IRANIANS IN BAHRAIN AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATESMIGRATION, MINORITIES, AND IDENTITIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF ARAB
STATES

by
Eric Andrew McCoy___________________________
Copyright © Eric A. McCoy 2008

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF NEAR EASTERN STUDIESIn Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

2008

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STATEMENT BY AUTHORThis thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced
degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be madeavailable to borrowers under rules of the Library.
Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided
that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended
quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by
the copyright holder.

SIGNED:

Eric A. McCoy

APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTORThis thesis has been approved on the date shown below:_______________________________
Kamran Talattof
Professor of Near Eastern Studies______________________
Date

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work would not have been completed without the help of many individuals
and organizations, although I only mention a select few here.
Thanks are in order first to my thesis advisor Kamran Talattof, as well as Michael
Bonine and Anne Betteridge, all of whom agreed to sit on my Master’s thesis committee.
I am still proud of their patience and helpful insight through all the twists and turns thisproject has entailed. I am also grateful to them for their hands-on guidance, not only
throughout the thesis process but both in and outside of the classroom.
Linda Darling deserves special thanks for introducing me to borderlands theory
and letting me apply it in perhaps unconventional ways in two of her courses. Were it not
for my interest in studying the Persian Gulf as Borderland instead of Ottoman Turkey,
she could just as easily been my thesis advisor.
Leila Hudson also earns my gratitude for pushing me out of my shell andexpanding my horizons by attending academic conferences like MESA, as well as writing
and presenting on the most unlikely topics. I also appreciate my classmates for putting up
with those same presentations and or my arguments on her class blogs.
Thanks are also in order to the University of Arizona Center for Middle East
Studies (CMES) for many things. First and foremost, they guided me through the ins andouts of being a FLAS Fellow in advanced Persian over a two-year period. Second, they
provided me with travel grant funds to conferences in Montreal and Washington DC, aswell as an internship in Bahrain, enabling me to expand my horizons and learn fromdistant scholars and the people of the Middle East. Thanks are also due to them for giving
me constant opportunities to present my findings, through CMES-sponsored panels,
photo exhibitions and annual newsletters.
For that matter, I owe a great deal to the many Bahrainis I met in summer 2007,
who not only made my stay gratifying but inspired me to write the thesis you are reading
now. Hopefully this work will shine greater light on Bahrain.
Finally, I could not have completed this work without the support of my family.
From that distant Norwegian cousin, who quizzed me in Persian, to my sister and parents,
I have found the greatest encouragement, strength and love. Thank you, Mom, Dad andLauren.

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DEDICATIONThis thesis is dedicated to Catalina (Señora) Rodriguez and Dana Elmer, whose teaching
and influence still shapes my life.

Were it not for el gordo and los puntos adicionales, a high school freshman never would
have been inspired to speak one or more languages aside from English, much less recite
poetry. Were it not for the promise of free food, a high school sophomore would havenever joined a Persian Club or the joys of writing from right to left. Thank you, Señora
Rodríguez.

Were it not for a 30 out of 60 on his first high school English essay, a high school
freshman might have believed his writing was perfect and only applied himself halfheartedly as a writer. Were it not for a class trip to a Persian art exhibit at the Universityof California-Los Angeles, a high school sophomore might never have gained an
appreciation for the Middle East or the urge to one day visit there. Thank you, Mr. Elmer.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………….7

1. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………...8

2. APPROACHING PERSIAN GULF COMMUNITIES………………….……..…,…19

3. IRANIAN IDENTITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF ARAB STATES…………………34

4. ARAB IDENTITY IN BAHRAIN AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES…….....67

Bahrain…………………………………………………………………….…68

The United Arab Emirates………..…………………...……...………...……75

5. EBB AND FLOW: GULF IRANIAN CONTRIBUTIONS AND REMAINING
CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION IN GULF ARAB SOCIETY ........85

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TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued

6. CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………..96

APPENDIX A: LIST OF GULF IRANIAN FAMILIES BY SUBGROUP.….……….101

WORKS CITED…………..…………………………………………………………....104

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ABSTRACTThis thesis analyzes the unexplored space that Iranian expatriates occupy in
Persian Gulf Arab States, specifically Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. It argues
that culturally ascribed markers such as ethnicity, language, clothing, gender, religion,
historical factors and nationality combine to produce hybrid Gulf Iranian identities
among Iranian expatriates. The thesis performs an analysis of Iranian expatriate
individuals' situations and conditions in the above societies and assesses the level ofcross-interaction between Arabs and Iranians by building upon theories by Martinez,
Hegel, Hobsbawm and Said. It concludes that studies of Iranian expatriates may not be
performed in terms of Iranian or Gulf Arab identities but as a fluid synthesis of the two
with sociopolitical implications for all Persian Gulf States. By understanding the Gulf
Iranian expatriate community, or Gulf Iranians, we can move beyond analyses that arelimited to national, ethnic and ideological lines to reevaluate Persian Gulf identities
entirely.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
What is the difference between Iranians who live in Iran with those who live in,say, Bahrain, or the United Arab Emirates? Furthermore, how are the Iranians living in
Persian Gulf Arab States different from their hosts? Such questions about identity are notsimply rhetorical in the Persian Gulf but are issues of considerable import for its Araband Iranian denizens. In fact, questions relating to identity issues are acutely sensitive forsmall states such as Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, which are surrounded bysubstantially larger regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. Knowing whatshapes identity in such spaces plays a vital role in defining a person’s ancestry andorigins, ethnicity, language, clothing, citizenship, and social status as a member of amajority or minority, even their sense of history in contrast to those around them. It also
shapes the perceptions about the size and fate of self-identified groups.
Much has been written and documented about the Persian Gulf Arab States, their
histories, and their citizens, especially about common features shared between them incomparison to larger states like Iran. Upon a visit to any one of the small Gulf Arabmonarchies, one might get the impression that individual city-states dominate the national
area and population. Citizens there exhibit many similarities, including common language
and ethnicity (Arabic), economy (oil-based welfare state or rentier state), ruling
government (monarchy), societal structure (tribally-based), native population size
(relatively small) and foreign population size (relatively big). In 2002, Bahrain’s
population amounted to approximately 650,000 inhabitants, with 37 percent or 225,000
individuals listed as non-nationals, while the United Arab Emirates total population was

9

4.3 million inhabitants, with 80 to 85 percent of their population, or around 3.5 million
individuals counting as foreign nationals in 2004.1 The combined population of the twostates amounts to only about five million inhabitants or 7.6% the size of Iran’s populationof over 65 million inhabitants, according to a July 2008 estimate.2 Also, these population
numbers do not account or distinguish between citizens and foreign residents of theabove countries, their social class, or ethnicity, which make it hard to determine theextent and influence of foreigners. For example, a recent news article claimed that
450,000 Iranians had residency within the United Arab Emirates in 2007, although it does
not provide a source or information on their backgrounds.3
The most distinguishing attribute of Gulf Arab nations compared to other nations
is their entrepôt emphasis, which has attracted large, diverse expatriate populations totheir shores. For centuries, the littoral area of the Gulf has been a cosmopolitan hub oftrade between Europe, Africa and Asia, with various ports such as Bahrain [Manama],
and Muscat serving as major focal points over time.4 The Persian Gulf gained renown for1

The numbers cited are estimates provided by the Bahraini and Emirati embassies to the UnitedStates. “People and Culture” Embassy of the Kingdom of Bahrain – About Bahrain. Available online.
<http://www.bahrainembassy.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=section.home&id=18>. Accessed 30. October
2008; “United Arab Emirates: Facts and Figures” Embassy of the United Arab Emirates: UAE in Brief.
Available online. <http://uae-embassy.org/html/About/faq.html>. Accessed 30. October 2008. Additional
estimates can be found at the CIA World Factbook website for 2008. A word of caution should be noted:
there are no reliable figures for populations in Gulf Arab states. However, such estimates can give someidea of magnitude when comparing different states demographically. See Michael Bonine “Population
Growth, the Labor Market and Gulf Security.” Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century. Eds. David Long
and Christian Koch (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997): 227.
2
“Iran.” CIA – The World Factbook. 23 October 2008. Available online.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html>. Accessed 30 October 2008.
3“Dubai's powerful Iranian business community is hurt by international sanctions” 28. December
2007. International Herald Tribune.com. Available online.
<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/28/africa/ME-FEA-GEN-GLF-Irans-Boomtown.php>. Accessed
13. October 2008.
4
Rosemarie Said Zahlan The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, theUnited Arab Emirates and Oman (London: Ithaca Press, 1998): 9, 11-12.

10

its natural pearls for millennia, and was subjugated by European powers under thePortuguese, Dutch and British Empires for several centuries.5 Since the oil boom, thevariety of different ethnic groups residing in Persian Gulf Arab States has included
Filipinos, Moroccans, Australians, Lebanese and Sri Lankans. Expatriate populations
helped build the most up-to-date infrastructures, provide highly demanded skills andexpertise as well as filled many undesirable professional roles for the traditional Arabsociety. Gulf Arab hosts have created various spaces for outsiders within the Persian Gulf
Arab States, so long as expatriates are willing to work and only reside there temporarily.
For example, expatriates seeking work visas in Bahrain must find an in-country sponsor
to vouch for them in order to remain there longer than two weeks, and similar laws havebeen enacted in the United Arab Emirates.6 A few Persian Gulf Arab States now embody
a unique situation where their native populations are outnumbered by the number offoreigners in their midst, which provokes concern. Upon the occurrence of foreign labor
riots, one Dubai security official cautioned, “the large number of expatriate workers
poses a risk to national security and should be reduced.”75

Ibid. 10-17.
“Fragomen – Bahrain: Business Immigration Summary.” 22. March 2003. Resources – Country
Summaries. Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy, LLP. Available online.
<http://pubweb.fdbl.com/ihp8/global/media85.nsf/public-country-briefs/bahrain?opendocument> Accessed
30. October 2008; “UAE Immigration Laws and Procedures in Dubai” Al Tamimi & Company – Advocates& Legal Consultants. Available online.
<http://www.zu.ac.ae/library/html/UAEInfo/documents/UAEImmigrationLaw.pdf>. Accessed 30. October
2008.
7
Amy Glass “Foreigners pose ‘risk’ to UAE security” 16. April 2008. Arabian Business.com.
Available online. <http://www.arabianbusiness.com/516712-foreigners-pose-risk-to-uae-security->.
Accessed 14. October 2008. For an alternative perspective, see Salman Dosari, “Panj saad hezar-e irani-emahajer dar emirate-e motahed-e ‘arabi” (Trans. Mani Parsa). 16. Bahman 1385. [23. January 2007] Radio
Zamaneh.com. Available online. <http://www.radiozamaneh.org/morenews/2007/02/post_503.html>.
Accessed 25. August 2008. Bahraini officials have also commented on the effect foreign influences have on
their domestic population. See Mark Trevelyan “Bahrain speaks out against war on Iran” 26. June 2008.
6

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One finds one of the most intriguing expatriate communities, Iranians, within thismilieu. Large numbers of Iranians, defined as individuals born in Iran, possessing Iranian
citizenship or descended from either of the first two categories, have traversed the Persian
Gulf waters for decades to live and work in the states on its south shore for a variety ofreasons, particularly Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.
Iranian expatriates have also migrated to various locations around the world andconsequently there has been an increase in scholarly information published about them invarious locales. Scholars such as Mehdi Bozorgmehr and Georges Sabagh have led theway in filling in knowledge regarding Iranian expatriates now residing in the UnitedStates with selected contributions in several works.8 Other scholars have taken up the
mantle of Iranian expatriate studies in other countries from France and Germany toTurkey and Canada.9 Yet comprehensive research or even an introduction on Iranianmigration in the Persian Gulf has been hard, if not impossible, to find.
This thesis analyzes the unexplored space that Iranian expatriates—individuals of
Iranian ancestry and those with current Iranian citizenship living outside of Iran on atemporary or long-term basis—occupy in Persian Gulf Arab States, specifically Bahrain

Reuters UK. Available online.
<http://uk.reuters.com/article/UKNews1/idUKL2544957720080626?sp=true>. Accessed 30. October 2008.
8
See for example contributions in Asghar Fathi (ed.) Iranian Refugees and Exiles since Khomeini(Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1991); Ron Kelley (ed.) Irangeles: Iranians in Los Angeles (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993); Georges Sabagh and Mehdi Bozorgmehr “Are the Characteristics of
Exiles Different from Immigrants? The Case of Iranians in Los Angeles” ISSR Working Papers in theSocial Sciences vol. 2 no.5 (Los Angeles: University of California Los Angeles Institute for Social Science
Research: 1986-87).
9
All articles referenced in this footnote come from Fathi 1991. They include Janet Bauer “A Long
Way Home: Islam in the Adaptation of Iranian Women Refugees in Turkey and West Germany”: 77-101;
Vida Nassehy-Behnam “Iranian Immigrants in France”: 102-20; Minoo Moallem “Ethnic Entrepreneurshipand Gender Relations Among Iranians in Montreal, Quebec, Canada”: 180-204.

12

and the United Arab Emirates.10 The work argues that culturally ascribed markers such as
ethnicity, language, clothing, gender, religion, historical factors and nationality combine
to produce hybrid Gulf Iranian identities among Iranian expatriates. The thesis performs
an analysis of Iranian expatriate individuals and assesses the level of cross-interaction
between Arabs and Iranians by building upon theories by Martinez, Hegel, Hobsbawm
and Said. Ultimately, the thesis aims to provoke further research in Gulf identity studies.
We should no longer think of Iranian expatriates in terms of Iranian or Gulf Arab
identities but a fluid synthesis of the two with sociopolitical implications for all Persian
Gulf States. By understanding the Gulf Iranian expatriate community, or Gulf Iranians,
we can move beyond simplistic national, ethnic and ideological lines to reevaluate
Persian Gulf identities as a whole.
The thesis is broken down into several chapters analyzing Iranians in Persian Gulf
Arab States, following this introductory chapter. Chapter Two examines both Iranian andArab identities in the Gulf by establishing a theoretical framework for studying the
Iranian community of the Gulf through the lens of identity issues, incorporating previous
theories from Oscar Martinez, Georg Hegel, Eric Hobsbawm, and Edward Said. Building
upon and revising models constructed by these scholars to fit our Gulf Iranian case, thiswork will show how we can assemble a portrait of Gulf Iranian society. Chapters Three
10

This is not to say other Gulf Arab States such as Kuwait or Qatar lack Iranian expatriate
communities. Statistically, Qatar has one of the highest percentages of Iranians relative to its native
population, which one 1986 text stated as 23.29%. Kuwait also has a considerable Iranian expatriate
population in its midst, many of whom can trace their ancestry back to an Iranian immigration wave fromnearby Basra in Iraq during the late 18th century. However, we shall only examine the Iranian populations
within Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates here. See John G. Lorimer Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf,'Oman, and Central Arabia 2 Vols. Vol. 1 – Historical (Calcutta, Supt. Govt. Print., 1908-1915. Westmead:
Farnborough Gregg, 1970): 1001-02; Vol. 2 – Geographical and Statistical (Calcutta, Supt. Govt. Print.,
1908-1915. Westmead: Farnborough Gregg, 1970): 1051; R. K. Ramazani Revolutionary Iran: Challenge
and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986): 34.

13

and Four build upon the previous theory through a sociological analysis of the various
subgroups that comprise both Gulf Arab and Iranian societies, touching upon issues suchas socioeconomic status, gender, dress and history. Whereas Chapter Three focuses
mainly on Iranian identity, Chapter Four looks at Arab identity in Bahrain and the United
Arab Emirates thus permitting us to explore factors that have shaped relations between
Gulf Arabs and Iranians. Chapter Five explores the Gulf Iranian community itself,
analyzing the Iranian community’s contributions to Bahrain and the United ArabEmirates, as well as the challenges the community faces towards eventual integration into
Gulf Arab society. Chapter Six then offers some concluding remarks.
There are several reasons for studying Iranian expatriates in an extra-Iranian
context such as the Persian Gulf Arab States. First, such a study offers researchers
another avenue to explore the divide between Arab and Iranian cultures. This text willseek to dispel any notion of an Arab-Iranian (Persian) conflict or the dangers of a Shi’acrescent, ideas which lend themselves to an overarching, clash of civilizations
paradigm.11 For example, one scholar claims to have traced the origins of such animosity
between sides to an earlier “Ottoman-Persian conflict” and subsequently marks as“probably one of the oldest rivalries in the history of the world.”12 Studying theperipheries, rather than the heartlands of Iranian and Arab societies, permits us to

11

Samuel P. Huntington “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, Issue 3: 22-49.
May Yamani offers an interesting analysis and history of the origins and uses of “Shi’a crescent”
terminology in one short article. See May Yamani “Arcs and Crescents” The World Today Vol. 62. Issue
12 (2006): 7-8.
12Martin Kramer “The Myth of Linkage” 16. June 2008. Martin Kramer’s Sandbox. Available
online. <http://sandbox.blog-city.com/the_myth_of_linkage.htm>. Accessed 30. October 2008. Kramer
gave a different edition of this same post during a presentation earlier at Harvard’s Center for Middle East
Studies on October 24, 2007 under the title, “Which Middle East Conflict?”14

discover where Iranian society ends and Arab society begins, and the genuine degree of
sharpness or starkness that exists between sides within a contemporary context. These
Persian Gulf Arab States are perhaps the area where Arabs make their strongest
characterizations and classifications of Iranians, often through firsthand contact with
Iranians themselves. As time passes and the region changes, how does the relationshipbetween Arab and Persian change? A study of Iranian expatriates in the Gulf can shedsome light upon the dynamics of contact and affiliation in the Persian Gulf.
Second, studying the sociological situation and background of Iranians in the
Persian Gulf Arab States gives us an alternative perspective into these Gulf Arabmonarchies. More simply, the study offers us the opportunity to see a critique of Gulf
Arab society from individuals familiar with the Gulf region to gain a more nuanced,
contrastive analysis of Gulf Arab societies. By viewing the Gulf States from Iranian andArab eyes, we can minimize and reduce the effect of outside biases to the region andinstead decipher the local picture. Considerable numbers of Indians, Southeast Asians,
non-Gulf Arabs and even Westerners live and work in the Gulf. While each of theexpatriate communities residing in the Gulf may share some similarities to and havesome affinity for aspects of Gulf society, they are still outsiders to the region whose
experience is relatively new and colored by a different sense of history and identity
relative to the Persian Gulf space. Consequently, this study will downplay and disregard
such outside actors in order to focus upon Iranian and Arab perspectives solely and while
diminishing Western filters or perspectives.

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Third, an analysis of the situation of the Iranian diaspora in the Persian Gulf Arabcountries allows us to dispel the notion of all Iranians being revolutionaries. Khomeiniand the post-1979 Iranian fundamentalist ideology advocated the export of the Iran’s
Islamic Revolution to other countries and is still the subject of heated debate on bothsides of the Persian Gulf. Many states logically fear the impact of these expatriates on
their governments and society by potential subversive elements within the Iranian
expatriate community.13 On the other hand, a considerable number of Iranians left their
homeland for non-revolutionary aims. Do Iranians within Gulf Arab society become an
asset or a liability to their hosts? This study will challenge simplistic black and white
analyses of Iranians and instead show the various, complex shades of gray which they
exhibit.
Fourth, the study of the Iranian expatriate community also contributes to a
growing field of study in the post-modern era: the discourse on transnational
communities. The adjective transnational, with its “trans” prefix indicating across or overis appropriate for describing Iranian expatriates living on the opposite side of the Persian
Gulf. Transnational also helps us to identify this Iranian community as one in movement
without indication as to the reasons for moving or an ultimate destination. Therefore,
studying the transnational community gives us a lot of room to explore different variables
exhibited within the Iranian expatriate community. Whether driven by political, economicor environmental reasons, different societies are moving away from their origins andhomelands to seek out opportunities elsewhere. The effect of change upon a transnational
13

Dosari “Panj saad hezar-e irani-e mahajer dar emirat-e motahed-e ‘arabi” 23. January 2007;
Glass “Foreigners pose ‘risk’ to UAE security” 16. April 2008.

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Iranian expatriate community living in the Gulf States and their new hosts in Bahrain andthe United Arab Emirates portends future changes in the determination of Gulf Arab
identity. Moreover, a study focusing on Iranian expatriates in the southern Persian Gulf
complements other studies of transnational communities in the region14 and will add
another layer of understanding to the region’s cosmopolitan mix.
A fifth major reason for studying Iranians in Persian Gulf Arab States is theirproximity or immediacy to Iran. Closeness with the vatan or “motherland” translates into
more contacts with Iran, whether economically, politically or historically over centuries.
In fact, portions of the Gulf once constituted vassal-states to Iran, or were former Iranian
territories. The badgirs of Dubai’s Bastakiyah district demonstrate one sign of Iran’sstrong connections to the Gulf Arab States. Iranians are always just across the horizon on
the northern and eastern shores of the Gulf, and control more than half of the shore
available to the Persian Gulf occupants. Studying them is also unique because members
comprising it come from a wider variety of socioeconomic levels than othercommunities. In fact, the only barrier separating Iran from every Persian Gulf Arab Stateis the waterway itself. Focusing on the Iranian expatriates in particular will help assess
whether or not a transnational culture’s proximity to its homeland translates into morebargaining power in the Arab society.

14

For example, Andrew Gardner, an ethnographic anthropologist, primarily examines thetransnational experience of Indians working and living in Bahrain alongside other expatriate communities.
However, Gardner also offers a comparison between these communities and Bahrain’s native population,
including what this paper terms as the Gulf Iranian community. See Andrew Gardner City of Strangers:
The Transnational Indian Community in Manama, Bahrain. (Doctoral Dissertation. Tucson: The Universityof Arizona, 2005). See also Anh N. Longva Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in
Kuwait (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).

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Lastly, studying the Iranian expatriate community gives us insight into therelationship between identity and the oil-based rentier economy. Economies rooted in oil
have enabled the small Gulf kingdoms to oversee welfare systems on par with many
Western nations, as well as to close a so-called centuries old development gap between
them over centuries in only decades. Almost overnight, Gulf Arabs have become richer,healthier and more mobile than their parents, challenging the traditional social mores andlifestyle through the establishment of a rentier state. In contrast, Iran has its own large oil
resources but has grappled with its own unique challenges to translating those reserves
into greater wealth for its citizens in its own form of rentier state. For example, thehistorian and sociologist Afsaneh Najmabadi has assessed the relationship between
political participation and the establishment of the rentier state, and noted how Iran’slarge, predominantly agricultural-based population was not able to benefit from oil
wealth distribution to the same extent as the demographically small Gulf Arab Statesprior to the Iranian Revolution.15 A recent news article also cited how Iran’s oil resources
may be depleted by the year 2015, and questioned the continued survival of the state
under an oil-based economy without some other form of investment or diversification.16
As oil continues to form the backbone of Gulf Arab economies and spurs jobs there, Gulf
Iranians continue to seek out jobs and a new life on the Gulf’s southern shore.

15

Afsaneh Najmabadi “Depoliticisation of a Rentier State: The Case of Pahlavi Iran.” in The
Rentier State Eds. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (New York: Croom Helm, 1987): 211-27.
16
Roger Stern “Iran Actually is Short of Oil – Muddled Mullahs” 8. January 2007. International
Herald Tribune.com. Available online. <http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/08/opinion/edstern.php>.
Accessed 30. October 2008.

18

For these reasons, we should be keen to focus greater scholarly attention on
Iranian expatriates and this thesis will shed some light on this community and theirrelationship with both sides of the Persian Gulf.

19

CHAPTER 2: APPROACHING PERSIAN GULF COMMUNITIESIn order to proceed, it is necessary to dispel any notions of a uniform Gulf society
along ethnic, linguistic, or national lines. In fact, identity, rather than nationality, plays
the primary factor in determining relations and interactions between inhabitants withorigins on both sides of the Persian Gulf, thus questioning the idea of using commonly
accepted Western constructions of ordering different societies along purely nationalisticlines. It will prove useful to employ some theoretical models to the Gulf context tounderstand the issues of Arab and Iranian identities, as well as how the issues of Gulfboundaries and territorial disputes have contributed to these over time. As the following
section will show, the distinctions made between the various Iranian expatriate groups by
Gulf Arabs carry significant ramifications for jobs, social standing, class identification,
political participation and naturalization within the Persian Gulf Arab States.
Oscar Martinez set forth a model for assessing transnational interaction and fusion
between countries within the borderlander or border people population in Border
People.17 Historian Martinez finds his inspiration in the borderland, a peripheral area
between the cores of different nations:International boundaries have the same basic functions everywhere: to delimit one
nation from another and to control the movement of people and goods from one sideof the boundary to the other. Borderlands are generally situated at the periphery ofnations, and to one degree or another all are subject to foreign influences. These
characteristics are common to borderlanders from different parts of the globe. The
17

Oscar J. Martinez. Border People: Life and Society in the U.S. – Mexico Borderlands (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1994). Oscar Martinez was not the first person to coin or use the expression
borderlands for the United States Mexico frontier area. The earliest reference I could find to borderlands
came in Gloria Anzaldúa Borderlands La Frontera: The New Mestiza (San Francisco: Spinsters/Aunt Lute
Book Company, 1987). However, his work does a better job of making use of existing history and theory tosupport his study as well as incorporate individual accounts across the region into a unified picture of theborderland.

20

determining influence of the border makes the lives of border peoples functionallysimilar irrespective of location, nationality, ethnicity, culture and language. In otherwords, all borderlanders share the border experience.18
The key to Martinez’ findings is his conclusion where the contact between groups in amixed, environment, the frontier, far from the heartlands of states, leads to theconstruction or synthesis of broader transnational identities which are neither one identity
nor the other, but a combination of the two.19 For example, in the US-Mexico case, thetransnational synthesis taking place there leads to the creation of bilingualEnglish/Spanish populations, and identity markers such as Mexican-American or Chicano
used on both sides. Martinez further believes that even among such populations,borderlanders themselves display signs of heterogeneity, being shaped by environmental
factors there, and the key is finding a way in which to quantify and assess distinct
subgroups within the border region.20 Through his borderlands abstraction, the historianaims to string together all collected bits of information into a greater overall picture
which looks beyond and around stark boundaries of traditionally-defined nation-states
and towards transnational processes of connections between different peoples.
Martinez implicitly channels Enlightenment theory of Hegel’s original model ofthesis: antithesis: synthesis for his transnational model. Two nations come into contact
with one another and conflict ensues. Hegel maintains that the juxtaposition and violent
interaction of binary oppositions (the thesis and its counter, antithesis) will continue until
a position is reached (the synthesis) in The Hegelian Dialectic. Depending on which side18

Ibid., xviii.
Ibid., 5.
20
Ibid., xvi-xvii.
19

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we take, whether one nation or another, the side chosen will represent the thesis in ourabstraction, while the opposite side represents the antithesis, and the two remain in
conflict until a resolution can be reached between them. When this happens, the result is
a synthesis of the two. In Martinez’ case, the synthesis created in his example is theborderland and borderlanders—the US-Mexico borderland and the various subcultures ofthe borderland (American, Mexican, Mexican American/Chicano)—and for our case, theequivalents are Persian Gulf States and various Gulf populations (Gulf Arab, Iranian,
Iranian expatriate), respectively. Unlike Hegel, in order to reach such a “transnational”
synthesis, some form of mixing or a resolution must occur between the two sides andMartinez addresses the various ways in which nations combine or fuse and at what level
they do so, allowing for the presence of a synthesis amongst both thesis and antithesis.
Such syntheses is not limited to physical contact alone but can take place at the level ofideas, and has been demonstrated in areas such as between Marxist and Islamic thoughtin Iran.21
Not everything in borderlands theory as set out by Martinez applies so evenly tothe case between Iran and the Persian Gulf Arab States, so some adjustments and revisionmust be made to his theory to fit the case of Gulf as Borderland. As Martinez’ worksuggests, the vast space of a borderlands region should provoke variation within theborderlands culture in distinct sub regions.22 In our case, we can substitute Bahrain andthe United Arab Emirates as two sub-regions of a greater Iranian-Arab borderland and21

Kamran Talattof, “Comrade Akbar: Islam, Marxism, and Modernity,” Comparative Studies ofSouth Asia, Africa and the Middle East 25, no. 3 (2005): 634-49.
22
Martinez 54-55.

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study the distinct Iranian expatriate culture forming there as a result of specific migration
paths to each country. Another major difference is that there is no land border between
Iran and the two subject states, but the porous, difficult to monitor Persian Gulf waters
instead. We should duly note that borderlands are not limited to land boundaries alone
but can also be interpreted as areas contiguous to international waterways over which
nations have no monopoly. A third major difference lies in the size of the states and in the
degree and flow of migration between them. Unlike the US-Mexico case, where the bruntof migration goes from the less populated state into the larger one and from south to norththe Persian case exhibits the opposite—migration is from the larger to the smaller states
and north to south. While the size of the Iranian expatriate population in Persian Gulf
Arab States is still smaller than the size of other expatriate communities, its effect isenough to alter the demographic makeup and place political and social pressures on
governments such as those in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. However, migration
which takes place in the Gulf is distinct from Martinez’ original case as Iranian expatriate
integration into Arab society is currently not a solution, or at least an easy one. In fact,
the Iranian expatriate experience living and working in Persian Gulf Arab States does notlead to naturalization, citizenship and ultimately, political enfranchisement in the sameway performing immigration to America has done for Iranians there (along with otherimmigrant communities).23
Finally, the last major difference between a Martinez borderland and the one
constructed here is the degree of third party influences in the construction of border23

Kelley xi, xiii-xiv.

23

identities. Although Martinez’ work does mention the Tohono O’odham and Pasqua
Yaqui—two indigenous tribes also present in the border region—such groups are too
small to generate a strong impact on the cultural synthesis forming between Americanand Mexican cultures. Therefore, his transnational model analyzing two predominantcultures straddling a borderland still holds true. The same cannot be said for the Persian
Gulf, where numerous expatriate communities contribute to the Gulf borderland
experience, and exert at least an indirect influence upon Gulf Arab society.24 Within such
milieu we may add at least one Iranian expatriate subgroup: the Baluch community, whoagain are neither ethnically Arab nor Iranian, and who operate within various roles in
Gulf Arab society without the negative, subversive stigma attached to them such as the‘Ajam nor the potentially positive connotation of being Arab, such as Huwala, two otherIranian expatriate subgroups.
The first example of the congruence of Martinez’ work with other theory comesfrom Eric Hobsbawm’s ideas in The Invention of Tradition. Hobsbawm originally used
the idea of invented tradition to illustrate how nations are created through selective,
careful use of the past in order to establish or maintain bonds between people, whether or
not a particular version of the past really took place:‘Invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly
or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate
certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies
continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish
continuity with a suitable historic past.25

24

Gardner.
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.) The Invention of Tradition (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1983): 1.
25

24

However, we do not quite grasp the relevance of Hobsbawm’s idea until several pages
later, when he elaborates on the importance of invented tradition:
There is probably no time and place with which historians are concerned which has
not seen the ‘invention’ of tradition.... [H]owever, we should expect it to occur more
frequently when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social
patterns for which ‘old’ traditions had been designed, producing new ones to which
they were not applicable, or when such old traditions and their institutional carriers
and promulgators no longer prove sufficiently adaptable and flexible, or are otherwise
eliminated: in short, when there are sufficiently large and rapid changes on the
demand or supply side.26
Hobsbawm shows us how a group can perpetuate its values through the use of
appropriated, convenient symbols and how change (i.e. transformation of society) plays afactor in establishing certain symbols to demarcate one society from another. Most
importantly, Hobsbawm uses his idea to assess nations and the degree to which they aresuccessful in the project of nation-building.27 The invention of tradition therefore plays into the establishment of boundary lines between nations, and it is within the borderland
where tradition faces its greatest challenge from outside forces.
How exactly does “invented tradition” fit within the Iranian expatriate situationand the concept of cultural synthesis? Iranian Huwala frequently invoke an alleged Arabpast as a mitigating factor to help integrate them into Gulf Arab society while discounting
their experience living within Iranian space, a tack employed by borderlanders according
to Martinez.28 On the other hand, ‘Ajam individuals are still considered foreign in spite ofliving amongst the Gulf Arab populations, over several generations. The integration of
the Iranian expatriate population itself into the Gulf Arab one threatens the Persian Gulf
26

Ibid., 4.
Ibid., 13.
28
Martinez 20.
27

25

Arab States’ socio-political system rooted in oil-based rentier economies since the former
could potentially increase the pool of individuals demanding social benefits and politicalrights as citizens. Further, Iranian expatriate individuals help to perpetuate less than pure
Persianized identities (i.e. non-sharif, la-ansab, bani-khudair, etc.), which undermine theexisting tribal Arab kinship links and frameworks maintained through endogamous
relationships. Therefore, one immediate response to such threat is Gulf Arabs’ renewedemphasis of clothing such as the thobe and ageyl to distinguish themselves from
culturally-defined outside populations such as Iranians. Bahrain and the island dispute
over Abu Musa and the Tunbs have served as the front lines of Iranian nationalist
territorial claims in the current day both before and during the Revolutionary Era,
although Iranian territory once included other parts of the Arabian Peninsula as well.
Whether or not Iran’s cross-Gulf claims to its southern shore or islands such as Abu
Musa and the Tunbs still have validity now may not be of much concern to Iranians
wistful of a more glorious past.29 Hobsbawm’s ideas give us additional tools with whichto assess the social and political boundaries between the two sides of the Persian Gulf,
how they shift over time, and the adjustments employed by the Gulf population tomaintain and preserve aspects of their identity in light of such changes.

29

Similar applications of ethno-national claims to territory that are rooted in history still exist
elsewhere today. They include Serbian claims to the newly declared Republic of Kosovo and even Osamabin Laden’s lament for the loss of al-Andalus (Spain). Bahrain had claimed Zubara, Qatar as its ancestral
home and part of Bahraini territory until World Court mediation settled the issue. Khuri 1980: 27; Bratislav
Panetlic, “Reshaping the Balkans in the First Two Centuries: The Case of Serbia.” Journal of Design
History. 20, no.2 (2007): 1-14; Isambard Wilkinson. “Fearsome dilemma of Spain's Muslims: The country's
south provides a sinister inspiration to Osama bin Laden and his followers.” The Daily Telegraph. 17 April
2004. Available from Access World News, Record Number A20040417 -19F4-EIW,0,XML,EIW.
<http://infoweb.newsbank.com.ezproxy.library.arizona.edu/>. Accessed 03 May 2007; Zahlan 1998: 3, 4748, 165.

26

Finally, Edward Said’s Orientalism may also have some use within Martinez’
framework for assessing the condition of Iranian expatriates.30 Originally, Said applied
Foucault’s theories on power dynamics to demonstrate how Western nations such as
Britain and France came to dominate the Middle East and the nations and groups there
during the 18th and 19th centuries, through a process of constructing the “other,” or thecollective individual they referred to as the Oriental. If one can attribute and confer theirunfavorable weaker qualities to someone else, such as another group, then distance anddifferentiate them from him or her for possessing the same specific qualities, one gains
power over them. In the Western European case, Britain and France succeeded inestablishing their superiority (at least in their minds) over an amalgamation of several
cultures lumped into a form of us (West) versus all the rest (Eastern or Oriental) culture,
while making no distinction between various groups.
Said’s thought about the relationship between two parties and the way in which
they view one another does not necessarily have to limit itself to East/West dynamics
though. We could also apply it to the struggle between Iran and the Arab States forcontrol of the Persian Gulf and the construction of the “other” between two so-called“oriental” nations in their territorial claims. Edward Said’s us/them model of duality
offers a contrast to Martinez’ cultural synthesis framework (or Hegel for that matter) andgives us a model for assessing Arab-Iranian relations at various levels. The application of30

Edward W. Said Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978). Edward Said’s work spawned
a new field of post-colonial research within Latin American Studies called Latin Americanism. The maindifference between Orientalism and Latin Americanism lay in analyzing the relationship between Latin
America and the West (i.e. Europe) rather than the Orient and West. For some examples, see Brett
Levinson “The Death of the Critique of Eurocentrism: Latinamericanism as a Global Praxis/Poiesis”
Revista de Estudios Hispanicos 31. no. 2 (1997): 169-201; Julio Ramos “Hemispheric Domains: 1898 andthe Origins of Latin Americanism” Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies 10. no. 3 (2001): 237-51.

27

Martinez’ thought, combined with the Hobsbawm’s theory, provides a template forindividuals forming a transnational synthesis and the relations between a newly emerging
third new party and its forebears.
In sum, by studying the Gulf as borderland and the Iranian expatriate population,
we can learn about the limits of Iranian and Gulf Arab cultures through the Iranian
expatriate individuals operating between them. We can also derive something about the
responses or lack thereof of central governments to co-opt or alienate the populations
operating on the periphery. Alternatively, we can learn about how neighboring
governments respond to the choices made by the original government and how they
appropriate or neglect the peripheral populations according to their specific needs, suchas integrating them into their labor force and national population or accusing them ofbeing a dangerous foreign entity. With the above theory in place, we can now turn thegeneral issue of Iranian expatriate migration.
Iranian migration has been driven by the shifting political calculus of Iran and theother Persian Gulf States in a process of attempting to draw and secure both physical andcultural borders between them according to Western-defined standards. It is important toexamine how territory was viewed in the prior era (up through the late 19th century) tounderstand why this is so important.
Traditionally, rights to territory had been intermingled in the southern parts of the
Gulf and northern Oman, where Iranians and Omanis had lived side by side for
centuries without any dividing line between them. The whole area was the frontier orthe zone of contact between Iran and Oman. The offshore islands were considered bycommon consent to be under direct Iranian sovereignty, yet nothing prevented thetribes of the southern Gulf territories, under common ownership, from living and28

working in the islands or in the northern coasts of the Gulf. People from the southerncoasts could travel freely to Iran and live there indefinitely even as recently as 1945.31
This illustrates just how non-uniform Persian Gulf States were then if we compare themto today’s delimitation of boundaries.32 Even before the Islamic Revolution, Iran and thePersian Gulf Arab States attempted to remove any ambiguity regarding an autonomous
region, disputed territory or population that had previously been left unclaimed by eitherside. The same author had earlier described such a shift and its fallout at the state level.
Delimitation of the earliest examples of modern boundaries in the vicinity of the Gulf
began in the 1870s (Baluchistan boundaries) when not only were Iran and others in
the region totally unfamiliar with the legal implications and geographicalsophistications of delimiting modern boundaries, but Iran’s traditionally ill-defined
relations between centre and periphery and her general weakness resulted in loss ofterritories in all directions.33
However, our understanding of the implications of Gulf boundary disputes is limited until
we examine the first-hand effects of such change.
The story becomes more intriguing when we consider how individuals living inand occupying the periphery were the first ones affected by central or core leadershipfrom Tehran, Sharjah, or Dubai and Gulf Iranians ultimately faced a different choice thanthat of their revolutionary peers in 1979: that of adopting one nationality or another rather
than overthrowing the government. For example, if we consider that there has nothistorically been one unified Baluch state but one split between Afghanistan, Iran or
Pakistan, the boundary limitations noted above have imposed Afghan, Iranian andPakistani ‘nationalities’ upon the entire Baluch population. Iran’s inhabitants who were31

Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf: A Maritime Political
Geography (Richmond: Curzon, 1999): 71.
32
Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zoneof Great Power Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974): 205.
33
Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 12.

29most liable to depart the country for the Gulf’s southern shore were more likely to live on
the fringes or periphery of society, both in figurative and literal senses.34 Why? If weconsider non-Persian speakers, this meant having to accept Persian language of the
majority in place of their native minority tongues. For traditional practicing Muslim
families, changes in dress as well as government intrusion into religious centers meant aloss of personal choice regarding their lifestyle in order to attain social advancement,such as the modernizing changes phased in during the 1920s and 1930s. For rural farmers
and unskilled labor, agricultural neglect and inflation meant such individuals moved tofind work and a means of living elsewhere, including urban areas. Such individuals had
little or nothing to gain from the modernizing changes instituted in the core rather thanthose made on the periphery. Even had such individuals stayed through the Iranian
Revolution, benefits to their ways of life would have been marginal at best. Such factors
played a major part in the identity calculations of every Gulf Iranian individual andultimately made them more susceptible to cross the newly established boundary lines.
In some cases, the resolution of territorial disputes led to voluntary expulsion
rather than accepting imposed rule. Migrants from Lengeh, Baluchistan and Khuzestan
provinces, Hengam Island or Sirri provide evidence of the fallout from border turmoil asa result of Iran successfully imposing its control within their ancestral homelands, and
who opted to cross the waters into the Persian Gulf Arab States. These regions allcomprise the outer edge or limits of Iran today, resulting in a rather autonomous character
34

This is a point Martinez has also alluded to regarding borderlanders with respect to centerperiphery studies. Interestingly, the author also uses the term “other” to describe the opportunism employedby borderlanders to adopt one or the other nationality depending on their needs. However, Martinez neverreferences Said and there is no indication he knew about the latter’s work. See Martinez xviii.

30

for such regions and enclaves, which were effectively detached from the state until the
1950s.35 Such regions (with the exception of oil-rich Khuzestan) were more likely toreceive less attention from the government for regional development expenditures, thus
making these regions more liable to foreign social and economic influences than thoseareas from the core of Iran.36 When emirates such as Dubai offered economic and social
incentives for northern shore Iranian populations as an alternative to unwanted
restrictions and scant social benefits, many individuals willingly migrated to the southernshore.
On the other hand, some members of the Iranian expatriate community
established outside the newly defined Iranian state’s boundaries in states like Bahrain had
no choice but to accept Arab rule in other territorial disputes with little or no support
from the Iranian government.
If the Iranian government did little to allay the fears of some states that it might
infiltrate and eventually dominate its tiny neighbors, it can also be said that it did nottake up the question of the status of Iranian immigrants in the Gulf states or pursue
their interests on a diplomatic level. The Iranian government essentially left thequestion of Iranian emigration to resolve itself through inaction, the natural course oftime, and regional developments.37
In Bahrain for example, individuals who were perhaps still loyal to Iran were in for asurprise when the Iranian government abandoned its claims to the island and recognized
its independence in 1971 after a United Nations administered plebiscite.38 Another35

Chubin 1974: 200.
Misagh Parsa Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 1989): 81.
37
Chubin 1974: 211-12.
38
John Duke Anthony Arab States of the Lower Gulf (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1976):
14; Christin Marschall Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (New York: Routledge
36

31

example came during the 1930s, when some of Bahrain’s Gulf Iranian individuals
refused Bahraini citizenship in spite of compulsory nationality laws meant to make thempledge allegiance Bahrain instead of Iran, with the island linking the right to own landwith Bahraini nationality.39 Fuccaro notes in the same passage how some Iranians soldtheir property and left, others maintained dual nationality until Iran recognized Bahrain’s
independence. Still, others tried to get around the law by transferring property rights totheir children and became stateless individuals as a result, thus lending complexity to theissue of nationality.40 Apart from lightly populated Qawasim-claimed islands such as Abu
Musa, there were not the same issues from a shift in territorial recognition in the United
Arab Emirates although as there were for Bahrain.
When we examine each of the above cases and factor in various terms such as
Huwala or Bidoon, we still see an inherent conflict between traditional ways ofidentifying the Gulf and its natives versus the idea of distinguishing the same individuals
under modern nationalities. On the one hand, Persian Gulf residents fall under categories
such as Iranian, Bahraini, Dubaian/Emirati, as one means of establishing an official
identity. As another means, individuals are still liable to be characterized by overlapping
non-national labels such as ‘Ajam and Baluch on account of their appearance, oradditional categories like place of origin.

Curzon, 2003): 8; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 133-36; Muhammed Ghanim Rumaihi Bahrain: Social andPolitical Change since the First World War (New York: Bowker Publishing, 1976): 31.
39
Nelida Fuccaro “Mapping the Transnational Community: Persians and the Space of the City in
Bahrain, c. 1869-1937” Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf. Ed. Madawi Al-Rasheed (NewYork: Routledge, 2005):2005: 44, 53. Fuccaro also ironically notes how in 1929, Bahrain recognized any
children born in Bahrain to be Bahraini nationals, even if they were born to foreign parents unlessregistered at the British Political Agency, who represented non-Bahrainis since 1861.
40
Ibid.

32

Most people in the region were identified according to their membership of a tribe (orits sub-divisions, the clan and extended family), or according to the locality fromwhich they originated. Such family names as Al Yamani (the Yemeni), Al Najdi(from the Najd), Al Hijazi (from the Hijaz) are common throughout the Gulf region.41
Accepted social boundaries, in addition to political ones, were just as liable to overlap
and shift with time, thereby fomenting a struggle between tradition and modernity inregards to identity in all the Persian Gulf states. When the Iranian Revolution took place,followed by the Iran-Iraq War, Gulf Arabs, Iranians, and Iranian expatriates grappledwith the unresolved issue of identity still further, as there was a newfound concern foreven more potential shifting of boundaries. And yet, the original factors that drew
Iranians towards the Gulf’s southern shore, such as job opportunities, lower taxes,
freedom of religious expression, and opposition to military service did not change.
So what is identity? Identity is a complex issue no matter the various theories it isframed in or quantifiable factors assigned to it. It depends on many contexts, such as thecreation of national boundaries, religious preference, adaptation to a particular location,customs, history, departure and separation from one’s place of origin, individual
experience and more, Gulf residents can fall into a number of categories and subgroups.
Identity is subjective to and determined by each individual and is liable to change based
upon the unique circumstances in which each person finds themselves in relation with thepeople around them. Such complexity and subjectivity does not preclude us from41

Longva 1997: 46. Fuccaro goes even further than Longva in specifically defining Iranians living
within Persian Gulf Arab States. “As the first or second generations settled in Bahrain they maintained
strong family links with their city of origin, and invested in houses and landed properties in their oldneighborhood. While the new family line was often established under the name of the first settler in
Manamah, larger groups which included different households continued to be identified with their places oforigin in Iran, as was the case for the Bushehris, Shirazis, Farsis, ‘Ahwazis and Bastekis.” Fuccaro 2005:
46.

33

attempting to study or quantify specific groups because that is where we glean the mostinsight into human relations at any specific time or place or in general. As the remainderof the text will show, individual and group identities go hand in hand with construction
and development of the Persian Gulf Arab States as we know them in 2008.

34

CHAPTER 3: IRANIAN IDENTITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF ARAB STATES
Iranian expatriates have consciously chosen to live outside of Iran and have begun
to adjust and adapt to life away from Iran, whether on a temporary or full-term basis.
Some of these individuals go back and forth maintaining dual residency on both sides of
the Gulf, others seek temporary work in the Gulf Arab States while others have taken
steps toward appropriating Arab identities. In short, there are a variety of ways Iranian
expatriates have moved away from Iranian towards Arab society. They are not entirely
Iranian or Arab but a hybrid society between the two sides.
To focusing our study, we will employ a new marker for the Iranian expatriate
community—Gulf Iranian—to help indicate distinct outlook and perceived identity ofsuch individuals living outside of Iran but still within the specific Persian Gulf context.
Gulf Iranian is a suitable term because it complements the existing term Gulf Arab,which has been applied to Bahrainis, Emiratis, Qataris and other Arabic-speaking
individuals indigenous to the Gulf. The following chapters will briefly delve into
introductory definitions of both Gulf Iranians and Gulf Arabs in order to put our study
into context.
Who exactly is a Gulf Iranian and what distinguishes them from Gulf Arabs orother Iranians? Gulf Iranians are simply any Iranian citizens or their descendants who,such as Gulf Arabs, now reside at least some of the time in one of the Persian Gulf ArabStates on temporary or long-term bases.42 Although the definition given for Gulf Iranianseems rather simple and broad, it does not touch upon the ethnic makeup of such
42

This definition includes Iranians who maintain and move between residences in both Iran and
the Persian Gulf Arab States.

35

individuals, thereby helping us to overcome the issue of ethnic non-Persian communities
within the Iranian community for example. It says nothing about the socioeconomic
standing of Iranian expatriates in the Persian Gulf or their social acceptance by the host
Arab society. One might infer a greater variability in such population in the region due toeconomically less expensive relocation costs to move across the Gulf as well as shorterjourney times, thus proving far less a barrier to entry than Europe or America. Still, one
major factor to consider for Gulf Iranians is the problem of being accepted by Gulf ArabStates and Arab society, which exerts a social cost upon them. Whether by choice or byuncontrollable circumstances, the Gulf Iranian represents the greater integration into
Arab society or perhaps a synthesis of a new Gulf society.
The Gulf Iranian subgroups can be divided as follows:
Huwala43 (literally “wanderer” or “migrant”) is the Gulf Arab designationreferring to ethnic Sunni Arab and Persian populations who had lived on the northern
Persian shore of the Gulf for an extended period of time and have become what somescholars term “semi-Persianized” Arabs.44 They speak Arabic and may or may not know
43

Taken on its own, the term Huwala (plural ‫ها‬, singular ‫ )ه‬is interesting in its various
spellings and transliterations into English from each author’s interpretation of Persian and Arabic. Various
sources consulted in this work have used all of the following spellings: Havaleh, Huwalah, Hule, Holis,
Howayla, Hawailah, Muha(w)walah, Hawla, Hoolah, hwala, Hwilah, Huwala, Hawala, al-Hawala,
Hawalah and Hawali. Undoubtedly, there are additional spellings, thus creating a potential minefield for
future English-language researchers of the Persian Gulf until scholars reach a common standard. This isalso not to be confused with hawala, an unofficial money trading practice in the Gulf today. For
simplification, this author will use Huwala to denote a Gulf Iranian subgroup and hawala for moneytransactions.
44
Easa Saleh Al-Gurg The Wells of Memory (London: John Murray, 1998): 232; John Barrett
Kelly Arabia, the Gulf and the West (New York: Basic Books, 1980): 164; May Seikaly “Bahraini Womenin Formal and Informal Groups: The Politics of Identification” Organizing Women: Formal and Informal
Women’s Groups in the Middle East. Eds. Dawn Chatty and Annika Rabo (New York: Berg, 1997): 13031. The theme of a Persianized, less than full Arab community frequently turns up regarding thiscommunity throughout many works referencing the Huwala. For example, Kelly explains how the Huwala
are more Persian because of their supposed non-tribal nature. Kelly also alludes to the same group’s

36

the Persian language, based upon whether their ancestors ever spoke Persian and if they
still retain it within successive generations.45 Mahdi Al-Tajir states that a number of thissubgroup speak a language called Bastaki, a variant of Persian, among each other in placeof Arabic.46 Huwala tend to be divided between the Sunni Shafi’i and Maliki schools ofIslamic jurisprudence.47 Generally, the Huwala trace their roots to somewhere along
Iran’s southern shores and islands, ranging from Khorramshahr in Khuzestan province tothe ports of Lengeh and Bandar Abbas, and even Hengam or Qeshm islands.48
The term Huwala has been in use for some time, as Huwala populations havecrisscrossed the Persian Gulf since before the advent of Islam, based upon the rise andfall of various maritime ports under Persian, Arab or Turkish control even before theEuropean arrival. During the 18th century, Huwala groups reportedly took over andcontrolled Bahrain.49 The same groups were known for alternating between manning the
Iranian fleet in the Persian Gulf as well as conducting mutinies against it during the same
period—making them both the official face of Iran to other Gulf Arabs as well as an antiIranian threat.50 Early 20th century sources such as Lorimer have ascribed this subgroup
to be part of a larger Arabian tribe called the Hawalah, and with some sources evenamorphousness and how they have also roamed the sea rather than the desert, the traditional area of theBedouin Arab. Seikaly diplomatically refers to the group as a Persian/Arab tribe.
45David E. Long The Persian Gulf: An Introduction to its People, Politics, and Economics(Boulder: Westview Press, 1978): 8.
46
Mahdi Abdalla Al-Tajir Language and Linguistic Origins in Bahrain: The Baharnah dialect ofArabic (Norfolk: Kegan Paul International, 1982): 7.
47
Ibid; Fred Lawson Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989):
4: Lorimer Vol 2: 754.
48
Ibid.
49
Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 138; Rumaihi 27.
50
Guive Mirfendereski, “The Ownership of the Tonb Islands: A Legal Analysis” in Small Islands,
Big Politics: the Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi, (New York: St
Martin’s Press, 1996): 123.

37

attributing the Qawasim family as a part of such tribe.51 However, the term remains
problematic and open to interpretation and debate in the 21st century, especially in lightof a de-emphasis on Bedouin affiliation according to some scholars.52 For example, Arab
Shi’a with Iranian origins are sometimes included among Huwala under a greater Arabumbrella. Depending on one’s viewpoint, Huwala can be seen as either a title of prestige
for one’s ascribed Arabness or an opportunistic way to make up for a vacillating, nontribal background in contrast to their cohorts based in the Arabian Peninsula.53
While Huwala families may not possess the same distinguished heritage and tribal
links as some Arabs in the Arabian Peninsula, they often make up for this through anestablished middleman status between ethnic Arabs and Persians.54 This is due to theirpreviously established connections to Iran, whether through language or commercial ties.
Depending upon their needs, Huwala can switch between “Arab” and “Persian” forgreater social mobility and still maintain connections on both sides of the Gulf. As such,the term overlaps with other subgroups such as the ‘Ajam which are discussed below. For
example, families such as those with (Al-)Kazrooni, Eshaq and Fikri surnames that would

51

Lorimer Vol. 2: 754-55; Andrea B. Rugh The Political Culture of Leadership in the United ArabEmirates (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 245; Hendrik Van Der Meulen (PhD dissertation: Tufts
University) The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates (Ann Arbor:
UMI, 1997): 202-04.
52
Anthony Cordesman Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE: Challenges of Security (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1997): 76; John E. Peterson The Arab Gulf States: Steps toward Political Participation(New York: Praeger, 1988): 63; Van Der Meulen 202-04.
53
One source claims that the term Huwala roughly translates as ‘turncoat’ and has gained apejorative meaning over time. Regardless, other scholars have continued to use this term. See Paul Dresch
and James Piscatori (eds.) Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the
Gulf (New York: IB Tauris, 2005): 254.
54
Rumaihi 131.

38

be grouped under the name Huwala in one source turn up as ‘Ajam in another; this could
be because of their perceived proximity or foreignness to other Arabs.55
In contrast, the ‘Ajam56 subgroup used within the Gulf Arab context generally
denotes ethnic Shi’i Persian populations with Iranian origins.57 The term ‘Ajam translates
as foreign, although one should note that this term is more frequently associated with thisspecific non-Arab population than others (e.g. Indian, Pakistani, or Thai). The ‘Ajam
follow the Usuli branch of the Ja’fari school of Islamic jurisprudence within Ithna Asharior Twelver Shi’ism, akin to most other Shi’a in the world.58 As a rule, the ‘Ajam speak
Persian as their primary language, and their Persian pronunciation influences their
Arabic, thus distinguishing them from native Arabic speakers.59 As a result, this
immediately identifies any ‘Ajam as a foreigner or non-Arab. It also makes ‘Ajam as a

55

For example Christopher Davidson’s only refers to ‘Ajam throughout his 2008 work. See
Christopher Davidson Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
For examples of Al-Kazrooni family members, see Michael Field The Merchants: The Big Business
Families of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States (Woodstock: Overlook Press, 1985): 76; Clive Holes,“Dialect and National Identity: The Cultural Politics of Self-Representation in Bahraini Musalsalat” inMonarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf eds. Paul Dresch, andJames Piscatori (New York: IB Tauris, 2005): 58; Fuad I. Khuri Tribe and State in Bahrain: The
Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1980): 160-61.
56‘Ajam ( ) is the Arabic plural form of Ijmi. Unlike Huwala, one finds less variation in thespellings of the term, with ‘Ajam or Ajam being the most frequent forms encountered in texts. LaurenceLouër “The Political Impact of Labor Migration in Bahrain” City and Society. Vol. 20, Issue 1 (2008): 40.
57
Anh Longva, “Citizenship in the Gulf States: Conceptualization and Practice” in Citizenship andState in the Middle East eds. Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis and Manuel S. Hassassian (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 2000): 189; Mostafa Vaziri Iran as Imagined Nation: The Construction of National
Identity (New York: Paragon House, 1993): 10. Vaziri also notes how the term ‘Ajam is also useddifferently in Iran and the Persian language. “‘Ajam for the non-Arabs was a foreign application to theirgroup, and its purpose of defining a congenial and common characteristic among them may have beenvague and meaningless. In its Persian or Iranian context, the term ‘Ajam could apply to various ethnic
groups in Iran (Lur, Kurd, Baluchi).”58
Lawson 4; Richard Nyrop (ed.) Persian Gulf States: Country Studies (Washington: American
University Press, 1985): 154-55. There are two main branches of jurisprudence within Ithna Ashari or
Twelver Shi’ism: the Akhbari and Usuli schools of jurisprudence. Both are practiced today in Bahrain,
although the majority of Bahrain’s Shi’a follow the Usuli school.
59
Cordesman 76.

39

more interchangeable term with broader markers such as Iranian or Persian by Gulf
Arabs to distinguish such individuals from the Baharna,60 Bahrain’s native Arab Shi’i
inhabitants.61 This makes it possible to include non-Shi’i Persians within the ‘Ajam
subgroup designation, as well as other individuals who are neither ethnically Arab nor
Persian but considered Iranian by Gulf Arab culture due to their foreignness. The term
‘Ajam still comes with some negative connotations in regard to their ability to speak
Arabic as well as in comparison with other foreign populations.62 Unlike their Huwalacounterparts, ‘Ajam individuals can trace their roots to a much wider swathe of Iran,ranging from Azerbaijan to Mashhad, thus resulting in a varied, more diverse population.
For example, one need look no further than surnames such as Daylami or Lingawi (forindividuals from Daylam or Lengeh) to trace such heritage directly to one city orvillage.63
The Baluch,64 who are neither ethnically Arab nor Persian, are yet anothersignificant Gulf Iranian population whose presence is noted by Arabs in the Gulf. Such as
the Huwala and most Gulf Arabs, the Baluch are practicing Sunni Muslims, although

60

Again, the term Baharna, (its singular form in Arabic is Bahrani) such as Huwala, takes many
written forms and this particular spelling is preferred by the author.
61
Peterson 63.
62
Two such negative statements are quoted here: “The only nod in the direction of linguistic
reality I noticed was in the portrayal of a Persian sherbet seller, who spoke in the kind of broken Arabic thatis the butt of Bahraini jokes about Persians’ inability to speak Arabic properly.” Dresch 255; “A Bahraini
adage, which shows the dislike felt for the Iranians runs ‘Sharr al Baluch wa la khair al ‘Ajam’ literally‘The worst of the Baluch is better than a good Persian’.” Rumaihi 35.
63
Holes 58.
64
Lorimer makes the following note on the use of Baluch in its various forms: “The name Baluchi,
sanctioned by English usage, is used to designate the race or tribes which form the subject of this article;
but the correct form of the word in Baluchistan is Baloch (‫) چ‬, both for the singular and for the plural, andthere the term Balochi refers only to the language spoken by the Baloch. In Arabic the name is Balush(‫ ) ش‬in the plural and Balushi ( ) in the singular.” Lorimer Vol. 2: 258.

40

they always follow the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence.65 Baluch society, such as
much of Gulf Arab society but unlike as the ‘Ajam, has also traditionally been triballyorganized.66 However, their common Sunni sectarian identity and tribal organization do
not afford them any additional favor above the ‘Ajam within the Gulf Arab community;in fact they are often considered as a lower socioeconomic stratum. The category ofBaluch, such as Huwala and ‘Ajam, is somewhat prone to overlap, as Gulf Iranians incertain jobs have been classified as Baluch within certain emirates even in light ofevidence to the contrary.67 The Baluch in the Gulf Arab States can trace their Iranianbased ancestors to the Makran coast, as well as to both Kerman and Sistan & Baluchistan
provinces on Iran’s eastern and southeastern extremes.68 This population is not only
fluent in their native Baluchi tongue, but Arabic and Persian as well.69 One issue that sets
the Baluch apart from their ethnic Arab and Persian counterparts is that they have never
had their own nation or tribal sponsor from which to draw substantial political or
economic support, as noted by Abdul Hakim Baluch, a Pakistani Baluch scholar.70 Still,this has not stopped the Baluch from serving in the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms in various
roles over centuries, whether as soldiers, pearling industry workers or even today in theoil industry.71

65

Anthony 9; Holes 58; Brian Spooner “Baluchistan – Geography, History and Ethnography”
Encyclopedia Iranica Online. Iranica.com. Available online. <http://iranica.com/newsite/index.isc>.
Accessed 17. October 2008.
66
Spooner “Baluchistan – Geography, History and Ethnography.”67
Van Der Meulen 361.
68
Long 1978: 14.
69
Anthony 16-18.
70“Abdul Hakim Baluch – Former Government Official and Author.” 09. June 2001. Gulf
News.com. Available online. <http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/01/06/09/19313.html>. Accessed 08.
October 2008.
71
Spooner “Baluchistan – Geography, History and Ethnography.”41

One can also expand a definition of Gulf Iranian to include mixtures andcombinations of any of the above groups as well as with the Gulf Arab populations. The
Shihuh are one good example of such mixture. Depending on one’s sources, this “tribe”
of the United Arab Emirates is formed of Arab, Persian, and Baluch elements at both theethnic and linguistic levels.72 Many of Bahrain’s original population, the Baharna, as
well as many Emiratis, can lay claim to part Persian descent especially through agrandmother two to three generations back during the pre-oil era, which may qualify
them as a new intermediate or mixed ethnic category in the future.73 Pirouz MojtahedZadeh notes that, prior to British control of the Persian Gulf in the early 19th century,
other Iranian Arab tribes such as the Al-Ali, the Al Bu-Maher, and the Khamarah also
migrated across the Gulf, and became recognized as tribal Arabs by other Arabs on the
Persian Gulf’s southern shore.74 Frauke Heard-Bey also alludes to the presence of freed
African slaves who are essentially accepted as Arabs today.75
The above discussion serves as an introduction to the heterogeneity andcomplexity of the societies living within the Persian Gulf Arab States today. For thisstudy, we will primarily focus on the three Gulf Iranian subgroups even though there areundoubtedly other Gulf Iranians with Iranian origins not mentioned here that could
broaden the study’s scope further. The principal reason for such omissions is the lack of

72

Davidson 343: Kevin G. Fenelon The United Arab Emirates: An Economic and Social Survey(London: Longman, 1973): 110; Frauke Heard-Bey From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates (NewYork: Longman Group, 1982): 77-80, 151-54; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 65-66.
73
Paul Dresch, “Debates on Marriage and Nationality in the United Arab Emirates” in Monarchies
and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf eds. Paul Dresch, and James
Piscatori (New York: IB Tauris, 2005): 141-42; Nyrop 154-55.
74
Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 67.
75
Heard-Bey 77-80, 151-54.

42

sufficient documented evidence or the existence of a small population. Out of Iran’sestimated population of 65 million in 2008, one can probably find other Gulf Iraniansubgroups such as ethnic Kurds or Azeri Turks among its expatriate population if
examining thoroughly enough, such as within the ‘Ajam community.76 Something similar
can be said for Iranians representing different religious subgroups, including Jewish,
Zoroastrian and Baha’i practitioners living and working among the Gulf Arab population.
Finally, there are potentially Gulf Iranian secularists, atheists and others who may haveabandoned religion all together or otherwise not practiced it.
Reportedly, a number of Iranian Jews had migrated to Bahrain in the 19th century,
although information today does not tell us whether or not any of the roughly 50 Bahraini
Jews living there now are of Iranian descent.77 Onley surmises that the transnational
business family of Safars operating in Bahrain may have Bakhtiari origins.78 Momencomments about a small migration of Iranian Baha’i to the Gulf Arab States after
religious persecution in Iran during the 20th century.79 In the United Arab Emirates,
Baha’i adherents are counted as Muslims and information on the Baha’i faith is banned
online, although the Abu Dhabi government did donate land for a Baha’i cemetery, thus

76

“Iran.” CIA – The World Factbook.
Al-Tajir 13; “Bahraini king taps Jewish woman lawmaker as envoy to U.S.” 29. May 2008.
Haaretz.com. Available online. <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/988420.html>. Accessed 02.
October 2008; “Bahreïn persiste et signe” International / Diplomatie. 08. June 2008. RadioCanada.ca.
Available online.
<http://www.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/International/2008/06/08/006-bahrein-diplomatie.shtml?ref=rss>.
Accessed 02. October 2008.
78
James Onley “Transnational Merchants in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf: The Case of the Safar
Family” Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf. Ed. Madawi Al-Rasheed (New York: Routledge,
2005): 64.
79
Moojan Momen “The Baha’i Community of Iran: Patterns of Exile and Problems ofCommunication,” in Iranian Refugees and Exiles since Khomeini ed. Asghar Fathi, (Costa Mesa: Mazda
Publishers, 1991): 23, 27.
77

43

indirectly acknowledging the presence of Baha’i who live there, although not necessarily
Iranian ones.80 While the Bahraini government does not recognize the Baha’i faith, it
allows its adherents to practice their faith freely, and a similar assumption can be maderegarding the unclear descent of Baha’is there, although no specific population numbers
can be given for communities in either country.81 Regardless, the three main subgroups
introduced above—Huwala, ‘Ajam, Baluch—provide us with some idea as to theminimal extent of diversity exhibited within the Gulf Iranian population and helps todispel the notion of a homogenous Iranian expatriate community on the Persian Gulf’ssouthern shore.
When we examine the three groups further, such as socioeconomic standing, thepicture becomes more intriguing and complex. Just as the Gulf Iranian’s population is not
ethnically, religiously or linguistically uniform, their professional and social roles within
Gulf Arab society also vary. At the top of the social ladder is a landed merchant class,particularly among the Huwala but also the ‘Ajam, who had migrated to promisingcommercial ports throughout the Persian Gulf Arab States. Originally, Gulf Iranianmerchants served in various roles within urban areas as pearl merchants, smugglers andtraders in pre-oil times although they have since diversified into other industries.82 Such

80

“United Arab Emirates International Religious Freedom Report 2007.” US Department of State– Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 14. September 2007. State.gov. Available online.
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90223.htm>. Accessed 02. October 2008.
81“Bahrain International Religious Freedom Report 2005.” US Department of State – Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 08. November 2005. State.gov. Available online.
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51597.htm>. Accessed 02. October 2008. One can make suchassumption for this and the previous two footnotes based upon Iran’s proximity to the Persian Gulf ArabStates as well as the Baha’i faith’s origins within Iran.
82
Al-Gurg 231; Molly Izzard The Gulf: Arabia’s Western Approaches (London: Murray, 1979):
179; Rosemarie Said Zahlan The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and Social History of theTrucial States (New York: Macmillan, 1978): 7.

44

interests include banking, automobile sales, produce sales and property.83 Still other Gulf
Iranians have gone into media and publishing ventures, including English language
publications, which are distributed within the Arabian Peninsula.84 Today, one finds them
primarily in urban areas rather than rural ones.85
A number of prominent Iranian merchant family names can be found in the Gulf,
including the Abdullah Rostamani, Alireza, Almoayed, Darwish, Galadari, Kanoo, andEassa Gurg.86 While many of these families settled in one particular Gulf sheikhdom,
today their interests frequently extend across multiple states, forming a transnational
network spanning both sides of the Persian Gulf.87 Many of these merchants are able toeducate their children in private, non-state schools as well as sending their children to
universities outside of the Gulf.88 Generally, these individuals are able to converse using
Arabic, Persian and even English interchangeably at the suq in their transactions in spiteof any local Arab resentment towards the usage of Persian.89 Some merchant families
have built up enough influence over the years and have obtained citizenship, and evengovernment portfolios in exchange for their long term support to the government or

83

Anthony 181; Field 76-77.
“Media.” Galadari Brothers Company LLC – United Arab Emirates. Available online.
<http://www.galadarigroup.com/galadari_brothers_media.php>. Accessed 10. October 2008.
85
Anthony 163-64.
86
Davidson 74, 156; Field 76-77; Van Der Meulen 198.
87
Davidson 156; Field 76-77.
88
Munira Fakhro Women at Work in the Gulf: A Case Study of Bahrain (London: Kegan PaulInternational, 1990): 42, 44-45. Coincidentally, Fakhro is identified as a Huwala surname elsewhere andthe history and background of the Fakhro family namesake specific to the Gulf can be found in manysources. See Anthony 56; Dresch 254; Field 75; Izzard 106, 109, 115; Lawson 77, 90; Long 1978: 14;
Lorimer Vol. 2: 754; Peterson 63.
89
Izzard 111; Rumaihi 30.
84

45

ruler.90 One should note although that the merchant class represents only a small portionof the total Gulf Iranian community.
Individuals within the Huwala, ‘Ajam, and Baluch populations also compriseanother side of the socioeconomic spectrum, forming a lower ‘labor’ class in distinct
contrast to the middle to upper merchant classes.91 In fact, the labor class has also beenpresent in the Gulf Arab States since pre-oil times and is identified as the most culturally
diverse of any group.92 Most Gulf Iranians, particularly Baluch, fill roles within theunskilled labor force from Dubai to Manama, including as “domestic servants, port
laborers, waiters, cement mixers, porters, messengers, street sweepers and guards andmaintenance men in office buildings.”93 Many of the positions filled by the labor classnoted above are for jobs which the respective governments are unable to fill with local
Gulf Arab labor due to these positions’ perceived lack of social prestige.94 Instead, thePersian Gulf Arab States are able to recruit foreigners, including Iranians, with temporary
jobs and which have higher wages than back home. Also, the Baluch population often
serves in the military forces of the Gulf Arab states, many of whom also come from90

For example, in Bahrain members of the Fakhro and Almoayed families have served ingovernment cabinet posts since Bahraini independence such as the Ministry of Health and Ministry ofInformation. Fuccaro also notes how Gulf Iranian merchants were in the position to loan money to theirlocal rulers and expect repayment of these loans even decades later, showing the clout merchants havepossessed over time. See Fuccaro 2005: 43; Lawson 76-77, 90.
91
Iranian scholarship has often focused upon a ‘bazaari’ class, especially its role within Pahlavi
and Revolutionary Iran. This author refrains from classifying Gulf Iranians under such a grouping mainly
because it is too broad for the scope of this paper. For a sense of the broadness of this class, here is thefollowing definition: “A stratified organization, an Iranian bazaar consists of: wholesalers, commission
agents, brokers, middlemen, merchants, money-changers, workshop owners, artisans, craftsmen,
apprentices, shopkeepers, shop assistants, hawkers, peddlers and porters.” Dilip Hiro Iran under the
Ayatollahs (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985): 375n33.
92
Enver Koury The United Arab Emirates: Its Political System and Politics (Hyattsville: Instituteof Middle Eastern and North African Affairs, 1980): 132-33.
93
Anthony 14, 62.
94
Ibid., 16-18.

46

Pakistan in addition to Iran.95 This same option is not usually open to other Gulf Iranians
or some members of the indigenous Arab populations (i.e. Baharna) for fear of
insurrection or perhaps questionable loyalty to the government. While the military system
in some Western nations operates as a meritocracy leading to social advancement andeventual citizenship, military service performed by the Baluch does not lead to social
advancement or integration into Gulf Arab society.96 Gulf Iranians are among the laborclasses that are more such likely to work longer hours for less pay than their more skilledpeers.97 Similar to other foreign laborers, the threat of deportation by administrative orderalso plays a significant factor in such individuals’ lives, as well as a lack of recourse to
unpaid wages or abusive labor practices.98
There is also a middle or ‘professional’ skilled class which operates between thetwo socioeconomic extremes of the Gulf Iranian community. One immediately infers thatthese individuals have achieved a higher level of education than the labor class, although
not necessarily equal to the merchant class. According to Koury, members in this stratum
include artisans, skilled laborers, and professionals within a white collar class, while
Long notes more specifically how Iranians serve in fields such as trade, craft, accounting,storekeeping, banking, and engineering.99 Iranians also worked as oil company
employees as early as the 1930s, a result of the high demand for skilled labor in Bahrain

95

Khuri 1980: 114-15; Andrea Rugh 247; Van Der Meulen 247.
Cordesman 78, 81, 93.
97
Anthony 16-18.
98
Shahram Chubin Security in the Persian Gulf: Domestic Factors v.1 (Aldershot: Gower, 1982):
96

79-81.
99

Koury 132-33; Long 1978: 110, 112.

47

and the fact that the oil industry in the Arabian Peninsula developed first in Bahrain.100
The Iranian’s ability to take higher-paying and more skilled jobs has drawn resentment
from domestic Gulf Arab men seeking the same jobs, because such jobs also carry moresocial prestige.101 While many of these individuals do not possess the same financial
clout as the merchant class, there are still a fair number of Gulf Iranian families whose
members serve in advisory, caretaker and managerial roles for the rulers of several
emirates as well as work for other merchants and international businesses.102
One sensitive issue to all Gulf Iranian socioeconomic classes who have lived in a
Gulf Arab country for an extended amount of time is whether or not an individual isconsidered a Bidoon.103 The term Bidoon (literally “without”) applies to any individual
who lacks or is without political and citizenship rights in their country of residence,
making them unequal in rights and duties compared to citizens.104 As Bahry noted asrecently as the year 2000, Bidoon individuals
Do not have legal residency and cannot hold Bahraini passports. Thus, they have noright to travel abroad, to buy houses under government-sponsored programs, or tohold government jobs. Recently, the Bahraini government issued regulations
100

Fakhro 1990: 3.
Ibid., Louër 39.
102
Hendrik Van Der Meulen (1997) offers a list of notable Iranian individuals serving in various
roles throughout the United Arab Emirates during the late 1990s throughout his work. One particularly
noteworthy aspect shows the roles Gulf Iranian individuals play in perhaps the smaller, less recognizedemirates instead of Abu Dhabi or Dubai. For example, Van Der Meulen includes information on Sharjah on
pages 223-24, Ras al-Khaimah 233, Fujairah 254, Ajman 260, and Umm al-Quwain 266-67.
103
Other spellings of Bidoon include: bedoun, bedun, bidoun and bidun. “Bahrain to Grant
Nationality to 10,000” 20. February 2001. Gulf News.com. Available online.
<http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/01/02/20/10070.htm>. Accessed 08. October 2008. Latheef Farook“Plight of Bahrain’s Bedoun Family.” 03. January 2002. Gulf News.com. Available online.
<http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/02/01/03/36804.html>. Accessed 08. October 2008; Longva 2000:
188-89.
104
Cordesman 76, 115; Sandra Lee “Bahrain.” The Greenwood Encyclopedia of Women’s Issues
Worldwide: The Middle East and North Africa. Ed. Lynn Walter. Vol. Ed. Bahira Sherif-Trask. Vol. 4.
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 2003): 56; Longva 2000: 188-89. Lee’s mention of Bahraini Bidoon includes“poor Persian, Afghan and Baluch immigrants.”
101

48

preventing them from sending their children to public schools or receiving free
medical care. However, the most important problem is that they are considered
foreign and can be deported at any time. Since the beginning of the 1980s, theBahraini government has deported hundreds of biduns to Iran.105
While this term is used in association with tribal Arabs in Kuwait, in the context of
Bahrain one frequently finds it applied to Gulf Iranians, especially ethnic Persians(‘Ajam) although it is also used to designate Baluch.106
One can grasp the magnitude of the Bidoon problem among Gulf Iranians in lightof a recent Bahraini government pronouncement that 30,000 Iranians were granted
citizenship in the past 50 years.107 Generally, Bidoon individuals are second and third
generation immigrants still not recognized in their birthplace as citizens and who tend to
be poor.108 However, wealth and/or social status does not always determine whether or
not an individual carries Bidoon status, since even Bahraini Huwala individuals havebeen denied Bahraini nationality due to previously vacated citizenship claims.109 In 1999,
Bahrain’s Shaikh Hamad offered citizenship to many Bidoon in addition to an earlier
round of passport granting to the group in 1995, although there are still numerous Bidoon

105

Louay Bahry “The Socioeconomic Foundations of the Shiite Opposition in Bahrain,”
Mediterranean Quarterly: A Journal of Global Issues. Vol. 11, No.3 (2000): 135. Bahry is careful to notethat a few of Bahrain’s original Bidoon were also Pakistani.
106
Ibid., Van Der Meulen 70. Van Der Meulen notes how the United Arab Emirates does not havea tribal Arab Bidoon population but does not speak to a Bidoon case such as Bahrain’s one. In fact, thisthesis author would recommend a future study to understand the evolution of the term Bidoon within the
Gulf and why there are different uses of it.
107
Habib Toumi “4,971 Asians 'given Bahrain nationality in 56 years” 04. September 2006. Gulf
News.com. Available online. <http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/09/04/10064855.html>. Accessed
08. October 2008.
108
Cordesman 76; Lee 56.
109
Douglas Ray and Deo Poonwassie (eds.) Education and Cultural Differences: New
Perspectives (New York: Garland Pub., 1992): 305-06.

49

today.110 Citizenship laws within the Gulf Arab States today require many years
established residency plus satisfactory knowledge of Arabic before a person can evenconsider for applying for citizenship, thus potentially prolonging the Bidoon status ofmany Gulf Iranians for an indefinite period whether due to linguistic or otherconstraints.111
Another subject to consider when looking at the Gulf Iranian community is theirchoice of clothing and personal appearance, a point strongly linked with identity
according to Ingham.112 In the early part of the 20th century, many Iranian men wore garb
similar to the Arabian thobe or dishdasha, with one of the main difference distinguishingthem from their Gulf Arab cohorts being a ‘gold-brocaded head dress.’113 In comparison,
Gulf Arab men have worn a head cloth known alternatively as a kufiya, ghitra, or
shmagh, which may be white or colored, along with a “rope-such as ribbon” called aniqal which was worn over the headcloth.114 Members of the Iranian merchant class havebeen singled out for wearing ‘broadcloth robes,’ ‘goldbraided black and brown wool
cloaks,’ or even ‘the traditional caftan and yellow-thread turban’115 Other individuals had
adopted Western style clothes that included suits and ties as early as the 1950s, with some110

“Bahrain to Grant Nationality to 10,000”; Cordesman 77; Farook; Lee 56; Longva 2000: 188-

89.
111

Van Der Meulen 71.
Bruce Ingham “Men’s Dress in the Arabian Peninsula: Historical and Present Perspectives,”
Nancy Lindisfarne-Tapper and Bruce Ingham (eds), Languages of Dress in the Middle East (London:
Curzon, 1997): 40.
113
Rupert Hay The Persian Gulf States (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1959): 48, 121;
Maureen Tweedy Bahrain and the Persian Gulf (Ipswich: East Anglian Magazine, 1952): 48; Izzard 81,
111.
114
Ingham 45; Fuad Khuri Tents and Pyramids: Games and Ideology in Arab Culture from
Backgammon to Autocratic Rule (London: Saqi, 1990): 111-12. Ingham also makes an interesting point
regarding the Arabic and Turkish linguistic origins of these headdresses.
115
Al-Gurg 4; Izzard 81.
112

50

adopting a combination of blazer and thobe.116 Today, some Gulf Iranians have taken up
the Arab style of dress such as the dishdasha used in the Arabian Peninsula, thus making
it hard to differentiate them from the Gulf Arabs.117 A cursory inspection of photos ofEasa Al-Gurg’s memoirs and Gulf Arab company websites shows that members of suchfamilies wear Western or Arab dress interchangeably today in multiple Persian Gulf ArabStates, according to the occasion.118 Ingham adds one last interesting point regarding
dress in the Gulf: “[F]ootwear is almost immaterial. One can appear at even the mostimportant functions wearing either shoes or sandals or even bare-foot.”119
Clothing allows the Gulf Iranians, along with other expatriate communities, todemonstrate their level of affinity to (or distance from) Gulf Arabs upon brief inspection.
Arab dress is far less uniform than appears at first sight, and a wealth of information
can be derived about a man from a close observation of his dress. The tilt of his‘ageyl120,’ the disposition of its thin, shoelace cord, can tell where he comes from….
The line is drawn between the Gulf Arabs and the expatriate Arabs of the former
Mandate territories by dress. Only the northerners keep to their trousers and jackets,once the emblems of a progressive outlook, and now paradoxically the very garmentsthat relegate them automatically to the status of despised and precariously tolerated
intruders.121
Izzard’s above statement highlights how careful examination of clothing within the
Persian Gulf Arab States can help Gulf Iranians make a good or bad impression as well as116

Hay 48; Izzard 111; Onley 78.
“Dubai's powerful Iranian business community is hurt by international sanctions” 28.
December 2007. International Herald Tribune.com. Available online.
<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/28/africa/ME-FEA-GEN-GLF-Irans-Boomtown.php>. Accessed
13. October 2008.
118
Al-Gurg 1998. This autobiographical book presents several photo stills of the native Dubaian
author and those around him throughout his life. Easa Al-Gurg, a prominent merchant and ambassador for
the United Arab Emirates, is a member of the Huwala class.
119
Ingham 51.
120
Izzard describes the ageyl as “the black wool camel hobble which the desert Arab loops in achaplet on his head.” This is an alternative spelling to the one offered by Fuad Khuri—iqal. See Izzard 80;
Khuri 1990: 111-12.
121
Izzard 81.
117

51

how they are classified, a point to which Baluch are not even immune.122 Interestingly,
Ingham also notes the flip side of Izzard’s statement, such that men not wearing Arabdress can “be in the company of women to whom he is not closely related by blood ormarriage.”123 Ultimately although, other factors such as one’s accent, family name orfacial appearance help to make the final determination of each individual’s social role(s)and their level of integration within Gulf Arab society.
While most of the discussion so far has focused on men, Gulf Iranian women also
play an active role within the Persian Gulf Arab States and have their own distinct paths
towards social mobility. Depending on her family’s social inclinations and wealth, some
women have had the option to work or obtain high administrative posts within recent
decades, especially among the merchant class.124 As Fakhro notes, the greater a family’s
income, the more likely an unmarried woman would go out into the workforce.125 Someof the richest Gulf Iranians in Bahrain allowed their daughters to manage their own
boutiques, galleries and beauty parlors starting in the early 1970s, opening the door for
greater women’s involvement in public space.126 Such trends corresponded with a generalincrease in women’s’ education and visible involvement in the public across ethnic lines
along with a decrease in the use of the abaya.127 Women in Bahrain were also known forbeing involved in politics, organizing non-government organizations, attending

122

Ingham 50.
Ingham 49.
124
Seikaly 1997: 135.
125
Fakhro 1990: 22.
126
Izzard 113-14.
127
Seikaly 1997: 132.
123

52

discussions at the ma’taim and even driving cars.128 However, women among the lower
classes were less likely to have the same opportunities as their more affluent peers.129
Iranian women were among the Emirati workforce as early as 1968, from governmentand oil company employees to domestic servants. Also, a small number of Iranian
women have worked as prostitutes in the Emirates, thus demonstrating the range ofoptions such women had, even in socially disreputable fields.130
Probably one of the most significant functions that Gulf Iranian women haveplayed is as marriage partners. Marriage has always been one valuable option for womenseeking greater integration into Gulf Arab society and the promise of future benefits,
including citizenship, for her and her dependents.131 Upon successful marriage to a Gulf
Arab, Gulf Iranian women would be expected to care for their children, and also would
gain access to the private spaces occupied by her husband’s family and not open to othermen. A matrimonial union might also provide political links that could be used by Gulf
Iranian women to open doors to jobs, potential business dealings or sympathy for her
immediate family. Generally today, only male Gulf Arab nationals can marry foreign
women without renouncing their citizenship, although there have been some exceptions

128

Ibid., 132-33, 141. Ma’taim is the Arabic plural form of ma’tam, which is a Shi’i Arab funeralhouse, meeting place, even a place to get some religious schooling. Fuccaro actually makes the connection
between ma’taim and the hosainiyehs, similar institutions that one finds in Iran. She also notes how the
ma’taim were not in distinct buildings but were conducted spontaneously in private residences until the
1890s. Nelida Fuccaro “Understanding the Urban History of Bahrain’, Critique: Journal of Critical Studiesof the Middle East 17/2 (2000):75.
129
Ibid., 136.
130
Anthony 167.
131
Dresch 141-43.

53

recently.132 Traditionally, one would almost never see a Gulf Arab woman married off toa Gulf Iranian man, especially if the woman is a member of the aristocracy, without
risking social backlash and rejection by their family and peers.133 As for Gulf Iranian
women, this does not mean such marriages were attainable or realistic, as social prestige,
blood, and inheritance issues could mar their potential unions as well.134 Still, somemarriages between the two groups often brought benefits to Gulf Arabs. In the past, suchmarriages between a Gulf Arab and Iranian brought prestige on Baharna families while
giving many Bahrainis claim to Iranian descent.135 Another issue that is not clear to thethesis author is whether or not a divorce between an Iranian woman and a Gulf Arab man
results in a loss of citizenship privileges and rights for the woman.
Choice of dress and appearance also play a role in distinguishing the various Gulf
Iranian women from one another. Many Iranian women chose to maintain wearing
religiously-acceptable dress for the Persian Gulf region, including the veil, in places suchas Bahrain or the United Arab Emirates, in spite of their prohibition within Iran from1936 until 1941 under Reza Shah.136 In Bahraini villages, Muslim women have been
noted for wearing colorful garments called meshmars, clothing that both Baharna andIranian women choose to wear.137 If some Gulf Iranian men tend to adopt and wear the132

Shereen Bushehri “Naturalised Bahrainis Return Home.” 04. November 2002. Gulf News.com.
Available online. <http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/02/11/04/67542.html>. Accessed 08. October 2008;
Toumi “4,971 Asians 'given Bahrain nationality in 56 years”.
133
For one particularly interesting example regarding a marriage between one man from a
Bahraini merchant family and a female Al Khalifa member, see Izzard 129-30.
134
Dresch 141-43.
135
Nyrop 154-55.
136
Muhammad Morsi Abdullah The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History (London: Croom
Helm, 1978): 276-77; Houchang Chehabi “Staging the Emperor's New Clothes: Dress Codes and NationBuilding under Reza Shah” Iranian Studies Vol. 26 No. 3/4 (1993): 209-29.
137
Fakhro 1990: 76.

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local thobe or dishdasha, many Gulf Iranian women have incorporated the abaya, theblack traditional robe referred to by Munira Fakhro, an indigenous Bahraini female
scholar.138 However, May Yamani is careful to note that Gulf women have also added thethobe to their wardrobe as a form of invented tradition, moving away from regional dressand have appropriated Arab identity in general, starting in the 1970s.139
It has been noted that veiling has regained some standing in more recent
generations as a form of reaffirming one’s religious faith.140 Fakhro notes how women in
Bahrain had adopted the hijab as late as 1990, which was not traditional dress but rather
imported from other Muslim countries.141 Interestingly, she also notes how these different
types of Islamic dress are not restricted to any specific class or religious sect on theisland.142 A Western female observer describes a cocktail party, also in Bahrain and thepeculiarities of the Persian women there.
There was a good deal of creamy skin, flashing eye, thinly penciled, perfectly shaped,
closely met eyebrow to be seen, the famous crescent shape of the Persian miniature,translated here to well-rouged girls in pretty evening clothes, modish and elegant.
They were all conscientiously dressed to make the greatest effect, plenty of jewellery,form-fitting confections of brilliant silks and gauzes, following the current fashion.143
Although Izzard exoticizes her subjects in the previous passage to a certain degree, it
helps us envision women there, especially if we consider how she specifies their ethnicity

138

Ibid., 75.
Mai Yamani “Changing the Habits of a Lifetime: The Adaptation of Hejazi Dress to the New
Social Order” Nancy Lindisfarne-Tapper and Bruce Ingham (eds), Languages of Dress in the Middle East
(London: Curzon, 1997): 63-64. Yamani also makes this interesting point in the same passage. “Thewomen who initially started the trend of wearing the men’s thob were considered ‘intellectual’ since at thattime they were relatively better educated and well-travelled than others. They appear to have taken thecustom from Western women who wore the men’s Saudi thob as ‘ethnic’ dress.”
140
Seikaly 1997: 139.
141
Fakhro 1990: 76.
142
Ibid.
143
Izzard 274.
139

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rather than their nationality—Bahraini, Iranian, etc. In a visit to an open space such as a
suq in the United Arab Emirates, Izzard also observed the contrast between public andprivate space. There, one could see contrasts such as the Baluch woman in brightly
colored outfits, wearing silver and turquoise jewelry versus masked, black-clad Arab
townswomen with gold jewelry.144 The previous observations do not confirm for us
whether or not the women were in fact Gulf Iranian ‘Ajam, Baluch or Huwala—although
they do present two probable cases. A woman’s appearance can take various guises,
based upon how she chooses to operate within society, and the social mores within her
particular subgroup. The clothing a woman wears may depend on whether or not the
space she occupies is public or private, and hence the familiarity she has with the persons
around her.
Another important issue is the various political responses of the Gulf Iranian
community to the state of Iran. During the political strife in Bahrain during the 1950s,
many Gulf Iranians had already begun to accept Bahraini citizenship as well as in the
United Arab Emirates. Some segments were known to “have severed all connection with
their country of origin.”145 During the build-up of the dispute between Iran and theUnited Arab Emirates over Abu Musa and Tunb islands, the rise of pro-Irandemonstrations never materialized in Dubai in spite of the large Gulf Iranian population
living there.146 When Emirati Arabs demonstrated against Iranians and destroyed theirproperty upon Iran’s repossession of the islands in 1971, the United Arab Emirate’s

144

Ibid., 244, 274.
Hay 148.
146
Anthony 16.
145

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president Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan compensated the aggrieved, but still apolitical, Gulf
Iranians for their losses.147 Four years before the Iranian Revolution, Anthony concluded
that:
Iranians historically have been less reticent about either their religious affiliation or
their ties to Iran. Even so, since Bahrayn achieved its independence in 1971, theIranian community in that shaykhdom has been less conspicuous in its nationalism.
Elsewhere, the various Iranian communities have usually conformed their national
and political aspiration and activities to the interests of the indigenous Arab
populations.148
Since the Iranian revolution, it has been noted in Bahrain how politically inactive
both Iranian-descended Bahrainis were as well as Iranian expatriates throughout the Gulf,
with special attention being made to not to upset the governments there during the IranIraq war.149 Perhaps as a result of such inaction, many Iranians, particularly ‘Ajam,
earned the enmity of Bahrain’s Arab Shi’i community for not sympathizing more withlocal grievances.150 A common theme that arises in several texts has been the greater
concern given by Gulf Iranians to earning money rather than instigating any political
trouble or operating as part of a fifth column.151 Gulf Iranians within emirates such as
Dubai during the Iran-Iraq war were known to “fulfill key functions in the emirate’s
economic life,” in spite of their Shi’i background.152 Even during the 1990s, Gulf Iranianindividuals avoided talking about problems with the Bahraini government, or inter-

147

Andrea Rugh 80.
Anthony 16-18.
149
Marschall 40-41.
150
Munira Fakhro “The Uprising in Bahrain: An Assessment” in The Persian Gulf at theMillennium: Essays on Politics, Economy, Security and Religion eds. Sick, Gary and Lawrence G. Potter(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1997): 183.
151
Long 1978: 110, 112; Marschall 43; Zahlan 1998: 177.
152
Charles Davies (ed.) After the War: Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf (Chichester: Carden, 1990):
35.
148

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sectarian conflict, and were noted for their support of the government, thus taking away
any credence to the idea that the political loyalty of all Gulf Iranians might come understrictly sectarian lines.153
Iranians living in the UAE could also be singled out for publicly pressuring the
Iranian government regarding its ongoing territorial dispute with the Emirates. “GulfToday (4 March 1998) published an open letter from the UAE’s Iranian expatriates to the
Iranian President, urging him to respond positively to the UAE’s calls for a peacefulsolution to the conflict over Abu Musa and Tunb Islands.”154 In fact, the only correlationthat any observers make regarding sympathy towards Iran and the Revolution has comefrom Gulf Iranian laborers, although they do not cite evidence in their specificinvolvement in any demonstrations there.155 Even then, other authors disputed suchclaims by noting how such workers were more interested in making money than taking
part in any subversive activities against any Gulf Arab governments.156 Thus, if there has
been any propensity of Gulf Iranians towards Iran, it has more to do with socioeconomic
grievances within the Persian Gulf Arab States than any other underlying issue. It has
nothing to do with ethnic or religious.
Just as Gulf Iranian identity lacks any uniformity along ethno-linguistic, religious
or socioeconomic lines, their rationale for traversing the Gulf waters has varied, too. In
fact, it is necessary to offer a brief view of the history of Gulf migration before
addressing the more recent migrations relevant to our study of Gulf Iranians. The Persian
153

Marschall 220.
Andrzej Kapiszewski Nationals and Expatriates: Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf
Cooperation Council States (Reading, Ithaca Press, 2001): 157.
155
Field 77; Marschall 42-43.
156
Ibid., 40-41.
154

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Gulf area has had a long, documented history of continuous cross-Gulf migrations andtrade since ancient times, particularly between Arab and Persian societies.157 Ethnic
Persian Sassanian Iran conquered and colonized Musan (the precursor to Oman andnamesake behind the Musandam Peninsula) while Arabs returned the favor when they
began migrating to the northern Gulf coasts even before the advent of Islam.158 Newlyconverted Arab Muslims invaded and settled in Sassanian lands and remained there for
centuries.159 As a result of these migrations and mixings, Mojtahed-Zadeh notes that:
The increased trade exchange between the two shores created a situation in which theprocess of cultural conglomeration and language mixture strengthened the distinct
community of the Persian Gulf, while continued migration from both Iran and theArabian Peninsula to the region and their mixture has made it quite difficult even now
to say who in the Persian Gulf is of true Iranian stock and who is of true Arabstock.160
Due to the mixture of the two societies, it had become increasingly important to help
distinguish and divide members of this middle category into distinct, non-Arabcategories. Gulf Arabs came to identify and distinguish their neighbors of Iranian origin,including by the different classifications such as Huwala or ‘Ajam, as noted earlier. Other
ethnic groups such as Turks, Indians, Baluch and even African slaves brought to the Gulf
traversed, if not at least resided by, the Gulf waters and were distinguished under similar
categories within the Persian Gulf Arab States, even before the arrival of the Portuguese
during the 16th century.161 By the mid to late19th century, the major path of migration

157

Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 9-10, 62-63.
Ibid., 63.
159
Richard N. Frye The Golden Age of Persia: The Arabs in the East (London: Weidenfeld andNicolson, 1975): 69-71; Richard N. Frye, The Heritage of Persia (London: Sphere Books, 1976): 276, 287;
Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 67-68.
160
Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 9-10.
161
Frye 1976: 8; Khuri 1980: 15, 51.
158

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shifted, with the majority of Gulf migrants traveling from northern Persian-controlledshores to southern Arab- and British-controlled ones as a result of greater social andeconomic opportunities in the Arab shaikhdoms.162
It is within this more recent context from the mid to late 19th century leading up to
the 1979 Iranian Revolution that we find the most information regarding Gulf Iranianmigration to the Gulf Arab States. Although there is still disagreement among scholars as
to the specific number of migrations, we can highlight generally noticeable successive
waves which took place during the following periods: 1) the 1860s through 1900s, 2) the
1920s and 1930s, 3) the 1950s through the 1970s. Many of these waves came from Iran’ssouthern littoral as a result social and economic turmoil within the Iranian state, although
they were later supplemented by greater migrations from the rest of Iran. Another theme
within the Gulf Iranian migration is a failure on the Iranian government’s part to co-opt
such individuals into its plans for the reorganization of society at distinct points in time.
Each wave can be distinguished from the next by certain particular patterns and featuresand one can use the following periods as a reference to determine different generations of
Iranians within the Persian Gulf Arab States, with the period from 1860-1910 counting
roughly as the first generation of migration away from Iran.163
The pattern of migration during the first period above came primarily as a
response to the Qajar government’s centralization and expansion within Iran, particularly
affecting several of the predominantly Arab populated Persian Gulf port cities of southern162Davidson 71.
Jahangir Qa’emmaqami also argues that there is at least one other immigration wave that took
place during the 1860s when Bahrain had established close ties to Iran as a dependent state, leading to anumber of Iranians moving to the island then. See Jahangir Qa’emmaqami, Bahrayn va masa’el-e Khalij-e
Fars (Tehran: Kitabkhane-ye Tahuri, 1962): 42-43.
163

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Iran which revolved around the pearl and maritime-based trades. One noteworthy
location was Bushehr, which not only suffered from central government encroachment,
but waves of famine, cholera and smallpox outbreaks and increased crime rates,
prompting large-scale migration.164 The Bushehri migration to Bahrain alone caused a
sharp increase in imports of specific goods which “set them apart from the local Arab
population,” such as books, rosewater, tea and spirits.165 A second location of note wasBandar ‘Abbas, which previously had been under Omani control, along with the islandsof Qeshm and Hormuz, until 1868.166
The third and most noteworthy location was Lengeh, which was then under thecontrol of a section of the Qasimi (Qawasim) Arab tribe who were Iranian vassals, alongwith the island of Sirri.167 During the 1880s, Iran ratcheted up pressure against Lengeh’s
Arab rulers to collect taxes and bow to the government in Tehran, this being administeredby the governor of Fars Province.168 In 1899, the Qajar government succeeded in seizing
control of Lengeh from the Qawasim and established a new customs station within theport city.169 Iran’s rationale for Lengeh’s conquest was to increase tax revenues in thecity and in the surrounding area, including other coastal cities such as Muhammarah164

Fuccaro 2005: 45-46.
Fuccaro 2005: 46.
166
Ibid., 51; Malcolm Yapp, “Part One. The History of the Persian Gulf: British Policy in the
Persian Gulf” in The Persian Gulf States ed. Alvin J. Cottrell (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1980): 53.
167
Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh “Perspectives on the Territorial History of the Tonb and Abu Musa
Islands” in Small Islands, Big Politics: the Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf ed. Hooshang
Amirahmadi, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996): 43; Richard Schofield, “Border Disputes in the Gulf:
Past, Present, and Future” in The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays on Politics, Economy, Security
and Religion eds. Gary Sick and Lawrence G. Potter (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1997): 134.
168
Abdullah 224, 230, Davidson 72-73; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1996: 43; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 173;
Yapp 53.
169
Abdullah 231-32; Yapp 53.
165

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[Khorramshahr] and the islands of Qeshm and Sirri, all for the purposes of funding the
rapidly developing government in Tehran.170 Although this measure was intended to help
fund the necessary infrastructure to operate the country without the primary Western
influences (i.e. British or Russian), it was introduced on the recommendation of another
Western administrator, the Belgians.171 The Iranian authorities further alienated the local
population: “New Persian laws were imposed on these Arab townsmen, refusing them
permission to bury their dead on these islands (as had been their custom) and preventing
merchants from registering new boats unless their wives agreed to stop covering theirfaces.”172 Many of Lengeh’s inhabitants, including merchants and individuals involved inmaritime-based trade, moved to the opposite shore of the Gulf in attempts to evade thehigher taxes and political unrest as a result of the Qajar Shah’s increasing reach andcontrol along Iran’s southern frontiers.173 During this first period, emirates such as
Bahrain, Sharjah and Dubai benefited from the influx of these Gulf Iranians, principally
because the Persian Gulf trade was shifted from the southern Iranian shore to the Arabone.
The second generational wave of pre-revolutionary Iranian emigrants to the Arablittoral built upon the first wave and was a response to Reza Shah’s attempts toconsolidate his own control over the autonomous and restive provinces and peoples
during the 1920s and 1930s. Upon the overthrow of the Qajar rulers, Reza Shah
170

Abdullah 230; Davoud Bavand, “The Legal Basis of Iran’s Sovereignty over Abu Musa Island”
in Small Islands, Big Politics: the Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi,(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996): 90-91; Davidson 72-73; Zahlan 1978: 80.
171
Abdullah 231-32; Davidson 72-73.
172
Davidson 72-73.
173
Abdullah 104, 231-32, Davidson 71-73; Fuccaro 2005: 45; Lorimer Vol. 1: 2134-37. Fuccaro
notes that between 1894 and 1904, the majority of Lingawis left their city.

62

continued to expand his power in the southern ports and nearby islands. In 1924, heoverpowered Khuzestan province’s174 Arab rulers and took control of this oil-richregion.175 By 1928, the Shah’s forces subdued Hengam Island and established a customs
post there to the dismay of its Dubai-allied ruler.176 Upon achieving control in his
southern flanks, the Shah also attempted to build upon much of the same modernizationand secularization measures introduced by the Qajars in the 1880s. For example, the Shahincreased taxation, attempted to impose immodest (or what was seen locally as
immodest) Western-designed clothing and the shaving of beards.177
Unlike the previous migration period, the Shah also began “requiring local
schools to teach in standardized Farsi [Persian] rather than in Arabic” and perhaps sought
to counter what one Huwala source claimed was a distinctly Arab society even down to
written deeds in Arabic.178 However, many Iranians rejected such measures andattempted to preserve traditional Muslim identities. Seccombe notes how Baluch men left
Iran, along with their wives and children to escape the bad economic situation andunpopular government in Iran.179 When they could no longer maintain their way of lifeand language in Iran, more Iranians from Khorramshahr to Lengeh emigrated instead in174

By the 1980s, Khuzestan would assume greater importance when Saddam Hussein attempted toco-opt the province’s population during the Iran-Iraq war. For more information on Khuzestan within the
Iran-Iraq war context, this author recommends the following works: Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp,
Iran and Iraq at War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988). Farhang Rajaee (ed.) Iranian Perspectives on the
Iran-Iraq War (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997).
175
Yapp 60; Zahlan 1978: 79.
176
Zahlan 1978: 88.
177
Abdullah 247-48; Davidson 74; Hesham Garaibeh, “Government Income Sources and theDevelopment of the Taxation System – the Case of Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait” in The Rentier State eds.
Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (New York: Croom Helm, 1987): 200; Hay 48.
178
Al-Gurg 3; Davidson 74.
179
Ian J. Seccombe “Migration to the Arabian Gulf: Evolution and Characteristics 1920-1950”
Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 10. No. 1 (1983): 4-5.

63

the same period.180 During the 1930s, the decline in the cultured pearl industry, alongwith the silting of Sharjah’s own creek, drove more Iranians from southern Iran to Dubai,
Kalba and additional mercantilist trade ports in Bahrain and Qatar.181 Modernizing andsecularizing measures took a toll on the populations of the Iranian coasts by the 1930s,
with Lengeh’s population reduced to a quarter of its size in 1900.182 Such a religiously
inspired migration during the second wave now may seem ironic in light of Iran’s Islamic
Revolution that toppled the Pahlavi dynasty. Another interesting feature of the second
wave was the emergence of Bahrain as the first major Gulf oil producer besides Iran,which began attracting Iranians skilled in the oil industry to the island country.183
A third generational wave of Iranian emigration to the Persian Gulf Arab Statescame as a result of growing economic and social pressures felt by all Iranians during the1950s through the early 1970s. Many of the Persian Gulf other sheikdoms joined Bahrain
in beginning to acquire great wealth through oil extraction and exploitation during thepost-World War II period and sought to develop their own particular infrastructures tohandle future growth. It should be noted that oil had replaced pearling by such time on
both shores, leading to societal transformation in Iran and the Gulf Arab States, but withmore pronounced effect on Arab society. However, the same sheikdoms had severe labor
shortages and enticed foreign manpower to their states with benefits such as free health

180

Abdullah 247-48.
Ibid; Anthony 56; Davidson 74; Field 60; Zahlan 1978: 11.
182
Abdullah 247-48.
183
Louër 34; Onley 78; Seccombe 1983: 6-9; Ian J. Seccombe and R. I. Lawless “Foreign Worker
Dependence in the Gulf, and the International Oil Companies: 1910-50” International Migration Review.
Vol. 20. No. 3 (1986): 562.
181

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care and education.184 On the other hand, many rural parts of Iran fell into neglect by the
Iranian administration in spite of government land reforms and increased attention,
prompting internal migration towards Iranian cities in some cases while also causing
other Iranians to migrate south to the Gulf Arab States instead.185 Iranians in this third
pre-revolutionary wave flocked to meet the labor demands of their Arab neighbors, withmore than half of all foreign workers in Bahrain coming from Iran and nearby Oman by
the 1960s.186 By the 1970s, Gulf countries such as Bahrain saw the formation of a large
middle class as a result of an economic upturn.187
One significant change during the third migration period came in the form ofgovernmental regulations to restrict the flow of Gulf Iranian migration. Iran first
responded by establishing restrictions on cross-Gulf migration during the 1950s andPersian Gulf Arab States similarly responded by revising and enforcing their nationality
laws to thwart Gulf Iranian (and other) migration.188 The rationale on the Arab side for
immigration restriction may have had to do with civil unrest caused by Gulf Iranian
populations as well as the rise of Arab nationalism advocated by Nasser during the 1950s
and 1960s.189 In the 1960s, the Shah shifted attention to southern Iran.190 The Iranianruler began to increase road and port construction there to create jobs, then built Persian-184

Abdullah 276-77; Chubin 1974: 205.
Ibid.; Chubin 1974: 200; Nikki R. Keddie Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 2003):152.
186
Helen Chapin Metz (ed.) Persian Gulf States: Country Studies (Washington: Federal Research
Division, Library of Congress, 1994): 130.
187
May Seikaly “Kuwait and Bahrain: The Appeal of Globalization and Internal Constraints” Iran,
Iraq and the Arab Gulf States Ed. Joseph Kechichian (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001): 181.
188
Chubin 1974: 209-10; Longva 2000: 184-85; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 71.
189
Chubin 1974: 207, 213; Svatopluk Soucek Persian Gulf: Its Past and Present (Costa Mesa:
Mazda Publishers, 2008): xviii.
190
Chubin 1974: 209-10.
185

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language schools and hospitals within Iran and the Persian Gulf Arab States as a means tomaintain connections between Iranian expatriates and their homeland.191 The Shah also
greatly expanded the size of Iran’s military and weapons arsenal and placed an emphasison military service as a way of working for the state and proving oneself to be a good
citizen.192 This also prompted some migration to the southern shores in order to evadeconscription.193 Still, many other Gulf Iranians were driven by job opportunities andmoney, religious freedom of expression, even identity preservation.
Upon the Islamic Revolution, Iranians continued migrating to Persian Gulf ArabStates for various reasons and joined their brethren on the other side. Although much has
been documented about the Iranian Revolution, evidence regarding cross-Gulf migration
within the Gulf Iranian community and the rationale behind specific emigration there(rather than to Western nations) is hard to find. Nevertheless, a few patterns have been
detected. Mehdi Bozorgmehr has adduced that some post-Revolutionary migrants left
Iran to escape being drafted to fight in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, continuing themilitary conscription evasion of the previous migration period.194 Christopher Davidson
notes how the Iranian Revolution, as well as successive Iranian administrations haveprompted a new wave of merchant migration across the waters with Gulf Iranians who
have felt alienated by the government.195 Many other Gulf Iranians who migrated to the
Persian Gulf Arab States within the period did so originally with the intention to stop
191

Abdullah 276-77; Chubin 1974: 203; Davidson 76.
Najmabadi 222-23; Chubin 1974: 202.
193
Anthony 16-18; Chubin 1974: 202.
194
Mehdi Bozorgmehr “Iranian Diaspora – Diaspora in the Postrevolutionary Period”
Encyclopedia Iranica Online. Iranica.com. Available online. <http://iranica.com/newsite/index.isc>.
Accessed 17. October 2008.
195
Davidson 76.
192

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there only temporarily on the way to Western countries, and only later would they
establish (or attempt to establish) permanent residency across the Gulf.196 Bahrain’s
economic prosperity during the late 1980s was noted to have reached groups such as the‘Ajam, Baluch, and even Bidoon, which probably enticed further Gulf Iranianmigration.197 One New York Times article has surmised the following about emigration to
Dubai in particular:
The Iranians rushing here are mainly seeking the same formula: personal freedom,
political and economic stability and a break from the West's political tensions with
Iran. Businessmen use Dubai's free-market zones to funnel goods across the gulf,
skirting the trade sanctions in place against Iran since the 1979 revolution.
Youngsters come for schooling minus the mullahs, while older Iranians come for amore comfortable and cosmopolitan life.198
Apart from the presence of Iran’s political tensions with the West, all of the above
patterns appear to reflect previous trends from earlier migration waves. For that reason, it
is better to remain focused upon pre-Revolutionary immigration waves to get a better
sense of Gulf Iranian identity.
Having given some attention to the issue of Gulf Iranian identity, it is now
appropriate to shift our focus and energy to analyze the other side of the identity
equation: the factors determining Gulf Arab identity versus those contributing to the Gulf
Iranian one.

196

Dosari “Panj saad hezar-e irani-e mahajer dar emirate-e motahed-e ‘arabi” 23. January 2007.
Seikaly 2001: 181.
198
Hassan Fattah “Young Iranians Follow Dreams to Dubai.” The New York Times. 4. December
2005. 14.
197

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CHAPTER 4: ARAB IDENTITY IN BAHRAIN AND THE UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES
Our study of identity issues within Gulf borderland would not be complete
without also analyzing the Gulf Arab population of Bahrain and the United ArabEmirates, the two selected Persian Gulf Arab States. A particular focus will be on thelargely Gulf Arab populace within each state, including the prominent families holding
the reins of power as well as a history of each country in contrast and relation to Iran.
Who are Gulf Arabs and what sets them apart from other Arabs? Gulf Arabs of
the small Persian Gulf Arab States of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates can be
distinguished from the Arabs from the interior of the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere bycertain characteristics. The most unique trait of Gulf Arabs in these small states is theirorientation and focus towards the sea rather than the desert.199 Their maritime orientation
contrasts with the perhaps traditional view of the Arab Bedouin as desert nomads,
although both are tribally-organized. Maritime-focused life, rather than a landward one,has resulted in the organization of Gulf Arab society in these small sheikhdoms as a seaoriented society where livelihoods have traditionally been earned in marine industries.
Before the 20th century, the center of the Gulf Arab economy came through their ability
to acquire lulu and morvarid, more commonly known as pearls (as translated from Arabic
and Persian respectively), which they sold in ports such as Dubai, Lengeh, Manama, andMuscat.200 Today, some members of Gulf Arab society continue to work in marine-based
199

Anthony 38.
Richard LeBaron Bowen “The Pearl Fisheries of the Persian Gulf,” Middle East Journal 5(spring 1951): 165-66. Bowen incorrectly transcribes the Persian term for pearl (‫ )وار‬into English as‘mawarid’ which may lead to some confusion.
200

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industries such as fishing, maritime commerce and trade and most recently, petroleum
extraction and tourism. Another trait of Gulf Arab society is their highly cosmopolitan
outlook, framed by an outward orientation towards the sea and openness to trade (andconsequently dialogue) with outside groups in order to survive.

Bahrain
The Bahraini Arab population can generally be broken down into two major
population groups along confessional lines: Shi’a and Sunni.201 Population estimates
given for the island’s Shi’a range anywhere between 60 and 70 per cent of the native
population, while Sunni Arabs and other groups constitute the remainder.202 The island’s
Shi’i Arab population can be divided between the Baharna203 and Hassawi subgroups.
The Baharna are the majority of Bahrain’s total population and were the island’s
indigenous population prior to 1782.204 The Baharna, along with the Hassawi, follow thetwo branches of the Ja’fari school of Islamic jurisprudence, much such as the ‘Ajam.205
In the past, the Baharna lived primarily inland, in rural areas of the island, but due torecent urbanization many have moved to urban centers such as Manama or haveeffectively become ‘urbanized’ due to their villages being swallowed up by expanding
201

Some authors have gone on to note how Bahrain’s Arab population can also be divided into
two linguistic groups as well on account of differences between rural Baharna and urban Najdi dialects.
See Al-Tajir; Holes for more information.
202
Falah Al-Mdaires “Shi’ism and Political Protest in Bahrain.” Digest of Middle East Studies(DOMES) 11 no. 1 (2002): 1; Bahry 132; Lee 43.
203
Another name that the Baharna once used to distinguish themselves from others is halayil,
meaning either ‘lawful possessions’ or ‘owners.’ This term came up as a result of the Baharna’s claims to
the island versus later claims made by other Arabs and Iranians who settled the island at a later point. See
Al-Tajir 8. Other references to the Baharna include spellings such as: Bahrani (Khuri 1980: 2) andBahraanis (Gardner 254).
204
Al-Tajir 8; Bahry 133.
205
Khuri 1980: 2, 68; Lawson 4.

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metropolitan areas.206 In contrast, the Hassawi subgroup represents Shi’i Arabs who
immigrated to the island from the heart of the Arabian Peninsula mainly during the 19th
century, particularly the al-Hasa region in eastern Saudi Arabia and directly west of
Bahrain today.207 Both groups constitute Ithna Ashari Shi’a such as their Gulf Iraniancounterparts.
The island’s Sunni population represents a minority of the total population but
nonetheless exerts a powerful influence there, primarily as a result of the ruling Al
Khalifa family. The Najdi, which include the Al Khalifa family and their tribal allies, arealso individuals with ties to the Arabian Peninsula, particularly the al-Najd region of
Saudi Arabia.208 Najdi individuals are primarily coastal urban dwellers who tend to workin the same professional fields as the Huwala, but operate under the Hanbali school ofIslamic jurisprudence.209 In contrast, Bahrain’s tribal Sunni population, including the Al
Khalifa family, follows the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence.210 When we take into
account the Huwala, we see the diversity of choice of the island’s Arab Sunni adherents
in their particular Islamic schools of practice.211
We can also say a few words regarding social status among Bahrain’s
predominantly Arab population. The most important point to note is how one family—the
Al Khalifa—holds the reins of political power and has determined the rules of social
206

Holes 58-59; Khuri 1980: 250-51; Peterson 63.
Al-Mdaires 2; Colbert Held, Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples and Politics (London:
Westview, 1994): 322-23; Nyrop 154-55. Nyrop notes that the Hassawi came from Saudi Arabia’s Eastern
Province, primarily the Al Hufuf and Al Qatif oases. Al-Mdaires adds that the Hassawi Shi’a came fromthe area as a result of Wahhabi expansion then.
208
Gardner 253.
209
Khuri 1980: 4, 68.
210
Al-Tajir 7; Khuri 1980: 68.
211
Khuri 1980: 68, 240.
207

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standing and economic distribution in a nearly monopolistic manner without serious
competition from rival tribes or parties. A significant part of such power has to do withthe discovery of oil in the country during the 1930s, a discovery that has sincetransformed it into a rentier state with obvious consequences for the reorganization andtransformation of Bahrain’s demographically small society.212 With their oil-based
wealth, the key to such power on the island for the Al Khalifa has been to maintainquiescent sedentary citizens by distributing jobs as well as other social benefits, such as
free housing, education and health care to the Bahraini Arab populace. Fuad Khuri notes
how Bahraini society has traditionally divided itself into three genealogical categories indescending order of preference: the ansab, the la-ansab, and the bani-khudair.213 The
basic distinction between the three categories has involved whether or not one can provea clear tribal Arab ancestry and not necessarily one’s religious background, of which thebani-khudair constitute the lowest, non-Arab classes, including former slaves.
Another issue related to genealogy was whether or not a person qualified as asharif or someone descended from Ismail, which played a part in determining marriage
partners.214 Ultimately, such genealogical classification has the practical effect ofdetermining one’s job prospects, as each individual has been put into a qabili (tribal) or
212

As Beblawi notes, “A rentier is thus more of a social function than an economic category, andis perceived as a member of a special group who, although he does not participate actively in the economic
production, receives nevertheless a share in the produce and at times a handsome share. The distinguishingfeature of the rentier thus resides in the lack or absence of a productive outlook in his behaviour.” See
Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World” in The Rentier State eds. Hazem Beblawi and
Giacomo Luciani (New York: Croom Helm, 1987): 50. The rise of oil also parallels the decline of thepearling industry in the Persian Gulf.
213
Khuri translates ansab to mean “clear genealogies” la-ansab to mean “unclear genealogies”
and bani-khudair to mean “the sons of green” or those with unclear claims. Khuri then goes on to describe
how the island’s black population falls within this final category. Interestingly, the author never mentions
other non-Arab populations in Bahrain nor the indigenous Baharna. See Khuri 1990: 33.
214
Izzard 129-30.

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madani (urban) class—the former track leading to military and defense, the latter leading
to administrative services and technocrat positions.215 Many of the island’s Arab Shi’i
population such as the Baharna probably fall under a la-ansab heading while Hassawi
individuals could equally fall under either ansab or la-ansab headings under Khuri’s
categorization, depending on whether or not they possessed tribal affiliations. If we were
to factor our Gulf Iranian subgroups into this equation, this would result in the Huwala
representing la-ansab individuals while the ‘Ajam and Baluch fit within the bani-khudair
category.
However, other outside identity formation patterns have also come into playrecently that at least overlap with, if not complicate, Khuri’s proposed scheme. One suchcase is each individual’s ties to the greater Arab nation as a result of the rise of Arabnationalism in the 1950s.
Nowadays the term ‘Arab is loosely used in Bahrain to refer to anyone who is anindigenous Arabic-speaking Sunni, whether or not he has an Arabian tribal pedigree.
Strictly speaking, however, the term originally referred only to endogamous groups
such as the al-Manna’i, Al Bu ‘Aynayn, Al Bu Rumayh, al-Ghatam, al-Dawasir, alZayyani, etc. who lived in one or other of the tribal settlements… and who had (andstill have) genealogical affiliations with the tribes of mainland Arabia.216
Another issue worth discussing regarding Arab identity is the varying layers ofcitizenship possessed by each Gulf resident, a consequence of Western notions of thestate and citizenship as well as the presence of numerous and distinct expatriate
communities. “There are commonly reckoned three circles of identity in Gulf society
beyond that of muwatin or fellow citizen: khaliji or Gulf, then Arab, then ajnabi or

215
216

Khuri 1990: 128-29.
Holes 58.

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foreign.”217 Although the previous point makes no distinction of where Gulf Iranians
might fit, it is probably safe to say such individuals would occupy the lowest ajnabi rungunder such a distinction in Bahrain.218
One of the main rationales for the existing Bahraini government’s implementationof Arab identity structure and organization on its populace is to counteract both its long
historical association with Iran and Iranian society (i.e. ‘Ajam) as well as its indigenous
Arab Shi’a (Baharna). The shared fates of Bahrain and Iran, as well as their peoples, canbe traced at least as early as the 5th century BCE to the Achaemenid Empire.219 Both sides
have exerted control over the Gulf in an ebb and flow extending back millennia to preIslamic times, when the ancient Iranians of the Sassanian Empire controlled portions of
the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, parts of which are now Arab-controlled today.220 As Svat
Soucek notes, Iranian dominance of the Persian Gulf, even for the name of that body ofwater, went unquestioned for centuries, if not millennia, and lasted until the import ofArab nationalism from Egypt in the 1960s which brought about a new name.221 The
Islamic Revolution in Iran only served as a revival of the danger of expanding Iranian
influence, especially in highly susceptible states like Bahrain, where Arab and Sunni
identities, along with a monarchist-centered government often feel threatened by the Shi’i

217

Paul Dresch, “Introduction: Societies, Identities and Global Issues” in Monarchies andNations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf eds. Paul Dresch, and James Piscatori(New York: IB Tauris, 2005): 25.
218
Enver Koury makes this very point in his discussion regarding the place of Iranians with theUnited Arab Emirates’ social structure. See Koury 132-33.
219
Marschall 5; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1996: 34; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 61-62; Haleh Vaziri, (PhD
dissertation: Georgetown University) The Islamic Republic and its Neighbors: Ideology and the National
Interest in Iran’s Foreign Policy during the Khomeini Decade (Washington: Georgetown University,
1995): 116.
220
Frye 1975; Frye 1976.
221
Soucek xviii.

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democracy of Iran. The presence of the Baharna on the island only complicates the notionof Bahrain as a Sunni Arab island.
For our purposes we shall briefly examine the Bahraini-Iranian relationship sincethe 17th century, which commemorates the start of Iran’s modern claims to the island as
well as the Al Khalifa presence there. In 1602, Safavid Iranian naval forces wrested
control of Bahrain from the Portuguese, thus marking the start of some Iranian migration,
including a few ‘Ajam to the islands.222 As previously noted, Huwala Arabs ruled
Bahrain by the start of the 18th century and acted on Iran’s behalf under Sheikh
Jubbara.223 It appears that Gulf Iranian Huwala also helped Iran reassert control over theisland during one invasion in 1736 in support of the Qajar ruler Nadir Shah, but werelater overthrown in 1753 when the Omani sheikh of Bushehr, Nasir Al-Madkhur, seized
it on behalf of the Iranian Zand ruler Karim Khan Zand.224 Political turmoil between
Iranian Zand and Qajar ruling factions caused Bahrain to become increasingly vulnerable
to other non-Iranian influences and by 1782, the Al Khalifa family and their tribal allies
successfully invaded and took over Bahrain from its Omani-Iranian administrators.225
The Al Khalifa family was generally familiar with Bahrain and its nearby vicinity due tothe sea-based trade they conducted there throughout the 18th century as part of the greater

222

Al-Mdaires 2; Lorimer Vol. 1: 836; Peterson 63.
Ahmad Mustafa Abu-Hakima History of Eastern Arabia, 1750-1800; The Rise andDevelopment of Bahrain and Kuwait (Beirut: Khayats 1965): 34; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 138; Rumaihi 2728.
224
Abu-Hakima 78-79; John Barrett Kelly, “The Persian Claim to Bahrain,” International Affairs
33 (1957): 51-70; Lorimer Vol. 1: 837.
225
Abu-Hakima 76, 80; Khuri 1980: 24-25.
223

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‘Utub tribe.226 As early as 1716, the Al Khalifa appeared in Kuwait along with the Al
Sabah family, and had taken control of Zubara (in what is now Qatar) in 1766, just a
short distance east from Bahrain.227 Between 1753 and 1782, the Al Khalifa had tried tosettle in Bahrain at least once but were prohibited from staying there by the Iranian-allied
Bani Madkhurs.228 It was not until 1782 when the Al Khalifa family and its allies
successfully took over Bahrain and established their dynasty there the following year.229
From 1783 until the present, Al Khalifa-ruled Bahrain has faced continued
challenges to its sovereignty from Iran as well as been a continued recipient of cross-Gulf
immigration on the part of Gulf Iranians. In 1859, Bahrain’s ruler recognized Iraniansovereignty over the island (and later Turkish sovereignty) during the same year as heattempted to play off larger, neighboring rivals.230 During the 1920s, Iran sought to haveits dispute over Bahrain with the Al Khalifa referred to the League of Nations.231 In 1932,
the same year oil was discovered on the island, Iran offered to renounce its claims to
Bahrain in exchange for recognition of ownership of the three islands of Abu Musa andthe Tunbs, but this proposal was rejected.232 During the late 1930s, Bahrain deported
several Iranians working for BAPCO, the island’s oil company, in attempts to open up

226

The ‘Utub tribe’s three main branches included the Al Sabah family (now ruling Kuwait) the
Al Khalifa family (now ruling Bahrain), and the Al Jalahima, who also participated in the 1782 invasion of
Bahrain. Lorimer Vol. 2: 1917-19.
227
Abu-Hakima 66-67, 79, Khuri 1980: 23.
228
Abu-Hakima 67.
229
Khuri 1980: 25.
230
Cordesman 35; Khuri 1980: 31.
231
Richard Schofield, “Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during theTwentieth Century,” in Richard Schofield (ed.) Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States (New York:Saint Martin’s Press, 1994): 37.
232
Mojtahed-Zadeh 1996: 50. Interestingly, the idea of exchanging recognition of Bahrain for thethree islands would come up later when Bahrain achieved its independence. Also see ibid., 53-54.

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more jobs for the native Bahraini population.233 In 1957, Bahrain was declared Iran’s 14th
province by the Iranian Parliament and had two seats reserved for it in the chamber.234
This, along with the rise of a nationalist movement in Iran under Mohammad Mosaddeq,
led to “disturbances” within Bahrain supposedly caused by Iranians living there. By
1960, at least 50 Iranians were deported as a result of fallout from such alleged actions.235
However, by 1969 the Shah agreed to a UN-backed plebiscite to help determine thefuture national aspirations of the island’s inhabitants and the following year, Bahrainis
voted overwhelmingly for self-rule.236 In 1971, Bahrain declared its independence andwent from being a Trucial sheikhdom into a self-governing state. However, upon the
inception of the Iranian Revolution, Bahrain under the Al Khalifa family has had to faceintermittent claims to the country by Iranians claiming to represent the latest Iranianadministration.

The United Arab Emirates
In contrast to Bahrain, the Gulf Arab population of the United Arab Emirates isdifferent demographically and subsequently, has different Arab identity issues. Sunni
Arabs constitute the majority of the native population while Shi’i Arabs are a minority—
the opposite of Bahrain. Also, there is not one but seven separate ruling families in the
country, one for each of the Emirates—Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah,
Ajman, Fujairah and Umm al-Quwain, thus making a more complex picture. There is also
233Louër 34; Seccombe 1983: 6-7. Seccombe then describes how BAPCO proceeded to hire more
Iranians again after World War II.
234
Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 131.
235
Chubin 1974: 207; Rumaihi 30.
236
Marschall 8.

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a much larger presence and diversity of various tribally-organized Arab groups which has
been explored elsewhere.237 For our purposes, the simplest way to analyze the Gulf Arab
population there would be to divide the Emirati Gulf Arab population into two broad
camps: Arabs of the ruling families versus the subject population.
The most prominent Gulf Arab tribal grouping in the United Arab Emirates is theBani Yas, whose members rule both Abu Dhabi (under the family name Al Nahyan238)
and Dubai (under the name Al Maktum239)—the two largest, most influential emirates
and also referred to collectively as the southern emirates. Members of the Qawasim (AlQasimi family) tribe rule both Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah while the Na’im (Al Bu
Khuraiban), Sharqiyyim, and Al Mualla (Al Ali) rule Ajman, Fujairah, and Umm alQuwain respectively. Collectively, the other five emirates are referred to as the Northern
Emirates. With the exception of perhaps the Qawasim, the UAE’s ruling families cantrace their origins to the Arabian Peninsula. The Bani Yas are generally Maliki, theQawasim, Al Mualla and Na’im are Hanbali, and the Sharqiyyim are Shafi’i,demonstrating the diversity of various ruling groups’ specific approaches to Islamic
jurisprudence.240 Most of the United Arab Emirates has become heavily urbanized,
especially in the Dubai-Ajman-Sharjah area, such that most members of the above tribes
have taken to life in the cities.241

237

Van Der Meulen 451.
The Al Nayhan are alternatively known as the Al-Bu Falah.
239
The Al Maktum are also sometimes referred to as Al Bu Falasah.
240
Van Der Meulen 326, 451.
241
Sulayman Khalaf, “The Evolution of the Gulf City Type, Oil, and Globalization” in
Globalization and the Gulf eds. John Fox, Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mohammed al-Mutawa (NewYork: Routledge, 2006): 250.
238

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The resident, non-ruling Gulf Arab population in the United Arab Emirates offers
even more contrast. Previous researchers such as Lorimer, Heard-Bey and Van Der
Meulen have revised lists of dozens of Emirati tribes and elucidated their connections to
the various local rulers across inter-emirate boundary lines.242 It should be noted that
Emirati tribesmen have demonstrated a greater level of mobility than their Bahraini peers
in moving between Emirates; for example, the case of a large migration of the Al-Bu
Shamis from Sharjah to Dubai.243 The Shihuh comprise the third largest ‘Arab tribe’ inthe seven emirates according to one census (after the Bani Yas and Sharqiyyin), and arelargely concentrated in the rural villages of Ras al-Khaimah emirate, although they
exercise little power there.244 Interestingly, Baharna individuals have been present within
the urban areas of Abu Dhabi and Dubai for at least a century and, due to their presence
as the only Ithna Ashari Shi’i community prior to major Gulf Iranian migration, the term
Baharna has been used interchangeably for Arabic-speaking Shi’a, regardless of their
origins.245 Tribes such as the Awamir and Bani Kalban also count Ibadi Shi’a (that isfiver Shi’i) among their numbers.246 Although we could go into more detail regarding
each Gulf Arab tribal segment here, it is enough to say tribal diversity, as well as theconfederate nature of several emirates separate Abu Dhabi and its fellow emirates from
Bahrain upon first glance at the population level.

242

For example, see the tribal indexes given for the following works: Heard-Bey 507-10; Van Der
Meulen 321-23. Also, volume two of Lorimer (Geographical and Statistical) operates as a valuable A to Z
type dictionary for the Persian Gulf area in spite of its age, with many short sections on the same tribes
referenced throughout his work.
243
Davidson 84-85.
244
Van Der Meulen 431-32.
245
Ibid., 359-60.
246
Ibid., 451.

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The United Arab Emirates offers a similar picture in regards to the ordering ofsociety according to genealogy, Arab-ness, and national identity, as well as it also being
an oil-based rentier state. However, given the multiple ruling tribal authorities within the
United Arab Emirates and the unevenness of oil and natural gas reserves distributed
between them,247 one might (rightly) expect some challenge or alternative perception to
the rules of social ordering and mobility within the Arab community. A quick comparison
between Abu Dhabi and Dubai offers such evidence.
Establishing the state involved at least two very different views of nationality. Shaykh
Rashid of Dubai is supposed to have said, ‘Those who were with us when we werepoor should be with us now we are rich’, implying that shared experience carriedweight. Shaykh Zayed of Abu Dhabi, by contrast, looked more to nasab, “genealogy”
of the kind claimed by Arab tribes; for his own family, the Al Nahyan, are hereditarychiefs of note among the Bani Yas.248
Dresch also highlights how access to Shaikh Rashid and the ruling power circle, such as
an advisory role, is the ultimate determinant of one’s standing within Dubai.249 One’s
Arab identity is not necessarily the first predictor of success, but their presence andcontribution to Dubai instead. Therefore, Dubai diminished the role that tribal ties playedin the particular emirate and created the potential for non-Arabs to climb the social
ladder.250 Sharjah has also demonstrated the same tendency of selecting individuals withpersonal ability and shared experience over tribal affiliation, although at a smaller

247“UAE Oil and Gas.” United Arab Emirates Ministry of Finance and Industry. Available online.
<http://www.uae.gov.ae/Government/oil_gas.htm>. Accessed 31. October 2008.
248
Dresch 258.
249
Dresch 143.
250
Andrea Rugh 119; Van Der Meulen 173.

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scale.251 Inter-emirate competition plays a significant part in the determination of Arab
identity within the various southern emirates.
Quite the opposite of Bahrain, the area that became the United Arab Emirates in1971 is not as sensitive to Iranian identity issues primarily due to its majority Sunni
population (and minority Shi’i one), as well as lack of long-standing territorial claims to
it by Iran—with the exception of Abu Musa and the Tunbs. The seven former Trucial
States do have their own long and distinct history of contact with Iran, although the most
pertinent information concerning us comes from the 16th century onward. When we speakof Iranian-Emirati contacts then, we are primarily referring to Iran’s contacts with one
tribal grouping in particular, the Qawasim, until the 19th century, when the Bani Yas of
Dubai opened their port city to Iranian trade. The Qawasim began to assert control onboth sides of the Persian Gulf in the 18th century, at the same time as the decline of the
Safavid Empire in Iran.252 As such, the Qawasim have played a large role in therelationship between Iranians and the southern shore Arabs of the Persian Gulf until only
recently.
The height of Qawasim power came during the 18th century. In the 1720s, theQawasim seized Basidu, the port city of Qeshm Island although Iran would regain control
by 1734.253 During conflict between Iran and Oman in 1737, Iranian forces took control
of Khor Fakkan (now a part of Sharjah emirate) and subdued Qawasim forces there.254 In
1744, the Qawasim, in alliance with Omani forces, expelled the Iranian forces occupying251

Van Der Meulen 223-24.
Mojtahed-Zadeh 1996: 36.
253
Amirahmadi 122; Schofield 1994: 35.
254
Lorimer Vol. 1: 631.
252

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the port city of Julfar.255 Three years later, when the Qajar ruler Nadir Shah died, theIranian governor of Bandar Abbas formed an alliance with the Qawasim throughmarriage, thus opening the door to Qawasim influence on Iran’s southern shore.256
Qawasim forces from Julfar then landed in Bandar Abbas in 1759 and establishedthemselves in various nearby Iranian ports.257 By that time, the Qawasim had become theleaders of the Huwala ‘tribe’ and had moved into territory on the northern Iranian shores(such as Lengeh), ruling there as semi-independent vassals for Iranian and Omani
overlords.258
Nearby Ras al-Khaimah, also controlled by factions of the Qawasim, later became
an independent port, having gained recognition for its independence from Oman in 1763,
and was only one of the northern emirates to achieve such status at that time.259 Records
dating to the 1760s show that the Qawasim/Huwala individuals were also found residingon Hormuz and Qais islands on the Iranian side of the Gulf as well.260 By the 1780s, theQawasim had gained such influence that they were called in as mediators to try andresolve the dispute between Iran and the Al Khalifa family over Bahrain after the latter’s
successful invasion of the island in 1782.261
However, Qawasim power waned during the late 19th and early 20th centuries as
the British curtailed the tribe’s maritime powers in the southern Gulf (ultimately
255

It should be noted that by this time, both Iranian and Qawasim forces were each allied withrival Omani factions during an Omani civil war. See Samuel Barrett Miles The Countries and Tribes of the
Persian Gulf (London: Frank Cass, 1966): 256, 269, 443; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1996: 37.
256
Lorimer Vol. 1: 632.
257
Mojtahed-Zadeh 1996: 38.
258
Ibid.; Lorimer Vol. 1: 632.
259
Ibid.; Van Der Meulen 203n4, 389-90.
260
Abu-Hakima 79.
261
Lorimer Vol. 1: 634.

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assuming control over their foreign relations from 1820 until 1971262), while Iranreasserted control over its southern periphery in places such as Lengeh. By this time,other powers such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi came to assert control over the pearl- andsea-based trades at their expense.263 Gradually, the Qawasim began a process of splitting
into smaller factions, with Sharjah splitting off into its own emirate first in 1867, then in1921 and ultimately in 1952.264 For the purposes of Iranian-Emirati relations, such a split,
along with the Qawasim decline, were important because starting in the late 19th century
it would complicate the disputes between the Qawasim and Iranians over possession of
the southern Iranian coastline and Persian Gulf islands.
In contrast, non-Qawasim Emiratis began to establish their own independent
relations with Iran until the 19th century thanks to the rise of Dubai as a rival port to
Sharjah and Lengeh for Gulf trade, especially from Iranian merchants. Members of theBani Yas tribal grouping registered a marginal presence on the Emirates coasts until then,and were primarily land-based within the area of the Buraimi and Liwa Oases on theborder with Oman today.265 Abu Dhabi and Dubai towns were not established as
independent Bani Yas emirates until 1761 and 1833 respectively.266 Abu Dhabi itself
only became the capital of Bani Yas domains in the 1790s (which were primarily inland
away from the coasts and contact with Iranians) and by the 1830s the tribe split into two
factions, with the Al Maktum asserting their independence from the Al Nahyan by
262

Heard-Bey 285-86, 361-62, 367-70.
Andrea Rugh 104.
264
Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah split from one another on two occasions: first in 1867 and then in
1921. However, the two incorporated in 1900. See Mojtahed-Zadeh 1996: 40; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 168.
265
Lorimer Vol. 2: 1934-35; Van Der Meulen 372.
266
Lorimer adds that Dubai had already existed as a city as early as 1799 and was a Bani Yas
dependency until 1825. See Heard-Bey 201; Lorimer Vol. 1: 772; Van Der Meulen 184
263

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occupying the borderland between Bani Yas and Qawasim territories.267 In the early 19th
century, members of the Dubai branch of the Bani Yas migrated to Hengam Island withthe blessing of Oman’s sultan, who supposedly held the Iranian lease for the island.268
However, Hengam reverted back to Iranian control, and would lead to later
confrontations between Iranians and Dubai natives in 1928.269
By the early 20th century, at least 500 Gulf Iranians were already living in Abu
Dhabi and others had moved to Dubai as well, establishing what would become thelatter’s Bastakiyah district.270 Other would-be emirates and their nearby hinterlands had
deferred to Qawasim rule in exchange for joining into the tribe’s maritime trade and were
included within the Qawasim domains at the time.271 In the early 19th century, however,such emirates began to assert themselves and were recognized as individual Trucial
sheikhdoms by the British, including: Ajman (1820), Umm al-Quwain (1820) andFujairah (1952).272 The last three emirates, along with Abu Dhabi had little contact with
Iran, thus limiting relations pre-federation to Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah, and Sharjah,
although each did absorb a portion of the Gulf Iranian migration both in the cities andvillages.273 In summary, the relationship between many Emiratis and Iranians has been
shaped by the lack of a large Shi’i population as well as competing interests between thevarious Emirates for Iranian trade.

267

It is interesting to note the close familial connections between Abu Dhabi and Dubai eventoday, as Van Der Meulen points out. See Davidson 10, 15; Van Der Meulen 181.
268
Zahlan 1978: 88.
269
Ibid.
270
Heard-Bey 201; Van Der Meulen 359-60; Zahlan 1978: 178.
271
Heard-Bey 68-69.
272
Van Der Meulen 248-49, 256, 263.
273
Heard-Bey 201, 227.

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Cross-Gulf relations between the Emirates and Iranians during the 20th century
still remained somewhat mixed. The two Qawasim emirates and Iran continued to assert
their claims to various islands, including Sirri, Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb
islands.274 As late as 1959, Iran still did not recognize the independence of the Trucial
Shaikhdoms, although the former’s continuing dispute with both Sharjah and Ras alKhaimah over the possession of Abu Musa and the Tunb islands probably contributed insome part to acknowledge the Shaikhdoms’ existence.275 However, in 1971, the Shahrecognized both Bahrain and the newly formed United Arab Emirates as states upon theirformations.276 After British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in November 1971, Iranianforces took control of Abu Musa and the Tunb islands, thus provoking protest from theUAE.277 It was revealed by the end of the same month however that the Shah had reacheda Memorandum of Understanding with Sharjah’s ruler with each one respecting theother’s claims to Abu Musa, although he failed to reach a similar agreement with Ras alKhaimah over the Tunbs.278 Apart from such incidents, relations between the two
governments and their citizens encountered little strain until after the Iranian
Revolution.279 Although Iran and the United Arab Emirates have still not settled all of
their territorial disputes through the present day, this has not precluded the two states
274

Van Der Meulen 202-04; Zahlan 1978: 80.
Hay 148.
276
Hooshang Amirahmadi “The Colonial-Political Dimension of the Iran-UAE Dispute” in Small
Islands, Big Politics: the Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi, (New York:St Martin’s Press, 1996):10; Nader Entessar, “Changing Patterns of Iranian-Arab relations,” Journal ofSocial, Political and Economic Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1984): 342; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1999: 69; Rumaihi 31.
277
Amirahmadi 10; Schofield 1994: 38-40; Schofield 1997: 147-48.
278
Amirahmadi 10; Schofield 1994: 38-40.
279
As John Duke Anthony attested in his work, “Shaykh Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi, theRuler of Ra’s al-Khaymah, told this writer in an interview shortly before the Tunbs were seized: ‘I have noquarrel with the Iranian people who are living among us, nor with those in Iran. Iranians have always been
welcome here, and they always will be. My problems are with the Iranian government.’” See Anthony 41.
275

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from maintaining relations with one another nor has it curtailed the migration of Gulf
Iranians to the southern shore Gulf Arab State.

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CHAPTER 5: EBB AND FLOW: GULF IRANIAN CONTRIBUTIONS AND
REMAINING CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION IN GULF ARAB SOCIETY
The following section builds upon Gulf Iranian and Arab identity investigations aswell as earlier theory discussion. It briefly analyzes specific contributions made by Gulf
Iranian community to Gulf Arab society in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates,
particularly on the individual and community levels. It also assess the challenges Gulf
Iranians still face in attempting to integrate into the Gulf Arab environment and society.
These case studies will demonstrate the independent, active roles which distinct Huwalaand ‘Ajam individuals and families have played within Gulf Arab society as well as thewider community contribution by these groups. It further shows how these changes haveaffected and reshaped different facets of Gulf Arab culture with a new hybrid flavor,
combining elements from both Arab and Iranian cultures.
One example of a prominent Gulf Iranian Huwala family in Bahrain is the KanooAlmoayed family group.280 Members of this Arab family were originally banking
middlemen for pearl merchants in the 1880s and gradually worked their way into thefavor of the ruling Al Khalifa family.281 By the 1920s, the Kanoo had one of the city’srichest and oldest residential districts named after them, as well as one where both
Huwala and ‘Ajam resided.282 The Kanoo branch diversified into shipping during the1940s after the fall of the pearl industry, and gradually obtained a monopoly in shipping

280

As Molly Izzard notes, the Almoayed family is in fact an offshoot of the Kanoo family line,
having changed their name to differentiate themselves from their cousins, thus provoking their combined
study here. Both families share the same ancestors. See Izzard 107.
281
Ibid., 108.
282
Fuccaro 2000: 70.

86

petroleum resources for the United States military.283 Today, the Kanoos have alsocounted doctors and Bahraini National Assembly representatives among them, along with
the Almoayed family members.284 The Almoayed branch under Yusuf Almoayed began
moving into metal-based industries starting in the 1930s, including automobile andappliance sales, inspired by Yusuf plying his trade as a middleman for acquiring
materials for British forces stationed on the island.285 Both branches of this Huwalafamily emphasize that they had lived only a short time on the Gulf’s Iranian shore, thus
asserting that they possess more Arab characteristics than Iranian ones. This attitude isrelated to the Iranian nationalism of the 1950s as well as political strife which took place
within Bahrain then.286 A quick Google search using the terms ‘Kanoo Bahrain’ or‘Almoayed Bahrain’ yields over 53,000 and 7,000 hits, respectively, including links to
the various business ventures that branches within each family operate on the island andaround the world.287 In fact, one could easily count published websites of these Huwalafamilies as another form of Gulf Iranian contribution. Other examples of Huwala worth
mentioning are the Fakhro, Khunji, Bastaki, and Ali Reza families, some of whose names
allude to various place names with Iran and even common names used by Iranian Shi’i
individuals.288

283

Lawson 54-55.
Ibid., 90.
285
Izzard 114-15; Lawson 54.
286
Bahry 4; Field 75; Lawson 10.
287“Almoayed Bahrain” Google Search. Available online.
<http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&safe=off&rls=com.microsoft%3Aen-US&q=Almoayed+Bahrain>.
Accessed 24 October 2008; “Kanoo Bahrain” Google Search. Available online.
<http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=Kanoo+Bahrain&aq=f&oq=>. Accessed 24 October 2008.
288
Field 76; Holes 58.
284

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While the ‘Ajam families of Bahrain are not nearly as referenced within historicaland biographical works, we can find some of their own contributions, if not at least theirappearances, documented within the same society as well. Members of the al-Kazruni
and Bushihri families, who worked in the boating and pearling industries, established andmaintained one of the island’s ma’tam, the Al-Ajam (Al-Kabir) in 1892, and were also
responsible for building island mosques, hospitals and even the British Political
Agency.289 When Abdul-Nabi al-Kazruni and Abdul-Nabi Bushihri had both died, theyleft the administration of the funeral house to a board comprised of future generations of‘Ajam in 1945.290 The two families were also responsible for bringing over andsupporting other Iranian families they knew who were involved within constructionrelated industries starting in the early 1900s.291 Fuccaro notes that by 1951, a majority of
the Al-Ajam ma’tam board were descended from families that came from one specificquarter of Bushehr in Iran.292 A member of the al-Kazrooni family also served as a
Persian representative in the ruler’s council at the turn of the 20th century and his
descendents are still known to be prominent merchants there.293 Another ‘Ajam
individual, Husayn Muhammad Baqir Aryan, ran for a National Assembly position insome of the country’s first elections upon independence in 1971, although he was289

Fuccaro 2005: 50; Khuri 1980: 160.
Ibid.
291
Fuccaro 2005: 50.
292
Ibid., 46, 48. Also according to Fuccaro, part of the reason for this representation was that
“Between 1889 and 1910 the Bushehri and Kazruni families brought to Manamah under their protection
approximately 20 per cent of the total ‘Ajam population of the city.”
293
Field 75; Khuri 1980: 60.
290

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defeated by an Arab candidate.294 One intriguing note is that some of the ‘Ajam families
who originally established themselves in Bahrain then migrated and resettled in the
United Arab Emirates, where they have since gained considerable business and politicalclout, including the Al-Fardan and Sayigh families.295
Two examples of Gulf Iranian Huwala in the United Arab Emirates are the AlGurg and the Darwish families, the latter whose family links spread across the Gulf
through the emirates of Ajman, Dubai, and Umm al-Quwain and even into neighboring
Qatar.296 Easa Saleh Al-Gurg, the United Arab Emirates’ former ambassador to theUnited Kingdom, provides one of the first autobiographical accounts of a Gulf Iranian inEnglish in The Wells of Memory, a narrative which its editor notes could serve as aninspirational rags-to-riches story for both Gulf Arabs and Gulf Iranians, as well as future
writers.297 Easa Al-Gurg details how his own family had originally lived in Lengeh, Iranbut departed there to return to life along the Arab shore, echoing similar sentiments of the
Huwala merchant families in Bahrain.298 The Darwish family’s principal contributions to
Emirati society are through commercial ventures, banks, and utility management
throughout the country.299 However, they, such as the Al-Gurg, Kanoo, and Almoayed of
Bahrain, have acquired such clout as to earn various regional and federal government
ministry portfolios within the United Arab Emirates.300 Besides the Al-Gurg and Darwish

294

Emile Nakhleh Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society (Lexington:
Lexington Books, 1976): 155.
295
Van Der Meulen 199.
296
Field 75; Long 1978: 15; Van Der Meulen 198.
297
Al-Gurg xiii.
298
Ibid., 2-4.
299
Van Der Meulen 198.
300
Ibid.

89

families, there are also other Huwala families who have established themselves inprominent roles in the various seven emirates, including the Al-Serkal and Zaruni(Sharjah), the Al-Awadi and Bahruzian (Fujairah) and the Al Jakkah (Ras alKhaimah).301
Members of the ‘Ajam have also made their mark in the United Arab Emirates,
particularly in the entrepreneurial climate of Dubai. During the first migration wave of
the 1890s, a large segment of the merchant Al-Ansari family relocated to Dubai from
Lengeh and has remained there, still operating within the same role.302 Before Easa AlGurg served as his country’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Mahdi al-Tajir, wasinstrumental in the development of the Emirates embassy there starting in 1972 and also
served as a close adviser to Dubai’s ruler, Shaikh Rashid, for many years.303 There are
numerous other ‘Ajam or ethnic Persians who operate within the Emirates, and one
should take note that one finds their greatest representation and influence “among the
shopkeepers and souk store owners. It is at this level, rather than in the ranks of the big
families, that the Persians have their strength in commerce in all the Gulf states.”304
Even though there has been a select group of prominent Gulf Iranian families andindividuals who carved their own path away from Iran, the greater Gulf Iranian
community also has played an active role in shaping their society on the Persian Gulf’ssouthern shores. A few examples from both Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates

301

Ibid., 223-24, 233, 254.
Davidson 73; Van Der Meulen 198-99.
303
Ibid.
304
Field 76-77.
302

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specific to subgroups of the Gulf Iranian community will show what has been imported
from Iran, particularly traditional festivities and architectural styles.
One tradition in Bahrain inspired by Gulf Iranian influence at least since the past
century has been the Ashura ta’ziyeh or passion play performed during the month ofMuharram along with the related tamthiliyyah or processions.305 Members of the Bahraini
Shi’i population, whether ‘Ajam, Baharna, or Hassawi, have organized a series ofcommunity events to commemorate the martyrdom of Husain (The Third Imam), whodied on the plains of Karbala in 680 CE.306 The basis of such organization has comethrough individual fundraising and organization within a ma’tam307 or funeral house
which serves as a community meeting place and is operated by each of the Shi’i
subgroups within the island’s cities and rural areas.308 The most elaborate of such
ma’tam-sponsored events are the marches and processions by Shi’a to demonstrate theirmourning for Husain by self-flagellation, as well as passion plays depicting the events
leading up to his martyrdom.309
Ashura celebrations have incorporated foreign elements into them over the years.
Khuri notes that during the 1890s, three of the most prominent ma’taim were founded byrich Shi’i merchants, including the ‘al-Ajam ma’tam.310 He also surmises that “the use of305

Fuccaro 2005: 48.
Lawson 11.
307
Lawson alternatively translates ma’tam to meaning mourning house. Ibid.; Khuri 1980: 156.
308
Louay Bahry explains the significance of such places in more detail. “As a religious symbol of
the Shiite community, the matams are an old and well-established institution, going back hundreds of years.
There may be as many as four hundred of them in the country. Matams are meeting places where Shiites
gather to mourn the death of a family member, for example, and to meet prior to or at the end of a religious
procession. They are the sites of Shiite religious commemorations and social and even political gatherings.”
See Bahry 135.
309
Khuri 1980: 155-56.
310
Ibid., 160.
306

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chains, swords, drums, or music in these processions is believed to have been introducedby the Persian Shi’a around the mid-1930s.”311 This Iranian influence not only coincides
with the second wave of Iranian migration across the Gulf, both the Huwala and ‘Ajam,
but also with the Iranian government’s modernization programs, including curtailingcertain religious expressions. “Having banned in 1939 self-flagellation in public on theanniversary of Imam Hussein’s death on the tenth of Muharram, the Shah tried to stop the
public performance of Shia passion plays preceding the mourning, and prohibit thepilgrimage to Mecca.”312 We also find further evidence of a connection between crossGulf migration and cultural mixing, thus confirming one Gulf Iranian contribution toexisting Bahraini traditions as presented by Khuri.313
The Ashura processions would take on further significance during the 1950s when
Bahraini Shi’i adherents were attacked by Bahraini Sunnis, thus adding a politicaldimension to the religious ceremonies.314 By the time of the Iranian Revolution, theprocessions gained even further political significance as a surrogate for politicalexpression (in the absence of political parties) for social injustice and unrighteous rule
under the Al Khalifa family for failing to uphold the Bahraini constitution as set out in
1973.315 Such actions were not without precedent in Iran before the Revolution and given
the religious training some Bahraini Shi’a received in Iran, along with the presence of

311

Ibid., 268.
Hiro 28.
313
Abdullah 247-48; Heard-Bey 133. Both of these authors specifically note how the Shah’sactions prompted Gulf Iranian emigration, although to the United Arab Emirates instead.
314
Al-Mdaires 4.
315
Bahry 130-31.
312

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‘Ajam, one can perhaps see a stronger connection between Gulf Iranian influences andBahraini Shi’i practice today.316
The Gulf Iranian population has not only left its mark demographically on
numerous locations throughout the Gulf but also they have left an architectural imprint
along the Persian Gulf’s southern shores. In Manama, Bahrain’s capital, the Awazir
district, one of its city quarters, has gained notoriety for its Persian community, especially
its merchant class.317 The same city’s al-Hurra and al-Ajam districts also historically havebeen known for their Persian Shi’a or ‘Ajam communities, including the ma’taim
operated by them.318 Neighborhoods such as the ‘Awadhiyyah were established in the
1890s by its Huwala population from ‘Awaz, while ‘Ajam immigrants from Bandar
Abbas established the Zulm ‘Abad district in 1923 before moving on to Adliyya districtin the 1930s. 319 The development of many of the Persian districts of the city can be
attributed to patron-client relationships between rich merchants and poorer workers who
immigrated to the city in search of construction jobs and eventually property
investments.320 These points give us more detail as to the effect of Iranian immigration’s
first and second waves on Manama’s growth as well as that city’s hidden Iraniancharacter.

316

Keddie 71.
Izzard 101.
318
Fuccaro 2005: 50; Khuri 1980: 250; Lawson 11.
319
Fuccaro 2005: 51; Fuccaro 2000: 69.
320
Fuccaro 2005: 50-51. There were other Gulf Iranians who came to Bahrain outside of thepatron-client system as well, which Fuccaro also mentions in the same passage.
317

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The emirate of Dubai also has its own Persian quarters, including Deira and a
district known as the Bastakiyah, a name inspired by the village of Bastak in Iran.321 The
Gulf Iranian connection is not limited to people although, as Iranian architecture also hastaken its distinct place among Gulf Arab buildings. Wind towers known as badgirs thatwere constructed by Lingawi merchants in southern emirates during the late 19th century
have been adopted by local malls such as the Madinat Jumeirah in Dubai, as well as
being preserved by residents in both Dubai’s Bastakiyah district and the Blue Souq inneighboring Sharjah.322 In 2007 it was estimated that about 6,500 Iranian businesses wereoperating in the United Arab Emirates, although this included some cart or wheeled
merchants.323 The continued existence of such architecture and their districts indicates therole Gulf Iranians continue to play in the Persian Gulf Arab States.
The above points when taken together do not all signify the acceptance or
seamless entry of the Gulf Iranian community itself into Gulf Arab society, nor is every
aspect of Gulf Arab space attractive to them. One Dubai based artist and Gulf Iranian has
noted the relationship between the city’s large, isolated buildings and a large
multinational population in addition to the resident Arab one whose members also isolatethemselves from one another—which ultimately leads to a culture-less city condemned todeath.324 The same artist decries how the Gulf Arab city lacks cohesion and operates in aramshackle manner, and he makes a comparison of his newly-adopted home to the cities
321

Fattah; Izzard 242.
Abdullah 118; Davidson 113; Heard-Bey 246; Peter Vine and Paula Casey United ArabEmirates: Profile of a Country’s Heritage and Modern Development (London: Immel, 1992): 114.
323
Dosari “Panj saad hezar-e irani-e mahajer dar emirat-e motahed-e ‘arabi” 23. January 2007.
324
Asha Shahir “Ebrahim haqiqi: dubai mahakum be marg ast.” 18. June 2008. Radio Farda.com.
Available online. <http://www.radiofarda.com/Article/2008/06/18/haghighi.html>. Accessed 25. August
2008.
322

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across the water in Iran, demonstrating the dissonance some Iranians feel with life on the
Gulf’s southern shores. Gulf Iranians also must make harsh adjustments to the hot, humid
climate of the Persian Gulf, particularly in the excessively hot, humid summer months,
sometimes even without the luxury of air conditioning.325
The integration of Gulf Iranians into Gulf Arab society in Bahrain and the United
Arab Emirates can be quite difficult. One author keenly asserts an interesting feature of
the Persian Gulf’s states: “Not to live in a villa or a bayt sha’bi (not to have one’s own
walls, in brief) is to be less than fully a citizen.”326 Gulf Arabs frequently perceive
residency for outside individuals to be only temporary. What, then, can we say ofnationality? “The smaller polities of the Gulf may be seen as ‘ethnocracies,’ in which all
citizens enjoy a certain privileged status, and the distinctive identity of citizens isprotected in sometimes unusual ways.”327 “It also appears that Iran remains a threat to the
Arab states whether it is ruled by traditional conservatives, reformists, or
neoconservatives. According to a majority of Arab politicians, Iran is a trouble-making
country whose decision-makers always remain the same, whoever is in power.”328 While
Gulf Iranians may find economic success within either the United Arab Emirates or
Bahrain, they always run the risk of being associated with the present Iranian regime, or

325

Asha Shahir “Tabestan dar dubai; behest-e turistha o jahanom-e kargaran.” 25. July 2008.
Radio Farda.com. Available online<http://www.radiofarda.com/Article/2008/07/25/f5_dubai_summer.html>. Accessed 25. August 2008.
326
Paul Dresch, “Foreign Matter: The Place of Strangers in Gulf Society” in Globalization and the
Gulf eds. John Fox, Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mohammed al-Mutawa (New York: Routledge, 2006):
210.
327
Ibid., 203.
328
Mahjoob Zweiri, “Arab-Iranian Relations: New Realities?” in Iran’s Foreign Policy: From
Khatami to Ahmadinejad eds. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2008):
122.

95

failing that, not quite attaining citizenship rights and all the social and political benefits
which that entails to the same degree as their Gulf Arab neighbors and counterparts.

96

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
This thesis has explored a number of issues of the Gulf Iranians, those Iranian
expatriates living in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. We explored various theories
in an attempt to quantify the relationship between Gulf Iranians and the issue of politicaland social boundaries within the Persian Gulf Arab States. Oscar Martinez’ work has
shown us how within borderlands, relationships between individuals operate not so muchin black and white but a grey area as occupants of the two sides attempt to navigate at thefringes or peripheries of society. Eric Hobsbawm’s theory builds upon Martinez byshowing how society from the core attempts to define identity in its terms, rather thanthose of the borderlander, as it tries to thwart hybridized, impure society. Edward Said’s
work firmly illustrates how demonization of the other culture takes place within the
struggle to demarcate one society from another. When such factors are combined, we
have the needed tools to analyze the shifting calculus of borders between Iranian andGulf Arab society, and how they are played out with Gulf Iranians in particular at theedge or forefront of both groups. We also see the consequences of Western-imposed
ideas of territoriality and citizenship upon the two populations with as yet unresolved
disputes over what constitutes Arab or Iranian land or even identity. Surprisingly, welearned how individuals on the periphery can shape their own destinies and makeindependent, conscious decisions more so than their counterparts in the core inland areas
to operate on one side of a boundary or another.
The second section, specifically focusing on identity in Chapters Three and Four,has outlined three major subgroups within the Gulf Iranian community: the Huwala, the97‘Ajam, and the Baluch. It explored the various origins of the three distinct subgroups andtheir original connections and origins to Iran and each other. It has delved into theirvarious socioeconomic strata and professional roles within the Persian Gulf Arab States.
Further, it has assessed a case common to members of all three groups, the Bidoon, andshown the implications their status has for Gulf Iranian integration into Gulf Arabsociety. We have learned about the distinctive clothing choices Gulf Iranians make within
Gulf Arab society, their political inclinations, and the potential repercussions that result
from such choices. We also have explored the role of Gulf Iranian women living within
the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, including professional roles they occupy and thevarious options they exercise towards social mobility in the two states, as throughmarriage. Women’s choice of dress also plays a factor in establishing their identities
within Gulf Arab society.
Upon examining the above factors determining identity, we have also exploredthe various Gulf Iranian migration waves to the Persian Gulf Arab States since the mid tolate 19th century. We have discovered common themes of how various forms ofmodernization within Iran have played a significant factor in the choices of eachsuccessive wave or generation to consciously choose life on the southern shores of the
Persian Gulf. During the first wave of migration, we learned how increased taxation
facilitated an exodus of Huwala merchants from southern Iranian ports such as Lengeh toother Gulf pearling ports during the turn of the century. The second migration wave has
shown us how many religiously-inclined Gulf Iranians including both Huwala and ‘Ajam
individuals opted to move towards more traditionally organized Muslim ports rather than

98

accept stringent Western clothing guidelines and other restrictions on their existing wayof life. Gulf Iranians during the third migration wave were motivated again by economic
incentives, especially the promise of greater income and job opportunities within theseoil-producing states. We also glimpsed how military conscription played a factor in someindividuals’ choices to opt for life in the Gulf Arab states prior to the 1979 Iranian
Revolution. During the fourth and most recent migration wave, we observed how
revolution and war led many Gulf Iranians to join their peers across the waters for a newlife. Each of the successive migration waves have built upon each another, there being
overlap in the rationale for this Iranian emigration.
We also learned about Gulf Arabs and the identity issues particular to them. In
Bahrain, we discovered two main divisions within Bahraini society, between a majority
Shi’i population and a minority Sunni one. We also learned about the diversity withineach community; whether it was between indigenous island Shi’a and their Peninsularpeers, or tribally-organized Sunni, such as the Al Khalifa, versus their urban neighbors.
We examined why Sunni Arab identity is important for the existing Bahraini government
in its attempts to monopolize its control over the archipelago and counteract the island’slong association with Iran and an entrenched indigenous Shi’i population. In contrast, welearned about the distinct nature of the United Arab Emirates in its confederation of sevensmaller emirates. Such a confederation, with a more diverse Sunni population along witha relatively small Shi’i community overall, has appeared more welcoming to Gulf
Iranians in comparison with Bahrain. Our historical analysis of Iranian-Emirati ties shows

99

the varying relations between the separate emirates and Iran, ranging from warm (Dubai)
to more tense (Ras al-Khaimah).
Finally, we briefly explored some of the contributions made by Gulf Iranians to
Bahraini and Emirati society in Chapter Five. We learned about some of the prominent
individuals and families within Gulf Iranian subgroups and the imprints they have madein their newly adopted countries. We have ascertained the level of success of some of theabove individuals in attaining important government positions and influence as well as
the variety of roles they play in Persian Gulf Arab States. We began to discover theextent of distinct Gulf Iranian communities such as the Awasir and Bastakiyah, theirarchitectural contributions to Gulf Arab society, and how they have shaped the urban
character of Manama and Dubai. We discovered how specific Iranian religious traditions
have shaped and influenced Shi’i society and tradition within Bahrain. We also learned
about the limitations of life within Gulf Arab society, such as alienation from the Gulf
Arab populace as well as the loss which Gulf Iranians feel upon departure from their
homeland.
Undoubtedly, there is both a need and room for more research regarding the Gulf
Iranian community, including a focus on Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. More in-depth,
anthropological work focusing on the Huwala, ‘Ajam, or Baluch subgroups or otherIranians is needed. It is this author’s hope that this research will spur further studies anddebate regarding Gulf Iranians and their relations with Gulf Arabs. It also has aimed to
downplay any notions of a uniform, Iranian society driven only by revolutionary zeal andexpansionist ideals. By exploring the grey areas between the various Gulf denizens, this100

thesis has aspired to bridge the gap between modern Iranian and Arab studies towards afield of Persian Gulf Studies inclusive of both sides. It is at the shifting boundaries andperipheries of societies and nations where we find some of the most interesting processesof interaction, negotiation, and questioning taking place. The Gulf Iranians are evidenceof such boundaries.

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APPENDIX A – LIST OF GULF IRANIAN FAMILIES BY SUBGROUP
Huwala individual family references
Name
Al-Ali (UAQ)
Al-Awadi (Bahrain)
Al-Gurg (Dubai)
Al-Hajiri (Sharjah)(Al-)Kaziruni (Bahrain)*
Al-Khaja (Sharjah)
Al-Mulla (Dubai)
Al-Serkal (Sharjah)
Ali Reza (Bahrain)
Almoayed (Bahrain)

Bastaki (Bahrain)
Darwish (Bahrain, Qatar, Dubai, Ajman, UAQ)
Daylami (Bahrain)
Eshaq (Bahrain)*Fakhro (Bahrain, Qatar)

Kanoo (Bahrain)

Khunji (Bahrain)
Kuhiji (Bahrain)
Matar (Bahrain)
Qasimi (Sharjah, RAK)
Safar (Bahrain)*
Zaruni (Sharjah)* = Referenced under more than one subgroup
UAQ = Umm al-Quwain
RAK = Ras al-Khaimah

Reference and Page Number
Mojtahed-Zadeh 67; Van Der
Meulen 223
Peterson 63
Al-Gurg; Davidson 156; Field 76;
Onley 79; Van Der Meulen 198-99
Van Der Meulen 223-24
Dresch 58; Field 76; Fuccaro 2005:
48-50; Khuri 160-61
Van Der Meulen 223-24
Van Der Meulen 198-99
Van Der Meulen 223-24
Anthony 56; Izzard 107, 114
Anthony 56; Dresch 254; Field 75;
Izzard 106-10, 112, 114-16; Lawson
54-55, 77, 90; Peterson 63
Dresch 58; Fuccaro 2005: 46
Anthony 56; Field 76; Long 15; Van
Der Meulen 198-99
Dresch 58
Field 76; Izzard 106-07, 111, 115
Anthony 56; Dresch 254; Field 75;
Izzard 106, 109, 115; Lawson 77, 90;
Long 14; Lorimer 754; Peterson 63
Anthony 56; Dresch 254; Field 75;
Izzard 106-10; Lawson 54-55, 90;
Long 14; Onley 62-63; Peterson 63;
Rumaihi 131
Dresch 58
Dresch 58
Peterson 63
Mojtahed-Zadeh 67; Van Der
Meulen 223-24
Fuccaro 2005: 43, 45, 48; Onley 6264, 68
Van Der Meulen 223-24

102

APPENDIX A – LIST OF GULF IRANIAN FAMILIES BY SUBGROUP‘Ajam individual family references
Name
Abdullatif (Dubai)*
Al-Abudi (Sharjah)
Al-Ansari (Dubai)
Al-Fardan (Bahrain; Dubai)
Al-Tajir (Dubai)
Aryan (Bahrain)
Badri (Dubai)*Bushihri (Bahrain)
Diwani (Bahrain)
Farsi (Bahrain)
Fikri (Dubai)*
Galadari (Dubai)
Ghulam Abbas (Dubai)*
Sayigh (Bahrain; Dubai)* = Referenced under more than one subgroup
UAQ = Umm al-Quwain
RAK = Ras al-Khaimah

Reference and Page NumberDavidson 73
Van Der Meulen 223-24
Davidson 73; Van Der Meulen 19899
Van Der Meulen 198-99
Al-Alkim 50, Van Der Meulen 19899
Nakhleh 158, 160
Davidson 73
Fuccaro 2005: 44, 46-50; Khuri 160
Field 76
Fuccaro 2005: 46
Davidson 73; Field 76
Field 76; Van Der Meulen 198-99
Davidson 73
Van Der Meulen 198-99

103

APPENDIX A – LIST OF GULF IRANIAN FAMILIES BY SUBGROUP
Unknown Background
Name
Ahwazi (Bahrain)
Al-Awadi (Fujairah—related to Bahrain Awadi?)
Al-Jakkah (RAK)
Al-Kharji (UAQ)
Al-Raqbani (Fujairah)
Al-Saffarini (RAK)
Al-Sharafa (Ajman)
Al-Zarb (Bahrain)
Ariyan (Bahrain)
Bahruzian (Fujairah)
Beder (Bahrain)
Beljik (Bahrain)
Dawani (Bahrain)—same as Diwani?
Husayn Banna’ (Bahrain)
Isfandiyar (Bahrain)
Khoory (Dubai)
Murtaza (UAQ)
Naboodah (Dubai)
Natafji (Fujairah)
Rostamani (Dubai)
Ruyan (Bahrain)
Sa’ati (Bahrain)
Shahin (Fujairah)
Sharif (Fujairah—related to Bahrain Sharif?)
Sharif (Bahrain)
Shekib (Bahrain)
Shirazi (Bahrain)

UAQ = Umm al-Quwain
RAK = Ras al-Khaimah

Reference and Page Number
Fuccaro 2005: 46
Van Der Meulen 254
Van Der Meulen 233
Van Der Meulen 266-67
Van Der Meulen 254
Van Der Meulen 233
Van Der Meulen 260
Onley 62-63
Fuccaro 2005: 50
Van Der Meulen 254
Fuccaro 2005: 47
Fuccaro 2005: 47
Fuccaro 2005: 47
Fuccaro 2005: 50
Fuccaro 2005: 47
Field 76
Van Der Meulen 266-67
Al-Alkim 44; Field 76
Van Der Meulen 254
Field 76
Fuccaro 2005: 50
Fuccaro 2005: 50
Van Der Meulen 254
Van Der Meulen 254
Fuccaro 2005: 48; Onley 73
Fuccaro 2005: 50
Fuccaro 2005: 46

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