THE TAIWANESE QUESTION:PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OR
UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE
Dr. Masayo Goto

SUMMARY
About Taiwan
Taiwan‘s democratisation
Taiwan President Ma
US and Taiwan Relations
Taiwan and Japan Relations
A cross-strait conflict after Chen and MaTAIWAN
Geography
Area: 36,189 sq. km.
Cities (2009): Capital--Taipei
Population (Feb. 2009): 23.0 million.
Annual growth rate (2008): 0.34%.
Languages: Mandarin Chinese (official),
Taiwanese, Hakka.
Political Establishment
Type: Multi-party democracy.
Major political parties: Kuomintang (KMT or
Nationalist Party); Democratic Progressive Party(DPP); several small parties.
Defense proposed (2009): 17.2%of entire budget.

TAIWAN‘S DEMOCRATISATION
1949 Communist forces led by Mao Zedong defeat
Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists, driving him andmore than a million followers to Taiwan. Chiang
sets up a government-in-exile.
1954 The U.S. signs a mutual-defense treaty with
Taiwan1958 China attacks the island of Quemoy, a base forabout 100,000 Nationalist troops in the Taiwan
Strait, in a bid to "liberate" Taiwan. The U.S.
deploys the Seventh Fleet; the Chinese back off
1971 Taiwan is expelled from the UN and its seatgiven to China, following a secret visit to Beijing by
the then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger

In 1988, Lee Teng-hui becomes the island‗s firstnative Taiwanese President (1988-2000), anddemocratic reforms begin to take holdIn1991, in the first full election in many decades,
Kuomintang won 71% of the vote. He formallydeclared an end to emergency rule, which had
existed since Chiang's forces originally occupied theisland.
In 1993, the president Lee nominated Lien Chan,
another native, to be prime minister, marking afurther generational shift away from the mainland
exiles.
In 1993, The first high-level talks between China andTaiwan take place in Singapore
In 1995, A visit to the U.S. by President Lee prompts
China to perform missile tests and military exercisesin the Taiwan Strait just before the island's firstpresidential election by universal suffrage. Lee wins

In 1998, Taiwan renewed its push for a separate UN
seat—its sixth attempt in recent years. The move has
been blocked each time by the Chinese government.
In 1999, President Lee rankled mainland China byannouncing that he was abandoning the longstanding ―One China‖ policy and that he would deal
with China on a ―state-to-state basis.‖ Lee infuriates
Beijing implying that Taiwan is an independent
sovereign nation.
In 2000, DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian is elected
President, ending more than 50 years of Kuomintang
rule

―One China‖ policy
The one-China policy holds that there is but one
China and that Taiwan is part of China.
The 1992 Consensus
A term describing the outcome of a meeting in 1992
between China and Taiwan. The Consensus is that,on the subject of the "One China principle", bothsides recognise there is only one China - bothmainland China and Taiwan belong to the same
China

―state-to-state basis.‖
In 1999, Lee stated that ―Since the introduction of its
constitutional reforms in 1991, Taiwan has redefined
its relationship with mainland China as being state
to state relations or at least special state-to-state
relations‖.

THE ―FIVE NOS‖
Chen gave his inaugural address in 2000
I will not declare independence
2. I will not change the national title
3. I will not push forth the inclusion of the so-called―state-to-state‖ description in the Constitution
4. I will not promote a referendum to change thestatus quo in regards to the question of
independence or unification
5. The abolition of the National Unification Council
or the National Unification Guidelines will not be
an issue↓
1.

Maintenance of the status quo

In 2001, Taiwan eases restrictions on its companies
wanting to invest in China. Two journalists from themainland's Xinhua News Agency become the first
Chinese reporters to visit Taiwan under the island's
new "open door" policy
In 2002, President Chen defines the status quo as"one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait,"
sparking criticism from Beijing and his domestic
opponents . Taiwan joined the World Trade
Organization.
In 2003, a Taiwan airliner makes the first civilian
flight to the mainland since 1949.
In 2004, Chen announces plans for a referendum onelection day on March 20, 2004, to ask voters whether
the island should increase its defense budget andengage in dialogue with Beijing

Chen used controversial issues such as “one country on eitherside (2002),” “name change movement (2004-2008),” “newconstitution (2004),” “new nation (2004),” “missile referendum(2004),” “mainland policy referendum (2004),” “abolishment of
National Unification Council and National Unification
Guidelines (2006),” “WHO bid in the name of Taiwan (2007),”and “UN bid referendum in the name of Taiwan (2007-2008),”
to provoke China
All of these escalated the cross-strait tensions. The US has
regarded Chen as reckless and untrustworthy since 2006.
Chinese government adopted a policy of “listening to his words
while observing his deeds” in the initial stage, hoping Chen
could come back to the normal track in the cross-strait
relations.
In 2008, Kuomintang (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Yingjeou won the ROC presidential election in Taiwan.

Ma Ying-jeousince 20 May 2008
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)TAIWAN PRESIDENT MA
Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou assumed officeon 20 May 2008. He abandoned his predecessor‘s
pro-independence stance ⇒ China and Taiwan
ended a six-decade ban on direct shipping, airand postal links. However, threat to Taiwan
continue despite significant reduction in crossStrait tension over the last year.
According to the US Defence department, since
2000, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait
has continued to shift in China‘s favour. This ismarked by the sustained deployment ofadvanced military equipment to the regions
opposite Taiwan.

Ma reinforced his desire to pursue closer ties tomainland China when he outlined his economic
plan.
Ma called for access to China‘s financial markets
for Taiwanese businesses, regular passenger flights
and cargo passage across the Taiwan Strait.
Ma insisted that China remove the short- andmedium-range missiles facing Taiwan before he
will engage in peace talks with China.
Ma realized several of his goals in November 2008,
Chen Yunlin, the head of the Chinese organizationthat negotiates with Taiwan, visited the island,
becoming the most senior mainland official to do sosince 1949. He and President Ma signed several
pacts that will lead to a significant increase intransportation and shipments of food between thetwo sides.

US AND TAIWAN RELATIONSIn 1972, U.S. President Nixon visited China, toresume full diplomatic relations between the twonations and to end the formal U.S. ties with
TaiwanIn 1979, The U.S. cuts formal links with Taiwan
and agrees to abide by Beijing's "one China" policy
In1979, the Taiwan Relations Act passed the US
Congress after the establishment of relations with
the People's Republic of China and the breakingof relations between the United States and theRepublic of China on the island of Taiwan by
President Jimmy Carter. It more clearly defines
the American position on Taiwan and its crossstrait relationship with Beijing.

TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT
1.

Provides for Taiwan to be treated under U.S.
laws the same as "foreign countries, nations,states, governments, or similar entities".

2.

Stipulates that the US will "consider any effort
to determine the future of Taiwan by other thanpeaceful means, including by boycotts orembargoes, a threat to the peace and security of
the Western Pacific area and of grave concern
to the US " but does not mandate that the US
intervene in these situations.

3.

Requires the US ―to provide Taiwan with arms ofa defensive character‖, and ―to maintain thecapacity of the United States to resist any resort
to force or other forms of coercion that would
jeopardize the security.‖ ⇒U.S. governments
have sold arms to the ROC in compliance with
the Taiwan Relations Act.

The PRC views the Taiwan Relations Act as "anunwarranted intrusion by the United States into
the internal affairs of China."

TAIWAN AND JAPAN RELATIONSJapan-Taiwan Relations are guided by the 1972
Japan-PRC Joint Communiqué. Since that time,
Japan has maintained non-governmental, workinglevel relations with Taiwan since Japan does notrecognize the ROC as an official government, anduses the neutral name of "Taiwan" instead.

The Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japanand the Government of the People's Republic ofChina was signed in Beijing on in 1972.
1.

Established diplomatic relations between Japanand the People's Republic of China

2.

Resulted in the severing of official relations
between Japan and the Republic of China.

3.

Ended the "abnormal relations between Japan and
China―

4.

Recognized the People's Republic of China as the"sole government of China―

1998 Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a
Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for
Peace and Development
Japan continues to maintain its stand on the
Taiwan issue as set forth in the Joint Communiquéof the Government of Japan and the Governmentof the PRC and reiterates its understanding that
there is only one China. Japan reiterated that it
will maintain its exchanges with Taiwan in theform of a private and regional nature.

In the event of the cross strait conflict, Japan
would stay out of the conflict as much as possible
and provide logistical and intelligence support for
an American military operation. Then Japan could
participate in peacekeeping operations.

A CROSS-STRAIT CONFLICTAFTER CHEN AND MAWHAT ARE MA-SIEW (VICE PRESIDENT OF
PRC)’S CROSS-STRAIT POLICIES?
Ma proposed a “modus vivendi” approach, a “mutual nondenial” principle, and the three-no policy of “no unification,no independence, no use of force,” whereas Siew presented theidea of “cross-strait common market.”First, Taiwan and China continue to coexist or work together
while waiting for their disputes to be settled.
Second, in preparation of possible cross-strait negotiations on
Taiwan’s international space, a “mutual non-denial” principle
is proposed because, there will be a benign mutual interaction
if both sides of the Taiwan Strait do not deny each other.

Third, the three-no policy of “no unification, no independence,no use of force” is proposed to accommodate futurenegotiations with China on cross-strait peace agreement.
Unification is not acceptable to the overwhelming majority of
Taiwan people, while independence will only be a disaster toboth sides of the Taiwan Strait. So long as Taiwan does not go
independent and China does not seek unification, then thecoercion from China against Taiwan is unnecessary.
Fourth, Frank Hsieh labeled Siew’s “cross-strait common
market” as “one China common market” during the campaign,
criticizing it would only hurt Taiwan’s economy after China’s
intrusion with its huge professionals as well as immense
poisoned agricultural and industrial products.

WHAT ARE “ONE CHINA WITH DIFFERENT
INTERPRETATIONS” AND “1992 CONSENSUS”?
How will Ma and Siew sell their ideas to Chinese leader Hu
Jintao? They understand that the cross-strait relations will not
only stagnate but also deteriorate if Taiwan is determined to
go independent. The only way for them to put Chinese leader
at ease is to go back to the normal track of cross-strait
relations under the mutual understanding of “One China withdifferent interpretations”
Due to DPP government’s strong opposition to the use of “oneChina” in its relations with the mainland, Dr. Su, a former
chairman of Council of Mainland Affairs in the Leeadministration, proposed the term of “1992 consensus” in lieu
of “One China with different interpretations” in 2000.

Chen not only refused to accept the “1992 consensus,” but also
accused it of the “surrender consensus,” criticizing that its
existence could never be found in the official cross-strait
documents and claiming that China never recognized or
accepted its existence in public.
Fortunately, what Chen completely denied is now affirmed by
China and the US. On March 26, 2008, both U.S. President Bushand Chinese President Hu pointed out in their telephone
conversation that the “1992 consensus” is the key to theresumption of cross-strait talks.
Ma will let Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) tonegotiate directly with China’s Association for Relations Acrossthe Taiwan Straits (ARATS) on economic, political and peaceissues.

WHAT ARE “ONE CHINA WITH DIFFERENT
INTERPRETATIONS” AND “1992 CONSENSUS”?
“One China
with Different
Interpretation
s”?



“1992
Consensus”?

In their telephone conversation on March 26, 2008, U.S. President George
W. Bush and Chinese President Hu praise the “1992 consensus” as the key
to the resumption of cross-strait negotiations.

WILL HU KEEP HIS PROMISES IN FOUR POINTS?
On March 4, 2008, Hu Jintao reiterated a four-point
guideline on cross-straits relations under the newcircumstances, which was initially set forth in 2005.
The four guidelines are as follows:(1) Never sway in adhering to the one-China principle:(2) Never give up efforts to seek peaceful reunification(3) Never change the principle of placing hope on the
Taiwan people(4) Never compromise in opposing the "Taiwan
independence" secessionist activities

US “FIVE EXPECTATIONS”
The US is playing an active role in promoting the resumption ofcross-strait dialogues. Douglas Spelman, the DOS coordination
chief in charge of Taiwan affairs, proposed US “five expectations”
on cross-strait relations on March 25, 2008, including:
US-Taiwan relations should go back to the normal track;(2) Taiwan should strengthen its military defense;(3) China should lower its military coercion against Taiwan;(4) China should respect Taiwan’s international space;(5) both sides of the Taiwan Strait should resume the substantial
dialogues.
(1)

THREE STAGES OF DIALOGUES
Raymond Burghardt, Chairman of AIT board, said on
March 28, 2008 that he advised President-elect Ma to divide
the cross-strait dialogues into three stages.
1st stage: Taiwan and China can tackle the issue of crossstrait charter flights and direct flights.

2nd stage: Taipei can enter into negotiations with China on
cross-strait economic, trade, investment issues
3rd stage: Two parties can start the politically sensitive
negotiations on peace accord, confidence-building measures(CBMs), and Taiwan’s participation in NGOs and IGOs.

DO THE US AND CHINA CO-MANAGE TAIWANSTRAIT AFFAIRS?
The US not only turned down Taiwan’s request for negotiatinga Taiwan-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and procuring F16C/D jets, but also terminate high-level communication
channels between the US and Taiwan.
The US and China have not commonly managed the Taiwan
Strait affairs as they disagree on the issue of “one China,” USarms sales to Taiwan, the use of force against Taiwan and how
the problem of Taiwan will be solved peacefully.

However, they have reached a number of consensuses since late
2003(1) maintaining the status quo of Taiwan Strait(2) preventing Taiwan independence(3) promoting the resumption of cross-strait dialogues(4) managing the cross-strait crises via the hotline
As a result, mutual distrust exists not only across the Taiwan
Strait but also between Taiwan and the United States.
Meanwhile, there has evolved mutual trust between the UnitedStates and China since 2002.

WILL CHINA HELP MA YING-JEOU?
Although the meeting between President Hu and Taiwan's Vice President-electVincent Siew in 2008 is mostly symbolic, their rendezvous will bring about thecross-strait frequent direct charter flights, direct scheduled flights, direct airline
connections, increased tourism, financial cooperation, and more cross-strait
investment soon.

Even if China does not take advantage of its economic offers to make politicalprofits, will it continue to help Taiwan in the third and fourth stages ofnegotiations when Taiwan’s participation in the IGOs and NGOs, “mutual nondenial,” “cross-strait common market,” and Taiwan’s participation in the processof East Asian economic integration are the important issues to be discussed?
Both Bush and Hu have praised the “1992 consensus” as the key to theresumption of cross-strait negotiations. Since 2005 Hu has let it be known that, aslong as the island acknowledges the consensus, China is willing to live with thestatus quo while growing closer to Taiwan economically and politically.

HAVE CHINA-US-TAIWAN RELATIONS CHANGEDAFTER MA’S VICTORY?

Taiwan's vice president-elect Vincent Siew, left, smiles during
a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao on the sidelinesof the Boao Forum for Asia held in Boao, southern China's
Hainan province, April 12, 2008.

WILL CHINA HELP TAIWAN WHEN
SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE IS INVOLVED?
First, when Hu praises the “1992 consensus” in public,
stressing China will be willing to live with the status quo of
Taiwan, why do the Chinese foreign and defense ministries
have different say on the issue of “one China”?

Second, the Chinese military has long opposed US arms sales
to Taiwan. However, if Taiwan does not have strong militarystrength to defend itself, it will not have confidence in
conducting negotiations with China. The problem with Chinais that it can hardly change its mind-set in the short run.
Third, China has long exerted its political pressures on its
allies to oppose Taiwan’s participation in the IGOs and NGOs.
Meanwhile, there has been a diplomatic war between China
and Taiwan for the past 60 years. The problem with China’s
foreign ministry is that it can hardly change its mentality inthe foreseeable future.

Fourth, if Taiwan is to be a part in the process of East Asian
economic integration, it must sign FTA with the members of
ASEAN. Will Hu be willing to extend his assistance to Taiwan
in its participation in the ASEAN free trade area?
Fifth, as the idea of “cross-strait common market” involves thehighly politically sensitive issue of sovereignty, will Hu help
Siew to make his dream come true?
Sixth, according to Chinese historians and Chinese authorities,
the so-called “Republic of China” has ceased in 1949.
Therefore, it will be quite difficult for Beijing to acquiesce the“Republic of China,” much less recognize its existence in public.

If China is reluctant to help Taiwan to participate in theinternational organizations and formulate a cross-strait market,
then the cross-strait talks will likely be stuck with little progressin prospect, not to mention the overall political, military andstrategic talks.
Indeed, such issues as the official conclusion of the state of
hostility, CBMs, peace accord, and Taiwan’s political status will
be more difficult for China to make concessions.

WILL US INTEREST IN TAIWAN AND THE REGION BE
AFFECTED AFTER MA’S VICTORY?
The impact of improved cross-strait relations on the US-Taiwan
relations.
The KMT government might adopt a cross-strait policy sofavorable to China that it could affect US interests in Taiwan
and damage US interests in the region. For example, Taiwan
could resist US pressure that it increase military spending on the
grounds that such expenditures are too high, too confrontationaland may be unnecessary in light of potential improvements incross-strait interactions.

Under the new KMT government, the United States will be
faced with challenges familiar from past years,
1.

decisions on new arms sales

2.

how to accommodate requests for visits to the United Statesby Ma and other senior Taiwan officials

3.

the level of US relations with the Ma administration

4.

whether to pursue closer economic ties (such as the signing ofa cross-strait FTA

5.

what role the US should play in cross-strait relations

HAVE CHINA-US-TAIWAN RELATIONS CHANGEDAFTER MA’S VICTORY?
China-US-Taiwan relations have slightly differed from those of
the past. The cross-strait relations have increasingly become
warmer than ever before. Taiwan-US relations have been alittle distant due to US reluctance to agree to Ma’s application
for a visit to the States.
While the US is still hesitating whether to grant Ma a visa, Hu
not only welcomed and treated Siew as Taiwan’s de facto
deputy leader at the Boao Forum, but also promised to deliver
more benefits to the island.

WILL THE US BE AN ANXIOUS PROMOTER OR A
RELUCTANT MEDIATOR?
The US is playing an active role in promoting the resumptionof cross-strait talks.
In addition, the US put forward “five expectations” and “threestages of dialogues” to Taiwan for consideration.
On the other hand, the United States is rather hesitant about
taking any action while promoting the resumption of crossstrait talks. “Five expectations” and “three stages of dialogues”
clearly reveal US’s anxious anticipation on the resumption ofcross-strait negotiations.

THE US SHOULD PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN
THE PROCESS OF SWIFT IMPROVEMENT INCROSS-STRAIT RELATIONSThe US has attempted to maintain the status quoon the Taiwan Strait, as this best serves USinterests.
Taiwan hostile to mainland China can be a cardin the US's hands. Such a Taiwan is a natural allyof the US that can help it expand its power in the
Far East and feed the US military-industrial
complex. The US will never give up this card tocontain China's rise.

The US can play an active role in the process of improvementin cross-strait relations and East Asian economic integration.
So far, the US tries to “take” rather than “give” from him byputting forwarding “five expectations” and “three stages of
dialogues” for consideration without granting him a visa.
China's government has urged Barack Obama to
oppose independence for Taiwan.
Obama supports the "one China" policy‖, adherers
to the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués
concerning Taiwan, and observes the Taiwan
Relations Act. The US would continue to provide
the arms necessary for Taiwan to deter possible
aggression and support Taiwan‘s efforts to build
closer ties with the Mainland.

IS CHINA GOING TO INVADE TAIWAN?
Invading Taiwan would make little sense for
China(1) Taiwan is the biggest provider of foreign
direct investment to the country – third party
intervention would be immediate if China
invaded Taiwan(2) Taiwan appears as a justification for the
Chinese military‘s modernization – theTaiwan issue justifies the budgetary claims of
the People‘s Liberation Army (PLA).
「TAIWAN OUTLOOK」Prospects of Cross-Strait Relations
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cYqy34EVNtICONCLUSIONSFor China and Taiwan, it is an issue of oneChina vs independence.
For the US and its allies, it was neither a moral
issue nor an issue of principle, nor a matter of
democracy, but an issue of strategic judgment,of keeping the peace in the Strait, not a choice
between expediency and principle.

END OF LECTURE