworm their way into the code itself. Mountains do

So Harris criticizes Aristotle’s explanation of

not have feet, but no eyebrows are raised whenmetaphor, pointing out that a fixed code is not fixed:

someone speaks of the ‘foot of the Matterhorn’. Nordoes it cause us any problem to work out what kind

The underlying logic of this explanation isof animal a ‘human guinea-pig’ might be. Worse still,

typical of fixed-code semantics. First we have theas soon as we start looking for metaphors we findassumption that a determinate correlation between

them all over the place. They suddenly appear innames and things is already in place, such thateven the most banal and commonplace of utterances.


each name has an identified thing ‘belonging’ to(Harris 1998: 90)

it. Second, we have the assumption that metaphor
disrupts these correlations by giving a thing the

So Harris insists that the distinction between‘wrong’ name, i.e. a name that rightly belongs to

the literal and the metaphorical is the distinctionsome other thing. Third, we have the assumption

between langue (the code) and parole (its use),that nevertheless this transference is systematic in

pointing out that the distinction is head and tail ofsome way, and an explanation of the phenomenon

the same coin:― 44 ―

Saussure and Fixed Codes

The core problem here is, again, one generated

argument,’ ” Alice objected.

by the fixed-code doctrine itself; the problem being“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, inthat the distinction between the literal and therather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose

metaphorical melts away when we try to draw

it to mean—neither more nor less.”“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you canit in any systematic or rigorous way. (How many
metaphors does the preceding sentence include?)

make words mean so many different things.”“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which

And this problem in turn relates to another; what
also melts away is the elusive distinction between

is to be master—that’s all.”

(Carroll 1960: 186)

the code and its use, between langue and parole.
When we adopt an integrational perspective, we see

Here Humpty Dumpty insists that he can makethat in fact these two difficulties are head and tail ofwords mean what he wants them to. In other words,

the same theoretical coin.

he denies the idea of the fixed-code theory, according(Harris 1998: 90)

to which we can only use words meaning what theLast of all, Harris insists that metaphors aretheory determines. But in reality we can use words

the same as language use in general. Toolan (1996)

as we like. As Toolan says, “novelty in language

says that novelty in language use is the norm anduse is the norm” and “anything can mean anythingthat anything can mean anything in particularin particular circumstances.” Harris comments on

circumstances:

Humpty Dumpty as follows:

The recommended integrationist approach

Humpty Dumpty is perhaps the most famous

to metaphor will already be apparent from thechampion of the thesis that words mean whateverforegoing discussion: its starting point is to question

the speaker wants them to. His argument with‘whether metaphors are indeed different in kind from

Alice about the meaning of the word glory has

language use in general’, this being no more than abecome a kind of symbolic anecdote in modern

corollary of the integrationist view that ‘novelty insemantic theory. Humpty Dumpty’s thesis, patently,

language use is the norm’ (Toolan, 1996, pp. 59-60).

is quite unacceptable to the fixed-code theorist. In

Once we accept that, contrary to what fixed-code

fixed-code semantics, it is the code that determines

theorists would have us believe, ‘anything can mean

the meaning, not the speaker. And yet it seems

anything in particular circumstances’ (Toolan, 1996,

undeniable that people do often ask others what theyp. 62), then the question for investigation is howmean in order to clarify a remark; and undeniable

those particular circumstances produce the patternthat this is often a sensible strategy.
of integration that results in something meaning
what it does.

(Harris 1998: 71)(Harris 1998: 90)
So, according to Harris, the English sentence,

Toolan’s words remind us of Humpty Dumpty.
Humpty Dumpty says to Alice the same thing as‘Pass the salt, please’ can be interpreted, dependingon various cultures:

this in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass:
From an integrationalist point of view, it would“And only one for birthday presents, you know.

be fruitless to attempt to define the meaning of thewords Pass the salt, please without reference to the

There’s glory for you!”“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory,’ ”Alice‘cultural prerequisites’, as Silverstein [1977] calls
them. How complex these are, even in such a trivial

said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Ofcase, emerges from the fact that we can imagine

course you don’t—till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s avarious cultures other than our own in which, fornice knock-down argument for you!’ ”

example, any one of the following language-games“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean a ‘nice knock-down

might regularly occur. 1. When Smith said Pass

― 45 ―Naoki ARAKI

the salt, please, Jones first removed the salt from& Through the Looking-Glass. A Signet Classic.

the salt-cellar, poured it on to a napkin, folded the1960.

napkin and then handed the folded napkin to Smith.

Chafe, W. L. Meaning and the Structure of Language.

2. When Smith said Pass the salt, please, Jones
took the salt and sprinkled it on the food on Smith’s

University of Chicago Press. 1970.
Denes, P. B. and Pinson, E. N. The Speech Chain.
Doubleday. 1963.

plate. 3. When Smith said Pass the salt, please,
Jones took the salt, and sprinkled it over Smith’sHarris, Roy. “Communication and Language.”

head, shouting ‘Abracadabra’. There is no need to(Reprinted in The Foundations of Linguistic

multiply the hypothetical possibilities further. In

Theory: Selected Writings of Roy Harris. pp.

these three imaginary cultures, the meaning of Pass

136-150. Routledge. 1990a). 1978.

the salt, please would be different; and in all three

Harris, Roy. “The Speech-Communication Model incultures it would be different from the meaning we

Twentieth-Century Linguistics and its Sources.”understand Pass the salt, please to have in ours.

(Reprinted in The Foundations of Linguistic

From an integrationalist point of view, the meaning

Theory: Selected Writings of Roy Harris. pp.
151-157. Routledge. 1990b). 1983.

is inseparable from the language-game; and it is thisview of meaning we have to adopt if we want toHarris, Roy. “Language as Social Interaction:
Integrationalism versus Segregationalism.”

understand language as social interaction.
Language Sciences vol. 9, no. 2. pp. 131-143. 1987a.

(Harris 1987a: 205)

(Reprinted in The Foundations of Linguistic

Conclusion

Theory: Selected Writings of Roy Harris. pp.
197-209. Routledge. 1990c).

According to Harris, Saussure bases his theoryof communication on telementation (circuit de laHarris, Roy. The Language Machine. Duckworth.
1987b.

parole), which is transference of thought from one
person to another. Furthermore, telementation

Harris , Roy. “On Redefining Linguistics .” inleads to a fixed code, which is langue in Saussure’s

Redefining Linguistics, edited by H. G. Davis andterminology. In other words, telementation is based

T. J. Taylor, Routledge, pp. 18-52, 1990d.

on a fixed code. This idea has been passed on from

Harris, Roy. Signs, Language and Communication.
Routledge. 1996.

Aristotle down to the present day.
But in reality, linguistic communication does not

H a r r is , Roy. In t r o d u c t i o n t o In t e g r a t i o n a l
Linguistics. Pergamon Press. 1998.

consists of telementation. So extra-linguistic factors
are involved in linguistic communication. Therefore,Katz, J. J. The Philosophy of Language. Harper &Row. 1966.

if communication is successful, then a fixed code
is not fixed at all. We can communicate with each

L ocke , John . A n Es s a y C o n ce r n in g Hum a nother using language, which serves us as a medium

Understanding (1690), edited by P. Nidditch.

with extra-linguistic factors.

Oxford University Press. 1975.

If Harris is right, do we need to reconsider how

Moore, T. and Carling, C. Understanding Language:
Towards a Post-Chomskyan Linguistics. The

linguistic communication is successfully achieved?

MacMillan Press. 1982.

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