FULL REPORTInternational Security
in 2045
Exploring Futures for Peace,
Security and Disarmament
SARAH GRAND-CLÉMENT

Acknowledgments
Support from UNIDIR’s core funders provides the foundation for all of the Institute’s activities. The
preparation of this joint report has been supported by generous funding to UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme by the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, and by Microsoft.
The author wishes to thank the members of the project team, Dr. Giacomo Persi Paoli and Harry Deng,for their invaluable inputs, insights, and overall teamwork during the creation of the scenarios and subsequent data collection activities, as well as to Elia Duran-Smith for her support with the interviews.
Particular thanks also go to all members of the expert group who graciously provided their time andexpertise and who were central to the creation of the final set of future scenarios. The author is also
grateful to all who took part in the workshops and interviews, and extends particular thanks to Amb.
Rose Gottemoeller from the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Dr. Andrew Reddie
and Leah Walker from the Berkeley Risk and Security Lab for hosting the first workshop. Last but notleast, thanks go to the reviewers of the report: Alexandra Hall, Manuel Martinez Miralles, Dr. Giacomo
Persi Paoli, Dr. Andrew Reddie, and Dr. Beyza Unal.

About UNIDIRThe United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous
institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament,
UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Basedin Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas
needed to find solutions to critical security problems.

Note
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning thelegal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of
its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its
staff members, or sponsors.

CitationGrand-Clément, Sarah. 2023. “International Security in 2045: Exploring Futures for Peace, Security
and Disarmament”. UNIDIR: Geneva.

Cover Image: © Louis Maniquet / Unsplash, 2018.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 52AuthorSarah Grand-Clément
Researcher, Conventional Arms and Ammunition, Security
and Technology
Sarah Grand-Clément is a Researcher in the Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme and the
Security and Technology Programme of UNIDIR. Her work examines the intersection of technology
and conventional arms, exploring both the benefits, as well as the challenges and threats technology
can pose to international security. Sarah also has expertise in the use of futures methodologies as away to help explore policy issues, in particular the use of horizon scanning, serious gaming and futurescenarios. She holds an MSc in Arab World Studies from Durham University.

Project Team
Giacomo Persi Paoli
Head, Security and Technology
Dr. Giacomo Persi Paoli is the Head of the Security and Technology Programme at UNIDIR. His expertisespans the science and technology domain with emphasis on the implications of emerging technologies
for security and defence. Before joining UNIDIR, Giacomo was Associate Director at RAND Europe
where he led the defence and security science, technology and innovation portfolio as well as RAND’s
Centre for Futures and Foresight Studies. He holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Rome,
Italy, and a Master’s degree in political science from the University of Pisa, Italy.

Harry Deng
Consultant, Security and Technology
Harry Deng is a Consultant for the Security and Technology Programme at UNIDIR, where his work
focuses on the international security implications of emerging technologies. He holds a Master’s
degree in global governance from the University of Waterloo, where he is currently a PhD candidate.
Follow Harry on Twitter @hwrdeng.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 53Acronyms & Abbreviations
AI

Artificial Intelligence

CSO

Civil society organization

GGE

Group of Governmental Experts

NSA

Non-State actor

O EWG

Open-ended Working GroupSDGS

Sustainable Development Goals

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

4

Contents
Executive Summary

6

1.

Introduction

11

1.1

Value of Foresight to International Security

11

1.2

Purpose and Scope of the Project		

13

1.3

Methodology

16

1.4

Report Structure

16

2.

Providing the Setting: Unpacking the Future Scenarios

17

2.1

Future Scenarios Overview

18

2.2

Workshop Reactions to the Scenarios

19

2.2.1

Waiting for Godot

20

2.2.2

Paradise Lost

21

2.2.3

A Modern Utopia

21

2.2.4

War and Peace

22

2.2.5

Fragmented Fault Lines

23

3.

Identifying the Issue: Threats to International Peace and Security

24

3.1

Future and Relevance of the United Nations System

25

3.2

Trust among States and in Institutions

28

3.3

The Disarmament Machinery

29

3.4

Role of Non-State Actors in International Relations

31

3.5

Role of Regional and Subregional Entities in International Relations

35

3.6

Technology and Innovation

36

3.7

Non-Traditional Threats to Peace and Security

37

3.8

Key Takeaways

37

4.

Dealing with the Threats: Possible Pathways for Action

38

4.1

Issue-Specific Pathways for Action

38

4.2

General Purpose and Cross-Cutting Pathways for Action

45

4.3

Key Takeaways from the Pathways for Action

46

5.

Preparing for the Future: The Way Ahead

48

References

49

Annex 1. Detailed Pathways for Action

51

Annex 2. Expert Participation

65

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5

Executive Summary
Threats to peace that relate to arms control and disarmament have a direct impact on the future of international peace and security, as well as to the achievement of all Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs). Discussions regarding arms control and disarmament at the multilateral level are largely—
though not always—focused on current issues, and are often reactive – rather than proactive – in
response to specific threats or evolutions in behaviour or technology. There is also limited space outsideof set processes to discuss broader threats, interlinkages, and anticipatory action. The use of foresight
to examine international security, and specifically issues of arms control and disarmament, can help
our collective preparedness to deal with upcoming unpredictability and to increase our resilience in theface of it. It can also make relevant stakeholders consider what actions are available today and could betaken to mitigate or avoid unwanted futures, and pave the path for preferred futures.
This report presents the findings of a foresight study which utilized future scenarios as a method to
explore potential future challenges, focusing on threats to international security linked to arms
control and disarmament, with a view to identifying options for actions available today to mitigate
the identified challenges.
The threats identified via engagement with a range of stakeholders can be divided across seven
themes:
FUTURE AND RELEVANCE

TRUST AMONG STATESTHE DISARMAMENT

ROLE OF NSAs IN

OF THE UNITED NATIONSAND IN INSTITUTIONSMACHINERY

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSROLE OF REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONALTECHNOLOGYNON-TRADITIONAL THREATS

ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSAND INNOVATIONTO PEACE AND SECURITY

While the themes and their associated threats are not exhaustive, they demonstrate not only therelevance and primacy of the United Nations to arms control and disarmament, but also the range ofchallenges to be addressed, from strategic to operational issues.
This report also provides possible pathways for action for each of the threats identified. The following
pages outline both the threats and provide a summary overview of the pathways for action.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

6

1.

Uneven distribution of power and lack of inclusiveness within decision-making structures
a. Revitalize discussions on Security Council reformb. Engage more closely with the regional levelc. Ensure diversity in delegations

2.

Member States withdrawing from meaningful multilateral engagementa. Devolve more decision-making to the regional level

3.

Ability to cope with the acceleration and intersection of crises and issues
a. Keep track of changing attitudes, norms, and circumstances to quickly adapt or react to themb. Consider the limitations of institutional or process mandatesc. Create opportunities to deepen substantive discussions
d. Approach issues from a broader lense. Streamline the disarmament agendaf.

Increase the transparency about successes and failures

g. Enable greater feedback loops
4.

Over-politicization of issues within the United Nations
a. Maintain impartiality

5.

Divisions or competition between Member Statesa. Ensure that multilateral mechanisms remain in placeb. Create incentive-based coalitions
c. Reflect upon the consensus decision-making system

6.

Weakening of States or their authority in international relations→

See pathways for action under Issues 1 (Uneven distribution of power and lack of inclusiveness within deci-sion-making structures), 2 (Member States withdrawing from meaningful multilateral engagement), 3 (Ability tocope with the acceleration and intersection of crises and issues), and 12 (Tensions between the roles of private
sector actors and those of States at the international level).

7.

Low or lack of trust between Member States→ See pathways for action under Issue 5 (Divisions or competition between Member States).

8.

Low or lack of trust in the United Nations
a. Rethink the issues that the United Nations is best placed to address
b. Improve external communications

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 57

9.

Lack of adequate responses to non-compliancea. Re-examine incentives
b. Strengthen resources for implementation and enforcementc. Enable greater enforcement mechanisms
d. Make compliance a whole-of-society responsibility
e. Ensure transparency and legitimacy of assessments of possible non-compliancef.

Emphasize the benefits of complianceg. Encourage norm-building within regional groups or blocks of Statesh. Enhance the role of regional disarmament centresi.

Engage with communities working in related areas

10. Arms build-up as a way to bolster security
a. Reinvigorate diplomatic relations
b. Change the narrative around deterrencec. Encourage and improve transparency around spending and weaponsd. Employ confidence building mechanisms
e. Ensure robust arms control treaties are maintainedf.

Decrease economic reliance on weapons production

g. Engage with national or local-level actors
h. Prioritize human security
11. Weak rules-based ordera. Hold open and honest discussions around the current orderb. Engage with regional and subregional actors
c. Ensure national and international organizations have sufficient resources
d. Enhance data on arms control and disarmament issues
12. Tensions between the roles of private sector actors and those of States at the international
level
a. Maintain role of States in policy- and norm-making
b. Enhance public-private partnerships
c. Reinforce international law-based frameworks
d. Encourage multistakeholder dialogues in arms control and disarmament mechanisms
13. Difficulty in aligning interests between private and public actors
a. Encourage initiatives and incentive structures that drive closer alignment between the private
sector with Statesb. Focus on individuals in addition to the entitiesc. Update regulations on private sector involvement

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

8

14. Marginalization of NSAs in international relations
a. Recognize the strengths of NSA inclusion
b. Improve NSA representation at the national levelc. Streamline the approval process for NSA accreditationd. Improve mechanisms for NSA participation in processes
e. Improve processes for geographically diverse NSA participationf.

Consider a partnership model to enhance collaboration

15. Lack of sufficient inclusion and use of regional and subregional entities
a. Include subregional and even local entities as well as regional onesb. Empower regional and subregional entities in arms control and disarmamentc. Develop a clear capacity-building strategy
d. Improve coordination between, and participation of, entities
16. Balancing between regulating technology and enabling innovation
a. Clarify the narrative
b. Enhance anticipatory governancec. Consider using more dynamic and flexible approaches as part of technological governance
17. Access and control of technology and the consequences thereofa. Hold regular discussions on technological issues
b. Provide support to Statesc. Develop better export control regimes and pathways to share technologies
18. Insufficient preparation for non-traditional threatsa. Improve the involvement of a wider set of actors
b. Learn from cross-cutting successesc. Create instruments which are adaptable to future change
d. Focus on the 2030 Agenda and beyond
e. Improve the use of mitigation and early warning mechanismsf.

Re-examine concepts such as peace and conflict

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9These pathways for action are not recommendations, but rather aim to provide a range of ideas that
could be further discussed and developed with a broad range of stakeholders, both within and outsideof the United Nations. As shown by the range of pathways for action, it is not possible to address threats
to international security as it relates to weapons and disarmament only; to enable progress in theseareas requires action in many other domains and more broadly, portraying the interlinked nature ofmany of these threats as well as the possible pathways for action.
In addition to these pathways for action, the following elements should also be taken into account:•

The varying time frames that exist to address and enact the various proposed pathways for action;some of the pathways for action can be addressed rapidly but, for many, the pace of change will belengthy and slow.

•

Many of the pathways for action would require multiple stakeholders to achieve.

•

Broader normative concepts are necessary for these pathways for action to be successful. This
notably includes trust, transparency, solidarity, and accountability, which underpin the elements
noted as providing a way forward.

•

Causality may be difficult to attribute, particularly if several pathways for action are employed in conjunction, in addition to other extraneous developments. This may make it difficult to identify areas ofgood practice.

New York, USA, 2005: "Non-Violence" A gift from the Government of Luxembourg
presented to the United Nations in 1988. Credit: © UN PhotoI N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

101. Introduction
The world is currently witnessing a number

ambiguity and even instability with great powerof interlinked and reinforcing trends: unprec-competition;4 and a resurgence of threats

edented technological developments whichand behaviours from the past.5 These are all

are driving the transformation of societies;1

examples of factors that present new risks anda worsening of the climate crisis;2 renewed

opportunities to global peace and security.

geo-political tensions;3 increased strategic

1.1 Value of Foresight to International Security
It is within this context that, in 2021, the Unitedpolicy briefs expanding on elements contained

Nations

in Our Common Agenda. These briefs include:

Secretary-Generalreleased

Our

Common Agenda, a new vision for multilateralism, aiming to “get the world back on track by•actions to address increasingly compound-turbocharging action on the Sustainable Devel-

ed—as well as new—challenges to peace

opment Goals [SDGs]”. Our Common Agenda
6and security;

identifies 12 areas requiring multilateral action
to be achieved, which notably includes a call fora Summit of the Future to discuss and agree on•technologies

commitments.

and ahead of the Summit of the Future plannedfor 2024, the Secretary-General issued 11

Global Digital Compact, which proposesmeasures to enjoy the benefits of digitalactions and steps to meet existing international

Following the release of Our Common Agenda

A New Agenda for Peace, which considers

while

also

safeguarding

against their misuse;•

International Financial Architecture, which
proposes reforms of the international
financial architecture as a way to aid the implementation of the SDGs; and1

United Nations, “UN Secretary-General’s Strategy On New Technologies”, 2018, https://www.un.org/en/newtechnologies/
images/pdf/SGs-Strategy-on-New-Technologies.pdf.

2“Climate Change: A Threat to Human Wellbeing and Health of the Planet. Taking Action Now Can Secure Our Future”, IPCC,
28 February 2022, https://www.ipcc.ch/2022/02/28/pr-wgii-ar6/.

3

United Nations, “A New Agenda for Peace: Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 9”, 2023, https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/
files/our-common-agenda-policy-brief-new-agenda-for-peace-en.pdf.

4“Launching New Agenda for Peace Policy Brief, Secretary-General Urges States to ‘Preserve Our Universal Institution’ amid
Highest Level of Geopolitical Tension in Decades”, United Nations, 20 July 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2023/sgsm21885.
doc.htm.

5

For example, as relates to risk of nuclear weapons use; see “Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use Higher Than at Any Time Since
Cold War, Disarmament Affairs Chief Warns Security Council”, United Nations, 31 March 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2023/
sc15250.doc.htm; United Nations, “A New Agenda for Peace”.
6

United Nations, “Our Common Agenda”, 2021, https://www.un.org/en/common-agenda.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

11•

United Nations 2.0, which aims to modernize

which can be used to enable individuals andthe United Nations through a “Quintet ofgroups to think about the future in a structured

Change”, notably via embedding and in-

way and to help manage uncertainty. These

creasing the use of innovation, foresight,

methods also help users consider the different

and behavioural science. This policy brief

and complex interconnections and interactions

in particular builds upon the focus placed bythat shape a given context. Therefore, as the

Our Common Agenda on the importance of

future will always remain unpredictable, the aim

futures and foresight to support the work of

is not to try to predict the future but to become

the United Nations.

better prepared to deal with upcoming unpre-

Foresight and futures methods have alreadybeen employed within the United Nations: for

dictability and to increase our resilience in theface of it.

example, the United Nations Development

Overall, these methods can be used to help

Programme has developed a manual intended

decision makers with their preparedness,for stakeholders in

reinforce their ability

developing countries

to consider the future

to demonstrate how
foresight
to

can

help

implement

theSDGs.7

However,the use of such approaches have been
more limited in areas
relating

to

peace

and security within

Scenarios are not projections, predictions,or preferences; rather, they are coherent
and credible alternative stories about the
future. They are designed to help [entities]
challenge their assumptions, develop theirstrategies, and test their plans.
Cornelius et al. (2005)

the United Nations,which namely include deliberative bodies of the
Security Council and the General Assembly,and United Nations structures and activities in
the form of conflict prevention, peacekeeping,peacebuilding, countering terrorism, and disar-in all its complexity,
and aid them to create
more resilient and future-proof plans andpolicies.
A

wide

range

of

futures and foresightmethods exist to help
in this endeavour.8
One such method is the creation of a range ofdifferent future scenarios, which showcase
multidimensional and multifaceted alternatives of the future. Future scenarios are meant
to be used as simulations of possible futures,mament.

to explore how certain aspects may develop,

The use of foresight and other future-focused

the most well-known cases of use has been bymethods offers a range of advantages. Futures

Shell, which has been using future scenariosand foresight methods represent a set of tools

since the 1970s, and which have been credited

and identify potential areas for action. One of

7

UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence, “Foresight Manual: Empowered Futures for the 2030 Agenda”, 5 February
2018, https://www.undp.org/publications/foresight-manual-empowered-futures.

8

Popper (2008) provides an exhaustive overview of a range of qualitative, quantitative and semi-quantitative foresight methods;
Popper, R. (2008). “How Are Foresight Methods Selected?”, Foresight, 10(6), 62–89. doi:10.1108/14636680810918586, p. 66.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

12

with anticipating changes to global energyorganizations, to international and regional9

and their possible impacts to the company.

entities, such as the Organization for Economic

Beyond Shell and other private sector actors,

Cooperation and Development and the Joint

future scenarios have since been employed byUnited Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, asa range of institutions, from non-governmental

well as national governments.

1.2 Purpose and Scope of the Project
To provide a more future-focused approach toleast desirable futures. Specifically, the projectinternational security that also corresponds

sought to:to the goals of Our Common Agenda and canhelp support the upcoming Summit of the•the state of the world in 2045—the United

Future,10 UNIDIR undertook a project to explore

Nations’ 100th anniversary (see Section 1.3

potential future challenges, focusing on

for further details on the methodology);

threats to international security linked toarms control and disarmament, with a viewto identifying options for actions available•

and the United Nations, with a specific focus
on global challenges and threats to peaceThis project aligns with A New Agenda forand security that pertain to arms control andPeace, one of the policy briefs providing further
Agenda. Specifically, A New Agenda for Peacementions that, to achieve lasting peace andprosperity, “we must adapt to the geopoliticalrealities of today and the threats of tomorrow”.11
This aligns with the project goals to explore
what some of these future threats might beand explore what could be done to avoid theunderstand what these different futurescenarios entail for international security

today to mitigate the identified challenges.

detail on the proposals within Our Common

develop plausible future scenarios depicting

disarmament;12 and•identify pathways for action to help address
threats to peace and security relating toarms control and disarmament within thecontext of the United Nations, to serve as
initial points of reflection and discussion
starters to improve or address the threats
identified.

9Peter Cornelius, Alexander Van de Putte, and Mattia Romani, “Three Decades of Scenario Planning in Shell”, California Management Review 48, no. 1 (2005): 92–109, doi:10.2307/41166329.

10

One of the calls by the United Nations Secretary-General in Our Common Agenda was for a Summit of the Future, to “forge a
new global consensus on what our future should look like, and what we can do today to secure it” (United Nations, “Our Common
Agenda”, 5). The Summit of the Future is planned for 2024 based on General Assembly resolution A/RES/76/307.
11

United Nations, “A New Agenda for Peace”, 11.

12

While the terms ‘arms control’ and ‘disarmament’ can tend to be used interchangeably, they do refer to different outcomes.
Disarmament involves removing access and use of weapons, while arms control is about ensuring weapons access, management, and use is for legitimate use and users and not in excessive amounts. Additionally, the use of the term ‘disarmamentmachinery’ in this report and beyond refers to both disarmament and arms control and relates to all weapon types—conventional, of mass destruction, and new technology.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

13

Given the potential for an extremely large

threats (e.g., inter-State conflict, armed

scope, three main steps were taken to ensure

violence, terrorism, etc.), both natural andthat this study remained feasible, as well as

those caused by humans.

aligned with UNIDIR’s focus and mission. First,
regional and subregional challenges were con-•within a region against existential risks,sidered at the macro level. In other words, while

to include both natural threats and thoseit was not possible to examine or reference

caused by humans, including the ability to

specific country- or regional-level issues, thecooperate and address risks and threats

aim was to ensure that their broader impacts
were captured, as much as possible, at themacro level.
Second, the study sought to provide a framingfor ‘international security’. There are manydifferent definitions of this concept, and thus
providing a central framing helped ensure thatthe chosen definition aligned with ultimate
project goal. As a starting point, the project
team followed the description of the First
Committee, which focuses on “disarmament,
global challenges and threats to peace that
affect the international community and seeks
out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime”.13 To aid in the analysisof threats, the project team then further broke
down the concept of international security
into four levels, which all feed into each other,
to create a nested concept of international
security. These levels are as follows.
•

Human security: The security of individuals, which entails being protected from bothmilitary and non-military threats.14•

National security: The ability of States
to exercise their sovereignty and ensure
the safety and protection of people andsocieties against external and internal

13

Regional security: The security of States

within a regional group.
•

Global security: The security and resilienceof the international system against existential risks, to include both natural threats andthose caused by humans.

Third, even with this multi-level definition,
the concept of international security remains
broad and encompasses a multitude of issues.
Therefore, the project specifically focuses on
issues relating to arms control and disarmament within the larger concept of international security. Additionally, while we acknowledge that multilateralism extends beyond theUnited Nations, it should also be noted thatthe focus and scope of the study and thisreport is on the United Nations, and therefore
specifically on threats to the work of the United
Nations in the area of multilateral arms control
and disarmament.
However, it should be noted that while thisreport focuses specifically on issues related
to arms control and disarmament within international security, the project and futurescenarios can be employed to consider otherissues related to international security, suchas conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, humanitarian aid, counter-terrorism,

See https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/.

14

Definition adapted from General Assembly resolution 66/290. It should be noted that human-centred approaches are also
highlighted in A New Agenda for Peace, which notably emphasizes the need for human-centred disarmament and more consideration on the human cost of weapons and ways to reduce this cost.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

14

organized crime and more. Figure 1 visualiz-figure below demonstrates how the different

es the system thinking behind the approach,elements within international security are

and how other elements of international

shaped by the broader system within which

security that could be explored. Overall, thethey exist.

Figure 1. The System Thinking behind the Use of Future Scenarios

HIGH-LEVEL FACTORS SHAPING THE WIDER SYSTEM(e.g., attitude towards multilateralism, commitment to a rules-based order, resilience of nation States)

MID-LEVEL FACTORSSCENARIO(e.g., trust in institutions, nature of interstate relationships, technology governance and weaponization)

CREATION

FACTORS SPECIFIC TO PEACE AND CONFLICT(e.g., attitude towards conﬂict or dispute resolutionprevalence of conﬂict, conﬂict intensity)

Understanding the different
ways in which conﬂicts may
be waged in the future, inother words, the various“battleﬁelds of the future”

Identifying the different
threats posed to the work of
the United Nations on arms
control and disarmament

Examining how the future ofpeace and conﬂict mightchange and challenge
approaches to peacebuilding

RANGE OF ELEMENTS WHICH CAN BE EXAMINED VIA A SIMILAR SET OF SCENARIOSThis report is primarily aimed at Member Statesthat so many of these issues are interlinked withand the diplomatic community, United Nations

others, such as climate change, development,

personnel, and civil society representatives

health, economics and more, the study likely

working on issues related to security and threats

may also have relevance to a broader range ofto peace, arms control and disarmament, andstakeholders, including private sector actors.

conflict and conflict prevention. However, given

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15

1.3 Methodology
This project comprised three main activi-

assessed against each other to subsequently

ties. First, there was the development of theform sets of future scenarios.16

future scenarios between September 2022
and March 2023. A structured methodology was used to develop the future scenarios,
which was supported by a series of consultations with a core group of 15 subject matter
experts, each with their own areas of expertise.15 The use of a sufficiently large and diverse
expert group, in addition to the design of theconsultative process itself, which aggregatedviews without seeking to give particular inputs
dominance over others, sought to mitigate any
potential subjectivity and biases on the part ofthe experts. The scenarios themselves wereconstructed through a multi-step approach
which included identifying elements, or factors,
that comprise the world we live in, from which
a set of particularly relevant and central factors
were identified. Different future developmentsof these short-listed factors were defined andSecond, these scenarios were then used as abasis for workshop discussions. In total, five
workshops were held between April and June
2023. These brought together over 60 participants representing a range of United Nations
entities and Member States, as well as representatives from academia, civil society, and theprivate sector.
Third, 22 targeted interviews were conducted
to assess, augment, refine, and validate
the pathways for actions emerging from theworkshop discussions, a process supplemented by consultation of relevant literature anddata. A separate publication details the methodology and can be read in parallel to this report;that publication also contains all elements comprising the individual scenarios.17

1.4 Report Structure
Following this introductory chapter, the report

threats identified (Chapter 4) before providing

introduces the future scenarios which wereseveral overarching and concluding remarks

used to prompt discussion about future threats(Chapter 5). Annex 1 provides further detail on

and pathways for action (Chapter 2), before

the pathways for action, while Annex 2 contains

detailing the main themes which emerged frominformation on participation by experts in thisthe discussion and delving into the threats iden-

project.

tified (Chapter 3). The report then examines
the possible pathways for action based on the

15This included experts internal to UNIDIR, as well as external experts with expertise outside of disarmament.

16

For further information, please consult the methodology report which explains the creation of the future scenarios in moredetail. Grand-Clément, S., “International Security in 2045: The methodology behind the future scenarios,” 2024.
17

Ibid.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

16

New York, USA, 2022: “Peace Monument” sculpture at right of the Secretariat building at UN Headquarters.
Credit: © UN Photo/Rick Bajornas

2. Providing the Setting: Unpacking
the Future Scenarios
The five future scenarios created as part of theopportunities for international security withinproject were intended as tools to enable dis-these different contexts. This section provides

cussion regarding the threats to internationala brief overview of the five scenarios, with thepeace and security, and pathways for action.

full narrative available in the parallel publi-

As international security does not happen in acation focused on the methodology behindvacuum (as shown in Figure 1), the scenarios

the scenarios, as well as an overview of theseek to describe various states of the world in

overall reactions to these scenarios from the2045, acting as a basis to explore threats andworkshops.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

17

2.1 Future Scenarios Overview
Figure 2 provides an overview of the main

emerging from the analysis in context. However,elements comprising each of the five future

it is recommended to read the scenario narra-

scenarios. These elements provide only atives to understand the nuances and complexi-

snapshot of the scenarios and their complex-

ties of each scenario.

ity, and are intended to help place the themes

Figure 2. Overview of Some of the Main Elements of Each Future Scenario
WA I T I N G F O R

PA R A D I S E

A MODERN

WA R A N D

FRAGMENTED

GODOT

LOST

UTOPIAPEACEFA U LT L I N E S

Polarity andAuthority ofStates have

Harmonious

World isWorld isattitude toStates in decline,

lost interest in

relations between

fragmented

fragmented

multilateralismwith underlying

international

multiple spheres

between two

between multiple

tensions

relations andof influencepoles of power

spheres ofrelations are

influencefragmented

Role of private

Very strong,

Decreased

Similar role andDecreased

Important andsector actors

leading, andinfluence

influence to that ofinfluence

influential rolein International

influential role

the early 2020s

Relations18

Level and type ofLocalized,

High intensity

Infrequent; if they

Conflict is

Few conflicts,

conflictfrequent,

conflicts abound,occur, they are

localized,

although theseprimarily underno willingness tolocalized

frequent, andtend to be inter-the threshold ofresolve theseprimarily low-

State withintensity

hostilities underarmed conflictthe threshold ofarmed conflict

Majority form

Democraticof national

backsliding

Authoritarianism

Democratization

Democratic

Democratization

backsliding

governanceLiveability ofLiveable in mostDecreased

More parts of

Decreased

Liveable in mostplanet Earthplacesliveability

Earth are liveable

liveability

placescompared to theearly 2020s

18

Within the scenarios, private sector actors are defined as private companies and industries only.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

18

2.2 Workshop Reactions to the Scenarios
Because our vision and opinions related to thewhich comprise the scenarios. Specifically, re-future are subjective, it can be hard to separate

spondents were asked to specify three aspects

what one wants to see happen versus what

per each projection: how similar they felt it was

one thinks might happen. To try and under-

to the current situation, how similar they felt it

stand which scenario might be the preferred

was to the expected future, and how similar

versus the predicted future, a questionnaire

they felt it was to their desired future. These

was shared with each registered workshop par-scores were then aggregated and assessed

ticipant, prior to sharing any information on

against the projections which belong to eachthe scenarios themselves. This questionnaire

scenario, resulting in the distribution presented

asked respondents to assess the projectionsin Figure 3.19

Figure 3. Mapping Scenarios Against Present Day, Expected Future, and Desired
Future71

66

32

WA I T ING F OR
GO DOT

MA T C H PERC EN TAGE

59

61

2

PARAD ISELOSTPRESENT DAY

34

23

95

A MO D E R N
U TO P I A

7370
WAR ANDPEACEEXPECTED FUTURE

15

74

65

48

FR A G ME N TE D
FA U LT LI N E SDESIRED FUTURE

19

A total of 34 questionnaires were completed (n=34). Of these, 62% were from United Nations respondents, 24% from Member
State representatives, 6% from academia, 3% from the public sector, 3% from a private–public entity, and 3% from the private
sector. The distribution by stakeholder type is therefore not equal or representative given certain stakeholders are overrepresented compared to others. Responses from geographical regions are also skewed when examining Member States represented;
for example, there were no responses from African State representatives, and only one response from the Latin American and
Caribbean States regional group, one from the Eastern Europe regional group, two from the Western European and other States,
and four from the Asia–Pacific regional group.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

19

The responses shown in Figure 3 demon-‘A Modern Utopia’ would require a significant

strate that respondents did not see one specificdeparture from our current approaches, means,

scenario matching the situation of the present

and methods.

day (which was April–June 2023 for the respondents). Similarly, there was no shared perspective from respondents on which scenario
would be the expected future. Interestingly, the ‘War and Peace’ scenario was seen, in
both instances, as closest to the present day
and expected future, albeit by a small margincompared to ‘Waiting for Godot’ and ‘Frag-

Finally, the least desired future other than‘Paradise Lost’ is ‘War and Peace’. However, as
noted above, it is this scenario which was seen
as most expected to unfold in the future, out of
the five presented.
This begs the question: how can we move away

mented Fault Lines’.

from these least desired yet most expected

Greater divergence occurs with regard to thedesired, yet least expected futures?

desired future; here, ‘A Modern Utopia’ shines
through as the clear preference, although
it is the least expected future. Conversely,‘Paradise Lost’, while being the least desired
future, scores highly when asked if it is the
expected future. There is a clear divergenceshown by respondents in terms of their desires
and expectations for the future, indicating thatthe pathway towards a desired future such astype of futures, and instead towards our most

A short summary of the reactions to eachof the scenarios is provided in the sections
below. These summaries notably include
the perception from participants as to the‘stability’—or lack therefore—in the scenario.
This refers to whether a scenario was seen as
being a permanent situation, or whether it wasperceived as a transitionary stage.

2.2.1 Waiting for Godot
Polarity and attitude to multilateralism

Authority of States in decline, with underlying tensions

Role of private sector actors in International Relations

Very strong, leading, and influential role

Level and type of conflict

Localized, frequent, primarily under the threshold of armed
conflict

Majority form of national governance

Democratic backsliding

Liveability of planet EarthLiveable in most places

The increased role of private sector actors in in-

relations, and States in which no such influential

ternational relations was perceived as a threat

private sector actors have emerged. However, it

by most workshop participants. This was due

was noted that States which do not have strong

to the perception that this could drive a divide

private sector actors leading the way in inter-between States in which influential private

national relations would have an incentive tosector actors (e.g., multinational corporations)cooperate and coordinate, notably to maintainemerge and which are relevant in international

relevance. This would eventually lead to a

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 520

two-sided system with the elite on the onethat this scenario as not stable. Rather, it washand, where private sector actors originate orseen as being a transitional phase that could,

are based, and the majority, which do not havefor example, take place before the ‘Paradisesuch strong or even any private sector actors in

Lost’ scenario.

international relations. Overall, the sense was

2.2.2 Paradise Lost
Polarity and attitude to multilateralism

States have lost interest in international relations and relations
are fragmented

Role of private sector actors in International Relations

Decreased influence

Level and type of conflict

High intensity conflicts abound, no willingness to resolve these

Majority form of national governance

Authoritarianism

Liveability of planet Earth

Decreased liveability

This was seen as the ‘worst’ possible scenario,

unsustainable, it was also noted that it would bewith many, if not all, aspects being negative.

hard to get out of such a scenario. There were

The United Nations was seen as not being

notably fears that drastic measures—such as

able to have a role in this future, with no ability

the use of weapons of mass destruction—could

to respond to the various crisis situations, andbe used to put an end to the constant cycle ofcurrent mechanisms inadequate or unableconflict and other issues plaguing this scenario,

to function in this type of future. While it wassuch as low trust and incohesive societies.

highlighted that this scenario is unstable and2.2.3 A Modern Utopia
Polarity and attitude to multilateralism

Harmonious relations between multiple spheres of influence

Role of private sector actors in International Relations

Similar role and influence to that of the early 2020s

Level and type of conflict

Infrequent; if they occur, they are localized

Majority form of national governance

Democratization

Liveability of planet Earth

More parts of Earth are liveable compared to the early 2020s

On the surface, this scenario was seen to beOverall, it was noted that despite the circum-

the ‘best’ outcome for the future of the fivestances being ideal, this scenario presents a

scenarios. However, there was overarch-

number of underlying risks, including potential

ing agreement that this scenario is not stable.

spoilers or exogenous threats that do not

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

21

depend on (good) governance. The issue ofand responsibilities of the United Nations

human forgetfulness was notably raised, in thatwould need to increase to not only maintain thisforgetting the horrors of the pastscenario but also to be prepared

was a risk and once this occurred,

for any future threat. However, it

serious steps to prevent future Workshop participant
reoccurrence of such issues.

stances in this scenario would

Overall, the maintenance of suchness and proactivity to identify

people may be less likely to take Utopia has an expiry date. was also noted that the circum-

a future was seen as requiring many resources

allow for much more prepared-

and address emerging situations of concern.

and considerable effort; specifically, the role

2.2.4 War and Peace
Polarity and attitude to multilateralism

World is fragmented between two poles of powerRole of private sector actors in International Relations

Decreased influence

Level and type of conflict

Conflict is localized, frequent, and primarily low-intensity

Majority form of national governance

Democratic backsliding

Liveability of planet Earth

Decreased liveability

While this scenario was seen as reminiscent ofcollaboration, or whether this could help,

the Cold War, several aspects were highlighted

depending on how powerful the poles were.

as being different from the past, such as stalled

This could also depend on the issue at hand—innovation and issues linked to climate change.

for example, climate change or weapons gov-

This highlighted the importance of not letting

ernance, which may have different responses.

the past impact our perceptions of the future—

Overall, this future was seen as needing to getor present. There were notably diverging views

worse—such as a ‘Paradise Lost’ situation—

on whether a bipolar world would prevent the

before it could improve.

management of issues requiring international

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

22

2.2.5 Fragmented Fault Lines
Polarity and attitude to multilateralism

World is fragmented between multiple spheres of influence

Role of private sector actors in International Relations

Important and influential role

Level and type of conflict

Few conflicts, although these tend to be inter-State withhostilities under the threshold of armed conflict

Majority form of national governance

Democratization

Liveability of planet EarthLiveable in most places

There was some divergence with regard to thisdepending on State behaviour and whether that

scenario, not least because of the dichotomy

would result in tensions or conflict. It was also

between the poor situation at the geopolit-

mentioned that international institutions may

ical level versus the generally acceptablestruggle to deal with global issues in this kindsituation nationally. Consequently, there wasof future, although it was noted—and demon-no consensus as to whether this scenario isstrated by the questionnaire results—that thisstable or not; however, participants raised

scenario has similarities to the current multilat-that it could develop in unpredictable ways

eral context.

Bologna, Italy, 2013: An old man passes by a street graffiti. Credit: © Kizel

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

23

3. Identifying the Issue: Threats toInternational Peace and Security
Using the future scenarios to identify threats—

to taking a future-focused outlook. Partici-

and

for

pants may also be less able to identify drivers

action—possesses several advantages. The

of change that could pose a threat that need toscenarios allow individuals to project them-be addressed. And finally, use of scenarios canselves into different types of futures withhelp avoid groupthink, as participants are given

different possible events, and consider issues

more creative freedom and space for contem-

from different angles, as well as issues that

plation, enabling them to use the scenarios as athey may not naturally consider. The scenarios

safe space to challenge existing assumptions.

fromthese,

possible

pathwaysalso encourage individuals to examine inter-

While all the scenarios differed from one

linkages between elements contained within

another, there were nonetheless some common

the scenarios, but also between the scenarios

themes which emerged across many, if not all,themselves. Finally, the scenarios provide

scenarios, workshops, and stakeholder groups.

all participants a baseline understanding ofThis section provides an overview of these

specific future contexts. Overall, without thethemes and their related threats, based on theuse of such scenarios, the insights in this

discussions from the workshops. Each theme

chapter, and thus the pathways for action in thecontains a brief description of the discussions

following chapter may not have been reached.

centred around it. Then, specific threats with

Notably, without scenarios, discussions on

regard to that theme are outlined. An overview

threats may be based on knowledge of theof the themes is provided in Figure 4.

past or fixated on current issues, as opposed

Figure 4. Overview of the Themes20

FUTURE AND RELEVANCE

TRUST AMONG STATESTHE DISARMAMENT

ROLE OF NSAs IN

OF THE UNITED NATIONSAND IN INSTITUTIONSMACHINERY

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSROLE OF REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONALTECHNOLOGYNON-TRADITIONAL THREATS

ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSAND INNOVATIONTO PEACE AND SECURITY20

The order of the themes, or the threats contained within these themes, does not imply a hierarchy or order in terms of thethemes or threats.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

24

The themes and threats identified below are not

the workshops; and third, by the workshop par-exhaustive—nor do they aim to be. The threats

ticipants—while a wide range of participants

identified were driven by, first, the study scopewere sought, there was nonetheless a bias inand area of focus, which examined internation-

their selection notably in terms of their involve-

al security from an arms control and disarma-

ment and familiarity with the United Nations.

ment perspective; second, by the scope of theThis, for example, explains the focus on the

future scenarios, which focus on and highlight

United Nations with regard to certain issues

specific aspects of the future. These aspects(such as multilateralism and trust) as opposed

played a role in shaping the discussions within

to taking a broader perspective.

21

3.1 Future and Relevance of the United Nations
System
The maintenance of the United Nations struc-multilateralism and solve global issues, fromtures was highlighted by workshop participants

climate change to conflicts. Second, the uniqueas key for several reasons. First, the importancerole of the United Nations for global gover-of the United Nations as an institution which cannance was discussed at length, notably how

provide a neutral platform for multilateralism

it is a central convening actor in the aftermathand global governance featured in workshop

of global disasters, providing a platform for the

discussions pertaining to all scenarios. This

collection of lessons learned from all Member

element
noted

was

also

A

New

in

Agenda for Peace,
which
that

observes
theUnitedNations is “the mostinclusive arena for
diplomacy to manage

No United Nations or just a figurehead
United Nations is the worst outcome—the
United Nations still provides an undeniable
platform to help with multilateralism.
Workshop participant

global politics andits growing fractures”.22 It was noted that in
scenarios where the United Nations was seen

States.

Severalpossiblethreats

that could harm thelong-term continuity
and relevance of theUnited Nations thus
emergedfromthediscussions:
The uneven distribution of power and lackof inclusiveness within decision-making

as more likely to have a caretaker role (or no

structures, notably the Security Council

longer existed, in a substantive way or at all)A number of comments were made about

it would be much harder to achieve effective

the lack of inclusiveness, which was seen

21

A number of additional threats not raised during the workshops do of course exist—ranging from the lack of sufficient funding
for peace and disarmament at the United Nations to the threat to security by non-State armed groups. The lack of mention ofthese threats in this report does not imply that they are not considered as important; rather, these were not discussed within thescope and context of the present study.
22

United Nations, “A New Agenda for Peace”, 18.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 525

as negatively impacting sustainability of the

The acceleration and intersection of global

United Nations, trust in the United Nations as ancrises and issues combined with the United

institution, and its ability to mediate and resolve

Nation’s capacity to cope

issues impacting global security. Additional-

The United Nations is in high demand acrossly, the current system whereby the majority ofStates are accountable to a select few, whichthemselves have limited accountability, wasraised as problematic, both now and in the
future scenarios. In the literature, the uneven
distribution of power has also been linked topotential non-compliance with decisions, instruments, and regulations relating to arms
control and disarmament (see also threat below
and Section 3.4).23
Member States withdrawing from meaningful
engagement with the multilateral settingsof the United Nations and specifically fromexisting processes pertaining to arms
control and disarmament
Disengagement can make compliance withthe disarmament machinery more sporadic,
due to not seeing the use or relevance of
these processes or the United Nations more
widely, and not wanting to continue investing
in it. This could mean a deprioritization of theUnited Nations, leading to insufficient or no
funding, affecting the ability for the organization to take action, deliver on its mandate or

many fronts. This can be perceived as a lack of
responsiveness or agility to respond to (new)challenges and threats. However, workshop
discussions did note that the organization’s
bureaucracy and ways of working could playa role in affecting the time needed for action
to be taken on certain topics. Notably, theissue of new and emerging technologies in thecontext of arms control and disarmament was
mentioned. Moreover, it was highlighted thatthe disarmament agenda is very congested,with processes and meetings happening one
after the other and sometimes even concurrently. This can lead to representatives having insufficient time to absorb material or insufficientpersonnel to attend the relevant meetings.
States with less capacity are more affected bythis issue, which in turn can harm representation and equal ability to participate. Additionally, while mandates can aid with accountability
and focus, they can also limit inter-agency cooperation, hamper processes examining linked
issues, and impede operations taking placeoutside of silos.

keep its structures fit-for-purpose. This in turnThe over-politicization of issues dealt with incould further impact the United Nations’ reputa-

the United Nations

tion regarding its ability to achieve change, andWhile the United Nations is inherently a policy

create a vicious cycle where it is further deprioritized (see also discussions relating to trust in
Section 3.2).

organization,24 as noted in A New Agenda
for Peace, “the United Nations is shaped

23

See Patrick et al., UN Security Council Reform: What the World Thinks, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 28
2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/06/28/un-security-council-reform-what-world-thinks-pub-90032.

24

This stems from the fact that each Member State is implementing their own foreign policy at the multilateral level, so in thatsense issues are political within the United Nations.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

26

fundamentally by the willingness of its Member

Weakening of States or their authority in in-States to cooperate”.

ternational relations

25

As such, the threat

highlighted by workshop participants refers to
the over-politicization of issues, thus potentially limiting or preventing the United Nations’ability to respond to urgent issues or rendering
the United Nations’ response ineffective due toa (perceived) lack of independence of action. A
related issue is how this affects decision-making, where deference to the lowest common denominator can water down decisions and sub-This situation could lead to a stagnation of
governance, as well as to a reduced role of
the United Nations, which depends on the capacities of its Member States. This could also
empower non-State actors to fill the vacuum,
which poses threats of its own. This notably
concerns the empowerment of private sector
actors, discussed further in Section 3.4.

sequent actions, linked, further down the line,

Under this theme, it is important to distin-

to a loss of trust (see Section 3.3). Over-politici-

guish between mandate-driven elements ofzation could also lead to insider versus outsider

the United Nations, which include operation-

dynamics; a lack, or perceived lack, of impar-

al United Nations agencies and Secretariat

tiality; and to a lack of cooperation between

Offices and Departments (such as the United

Member States on issues requiring global gov-

Nations Children’s Fund, the International Or-

ernance. Ultimately, this was said to affect theganization for Migration, the Department ofimage of the United Nations, as well as its ability

Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and theto take decisive action.

Office for Disarmament Affairs), versus negoti-

Divisions or competition between Member
Statesation and decision-making bodies for Member
States (such as the General Assembly, theSecurity Council, and the Conference on Dis-

This could lead to stagnation at decision-mak-armament). While noting this distinction, it ising forums. This also results in the perceived

also important to note that the Secretariat andinefficiency of the United Nations, particularly

Agencies receive their mandates from deci-

if this pertains to dealing with a security threatsion-making bodies, so while the functions areor its outcomes, and an inability to solve chal-different, the division between both elements islenges due to a lack of cooperation. An addi-

not so clear cut. Both elements have similarities

tional element to consider under this threat are

in terms of the threats faced but conflating themchallenges linked to the misuse of the principle

risks losing nuance and misconstruing issues.

of consensus, whereby in decision-making

For example, mandate-driven organizations doforums that hold to consensus agreement, with-not face the same issues of deadlock as deci-holding consensus can sometimes be wieldedsion-making bodies, but their ability for action

as a de facto veto to prevent a process fromwould be impacted the lack of consensus inachieving an outcome. This is an issue that has

decision-making bodies. Table 1 provides analready been raised by Member States.

overview of how the threats identified above26

map against the two different types of bodies.

25

United Nations, “A New Agenda for Peace”, 3.

26See, for example, United Nations, Disarmament Machinery Impasse ‘Cause and Consequence’ of Competing Strategic Priorities, Ruthless Pursuit of Military Advantage, First Committee Told, 27 October 2022, https://press.un.org/en/2022/gadis3700.
doc.htm.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 5

27

Table 1. Relevance of Identified Threats to Either Operational United Nations
Bodies or the United Nations as a Convening Platform, based on Workshop
DiscussionsISSUE

S E C R E TA R I AT A N D

U N I T E D N AT I O N S N E G O T I AT I O N

AGENCIESAND DECISION-MAKING BODIES

Lack of responsiveness and lack ofagility of responseMember States withdrawing frommeaningful multilateral engagementOver-politicization of the United
NationsDivisions or competition between
Member States

Uneven distribution of power andlack of inclusiveness within decision-making structures

Weakening of States or theirauthority in international relations

3.2 Trust among States and in Institutions
The level of trust in institutions provides legit-

violence has stopped.27 Multiple analyses exist

imacy as well as an ability to address issues.

examining levels of trust in the United Nations

Trust—or the lack thereof—impacts peace andby the general public.28 Yet these show the dif-security. Not least because a deficit can play aficulty in identifying an overarching answer onrole in rising tensions and even conflicts, but

trust in the United Nations, as there are differ-also because it impacts whether institutions

ences between countries and regions, famil-

are seen as being fit-for-purpose. For example,

iarity with the United Nations, and timings ofthe existence of trust is brought up as a key

surveys where answers may differ following

factor in facilitating a peace process once thedifferent large-scale events (e.g., the COVID-19

27

DPPA, “Guidance on Mediation of Ceasefires”, September 2022, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/
files/Ceasefire-Guidance-2022.pdf.

28

For a meta-analysis of these various surveys, see “Do People Trust the UN? A Look at the Data”, Albert Trithart and Olivia
Case, 22 February 2023, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2023/02/do-people-trust-the-un-a-look-at-the-data/.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 528

pandemic, or in a situation of conflict). Twofrom protecting individuals, for example due topossible threats linked to the decline of trust in

the unwillingness of individuals to interact withinstitutions emerged from the discussions:these institutions. In turn, this could impact

Low or lack of trust between Member States
and the impact on multilateralism

national and human security due to continued
exposure to risk. The issue of a ‘trust deficit’ hasnotably been brought up by the Secretary-Gen-

Trust between States was raised in some oferal at the Security Council, demonstrating

the workshop discussions, notably on how low

the importance of this concept to ensuring
effective multilateralism,

or lack of trust between
MemberimpactStatesUnitednegotiationcanNations

and

deci-

sion-making bodies (seeSection 3.1). This affects
external perceptions of

In a world of sovereign States,international cooperation ispredicated upon trust.
A New Agenda for Peace, p. 8

but also at the national
level and its impact onnational political establishments.29 Low or lack oftrust in the organization is
also driven by a perceived

the United Nations (seelack of transparency, forbelow), but also its ability

example in addressing

to achieve substantive outcomes. Notably, it

issues such as accusations of sexual abusecan be an impediment to the United Nation’sor other serious misconduct, which can affectarms control and disarmament architecture,

the organization’s reputation. Overall, thethe importance of which is highlighted in A New

scenarios and subsequent discussions with

Agenda for Peace.

workshop participants demonstrated that alack of trust in the United Nations specifically,

Low or lack of trust in public sector institu-

and international organizations more generally,tions, particularly the United Nations

combined with the loss of interest in participa-

Workshop participants discussed the lack oftion in these multilateral forums is a fundamen-

trust by civil society in public sector institu-

tal threat to the United Nations.

tions, noting that this could prevent institutions

3.3 The Disarmament Machinery
Arms control, disarmament, and non-prolifer-

treaties, agreements, protocols and more canation play a key role in ensuring adherence tobe discussed and agreed upon. However, there

principles of peace and international law, as wellhas been paralysis in some elements of theas the reduction of conflict. The United Nations

disarmament machinery for decades, mostprovides a platform through which numerous

notably the Conference on Disarmament,30 and29

United Nations, “Secretary-General Highlights ‘Trust Deficit’ amid Rising Global Turbulence, in Remarks to Security Council
Debate on ‘Upholding United Nations Charter’”, 9 January 2020, https://press.un.org/en/2020/sgsm19934.doc.htm.

30

United Nations, “A New Agenda for Peace”.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 529

the failure to reach consensus across a range

comply with governance mechanisms thatof processes,

as well as withdrawals fromcannot be enforced, and especially if others

treaties and other such steps back from mul-flout the rules. This, however, has a broader

tilateral or even bilateral agreements.

impact on institutional credibility. This lack of

31

32

theless,
been

there

have

enforcement of com-

successes

andpliance, combined with

progresstoo,

asConvention

the

such

on Cluster Munitions
adopted in 2008, the
Arms

Trade

Treatyadopted in 2013, theTreaty on the Prohibition
of

None-

NuclearArms control frameworks and crisis
management arrangements that helped
stabilize great power rivalries andprevent another world war have eroded.

factors that further erode
trust among States, andbetween States and ininsti-

tutions, including the

Weapons

Through-life Conventional Ammunition Man-

compliance, can also betergovernmental

A New Agenda for Peace, p. 4

adopted in 2017, and the Global Framework forthe difficulty of verifying

United Nations.
The use of an arms build-up to bolster

agement adopted in 2023, which have con-security

tributed to prohibiting the use, transfer, andThe predominant mindset remains that more

stockpiling of specific weapons, in addition

weapons, conventional or otherwise, affords

to increasing transparency and responsible

better security. However, there are a number

action as regards the arms trade and ammuni-of threats linked to this. First, this accumula-tion through-life management. Nonetheless,tion of weapons can be a cause of proliferation

several possible threats that could harm theand diversion. Second, an arms build-up as ainternational security infrastructure emerged

deterrence strategy can be a driver of instabil-from the discussions:ity. Overall, this issue is very much tied to how

The lack of adequate responses to non-compliance with existing instruments
This gap can lead to States increasingly notsecurity is and continues to be conceptualizedaround weapons.
A weak rules-based order, or a breakdown ofcomplying as they do not fear repercussions,the rules-based orderthus undermining confidence in multilateralThe rules-based order has been portrayed asmechanisms. There is also the parallel issue

the basis for international relations. However,that the incentives for compliance may be in-understandings can vary across States as toadequate. It can be unattractive for States tothe rules underpinning this order.33 A lack of

31

This includes, for example, the 2022 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the GGE on lethal autonomous weaponssystems, and the 2023 OEWG on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours.
32

See Miller, Steven, Hard Times for Arms Control: What Can Be Done?, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, February2022, https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/AC1-Hard-Times-For-Arms-Control-2022-HCSS.pdf.

33

The lack of a clear definition has been increasingly discussed; see, for example, Boas Lieberherr, “The “Rules-Based Order”:
Conflicting Understandings”, CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 317, February 2023, https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse317-EN.pdf.

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consensus on the rules-based order posesStates of [the] universal normative frame-

threats to international security, in particular

works”34 observing that “rebuilding consensus

human security. This issue is also highlighted

on the meaning of and adherence to thesein A New Agenda for Peace, which notes thatframeworks is an essential task for the interna-

there are “different interpretations by Member

tional system”.35

3.4 Role of Non-State Actors in International
Relations
Non-State actors (NSAs) include a very

purposes. To that end, an overview of which

wide range of organizations and individuals,

NSAs are in discussed in this report is provided

who have different interests, influence, andin Box 1.

Box 1. NSAs in the Context of this Report
In the context of this report, NSAs refer to non-governmental organizations such as civil society organizations (CSOs), academic and research organizations, advocacy groups, and grassroot movements.
Note that discussions did not include non-State armed groups as a category of actor included within
NSAs. In the workshops, participants also discussed private sector actors separately to other types
of NSAs.

Private sector actors have an increasing-

the role of private satellite services in providing

ly large role in international relations. Whilecommunications services.

the private sector is not a singular entity, andeach company has a different reach, motivation, and desired outcomes, it is undeniable
that collectively they are increasingly important
globally, from providing essential infrastructureand services, to developing means of warfare.
This is exemplified by the importance of therole of pharmaceutical corporations during the
COVID-19 pandemic in developing vaccines, or

34

United Nations, “A New Agenda for Peace”, 7.

35

Ibid.

The increased role and importance of private
sector actors overall is also reflected in the international security sphere, where their roleand decisions have an impact on the geopolitical balance, including security issues.
Technology companies in particular have an
outsized influence on new developments, aswell as their access and use—but governance

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mechanisms at the multilateral level are aimed
at States, and only indirectly, in some cases, atprivate sector actors. The provision of Starlink
satellite services to Ukraine was notably highlighted as an example of the impact a single
private company can have on geopoliticalaffairs.36 A brief explanation is provided inBox 2 on the important role played by private
sector actors in the context of the disarmamentmachinery.

36

2016: Satellite over the coast. Credit: © Unsplash / SpaceX.

Emma Schroeder and Sean Dack, “A Parallel Terrain:
Public-Private Defense of the Ukrainian Information Environment”, Atlantic Council, 27 February 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-parallel-terrain-public-private-defense-of-the-ukrainian-information-environment/.

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Box 2. Role of Private Actors in International Security
Private sector actors play an important role in the defence and security domain. Within conventional arms and ammunition, which ranges from large military equipment such as tanks, fighter aircraft,submarines, to small arms and light weapons, private sector actors play a key role in developing,producing, marketing, selling, and transferring such items. While a country’s defence industrial andtechnological base often merges both private and public sector actors, arms control mechanisms at
the multilateral level—such as the Arms Trade Treaty—are discussed and agreed between States, withlittle or limited involvement from private sector actors despite the critical role they play in ensuring thetreaty’s effectiveness and universalization.37
With regard to technology, private sector actors play an outsized role in its development and provision,
whether this be in the areas of cyber, artificial intelligence (AI), enabling technologies (e.g., semi-conductors, quantum computing, processors, etc.), missile, and satellite technologies. This is notwithstanding the fact that the majority of these technologies are dual use, meaning that development
occurs for both civilian and military purposes. For example, private sector actors are leading the way interms of the newest developments pertaining to AI; yet, private sector actors, unlike other NSAs suchas academia or civil society, do not attend the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Discussions relating to cyber are more inclusive. The 2021–2025 Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies is open to all entities with appropriate accreditation, and private sector actors do take part.
However, it should be noted that the previous cyber process (2004–2021) was only open to governments. Additionally, there is pushback in the current OEWG on which private sector actors are allowed
to participate and the extent of their participation.
In terms of outer space, the private sector is heavily involved, from commercial ventures to strategic
space operations. They are nonetheless putting forward best practices in order to ensure safety for
their commercial ventures.38 Discussions in the 2022–2023 OEWG on reducing space threats throughnorms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours also reinforced the importance of States cooperating with the private sector, noting that their presence in space could increase risks of misunderstanding or miscalculation and thus lead to conflict in outer space.

37

Paul Holtom and Anna Mensah, “The Role of Industry in Responsible International Transfers of Conventional Arms”, UNIDIR,
30 March 2023, https://unidir.org/publication/role-industry-responsible-international-transfers-conventional-arms.

38

Sarah Erickson and Vivienne Zhang, “Advancing Space Security Through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible
Behaviour? Webinar Summary Report”, UNIDIR, 1 September 2022, https://www.unidir.org/publication/advancing-space-security-through-norms-rules-and-principles-responsible-behaviour.

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33

While the discussions demonstrated that, forThis raised the question as to how best involve

the workshop participants, it was importantthem, particularly in discussions at the multi-

for States to remain the primary actors in in-lateral level. Making the United Nations moreternational relations, there was also an ac-

inclusive could come with risks of diluting theknowledgment of the role and importance ofroles States play, as well as leading to pushback

NSAs, beyond private sector actors. These forfrom States regarding their participation. One

example include civil society, non-governmen-of the reasons put forward by workshop partic-tal organizations, grassroots movements, faith-ipants for such possible pushback is linked tobased organizations, and youth groups. Thesethe sentiment that private sector actors may be

actors emerged as a key mitigating measure

a way for certain States with powerful private

against the more negative characteristics ofsectors to achieve economic colonialism. Thiscertain scenarios, notably in terms of providing

also raised questions around the fitness of thea system of checks and balances at the multi-

system; notably, around who would be respon-lateral level, whereby they can offer different

sible and accountable for decisions made or in-

inputs and perspectives during processes,

fluenced by private sector actors.

review conferences, and other similar multilateral discussions. Several possible threats

Difficulty in aligning interests between

arising from the role—or lack thereof—of NSAs

private and public sector actors

in international relations emerged from the dis-

The wide difference in incentive structures

cussions, particularly focusing on the growing

between private sector actors and States wasimportance of private sector actors in the inter-highlighted, not least due to what this may meannational sphere:

in terms of international and national security

Tensions between the roles of private sector
actors and those of States at the international levelshould they continue to gain prominence. For
example, workshop participants noted thatprivate sector actors may not give humansecurity the same importance that a State

Certain workshop participants mentioned that,would; they may also be driven by financial

at the national level, the growing influence ofconsiderations or are beholden to sharehold-private sector actors has already led some toers, unlike States. Additionally, private sectors

assume functions or responsibilities tradition-

actors can play a role in funding initiatives,

ally held by States through outsourcing or pri-such as those by other NSAs. In some cases,

vatization, in domains as distinct as healthcare,

this can be a way to seek to exert influence.

education or the military. Yet, international insti-

This brings up a number of questions aroundtutions and multilateralism have been shaped

how they might approach some issues suchby States, for States, as the primary actors, andas weapons proliferation or conflict prevention,

are not adapted to the private sector. Linked togiven the divergent interests.

this, there was a point made about how this could
put the multilateral system and the relevanceMarginalization of NSAs, beyond privateof the United Nations at risk, as private sector

sector actors, in international relations

actors do not have the same interests or obli-

NSA participation is important for bringing agation to implement international law as States.

range of views, perspectives, and expertise

However, it was recognized by participants that

into issues. Moreover, and unlike private

involvement of multi-stakeholder perspectives,sector actors, the presence of NSAs is alreadyincluding private sector actors, is important.

well-established at the United Nations andI N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 534

across the various arms control and disar-

Member States to take part, do not allow NSAs

mament processes; however, there has been

to be present, unless invited to take an informalsome pushback to their participation or atten-

and advisory role, such as through the provision

dance in certain forums. It should also be notedof a briefing, hence limiting their involvement inthat General Assembly GGE working groups,

certain discussions.

in addition to only allowing a maximum of 25

3.5 Role of Regional and Subregional Entities inInternational Relationsorganizations

currently, and how this could be impacted inalready cooperate and are included at the

instances where multilateralism breaks down.

United Nations and in the various arms control

Regional organizations could also be an entry

and disarmament processes. The Security

point to improving current systems, by being a

Council has acknowledged the important role

place for dialogue where the outputs are thenplayed by these organizations in maintaining

fed into the global level; play a more prominentinternational peace and security. Yet, discus-role in liaising with States and seeking theirsions noted that decision-making remains cen-buy-in, thus empowering regional and subre-

tralized within the United Nations, and that de-gional entities in their actions and decisions;cision-making is sometimes paralysed at theas well as a pathway to capturing ideas andmultilateral level. One possible threat emerged

enabling modernization and reform of multilat-

from the discussions:eral organizations. However, there was also a

Regional

andsubregional

39

Lack of sufficient inclusion and use ofregional and subregional entities

point raised as to the impact of a more regional-based approach on States’ sovereignty, andwhether this may actually be counterproduc-

As noted above, discussions revolved aroundtive, demonstrating that a considered approachthe very centralized approach to security

would be necessary to address such a threat.

39

United Nations, “In Times of Global Crises, Collaboration between Regional Organizations, United Nations Has ‘Grown Exponentially’, Secretary-General Tells Security Council”, 19 April 2021, https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14498.doc.htm. Thisis also an aspect highlighted in A New Agenda for Peace which notes that “In the face of growing competition at the global level
and threats that are increasingly transnational, we need regional frameworks and organizations, in accordance with Chapter
VIII of the Charter, that promote trust-building, transparency and détente. We also need strong partnerships between the United
Nations and regional organizations. Regional frameworks and organizations are critical building blocks for the networked multilateralism that I [the Secretary-General] envisage”; United Nations, “A New Agenda for Peace”, 12.

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35

3.6 Technology and Innovation
Technology takes many different shapes andadaptation. But they also noted that there is aforms, from low- to high-end innovations. This

need to ensure that technology is not used forincludes advanced technologies, such as AI or

unlawful purposes, such as promoting arms

cyber; enabling technologies, such semi-con-proliferation or within weapons which do notductors, quantum computing, additive man-conform to international humanitarian law. Yet,ufacturing, or processors; and applied tech-this is a thorny and difficult challenge, which

nologies, which combines many of thesecan be witnessed through the discussions in

aforementioned technologies, such as within

multilateral processes, such as the GGE on

uncrewed systems or weapons of mass de-lethal autonomous weapons systems whereby

struction. The impact and governance of tech-this argument is as yet unresolved, or in relation

nologies, and in particular digital technologies,

to legislation applied at the regional level, foris an issue which is the focus of one of the Sec-

example the pushback to the European Union’s

retary-General’s latest policy briefs, A Global

AI Act.40

Digital Compact — an Open, Free and Secure
Digital Future for All, as well as in A New Agenda

Managing access and control of technology

for Peace, in addition to the yearly release of aand the consequences thereof

report on current developments in science and

The distribution of innovation and technol-

technology and their potential impacts on in-

ogy is currently uneven between and within

ternational security and disarmament efforts.

countries. This creates a divide which seems

Several possible threats linked to the role andlikely to continue into the future and could have

impact of technology and innovation emergeda negative impact on cooperation and tech-from the discussions:nological governance. Additionally, technolo-

The ability to strike a balance between
regulating technology while still allowing
sufficient space for beneficial innovation

gy could be a driver of instability: who controls
and has or gives access to technology may also
play a role in defining it in the context of use
prior to, during, and after situations of violence

The discussions highlighted that technolog-

or conflict. The incentives to developing tech-ical innovations could play an important role

nology may also affect how a given technology

in improving core aspects of livelihoods, suchis applied—for example, between one focused

as food and water access or climate change

on national interests versus for public good.

40

Javier Espinoza, “European Companies Sound Alarm over Draft AI Law”, Financial Times, 29 June 2023, https://www.
ft.com/content/9b72a5f4-a6d8-41aa-95b8-c75f0bc92465. For more details on the EU AI Act, see European Parliament,“MEPs Ready to Negotiate First-ever Rules for Safe and Transparent AI”, 14 June 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
news/en/press-room/20230609IPR96212/meps-ready-to-negotiate-first-ever-rules-for-safe-and-transparent-ai.

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3.7 Non-Traditional Threats to Peace and Security
The disarmament machinery at the United

The United Nations peace and security ar-

Nations is geared towards dealing with tradi-chitecture is not sufficiently adapted ortional security threats, which are defined as

prepared for non-traditional threats“state survival and conceived mainly in terms

The disarmament machinery focuses on issuesof interstate military conflict”. However, there
41

has been an increase in non-traditional threats
to peace and security and growing understanding of their potential impact. These

relating to disarmament and arms control, withthe challenge being that there are no other machineries beyond the disarmament one andthe Security Council to deal with in-include technologically-driven disinformation, climate change, unsafe

ternational security matters. While

Peace is not
migration, pandemics, and weaponabsence of war.

the non-traditional threats may be dealt
with and discussed in other parts ofization of trade, to name but a few.

the United Nations, the discussions

These threats can be compound- Spinoza, quoted by a are not integrated or cross-cutting.
ed with one another and can also workshop participant

Additionally, these non-tradition-lead to traditional threats—in otheral threats move the paradigm awaywords, armed conflict. One possible
threat linked to non-traditional threats to peaceand security emerged from the discussions:from State sovereignty as the target,
towards internal or human security, which has
not traditionally or always been the primary
focus of many of the multilateral arms control
and disarmament mechanisms in place.

3.8 Key Takeaways
Overall, workshop participants identified aemerges as being of primary importance torange of threats when using the various future

address threats related to weapons as well

scenarios as tools for examination. Some ofas the many other interconnected threats,these threats may appear, at first glance, to be

and thus international security issues more

outside the remit of arms control and disarma-

generally.

ment. However, as the analysis above demon-stated that a mere figurehead structure—or no

strates, high-level issues relating to the United

United Nations—was the worst outcome, as the

Nations as a whole affect specific issues per-United Nations provides a necessary platformtaining to arms control and disarmament.

conducive to multilateralism.

Workshopparticipants

notably

The continuing relevance of the United Nations
as a convening and decision-making platform

41

Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones, “The Politics and Governance of Non-Traditional Security”, International Studies Quarterly
57, no. 3 (2013): 462–473, 2023: doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12014, p. 462.

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4. Dealing with the Threats:
Possible Pathways for Action
Having discussed the threats, this section

not recommendations, although the hope isoutlines possible pathways for action tothat they could be, in the future, developed asaddress these threats, based on inputs fromsuch. Within the scope of this report, the identi-

the workshops as well as interviews with overfied pathways for action provide avenues for re-

20 experts from the United Nations, regional

flection on what could be undertaken to addressorganizations, Member States, research orga-

the threats identified, acting as a starting – ornizations and academia, civil society, and thecontinuation – point for a conversation around

private sector. These pathways for action arethese issues.

4.1 Issue-Specific Pathways for Action
Table 2 provides an overview of pathways for

Many of the themes and threats, and conse-

action identified which are either specific toquently pathways for action, have some level ofissues of arms control and disarmament oroverlap or linkages between them. As a result,would have a significant impact upon arms

the pathways for action, while divided by issues

control and disarmament processes, discus-

identified, aim to reflect which elements identi-

sions, and implementation. A more detailed ex-

fied to address or overcome a particular threat

planation of each of these pathways for action,

may also apply or have an impact on others.

including examples of action which could betaken, is provided in Annex 1.

I N©
T EUN
R NPhoto/PauloAT I O N A L SFilgueiras
ECURITY IN 2045
New York, USA, 2015. Security Council unanimously adopting resolution 1649. Credit:38

Table 2. Issue-Specific Pathways for Action to Address the Identified Threats

ISSUE

PAT H W AYS F O R A C T I O N

1. Uneven distribution of power andlack of inclusiveness within decision-making structures

a. Revitalize discussions on Security Council reform: Issues to address notably
pertain to representation in the Security Council, existence and use of the veto,and redistribution of decision-making in order to reinforce trust in the Security
Council and enable constructive outcomes.
b. Engage more closely with the regional level: Increased dialogue and decision-making at the regional level on issues of arms control and disarmament
may be a way to bridge the disconnect felt between challenges faced on the
ground versus the decision-making locations.
c. Ensure diversity in delegations: Delegations could seek to improve their inclusiveness to ensure diverse perspectives and contributions on arms control anddisarmament processes, such as in terms of gender and age characteristics.
→ See also pathways for action under Issue 14 (Marginalization of NSAs in international relations) and Issue 15 (Lack of sufficient inclusion and use of regional andsubregional entities).

2. Member States withdrawing frommeaningful multilateral engagementa. Devolve more decision-making to the regional level: Seek to empower
regional and subregional organizations in the area of arms control and disarmament to not only enhance engagement but also ensure change is still occurringon the ground regardless of issues at the multilateral level.
→ See also pathways for action under Issue 3 (Ability to cope with the acceleration and intersection of crises and issues), 8 (Low or lack of trust in the United
Nations), and Issue 15 (Lack of sufficient inclusion and use of regional and subregional entities).

3. Ability to cope with the acceleration and intersection of crises andissuesa. Keep track of changing attitudes, norms, and circumstances to quickly
adapt or react to them: Understand the impact and implications of any evolutions or changes (for example, in illegal or illicit behaviour regarding weapons
diversion or use, in technologies, etc.) on the work of the United Nations and inparticularly that relating to arms control and disarmament.
b. Consider the limitations of institutional or process mandates: Having more
flexibility embedded in mandates could help improve more substantive inter-institutional collaboration, to examine issues that may otherwise fall within amandate ‘gap’, such as technological convergence.
c. Create opportunities to deepen substantive discussions: Circulating more
non-papers to explore issues informally, or holding informal consultations prior
to meetings or debates, could help increase awareness and knowledge, and inturn streamline discussions.
d. Approach issues from a broader lens: Given many issues converge, ensurethat these convergences are examined in a more unified way, such as bycapturing the political, social, and economic dimensions of certain arms control
and disarmament issues.
e. Streamline the disarmament agenda: Investigate how the disarmament
agenda could be streamlined, to allow more time between processes for
diplomats to absorb relevant material.
f. Increase the transparency about successes and failures: The United
Nations, and the disarmament machinery specifically, should demonstrate thatit can address specific problems that are currently taking place and impacting
different regions, but also be honest about its limits.

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39

g. Enable greater feedback loops: Obtaining inputs, feedback, and insights from
United Nations personnel and the general public on processes, mechanisms,
and the United Nations more broadly can help identify what could work better.
→ See also pathways for action under Issue 8 (Low or lack of trust in the United
Nations), Issue 16 (Balancing between regulating technology and enabling innovation), Issue 18 (Insufficient preparation for non-traditional threats).
4. Over-politicization of issues within
the United Nations

a. Maintain impartiality: United Nations bodies should maintain impartiality andnot seek to stigmatize different sides, continuing to re-main a neutral platform
for negotiations between States.

5. Divisions or competition between
Member Statesa. Ensure that multilateral mechanisms remain in place: Preserve multilateralmechanisms as a way to encourage and foster dialogue.
b. Create incentive-based coalitions: Partnerships and coalitions between
Member States that focus on areas of action as an incentive could be createdaround formal processes.
c. Reflect upon the consensus decision-making system: Further discussion
and decisions on correct use of consensus voting is necessary, and how toensure that it can be used adequately without derailing processes.
→ See also pathways for action under Issue 2 (Member States withdrawing frommeaningful multilateral engagement) and Issue 8 (Low or lack of trust in the United
Nations).

6. Weakening of States or theirauthority in international relations→ See pathways for action under Issues 1 (Uneven distribution of power and lackof inclusiveness within decision-making structures), 2 (Member States withdrawing from meaningful multilateral engagement), 3 (Ability to cope with the acceleration and intersection of crises and issues), and 12 (Tensions between the roles ofprivate sector actors and those of States at the international level).

7. Low or lack of trust between
Member States→ See pathways for action under Issue 5 (Divisions or competition between
Member States).

8. Low or lack of trust in the United
Nationsa. Rethink the issues that the United Nations is best placed to address: Acknowledging the limitations of the United Nations can help rebuild trust in its
capacity for action, as well as a focus on its areas of strength, such as being a
convening platform.
b. Improve external communications: Maintaining and constantly improving theUnited Nations’ external communication is important to ensure that there is anunderstanding of the role of the organization, what it can do, and what it hascontrol over.
→ See also pathway for action under Issues 1 (Uneven distribution of power andlack of inclusiveness within decision-making structures), 3 (Ability to cope with theacceleration and intersection of crises and issues), 14 (Marginalization of NSAs ininternational relations) and 15 (Lack of sufficient inclusion and use of regional andsubregional entities).

9. Lack of adequate responses tonon-compliancea. Re-examine incentives: There is a need to rethink the incentives for compliance, examining both punitive and non-punitive measures as well as the existing
infrastructure and resources to aid States with compliance.

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b. Strengthen resources for implementation and enforcement: A review of theresources available for the different instruments across conventional weapons
and weapons of mass destruction would help to ascertain which need additional resources for implementation and enforcement, as well as what resources
might be needed for international cooperation and assistance.
c. Enable greater enforcement mechanisms: Options include ensuring thatsuch mechanisms are implementable and adaptable, as well as putting in place
the means to compel adherence.
d. Make compliance a whole-of-society responsibility: Encouraging a wider
range of NSAs (e.g., private sector actors, academia, CSOs, and beyond) totake an active role. This can help place bottom-up pressure as well as top-downpressure to ensure compliance.
e. Ensure transparency and legitimacy of assessments of possible non-compliance: Increasing the diversity of inspectors in terms of their background
could be a way forward. Ensuring that personnel have technical expertise,including within secretariats overseeing implementation of treaties or frameworks, would also help.
f. Emphasize the benefits of compliance: Emphasis around the benefits ofcompliance (e.g., economic, societal, etc.) could be done through improved
communication, including with NSAs, but also using novel techniques, such
applying behavioural insights, such as nudging.
g. Encourage norm-building within regional groups or blocks of States:
Regional application of norms and frameworks could help ensure that these are
tailored to regional needs.
h. Enhance the role of regional disarmament centres: Regional disarmamentcentres have a very good understanding of national and regional contexts andcan help channel technical expertise on arms control to United Nations country
teams.
i. Engage with communities working in related areas: Reduction of silos
between communities working on the same issues, albeit with a different focus,
should be examined and enacted.
→ See also pathways for action under Issues 1 (Uneven distribution of power andlack of inclusiveness within decision-making structures), 3 (Ability to cope withthe acceleration and intersection of crises and issues), and 15 (Lack of sufficient
inclusion and use of regional and subregional entities).
10. Arms build-up as a way to bolster
securitya. Reinvigorate diplomatic relations: Increase opportunities for exchange andidentification of areas of common ground to resolve particular issues.
b. Change the narrative around deterrence: Emphasize collaboration, prevention, and regulation, such as by developing acceptable norms of State
behaviour, as opposed to thinking in terms of reprisals, mutually assured destruction, or escalation.
c. Encourage and improve transparency around spending and weapons:
Transparency in military and security spending can help provide clarity andreduce the need to purchase or develop more weapons systems – overall
helping increase trust.
d. Employ confidence-building mechanisms: Trust-building is essential, as
distrust and opaqueness are key drivers in weapons build-up.
e. Ensure robust arms control treaties are maintained: States mostly abide
by existing instruments, so ensuring that these instruments do not fall by thewayside or that States do not withdraw from treaties is key.

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f. Decrease economic reliance on weapons production: Examine how
economic reliance on weapons production can be shifted, as this can disincentivize moving away from weapons manufacturing.
g. Engage with national or local-level actors: Engagement with national or local
actors can help promote change bottom-up, in addition to top-down approaches.
h. Prioritize human security: Prioritization of human security can help shift thefocus away from weapons-led security.
→ See also pathways for action under Issues 14 (Marginalization of NSAs in international relations) and 18 (Insufficient preparation for non-traditional threats).
11. Weak rules-based ordera. Hold open and honest discussions around the current order: Understanding
the reasons why the current order was created in the first place, what does notwork, or what challenges exist is key to being able to address these issues andrebuild a stronger order.
b. Engage with regional and subregional actors: Engaging in discussions
with regional and subregional actors in times of crisis, as opposed to seeking
punitive actions, can help improve relationships and build trust. In turn, this canhelp improve adherence to international norms and rules.
c. Ensure national and international organizations have sufficient resources:
International organizations play a key role in maintaining the rules-based order,and ensuring that States abide with international law, frameworks, and other instruments, but they need sufficient resources to do so.
d. Enhance data on arms control and disarmament issues: Data is a key
element for accountability, and increased quality and quantity of such data could
help enhance transparency and trust.
→ See also pathways for action under Issues 3 (Ability to cope with the acceleration and intersection of crises and issues), 14 (Marginalization of NSAs in international relations), 9 (Lack of adequate responses to non-compliance) and 15 (Lackof sufficient inclusion and use of regional and subregional entities).

12. Tensions between the roles ofprivate sector actors and those ofStates at the international levela. Maintain role of States in policy- and norm-making: States should remain
proactive in tackling issues and considering the challenges and benefits to international, regional, national, local, and human security.
b. Enhance public–private partnerships: There needs to be recognition thatprovision of rules, regulation, and norms should be done jointly with private
sector actors, particularly given their important and growing role in international security matters.
c. Reinforce international law-based frameworks: International law remains in
the remit of States, so reinforcing it can also serve as a reminder of the currently
important and crucial role of States in this domain.
d. Encourage multi-stakeholder dialogues in arms control and disarmamentmechanisms: Enabling and encouraging the participation of NSAs in working
groups, meetings, processes, and review conferences can help improve theirunderstanding of instruments, as well as provide opportunities to benefit fromtheir insight, expertise, and knowledge in a specific area.
→ See also pathways for action under Issues 1 (Uneven distribution of power andlack of inclusiveness within decision-making structures), 2 (Member States withdrawing from meaningful multilateral engagement), and 3 (Ability to cope with theacceleration and intersection of crises and issues).

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13. Difficulty in aligning interests
be-tween private and public actors

a. Encourage initiatives and incentive structures that drive closer alignment
between the private sector and States: Incentive structures between actors
are different, and identifying areas of overlap (or lack thereof) can help with theidentification of areas for collaboration and strengthening of relationships.
b. Focus on individuals in addition to entities: In addition to the focus on private
sector actors with regard to norms and rules, also focus on the individuals withinthese entities.
c. Update regulations on private sector involvement: Private sector actors play
an increasingly large role, and therefore being clearer on their involvement inareas such as peacebuilding, peacekeeping, reconstruction, and development
is critical going forward.

14. Marginalization of NSAs in international relations

a. Recognize the strengths of NSA inclusion: NSAs can provide additional andnew perspectives, in addition to providing substantive input in terms of Track 2
diplomacy and, as such, additional recognition of the added value of NSAs isneeded.
b. Improve NSA representation at the national level: States could look to ensure
and improve inclusion of NSAs at the national level, which would in turn haveknock-on effects at the international level.
c. Streamline the approval process for NSA accreditation: The process for
NSAs to obtain a consultative status could be further streamlined to ensure
broader participation.
d. Improve mechanisms for NSA participation in processes: Making States
provide an explanation as to why certain NSAs are blocked from participation
could help address issues and identify underlying problems.
e. Improve processes for geographically diverse NSA participation: Ensuring
regional balance of NSA participation goes hand-in-hand with ensuring
improved participation.
f. Consider a partnership model to enhance collaboration: Closer collaboration and informal ways of working between States and NSAs could ensure that
NSAs are able to share their views even if processes or rules of procedure may
not always allow for their (full) participation.

15. Lack of sufficient inclusion anduse of regional and subregional
entities

a. Include subregional and even local entities as well as regional ones: Subregional entities can play an equally, if not more, important role, and further effort
could be undertaken to ensure their inclusion at the multilateral level.
b. Empower regional and subregional entities in arms control and disarmament: Regionally focused mechanisms should be pursued to ensure that instruments are designed according to regional or subregional realities, which also
increases their chances of implementation.
c. Develop a clear capacity-building strategy: Improve capacity within regionaland subregional entities through the provision of resources, training, and opportunities for engagement.
d. Improve coordination between, and participation of, entities: Putting inplace memorandums of understanding for ensuring political alignment between
regional and subregional entities can help increase their role at the multilaterallevel as well as improve their coordination.
→ See also pathways for action under Issue 9 (Lack of adequate responses tonon-compliance).

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16. Balancing between regulating
technology and enabling innovation

a. Clarify the narrative: Utilize capacity-building initiatives, or informal
meetings prior to formal processes, to enhance clarity on issues of technology and governance.
b. Enhance anticipatory governance: Better foresight is needed with regard to
emerging and dual-use technology, in order to be more proactive in terms oftechnological issues and how they may impact—either positively or negatively—international peace and security, as well as issues related to arms control
and disarmament.
c. Consider using more dynamic and flexible approaches as part of technological governance: Consider more dynamic approaches, beyond traditional
treaty structures as found in the arms control and disarmament field, to consider
technologies with wide-ranging applications.
→ See also pathways for action under Issues 12 (Tensions between the roles ofprivate sector actors and those of States at the international level), 14 (Marginalization of NSAs in international relations) and 15 (Lack of sufficient inclusion anduse of regional and subregional entities).

17. Access and control of technology
and the consequences thereofa. Hold regular discussions on technological issues: Making use of the diversityof instruments within the United Nations in order to discuss changes—often
rapid—in technologies, in order to be more proactive about these issues.
b. Provide support to States: Capacity-building activities should be considered in order to provide States with a better understanding around fair technology transfers, particularly for developing States, and to overcome any gaps inknowledge.
c. Develop better export control regimes and pathways to share technologies:
New and emerging technologies require thinking about their access throughexport controls in more detail.
→ See also pathways for action under Issues 12 (Tensions between the roles ofprivate sector actors and those of States at the inter-national level), 8 (Difficultyin aligning interests between private and public actors), and 15 (Lack of sufficient
inclusion and use of regional and subregional entities).

18. Insufficient preparation
non-traditional threatsfora. Improve the involvement of a wider set of actors: A more inclusive approachshould be taken to enable NSAs, regional and subregional groups, independent
experts, and other actors’ contribution to national, regional, and global strategies, discussions, and processes.
b. Learn from cross-cutting successes: Leverage lessons learned from existing
cross-area and cross-entity bodies, such as the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact Committee Secretariat.
c. Create instruments which are adaptable to future change: There should bea shift away from relying on past knowledge, towards approaches that enable
more future-focused thinking on threats to international peace and security.
d. Focus on the 2030 Agenda and beyond: In addition to seeking to implement
the 2030 Agenda, consideration of what will come after and how to reinforce
communication and action on linkages between issues of arms control and disarmament and development should be considered.
e. Improve the use of mitigation and early warning mechanisms: These mechanisms can be set up to monitor a range of variables, which can map across a
range of threats.
f. Re-examine concepts such as peace and conflict: Revisiting definitions of‘conflict’ could also be a way to include a broader scope with regard to threats.
→ See also pathways for action under Issues 3 (Ability to cope with the acceleration and intersection of crises and issues), 14 (Marginalization of NSAs in international relations), 9 (Lack of adequate responses to non-compliance) and 15 (Lackof sufficient inclusion and use of regional and subregional entities).

4.2 General Purpose and Cross-Cutting Pathways
for Action
Some of the pathways for action identified

aim to delve into these in detail, but nonethe-were not necessarily specific to issues of arms

less provides an overview of selected broader

control and disarmament, but rather pertained

pathways for action which were mentioned by

to more general purpose and cross-cuttinginterviewees alongside more targeted and is-issues which would also indirectly impact arms

sue-specific pathways for action (see Box 3).

control and disarmament. The report does not

Box 3. General Purpose and Cross-Cutting Pathways for Action to
Address the Identified Threats
Importance of the United Nations’ principles
It is important that the United Nations organization conducts its business according to the principles
that it espouses. This can manifest itself in multiple ways, such as remuneration of interns.
Fostering a culture of collaboration and cooperation
Beyond processes and mandates, people can play an important role in continuing and promoting
siloed attitudes and thus hampering inter-agency cooperation and collaboration. Ensuring that recruitment hires individuals with the right values, vision and diversity of thought is therefore important.
Equally important is seeking individuals with an inclusive mindset, who would be open to collaborative
efforts, as well as identifying leaders with the type(s) of leadership model most beneficial to achieve theintended goals. Within the existing workforce, use of behavioural insights to nudge attitudes and ways
of working could for example be considered, as well as ensuring that organizational configurations andpractices incentivize rather than challenge collaboration and cooperation.
Trainings and secondments between different communities
Specialized staff should be offered trainings to understand areas of overlap. This could also be achieved
through secondments between a range of United Nations agencies.
Informal platforms for discussions
Outside of formal negotiations, having inclusive and informal platforms or other avenues for Member
States and other stakeholders to consult, develop, and discuss ideas can help find areas of common
ground and agreement. Informal retreats and meetings could therefore be considered, as well as production of non-papers and other similar initiatives to stimulate information-sharing. This could also help
improve the efficiency of processes, including those relating to arms control and disarmament.

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Transparency and complementarity in funding
Lack of trust can stem from the feeling that States with more resources are able to wield influence
through their funding. This issue would require further examination, and an increase in transparency and declarations of conflict of interest could be considered. Transparency could also be increased
with regard to earmarked funding for specific projects. Additionally, complementarity in funding should
be sought between donors; this could help States pool together resources to fund areas of common
interest and avoid duplication of effort.

4.3 Key Takeaways from the Pathways for Action
The pathways for action outlined above demon-and the discussions emerging from them.

strate a number of initiatives with varying

At the same time, monitoring and assessing

scopes and scales. Some of the pathways

States and their behaviours should account forare more strategic in nature, some are more

not only identifying non-compliance but also

tactical, while others are more operational, andrewarding positive behaviours, as was noted in

may also, if implemented, have different likely or

the pathways for action. Indeed, focus should

potential impacts on the threat they are seeking

also be placed on ensuring that States remain

to overcome. The pathways also provide a

involved at the multilateral level, to enable

range of ideas that could be further discussed

crucial discussions and diplomacy to keep

and developed with a broad range of stakehold-thriving.

er, within and outside of the United Nations.
Yet, as shown by the range of pathways foraction, it is not possible to address threats tointernational security as it relates to weaponsand disarmament only; to enable progress inthese areas requires action in many others andmore broadly, portraying the interlinked natureof many of these threats—and pathways for

Many of the threats identified in A New Agenda
for Peace emerged from the workshop discussions in this project too, despite a different
approach and focus. This demonstrates that
there are core issues that need to be addressedto help secure a future which is more, rather thanless, appealing. As such, when analysing theaction.

pathways for action identified as possibilities

States remain the primary actors able to deal

for reflection emerge. First, the time framewith challenges related to international security,

necessary to enact the various proposed

namely conflicts, but also global threats such as

pathways for action. Some of the pathways forclimate change or new and emerging technolo-

action can be addressed rapidly but, for many,gy. Yet, the need to include a more diverse set

the pace of change will be lengthy and slow. Thisof stakeholders emerges clearly across thesedoes not necessarily mean that change is notpathways for action yielded by the scenarios

happening, but that there should be recognition

to address the identified threats, several points

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that some issues will take years if not decades
to address—and patience and continuous effort
will be required. Second, these pathways foraction would require multiple stakeholders
to achieve. Dialogue, agreement, and collaborative partnership will be needed to define not
only the way forward on the pathways for action,
but also in order to enact them. Third, several
broader normative concepts are necessary
for these pathways for action to be successful. This notably includes trust, transparency,
solidarity, and accountability, which underpin
the elements noted as providing a way forward.
Fourth, causality may be difficult to attribute,
particularly if several pathways for action are
employed in conjunction, in addition to otherextraneous developments. This may impact
the collective ability to understand and develop
good practices, unless robust evaluation is undertaken.

Bamako, Mali, 2020. Peace Monument. Credit: © mtcurado

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5. Preparing for the Future: The Way
Ahead
The future is, of course, unknown. However,conversation, in the context of the Summit of

the use of futures and foresight methods can

the Future and beyond. Indeed, as the future

help provide us with the tools to increase our

scenarios show, our greatest threats are bothresilience, as well as consider issues and takeinaction and ‘more of the same’—in otherdecisions with a more future-focused andwords, entrenchment in a particular structure orproactive mindset. As shown through this par-set of interests. To that end, building upon theticular project, while questions around arms

pathways for action could constitute a series ofcontrol and disarmament are critical when con-next steps. For example, this could entail un-sidering peace and security issues, taking a step

derstanding the levels of effort required for im-

back and thinking across areas of work demon-

plementation mapped against likely returns

strate the interlinkages in issues needing to be

on investment, to allow careful selection of

tackled. The creation of the future scenarios

the most relevant pathways in a time of con-

can thus be used as a starting point to examine

strained resources and a complex geopoliti-

other elements and more specific issues within

cal climate. Developing the pathways of action

the international security sphere—such as how

into recommendations could then be a sub-conflicts may change and evolve in the future.

sequent step. The complexity of defining, let

Overall, the role of the United Nations inarms control and disarmament is key, andthere is a need to strengthen what alreadyexists. However, many of the aspects raisedin this report—both the threats and pathways
for action—merit a broader and deeper

Brno, Czechia, 2020. Inflatable Earth model. Credit: © Lubo Ivanko

alone implementing, these pathways requires
a collaborative approach within and beyond
the United Nations. Despite the challenges
ahead, however, we need to confront the issues
if we do not want to end up in a Paradise Lost
scenario—and acknowledge that the hard work
will not end even if we reach A Modern Utopia.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y I N 2 0 4 548

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Annex 1. Detailed Pathways for
ActionThe following pages provide additional detail for each pathway for action described in Section 4.
1.

Uneven distribution of power and lack of inclusiveness within decision-making structures
a. Revitalize discussions on Security Council reform: Issues to address notably pertained
to representation in the Security Council, existence and use of the veto, and redistribution ofdecision-making. Suggestions include: (i) moving discussions and decisions on sanctions
from the Security Council to the General Assembly. It was noted that the imbalance in power
and lack of representation of certain regions in the Security Council mean that application of
sanctions is not always felt to be impartial. This would also mean the application of sanctions
would be based on majority voting by all Member States; (ii) issues that cannot find agreementin the Security Council could be automatically moved to the General Assembly ; (iii) increase
involvement and consultation by the Security Council with those affected by its decisions;42(iv) revitalize discussions on whether and how to include additional permanent members in
the Security Council, and provide a transparent and uniform decision; (v) reduce the use of theveto or remove the possibility of using it when discussing certain topics.
b. Engage more closely with the regional level: Increased dialogue and decision-making at theregional level on issues of arms control and disarmament could aid representation and horizontal governance on matters relating to weapons and international security. This could also
be a way to bridge some of the disconnect felt between challenges faced on the ground versus
the decision-making locations. Such regional perspectives on power distribution and inclusiveness could then be taken up at the global level. A way forward could be to have more dialogue
and incentives on the matter of reform at the regional level by States, with the outcome of these
discussions then taken up at the global level. Avoiding excessive top-down action can also
help re-establish trust; this can include the United Nations taking a more passive role, and delegating arms control and disarmament matters and implementation more to regional, subregional, and non-governmental organizations.
c. Ensure diversity in delegations: Inclusiveness should also be considered within delegations
notably by including diverse perspectives, such as gender and youth, and ensuring that they
too can attend and contribute to arms control and disarmament processes (such as GGEs,
OEWGs, First Committee, etc.). This could expand upon existing initiatives, such as Youth4Disarmament. Funding structures and incentives may be needed to enable this and ensure it
can be upheld by all Member States.

42 See The Elders, The Elders call for strengthening of the United Nations, 1 February 2015, https://theelders.org/news/elders-call-strengthening-united-nations.

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51

→ See also pathways for action under Issue 14 (Marginalization of NSAs in international relations) andIssue 15 (Lack of sufficient inclusion and use of regional and subregional entities).
2.

Member States withdrawing from meaningful multilateral engagementa. Devolve more decision-making to the regional level: Empowerment of regional and subregional organizations in the area of arms control and disarmament can help increase willingness of engagement, especially with regard to adapting action to region-specific challenges
and capacity for action. Additionally, if action is held up at the global level, change—and improvement of security—can still happen at the regional, subregional, and national levels.

→ See also pathways for action under Issues 3 (Ability to cope with the acceleration and intersectionof crises and issues), 8 (Low or lack of trust in the United Nations), and 15 (Lack of sufficient inclusion
and use of regional and subregional entities).
3.

Ability to cope with the acceleration and intersection of crises and issues
a. Keep track of changing attitudes, norms, and circumstances in order to quickly adapt
or react to them: Understand the impact and implications of any evolutions or changes (forexample, in illegal or illicit behaviour regarding weapons diversion or use, in technologies, etc.)
on the work of the United Nations and in particularly that relating to arms control and disarmament. A secondary and linked aspect is to then have the mechanisms necessary to determine
whether and how the United Nations, or parts thereof, should adapt or react as a consequencein order to ensure such matters receive timely attention or are taken into account.
b. Consider the limitations of institutional or process mandates: Having more flexibility
embedded in mandates could help improve more substantive inter-institution collaboration.
For example, arms control and disarmament processes could be enabled, where appropriate,
to discuss a broader range of weapons and technologies. This could be achieved by initiating cross-cutting mandates across categories of weapon systems, or on technological convergence, or non-traditional threats. This could help address increasingly interlinked issues in a
way that current processes do not reflect the reality on the ground.
c. Create opportunities to deepen substantive discussions: Circulating more non-papers
to explore issues informally, or holding informal consultations prior to meetings or debates,
could help increase awareness and knowledge. In turn, this can help improve and streamline
discussions, and ultimately benefit the United Nations work in the field of arms control anddisarmament.
d. Approach issues from a broader lens: Many issues converge, yet the way in which they
are dealt with is fragmented (for example, discussions regarding AI). Some of this is due
to mandates, as discussed in 3b above. Arms control and disarmament issues could, forexample, also capture political, social, and economic dimensions of certain issues, and incorporate more closely cross-cutting work from other agencies and institutions (for example, on AI
involve UNESCO, the Human Right Council, etc.). Another aspect is the committee structureof the General Assembly whereby similar topics are dealt by different committees (for example,
outer space). A working group could be created to examine these converging issues which are‘cross-mandate’ and ensure that they are examined in their entirety, and not limited by mandate
or other limitations.
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e. Streamline the disarmament agenda: Investigate how the disarmament agenda could be
streamlined, to allow more time between processes for diplomats to absorb relevant material.
f.

Increase transparency about successes and failures: The United Nations, and the disarmament machinery specifically, should demonstrate that it can address specific problems thatare currently taking place and impacting different regions, but also be honest about its limits.
This can also help increase understanding about what hampers progress. The disarmamentmachinery should also seek to improve communications about its successes, to demonstratethat it can deliver upon its various mandates and has relevance. This can also be helped by decoupling what is achieved by United Nations structures versus political processes which are
Member State-led.

g. Enable greater feedback loops: Obtaining inputs, feedback, and insights from United Nations
personnel and the general public on processes, mechanisms, and the United Nations more
broadly can help identify what could work better. Such outreach can also aid in obtaining a
range of ideas on how to address the identified issues.
→ See also pathways for action under Issues 8 (Low or lack of trust in the United Nations), 16 (Balancing
between regulating technology and enabling innovation), and 18 (Insufficient preparation for non-traditional threats).
4.

Over-politicization of issues within the United Nations
a. Maintain impartiality: United Nations bodies should maintain impartiality, and not seek to stigmatize different sides. This includes continuing to uphold the Charter of the United Nations,existing norms, and international law. The United Nations should maintain its role as a neutral
platform in order to successfully lead negotiations between States. Furthermore, equal actions
should be followed by equal consequences; there should not be a (perception of) difference
between States. A transparent body to verify allegations of non-impartiality could be considered.

5.

Divisions or competition between Member Statesa. Ensure that multilateral mechanisms remain in place: Even if the use of multilateral mechanisms enabling communication and cooperation fluctuates, their existence should always bepreserved as a way to encourage and foster dialogue. Commitments could be put into place toensure that there is sufficient funding and other resources for their long-term survival.
b. Create incentive-based coalitions: Partnerships and coalitions between Member Statesthat focus on areas of action as an incentive could be created around formal processes. Thisapproach could complement and support multilateral processes and coalitions or alliances
based on areas of interest, such as by focusing on deepening the discussions on certain topics,
or focus on issues such as implementation and capacity-building.
c. Reflect upon the consensus decision-making system: Further discussion and decisions oncorrect use of consensus voting is necessary, and how to ensure that it can be used adequately
without derailing processes. Ideas include moving towards majority voting when no consensus
can be achieved, or abstentions which do not block otherwise unanimous decisions.

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53

→ See also pathways for action under Issues 2 (Member States withdrawing from meaningful multilateral engagement) and 8 (Low or lack of trust in the United Nations).
6.

Weakening of States or their authority in international relations→ See pathways for action under Issues 1 (Uneven distribution of power and lack of inclusivenesswithin decision-making structures), 2 (Member States withdrawing from meaningful multilateral engagement), 3 (Ability to cope with the acceleration and intersection of crises and issues), and 12(Tensions between the roles of private sector actors and those of States at the international level).
7.

Low or lack of trust between Member States→ See pathways for action under Issue 5 (Divisions or competition between Member States).
8.

Low or lack of trust in the United Nations
a. Rethink the issues that the United Nations is best placed to address: Acknowledging thelimitations of the United Nations can help rebuild trust in its capacity for action. This could forexample entail focusing predominantly on serving as a convening power, and engaging andsharing certain tasks with other actors, such as regional and subregional actors on areas on
issues like peacekeeping.
b. Improve external communications: Maintaining and constantly improving the United Nations’external communication is important to ensure that there is an understanding of the role of theorganization, what it can do, and what it has control over. This is particularly critical when it
comes to issues of international security, where understanding the differences between the
Secretariat and agencies versus the negotiation and decision-making bodies can help thegeneral public understand what can and is being done by United Nations staff (e.g., gathering
data about arms transfers and making it available), and what is within the remit of Member
States (e.g., providing such data to the United Nations). This can include utilizing novel means,such as online participation and feedback, in addition to ensuring the existing public education
initiatives continue.

→ See also pathways for action under Issues 1 (Uneven distribution of power and lack of inclusivenesswithin decision-making structures), 3 (Ability to cope with the acceleration and intersection of crises
and issues), 14 (Marginalization of NSAs in international relations) and 15 (Lack of sufficient inclusion
and use of regional and subregional entities).
9.

Lack of adequate responses to non-compliancea. Re-examine incentives: There is a need to rethink incentives for compliance. As regards
punitive actions, one aspect is to make sure that sanctions, such as economic ones, areapplied in a non-discriminatory fashion—in other words, that similar acts of non-complianceby States get comparable punitive actions. As regards non-punitive measures, reflecting upon
the provision of incentives or rewards to States which abide by the existing treaties, regulations
and norms could also incentivize compliance. Another aspect is ensuring that States have thenecessary tools and resources in order to comply with a treaty, framework, norms, or other, andmake these available if not. Pursuing action should also be after a buffer period, in cases whereparallel or back-channel processes have proven to be inconclusive.

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b. Strengthen resources for implementation and enforcement: A review of the resources
available for different instruments across conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction would help to ascertain which need additional resources for implementation and enforcement, as well as what resources might be needed for international cooperation and assistance. In addition, an examination of whether these resources would be more beneficial at thenational or regional level would also be necessary. For example, efforts made to improve peaceand security could also be examined as being a potential condition for receiving development
assistance.
c. Enable greater enforcement mechanisms: Several options can emerge as part of thispathway. First, the design phase of instruments should ensure that implementation and enforcement mechanisms are included, actionable, and adaptable to future change. In legal
terms, this could include improving the competency of international courts to take action,
strengthening the status of international decisions, implementing a specific court to address
violations to a treaty or framework. In punitive terms, enacting measures already integrated inagreements, in cases of long-standing or severe non-compliance, could serve as a means tocompel adherence and demonstrate that non-compliance will be punished. To aid with conciliation, establishment of mediation processes and dispute resolutions mechanisms could also
be considered.
d. Make compliance a whole-of-society responsibility: Encouraging a wider range of NSAs(e.g., private sector actors, academia, CSOs, and beyond) to take an active role. This can help
place bottom-up pressure as well as top-down pressure to ensure compliance.
e. Ensure transparency and legitimacy of assessments of possible non-compliance: Increasing the diversity of inspectors in terms of their background could be a way forward. Ensuringthat personnel have technical expertise, including within secretariats overseeing implementation of treaties or frameworks, would also help.
f.

Emphasize the benefits of compliance: Emphasis around the benefits of compliance (e.g.,
economic, societal, etc.) could be done through improved communication, including with
NSAs, but also using novel techniques, such applying behavioural insights such as nudging.

g. Encourage norm-building within regional groups or blocks of States: Regional applicationof norms and frameworks could help ensure that these are tailored to regional needs. Additionally, this can also place more responsibility on regional groups or blocs to ensure compliance,such as through sanctions between members, including removal from the block, economic
sanctions, peer reviews, or other. Strengthening regional compliance can also strengthen
compliance and maintenance of norms at the global level.
h. Enhance the role of regional disarmament centres: Regional disarmament centres havea very good understanding of national and regional contexts and can help channel technicalexpertise on arms control to United Nations country teams; as such, more effort could be madeto ensure that their role is made more prominent, and their activities are as visible and impactful
as possible within the disarmament machinery and beyond. This could include, for example,
improving support available to them, as well as the coordination and information-sharing
between them. The role of regional disarmament centres could also be enhanced throughmore inclusion in decision-making at the global level.

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55

i.

Engage with communities working in related areas: Reduction of silos between communities working on the same issues, albeit with a different focus, should be examined and enacted.
For example, the arms control and disarmament community could improve coordination anddialogue with the development, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding communities, particularly at the strategic-level. Notably, institutional change could be considered tostrengthen collaboration and communication at the working level.

→ See also pathways for action under Issues 1 (Uneven distribution of power and lack of inclusivenesswithin decision-making structures), 3 (Ability to cope with the acceleration and intersection of crises
and issues), and 15 (Lack of sufficient inclusion and use of regional and subregional entities).
10. Arms build-up as a way to bolster security
a. Reinvigorate diplomatic relations: Increase opportunities for exchange and identification ofareas of common ground to resolve particular issues. Improving personal relationships canalso help, for example providing space and incentives for diplomats to get to know each otherbetter on a personal level can help build greater trust, and reduce the need to rely on weaponsin times of geopolitical instability. To that end, Track 1.5 or Track 2 diplomacy can also be helpful
in enabling dialogue.
b. Change the narrative around deterrence: Emphasize collaboration, prevention, and regulation, such as by developing acceptable norms of State behaviour, as opposed to thinking
in terms of reprisals, mutually assured destruction, or escalation. Overall, seek to reduce thedegree to which weapons are seen as improving security, or better yet remove the incentive fordeterrence. Improving actor-specific understanding on weapons build-up could help, such as
on why specific actors acquire, possess, and retain weapons, to then also be able to examine
what may contribute to them being put aside. Processes and instruments focus on the ‘supply’of weapons. However, examining the ‘demand’ can not only help develop a better understanding of existing issues, but also integrate considerations regarding non-traditional threats (seeIssue area 17). Having a combined approach which addresses both supply and demand could
therefore be implemented. Each actor will have its own reasons and circumstances, as wellas weapons mix, so a case-by-case approach would be the most conducive to obtain positive
results.
c. Encourage and improve transparency around spending and weapons: Transparency inmilitary and security spending can help provide clarity and reduce the need to purchase ordevelop more weapons systems and overall help increase trust. This could involve revitalizing and continuing to promote engagement with transparency instruments, such as the United
Nations Register of Conventional Arms, the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures
and the Arms Trade Treaty. It could also involve ensuring regular inspections are taking place.
d. Employ confidence-building mechanisms: Trust-building is essential, as distrust andopaqueness are key drivers in weapons build-up. Development and maintenance of suchmechanisms, including at bilateral and regional levels, can therefore help, including thosewhich are already embedded in existing instruments.
e. Ensure robust arms control treaties are maintained: States mostly abide by existing instruments, so ensuring that these instruments do not fall by the wayside or that States do notwithdraw from treaties is key.
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f.

Decrease economic reliance on weapons production: Economic reliance on weapons production can disincentivize moving away from weapon manufacturing. This could be counteredby initiatives looking to transition workers to other industries requiring similar skillsets, reskill
individuals, and re-use the equipment in relevant industries. Such an approach would howeverrequire engagement with private sector actors.

g. Engage with national or local-level actors: In addition to top-down approaches, engagementwith national or local actors can also help promote change bottom-up. This can be througheducation and awareness-raising about having a broader sense of security beyond militarization. This can also include efforts to improve women’s representation, as they can bring indifferent conceptions of security to governance.
h. Prioritize human security: Prioritization of human security can help shift the from away from
weapons-led security. This can be done by ensuring this perspective is discussed, highlighted,
and enforced across mechanisms, treaties, and other arms control and disarmament instruments.
→ See also pathways for action under Issues 14 (Marginalization of NSAs in international relations)and 18 (Insufficient preparation for non-traditional threats).
11. Weak rules-based ordera. Hold open and honest discussions around the current order: Understanding the reasons
why the current order was created in the first place, what does not work, or what challenges
exist is key to being able to address these issues and rebuild a stronger order. Informal as well
as formal multi-stakeholder discussions could be held in order to restate the collective challenges the international community faces, and reinvigorate consensus around the rules-basedorder.
b. Engage with regional and subregional actors: Engaging in discussions with regional andsubregional actors in times of crisis, as opposed to seeking punitive actions, can help improve
relationships and build trust. In turn, this can help improve adherence to international norms
and rules.
c. Ensure national and international organizations have sufficient resources: Internationalorganizations play a key role in maintaining the rules-based order, and ensuring that States
abide with international law, frameworks, and other instruments. However, to do so, they needappropriate resources. National organizations can also play a key role, and thus ensuring continuity in funds, programmes and other initiatives which enable them to obtain the necessary
resources is key.
d. Enhance data on arms control and disarmament issues: Data is a key element for accountability. Improving and incentivizing voluntary State reporting and participation in processes
can be a way to improve existing data. Data issues could also be examined more comprehensively, beyond reporting requested from States.
→ See also pathways for action under Issues 3 (Ability to cope with the acceleration and intersection of crises and issues), 14 (Marginalization of NSAs in international relations), 9 (Lack of adequate
responses to non-compliance) and 15 (Lack of sufficient inclusion and use of regional and subregional
entities).

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12. Tensions between the roles of private sector actors and those of States at the international
level
a. Maintain role of States in policy- and norm-making: States should remain proactive intackling issues and considering the challenges and benefits to international, regional, national,
local, and human security.
b. Enhance public–private partnerships: There needs to be recognition that provision of rules,
regulation, and norms should be done jointly with private sector actors, particularly given theirimportant and growing role in international security matters, as discussed in Section 3.3. An
exact exploration of how best to distribute the involvement of the various actors in arms control
and disarmament discussions, processes, and implementation of decisions, and how best to
integrate new actors, would however also be needed. This could for example involve emphasizing the benefits of the involvement and participation of the private sector in arms control anddisarmament related matters.
c. Reinforce international law-based frameworks: International law remains in the remit ofStates, so reinforcing it can also serve as a reminder of the currently important and crucial roleof States in this domain. Reinforcing it also serves the purpose of providing further commitment to tackling threats to peace and security.
d. Encourage multi-stakeholder dialogues in arms control and disarmament mechanisms:
Enabling and encouraging the participation of NSAs in working groups, meetings, processes,
and review conferences can help improve their understanding of instruments, as well as
provide opportunities to benefit from their insight, expertise, and knowledge in a specific area.
Informal discussions can also help to ensure alignment between discussions at the multilaterallevel and on-the-ground realities. This should, as much as possible, also include non-Western
private sector actors.
→ See also pathways for action under Issues 1 (Uneven distribution of power and lack of inclusiveness within decision-making structures), 2 (Member States withdrawing from meaningful multilateralengagement), and 3 (Ability to cope with the acceleration and intersection of crises and issues).
13. Difficulty in aligning interests between private and public actors
a. Encourage initiatives and incentive structures that drive closer alignment between theprivate sector and States: Incentive structures between actors are different with regard to international security, and the aim would be to move away from elements such as profit, market
share, influence, or investment opportunities being the primary incentives motivating private
sector actors in this area. Understanding which interests overlap and compete between private
sector and public sector actors can help identify areas for collaboration and areas which need
to be bridged. Specifically, compliance and accountability mechanisms could be used to aligninterests of private sector actors with issues such as arms control, disarmament, and conflict
prevention. These mechanisms could for example mirror existing mechanisms, such as theenvironmental, social, and corporate governance movement implemented to guide more sustainable investment strategies. This can also help to identify how commercial decisions bycertain private sector actors can be managed in terms of their impact on regulatory decisions.

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Development of guiding principles empowering private sector actors towards positive development and strengthening of international security while providing a financial incentive could
therefore be considered.
b. Focus on individuals in addition to the entities: Currently, focus on private sector actors withininternational security is primarily on the entities themselves. However, an approach could be toalso focus on the individuals within these entities, to appeal to them about the norms and rulesthat are seen as critical within arms control and disarmament processes—in effect, separating
individuals from the corporate aspect.
c. Update regulations on private sector involvement: Private sector actors play an increasingly large role, and therefore being clearer on their involvement in areas such as peacebuilding,peacekeeping, reconstruction, and development is critical going forward. Conversely, there
may also be a need to increase the involvement of public sector and international institutionsin private sector or industrial structures, in an understanding that private sector involvement is
an ongoing and defining feature.
14. Marginalization of NSAs in international relations
a. Recognize the strengths of NSA inclusion: NSAs can provide additional and new perspectives, in addition to providing substantive input in terms of Track 2 diplomacy. Additional recognition of the added value of NSAs is needed—for example, applying learning and successes
from processes which successfully included NSAs. In the disarmament field, the use of
explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA) political declaration process has been citedof a good example of CSO inclusion. Outside of this, the sharing of personal experiences ofpeople with HIV/AIDS to the executive board of Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
is also a good example of bringing the reality on the ground to decision makers. Taking theseexamples into account, one way forward within the arms control and disarmament field more
broadly could be to have NSA work presented on a regular basis to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, to better highlight challenges faced on the ground.
b. Improve NSA representation at the national level: States could look to ensure and improve
inclusion of NSAs at the national level, which would in turn have knock-on effects at the international level. This could include consolidating national organizations and advocates, liaisingwith them, and giving them the necessary space to provide their inputs.
c. Streamline the approval process for NSA accreditation: NSAs looking to obtain a consultative status which enables them access to a number of bodies and mechanisms must apply
for Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) accreditation. Suggestions to streamline thisprocess include ensuring faster decision times, and the possibility to appeal should an application be rejected.
d. Improve mechanisms for NSA participation in processes: Making States provide an explanation as to why certain NSAs are blocked from participation could therefore help address
issues and identify underlying problems. In a similar vein, protecting the speaking time for NSA
interventions can also help ensure that chairs leave sufficient time for NSA participation, or
ensure that NSAs can take the floor at multiple intervals throughout, as is the case in the Arms
Trade Treaty Conferences of States Parties. Reframing working groups, particularly on new

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be considered. Multi-stakeholder dialogues and other information consultation mechanisms
could also be increasingly used.
e. Improve processes for geographically diverse NSA participation: Ensuring regionalbalance of NSA participation goes hand-in-hand with ensuring improved participation. Notably,an examination or barriers to entry—literally and figuratively—faced by NSA representatives tomeetings in New York or Geneva would be needed. Lessening visa requirements and providing
funding for non-Western NSAs could help ensure more diverse views.
f.

Consider a partnership model to enhance collaboration: Closer collaboration and informal
ways of working between States and NSAs could ensure that NSAs are able to share theirviews even if processes or rules of procedure may not always allow for their (full) participation. These consultations could also ensure that a variety of voices are heard, including of under-represented people (youth, women, victims, etc.). As noted in discussions relating to therevitalization of the Conference on Disarmament, views from NSAs could also be incorporatedby States in their national statements.43

15. Lack of sufficient inclusion and use of regional and subregional entities
a. Include subregional and even local entities as well as regional ones: Subregional entities
can play an equally, if not more, important role. Therefore, more should be done to ensure subregional entities are included in multilateral processes, discussions and other mechanisms.
This inclusion can also promote uptake of certain issues within subregional entities, which canplay a role in helping States ratify and implement instruments. Formalization of approaches tosubregional (and, in some cases, regional) entities could help emphasize importance of participation to processes at the global level. Inclusion of local entities or individuals could also
be explored, such as mayors or urban leaders, to promote a bottom-up approach to tacklingcertain issues.
b. Empower regional and subregional entities in arms control and disarmament: Regionallyfocused mechanisms should be pursued to ensure that instruments are designed according
to regional or subregional realities, which also increases their chances of implementation.
The Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management is an example
of such an instrument, which provides the general framework which can be then made more
specific for each region. The United Nations could seek to moderate and facilitate discussion on regional issues, while letting regional and subregional actors lead on the substanceof the discussions and implementation of various mechanisms. On the other side of the coin,regional and subregional entities could also engage more closely on these issues and demonstrate proactive involvement.
c. Develop a clear capacity-building strategy: Improve capacity within regional and subregional entities through the provision of resources, training, and opportunities for engagement. The

43 See Sebban et al., “Revitalizing the Conference on Disarmament: Workshop Report”, UNIDIR, 18 August 2023, https://doi.
org/10.37559/WMD/23/CD-Retreat.

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United Nations can play a role in developing guidance for these entities, particularly on issues
where States may not have sufficient knowledge or understanding on the importance of their involvement. Gaps in knowledge between regions need to be identified and could be addressed
within the regional and subregional groups.
d. Improve coordination between, and participation of, entities: Putting in place memorandums of understanding for ensuring political alignment between regional and subregional
entities can help increase their role at the multilateral level as well as improve their coordination.
→ See also pathways for action under Issue 9 (Lack of adequate responses to non-compliance).
16. Balancing between regulating technology and enabling innovation
a. Clarify the narrative: Utilize capacity-building initiatives, or informal meetings prior to formal
processes, to enhance clarity on the fact that technology regulation and governance will nothamper innovation or development of emerging technology for peaceful uses, which may help
remove some misconceptions or misinformation.
b. Enhance anticipatory governance: Better foresight is needed with regard to emerging anddual-use technology, in order to be more proactive in terms of technological issues and how
they may impact—either positively or negatively—international peace and security, as well as
issues related to arms control and disarmament. This could include regular horizon-scanning
activities, discussions with external experts, and setting of clear criteria as to when a technology would merit further discussion by Member States as part of a more formalized process.
c. Consider using more dynamic and flexible approaches as part of technological governance: Traditional treaty structures as found in the arms control and disarmament field may
not be the most adapted to technologies which have wide-ranging applications as well as both
positive and ‘less positive’ impacts. Elaborating more dynamic approaches could be helpful.
This can even include holding discussions that are not dependent on achieving consensus oran outcome document.
→ See also pathways for action under Issues 12 (Tensions between the roles of private sector actors
and those of States at the international level), 14 (Marginalization of NSAs in international relations),
and 15 (Lack of sufficient inclusion and use of regional and subregional entities).
17. Access and control of technology and the consequences thereofa. Hold regular discussions on technological issues: Making use of the diversity of instruments
within the United Nations—such as the Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Technology or Arria-formula meetings within the Security Council—in order to discuss changes—often
rapid—in technologies, in order to be more proactive about these issues.
b. Provide support to States: Capacity-building activities should be considered in order toprovide States with a better understanding around fair technology transfers, particularly fordeveloping States, and to overcome any gaps in knowledge. Entities at the global, regional,
and subregional levels could also develop implementation mechanisms, as well as monitoring and assessment of technologies. There should be an encouragement to share beneficial

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innovations to overcome a technological divide between and within States. This can also
include support to help States develop relevant national strategies.
c. Develop better export control regimes and pathways to share technologies: New andemerging technologies require thinking about their access through export controls in moredetail. Amended mechanisms and involvement of experts can help develop understandings ofthe challenges, opportunities, and ethical considerations. This could also include consideringexport (and import) controls of intangible technology transfers.
→ See also pathways for action under Issues 12 (Tensions between the roles of private sector actors
and those of States at the international level), 8 (Difficulty in aligning interests between private andpublic actors), and 15 (Lack of sufficient inclusion and use of regional and subregional entities).
18. Insufficient preparation for non-traditional threatsa. Improve the involvement of a wider set of actors: A more inclusive approach should be taken
to enable NSAs, regional and subregional groups, independent experts, and other actors tocontribute to national, regional, and global strategies, discussions, and processes. This
broader set of actors should be enabled to provide authoritative information on realities andissues on the ground. Often, they can bring in perspectives which demonstrate the interlinkages between issues, in ways which are sometimes not addressed in full in processes, but
merit examination. This also includes liaising more with other communities of actors working
on issues linked to or impacting arms control and disarmament, such as experts on development, climate change, economics, or health issues, such as by setting up working groups ora taskforce for this type of cross-cutting work. It would however be important to ensure that
this expertise is reflected in discussion and processes, rather than merely securitizing these
non-traditional threats.
b. Learn from cross-cutting successes: Several cross-area and cross-entity bodies haveemerged, such as the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact
Committee Secretariat. The Compact notably involves close to 50 entities, bringing together
entities working on issues relating to arms control and disarmament with those working on
counter-terrorism, crime, and more. This example and others can provide a blueprint and setof lessons learned for tackling other cross-cutting areas which are seen as not traditionallybelonging within the remit of arms control and disarmament.
c. Create instruments which are adaptable to future change: There should be a shift away fromrelying on past knowledge, towards approaches that enable more future-focused thinking on
threats to international peace and security. Futures and foresight methods could, for example,
be employed to avoid solely relying on empirical approaches to analyse threats. Additionally,embedding more flexibility to ensure that arms control and disarmament agreements can be
implemented, amended and supplemented, in order to keep abreast of ongoing developments,
could be a possible solution for exploration.
d. Focus on the 2030 Agenda and beyond: The SDGs cover a range of issues and provide aclear roadmap for what can and should be achieved. Change or action against non-traditional
threats that impact peace and security can therefore be actioned by seeking to implement the2030 Agenda within the timelines set out by the Secretary-General, and monitor implementation

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in order to prepare for what may come after Agenda 2030. Additionally, the 2030 Agenda
provides clear linkages between issues of arms control and disarmament and development,
the message of which could be reinforced and better communicated and in the future could be
integrated more closely with issues of peace, security and disarmament within arms control
and disarmament forums.
e. Improve the use of mitigation and early warning mechanisms: These mechanisms can be
set up to monitor a range of variables, which can map across a range of threats. Alongsidethese mechanisms, an adequate response and multi-stakeholder response to these indicators
should also be determined.
f.

Re-examine concepts such as peace and conflict: Revisiting definitions of ‘conflict could
also be a way to include a broader scope with regard to threats. This includes, notably, taking
into account instances or weapons that fall under the threshold—such as instances of armed
violence, or low-level weapons such as improvised explosive devices.

→ See also pathways for action under Issues 3 (Ability to cope with the acceleration and intersection of crises and issues), 14 (Marginalization of NSAs in international relations), 9 (Lack of adequate
responses to non-compliance), and 15 (Lack of sufficient inclusion and use of regional and subregional entities).

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Annex 2. Expert Participation
The expert group was comprised of 15 core experts and 7 ad-hoc experts who helped shape the development of the future scenarios. Four chose to remain anonymous, with the remaining 18 acknowledged
below.
Alisha Anand

Trish Lavery

Andrey Baklitskiy

Marina Manke

Tomisha Bino

Manuel Martinez Miralles

Renata Dalaqua

Siobhan O’Neil

Harry Deng

Giacomo Persi Paoli

Sarah Erickson

Pavel Podvig

Hardy Giezendanner

Farzan Sabet

Sarah Grand-Clément

Ioana Puscas

Paul Holtom

Sweta Saxena

Beyond the expert group, over 60 participants took part across the five workshops, all of which were
held under the Chatham House Rule. In addition, interviews were conducted with 22 individuals, two of
which chose to remain anonymous, with the remaining 20 acknowledged below.
Simon Bagshaw

Nnenna Ifeanyi-Ajufo

Tiyamike Banda

Chris King

Tomisha Bino

Ivan Marques

Renata Dalaqua

Manuel Martinez Miralles

Lucia Dammert

Uzochukwu Ohanyere

Neil Davison

Siobhan O’Neil

Renata Dwan

Saji Prelis

Chris Earney

Lena Slachmuijlder

Rose Gottemoeller

Michael Spies

Henriette van Gulik

Beyza Unal

Paul Holtom

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