Bull. Hiroshima Inst. Tech. Research Vol.49（2015）1-11

ArticleSaussure and Chomsky― Langue and I-language ―Naoki ARAKI*（Received Oct. 31, 2014）

Abstract
Ferdinand de Saussure and Noam Chomsky are considered to be the most inﬂuential linguists. In
this paper, we contrast their accounts concerning the following issues of language and try to makeclear differences between them, mainly referring to Saussure’s langue and Chomsky’s I-language: 1)
How concepts emerge, 2) How phonemes appear, 3) How languages change, 4) Where syntax belongs to, 5) Whether language is social or biological, 6) What parts of speech are, and 7) Whether
languages are delimited or not. By doing so, it will be understood that in what ways the two linguists have common or different ideas about language.
Key Words: langue, parole, I-language, E-language, concept, phoneme, changes of language,

syntax, social fact, biology, parts of speech, delimitation of languages.

Introduction

1. How do concepts emerge?

In the history of linguistics, Saussure and Chomsky have had a great influence on methodology of
linguistics. What have they thought of language andhow have they treated with language? Are their research methods or views of language the same as ordifferent from each other? Even though their views
are different, can we reconcile them? Or after all, dotheir views lead to the same conclusion? To answer
these questions above, we will consider the two linguists’ thoughts concerning languages: 1) How concepts emerge, 2) How phonemes appear, 3) How languages change, 4 ) Where syntax belongs to, 5 )Whether language is social or biological, 6) Whatparts of speech are, and 7) Whether languages aredelimited or not.

1.1. Concepts emerge after a langue divides the masses＊＊＊of concept and soundAccording to Saussure, it is after a langue (language) divides both the mass of concept and themass of sound at the same time that signes (words)
begin to exist. This means that we have nothing distinct both in the mass of concept and in the mass ofsound in advance of a langue:
Psychologically, what are our ideas, apart fromour language [langue]? They probably do not exist.
Or in a form that may be described as amorphous.
We should probably be unable, according to philosophers and linguists, to distinguish two ideas clearly
without the help of a language [langue] (internal language [langue] naturally). Consequently, in itself,
the purely conceptual mass of our ideas, the mass
separated from the language [langue], is like a kindof shapeless nebula, in which it is impossible to dis-

Department of Information Systems and Management, Faculty of Applied Information Science, Hiroshima Institute of Technology,
Hiroshima 731-5193, Japan―1―

Naoki ARAKI

tinguish anything initially. The same goes, then, forthe language [langue]: the different ideas represent
nothing pre-existing. There are no: a) ideas alreadyestablished and quite distinct from one another, b)
signs for these ideas. But there is nothing at all distinct in thought before the linguistic sign. This is themain thing. On the other hand, it is also worth asking
if, beside this entirely indistinct realm of ideas, therealm of sound offers in advance quite distinct ideas(taken in itself apart from the idea). There are no distinct units of sound either, delimited in advance. [...]
It would above all be necessary that the signiﬁed element should be something determined in advance,
and it is not.
(Saussure 1993: 137a-139a)
Does anything like“pure concepts ”or“purephonemes”exist before signes come into being? If“pure concepts”existed before signes emerge, what
would happen? As proof of this, Saussure insiststhat his view can be verified in vocabulary, tense,
and aspect:
If ideas were predetermined in the human mind
before being linguistic values, one thing that would
necessarily happen is that terms would correspondexactly as between one language [langue] and another.
FrenchGermancher ‘
lieb, teuer (also moral)[ dear’]There is no exact correspondence.
juger, estimer
urteilen, erachten‘[ judge, estimate’]
have a set of meanings only
partly coinciding with
French juger, estimer
We see that in advance of the language [ langue ]there is nothing which is the notion‘cher’in itself.
[...] Idea of different tenses, which seems quite natural to us, is quite alien to certain languages. As in
the Semitic system (Hebrew) there is no distinction,
as between present, future and past; that is to saythese ideas of tense are not predetermined, but exist
only as values in one language [langue] or another.
Old German has no future, no proper form for the
future. It expresses it by means of the present. But
this is a matter of speaking. Hence Old German present value is not the same as in French future. Similarly if we take the difference between the perfective
aspect of the verb and the imperfective aspect in the

Slavic languages (difﬁculty in the study of these languages). In Slavic languages, constant distinction
between aspects of the verb: action outside any question of time or in process of accomplishment. We
ﬁnd these distinctions difﬁcult because the categories
are unfamiliar. So not predetermined, but value.
(Saussure 1993: 139a-140a)
According to Trask, Chinese lacks tense entirely
and the African language Bamileke-Dschang distinguishes 11 tenses (Trask 2007: 294). Sampson also
points out the same thing as this concerning“mood,”
quoting examples of French and English (Sampson
1980: 39). If Saussure is right, we cannot have what
are called“pure concepts”, which Chomsky thinks
are innate as we shall see later, before we have acquired a language (langue). Languages are, for Saussure, a fait social (social fact). Moreover, Saussure
insists that concepts separated from sounds are justan object of psychology, but not that of linguistics:
The same thing must be said as regards the mental side of the linguistic sign. If you consider thevarious concepts (love, see, house) in themselves,apart from their representation a representing sign,
they are a series of psychological objects. In the psychological domain, you can say that it is a complex
unit. The concept must be only the value of an
acoustic image if it is to belong to the linguistic domain. Or else, if you bring it into the linguistic domain, it is an abstraction.
(Saussure 1993: 79a)
Saussure’s view leads to the denial of Chomsky’s
idea that we are born with concepts which are equivalent to Saussure’s signifiés (concepts) and are separated from signifiants (sounds). Then, why does
Chomsky think that we are born with concepts?
Next, we discuss Chomsky’s view of concepts.
1.2. We are born with a list of pre-existing concepts

According to Chomsky, the properties of the
Spanish words seguir, perseguir, and persuadir arevery complicated:
Consider the words seguir “( follow”) and perseguir “( chase”). The latter involves human intention.
To chase someone is not merely to follow him; infacts, one may chase someone without exactly following his path, and one may be following someone’spath precisely at a ﬁxed distance from him without―2―

Saussure and Chomsky

chasing him [...]. Rather, to chase someone is to follow him [...] with a certain intention: the intention tokeep on his trail and perhaps [...] to catch him. Similarly, the word persuadir “( persuade”) involves thenotion of causation as well as the notion of intention
or decision [...]. To persuade John to go to college is
to cause John to decide or intend to go to college; if
John at no point decides or intends to go to college,
then I have not persuaded him to go to college, however much I may have tried. The situation is in fact agood bit more complex. I may cause John to decideto go to college by force or threat, but without having persuaded him to go to college, strictly speaking.
Persuasion involves volition. If I say that the police
interrogator persuaded John to confess by the threatof torture, I am using the term“persuade”ironically.
(Chomsky 1988: 31-32)
In spite of these facts, children can learn thewords perfectly right away. This means that they areborn with a long list of concepts, which correspondto the words prior to any experience. Then theylearn the labels that go with the pre-existing concepts. Chomsky insists that this is the way children
acquire their vocabulary. So, if Chomsky is right, it
does not follow that we have nothing like“pure concepts”in advance of a langue as Saussure insists.
But on the other hand, Chomsky does not deny that“words may not match precisely across languages(Chomsky 1988: 32)”just as Saussure has alreadypointed out above. In other words, he accepts thepossibility of modiﬁcation of the conceptual framework“by experience and varying cultural contexts(Chomsky 1988: 32)”, but nevertheless he insists thatthe framework is a common human property:[...] it is beyond question that acquisition of vocabulary is guided by a rich and invariant conceptual
system, which is prior to any experience.
(Chomsky 1988: 32)
So, for Chomsky language is a matter of biology, but not a matter of society as Saussure insists.
Incidentally, Chomsky thinks that we are born with
Universal Grammar (henceforth UG) with parameters. Then, as we are exposed to a language spoken
around us, the parameters are set one way or anotherand we acquire a particular language. Chomsky calls
this language an internalized language (I-language).

The language may be English or Japanese or whatever, depending on the circumstances under which
we are living. Can’t we apply this idea to acquisitionof vocabulary? Suppose we are equipped with UG
of concepts and sounds of words. This UG has parameters both for concepts and for sounds each. As
we are exposed to words of a language, the parameters are set one way or another and we acquire a system of concepts and sounds of the language. Chomsky has not proposed such an idea but he implies that
we may have UG of morals (Chomsky 1988: 152153), the arts (Chomsky 1980: 252; 1988: 152), mathematics (Chomsky 1980 : 249 ), face-recognition(Chomsky 1980: 248-249), and science-forming capacity (Chomsky 1980: 251-252; 1988: 156-159). So
it is thought that he is likely to accept the speculation
above. If this hypothesis is assumed to be correct,
we can explain both why children can learn words sofast and accurately and why every human language
has its own unique, distinct system of concepts andsounds. Can this idea reconcile Saussure’s thoughtthat a langue determines its sounds and concepts
with Chomsky’s that we are equipped with concepts
at birth?
2. How do phonemes appear?
2.1. We are born with phonemes

According to Chomsky, we are born with phonemes:
Consider, for example, the words listed below,
where column I is the conventional orthography, column II appears
I
II
III
bet
bet
bet
bent
bent
bẽt
bend
bend
bend
knot
nat
nat
nod
nad
nAd
write
rayt
rayt
ride
rayd
rAyd
writerrayt+rrayDr
rider
rayd+rrAyDr
to be the correct phonological representation, andcolumn III, the approximate phonetic representations
in one dialect of English, [...] The representations ofcolumn II are essentially the mental representations―3―

Naoki ARAKIof the lexicon, which enter into the syntax and semantics. The phonetic representations of column III
derive from these by straightforward rules, most ofthem quite general: Vowels assume a particular quality before voiced and unvoiced consonants and become nasalized before nasal consonants, the nasal
consonant drops before an unvoiced dental, and (inthis dialect) the dental stops merge as [D] medially
under this stress contour. Applying these rules, wederive the phonetic forms (III) from the lexical-phonological representations (II). The latter representations are not derived from the speech sounds by analytic procedures of segmentation, classification,
extraction of physical features, and so forth, but are
established and justiﬁed as part of the best theory foraccounting ultimately for the general relation between sound and meaning of the I-language. Further
syntactic and semantic rules apply to the representations of (II) in the expressions in which these words
appear. The I-language, incorporating the rules thatform the representations (II) and the rules that relatethem to (III), is acquired by the child by applying theprinciples incorporated in the initial state S0 [UG] tothe presented facts; the problem for the grammarianis to discover these principles and show how theylead to the choice of the representations (II) [...].
(Chomsky 1986: 41-43)
Here Chomsky thinks that phonemes are innate.
He says that the representations of column II (whichis thought to be the phonological representation) areessentially the mental representations of the lexicon,from which the phonetic representations of column
III derive. In other words, he thinks that the phonetic forms (III) are derived from the lexical-phonological representations (II). Moreover, he goes on to say,“the I-language, incorporating the rules that form therepresentations (II) and the rules that relate them to(III), is acquired by the child by applying the principles incorporated in the initial state S0 [UG] to thepresented facts.” So for Chomsky, the problem forthe grammarian is to discover these principles (which
are incorporated in the initial state S 0 [UG]) andshow how they lead to the choice of the representations (II). Chomsky’s explanation could be interpreted as follows:
Column II is the mental representations of thelexicon, from which the physical representations ofcolumn III derive. This means that (III) is developed
from (II). How is column II acquired? Children areborn with UG, which incorporates principles, andthen they are exposed to the presented facts and theyacquire the I-language, which incorporates both therules that form the representations (II) and the rulesthat relate them to (III). So the acquisition of therepresentations of (II) is a matter of choice for
Chomsky. It depends on what kinds of presented
facts children are exposed to that they acquire whatkinds of representation (II). In short, children acquire phonemes based on UG. After all Chomsky insists that we have phonemes and rules in advance,then we produce sounds of words, using the phonemes and applying the rules to them. For Chomsky,
phonemes exist independently of concepts, which
Saussure thinks are closely linked with sounds.
2.2. Phonemes appear after a langue divides the massesof concept and soundAccording to Saussure we have signes after boththe mass of concept and the mass of sound are divided by a langue at the same time. If something like“pure phonemes”existed in advance before signes
appear, what would happen? Phonemes across all
the languages would probably correspond to one another, even if in part. But they actually don’t. For
example, in English a phoneme /p/ can be pronounced [ph] or [p] as an allophone. But Mandarin
Chinese has two different words pronounced [phā]and [pā] respectively. These two sounds [ph] and [p]belong to two clearly different phonemes /ph/ and /p/.
So Mandarin Chinese has two phonemes /ph/ and /p/(Trask 2007: 214). This means that one phoneme /p/in English is treated as two phonemes /ph/ and /p/ in
Mandarin Chinese. Sampson also points out thesame thing as this, quoting two examples: one is one
phoneme for English and two phonemes for Russian,and the other is one phoneme for Japanese and twophonemes for English. (Sampson 1980: 38-39). So if
this is true, something like“pure phonemes”, which
Chomsky thinks are innate, does not exist in advance:
The precautions to be taken are various, in accordance with the actual nature of the linguistic ob―4―

Saussure and Chomsky

ject. The ﬁrst condition to be satisﬁed for identifying
a linguistic entity is that the association between thetwo elements [the concept and the acoustic image]should be present and maintained. If we unwittingly
take only one of the elements, one of the parts, wehave straight away created a spurious linguistic unit.
We have made an abstraction and it is no longer theconcrete object that we have before us. One must notdissociate what is associated in the linguistic sign.
(Saussure 1993: 79a)
Saussure insists that sounds fall within linguistics only when they are considered as the material
basis for the concepts:
It constantly happens that in reality you take justone part of the linguistic sign even when you think
you are dealing with the whole, and then you are nolonger dealing with linguistic entities. Thus if wetake the material side, the sequence of sounds, it will
be linguistic only if considered as the material basis
for the idea; but envisaged in itself (the materialside) it is a substance which is not linguistic, substance which can only be relevant to the study ofspeech, if the envelope of the word represents a substance which is not linguistic. A language we do notknow is not linguistic as far as we are concerned.
From that point of view, you can say that the material word is an abstraction from the linguistic point ofview. As a concrete object, it is not part of linguistics.
(Saussure 1993: 79a)
Similarly, for Saussure, both sounds and concepts are closely linked together, so neither sounds
separated from concepts nor concepts separated fromsounds are the object of linguistics, but that of phonetics or psychology respectively. For Chomsky, weare born with concepts and phonemes and find out
sounds which are to be combined with the concepts.
Then we produce the sounds, using the phonemes
and applying rules, which are innate, to them. According to Saussure, neither concepts separated fromsounds, nor sounds separated from concepts are objects of linguistics and do exist in advance of alangue in itself. In this respect, Saussure and Chomsky are sharply opposed to each other. By the way,
Sampson is skeptical of the reality of phonemes,
quoting an example of Mandarin Chinese (Sampson
1980: 70-74). He says that the phoneme theory isjust a statistical tendency.
3. How do languages change?
3.1. Parole changes langue

Saussure says that it is parole that changes alangue:But changes always begin with facts of speech[parole]. [...] Every evolution, every evolutionary
fact in a language [langue ] begins with a fact ofspeech. [...] The cause of evolutionary linguistic
facts lies in facts of speech. [...] But at the sametime, it will be seen that the facts of speech where an
innovation is tried out are always individual. Why inGerman did people come to say ich war - wir waren
instead of ich was - wir waren (as in English I was:we were)? Because a few individuals began to say
ich war by analogy. It was only a fact of speech [parole] and not a fact of the language [langue] as longas there were only a few individuals who did it.
(Saussure 1993: 118a-119a)
Thus, it is not until a society accepts parole thatparole has become a part of a langue. So it follows
that a langue does not precede parole, but that parolecauses historical changes of a langue. Moreover, thechanges are caused by“analogy.”
3.2. Historical changes of languages are consequencesof re-settings of parameters

On the other hand, Chomsky insists that historical changes of an E-language (externalized language), which is equivalent to parole in Saussure’s
framework, are caused by re-settings of parametersof UG:In Spanish, for example, there are such constructions as(23)
a. Llega.
Arrives.
“He/she/it arrives.”
b. Llega Juan.
Arrives Juan.
“Juan arrives.”[...] The same is true of Italian and other Romance
languages. But in French the corresponding forms
are impossible. The subject must be explicitly expressed throughout, and it cannot follow the verb as―5―

Naoki ARAKIin (23b) [...] These differences between French andthe other Romance languages developed only a few
centuries ago and apparently at about the same time.
It is likely that they are consequences of a change ina single parameter, perhaps inﬂuenced by the example of the nearby Germanic languages. [...] Some
progress has been made in reducing these consequences to what is called the null subject parameter,
which determines whether the subject of a clause canbe suppressed, as in (23a), [...](Chomsky 1988: 63-64)
As we have seen, Chomsky thinks that historicalchanges of an E-language are caused by re-settingsof parameters of UG while Saussure insists thatchanges of parole, which is equivalent to an E-language, cause those of a langue, which is thought tobe equivalent to an I-language. Here the point may
be the interpretation of Saussure’s idea of“langue.”
Saussure asks why people say in German,“ich war wir waren,”but not“ich was - wir waren”as in English“I was - we were.”He answers,“Because a few
individuals began to say ich war by analogy.”So
here Saussure treats with the change of vocabulary,in this case, from“was”to“war,”but not the changeof word order as in the case of French illustrated by
Chomsky. It may be the logical necessity that Saussure’s example of change of language is limited to
vocabulary because his langue excludes sentencesfrom its domain as we shall see later. On the other
hand, for Chomsky the change of language meansthat of word order because his parameters of UG are
not thought to be involved in vocabulary at all. So
the difference between Saussure and Chomsky on
the changes of language may not be discussed in thesame way. For Saussure a langue is an inventory ofwords while for Chomsky an I-language is the consequences of UG with parameters set in a particularmanner. So changes of a langue are, for Saussure,changes of vocabulary whereas changes of an I-language are, for Chomsky, changes of parameters of
UG because an I-language is consequences of UG
after parameters are set in a particular way. So it
seems that these two theories are not compatible
with each other. But if Saussure’s theory is interpreted as the following: parole changes the values of parameters of UG, and then a langue also changes, this―6―

interpretation may coincide with Chomsky’s theory
quite well. After all, do Saussure and Chomsky explain the same phenomena in a different way?
4. Where does syntax belong to?
4.1. Syntax belongs to parole

According to Saussure, valeurs (values) ofwords are realized by the opposition or difference
between words. This opposition or difference is developed in two domains, one of which is called a
syntagmatic relation (a syntagma):
The value (valeur) of a word at any given moment exists only in relation to other similar units.
The relation and the difference between words has
its basis in two dimensions, two quite separate domains: each of these generates a certain kind of value
and the contrast between the two itself throws lighton each. We are dealing with two domains or two
ways of connecting words with one another. Thereis 1) syntagmatic co-ordination and the domain ofsyntagmatic relations. [...] This combination giving
rise to certain relations may be called a syntagma. It
is the combination of two or several units, all present
and consecutive. If they formed a sequence with noconnexion between them, I would not call them asyntagma, but several consecutive units with a connexion between them or with the whole form a syntagma.
(Saussure 1993: 128a-129a)As“the combination of two or several units,”
for example, we have a German word Hauptmann, aGerman compound word Dummheit, a Latin word
magnanimus (and animus as well), and a French
fixed expression (cliché) s ’il vous plait in eachlangue. Then do sentences, which are combinationsof words called syntagmas, belong to a langue? Saussure answers this question:
Syntagmas, although they are to be seen in combinations that are not sentences, clearly include sentences themselves as types. Every sentence will be asyntagma. Now the sentence belongs to speech [parole] and not to the language [langue].
(Saussure 1993: 131a)
Furthermore, Saussure explains why sentences
belong to parole and not to a langue:[...] there is always that individual element, thecombination which is left for everyone to choose inSaussure and Chomsky

order to express their own thought in a sentence.
This combination belongs to speech [parole], for it isan execution.
(Saussure 1993: 73a)Thus, Saussure cannot help admitting that a syntagmatic relation (a syntagma ) belongs both to alangue and to parole:
That part (second individual use of the languagecode) raises a question. It is only ultimately in syntax that there is a certain vagueness about what isgiven in the language [langue] and what is left to individual initiative. The delimitation is difﬁcult to establish. It must be admitted that here in the domainof syntax the social element [langue] and the individual element [parole], execution and ﬁxed association, are somewhat intermingled, get more or less intermingled.
(Saussure 1993: 73a)4.2. Syntax belongs to I-language

According to Chomsky, we have“notion of
structure”in our mind, which he calls an“internalized language (I-language)”:[...] Otto Jespersen, who held that there is some“notion of structure ”in the mind of the speaker“which is definite enough to guide him in framing
sentences of his own,”in particular,“free expressions”that may be new to the speaker and to others.
Let us refer to this“notion of structure”as an“internalized language ”(I-language). The I-language,then, is some element of the mind of the person who
knows the language, acquired by the learner, andused by the speaker-hearer. (Chomsky 1986: 21-22)
We acquire an I-language after parameters of
UG are set one way or another, depending on thelanguage spoken around us. Moreover, this UG has
certain categories of lexical items:
Universal grammar permits certain categories oflexical items, basically four: verbs (V), nouns (N),adjectives (A), and adpositions (P; prepositions or
postpositions, depending on whether they precede orfollow their complements). [...] For each of these basic categories, universal grammar provides a projection of which it is the head: verb phrase (VP), nounphrase (NP), adjective phrase (AP), adpositional
phrase (PP).
(Chomsky 1988: 68)
Each projection is composed of a head and acomplement. Chomsky thinks that it is determinedby a parameter of UG called a head-parameter
whether a head precedes or follows a complement.
For example, in Spanish, the value of the head-parameter is“head ﬁrst,”which means heads precede
complements in the four projections:a. VP: hablar inglés“speak English”
b. NP: traducción del librotranslation of-the book“translation of the book”
c. AP: lleno de agua
“full of water”
d. PP: a Juan
“to Juan”(Chomsky 1988: 68)
The same is true of English too. But in Miskito
and Japanese, the value of the head-parameter is“head last,”which means heads follow complementsin the four projections. Chomsky ’s explanation
seems to be perfect but there are some languages
whose word order cannot be explained using thehead-parameter of UG:
There are possibilities of word order permitted
by universal grammar that go beyond those I have illustrated. The languages mentioned so far observe
the condition that the elements of a phrase are adjacent, [...] But some languages do not observe thiscondition of adjacency in the underlying abstract
structure. Phrases may be genuinely“scattered, ”
though there is good reason to believe that the phrases do exist and are determined by the same generalprinciples with other forms of association replacing
adjacency.
(Chomsky 1988: 73)
Thus, Chomsky manages to solve the problem
of word order based on the head-parameter of UG.
On the other hand, Saussure thinks that sentences,which appear as a syntagmatic relation, belong toparole, but not to a langue. So word order, such“head ﬁrst”or“head last”as Chomsky insists, does
not belong to a langue. This means that Chomsky’s
assertion is not the subject matter of linguistics for
Saussure.“Notion of structure,”which Jespersen
thinks is necessary in making sentences of“free expressions,”belongs to parole according to Saussure.
Thus syntax, which is the main theme for Chomsky,
belongs to parole for Saussure. Should Saussure
have limited syntagmatic relations to parole? Why―7―

Naoki ARAKI

Whereas there is no collective speech [parole]. To
say that a word has come into the language [langue]
is to say that it has received collective approval.
Acts of speech [ parole ] remain individual, apartfrom being momentary. Crowd gathered in a market
square; in what way is the language [langue] present
in this crowd? In the form of a deposit existing in
brain of each of the persons making up the crowd
like a dictionary of which all the copies were distributed to these persons. This thing, although internal
to each individual, is at the same time collective, lying beyond the will of the individual. 1 + 1 + 1 ...＝ 1(collective model).
(Saussure 1993: 91a)
A langue is what is acquired but not an ability
endowed by nature:[...] The language faculty, it will be said, appears
to us as a faculty given to us by nature, whereas thelanguage [langue], on the contrary, is something thatis acquired and conventional. It cannot take precedence over natural phenomena, natural instincts.
(Saussure 1993: 66a)
Furthermore, Saussure compares a langue towork of music:
The language [langue] is comparable to work ofmusic. A musical work exists only in virtue of thetotal number of performances of it. The performances are something quite apart from the work. A symphony is a reality that exists without any performance. Similarly, the renderings in speech [parole]of what is given in the language [langue] may seem
inessential.
(Saussure 1993: 72a)
As we have seen, langue is a social fact for Saussure.

does not Saussure think that sentences belong to alangue? The number of sentences is inﬁnite. So if
we suppose that sentences belong to a langue, then it
follows that in a langue we have all the sentences wemake in prior to actual utterances. This means that
we derive the suitable ready-made sentences from alangue. This comes to mean that uttering sentences
is not a creative activity. Saussure might have wanted to avoid such a conclusion. Sampson says almost
the same thing as this (Sampson 1980: 54). On theother hand, Chomsky seeks formal universality, admitting the inﬁnity of linguistic expressions. He assumes UG to be innate in human beings because
children can acquire a complexly structured language
easily and quickly without being taught anything.
His head-parameter is postulated as a mechanism toenable various human languages to be derived fromUG. But actually even in English, which has a relatively fixed word order, an object could be moved
before a verb: This paper I have written. Is Chomsky really right? Is word order determined by a parameter of UG? As we have seen, Saussure regards
sentences as an individual execution while Chomsky
insists that word order is biologically determined by
the value of the head-parameter of UG. After all, thequestion of where sentences belong to may be a matter of what a langue or I-language is. For Saussure, alangue is an inventory of words so it follows that
sentences belong to parole, but not to a langue. On
the other hand, for Chomsky, an I-language is consequences of parameter-setting of UG, so sentences, inthis case, types of word order, belong to an I-language, but not to an E-language. Their difference
concerning sentences may come from that between alangue and an I-language.

5.2. I-language is biologicalAccording to Chomsky, on the other hand, Ilanguage is mental states and representations of themind/brains, which is physically encoded in somemanner. Moreover, I-language is the human biological endowment, so linguistics is ultimately part of
biology:[...], the steady state of knowledge attained [Ilanguage] and the initial state S0 [UG] are real elements of particular mind/brains, aspects of the physical world, where we understand mental states andrepresentations to be physically encoded in some

5. Is language social or biological?
5.1. Langue is a social fact (fait social)

According to Saussure, a langue exists as what
is socially approved by members of a community. It
is located in brains of members of a community justlike a dictionary. Moreover, a langue exists as if itwere outside of the will of members of a community:
Developing and fixing this product [langue] is
the work of the collective intelligence. Everythingthat is the language [langue] is implicitly collective.
―8―

Saussure and Chomsky

manner. [...] Linguistics, conceived as the study of Ilanguage and S0 [UG], becomes part of psychology,
ultimately biology.
(Chomsky 1986: 26-27)
For Chomsky, an I-language exists in the brainof a single individual, even though there are not anyother people. But for Saussure, a langue does notexist as a perfect thing in a single individual as
Chomsky asserts. It is not until there are many individuals who consist of a society that a langue does
exist. For Chomsky, an I-language is physical but for
Saussure, a langue exists outside of an individual’s
will. Chomsky insists that an I-language, which is
acquired after parameters of UG are set one way or
another, is innate and endowed by nature whereas
Saussure thinks that a langue is what is learned. In
this respect, Chomsky’s I-language is biological but
Saussure’s langue is social. Saussure says that alangue exists without the execution of parole just as
work of music does without being performed. Similarly, Chomsky thinks that the essence of chess is not
the moves of its pieces but its rules (Chomsky 1986:
27). This means that the essence of language is notutterances made in everyday life (E-language) but
what enables such utterances (I-language). As wehave seen, Saussure and Chomsky agree that the essence of language is language rules which intervene
between cognition and expression, whether a language is thought to be social or biological. But if
language rules are, as Miura points out (Miura 1967:
149-199),“conceptually objectified will”which intervenes between cognition and expression in process structure of language: object → cognition → expression, it is thought that Chomsky reduces language
rules to physical things and Saussure thinks of themas something like a dictionary. Why does Saussure
think that a langue is social (a fait social)? Why
does Chomsky think that an I-language is biological?
It may be because Saussure’s langue is based on thesocial contract and Chomsky’s I-language is derived
from UG, which is biologically determined in genes.

Universal grammar permits certain categories oflexical items, basically four: verbs (V), nouns (N),adjectives (A), and adpositions (P; prepositions or
postpositions, depending on whether they precede orfollow their complements). [...] The basic elementsof the lexicon fall within these four categories, [...](Chomsky 1988: 68)
We acquire various I-languages (human languages) after the values of the parameters of UG are
set one way or another. So it is thought that four categories: verbs (V), nouns (N), adjectives (A), andadpositions (P) are innate, common and universal
across all the human languages.
6.2. Parts of speech are not a linguistic reality

On the other hand, for Saussure the classification of parts of speech is not a grammatical reality:
In the French sentence ces gants sont bon
marché ‘( these gloves are good value ’), is bonmarché ‘( good value’) an adjective? Logically, it
has the right meaning. But grammatically it is lessclear. For bon marché does not behave like a normal
French adjective: it is invariable, never precedes its
noun, and so on. Furthermore, it consists of twowords. What the parts of speech provide is a classiﬁcation of individual words: so how can a group of
two words belong to one or other of the parts ofspeech? Yet if we split it up into two words, and saybon ‘( good’) is an adjective, whereas marché ‘( value’) is a noun, we have not accounted for the single
expression bon marché ‘( good value’). The conclusion is that our‘parts of speech’classiﬁcation must
be defective or incomplete: its division of words into
nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc. does not correspond to
any undeniable linguistic reality.
(Saussure 1983: 108)
The same thing may be true of a piece of cake inthe English sentence“The question is a piece of
cake.” Is it an adjective? It never has the comparative or superlative degree. Furthermore, it consists offour words. So how can a group of four words belong to one or other of the parts of speech? Yet if we
split it up into four words, and say a is an article,
piece a noun, of a preposition, and cake a noun, we
have not accounted for the single expression a pieceof cake. Chomsky is sharply opposed to Saussure in

6. What are parts of speech?
6.1. Parts of speech are innate and physically encodedin the mind/brains

Chomsky’s UG has four categories of lexical
items:―9―

Naoki ARAKI

regard to classification of parts of speech. For
Chomsky, parts of speech are physical and biologically encoded in genes, but for Saussure, they are notgrammatical reality but what is logical (we mistakeparts of speech for what is grammatical). Are partsof speech innate or just logical artifacts? It is unlikely that Saussure would accept Chomsky’s reality ofparts of speech because he thinks that parts of speech
are logic and imposed on grammar. After all, for
Saussure, a langue is concerned with only words(signes). So parts of speech are not involved in alangue but in logic as he suggests. On the other
hand, for Chomsky, an I-language is concerned withword order, or syntax. So the distinction of“parts ofspeech”is closely linked with an I-language because
the distinction of“parts of speech”is indispensable
to word order, or syntax. So their difference in regard to“parts of speech”is due to that between their
key concept of language: langue and I-language.

presence of a transition zone would be surprising.
But language [langue] A is an aggregate of dialectsinternally related, while language [langue] B is likewise an aggregate of dialects. Everything is transitional from one end of the area to the other. 2) In theschema I have just presented, I assumed dialects to
be closed; but ultimately there are only dialects open
on all sides, formed by the succession of waves inwhich they participate. We must not imagine there
are boundaries between language [langue] A and language [langue] B.
(Saussure 1993: 31a)
For Saussure, a langue is a continuum with noboundaries between langues. Chomsky insists thatan I-language, which is acquired after the values ofparameters of UG are set one way or another, is theobject of linguistics because a language, which iscalled an E-language by Chomsky, has a vague sociopolitical factors. On the other hand, Saussure
does not admit the boundaries of languages [langues]at all. But there are boundaries between I-languages
because each I-language is the consequences of aparticular parameter-setting of UG. I-languages aredifferent from one another in the values of parameters. But langues have no boundaries between themselves. So is it impossible that Chomsky’s I-language and Saussure ’s langue can be reconciled?
When Chomsky asserts that the term“language”involves obscure sociopolitical factors, he refers to Elanguage as language. So for Chomsky, I-language
does not involve any obscure sociopolitical factors at
all, but it is a clear and scientiﬁc object of linguistics.
On the other hand, for Saussure, there are no boundaries between langues. So it follows that there are
no boundaries whatever between paroles, which arenothing but executions of langues. That is to say, for
Saussure, there are no boundaries both between
langues and between paroles. Saussure and Chomsky agree that the term“language”(E-language) involves obscure sociopolitical factors and there are noboundaries between paroles, which are execution of
langues. But they do not agree that an I-language isa delimited entity deﬁned by the values of parameters of UG but that there are no boundaries whatever
between langues, which are thought to be equivalent
to I-languages in Chomsky’s framework. After all,can’t we reconcile these two theses: 1) Saussure’s

7. Is langue or I-language delimited?
7. 1. I-language is delimited

According to Chomsky, the term“language”involves obscure sociopolitical factors:
We speak of Chinese as a language, whereas
Spanish, Catalan, Portuguese, Italian, and the other
Romance languages are different languages. But theso-called dialects of Chinese are as varied as the Romance languages. We call Dutch a language andGerman a different language, but the variety of German spoken near the Dutch border can be understoodby speakers of Dutch who live nearby, though not by
speakers of German in more remote areas.
(Chomsky 1988: 37)
So Chomsky asserts that the term“language”is
not useful in linguistics because of its sociopoliticalfactors.
7.2. Langue is not delimited

On the other hand, according to Saussure, there
are no boundaries between langues:
On the same principle by which languages[langues] are divided into dialects, there are no precise boundaries between languages [langues ]. 1)
Supposing there were a uniform language [langue] A
and an equally uniform language [langue] B, the― 10 ―

Saussure and Chomsky

thesis that there are no boundaries at all between
langues; and 2) Chomsky’s thesis that I-languages
are delimited entities, which can be studied in thescientiﬁc framework as in other domains of naturalsciences? For Saussure, a langue is, after all, theconsequences of how the world, which is a continuum according to him, is split into a certain pattern,which is a langue itself. So there could be overlaps
between langues, which are not the same as one another. That’s why Saussure says that there is noboundaries between langues. On the other hand, for
Chomsky, E-languages, considered as something social, do not have any inherent boundaries between
themselves as Saussure asserts, but I-languages, considered as consequences of parameter-settings of
UG, have a deﬁnite boundaries between themselves.
This difference may be also based on that of theirviews of language: langue and I-language.

been uniﬁed into one grand theory so far, just as thetheory of relativity and the quantum theory have not.
Will these two thoughts be reconciled some day? Or
will one of the two give way to the other?

References
Chomsky, Noam. Rules and Representations. Columbia
University Press. 1980.
Chomsky, Noam. Knowledge of Language: Its Nature,
Origin, and Use. Praeger. 1986.

Chomsky, Noam. Language and Problems of Knowledge.
The MIT Press. 1988.
Miura, Tsutomu. Theory of Cognition and Language: Part
1. Keisoshobo. 1967. (in Japanese)

Sampson, Geoffrey. Schools of Linguistics . Stanford
University Press. 1980.
Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics(edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye withthe collaboration of Albert Riedlinger, translated andConclusion

annotated by Roy Harris). Duckworth. 1983.

We have considered Saussure’s and Chomsky’s
views of languages. What underlies their differencesis their fundamental idea of languages. Saussure insists that languages are a social fact while Chomsky
asserts that languages are biological. Their different
views of language come from these basic standpoints. Although Saussure and Chomsky have had agreat impact on linguistics and other ﬁelds of sciences as well, their thoughts on language have never

Saussure, Ferdinand de. Troisieme Cours de Linguistique
General (1910-1911) d’après les cahiers d’Emile
Constantin (Saussure’ s Third Course of Lectures on
General Linguistics (1910-1911) From the notebooksof Emile Constantin, French text edited by Eisuke
Komatsu, English translation by Roy Harris) .

Pergamon Press. 1993.
Trask, R.L. Language and Linguistics, the Key Concepts.
2nd edition. Routledge. 2007.

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