THE ＧＬＯＢＡＬＩＺＡＴＩＯＮ ＆ ＧＯVＥＲＮＡＮＣＥ ＰＲＯＪＥCＴ， ＨＯＫＫＡＩＤＯ ＵＮＩＶＥＲＳＩＴＹＷＯＲＫＩＮＧ ＰＡＰＥＲ ＳＥＲＩＥＳThe Question of Japan s Right to Collective Defense
within Globalization and Empire
Ｖ−０８

Ｓｈｕｓｅｉ Ｔａｎａｋａ, Fukuyama University(Translated by Aaron Skabelund, Hokkaido University)＊

Transcript of the lecture for the Symposium Liberal Democracy in a Global &American Era, 7 February 2004．
＊

None of these papers should be cited without the author’s permission.

The Question of Japan’s Right to Collective Defense
within “Globalization and Empire”
Tanaka Shûsei

Good afternoon. It is an honor to be able to present my views today with this group ofeminent scholars.
Before I begin, I ask for your understanding on one point. Because of my current
affiliation at Fukuyama University, perhaps I should try to contribute to this debate as auniversity faculty member, but my current status is a bit like facial cosmetics.
Underneath this make-up, I am a politician, so it is from that perspective that I would liketo talk today. For that reason, I will speak from my own experiences, and rather thancomment about the opinions of others, I will put forward my own argument.
In addition, I ask for your indulgence on one other matter. I am not sure my remarks will
fit within the parameters of this symposium, but because this is a valuable opportunity, I
would like to say what I have prepared and leave it at that.

The Background to the Debate over the Constitution
I was very surprised when the leader of the Democratic Party, Kan Naoto, stated at the
party’s recent conference that the party would announce proposed revisions to theconstitution by 2006. I don’t think this decision was based on the opinion that theconstitution must be revised. Rather, because the debate within the government has beengetting lots of attention, Kan probably decided that if the Democratic Party did not join in
the debate then party members might start loose their confidence or that fissures within
the party might develop, and that eventually the party was going to have to face the issueof constitutional revision, so it might as well do so sooner than later. In other words, thiswas a preemptive attack for self-defense—or pragmatism on the part of Kan.
I don’t think that the existing constitution is perfect. I do think that someday it will need
to be revised, and that the opportunity will present itself eventually. Now is not the time.
A new constitution should not emerge until after a full-fledged debate about what theappropriate course for Japan is after the Cold War, about Japan’s proper position withininternational society, and about what kind of country Japan ought to be has taken place
and a consensus has emerged. Because the Democratic Party itself has not reached aconclusion about these important issues and not gained the trust of the public, it is notpossible for the party to contribute to constitutional revision, so now it not the time forthe party to be engaged in drafting such a proposal.
The reason that constitutional revision has become an issue is due to the realist demandsof the ruling government parties. These demands originate from the question of the“exercise of the right of collective self-defense.” For the government, this is a pressing
issue. If the Democratic Party joins this debate it will result in the opening of a Pandora’sbox, and the result will be inconclusive and result in an escape from the larger questions
facing Japan. If the debate proceeds without a debate and consensus about what path
Japan should take, even if the constitution is revised, the result will be inconclusive.

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For a long time I have insisted that historically “new constitutions are the product of a
new era.” I cannot think of a single exception when this was not the case. It is ordinary
for a new era to produce new constitution. The Meiji period produced the Meiji
constitution, and the postwar system produced today’s constitution. I cannot think of any
examples of a new constitution producing a new era.
Therefore, in my view an attempt to change the basic law of the land even though thepower and governing structure and system has remained unchanged is simply a strategy
to extend the life of the current governing system. I think that the current process islikely to have that result, and that a more fundamental shift in the system is necessary
before things will really change.
The Democratic Party pledges that it is aiming for a “constitution that will wrestle power
away from the bureaucracy.” I think that this is a worthy goal, but this can be done underthe existing constitution. If politicians are unable to wrestle power away from thebureaucrats under the existing constitution, they will not be able to do even after
changing the constitution. If they first win the public’s trust by succeeding in wrestlingpower away from the bureaucracy, then the prospects for successfully revising theconstitution will emerge.
The ruling government parties would like to explicitly write the “exercise of the right ofcollective self-defense” into the constitution. I don’t understand why during the generalelection the pros and cons of the right of collective self-defense were not seriously
debated. What I really find suspicious is why this debate did not take place during theelection last year rather than emerging now after the election.

The Complementary Relationship Between the Constitution and the UN Charter
It is my understanding that the Japanese constitution and the UN Charter have acomplementary relationship in regards to the issue of the right of collective self-defense.
The two are historically connected. In 1945, the UN Charter was announced, and during
February of the next year most of the work on the drafting of the constitution was done.
Soon after this, Churchill—who Professor Dore just mentioned—delivered his Iron
Curtain speech, which was a sign of the coming Cold War between the East and West.
In other words, the Japanese constitution was created with the presupposition that the UN
Charter would function, and without an assumption that a standoff would develop
between the United States and the Soviet Union. To put it more concretely, theconstitution was drafted under the presumption that, as outlined in Chapter 7 of thecharter, the United Nations would militarily punish rogue states.
Soon after the end of the Gulf War and before Miyazawa Kiichi became prime minister, I
helped him write “The Creation of a Permanent United Nations Army and Wide-scale
Disarmament” for the magazine Gekkan Asahi. During the writing of this piece,
Miyazawa insisted that the article argue that all soldiers and units in such an army beconsidered international civil servants, like the employees of the United Nations. Therewas some disagreement on this point between Miyazawa and I, but he was adamant on
this issue.

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As we prepared the essay, the two of us took the time to once again carefully research
the process by which the Japanese constitution was created. This is what we concluded:“On the basis the UN Charter, international society was to act as police that would
chasten any rogue states. Therefore, it was unnecessary for states to engage in duels or to
strike out at other states on their own in the name of self-preservation. Until this systemmatured, it was okay for states to exercise the right of self-defense. This privilege wasderived in the ‘right of individual self-defense’ and the ‘right of collective self-defense’as spelled out by the charter, but this right was understood as transitory. Because thiswas the case, it was reasonable for we in Japan to completely disarm. If anything
happened, Japan believed that the United Nations—international society acting as thepolice—would protect us.”
However, the Cold War worsened with the victory of the communists in the Chinese civil
war in 1949 and conflict on the Korean peninsula that erupted the following year. In theeat-or-be-eaten conditions that developed, only Japan was unarmed. And theinternational police, which Japan had placed its hopes in, did not function as promised.
So in order to protect itself, Japan created the smallest unit possible for its own defense in
the form of the National Police Reserve, the Police Reserve Force, and then the SelfDefense Force. In addition, Japan entered into the US-Japan Security Treaty, a bilateral,
if abnormal, alliance.
For these reasons, I thought that the close of the Cold War signaled another chance for
the United Nations to assume its policing and collective security functions. When I
expressed this opinion to Miyazawa, he would reply, “Right on, the United Nations
should create a standing army as quickly as possible.”
We then transferred this vision into the essay. At the time, Miyazawa was enthusiastic
about playing a leading role in the new government, so with this in mind I prepared thearticle. That autumn, Miyazawa became prime minister and formed a cabinet. Becauseof that experience, I have doubts about the current debate about collective self-defense.
Although it may not need to precisely follow the parameters of Chapter 7 of the UN
Charter, I think that Japan should promote efforts to create a collective security systemand strengthen the policing functions of the United Nations. Japan ought to work to
make this happen, and in the case that such a system is created, it ought to participate. In
other words, for a long time I have thought that Japan ought to take a leadership role inguiding the world to a new order that completely leaves behind an era in which the rightto individual and collective self-defense is needed.

Why Collective Self-Defense is Unnecessary
For a number of reasons, I think the right of collective self-defense is unnecessary forJapan. It is highly convenient that the existing constitution does not recognize the rightcollective self-defense. If we had a constitution that recognized this right, I would evenurge that the constitution be revised so that it would no longer be recognized.
The first reason why I think the right of collective self-defense is unnecessary pertains to
the question of whether the clear possession of this privilege by Japan would lead to4greater peace and security in Asia, particularly in East Asia. I think it would not. If
Japan has this right, I think it will contribute to greater instability in East Asia.
Another reason is related to the nature of collective self-defense, of which there are two
types or two forms. When we think about collective self-defense, we need to think in themost concrete terms as possible. Joining in an alliance with an average country like
Canada or Korea is an entirely different matter than aligning oneself with a superpower.
The difference can be counted in terms of the frequency that the country goes to war, andthe level of flexibility and equality allowed by the treaty that defines the alliance. One
can think of this in relation to democracy between nations. We can anticipate that analliance with a superpower will mean that a country is faced with projecting its military
power to many of the world’s battlefields on a regular basis. I question whether we areprepared to do this?
Perhaps a golfing metaphor might be useful. If America were the golfer, then would
Japan not be the caddy? The caddy asks the golfer, “What golf course will we go tonext?” If the golfer replies, “I have not decided,” the caddy can only say, “Oh, is that so.
Well, I will accompany wherever you go.” In such a relationship, the right to collective
self-defense will not lead to an equal relationship.
If strengthening the US-Japan alliance means a desire for the right of collective selfdefense, I think we are mistaken. We need to think about this issue more carefully.

Two Paths—A World Republic and a World Empire
I think there are two paths, or two currents, in the international security system in the
post-Cold War era. At any rate, the world will probably, or be forced to, converge into
one of these paths during this century. This is because there are many problems thatdemand a global solution, as highlighted so well by the outbreak of SARS.
These two paths can be divided cleanly into one that leads toward a world republic andthe other leading toward a world empire. By a world republic, I mean a situation inwhich the free will, sovereignty, culture, and traditions of each nation are respected andthere is equality among nations.
On the other hand, by a world empire I am referring to a situation where a single state
controls the world through military power. If this was going to happen, it would havebeen best if Napoleon would have accomplished it some 200 years ago, because if he had
been able to bring the world under his control before the development of weapons ofmass destruction, then he might have been able to create a world devoid of war. Now,
however, even if such an empire is created, wars would not disappear, and an attempt tocreate such an empire would be marked by incredible devastation. Anyhow, the creationof such an empire now is probably impossible, so it would be best if the worldconcentrated on strengthening the United Nations in concrete ways through steadyconsensus building. For that reason, I think this century will see efforts to integrate theworld into a world republic or something similar.
Perhaps this is the aim of the Bush administration. Maybe they are trying to create a neworder, a sort of network of countries connected by agreements of collective self-defense

5with the United States, so that America is positioned as the atom at the center linked inindividual alliances with each country. If this is the case, then the United Nations will
surely whither away.
After the speedy end of the invasion of Iraq and U.S. troops had knocked over Hussein’s
statue, a number of former Japanese Foreign Ministry officials repeatedly asserted invarious magazine articles that the “United Nations was now irrelevant.” It appears thatthey believed that a new world order would be formed in the wake of America’s moves,which would make the United Nations impotent. I too thought the Bush administration
was attempting to close the United Nations as if it were shutting an umbrella.
For some countries, alliances are more important than membership in the United Nations,so participation, for example, in the “coalition of the willing” is an imperative.
The current United Nations is still extremely immature, despite years of difficult
struggles and sacrifices. The two paths now available are to try to nurture the current
system, or to abandon it and forcefully bring about integration through different means.
There are at least three forces that block the path toward a world empire, and for thesereasons a world empire will not emerge. The first force is the power of China, which
seems to prefer keeping a distance from America. The United States will not be able tomanipulate China’s economic or political power even if it is ascendant, and China will
not fall in line with American hegemony. Even more important, Islamic power will notconform to American leadership. The more the Bush administration appears to beleading a coalition force of Jews and Christians, the less willing Muslims will be tofollow American initiatives.
The third force that will stymie any attempt to create a world empire is international
popular opinion. Public attitudes in mature democratic states, including the United States,
Britain, and Japan, will not accept such efforts by the Bush administration. Resistance inmany countries is already evident. Governments may follow along, but because thepeople have the power to at least change the government through elections, any attempt
to create a world empire will collapse in midstream.
In fact, it has already collapsed. And America, the only country that could possibly leadand that possesses the conditions to gain the respect of the entire world is wandering in
the clouds of anti-American feelings created by the collapse. It is a huge loss for theUnited States to not be trusted by international society. For that reason, I wonder why
Koizumi did not say to the United States, “You are going to fail, so don’t do it.”
It is of course too late to be saying such things, but just before the Iraq War began I
appeared on a television program and declared that, “If the United States launches anattack, this will be condemned by history,” and “If Japan supports this war, that too will
be condemned by history.” These mistakes cannot be corrected, but because this is notdirectly relevant to today’s theme, I hope we can talk about it afterward.
When I examine democracy, I see three different layers, or three different qualities of
democracy. The first is democracy in each country. This is what we could call“domestic democracy,” which includes the various elements of democracy pertaining toeconomics, human rights, and political procedures. Domestic democracy takes many

6
forms. There is the democracy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and ofcourse there is America that greatly values democracy.
In addition to internal democracy, there is also “stateless” democracy that crosses
national borders. This is a universal democracy that encompasses the many global issues
such as human rights, the environment, and gender equality. We might call it“international democracy.”
The third layer of democracy is “democracy between nation-states.” To imagine thiskind of democracy, one should think of countries as individual people. If we think ofnations as people, then it is clear that democracy between nations is not making progressin today’s world. For a long time, it was making progress, but the actions of the Bushadministration represent a fundamental challenge to this kind of democracy.
I must emphasize that no matter how mature democracy might be internally, there is thepotential that the same country might not be democratic in its relations with othercountries. In fact, the potential that a mature democratic state might choose to become an
empire is extremely high. This is particularly the case if the country begins to think only
about its own national interests. Domestic democracy and international democracy are
entirely different.
In addition, the development of domestic democracy may not necessarily bring about
policies that lead to international democracy. Even if every country in the world became
internally democratic, this would not mean that it would instantly result in democracy
among nations, or that it would guarantee democracy within international society. In
contrast, it is possible that a country with a developing but still immature democracy, onethat only has elections, might be more considerate of other countries on the international
level and implement peaceful policies. Therefore, just because a country is an immaturedomestic democracy does not mean that is democratically immature in its dealings ininternational society.

Breaking the Deadlock—The United Nations and the International Public Opinion
The central issue is democracy between nations, and one of the places it is played out inthe United Nations. At certain times, such as when the Third World wielded substantial
influence within the General Assembly, the United Nations seems to be extremely
democratic in character. This occurred during the Cold War the Third World was able touse the United States as a political venue, and both the United States and the Soviet
Union actively courted their favor. Because they could seek the favor of both major
powers, the Third World had significant leeway to express their opinions. The Third
World, though, lost its venue with the end of the Cold War and is now huddled together.
How can we break out of this situation? In order to nurture greater democracy among
nations, it is necessary for us to entrust the United Nations with a greater role and toreform the United Nations.
The government has made clear its desire to become a member of the Security Council,
but I would like to put a brake on this effort. Why? First of all, I cannot help but be
skeptical of the government’s aims to join the Security Council when it has not even7
figured out what path Japan ought to take in the world. Even more importantly, if theUnited Nations is reformed, I strongly feel the government should use the opportunity toquestion whether the system of the Security Council itself needs to be reformed. The
current system does not foster democracy between nations. A system where there are noelections and no term limits does not lead to democracy. Japan should take a leadershiprole in encouraging concrete reforms in this area.
One other way for the current dilemma to be resolved is through international public
opinion. As international public opinion becomes more powerful, it will further ignite
domestic opinion and be a driving force toward greater democracy between nations.
There are still many things I would like to say, but it looks like I am out of time. So now
that I have laid out some of these issues, I will stop here and save my comments for the
discussion period. Thank you.