Branch Points:
Global Scenarios and Human Choice
Gilberto Gallopin, Al Hammond, Paul Raskin and Rob Swart
A Resource Paper of the Global Scenario GroupSEISTOCKHOLM
ENVIRONMENTINSTITUTE© Copyright 1997 by the Stockholm Environment Institute
No Part of this report may be reproduced in any form without written permission from the publisher.

Stockholm Environment InstituteBox 2142, S103 14, Stockholm, SwedenTel:+46 8 723 0260
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PoleStar Series Report no. 7
1997

ISSN: 1400-7185
ISBN: 91 88714 39 X

ThePublication SeriesThis publication series is produced by Stockholm Environment Institute’s PoleStar Project.
Named after the star that guided voyagers through uncharted waters, the multi-year PoleStar
Project addresses critical aspects of the transition to sustainability. Scenario analysis
illuminates long-range problems and possibilities at global, regional, national and local levels.
Capacity building strengthens professional capabilities for a new era of development. Policy
studies fashion strategies and actions. To aid these efforts, the project developed the PoleStar
System©, a comprehensive, flexible and user-friendly decision-support tool. The PoleStar
System is now used internationally in diverse sustainability studies to organize pertinent data,
formulate alternative development scenarios and evaluate strategies for sustainable
development.
To carry forward the global aspects of this work, a Global Scenario Group (GSG) wasestablished to engage a diverse group of development professionals in a long-term commitment
to examining the requirements for sustainability. The GSG is an independent, international andinter-disciplinary body, representing a variety of geographic and professional experiences. It
engages in an on-going process of global and regional scenario development, policy analysis
and public education. The diversity and continuity of the GSG offer a unique resource for the
research and policy communities. The GSG pursues its objectives through research, publicationand collaboration with sustainable development projects at national and regional levels.
This report presents the perspective of the GSG on the sustainability challenge and on global
futures. It is offered as a resource document to scientific, policy and awareness-building efforts
for fostering desirable social and environmental conditions in the 21st Century. Previous
PoleStar publication series reports are:
1. The Sustainability Transition: Beyond Conventional Development (Raskin, Chadwick,Jackson and Leach)
2. PoleStar System Manual (Raskin, Heaps and Sieber)
3. Global Energy in the 21st Century: Patterns, Projections and Problems (Raskin andMargolis)
4. Water and Sustainability: A Global Outlook (Raskin, Hansen and Margolis)
5. Global Land and Food in the 21st Century: Trends and Issues for Sustainability (Leach)
6. Accounting for Toxic Emissions from the Global Economy: The Case of Cadmium(Jackson and MacGillivray)Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choiceiii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................ iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................. v
ABSTRACT........................................................................................................ vi
1. THE CHALLENGE ......................................................................................... 1
1.1. The Human Predicament....................................................................... 1
1.2. The Sustainability Notion...................................................................... 2
1.3. The Policy Context............................................................................... 3
2. THE SCENARIO APPROACH........................................................................ 5
2.1. Objectives............................................................................................. 5
2.2. System Perspectives and Scenario Criteria ............................................ 5
2.3. Global Scenarios in Historical Perspective ............................................ 7
2.4. Methodological Elements ..................................................................... 7
3. SCENARIO OVERVIEW.............................................................................. 11
4. CRITICAL TRENDS..................................................................................... 174.1. Population Growth ............................................................................. 174.2. Economic Growth .............................................................................. 174.3. Technological Change ........................................................................ 18
4.4. Decentralization of Authority.............................................................. 19
4.5. Equity Trends..................................................................................... 19
4.6. Resource Depletion ............................................................................ 19
4.7. Pollution and Global Environmental Change ....................................... 20
5. CONVENTIONAL WORLDS ....................................................................... 21
5.1. The Paradigm ..................................................................................... 21
5.2. Variations........................................................................................... 21
5.3. Reference Variant: The Problem ......................................................... 225.4. Policy Reform Variant: The Answer?.................................................. 25
6. BARBARIZATION ....................................................................................... 29
6.1. The Scenarios Unfold ......................................................................... 29
6.2. Breakdown......................................................................................... 33
6.3. Fortress World ................................................................................... 33
7. GREAT TRANSITIONS................................................................................ 35
7.1. Narrowing the Focus .......................................................................... 35
7.2. New Social Actors, New World View................................................. 36
7.3. A New Sustainability Paradigm Unfolds.............................................. 37
8. THE TASKS AHEAD.................................................................................... 41
8.1. Research Directions............................................................................ 41
8.2. Reflections at the Branch Point........................................................... 42

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Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

REFERENCES .................................................................................................. 45

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. The Socio-Ecological System ................................................................ 6
Figure 2. Driving Forces, Attractors, Sideswipes .................................................. 9
Figure 3. Scenarios Structure with Illustrative Patterns of Change ...................... 13
Figure 4. Illustrative Global Economic Output and Population for
Scenarios (1990-2100) ....................................................................................... 14
Figure 5. Illustrative Economic Output and Population for Scenarios, byMacro-Region (1990-2100)................................................................................ 14
Figure 6. Economic Output and Population, Blow-up of Rich Regions(1990-2100) ....................................................................................................... 15
Figure 7. Macro-Regional Equity Space for Scenarios (1990-2100) .................... 16
Figure 8. Global Patterns in Conventional Worlds-Reference Scenario................ 24
Figure 9. Global Energy Requirements for Policy Reform Scenario..................... 26
Figure 10. Global Energy Requirements for Reference Scenario.......................... 26
Figure 11. Energy-related CO2 Emissions for Conventional Worlds Scenarios.... 27
Figure 12. Barbarization Unfolds ........................................................................ 32
Figure 13. New Sustainability Paradigm Unfolds................................................. 40

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choicev

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This study was a collective effort in two senses. First, though dispersed acrossthree continents, the authors engaged in an intense year-long electronic
collaboration, punctuated by occasional face-to-face working sessions, in which thescenario methods, structure and descriptions gradually were developed and honed.
The resulting synthesis, is far more than the sum of our individual contributions.
Second, this work is very much the product of the entire Global Scenario
Group (see inside cover for a description of the GSG). At its November 1995
meeting, the GSG nominated the co-authors to prepare a draft of this paper toprovide a conceptual framework for its own on-going work on scenarios andsustainability, and for others concerned with these issues. GSG members provided
substantive input to this document at several stages -- the initial formulation of theperspective, the review of intermediate drafts, and a final review at the December
1996 meeting of the GSG. Our thanks go to each of our colleagues on the GSG:
Khaled Mohammed Fahmy (Egypt), Tibor Farago (Hungary), Pablo Gutman(Argentina), H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo (Kenya), A. Atiq Rahman (Bangladesh),
Setijati D. Sastrapradja (Indonesia), Katsuo Seiki (Japan), Nicholas Sonntag(Canada), and Veerle Vandeweerd (Belgium).
The document benefited from the comments of a number of others, as well.
In particular, we would like to express our gratitude to Professor Michael
Chadwick, former Director of the Stockholm Environment Institute, who wasinstrumental in the formation of the GSG and contributed important insights andsuggestions. Also, we are indebted to Dr. Gil Pontius of the GSG Secretariat at
SEI-Boston for his assistance in preparing the manuscript and to Karin Hultcrantz
at SEI headquarters for final editorial review.
Finally, we wish to acknowledge our appreciation to the Rockefeller
Foundation, the United Nations Environment Programme and the Global Industrial
and Social Policy Research Institute for funding earlier GSG activities, and to the
Nippon Foundation for major assistance for this work.
While we benefited immensely from the support of such able colleagues andpartners, we accept responsibility for the final product. We look forward toworking with others to further clarify the perils and possibilities for the future, andthe choices before us.

vi

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

ABSTRACTThe quest for sustainability must be pursued at many levels -- local, national,
regional and global. Unique sets of issues, solutions, and institutional processes
come into focus when the problem is viewed from these various perspectives. In
addition, it is important to consider the interplay between levels. In our globalizing
world, regional and national strategies for sustainable development will be myopic
unless they also are informed by a global perspective.
Today, globalization takes many forms -- stresses on the biosphere, farreaching cultural impacts of communication technology, expansion of worldwide
commerce, and rise of new geo-political tensions. Driven by this powerful new
constellation of forces, the world system is at an uncertain branch point fromwhich a wide range of possible futures could unfold in the 21st Century. The
transformation of human civilization could be profound, perhaps as significant as
the transition to settled agriculture and the industrial revolution. The aim of thisstudy is to explore scenarios of the future and to consider their implications.
The concept of sustainability implies the reconciliation of long-term
development and environmental goals; it is concerned with the future. While thefuture is open and cannot be predicted, scenarios offer a powerful means for
examining the forces shaping our world, the uncertainties that lie before us and theimplications for tomorrow of our actions today. A scenario is a story, told in words
and numbers, concerning the manner in which future events could unfold andoffering lessons on how to direct the flow of events towards desirable pathways
and away from undesirable ones.
The report begins with a description of the sustainability problem andoutlines criteria for a transition to sustainability. Key methodological concepts for
scenario analysis are described. A taxonomy of scenarios is introduced based on a
two-tier hierarchy: classes distinguished by fundamentally different social visions
and variants reflecting a range of possible outcomes within each class.
Three broad scenario classes are depicted -- Conventional Worlds,
Barbarization, and Great Transitions -- which are characterized by, respectively,
essential continuity with current patterns, fundamental but undesirable socialchange, and fundamental and favorable social transformation. Conventional Worlds
envision the global system of the 21st century evolving without major surprises,
sharp discontinuities, or fundamental transformations in the basis for humancivilization. The future is shaped by the continued evolution, expansion andglobalization of the dominant values and socio-economic relationships of industrial
society. By contrast, the Barbarization and Great Transition scenario classes relax
the notion of the long term continuity of dominant values and institutionalarrangements.
Two variants are considered in detail for each class, for a total of six
scenarios. Within Conventional Worlds, the Reference variant incorporates midrange population and development projections, and typical technological change
assumptions. The Policy Reform variant adds strong, comprehensive andcoordinated government action, as called for in many policy-oriented discussionsof sustainability, to achieve greater social equity and environmental protection. In
this scenario, the political will evolves for strengthening management systems andrapidly diffusing environmentally-friendly technology. Whatever their differences,
Conventional Worlds variants share the premises of the continuity of institutionsand values, the rapid growth of the world economy and the convergence of global
regions toward the norms set by highly industrial countries. In the business-as-Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choicevii

usual Reference variant, the problem of resolving the social and environmental
stress arising from global population and economic growth is left to the selfcorrecting logic of competitive markets. In the Policy Reform variant, sustainability
is pursued as a proactive strategic priority.
Barbarization scenarios envision the grim possibility that the social,economic and moral underpinnings of civilization deteriorate, as emerging
problems overwhelm the coping capacity of both markets and policy reforms. The
Breakdown variant leads to unbridled conflict, institutional disintegration, andeconomic collapse. The Fortress World variant features an authoritarian responseto the threat of breakdown. Ensconced in protected enclaves, elites safeguard theirprivilege by controlling an impoverished majority and managing critical natural
resources, while outside the fortress there is repression, environmental destruction,and misery.
Great Transitions explore visionary solutions to the sustainability challenge,
including new socio-economic arrangements and fundamental changes in values.
These scenarios depict a transition to a society that preserves natural systems,
provides high levels of welfare through material sufficiency and equitable
distribution, and enjoys a strong sense of social solidarity. Population levels arestabilized at moderate levels and material flows through the economy are radicallyreduced through reduced consumerism and massive use of green technologies. The
Eco-communalism variant incorporates a green vision of bio-regionalism, localism,
face-to-face democracy, small technology, and economic autarky. The New
Sustainability Paradigm variant shares some of these goals, but would seek tochange the character of urban, industrial civilization rather than replace it, to build
a more humane and equitable global civilization rather than retreat into localism.
In a final section, future tasks for global scenario analysis in the areas ofscience, policy and public education are discussed. The paper closes with areflection at the branch point, noting that a business-as-usual Conventional
Worlds-Reference future could put severe social and environmental stress on the
global system in the next century, and that such stress would increase the peril oflurches toward Barbarization. A Conventional World-Policy Reform future would
counter these risks, but due to limited political will and the sheer scale of the
problem policy initiatives alone may be inadequate to the sustainability challenge.
New values and institutions, a Great Transition, may be both needed forsustainability and desired as a new stage of civilization. Policy scenarios warrant
our near term attention since they mitigate risk, while keeping open opportunities
for the development of a new sustainability paradigm.

1.
THE CHALLENGE
We live in an age of accelerating change and uncertainty. The future is open, no
one can predict with any certitude how history will unfold in the 21st Century. Yet,
more than ever, we must consider the possible futures that might emanate from theturbulent conditions of our time, and the implications for human choice and action.
In this spirit, this paper offers a perspective and framework for reflecting on global
scenarios as human civilization approaches critical branch points over the coming
decades.
Global scenario analysis aims to illuminate the character of the current global
system, the dynamics driving it forward, and the spectrum of possible future statesand pathways. The endeavor is animated by a conviction, it assumes that informed
human choice, mediated through governmental policies, civil initiatives andindividual decisions, can shape the future in essential ways. While reflecting
realistically on the perils for the future, we retain the optimism that there are
attractive possibilities, as well, for humanity and the environment in the 21st
century.
1.1. The Human Predicament
For most of human history, the challenge for the human race has been survival against
natural forces that have often been harsh and unpredictable. The power to shape,
control and transform nature evolved gradually over several million years. Then, theindustrial revolution, in the context of the emergence of the capitalist economic systemand the modern world-view, initiated a two hundred year process of rapid change intechnology, population, the environment and the social order.
The increasingly interdependent global system we observe today is a waystation in this sweeping process of growth, transformation and expansion. But a
new and ominous feature of the current phase of history is that human impacts on
the environment have reached global scales. The contradiction between the growth
imperative of the modern world system and the constraints of a finite planet will be
resolved. The critical question is, how?
In the 20th century, humanity acquired military weapons of such power as tobecome a serious threat to itself. With the end of the Cold War, that threat hasreceded for now. But a new and more subtle challenge awaits humanity in the 21st
century, the challenge of creating a sustainable global civilization. There areunprecedented possibilities for technological and economic progress that could
eradicate hunger and many diseases, improve the human condition, enrich thehuman stock of knowledge and cultural achievement, and increase opportunity andchoice.
At the same time, the sheer scale of human enterprise -- the number ofpeople, the growing levels of material consumption and production -- may exceed
the carrying capacity of the planet. Human lifestyles and the industrial systems that
support them threaten to change the climate, degrade ecosystems and deplete theearth's biological wealth, altering the natural environment on a global scale. And
the 21st century may consign billions of the yet unborn to an existence of poverty,
hunger, and hardship. The destitution of multitudes amidst unprecedented levels of
wealth and comfort for the privileged could portend social unrest and violence on
unprecedented scales, challenging the very notion of a global civilization.
How humanity will cope with such challenges is not certain. Nor is theoutcome determined, it will be influenced by the individual and collective choicesthat we make. Will we be able to hand on to our grandchildren a global society,2

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swartand a planet, that is richer in possibilities than our present one, or will we leave amore impoverished Earth as a patrimony for future generations? Will humanexistence and human institutions such as families and communities be more secure
or more fragile in the global society of the mid-21st century?
1.2. The Sustainability Notion
Sustainability is concerned with reconciling the long-term development of humansociety with the finite limits of the planet. Implicit in the notion of sustainability are suchquestions as: How shall we use the Earth? What kind of human society shall we build
on it? And how can we leave future generations a world with more opportunities rather
than fewer? The classic formulation that sustainable development "meets the needs ofthe present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs" reflects these broad notions (WCED, 1987).
Two legitimate moral and social imperatives must be reconciled: the needs ofthe present and the needs of the future. The living standards of the billions today
who do not enjoy the benefits of human progress -- many of whom cannot satisfy
even their basic needs -- must be improved. At the same time, development
patterns in both rich and poor countries must be altered so as not to leave a bittersocial and environmental legacy to future generations. For example,
industrialization has relied on inexpensive and abundant fossil energy resources,
particularly oil, natural gas and coal. Yet continued reliance on these fuels for the
expansion of industrial activity risks committing the world to significant climatic
alterations and extreme weather events for centuries to come (IPCC, 1996).
Environmental degradation may not be the only sad bequest to ourdescendants. Equally grave could be the degradation of the notion of civilization
itself. As the willful slaughter of millions in the Holocaust left a poisonous mark on
the 20th century, the potential descent of whole regions into chaos, violence or
starvation could taint the 21st. If the disparity between rich and poor classes andcountries continues to grow, the implications are not positive for building
international stability and a global community.
What might characterize a sustainable world? What should our goals be?
While the notion of sustainability must accommodate a diversity of views, as an
ideal, many people might agree that we would like our grandchildren and greatgrandchildren to inherit a world, half a century hence, in which:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

absolute poverty, malnutrition and famine are eradicated, and access to basic
health care and education is universal
quality of life is improving, with satisfactory material conditions and expanding
opportunities for fulfillment for all
inequity between rich and poor is diminishedenvironmental quality is increasing, with critical biological resources
recovering, pollution under control, and climate stability is in sight.
violence and armed conflict are infrequent
human solidarity is stronger at family, community and global levels
global population growth ceases

This vision reflects widely held values -- freedom from want and from fear,
desire for higher quality lifestyles and for a more equitable world, and a concern
for environmental preservation. The goals are closely coupled. Stabilization of the
global population, for example, probably also requires arranging a world economy

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice3

in which access to shelter, food, health care, security and education are universal.
Also, poverty reduction and greater equity almost certainly are essential forpreserving biological resources. Moreover, preventing increased violence andconflict may depend both on rising incomes and on increased equity withincountries and between rich and poor regions.
Yet providing for economic growth and rising standards of living without
increasing pollution and accelerating climate change requires a profoundtransformation in industrial processes, in the basis of modern lifestyles, and in the
structure of economic development. The coupling across issues and sectors is at
the heart of the idea of sustainability. It means that we may need to achieve thesegoals together, or not at all.
1.3. The Policy Context
The present period is one of change and confusion. The collapse of the Soviet Union
ended the Cold War that dominated international policy for half a century. The
ascendancy of the market model of economic organization has led to policy reforms inmany countries encouraging privatization, deregulation, and free trade. While in somecountries these efforts have fostered rapid economic growth, for many others,
development has proven elusive or has benefited only a very few.
At the same time, the globalizing economy, with increasingly powerfulmultinational corporations, and greater mobility of capital, has changed theconditions under which national economic development occurs. The Earth Summit
in 1992 marked a recognition that environmental, social, and economic concerns
are closely connected and must be pursued jointly. Yet structures of power andhabits of mind change slowly. Many development efforts are still narrowly focused,and effective models for more integrated approaches to sustainable development
are still lacking. Moreover, many individuals and institutions have a strong stake inpreserving existing arrangements. Large landowners often resist land reform,
energy producers (companies and countries) often slow efforts to address climate
issues, privileged groups often oppose efforts to help the poor, and multinational
corporations seek unfettered access to natural resources. Social transition isdifficult, especially without a widely-shared positive vision of the purpose ofchange and why it is necessary.
Despite globalization, the world is still sharply divided into rich and poor
countries, who face very different constraints and opportunities. Advanced
industrial countries, despite the often extreme dichotomies between their rich andpoor citizens, could, in principle, distance themselves from the developing world.
This is because they are increasingly less dependent on natural resources, especiallyfrom the South. The developing countries, in contrast, are still highly dependent on
trade, technology and capital from the rich countries.
This notwithstanding, the destinies of rich and poor are more tightly coupledthan ever before in history. The linkage is environmental and social. The
environmental link derives from the fact that rich and poor share the same planet.
The social link from the fact that poverty and social disintegration in the South canthreaten the security and well-being of the North, due to the increased mobility ofpeople in a global economy. If they can export nothing else, the poor can at least
readily export their misery, through migration, crime, terrorism, and disease.
This coupling of destinies means that there are no separate solutions, one for
the South and one for the North. Only a truly global solution can achieve a humaneand sustainable future. This is why the level of discussion and planning must be

4

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

moved higher, to the level of the human species, the biosphere, and the global
society.
A source of hope is the growing realization that, once a sufficient level ofmaterial well-being is achieved, quality of life can expand without parallel increases
in material requirements. The consumer society and its presumption of everexpanding material wants, is not synonymous with development and greater humanwelfare. Sustainable economic development can be based on qualitative expansion-- growth in knowledge, in human capabilities, in social capital -- that does not
imply ever-increasing material wealth and environmental pressure.

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice5

2.
THE SCENARIO APPROACH
While the concept of sustainable development has stimulated considerable debate
on specific interpretations, it is clear that inherent in the notion is a concern for the
long-range future. Substantive analyses of the meaning and implications ofsustainable development require a long-view over at least several generations.
Projections of trends in human affairs may be legitimate over the short-term, but
not as time horizons expand from months and years to decades and generations.
Fundamental uncertainty is introduced both by our limited understanding of humanand ecological processes, and by the intrinsic indeterminism of complex dynamic
systems. Moreover, social futures will depend on human choices which are yet to
be made.
2.1. Objectives
Scenario analysis offers a way to consider long range futures in light of these
uncertainties and to examine the requirements for a transition to sustainability.
Scenarios are not projections, forecasts or projections. Rather, they are stories
about the future with a logical plot and narrative governing the manner in which
events unfold (Schwartz, 1991; Cole, 1981; Miles, 1981). Scenarios usually
include images of the future -- snapshots of the major features of interest at various
points in time -- and an account of the flow of events leading to such future
conditions. Compelling scenarios need to be constructed with rigor, detail andcreativity, and evaluated for plausibility, self-consistency and sustainability.
Scenario analysis challenges us to ponder critical issues and to explore theuniverse of possibilities for the future. Scenarios also clarify alternative worldviews and values, challenge conventional thinking and encourage debate. Since
scenarios embody the perspectives of their creators, either explicitly or implicitly,
they are never value-free. They draw on both science -- an understanding of
historical patterns, current conditions and physical and social processes -- andimagination, to conceive, articulate and evaluate a range of socio-ecologicalpathways (Raskin et al., 1996a).
To shed light on the problem of global sustainability, we wish to consider
scenarios that incorporate alternative social visions, and highlight significant causal
processes and critical decision points. At such points, the choices of many actors
and interests -- individuals, corporations, labor, policy makers, political institutions,cultural and spiritual leaders, and environmental activists -- can influence which
global pathway emerges from the panoply of possible futures. Ultimately, thescenario approach can provide a common framework for diverse stakeholders toaddress the critical concerns of our time, and a forum for discussion and debate on
the sustainability transition. In the near term, scenarios can offer guidance to thenational and international policy community for converting the sustainability
principle into practical policies and actions.
2.2. System Perspectives and Scenario Criteria
The evolving world system can be considered a socio-ecological system,comprised of environmental and human subsystems and their interactions (Gallopín
et al., 1989), as illustrated in Figure 1. The environmental subsystem may in turn bedecomposed into ecosystems, biophysical processes and other aspects of thenatural world. The economic and social subsystems include various sectoralcomponents, and cultural and institutional processes. Subsystems interact innumerous ways and are mutually conditioning, so that a sharp distinction between

6

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swartdependent and independent variables is not meaningful. However, at a given time,certain processes may dominate the dynamics of the whole system, and thus may
be considered “driving forces”.
Socio-ecological systems can be defined at multiple spatial levels -- global,
regional, national local. Different issues come into focus as one zooms in or out.
For example, a planetary panorama is needed to reveal global economic, cultural,demographic and environmental phenomena. A regional perspective is required toanalyze the problems of acid rain, water allocation and certain migration patterns.
A national focus sheds light on many policies, trade patterns and security issues. A
local view often is appropriate for evaluating land-change patterns, biodiversity andground level pollution. Though our focus here will be global, all levels of
resolution are needed to understand the entire system of interactions, and to fully
address the problem of sustainability.

Society

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Environment
Atmosphere
Hydrosphere
Land
Biota
Minerals

s
ce
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Se
nd
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sa
tio
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titu
Go
Ins
nd
ra
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Population
Lifestyle
CultureSocial Organization

Natural Resources
Impacts

EconomyAgriculture
Households
Industry
Transport
Services

Source: Raskin et al. (1996a)

Figure 1. The Socio-Ecological System

With the socio-ecological systems framework in mind, design criteria forpolicy-oriented scenario analyses may be identified (Swart et al., 1996). Ideally,
scenarios would be:••

global with regional and, ultimately, subregional disaggregation
comprehensive with integrated treatment of major environmental, social andeconomic issues and interactions• analytically sound with regard to use of data and scientific theory• diverse with representation of a range of future visions, values and world-views
Scenario development is best approached as an ongoing process. Scenarios
become more refined in the course of time, benefiting from the feedback of policy,

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice7

environmental and public interest communities, better data and advances insustainability sciences. At the same time, scenarios can provide useful guidance tosetting research agendas and prioritizing data development efforts. In this iterative
manner, the degree of spatial resolution, the level of thematic detail and theintegration of scientific theory can evolve with time. The diversity criterion should
be incorporated even in preliminary stages of scenario development so that a richrange of perspectives can inform the analysis, and a process launched forcommunication, consensus and action.
2.3. Global Scenarios in Historical Perspective
Speculation on the future has been a constant in human history, imbedded inmythology, religion social visions and literature. Since the 1970s, scenario
explorations have brought the problem of the environment and development to theforefront of political attention. Early work included mathematical simulation
models (Meadows et al., 1972; Herrera et al., 1976; Mesarovic and Pestel, 1974),
qualitative exercises (Kahn and Wiener, 1967; Kahn, Brown and Martel, 1976),
input-output analysis (Leontieff, 1976), and eclectic approaches (Barney, 1980).
Reviews and critiques of global assessments introduced fresh insight (University of
Sussex, 1973; Meadows et al., 1982).
More recently, a second wave of global scenario studies have included
narrative scans of alternative futures (Burrows et al., 1991; Milbrath, 1989), an
optimistic analysis by the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (1992), the pessimistic
analysis by Kaplan (1994), a consideration of surprising futures (Svedin andAniansson, 1987; Toth et al., 1989), and the United Nations Global Outlook(United Nations, 1990). The climate change issue gave rise to numerous modelbased world energy scenarios, most importantly, those of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1992) which generally remain withinconventional notions of long-range development. In addition, authors haverevisited first-wave studies and affirmed their essential findings despite intense andsometimes rancorous criticism in the interim (Barney et al., 1993; Meadows et al.,1992).
2.4. Methodological Elements
Many global studies rely heavily on complex mathematical models. The aim is a
desirable one of establishing a disciplined and internally consistent basis forunderstanding complex processes. But formal models also have significant
limitations for representing complex and open human systems, notwithstanding
occasionally excessive claims for them. Models implicitly embody specificdisciplinary paradigms (e.g., economics or ecology), and even within theseparadigms can capture only those elements that are reasonably well-understoodand amenable to quantification. Also, the high level of spatial aggregation in manymodels can mask the local specificity underlying calculated average global andregional trends.
Moreover, overzealous reliance on mathematical models downgrades theimportance of the underlying qualitative narrative of scenarios, so that the world
behind the figures remains opaque. Well-articulated scenarios will certainly include
quantitative insight from scientific models. But they will give due weight, as well,to the scenario narrative and to key elements that are not quantifiable either inprinciple (e.g., cultural influences, behavior and institutional responses to change)
or in practice due to inadequacies in data or scientific theory. Thus, scenarios can8Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

provide a broader perspective than exercises which are heavily model-based, whileat the same time making use of various quantitative tools such as accounting
frameworks (Raskin et al., 1996b) and mathematical simulation models (Hornung,1992). Quantitative analysis can offer a degree of structure, discipline and rigor.
Narrative can offer texture, richness and insight. The art is in the balance.
The development of scenarios generally begins with a characterization ofcurrent state and driving forces (Figure 2). These provide a representation of theconditions of the socio-ecological system and the major factors propelling thesystem forward. The driving forces are associated with persistent and dominantphenomena and processes already in the pipeline. In addition, the scenario
description should include the identification of critical uncertainties the resolutionof which will fundamentally alter the course of events. The current state, driving
forces, and critical uncertainties form the backbone of the scenarios. In addition, allscenarios unfold according to an internal logic which links the elements into a
coherent plot.
Long-range scenarios must recognize the role of deliberate human actions
and choices in shaping the future. Human choice is influenced by culturalpreferences, social visions and by psycho-social factors that are not wellunderstood. As a complement to the driving forces, it is useful to introduce theconcept of attractive and repulsive forces which can “substantially redirect beliefs,
behaviors, policies and institutions towards some futures and away from others”(Raskin et al., 1996a). If the attractors and repellors are assumed to be weak, or ifthey are consistent with current driving forces, the future evolves in what is
typically called a business-as-usual scenario (referred to in this study as theConventional Worlds-Reference scenario). Visions of the future can motivate
actions toward reaching desirable outcomes; one must imagine a future before
acting to create it. In this manner, subjective visions of future states, operating
through human awareness, choice, and agency become objective forcesconditioning the evolution of socio-ecological systems. Also, shown in Figure 2 are“sideswipes”, major surprises that can influence the future strongly -- a world war,“miracle” technologies, an extreme natural disaster, a pandemic, breakdown of theclimate system.

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice9

FutureState

Current
State

Driving
ForcesAttractive
ForcesFutureState

Sideswipes
FutureState

Past

Present

FutureSource: Raskin et al. (1996a)

Figure 2. Driving Forces, Attractors, Sideswipes

Finally, the construction and interpretation of a scenario will be influenced by
the beliefs and theoretical assumptions of the analyst. The account of themechanisms leading to alternative scenarios and judgment of the efficacy ofalternative actions is guided by one’s world view, although this is rarely madeexplicit1. Rarer still is the use of contrasting world-views to show the variation in
scenario interpretation (Miles, 1981). Though always difficult, critical reflectionand explication of the philosophical predisposition informing a scenario is an
essential aspect of scenario description and documentation.
Another important concept is the distinction between slow and fast dynamics
operating within socio-ecological systems . High-level structures such as
governance systems, economic modes of production, and cultural preferences tend
to change relatively slowly. Environmental processes can also be slow, forexample, significant climate response to human disturbances of the carbon cycle
can take many decades. By contrast, the dynamics of lower subsystems can be fast,
like the changing behavior of individual consumers in response to financial signals
or the quality of local water resources in response to emissions.
The tension between the slower processes of the whole and the more rapidchanges of subsystems shapes the critical uncertainties in the system. Over the
short term, the slower processes contain the faster processes. But as a system
becomes progressively more complex, it can become more brittle and vulnerable tothe influence of low-level, fast-dynamics (Holling, 1986). This can induce a rapid
qualitative change to a new state. Notably, the growing extent and speed of global
communications is accelerating high-level processes, and injecting more potential
for surprise into the global socio-ecological system (Gallopin, 1991).
1

A notable example was the Latin American World Model (Herrera et al., 1976).

10

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

The long-term persistence of the slow dynamics of large-scale structures areassociated with scenarios in which the future is shaped strongly by the past without
abrupt and fundamental discontinuities. We refer to this condition as structuralinvariance. For exploring a rich range of plausible long-term scenarios, however,
the hypothesis of structural invariance has to be relaxed. We turn next to a
structure for long-range global scenarios that goes beyond the assumption of theessential continuity of conventional structures.

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice

11

3.
SCENARIO OVERVIEWAll scenario exercises must organize the bewildering zoo of possible futures intosome kind of taxonomy. A practical structure for organizing global scenarios must
balance between two competing considerations. The goal of analytic rigor invites
an expansive range of scenario variations for exploring the full richness and textureof future possibilities. Conversely, the desire to communicate findings to a wide
audience of non-specialists dictates brevity and clarity, not to mention resource
constraints.
Generally, the exercises rely on a very few stylized scenarios for illuminating
key issues, choices and uncertainties concerning the future. In typical policyoriented studies, a “mid-range” scenario is complemented by additional scenarios
which are generated by varying key driving forces -- such as population, economic
growth, and technological change -- across high-low ranges. Our intention here is
to introduce a framework for transcending the practice of reducing the richdiversity of long-term possibilities to mere variation in quantitative assumptions.
It is useful to classify scenarios within a two-tier hierarchy: classes based on
fundamentally different social visions and variants reflecting a range of possible
outcomes within each class. This procedure highlights the plausible qualitativetransitions in fundamental directions for society in light of today’s driving forces,
future uncertainties and the many critical individual and collective decisions yet tobe taken. We begin with three broad classes which we call Conventional Worlds,
Barbarization, and Great Transitions distinguished by, respectively, essential
continuity with current pattern, fundamental but undesirable social change, andfundamental and favorable social transformation.
Conventional Worlds envision the global system of the 21st century evolving
without major surprises, sharp discontinuities, or fundamental transformations in
the basis for human civilization. The future is shaped by the continued evolution,
expansion and globalization of the dominant values and socio-economic
relationships of industrial society. By contrast, the Barbarization and Great
Transition scenario classes relax the notion of the long term continuity of dominantvalues and institutional arrangements. Indeed, these scenarios envision profoundhistorical transformations over the next century in the fundamental organizing
principles of society, perhaps as significant as the transition to settled agriculture
and the industrial revolution.
For each class, we define two variants, for a total of six scenarios. Within
Conventional Worlds, the Reference variant incorporates mid-range populationand development projections, and typical technological change assumptions. The
Policy Reform scenario adds strong, comprehensive and coordinated government
action, as called for in many policy-oriented discussions of sustainability, to achieve
greater social equity and environmental protection. In this variant, the political will
evolves for strengthening management systems and rapidly diffusing
environmentally-friendly technology. Whatever their differences, Conventional
Worlds variants share the premises of the continuity of institutions and values, therapid growth of the world economy and the convergence of global regions toward
the norms set by highly industrial countries. In the business-as-usual Reference
variant, the problem of resolving the social and environmental stress arising fromglobal population and economic growth is left to the self-correcting logic ofcompetitive markets. In the Policy Reform variant, sustainability is pursued as aproactive strategic priority.

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Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

Barbarization scenarios envision the grim possibility that the social,economic and moral underpinnings of civilization deteriorate, as emerging
problems overwhelm the coping capacity of both markets and policy reforms. The
Breakdown variant leads to unbridled conflict, institutional disintegration, andeconomic collapse. The Fortress World variant features an authoritarian responseto the threat of breakdown. Ensconced in protected enclaves, elites safeguard theirprivilege by controlling an impoverished majority and managing critical natural
resources, while outside the fortress there is repression, environmental destruction,and misery.
Great Transitions explore visionary solutions to the sustainability challenge,
including new socio-economic arrangements and fundamental changes in values.
These scenarios depict a transition to a society that preserves natural systems,
provides high levels of welfare through material sufficiency and equitable
distribution, and enjoys a strong sense of social solidarity. Population levels arestabilized at moderate levels and material flows through the economy are radicallyreduced through lower consumerism and massive use of green technologies. The
Eco-communalism variant incorporates the green vision of bio-regionalism,
localism, face-to-face democracy, small technology, and economic autarky. The
New Sustainability Paradigm variant shares some of these goals, but would seek
to change the character of urban, industrial civilization rather than replace it, tobuild a more humane and equitable global civilization rather than retreat into
localism.
Many alternative scenarios can be constructed as variations and blends ofthese pure cases. Scenarios more nuanced than the ideal types presented here
would reflect regional variations and the possibilities of discontinuous jumps at
critical points in the development trajectory. But the idealized taxonomy provides auseful framework and point of departure for more detailed explorations.
Conventional Worlds is where the standard policy discussion occurs.
Barbarization lurks as a danger, the punishment imposed on future generations forunwarranted complacency today. Great Transitions offer idealistic alternatives;
futures that may seem utopian, but are perhaps no less plausible than asustainability transition without fundamental social transformation.
The scenario structure is summarized in Figure 3, and indicative sketches ofthe behavior over time for six descriptive variables: population growth, economic
scale, environmental quality, socio-economic equity, technological change anddegree of social and geopolitical conflict. The curves are intended as roughillustrations of the possible patterns of change only.

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice

13

Figure 3. Scenarios Structure with Illustrative Patterns of Change

We expand on the scenario descriptions in the following sections. It is not
our intention here to provide detailed quantitative characterization of scenario
variants -- that shall remain a task for the future. Nevertheless, idealized andsimplified scenario trajectories are illustrated in Figure 4 in a “space” defined bypopulation along one axis and economic scale along the other. All scenarios departfrom today’s world, influenced by current driving forces. By the year 2100 -- theend of each trajectory in the figure -- the path has fractured into many possible
future worlds due to different responses to critical conditions.
Conventional Worlds scenarios incorporate standard projections of
population and economic growth. During the next century, population more thandoubles and economic output increases by more than eleven-fold as developing
regions gradually converge towards socio-economic patterns in rich countries. In
Barbarization-Fortress World, global income grows very slowly as the few
become much richer and the many get somewhat poorer. In Breakdown, world
population peaks in the middle of the next century before falling due to famine,
disintegration of health institutions and warfare, while income begins to fall withthe collapse of the economic and technological base. Great Transitions population
increases slowly to 2050, as the demographic momentum built into today’s
conditions plays out, then stabilizes or gradually decreases over the rest of the
century, due to assumed increased availability of contraception, increased status of

14

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

women, and decreased desire for child labor. This is plausible since someindustrialized countries today have lower fertility rates than implied by even thelowest population growth levels shown.

GROSS WORLD PRODUCT(trillion $)250

Policy Reform

200

Reference

150

Great Transitions
100

Fortress World
50

1990

Breakdown

0
0

2

4

6

8

10

12

POPULATION(billions)Figure 4. Illustrative Global Economic Output and Population for Scenarios (1990-2100)

The global picture of Figure 4 can be disaggregated by region. To glean the
broad patterns, we plot illustrative scenario patterns for two macro-regions inFigure 5, referred to as “rich and poor” regions (1990 figures are for the OECDand non-OECD regions). Figure 6 zooms in on the pattern in the rich regions.

250

Poor Regions

ECONOMIC OUTPUT(trillion $)200

Policy Reform

Reference

150

100

Great Transitions

Rich Regions

50

Fortress World
1990

1990

0
0

2

4

Breakdown
6

8

10

12

POPULATION(billions)Figure 5. Illustrative Economic Output and Population for Scenarios, by Macro-Region(1990-2100)

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice

1580

Reference70

Fortress WorldECONOMIC OUTPUT(trillion $)

60

50

40

Policy Reform

Great Transitions

30

20
1990
10

Breakdown
0
0.50

0.55

0.60

0.65

0.70

0.75

0.80

0.85

0.90

0.95

1.00

POPULATION(billions)Figure 6. Economic Output and Population, Blow-up of Rich Regions (1990-2100)

To get a better view of the equity implications of the scenarios, we plot the
scenarios in an “equity space” (Figure 7). In this view, the axes are average
incomes in rich and poor macro-regions (again, 1990 figures are for OECD andnon-OECD, respectively). As a scenario approaches the line of equity, thedifference between incomes in rich and poor areas diminishes. When a scenario
moves parallel to the line of equity, the absolute difference in incomes between theregions is maintained. Despite relatively rapid annual percent growth of developing
region economies assumed in standard projections, inequity persists in theConventional Worlds-Reference scenario, as the curve moves away from the lineof equity. In general, incomes gradually converge in the sense that the ratio of
average GDP per capita in regions to other regions decreases. However, theabsolute difference increases as incomes soar in rich countries.
By contrast, the trajectory of the Policy Reform variant approaches the lineof equity. Nevertheless, substantial income disparities remain, even by 2100,
despite the assumed moderate income growth rates in rich regions and substantial
wealth transfers. In general, it is extremely difficult to redress fully the current
global inequities under Conventional Worlds conditions that assume continuing
economic growth in rich areas. Barbarization-Breakdown is a high-equity scenario
but at low income levels, while the Barbarization-Fortress World, by definition, isa case of extreme inequity. The Great Transitions scenarios approach equity
conditions rapidly.

16

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

LINE OF EQUITY

INCOME IN POOR REGIONS(1000$/person)

30

Policy Reform

20

Great Transitions
Reference

10

45°

Breakdown

Fortress World

1990

0
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

INCOME IN RICH REGIONS(1000$/person)

Figure 7. Macro-Regional Equity Space for Scenarios (1990-2100)

70

80

90

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice

17

4.
CRITICAL TRENDS
A number of conditions and processes now underway act as basic drivers of change.
The momentum built into these drivers strongly influences the near-term evolution of
the global system and reduces the likelihood, and even the possibility, of many longrange scenarios. While current trends are not inevitably persistent, they certainly
condition the initial direction of economic, social, and environmental change and maystrongly influence even the long term future. It is important to recognize, however, that
ultimately these processes are themselves influenced by social, economic, andenvironmental conditions; they are human processes that can and do change as social
attitudes and expectations adjust to altered circumstances.
4.1. Population Growth
The human population is growing by about 900 million per decade -- the largest
absolute increase in human history. Nearly all of this growth is occurring in developing
countries. India's population, for example, is growing at 1.9 percent per year, as are thepopulations of Latin America and East Asia. Africa's population is growing much
faster, 2.8 percent per year, while China, at 1.1 percent per year, is growing much more
slowly, but on a large base. Developing countries are also experiencing a surge ofurbanization, with over 90 percent of their population growth occurring in urban areas.
Among the industrial and transitional economies, only the United States is experiencing
any significant population growth, in part because of continuing migration, while othernations in these categories have stable or declining populations.
Rapid population growth appears unavoidable for at least the next two or
three decades -- a consequence in part of rising life expectancies in most countries
and the large proportion of the population in developing regions that is not yet ofchild-bearing age. Population patterns after about 2025 will depend on a number offactors, the most important of which is fertility. Any population with a fertility
greater than replacement rate, about 2.1 children per woman, will continue togrow, while any population with a lesser fertility rate will eventually decline.
Current fertility rates show very large regional variations. Fertility is highest in
Africa, nearly 6 children per woman, which would lead to a doubling in that
region's population in 24 years assuming present life expectancies. By contrast,
China's fertility has dropped below the replacement rate, which if maintained willstabilize that country's population within a generation. Fertility rates for otherdeveloping regions fall between these figures, while those for many developed
countries are below the replacement rate.
Most population projections assume a gradual decline in fertility rates. The
UN medium projection, for example, assumes that all countries reach replacement
rate fertility by the year 2050. If the decline does not occur, then population
growth could be significantly higher than projected. At the same time, if childbearing attitudes and behavior were to change rapidly, or if mortality rates were to
rise precipitously, global population growth could be less rapid than in standard
projections.
4.2. Economic Growth
The global pattern of economic activity, now concentrated in the industrial countries, islikely to change. Economic growth rates in many developing regions are higher than in
the present industrial countries, presaging their growing role in the world's economy.
China's economy, for example, is already the third-largest in the world (when measured
in terms of its relative purchasing power instead of at the current exchange value of its

18

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swartcurrency) and growing more than twice as fast as that of the United States. India,
Southeast Asia, and Latin America are also growing more rapidly than the present
industrial economies. If these trends continue, the world economy will no longer be
dominated by the United States, Europe, and Japan, but will increasingly include anumber of major new participants, possibly including a revitalized and resurgent Russia.
Average per capita incomes in developing regions, however, are likely to remain far
below those in the present industrial countries.
Global consumption of energy and raw materials is also rising. Indeed,although per capita consumption of raw materials and energy has generally reacheda plateau in the industrial countries in recent decades, the developing countries'
needs for basic infrastructure -- and their still-growing populations -- means thatenergy and materials consumption is likely to continue to rise rapidly for some time
to come. Per capita levels of energy and materials consumption in these countries
remain much lower than in developed countries. These historic gaps will persist
over the next decades, closing only gradually with economic growth in the nonindustrialized countries. Overall, rising consumption of natural resources is likely
to lead to increased environmental degradation, especially in developing countries,
although increasing efficiency in the use of energy and materials could partially
offset these trends.
4.3. Technological Change
We live in a period of rapid, perhaps unprecedented technological innovation. One way
to gain perspective on such changes is to compare them to an earlier period of equallyfundamental technological change. The industrial revolution was marked by a roughly
thousand-fold increase in the ability to harness energy for industrial purposes -- achange from one horsepower to a 1000-horsepower steam engine. The last third of the20th century is marked by great changes in the ability to manipulate and transmit
information, including dramatic increases in computing power (an increase by a factor
of about 100,000 in the number of transistors on a microchip) and in
telecommunications capacity (an increase by a factor of about 10,000 in the number ofbits per second that can be transmitted along a single optical fiber).
This double revolution in information technology is far from complete and its
social effects -- which may include a significant global impact on industrialorganization and the structure of economic activity, employment patterns, andlifestyles -- are only beginning to be widely experienced. But it already is clear thatthey may be profound, displacing some forms of human mental activity (in muchthe same way that the industrial revolution displaced some forms of humanphysical activity) while enabling others, possibly including far more complex formsof social organization.
In addition, the biotechnology revolution -- the ability to manipulate genetic
information and the biochemical mechanisms of living organisms -- and thematerials revolution -- the ability to craft new materials at the molecular level -- areboth gathering momentum, though their full technological impact is uncertain andlies some decades in the future. Intense competition in the global market placeprovides incentive for rapid introduction and world-wide diffusion of newtechnologies. The technological ground rules are likely to change significantly overthe next half century with the potential for immense impacts through employment
displacement, life-style change and the globalization of culture.

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice

19

4.4. Decentralization of Authority
Currently, there is a strong trend toward decentralization of authority and greater
individual autonomy. On an individual level, this trend is noticeable in increased
emphasis on "rights" -- human rights, women's rights, and so on. In the private sector,
this trend is reflected in the form of "flat" corporate structures and decentralized
decision-making -- even in the rise of entities that have no formal authority structure,such as the Internet. In the public sector, the trend is noticeable in the spread of
democratic governments, in the devolution of governmental authority to smaller andmore local units, and in separatist movements.
These trends and the rise of many new actors -- from citizens groups to
global corporations -- make governance an increasingly complex process. Global
capital markets, for example, are not under the control of any government and candestabilize even strong currencies. Global communications networks from CNN tocellular satellite phones to the Internet convey information that is increasingly
difficult for even determined governments to control. The growing strength ofthese global private sector entities is in marked contrast to the continuing weaknessof global governance institutions. On a local and national level, the growing
number and influence of non-governmental organizations and citizens groups is inpart due to their ability to provide information and services that governments do
not or cannot provide.
4.5. Equity Trends
A worrisome trend is the growing economic stratification between rich and poor bothwithin and among countries. In the United States, for example, the distribution offamily incomes has widened over the past 20 years. Families in the lower half of theincome distribution have actually lost ground in constant dollars, while those in theupper 20 percent have done very well, many becoming extravagantly wealthy. The
income gap between developing and developed countries has increased over the same
period. For example, the gap between average per capita income in Japan and in China,
has doubled, while that between the US and China has increased by 30 percent, despite
rapid economic growth in China. An increasing percentage of global income and wealthaccrues to the richest 20 percent of the world's population. Standard economic
projections suggest that inequity is likely to become more extreme in coming decades
within countries, as welfare policies are weakened, and among countries, where only
very feeble international mechanisms exist for wealth transfer. Widening equity gaps
within a society may threaten social stability; widening gaps among nations motivate
illegal immigration and social tension, complicating attempts to forge joint solutions to
global problems.
4.6. Resource Depletion
The most accessible and economic nonrenewable resources, such as minerals or energy
resources, are being depleted. Growing global demands eventually will require themore efficient use of these resources and the development of substitutes, a continuingchallenge to technology. This challenge was met over the past twenty years, concernswith “limits to growth” notwithstanding, as known reserves (economically exploitable
resources) are higher and real commodity prices are lower. Nevertheless, current trends
could lead to shortages and dislocations in strategic materials over the next decades, forexample, a re-emergence of oil shortages and, with it, the potentially explosive geopolitics of oil (Raskin and Margolis, 1995).

20

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

Of even greater concern is the depletion and degradation of so-called
renewable resources such as fresh water, fish and shellfish, and forests in many
parts of the world. The cause is both harvesting of resources at rates greater thanthey can be replenished and increasing damage to the natural systems that sustain
renewable resources -- clearing of forests, degradation of fertile soils, exhaustionof fisheries, damage to watersheds and estuaries. This trend has been dominatedhistorically by the over-exploitation of resources to service industrialization, but
has been linked also to the growing populations of impoverished people who
depend on and are forced to over-use these resources, for lack of other options.
Depleted resources, in turn, undermine rural economies. Thus, this environmental
trend is closely linked to the problem of poverty.
4.7. Pollution and Global Environmental Change
The rapidly growing urban areas in developing countries are subjecting larger andlarger populations to urban pollution hazards, from shortages of both clean drinking
water and sanitation to exposure to air pollution and toxic materials. Despite significant
progress, the number of people who lack access to clean drinking water is still growing(WRI, 1996). Most megacities in developing countries fail to meet World HealthOrganization standards for air quality. Both trends are significant threats to humanhealth.
On a global scale, worldwide emissions of carbon dioxide -- a major
greenhouse gas -- are rising rapidly, a consequence of growing use of coal, oil, andnatural gas. Projections of future energy demand suggest that energy use will
double by the year 2020, for example, and that carbon dioxide emissions will riseby nearly the same amount, reflecting continuing high levels of energy use indeveloped countries and growing industrialization in many developing countries.
The implication of this trend is that, far from stabilizing atmospheric levels ofcarbon dioxide, the world is accelerating the threat of global climate change.
Other social and environmental trends may also prove significant over thelong term -- rapid shifts in labor markets in both developed countries (from manualto "knowledge-work" jobs with considerable labor displacement and structural
unemployment) and developing countries (from agricultural labor to urban
manufacturing and service jobs), the growing trend to violence in all societies, thepotential threat to human fertility and cognitive abilities from chronic exposures to
toxic materials. At the same time, literacy is improving, incomes and health are
generally rising (although not for everyone), and the risk of total war appears to be
declining, although numerous hot spots persist.

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice

21

5.
CONVENTIONAL WORLDSAll scenarios unfold from a common point of departure, the initial conditions anddriving forces as characterized in the previous section. The Conventional Worlds
family of scenarios are distinguished by the assumptions of no major
discontinuities, fundamental change in human values, or other structural ruptures.
They have in common a vision of a world where development, governed by thegrowth dynamics of modern industrial society, is gradual and steady. Population
grows at mid-range projections and aggregate economic output expands
indefinitely while consumption and production practices in developing andtransitional regions converge toward those of industrialized countries, even as thelatter become much richer. The world becomes progressively more integrated both
economically and culturally in Conventional Worlds, though scenario variants candiverge in many important ways on how, when and to what degree this might
happen.
5.1. The Paradigm
The present historical juncture is best understood in the context of the advance ofthe modern era, a long and continuing process of social transformation. The
industrial revolution, a defining moment of this process, ushered in an era ofaccelerating cultural, technological and geopolitical change which continues today.
Based on the expansion of production and the penetration of new markets, thesystem of industrial capitalism has penetrated societies on its periphery and,overcoming traditionalist and socialist resistance nearly everywhere, incorporated
them into the nexus of market relations. Contemporary globalization phenomena isa stage of this two hundred year process.
The conventional paradigm makes the apparently moderate, though notnecessarily probable, assumption of the unimpeded unfolding of the values andsocio-economic arrangements that evolved during the industrial era. There areseveral interlinked aspects of the Conventional Worlds vision. Competitive markets
and private investment remain the engines for economic growth and wealthallocation. Globalization of product and labor markets continues apace, catalyzed
by free trade agreements, unregulated capital and financial flows, and information
technology. Transnational corporations dominate an increasingly borderless
economy. Consumerism and possessive individualism endure as primary human
motives. Consumption patterns and production practices in developing regions
converge toward those of highly industrialized countries. The nation-state thrives
as the dominant unit of governance. Consumer culture permeates all societies via
electronic media, eventually reducing diversity despite fundamentalist, ethnic andnationalist backlash.
5.2. Variations
Within these broad parameters, many Conventional World scenario variants areconceivable based on variations in a number of uncertain factors. These factors
include long-range demographic patterns, the changing structure of regional
economic and geo-political dominance, the severity of environmental feedbacks
and constraints, the scale of economically recoverable natural resources and thepace of technological innovation. Other important characteristics of scenarios are
the assumed degree and speed of socio-economic convergence between countries
and the level of distributional equity within countries.

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Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

Finally, the policy dimension -- the character and timing of governmental
action -- is critical for distinguishing among Conventional Worlds scenarios. At
one extreme, a non-interventionist, “business-as-usual” attitude toward policy canbe pictured -- a Conventional World-Reference variant where little policy
adjustment is assumed. Depending on the philosophical predisposition of theobserver, the risks of such a laissez-faire scenario will be weighed very differently.
Free market optimists tend to downgrade environmental and social concerns,
trusting in market adaptations to provide timely solutions. Pessimist about theadequacy of automatic market mechanisms would fear that a business-as-usual
stance toward the future would endanger, perhaps catastrophically, the long-range
health of social and ecological systems.
By contrast, policy-intensive scenarios assume the enactment of acomprehensive and vigorous set of actions with the aim of steering the system
away from destabilizing social tension and environmental pressure, and towardsustainability. The Conventional World-Policy Reform scenario is an example.
Again, depending on one’s world view, such scenarios may be perceived as
unrealistic and even evil (if you favor unfettered competitive markets to optimize
the social good), or a more enlightened approach to sustainability (if you believe
collective action is needed to promote equity, ecology and other values). To
disclose the obvious, the present authors tend toward the latter orientation.
The Reference scenario variant incorporates strong economic growth, midrange population and development projections, and gradual technological change
assumptions. The Policy Reform variant introduces measures to address two of the
problematic aspects of the Reference scenario-- poverty and threats to the environment. It attempts to balance the objective ofhigh economic growth with strong policies for distributional equity andenvironmental protection, primarily through the rapid development and deploymentof improved technology. Global scenario research must eventually explore thesensitivity to a reasonable range of demographic, economic, technological, andgeo-political variables. For now, these variants offer a manageable glimpse of the
problems and possibilities within a conventional development framework.
5.3. Reference Variant: The Problem
In the Reference scenario, economic growth is given first priority as largely
unregulated markets expand internationally. While some countries, groups andfirms lose the race and are excluded, many prosper. Population growth is uneven
with rapid increases in some of the poorer regions, slow or even negative change insome of the richer regions, while there is increasing migration pressure from poor
to rich areas. The rich get richer and, even though new social strata achieveaffluence, poverty persists. Indeed, income distribution becomes increasingly
skewed both within most nations and between rich and poor countries despitesome efforts to combat absolute poverty. Environmental quality improves in someof the rich areas, deteriorates in the poor areas while the cumulative effects on
global scales are exacerbated. Social friction is aggravated by migration pressure,competition for natural resources, and environmental deterioration. Discord isaddressed piecemeal through conflict resolution mechanisms that tend to preserve
the prerogatives of the powerful.
To this narrative, we can add a quantitative sketch of the scenario byincorporating current trends, policies and mainstream assumptions on development(Raskin et al., 1996a; Raskin et al., 1997; Leach, 1995). Following UN projections,Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice23

we assume that average fertility rates approach replacement levels (about 2.1 births
per woman) over the next 50 years, as developing region development patterns inthe scenario gradually converge toward those of highly developed regions (United
Nations, 1992). This demographic shift is driven in part by family planning efforts
and greater equality for women. Nevertheless, world population nearly doubles by
the year 2050 to just over 10 billion people, as it approaches equilibrium levels.
Nearly all the increase is in developing regions, as populations in the rich regions asa share of world total decreases from about 20% today to 10% in 2050.
Economic assumptions for the scenario are based on 1990 figures drawn
from World Bank (1993) data and mid-range projections from the IPCC (1992).
The world economy grows from about $20 trillion in 1990 to $95 trillion in 2050
with continued growth thereafter (monetary figures are expressed in 1990 $). The
economies of developing regions grow more rapidly than OECD regions, withaverage annual growth rates to the year 2050 at about 3.6% and 2%, respectively.
Consequently, the OECD share of world output decreases from 80% in 1990 to
60% in 2050. Despite the relatively rapid growth in developing region economies,
inequity persists in the Conventional World-Reference scenario. Because of highpopulation growth rates, income growth rates are significantly less than total GDP
growth rates in developing countries. In general, incomes gradually converge in thesense that the ratio of average GDP per capita in regions to other regions
decreases from 20 in 1990 to 15 in 2050. However, the absolute difference
increases from an average of 18,000 $/capita in 1990 to 55,000 $/capita by 2050 asincomes soar in rich countries.
In addition to these aggregate drivers, the Reference scenario assumes anumber of underlying structural processes. A gradual shift continues in thecomposition of economic activity from industry to services in OECD countries(and eventually, other regions). In particular, the shares of material intensive
industries decreases gradually, consistent with recent trends in industrializedcountries. The penetration of new technology leads to more efficient use of energy
and water, growing utilization of renewable energy resources, and cleaner
industrial processes.
The aggregate patterns of the scenario are illustrated in Figure 8 whichshows selected global indicators for the year 2025 and 2050 (relative to 1990
values). Note that energy and water use grow far less rapidly than GDP due to thestructural and technological changes described above. Despite reductions in thethroughput per unit of GDP (throughput refers to the materials input to theeconomy and waste output), pressure on resources and the environment increase as
the growth in the scale of human activity overwhelms the greater levels of
efficiency. As a measure of environmental pressure, we see that carbon dioxide
emissions (CO2), the major contributor to the risk of global climate change,
increase substantially.

24

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

4.5

MULTIPLE OF 1990 QUANTITY

4
3.5

3

1990
2025
2050

2.5
2

1.5

1
0.5

0
POPULATION

GDP per
CAPITAGDP

FOOD

ENERGYWATER

CO2EMISSIONS

Figure 8. Global Patterns in Conventional Worlds-Reference Scenario

The Conventional Worlds-Reference scenario provides a benchmark foranalyzing the constraints and obstacles to business-as-usual development, and thetiming and scale required for the adoption of alternative behaviors, institutions andtechnologies. There are strong indications that such a scenario is not likely to beeither sustainable or desirable. Here, we identify only briefly some of the more
serious environmental, resource, and social obstacles and risks that lie along thispath of development (Raskin et al., 1996a).
First, the cumulative loads on biogeochemical cycles and ecosystems in the
scenario could exceed natural assimilative capacities. This is exemplified by the
sharp increase in CO2, which contradicts radically the climate stabilization goal of
reduced emissions. There are parallel problems in such areas as habitat destruction,
biodiversity loss, and the accumulation of toxic chemicals in the environment.
Second, heightened pressure on resources could lead to disruption,
dislocation and conflict. In the absence of unexpected discoveries, sometime during
the first few decades of the next century oil would again become scarce, prices
would rise and the geopolitics of oil would return as a major theme in international
affairs. Growing water demands and pollution loads would increasingly stressrenewable water resources, threaten aquatic ecosystems and generate discord over
the allocation of scarce fresh water within and between countries (Raskin et al.,1995). Agricultural output would need to more than double by 2050 in order tofeed a richer and larger population, which would lead to further conversion offorests and wetlands, increase in the pollution of soil and water systems, and thecontinued loss of degraded arable land due to unsustainable farming practices.
Exacerbating the agriculture challenge is the near certainty that future expansion ofirrigation, which played a significant role in the historic expansion of foodproduction, will be seriously constrained by water shortage and lack of suitablesites. Unfavorable climate alterations would further complicate matters in many
areas.

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice25

and resource constraint, would undermine social cohesion, stimulate migration andweaken international security. We have seen, for example, that conflict over oil andwater can be expected, while the impacts of climate change, though speculative,
could be severely disruptive. Breakdowns in socio-political stability could provide,in turn, the conditions for authoritarianism, for the flaring of regional, ethnic, andreligious conflict, and for the suppression of democratic institutions. That is, for a
cataclysmic leap toward Barbarization.
5.4. Policy Reform Variant: The Answer?
Fortunately, there is the more salutary possibility that such risks would induce acomprehensive policy response to steer the system toward sustainability. The
Policy Reform scenario is still growth-oriented but assumes a comprehensive
policy response to the environmental and social risks encountered in the Reference
scenario. The scenario does not assume major deviations in the conventional
development paradigm, values and institutional structures, but within those
constraints incorporates rapid economic growth, far greater distributional equity
and vigorous attempts to protect the environment.
The definitive reference for this vision is Our Common Future (WCED,1987), the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development(popularly referred to as “Brundtland” after the Commission’s chairperson). Thishighly influential work offered a comprehensive appraisal of the “interlocking
crises” threatening the future, and an eloquent call for “a new era of economic
growth, one that must be based on policies that sustain and expand theenvironmental resource base”.
The Brundtland report popularized the concept of sustainable development,
arguing that a healthy economy and a healthy ecology should be viewed as
mutually dependent goals, not antagonistic values. Moreover, the report linked
environmental protection to the eradication of poverty through economic growth.
Greater social equity is therefore not only an ethical imperative for Brundtland, but
an objective requirement for sustainable development. The Commission identified aset of policy directions for reducing poverty, creating better management systems
and for the more rapid development, transfer and deployment of environmentallyfavorable technology, which were further elaborated in Agenda 21, a major
agreement of United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in
1992 in Rio de Janeiro (UNCED, 1992).
The broad contours of a Policy Reform scenario were sketched in Figure 3 -high income and economic growth, improving environmental conditions, greater
equity and reduced conflict. A hypothetical scenario was plotted in Figure 4
showing gross world trends in population and economic output. Note that
population growth is somewhat moderated relative to Reference scenario (due tomore rapid modernization in developing regions), average incomes are higher andthe scale of the aggregate global economy remains high. The difference between
the two scenarios is better revealed in Figures 5 and 6, which show scenario
trajectories for each macro-region, and Figure 7. Policy Reform is shown to reflecta considerably more rapid approach to equity than the Reference variant, but
remains far from closing the gap between rich and poor regions.
Policy Reform assumes a transition toward far greater efficiency of resourceuse, more reliance on renewable resources and less environmental pressure. For
example, energy requirements and the use of fossil fuels is diminished sharply
under Policy Reform assumptions. This is illustrated in Figures 9 and 10 which

26

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swartshow possible long range global energy patterns in Policy Reform and Reference
cases (Pontius and Raskin, 1996).

1200
Renew ables

Primary Energy(Exajoules)

1000

Hydropow er

800

Traditional Fuels

600

Uranium

400

Nat Gas

200

Coal

0
1990

Crude Oil
2025

2050

2075

2100

Year

Figure 9. Global Energy Requirements for Policy Reform Scenario

1600
Renew ables
1400
Hydropow er

Primary Energy(Exajoules)

1200
Traditional Fuels

1000
800

Uranium

600
Natural Gas
400
Coal
200
0
1990

Crude Oil
2025

2050

2075

2100

Year

Figure 10. Global Energy Requirements for Reference Scenario

Policy Reform scenarios explore the scope for policy-driven improvements intechnology and management systems for meeting sustainability goals. Two kinds ofquestions can be raised about this strategy, one pragmatic and one normative. A
practical concern is whether Policy Reform, without fundamental structuralchange, offers a plausible pathway to sustainability. In the market-driven
institutional context assumed, it would be an immense challenge to marshal thepolitical will for the massive policy intervention required. This is underscored in
Figure 11 which compares carbon dioxide emissions from energy for the two
Conventional Worlds variants, based on the energy patterns discussed above.

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice

27

Cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide are curtailed in the Policy Reform case,but still grow despite dramatic shifts toward a sustainable energy system.
In addition to pragmatic questions, there is also a normative critique: thePolicy Reform approach might achieve a sustainable world, but not one consideredworth living in. The life-styles and values offered by Conventional Worlds
ultimately may be found undesirable on social, environmental, or ethical grounds.
Alternative social visions -- Great Transitions -- may evolve that would
accommodate nature more and engineer it less, while asserting the values ofcooperation, community, culture and material sufficiency into a world seen to be
driven by excessive competition, individualism, vulgarity and greed. This
perspective is developed further in Section 7.

1600

CUMULATIVE EMISSIONS(Gigatons of C)

1400

1200

1000

800

Reference

600

400

Policy Reform
200

0
1990

2025

2050

2075

YEAR

Figure 11. Energy-related CO2 Emissions for Conventional Worlds Scenarios

2100

28

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice

29

6.
BARBARIZATION
Conventional Worlds assume that environmental and social tensions are resolved
through the co-evolution of countervailing factors. In the Reference variant, theadaptations occur organically through the self-correcting logic of markets, social
patterns and human ingenuity, while in the Policy Reform variant, the necessary
adjustments are a matter of active policy management. Barbarization scenarios
explore the possibility that the coming century will be far grimmer, as the destabilizing stresses of Conventional Worlds overwhelm the coping capacity ofmarkets and management institutions. The socio-ecological system veers toward
worlds of sharply declining physical amenities and erosion of the social and moral
underpinnings of civilization. We explore such scenarios to be forewarned, to help
identify early warning signs and to increase the readiness to counteract theconditions that could initiate them.
6.1. The Scenarios Unfold
The major driving forces propelling this scenario include worldwide political andeconomic changes, inequity and persistent poverty, growing populations,environmental degradation and technological innovation. Following the breakdownof the Soviet Union, capitalism is ascendant everywhere. A critical uncertainty,
however, is whether the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
will make a successful transition to market-based economies and democratic
political systems.
Social concerns are radically downgraded as national governments graduallylose relevance and power relative to transnational corporations and global market
forces. A growing disenchantment with the idea of development aid permeates
industrial societies. Foreign assistance is reduced drastically, and earmarked
increasingly for disaster relief and peacekeeping operations, not genuine
development (Mathews, 1994). Absolute poverty increases and the gap between
rich and poor -- both within and between rich and poor countries -- continues to
grow.
The resentment of poor people rises. Increased exposure to global media andtourism in underdeveloped regions accentuates the immense differences in life
styles between rich and poor. The conviction festers that the poor have beencheated out of development, that their options have been pre-empted by thewealthy. Among intellectuals in developing countries, awareness grows that highconsumption life styles will not be available to all who might aspire to it. A newsocial actor emerges: educated, downwardly mobile and angry. Social polarization
feeds off the disenchantment of the rich and resentment of the poor.
With rapid population growth in the poorer regions, a huge international
youth culture emerges. Numbering in the billions, the "global teenager" shareremarkably similar expectations and attitudes, with consumerist and nihilist
tendencies reinforced by ubiquitous entertainment and advertising imagery reaching
every corner of the earth through the expanding information revolution. But the
tantalizing visions and products of “McWorld” are largely unattainable, as
increasing expectations and decreasing access collide (Barber, 1995). Thesetensions induce waves of legal and illegal migration to rich countries, and to areasof prosperity within poor countries, as the young and mobile seek a better life.
Despite some successes, notably in the richest countries, environmental
conditions continue to worsen. The unfettered expansion of market-based
economies leads to increased industrial activity and rising pollution. Rapid

30

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

urbanization displaces natural ecosystems and severely stresses local environments.
Deepening rural poverty accelerates soil degradation and deforestation. As
freshwater resources become increasingly scarce, conflict over water emerges
among riverine countries. Already brittle marine fisheries collapse under additionalpressure, depriving a billion people of their primary source of protein. Climatechange causes hardship for subsistence farmers in many regions. Famine in Africa
and elsewhere grows more frequent and more severe, while the response capacityof relief agencies slackens. Mortality rates increase in association with deepening
environmental degradation, compounded by the emergence of new and theresurgence of old diseases (Miller, 1989).
Technological advance initially continues. But scientific and technicalknowledge becomes increasingly a private commodity and decreasingly part of the
public domain, slowing progress on fundamental problems. Control of innovation
and access to information become part of the growing gap between rich and poor.
While high-tech products are widely disseminated through the global market,
technological innovation and its economic benefits are further concentrated in therich countries and transnational corporations.
Severe social and military conflict spread. Social tensions fester in thecontext of deepening socio-economic inequity, increased morbidity, and reduced
access to natural resources. International discord is driven by widening interregional disparity, growing economic competition and the progressive withdrawalof rich countries from significant engagement in development assistance. Rather
than big wars, small-scale armed conflicts and violence become common, driven bya wide variety of causes: ethnic or religious differences, ideologically-based
terrorism, struggles over natural resources, competing nationalisms, andcommercial wars between economic groups, both legal and illegal (such as drug
dealers).
Civil order breaks down in many areas leaving a kind of criminal anarchy in
its wake (Kaplan, 1994). Within the rich countries, there is a growing perceptionthat poor and growing populations in the developing regions threaten their wellbeing through migration, crime, terrorism, disease, and global environmental
degradation. Conflict takes a toll increasingly on economic growth. Public andprivate resources are diverted to security, as international investment in troubled
regions plummets. In societies consumed by conflict, both environmental
protection and infrastructure maintenance are neglected, hastening degradation anddecay -- reversing decades of development. The poor are increasingly vulnerable tofloods, droughts and other extreme weather events, which are more frequent andsevere as global climate change proceeds apace.
An era of accelerating regional fragmentation, economic and political
disorder and a poisonous intolerance descends. Some countries devolve to ajagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states, and nebulous regional formations.
Some formerly prosperous industrial countries join the ranks of impoverishedstates. Incessant conflict, chaos and uncertainty fosters pervasive fear andhopelessness. Economic development ceases, technological progress stagnates(except for better security for the privileged), and no individual country is able tolead or control the others.
The reaction of the remaining powerful institutions -- country alliances,transnational corporations, international organizations, armed forces -- to thismultidimensional crisis constitutes a critical uncertainty in the Barbarization
process. In the Breakdown variant, the response is inadequate to cope with theBranch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice31

rising tide of socio-economic chaos, as conflict and rivalry overwhelm all efforts toimpose coherence. In the Fortress World variant, the response is sufficiently
coherent and forceful to impose a form of authoritarian order. Key elements anddecision points are summarized in Figure 12.

32

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart*Cold War ends
*Capitalism universallyascendant*Globalization accelerates*Military restructuring*Private security industry
booms*Weapons readily available*Fissible materials illegally
traded*High population growth in poor
regions*Youthful population structures
in P*Aging populations structures inR*Absolute poverty persists*High distributional inequity
within countries*Large income gaps between
countries*R experience steadyeconomic growth*Few "tigers" grow rapidly*Disparity between R and P
widens*Map of wealth/poverty shifts*Deterioration of biosphericsystems*Accelerating ecosystems
and habitat destruction*Human health impacts widen*Foreign development aid
decreases*National welfare systems
erode*UN system crippled*Ethnic, nationalistic and religious
tensions mount*Non-ideological conflicts flare*Disputes over scarce natural
resources broaden*Organized crime and drug cartels
flourish*Environmental stressheightens*Ecosystem disturbance atplanetary scale*Global interdependence
advances*High tech development continues*TNCs control innovation anddiffusion*Benefits monopolized by R
*Global information system
expands*Disenchantment
everywhere*Resentment deepens inP*R perceive P as serious
threat*Xenophobia rises in R
*Expansionism to secureborders widespread*Economic instability*Rampant
unemployment*Economies stagnate, evenamong R
*Life quality deteriorates*Environmental problems
intensify*Technologicaldecline*Management
systems debilitated*Societies become
disorderly*Regions fragment

R, TNCs compete(BREAKDOWN )R, TNCs unite to control P(FORTRESS WORLD )R=rich (regions, countries, groups)
P=poor (regions, countries, groups)

Figure 12. Barbarization Unfolds*Massivemigration*Crime rates riseBranch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice33

6.2. Breakdown
In this variant, the vicious cycle of chaos, conflict and desperation spiral out ofcontrol. The security apparatus within remaining privileged areas cannot containthe tide of violence from disaffected individuals, terrorist organizations, ethnoreligous groups, economic factions, and organized crime. Collapse of civil order
becomes widespread, as populations become increasingly desperate andgovernments weaken.
Refugees fleeing from chaotic zones destabilize neighboring areas,
inadvertently contributing to widening waves of disorder. To stem migration,
increasing resources are devoted to police powers, border security, and control of
the activities of citizens. The global economic, finance and governance systems
founder, though the media lingers to spread fresh news of upheaval. The retreat ofglobalization is particularly devastating for industrial economies highly dependent
on trade and imported natural resources. The result is rising unemployment,
economic depression, political instability, and outbreaks of civil disorder, even inrich countries.
This self-reinforcing chain of events eventually leads to a generaldisintegration of social, cultural, and political institutions, deindustrialization (tovarying degrees in different regions), and in many regions a return to semi-tribal or
feudal societal structures. With the collapse of markets and investment generally,
technological progress halts -- and the level of technological capability regresses.
Population eventually begins to decrease as mortality rates surge with economic
collapse and environmental degradation. Many couples, deeply pessimistic about
the future, choose not to bring children into the world. In a bitter irony, equity
increases but only because everybody gets poorer. Breakdown conditions could
persist for many decades before social evolution to higher levels of civilization
again becomes possible.
6.3. Fortress WorldIn the Fortress World variant, powerful regional and international actors
comprehend the perilous forces leading to Breakdown. They are able to muster asufficiently organized response to protect their own interests and to create lasting
alliances between them. Arising within the cynical and pessimistic social mood of
Barbarization conditions, these alliances are not directed at improving the general
well-being, but at protecting the privileges of rich and powerful elites. This isviewed as a matter of necessity in a world in which wealth, resources andconventional governance systems are eroding. The elite retreat to protectedenclaves, mostly in historically rich nations, but in favored enclaves in poor nations,as well.
Outside the fortress, the majority is mired in poverty, denied access to scarce
resources and restricted in mobility, expression and basic rights. The authorities
employ active means of repression to guarantee exclusive access to needed
resources (such as oil fields and key mines) and to stop further degradation of the
global commons of air and ocean resources. Draconian measures are required tocontrol social unrest and migration. Strategic mineral reserves, freshwater andimportant biological resources are put under military control.
Technology is maintained in the fortresses, even with some continued
innovation, but deteriorates elsewhere. Local pollution within the fortress is
reduced through increased efficiency and recycling. Pollution is also exported
outside the enclaves, contributing to the extreme environmental deterioration

34

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

induced by the unsustainable practices of the desperately poor and by the
extraction of resources for the wealthy. However, favored resort areas including
nature and hunting preserves are declared ecological protection zones, from which
the poor are excluded.
The elite have halted the advance of barbarism at their heavily guarded gates,but only by barbarizing the majority of the human race. They are entrenched inbubbles of privilege amidst oceans of misery, descendants of the “gated cities” andpersonal security industry of our own time. In this scenario, the major line ofconflict is between the rich and the poor, a new functional divide replacing the old
North-South notion. Global equity is very low, though it could be high within thefortress, and outside. For those unfortunate enough to be born poor, life is
Hobbesian: nasty, brutish, and short.
The sustainability of the Fortress World is contingent on the organizational
ability of the privileged enclaves to maintain control over the disenfranchised. A
general uprising of the excluded population, especially if rivalry opens fissures in
the common front of the rich groups, could overturn the system. The scenario
seems to contain the seeds of its own destruction, although it could last for
decades. The collapse of the Fortress World could lead to a Breakdown trajectoryor to the emergence of a new, more equitable world order.

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice

35

7.
GREAT TRANSITIONSConventional Worlds offer visions of gradual adjustment and essential continuityof future values and institutions with those of the industrial era. Barbarization
scenarios glimpse the unhappy possibility that conventional development fails tocope with the environmental and social stresses it induces, and civilization
unravels. We turn now to a third path, Great Transitions scenarios in which global
society, rather than descending into cruelty and chaos, evolves to a higher stage.
7.1. Narrowing the Focus
Great Transitions may seem idealistic and improbable from today’s perspective -but they are possible, and may even be necessary to achieve the goals ofsustainability and equity. They imply structural rather than incremental changes insocial practices and therefore a discontinuity in the historical trajectory. They could
emerge, if at all, either through a fundamental departure from the current path, or
as a new start following a destructive period of barbarization.
The second possibility -- that a good society emerges from the ashes ofdesolation -- may be intriguing as a matter for contemplation and creative fiction.
But it is not instructive for policy-making or for formulating actions to avoid
barbarization. That is, unless barbarization was thought to be inevitable, in whichcase strategies might be considered for planting the seeds for renewal sometime in
the future, and protecting them during the coming dark ages. Or, if one thought the
only path to a great transition went through barbarization, the perverse conclusion
might be drawn that it would be desirable to accelerate barbarization throughfostering chaos and anarchy. It is our conviction, however, that barbarization is
avoidable, so such extreme pessimism and dubious ethics, while not inconsistent,
will concern us no further.
There is an immense range of possible Great Transitions scenarios.
Reasonable people can disagree on the desirability, stability and likelihood ofalternative visions of a golden age in the next century. Our taxonomy of idealized
scenarios (Section 4) introduced two variants to reflect at least some of thisdiversity: Eco-communalism and the New Sustainability Paradigm.
Eco-communalism envisions a patchwork of semi-isolated and self-reliant
communities. If this world were ever to occur, it might be quite sustainable withhigh equity, low economic growth, and low populations. Advances in theunderstanding of human behavior, in psychological dynamics and in holistic
education could minimize the likelihood of the emergence of aggressive behavior.
Nevertheless, a major threat to sustainability could come from the possibility thatsome of the more or less isolated communities develop into aggressive,
expansionist forces which attempt to dominate neighboring communities.
That said, it is difficult to identify a plausible trajectory leading from thepresent situation to Eco-communalism. The acceleration of globalization and thecomplexity of modern economies suggest that, even if there were a transition tosuch a society, it is likely to be mediated through a series of other social
formations. There appear to be two possibilities.
First, Eco-communalism could emerge from a New Sustainability Paradigm
world if a powerful consensus arose for localism, diversity, and autonomy. Then,perhaps, inter-regional economic, political and social linkages could whither,
especially if revolutionary advances in small-scale technology make themaintenance of large-scale infrastructure and trade unnecessary. Second, Ecocommunalism might emerge in the recovery from Breakdown. Under conditions of36

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

reduced population and a rupture in modern institutions, a network of societies,
guided by a “small-is-beautiful” philosophy conceivably could arise. In either case,our focus must turn to the New Sustainability Paradigm, as either a precursor ofother social systems or as an alternative to barbarization.
7.2. New Social Actors, New World View
Current driving forces have been discussed in earlier sections and are the common
point of departure for all scenarios: global political and economic change,
structural inequity and persistent poverty, growing population, environmental
problems, and technological innovation. Here we expand on two aspects -- newsocial actors and an incipient new world outlook -- that are particularly germane
pre-conditions for a Great Transition.
The second half of the 20th century saw the emergence of three importantsocial actors: intergovernmental global organizations, transnational corporations,and non-governmental organizations. The United Nations and its constellation of
specialized agencies are representative of intergovernmental organizations. Despite
its scale and many achievements, hopes that the UN would play a major role inglobal governance -- from peacekeeping to development -- have not been fulfilledby the end of the century. Inefficiency, lack of funding, and the absence of any real
power compromised the original vision of the UN as a global civil service, while
the organization became a forum for airing national political tension, especiallyduring the Cold War period. Still, it does represent the legitimate voice of thegovernments of the planet. Other supranational groups include the OECD (the“rich nations club”), the Group of 77 (Southern Group), the European Union, theregional development banks, and so on, each with their own mandate andviewpoint.
The second type of social actor, and one whose power has been escalating
since the end of World War II, are the multinational and transnational
corporations. These huge business combines command immense human, financial
and natural resources. They have become a major economic force, with a truly
planetary reach and a growing ability to shape world markets. As capitalist entities,
they are competitive, expansionist and, of course, driven by the bottom line ofprofit.
The third type of new social actor is the citizens’ groups, voluntary groups,
and other kinds of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). More recent to
explode on the scene, these voices of civil society cover a tremendous range in sizeand purpose. In general, they tend to be more dispersed, grass-roots and sociallyoriented than other social entities. The rise in their numbers has been one of themost dramatic -- and for many, hopeful -- processes of the century. Increasingly,
they join in global campaigns addressing humanitarian, developmental, andenvironmental issues, and have become a significant force.
We have identified the rise of market economies and the values andbehaviors they encourage -- competition, consumerism, individualism, materialism-- to be a dominant trend of our epoch. At the same time, a nascent oppositional
outlook among many individuals and groups throughout the world may anticipate
cultural changes that would become dominant in a Great Transition. The newvalues flow from concerns for a sustainable relationship with nature, theresurrection of community, the rejection of material profligacy in favor of
sufficiency, and the search for meaning and qualitative development. WhileBranch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice37

inchoate and unsystematic today, this constellation of values may portend a newworld view for a future day.
7.3. A New Sustainability Paradigm Unfolds
As with earlier scenarios, the backdrop to the New Sustainability Paradigm is acluster of deepening environmental and social tensions. However, a the newparadigm coalesces as a constructive and popular basis for social andenvironmental reconstruction, as articulate leaders emerge to both express andstimulate the process of change. Some of the major elements of the transition are
sketched in Figure 13.
Three mutually reinforcing processes develop: social, environmental, andcultural. First, there is growing concern by governments, business, and the generalpublic about the threat of social unrest and conflict. As increasing inequity
combines with population growth and migration, the hopes for better living
conditions of masses of people are lost. The rising tide of resentment and anger
poses clear threats to security. The conviction grows that governance has grown
too weak, and that over reliance on the profit motive as an engine for economic
growth has been environmentally and socially costly.
Second, many environmental problems worsen and new problems arise.
Some environmental problems reach threshold levels (extreme climate events,
acidification, pandemics). Meanwhile, a scientific consensus emerges that largescale shifts in the planetary system are both possible and increasingly likely
reinforcing concern about sudden catastrophic changes in climate, life-support
systems, and public health.
Third, there is increasing disenchantment with lifestyles focused on material
acquisition within some segments of the population, particularly the young. The
values of simplicity, tranquillity and community begin to displace those of
consumerism, competition and individualism. Many opt to reduce their working
hours (and income) in favor of increased time to pursue study, artistic endeavors,interpersonal relations, craft production and new searches for meaning.
Slowly, these processes coalesce into a world-wide ferment, with untold
millions searching for new ideals, meaning and forms of social existence. Someturn toward esoteric sects, but they are the minority. The youth of the globe
discovers a new idealism and collective identity in the search for a planetarycommunity. The exchange of ideas and sense of global unity are assisted by the
now nearly universal networks that span the planet, linking individuals groups,
organizations and governments. The Internet offers powerful new channels forcommunication, education, and democratic process.
Global meetings and festivals explore the new values of equity, theenvironment, alternative lifestyles and human rights. Civil groups begins toorganize international political movements, and governments and corporations
alike begin to pay close attention. Eventually, many communities and some regions
opt for alternative lifestyles and economic practices. Some stress high-technology
solutions, some prefer frugality, and some practice small-is-beautiful utopian
visions with an eco-mystical relationship to nature.
The tension between the forces of conventional development (orbarbarization) and the new planetary consciousness has reached the critical
moment. Does the planetary ferment and network of community-based movements
continue to grow? Or is the movement absorbed by the system as occurred, forexample, in India after Ghandi and with the counter-culture of the 1960s? Does the38

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

global teenager succumb to destructive nihilism, ambitious cynicism, or maintainidealism?
In the New Sustainability Paradigm, equity and sustainability, rather thaneconomic growth, come to define development. Material sufficiency becomes thepreferred lifestyle, while ostentatious consumption is viewed as primitive and a signof bad taste. Some transnational corporations accept -- even advocate, in somenotable cases -- the need for general limits and constraints around a new businessethic of eco-efficiency. Others resist change, but under popular pressure organizedlocally, nationally, and globally, governments and corporations begin negotiations
around a New Planetary Deal. Building on intentional reductions in material
consumption in rich countries, agreements are reached on international mechanisms
for the redistribution of wealth. These transfers are tied to voluntary reductions infamily size in countries with fast growing populations and to meeting globallyagreed environmental targets.
A new metropolitan vision inspires the redesign of urban neighborhoods.
Integrated settlement patterns place home, work, shops and leisure activity incloser proximity. Automobile dependence is reduced radically, and a sense ofcommunity and connectedness is re-established. The basis for this renaissance ofdiverse and secure communities is the elimination of the urban underclass, theubiquitous signal of social distress of the previous era. For many people, the townwithin-the-city provides the ideal balance of a human scale with cosmopolitan
cultural intensity.
Dispersed small towns also become popular as communication andinformation technologies increasingly allow for the decentralization of activities.
The migration from rural to urban areas reverses as many opt for the lower stresslevel and increased contact with nature offered by smaller communities. A new
spirit of community identification and participation is reinforced by changes inphysical design, including decentralized renewable energy systems, more selfreliant production patterns, and pride in local environments. With attractive urban
and rural alternatives, the mall culture fades as new urban and rural options
underscore the sterility, hidden costs and isolation of suburbia.
Technology transfer and joint sustainable development initiatives usher in a
new era of cooperation between rich and poor regions. Poorer regions pioneer
technologies and development approaches that conform to their unique climate,geography, resources, demographics, and religious and cultural traditions (Olson,
1994). Innovations flow increasingly from poor to rich regions.
In the new economic arrangements, markets are used to achieve production
and allocation efficiency, but only within the limits of non-market constraints
defined by social, cultural and environmental goals. The time-horizon for economic
decisions is lengthened to decades, in order to take meaningful account of
ecological processes. New technologies for sustainability flourish as public
preferences and prices shift. A variety of policy mechanisms are used to achieve thesustainability program. These include a revised tax system and other market signals
to discourage environmental “bads” and certain types of consumption. The polluter
pays principle is universally implemented. Antisocial corporate behavior is
discouraged further by thorough public disclosure of information. Well-designed
environmental, economic, and social indicators measure the effectiveness ofpolicies, giving the public an informed basis for seeking change.
Distributed forms of governance evolve, and mechanisms for decisionmaking are established from local to global scales. In this nested structure, regions

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice39

and communities have considerable control over socio-economic decisions andapproaches to environmental preservation, constrained only by the impacts onlarger-scale environments and processes. For example, local energy systems vary
greatly, but must meet per capita greenhouse gas emissions guidelines which are
set by global-level agreements, while local water strategies must be compatible
with allocation rules and ecosystem goals set at the river basin level. Global
governance is based on a federation of regions which, through a rejuvenatedUnited Nations and a truly global civil service, effectively fosters cooperation,
security and environmental health.
Population growth slows and then stabilize at relatively low levels as poverty
is eliminated and women become equal participants in the life of communities.
Inherited environmental problems are abating, though some effects linger for many
decades. Greenhouse emissions are reduced sharply as lifestyles become lessenergy intensive while renewable energy resources and highly efficient energy using
equipment become the norm. Chemical pollution is virtually eliminated with thegradual phase-in of clean production processes. Sustainable agriculture practices
are adopted universally, tailored to local conditions and tightly linked to local
markets (Gallopín, 1992, 1995).
Conflicts are resolved by negotiation, collaboration and consensus. As armies
are cut back and defense systems dismantled, a massive peace dividend ischanneled toward the transition to sustainability and the eradication of the vestigesof poverty. Economic development continues indefinitely, mostly concentrated in
the non-material realm -- services, culture, art, sports, research. A labor-intensive
crafts economy rises spontaneously on the platform of the high technology base,providing a rewarding outlet for creative expression and a dizzying diversity ofhighly esthetic and treasured goods.
The exhilaration of pioneering a socially and environmentally superior way oflife becomes a powerful attracting force in its own right, a self-fulfilling prophecy
able to draw the present to itself. The human species has at last reached the End ofChildhood.

40

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart*Cold War ends
*Capitalism universallyascendant*Globalization
accelerates*De-militarization begins*Peace dividend captured
for development*Weapons trade reduced*Absolute poverty
persists*High distributional
inequity withincountries*Large income gaps
between ountries*High population growth inpoor regions*Youthful population structures
in P*Aging populations structures
in R*Environmental stress heightens*Ecosystem disturbance atplanetary scale*Global interdependence advances*Science of complex
socio-ecological systems develops*R experience steadyeconomic growth*Gradual growth in P
*Disparity between R and P
persists*High tech development continues*TNCs control innovation anddiffusion*Benefits monopolized by R
*Global information system
expands*NGOs proliferate*Civil society
strengthened*UN reinvigorated*Migration
increases*Crime unabated*Disenchantment with
consumerism rises in R
*Search for new
development paradigm inP*Potential for conflict rises*Environmental stressheightens*Government andbusiness concern surges*Development philosophy is reconsidered*A New International Sustainability Party
mushrooms*Experiments in alternative life-styles andsocial organization proliferate*Scientific insight support holistic world views*Internet provides medium for planetary
ferment*New Planetary Deal adopted*Joint management of global ecologicalresources instituted*Material consumption voluntarily limited inR*Population growth in P voluntarily reduced*International redistribution of wealthproceeds

NEW SUSTAINABILITY
PARADIGM

Figure 13. New Sustainability Paradigm Unfolds

R=rich (regions, countries, groups)
P=poor (regions, countries, groups)
TNC=transnational corporations

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice41

8.
THE TASKS AHEAD
We have presented an approach for exploring long range global futures and theirimplications for sustainability and the human enterprise in the 21st century. A
structure was introduced for organizing the wide spectrum of scenarios that mightbranch from current conditions and trends. Based on that structure, we went on to
sketch a range of alternative scenarios that represent very different visions of the
future, including a discussion of key driving forces, critical uncertainties anddecision points. Here, we suggest directions for further elaboration and concluding
remarks.
8.1. Research Directions
Scenario inquiry has multiple purposes. These cluster into three areas: science,education and policy.
First, the scenario approach can play an important role in advancing scientificunderstanding of biophysical processes. The interplay between scientific andscenario research is bi-directional. The elaboration of long-range socio-ecologicalscenarios must draw heavily on the insight, information and concepts of various
specialized studies and modeling efforts. Conversely, well-structured scenarios help
direct scientific research by clarifying data gaps and conceptual uncertainties.
Scenarios also set the range of interest for key parameters used to drive complex
quantitative models.
Second, scenarios have a role in communicating issues and building publicawareness. As they are developed into well-told stories about the future, stories
that interweave imaginative narrative with quantitative rigor, scenarios can alertand educate on the problems of the future and the choices before us. The challenge
is to make those stories compelling and accessible, and to find effective
mechanisms for popular communication. In addition to the use of traditional print
and audio-visual media, interactive Internet sites may be used eventually tostimulate a significant global discussion on scenarios for the future.
Finally, there is a strong link between the insight offered by scenarios and thepolicy process. Scenario analysis is a powerful tool for identifying emerging
problems and risks, and the processes driving them. Then, scenarios are used to setsocial, economic and environmental goals, and to design appropriate actions. This
offers a systematic basis for prioritizing issues for strategic attention, andestimating the desired scale and timing of policy-induced changes. To advancethese objectives, global scenarios will need to be given more thematic and spatial
detail in order to reveal the policy implications for specific issue areas such as
water, energy, food, land, health, demographics, ecological systems and economic
development.
It is essential that the scenario approach be applied directly to policy-oriented
national, regional and local sustainability studies (sometimes referred to as Agenda
21 studies after the 1992 Rio conference document). The global perspective
provides a framework for placing subglobal assessments in the context of the
global dynamics which increasingly shape and constrain all regions. Bottom-up andtop-down analysis will need to be harmonized by zooming in from global scales toconsider the national implications of alternative scenarios, and from there to local
levels. At the same time, local and national sustainability exercises will enrichglobal scenarios in a cumulative and iterative process.
Ultimately, the policies for a sustainability transition must be matched to theconditions and priorities operating at global, national and local levels. Likewise, the42Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

instruments employed for implement policy goals will vary -- taxes and fiscal
structures, research and development, standards and regulation, education andoutreach, market stimulation, income and industrial policy. Consequently, policyrelevant scenario research for sustainability must proceed down multiple andstrongly interacting paths -- global and regional scenarios; national and local policy
studies; and sectoral analyses. The challenge is to integrate over these dimensions
in a continuing and open process that lends insight and motivation to sustainability
initiatives.
8.2. Reflections at the Branch Point
The global system of today, in all its complexity and turbulence, is the consequenceof sweeping historical transformations in the basis for human society. With roots in
the industrial revolution of two hundred years ago, a ceaseless spiral of change intechnology, values, social organization and the degree of human impact on thebiosphere has generated a vexing socio-economic and environmental predicament.
As crystallized in the modern notion of sustainability, human history may beon the cusp of a fundamental change. No more can we ignore the risks that
unbridled and feckless growth visits on the future. No more, in this globalizing
world, can a solution for the privileged be de-coupled from the fate of the poor.
Taking the long-view is no longer a pastime for visionaries and dreamers. It has
become a practical and scientific imperative for those concerned with therequirements today for a transition to sustainability tomorrow.
The future is not already written. Rather than simply “happening”, the humanfuture depends on collective and individual choices and actions. At the same time,
the range of possible futures is strongly constrained by physical, social andhistorical conditions and forces. The future path actually taken will be conditionedby the manner of interplay between material and institutional constraints, on the
one hand, and human responses, on the other -- between necessity and freedom.
Under stable conditions, there are strong constraints to voluntary challenges
to hegemonic values and institutions. However, in periods of instability, where
dominant social processes become less binding, "choices" can ripple through thesystem in a kind of social tsunami. At such “branch points”, institutional constraints
abate and collective and individual decisions have greater potential to affectmatters. This often, but not necessarily, finds expression through a strong leader
who, in turn, shapes history and the resolution of the branch point uncertainty.
So, the long-range future cannot be predicted mechanically from current
conditions and driving forces. The arc of history can branch in fundamental ways.
The outcome will depend on how global and ecological systems respond to criticaluncertainties and crises, and on human choices and actions. We have considered
three qualitatively distinct and contrasting classes of scenarios for the global system-- Conventional Worlds, Barbarization and Great Transitions. These envision,respectively, evolutionary outcomes which are continuous with modern industrial
development, highly unfavorable futures in which civilized norms collapse, andidealistic transformations to new paradigms for individual and social well-being.
It is natural that policy-oriented scenario analysis focus, in the first instance,
on Conventional Worlds scenarios, since the contemporary discussion takes place
here. The Conventional Worlds-Policy Reform scenario explores the possibilities
for a comprehensive policy response to the sustainability challenge without
assuming fundamental structural change in governance systems, institutions andhuman values. Nevertheless, Conventional Worlds scenarios cannot be assumed toBranch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice43

be likely. Nor can historic tilts toward Barbarization or Great Transitions worlds
be ruled out -- indeed, one need not be a cynic to observe troubling portents of theformer in the evolving socio-ecological conflicts of our time. Nobody canrigorously assign probabilities to such transformations since they depend on
inherent uncertainties in complex systems -- and on human choices which are yet to
be made.
Understanding the possible pathways to Barbarization can have fundamental
implications for policy, as well. Though not yet in the realm of normal policy
discourse, greater appreciation of the risk of social polarization and environmental
crises can stimulate actions to mute critical tensions in the system. Policy initiatives
suggested by a Policy Reform scenario would reduce the likelihood that the global
system lurches toward undesirable futures, especially if the values underpinning the
New Sustainability Paradigm are cultivated and spread. The weighty challenge forcurrent generations is to think and act in ways that reduce social and ecologicalstress, while keeping future opportunities open for a Great Transition.

44

Gallopin, Hammond, Raskin and Swart

Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice45

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