Insurance Law Alert

January 2021

In This Issue
Insurer Not Entitled To Recoup Defense Costs After No Duty To Defend
Ruling, New York Appellate Court Rules
Reversing a lower court, a New York appellate court ruled that an insurer is not entitled
to reimbursement of defense costs following a ruling that it had no duty to defend orindemnify the underlying claims. American Western Home Ins. Co. v. Gjonaj Realty &Management Co., 2020 WL 7767944 (N.Y. App. Div. 2nd Dep’t Dec. 30, 2020).
(Click here for full article)“Skilled inhandling catastrophic
event liability issues andbad faith disputes, and acts
for an enviable client rosterof market-leading
insurance providers.”– Chambers USA
2020

Fifth Circuit Upholds Excess Insurer’s Failure-To-Settle Claim Against
Primary Insurer
The Fifth Circuit ruled that a primary insurer violated its common law duty under Texas
law to accept a settlement offer within primary policy limits. American Guarantee &Liability Ins. Co. v. ACE American Ins. Co., 983 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. Dec. 21, 2020).
(Click here for full article)

Connecticut Appellate Court Reverses Trial Court Rulings On Exhaustion
And Per-Occurrence Limits
A Connecticut appellate court ruled that a trial court erred in holding that excess policies
did not attach based on the policyholder’s failure to exhaust primary policies, explainingthat the trial court incorrectly determined the per-occurrence limits of the primarypolicies. Continental Cas. Co. v. Rohr, Inc., 201 Conn. App. 636 (2020). (Click here forfull article)

Wave Of Dismissals Of COVID-19-Related Coverage Suits Continue, With
Few Exceptions
While courts across the country continue to dismiss suits seeking insurance coverage for
COVID-19-related business losses, an Ohio federal district court ruled that the phrase“direct physical loss of or damage to” was ambiguous and must be construed in favor ofcoverage. Henderson Road Rest. Sys., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2021 WL 168422 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 19, 2021). In addition, a Pennsylvania federal district court denied an insurer’s
motion to dismiss based on the reasonable expectations doctrine, notwithstanding thepolicyholder’s failure to allege direct physical loss or damage. Humans & Resources,
LLC v. Firstline National Ins. Co., 2021 WL 75775 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2021). (Click here forfull article)

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

1

In Test Case, United Kingdom’s Highest Court Rules That Insurers Must
Cover COVID-19-Related Business Interruption Losses
The United Kingdom’s top court ruled that insurers were required to pay businessinterruption losses incurred by companies that were forced to shut down during the
mandated lockdown. Financial Conduct Authority v. Arch Ins. (UK) Ltd., No. UKSC
2020/0177 (U.K.). (Click here for full article)

Ninth Circuit Asks Washington Supreme Court To Address Applicability
Of Filed Rate Doctrine To Rates Charged By Intermediaries, Rather Than
Regulated Entities
The Ninth Circuit asked the Washington Supreme Court to decide whether the filed rate
doctrine extends to a situation in which an intermediary, rather than the regulated entity,
charges the filed rate to its customers. Alpert v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 983 F.3d 1129
(9th Cir. Dec. 31, 2020). (Click here for full article)2

assertion that an “implied contract”
Defense Cost Alert: theestablishes a right of reimbursement where

Insurer Not Entitled To Recoup
Defense Costs After No Duty To
Defend Ruling, New York Appellate
Court Rules
Reversing a lower court, a New York appellate
court ruled that an insurer is not entitled toreimbursement of defense costs following
a ruling that it had no duty to defend orindemnify the underlying claims. American
Western Home Ins. Co. v. Gjonaj Realty &Management Co., 2020 WL 7767944 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2nd Dep’t Dec. 30, 2020).

the insurer expressly reserves a right toreimbursement in a reservation of rights,
stating that a “unilateral reservation ofrights ‘cannot create rights not containedin the insurance policy.’” In addition, thecourt rejected reimbursement based on
unjust enrichment, finding that “New Yorklaw precludes claims of unjust enrichment
where an insurance policy governs the subject
matter at issue.” Finally, the court held thateven if an unjust enrichment claim wereavailable, it would fail because the insured
was not unjustly enriched given the broad
duty to defend provided by the policy.
The court acknowledged that a few New Yorkfederal district and state trial courts andat least one appellate court applying New
York law (and courts in other jurisdictions)have allowed such reimbursement following
a ruling that the insurer has no duty to
defend or indemnify, but deemed those cases
unpersuasive or factually distinguishable.

The insured was sued in a personal injury
action, but failed to notify its insurer for morethan four years after the accident and after adefault judgment had been entered against
it. The insurer initially denied coverage, but
after a court vacated the default judgment, theinsurer agreed to defend under a reservationof rights. In particular, the insurer sought toinvestigate whether it was prejudiced by thedelay in notice. Thereafter, an appellate court
reinstated the default judgment against theinsured. The insurer again denied coverage
and reserved its right to recover any fees andcosts it had incurred in defending the insured.
In the present suit, the insurer sought adeclaration that it had no duty to defend orindemnify the insured and that it was entitled
to recover the fees and costs incurred on
the insured’s behalf. A New York trial court
granted the insurer’s summary judgment
motion on all issues.
The appellate court reversed in part, rulingthat although the insurer had no duty to
defend or indemnify, it was not entitled toreimbursement of defense costs alreadyspent. Addressing this “novel issue” under
New York law, the appellate court held that
there was no contractual basis for recoupmentof defense costs. The court expressly rejected

Excess Alerts:
Fifth Circuit Upholds Excess
Insurer’s Failure-To-Settle Claim
Against Primary Insurer
Our December 2020 Alert discussed an
Eleventh Circuit decision holding that underGeorgia law, a primary insurer was liable
to an excess insurer for negligently failingto settle underlying claims against thepolicyholder. Last month, the Fifth Circuit
followed suit, ruling that a primary insurer
violated its common law duty under Texas law
to accept a settlement offer within primarypolicy limits. American Guarantee & Liability
Ins. Co. v. ACE American Ins. Co., 983 F.3d
203 (5th Cir. Dec. 21, 2020).
The suit against the policyholder, theBrickman Group, arose out of a fatal car
accident. Brickman was insured under an ACE
primary policy with a $2 million limit and an
American Guarantee excess policy with a $10
million limit. On the eve of trial, plaintiffs
made a $2 million settlement demand. ACE
countered at $500,000, which plaintiffs
rejected. At trial, the judge issued several
evidentiary rulings adverse to Brickman.
During jury deliberations, plaintiffs made3

two more settlement demands. The first wasa high/low offer of $1.9 to $2.0 million “withcosts.” ACE rejected the demand, believing
it was outside of its settlement valuation
because the inclusion of costs would put thevalue beyond its policy limit. A third offer
renewed plaintiffs’ original offer to settle for$2 million. Brickman declined and the nextday, the jury returned a verdict of nearly $40
million. The parties ultimately settled for $10
million. ACE and American Guarantee eachpaid their policy limits.
Thereafter, American Guarantee sued ACE
for equitable subrogation, alleging thatACE violated its duty under G.A. Stowers
Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d544 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1929) by rejecting thesettlement offers. Under Texas law, a primary
insurer has a Stowers duty to “exercise
ordinary care in the settlement of claims.”
However, the Stowers duty arises only if
the claim is within the scope of coverage,
the demand is within policy limits, and aprudent insurer would accept the terms ofthe demand. In addition, the settlement
terms must be clear and unconditional. The
district court ruled that all three settlement
offers satisfied the Stowers requirements andtherefore triggered ACE’s duty to settle. The
district court further ruled that ACE’s first
rejection was reasonable, but that the othertwo were not.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed on different
grounds. The Fifth Circuit ruled that thesecond offer did not trigger ACE’s Stowers
duty because it was not “clear.” The court
explained that inclusion of “costs” in the high/low offer rendered it ambiguous. However,the Fifth Circuit agreed that the third offer
triggered ACE’s Stowers duty. Addressing thismatter of first impression under Texas law,
the Fifth Circuit rejected ACE’s contention
that the third offer was conditional. ACE
claimed that there were adverse interests
among the plaintiffs—the parent of thedeceased, alongside her minor children
whom she represented as “next friend.” ACE
argued that those potentially adverse interests
required settlement approval by a court and/or guardian ad litem, which in turn, rendered
the offer inherently conditional. The Fifth
Circuit disagreed, noting the lack of evidence
that the settlement offer was more favorable
to the parent plaintiff than the minor
children. In addition, the court emphasized
Texas law does not require third-party

approval in every case in which a parent
serves as next friend for minor children. The
court explained: “because such appointments
are not required, we cannot conceive thatevery settlement generated in a case involving
claims of a parent on behalf of herself andchildren violates Stowers because of a barepotential conflict of interest.”
Having concluded that the third offer
triggered ACE’s Stowers duty, the court
addressed whether an “ordinarily prudent
insurer” would have accepted it. The court
ruled that, based on the developments at trial,
ACE should have recognized the potential
exposure of an excess judgment and had aduty to accept the offer.

Connecticut Appellate Court
Reverses Trial Court Rulings On
Exhaustion And Per-Occurrence
LimitsA Connecticut appellate court ruled that a
trial court erred in holding that excess policies
did not attach based on the policy’s failure
to exhaust primary policies, explaining thatthe trial court incorrectly determined the
per-occurrence limits of the primary policies.
Continental Cas. Co. v. Rohr, Inc., 201 Conn.
App. 636 (2020).
Excess insurers filed suit against Rohr andseveral of its insurers, seeking a declaration of
their coverage obligations for environmental
remediation claims stemming from Rohr’s
manufacturing facilities. The court, applying
California law, issued the following rulings:
Annualization of Per-Occurrence Limits
Royal issued two three-year primary policies
with limits of $2 million per occurrence
and $2 million aggregate. The policies also
included endorsements stating that the policy
4period “is comprised of three consecutive
annual periods.” Both primary policies wereextended for an additional three years.
The appellate court rejected the notion thatthe per-occurrence limits could be annualized,
such that the two three-year primary policies
and each of their three-year extensions
provided a total of $24 million in peroccurrence coverage. The court reasoned thatendorsement language stating that the policy
period “is comprised of three consecutive
annual periods” is only “relevant in that rates
are based on annual periods.” Emphasizingthat the word “comprised” means “to bemade of up,” the court concluded that thelanguage did not support an interpretation inwhich each year constitutes a separate policy
period. As such, the court ruled that each
Royal primary policy provided coverage of $2
million per-occurrence during the three-year
policy period.

Policy Extensions
The appellate court also ruled that the threeyear extensions of the two Royal policies did
not result in additional per-occurrence limits.
The court explained that the extensions
were not new “stand-alone policies,” butrather extensions of the original policy
periods, creating “continuous contract[s].”In so ruling, the court relied on languagein the certificate that stated: “It is hereby
understood and agreed that the term of [the]above policy is extended for a period of three
years.” (Emphasis in original). Having ruledthat the extensions were mere continuationsof the original Royal policies, the court ruledthat the $2 million limits for each policy
applied “regardless of the number of years thecoverage has been in force.”
Horizontal vs. Vertical Exhaustion
Emphasizing that under California law,
“horizontal exhaustion is the rule . . . in

long-tail cases unless specific policy language
both describes and limits the underlying
policies,” the appellate court ruled thathorizontal exhaustion (which requires
exhaustion of all primary policies across therelevant time period) applied to determine
excess coverage obligations. The court
explained that policy language defining“ultimate net loss” to include “all recoveries”
and “other valid and collectible insurance”
requires horizontal exhaustion, even if theexcess policy makes reference to a specificprimary policy as well.
The appellate court also addressed whether
certain excess policies issued by Harbor andLondon contained language that renderedthem “specific” to a particular underlying
policy, thus warranting vertical exhaustion.
The excess policies at issue conditioned
attachment “only after the Primary andUnderlying Excess Insurers have paid or havebeen held liable to pay the full amount of thePrimary and Underlying Excess Limit(s).”Based on this language, the court ruled thatthe excess policies were not triggered until
Rohr “has recovered all proceeds from all
valid and collectible underlying insurance.”
The court rejected the argument that theexcess policies were “specific” to certain Royal
primary policies because the excess policies“referenced” the Royal policies.
Actual Payment as Prerequisite
to Exhaustion
The appellate court ruled that Royal was
required to actually pay its policy limits inorder to satisfy the exhaustion requirement ofexcess policies. The court relied on language
sating that excess liability did not attach“unless and until the Assured has by final
judgment been adjudged to pay an amountwhich exceed such Primary and Underlying
Excess Limit(s) and then only after thePrimary and Underlying Excess Insurers
have paid or have been held liable to pay thefull amount of the Primary and Underlying
Excess Limit(s).”The court rejected Rohr’s assertion thatexhaustion could be established throughevidence that the loss attributable to a single
occurrence was greater than the attachment
point of the excess policies. Similarly, thecourt rejected the contention that exhaustion
was satisfied by virtue of the fact that Royaland other primary insurers continued to
be defendants in this litigation, subject to5

liability through contribution claims of otherinsurers. Here, because Rohr’s settlement
payment from Royal exceeded the combined$4 million limits of its two policies, thecourt ruled that the exhaustion requirement
was satisfied.
Below Limits Settlements
With respect to certain excess policies issued
by Federal and Century, the court ruled that
where, as here, an excess policy specificallynames certain underlying policies in its
schedule of insurance, the policyholder must
exhaust the limits of the policies listed in
the underlying schedule. The court ruledthat excess coverage under Federal’s andCentury’s policies was not available because
Rohr’s underlying settlement did not exceed
the combined limits of policies directly
underlying the Federal and Century policies(and listed in their respective schedules
of insurance).

property. In addition, Zurich argued thatcoverage was barred by a microorganism
exclusion.
The court disagreed and granted thepolicyholder’s summary judgment motion.
The court deemed the phrase “direct
physical loss of or damage to real property”
ambiguous, holding that use of the disjunctive“or” suggests that physical loss can meansomething different than damage to real
property. Construing this ambiguity in thepolicyholder’s favor, the court reasoned thatphysical loss could include the inability touse property for its intended purpose. In soruling, the court distinguished cases involving“physical loss to” verbiage, suggesting thatphysical loss “to” property may be different
than physical loss “of” property.

COVID-19 Alerts:
Wave Of Dismissals Of COVID-19Related Coverage Suits Continue,
With Few Exceptions
Courts across the country continue to dismiss
suits seeking insurance coverage for COVID19-related business losses, largely on thebasis that the policyholder has not alleged therequisite “direct physical loss of or damage toproperty” and/or that a virus exclusion bars
coverage. In the past month, more than twodozen courts have dismissed such claims.
However, an Ohio federal district court ruledin the policyholder’s favor, finding that thephrase “direct physical loss of or damage to”
was ambiguous and must be construed infavor of coverage. Henderson Road Rest. Sys.,
Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2021 WL 168422(N.D. Ohio Jan. 19, 2021).
The restaurant operator sought coverage forlosses incurred after it was forced to shut
down several of its restaurants, and restrict
operations to take-out services for the few
that remained open. Zurich denied coverage,
arguing that the restaurants did not suffer
direct physical loss of or damage to property
because, among other things, the parties
had stipulated that there was no physicalalteration or structural damage to any insured

In addition, the court rejected the insurer’s
contention that there was no physical loss“of” property because the policyholder was
still able to conduct take-out service at its
restaurants. The court emphasized thatthe insured properties were used almost
exclusively for in person dining and that theinsurer failed to assert facts demonstratingthat the policyholder could have reasonablytransitioned to take-out. The court also
rejected the notion that the loss of property
must be permanent, noting that the word
“loss” is not limited to permanent disposition.
Notably, in another Ohio decision, in which
the policyholder likewise argued that identicalpolicy language was ambiguous, the court
dismissed the coverage claims, ruling thatthe complaint failed to allege a thresholdclaim of “direct physical loss of or damage to”
property. Santo’s Italian Café LLC v. Acuity
Ins. Co., 2020 WL 7490095 (N.D. Ohio
Dec 21, 2020). Recognizing that “differinginterpretations of Ohio contract law bydifferent courts threaten to undermine the6uniform application of that law to similarly
situated litigants,” and the lack of controlling
Ohio precedent, a different federal district
court in Ohio certified the following questionof law to the Ohio Supreme Court: “Doesthe general presence in the community,
or on surfaces at a premises, of the novel
coronavirus known as SARS-CoV-2,
constitute direct physical loss or damage toproperty; or does the presence on a premisesof a person infected with COVID-19 constitutedirect physical loss or damage to property
at that premises?” Neuro-Communication
Servs., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 4:20CV-1275 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 19, 2021).

A Pennsylvania federal district court also
recently denied an insurer’s motion todismiss on the pleadings, notwithstanding thepolicyholder’s failure to allege direct physicalloss or damage. In Humans & Resources,
LLC v. Firstline National Ins. Co., 2021
WL 75775 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2021), the court
agreed with the insurer that the complaint“did not allege facts which plausibly suggestthat Plaintiff’s forced suspension of its
operations and resulting loss of businessincome was caused by a direct physical lossof or damage to property.” In addition, thecourt ruled that a virus exclusion would
have barred coverage in any event, rejecting
the policyholder’s regulatory estoppel
argument. Notwithstanding these findings,
the court declined to dismiss the suit, citing
Pennsylvania’s reasonable expectations
doctrine. The court explained that thedoctrine applies even where the expectations
are in direct conflict with the unambiguous
terms of the policy. The court concluded
that dismissal was not warranted because
the policyholder alleged that it purchased
the policy with a reasonable expectation ofcoverage for the business interruption losses
at issue.

The court in Henderson Road also ruled thatthe microorganism exclusion did not bar
coverage, explaining that the loss was causedby the government orders, not by the presenceor spread of microorganisms at insured
premises. The court emphasized that theparties had stipulated that none of the insured
premises were closed as a result of the known
presence of COVID-19 particles. Additionally,
the court rejected Zurich’s contention thatthe anti-concurrent language (stating thatthe exclusion applies “regardless of any
other cause or event . . . that contributes
concurrently or in any sequence to the loss”)
operated to exclude coverage, explaining that
“this argument is dependent on a findingthat Microorganisms caused, at least in part,
damage to Plaintiffs’ property”—a finding
contrary to the parties’ stipulation.

However, even after Humans & Resources,
Pennsylvania federal courts have dismissed
other COVID-19-related coverage suits raisingsimilar reasonable expectations arguments.

However, the court dismissed thepolicyholder’s bad faith claim, findingthat Zurich had a reasonable basis fordenying coverage, particularly in light of
the “growing consensus of courts” thathave rejected COVID-19-related businessinterruption claims.

In Test Case, United Kingdom’sHighest Court Rules That Insurers
Must Cover COVID-19-Related
Business Interruption Losses
The United Kingdom’s top court ruled that
insurers were required to pay businessinterruption losses incurred by companies
that were forced to shut down during the
mandated lockdown. Financial Conduct
Authority v. Arch Ins. (UK) Ltd., No. UKSC
2020/0177 (U.K.).
The case was brought by the Financial
Conduct Authority under the Financial
Markets Test Case Scheme, which allows aclaim “raising issues of general importance tofinancial markets to be determined in a test
case without the need for a specific dispute
between the parties where immediately
relevant and authoritative English law
guidance is needed.” Importantly, the policies
in this test case included specific English“disease clause” extensions, which eliminated7

the standard “physical damage” requirementof all-risk property policies.
The court ruled that such policies provide
coverage if the “occurrence” of COVID-19 waswithin the geographic vicinity of the insured
property and caused business interruption
losses. The court rejected a more stringent
causation requirement, under which thepolicyholder would need to establish thata particular case of COVID-19 caused thespecific business to shut down.
In addition, the court held that a governmentmandated lockdown was not necessarily aprerequisite to coverage under “Prevention ofAccess Clauses,” and that businesses that shut
down prior to such legislative action could
potentially recover. The court explained that
instructions given by public authority, suchas warnings by government officials, could
constitute a “restriction imposed” if they carry“the imminent threat of legal compulsion.”
The court also ruled that a policyholder cansatisfy a “denial of access” clause even whereits business remains partially open, so long as
the policyholder is unable to use the premises
for a “discrete business activity” or is unable
to use “a discrete part of the premises for
its business activities.” This ruling directly
affects business such as restaurants, whichwere able to remain open for take-out
business, but were required to cease in-housedining services.
Finally, the court addressed the extent
to which business interruption coverage
may be limited if a business would haveexperienced financial loss due to othercircumstances beyond the scope of thepolicy (i.e., the pandemic in general, rather
than the particular policyholder’s businessclosure). The insurers argued that under
the policies’ “Trends Clauses,” recovery isunavailable (or significantly limited) because
the policyholders would have suffered thesame or similar business interruption losses
even if the insured risk had not occurred,because such losses would have arisen
regardless of the operation of the insured
perils based on the wider consequences of
the COVID-19 pandemic. The court rejected
this contention, stating that “the aim of such
clauses is to arrive at the results that would
have been achieved but for the insured periland circumstances arising out of the sameunderlying or originating cause.” (Emphasis
added). As such, the court held:[T]he court below was wrong to hold thatthe indemnity for business interruption
loss sustained after cover was triggered
should be reduced to reflect a downturnin the turnover of the business due to
COVID-19 which would have continued
even if cover had not been triggered by
the insured peril. The court had correctly
concluded that losses should be assessedon the assumption that there was no
COVID-19 pandemic. Consistently
with that conclusion, the court shouldhave held that, in calculating loss, theassumption should be made that pretrigger losses caused by the pandemic
would not have continued during theoperation of the insured peril.
In so ruling, the court expressly overturned
precedent which held that businessinterruption coverage may be limited if thepolicyholder would have incurred losses
even if the particular insured risk had notoccurred. See Orient-Express Hotels Ltd v.
Assicurazioni Generali SpA, [2010] EWHC
1186 (Comm); [2010] Lloyd’s Rep IR 531.
The decision was based on a representative
sample of standard form businessinterruption policies that contained thedisease clause extension in light of agreed
and assumed facts. The court estimated that,in addition to the particular policies chosen
for the test case, approximately 700 typesof policies issued by more than 60 different
insurers and 370,000 policyholders could
potentially be affected by the ruling.

8Filed Rate Alert:
Ninth Circuit Asks Washington
Supreme Court To Address
Applicability Of Filed Rate
Doctrine To Rates Charged By
Intermediaries, Rather Than
Regulated Entities
The filed rate doctrine may prevent
policyholders from suing insurancecompanies and other regulated entities basedon allegedly unreasonable rates if those rates
were approved by a regulator. See September
2020 Alert, October 2018 Alert, September
2015 Alert, May 2011 Alert, October 2010
Alert. In a recent case, the central issue
in dispute was whether the filed rate
doctrine extends to a situation in which anintermediary, rather than the regulated entity,
charges the filed rate to its customers. Alpert
v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 983 F.3d 1129
(9th Cir. Dec. 31, 2020).
A homeowner was required by his mortgage
company (Nationstar) to maintain a hazard
insurance policy. When his policy lapsed,
Nationstar purchased insurance and charged
the homeowner a rate approved by the
Washington Insurance Commissioner. The
homeowner sued, alleging that although therate he was charged accurately reflected therate approved by state authority, it did not

represent Nationstar’s true cost of insurance.
He claimed that Nationstar received
kickbacks in the form of commissions,such that the actual cost of the policy to
Nationstar was substantially less than what
he was charged. Nationstar argued that the
homeowner’s claims are barred by the filed
rate doctrine.
Noting issues of unsettled state law, the Ninth
Circuit certified the following questions to the
Washington Supreme Court:
1. Should the filed rate doctrine apply toclaims by a Washington homeowneragainst a loan servicer arising fromthe placement of lender placed
insurance . . . where the servicer
purchased the insurance from aseparate insurance company who
filed the insurance product with
the Washington State Office of the
Insurance Commissioner?
2. In the event the filed rate doctrine
does apply to this type of transaction,
do the damages requested by Plaintiff
fall outside the scope of the filed rate
doctrine, or rather do they “directly
attack agency-approved rates,” suchthat they are barred . . . ?
We will keep you apprised of further
developments in this matter.

9

Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.

Mary Beth Forshaw+1-212-455-2846
mforshaw@stblaw.com

Michael J. Garvey+1-212-455-7358
mgarvey@stblaw.com

Joshua Polster+1-212-455-2266
joshua.polster@stblaw.com

Andrew T. Frankel+1-212-455-3073
afrankel@stblaw.com

Tyler B. Robinson+44-(0)20-7275-6118
trobinson@stblaw.com

Summer Craig+1-212-455-3881
scraig@stblaw.com

Lynn K. Neuner+1-212-455-2696
lneuner@stblaw.com

George S. Wang
+1-212-455-2228
gwang@stblaw.com

Jonathan T. Menitove+1-212-455-2693
jonathan.menitove@stblaw.com

Chet A. Kronenberg+1-310-407-7557
ckronenberg@stblaw.com

Craig S. Waldman+1-212-455-2881
cwaldman@stblaw.com

Isaac M. Rethy+1-212-455-3869
irethy@stblaw.com

Bryce L. Friedman+1-212-455-2235
bfriedman@stblaw.com

Susannah S. Geltman+1-212-455-2762
sgeltman@stblaw.com

This edition of the
Insurance Law Alert was
prepared by Bryce L. Friedman
bfriedman@stblaw.com /+1-212-4552235 and Joshua Polster
joshua.polster@stblaw.com /+1-212455-2266 with contributions
by Karen Cestarikcestari@stblaw.com.

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the
lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts
or matters, nor does the distribution of this publication to any person constitute the establishment of an
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Please click here to subscribe to the Insurance Law Alert.
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