Conflict Quarterly

Marshal Ogarkov on theModern Theater Operation
by
Mary C. FitzGerald
INTRODUCTION
Since his appointment as Chief of the General Staff in 1977, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov has emerged as perhaps the most controversial ofprominent Soviet military figures. Throughout his writings, Ogarkov has
continued to contrast the stability of conventional conflict with the innate instability of nuclear warfare. Yet some Western analysts persist in
depicting him as the last of the nuclear war-wagers,1 and pit him against
a more "conciliatory" politico-military leadership.2 With the announcement of his transfer to other duties in early September 1984, the case wasthought to be closed. However, the April 1985 publication by Voyenizdat
of his new book, History Teaches Vigilance, (hereafter cited as History)
propelled the enigmatic marshal once again to center stage. The 1985
History reveals that the former Chief of the Soviet General Staff has
firmly reinforced his recurrent message: the altered military utility of
nuclear weapons and the qualitatively new combat characteristics of conventional means require that the forms and methods of combat action beadapted accordingly. His modern theater operation may indeed reflect arevolutionized Soviet military science, and his own activities since
September 1984 may mark its formal debut.
A review of Ogarkov's writings indicates that he has long been theprophet of a phenomenon that General William Odom recently dubbed"the third revolution" in Soviet military affairs.3 According to Odom,
the third revolution involves changes in Soviet doctrine generated by theso-called emerging technologies and the trend towards new, non-nuclear
weapons. 4 Perhaps not coincidentally, a ground-breaking book by ColGen. M.A. Gareyev, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, added clout tothe Ogarkov position in January 1985. Gareyev argued that while
Sokolovskiy's classic Military Strategy was generally valid for its time,"given the appearance of nuclear-missile weapons," many of its central
propositions have become obsolete.5 Ogarkov is not alone among the top
Soviet military leadership in his military-strategic views,6 but he clearly
emerges at the vanguard of the new revolution in Soviet military affairs.
Having downgraded the military utility of nuclear weapons in theface of "Mutual Assured Destruction" (M.A.D.), Ogarkov then consistently describes limited nuclear options as impossible in practice andleading inevitably to " a catastrophe that can call into question the fate oflife itself on the whole earth.'" How then does the former Chief of theSoviet General Staff propose to fight a future war?
THE INDEPENDENT CONVENTIONAL OPTION
There is growing evidence that in 1977, coincidentally with L.I.
Brezhnev's address at Tula' and Ogarkov's elevation to Chief of the39

Summer 1986
General Staff, the Soviets adopted an independent conventional war option as a long-term development goal. One form of evidence comes from
Soviet writers themselves, who often exploit U.S. doctrine as a foil forpresent and projected Soviet doctrine. According to Marshal Ogarkov,
U.S. plans for a future war have included both nuclear and conventional
scenarios. In a 1981 article in Sovetskaya Rossiya, he charged that international imperialism counted "primarily on the use of nuclear
weapons."' His 1982 book, Always in Readiness to Defend theFatherland (hereafter cited as Always), again held that the imperialist
circles depend, primarily in modern war, "on nuclear-missile weapons
with their various modifications, including neutron weapons."10
Nevertheless, Ogarkov has consistently depicted the U.S. as moving
toward a greater reliance on conventional options, especially in terms ofthe duration and scope of future military action. In 1979, he wrote that
the U.S. entertained the possibility of protracted military action with theuse of conventional weapons only." In the 1982 Always, however, hepointed to a U.S. capability for waging a war with the use of conventional weapons only, in Europe and also "in the Near, Middle and Far
East, and all sea and ocean theaters of military action."12 In his 1985
History, Ogarkov repeated this scenario verbatim.'' He also introduced a
new U.S. capability to wage a protracted conventional war in any area of
the world that posed a threat to its vital interests.14 The 1985 book issignificant because, for the first time since 1979, Ogarkov's descriptionof U.S. doctrine does not include the recurrent charge that the U.S. isrelying primarily on nuclear weapons in their various modifications.
A review of Soviet military writings since 1977 indicates thatnumerous Soviet military figures likewise depict the U.S. as consistently
moving toward a protracted, general, conventional option.15 In the 1985
update of his earlier book on U.S. and NATO military strategy,
Gen.-Maj. R.G. Simonyan added the following types of wars to the inventory kept by Pentagon and NATO strategists: general conventional,
conventional war in a theater of war, and conventional war in a theaterof military action (TVD)." Col. V. Alekseyev included the same
U.S./NATO conventional options in a Red Star article that appeared on
the eve of the 27th Party Congress." Throughout the 1980s, in fact, themost prominent Soviet military spokesmen have warned that the Western
threat consists primarily in an all-conventional conflict in which major
strategic operations are successfully conducted within one or more TVDs
without recourse to nuclear weapons."
Another form of evidence for the Soviet conventional option comesfrom discussions on the "specific features" of a future war, including
the type of weaponry that will be employed. A review of Ogarkov's
writings indicates that since 1971, the former Chief of the General Staff
has been actively lobbying for a timely incorporation of the latest
technology into Soviet military theory and practice. As early as his 1971
article in Red Star, Ogarkov was already noting that "the fundamentallynew types of weapons and combat technology, combined with certain
other means, have now become the decisive means for conducting armed40Conflict Quarterly
combat."" After specifying both nuclear-missile weapons and other new
combat technology, Ogarkov stressed "how important it is to notice ingood time the shoots of what is new, ... and to persistently introduce
them into the practice of military affairs."
In a 1981 Kommunist article, Ogarkov contended that "[military
art has no right to lag behind the combat potential of the means of armed
combat, particularly at the present stage, when, on the basis of scientifictechnical progress, the main weapons systems change practically every
10-12 years."20 His 1982 Pravda article urges "timely introduction of thenecessary corrective measures into the accepted methods and forms of
combat action,"21 and in 1983 Ogarkov argued that "[i]nertia ofthought, and a stubborn, mechanical, unthinking attachment to the oldways are dangerous in present-day conditions."23 Later in 1983 heasserted that the emergence of "new means of armed combat requires the
improvement of existing forms of combat action ...," and that "bold experiments and solutions are necessary, even if this means discarding obsolete traditions, views, and propositions."23
In his 1984 "May Day" interview, Ogarkov cited Chernenko on theneed to "overcome all conservatism and stagnation,"24 and his 1985
History continues the theme. In the matter of modernizing military
theory and practice, he writes, "stagnation and a delayed re-structuringof views ... are fraught with the most severe consequences."25 The opinion is apparently widespread that Ogarkov was demoted precisely
because of his call for rapid incorporation of the latest technology into
Soviet military theory and practice. A review of Soviet writings from1977 to the present, however, reveals no evidence of a dispute between
Ogarkov and the rest of the military leadership on this issue.26
Throughout his writings, Ogarkov has focused increasingly on the
new conventional means. In 1978, he noted that scientific-technical progress had accelerated the improvement of conventional, classical meansof combat, and had "sharply increased their combat capabilities."27 In
an Izvestiya article in 1983, he explained that existing strategic as well as
operational and tactical means of armed combat were being improved
and new means created on the basis of the latest achievements in electronics and other technical sciences. In this context, he went on to statethat improve automated systems of command and control, and "highly
effective new conventional means of armed combat are being developedand introduced."2'
In a 1983 article in Red Star, Ogarkov equated the "new conventional means of warfare" with "precision weapons, reconnaissancestrike complexes, and weapons based on new physical principles."29 In
his 1984 interview in Red Star, Ogarkov maintained that "the development of conventional means of destruction ... is making many kinds ofweapons global."30 The ever-expanding range of conventional means
was facilitating the immediate involvement of an entire country in combat action, a phenomenon not possible in past wars. As a result, thezones of possible combat action were sharply expanding, as were the roleand importance of the war's "initial period" and its first operations.
41

Summer 1986
Marshal Ogarkov has consistently rounded out his discussions of
new weaponry by stressing its impact on military theory and practice. As
early as 1977, he wrote that incorporation of the latest weapons andtechnology by the troops and naval forces "invariably entails changes inmilitary art: in strategy, operational art and tactics, and the forms andmethods of combat action."31 This theme has remained consistent in his
writings.32 Ogarkov has been careful throughout to stress that the fundamental changes occurring in military theory and practice are the resultof two phenomena, the creation of nuclear weapons and "the upgradingof other types of weapons and technology ,..." 33 He also has taken pains
to indicate that these changes "are occurring at the present time in themeans of armed combat."34 Finally, Ogarkov has long focused a special
attention on "developing methods of combat action under conditions
where the opponent uses precision [conventional] combat complexes,
new means of reconnaissance and radioelectronic combat, andautomated systems of guiding weapons and commanding troops."35 The
following section will demonstrate that the new conventional weaponry
may have already transformed Soviet concepts of the modern theater
operation.

THE MODERN THEATER OPERATION
In his 1984 Red Star interview, Ogarkov emphasized that thequalitative leap in the development of conventional weapons inevitably
entails changes in the conduct of modern operations.36 As a result,military actions could be conducted with conventional means inqualitatively new and incomparably more destructive forms than before.
Writing in Foreign Military Review in June 1985, Gen.-Lt. I. Rudnev
agreed that the new precision conventional arms have triggered thedevelopment of new concepts for conducting operations in both continental and maritime TVDs.37 In fact, the major, officially-sanctioned
military works of the 1980s already provide evidence of a new, allconventional dimension in modern Soviet strategy for theater warfare.3'
In 1978, Gen.-Lt. M.M. Kir'yan authored an entry in the Soviet
Military Encyclopedia that stressed the role of nuclear weapons in themodern combat operation.39 In his 1982 book on scientific-technical progress and the Soviet Armed Forces, however, Kir'yan wrote that strategic
operations "can be conducted both with and without the use of nuclear
weapons."40 Though the 1978 encyclopedia entry focused on nuclear
weapons, the same entry in the 1983 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary,edited by Ogarkov, contains no reference to the use of nuclear weapons
in the modern operation.41 The 1983 edition also includes a sentence inthe entry on "Military Strategy" that was not included in the corresponding, 1979 entry: "Achieving the objectives of the operation is possible... in the context of both conventional and nuclear weapons use."42
A review of Marshal Ogarkov's writings reveals that while he has
discussed the modern theater operation on several occasions,43 his 1985
History may well contain the first public description of the new, allconventional dimension in Soviet theater strategy. The point of42

Conflict Quarterly

departure for this interpretation is found in Figure 1, which compares
Ogarkov's 1982 and 1985 versions of the modern theater operation.
Perhaps the most telling difference between Ogarkov's 1982 and1985 theater operations is his treatment of the strategic nuclear forces. In
1982, Ogarkov told the reader that the supreme military leadership could
substantially influence the achievement of the war's objectives with thehelp of the strategic nuclear forces. In 1985, however, Ogarkov apparently removed the strategic nuclear forces from the modern theater
operation. At the same time, he expanded the role of the supreme
military leadership to that of directly and decisively influencing thecourse and outcome of the war. Here it should be noted that this particular formula was last used in the second half of the 1960s to describe
the impact of massive nuclear strikes on the course and outcome of afuture war. Along with other Soviet military writers, however, Ogarkov
himself may have already provided certain clues that could explain both
the removal of the strategic nuclear forces from the theater operationand the resurrection of the course-and-outcome formula.
In his landmark 1981 Kommunist article, Ogarkov removed theStrategic Missile Troops from the normal rank ordering of the branchesof the Soviet Armed Forces: "The first element of the combat might of
the Soviet Armed Forces is the strategic nuclear forces, which serve as thebasic factor for deterring the aggressor, and have the capability to immediately deliver an annihilating retaliatory strike if strategic nuclear
weapons are used against the Soviet Union and the other countries of thesocialist community."44
In History he not only refers to the strategic nuclear forces of the
U.S., but also introduces a Russian acronym for these forces:"S.Ya.S." 45 At the very least, one could infer from this that the"strategic nuclear forces" will be around on a regular basis. It should be
noted, however, that this appellation isnever followed by the words "ofthe Armed Forces," the standard Soviet formula for designating abranch of the Soviet Armed Forces. It should also be noted that in
Always, Ogarkov made a statement unprecedented for Soviet military
thought, explaining that Ground Troops "are, in essence, the basic
branch of our Armed Forces."46
In his 1979 entry on the "Strategic Operation" in the Soviet Military
Encyclopedia (edited by Ogarkov), M.I. Cherednichenko wrote that in
the context of nuclear weapons use, the strategic nuclear forces "are required" for the conduct of a strategic operation in a continental TVD.47
The same entry in the 1983 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (also editedby Ogarkov) reiterates that the strategic nuclear forces "are required"for the conduct of a strategic operation in a continental TVD.47 In lightof the foregoing, Ogarkov's 1985 removal of the word "strategic" from"strategic operation" may further indicate that his theater operation
does not involve the strategic nuclear forces.
Comparisons of other encyclopedia entries likewise point to thediminishing role of the strategic nuclear forces in the modern theater
operation. The 1979 edition of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia defined43Summer 1986
FIGURE 1
C O M P A R I S O N O F O G A R K O V ' S 1982 A N D 1985
THEATER OPERATIONS
1982

1985

At the present time there can beat the disposal of a command offronts means of destruction (missilearmed aviation, aviation with a greatradius of action and other things), thecombat potential of which alreadysignificantly exceeds the framework offront operations. Troop mobility andmaneuverability have grown sharply;
the periods for concentrating strikegroupings have been reduced; the conditions and m e t h o d s for accomplishing operational and strategictasks by tactical and operational formations of the branches of the armed
forces have changed. And with thecreation of the strategic nuclear
forces, the supreme military leadership has acquired a potential for
substantially influencing the attainment of the war's strategic andmilitary policy objectives. As a result,the old forms for employing tacticaland operational formations of branches of the armed forces have in many
respects already ceased to correspondto present-day conditions.

At p r e s e n t , the c o m b a t
capabilities of troops, aviation, andthe fleet, the long range of their
weapons, and their maneuverability
have grown sharply. The periods forconcentrating strike groupings andreplenishing materiel have been reduced, and the conditions and methods
for accomplishing operational andstrategic tasks by the tactical andoperational formations of branches of
the armed forces have changed. Given
this, the supreme military leadershiphas acquired a potential for directly
and decisively influencing the course
and outcome of a war. As a result, theold forms for employing tactical andoperational formations of branches of
the armed forces have in many
respects already ceased to correspondto present-day conditions. Because ofthis, it is necessary to view the basic
operation as apparently no longer thefront operation, and not even an
operation by a group of fronts, but aform of military action on a more
modern, improved, and greater scale:the operation in a theater of military
action. In the course of such an operation two or more front (fleet) operations can be conducted successively byeach front (fleet), with or even
without short pauses between them.**

Because of this, it is necessary toview the basic operation of a modern
war as apparently no longer the front
operation, but a form of military action on a greater scale: the strategic
operation in a theater of military action. In the course of such an operation, two or more front operations
can be carried out successively, withor even without short pauses between
them, by each front (fleet).** Always, pp. 34-35.

* History, p. 47.

44

Conflict Quarterly"strategic arms" as "various types of nuclear-missile weapons ... designed for accomplishing strategic tasks in war."49 The 1983 Military Encylopedic Dictionary, however, defines "strategic arms" as "various
types of weapons ... designed for accomplishing strategic tasks inwar."50 The 1979 entry for "strategic forces" (a "foreign term" describing those systems earmarked for a general nuclear war) states that the
U.S., Britain, and France devote primary attention to their strategic offensive forces, which they view as the most important component of theirarmed forces." The 1983 entry, however, contains no such statement.52
In discussing the Marxist-Leninist dialectic of arms development inHistory, Ogarkov himself made a ground-breaking statement that may
well bear on his removal of the strategic nuclear forces from the modern
theater operation. Prior to 1985, Ogarkov's writings had consistently
echoed the mainstream Soviet line on this dialectic: the ineluctabledevelopment of nuclear weapons has led to a situation wherein the struggle between the offense and the defense will be tilted in favor of offensive
weapons.53 In his 1978 Kommunist article, he explained that:the history of wars convincingly testifies ... to the constant contradiction between the means of attack anddefense. The appearance of new means of attack has
always [inevitably] led to the creation of correspondingmeans of counter-action, and this in the final analysis
has led to the development of new methods for conducting engagements, battles, and operations [and the war
in general]. This also applies fully to nuclear-missile
weapons, whose rapid development stimulated militaryscientific theory and practice to actively develop means
and methods of counter-action. The appearance ofmeans of defense against weapons of mass destruction
in turn prompted the improvement of nuclear-missilemeans of attack. "The foregoing passage was repeated verbatim in Ogarkov's 1982
Always, with the addition of the words in brackets.55 In History,
however, Ogarkov made several significant changes in his standard
discussion of this dialectical law. First, the sentences that are italicized
above did not appear in History. Second, he added a discussion that had
never appeared before. World War I, he said, had led to a situation
wherein the defense proved to be a stronger than the offense. In thecourse of World War II, however, a new contradiction arose: the meansof offense proved to be stronger than the means of defense. As a result,during the war and especially in the post-war period, "means of defense
were developed at an accelerated rate ... whose skillful use at a certain
stage balanced the means of offense and defense to some degree."56
By excising the italicized sentences of 1978 and 1982, and replacing
them with the notion of a "balance" in the means of offense and defense
in 1985, Ogarkov may be affirming that he sees no military utility in thefurther "improvement of nuclear-missile means of attack."57 This is supported by the fact that in the new book, he specifically excised a sentence45Summer 1986
that had always appeared in his previous discussions of the law of unityand struggle of opposites: "This [the law] applies fully to nuclear-missile
weapons ...."If Ogarkov's unprecedented "balance" in nuclear means of offense
and defense points to a neutralization of nuclear weapons in general,then one must look elsewhere for the weapons that will give the supreme
military leadership the capacity for directly and decisively influencing
both the course and outcome of a future war. Throughout the 1980s,
Ogarkov and other military thinkers have provided evidence of an allconventional Soviet theater operation in their discussions of emerging
military technologies, of the initial period of a future war, and of the factors influencing the course and outcome of a future war.
EMERGING MILITARY TECHNOLOGIESOgarkov has not mentioned nuclear weapons in the arms inventoriesof the other branches since his 1981 introduction of the "strategic
nuclear forces" as the first element of the USSR's combat might, a practice not generally followed by all Soviet writers. While this is also true of
his 1983 article in Red Star, Ogarkov there directs special attention to the
new types of precision weapons and microcircuitry with which the otherbranches are increasingly being equipped." Again in 1983 he writes that"the creation of non-nuclear means of armed combat with great destructive force ... is sharply changing the nature of war, the methods of
unleashing it, and its possible consequences."" General Odom has written specifically that the stimuli for Ogarkov's 1982 multi-front operation
in a TVD were the new conventional technologies, and that "the trend in
the West toward new, non-nuclear weapons has been underway for morethan a decade." 60 In light of his recurrent discussions of the significantly
qualitative improvements in range, destructiveness, and effectiveness ofthe new conventional means, Ogarkov may well be saying that conventional weapons outfitted with smart technology are capable of exerting a
direct and decisive influence on the course and even the outcome of afuture war.
Writing in Foreign Military Review in 1984, Col. F. Dmitriyev explained that in the U.S. and NATO, tactical and operational-tacticalguided, non-nuclear weapons have been designated as "precision"
weapons. 61 Throughout the 1980s, numerous Soviet military thinkers
have equated the combat characteristics of these new precision means
with those of nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons. In the 1984
Red Star interview, Marshal Ogarkov stated that the new developments
in conventional weapons were making them as effective as weapons ofmass destruction. 62 In History, he wrote that conventional weapons areapproximating nuclear "in terms of their combat characteristics and effectiveness."63 As early as 1980, in fact, Gen.-Maj. V. Makarevskiy
noted that "foreign military specialists" planned to use the new conventional means to accomplish many combat tasks that were formerly
assigned to tactical nuclear weapons.64
Writing in Red Star in early 1984, Gen.-Lt. M. Proskurin included46

Conflict Quarterly
cruise missiles and reconnaissance-strike complexes among the precision
conventional means, whose destructive power likewise approximatedthat of tactical nuclear weapons.65 Later, in 1984, Gen.-Maj. F. Gontar'
warned that the U.S. planned to develop precision ballistic and cruise
missiles armed with conventional warheads, which approximated lowyield nuclear weapons in their destructive capacity.66 Writing in Red Starin 1986, V. Kuznetsov asserted that the precision conventional means
had the combat effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons, and that they
did not produce the same radioactive contamination of the ground.67
Among others, Marshal Kulikov has also equated the combat effectiveness of precision conventional means with that of tactical nuclear
weapons.68
Other Soviet military thinkers have described the new conventional
means in terms of a potential strategic significance. Writing in Red Starin late 1982, Gen.-Maj. V. Makarevskiy noted that with the help of
operational-tactical and cruise missiles, the new conventional means
could have the same ranges as [unspecified] nuclear weapons.69 With thehelp of long-range missiles, he reiterated in early 1984, the new precision
munitions could cover the same distances as [unspecified] nuclear
weapons.70 Marshal Petrov argued in 1983 that the new conventional
means could accomplish certain tasks that were formerly assigned to[unspecified] nuclear arms.71 In a 1983 Red Star article that discussed the
Air-Land Battle, Col. L. Semeyko was even more explicit concerning thepotential strategic significance of the new conventional means. The U.S.
planned to develop conventional armed forces, he warned, that werecapable of directly threatening the territory of the Soviet Union. 72 In a
1984 Red Star article entitled "Modern Weapons and Tactics,"
Gen.-Maj. I. Vorob'yev explained that precision conventional means
were changing the face of modern warfare, and could now be usedagainst the entire depth of the opponent's combat dispositions.73 In themonth of the 27th Party Congress, Gen.-Maj. V. Makarevskiy stated in
Red Star that precision conventional weapons could have a significant
operational "and even strategic effect."74
Especially in the context of the Air-Land Battle and "Rogers Plan,"numerous Soviet military writers have focused specifically on theenhanced combat potential of ballistic and cruise missiles that are conventionally armed.73 In a 1983 Red Star article, Gen.-Lt. M. Proskurinreferred to "Pershing-2s" and ground-, air-, and sea-launched cruise
missiles armed with conventional warheads,76 and repeated the referencein late 1985.77 (It should be noted that, to date, the U.S. has neither"Pershing-2s" nor ground- and air-launched cruise missiles that are conventionally armed.) Gen.-Maj. F. Gontar' has written that the U.S. andNATO intend to use non-nuclear cruise and ballistic missiles against
nuclear targets and nuclear-missile means of the USSR.78 Writing in Red
Star in 1985, Col. A. Drozhzhin added "Minutemen" missiles to the projected U.S. inventory of non-nuclear weapons in Europe.79 Both
Gen.-Lt. Proskurin80 and Gen.-Maj. Marakevskiy81 have alleged that the
U.S. was planning to use existing and projected tactical and strategic
aviation to deliver precision conventional munitions. In addition,
47

Summer 1986
Makarevskiy has written that conventional medium-range missiles haveranges of up to 2,500 km.82
Writing in Foreign Military Review in June 1985, Gen.-Lt. I.
Rudnev discussed the wide-scale equipping of the U.S. Navy withmedium- and long-range cruise missiles armed with conventional
warheads. According to Rudnev, this development involves certainchanges in the organization and conduct of maritime operations because
the new systems can hit surface objectives at distances of over 500 km,
and coastal targets up to 1300 km away.83 This development, he continued, will significantly enhance the Navy's ability to conduct effective,
mobile, and active combat actions in sea and ocean theaters. The equipping of U.S. ships with the latest precision conventional means will
substantially increase their air defense capabilities in combat with the opponent's aviation and cruise missiles.
Here it should be mentioned that when Marshal Ogarkov publishedhis revised, 1985 description of the modern Soviet theater operations,Moscow had already deployed its first precision, enhanced-range, dualcapable missiles in Eastern Europe. As Dennis Gormley noted in the fallof 1985, improvements in missile accuracy and conventional warhead effectiveness of these SRBMs "foreshadow the capacity to furnish conventional solutions for nuclear problems."84 As indicated above, Soviet
military thinkers confirm that emerging conventional technologies now
approach nuclear means in terms of their strategic potential.
INITIAL PERIOD OF A FUTURE WAR
The role of a war's "initial period" has changed over time in Soviet
military thought. In the first half of the 1960s, the initial period of afuture war consisted of massive nuclear strikes and was said to be
decisive for the course and outcome of that war.85 Coincidentally with
the U.S. adoption of the Air-Land Battle, however, Soviet military
writers began to link the importance of a future war's initial period withthe combat characteristics of the new precision conventional means.
In his 1983 Izvestiya article, Marshal Ogarkov contended that
because the aggressor could use new means and methods of armed combat in a future war, combat tasks would be accomplished differently atthe outset of the war. This would, in turn, give rise to the special role andimportance of the war's initial period in present-day conditions. The
new, precision, conventional, "operational-tactical and strategic means"would predetermine the operations of the war's initial period which, as
the experience of local wars shows, could have a "decisive
importance."86 In his 1984 Red Star interview, Ogarkov reiterated thatthe role and importance of the war's initial period was growing incomparably as a result of the combat characteristics of precision conventional means.87
Especially in the context of the Air-Land Battle, many prominent
Soviet military figures have characterized the operations of the war's initial period as involving the new conventional means without recourse tonuclear weapons.88 Like Ogarkov, they have also stressed the growing
48

Conflict Quarterlyrole and importance of the initial period in present-day conditions.
Writing in Red Star in January" and November ,0 of 1984, Gen.-Lt. Proskurin explained that the essence of the Air-Land Battle consisted inachieving "decisive success" in the operations of the war's initial period.
Also writing in 1984, Marshal Kulikov linked the achievement of"decisive success" in the initial period with both the Air-Land Battle andthe "Rogers P l a n . " " Kulikov wrote elsewhere that the essence of the"Rogers Plan" consisted of combat action in the initial period thatwould inflict a "crushing defeat" on the opponent's armed forces
without using nuclear weapons.92 Among others, Gen.-Lt. Proskurin hasreiterated this description of a future war's initial period.' 3
The writers mentioned above have not actually stated that, like thenuclear initial period of the early 1960s, the new, conventional initialperiod could decisively influence the course and outcome of a future war.
However, in the context of conventional weapons use, the war's initialperiod has rarely if ever been described as a period of a "decisive
success,"" 1 or as an operational period that could inflict a "crushingdefeat" on the opponent's armed forces. The customary Soviet formulafor past (conventional) wars held that the initial period consisted ofoperations for achieving the war's "immediate" strategic objectives:
defeating the troops of the first strategic echelon and creating conditions
for a victorious termination of the war." Yet, Soviet military writers who
have discussed the Air-Land Battle consistently state that precision conventional means can be used to defeat the opponent's first, second, third,
and rear echelons in the initial period of a future war.' 6 While thesewriters may not have used the 1960s (nuclear) formula of decisive influence on the course and outcome of the war, they clearly envisioned an
unprecedented role for the conventional initial period of a future war.
In November 1985, Gen.-Lt. A.I. Yevseyev published an article in
the Military-historical Journal that discussed changes in the content andcharacter of the war's initial period. After describing the initial period of
the two world wars in terms of the customary Soviet formula, he thenmade a statement unprecedented for Soviet military thought. In contrast
to past wars, he wrote, "the main content of the initial period in presentday conditions can be the delivery by the belligérants of nuclear strikes or
strikes with conventional means of destruction ... for achieving the war's
main objectives." 97 Elsewhere in the article he noted that because the
new means of destruction facilitate the achievement of immediate
strategic objectives at a vastly accelerated rate in comparison with WorldWar II, the initial period of a future war will be much shorter. Consequently, military actions in the initial period will differ substantially inscope in comparison with past wars. This, he continues, need not apply
only to a nuclear war; the Air-Land Battle envisages decisive actions to adepth that encompasses the territory of an entire country at once."
Yevseyev's statement is unique because the initial period of a war
has rarely if ever been seen as^a time to achieve the war's main objectives.
Yevseyev does revert to the customary formula when he states that the initial period can achieve the war's immediate objectives which, in past49

Summer 1986

wars, included defeating the troops of the first strategic echelon. Like
Ogarkov and the others, however, Yevseyev states that the non-nuclear
means earmarked for the Air-Land Battle can involve the territory of an
entire country at once — that is, the opponent's first, second, third, andrear echelons simultaneously. As Ogarkov wrote in 1984, the enhanced
range of precision conventional means facilitates the immediate involvement of an entire country in combat action, a phenomenon not possible
in past wars."
In light of the new combat characteristics of conventional means,the old immediate objective of defeating the first strategic echelon would
seem to belong to history. If, on the other hand, the war's immediate objectives now include the simultaneous defeat of all echelons, then this
could be termed a main objective as well. Yevseyev's own description
supports the latter interpretation: the war's main objectives can now be
achieved with either nuclear strikes or strikes by conventional weapons
alone. Soviet military thought could not have acknowledged more explicitly the potential of conventional weapons to solve nuclear problems
in a future war.
COURSE AND OUTCOME OF A FUTURE WAR
Over the years, changes in Soviet doctrine have often been revealed
through changes in standard Soviet formulae. Critical among these inSoviet military thought is the course-and-outcome formula, or those factors that are said to influence the course and outcome of a future war.
While the war's initial period (of nuclear strikes) was said to be decisivein the first half of the 1960s, massive nuclear strikes became decisive forthe war's course and outcome in the second half of the 1960s.100 Until
Ogarkov's 1985 description of the theater operation, in fact, the only
other factors to be termed decisive for the course and outcome of a war
were the "permanently operating factors" of pre-nuclear warfare.
In Always, Ogarkov's description of the theater operation contained
the following statement: "And with the creation of the strategic nuclear
forces, the supreme military leadership has acquired a potential for
substantially influencing the achievement of the war's strategic andmilitary policy objectives."101 In light of the fact that nuclear weapons
were said to exert a decisive influence on the course and outcome of thewar in the 1960s, Ogarkov clearly downgraded their influence in 1982.
Elsewhere in the same book, however, he does rely on the course-andoutcome formula.
First, he asserts that the scientific-technical revolution is exerting anever-growing influence on the development of military affairs and on thedesign of new methods and forms of conducting combat actions. Second, the pace of development of military technology and weaponry is
accelerating, thus affecting the pace of development in military affairs asa whole. Third, "the importance of strategic means of waging war —which are now capable of directly influencing its course and outcome —is growing, and so is the importance of operational-strategic organs ofcommand and control,"102 though it should be noted that operational50

Conflict Quarterly

strategic organs of command and control would not have stategic nuclear
means at their disposal. In addition, Ogarkov refers ambiguously to new
precision conventional means that can be "both strategic andoperational-tactical,"10' in his 1983 Izvestiya article.
Finally, in History, Ogarkov used the course-and-outcome formula
to describe the modern theater operation: "Given this,104 the supreme
military leadership has acquired a potential for directly and decisively influencing the course and outcome of a war."103 Ogarkov has clearly
reduced the influence of the strategic nuclear forces in 1982, and removes
them altogether from the theater operation in 1985, although in 1985, thesupreme military leadership controls weapons which, like the massive
nuclear strikes of the 1960s, can directly and decisively influence thecourse and outcome of the war. Perhaps the final key to Ogarkov's cryptic formula lies in another formula that has involved the course and outcome of a future war. As early as 1979, Gen.-Maj. R.G. Simonyan wrotethat the course and outcome of a war on the European continent would
depend on the course and outcome of combat actions in the Central
European TVD.106 There is no reason to believe that the situation is any
different today, and every reason to believe that in this context, at least,
the new, precision, conventional, strategic means could directly anddecisively influence the course and outcome of a future war.
Throughout his writings, Marshal Ogarkov has focused on both thediminishing military utility of nuclear weapons107 and the enhanced combat characteristics of precision conventional means. At the same time,
numerous Soviet military thinkers have acknowledged that the newweapons:
1) approximate the effectiveness of nuclear and other massdestruction weapons with less collateral damage;2) have ranges of up to 2,500 km;
3) are strategic means with a strategic effect; and4) can be used to achieve the war's immediate and main objectives,
including a simultaneous and crushing defeat of the opponent's
first, second, third, and rear echelons in a non-nuclear initialperiod.
As early as 1981, Foreign Military Review noted that during the"Autumn Forge-80" maneuvers, the NATO troops succeeded in accomplishing all of the tasks of a strategic operation "without resorting to
the use of nuclear weapons."10' Less than a year later, Gen.-Lt. M.M.
Kir'yan wrote that the U.S. does not exclude the conduct of combat action
using conventional weapons alone. "In this context," he continued,"Soviet military thought has developed the methods for conducting
military action both with and without the use of nuclear weapons."109 In
short, Marshal Ogarkov's modern theater operation stems directly frommainstream Soviet doctrine. As Red Star put it in 1984: "Modern conceptions of a non-nuclear war envisage reconciling the attainment of strategic
results using conventional weapons with the readiness to repel a nuclear attack."110 The Soviets have already deployed precision, dual-capablesystems in the Central European TVD, where the outcome of combat action will determine the outcome of a war on the European continent.
51

Summer 1986
THE NEW REVOLUTION IN SOVIET MILITARY ÄFFAIRSThe present study has indicated that, over the years, Marshal
Ogarkov has only intensified his unchanging message: the altered
military utility of nuclear weapons and significantly qualitative improvements in conventional means are changing the forms and methodsof combat action and the nature of war as a whole. While Ogarkov's
writings have been prophetic in this regard, they are not unique. In early
1985, Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev wrote that "the inevitability of a retaliatory nuclear strike and its catastrophic consequences" haveconvinced the probable opponent to concentrate on developing conventional weapons that are characterized by greater effectiveness in yield,
range, and accuracy. Methods of conducting military action with
automated, precision-guided conventional weapons are also being improved. Soviet military science has not ignored these trends, he continued, and "takes them into account in the training and command andcontrol of troops."" 1Col.-Gen. M.A. Gareyev wrote also in 1985 that "the upgrading
and stockpiling of nuclear-missile weapons have reached a point where
their mass use in war could issue in catastrophic consequences for bothsides." Under these conditions the West counts on fighting "a relatively
long war with conventional weapons and, above all, new types of precision weapons."" 2 In present-day conditions, he wrote elsewhere,
military science itself "must more actively determine the most important
directions for the development of weapons and technology ....'" 1 3Petersen and Hines wrote in 1983 that the Soviets had already expanded and adjusted the structure of their armed forces "to accommodate operational concepts that support the conventional offensive,"and that "the extent of these structural changes suggests that this latest
phase in the evolution of Soviet strategy is already quite mature."" 4
Along with Dennis Gormley," 5 Lt. Col. Kerry L. Hines published an article in late 1985 on the "conventional deep-strike mission" of Soviet
SRBMs." 6 The 1986 edition of Soviet Military Power confirms that withconventional warheads and guidance systems, Soviet long-range cruise
missiles "would pose a significant non-nuclear threat to U.S. and Eurasian airfields and nuclear weapons."" 7 Advances in warheadcapabilities, accuracy, and reliability are likewise expected in the Soviet
SRBM force. Combined-arms commanders would then have "enhanced
non-nuclear targeting options, and more flexible and survivable
SRBMs." 1 " The new generation of Soviet SRINF missiles can likewise
be employed effectively with conventional warheads, which will give theSoviets " a formidable conventional deep-strike system." 1 "In his 1985 discussion of the law of unity and struggle of opposites,
Marshal Ogarkov added a passage that had never appeared in his earlier
treatments of this law. In it he emphasized that in present-day conditions, "when an active replacement of one generation of weapons withanother is taking place," it is extremely important that military cadresexamine all aspects of the development in military affairs from all
sides.120 When considered in the context of his ever-increasing focus on52

Conflict Quarterly
the new conventional means, this other generation of weapons mostprobably refers to conventional weapons outfitted with the emerging
technologies.
In Always, Ogarkov used even more provocative language todescribe the new developments in military affairs: "A profound andrevolutionary — in the full sense of the word — perevorot["revolution," "turn-about," "upheaval"] in military affairs is occurring in our time ....'" 21 He connected this revolution with the creation of
nuclear weapons, the rapid development of electronics, the developmentof weapons based on new physical principles, and the far-ranging
qualitative upgrading of conventional means of armed combat. In
History, he contended that this "profound and revolutionary — in thefull sense of the word — perevorot is continuing in our time ....'"" Herehe connected it with the further development and qualitative upgradingof nuclear weapons, the rapid development of electronics, and also withthe significantly qualitative upgrading of conventional means andmethods of armed combat. These factors are, in turn, exerting an influence primarily on the development and improvement of the forms andmethods of combat action, the organizational structure of troops andnaval forces, and the improvement of command-and-control systems
and organs.
Few members of the top military leadership have used the strong
verbiage used by Ogarkov to describe current developments in Soviet
military affairs. In 1984, Marshal Kulikov wrote simply that "the introduction of new weapons generates changes even in the methods ofconducting combat actions and operations."123 While Gorshkov referredto the "qualitative leap in the development of the material base,"124 herefrained from further comment, choosing not to specify whether
nuclear or conventional weapons were involved. Other Soviet military
figures, however, have cited their Western counterparts as stating thatthe improved conventional means "have brought military technology to
the threshold of a real revolution in the sphere of conventional arms."125
Marshal Ogarkov thus emerges as the most vocal proponent of the
new revolution in Soviet military affairs. Indeed, in both his 1982 and1985 books, Ogarkov has connected the "revolutionary ...perevorot" inmilitary affairs with the qualitative upgrading of nuclear and conventional arms. In his 1985 article in the Military-historical Journal,
Col.-Gen. M.A. Gareyev clearly echoes Ogarkov when he writes that"[w]e may now speak of a turning point in the development of militaryscience ...."•" This he connects "especially with the appearance inNATO countries of new types of precision conventional weapons." Inview of this, it is necessary to re-think the fundamental military-strategic
problems of defending the socialist Fatherland. To continue the chain of
events, Ogarkov warns, in History, that delayed "re-structuring ofviews" is fraught with the most severe consequences.127
In his 1984 Red Star interview and again in his post-transfer article
in Kommunist of the Armed Forces, Ogarkov wrote that one need not bea military man to understand that the further expansion of nuclear
53

Summer 1986

arsenals is senseless.1" In History, he reiterated that the nuclear weapons
stockpiled in the world today "are indeed absurd from a military pointof view."129 In this light it is extremely significant that the following
statements were both made in 1985:
Subsequently, in the 70s and 80s, the rapid quantitative
growth of nuclear weapons ... led ... to a break inprevious views on their role and importance in war ...
and even on the possibility of waging war at all with theuse of nuclear weapons.130
There is even greater irony in seeing military force
developers, through their efforts to make nuclear
weapons practical for tactical and operational use,
become proponents of more limited and controlled use
and perhaps even nonuse of nuclear weapons.111
Indeed, one need not be a military man to see here the convergenceof U.S.-Soviet military thought on the diminishing utility of nuclear
weapons.
CONCLUSION
When the Soviets accepted M.A.D. as a present-day reality, theSoviet debate on the viability of nuclear war as an instrument of policy
reached a consensus: nuclear war is so unpromising and dangerous that itremains an instrument of policy only in theory, an instrument of policythat cannot be used. A growing body of evidence indicates that in 1977,
coincidental with Ogarkov's elevation to Chief of the General Staff,
Moscow designated an independent conventional war option as its longterm military development goal.
Like Ogarkov, other Soviet writers have provided evidence of theconventional option, especially in their perceptions of the Western threat
and, specifically, of the Air-Land Battle and "Rogers Plan." By theirown admission, Soviet military science is being adapted to accommodate
operational concepts based on a large-scale incorporation of smart, nonnuclear weapons. At the same time, Western analysts are documenting
more and more changes in Soviet strategy, operational art, force structure, and weapons modernization that point clearly to a conventional
high-tech option. The conventional deep-strike mission for Soviet
SRBMs is a clear example of the growing reliance on enhanced «onnuclear options, especially as described in Marshal Ogarkov's modern
theater operation.

54

Conflict

Quarterly

Footnotes
1. For example, see Dan L. Strode and Rebecca V. Strode, "Diplomacy and Defense inSoviet National Security Policy," International Security, 8, no. 2 (Fall 1983), p. 92.
2. For example, see George C. Weickhardt, "Ustinov vs. Ogarkov," Problems of Communism (January-February, 1985), p. 78.
3. William E. Odom, "Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions," Problems ofCommunism (July-August, 1985), pp. 6-14.
4. Ibid., pp. 7-9.
5. Col.-Gen. M.A. Gareyev, M.V. Frunze—voyennyi teoretik (Moscow: Voyenizdat,1985), p. 239; see also pp. 240-241.
6. Mary C. FitzGerald, The New Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs (forthcoming,
Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc.).
7. MSU N.V. Ogarkov, History Teaches Vigilance (Istoriya uchit bditel'nosti) (Moscow:
Voyenizdat, 1985), p. 68.
8. L.I. Brezhnev, Speech, Pravda, January 19, 1977, p. 2.
9. MSU N.V. Ogarkov, "On Guard Over Peaceful Labor," Sovetskaya Rossiya,
February 22, 1981, p. 1.
10. MSU N.V. Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the Fatherland (Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite Otechestva) (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982), p. 47.
11. MSU N.V. Ogarkov, "Military Strategy," in MSU N.V. Ogarkov (ed.), Sovetskaya
Voyennaya Entsiklopediya [hereinafter cited as SVE\, vol. 7 (Moscow: Voyenizdat,1979), p. 563.
12. Ogarkov, Always, pp. 16-17.
13. Ogarkov, History, pp. 68-69.
14. Ibid., p. 67.
15. Mary C. FitzGerald, "Marshal Ogarkov on Modern War" (forthcoming, Defense
Analysis).
16. Gen.-Maj. R.G. Simonyan, The Real Danger: Imperialism's Military Blocs (Real'naya
opasnost': voyennyye bloki imperializma) (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1985), pp. 70-71.
17. Col. V. Alekseyev, " 'Conventional' Wars in the Plans of the Pentagon and NATO,"
Krasnaya zvezda (hereinafter cited as KZ), January 17, 1986, p. 3.
18. FitzGerald, New Revolution.
19. MSU N.V. Ogarkov, KZ, September 3, 1971.
20. MSU N.V. Ogarkov, "On Guard Over Peaceful Labor," Kommunist, no. 10 (1981),
p. 86.
21. MSU N.V. Ogarkov, "The Creative Thought of a Military Leader," Pravda, October
2, 1982, p. 3.
22. MSU N.V. Ogarkov, "The Victory and the Present," Izvestiya, May 9, 1983, p. 2.
23. MSU N.V. Ogarkov, "A Reliable Defense to Peace," KZ, September 23, 1983, p. 2.
24. MSU N.V. Ogarkov, "Defense of Socialism: The Experience of History and the Present," KZ, May 9, 1984, p. 3.
25. Ogarkov, History, p. 47.
26. Mary C. FitzGerald, "Marshal Ogarkov and the Soviet Politico-Military Leadership"(forthcoming, Soviet Union).
27. MSU N.V. Ogarkov, "Military Science and the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland,"
Kommunist, no. 7 (1978), p. 115.
28. Ogarkov, "Victory," p. 2.
29. Ogarkov, "Reliable Defense," p. 2.
30. Ogarkov, "Defense of Socialism," p. 3.
31. MSU N.V. Ogarkov, "Defense of the Socialist Fatherland is a Matter for All the People," KZ, October 27, 1977.

55

Summer1986

32. See the following by Ogarkov: "Military Science," p. I l l ; and "Military Strategy,"p. 556.
33. Ogarkov, "Military Strategy," p. 563.
34. Ogarkov, "Defense of Socialism," p. 3.
35. Ogarkov, "Reliable Defense," p. 2.
36. Ogarkov, "Defense of Socialism," p. 3.
37. Gen.-Lt. I. Rudnev, "The Aggressiveness of U.S. Military Doctrine is Growing,"
Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye, no. 6 (1985), p. 12.
38. FitzGerald, New Revolution.
39. M.M. Kir'yan, "Operation," in Ogarkov (ed.), SVE, vol. 6 (1978), p. 66.
40. M.M. Kir'yan (ed.), Military-Technical Progress and the Armed Forces of the USSR
(Voyenno-tekhnicheskiy progress i vooruzhennyye sily SSSR) (Moscow: Voyenizdat,1982), p. 315.
41. "Operation," in MSU N.V. Ogarkov (ed.), Voyennyi Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar'[hereafter cited as VES] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1983), p. 516.
42. Ibid., p. 712.
43. For example, see Ogarkov, "On Guard," Kommunist, p. 86.
44. Ibid., p. 87.
45. Ogarkov, History, p. 68.
46. Ogarkov, Always, p. 49.
47. M.I. Cherednichenko, "Strategic Operation," in Ogarkov (ed.), SVE, vol. 7 (1979),
pp. 551-552.
48. "Strategic Operation," in Ogarkov (ed.), VES, p. 710.
49. "Strategic Arms," in Ogarkov (ed.), SVE, vol. 7 (1979), pp. 552-553.
50. "Strategic Arms," in Ogarkov (ed.), VES, p. 710.
51. I.P. Korotchenko, "Strategic Forces," in Ogarkov (ed.), SVE, vol. 7 (1979), p. 554.
52. "Strategic Forces," in Ogarkov (ed.), VES, pp. 710-711.
53. Mary C. FitzGerald, Soviet Views on Nuclear War (forthcoming, Academic International Press).
54. Ogarkov, "Military Science," p. 117.
55. Ogarkov, Always, p. 36.
56. Ogarkov, History, p. 49.
57. I am indebted to Raymond L. Garthoff for this point.
58. MSU N.V. Ogarkov, "A Reliable Bastion of Socialism and Peace," KZ, February 23,
1983, p. 2.
59. Ogarkov, "Reliable Defense," p. 2.
60. Odom, "Soviet Force Posture," p. 7.
61. Col. F. Dmitriyev, "U.S. and NATO Precision Weapons," Zarubezhnoye voyennoye
obozreniye, no. 8 (1984), p. 7.
62. Ogarkov, "Defense of Socialism," p. 3.
63. Ogarkov, History, p. 24.
64. Gen.-Maj. V. Makarevskiy, "In Pursuit of 'Superweapons'," KZ, April 3, 1980, p. 3.
65. Gen.-Lt. M. Proskurin, "Yet Another Aggressive Concept," KZ, January 6, 1984,
p. 3.
66. Gen.-Maj. F. Gontar', "With a View to Aggression," KZ, December 15, 1984, p. 5.
67. V. Kuznetsov, "The Cart-horse and the Race-horse," KZ, January 31, 1986, p. 3.
68. MSU V. Kulikov, "Curbing the Arms Race," KZ, February 21, 1984, p. 3. See alsoGen.-Lt. M. Titov, "A Reliable Obstacle," KZ, September 3, 1983, p. 5; Capt. 2ndRank, V. Kuzar', "NATO — Alliance in the Name of Aggression," KZ, April 8,1984,
p. 3; and Admiral A. Sorokin, "Bastion of Militarism," Sovetskaya Rossiya,
December 21, 1984, p. 5.

56

Conflict
69.

QuarterlyGen.-Maj. V. Makarevskiy, "What Is Hidden Behind the 'Rogers Plan'," KZ,
November 23, 1982, p. 3.
70. Gen.-Maj. V. Makarevskiy, "They Call Them 'Conventional' ...," Izvestiya,
February 18, 1984, p. 5.
71. Col. V. Morozov, Interview with MSU V. Petrov, "Superiority ... Over Common
Sense," Sovetskaya Rossiya, December 1, 1983, p. 5.
72. Col. L. Semeyko, "In Pursuit of Superiority: The Dangerous Nature of the Development of U.S. Military Doctrine," KZ, August 5, 1983, p. 3.
73. Gen.-Maj. I. Vorob'yev, "Modern Weapons and Tactics," KZ, September 15, 1984,
p. 2.
74. Gen.-Maj. V. Makarevskiy, "A Pressing Need," KZ, February 21, 1986, p. 3.
75. Makarevskiy, "Rogers Plan," p. 3. See also Capt. 2nd Rank V. Kuzar', "NATO: A
Stake on Superiority," KZ, December 9, 1984, p. 3; and Kuznetsov, "Cart-horse,"
p. 3.
76. Gen.-Lt. M. Proskurin, "The Aggressive Essence of the 'Rogers Plan'," KZ, October
29, 1983, p. 5.
77. Gen.-Lt. M. Proskurin, "What Is Hidden Behind the 'Rogers Plan'," KZ, December
3, 1985, p. 3.
78. Gontar', "Aggression," p. 5.
79. Col. A. Drozhzhin, "The Burden of the Arms Race," KZ, July 19, 1985, p. 3.
80. Proskurin, "Aggressive Essence," p. 3.
81. Gen.-Maj. V. Makarevskiy, "In the Interests of Europe and the World," KZ, June24, 1986, p. 3.
82. Marakevskiy, "Pressing Need," p. 3.
83. Rudnev: "U.S. Military Doctrine," pp. 12-13.
84. Dennis M. Gormley, "A New Dimension to Soviet Theater Strategy," Orbis (Fall1985), p. 541.
85. I am indebted to James McConnell for this point.
86. Ogarkov, "Victory," p. 2.
87. Ogarkov, "Defense of Socialism," p. 3.
88. For example, see Proskurin, "Aggressive Essence," p. 5; Gontar', "Aggression," p.
5; and Makarevskiy, "Europe," p. 3.
89. Proskurin, "Aggressive Concept," p. 3.
90. Gen.-Lt. M. Proskurin, "Rehearsing for War," KZ, November 24, 1984, p. 5.
91. MSU V.G. Kulikov, "In the Name of Peace of Earth," Izvestiya, May 8, 1984, p. 2.
92. Kulikov, "Arms Race," p. 3.
93. Proskurin, "Aggressive Essence," p. 3.
94. For a possible exception, see Gen.-Lt. A.I. Yevseyev, "On Several Trends in the
Changing Content and Character of the War's Initial Period," Military-historical
Journal, no. 11 (1985), p. 14.
95. For example, see S.P. Ivanov and M.M. Kir'yan, "Initial Period of the War," inOgarkov (ed.), SVE, vol. 5 (1978), p. 558; and "Initial Period of the War," inOgarkov, (ed.), VES, p. 482.
96. For example, see Makarevskiy, "Europe," p. 3.
97. Yevseyev, "Initial Period," pp. 14-15.
98. Ibid., p. 18.
99. Ogarkov, "Defense of Socialism," p. 3.
100. I am indebted to James McConnell for this point.
101. Ogarkov, Always, pp. 34-35.
102. Ibid., p. 44.

57

Summer 1986
103. Ogarkov, "Victory," p. 2.
104. See the definitions of "pri" in B.M. Volin and D.N. Ushakov (ed.), Tolkovyislovar'
Russkovo yazyka, vol. HI (Moscow: 1939), p. 759, and A.O. Yevgen'yev (ed.),Slovar' Russkovo yazyka (2nd ed.), vol. Ill (Moscow: 1983), p. 388.
105. Ogarkov, History, p. 47.
106. Gen.-Maj. R.G. Simonyan, "The Aggressive Bloc's Main Bridgehead," KZ, July 27,
1979, p. 3.
107. FitzGerald, "Marshal Ogarkov on Modern War."108. Col. M. Vasil'chenko, "The 'Autumn Forge-80' NATO Maneuvers," Zarubezhnoye
voyennoye obozreniye, no. 4 (1981), p. 13.
109. Kir'yan Military-technical Progress, p. 313.
110. G. Kostev, "Cooperation of the Army and Navy," KZ, March 17, 1984, p. 2.
111. MSU S. Akhromeyev, "The Superiority of Soviet Military Science and Soviet Military
Art as One of the Most Important Factors of Victory in the Great Patriotic War,"
Kommunist, no. 3 (1985), p. 62.
112. Gareyev, Frunze, p. 240.
113. Col.-Gen. M.A. Gareyev, "The Creative Nature of Soviet Military Science in the
Great Patriotic War," Military-historical Journal, no. 7 (1985), p. 28.
114. Phillip A. Petersen and John G. Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet
Theater Strategy," Orbis (Fall 1983), p. 724.
115. Gormley, "New Dimension," pp. 537-569.
116. Lt. Col. Kerry L. Hines, "Soviet Short-range Ballistic Missiles," International
Defense Review, no. 12 (1985), pp. 1909-1914.
117. Soviet Military Power (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1986), p. 34.
118. Ibid., p. 39.
119. Ibid., p. 69.
120. Ogarkov, History, p. 49.
121. Ogarkov, Always, p. 31.
122. Ogarkov, History, p. 41.
123. MSU V.G. Kulikov, "On Guard Over Security," Sovetskaya Rossiya, May 13, 1984,
p. 5.
124. Fit. Adm. S.G. Gorshkov, "The Experience of the Great Patriotic War and the Current Stage of Development of the Naval Art," Morskoi sbornik, no. 4 (1985), p. 21.
125. Makarevskiy, " 'Superweapons'," p. 3.
126. Gareyev, "Soviet Military Science," p. 29.
127. Ogarkov, History, p. 47.
128. Ogarkov, "Defense of Socialism," p. 3, and Ogarkov, "The Unfading Glory ofSoviet Weapons," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, no. 21 (1984), p. 25.
129. Ogarkov, History, p. 88.
130. Ibid., p. 51.
131. Odom, "Soviet Force Posture, p. 12. I am indebted to William Kincade forhighlighting this covergence of U.S. and Soviet military minds.

58