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Do Professional Ethics Make
Negotiators Unethical?
An Empirical Study with Scenarios ofDivorce Settlement
Hiroharu Saito1
This is an empirical study to examine effects of the U.S. attorneys’ professional ethical rules in negotiation. This study isthe first to seriously measure the effects of the professional ethical rules. The first novel feature of this study is in its methodology: the author conducted a survey of law school students, whichenabled a comparison of two groups: those who have alreadylearned professional ethics and those who have not yet learned
them. The questionnaire presented three hypothetical cases withcertain ethical dilemmas in divorce settlement negotiations. It
asked the respondents how they would deal with the situations
and what the reasons behind their decisions were. The second
novel feature is the inclusion of ethical dilemmas concerning athird party’s human rights. Specifically, this study used situations to negotiate custody of a child, a non-monetary issue. Key
findings: compared to respondents before ethical education, respondents after ethical education defer to the parent’s (the client’s) interests more; and in return, they are more reluctant todisclose true information or to care about the child’s welfare. The
results indicate that the professional ethical rules and legal education in the U.S. diminishes attorneys’ ethical sense of fairness(in particular, truthfulness) and public interests (in particular,
third party’s human rights) while enhancing loyalty to theirclients.
1. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tokyo. LL.M., Harvard Law School.
M.A. (Education) & LL.B., University of Tokyo. For their invaluable feedback on earlier drafts of this Article, the author would like to thank Shozo Ota, Daniel H. Foote,and the participants at the 2016 Conference for the Japanese Association of Sociology
of Law. The author would also like to thank his friend, Shane D. Anderson, for helpfulcomments at the stage of designing the survey—especially the input about J.D. students’ general customs in law schools. Finally, the author would like to thank everyone who helped him distribute the survey and all the people who participated in it.
This study has no affiliation to any specific law school or university in the States (seeinfra note 44).

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CONTENTSI.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Attorneys’ Negotiation Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Structure of Ethical Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Truthfulness in the Fairness Principle . . . . . . . .
a. Interpretation of Rule 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Arguments Over Rule 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Major Preceding Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Present Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II.
Methodology – Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Respondents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Basic Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Three Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Case A (Assets) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Case U (Unfitness) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Case P (Preference) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Factors Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III.
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Case A (Assets) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Case U (Unfitness) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Case P (Preference) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Factors Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Case U (Unfitness) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Case P (Preference) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV.
Discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Key Findings – Structure of Ethical Dilemma . . . . .
1. Client Principle versus Fairness Principle . . . . .
2. Client Principle versus Public Principle . . . . . . .
3. Client Principle versus Fairness Principle
plus Public Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Summary – Hypothesis I or II? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Other Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Knowledge of Family Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Limitations of Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V.
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix A – Survey Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview
The author conducted a survey of U.S. law school students. Participants were placed in a situation to act as a parent’s attorney indivorce settlement negotiations and given three hypothetical scenarios with ethical dilemmas. This study observed the differences in responses between students who had previously learned professional
ethics and students who had not yet learned them. This study revealed alterations of negotiators’ ethical sense and bargaining behaviors due to learning attorneys’ professional ethical rules (e.g., theModel Rules of Professional Conduct).2 The purpose of this study is to
examine empirically the educational effects of the U.S. attorneys’ professional ethics and, furthermore, to uncover the effects of the ethicalrules on negotiators’ behaviors.
B. BackgroundWhy does this study focus on divorce settlement? Why does it
address professional ethics? The background of the study can be described from two perspectives.
The first perspective is the role of attorneys in divorce disputes(child custody disputes) with regard to the security of children’s welfare. The primary focus of this study is on divorce settlements involving children. Custody of the child is an important issue for parents.
For many parents, children are what matters the most, and thus,
child custody and visitation frequently turn out to be the most salientissues upon divorcing. But, more importantly, child custody—which
parent is to live with the child after divorce—is a critical issue forchildren’s welfare. If a divorce case goes to trial, the court will determine the custodial parent(s) based on the “best interests of the child”
standard. During the judicial procedure, the court may conduct necessary investigations and may appoint a guardian ad litem and/or an
attorney for the child to evaluate the “best interests of the child.”
From that standpoint, the welfare of children will be secured if a divorce case goes to trial.
However, the majority of divorce cases are settled through private settlement without a trial. A typical divorce process goes in theStates as follows: Upon divorce, a couple must determine all of the
2. In general, the term professional “ethics” can be used for either ethical sensethat attorneys actually have or rules that are norms of behaviors. In this Article to
avoid confusion, the former is referred to as “ethical sense,” the latter as “ethicalrules,” and both as “ethics.”

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divorce conditions such as child custody, visitation, property division,
child support and alimony. If they have any trouble in determining
the divorce conditions, then it is developed into a dispute. Each of theparents may hire an attorney for negotiations. Attorneys representing each side negotiate to settle the dispute, without bringing a lawsuit. If attorneys can reach an agreement, the dispute is resolved.
Attorneys just file the mutual agreement with the court for issuanceof the divorce decree, and the court defers to this agreement.3 Only if
the attorneys cannot reach an agreement is the dispute developed
into litigation before the court. In practice, divorce conditions in the
majority of divorce cases are privately determined outside the court,
while a few cases are actually litigated before the court.
The author’s concern is that children’s welfare may be undermined in those majority cases, where no litigation occurs. There is no
guarantee that divorce conditions privately agreed to by parents
outside of court meet the “best interests of the child” standard. One
classic argument concerning parents’ negotiation is the existence oftrade-offs between child custody and money: for instance, a mothermight agree to give a father custodial rights or more frequent visitation rights in order for him to provide her with more generous childsupport and alimony.4 In other words, children’s interests (i.e., custody and visitation) may be bartered for parents’ interests (i.e.,
money).
Then, how can we secure children’s welfare in divorce settlement? This study casts a spotlight on the role of parents’ attorneys,
who are the only legal professionals involved with divorce disputes
outside the court. Of course, an attorney for a parent generally works
3. To be precise, divorcing couples are always required to obtain a decree fromthe court in the U.S. The court reserves the legal authority to determine the divorce
conditions. However, in practice, the court usually acknowledges the conditions
agreed to by the parties. In most of the divorce cases, once parents file a form with thecourt specifying the divorce conditions agreed upon, the court will issue a decree inaccordance with the form submitted. To be specific, one standard is the “unconscionable” standard: the court shall issue a divorce decree unless the court finds the agreement “unconscionable.” UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT §306 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1973). Therefore, divorcing couples themselves have de facto discretion to settle thedivorce conditions without pursuing litigation (private ordering). See Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 952-58 (1979). For information on the detailed practice ofdivorce cases, see, e.g., DONALD G. TYE ET AL., TRYING DIVORCE CASES IN MASSACHUSETTS (3rd ed. 2013).
4. See, e.g., Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 963-66. Having said that,
this argument has not been supported empirically. See, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY &ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY(1992) (finding no statistical evidence).

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to maximize the settlement for that parent, the client. However, attorneys are perhaps somehow considerate of children’s welfare during the settlement. As a legal professional working for social justice,parents’ attorneys might somehow be playing a role of “safety net” toprotect children’s welfare in a divorce settlement;5 or children’s welfare might be rather undermined due to the intervention of attorneys
serving for the parents. In this regard, the professional ethical rules
should have a certain impact on attorneys’ behaviors in divorce
settlement.
The second perspective is more general, moving beyond the scopeof divorce disputes: how the professional ethics of negotiation should
be. This perspective is also linked to discussions of the ideal role andfunction of attorneys in society. The negotiation ethics of attorneys
have a great impact on society and social justice. For instance, in divorce disputes as described above, settlement negotiations are situations where decisions are made without involvement from a court;
attorneys are the only legal professionals involved. In addition, thesituation of divorce settlement is useful for examining negotiation
ethics because it contains all of the major ethical principles.6
C. Attorneys’ Negotiation Ethics
1. Structure of Ethical Dilemma
In many cases for attorneys, rendering a service for the client
and achieving social justice in society are mutually reinforcing goals.
A typical example would be where an attorney assists a client suffering from unlawful activities. However, in some cases, a client’s interests may conflict with social justice. When an attorney negotiateswith a counterparty on behalf of the client, the attorney is required to
do his/her best for the client (the “Client Principle”). But, it does notmean the attorney is obliged to do anything to achieve the client’s
interests. The Client Principle does have a certain limitation fromsocial justice.
5. This idea, whether parents’ attorneys can function as “safety net,” was raisedin the author’s previous article, Hiroharu Saito, Bargaining in the Shadow of Children’s Voices in Divorce Custody Disputes: Comparative Analysis of Japan and the
U.S., 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 937, 978-79 (2016). The previous article theoretically analyzed empowerment of children’s participation rights (i.e., respecting children’s own wishes) in divorce custody disputes through a law and economics
framework, and it referred to the attorneys’ truthfulness rule (infra Rule 4.1) innegotiations.
6. See discussion infra Section I.C.1 for the details of ethical principles and Section II.B.2 for their applications to divorce settlement situations.

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First, fairness in any settlement, which relates to the rights andinterests of counterparty, would be a conflicting principle (the “Fairness Principle”). The Fairness Principle addresses questions such as:
Can attorneys employ “dirty” or “dishonest” tactics in negotiations? If
yes, to what extent can attorneys use those tactics?
Second, attorneys are required to respect public interests, inother words, rights and interests of third parties (the “Public Principle”). Can attorneys settle the case in a way to diminish and exploit
any third party’s rights or interests to accomplish the client’s goal?
Negotiating attorneys are sometimes placed in a situation of ethicaldilemmas among these three principles, which this Article refers toas the “Structure of Ethical Dilemma” (Figure 1).

Fairness Principle
Client Principle
Public Principle
FIGURE 1—STRUCTURE OF ETHICAL DILEMMA
These principles are prescribed in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Model Rules”) of the American Bar Association(“ABA”), which is almost universally adopted in the U.S.—every state
except California has adopted the Model Rules.
Client Principle. The role of attorneys was discussed during
the establishment of the Model Rules in 1983, which replaced the former Model Code of Professional Responsibility.7 As a result of the
discussions, the drafters chose to highlight the Client Principle as afundamental role of attorneys. The first paragraph of Preamble of theModel Rules clarifies that a lawyer “is a representative of clients.”8Rule 1.2 acknowledges the authority of the client: “a lawyer shallabide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation.”9 Rule 1.3 stipulates zealous representation: “A lawyer should
pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction
7. See Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers’ Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90
IOWA L. REV. 475, 499–500 (2005); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OFLAWYERING §1.04, §7.02 (4th ed. 2015). For classic discussions on the issue of loyalty
to clients, see generally Jack B. Weinstein, On the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1972).
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N,
1983).
9. Id. at r. 1.2.

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and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.” Also, “A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon theclient’s behalf.”10 The basic idea is to “assume that justice is beingdone” if each lawyer zealously represents each client.11
Fairness Principle. However, at the same time, the Model
Rules recognize limitations on the Client Principle in several ways.
In terms of fairness, the Preamble generally emphasizes the importance of honesty: “[a]s negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest
dealings with others.”12 Rule 8.4(c) clarifies that to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” qualifies as professional misconduct for an attorney.13 With regard to
advocacy in judicial procedures, Rule 3.4 suggests fairness to opposing party and counsel. Although Rule 3.4 does not explicitly coverfairness in private negotiations, the ABA’s Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiation (2002) complements and emphasizes fairness insettlement negotiations (§2.3 Duty of Fair Dealing): “[a] lawyer’s conduct in negotiating a settlement should be characterized by honorand fair-dealing.” More specifically, one of the most practical fairness
issues in negotiations is truthfulness. For this, Rule 4.1 of the Model
Rules prohibits misrepresentation of a material fact to a
counterparty (see I-C-2 below for details of Rule 4.1).
Public Principle. The Model Rules consider public interests
and third party’s rights as well. Rule 4.4, entitled “Respect for Rightsof Third Persons,” prohibits usage of “methods of obtaining evidence
that violate the legal rights of [a third person].”14 Its comment emphasizes that “responsibility to a client requires a lawyer tosubordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights ofthird persons.”15 In addition, although in the context of access to justice, the preamble says “[a] lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies
in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, andsometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at r. 1.3 cmt. 1.
Id. at Preamble and Scope 8.
Id. at Preamble and Scope 2.
Id. at r. 8.4.
Id. at r. 4.4.
Id. at r. 4.4 cmt. 1.

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assistance” and “[a lawyer] should help the bar regulate itself in the
public interest.”16
2. Truthfulness in the Fairness Principle
a. Interpretation of Rule 4.1
In terms of the Fairness Principle, the ethical issue attorneys
most often face in negotiation practice is probably the issue of truthfulness and misrepresentation. Consequently, among the three Principles and provisions mentioned above, Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules
has been discussed and studied most extensively.
Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others (emphasis andnote added):In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall notknowingly:(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act
by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6 [note:
Rule 1.6 covers confidentiality of information].
Rule 4.1 suggests truthfulness in material fact. The fact is material if it would or could influence the hearer’s decision-making process significantly.17 In general, Rule 4.1 does not require affirmative
disclosure of information. Rule 4.1(b) forces attorneys to disclose amaterial fact in exceptional circumstances where the lawyer can
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act only by disclosing the information. But, attorneys ordinarily have an option to avoid crime or
fraud by withdrawing from representation of the client.18 Thus, Rule4.1(b) would apply to only rare cases. However, Rule 4.1(a) covers certain types of nondisclosure. Although the language used in Rule4.1(a) is “false statement,” it prohibits any misrepresentation of material fact; it includes misrepresentation by omission (silence) or partial
statements as well as by making affirmative false statements.19 In
16. Id. at Preamble and Scope 6.
17. See generally, ELLEN J. BENNETT, ELIZABETH J. COHEN & HELEN W. GUNNARSSON, ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 4.1 (8th ed. 2015). E.g., In re Merkel,
138 P.3d 847 (Or. 2006). The former Model Code of Professional Ethics did not havethis materiality requirement—it technically prohibited a false statement of any fact.
Some states still have not adapted the materiality requirement today. See Am. Bar
Ass’n, State Rules Comparison Charts (Sep. 15, 2016), http://ambar.org/
MRPCStateCharts.
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 3.
19. Id. at r. 4.1 cmt. 1.

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practice, misrepresentation by omission would be a more common
ethical dilemma than affirmative false statements. While many attorneys would hesitate to make affirmative lies to their counterparties, they would be more open to using silence as a tactic.
In reality, the line between acceptable nondisclosure and unacceptable misrepresentation by omission is not clear. For instance,cases of nondisclosure of facts such as client’s death20 and the existence of third insurance policy21 have been judged as unacceptablemisrepresentation. In contrast, a case of nondisclosure of life expectancy in settling compensation claims was exempt from Rule 4.1(a)because no question was posed regarding life expectancy.22 The judgment varies by situation and there are no simple criteria.
b. Arguments Over Rule 4.1
Rule 4.1(a) explicitly prohibits attorneys’ misrepresentation of amaterial fact during negotiations. But, at the same time, the scope of
its regulation is limited to such misrepresentation of a material fact.
This standard is low: it is basically the same level as that for fraud as
proscribed in contract law and criminal law.23 Consequently, there
are pros and cons of Rule 4.1.24
Some have supported Rule 4.1 for practical reasons. For instance, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. emphasized the lack of consensus
among attorneys with respect to the concept of fairness in negotiation, and concluded that it was practically impossible to formulate asingle standard more restrictive than Rule 4.1.25 Further, Gerald B.
Wetlaufer argued the importance of separating legal requirements
and “ethics.” He insisted that laws and codes, such as the Rules of
20. See Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op.
95–397 (1995); Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1997); In re Rosen, 198
P.3d 116 (Colo. 2008); In re Lyons, 780 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. 2010).
21. Nebraska ex rel. Neb State Bar Ass’n v. Addison, 412 N.W.2d 855, 856 (Neb.
1987).
22. Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 2001–26(2001).
23. See, e.g., Thomas F. Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. RICH. L.
REV. 99, 102–03 (1982).
24. See generally, Art Hinshaw & Jess K. Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An
Empirical Study of Attorney Negotiation Ethics, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 95, 107–10(2011); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous Negotiator, 8
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45, 46 (1994); CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, Ethics, Morality, andProfessional Responsibility in Negotiation, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 134–35 (Phyllis Bernard & Bryant Garth eds., 2002).
25. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer’s Obligation to Be Trustworthy When
Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 181, 193, 196 (1981).

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Professional Conduct, should be less demanding than “ethics” because codes are meant to deal stably with all related problems.26
Others have supported Rule 4.1 more proactively. For example,
James J. White claimed that misleading a counterparty is “the essence of negotiation.”27 In accordance with this opinion, minor deceptions (i.e., the essence of negotiation) should not be regulated by theprofessional rules.
On the other hand, a major criticism of Rule 4.1 has been about
its low standard. Gary Tobias Lowenthal described this rule as a “noholds-barred approach” that “do[es] very little regulating” andstrongly criticized the ABA for embracing such a low standard at thelevel of “New York hardball” as the official standard. Lowenthal insisted that while it would be best for the ABA to develop a higher,
more detailed standard, it would be better to abolish Rule 4.1 than toleave it in its current form.28 Thomas F. Guernsey underlined theprivate nature of negotiation and difficulties in enforcing the ethicalrules. His idea was that it was nonsense to further develop un-enforceable rules. Guernsey suggested abolishing Rule 4.1 or any kindof written rules; lawyers should “accept the fact that there is no guidance” and leave negotiations to be handled by “caveat” lawyers.29
3. Major Preceding Studies
Not many empirical studies have been conducted on attorneys’
negotiation ethics. Some descriptive studies have surveyed attorneys
to evaluate their ethical sense and practice. These descriptive studies
focused on the tension between the Client Principle and the Fairness
Principle—mostly concerning attorneys’ ethical sense regarding
truthfulness and their compliance (or non-compliance) with Rule 4.1.
Specifically, these studies have addressed the issues of attorneys’ minor deceptions (i.e., the level below material fact under Rule 4.1) andmajor deceptions (i.e., rising to the level of misrepresentations of material fact under Rule 4.1).
26. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiation, 75 IOWA L. REV.
1219, 1234–35 (1990).
27. James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in
Negotiation, 5 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 928 (1980). Also, minor deceptions appear
commonly in practice (see supra Section I.C.3). Cf. Scott R. Peppet, Can Saints Negotiate? A Brief Introduction to the Problems of Perfect Ethics in Bargaining, 7 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 83 (2002) (casting doubt on White’s idea by using an example of negotiations between two saints).
28. Gary Tobias Lowenthal, The Bar’s Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining by
Lawyers, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 445–47 (1988).
29. Guernsey, supra note 23, at 125–27.

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First, with regard to minor deceptions, studies have suggested
that they are commonly accepted in practice. Scott S. Dahl found that
there was a general consensus among attorneys to accept minor deceptions as a part of the negotiation “game.” For his study, he interviewed 14 attorneys in Texas and presented them with ten situations
mostly related to minor untruthfulness in negotiations.30 Anothersurvey of nearly 100 lawyers at the ABA Annual Meeting found that73% of the respondents had actually engaged in settlement “puffery.”31 Also a majority (61%) of the respondents answered that it was
ethically permissible to engage in settlement “puffery.”32
Further, regarding major deceptions, studies have indicated that
ethical sense in negotiations varies widely from attorney to attorney
and by situation, and that attorneys sometimes violate Rule 4.1.
Larry Lempert surveyed 15 experienced attorneys (eight law professors, five practicing lawyers, one federal court judge, and one magistrate judge) and asked them four hypothetical situations regarding
misrepresentation. These situations involved the opportunity to misrepresent (i) the authorized amount for settlement, (ii) the degree ofclient’s injury, (iii) client’s emotional distress and (iv) the continuityof client’s business. Differences of opinion existed among attorneys ineach situation.33 Twenty years later, Peter Reilly replicated the same
study with 30 attorneys around the country and obtained similar results.34 More recently, Andrew Hogan replicated those studies with112 first-year law students at Georgetown University Law Center tofind out the baseline of ethical sense of beginning law students.35 The
results looked somewhat similar to the original studies of attorneys,
suggesting that learning professional ethics at law school might nothave a large impact on attorneys’ ethical sense. But, the sample sizes
30. Scott S. Dahl, Ethics on the Table: Stretching the Truth in Negotiations, 8REV. LITIG. 173 (1989).
31. Terry Carter, Ethics by the Numbers: Many Lawyers Have Been Asked by Clients or Other Lawyers to Violate Conduct Rules, Survey Suggests, 83 A.B.A. J. 97(1997). The exact language of the question was “[i]s it ethically permissible to engage
in settlement ‘puffery’ that involves some misrepresentation?” Given the expression of“some misrepresentation,” this question might have intended to ask about major deceptions. But, because of the word of “puffery,” it would be more reasonable to classify
this question as data for minor deceptions.
32. Id.
33. Larry Lempert, In Settlement Talks, Does Telling the Truth Have Its Limits?,
2 INSIDE LITIG. 1 (1988) [Reprinted in LEGAL ETHICS 457–63 (Deborah L. Rhode &David Luban eds., 6th ed. 2013)].
34. Peter Reilly, Was Machiavelli Right? Lying in Negotiation and the Art of Defensive Self-Help, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 481 (2009).
35. Andrew Hogan, The Naive Negotiator: An Empirical Study of First-Year Law
School Students’ Truth-Telling Ethics, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 725 (2013).

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of the original studies were relatively small (15 and 30, respectively),and no statistical analysis was employed in this series of studies.36 In
another survey of 23 Florida lawyers who participated in a mediation
workshop, participants estimated that lying about material facts occurred in 23% of the non-mediated negotiations, 25% of the joint-session style mediations, and 17% of the caucus style mediations.37
All of the studies listed above were inspiring but had some issues
in validity and reliability for a scholarly empirical work—for instance, lack of sophisticated questionnaire design,38 representative
sampling, or statistical analysis. As a large and more sophisticatedempirical study, Art Hinshaw and Jess K. Alberts conducted a surveyof 738 practicing lawyers in Arizona and Missouri. They used a scenario of misrepresentation of fatal disease infection (the hypotheticalscenario of the “DONS” case made by the Program on Negotiation at
Harvard Law School for educational purposes) and asked participants how to deal with the situation. They found two things: (i) some
attorneys would engage in a fraudulent settlement prohibited under
Rule 4.1 if requested by their client; and (ii) attorneys’ knowledge andunderstanding of Rule 4.1 (i.e., of the meaning of material fact andmisrepresentation) were sometimes inaccurate.39
Finally, regarding a broader ethical sense of fairness (unrelated
to truthfulness), Jennifer K. Robbennolt conducted an experiment of
190 attorneys, which focused on the effects of apology in settlement.
The results suggested both that attorneys and litigants (i.e., laypeople) differed in their estimates of fair settlement value and that attorneys were inclined to exploit a counterparty’s apologies to achieve
more favorable settlements while the client-litigants were inclined toaccept less favorable settlements when apologies were being
presented to them.40 It indicated the strong impact of the Client Principle—attorneys could be even more partisan than clients with regard to maximizing clients’ monetary interests.
4. Present Study
The present study has two novel features.
36. Lempert, supra note 33; Reilly, supra note 34.
37. Don Peters, When Lawyers Move Their Lips: Attorney Truthfulness in Mediation and a Modest Proposal, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 119 (2007). Both parties face eachother in one room with a mediator(s) in the joint-session style mediation while eachparty talks to a mediator(s) separately and privately in the caucus style mediation.
38. See, e.g., supra note 32.
39. Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 24.
40. Jennifer K Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349 (2008).

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First, this study is the first to seriously examine the educational
effects of the attorneys’ professional ethics at law school. Moreover, itis the first to uncover the effects of the ethical rules for negotiation.
Previous studies did observe the reality of attorneys’ ethical sense
and practice, but they have not really examined the effects of the ethical rules themselves. For example, even if attorneys’ behaviors innegotiations conformed to Rule 4.1, those behaviors might be simply
from attorneys’ inherent sense of morality regardless of existence ofthe rule. Conversely, even if many attorneys were found to be violating Rule 4.1, existence of the rule might have decreased the numberof violators to some degree. Therefore, in order to reveal the actual
effects of the ethical rules, it is necessary to compare the ethical senseof those who know the professional ethical rules and those who do notknow them. Surveying attorneys does not allow comparison of thetwo groups, because all of the attorneys are supposed to know the
professional ethical rules. Therefore, to measure the effects of the
ethical rules, this study instead compared responses from two law
student groups: those before legal ethical education and those after
legal ethical education.
Second, this study is innovative in that it encompasses the aspectof the Public Principle. It focuses on ethical dilemmas concerning athird party’s human rights by employing situations to negotiate custody of a child. The situations used in preceding studies were dominated by negotiations of monetary issues, such as damage liability, inwhich the attorney’s role was solely to seek monetary compensations
from a counterparty. In accordance with the Structure of Ethical Dilemma (see Figure 1), the dilemma used in the preceding studies was
simply the Client Principle versus the Fairness Principle (specifically, truthfulness). The present study is the first to test the ethicaldilemmas involving the Public Principle, such as: the Client Principle
versus the Public Principle and the Client Principle versus the Fairness Principle plus the Public Principle.
5. Hypotheses
From the Structure of Ethical Dilemma, the author developed
two opposing hypotheses (theoretical hypotheses) to be examined inrelation to the general effects of the professional ethical rules.
Hypothesis I: The Fairness Principle and the Public Principle
both inhibit the Client Principle. The professional ethical rules as awhole have an effect of facilitating negotiators’ consideration for fairness (particularly, truthfulness) and public interests in negotiations.
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would have an effect of softening partisan focus on parents’ interestsand enhancing truthfulness of relevant facts and consideration forchildren’s welfare” (Working Hypothesis I) in the context of educational effects for divorce settlement negotiation.
Hypothesis II: The Fairness Principle and the Public Principle do
not inhibit the Client Principle. The professional ethical rules as awhole have an effect of enhancing negotiators’ partisan representation while diminishing negotiators’ consideration for fairness (particularly, truthfulness) and public interests in negotiation. If
Hypothesis II were correct, “learning the professional ethical rules
would have an effect of enhancing partisan focus on parents’ interestsand diminishing truthfulness of relevant facts and consideration forchildren’s welfare” (Working Hypothesis II) in the context of educational effects for divorce settlement negotiation.
The Client Principle is set as a fundamental doctrine for attorneys in the U.S. Besides, previous studies41 have indicated the realityof attorneys’ usage of deception (i.e., lack of truthfulness) in negotiations. Thus, the Client Principle might be dominating over the Fairness and the Public Principles. If that is the case, Hypothesis II iscorrect. However, if attorneys have a natural tendency towards partisanship regardless of the ethical rules, learning the Fairness Principle and the Public Principle stated in the ethical rules might be newadditions to attorneys’ ethical sense. Preceding studies have also suggested that at least some attorneys are reluctant to misrepresent material facts in negotiations. Given this, Hypothesis I might be correct:
the Fairness and the Public Principles might be controlling the excessive Client Principle. Which one is correct, Hypothesis I or II? To examine these Hypotheses, this study constructed the more specific
Working Hypotheses mentioned above.
II. METHODOLOGY – SURVEY
A. Respondents
A total of 113 J.D. students42 participated in this survey.43 It
treated 110 respondents as one data set after excluding three participants whose experiences of ethical education were unknown. All of
41. See supra I.C.3.
42. This survey did not include LL.M. students. Most LL.M. students are bar
practitioners in other countries, who have already learned professional ethics in theircountries. Thus, their responses would be affected by ethical rules in their own
jurisdictions.
43. Respondents’ status as law school students was confirmed by two techniques.
The aforementioned students’ “groups” (for each year or section of each school) on

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the respondents were from five prestigious schools44 ranked within
the top 20 in the most recent U.S. News Best Law School rankings.45
The sample was well balanced in learning experience of professional ethics: approximately half of the respondents (58 (52.73%)) hadlearned professional ethics while the other half (52 (47.27%)) had not
yet learned. To be specific, a respondent was classified as “after ethical education” if he/she had experienced at least one of the following
three learning opportunities: 36 (32.73%) had taken the MPRE; 55(50.00%) had taken a course of legal profession; 30 (27.27%) had
taken a course of negotiation. Respondents were from each year: 1L –
29 (26.36%), 2L – 41 (37.27%), and 3L – 40 (36.36%). They were gender-balanced: male – 52 (47.27%), female – 57 (51.82%) and no response – 1 (0.91%). The age range of respondents was from 21 to 34(mean = 25.4146, SD = 2.3647). A majority of the respondents (97(88.18%)) were single never married while some (13 (11.82%)) were
married.48 Only one respondent answered he/she had children. Some
respondents (17 (15.45%)) had experienced parents’ divorce or separation in the past while the majority (93 (84.55%)) had not.49 The
Facebook were closed groups in which only the group members could see the post for
the recruitment. Also, respondents were asked to voluntarily enter their personal
email address given by the university in the end of the survey to receive a small
amount of online-shopping gift card by lottery: 84 out of 113 participants provided anauthentic university email address. Respondents knew to expect anonymity: they
were clearly notified that the email addresses were collected separately from theother survey data and could not be matched to their responses.
44. The purpose of this study was not to compare ethical educations among different schools, and the author had no intention to harm reputations or to disturb
educations of particular schools. Thus, respondents’ school names were completely
eliminated from the data set after checking the above-mentioned general characteristics of the respondents (i.e., the data set does not contain any data linked to specificschools). Just for clarification, this study has no affiliation to any specific schools in
the U.S. It was not supported or promoted, in any sense, by any institutions in the
U.S.
45. The U.S. News Best Law School rankings 2017, U.S. NEWS, http://gradschools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/lawrankings (last visited Jul. 10, 2016).
46. Mean age of 108 respondents. Two respondents did not provide their age.
47. “SD” represents standard deviation. Hereinafter the same.
48. No respondent was divorced, separated, or widowed.
49. 15.45% seems to be lower than the general divorce rate in the U.S., which isoften estimated around 50%. See, e.g., National Center for Health Statistics, National
Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm (last updated Nov. 23, 2015) (stating that the marriage rate is 6.9 and the
divorce rate is 3.2 per 1,000 people in 2014 in the States: 3.2/6.9 = 46%) The low
divorce rate in this study may be explained by a possibly lower divorce rate among
parents of students at elite law schools. But, it may be due to some self-selection
bias—students who experienced their parents’ divorce might have been reluctant toparticipate in this survey.

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respondents’ average knowledge of family law and Rule 4.1 was nothigh. On a scale of 1–4 (from 1 “not at all” to 4 “know it well”), themean knowledge of family law50 was 1.58 (SD = 0.68), and that ofRule 4.1 was 2.00 (SD = 0.88).
For recruitment, this study used students’ informal social channels such as Facebook51 in order to collect responses from each year
and from various students. With the help of cooperator students, thedescription and the URL of the survey were distributed to law students. The time of distribution was carefully designed to be between
mid-November 2015 and early February 2016 (i.e., from the end offall term until the beginning of spring term) for two reasons. First, it
was not preferable to implement the survey in the middle of a semester because the purpose of the study is to compare two groups of students: students after ethical education (e.g., those who havecompleted a course of legal profession) and students before ethicaleducation (e.g., those who have not started a course of legal profession). In the middle of a course, students may have learned only apart of the three Principles on negotiation ethics. Second, in general,many students take the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE52) in early November of their third year. Therefore, the survey was conducted after mid-November to secure an
appropriate number of responses from students after ethical education (i.e., those who have studied for and taken the MPRE), in otherwords, to balance the number of responses from the two groups forcomparison.
B. Questionnaire
1. Basic Scenario
The questionnaire used in this study is provided in Appendix A.
In the section of Basic Scenario at the beginning of the questionnaire,
50. To be exact, the question was what is your knowledge of family law and childlaw.
51. Facebook (https://www.facebook.com) is a social networking service. Students
usually have a “group” for each year or section of their schools on Facebook to exchange information with each other. A Facebook “group” is basically an online bulletin board, on which students can post messages freely to announce social/study eventsand to share information about classes etc. As Facebook is the most popular onlinesocial networking service at the present time, almost all of the students were assumed
to be in those groups. Thus, recruitment through those groups was one efficient way
to reach a large unbiased population of law students.
52. The MPRE is a pre/co-requisite for bar exams in most of the states, whichtakes place three times a year in March, August and November. The exam date in
November 2015 was November 7th.

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respondents were placed in a divorce settlement negotiation, of which
the major issue was post-divorce custody of the child. Respondents
were asked to act as an attorney representing one of the divorcing
parents. In order to control any possible bias attributable to gender,
the client’s and the child’s gender were not specified in the scenario.
Also, either of age five or 14 was assigned randomly to each respondent for the purpose of controlling the effects of child’s age. Attorneys’
ethical sense and actions might differ in accordance with the child’sage. However, with the word of “child,” one might assume an infant
while another might imagine a matured juvenile. Therefore, a certain
age had to be given in the scenario. Since one of the situations tested
in the questionnaire was about a child’s own preference (see Case P
below), the ages of five and 14 were used. A five-year-old child is capable of expressing his/her own wishes but is quite immature, while a
14-year-old child is often considered mature enough so that his/herown preference should be respected.53
Based on this scenario, respondents were given three hypothetical cases that have ethical dilemmas in negotiation: Case A about
hidden assets, Case U about client’s unfitness, and Case P aboutchild’s own preference. Respondents were asked to answer how theywould deal with the situations (by multiple-choice questions). After
that, the questionnaire also asked reasons behind respondents’choices in Cases U and P (by scaling matrix).
2. Three Cases
a. Case A (Assets)
The first case, Case A, was a case for disclosure of client’s hidden
assets54—the client confessed that he/she had secret extra assets andrequested respondents not to reveal the secret assets to thecounterparty if possible. Case A contained two questions, one withenormous assets of $1,000,000 (obviously a material fact) and anotherwith a trivial asset of $100 (a nonmaterial fact).55 The two questions
53. E.g., children reaching the age of 14 have the right to select the custodial
parent in the State of Georgia (GA. CODE ANN., § 19-9-3 (2011)); Froug v. Harper, 140
S.E.2d 844, 845 (Ga. 1965). See, e.g., Saito, supra note 5 at 948–54 for details of therole of children’s preferences in the legal system for divorce.
54. A more neutral wording, “extra assets,” was used in the questionnaire because of concerns that the expression “hidden assets” might induce respondents tothink that the assets should not be revealed.
55. To be exact, the impact of the assets’ amount is a relative matter. $1,000,000
could be the same value for a billionaire as $100 for an impoverished person. However, the author rather intended to keep the questions concise by excluding information such as the client’s total assets or the wealth level. Besides, in theory, any facts ofR\\jciprod01\productn\H\HNR\22-2\HNR204.txt

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were presented to each respondent in random order to control any
carry-over or anchoring effect: half of the respondents answered$1,000,000 first and $100 second while the other half answered in the
opposite order. In both questions, respondents were asked to choose
from three options: disclosure (Yes, I would disclose it); nondisclosure(No, I would not disclose it); and conditional disclosure (I would disclose it if asked explicitly and specifically by the counterparty).
The wording of the case was designed to be concise and to generate a gray-zone ethical dilemma. First, the condition of if possible
grants discretion to respondents. Due to the rule of confidentiality,
respondents would have no choice but to withhold the information if
demanded by the client as a strict order.56 Regarding the options, one
conditional option was included based on the results of precedingstudies,57 in which a certain percentage of attorneys responded witha qualified answer to various cases. On the other hand, resignationfrom representation was not included as an option; if included, respondents might easily escape from confronting the designed ethicaldilemmas.58
As described above (I-C-2-a), there are no simple criteria to judge
misrepresentation.59 However, it would be reasonable to consider
that nondisclosure of $1,000,000 in Case A qualifies as misrepresentation by omission. Unless the attorney discloses this fact, thean asset’s amount (including $100 in extra assets) might be a material fact despite thetriviality of the amount because it affects the results of property division—it could
technically be fraud even if the amount of damage is minor. But, the main purpose of
Case A was not to reveal the preciseness of respondents’ interpretations of Rule 4.1
but to observe respondents’ reactions in situations with different levels of gravity/
triviality of the information.
56. Rule 1.6(a) “A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent.” (c) “A lawyer shall makereasonable efforts to prevent. . . unauthorized disclosure.” In practice, attorneys
should consider resigning from the representation if withholding the information
would cause ethical problems (e.g., would assist client’s crime or fraud). MODEL RULESOF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6.
57. Lempert, supra note 33 (see also Reilly, supra note 34 and Hogan, supra note35); Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 24.
58. For this study’s purpose of measuring the alterations of ethical sense, it wasessential that respondents sincerely confronted the ethical dilemmas. Furthermore,
resignation in real practice would not be as easy as choosing it in a multiple-choicequestion of a survey. Preceding studies have also not included resignation as an
option.
59. This study daringly chose the scenarios of misrepresentation by omission, instead of affirmative false statement (by commission). Misrepresentation by omission
would be a more common ethical dilemma in negotiation practice as mentioned in
I.C.2.a above. Asking whether respondents would make an affirmative lie might makeit clearer that the options fall under the violation of Rule 4.1. But, this kind of clearcut question would be separate from the reality of legal practice.

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counterparty would take the false premise of a much smaller amountas the total assets and agree to the settlement based on the false premise. Also, as the total amount of assets often appears on the settlement agreement, preparing and signing the agreement can beconsidered an affirmative false statement by document. Therefore,
the options of not disclose it and disclose it if asked (i.e., not disclose
unless asked by the counterparty) could be a violation of Rule 4.1.
Although this study used situations of divorce negotiations, theethical dilemma in Case A was designed to be similar to situations
tested in preceding studies (i.e., situations of simple financial negotiations). That is the Client Principle versus the Fairness Principle.
The purpose of Case A, developed from preceding descriptive studies,
was to discover the effects of the ethical rules in the situations of the
Client Principle versus the Fairness Principle. Furthermore, it was toreveal how the effects differ in accordance with materiality of
information.
b. Case U (Unfitness)
The second and third cases were both related to custody of thechild: a case of client’s unfitness (“Case U”) and a case of child’s own
preference (“Case P”). These two cases were presented to each respondent in random order to control possible carry-over or anchoring
effects.
In Case U, the client confessed that he/she had continuously
failed to provide basic necessities to the child; essentially, the client
was an unfit parent. An expression of “neglect” was not explicitly
used in the scenario, but the situation could fall under such a category. However, the client was eager to obtain custody, and requested
respondents not to reveal the fact of client’s unfitness to thecounterparty if possible as the same as Case A. The first question waswhether or not to disclose this fact during the negotiations, and respondents answered from three options: disclosure (Yes, I would disclose it); nondisclosure (No, I would not disclose it); and conditional
disclosure (I would disclose it if asked explicitly and specifically by thecounterparty).
The second question was about respondents’ basic strategy forthe negotiations, of which options were: I would try to obtain; I would
somewhat try to obtain; I would somewhat try to give away; and I
would try to give away custody of the child. It is reasonable to consider parent’s unfitness as a material fact under Rule 4.1. If Case U
goes to court for adjudication, custody of the child will definitely begiven to the counterparty, a fit parent, in accordance with the “best\\jciprod01\productn\H\HNR\22-2\HNR204.txt

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interests of the child” standard. Also, it is a tragedy for the child tocontinue to live with an unfit parent who fails to provide basic necessities (i.e., neglect). In the case of parent’s unfitness, even the stateagency may intervene against the family to protect the child.60 Thus,
the fact of the parent’s unfitness would certainly influence the otherparent’s decision-making significantly.61 In this scenario, two parties
will negotiate and argue the custody based on the premise of client’s
fitness as parent unless the negotiator discloses the fact. The negotiator’s failure to do so would certainly mislead the counterparty. Thus,
the options of not disclose it and disclose it if asked (i.e., not disclose
unless asked by the counterparty) could be a violation of Rule 4.1.
The first question of fact disclosure included all three of the ethical principles. Respondents were placed in a dilemma between the
Client Principle versus the Fairness Principle plus the Public Principle. From the Client Principle, respondents shall not disclose the factof client’s unfitness, which was disadvantageous for the client to seek
custody. But, from the viewpoint of truthfulness (the Fairness Principle) and the viewpoint of the child’s human rights (the Public Principle), respondents might want to disclose the client’s unfitness to thecounterparty. The second question of basic strategy was unrelated tofact disclosure; the ethical dilemma was between the Client Principle
and the Public Principle. From the Client Principle, respondents
were required to do their best to obtain custody as requested by theclient. But, from the perspective of the child’s human rights (the Public Principle), respondents might want to give away custody in light ofthe client’s unfitness.
c. Case P (Preference)
In Case P, the client confessed that the child’s own preference
was to live not with the client, but with the counterparty. Both theclient and the counterparty are equally fit parents for raising thechild. The client was still eager to obtain the custody, and requested
respondents not to reveal the child’s own preference to thecounterparty if possible. As with Case U, two questions (fact disclosure and basic strategy) were presented.
It is plausible to consider the child’s preference as a material fact
under Rule 4.1; it is more plausible in the case of a child who is 14
years old than of one who is five years old. When determining the
60. See generally DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, ET AL., CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE,POLICY AND PRACTICE 279–438 (5th ed. 2014) for legal issues over abuse and neglect.
61. See supra Section I.C.2.a for the definition of material fact.

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custodial parent(s), the court takes the factor of a child’s preference
into account under the “best interests of the child” standard. Thus, if
Case P goes to court for adjudication, the court will likely give thecustody to the counterparty as long as other factors are balanced(Case P explicitly mentioned they are an equally fit parent). In thatsense, the fact of a child’s own preference is an important factor forthe decision-making in child custody negotiation. The older the childis, the more the court defers to a child’s own preference. As describedabove, children at the age of 14 even have a right to choose their custodial parent in a certain state.62
In the scenario, two parties will negotiate and argue the custody
based on the premise that the child does not have a preference of thecounterparty unless the negotiator discloses the fact. Thus, as with
Case U, the options of disclose it and disclose it if asked could be misrepresentation by omission that violates Rule 4.1.
The ethical dilemmas in Case P were similar to Case U. The
question of fact disclosure was under the dilemma of the Client Principle versus the Fairness Principle plus the Public Principle. The
question of basic strategy was under the dilemma of the Client Principle versus the Public Principle. Having said that, the materiality
and seriousness of the fact differed between Case U and Case P. As
mentioned above, both client’s unfitness and child’s preference arematerial facts; however, the child’s preference is only one of the factors for a court to determine the best interest of the child, while parent’s unfitness alone (regardless of other factors) can be a criticalfactor for a court to take away custody. Also, Case P (the child will
live with a fit parent who does not meet the child’s preference) was
less severe than Case U (the child will live with an unfit parent who
does neglect him/her) from the viewpoint of the child’s human rights.
3. Factors ConsideredWith regard to Cases U and P, respondents were asked to provide the reasons behind their choices. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 not at all,2 slightly, 3 moderately, 4 very, 5 extremely), they were asked to indicate how important each of the listed factors was for them in theirdecision making process.63 For the first question regarding disclosure, eight factors were presented to respondents: getting a fair settlement; complying with the Rules of Professional Conduct; securing the62. See supra note 53.
63. In order to avoid any potential carry-over effects to respondents’ answers in
the latter case, reasons for both cases were asked after respondents completed both ofCases U and P.

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child’s welfare; maximizing the settlement for your client; conducting
yourself ethically; maintaining your integrity; maintaining client confidences; avoiding assisting in a client’s fraud. For the second question regarding strategy, six factors were presented: getting a fairsettlement; obtaining a profitable fee for yourself; securing the child’s
welfare; maximizing the settlement for your client; avoiding litigation;
avoiding assisting in a client’s fraud. In each question, all of thesefactors were presented in random order in a matrix.
The primary purpose of asking for reasons was to observe differences—regarding to what extent respondents highlight each factor—
between the two groups: those after ethical education and those
before. Upon designing the lists of factors in each question, this study
selected several factors that had been identified in preceding studies
and modified them in a way to conform to the Structure of EthicalDilemmas (Figure 1 above) in this study. Maximizing the settlement
for your client was a factor for the Client Principle. Getting a fairsettlement64 and avoiding assisting in a client’s fraud represented theethics of the Fairness Principle. Securing the child’s welfare was afactor for the ethics of the Public Principle. Some other factors werealso included, which were identified as important rationales in truthtelling by Hinshaw and Alberts (maintaining your integrity, maintaining client confidences, and complying with the Rules of Professional Conduct65) and as lawyers’ high-priority goals of negotiation inanother preceding study (conducting yourself ethically, obtaining a
profitable fee for yourself, and avoiding litigation66).
III. RESULTS
A. Case A (Assets)
In the case of $1,000,000 secret assets, distribution patterns ofrespondents’ decisions were almost identical between the two groups(those before ethical education and those after ethical education). In
both groups, most respondents decided to disclose the fact to thecounterparty: more than 40% of respondents chose to unconditionally
64. The original wordings were “maximizing settlement” and “fair settlement.”
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the
Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 217–18 tbls. B8 & B9(2002).
65. The original wordings were “my integrity is too important,” “the information
is protected by the professional rules of conduct regarding client confidences,” and “todo so may violate the rules of professional conduct.” Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note
24, at 125–28 tbls. 2 & 3.
66. The original wordings were “ethical conduct,” “profitable fee,” and “avoiding
litigation.” Shneider, supra note 64, at 217–18 tbls. B8 & B9.

RR

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disclose it, and approximately 50% chose to conditionally disclose it if
asked by the counterparty (Table 1).
TABLE 1– DISCLOSURE OF $1,000,000 ASSETS BY STUDENTS GROUP67
Not Disclose

If Asked

Disclose

Total

Before Education

6 (11.54%)

25 (48.08%)

21 (40.38%)

52 (100%)

After Education

3 (5.17%)31 (53.45%)

24 (41.38%)

58 (100%)

Fisher's exact test, p = 0.500

In contrast, in the case of $100 secret assets, the proportion of
disclose largely decreased, while not disclose increased in both of thetwo groups. However, the distribution patterns of the two were different. Students after ethical education were more inclined to not disclose the fact. In the group of students after ethical education, nearly
40% chose to withhold the fact while only 25% of students before ethical education chose to do so. Also, the proportion of disclose was lessthan 10% in the group after ethical education while the proportion
was more than 20% in the group before ethical education (Table 2 &Figure 2). Pearson’s c2 test confirmed the difference between the twogroups was statistically significant at the 10 percent level.

FIGURE 2 – DISCLOSURE OF $100 ASSETS BY STUDENTS GROUP

67. Fisher’s exact test, instead of Pearson’s c2 test, was used for the significancetest because there was a cell with a frequency less than five in the table (i.e., “3” forAfter Education – Not Disclose).

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TABLE 2 – DISCLOSURE OF $100 ASSETS BY STUDENTS GROUP
Not Disclose

If Asked

Disclose

Total

Before Education

13 (25.00%)

28 (53.85%)

11 (21.15%)

52 (100%)

After Education

23 (39.66%)

30 (51.72%)

5 (8.62%)58 (100%)

ʖ2(2) = 4.7837, p = 0.091

B. Case U (Unfitness)
For the question concerning disclosure of the fact of client’s unfitness, the difference of distribution patterns between the two groups
was striking. Basically, students after ethical education were more
inclined to withhold the fact. Only about 10% of students after ethicaleducation decided to unconditionally disclose the fact to thecounterparty, while over 40% of those before ethical education selected to disclose. Also, the proportion of not disclose after ethical education was almost double compared to the group before ethicaleducation (Table 3 & Figure 3). Pearson’s c2 test confirmed the difference between the two groups was statistically significant at the 0.1
percent level.

TABLE 3 – DISCLOSURE OF UNFITNESS BY STUDENTS GROUP
Not Disclose

If Asked

Disclose

Total

Before Education

9 (17.31%)

20 (38.46%)

23 (44.23%)

52 (100%)

After Education

19 (32.76%)

33 (56.90%)

6 (10.34%)

58 (100%)ʖ 2(2) = 16.4473, p = 0.000

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Table 4 shows results of an analysis using ordered logistic regression: ethical education and several other respondents’ characteristics as independent variables68 and respondents’ choices in thedisclosure question of Case U as dependent variable.69
Column (1), the model of one independent variable, shows theeffect of ethical education is statistically significant at the 0.1 percent
level. Column (2) added one more factor, knowledge of family law.70
The author hypothesized that knowledge of family law might affectrespondents’ understanding of importance of the client’s unfitness information in the negotiation. The impact of ethical education was still
statistically significant (1 percent level) after controlling the knowledge of family law. Also, as the author anticipated, the effect ofknowledge of family law was significant (10 percent level). Then, incolumn (3), the effect of ethical education (1 percent level) and knowledge of family law (10 percent level) were statistically significant
68. Two variables, knowledge of family law and knowledge of Rule 4.1, weretreated as numerical variables (1 not at all, 2 know a little, 3 know a fair amount, 4know it well). Other independent variables were dummy variables: gender (0 male, 1female); marriage (0 single never married, 1 married); experience of parents’ divorcein the past (0 no, 1 yes); child’s age in the scenario (0 five years old, 1 fourteen years
old).
69. See, e.g., SCOTT J. LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA 309–83 (3d ed. 2014) for details of ordered logistic regression model. The three levels in the disclosure question of Case U
were not disclose it, disclose it if asked explicitly and specifically by the counterparty,and (unconditionally) disclose it. These levels had an order toward a direction
whether to disclose the information while distance between each level would differ.
Therefore, this study treated this dependent variable as ordinal but not continuous(not numerical) to employ ordered logistic regression. The estimating equation of themodel (e.g., for column (3)) is:

i indexes individuals. b is a constant. b1∼b6 are coefficients for each independent variable. e is the error term (representing the effects of other variables not included in theequation). ethicsD(latent) is a latent variable not directly observable, which basicallyquantifies an individual’s ethical sense concerning fact disclosure. ethicsD(overt) represents response to the disclosure question, which is the overt expression of
ethicsD(latent) in an individual’s bargaining behavior. The response to the questionchanges if latent ethical sense exceeds the threshold a1 or a2. The ordered logistic
regression model estimates constant (b0, all of the coefficients (b1∼b6) and thresholds(a1, a2) simultaneously by the maximum-likelihood approach based on the assumptionthat the distribution of e follows the logistic distribution.
70. Correlation between ethical education and knowledge of family law was weak
(0.25), under which multicollinearity would not be an issue.

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even after controlling for other possibly relevant factors such as respondents’ gender, marital status, parents’ divorce, and the age of thechild in the scenario (five or 14). At the same time, column (3) did not
find any effects of these other factors at statistically significant
levels. The estimated coefficients of the two variables,71 ethical education (-1.229) and knowledge of family law (-0.511), were both negative, meaning that respondents after ethical education andrespondents with higher knowledge of family law were more inclined
to not disclose the fact of client’s unfitness. Column (4) added two
more factors: year at school and knowledge of Rule 4.1.72 After controlling for these two factors, the effects of ethical education (5 percent level) and knowledge of family law (10 percent level) were still
statistically significant. At the same time, the effects of year andknowledge of Rule 4.1 were not statistically significant. The result
indicates that the respondents’ choices were affected by ethical education itself and not by the entire law school education,73 and thatknowledge of Rule 4.1 did not have an impact on respondents’choices.

71. I.e., the estimation of coefficients b1 and b2, respectively, in the equation mentioned in supra note 69.
72. It treated year (1L–3L) as a continuous variable. Upper-class students havemore opportunities to experience ethical education than lower-class students; correlation between year and ethical education was strong (= 0.70). Also, law school students
learn Rule 4.1 as a part of professional ethics through their ethical education; there
was correlation between knowledge of Rule 4.1 and ethical education (= 0.67). With
regard to the issue of multicollinearity, the author checked VIFs for the linear model(OLS) with the same independent variables. The VIF for each variable was not high(< 3), meaning that adding these two variables in the model did not cause the issue ofsevere multicollinearity (i.e., an issue of imprecise estimation).
73. See infra Section IV.D for further discussion.

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TABLE 4 – DISCLOSURE OF UNFITNESS (ORDERED LOGISTIC
REGRESSION)
ethics edu
family law
gender (female)marriageparents’ divorce
child’s age (14)yearrule 4.1(1)-1.389***(0.390)(2)-1.232**(0.397)-0.563†(0.289)(3)-1.229**(0.410)-0.511†(0.294)0.295(0.380)0.0695(0.575)0.778(0.549)0.294(0.386)(4)-1.464*(0.642)-0.568†(0.309)0.336(0.390)0.0471(0.578)0.764(0.552)0.257(0.398)0.0402(0.350)0.176(0.302)-103.342
0.0961
109

Log-likelihood-108.867-106.907-103.527
Pseudo R2
0.05880.07580.0945Observations
110
110
109
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients. Standard errors are inparentheses. *** Significant at 0.1% level. ** Significant at 1% level. * Significant at
5% level. † Significant at 10% level.

With regard to the question about basic strategy in Case U, thedistribution patterns of the two groups differed largely. Although the
p-value by Pearson’s c2 test went slightly above the 10 percent level(p = 0.113), the difference seemed to be obvious from the graph (Table
5 & Figure 4). The most frequent response (about 40 percent) in thegroup after ethical education was try to obtain custody while it was
somewhat try to give away custody in the group before ethical education. Respondents after ethical education were more inclined to obtain custody of the child even though the client was an unfit parent.

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FIGURE 4 – STRATEGY FOR UNFITNESS BY STUDENTS GROUPTABLE 5 – STRATEGY FOR UNFITNESS BY STUDENTS GROUP
ObtainSomewhat
ObtainSomewhat
give away

give away

Total

Before Education

11 (21.15%)

14 (26.92%)

19 (36.54%)

8 (15.38%)

52 (100%)

After Education

24 (41.38%)

15 (25.86%)

13 (22.41%)

6 (10.34%)

58 (100%)ʖ 2(3) = 5.9642, p = 0.113

Table 6 shows results of ordered logistic regression like Table 4:
ethical education and several other respondents’ characteristics as
independent variables and respondents’ choices in the strategy question of Case U as dependent variable.74 Column (1), the model of one
independent variable, shows the effect of ethical education is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Column (2) added one morefactor: knowledge of family law. After controlling for knowledge of
74. The estimating equation of the model (e.g., for column (3)) is:

i indexes individuals. δ0 is a constant. δp1~δ6 are coefficients for each independent
variable. m is the error term (representing the effects of other variables not included in
the equation). ethicsS(latent) is a latent variable not directly observable, which quantifies an individual’s ethical sense concerning basic strategy. ethicsS(overt) represents
response to the strategy question, which is the overt expression of ethicsS(latent) in
an individual’s bargaining behavior. The response to the question changes if latent
ethical sense exceeds the threshold g1, g2 or g3.

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family law, the impact of ethical education was still statistically significant (5 percent level). But, unlike in the question of disclosure,the effect of knowledge of family law was not significant. In column(3), the effect of ethical education was significant (10 percent level)
even after controlling for some more possibly relevant factors such as
respondents’ gender, marital status, parents’ divorce, and the age ofthe child in the scenario (five or 14). The effect of respondent’s gender
was also statistically significant (10 percent level). Effects of otherfactors were not observed at statistically significant levels. The estimated coefficient of ethical education (-0.628)75 was negative, meaning that respondents after ethical education were more inclined toobtain custody of the child. That of gender (0.603)76 was positive,
meaning that females, comparing to males, were more inclined togive away custody. In contrast to the question about disclosure (Table4), the effect of ethical education was not statistically significant (p =0.140) when controlling for “year” in column (4).77
TABLE 6 – STRATEGY FOR UNFITNESS (ORDERED LOGISTIC
REGRESSION)
ethics edu
family law
gender (female)marriageparents’ divorce
child’s age (14)(1)-0.811*(0.352)(2)-0.733*(0.364)-0.221(0.264)(3)-0.628†(0.376)-0.312(0.272)0.603 †
(0.363)0.220(0.508)-0.0565(0.492)-0.323(0.362)year
Log-likelihood-144.406-144.053-140.990
Pseudo R2
0.01840.02080.0340Observations
110
110
109
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients. Standard errors are inparentheses. * Significant at 5% level. † Significant at 10% level.

(4)-0.782(0.530)-0.318(0.273)0.618†(0.365)0.203(0.512)-0.0727(0.494)-0.351(0.369)0.135(0.326)-140.904
0.0346
109

75. I.e., the estimation of coefficient g1 in the equation mentioned in supra note
74.

R

76. I.e., the estimation of coefficient g3 in the equation mentioned in supra note
74.
77. See infra Section IV.D for further discussion. Similar to supra note 72, theauthor checked VIFs for the linear model (OLS) with the same independent variables.
The VIF for each variable was not high (< 3), meaning that multicollinearity was not
a severe issue.

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C. Case P (Preference)
For the question concerning disclosure of the fact of child’s own
preference, the distribution patterns of the two groups were thesame. About 40% of the respondents chose to not disclose the fact,
50% chose to disclose it if asked by the counterparty, and only 10% todisclose (Table 7). The distribution patterns of the two groups weresimilar for the question of strategy as well. The majority of the students decided to try to obtain or at least to somewhat try to obtaincustody even though it was against the child’s own preference (Table
8). The age of the child (five or 14) in the scenario did not make adifference in the distribution patterns.
TABLE 7 – DISCLOSURE OF PREFERENCE BY STUDENTS GROUP
Not Disclose

If Asked

Disclose

Total

Before Education

20 (38.46%)

26 (50.00%)

6 (11.54%)

52 (100%)

After Education

23 (39.66%)

30 (51.72%)

5 (8.62%)58 (100%)ʖ 2(2) = 0.2594, p = 0.878

TABLE 8 – STRATEGY FOR PREFERENCE BY STUDENTS GROUP78
ObtainSomewhat
ObtainSomewhat
give away

give away

Total

Before Education

33 (66.00%)

9 (18.00%)

4 (8.00%)

4 (8.00%)

50 (100%)

After Education

30 (51.72%)

16 (27.59%)

10 (17.24%)

2 (3.45%)58 (100%)

Fisher's exact test, p = 0.192

D. Factors Considered
1. Case U (Unfitness)
With respect to the question of disclosure in Case U, the mean(scale of 1–5) of the post-education group was higher in maximizing
the settlement for your client (0.1 percent level) and maintaining client confidences (1 percent level),79 and lower in securing the child’s
78. Fisher’s exact test, instead of Pearson’s c2 test, was used for the significancetest because several cells in the table had frequencies smaller than five.
79. The factor of maintaining client confidences as well as maximizing the settlement for your client represents the Client Principle. Confidentiality of client information is regulated under Rule 1.6, but with the words “if possible” in the scenario,
respondents were given discretion to decide whether or not to disclose the information. Confidentiality under Rule 1.6 was not an issue in the scenarios of this study.
Thus, maintaining client confidences can be classified as a factor simply related toclient interests.

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welfare (5 percent level) than the pre-education group (Table 9). Differences between the two groups in the other factors were not statistically significant.
Similarly, regarding the question of strategy in Case U, themean (scale of 1–5) of the post-education group was higher in maximizing the settlement for your client (0.1 percent level), and lower insecuring the child’s welfare (5 percent level) than the pre-educationgroup (Table 10). No significant differences between the two groups
were observed in the other factors.
TABLE 9 – FACTORS: DISCLOSURE OF UNFITNESS (SCALE OF 1–5)
Mean of Students Mean of Students
Difference
Before Education
After Education
fair settlement
3.490
3.661
0.171
(0.152)(0.147)(0.211)
rules of p. c.
3.843
4.018
0.175
(0.149)(0.126)(0.195)child’s welfare
4.275
3.893
-0.382*(0.125)(0.139)(0.187)max. client
2.922
3.750
0.828***(0.177)(0.158)(0.237)
conduct ethic.
4.392
4.250
-0.142(0.101)(0.125)(0.161)
integrity
4.353
4.196
-0.157(0.128)(0.112)(0.170)confidences
3.588
4.143
0.555**(0.154)(0.123)(0.197)
avoid fraud
3.922
3.964
0.043
(0.134)(0.125)(0.183)
Notes: The table reports means by scale of 1 to 5. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Observations of students before education are 51 and after education are 56.
*** Significant at 0.1% level. ** Significant at 1% level. * Significant at 5% level. By
Welch’s t test (two-sided).

TABLE 10 – FACTORS: STRATEGY FOR UNFITNESS (SCALE OF 1–5)
Mean of Students Mean of Students
Difference
Before Education
After Education
fair settlement
3.549
3.719
0.170
(0.152)(0.122)(0.195)
obtain fee
2.157
2.298
0.141
(0.162)(0.173)(0.237)child’s welfare
4.216
3.825
-0.391*(0.144)(0.144)(0.203)max. client
2.902
3.772
0.870***(0.180)(0.152)(0.236)
avoid litigation
2.471
2.667
0.196
(0.154)(0.138)(0.207)
avoid fraud
3.588
3.860
0.271
(0.173)(0.110)(0.205)
Notes: The table reports means by scale of 1 to 5. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Observations of students before education are 51 and after education are 57.
*** Significant at 0.1% level. * Significant at 5% level. By Welch’s t test (two-sided).

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2. Case P (Preference)
As for the question of disclosure in Case P, mean (scale of 1–5) of
the post-education group was higher in maximizing the settlement foryour client (5 percent level), maintaining client confidences (5 percent
level), and avoiding assisting in a client’s fraud (10 percent level)
than the pre-education group (Table 11). Differences between the twogroups in the other factors, including securing the child’s welfare,
were not significant.
Similarly, regarding the question of strategy in Case P, mean(scale of 1–5) of the post-education group was higher in maximizing
the settlement for your client (1 percent level) and avoiding assistingin a client’s fraud (10 percent level) than the pre-education group (Table 12). No significant differences between the two groups were observed in the other factors including securing the child’s welfare.
TABLE 11 – FACTORS: DISCLOSURE OF PREFERENCE (SCALE OF 1-5)
Mean of Students Mean of Students
Difference
Before Education
After Education
fair settlement
3.720
3.772
0.052
(0.131)(0.123)(0.180)rules of p. c.
3.920
4.140
0.220
(0.130)(0.126)(0.182)child’s welfare
3.900
3.754
-0.146(0.129)(0.131)(0.183)max. client
3.540
3.965
0.425*(0.141)(0.139)(0.198)
conduct ethic.
4.260
4.193
-0.067(0.106)(0.121)(0.161)
integrity
4.120
4.035
-0.085(0.127)(0.117)(0.173)
confidences
4.000
4.368
0.368*(0.128)(0.105)(0.165)
avoid fraud
3.440
3.912
0.472†(0.192)(0.126)(0.230)Notes: The table reports means by scale of 1 to 5. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Observations of students before education are 50 and after education are 57.
* Significant at 5% level. † Significant at 10% level. By Welch’s t test (two-sided).

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TABLE 12 – FACTORS: STRATEGY FOR PREFERENCE (SCALE OF 1-5)
Mean of Students Mean of Students
Difference
Before Education
After Education
fair settlement
3.451
3.702
0.251
(0.144)(0.125)(0.190)obtain fee
2.118
2.386
0.268
(0.150)(0.166)(0.223)child’s welfare
3.980
3.789
-0.191(0.130)(0.132)(0.185)max. client
3.451
4.070
0.619**(0.159)(0.114)(0.196)
avoid litigation
2.529
2.491
-0.038(0.149)(0.123)(0.193)
avoid fraud
3.392
3.789
0.397†(0.179)(0.127)(2.220)Notes: The table reports means by scale of 1 to 5. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Observations of students before education are 51 and after education are 57.
** Significant at 1% level. † Significant at 10% level. By Welch’s t test (two-sided).

IV. DISCUSSION
A. Key Findings – Structure of Ethical Dilemma
1. Client Principle versus Fairness Principle
The results of Case A (assets) indicate effects of the professional
ethical rules given the ethical dilemma between the Client Principle
and the Fairness Principle. First, the result of the case of $100 assets(students after ethical education were more inclined to not disclose
the fact) indicates that the ethical education and the professional ethical rules facilitate minor deceptions in negotiations. This result empirically supports the arguments by critics of Rule 4.1—critics haveargued that Rule 4.1, embracing a quite low standard as an official
rule, may facilitate hardball negotiation styles with heavy usage ofminor deceptions.80 A reasonable interpretation in a nutshell would
be: negotiators are not only more comfortable making small lies
under Rule 4.1, but also, under the Client Principle, they are required to employ minor deceptions to achieve client’s interests.
Then, does the Fairness Principle including Rule 4.1 have any
positive effect in preventing negotiators’ major deceptions? The answer seems to be “No.” The result of the case of $1,000,000 assets (nodifference was observed between students before and after ethical education. Majority of the respondents selected disclose or at least disclose it if asked) suggests that the ethical education and theprofessional ethical rules do not have any impact on negotiators’ ethical sense in a situation where the fact in question is clearly material.
80. See supra Section I.C.2.b.

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In other words, attorneys seem to follow their inherent sense of ethics
to deal with a situation of material fact regardless of the ethical rules(e.g., Rule 4.1). This finding actually conforms to the preceding studies, which have discovered the reality that attorneys sometimes goagainst Rule 4.1.81
2. Client Principle versus Public Principle
The result of the strategy question in Case U indicates effects ofthe ethical education and the professional ethical rules under the ethical dilemma between the Client Principle and the Public Principle.
Students after ethical education were more inclined to value the Client Principle. They were more inclined to obtain custody of the childeven though the client was an unfit parent and the situation was serious for the child’s welfare. Approximately 70% of the students after
ethical education tried to obtain or somewhat obtain custody of thechild while only 50% of those before ethical education did the same.82
Furthermore, to the question of subjective reasoning, students after
ethical education, compared to those before ethical education, placed
more emphasis on maximizing client’s interests and less emphasis on
securing the child’s welfare. These results indicate that the Client
Principle has a greater impact on negotiators’ ethical sense than the
Public Principle, and that the ethical education and professional ethical rules have an effect of diminishing negotiators’ consideration forthe child’s welfare.
The strategy question in Case P (preference) was designed to discuss the effects of the professional ethical rules in a less severe casefrom the perspective of the child’s welfare (i.e., a case where the demand from the Public Principle is weaker) than the case of client’s
unfitness. The result of the subjective reasoning was that students
after ethical education, compared to those before ethical education,
were more considerate of maximizing client interest. However, no difference was observed between the two groups in the strategy question (majority of the respondents tried to obtain or somewhat obtaincustody). This result indicates that the ethical education and the professional ethical rules do not have an impact on negotiators’ actual
bargaining behaviors in non-severe cases.

81. See supra Section I.C.3.
82. See supra Table 5 and Figure 4.

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3. Client Principle versus Fairness Principle plus Public
Principle
The fact disclosure question in Case U (unfitness) was designed
to discuss the effects of the professional ethical rules under the ethical dilemma between the Client Principle and the Fairness Principle
plus the Public Principle. Similar to the strategy question, the result
was that students after ethical education were more inclined to value
the Client Principle. They were more inclined to not disclose the factof client’s unfitness (a material fact of which misrepresentation wasprohibited under Rule 4.1 and a serious fact for the child’s welfare) tothe counterparty. In addition, the result of subjective reasoning
showed that students after ethical education, compared to those
before ethical education, put more emphasis on client’s interests andless emphasis on securing the child’s welfare. These results indicatethat the Client Principle has a greater impact on negotiators’ ethicalsense even if the other two principles, the Fairness and the Public
Principles, are combined.
One question arises when you compare the result of disclosure
question in Case U with Case A. Why do the professional ethicalrules have an impact on negotiators’ sense of ethics in Case U (students after ethical education were inclined to not disclose) and haveno impact on $1,000,000 assets case in Case A (both groups were inclined to disclose)? Both of the facts are material under Rule 4.1.
These results suggest that the impact of the Client Principle isstronger in the case of non-monetary negotiations such as custody negotiations than simple financial negotiations. Negotiators may beless cautious of misrepresentation or fraud if the fact in question is
not a monetary or proprietary issue; or it may be easier for negotiators to rationalize non-disclosure of a fact that is somewhat amenable
to different interpretations such as unfitness as a parent.83 In any
case, the Fairness Principle seems to be less workable in cases where
the child’s welfare (a public interest) is involved.
Lastly, the result of the disclosure question in Case P (preference) (both groups were inclined to disclose) indicates that the ethical
83. The description of Case U was written carefully to avoid respondents’ subjective interpretations; however, it is impossible to eliminate all of the subjective aspectsof a non-monetary or non-proprietary fact. For instance, the phrases “your client
seems to be an unfit parent” and “the counterparty seems to be a fit parent” used inCase U might have helped some respondents rationalize non-disclosure. But, thesephrases are in line with the actual situation of attorneys’ practice—it is always “seems
to be” because attorneys have to analyze fitness or unfitness of a parent from limited
information.

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education and the professional ethical rules do not have an impact onnegotiators’ actual bargaining behaviors in cases less severe for thechild’s welfare. Having said that, in the subjective reasoning for thedisclosure question of Case P, students after ethical education, compared to those before ethical education, were more considerate of
avoiding assisting fraud84 as well as of maximizing client’s interest.
It indicates that the professional ethical rules have an effect of reminding negotiators of the judgment standard (as described in I-C-2b, avoiding fraud is the same level of standard as Rule 4.1) although
it does not change negotiators’ actual bargaining behaviors.
B. Summary – Hypothesis I or II?
With regard to the ethical dilemma of the Client Principle versus
the Fairness Principle, the results of Case A indicate that the professional ethical rules have an effect of facilitating minor deceptions
while they have no effect of preventing major deceptions.
Regarding the ethical dilemma of the Client Principle versus the
Public Principle, the results of the strategy questions in Cases U and
P indicate that the professional ethical rules have an effect of enhancing negotiators’ partisan representation and diminishing consideration for the child’s welfare (a public interest) under severe situations
while the rules do not have an impact in non-severe situations.
As for the ethical dilemma of the Client Principle versus the
Fairness Principle plus the Public Principle, the indications of thedisclosure questions in Cases U and P are similar to the above-mentioned strategy questions. Even if the Fairness Principle and the
Public Principle are combined, the Client Principle overwhelms themand has a greater impact on negotiators’ ethical sense. Furthermore,when compared to the results of Case A, it is indicated that the Fairness Principle is less workable in non-financial cases where thechild’s welfare (a public interest) is involved.
To sum up, the findings of this study support Hypothesis II of thetwo hypotheses presented in the beginning of this Article (I-C-5). In
the context of divorce settlement negotiation, this study uncovered
the effect of ethical education on law students, which is diminishing
truthfulness of relevant facts and consideration for children’s welfare(i.e., Working Hypothesis II is verified). Therefore, by implication, theU.S. professional ethical rules as a whole have an effect of enhancing
negotiators’ partisan representation while diminishing negotiators’
84. The factor of avoiding assisting in a client’s fraud.

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consideration for fairness (particularly, truthfulness) and public interests in negotiation (i.e., Hypothesis II is supported). The Client
Principle is not inhibited by the Fairness Principle or the Public Principle, and it has predominant effects.
C. Other Findings
1. Knowledge of Family Law
Knowledge of family law affected respondents’ decisions in thedisclosure question in Case U (unfitness).85 This finding also supports discussions above—it suggests the predominant impact of the
Client Principle and ineffectiveness of the Fairness Principle. If theFairness Principle or Rule 4.1 had a substantial effect on negotiators’
ethical sense, knowledge of family law would enhance disclosure of
the fact of client’s unfitness because respondents can more easily
identify parent’s unfitness as a material fact (Rule 4.1) and as a severe fact for the child’s welfare with higher knowledge of family law.
But, the result was the opposite. In this study, knowledge of family
law discouraged respondents from disclosing client’s unfitness. Thisis probably due to the impact of the Client Principle. If respondents
know of family law, they have a better prediction of the disadvantageous outcome of disclosing client’s unfitness to the counterparty—
the client will surely lose custody of the child.
2. Gender
Respondents’ gender had a statistically significant impact on thebasic strategy for Case U (unfitness).86 The result indicates female
negotiators are more considerate of children’s interests than malenegotiators, even if it goes against the client’s request. However, thedifference did not appear in Case P (preference), where the scenario
was less severe from the perspective of the child’s welfare. Therefore,
this gender-based difference might appear only in a critical casewhere children’s welfare or other human rights issues are severely atstake. The mechanism of the gender-based difference was beyond thescope of this study and needs to be checked by further studies.
D. Limitations of Study
The author would like to note five issues as limitations of thisstudy.
85. See supra Table 4.
86. See supra Table 6.

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First, the changes in students’ ethical sense this study observed
might be attributable to the law school education as a whole and notsolely to ethical education. This study identified three major opportunities to learn professional ethics for negotiation: by taking the
MPRE, by taking a course of legal profession, and by taking a course
related to negotiation. However, students’ ethical sense could be influenced by other experiences in law school education, such as taking
clinical programs. Even the atmosphere of school might affect students’ ethical sense. Due to the limited sample size of this study, it
was difficult to strictly distinguish the effect of ethical education andthat of entire law school education because correlation between year
(1L–3L) and ethical education was strong (0.70). While this study
successfully found the effect of ethical education itself separated fromthe effect of entire education in the disclosure question of Case U,87
this study could not find it statistically significant in other cases
when controlling the factor of year.88 Having said that, any ethicalsense students acquire from the entire law school education would beeventually based on the Model Rules and other fundamental ethicalprinciples. Thus, this study would have observed the effects of professional ethical rules even if the difference of ethical sense in some degree between the two groups came from the entire law school
education and not from the particular ethical education.
Second, as for the nature of the sample, the respondents do not
represent all of the law students in the States. The sample data is
only from students at five top-tier law schools (ranked within top 20).
Therefore, students at lower ranked schools might have a different
ethical sense, and the effect of ethical education to them might bedifferent from the results of this study. Having said that, a certain
degree of diversity was maintained, as the ranks of respondents’schools varied within top 20. Thus, this study’s sample at least represents students of elite law schools.
Third, in connection with the second issue, this study treated allof the respondents from different schools as one data set89 on the premise that there is no difference among schools. But, the actual ethicaleducation, school climate, and student characteristics might differ byschool. If so, students’ ethical sense and the effect of ethical education
87. See supra Section III.B.
88. See supra Section III.B for the strategy question of Case U. The effect of ethical education was not statistically significant in questions of Case A as well whenyear was controlled by the method of ordered logistic regression.
89. See supra II.A and note 44.

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might somehow differ by school. Those possible differences by school
were outside the scope of this study.
Fourth, the respondents were law school students and not real
attorneys. This study employed law school students in order to compare the pre-education group and the post-education group. But, attorneys’ ethical sense might keep changing after practicing for acertain period of time or after taking courses of continuing legal education (“CLE”) at the bar associations. Thus, the results of this study(i.e., the answers from students after ethical education) might not be
the same as the ethical sense of real attorneys. It would be interesting to administer the same questionnaire to attorneys in the future.
However, given that respondents of this study were students at eliteschools, most of whom will safely pass the bar exam and will findactual employment at law firms immediately after graduation, theethical sense of post-education students would not largely differ fromthat of real attorneys.
Fifth, this study focused on the case of divorce settlement, withsome limited scenarios. The effect of ethical education and the professional ethical rules might differ in other cases than divorce settlement. Also, the results of Case A might not be exactly the same if it
uses different amounts of assets. This study used the two numbers,$1,000,000 and $100, which were clearly material and nonmaterial.
But, respondents’ reactions may be different in the case of middle
amounts such as $10,000 and $1,000. It would be ideal to test several
different numbers in the future. Having said that, Cases A, U and P
in this study would roughly cover all of the major situations in divorce settlement practice.90
V. CONCLUSION
Loyalty to their clients is at the core of attorneys’ ethical rules in
the U.S. However, this principle might be too narrowly focused.
Among the three principles related to negotiation ethics, only the Client Principle has substantial impact on negotiators, while other principles, such as the Fairness and the Public Principles, are powerless.
This study empirically uncovered that learning professional ethics
makes negotiators less considerate of fairness and public interests. In
90. Another important situation regarding divorce (in particular, post-divorce)
would be disputes over visitation. But, the structure of visitation disputes is basicallythe same as that of custody disputes. Therefore, findings from Cases U and P are
relevant to visitation disputes as well.

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other words, legal education makes attorneys more “unethical.” Attorneys are seeking their clients’ interests by way of sacrificing third
party’s rights (public interests) as well as fairness and truthfulness
in negotiation. Even worse, this study found that they are less hesitant to misrepresent material facts when negotiating non-monetaryissues (e.g., custody of a child).
The U.S.-style partisan role of attorneys would work perfectly
well if every single person in society could hire an attorney. But, in
reality, there are vulnerable people in society, such as children, whohave difficulties in obtaining their own attorneys. The rights of thosevulnerable people might be undermined under the current system. It
would widen the welfare gap between those who can afford attorneys
and those who do not have access to attorneys. For instance, in thecase of divorce settlement, parents’ attorneys cannot be considered a“safety net” to protect child welfare. Unfortunately, attorneys would
rather sacrifice the welfare of the child to achieve the interests of theparent, the client. Children’s rights and welfare are not secured
under the current system.
For the future directions, the author would like to recommend
three different approaches to improve the situation. The first approach would be to expand equal access to attorneys.91 It is necessary
to secure vulnerable people’s access to attorneys when sticking to thepartisan representation system. For example, in the context of divorce cases, children’s access to attorneys is essential even if the caseis settled outside the court. The second approach would be education.
Legal education at law school (and CLE) should also underline theimportance of fairness and public interests while maintaining thepartisan representation system. As the Fairness and the Public Principles are already mentioned in the Model Rules, it is perhaps a matter of how the rules are taught.92 But, given the current dominationof the Client Principle, a mere renewal of Professional Responsibility
courses would not be sufficient. It might be ideal to develop a newmodel of clinical education focusing on professionalism.93 The third
91. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope 6.
92. In this regard, it would be ideal to study qualitatively the recent reality of
how professional ethics are taught in law schools and the impact of different teaching
methods.
93. For reference, Harvard Medical School implemented a major reform of its
medical education in 2006, and one of its purposes was to foster a better sense of
professional responsibility, such as by infusing students with a sense of empathy forpatients. The reform highlighted continuous clinical education and students’ interactions with patients. See, e.g., Jules L. Dienstag & Jane M. Neill, Harvard Medical
School, 85 ACAD. MED. S269 (2010).

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approach might be to simply abolish the principle of partisan representation. The current professional ethics put excessive emphasis on
loyalty to the clients, and that causes the problem. By deleting theemphasis of this principle, attorneys’ loyalty to their clients would be
moderately guided by the attorney-client market mechanisms. Under
the present market of legal services, attorneys care about the interests of their clients anyway; otherwise, they will lose their jobs. Thus,
it might be unnecessary to highlight the principle of partisan representation in the professional ethical rules. This Article leaves open
further discussions for system reforms. But, the attorneys’ professional ethics and current legal education do have the issue of impairing fairness and public interests in negotiation. This issue should not
be ignored.

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APPENDIX A – SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE94
Introduction
You are being asked to take part in a research study being done by
Hiroharu Saito from University of Tokyo.
If you choose to be in the study, you will complete a survey. This survey will help us learn about attorneys’ behaviors in divorce settlement negotiations over child custody. The survey will take you about
10-15 minutes.
You can skip questions that you do not want to answer or stop thesurvey at any time.
The survey is anonymous, and no one will be able to link your answers back to you. Please do not include your name or other information that could be used to identify you in survey responses.
We will give a $5 Amazon gift card to 20 of the participants via alottery. If you want to participate in the gift lottery, [We will give a $1
Amazon gift card to each participant. If you want to get the giftcard,]95 you will be asked to enter your email address at the end of
the survey. Your email address will not be linked to your answers
and will be kept confidential. Your email address is for the purpose ofholding the lottery and delivering the Amazon gift card to the winner.
Being in this study is voluntary. Please close the webpage if you do
not want to participate.
You must be a current JD student at law school in the U.S. to participate in this study. If you are not, please close the webpage.
Please contact Hiroharu Saito at saito [at] hrs-law.com for any questions or comments.
If you have read the above information and agree to participate inthis study, click the “Next” button to start the survey.
Thank you for your participation.

94. Horizontal lines indicate page breaks in the actual online questionnaire.
95. Most participants (97) participated in this survey on the basis of $5 to $20 via
a lottery. An additional 16 participated on the basis of $1 each. Eighty-four participants actually provided their email address for this small compensation.

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Basic Scenario
Please read the following scenario:
Basic Scenario
You are an attorney working on a pre-litigation divorce dispute. You
are representing a client who is one of the divorcing parents. You willsoon start the settlement negotiations for the divorce conditions suchas child custody, visitation, property division, child support and alimony with the other parent’s attorney. The divorcing couple has one
child, who is 5 [14] years old. The biggest issue between the couple isthe custody of the child. Both of the parents are very eager to obtaincustody – both physical and legal custody.
Based on this scenario, three hypothetical cases will be presented toyou. Those hypothetical cases are totally independent from eachother. Answer questions one by one in order. You cannot go backward.
Please take time to read and to think carefully before answering thequestions.
Practice Question: what is the age of the child in our scenario? (click
the radio button to select the option)○ 5 [14] years old
Case AYour client revealed to you that he/she has extra assets unknown tothe counterparty.
However, your client asked you not to reveal this fact (= extra assets)
to the counterparty during negotiations if possible. Revealing thisfact may affect the settlement of financial issues such as property
division, child support and alimony.
Questions for Case A are on the next page.
If the amount of the extra assets was $1,000,000 (one million dollars),would you disclose the fact of your client’s extra assets to thecounterparty during the negotiations?
○ Yes, I would disclose it.
○ No, I would not disclose it.
○ I would disclose it if asked explicitly and specifically by thecounterparty.

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If the amount of the extra assets was $100 (one hundred dollars),would you disclose the fact of your client’s extra assets to thecounterparty during the negotiations?
○ Yes, I would disclose it.
○ No, I would not disclose it.
○ I would disclose it if asked explicitly and specifically by thecounterparty.

Case U96
Your client revealed to you that he/she has continuously failed to provide basic necessities to the child. Based on the client’s confession,
your client seems to be an unfit parent. Furthermore, thecounterparty seems to be a fit parent.
However, your client is still eager to obtain custody of the child. Yourclient asked you not to reveal the fact of his/her unfitness (= the client
has continuously failed to provide basic necessities to the child) to thecounterparty during the negotiations if possible.
Remember that the age of the child is 5 [14].
Would you disclose the fact of your client’s unfitness to thecounterparty during the negotiations?
○ Yes, I would disclose it.
○ No, I would not disclose it.
○ I would disclose it if asked explicitly and specifically by thecounterparty.
What would be your basic strategy for the negotiations in Case U?
○ I would try to obtain custody of the child.
○ I would somewhat try to obtain custody of the child.
○ I would somewhat try to give away custody of the child.
○ I would try to give away custody of the child.

Case PYour client revealed to you that the child’s own preference is to livewith the counterparty rather than with the client. Both the client andthe counterparty seem to be an equally fit parent for raising the child.
96. The two cases, Case U and Case P, were presented in random order to each
respondent.

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However, your client is still eager to obtain custody of the child. Yourclient asked you not to reveal the child’s own preference to thecounterparty during the negotiations if possible.
Remember that the age of the child is 5 [14].
Would you disclose the fact of the child’s own preference to thecounterparty during the negotiations?
○ Yes, I would disclose it.
○ No, I would not disclose it.
○ I would disclose it if asked explicitly and specifically by thecounterparty.
What would be your basic strategy for the negotiations in Case P?
○ I would try to obtain custody of the child.
○ I would somewhat try to obtain custody of the child.
○ I would somewhat try to give away custody of the child.
○ I would try to give away custody of the child.
Now, we would like to know the reasons behind your decisions inCase U (the case of client’s unfitness).97
On a scale of 1 (Not at all important) to 5 (Extremely important),
please indicate how important each of the following factors98 was foryou in your decision making process regarding the question “Would
you disclose the fact of your client’s unfitness to the counterparty
during the negotiations?” in Case U. Remember your answer to thisquestion was [the respondent’s answer to the previous question being
inserted automatically].
Re-post of Case U
Your client revealed to you that he/she has continuously failed to provide basic necessities to the child. Based on the client’s confession,
your client seems to be an unfit parent. Furthermore, thecounterparty seems to be a fit parent. However, your client is still
eager to obtain custody of the child. Your client asked you not to reveal the fact of his/her unfitness (= the client has continuously failed
to provide basic necessities to the child) to the counterparty during
the negotiations if possible.
97. The reasons behind the answers given for the two cases, Case U and Case P,
were asked in random order to each respondent.
98. Eight factors were presented in random order in a matrix.

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1(Not at all)2
(Slightly)

3(Moderately)

4(Very)

5(Extremely)

Getting a fairsettlement

|

|

|

|

|

Complying
with the RulesofProfessional
Conduct

|

|

|

|

|

Securing thechild’s
welfare

|

|

|

|

|

Maximizing
the settlement
for your client

|

|

|

|

|

Conducting
yourself
ethically

|

|

|

|

|

Maintaining
your integrity

|

|

|

|

|

Maintaining
clientconfidences

|

|

|

|

|

Avoiding
assisting in aclient’s fraud

|

|

|

|

|

On a scale of 1 (Not at all important) to 5 (Extremely important),
please indicate how important each of the following factors99 was foryou in your decision making process regarding the question “Whatwould be your basic strategy for the negotiations in Case U?”. Remember your answer to this question was [the respondent’s answer
to the previous question being inserted automatically].

99. Six factors were presented in random order in a matrix.

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1(Not at all)2
(Slightly)

3(Moderately)

4(Very)

5(Extremely)

Getting a fairsettlement

|

|

|

|

|

Obtaining a
profitable fee
for yourself

|

|

|

|

|

Securing thechild’s welfare

|

|

|

|

|

Maximizing
the settlement
for your client

|

|

|

|

|

Avoiding
litigation

|

|

|

|

|

Avoiding
assisting in aclient’s fraud

|

|

|

|

|

Now, we would like to know the reasons behind your decisions inCase P (the case of child’s own preference).
On a scale of 1 (Not at all important) to 5 (Extremely important),
please indicate how important each of the following factors100 was foryou in your decision making process regarding the question “Would
you disclose the fact of child’s own preference to the counterparty
during the negotiations?” in Case P. Remember your answer to thisquestion was [the respondent’s answer to the previous question being
inserted automatically].
Re-post of Case P
Your client revealed to you that the child’s own preference is to livewith the counterparty rather than with the client. Both the client andthe counterparty seem to be an equally fit parent for raising the child.
However, your client is still eager to obtain custody of the child. Yourclient asked you not to reveal the child’s own preference to thecounterparty during the negotiations if possible.
[omitted: a matrix with the same eight factors as Case U]

100. Eight factors were presented in random order in a matrix.

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On a scale of 1 (Not at all important) to 5 (Extremely important),
please indicate how important each of the following factors101 was foryou in your decision making process regarding the question “Whatwould be your basic strategy for the negotiations in Case P?”. Remember your answer to this question was [the respondent’s answer
to the previous question being inserted automatically].
[omitted: a matrix with the same six factors as Case U]

You are almost done. Please answer the final questions below.
Which year are you in?
○ 1L (Class of 2018)○ 2L (Class of 2017)○ 3L (Class of 2016)
Which law school do you go to? Enter the name of your law school.
[Textbox]
What is your gender○ Male○ Female
What is your age?
[pull-down options: range 10-80]
What is your current marital status?
○ Single, never married○ Married○ Divorced○ Separated○ Widowed
Do you have children?
○ Yes
○ No
Have you experienced your parents’ divorce or separation in the past?
○ Yes
○ No
101. Six factors were presented in random order in a matrix.

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Have you taken MPRE (Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination)?
○ Yes
○ No
Have you taken any courses (by fall 2015) that satisfy the law
school’s Professional Responsibility requirement? (e.g., Legal
Profession)
○ Yes
○ No
Have you taken any courses (by fall 2015) that are directly related tonegotiation?
○ Yes
○ No
What is your knowledge of family law and child law?
○ Not at all○ Know a little○ Know a fair amount○ Know it well
What is your knowledge of ABA Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
4.1 regarding misrepresentations?
ABA Rule 4.1 (note added):In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure isnecessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client,unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6 [note: Rule 1.6 covers confidentiality of information].
○ Not at all○ Know a little○ Know a fair amount○ Know it well

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