Maritime Cooperation：Challenges and Opportunities…Japanese Perspective…
VADM (ret) Hideaki Kaneda(This paper was presented at the Fifth Japan-Australia Track 1.5 Dialogue, co-hosted
by the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, Tokyo, July 23-24, 2009. The views presented here are the author’s own anddo not represent the views of the Japan Institute of International Affairs)

To prepare for any conflicts with other countries in scramble over maritime
resources and energy, or in territorial disputes including the determination of maritime
territory under the sovereign right of a nation, each country shall develop a full crisis
response system, while adopting various maritime security and confidence building
measures to mitigate the rise of tense situation and to prevent the manifestation ofarmed conflicts.
Japan, with the allied US, is to jointly maintain and deploy robust maritime
defense power in preparation for unstable security environment arisen when regional
power balance collapses, especially as a nation seeking hegemony advances toward theoceans. Japan, with the allied US, should proceed to share common strategic interests
and responses with other trustworthy maritime nations, like Australia.
On the other hand, for many years in the past, Japan has taken active initiative inthe regional maritime security cooperation.
welcomed by regional nations.

Its activities have been highly valued andEspecially the international cooperation activities

among navies and coast guards have made significant contribution in promoting theconfidence, transparency and mutual understanding among nations through theirefforts to stabilize regional maritime security environment.

Japan will continue toproceed this way with like-minded maritime powers, like Australia.
For the security of broader ranged regional or global SLOCs, ultimately theinternational collaboration among maritime nations sharing the common values shouldbe essential from the peace time.

In order to develop and ensure international

collaboration in maritime security, Japan proposes to build a maritime security coalition

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that loosely binds like-minded nations with common values, like Australia,

Those

nations participating in this maritime security coalition are required to comply withinternational norms or rules, at least, and to share willingness to contribute to andcooperate with international community.

1. Rising Maritime Power of China(1) Chinese Ambition to Expand Maritime Power
Chinese military advancement toward oceans has been especially evident aroundthe Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, and the “String of Pearls”
through the Indian Ocean where vital SLOCs pass through.
are no exception to their advancement.

Japan’s neighboring seas

As seen in the strong stance China hasrecently taken in the issues of Japan-China mid-line and their repeated invasion ofJapan’s territory water near Senkaku Islands, China is forcibly advancing its ways into
the East China Sea. Chinese Navy is openly exhibiting its military power throughvarious military activities, such as Han class nuclear submarine’s unlawful submerged
invasion of Japan’s territory water near Okinawa, and Song class submarine’s
adventurous approach toward a US aircraft carrier.

At the end of 2008, their one

surface squadron navigated throughout the Sea of Japan, as well as another squadronthroughout the East China Sea, demonstrating their strong military interests in thewaters surrounding Japan.

Moreover, their maritime survey activities were observed

near Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands and Oki-no-Torishima Island for possible purpose ofsubmarine activities.
These activities clearly indicate China’s intention to make the South China Sea a“Sanctuary (Sacred Area：聖域)” surrounded by China’s southern coastlines and their“First Island Defense Line,” connecting Japanese archipelago, Okinawa (Nansei)
Islands, Taiwan, Philippines and Borneo, which they consider as their Ultimate DefenseLine.

At the same time, China starts to make the East China Sea as their “Front Yard

(Control Area：制域)”, and demonstrates their intention to further expand their Forward
Defense Line (extended maritime defense border) east-ward, as their military power
and ocean-going capability develop further.

In this way, they are to create a strategic“Buffer Zone (Expedition Area：征域)” on the waters inside their “Second Island Defense
Line” along the line of around 150 degrees East Longitude, extending from the Western
Kuril Islands, Ogasawara Islands and Mariana Islands (Guam) to New Guinea.
This “Buffer Zone” encompasses almost all of Japanese territory waters including
Japan’s Pacific Islands and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as well as major

2military and commercial SLOCs.
Chinese Navy will likely intend to overwhelm Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forcein terms of military power in this “Buffer Zone”, which may ultimately be the waters
where Chinese Navy thinks to compete with the activities of the US Navy in fight overthe hegemony of the Western Pacific Ocean.

These waters will be the area where they

are to deny the access of the US Naval intervention forces in case crisis arises overTaiwan and others.

Chinese Navy is building their power mainly by increasing thenumber of modernized nuclear strategic and attack submarines as well as conventional
attack submarines that can take actions in these waters, with large surface combatants,
ground-based aircrafts with air refueling capability, anti-ship ballistic and cruise
missiles.
(2) Chinese Aircraft Carrier
However, the Chinese Navy lacks one capability if they are to combat with the US
Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in these waters, that is, the aircraft
carrier battle group.

As they are to take actions as far away as possible from themainland China, it is essential to have the capability of ship-based air powers.
Military experts worldwide share a common view that Chinese Navy has actually
started the plan to build aircraft carrier battle groups. First, they are to remodel
Varyag, an incomplete aircraft carrier of former Soviet Union Navy stationed in Dalian,as a training (experimental) aircraft carrier, and create three aircraft carrier battlegroups by 2020 through their self developing efforts and Russian aids.
To support such a view, the deputy director of General Equipment Department of
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) stated in March 2006 that “PLA is to build aircraft
carriers” and “to develop aircraft carrier battle groups”, indicating their intention topromote research and development in escort ships and ship-based air powers foraircraft carriers.

At the end of 2008, the spokesmen of Chinese MOD stated that“aircraft carriers are the embodiment of a nation’s overall capability”, and “it is not
surprising” that “China seriously study and consider issues related to aircraft carriers.”
Moreover, China is said to have a plan to build nuclear powered aircraft carriers.
China’s efforts to build power projection capability following the completion of
aircraft carrier battle groups may reach the level that can endanger regional militarybalance, increasing the risk of Chinese political leaders driven toward the exercises ofadventurous or even imprudent military actions.

Han class nuclear submarine’s

unlawful submerged invasion indicates a sign of danger in Chinese domestic politics, inwhich political leaders with less military experiences such as President Hu Jintao and3Premier Wen Jiabao may lose the control over the adventurous ambition of PLA to
demonstrate their military power, even before the completion of aircraft carrier battlegroups.

2. Reassurance of Japan-US “Maritime Defense” Alliance(1) Japan-US “Maritime Defense” Alliance
If the safety and security of the military and commercial SLOCs in the Asia-Pacificregion could be disrupted, it will seriously and adversely affect global economy and the
security of the region and coastal nations.

Especially for Japan, free use of oceans is

the very fundamental and essential factor in its “existence” and “prosperity”, and the
securing the safety of SLOCs presents critical importance.

Still, SLOCs extend overvast areas of waters in the world, and it is apparent that Japan alone cannot ensure thesafety of these SLOCs.
Since the end of the Second World War, Japan has valued and maintained thestrong alliance with the US (as a “Maritime Defense” Alliance) that provides powerfulmaritime defense commitments.

As international security environment undergoes

significant changes, it is extremely critical in a long term to sustain this “Maritime
Defense” Alliance between the US “on the cross road in its position as a global leader” in
the international community, and Japan “on the cross road toward rise or fall as an
influential nation.”

Both nations clearly indicated their intention to maintain thisalliance healthy.
Japan and the US have strong points and weak points.

In their relationship, it isessential to maintain cooperative and complimentary relationship as a “pair in thethree-legged race,” with the US as a “Strong and Desirable” global power, and Japan asa “Tough and Reliable” influential power of the world.

To maintain such relationship ofJapan-US Alliance is not only preferable for the US and Japan, but also as a key factor
to bring favorable impacts to the region and the international community in terms ofsustaining and developing international system based on liberal democracy.
More straightly speaking, in terms of regional security, the issue is how to maintaineffective defense over Japan’s territory, EEZ and SLOCs against the apparent ambitionof China to create their strategic “Buffer Zone.”

When looking at the map of thesewaters, it is evident that China’s strategic “Buffer Zone” almost coincides with a“Triangle” connecting Japanese archipelago, Okinawa Islands, and Guam.
Upon the transfer of US Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa to Guam, if the US
forces and Japan Self-Defense Forces can actively and jointly operate military aircrafts

4and naval ships in the waters of this “Triangle” and the East China Sea to demonstrate
their powers of control over these waters, it may thwart the ambitious advancement ofChina.
In other words, this “Triangle” can signify “Strategic Delta Waters” to weaken thestrategic “Buffer Zone” of China. This means, however, that Japan itself might need topossess some nuclear-powered attack submarines and tactical aircraft carrier battlegroups. In this sense, Japan should have serious discussion on this subject upon thedevelopment of new National Defense Program Guideline and the revision of Mid-Term
Defense Program scheduled to be completed by the end of 2009.
(2) Reassurance of Japan-US AllianceIn the United States, a new Obama administration has been started.

The

Administration has appointed Asian experts such as Assistant Secretary of State
Campbell and Assistant Secretary of Defense Gregson, as the cores of its policy making
on the Asian diplomacy and military issue.

Recently, those two have visited Japan toattend mini “2+2” talks with those counterparts of Japan, focusing on the US extended
nuclear deterrence issue for the defense of Japan in this talks.
On the other hand, while the Secretary of State Clinton selected Japan as the first
country to visit calling it the “keystone of Asian policies”, and signed the “Agreement totransfer US Marines in Okinawa to Guam”, at the almost same time, however, shedeclared the promotion of “strategic and economic dialogue” with China including theresumption of defense dialogue.
As Japan’s political decision making to dispatch the naval forces on Somali piracy
issue has been far behind than China, if Japan does not voice its own opinion loudly, theUS is likely to lean on China.

Japanese politics need to regain effective functions so it

can clearly demonstrate its intention to maintain solid and complimentary alliancerelationship between “Tough and Reliable Japan” and “Strong and Desirable US” as a“three-legged race pair”, in order to subjectively contribute to and cooperate for thesolutions of global issues in international politics, economy and so on.
At the same time, Japanese politics need to share the concerns with the US over
China’s ambition to build strategic “Buffer Zone” and the recognition on the needs tocreate and secure the “Strategic Delta Waters.” Regardless to the results of the coming
general election in Japan, the elected administration must keep this line in its
diplomatic and defense policy.
Then, a question is how we should do in the outer area of this “Strategic Delta
Waters.”Who should be reliable members for Japan and the US to play a “four-legged5

race trio” or more legged?

3. Cooperation with Other Reliable Influential Maritime Nations(1) Semi-Alliance with Australia in the “North-South Extended Asia”
Major SLOCs can be described as the artery of the maritime nations such as Japan,
which extend beyond the “Strategic Delta Waters” to run through the waters of the East
China Sea and the South China Sea peripheral to China, Indian Ocean, southern
peripheral of the “Strategic Delta Waters”, Oceania, South Pacific region, and East
Pacific region adjacent to the region, and expanding further in a global scale. It is
impossible to attain the security of such broad ranged SLOCs by Japan-US “Maritime
Defense” Alliance alone.

There must be cooperation and coordination with otherreliable maritime nations of each region.
For Japan and the US, the relationship with Australia has special significance as itneighbors Asia-Pacific region and has strong interests in the security of South East Asiaand the safety of SLOCs.

Considering recent international economic situation andsecurity environment, Australia is one of the most important countries in the“North-South Extended Asian” region.

These three countries of Japan, the US andAustralia share the same “values” based on liberal democracy, and Japan and the US,
and the US and Australia are allies, while Japan and Australia have been establishinga so-called “Semi-Alliance” relationship.

For the peace and stability of Asia, suchtrilateral “Maritime Semi-Alliance” has vital significance.
Although Japan has several issues with neighboring countries over sovereign rights,
including the mid-line issue and territorial disputes over islands, they are bilateralissues, inviting less interest from Australia, than the US.
The issue of China’s military challenge over the Western Pacific Ocean, or the
east-ward expansion of their “Second Island Defense Line”, however, is the issue not
only Japan and the US, but also Australia cannot neglect in terms of their own security.
A traditional and historic strategic view of Australia, “Threats will come from North”,
would not been changed.

This issue can become common strategic issue among thesethree countries.
If Japan and the US take appropriate actions, there can be an opportunity to jointly
develop the approaches to restrain and control political and military advances of China
toward their strategic “Buffer Zone”, that is, “Strategic Delta Waters” and its peripheral
for Japan-US alliance.

Moreover, if Australian Defence Forces would join military

actions with Japan and the US based on Guam, it can provide considerable strategic

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significance in the “Strategic Delta Waters” and its southern peripheral. In the future,such actions can develop to joint actions extended into outer region such as in
Oceania/South Pacific region, the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
(2) Cooperation with India in the “East-West Extended Asia”
In regards to the Indian Ocean region, the regional countries used to form “Arc of
instability” and were recognized as the region of state to state and in-state struggles
offering bases for international terrorist group activities.
weaker linkage with the Pacific region.

These countries also had

In recent years, however, the SLOCs

connecting both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are increasingly recognized as
the major artery of “Arc of inseparability” linked by solidarity and coordination in termsof security and economy.
For Asian countries, India becomes one of the most important nations in the“East-West Extended Asia.”

For three countries of Japan, the US and Australia, Indiais the only stable maritime nation with willingness and capability to provide close
coordination in ensuring maritime safety in the Indian Ocean, and the only nation thatcan share the “values” of liberal democracy.
“Maritime Semi-Alliance” among Japan, the US and Australia needs to start close
linkage with India, maintaining close cooperative relationship with South East Asian
countries, and work with influential powers of other regions to create global maritime
coalition centered around a global and reliable maritime power, the US, and shared acommon goal of pursuing “existence, prosperity and values” based on liberal democracy.

4.

Regional Maritime Security Cooperation(1) Progressing Regional Maritime Security Cooperation
Any maritime nation in a region has the needs to secure freedom of navigation on
oceans, and to stabilize maritime security environment, while avoiding and preventing
armed conflicts over maritime interests, and promoting the sustainable development ofoceans.
The ocean is a gigantic entity that requires a comprehensive measure to solve any
issues concerned, hence the cooperation among regional maritime countries isincreasing importance, especially in the aspects of military/security, resources/
environmental protection, and the promotion of science and technology.
For many years in the past, Japan has taken active initiative in the regional
maritime security cooperation.

Its activities have been highly valued and welcomed by7

a broad range of regional nations.
Especially the international cooperation activities among navies and coast guards
have made significant contribution in promoting the confidence, transparency andmutual understanding among nations through their efforts to stabilize regional
maritime security environment.

Examples include “the Western Pacific Naval

Symposium” for which Japan has taken an initiative to create with Australia, “North
Pacific Maritime Security Summit” and “Head of Asian Coast Guards Agency Meeting”
launched under Japan’s initiative.
Japan intends to continue expanding such international activities and building
multi-layered regime in maritime security cooperation with regional countries.
Japan actively supports the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP), which is a
program promoted by the United States for the purpose of providing disaster relief andpreventing maritime terrorism, piracy, and the proliferation of the weapons of mass
destruction, through the use of various types of maritime forces possessed by regional
nations.

Furthermore, Japan, with Australia, supports the notion of the United Statedthat the GMP activities should be promoted in the Western Pacific region including theSouth East Asia and the Oceania, in addition to the waters surrounding Japan.
Under these notions, Japan continues to provide extensive efforts, in cooperation
with the United States, to develop Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as international
public goods.

Moreover, it intends to offer cooperation in preventing nations andnon-state entities to misuse MDA as way to disturb the freedom of navigation.
In regards to GMP, Japan believes that the support activities to ensure
navigational safety at the Malacca/Singapore Strait and neighboring areas should be
extended to the Indian Ocean, Oceania or South Pacific.

Japan further plans topromote cooperation with the developing countries, to the extent permissible for Japan
to exercise in such area.

As an example, Japan has been participating in international

efforts for the suppression of piracy off the coast of Somalia and Gulf of Aden. This
would provide excellent opportunities for Japan to share cooperative activities, directly
and indirectly, with many other countries participating in such efforts, including the US,
EU, Australia, India, Singapore, ROK and so on, including even China or Russia.
Japan considers that these efforts may provide ideal opportunity in developing a
multilateral system to ensure the maritime security.
(2) Further Promotion of Maritime Security Cooperation
Japan appreciates the role of International Maritime Organization (IMO) or otherinternational entities in addressing maritime security issues.

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In regards to the piracy

issue, Japan welcomes that the “Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy
and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)” has been developed into a
regional cooperation framework through their information exchange and data analysis
activities as well as the capacity building supports.

Moreover, it appreciates this as avaluable model of international cooperation in solving the piracy issue off the coasts ofEast and West Africa. Japan strongly hopes for the early accessions of Indonesia andMalaysia to ReCAAP, while considering this “ReCAAP model” as a model to be applied
to other regions on the various maritime security issues.
Japan considers that it should further promote diplomatic efforts in offering
cooperation to developing countries, especially in the fields of; coastal development,
navigational safety and security in international waters and straits; support forenvironmental protection activities, training and education of coast guards, andinformation exchanges in the maritime security.

Furthermore, Japan is currently

assessing the possible mitigation of its three principles for the embargo on arms export,
in view of maintaining maritime security, so that it can provide some useful assets suchas flying boats or patrol boats for that purpose, to further enhance the effectiveness ofaids and supports to developing countries.
In addition, Japan intends to continue supporting and contributing to themaintenance and enhancement of several “cooperative mechanisms,” which relevant
countries have introduced for the purpose of securing navigation and conserving
environment around Malacca and Singapore Strait.

Japan also hopes to continue

promoting measures for the enhancement of cooperation among not only governments
but also private sectors such as shipping companies or maritime industries.

5.

Maritime Security Coalition
Here the “Maritime Security Coalition” is defined as the “global or regional

nation-to-nation coalition with the objective to maintain and secure safe and free use ofoceans from the peace time.”“Maritime Security Coalition” centered by “Maritime

Semi-Alliance”

Japan-US-Australia

consistingofshouldtake

responsibilities,

cooperating with the other regional responsible maritime powers, appropriate to ensure
the maritime security, as the core “responsible stakeholders.”

In addition, suchcoalition need to develop closer cooperative relationships with other democratic
maritime powers in view of developing “Broad Maritime Security Coalition” to cover“Broad Sea Lane”, and ultimately to build a “Global Maritime Security Coalition.”9(1) Democratic Maritime Powers
The democratic maritime powers should strengthen their relationship as “Maritime
Security Coalition” based on their common three features of “democratic countries”,“maritime powers” and “modernized maritime forces.”
In terms of the first feature of “democratic countries,” their universal interests andbenefits would be to attempt the dissemination and solidification of the concept andvalues common to the powers, i.e. democracy. Since the powers inevitably involves
countries with different traditions and governance systems, to ask their cooperation inmaintaining the maritime security would be a big challenge to those. In addition, thepowers have fundamental differences in geopolitical, historical, environmental, cultural,
linguistics, and religious backgrounds, although they share the values founded on
democracy.

Their national concepts are not entirely the same and there are somedifferences in their political system.

However, the democratic maritime powers

undoubtedly share basic concepts as the democratic countries, and their history of fighton the ideology for the last 60 years after the end of the World War Second clearly
demonstrated the presence of such common concepts.
For the second feature of “maritime powers”, they need to maintain “properly
managed maritime freedom” for their existence and prosperity.

As for the security of

the “Broad Sea Lane”, they need to recognize this matter straightly related Chinese
strategic and military aggressive advancement toward the “string of pearls” throughIndian Ocean, and disputed area in South and East China Sea, and vast Western Pacific
Ocean, specifically their strategic “Buffer Zone” between their First and Second Island
Defense Lines.

Considering these factors, to ensure the “Maritime Security” and“Management of Marine Interests” will become important for the maritime powers as away to effectively deter the aggressive and unlawful advancement of China anywhere in
the “Broad Sea Lane.”On the other hand, to find common interests with regional countries including
China in terms of “maintaining regional maritime order (law enforcement)” is possible.
This is because to maintain regional maritime order, such as to prevent theindiscriminate terrorist attacks including maritime terrorism that international
terrorists groups are likely to launch in association with local terrorist groups, and toaddress the issues of piracy, and drug/human trafficking, is to the interests of all thecountries and their people in the region.

There is no reason they refuse to cooperate insuch responses.
Finally, in terms of the third feature of “modernized maritime forces”, the region
has some countries with many islands and broad area to patrol, yet insufficient10maritime military and police forces quantitatively as well as qualitatively.

Therefore,

to provide “capacity building” and other supports acceptable to concerned countries willbe the responsibility common to the maritime powers.

In this sense, it is still

noteworthy that Japan, the US and Australia, cooperating with India and othercountries, swiftly sent troops for the relief and recovery support activities at the time of
Sumatra earthquake and Tsunami disaster of 2005, and their efforts were welcomed by
local government and people.
(2) Maritime Security Coalition
The “Maritime Security Coalition” is the “global or regional nation-to-nation
coalition with the objective to maintain and secure safe and free use of oceans from thepeace time.” This kind of coalition does not necessarily require the entry into force of atreaty or international convention, but can be a multi-national network based on
mutual confidence with common concepts.
Therefore, it is basically possible to enter into a coalition relationship with any
coastal countries as long as they can share the common objectives. In building suchglobal or regional maritime coalition, each member country is required to take a
responsible role proportionate to the features of the country or the region.

How to takeresponsibility may differ from a nation to a nation, and each can decide on what eachcan contribute within each intention and capacity.
One precondition for accession to such Maritime Security Coalition will be whether
a country can share three basic Marine Interests with other countries.

Those are, inthe maritime domain: (i) to cooperate in maintaining the security of the region frompeace time as well as in emergency or crisis (Existence); (ii) to cooperate and to prosper
together in the commerce and trades as well as marine resource development(Prosperity), and (iii) to sincerely pursue the conservation and development of various
benefits the seas can provide in terms of marine environment protection and marine
resource control (Value).
In short, the basic requirement to join the coalition is that “a country has no severe
dispute over marine interests or territories, economic conflicts, or objections toward
environmental conservation or the development of marine resources.” Even if there isa seed of dispute, to build a coalition among countries that allow fair and democratic
way of solving disputes is essential for maintaining the coalition.

More importantly,

the coalition needs to be built on the national action principle of each participant as“service to others,” which is based on the idea of democracy.
Each Japan, the US and Australia, maybe India, holds very positive and eager will11

to be a “Responsible Stakeholder” for “Maritime Security Coalition” in the “Expanded
Asia.”(3) Broad Maritime Security Coalition
In consideration of the above, it will be the best to create a coalition among the US
allied or friends (in other words, among democratic maritime powers that share thesame three indicators of Existence, Prosperity, and Value), then add the regional
democratic maritime powers that can fulfill these three indicator conditions and theaction principle of the powers as “service to others”, and eventually expand to include
other countries.
First of all, the link between North East Asia and Oceania including South Pacificregion, are likely to have the “Maritime Semi-Alliance” of Japan, the US and Australia
taking a role to assure maritime security in principle.
On the other hand, it is urgently needed to develop “Maritime Security Coalition”
centered around the “Maritime Security Cooperation” of Japan, India and the US toensure the maritime security of the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region from thepeace time, since the SLOCs that navigate through “East-West Expanded Asia”
extending from the South of Suez Canal (East of Cape of Hope) to the North East Asia
are the most important and vulnerable among “Broad Sea Lane.” If other influential
democratic maritime powers, such as Singapore, are to join this coalition, it will boost
the creation of “Maritime Security Coalition.”
Although the obvious security collaboration between India and Australia is said tobe unlikely and needed to pay a close attention to the movement of the administrationsof both countries for a moment, still it will not be difficult for such stakeholder countries
to make efforts for the maritime security in each relevant region, through “Maritime
Security Coalition” such as the one among Japan-US-Australia, and Japan-India-US,
with a view to unify and develop more regional wide “Broad Maritime Security
Coalition” in the “Broad Sea Lane” sometime in the future.
For the “Broad Maritime Security Coalition”, it is important to build global
coalition with other global democratic maritime powers.

It is certainly possible tobuild a “Global Maritime Security Coalition” that is founded on freedom and democracy,
and shares common indices of pursuit of “Existence, Prosperity and Values”, mainly by
the various “Maritime Security Coalitions” centered around the US in the regions
adjacent to broadly unified SLOCs, such as the coalition with Canada in East PacificRegion, Turkey, France and Italy in the Mediterranean Region, the UK in the Northern
Atlantic region, and Germany and others in the Europe.

12In case of Japan, the initiative of the “Broad Maritime Security Coalition” coincides
with the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” proposed by then Foreign Minister Aso, andthe “coalition of nations based on common values” stated by the former Prime Minister
Abe.

The ex-Prime Minister Fukuda promised to continue Abe’s concept in his

diplomatic policies as “Synergy with Japan-US Alliance and Diplomacy toward Asia.”(4) Challenge for “Maritime Security Coalition”
Finally, an important element of the global or regional “Maritime Security
Coalition” is how to assure maritime security especially at the choke points of SLOCs on
the coasts from the peace time, even if a coalition can be formed in and covered the area
as discussed above, for the most part.

As these regions are the stages of historic

confrontations over territories and marine interests of coastal countries, as
demonstrated in relations of Japan with China, ROK, and Russia, and the national
interests of relevant countries intertwined, it will be difficult task to form a cooperative
system.
For example, it will not be so easy to build coalition system in the North East Asia
and South East Asia due to their coastal SLOCs involving many seeds of confrontations.
In the East China Sea and South China Sea, China has coerced and aggressively
advanced toward oceans, which has led to the rise of confrontations over territories, andmarine interests such as sea-bottom resources.

For the region, the security

coordination with three countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore at the coasts ofMalacca-Singapore Strait will be the most important one of all.
In addition, there are other areas that have similar and complicated problems, suchas the Persian Gulf, Arabian Peninsula and its coasts, where remains religious
confrontations centered on Islam, conflicts over oil rights and concessions, and the
hot-bed of international terrorism or piracy, and East African coasts as well as Eastern
Mediterranean Areas. However, it is possible to develop the opportunities to resolve
the issues in the future, if we are to aim for the regional “Maritime Security Coalitions”
among relevant coastal countries.

As described before, the joint action among relevant

countries can be relatively easy to develop, if the focus is limited to the “maintenance ofmaritime order (law enforcement)” in order to respond against international terrorism
and piracy, or non-traditional maritime risk factors.
Conclusion
Chinese military advancement toward oceans is especially evident in the South
China Sea and the Indian Ocean where vital SLOCs pass through as well as Japan’s

13

surrounding seas including East China Sea.

These activities clearly indicate China’s

intention to make the South China Sea a “Sanctuary (Sacred Area)”, the East China Sea
a “Front Yard (Control Area)” inside their “First Island Defense Line.” They also try tocreate its strategic “Buffer Zone (Expedition Area)” on the waters inside their “Second
Island Defense Line.”
Japan-US alliance is essentially a Maritime Defense Alliance.
US have strong points and weak points.

Both Japan and theIn their relationship, it is essential tomaintain cooperative and complimentary relationship as a “pair in the three-legged
race,” with the US as a “Strong and Desirable” global power, and Japan as a “Tough andReliable” influential power of the world.

More straightly speaking, in terms of regional

security, the issue is how to maintain effective defense over Japan’s territory, EEZ and
SLOCs against the apparent ambition of China to create its strategic “Buffer Zone.”
Beyond the Chinese Sanctuary, Front Yard or even strategic “Buffer Zone”, vital
SLOCs can be described as the artery of Japan, expanding further in a global scale.

It

is impossible to attain the security of such broad ranged SLOCs by Japan-US Maritime
Defense Alliance alone.

There must be cooperation and coordination with reliablemaritime nations of each region, such as Australia which is one of the most important
countries in the “North-South Extended Asia.”

These three maritime countries ofJapan, the US and Australia share the same “values” and common “interests”, based onliberal democracy.
For these three countries, India is the only maritime nation with willingness andcapability to provide close coordination in ensuring SLOC security in the Indian Ocean,and that can share the “values” of liberal democracy.
important countries in the “East-West Extended Asia.”

India is one of the mostIn the South-East Asian region,

we can find some reliable maritime countries, such as Singapore, as like as India in the
Indian Ocean.
From the peace time, the “Maritime Semi-Alliance” of Japan, the US and Australia
must create “Maritime Security Coalition”, sharing same values with other democratic
maritime nations, such as India or Singapore.

And further, Japan-US-Australia“Maritime Semi-Alliance” should take initiatives in developing broader “Maritime
Security Coalition” through the efforts of relevant countries in the global stage to unify
voluntary coalitions.
For many years in the past, on the other hand, Japan has taken active initiative inthe regional maritime security cooperation.
welcomed by regional nations.

Its activities have been highly valued andJapan will continue to proceed this way withlike-minded maritime powers, like Australia.

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