Preliminary informal English translation(This document was issued by the Fukui District Court, Fukui Prefecture on 14 April 2015.)

2014 (Heisei 26) （ヨ）No. 31 Petition Seeking a Provisional Disposition
Order for an Injunction Barring Operation of Takahama Nuclear Power
Station Units 3 and 4
Main Text
1. The defendant must not operate the Takahama Nuclear Power Station Units 3 and 4 reactors
located at 1 Tanoura, Takahama Town, Ohi County, Fukui Prefecture
2. The costs of the disposition litigation shall be paid by the defendant

Summary of the Reasoning
1. Concerning earthquakes with basic earthquake ground motion over 700 gal
Basic earthquake ground motion is the maximum earthquake that can be predicted to occur ata nuclear power station. To properly establish the basic earthquake ground motion is thefoundation for securing seismic resistance safety of the nuclear power station, and, anearthquake which goes beyond the basic earthquake ground motion should never occur.
However, at the fewer than 20 locations of nuclear power stations nationwide, since the lessthan 10 years from 2005, earthquakes that surpassed the basic earthquake ground motion
have occurred 5 times at 4 nuclear power stations. Just as the above 4 nuclear power stations,the estimation for earthquakes for the nuclear reactors in this court case is undertaken basedon the method of investigation and analysis of past earthquakes and active faults in the vicinity.
Grounds cannot be found for the defendant’s claim that its own earthquake estimation isaccurate for the two reactors in this case in spite of the fact there are no great differences in thedefendant’s own methods of evaluating active faults.
Moreover, Professor Kojiro Irikura, who is the proposer of this methodology for estimating thestrength of earthquake ground motion based on the state of the active fault(s) has stated, wheninterviewed by a newspaper reporter, that, “It is sometimes thought that the basic earthquake
ground motion obtained from calculation is the figure for the greatest tremor, but this is not thecase.” “I proposed a calculation method using scientific formulas, but there are plenty ofearthquakes that diverge from the average. There are also times when the observation (of theearthquake) itself is mistaken.” It is hard to find, for a nuclear power station that must be
prepared for a remotely possible accident, the rationale for establishing a basic earthquake
ground motion which is based upon the foundation of the image of a mean earthquake. Thesesignify that basic earthquake ground motion has lost its reliability not only based upon trackrecord, but also, upon logic.

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If an earthquake were to occur that is greater than the basic earthquake ground motion, there isa danger that the facility will be damaged. In that event, with the difficulty of assessing thesituation and various time restrictions, many difficulties will occur in order to terminate thesituation, and it can be recognized that there is a danger of it developing to the point of coredamage.
2. Regarding earthquakes less than the basic earthquake ground motion of 700 gal
The basic earthquake ground motion when operation commenced at the reactors in this casewas 370 gal. This figure was raised to 550 gal, and under the reasoning that there was a safetymargin, no fundamental seismic resistance construction was undertaken. It was raised again to700 gal at the time the new regulatory standards were put in place. The basic earthquake
ground motion should be the foundation for assuring the seismic safety of the nuclear power
station, and the measure of simply only raising the figure for it is not societally acceptable, andis considered incompatible with the safety design ideology of the defendant.
The defendant has itself acknowledged that there is a danger of the outside power supply being
cut off and main water supply being cut off due to damage to the main water supply pumps as aresult of an earthquake of less than 700 gal, the basic earthquake ground motion. The basic
status of the nuclear reactor should be that the cooling function be maintained by the outside
power source and main coolant water supply. It can be thought that it is sound sociallyaccepted general practice to consider these facilities to be of vital importance to safety and thus
seek seismic resistance that is fitting for the function of facilities that undertake primaryfunctions which are indispensable for securing safety. This court finds it very difficult tounderstand the defendant’s claim that these facilities are not vital facilities for safety. The
defendant claims that the design of the safety facilities at the reactors of this case is based
upon the thinking of defense in depth. The understanding of the concept of defense in depth isthat there is a preparedness by which even though the wall of the robust first defense may be
broken through, there is a second and third wall behind it, However, with the first wall paltry,
one is immediately faced with battling with one’s boats burnt. This kind of preparedness isdeviation from the important meaning of defense in depth.
The court therefore finds that there is a danger of core damage due to loss of coolant function
as a result of an earthquake less than 700 gal which is the basic earthquake ground motion.
3. Mid-Summary Concerning Maintenance of Cooling Function
The Japanese archipelago is situated on the borders of 4 plates, and 10% of all earthquakesthat occur worldwide occur here in the land space of our nation, and, areas free fromearthquakes do not exist in this country. The defendant emphasizes the regional characteristic
differences between the other nuclear power station sites where earthquakes have occurred
which have gone beyond the basic earthquake ground motion, and, the Takahama nuclear
power station. However, these regional characteristic differences themselves are uncertain,
and, the court is of the view that these differences do not carry significant meaning in the big2

picture, considering the grave situation as indicated above which face our country nationwide. It
is simply merely an optimistic prospect lacking grounds to consider that severe earthquakes
which have recurred outside nuclear power station facilities in various locations, and,earthquakes exceeding the basic ground motion which have occurred 5 times at nuclear power
plant sites will not occur for the Takahama nuclear power plant station. Moreover, if indeed aserious loss of coolant function accident could occur, this danger is not a remote risk but goes
far beyond that and is a realistic, imminent danger.
4. Concerning Spent Nuclear FuelIn spite of the fact that spent nuclear fuel has the possibility of causing damage which could
involve the very existence of our nation’s continuation, it is not encased in a robust facility suchas a containment. In addition to the enormous expenses required in order to obtain a robust
facility which could shut in nuclear fuel, it is unavoidable to come to the conclusion	  that such a
response to the issue is based upon the prospect that such a serious accident would probably
only occur very rarely. It is not based on the judgment that the safety of the nation’s citizens
must take precedence above all. Also, the spent nuclear fuel pool’s water intake facility is class
B seismic resistance.
5. Concerning Covering the Preservation Claim
The weaknesses of this nuclear power nuclear power station in this case cannot beameliorated without undertaking each of the following measures: 1. Reassess the standard forestablishing the basic earthquake ground motion, and, increase greatly the basic earthquake
ground motion.

2. Make the seismic resistance of both the external power source and main

water intake S-class, in order make them capable of coping with the basic earthquake groundmotion.

3. Encase the spent nuclear fuel in a robust facility.

4. Make the seismic resistanceof the water intake facility for the spent nuclear fuel pool S-class. Also, the difficulty of grasping
the situation in the event of an earthquake substantiates the necessity for the measurement
equipment related to the spent nuclear fuel pool to be S-class. And, the danger that radioactive
substances could bring to the central control room underlines the basis for the necessity ofestablishing a Seismic Isolation Building which has high seismic resistance ability andprotective function against radioactive substances. In spite of all this, the new regulatory
standards established by the Nuclear Regulation Authority do not include any of these points
for regulation. With regards to the Seismic Isolation Building, although this facility is scheduled
to be put in place, a grace period has been established for its implementation. However, sinceearthquakes occur absolutely unrelated to the plans or intensions of human beings, it isself-evident that there is no rationality for such a regulatory method.
In order for the Nuclear Regulation Authority to grant permission for a change in reactor
installation, the nuclear reactor facility which is undergoing the application process must
undergo a rational review process from the an expert technical standpoint, with the regulatory
standards themselves also needing to be rational, the aim of which is to prevent even theremote possibility of serious damage which would cause grave harm to the life and body of the3

citizens in the area of that nuclear power facility, etc. by making the nuclear power facility
undergo a comprehensive review. (Japan Supreme Court, October 29, 1992, First Petty Bench
Court Ruling, Ikata Supreme Court Verdict.) This then means that the rationality which should
be required of the new nuclear regulatory standards is that they are understood to be very strictin content, and, if the nuclear power facility meets thestandards’ requirements, that it would

then prevent even the remote possibility of grave damage. However, as indicated above, thestandards are merely lax, and even if their requirements were met, the safety of the nuclear
reactors in this case is not secured.

The news regulatory standards lack rationality. As longas this is the case, it is not necessary to judge whether or not the nuclear power stations in thiscase meet the new regulatory standards, and since it is recognized that there is a concrete riskthat the personal rights of the plaintiffs will be infringed, covering the claim that is to bepreserved is recognized. It is recognized that the claim that is to be preserved should becovered.
6. Concerning the Necessity of Preservation
There is a danger that the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable damage as a result of an accident at
the nuclear power station of this case, and, there is no time to spare to wait for the conclusionof the full lawsuit, and also, under the current situation where the Nuclear Regulation Authority
has already granted permission for a change in reactor installation, the court also recognizes
the necessity of preservation.

Translator’s note:
Japanese original of this document:
http://adieunpp.com/karisasitome/150414decabstract.pdf
Full judgment:
http://adieunpp.com/karisasitome/150414decision.pdf
Preliminary informal English translation by Green Action (Japan)
Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
Tel: +81-75-701-7223
Fax: +81-75-702-1952
Contact: Aileen MIoko Smith
Cell:+81-90-3620-9251
email: amsmith@gol.com

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