CLIMATE CHANGE IS DRIVINGPEOPLE INTO ARMED GROUPSFIVE TAKEAWAYS(JULY 2024)

Quite literally a hot topic, climate-security is among the key concerns of theinternational community today. By now, it is well established that climate change
plays a role in driving armed conflict, but the question remains: how exactly?
The general answer: It’s complicated. There is no direct link by which higher
temperatures or changes in rainfall automatically lead to violence. Rather, the climateconflict-nexus is driven by indirect pathways and mediating factors that influence ifor how these linkages play out. On top of that, as climate change manifests differently
across – and even within – regions, its intermediate effects on conflict onset or conflict
dynamics can vary as well. Broadly, heavy storms, torrential rains, floods, wildfires, aswell as slow-onset stressors like droughts, shifting seasonal rainfall anddesertification can fuel existing vulnerabilities, undermining human security andincreasing the risk of – potentially large-scale – armed or criminal violence.
Importantly, by putting a strain on natural resources and the agricultural livelihoods
that depend on them, climate change is eroding socio-economic resilience in often
already fragile regions. Compounded by weak governance and limited coping
capacities, this presents a breeding ground for competition over water and arable land
– and for armed groups to recruit from hard-hit communities that lack economic
alternatives and effective dispute resolution. Armed groups can also exploit resource
scarcity by controlling access to land and waterways, gaining a foothold in localcommunities. Other factors, such as climate-induced displacement or food insecurity
and their effects on inequality and social cohesion, only add to the pressure.
Across several case studies, MEAC’s unique local-level data sheds light on someof these links. In surveys with community members, leaders, as well as former andcurrent armed group associates, five key findings stand out:

CLIMATE CHANGE IS WIDELY FELTIn the North West of Nigeria, for example, 78 per cent of (adult) respondents
reported significant changes in rainfall, heat, and related stressors such as
droughts or floods compared to when they were younger (1). Among
community members in Colombia, it was 85 per cent (2).

1. In 2024, adult respondents (N=2555) were asked: “Compared to when you were younger, do you think there have beensignificant changes in rainfall, temperatures, or the frequency and intensity of droughts or floods?” - Yes / No / Refused toanswer.
2. In 2021, respondents (N=2460) were asked: “In your lifetime, do you think there have been great changes in rainfall,temperatures, or weather events such as floods and droughts?” - Yes / No / Refused to answer.

LIVES AND LIVELIHOODS ARE THREATENEDIn each survey location, people struggle in their farming, herding, orfishing because of this. In the Lake Chad Basin region, many said that
they, or people they know, were having longstanding difficulties
making a living from agriculture because of specific climatic changes(28 per cent of respondents in North East Nigeria, 61 per cent inCameroon, 78 per cent in Chad, 27 per cent in Niger; see note 3).

CLIMATE-RELATED LIVELIHOOD CHALLENGES
ARE PUSHING PEOPLE INTO ARMED GROUPS
Many respondents confirm that armed groups can and are taking
advantage of these grievances (a prominent example of which were ISIL’s
targeted recruitment campaigns in drought-stricken villages across Iraqand Syria). In the North East of Nigeria, of those survey respondents
acknowledging climate-related agricultural difficulties, 16 per cent said
they knew someone who joined Boko Haram because of this (18 per centin Cameroon, 37 per cent in Chad, 57 per cent in Niger; see note 4). The
numbers in Nigeria are even higher for associates of community security
groups such as the CJTF. Notably, climate-related difficulties not only
seem to impact recruitment into insurgent groups but are seen by thepublic as precipitating a shift towards all kinds of conflict actors.

Q: [OF THOSE ACKNOWLEDGING CLIMATE-RELATED DIFFICULTIES]: DO YOU KNOW OFANYONE WHO JOINED [NON-STATE ARMED GROUP] BECAUSE OF THESE DIFFICULTIES?

3. Between 2021 and 2022, respondents (N=764 in Cameroon, 729 in Chad, 463 in Niger, 2847 in Nigeria) were asked“Before the conflict came to your community, from what you have heard, did you or anyone you know experience difficulties
making a living from farming, herding or fishing because of any of the following? Please select all that apply.” - Changes inaverage temperature / Changes in average rainfall / Natural disasters / Changes in the lake or the cultivable lands (polders)[option in Chad, Cameroon, Niger only] / None of the above / Refused to answer.
4. In Chad (N=567), Cameroon (N=463), and Niger (N=126), respondents were asked: “Do you know of anyone who joined
Boko Haram because of these difficulties?” - Yes / No / Refused to answer. In Nigeria (N=826): “Do you know of anyone whojoined [Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah (also known as Boko Haram) / the CJTF, Yan Gora] or another group like this because ofthese difficulties?” - Yes / No / Refused to answer.

EX-ASSOCIATES THEMSELVES SAY SOUniquely, MEAC has first-hand reporting on this climate-driven recruitment.
Out of former Boko Haram associates in the North East of Nigeria who
acknowledged climate-related difficulties, 11 per cent reported that thisplayed a role in their recruitment. In Cameroon, Chad and Niger, this was 7per cent, 28 per cent and 51 per cent, respectively (5). In Colombia, 43 percent of surveyed ex-combatants from different armed groups said that they
had joined because of economic difficulties generally, and 6 per centspecifically attributed those to climate change (6).

Q: [OF THOSE WHO ACKNOWLEDGING CLIMATE-RELATED DIFFICULTIES]: WERE THESE
DIFFICULTIES AMONG THE REASONS WHY YOU CAME TO BE WITH [NON-STATE ARMED GROUP]?

EVERY STORY LOOKS DIFFERENT“Flood (1)” by Immanuel Afolabi, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

While a sizeable number of ex-combatants said climate-related
challenges drove them to align with an armed group, their individual paths
differ significantly. This makes sense given the subregional (and ofteneven local) variations of climatic impacts – as illustrated by the stories offormer Boko Haram associates in Nigeria (n.b. not depicted here).

My farm was affected byflooding. Before the insurgency, I
was farming in the hills Gwoza inBorno. When Boko Harammembers
occupiedmycommunity, they built their baseon the mountain and that
stopped me from having accessto good farm land. Heavy rainfall
and flooding made it impossible
to farm on the lands available tous. To be able to access goodland, one had to join them.

5. Former armed group associates who acknowledged climate-related difficulties (N=222 in Cameroon, 243 in Chad, 40 inNiger, 322 in Nigeria) were asked: “Were these difficulties among the reasons for why you came to be with [non-state armedgroup]?” - Yes / No / Refused to answer.
6. In 2022, respondents (N=134) were asked: “What are the main reasons why you joined [non-state armed group]? Please
select all that apply.” - To fight against the state / To achieve structural changes for the country / Because of domestic
violence / For status, power, and/or weapons / To protect my family or community / I was forced / For revenge / Due toincome generation difficulties caused by changes in climate or the environment / Other(s) / I refuse to answer. Although
there is no direct evidence, it is possible that respondents whose economic conditions are affected by climate changechose only the general 'economic difficulties' option.

I had no choice. The crops I planted were spoiled
due lack of enough rainfall, and did not yieldanything. My livestock was dying because there
were no grass for them to feed on and no water inthe rivers for them to drink. My health was also atrisk because I wasn’t able to get enough food toeat due to all these problems. This is why I joined.

At that time, sandstorms became more frequentand more powerful…there was a sandstorm thatremoved the roof off my house and destroyed it.
Life became really hard as a result of being
displaced and I joined the group when theopportunity came along, thinking my life would bebetter.

CLIMATE-SENSITIVE PEACEBUILDING AND
CONFLICT-SENSITIVE CLIMATE ADAPTATION
Stories like these and the quantitative findings that reinforce them call for more
attention to how climate change is influencing involvement in conflict. With a view toeffective prevention, they also call for tailored responses that take local variations
into account, especially in areas where agriculture is the sole source of income andsubsistence.
This is equally key for supporting exits from conflict and preventing recidivism.
People coming out of armed groups will likely find their land as dry, their wells as
empty and their families as hungry as before – likely even more so. In fact, MEAC
research in Chad and Cameroon suggests that climatic factors and dwindling
resources may be stifling the reintegration of ex-combatants. Former BokoHaram associates, most of them farmers or fishers before they entered the group,came back to their communities of origin to find their lands, boats, and equipment
taken over in their absence. Especially where the group still controls farmland andfishing sites, they are left without access to resources and without ways to restart
their lives.
Through conflict- and climate-sensitive programming, these grievances and
impediments to reintegration need to be addressed. As more evidence on climateconflict-pathways emerges, interventions that are highly attuned to these linkages
offer the potential to foster resilience and, ultimately, pave the way towards morestability for those most affected by the climate crisis facing the world today.