DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA
1903-1960's

by,Mohamed Zayyan 0. Aljazairi

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORYIn Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

19

6 8

STATEMENT BY AUTHORThis thesis has been' submitted in partial ful­
fillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The
University of Arizona and is deposited in the University
Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of
the Library.
Brief quotations from this thesis are allowablewithout special permission, provided, that accurate ac­knowledgment of source is m a d e . Requests for permission
for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manu­
script in whole or in part may be granted by the head ofthe major department or the Dean of the Graduate College
when in his judgment the proposed use of. .the material isin the interests of scholarship, In all other instances ,however, permission must be obtained from the author,sIGNED:'

APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTORThis thesis has been approved on the date shown below:

Oriental Studies^

TO
MY WIFE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude
to his Thesis Director, Assistant Professor, Dr. William
J. Wilson, in Oriental Studies, University of Arizona, for
his many valuable suggestions and continued willingness
to be of assistance throughout the author's program.

I

am thankful to Professor James A. Beatson for his guidance
and advice during the period of graduate study.

The

author is indebted to King Abdul-Aziz University, Saudi
Arabia, for the opportunity to attend graduate school.
Lastly, the author wishes to express his gratitude to hiswife for her patience and understanding during the courseof instruction.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES
ABSTRACT
I.

II,

III.

IV.

V.

. .»

. . , . ,.

„ .. . . „ . ,, . , . , . , . viii

. . , . .. . ..

. . . . .. . .

ix

INTRODUCTION

1

Historical Background of the Al-Saud Family« .
The Egyptian Expedition of 1811
The Wahhabi Movement . . „ , . ... , . » . . . .

1
4
14

IBN-SAUD' S FOREIGN POLICY

21

Emergence of a New State in Arabia
Ibn-Saud and the Turks .
, ., , , . , .. , .
Ibn-Saud1s Relations with the Hijaz..............
Ibn-Saud and Asir
. , .
Ibn-Saud and the Yemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Northern Borders Problems. . . . . . . . . . . .
Saudi Arabia - Egypt Relations . . .... ........

21
23
28
32
33
35
36

THE STATUS OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE
OF THE HIJAZ .

.

38

The Government Structure . . .. . . . . . . . .. .
The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Hijaz . .

38
39

THE GOVERNMENT FROM 1951-1966. . . . . . . . . .

47

Establishment of the Council of Ministries, 1953
The Transfer of the Office of Premier from King............... .. . . . .
Saud to Faisal
New King Proclaimed in Saudi Arabia. . . . . .

47

FOREIGN RELATIONS 1926 - 1960

55

KINGDOM. . . . . . . . .

Developing Diplomatic Relations. . . . . . .
.
Saudi Arabia and the Arab League .. . .
•.. . .
Saudi Arabia and the United N a t i o n s . ..v . . . .
Saudi - Egypt - Yemeni Relations . . . . . . . .
Yemeni Question. .. . . . . . , . .
. . .
Recognition by the United States andRussia's Support............ . > ,. .
.
The United States' Mediation . . . . . . . .
v

49
51

55
59
62
66
68
70
71

VI

TABLE OF CONTENTS(Continued):Page

The United Nations’ Observers
Peace Agreement at Jiddah and Earad
Conference
Extra 2 Extra! ...........
Khartum Agreement, 1967
VI,

VII.

SAUDI RELATIONS WITH

THE TWO BLOCS V

73
75
76
.

79

Saudi Relations with the Western Bloc.. , , ,Saudi - British Relations in the
19th Century . . ,', , , , . . . . . , . .
Saudi ^ British Relations 1906-1950’s, . .
Saudi - United States Relations......... .. ,Economic Factor.........
Saudi - Russia Relations , . . . . , , , , ,
,

79
79
83
103
103
111

NEUTRALIST POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC PACT .

115

Neutralist Policy of Saudi Arabia
VIII.

72

APPENDIX B,
APPENDIX C.
APPENDIX D.
APPENDIX E,. . . .

. . . . . . .

115............

123

ROYAL PRONOUNCEMENT CONCERNING THE POLICY
OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA WITHRESPECT TO THE SUBSOIL AND SEA BED OF
AREAS IN THE PERSIAN GULF CONTIGUOUS TO
THE COASTS OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA132

ROYAL DECREE REGARDING TERRITORIAL
WATERS OF SAUDI ARABIA . . . . . . . . . .

135

ROYAL DECREE NUMBER 2716 SEPTEMBER 18,
1932 . . . . . . . . . . .
...............

140

ANGLO - SAUDI ARABIAN. BURAIMI ARBITRATIONAGREEMENT JULY 30, 1954
. . . . , .

141

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE KING OF
SAUDI ARABIA AND THE PRESIDENT (TRUMAN)

154

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONSAPPENDIX A,. ., , .

.

Note from the King of Saudi Arabia to
the President, October 15, 1946
. . . . .
Note from the President to the King ofSaudi Arabia, October 28, 1946 ...........
APPENDIX F.

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PRESIDENT
JOHN F. KENNEDY AND AMIR FAISAL, PREMIER
AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF SAUDI ARABIA . . .

154
156

164

Vll

TABLE OF CONTENTS(Continued)
Page

APPENDIX G„APPENDIX H.

APPENDIX I.

THE CHARTER OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE
SIGNED BY SAUDI ARABIA, PAKISTAN AND
THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, MARCH 15,
1956, IN MECCA . . . . . ... . . . . . . .

170

LETTER SENT BY GENERAL-SECRETARY ANWAR
AL-SADAT TO KING S A U D , THE PRESIDENT
OF THE CONFERENCE V . . . ................

175

M A P S .............

176

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . .

.........

. . . . . . . .

Books in Arabic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Books in English. . .. . .. .... . . . „Documents . . . . . .
Newspapers and Periodicals. . . . . . . . . .

179
179
179
181
182

LIST OF TABLES '
Table

Page

1.

The Al^Saud Family.

. \. „ . . . . . .

2.

The Government from 1926-1953

3.

The Government from 1959 to 1963

4.

. .

.

5-6

. , . ...

40

. . . . . .

54

Chronological table of developing
diplomatic relations. . . , . . . . . . . .

57-58

5.

Bloc patterns in the Arab League

...

63

6.

Classification of neutralist andparticipation in gathering andmajor initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

118

viii

. . .

ABSTRACTThe present study was designed around two related
subjects;(2)(1) diplomatic relations of Saudi. Arabia, andthe development of the Saudi Government.

This thesis

is an effort to provide a detailed account of developing
Saudi foreign policy, to concentrate on some current issues
such as the Yemeni problem and the Buraimi dispute, andto find the cycles' in which the Saudi foreign policy runs.
The principal findings of this study are as follows:1.

The political-religious alliance succeeded infounding a strong State.

During the regime of Ibn-Saud,

190 2-1953, most of the territories which came under thecontrol of the first Wahhabi S t a t e (1747-1818) were taken.
2,

He developed the structure of the Government froma tribal system to a modern Government starting with theConstitution of 1926 of the Kingdom of the Hijaz to theestablishment of the Council of Ministers in 1953.
Saudi foreign policy runs in the following cycles:
1,

Regional cycle which is devoted to:A.

the Arab League Charter;B.

solidarity of the Arab Nation, motivated by

the fact that Saudi Arabia is the homeland of the Arab .
race;
ix

X
,C.

in the. Yemeni question King Faisal stood firmly

on the principle of the right of self-determination to the
Yemenis.
2.

International cycle in which the policy is:A.

devoted to.the UN Charter;B.

neutralist system (Saudi Arabia is out of thetwo satellites)? andC. desirous of Islamic solidarity, motivated by
the Saudi Arabian position in the Islamic world.
the homeland and center of Islam.

It is

Saudi rulers believethat Saudi Arabia can act as a bridge between.the extremist
Arab nationalist states and the Islamic, countries.

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION
Historical Background' of the Al-Saud Family
The history of the Saudi family began, according
to the Saudi Chronicler, by a migration of a citizen from
Al-Hasa who went in 1446 to visit a cousin, Ibn-Dira,
the chief of the Duraus settlers in central Arabia.

His

cousin granted him two villages in the Wadi Hanifa andto this land began the migration of the D u r u .
migrants came the Saudi family.

From these

A Royal Chronicler of

the Saudi Prince wrote a book titled A History of the Kingsof Al-Saud in which he said:"Saud Bin-Mohamed, Bin-Miqran

Bin-'Morkhan, Bin-Ibrahim, Bin-Mosa, Bin-Rabia, Bin-Mani,
Al-Muridi, from the tribe of Al-Masaleekh the branch of
Anaza from Wail, Bin-Sa’ad, Bin-Rabia, Bin-Nizar, Bin-Ma’ad
Bin-Adnan Saud is the real founder of this Dynasty.
was the governor of Al-Diriyah.

He

He left four sons."-*-

dynasty passed through a period of struggle,before it
established itself as a leading power in Arabia.

-*-S. Hathlul, History of the Kings of A l - S a u d ,1961, p. 6.

The

■

2

Before 1745 the Saudi Dynasty was a local family,
Arabia was divided and ruled by many local Amirs:(a) theSharifs in the Hijaz;(c) Al-Muamor in Aluyiana;
Idrisi in Asir;(b) Banu Khalid in Al-Hasa;(d) the Imam in the Yemen;(e) the(f) Al-Abu-Said in Musqat and Oman.

Al-Saud family history is divided into threephases:first, 1747-1818;

second, 1818-1891; third,

1902-present.
The first pha s e .

The first period started after

the alliance between Mohamed Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab and theAmir Mohamed Ibn-Saud in 1747.

Diriyah became a very

important center of the movement after this religiouspolitical alliance.
Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab invoked a Jihad against theneighbours.

The first goal of Mohamed Ibn-Saud was tooccupy Riyadh.

He spent many years until he succeededin occupying it.
His son Abdul-Aziz succeeded him to the throne
in 1765.

He continued his father's policy of conquest.

• He ruled thirty-nine years and succeeded in getting theloyalty of the tribes in the Najd.

He occupied Al-Hasa

as well as Mecca and Medina, the two Holy Cities in the
Hijaz.

His raids reached Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Oman

which were subjected to his authority.

Al-Hasad cameunder the Wahhabi authority and continued until the invasionnof Ibrahim Pasha in 1811.
Their influence extended tothe islands of Qatar and Bahrain.
The Sharif of Mecca, Khalib, led a campaign tosuppress the Wahhabis in 1791 but it failed.

In 1798

he led another campaign which also failed.
The Governor of Iraq led a campaign against the
Wahhabis and entered deeply into Al-Hasa in 1798 but
he failed completely to capture the country.

Abdul-Aziz was assassinated by an extremist Shiite in 1803.^
His successor, Saud, was considered the greatest
ruler in the first period of the Al-Saud Dynasty.
his regime the state reached its zenith.

In

With hisauthority strengthened in the Hijaz, he added Oman and
Bahrain to his realm.

His influence extended to Yemen.

He also put great pressure on Iraq.

He beseiged Basrahfor 12 days. . He invaded Iraq in 1805 and in 1808 beseiged
Korbala, the great shrine of the Shiite.

He also turned

to Syria and the Hijaz suffered heavily because of him.
He put great pressure upon the Sharif of Mecca, Khalib.
The Wahhabis forces stopped the Syrian pilgrimage until^Ibid., p. 7.
^M. Khariabah, Introduction to Modern A r a b 1s
History, 1960, p. 359.

they forced the Sharif to ask for a peace agreement.
Saud led the pilgrimage in the year 1806.

The Sharifof Mecca became a Wahhabi vassel.
S a u d 1s special interest was with the islands in
the Persian Gulf

Qatar and Bahrain.

The Saudi relations

with Oman and the British interference will be discussed
in Chapter VI.
The Wahhabi Empire reached its peak point in
1811.
1818.

It was destroyed by the Egyptian expedition in
4

The Egyptian Expedition of 1811
It was possible that the Wahhabi Empire would
extend its frontiers to the Mediterranean and the re­ligious reform of the Wahhabism would extend to all the
Arab world.
The Turks already had extended their indirectcontrol over the Hijaz in 1524 and annexed Yemen to the
Ottoman Empire.

The Turks had never gained effective

control of Arabia.

The Napoleonic invasion had contributed
cgreat successes to the Wahhabis.
In 1.806 the relations between Saud and the Amirof the pilgrimage of Syria and Egypt became strained

4T b i d . , pp. 3.60-362.
C
H.R.P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours,
1956, p. 157.

Table 1

The Al-Saud Family.
Rabiah Ibn-Mani - from a Nazah tribe
1
Moshe
Ibrahimf

1---Morkhan

I---AbdullahI----Rabeah

Abdul-Rahman

Saif

Moqrini

Ibrahim
1694

i
Mohamed—WatahanMorkhan

Zaid

MorkhanAbdullah
Moqrin1726
FarhanNasser1673

Thaniyan
1747

---1
Saud
1724
Mohamed
1765

IbrahimThaniyan
Saud

Abdul-Aziz
1765
Saud
1801-1814

AbdullahTurki
1824-1834

Ui

Table 1 (Continued).

1------

I----

Abdullah
1814-1818

KhalidMishariFaisal the Great
1834, 1843-1865

Jiluwi

Abdullah

I______

Abdul-Rahman

Ahmad

1
Talal

S a 1adSaud
1953-1964
Dethroned

Abdul Aziz
"Ibn-Saud"
1902-: 953
FclisalThe Present
K i m j 1964-

Abdullah

MohamedMohamedMohamedSaud
1871-1874

Abdullah

-- 1
Saud
1875

KhalidMisha

because Saud asked the Egyptians and the Syrians to stop
the tradition of the Mahmal(in which were carried therobes of Kaaba annually and with testimony)-

In 1807

Saud prevented the pilgrimages from Syria and Egypt fromentering the Hijaz unless they stopped at Al-Mahamal.
Saud prepared a very big army in Medina and ordered it toprevent the pilgrimage from Istanbul and Syria,
returned.

so it

Saud also took another measure against thesoldiers and settlers, Turks in Mecca, by expelling them.
This extremist fanatic policy of Saud caused an
uprising against him.

The people of the Hijaz sufferedeconomically because of Sa u d 1s prevention of the pilgrimage
upon which they depended.

Many of the Hijazis emigrated

to Egypt and Istanbul where they complained to the Sultan
and to Mohamed Ali-Pasha, the Governor of Egypt.
In 1807 the Sultan ordered the governor of Egypt
to free the Holy Cities from the Wahhabis.

Mohamed Ali-

Pasha had not confirmed his position in Egypt.

In 1811

Mohamed Ali responded to the call.
The Royal Chronicler, Amir Saud Bin-Hathlul says:"The Sharif of Mecca corresponded with the Muslim countries
and encouraged them to fight the Wahhabis ? he charged themwith unreal actions and said that the Wahhabis are®H. Wahba, The Island of the Arabs in the 20th
Century, 1956, p. 232.

Khoraj iates and they charged the Muslim and treated themas unbelievers."
The Turks decided to retake the Hijaz from the
Wahhabis because of their religious position and its
significance for the Islamic Caliphate.
Istanbul needed the Holy Cities for prestige inthe eyes of the Muslims.

Mohamed-Ali sent an army of

14,000 men under the command of his son Tusun.
army was estimated at about 7,000 men.
came by land and by sea.

The Wahhabis"

The Egyptian army

It tried to enter Medina but

was defeated by the Wahhabis.

The Egyptian army then re­ceived more supplies and beseiged the city which surrendered
to them in 1812.

They entered Mecca without further

military resistance in 1813.

The Egyptians imprisoned the

Sharif of Mecca and sent him to exile to Salonika where
he died in 1816.

The Egyptian army was defeated in Torabah

by the Saudis.
Amir Saud died in 1814 and was succeeded by his
son Abdullah.

In 1813 Mohamed Ali himself led his army

against the Wahhabis but he was defeated.

He returned to

Egypt and his son Ibrahim Pasha continued to conduct the
war in Arabia.. Ibrahim occupied Asir and Oasim.

7S . Hathlul, History of the Kings of .Al-Saud,
1961, p. 8.

9Abdullah Ibn^Saud who retired in Qasim, had opened
negotiations for the following reasons:position in the Najd to be insecure.

(1) He felt his(2) Some of the tribes

in Najd had submitted to the W a h h a b i .authority; yet they
had never fully accepted it.
Turks.

Many of them were joining the(3) Many Najdis felt that the recent defeat of

their master had completely destroyed his chance of
winning.8
Abdullah concluded the following agreement with
the Sublime Port in 1815:(1) That Abdullah acknowledge the Sultan ofTurkey as Suzerain; (2) that he would give
hostages for insurance of future conduct, andeven present himself in person in Constantinople
if called upon to do so; (3) that he deliver overDiriyah, his capital, to a governor appointed. by the Sultan; (4) that he restore the jewels
taken from Medina on the occasion of his
father's visit in 1809.9
War broke out in the next y e a r , 1816, when Abdullah
raided some tribes in the Hijaz.

Mohamed-Ali began anotherexpedition to suppress the Wahhabis.
defeated them.

His son Ibrahim Pasha

The Egyptian army beseiged Al-Rass andcompleted the occupation of Qasin in 1817.
moved to the Wahhabi capital.

They thenIt surrendered in 1818 after

Sh.R.P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, 1956 ,p. 118.
9Ibid., p. 119.

10
five months of seige.

H e 0imprisoned Amir Abdullah andsent him to Egypt and from there to Istanbul.

Habiz

Wahba explains why the Wahhabis w e r e .defeated»

He says:

The Najdis accused Abdullah of not being a capable
military man because he met the Egyptians.
Also
Abdullah showed that he was not a good politician
when he signed the Treaty because the Egyptians
were running short of supplies and were in a
critical position.10
The Egyptian expedition achieved its goal and put
an end to the Wahhabis' Empire in Arabia.

The Egyptians

did not succeed in establishing a firm policy to administer
the Najd, but instead left a vacuum and the Najd returned
to anarchy.
Did Mohamed-Ali send an expedition to Arabia merely
to obey the orders of the Sublime Port?

The answer is no,

because Mohamed-Ali's goal in the Ottoman Empire appeared
clearly in his later campaign in Syria and Palestine.
But Western resistence stopped his desires in the London
Conference in 1840.

(This is not the place to discuss

Mohamed Ali's ambitions in Arab i a , in the Hijaz, Asir,and the Najd.)
The Egyptian expedition in the Najd did not last
very long.

In 1820 Mishari Ibn-Saud returned from Qasim

after he escaped from the Egyptians.

He occupied the

10 h . Wahba, The Island of the Arabs in the 20th
Century, 1956, p. 225.

11
capital and the local ruler abdicated in favor of Mishari.
At this time Turkish troops arrived in the Najd led by
Abush-Aga.

But Ibn-Muammer, the ruler of Riyadh, declaredhimself to be a Turkish vassal.

'

Turki Ibn-Abdullah arrested Ibn-Muammer and his
son Mishari and killed them.

In 1821 a new Turkish

campaign arrived in Najd led by Husain-Bed, joined theprevious Turkish commander and founded a base for theiractivities in Tharmada.
joined them.

Many dissatisfied local leaders

The Turks occupied Riyadh.

Turki ibn™

Abdullah escaped but returned in 1 8 2 3 . He occupied
Riyadh and neighbouring cities and regions.

Also heoccupied Qasim, Al-Hasa and part of. Oman.

He had good

relations with Kuwait.
In 1829 he succeeded in driving the Turks fromthe Najd.

He received a delegate from Buraimi,

reestablished the first Wahhabi Empire.

He almostHowever, he wasassassinated in 1834 and was succeeded by his son Faisal.
Another Egyptian army reached Riyadh in 1837 and controlled
Najd in 1839.

The local rulers accepted.the Egyptians,

who appointed local rulers in Hail, Shammer Mountain,
and Al-Hasa.

Faisal was arrested and sent to Egypt.

He

lived in exile twice - from 1818-1828 and from 1838-1843,l^M. Khariabah, Introduction to Modern Arab's
History, 1960, pp. 367^369.

12
but afterwards he returned from Egypt.
his control.

He regained all the Wahhabi territories

except the Hijaz.

Faisal Ibn-Turki was the greatest man

in the second Wahhabi State.

He has been compared with

Saud the Great in the First Empire.
experience.

Al-Hasa came underHe had good diplomatic

His second return from exile in Egypt is

considered the beginning of the modern history of Arabia.
He died in 1865.
Faisal was a very strong man in the Second State.
His death left a vacuum, which in turn led to the declineof the second Wahhabi State.
Faisal was succeeded by his son Abdullah.

A

quarrel was raised between the brothers Saud, Abdullah,
Mohamed, and Abdul-Rahman.
Saud appealed to the ruler of Bahrain in his
struggle against Abdullah; the latter appealed to thegovernor of Baghdad, Midhat Pas h a , to help him against
his brother, Saud, who had taken Al-Hasa.

Midhat sent anexpedition by land and by sea to Al-Hasa and occupied it.
The Turks did not transfer Al-Hasa to Saud.

Midhat Pasha

himself came to organize the province and establishedfortifications.

.

•

In 1874 Abdul-Rahman requested the Turks toevacuate Al-Hasa but they refused.
he was defeated.

He fought, them but"

13"The throne passed from 1865-1876 eight times
among Abdullah, Saud, Abdul-Rahman and Baud's

s o n s .

"12This gives a clear picture of the anarchy which led tothe decline of the Second State until 18 91, when a newstrong state emerged in Hail.

Ibn-Rashid interfered in

the Saudi family quarrel.
The Saudi also interfered in Qasim affairs.
When a revolt was raised against Ibn-Rashid, Abdul-Rahman
went to help the revolutionaries but he was defeated.
After his defeat he went to Al-Hasa where he met the
Turkish Governor.
The Turkish ruler put before Abdul-Rahman thefollowing suggestions:-(1) Abdul Rahman would be theAmir of Riyadh and would be under the Turkish Government
and its protection.

He should recognize the Turkish

sovereignty paying about $1,200 annually as a symbol ofrecognition.

(2) The Turkish Government would guarantee

to protect him and supply him with arms.

(3) He would

be Qaim-Maqam Deputy to the Turkish G o v e r n m e n t . ^Abdul-Rahman refused this offer.
Kuwait to ask for refuge.

He went to

The Kuwait ruler refused.

He

went to Qatar where he stayed for.two mont h s , later

12s. Hathlul, History of the Kings of Al-Saud,
1961, p. 50.
12ibid., p. 53.

14
moving to Bahrain.

In 1892 finally the Kuwaiti ruler

allowed.him to come and welcomed him.
twelve years with him family.

He stayed for

Ibn-Rashid occupied

Riyadh and this was the end of. the second Saudi State.
The Wahhabi Movement
Before we talk about this movement and its founder,
we should talk about its roots.

The Wahhabis are thefollowers of the Hanbalite school, the most conservativeof the four schools in Islamic law.

It emphasized ad­

herence to the letter to the Hadith and the Koran.

The

Wahhabis followed the doctrine and the ideas of the great
Hanbalite scholar Tagi Al-Dinahmed Ibn-Taiymiyah, 12621328.

He was an outstanding scholar in religious law andinterpreter of the Hadith and the Koran.
are the following:

His main ideas(1) Muslim communities should follow

the life of the prophet and his companions, follow the
Sharia literally.

The Muslims should not follow thephilosophers and the Sufis because they are contradictory
to the classical spirit.

(2) A strict prohibition of

any special respect to tombs or of prayer to them, or
asking the help from saints or sacrificing to them.
(3)

The denial of the exaggeration of the prophet andrather more respect for his messages
the the door of Ijtihad.

(4) The opening of

15
Ibn-Taiymiyah1s movement aroused the Sufis andthe old school against him and also aroused.the anger ofthe fanatics who include most of the judges and the highofficals.

He was persecuted and imprisoned, but later

freed and returned to preach his ideas.

In some way hecould be compared to Martin Luther in the Christian church
because both of them preached the reformation of thechurch.

What we wanted to say here is that this preacher

and this movement did not succeed because the officals
were against it.

His movement was reformed again in thehands of the Wahhabis.
The founder of the Wahhabi movement was Mohamed
Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab, born in 1703 in the Najd from a high classfamily.

His grandfather was one of the greatest scholars

in the Najd.

His father was the judge of the city of

Uyaina.

'Sheik Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab studied the Hanbalite

school law and he was much interested in the books of
Ibn-Taiymiah.
to Medina.

He went on a pilgrimage to Mecca and moved

He stayed there and studied religious law.

He continued his trip and traveled to Al-Hasa,* Iraq and
Syria.

Wahhaba says that Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab traveled to*Eastern part of Saudi Arabia today.

16
Persia and learned Eastern wisdom.

Najib Ullah says

that:
He spent four years in Basra as a tutor; five
years in Baghdad, where he married a wealthy
heiress; one year in Kurdistan; two years in
Hamadan; and four years in Isfahan, where hestudied Greek philosophy a n d .Neoplatonism.
He went for a while to Qum, another city in
Persia, where he was considered a Hanbalite
scholar.13
Madi says that he traveled to Istanbul but this is in
dou bt.

According to Madi the factors which affected

Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab were the following:
1.

The society in the Najd was far removed from theright path of Islam.

The Wahhabi Chronicler wrote a work

considered very valuable and containing vast information
about Wahhabism and early Saudi family history.

Bishr

described the situation in the Najd which caused reaction
against Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab, who had called for the reform­
ation as follows:
At that time polytheism had become widespreadin Najd and elsewhere.
The belief in trees,stones, tombs and the buildings over them,,
and in the blessings to be had from tombs, andin sacrifices to them had increased; (also)
belief in seeking the help of the Jinn, andin sacrificing to them, and in placing food
before them and putting it in the corners of
the houses to cure the sick, and belief inthe good or evil power of the Jinn had in­creased; (finally) belief in oaths to otherl^Najib Ullah, Islamic Literature, 1963, p. 170.

■ ;■■■■

'

■■

■

17

than God and other polytheistic actions, bothmajor and minor had i n c r e a s e d . 14
2.

The influence of the Ibn-Taiymiah1s ideas grew.
Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab decided to preach for the reform­

ation of the church in Islam.

He chose the Najd, his

native country, to preach his doctrine which can besummarized as follows:1.

The unity of God:No prophet or saint was to ask

his help or attempt - tawsil - to be near or close to God.
2.

The prohibition of building domes or houses overtombs was ordered.
3.

War against all innovations was declared.

4.

Jihad, or the Holy War was declared against thepeople who did not obey this doctrine.

(This explains

Wahhabis' raids to Iraq, Yemen, Hijaz and Syria.)
In another word the Wahhabis wanted a rebirth of
the ideals of M o hamed1s ‘beliefs and deny the beliefs of
the Sufis and the Traditionalist such as the denial of thespecial respect to the saints.

The Wahhabis emphasized

the prohibition of wine, tobaccos and tombstones for thedead.

There was arguing between the Ulema of Egypt andthe Wahhabis about the tobacco.
Wahhabis refused to set up for visiting any mosquesother than these three mosques:

Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem.

14R. B. Winder, Saudi Arabia in the 19th Century,
1965, p. 12.

Mohamed Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab started preaching in the Najd,
but faced resistence from the Najdis.

There was a gulf

between him and the Najdis; even his father disagreed withhis preaching.

He also harshly criticized the innovationsof the Najdis who as a result persecuted him.

He wasforced to leave the town, Hurymila, which had been thefirst town to accept his preaching, and go to Uyainah.
The Governor was Uthman Ibn-Muamer who welcomed Ibn-AbdulWahhab and married him to his sister and encouraged him
in his preaching.

However, he was forced to leave thisrefuge because the Governor of Al-Hasa threatened IbnMuamer with stopping his aid if the Governor of Uyainah
did not kill Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab.
of his brother-in-law.

Uthman decided to get rid

Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab chose Daraiya

where a local Amir had ruled for generations.

There were

three persons who arranged for communication between the
Sheik and the Amir Mohamed Ibn-Saud and Mishari Bin-Thunian
the legitimate sons of Ibn-Saud.

The Amir converted to

Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab's doctrine and converted his tribes andother tribes to his teacher's gospel.

The. Amir promised

to protect the Shiek and to spread his preaching.
alliance was made in 1744.

This

The Wahhabism spread in mostof the Arabian Peninsula and also outside in the Islamic
world:(a) In the Sacatra Kingdom on the Neiger Riverin the Sudan, 1804-1900.

The Wahhabi preacher who spreadWahhabism in this area was called Uthman.
Nomadi tribe.

He was from theHe visited Mecca, met with the Wahhabis,and became converted to their doctrine and preached it.
He suppressed the paganism, spread the faith, and founded
the Kingdom.

Its population was ten million p e r s o n s . ^(b) Punjab - India, 1820-1830; Bengal, 1820^-1860.

An

Indian pilgrim adopted Wahhabi doctrine and preached it
in India because the Muslim life there was mixed with
Hindu ideas.

He succeeded in establishing an IslamicState based on the Wahhabi, doctrine.

The British suppressedi t ■in 1840 but the Wahhabism continued.

The greatest

sect of the Wahhabis there is the sect of Farazis.
(c) Sumatra - Malaysia.

Wahhabism started in 1803; alsoa pilgrimage visited Mecca and returned to preach the
Wahhabism there, but the followers of this man enteredinto a war with other Muslim sects. .The Dutch Government
decided to suppress it and war continued for sixteen years
with the Dutch until the latter succeeded in suppressing
it.

(d) Sanusi movement in Libya, which started in 1844.

The founder was called Mohamed Ali-Sanusi.
in Mecca when the Wahhabis captured it.
them and adopted some of their ideas.

He was studying

He associated withThe Sanusi State

15m . A. Madi, Modern Renaissance in Arabia Saudi Arabia, 1952, p. 60.

20
is similar to the Saudi State because both Kings are theHeads of State and the Imam of their believers.^
Wilfred Smith described the Wahhabism as follows:■They (the Wahhabis) call a halt to decadence,summoning Muslim society back to its first
purity and ord e r ... it (Wahhabism) was pur­itanical, vigorous, simple.
Its message
was straightforward:a return to classicalIslam.
It rejected the corruption and laxityof the contemporary decline, the accommodations
and cultural richness o,f the Medieval Empire.
It rejected the introverted warmth and otherwordly piety of the mystic way.
It rejectedalso the alien intellectualism not only ofphilosophy but of theology.
It rejected all
dissensions. It insisted solely on the law.
The classical law says the Wahhabis is thesum and substance of the faith.17
Mohamed Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab was a productive writer.
He wrote the following b o o k s :Al -Tawhid(The Unity);

Tafsir al-Oaran (the interpretation of the Koran in morethan one volume); Kashf al-Shubuhat
Doubts); Al-Kabiar wa Al-Masial(The Discovery of the(The Greatest Sins and theQuestions); a summary of The Big Interpretation, theoriginal of which is in many volumes; Fatwats andCorrespondence on the

Sharia.

l^Ibid., pp. 65-69.
17W. C. Smith, Islam in Recent History, 1957,
p." 42.
■^O. B i shr, The Title of Glorious in History of
Najd, 1955, p. 100.
.

CHAPTER II
IBN-SAUD'S FOREIGN POLICY
Emergence of a New State in Arabia
The key figure in the modern"history of Saudi
Arabia is Ibn-Saud as he is known in the West.

His real

name is Abdul-Aziz Ibn^Abdul-Rahaman and he was born in
1880.

He migrated with his father to Kuwait when he was

12 years old.

Kuwait offered him good training in politics

It was a battle field for international politics.

Germany'

ambition was to get the Baghdad railroad concession fromthe Sublime Port.

Germany wanted Kuwait to be the end

point for it so it could spread its influence in the
Persian Gulf.

Russia put obstacles before Germany's plan.

England also was mindful of its own colonies in the Orient.
It wanted to keep away other powers from the mines and theoil of the area.

Each of these countries was trying to get

the Kuwaiti ruler's friendship.

Abdul-Aziz stayed ten

years and witnessed many events which helped him later tobuild his State.

He learned the foreign political systems.

Fortunately the Kuwaiti ruler was a very astute politician.
The Kuwaiti ruler had stayed in India for a long time
where he met the British politicians.

At this time the22conflict between Kuwait and Ibn-Rashid in Hail arose.
Saudi refugees sided with the Kuwaiti.ruler, Mubark.
Abdul-Aziz participated in the battles against Ibn-Rashid.
The Kuwaiti ruler encouraged Abdul-Aziz in 1899and supplied him with a division of troops.

Ibn-Saud

entered Riyadh, but he was unable to conquer it.
In 1902 he decided to make a second attempt for
the following reasons:(1) The Saudi followers were per­secuted by Ibn-Rashid.

(2) Ibn-Saud disliked his life ofprotection under Mubark after having lost his Kingdom in
Riyadh.
His main goal from this campaign was to retake
Riyadh.

•He proved to be a very capable military commander,

which was evident from his plan not to meet his strong
enemy in open battle, but to depend on the booty from thetribes and to get the support of tribes which were proIbn-Rashid.
The Royal Chronicler, Saud Ibn-Hathlul gives thenames of the forty men who accompanied him.
only source which mentioned t h e m . ^It is theIbn-Saud Abdul-Aziz

succeeded in occupying Riyadh in the middle of January,
1902.

The occupation of Riyadh was considered the firststage for the third Saudi State.

Ibn-Saud occupied Sadir,l^S. Hathlul, History of the Kings of Al-Saud,
1961, p. 58.

23
Washm Mahmal, Majma, and by 1903 most of the Qasim region
were under his control.

Ibn^-Saud's success got the attentionof the Sublime Port because it saw in his power dangers
harmful to its interest in Arabia encouraging other local
rulers to follow his example.

Thus its prestige would

drop and it might lose its territories in Arabia.
broke out in Basna, Iraq and in the Yemen.

Riots

The latter

opposed the idea of the Jihad against the Turks in June
1904, so the Turks decided to act.

20

Ibn-Saud and the TurksThe Sublime Port felt the critical international
position for the Ottoman Caliphate and the instability
within the Ottoman State so Abdul-Hamid and his officals
thought seriously on the matter.
at two things:

Their action was aimed(1) To win the sympathy of the Islamic

people and to unite them around the Sublime Port.

The

Sultan showed special interest for the people in the Hijaz.
(2) To show the power of the Sublime Port a n d .to show that
it was still able to suppress and put down any revolt
against it.

,

It acted quickly and supported'Ibn-Rashid against
Ibn-Saud, because it thought that if Ibn-Saud got strong
enough he would not be a vassel to the Turks and that he .

20m . A. M a d i ,. Modern Renaissance in Arabia Saudi Arabia, 1952, p. 278.

24
might, in fact, follow a pro-British policy. . It sent anarmy of 8,000 equipped soldiers which joined Ibn-Rashid1s
army.

It met Ibn-Saud1s army in June 1904.

Ibn-Saud

defeated the united army in September 1904.21
The Turks, after their defeat, changed their policy
toward Ibn-Saud.

The Turks sent a. delegate to negotiatewith Ibn-Saud.

They asked Abdul-Aziz to send his father

to Iraq.

He went with the Kuwaiti ruler.

The Turks

suggested that the Qasim region be an independent neutralzone and act as a buffer state between Ibn-Rashid and IbnSaud.

They asked also that two military posts be there.

However, Ibn-Saud refused these suggestions.

The Turks

were ready to recognize Ibn-Saud as their deputy in the
Qasim region and independent ruler in the N a j d .

Thenegotiations failed, and began again before the agreement
was concluded between the two sides.

In the second roundthe situation in the Yemen changed rapidly for the worse
and the Turkish commander was ordered to leave to the
Yemen immediately.

Ibn-Saud defeated Ibn-Rashid in April,

1906.
Ibn-Saud sent a warning message to the Turkish
commander in Qasim to leave the region.

Ibn-Saud offeredtransportation to the Turkish soldiers to Iraq and to

21lbid,, pp. 109-113.

25
Medina,The Turkish influence came to an end in the Qasim
opand Najd provinces.
The year of 1912 Ibn-Saud spent in diplomatic

correspondence with the Ottomans who were busy at thattime with the Balkan war.
neutral.

The Arab's Amirs remained

Idrisi stood with the Italians.

The Turks

asked Ibn-Saud to send his troops against Idrisi or toprotect Asir from the Italians, but he refused.
In this period Jamal Bacha contacted Ibn-Saud toact as mediator between him and the Sharifs in Mecca;
but Jamal Bacha changed his, policy and started warning
Ibn-Saud that he would send an army to cross the Najd fromthe north to the south.
The Governor of Basrah was more realistic and knew
the power of Ibn-Saud.

He sent a letter to Ibn-Saudasking his opinion in the Arab's affairs and the Arab's
stand concerning the Ottomans.

Ibn-Saud replied to him

as follows:23...I know that your consultation with me is no
more than to know what are my goals.
This ismy opinion and you can explain it as you want.
The Turks are responsible for the differences
between the Ara b s ....I suggest that you invite
the Arab's Amirs, powerful and. w e a k , to a con­ference in a neutral country so they can confer
freely, away from any Ottoman interference.
The
...

...

1

■

'

;

:

22jy[. Khariabah, Introduction to Modern A r a b 's
Hi-story, 1960, p. 406.
Ibid., p. 410.

'■

purpose of this is to determine one of twomatters; that the Arab countries should be one
unit governed by one ruler or be divided into
valiyates and renew their frontier's and appointa capable person to govern each of them and totie these valiyates by many common .interests.
They should be administratively independent andthe Turks would be the supervisors of them...24
The Governor of Basrah was pleased with the sug­gestion.

He transferred it to Istanbul but Istanbul

ignored the suggestion.

To complete the story of Ibn-

Saud-Ottoman relations, we will talk now about anotherarea of conflict,
Ibn-Saud captured Al-Hasa in 1913.

The provinceof Al-Hasa, during the pre^Islamic period, was under the
Persians,

After Mohamed it converted to Islam.

The first

one, who made it a center for military and political op­
eration was Tahir Al-Qarmati.

It came under Saudi control

in the first Saudi State in the regime of Abdul-Aziz,
1791,

After the capture of Dariyah, 1818, Ibrahim, theEgyptian, controlled it so it was transferred to theTurks, and continued until Faisal Ibn-Turki retook it.
It was transferred in the period of anarchy and civil
war between Faisal's sons again to the Turks.

It becamepart of Basrah valiyat because of. Midhat Basha who con­quered it in 1871.

When Ibn-Saud regained his capital

ahd strengthened his power in central Arabia and Qasim

24g. Hathlul, History of the Kings of Al-Saud,
1961, p. 97.

27
the Turks were busy with war in the Balkans.
captured it for the following reasons:

In 1913 he(1) His relations

with the Turks became worse because they encouraged the
Sharif of Mecca.

(2) Al-Hasa was a Turkish center ofmilitary and political operations, in Arabia.

It was acenter for supplies for Ibn-Rashid's wars against IbnSaud.^5

Ibn-Saud captured the Turkish troops and trans­ferred them to Bahrain.

The conquest of Al-Hasa made him

a participant in the politics in the Persian Gulf.
here he contacted the British.

From

Al-Hasa was to be a greatsource of revenue in the future after the discovery ofoil.
The reaction of the Turks was not strong toward
Ibn-Saud.

They were afraid of loosing Ibn-Saud and con­sequently not only Al-Hasa, but central. Arabia also.
They tried to win him to their side.

The Turks sentdelegates who met Ibn-Saud near Kuwait.

The Ottomans

recognized him as Governor of the Najd and Deputy of
Al-Hasa.
At this time there were Turkish-British negotiationsof which Ibn-Saud did not know and which led to an agreementin 1913,

Arabia was divided between them in another25]%. A. Madi, Modern Renaissance, in Arabia Saudi Arabia, 1952, p. 124.

28
detailed agreement in 1914.

Ibn-Saud's territories were

put under the Turkish State.

But World War I broke out

and the agreement was not put into

p

r

a

c

t

i

c

e

.

^6

Ibn-Sa u d 1s Relations with the Hijaz
In the Conference of Kuwait, 1916, there was man­ifest a friendly relation between Ibn-Saud and Sharif
Hussein and Ibn-Saud encouraged the Arabs to assist in
his fight against the Turks.

In central Arabia, Ibn-

Saud defeated Ibn-Rashid who was allied with the Turks.
However,

in 1917 Sharif Hussein claimed to England that

Ibn-Saud did not participate in the Arabs' problem.
began between the leaders.
between th e m .

Britain tried to be a mediator

By the end of World War I, Ibn-Saud foundhimself surrounded by Hashimite States in Jordan,
and the Hijaz.

Doubt

Iraq,

A State border problem started between

Ibn-Saud and Iraq concerning the pasture for the nomadic
tribes.

England arranged a conference between Ibn-Saudand Iraq and Jordan in Kuwait and it lasted for two meetings.
This conference, did not accomplish anything.

Such were

the relations between Ibn-Saud and Hussein until 1919 when
Ibn-Saud defeated Hussein in the Battle of Tarabah.

Englandsided with Hussein so Ibn-Saud did not get the fruit ofthis battle.

'.1

26m . Khariabah, Introduction to Modern A r a b 1s
History, i960, p. 413.

o 29King Hussein found himself forced by the peopleof the Hijaz to abdicate in favor of his son, Ali, inorder to induce the Wahhabis to return to the Najd, but thisdid not convince Ibn-Saud and he captured Mecca and beseiged Jiddah for almost a year and sent his troops toMedina.

He beseiged it until it fell.

King Ali Ibn-Al-

Hussein signed a treaty with Ibn-Saud and abdicated therights of the Sharifs to the sovereignty of the Hijaz to
Ibn-Saud.
This treaty was signed December 17, 1925.
The:
terms of articles of the treaty and the transfer of the.

rights of the Sharifs to Ibn-Saud ensured the safety tothe officials of the Government, military or civilian,
and the tribes were ensured the safety of their persons
and their properties.

By the terms of Article 3, Ibn-

Saud ensured general forgiveness to all mentioned above.
Article 4, the soldiers have to give up their weapons,planes and the military equipment immediately.

Article8, Ibn-Saud agreed to keep the officials in their posts.
Article 9, King Ali had the right to carry his personal
properties.

Article 11, King Ali had to leave the Hijaz

after four days.

Article 12, all the ships which belonged

to the Hijaz-were transferred to Ibn-Saud.

This treatyoncontained 17 articles.
!

■

27h . Wahba, The Island of the Arabs in the 20th
Century, 1956, pp. 413-415.

30Islamic World Conference:

Ibn-Saud contacted theMuslim powers to reach an agreement concerning the govern­
ment of the Hijaz„
In 1924 when he captured the Hijaz, King Ibn-Sauddeclared that he would let the matter of government be
determined by all Muslim countries.

"We have sent atelegram to all Muslim countries to send their delegatesto the Islamic World Conference in M e c c a . E n g l a n d

andEgypt tried to be mediators between him and Sharif Ali
but Ibn-Saud refused this mediation.
The problems which faced Ibn-Saud in the inter­national affairs were the following:(a) his status asde facto ruler of the Holy Land of Islam in relation to
the rest of the Muslim w o r l d , (b) the problem created by
the impact of Wahhabism's ideas with the other schools of
religious thought, (c) fixing the frontiers which con­cerned both his neighbors in the Peninsula and the powers
holding mandates in the Arab rectangle, and(d) the questionof his relations with the United Kingdom and with otherpowers. 29^
After Ibn-Saud received the oath of the peopleof the Hijaz proclaiming him the King of the Hijaz and
Sultan of the Najd, he held a strong position.

At this28ibid .r p. 225.
Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 1955, p. 466.

31
time a supreme judge of the Egyptian court came to Jiddah.
At the end of the visit a seven point agreement was madeconcerning the status of the Hijaz, which would be discussed
by the Islamic World Conference.

Also a minister from

Iran came to see the situation in the Hijaz.

Two weeks

after the first declaration, Ibn-Saud announced that hehad cancelled the idea of the Islamic World Conference.
However, the King then changed his mind and agreed toarrange for an Islamic World Conference, although theConference would not discuss the status of the Hijaz.
Also Ibn-Saud made it clear to the sixty assembled dele­gates that temporal matters were to be excluded from thediscussion.

The question of the worship of saints and of

their tombs and shrines proved especially controversial.
In addition to these difficulties, there was a new incident
connected with the Egyptian Mahmal which arose.

Among

the difficulties also was the reconciliation between the
W h a b i , the conservative sect, and the liberal Muslims.
These were the main causes of the failure of this Congress.
Also the Muslim delegates mostly were politicians and theWhabi were theologians.

The Conference or the Congress

did not accomplish anything..
this Congress.

There are three views about

George Lenczowski says it had achieved

its purpose for Ibn-Saud by bringing him implicit or

. . ;.

■

explicit recognition from many Muslim

S t a t e s .

30

GeorgeAntonins considers it very valuable.

He say s :"Insofar32

as it brought the Wahhabi doctors into direct contact withthe views of the rest of Islam it was exceedingly useful,for that contact gave Ibn-Saud an opportunity to start on
the task of reconciling the two v i e w s „"31
Hafiz Wahba says:"But the Congress did not ac­complish anything for the Hijazians.

All the hopes todevelop the Hijaz were not realized."32
Ibn-Saud and Asir
Asir was ruled by the Idrisi Dynasty after Mohamed
Idrisi died in 1923.
two countries.

A struggle broke out between theThis encouraged the Imam of the Yemen tointerfere and utilize this opportunity to extend his realm
over Asir.

The descendents turned to Ibn-Saud, the oldally of Mohamed Idrisi.

Sayyid Hassan Ibn-Ali surrendered

his external sovereignty to Ibn-Saud on November 20, 1930.
Its internal sovereignty as well became fully a part of the
Saudi domain but before 1930 both sides signed a treaty
called the Protectorate(Mecca) Agreement.

Asir, the Hijaz,

30 g „ Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs,' 1962, p. 544.
31-g . Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 1955, p. 459.
32 h „•W a h b a , The Island of the Arabs in the 20th
Century, 1956, p. 304.

33
Najd and its Dependencies signed on October 21, 1926.
The important article of this Treaty is that in Article 1
Al-Hassan Ibn-Ali Alidrisi acknowledges the ancient marches
described in the Treaty of 1926 made between the Sultan of
the Najd and Imam Mohamed Adrisi and which were at thatdate subject to the house of Adrisi as being in the virtueof this agreement under the suzerainty of His Majesty theKing of the Hijaz, Sultan of the N a j d .

In Article 2, theImam of Asir may not.enter into political negotiation withany Government or grant any economic concession to any
person except with the sanction of His Majesty the Kingof the Hijaz.

In Article 3, the Imam of Asir may not de­clare war or make peace except with the sanction of His
Majesty.
These terms mean that Asir came under Saudi
monarchy and had not the right to contract with othercountries.

The Imam had no right to give any part of his

territories of Asir described in Article 1.^3

This

Treaty was a step of King Ibn-Saud to extend his authority
over Asir and finally Asir came under Saudi suzerainty.
Ibn-Saud and the Yemen
In 1934 a conflict broke out between Ibn-Saud andthe Yemen because Ibn-Saud extended his authority over Asir.

33j„ c . Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near East andMiddle East, V. II, 1956, p. 148.

."

- '

Imam Yahya regained some cities.

;

34

The Yemen took the ad­vantage of rebellion in Asir against the ruleof Ibn-Saud.

So a war broke out and is known as the Seven Weeks War.
Commander in Chief was Amir Faisal.

He gained victory andswept many territories.and defeated the Yemeni troops.
The Imam sued for peace and the war was concluded by thetreaty known as the Treaty of T a i f , Islamic Friendship andBrotherhood between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen.
importance of this Treaty is that:

The

In Article 1, the state,of war existing between the Yemen and Saudi Arabia isterminated as from the moment of signature of the Treaty
and there was forthwith to be established friendshipbetween Their Majesties the Kings and their.countries andpeoples.

In Article 2, each of the two recognizes thefull and absolute independence of

the kingdom of the otherpart and his sovereignty over it.

In Article 6, the twoparties undertake immediately to withdraw their troops
from the country.

In Article 9, the two parties undertakeby all moral and material means at their command to pre­vent the use of their territory as a base and center for
hostile action or enterprise against the country of the
other

p

a

r

t

y

.

The friendly relations between Saudi Arabia■^m . Khalil', The Arab States and the Arab League,
V. II, 196 0, pp. 214-223.

35
and the Yemen continued until the death of Imam Yahayh
and succession of his son when the revolution broke out in
the Yemen in 1962.

Then the relations became strained.
Northern Borders' Problems*

As we mentioned before, Ibn-Saud was surroundedby Hashimites on the northern border - Iraq.

Ibn-Saud

met at the Kuwait Conference which did not accomplish any
agreement.

Later he had to negotiate with Britain, who

held the mandates for the territories after his annexationof the Jabl Shammar.**treaties:

Ibn-Saud concluded the following(a) The Treaty signed in 1922 is known as the

Almohamarah Agreement.
on November- 2, 1925.

(b). The Hadda Agreement was signed
By the terms of this Treaty theparties fixed the frontiers between Najd and Transjordan.
(c)

The Bahra Agreement was signed on November 1, 1925.

Provisions were made for regulation of tribe migrationfrom Najd into Iraq and Jordan.

(d) Also Aqir protocol

changed some articles in the Treaty of 1922.
The Treaty of 1922 had solved the border questions
between Najd and Iraq and between Najd and Kuwait andchanged some articles in the protocol of Aqir in the sameyear

(1922).

*See Appendix A dealing with the Saudi subsoil
and sea bed in the Persian Gulf.
**South Hail, in the Qasim region.

36
Another treaty of friendship was signed in 1933
between Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

According to Article 1,permanent peace and friendship shall prevail between Jordan
and Saudi Arabia.

In Article 2, each of the two parties

undertook to preserve good relations.

According to Article

3, both sides will appoint officials in the zones in thefrontier who shall be responsible for the organizationof general cooperation.
Saudi Arabia - Egypt Relations
The first contact of Egypt with Ibn-Saud as we
mentioned was when delegates from Egypt came as mediators
between Ibn-Saud and the Sharif.

However, Ibn-Saud re­fused this mediation and suggested that Egypt lead thecall for an Islamic World Conference.
These contacts made the relation strained until
193 6 when Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed a treaty offriendship and brotherhood.

The Egyptian Government recog­

nized Saudi Arabia as full and absolutely independent.
There should be between the people of the two countries
a peace and friendship to prevent the use of theircountries as a base and center for any hostile action.
Establishment of a diplomatic relation between the twocountries was to be set up.

35Ibid„, pp. 212-214.

King Ibn-Saud w a s ;to insurethat the visits to Mecca for the pilgrimage be made easily.
According to this article(6) the two sides would sign apostal and other agreements.

After the two countries

signed this treaty they continued exchanging official
notes from 1936 to 1939 about some projects, roads, which
would be built in the Holy Cities in the Hijaz by the
Egyptian Government.

In 1945, the Egyptian King, Faruq,

paid a State visit to Ibn-Saud.

The meeting of the two

Kings is known as the Radwa Meeting.*

From this meetingcame the first step in the Arab League when it moved from'the protocol stage to a political organization and made afirm base for brotherhood and friendly relations between
the two Kings.

Another State visit was paid to Ibn-Saudby the President of Syria.

In the next year, 194 6, Ibn-

Saud paid a State visit to Egypt.

In 1948 the second

meeting of King -Ibn-Saud with the Hashimite King of Jordan
took place when the latter paid a visit to Saudi Arabia.
(The first meeting was in 1930 with the King of Iraq about t
the frontiers problem.36)*Radwa;Name of a mountain in the Hijaz.

.

-^M. a.. Madi., Modern Renaissance .in Arabia Saudi Arabia, 1952, pp. 177-226.

CHAPTER III
THE STATUS OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE KINGDOM OF THE HIJAZ
The Government Structure
Ibn-Saud knew how to establish his authority over
the tribes.

He taught them how to respect the authorityof the Government.

During the first period of the Ibn-

Saud rule he used the sword.

The major elements uponwhich were based the political theory and Saudi Government
37

are the following:

The r o y a l .family.
monarchy.

The Saudi Government is a(a) The King held the high office of the State.

(b) The office of the Prime Minister was also the King's.
(c) He exercised his authority as Sheik of Sheiks.
(d) The- King also was to be known as the Imam of thebelievers.
The tribes.

The tribes were also considered apolitical base of the Government structure because theheads of the tribes ruling in their small communities are
responsible for keeping order in their tribes.
of all these Sheiks is the King.

37 g . Lipsky, Saudi Ara b i a , 1960, p. 138.
38

The head' .

39

Religious leaders.

The Saudi State arose from a

political-religious alliance.

Mohamed Ibn-Abdul-Wahhab

allied himself with Amir Mohamed Ibn-Saud.
the sword united.

The word and

The house of Al-Saud leads the politicallife of the country/ while the Wahhabi house leads thereligious life.
There is a consulative council.
The constitution of the Government is the Koran
and Sunna - religious law - Sharia.
There are Western laws regulating administrationand industrial affairs.

,

From the conquest of the Hijaz in 1926 until 1948
there were three minister's offices - Minister of Defense,
Minister of Finance, and Minister of State.
The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Hijaz
On August 29, 1926, King Abdul-Aziz issued thisConstitution of the Kingdom of the Hijaz divided into
eight parts.

The most important are the following:

Departments of the Kingdom of the H i j a z .

ShariaAffairs, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Financial
Affairs, Public Education, and Military Affairs are the 'main divisions.
Legislative Assembly(Consulative).

a council should organize in the capital.

Article 28,
This should

consist of the Agent-General, his Advisors,.and six Notables

Table 2.

The Government from 1926-1953.
The King
President of the Council of Deputies
Deputy of the Council of Deputies

Tribal Village
Councils

Councils of
Jiddah and Mecca

Legislative Assembly(consulative)

District
Council

Deputies
Council

General Municipal
Councils

ProvincesAmirs

Department ofInterior

Department of
Education

Department of
PoliceDepartment of
Foreign Affairs

Royal
Court

Departments of theKingdom of the Hijaz
Department of
HealthDepartment of
Finance

SupremeCourt.Sharia
CourtsDeoartment of Defense

41who" shall be nominated by His Majesty the K i n g „Article31, all. decisions made by the Legislative Assembly shouldbe put into effect after they have been passed to His
Majesty the K i n g .

Article 10, if the Government asked theCouncil its opinion about some projects, decrees, or laws
and it refused to sign it and disagreed, the final word
is His Majesty the K i n g .

Article 13, the King has thefull right and the power to dismiss the Council or tochange some of its members anytime.
are appointed

The Council members

by His Majesty. It has no power tothe laws or decrees;

just give .its

opinion.

issue

From its name

we can know what it is - Majlis Al-Shura - (Consulative)
the King is the sole holder of the legislative authority
and he practices it by his own determination or by thesuggestion of thisC o u n c i l .

^8

He founded this Council asa gift to thepeople.

The Council has no limited number

but is as His

Majesty decides. We

can.raise this question.

Why did His Majesty found this Council?
reasons:

There are two(1) The Hijaz is the center of the State forcontact with the. foreign world; the administration has to'be m o d e r n . (2) This province of the State had known some­'thing of modern government under .the Turks and in the
Sharif periods.

Its people were willing to be governedby the modern system.

•^M, Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League,
V. I, 1960, p. 237.

42
Councils of Jiddah and Medi n a .

Article 32, a

committee shall be elected in Jiddah and Medina and becalled the Administrative Council.

This shall be consistedof the Deputy Governor "Qaimaqam", his assistants, theChief Official and four Notables; the latter will be chosen
and nominated by His Majesty the King.

Article 34, in

accordance with Article 31 of the Legislative Assembly,
all decisions made by the two Councils above mentioned
shall be passed to His Majesty the King for sanction.
Once they are sanctioned by His Majesty they must be putinto

e f f e c t .

39This above article emphasizes the authorityof the King over the two Councils.
General Municipal Councils.

Its members shall belandlords, members of special crafts, and notables whowill be selected by His Majesty the King.

Any member

selected to a Municipal Council should be a subject of His
Majesty.

Every resolution passed by the Councils in turnwill be submitted to the Legislative Assembly and willpass to His Majesty the King.

The directors of the Councils

should act in accordance with the resolutions' by the General
Councils and approved by. His Majesty. ^From the articles

mentioned above we can understand the following:

3^ibid., p. 240.
40Ibid., p. 242.

(1) His43
Majesty the King was the highest chief of the authority.
(2) He practiced it with the full power in the whole ofhis realm.
The Council of Deputies:

Majlis Al.-Wuk'a'la.

This

Council came into being under the Viceroy of the Hijaz,
Amir Faisal.

This Council appeared in December, 1931,

when the Constitution was issued.

This decree establishedfour members and a president, the Deputy for Foreign Affairs
and the Vice-President of the Consulative Assembly.

The

Council of Deputies, as defined by this decree was to havebeen a strong Government organ.

The Council issued all

instructions to the Government departments.

This authority

was spelled out as being delegated by the K i n g .

In reality

the Council had been functioning for several y e a r s .

It

was acting as an executive group in the Hijaz Government.
This was one force of the decree of this Council and its
functions.

Let us look in the Royal Decree,.Number 2716,

dated September 18, 1932.

41

Article 6 states:"Ourpresent Council of Deputies shall immediately formulate a new
Constitution, a new order for the succession to the throne,
and a new regulation for governmental organization and shallsubmit them to us that we may issue our orders concerningthem."

From the above article we understand that it has^ M i d d l e East Institute,. Middle East Journal,
1956, V. 11, pp. 2-3.

the power to .issue the laws and decrees for the Kingdom,
But in fact, it has not.

Now.I quote from a lecture inpolitical science in Riyadh University by Minister Ahmed
Zaki Ymani
said,(now Minister of. Oil in Saudi Arabia).

He"The Council of Deputies lived for a short period andcontinues'in name only and.has no trace in practical life.
This Council did not issue any of these decrees but thearticle showed clearly that the .King did not want to makethe Legislative Assembly the only source to issue the decrees
and the la ws .
■Hijaz.

This was the government system in the

How was the situation in Najd?

The King ruled

Najd and Al-Hasa on a personal basis without, ministerialintermediaries because the traditional patriarchal patternof government served most effectively.

He did have sub­ordinate leaders of the small groups of people and a bodyof advisors somewhat less formally organized.
advisory group developed the Royal Cabinet.

Out of thisThe most

illustrative,names are the following;
Dr. Abdul Allh Al-Damalaji who was the first one out
from Najd who served the King as doctor at first in 1915.
He knew French so he participated in many conferences withthe foreigners and was awarded.a high office and became
Deputy Vice-Minister in 192.5.

In 1930. his service cameto an end in Saudi Arabia.

.^^A, Zaki> Lectures in political science ‘in Riyadh
University, 1960. •Fuad Hamzah was a Palestinian refugee who accompanied
the King in 1 9 2 8 .arid became Deputy .Vice-Minister.

He

represented Saudi.Arabia..in the Vichy Conference and theAnkara Conference during World War II.
Hafiz Wahba is an Egyptian politician.

He accompanied

King Abdul^Aziz in his campaign against the' H i j a z .

TheKing sent him to Egypt to develop the friendly relations
between the two countries, but he failed.

He was appointed

as Director of the Education Department,and became a
Minister.

Later he became a Minister in London and served

as Ambassador from .1930 until 1956 when Saudi Arabia
severed its relations with Britain.

He. assisted theKing in foreign affairs and participated in many con­ferences .^J. B. Philby was the famous and illustrous advisor.
He worked as mediator between the Hashimites and IbnSaud but he was devoted to the latter.

He converted toIslam and was called Abdullah and lived in Riyadh.

His

sons still live in the Royal Institute in Saudi Arabia
and have monthly allowances.
Royal Order.

This consolidated t h e .Sultanate of

Najd and its Dependencies into a Kingdom and united it with
the Hi jaz on April. 19, 1927.

43m .•Khariabah, Introduction to Modern A r a b 1s
History, 1960, pp. 428-430.

Acting on the basis of the petition made to us
by those of our subjects who solve and bind in
the Sultanate of Najd and its Dependencies, wehave ordered that the Sultanate of Najd and its
Dependencies shall become "THE KINGDOM OF THE
HIJAZ AND NAJD AND ITS DEPENDENCIES" and that
our title will be the King of the Hijaz and Najd
and its Dependencies.44
Signed (Abdul-Aziz)*^ E u r o p a Publication, Middle East Survey andDirectory, V. Ill, p. 263.
*See Appendix B for the Royal Order, 1932.

CHAPTER IV
THE GOVERNMENT FROM 1951-1966■ New Ministries.

As we mentioned, there were in1948 three Minister offices. Finance, Defense, and State.
New Minister's offices were founded in June, 1951 and theMinistry of Interior was reestablished.

Then within

less than a year five Ministries were founded:

Communications,

September, 1953;. both Education and Agriculture in December,
1953; Commerce in M a r c h , 1954; and Health.

A number of

new independent or subordinate agencies were set up.^G
Establishment of the Council of Ministries , 1953
This began in October, 1953 when King Abdul-Aziz
ordered the formation of the Council of Ministers.

The

Decree's preamble states that the King decided to establish
a Council of Ministers in part, because of the increase in
number of the obligations and diversifications of the respon­
sibilities placed upon the State.
provisions of this Decree.

Article 1 sets forth the

A Council of Ministers is tobe formed under the Presidency of. Saud, Crown Prince ofthe Kingdom and Commander in Chief of the armed forces.
i. ^ M i d d l e East Institute, Middle East Journal,
V. 11, 1956, p. 4.
:. 47 ,

48
The Ministers may look into all the affairs of the nation
whether foreign or domestic; it has authority over theearlier Council of Deputies.

The Deputy of the Presidentof Ministers’ Council was Amir Faisal.

After the promul­

gation of the Decree, King Abdul-Aziz died and the Crown
Prince Saud became the King in his own rig h t .

King Baudissued the Royal Decree Number 380 on May 11, 1958.

Article11 states that the Council of Ministers shall consist of(a) the President of the Council of Ministers,(b) theVice-President of the Council of Ministers who shall be
appointed by the Royal Command on the recommendation of
the President,(c) the Departmental Ministers who shallbe appointed by Royal Command, (d) Ministers of State who
shall be appointed members of the Council by Royal Command,and(e) Advisors of His Majesty the King who shall be

appointed members of the Council.^7
This article means that the Ministers'

advisors

are appointed by Royal recommendation or the Presidentof the Council who was usually King Saud or his brotherAmir Faisal.

The Council is to approve the following more

specific items;(a) the annual budget, approval of theyear and balance sheet of the State,(b) internal agreements,(c) concessions a n d •monopoly contracts granted to individuals'47m . Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League,
1960, V. I, p. 240.

49
or companies,(d) the formation Of stock companies,

creation of new positions and jobs,
the employment of foreigners.

(e) the(f) all contracts for

Article 19 states that nolaws or agreements or international treaties or concessions‘oshall be issued except in accordance with the Royal Decrees
drafted after approval of the Council of

M i n i s t e r s .

^8

The Council comprises the following departments:(1) the office of the President of the Council,
Secretariat-General of the Council,
experts,(3) the branch of the(4) general office of the officials,

military branch, and(2) the(5) the(6) Technical Assistants Department.

According to Articles 8 and 44, the King is at the top of
the pyramid.

He gives the orders to his Prime Ministerand the latter will be responsible before the King con­cerning the Council.
direct authority.

The Prime Minister is the. second

After him comes the Deputy of thePrime Minister and the Council of Ministers' organizedcommittee.

In the service of the pyramid are spread theentire number of officials.
The Transfer of the Office of Premierfrom King Saud to Faisal
King Saud succeeded his father to the throne in
1953.

Crown Prince Faisal was the Viceroy of the Hijaz.

^ I b i d . , p. 244.

,

50

Saud relied solely on the tribes and religious leaders.
The tribes were kept loyal to the Government.
In 1955 the power passed.to Amir Faisal.

He wasPrime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Viceroyof the Hijaz.

He continued in these offices until 1958

when the foreign relations became complicated with theUnited Arab Republic.
The King was responding to the pressure of theroyal family to hand over all powers to Amir Faisal.
undertook his task.

He

The most pressing matters were financeand foreign relations.

Amir Faisal issued a communiqueon April 18, 1958 explaining the concerns of his Government in its foreign relations.

49

The Decree which was issued on March 24, 1958,
gave Faisal full powers to govern in fiscal, internal
and foreign fields.

However, King Saud did not consider

the transfer as final and he tried to regain the power fromhis brother Faisal.

The differences increased in December,

1960, regarding the degree of detailed information about
the revenues.

Faisal was unwilling to accept the pointof view of Saud so he tendered his resignation.

King Saudappointed a new cabinet in which he personally assumed thepremiership.

Saud offered to appoint Faisal as Deputy

49 g . DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, pp. 93-94.

51
Prime Minister but Faisal was. not ready to become Deputy
Prime Minister as long as his responsibilities in the
Government were not clarified.

.Fai s a l 1s. return to power

was in November, 1961; the King suddenly fainted andFaisal was appointed King's Deputy.
New King Proclaimed in Saudi Arabia
The differences between the two royal brothers
reached its climax in 1964.

The decision was taken by theroyal family and religious leaders who had the authority
to issue a Fatwa.

They disposed King Saud and proclaimed

his brother as the Monarch and transfered the power fromKing Saud to the Crown Prince and Prime Minister.
main points in the text are as follows:of the difference;

The(1) The enlargement(2) The fact of civil strife;(3) Theneed to find a decisive solution to these differences anddisputes which recur from time to time;(4) Studying thesituation in the light of development of events and re­viewing the state of the King's health;(5) The fact thatHis Majesty the King is Unable to carry out the affairs
in the State.
The Fatwa.

The royal family and the religious

leaders decided the following:(1) His Majesty King Saudshall be the King of the country.

(2) His Royal Highness

the Crown Prince and the President of the Council of52
Ministers f Amir Faisal, shall carry out all the internaland external affairs of the Kingdom without referring to
the K i n g ,The text w a s .signed by Grand Mufti and religious
leaders and his brothers and uncles.

Also the Council of

Ministers made decision number 653 dated March 30, 1964,■which is as follows:’(1) While His Majesty King S a u d .remained as
King of the country all the responsibilities'
are transferred to His Royal Highness theViceroy of His Majesty, and Crown Prince, Amir
Faisal.
(2) His Royal Highness the Crown
Prince and Viceroy is asked to approve theRoyal Decree attached to this decision in his
capacity as Viceroy.
Signed, Vice-President of
the Council of Ministers, Khalid Ibn-AbdulA z i z .50
So Amir Faisal issued a Royal Decree number 52
dated March 30, 1964..

In this decree he approved thedecision of the Council of Ministers.
The dethronement of the K i n g .

On November 2, 1964,

a statement broadcast over Mecca Radio said:
The decision to depose the King and proclaim
his brother as the Monarch was. taken by theCouncil of Ministers and the Consulative
Assembly, after considering a letter from theroyal family and religious leaders which decided
the following:(1) To dethrone Saud, (2) toproclaim Faisal as lawful King of Saudi Arabia,(3) and to ask Faisal to agree to the proc­
lamation.

•^Middle East Institute, Middle E a s t "Journal,
V. 18, 1964, pp. 352-353.

53
Thus ended■the 11 years of rule o f .the King Saud whichbrought to a climax the struggle for power between thetwo brothers.
Khalid appointed Deputy K i n g / Crown Prin c e .
also acted as Deputy Prime Minister.

KhalidKing Faisal continued

in the post of Prime Minister and also that of Foreign
Minister.

He was, during his father's lifetime, thecountry's expert on foreign affairs.

Faisal has held thepost ever since.
On March 29, 1965, King Faisal made a statement
in a broadcast over Mecca Radio:.

Since the position of Crown Prince is a funda­
mental factor for the continuation and firmnessof the reign, now the country enjoys stability,
advancement and prosperity.
Thanks to its
adherence to Islam. It gives me great pleasure
to announce...that I have chosen my brotherPrince Khalid Ibn-Abdul-Aziz as Crown Prince
to rule after m e . 52
This decision was made by the royal family headed
by Mohamed Ibn-Abdul-Aziz who was the pretender to thethrone in his father's life.
Mohamed:Radio Mecca quoted Prince"He would rather stay away from positions andtitles."53
The shape of the Government and the post ministeriescontinued until 1966.

5Ipeg.ional News Service, Middle East M i r r o r , V. 16,
1964, p. 2.
52Ibid., V. 17, p. 4.

53Ibid.

Table 3.

The Government from 1959 to 1963.
26 March
1959

2 July1960

21 December
1960

11 September
1961-1963

Prime Minister
Foreign Affairs
Economics andFinance
Defense andAviationInterior
Communication
Education

Amir Faisal*
ii
ii*

Amir Faisal*
ii
ii*

King Saud+
AssuwaylKing Saud+
Assuwayl

Amir Musaid

Talal

Nawaf

Amir Fahd
Faisal*SultanFahd

SultanFaisal*SultanFahd

Amir Mohamed

Agriculture

Khald

Khald

Abdullah

HealthTrade'King's Counsellor
Oil and Mineral
Resources
Labors works X
Broadcasting X
Press X
Pilgrimage

RashadAmir Faisal*
MashalRashadSalah
Mashal

Nasif
Shata

MohamedFaisal Turki
Abdullah Saad
Abdullah•
DabbaghAbdullah
Dabbagh
Nasif
Shata

Ministry

ii

n

*

Badr
Abdul-Aziz

Turiqi•

Turiqi
NassirBalkhayr
Hussein Arab

* 1 Also holds other post(s), he was Prime Minister in 1959 - 2 July 1960.
+ 2 King Saud held the post of Prime Minister on December 21, 1960 and continued
until 19 63; he was also the Kin g ,X 3 These two ministries are new posts;, they were two departments and Pilgrimage
Minister founded in 1962.
Combination of two tables with some changes, Tel-Aviv University, Middle East Record,
V, I, II, 1960-61,

CHAPTER VFOREIGN RELATIONS 1926 - 1960
Developing Diplomatic Relations
The Department of Foreign Affairs was foundedin Jiddah in 1926.

Its function was to run the foreign

policy of the State under the supervision and the controlof His Majesty King Ibn-Saud.

When the Constitution of

the Kingdom of Hijaz was issued in August, 1926, theDepartment of Foreign Affairs was divided, into four sections:(1) political;(2) administrative;(3) legal;(4) andconsular.
The Directorship of Foreign Affairs was assigned
by His Majesty the Ki n g .

The Department was directly

connected with the Royal Court but it received the ordersof the Agent-General in connection with the administrativeand consular sections.^4

The Department appointed a consularin Egypt as a Minister, and a Minister in London in 1930.
After four years the Department was changed and it
became a Ministry by a Royal Order.

The King appointed in1934 Amir Faisal the Viceroy of the Hijaz and a Minister

54m . Khalil, The Arab States' and the'Arab League,
1960, V. I, p. 236.
55

56
of the Foreign Affairs.

Fuad Hamaza became Deputy of the

Ministry,

I:t became the first Ministry founded in Saudi

Arabia„After ten years from its change to a Ministry it ,did not open consulates or embassies except in Palestinein 1935 when it appointed Mr. Al-Kuhaimi a Consul inJerusalem.

In 1942 it opened another one in Turkey.

After World War II it opened many embassies andconsulates in Paris, Washington, R o m e , Beirut, Amman,
Tehran, Mexico, Indonesia, Pakistan and many other countries(see Table 4).

In 1955 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

reorganized in the light of the development of the Saudi
foreign affairs.

It issued new orders.

^composed the following sections now:

The General Diwan,

this consists of the following sections?
Administration,

The Ministry(a) Political(b) Arabian Administration - Arab League,(c) Department of Protocol,
Palestine Department,(d) Consular Department,(e)(f) Public Relations and Press,(g) Western Department,

The second section is the Dip­

lomatic and Consular Missions which can be found by a
Royal Order,
Also it is possible to open an embassy or consulate
by a Royal Order.

■'

Amir Faisal continued as a Minister for Foreign
Affairs from 1926*-1960 when he resigned from, the officeTable 4.

Chronological table of developing diplomatic relations.

Country
Egypt
Great Britain*
Syria
TurkeyU.S.A.
Iraq
Palestine
JordanIranLebanon
Pakistan
India
Spain
MexicoItaly
Pakistan
France*Libya
Indonesia
The UN
Cuba '
Yemen
Tunisia
Switzerland
Japan
Sudan
Germany F.R.
Ethiopia

1926_______ 1948. 1950 1955 1957 1958 1959 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
X'
X
X
X
X
X
X '

'

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Table 4 (Continued).

Country
Venezuela
SwedenKuwaitGuineaChina R.
Malay A.F.
MoroccoNigeria
BengalAustria
GreeceNorwayDenmark

19261948
1950 1955 1957 1958 1959 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
.

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

*Saudi Arabia stopped its diplomatic relations with France after the Suez Canalcrisis also, with Britain after Buraimi problem.

58

for a y e a r .

He returned to the office in 1961 and servesat the present time(see Table 3 ) . ^After King Abdul-Aziz captured the Hi.jaz thefollowing States recognized him.

The first State was theSoviet Union in 1926 which sent an Ambassador called
Karim, a Muslim.

(Later the Saudi Government cut off

its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union for the
security of the State.)

Switzerland followed in 1927,

Germany in 1929 , Iran in .1930, the United .States and Iraq
in 1931, and Italy in 1932.

Egypt recognized the in­dependence of Saudi Arabia and established diplomatic
relations in 1926.

The United Kingdom followed in 1930,

Palestine in 1935, Turkey in 1942, and Syria in 1944.
Saudi Arabia and the Arab.League
In 1944 Saudi Arabia participated in the Conferenceof Alexandria and sent delegates but did not sign the ,protocol which was signed by five States at that time.
The Saudi Government signed the protocol in 1945 after
conferring with the King.

Saudi Arabia was an originalm e mb e r , even though they did not sign immediately.
Saudi Arabia signed the following treaties;(1) Pact of the League of Arab States, 1945;(2) Joint

55m . T. Sad i k , The Development of Government andAdministration :in Saudi Arabi a , 1965, pp. 71-73.

60

Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the Statesof the Arab League/ June 17, 1950;(3) Extradition Agreement

signed by Saudi Arabia on May 23, 1953;.. (4) Convention
concerning the nationality of Arab residents .in countriesof which they are not nationals signed oh May 23, 1953;(5) Convention of the Arab Union for communication andtelecommunications signed on February.12., 1953;(6) Con­vention on the privileges and immunities.of.the League ofthe Arab State in April, 1954;(7) Convention for facil­

itation of trade and regulation of transit trade among
States of the Arab League on February 23, 1954;(8) Con­vention for settlements of current transactions of thetransfer of capital among States of Arab League on February
23, 1954.56•

In the Arab League Council sessions from 1945-1964,
Saudi delegates held the post of Chariman as. the following:1.

Session:

6

2.

"

8

3.

"

13-11

4.

"

5.

D a t e : March.1946"

F e b . , 1946"

F e b . , 1951

21-1

"

March, 1954

"

30

"

O c t . , 1958

6-.

"

41-1

"

March, 1964

7.

"

41-Extra"

May, 1964'

Place:

Cairo

"

"

"

"

"

56^. Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League ,196 0, V. II, p. 427.

61
8„

Session

Extra

Date:

Sep t . , 1964

Place:

This was at the level of the Heads of State.
Chairman was the delegate of Saudi Arabia.

Alexandria
The

Saudi Arabia is an active member in the Arab League
and shows its responsibilities in the Arabs' questions
such as the problem of the Algerian Budget and the problemof the Palestinian organization.

Saudi Arabian policy

toward the Arab League was expressed by King Saud on theoccasion of his accession to the throne.
Our foreign policy as regards the Arabs isbased on the Arab League Charter...we sincerely
work for the achievement of greater Arab unity...I seize this opportunity to call for theclosing of ranks.
We should work concertedly
on matters which need our attention, namely
the protection of the rights of our Palestinianbrethren.58
I n ■1961 King Saud emphasized the loyality of his
country to the Charter of the Arab League and its support
for the liberation of Algeria, Oman and Buraimi.
Saudi Arabia shared in the total budget of the
Arab League and it paid in 1945, 7.00%; in 1953, 15.50%;
in 1958, 14.57%; in 1960, 11.46%; and in 1964, 10,97%.

57 r . n . Macdonald, The League of the Arab States,
1965, pp. 348-367.
58Tel-Aviv University, Middle East Record, V. I,
1960, p. 427.

62
The traditional dynamic rivalry between the Saudi
Royal House and the Hashimite Kings of Jordan and Iraq
was evidenced on the League Council at least until 1956.
The Saudis also moved closer to friendly relations
with Iraq and away from Egypt, both before and after the
19.58 Iraqi revolution.

From 1959 to 1961. the tendency

was for improved relations between the. Saudis and the
Egyptians.

CQ

After Faisal gained the throne he adopted a newpolicy.

The Yemeni problem made,•the situation worse andbecause of this he called for an Islamic alliance.

Saudi

Arabia came into close alliance with Jordan,.Morocco,
Tunisia and Sudan.

(See Table 5 for the blocs in the

Arab League until 1963.)•Saudi Arabia and the United Nations
King Faisal said at the plenary session of theUnited Nations in 1945 at San Francisco:...This charter does not represent perfection
as visualized by the small States.
Nevertheless,
it is doubtless the best ever produced by people
representing fifty States many of which havesuffered much in their struggle for liberty andthe defense of humanity....We the sons of the
Near East and Middle East and particularly of
the Arab Nations are filled with happiness andjoy at the collapse of these powers of evil...

.
■N. Macdonald, The League of the Arab States,
1965, pp. 78-79.

63

Table 5,

Bloc patterns in the 'Arab League.,"*

YEAR

EGYPT

•NEUTRAL'

IRAQ

1946

Saudi Arabia, Syria
Yemen, .Lebanon

1950

Saudi Arabia, Yemen

1955

Saudi Arabia, Jordan : Libya
Yemen, Syria
Lebanon1958

Yemen, Syria

Lebanon, Libya
Sudan, Tunisia
Jordan, Morocco

Saudi Arabia

19 60

Yemen, Syria,
Sudan, Morocco

Tunisia,Jordan
Saudi Arabia,
Libya

None

1963

Algeria, Kuwait
Yemen

Tunisia,Morocco,
Saudi Arabia,
Sudan,Jordan
Libya

Syria
LebanonJordanLebanonJordan,Syria
None*R. N. Macdonald, The League of the Arab States , 1965, p. 79.

indeed the world is indebted for its survival
to the allied nations, which engaged themselvesin war f sacrificing the best of their, youth andwealth for the security of mank i n d . ... In sucha moment as this we should not forget the reso­lute efforts of the late F. D . Roosevelt in thecause of peace and his farsighted action ininitiating this Conference....Let us practiceand preserve the principles which we have here
put down on paper...let this Charter be thesolid foundation upon which we shall build our
new and better w o r l d .^0
Saudi Arabia had signed the declaration by theUnited Nations in Washington, D. C.

It was signed at

first by 26 nations and one of these latter adherents
was Saudi Arabia.

The original members of the United

Nations, numbering 51, are those States which took partin the San Francisco Conference or had previously signed
the declaration of the United Nations, and which signed
and ratified the Charter.
in 1945.

Among them was Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia shared in the United Nations' budget

by .07%.
Saudi Arabia is a member in the United Nations
and related agencies such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency(IAEA); Food and Agriculture Organization(FAQ); Education, Scientific and C u l t u r e .(UNESCO); World
Health Organization
construction(WHO); International Bank for Re­(Bank); International Development Association

DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, p. 152.

(IDA); •International Finance Cooperation
national Monetary Fund
Organization( F U N D ) I n t e r n a t i o n a l Civil Aviation(ICAO); International Postal Union

International.Telecommunication
Organization(IFC); Inter­(UPU);(ITU);. World Meterological(WMO).^1

Saudi Arabia supports the United Nations and isloyal to its Charter.

In Saudi Arabia is an office be­longing to the United Nations and a representative fromthe United Nations.
Saudi Arabia is in the bloc of cooperation with
the Arab and Islamic countries, and in the Afro-Asianb l o c , and stresses the principles of Bandung„

Saudi

Arabia proposed many questions concerning Algeria, Tunisia,
M orocco, Syria, Lebanon, Oman, Southern Arabia, Suez
crises and the problem of Buriami.

Saudi Arabia works

with the Arab States and the Afro-Asian nations.

On

July 20, 1960, 25 Afro-Asian nations had requested thatthe question of Algeria be included in the agends of theFifteenth Session of the General Assembly.

The Saudi Arabia

representative said that he was authorized by the pro- 'visional Government of Algeria to state on its behalf that
it would accept, the result of a free Plebiscite organizedby the United Nations.^^ U n i t e d Nations, General Assembly, No. 341-343,
1957-1961, pp. 26-27.
^ U n i t e d Nations, U.N. Review, V. 31, pp. 40-41.

Saudi 'Arabia also had requested consideration of
the question of Buriami.

.In the Yemeni problem the United

Nations', peace observers came to watch,the borders between
the Yemen and Saudi Arabia,.as we shall see.
. Saudi Arabia's attitude to the'right of veto was
one of being strongly against it... It believed that thea,'right of veto would lead to trouble.
the United Nations'

Saudi delegates tosession in 1945 discussed this with theAmericans chiefly concerned who had invited the Saudis
for a discussion of it.^lSaudi - Egypt - Yemeni Relations
Saudi Arabian - Egyptian Mutual Defence Pact.

On

October 27, 1955, Saudi Arabia and Egypt signed a treaty
for defence.

By the terms of this Treaty they would affirm

security and peace, and settle all their international
differences by peaceful methods.

Any armed attack on the

territory or forces of one of them was to be considered as
an attack on them both.

They would establish a Supreme

Council.64
Military Pact between Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Republic and the Yemen in 19 5 6 .

^G.

The Governments of

DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, p. 153.

64]y[. Khalil, The Arab States and the"Arab League,
1960, V. II, p. 242.

.Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen in order to strengthen
the Arab League Charter and tighten military cooperation,
eager to maintain independence of their countries, and topreserve their security, as stated in' Article 1.

Accordingto Article 2, they will settle all international disputes
by peaceful m e a n s „These States consider any armed aggressionzT Ccommitted against- any State as against them all.
They have decided to set up a higher council, a
Military Council, and a Joint Command as stated in Article
5.
The Government of Egypt depended on the terms ofthis Treaty and went to the Republic of Yemen after arevolution broke out there.

The Treaty of Solidarity

between Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and the United Arab
Republic was signed on January 19, 1957.
This Treaty contained five main articles and four
supplementary articles.

The terms of this -Treaty con­cerned the aid of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia to Jordan.
The total amount is 12,500,000 pounds.

Saudi Arabia

paid the first amount and none of the other two States
paid.

Therefore, Saudi Arabia ended it a l s o .

was instead of the British aid to Jordan.

65ibid., pp. 250-252.

This amount68
Yemeni Question
In 1962 the old Imam of Yemen was d e a d ,week a coup-d’etat took place in S a n a .

After aSallal declaredthat Yemen become a republic and that the new Imam Mohamed
A l-Badr, son and heir to the previous Imam had been killed.
The republican leader asked the Egyptians for a
military aid who had already arrived before the revolt
broke o u t .
Egypt recognized immediately the new regime andwas followed by some other Arab Republic States and a num­
ber of Western countries.

The Imam Al-Badr was not killed.

He succeeded in escaping to the Saudi borders.
tribal followers.

He gained

This encouraged his family and mountaininhabitants to resist the new regime.
A month before the revolt in Yemen, Saudi Arabia
and Jordan concluded an agreement for "coordination offoreign policy", as well as close militaryc o o p e r a t i o n . ^Sana and Cairo Radios claimed attacks on the northby the Saudis and Jordanians but Jordan and Saudi Arabia
denied these stories by way of King Hussein and King Saud
who as foreign correspondents penetrated about five miles
into Yemeni territory and established the following facts;!
GGg. DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, pp. 110-114.

69(1) In no quarter of Saudi Arabia is there any zest fora military against Yemeni revolution.,(2) An aircraft

piloted it seems by Egyptians, scattered bombs in open
country around Saudi Arabia.^7(3) Prince Faisal answeredquestions about the subject of possible Saudi assistanceto the- Imam.

Faisal said,"Saudi help for the Imam depends

on a request from the Imam."68

The Saudis and Jordanians

are giving the Imam some limited logistical support, but
in the main, m o n e y , food and some ammunition are being
given.
DeGaury described the situation as follows:
In December, 1962, there were attacks from theair on Saudi frontier posts and on the last dayof the year there began a series of attacks by
Ilyushin bombers on the Saudi towns of Najranand on the coastal area town of Jizan.
Faisalordered general mobilization. -He announced
that Saudi conditions for ending the conflict
were withdrawal of all foreign armed forces fromthe Yemen and that all direct and indirect assist­ance was to stop.
After that the Yemenis were
to be left to determine the Government they
wished to have by themselves even if it were a
republic.G9
The Saudi Government's, attitude concerning the
problem was that it had strong relations and ties which^ T h e Economist, "King Saud and the Waves", 1962,
V. CCXIII, No. 6384, p. 670.
58ibid., p. 673.
8^G. DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, p. 116.

bind the two S t a t e s K i n g Faisal said:"We did not inter­fere hoping, that the people of yemen would, be left alone todetermine their fate .

You know the Imam is still alive...

there is a treaty between this country and the Government of
His Majesty.„.we supported the l a w f u l .Government ofY e m e n . ^0

The Prime Minister of the .United Arab. Republicstated to the National Assembly, ."In. accordance with ourprinciple of supporting Arab people we sided with the
Yemeni revolution until it realized its aims."

71

Three

Egyptian warships were at Hodida as well as troops.

The

United Arab Republic has come to the aid of the Yemeni
Republic with pilots and commando u n i t s .
RecognitionThe

by the UnitedStates and Russia's Support

Yemeni Republic is also locked in a struggle

with the Red Chinese who are sharply extending their in­fluence in the Yemeni Republic.
$45 million

in aid, 3,300.the Republican Government

Already Peking has sent .

Chinese technicians to work forand is training 800 students.

70Ibid., p. 162.
7•'•The ■Economist, "Peace Push" , 1965/ V. CCXVIII,
No. 6385, p. 1194.

71
Russia gaye moral support to the Republican sidein the United Nations.

Russia charged the United Kingdom

with interference in Yemenia f f a i r s ,^2

On December 19, 1962, the United States accorded
recognition to the Yemeni Republic,

On September 21, 1962,

on the eve of the Yemeni revolution the Egyptian paper
A l-Ahram published the text of letters exchanged byPresidents Kennedy and Nasser, QiIn November, President
Kennedy wrote to Nasser, Sallal and Kings Saud and Hussein,offering his good offices towards a settlement..

His aimwas to establish some guarantee of non-interference by
one State in the affairs of another,73

He proposed that

Hussein should withdraw from the problem and Saudi Arabia
should withdraw its support to the royalists.

However,what the United States sought from the recognition w a s •not achieved because Nasser did increase the troops,
units and tanks.
The United States’ Mediation
King Faisal talked in his speech at Tiaf on
September 5, 1963 about American mediation to put an end
to the Yemeni tragedy and Saudi Arabia accepted the72gnited Nations, Year B o o k , 1965, p. 164 .
7 3 h . Ingrams, .The Yemen' History, 1963, p. 141, .

72
mediation*

He said;

The agreement, which was to he fulfilled inletter and spirit provided for the following:(1) Saudi Arabia would stop its aid. to theroyalists and prevent royalists leaders fromusing Saudi territory as a base for their fightin Yemen.
(2) The United Arab Republic would
simultaneously withdraw its troops from Yemen
in stages as soon as possible.
At the same timethe Egyptian forces were to stop all military. activity in the battlefield.
(3) The United
Arab Republic was to stop all attacks on the
territory of Saudi Arabia.
(4). The setting up
of a demilitarized zone, extending 20 kilo­
meters on either side of the Yemeni-Saudi
borders where no armed forces or military equip­
ment would be allowed to enter.
(5) The stationingof neutral observers on both sides of the frontiersin the demilitarized zone to carry out patrols• outside of the zone in order to ascertain that
Saudi Arabia aid had stopped and that the United
Arab Republic's forces were being evacuatedthrough the ports and airports of Yemen.
(6)
Cooperation of both Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Republic with any mediator acceptable toboth sides with a view to reaching an agreementon the disengagement.74
President Kennedy's representative, Mr. Bunker,
came to Saudi Arabia, before this agreement was reached.
After the agreement was concluded, it was communicatedby the Americans to the United Nations and was adopted
by it.
The United Nations' Observers.
Oh April 29, 1963, the United Nations reported that
the Yemeni Republic, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab

74 g . DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, pp. 172-173.

73
Republic were concerned with the situation in Yemen whichmight threaten the peace of the Middle East.

The United

Nations sent Mr. R. Bunch and he visited Saudi Arabia,
Sallal, and Nasser.

Riyadh agreed to stop supplying theroyalist side with weapons and money.

In further reports

on May 27, 1963, the basis of information provided by
Von Horn, the Chief Military Observer, was that the United
Nations' observers along the border of Saudi Arabia andthe Yemen were very necessary and that this required not
more than 200 men.

The United Nations'observers stayed

for four months and after that they left because the United
Arab Republic stopped financing them.

That the United Arab

Republic and Saudi Arabia are still seeking peace with honour
is not doubted.

The seeking of peace brought Nasser to

Jiddah and he desired to end the civil war in Yemen.

King

Faisal also wants to see 50,000 Egyptian troops in Yemen .
removed from Arabia.

•

Peace Agreement at Jiddah and Harad Conference
Both leaders had good reason to stop the Yemeni
conflict.

The result of these two desires was the signingof a cease fire agreement in Jiddah in 1964.and thisagreement contains three points:(1).It provides forwithdrawal of all Egyptian troops from Yemen within
thirteen months.

(2) It also envisages, the establishmentof a 50-man council, including both royalist and republicans.

74
which will govern Yemen during the next 15 months todetermine what type of government will run the Yemen,(3) These provisions are set forth assuming the cease
fire sticks..

(Two previous efforts to end the fighting

came to naught.)75
Nasser was willing to let Yemenis themselves choose
their own government.

I think Nasser realized later that

there should be peace in Yemen in order that he might face
the internal problems in the United Arab Republic; likewise
King Faisal thought the Yemenis should determine their
future.

'The United Nations, Arab League and most world

countries hoped that the Harad Conference for peace talks
would succeed

As a result of the peace agreement at

Jiddah, the Harad Conference opened in December, 1964, whereroyalist and republican delegations met to work out whatsort of government should run the country for the nextyear.

King Faisal wanted the 60,000 Egyptian troops outof Yemen because he believed in the right of self determin­
ation for the nations.
It is hard for both sides to agree because they
have been fighting for five y e a r s . . The republican side
did not suggest at the Harad Conference returning to

75yewsWeek,
No. 16, p. 29.

"Death of a Dream", 1965, V. LXVI,

75
pre-revolution d a y s .

After.many weeks of meetings it

stopped and joined with.Nasser and Faisal to exchange thedifferent opinions.

The republican Yemenis suggested theHarad Conference broke down because the Jiddah agreement
left out some key points. . King Faisal declared that,"The Harad Conference was swaying between success andfailure."Extra!

Extra!
After I wrote all these pages I read this declarationin Al-Ahraru, an Egyptian newspaper, of May, 1966.

Nassersaid in his speech in a public meeting that:" We still support the Yemeni revolution.
Wewill not accept the offer to leave Yemen before
we are sure that the revolution will be successful.
We will attack Jizan and Najran.
If a soldiercomes from Saudi Arabia, we shall be in Yemen. more than'20 years from now.
If Faisal estab­lished an airport near the borders and bought
12 airplanes from England w e .shall destroy themin five minutes.
We consider the Yemeni revo­
lution our revolution and all Arabs' revolution.
' We easily could separate Jizan' and Najran from
Saudi Arabia because they belonged to Yemen inpast history.
We consider the peace agreement
no longer effective because Faisal broke it, andthat the Harad Conference failed.
King Hussein had recognized the republican side
as.we mentioned.

Later he paid a State visit to Saudi

Arabia and declared;"We will never recognize the bloody

baths in Yemen and we will never accept the worst situation

76

in Yem e n . ^King Faisal said;"We will never accept a

mediation in the Yemeni problem - because there was a. Kuwaiti attempt to solve this question - till the Egyptian
troops withdraw from Y e m e n . T h e r e f o r e ,the Jiddah

Peace. Agreement ceased to be effective and the Harad
Conference also was broken.
Khartum Agreement, 1967
The United Arab Republic put before the meeting of. the foreign ministers in the Arab League points for peacein Yemen.
In the Arab Summit Conference on August 29 September 1, 1967, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Republic concluded the following agreement:no1. Establishment of the Triad Committee tosupervise the carrying out "of the agreement.
The United Arab Republic would choose an ArabState.
Saudi Arabia also would choose a Stateand the Foreign Arab Minister's Conference
would choose a third State, or the two countries
together would choose the third,
2. The Committee would sponsor a plan for
the withdrawal of the United Arab Republic's troops
from Yemen and enforce it.

' ^ T h e Ministry of Information, News from Saudi
Arabia, V. Ill, No. 138, 1966, p. 4.
^ I b i d . , p. 3.
^Al-Medina,
1967, NO. 1049.

Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, September 1,

773.
Saudi Arabia would stop the military
aid to all the Yemenis.
4» The Committee would be an intermediary
until the Yemenis could establish the peaceand stability following the desire of the country
for the complete independence and integrity.
5.
The Committee will consult Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Republic in all the difficulties
which would meet the Committee, until it would
reach an agreement which would satisfy all theparties.
Saudi Arabia chose Morocco as its representative;
the United Arab Republic chose Iraq and both Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Republic agreed that the third State
would be the Sudan.

The Committee started its work.

In

September it called for a National Conference for the
Yemeni parties to reach an agreement among themselves
and :to solve their internal problem.
announced that;

The Committee"It realized that all parties agreed

on a cease fire and a permanent peace in Yemeni land."A l -Madina, a newspaper in Saudi Arabia reported:
The Cairo newspaper Al -Ahram said on September
26, 1967, that the United Arab Republic had
started withdrawing its troops from Yemen ac­
cording to Article 2 of the Agreement in AlKhartum and Saudi Arabia announced that it
stopped all aid to the Yemenis.
The United
Arab Republic's troops decreased by half ofwhat it was at the beginning of this year, 1967.
There were until now four attempts tosolve the Yemeni question and to establish
peace and stability and to secure the inde­
pendence.
The Yemen has continued for five

years in civil w a r . The Egyptian army andeconomy has suffered heavily.
The United Arab
Republic lost money which it needed for internal
projects and foreign debts.
The attempts whichwere made to solve the question are the following
1. When the United States recognized theRepublic in 1962/ it believed that it: had secured
in exchange the withdrawal of the Egyptianarmy.
Nasser failed to withdraw.
2. The second attempt was made in 1963 by
the United Nations’ Secretary General who ob­tained promises from Nasser and Saud that theyfirst begin withdrawal,
Saud complied but
Nasser did not.
The United Nations’ Supervisor
resigned and the Secretary General gave up.
3, The third attempt was made, the Jiddah
Peace Agreement, in September, 1964.
It wasto cease fire, withdrawal of the Egyptian
troops, and establishment of council from bothsides, but this also failed.
4,
The fourth attempt was made, the Khartum
Agreement in September, 1967, and the establish­
ment of the Triad States Committee to supervise
the Egyptian withdrawal and to find a peacefulsolution to t h e p r o b l e m , "78a78ajbid,, September 27, 1967, No. 1071,

CHAPTER VI
SAUDI RELATIONS WITH THE TWO BLOCS.
Saudi Relations with the Western Bloc
Saudi - British Relations in the 19th Century
England considered the route to India as vitalto its security.

The British officials looked to the

Persian Gulf as an area in which no foreign powers had
the right to establish footholds.

They wanted it to beopen to the British commerce and maritime interests,
and to be kept out of foreign threats.

This led them todraw more attention to the Arabian Principalities in the
Persian Gulf and later to interfere in quarrels among•them.

As a result of a commercial and religious war the

first attack on a British ship was in 1797.
Britain signed a treaty on October 12, 1798, withImam of Musqat.

It was a defensive measure against

Napoleon's expedition.

By the terms of this treaty, afriendship between Britain and Musqat had been founded.
Musqat would not give the French and Dutch an opportunity
to seat themselves in Musqat.

It prevented a French

vessel from entering into water at Musqat.

In case of

hostilities between the French and the British ships,
79

,

80
Masqat by land and by sea and by the people should takepart in the hostility with the English.

Masqat gave

permission to the British to establish a factory and tomount

g u n s .

79

Baud the Great, 1803-1814, showed special interestsin the Persian G u l f .

The Wahhabis interfered in the

Islands of Qatar, Bahrain and Trucal Oman.

The local

rulers were, allied against the Wahhabis in 1808, but the
Wahhabis won victory over them so the allies appealed to
the British maritime leaders in the coast.
put a ruler on the Island of Bahrain..

The Wahhabis

The local Princes

appealed to the British navy, the Iranian officials andthe ruler of Masqat who helped them with British aid.
The Wahhabi Empire reached its zenith in 1811
but it started to collapse after the Egyptian campaign
reached Uiriyah in 1818.
Winder described the British^attitude to the
Egyptian expedition as follows;
The British in India welcomed Ibrahim's progresswith open arms.
At least they reasoned a new
power would not have the predatory habits of
the Wahhabis... if the British sea power in the

79j. c. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near East•and Middle East, 1956, V. I, pp.. 64-65.

81
Gulf could combine with Ibrahim's land afmies,
a crushing blow could be struck against thepirates.80
The British Government sent a mission to search
for an alliance with Ibrahim and offered aid to reduce
the Wahhabi power completely but the mission came to
failure.
The Wahhabis controlled Oawasim tribesmen andencouraged their activities in the coastal area and attacked
the British ships,

Britain took action and by its alliancewith the Imam of Musgat drew a treaty on January 8, 1820,
for the suppressing of piracy and slave traffic and forced
all the Sheiks to respect the conditions of the treaty.
The treaty contained 11 articles.

By the terms of Article

1, "There shall be a cessation of plunder and piracy byland and sea on the port of the Arabs."

According to

Article 4, "The pacificated tribes shall all continue intheir former relations..,they shall be at peace with the
British Government, and shall not fight with each other."
Article 9 stated,"The carrying off of slaves from thecoasts of Africa or elsewhere and the transporting of themin vessels, is plunder and piracy, and the friendly Arabs
shall do nothing of this nature."81. 8Or . b . Winder, Saudi Arabia in the 19th Century,
1965, p. 140.

81j. c." Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near East andMiddle East, 1956, V. I, p. 89.

82

In 1821, Ibrahim, Basha was still in Oiryaih.

Inthis year an Ottoman campaign under the command, of HusseinBek occupied Riyadh and arrested many Saudi Princes.
Turki Ibn-Abdullah escaped but he returned in 1823 andsucceeded in regaining the throne„•
Delegates from Oman came and asked Turki to appoint
for them a ruler and judge and the division of army.
1829 he occupied Al-'Hasa.

In

Turki, after he had reached hishighest position in the Persian G u l f , made direct diplomatic
contact with the British.
in 1831.

He asked for friendly relations

The reply in general friendly terms was trans-.

mitted through the resident in the Persian Gulf as
follows:
Your communication has reached me and given
me gratification....Your disposition to a friendly
understanding is met with reciprocal feeling andthe terms of amity which existed between thisGovernment and Imam Baud will still remain inforce.82
The Imam’s sovereign extended over the coastal
area either under his direct rule or tributary status.
. Faisal Ibn-Turki renewed the old treaty with
the British Government in 1843.

The British resident

82 r „ b . Winder, Saudi Arabia in the 19th
Century, 1965, pp. 82-83.

in Bushir visited Riyadh in 1865 and renewed the oldtreaties though hot by an actual written

d

o

c

u

m

e

n

t

,

^3

Saudi - British Relations 1906-1950's
Sir Per Cox sent a cable on September 16, 1906,
to theBritish Government

in India clearing the privilege

if theBritish Government

put a fixed policy toward Ibn-

Saud.
1. To ignore Ibn-Saud's offer to sign atreaty might lead him to be our enemy.
2.
If we make our friendship with Ibn-Saudthis would help us tomaintain a friendshipwith the Imam of Musgat and other local .rulers.
3. Our help to Ibn-Saud would stop the
piracy in the Persian Gulf.
4.
It appeared very clear that the Turkishinterference in the central Arabian affairs would
lead ultimately to a uniting of all tribes under
Ibn-Saud;.if we did not help them they willseek the assistance from the others. .
However, the British Government in India rejected Per
C o x ’s suggestions because they thought that thiswould lead to direct involvement in the Arabs'
affairs.^
Ibn-Saud sent a letter in October, 1906, to
the Sheik of Qatar.

He asked him to sign a treaty with

83g_ DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, p. 13.
^ h . W a h b a , The Island of the Arabs in the20th Century, 1956, p. 245.

84
the British.

The letter was transferred, to Sir Per C o x .

Ibn-Saud suggested in his message to retake Al-Hasa, tohelp Ibn-Saud by its revenue and to establish the orderand discipline inbetween the tribes so he would suggest
signing a secret treaty with the British and it would be
responsible for protecting .the.coastal area from any
Turkish attack; in return he would establish some kind of
diplomatic relations.^
On November 9, 1907, the British Government inIndia asked Sir Per Cox's thoughts of how to reply to
Ibn-Saud and also asked the British Ambassador in Istanbul.
He advised leaving the whole problem alone and warned
them from the interference in Arabia's affairs.^^
In 1911 Ibn-Saud met Shakespear and discussedwith him his plan to retake Al-Hasa; however, Shakespear
warned him that the British would assume its responsibility
to protect its.allies.

In 1912 Ibn-Saud received news of

the war breaking out in the Balkans.

The Turks were sobusy in the Turco-Bulgarian war that Ibn-Saud took AlHasa in 1913.

Before he was engaged in this expedition,

Ibn-Saud first secured the British support.

85%bid., p. 246.
86Ibid. ,. p. 247,

Siiakespeair reached Riyadh in March,. 1914,

He wasthe British political agent in Kuwait, . He was told byhis .Government to j o i n ,Ibn^Saud> to remain with him, toencourage the Arabs to defeat the pro-Turkish forces andto prevent any arms and supplies to the Turks through the.
desert, to promote the Arab ideas of a rising against theTurks and above all tor e p o r t .

87. At this time hostilities broke out between the
pro-Turkish Ibn-Rashid and Ibn-Saud.

The latter went ina campaign against Ibn-Rashid, accompanied by Shakespear
who was killed in the battle.
In 1913 the Ottoman Empire and the British Government
signed a treaty dividing Arabia between them by fixed lines
from Qatar across the desert to meet the boundary between
Aden and Yemen.

North of the line is Turkish territory,

including Al-Hasa and Najd and south of the line is,therefore, a British territory.
Historian J. B. Philby said:"Whether the Turksthen had hopes of .the recovery of Al-Hasa with the British
help or approval, or whether they were activated by motivesof spite against Ibn-Saud or whether the Turkish envy acted
from some more sordid motive we shall never k n o w ."8887 g . DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, p. 17.
^J.

B. Philby, Saudi A r a b i a , 1955, pp. 270-271.,

86World War I broke out before the terms of theTreaty were put into effect.

Britain and the Ottoman

Empire were involved in the war so both sides tried to
win Ibn-Saud to their side.
British.

Ibn-Saud.sided with the

He arranged an expedition against Ibn-Rashid.
The British, especially Sir Per Cox, thought thatthe time was suitable to find a firm.base for their policy
with Ibn-Saud.

Sir Per Cox said that the British motives

were pushed by their position.

Their left flank was indanger because of the Bedouins'

attack; also theirnegotiation with Hussain was successful and they knewthat Ibn-Saud might put some difficulties before the
Sharif's plan.

Sir Per Cox met Ibn-Saud on December 26,

1915, and signed the following t r e a t y : ^Treaty of 1915.
1915.

Britain signed this Treaty in

They purchased Ibn-Saud's neutrality at 5,000

pounds of sterling a month.

The British Government ac­

knowledged and admitted that Najd, Al-Hasa, Qatif, andJubail and their Dependencies and Territories were thecountries of Ibn-Saud.

According to Article 2, in the ■event of aggression by any foreign.power, the British
Government, after consulting Ibn-Saud, may act considering
what is most effective for protecting his interests and^ H . W a h h a , 'The Island of the Arabs in the 20th
Century, 1956, p. 248,

■countries.

87

According' to Article' 3, Ibn-Saud promised torefrain from entering into any correspondence/ agreement
or treaty with any foreign nation.^0

This Treaty, con­taining seven articles, continued for 12 years.
Saudi-Hijazi-British relations.

Britain, at thistime,- was negotiating with the Sharif of Mecca about therevolt against the Turks.
this negotiation.

Ibn-Saud did not know about

The Sharif of.Mecca, Hussein Ibn-Ali,declared himself the King of the Arabs and revolted against
the Ottoman Empire.

In 1916, Hussein sent 5,000 pounds

sterling to Ibn-Saud.

He repeated these payments manytimes.

Ibn-Saud knew it meant that he would be his vassal.

Ibn-Saud sent the following message to the Sharif:
Father:We and you are in this war.

"My

Its fruits are forus; our troops have been sent to assist .you, but I wanted
more than this.

I am willing to send you One of my brothers

or my sons, to fight with your sons and in this war would-

be the great victory."^"*"The Sharif of Mecca sent the following reply:"Maybe you are mad or drunken.

You don't know why werevolt or for what purpose we s e e k . " ^^ J . C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near East andMiddle Ea s t , 1956, V. II, pp. 17-18.
,
91S . Hathlul, History, of the Kings of A l -Saud,
1961, p. 116.
/ 92Ibid., pp. 111-112.

'

88

Ibn-Saud wrote to the British political agent
in Iraq asking for an immediate meeting..

After Sir Per Cox

read the Sharif's message he assured.Ibn-Saud of his
independence and asked his assurance not to fight the
Sharif.
(1)

Ibn-Saud promised him upon two conditions:That the Sharif would not.interfere in the Najdi

affairs; and(2) not to speak in the name of all the Arabs

and not to claim himself the King of the A r a b s .
When Ibn-Saud was in Iraq he visited Al-Basrah
and saw the modern weapons of the w a r .

In this meeting

the British asked Ibn-Saud to fight Ibn-Rashid and promised
him help because the latter started to threaten the A r a b s 'troops which worked with the British.

The British foundthat the Arabs' revolt was very helpful.

In this time

many British delegates visited both leaders as mediators
but all the efforts failed.
In 1917, Mr. Hogarth, and Ronald Stuzor arrived
at Jiddah.

They were sent by the British political agent

in Cairo.

However, the Sharif refused;to allow them to

go to N a j d . . So other delegates came from Bahrain.

The

problem which concerned the British in this time was toGOconfiscate the supplies which were sent.to the Turks.

93Ibid., pp. 112-113.

89
In 1920f the British Government reduced the subsidyof Ibn-Saud,It also informed Ibn^Sa'ud that King Husseinoffered to meet h i m .

The British Government sent a mission

to Al-Hasa to meet Ibn-Saud.

He met with political agentsand the- result of the interview was the, following:(1) Ibn-

Saud claimed very earnestly and with., some warmth that the
British were making his position most difficult by lackof support.

(2) He complained that the apparent supportof claims of King Hussein to Syria had aroused much re­sentment in N a j d . ^Ibn-Saud considered that such a meeting with the
Sharif was quite impossible.

He also charged the Sharif

with wanting to utilize the Syria Jihad* in order toreinstate himself in the eyes of the Muslim world and at
the same time to discredit him.

Therefore , he earnestly

urged as a vital necessity that the following action betaken to restore confidence and to prove to the people of
Najd that he had not trusted Great Britain in vain.
1.
His Majesty's Government to guarantee
at once in writing the maintainence of theexisting status quo on the frontiers.

^^United Kingdom, Documents on British Foreign
Policy, First Series, V. XIII, p. 216.
*Jihad means the Holy War.

2, His Majesty's. Government to guaranteethat the gharif refrain from aggressive policy.
3. The Mecca and Medina pilgrimage is tobe opened to people of Najd.
The Civil Commissioner said he regarded Ibn-Saud as by far
the strongest man.in Arabia at present.and as able tomaintain his position and authority whether or not hereceived assistance-. ^The foreign office of the.United Kingdom decided
in 1920 to make a decision on the whole question of thepolitical and financial obligations to be incurred in the
future by the United Kingdom Government.in Arabia.

The

office gave a geographical definition and divided Arabia
into ten areas as follows:

Najd, Hail, Kuwait, Bahrain,

Muscat, Trucial Coast, Hadramaut, Yemen, Asir, and Anazah.
The British Government was already in treaty relations withall the ten areas except the Anazah/ Hail and Yemen.
Ibn-Saud was at this time in receipt of a subsidyof 5,000 pounds a month.

He also received recently an

additional present of 5,000 pounds as a mark of appreciationfrom the United Kingdom for having restrained his followers
from making the pilgrimage.

The high commissioner at

Baghdad suggested that his subsidy should be increased to
100,000 pounds a year paid quarterly.

. 95Ibid., p. 217. .

'91
Ibn-Saud increased his power and occupied the Jable
Shammer and the Hijaz,

He started from here to contact,

on a wide scale/ foreign countries in the Islamic world.
Before the fall of Medina and. Jiddah the British
political agent later in Iraq, arrived in the Hijaz tonegotiate w i t h ,Ibn-Saud.

Britain recognized him as theindependent-King of the Hijaz, Najd and its Dependencies.
Also it welcomed his application for buying weapons andsigned the following treaty:.
Treaty of Jiddah, 192 7 . • This Treaty recognized
Ibn-Saud.

According to Article 1, "His Britannic Majesty

recognizes the complete and absolute independence of thedominions of His Majesty the King of the Hijaz and Najd
and its Dependencies."
According to Article 8, the Treaty could be amended
automatically to prolong the agreement for seven years.
This Treaty still continues in effect.

In Article 6, itis stated that Ibn-Saud would undertake to maintain friendly
and peaceful relations with Kuwait and Bahrain, Qatar andOman.

Between 1927 and 1945 there were two important

events in the Saudi-British relations:desert, and(1) Riot in the(2) meeting between Ibn-Saud and Churchill.

Riot in the desert.

Ibn-Saud had faced! a serious

problem between 1928-1930 from the Ikhawan, the nomadic
tribes who settle on the land and build mud houses instead92of tents,

The' first ■project to settle the .nomadic tribes

started in 1911-1930 and spread rapidly.

.These Ikhwans

were fanatical and literally followed the Sharia.

They

put many difficulties before Ibn-Saud for the modernizationin Saudi Arabia.

They protested and resisted, the using of

the telephone and o t h e r 'modern inventions.
held a meeting in 1926,
for the following:

The Ikhwans

They protested against Ibn-Saud(1) sending his son, Saud, to Egypt;(2) sending his son Faisal to England - the "infidels";(3) the usage of the telephone and telegraph;collection of taxes;(4) the(5) the tolerant policy to the tribesof Iraq and Jordan to graze in the l a n d .of Najd;
prevention of the trade with Kuwait(6) his(If they are infidels

they should fight them; if not, Ibn-Saud should stop theboycott.);(7) his tolerant policy and. his silence to theShiit people of Al-Hasa(He should force them to e n t e r •theSunit School or they should be fought.).
When this meeting was. held, Ibn-Saud was in the
Hijaz.

He came in a hurry to Najd and held a conference.

After this conference the religious leaders issued a Fatwa
explaining the religious view and gave Ibn-Saud the fullpower and the right to act according to the religious
law, the right to collect taxes, to invite the Shiit,
kindly, to adopt the Sunit School, and to prevent the
Mohamal testimony.

Also the King could use the telephone

93
and the telegraph,’ Therefore,
for the rebellion.

Ibn-Saud removed the causes

The leader of this revolt was Faisal

Ad-bwaysh.

He put another diplomatic, difficulty before

Ibn-Saud,

He raided’,, with his followers, the Iraqi

frontiers and killed many soldiers a n d .civilians,
he raided Kuwait and Jordan in 1927-1928.

Also

British planes

bombed the tribes’- and the followers of Ad-Dwaysh but IbnSaud pursuaded the British to stop fighting Ad-Dwaysh.
He arranged with the Iraqi Government for a meeting with
the British,

The. British, Iraqi delegates and the Saudi

King met but the conference failed, and the revolt con­tinued. 97.
Ad-Dwaysh sent two messages.

The first was to theKing of Iraq and the second message was. to the Administrative‘inspector of southern Iraq, Mr. Glob.

Ad-Dwaysh told theKing of Iraq that he revolted against Ibn-Saud but the
British airplanes forced him to leave Iraq.

He asked His

Majesty to stop the British airplanes from fighting him
or to advise him on what the King of Iraq would want him
to do.

Ad-Dwaysh asked Mr, Glob to give him a British

nationality.98

97s. Hathlul, History.of the Kings of Al-Saud,
1961, pp. 185-191.
98ibid.

94

J, B . Philby stated;"He ^ Ad-Dwaysh - surrendered

to the British/ unwilling to. face his own sovereign, andKing Faisal of Iraq, inclined to accord him refuge in
Iraq, perhaps iri the hope of using him some day against
Ibn-Saud,"
Kuwait.

Ibn-Saud heard that Ad-Dwaysh had entered

He sent a cable to the British political agent

in Iraq which said;"The British Government has secured

to the Saudi Government not to accept the rebellions in
Iraq, Kuwait and Jordan, and now they are in Kuwait.

I

request that the British should kick them out of Kuwait
or allow our troops to follow them and to capture them."
Ibn-Saud received a reply saying that the British werearranging to kick the rebellions our of Kuwait.
British imprisoned them in a ship.

The

Ibn-Saud sent a cableasking the British to hand the criminals over to him.
The British replied to him asking him to. arrange for ameeting to discuss the rebellions and to sign a t r e a t y . ^Khabar and Wadh'a Conference.

The negotiations

between Ibn-Saud and the British started a year before
for the handling of the rebellionsi •• On January 19, 1930,
the British Government delegated the Chief of the Consuls
in the Persian G u l f , the Consul in Kuwait and the Chief
Commander of the British aircrafts in Iraq.

The Saudi

99j o b . Philby, Saudi A r a b i a , 1955, p. 264.

95
delegates were Habiz Wahba and Yousif Yasin.

The Con­ference, held for two weeks, ended by a treaty.

The

British Government agreed to hand.Ad-Dwaysh. to Ibn-Saudbut they insisted on the saving of his life.

In return,the Saudi Government had to hand over all the. booty thatthe rebellion got from their raids in Iraq and Kuwait.-*-^
Cairo, February 1 7 , 1945.

The following is fromthe account of Churchill.
The Prime Minister acted as host to the Kingof Saudi Arabia, Ibn-Saud'.
The party included
the King's sons, and brother's, and his ministers - 'it may well be of interest, for Ibn-Saud is now
the master of the Arab World.
He was not in
the least overawed by his English visitor whose
Zionist sympathies were no doubt known to him.
After luncheon, presents were handed to our party
who had been graded into three classes.
Churchill made no promises.
He had been
concerned with the problem of Palestine on andoff ever since it began, and he knew only too
well that there was no solution which both
Jews and Arabs would willingly accept.
Probably
he only wanted to meet Ibn-Saud through curiosity,
as a statesman and warrior possessing a careerwhich was almost as long as his own, and in his
brief report of the meeting he did not mention
any political discussion a t a l l . ^ O l
Saudi - British dispute over Buraimi.

The Buraimi

oasis extends over an area of 35,000 square kilometers,
consisting of eight villages with a population of 25,000.

•*"^S. Hathlul, History of the Kings of, Al-Saud,
1961, p. 199.
...
. Haworth, The Des e r t .Ki n g , 1964, p. 257.

96

The oasis played very .important roles as a great
center of the Wahhabi movement.

The Wahhabi relations

with Buraimi started in the regime of Sand the Great.

Hesent a mission in 180.8 to Oman to teach them the Wahhabi
doctrine.

When the British sided with the Omans in thefighting, the Wahhabis used Buraimi as a base for theiroperation.

The Wahhabis did not stay long in the Buraimi.

In 1819 the Wahhabi control came, to an e n d .
The Wahhabis tried again to regain their control
over Buraimi in the second Saudi State,

Turki sent adivision of troops and they occupied, it.

Imam Faisal

Ibn-Turki, i n .1844, sent Abdullah Ibn-Battala with a troop
to center in the oasis.
The chief tribes asked the British for aid which
was turned down.

An agreement was reached between the

Wahhabis and the local leaders on a basis to pay tributeof $M.T.5000 annually to
The Wahhabis'

R

i

y

a

d

h

.

effective control in the oasis lasted

from 1853-1869 and was made possible for many reasons:
1.

Faisal Ibn-Turki got very strong in Arabia after

his return from captivity in Cairo.

He retook the throne

and extended his sovereignty in .Al-Ha.sa.

He. sent his

officials to collect taxes as symbols of his control.

p.- 69.

102J. B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, 1964,■■V b ■

97
2.

The

d e a t h .of his strong opponent in the Hijaz,

Mohamed Ibn-Aun the Sharif of Mecca facilitated his control.
3.
of theThe

final help came with the deposition from power

most steadfast opponents of the Wahhabis in south­

eastern Arabia.^03
In 1866 Abdullah Ibn-Faisal, who had succeeded
his father as Amir, signed a treaty on April 21 which
read:
1. The resident in the Persian Gulf would
become the medium of friendship between theAmir and the British Government.
2. The Imam assured the resident in the
Persian Gulf on the part of the Imam that hewould not oppose or injure British subjects
residing in territories under the authority of
the Imam.
3. The Imam assured the resident in the
Persian Gulf on the part of the Imam that hewould not injure or attack the territories of
the Arab tribes in alliance with the British
Government... further than in receiving the
Zakat religious taxes that have been customaryof old.104
The collection of the Zakat in the Sharia is asymbol of sovereignty because it is only collected fromthe subjects of the State and it is the main revenue inthe Islamic Sta t e „It is used for the defense, civilian

works, welfare and social security.. It carried political

103Ibid., p. 81.
IQ^Ibid., pp. 84-85, quoted from a collection oftreaties...related to India, II volumes, 1892, X, 116.

98

implications and the citizens admitted the suzerainty of
the State,

If we went back further' to the history of thefirst Islamic State in the time of Caliph Abu-Baker
successor of the prophet Mohamed

,

t

the

when the tribes rejected

paying the Zakatf Baker considered this, action as a denialof the suzerainty of the State,.The Saudi Government put

forth a legal argument in 1955 in support of the Saudi's
claim to the disputed areas.

It reads in p a r t :...a true tax, leviable only by a sovereignand due from the individual subject.
Zakat isnot a political tribute, nor is it a voluntary
gift to a solely religious leader....Zakat isthe chief general tax imposed on the Muslims;
on him who has the right to collect it rests
accordingly the duty to protect those who payit.
No collection, as has been said without• protection...and the preservation of public
security....^05
The Saudi evidence is the tax registers reproduced
in Volume III of the Saudi Memorial between 18 66 and 1909.
There was no conflict over Buraimi except when King IbnSaud, in 1905, paid a visit to the Abu-Dhabi where thetwo rulers h a d .met Sir Per Cox who warned Ibn-Saud that,"Any interference by him in the affairs of Trucial Oman
would not be welcomed by the British."-^6•*•^0". B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, 1964,
p. 293.. '
■
.
v
: r
106Ibid. , p. 104.

; V:vv::'' .
-v' '''' \99
Ibn-Saucl did not take any further, action.

The

Ottoman and the British signed a treaty fixing the frontiersin 1913.

After Ibn-'Saud captured Al~Hasa he had friendly

relations with the British.

Ibn-Saud was recognized by

the Port as Governor of Najd.
When World War 1 broke out in 1914, it did notaffect Ibn-Saud's position in Al-Hasa and the British
signed a treaty in 1915 with Ibn-Saud.

It recognized his

independence.
Ibn-Saud visited Buraimi occasionally between
1925 and 1929.

The local Amir collected Zakat, enforced

the regulations, and maintained order.
In 1947-1948,
many times.

Ibn-Saud sent out a survey company

Abu-Dhabi protested against this survey but

the Saudi Government replied to the British Government thatthe camp was in Saudi territory and in the area of tribes
owing allegiance to Saudi Arabia and issued a statement
explaining the frontier lines between Saudi Arabia, Qatar
and Abu-Dhabi.

A conference was held in 1952 discussing

the frontier questions between the Saudi and the British.
The next move was in July, 1952; a camp was set and Saudi
Arabia sent an Amir to the oasis accompanied by 40 soldiers.
There was going to be open war but by the United States

100
Ambassador's mediation, both sides reached an agreement•

for arbitration.
On July/ 30, 1954, the main points of it were thefollowing:
1.

Both sides would remain where they were pending

arbitration.
2.

There was to be a five-man tribunal of one Britain,

one Saudi and three neutrals - Pakistan, Cuba and Belgium.
3.

The committee is requested to decide;(a) thelocation of common frontiers between Saudi Arabia and AbuDhabi, and4.

(b) sovereignty in the area.

In conducting its proceeding it should regard allconsiderations; . (a) historical facts relating to therights of Saudi Arabia, (b) the traditional loyalties of
the inhabitants of the ar e a , (c) the tribal organization,and(d) the exercise of jurisdiction.
The committee met in Geneva in 1955 to arbitrate

the dispute.
On November 9, 1955, the Saudi Government suggested
that a neutral commission be appointed to supervise affairs
in the disputed area.

*See Appendix D for the text.

■:

107Ibid. , p.' 163.
108m . Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League,
1960, V. II, p. 686-689.

101
In November f Saudi Arabia put the case before theArab League,

The political committee announced its supportof the Saudi case and urged the British to withdraw its
troops and demand .a return to arbitration.
King Saud "charged the British Government withhaving withdrawn from the arbitration because they foundthat they had a losing case.

He declared that he would

continue to try to establish his right to the Buraimi
Oasis by diplomaticm e a n s .

The State Department was sympathetic toward theSaudi case and it took into account the world opinion andfeared Russian interference in the problem.

Russia showed

King Saud their support on the frontier issue in an offer
of material and moral help.
The United States regarded the British reoccupationof the Buraimi as an act of aggression.

"The dispute of

Buraimi has become an issue not only between the United
Kingdom and Saudi Arabia but also between the United Kingdom
and the United States,

The old Anglo-American rivalryfor oil rights within the area has again come to thefront. " H Ol °9T i m e ,V .

LXVI, No. 24, December 12, 1955.

ilOcouncil for Middle East Asia, Middle East
Affairs, 1956, V. 7, p. 63.'

X.n November, 1958, the Saudi Government claimed theterritory Of Kharal-Odaid which it said had been illegally
occupied by Abudbi military forces under the British command,
The British Government recognized Abudbi sovereignty over
the ar e a .
The Saudi Government protested to the United Nations
and published several thick volumes of a "Memorial” of its
case for Buraimi„

In 1958, Prince Faisal, now King, said

that "the diplomatic relations with Britain could beresumed if the British either accepted arbitration again
Or withdrew from Buraimi. " m

The latest development in

the dispute came in 1960 when the United Nations asked theSwedish Ambassador to Spain to arbitrate with a view topossible placement of a United Nations' force inO a s i s .

On -November 12, 1961, King Saud declared:
We have tried everything possible to settleby peaceful means the dispute that has beencreated by the British aggression against thatpart of our country, Buraimi.
However, in theevent that the Swedish Ambassador, the mediatorof the United Nations, fails in his present
efforts we will not hesitate to take all thesteps that we deem fit to recover this Arabpart of our country.

lllTime, V, LXXI, No, 17/ April 21, 1958.
112m . Spencer, Political Evaluation in the
Middle E a s t , 1962, p. 318.
113Tei-Aviv University, Middle East Record,
1961, V. II, p. 381.

103
Saudi

United States'.Relations

Economic Factor
Ibn-Saud was dependent on the pilgrimage.

"It

was the main source of his income and. the pilgrimage wasa sensitive meter of the world trade„

In 1930 and 1931,

the number who came was disastrously small.

As the Kingdom, ■new in size and administration, began to grow, it gained
a little in complexity."114

All the gold, that came in was

the King's personal property and all that was paid out
was his personal bounty.

The foreign, debts and the internal

debts were more insidious.

There were three persons whocame in contact with Ibn-Saud at this time.

The first one

was Philby, then Crane, and the third one was Twitchell.
By this stage of Saudi Arabian developments, the Americanmining engineer, Karl S. Twitchell, had begun to play amajor role in the opening of Saudi Arabia .to Western business»
King Ibn-Saud asked him to make water and mineral surveys.
"The King then enlisted Twitchell's services tointerest American and British capital in mineral developmentin Saudi Arabia.

Ibn-Saud found that Standard Oil of

California wished to apply for an oil concession in Saudi
Arabia,"115■^"^D. Haworth, The Desert King., 1964, p. 220.
A. DeNova, American Interests and Policies in
the Middle E a s t , 1963, p . 206.

104
The first oil concession granted by Ibn-gaud wasgiven to Southern California, in 1933,

There was a lively

competition among the American oil.men,.Twitchell was one,and representatives' of the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Ibn-

Saud decided in favor of the United States, because hebelieved Americans to be practical,. efficient, disinterested
politically, anti-imperialist, and.because they offered
immediate payment in gold.
This is what Ibn-Saud said.: . "I tell:you, Philby,
if anyone were to offer me a million pounds, he would be
welcome to all the concessions he wanted in my country.
In 1937, Ibn-Saud had received a very advantageousoffer from Japan, but believing it to be motivated bypolitical considerations, he rejected it.

Germany also

had designs on Saudi oil and in the same year Dr. Fritz,
German Minister to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, who was stationedin Baghdad, visited Jiddah.

Late in 1934 another step

was taken toward the development of the natural resourcesof the country by the creation of the Saudi Mining Syndicate
Incorporated in the Bahamas.

The Syndicate represented

British and American capital to undertake to exploit■various minerals•*■•^0:. Haworth, The Desert Ki n g , 1964, p. 223.
7G. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs,
1962,, p. 549.

105
Establishment o f ..diplomatic 'relations.

This Treaty,

signed November 7, 1933, between Saudi Arabia and the UnitedStates was signed in London by Hafiz Wahba, the Saudi
Minister in England a n d .the Minister of the United States
in England to establish diplomatic.and trade relations.
American interests and the number of American
citizens residing in Saudi Arabia had been increased.
State Department suggested

that the consulate staff andmission in Cairo should go

to Saudi Arabia to study thesituation.

This was in 1939.

The American Minister in

Egypt reported as follows:
1. American financial interests in Saudi
Arabia have recently materially increased.
2. The Americans'activity connected with
American interests in Saudi Arabia is now in­creased.
3. Other important countries are giving
increased attention to Saudi Arabia.
4.
Southern California Oil Company, on
May 31, obtained an exclusive concession for aperiod of 60 years covering practically all ofSaudi Arabia.
An initial cash payment in goldof $1,200,000 will be made to the King and anannual rental of $170/000 is to be paid until
oil is discovered.
The King told Mr. Lenahanthat the Japanese, working jointly with the
Italians and Germans, aided by the British
Minister, had each offered much larger sums forsmaller concessions.

H & M . A. Madi, Modern Renaissance.in Arabia
Saudi Arabia, 1952, pp. 369-372.

The

106
5.
The Kincf believes that the Japanese ,Italians and Germans have in mind additional
territory, as well as oil concessions...
6. The King feels that to grant the Petroleum
Development, Limited another concession would
be to give the British a further grip on his
country.
7. Mr. Lenahan believes it to be of theutmost importance to the Southern California
that a legation be established so that t h e .
interest of the country be safeguarded.

„

Mr. Rogers, the executive of Southern California
said;
The situation, should be treated by ourGovernment as a political problem.' and that therequired financial aid should be extended to
the King under the Lend-Lease.A c t „ We feltthat the United States of America should use
this opportunity of cementing friendships between Saudi Arabia and the United States by goingdirectly to the financial assistance of theKing.
Ibn-Saud obtained financial aid from Great Britain
and this aid increased from .1941 to 1945 to about $2,500;000.
These grants were supplemented by American Lend-Lease.
Airport.

American Joint Chiefs of Staff, reacheda decision to secure a'good airport in the Middle East.
The Americans wanted a secure airport in the Persian Gulfarea.

The choice fell on Dahran in Saudi Arabia.

ations were conducted in 1943.
in 1943.

Negoti­

The agreement was concluded

It p r o v i d e d .for three years.

Other steps forll^W. W i l l i a m s America and the Middle E a s t , 19 58,
pp. 45-48.

107
closer relations with the United States were t a k e n ,In1942, at the request of the K i n g , an American agricultural
mission arrived in Saudi Arab i a .

An American military

mission also came.
These closer relations prepared for a meeting
between King Tbn-Saud and the President of the UnitedStates in 1945 in Egy p t .

Ibn-Saud also met Churchill.

The two Heads of State talked over the Palestine problem.
This meeting was in February , 1945; and in March, 1945,
Saudi Arabia declared war on Germany and subsequently her
representatives took part in the United Nations Con­
ference at San

F

r

a

n

c

i

s

c

o

.

^^0

In April, President Roosevelt, referring to thememorable conversation which they had not so long a g o ,12 ]sent a letter to King Ibn-Saud.

After President Roosevelt died, the new Presidentof the United States, Harry S. Truman, exchanged letterswith Ibn-Saud concerning the Palestine problem.

In October,

1946, King Ibn-Saud said in his letter:Y o u , Roosevelt, expressed your hope that it would
be solved, and in which you expressed the readinessof the United. States to assist the displaced-*-20(3. LenczoWski, The Middle East in World Affairs,
1962, p. 533.
•^Ignited States, Department of State Bulletin,
1945, p. 623.

108
persons, among whom are J e w s / because it contra. diets previous promises' made by the United Statesand. statements made from the White House,
In reply to this, letter, Harry S. Truman said in
his letter:
The Government and the people of the UnitedStates have given support to the concept of a
Jewish National Home in Palestine.
The UnitedStates takes the position that these people should
be prepared for self-government a.nd also that a
National Home for the Jewish should be established
in Palestine.*122
The agreement between the Government of Saudi Arabia
and the Government of the United States concerning the
Dahran airport concluded on June 12, 1949.
In 1957, the United States was permitted to use
the airport, which remained under the complete authorityof the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia.

The Government of

Saudi Arabia announced, on March 16, 1960, that it would
not renew the 1957 agreement.
The Saudi spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, denied that the Dahran airport served as a militarybase for any foreign country.

*See Appendix E for the two letters.
122ynited States, Department of State Bulletin,
1957, V. 15, pp. 848-851.
123united States, United States Treaties and other
International Agreements, 1965, V. 2, Part 2, pp. 1474-1482.

109
The Saudi Government announced t h a t :"All that theAmerican Government has there is the right of passage forcertain aircraft and for the supply of oil, • It is not theseat of any military force, nor is. it a store for militaryarms.

The passage of arms and warlike material is not

permitted. "-*-24
The United States-Saudi .Arabian Mutual Def ense
Assistance Agreement.was signed,in 1951.

By the terms ofthis. Treaty, the Saudi Arabians were to. obtain militaryarms and equipment from the United States.. The UnitedStates would also make available adequate numbers ofqualified United States Army, Navy and Air Force personnel
to provide training in the use of equipment, as well as
for tactical training.

The United States-Saudi Arabian

Agreement on Cooperation w a s .in April, 1957.

This wasreached during the visit of King Saud to the United States.
Friendship relations.

In the Yemeni problem, as

we mentioned before,* John F. Kennedy sent letters** toNasser, Sallal, Kings Saud and Hussein offering his good
offices toward a settlement.. He suggested that Jordan
should withdraw from.the problem and Saudi Arabia should

DeGaury, Faisal, 196.7, p. 94 .
*See Chapter V, Yemeni Question.
**See the text in Appendix F.

110
withdraw their support to the Imam,.However,, the tension' increased after the Egyptian's, threat, to .attack Najran in
Saudi Arabia.

John F .. Kennedy.a n d .A m i r .Faisal exchanged

letters in 1963.*

The President of the United Statesassured Saudi Arabia as follows;1,
Saudi Arabia can rely upon the friendshipand cooperation of the United States in handlingvarious tasks confronting your country in the
future,2, The United States is firmly and deeply
concerned with the stability and progress of
Saudi Arabia,
3, You may be certain of the full support• of the United States in safe-guarding the entityof the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.
4,
I am well aware that to attain yourobjectives, you should enjoy peace - from withinor outside the country.
5,
I share your anxiety over the tension
now prevailing in the
^25
r

e

g

i

o

n

.

King Faisal paid, a State visit to the United States
after he became King of Saudi Arabia and top level talks
took place between the Heads of the two countries.

The

United States was anxious to avoid direct involvement in
Middle East disputes.

At the end of the talks, a joint

communique issued a t •the White House renewed a pledge of*See the text in A p p e n d i x .F .
125Councj_3_ for Middle East Asia, Middle Eastern
Affairs, 1963, V. 14, p. 47.

Ill
United States concern for Saudi Arabian territorial in*>tegrity in the. event of a crisis, in. the Middle East.^^G
United States-Saudi Arabian.Defense' Constructionof Military Facilities' Agreement..

This Agreement was

signed by Saudi Arabia and the United States at Jiddah on
June 5, 1965.

It dealt with the plans, of the Governmentof Saudi Arabia to undertake construction of certain
military facilities and the services which the UnitedStates Army Corps of Engineers was. prepared to render toaid completion of. this program.

The. Defense Transfer

of Aircraft and Equipment Agreement was signed on November
11, 1965.
Saudi - Russia Relations
The first contact with Russia was in 1903 whenKing Ibn-Saud sent a letter to the Amir of Kuwait andstated that if Great Britain would not support him against
Ibn-Rashid, who allied himself with the Turks, Ibn-Saudwould accept the offer of Russia.

This meant that Russia

had contacted Ibn-Saud.
After Ibn-Saud1s conquest of the Hijaz, the Soviet
Union was the first -State to recognize the new regime in-'-^Regional News Services, Middle East Mirr o r ,1966, V. 18, No. 2, pp. 2-3. . . .
l ^ U n i t e d states, United States Treaties and other International Agreements, 1965, V. 16, Part I, p. 840.

112
the Hijaz in 1926 and, sent Karim Khan,as. Minister and he
was the first Foreign Minister in. Saudi Arabia.
Saudi policy toward the.
’Soviet Union

has been

consistently correct though notvery warm int o n e .

further proof of friendship wasshown in the visit ofPrince

Faisal to Moscow in 1932 at thehead of the Government

delegation.

The Prince saw Stalin and Molotov.

A

.-

As a

consequence of Faisal's visit the number of Russians coming
to Mecca increased.

In 1938, King Ibn-Saud terminated his

acceptance of a Soviet diplomatic mission in Jiddah.
Soviet writers praised the Saudi policy of neutrality
and its opposition to the Baghdad Pact.^^S
Saudi's position concerning, the political thoughtof Russia's dealing with the Middle East was that it wasof less importance than Egypt or Syria.

The Soviet Union

looked to Saudi Arabia as closer to the Western bloc andits companies served as a base for the Western b l o c .
Despite this, Russia, during the third, and fourth decadesof the 20th Century, assumed, in the view of less develop­
ment of this country, that the national movement should
not be put under careful watch on the condition that it
had to continue its policy of being anti-British.
the situation was changed in the fifth decade.

128 q „ DeGaury, Faisal, 1967, p. 121.

However,

The hopes

113
of Moscow were not fulfilled.

It considered that Saudi

Arabia had transferred to the American bloc after theextension of oil companies' projects in Saudi Ara b i a .
Nevertheless, the Soviets praised the Saudi rulers fortheir position for liberation and independence of Buraimi.
They supported Saudi Arabia in their anti-British dispute
over Buraimi Oasis.

This Soviet attitude towards the Saudi

rulers was influenced by the policy of the Soviet Union
in the third decade when Moscow considered Ibn-Saud theruler of the whole world in the future.

However, theSoviet Union changed its attitude in 1950-1955.

Maybe

they considered any attack on Saudi rulers.as an attack"I O

Q

to Islam, because they are the Keep e r .of Islamic Places.
The first break in the alliance occurred following
the King's visit to the United States early in 1957 when
Saud came to understand the importance of. fighting
communism.

He returned to the Middle East, friendly to the

Eisenhower Doctrine.

The King's visit brought about a neworientation openly anti-communist.

Saudi Arabia has no

diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
A recent Russian article described diplomatic andtrade relations between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia

129 l o Walter, The Soviet Union and the Middle E a s t ,1959, pp. 181-182.

114
from the beginning' on February 16, .1926,

The Russians

attempted to improve trade .'with. Arabia,

When Amir Faisal

went to Russia in 1932, he visited factories, military
academies and units and went to Leningrad.

The Trade

Treaty between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia was notconcluded but Saudi Arabia does import goods from Hungary,
Poland, Yugoslavia

a

n

d

C

z

e

c

h

o

s

l

o

v

a

k

i

a

.

DeGaury., Faisal, 1967, p. 76 .

CHAPTER VII
NEUTRALIST POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC PACT
Neutralist' Policy of Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia can act with twin .policies because it
is a religious and nationalist State.
land of Islam and the Arab race.

It is the home

It may appear that thetwin policy is contradictory but Islam and Arabism are aunit*

The twin policy is not strong in world politics.

The United Arab Republic believes and.works in three
directions;

African cycle, Arab cycle, and Islamic cycle -the latter, because of Alazhar University, which is one ofmany centers in the Islamic history.

Russia acts both asan Asiatic State and an European State in international
politics
Early in 1955^ twenty-nine States from Asia andAfrica decided to convene the Bandung Conference.

Saudi

Arabia was one of them - and proclaimed the very ideas
which were entertained by all these representatives onimportant foreign matters.

They declared their full support

for fundamental principles of human rights and for self
determination for all people of all nations.
The Belgrade Conference.

At the Conference itself,

which was held in Belgrade in 1961 and attended by 28
115

116
countries - among them Saudi A r a b i a , the basic platform
to be developed was in nonaligned policy; action lay inachieving international cooperation, a n d .coordination
through voluntary participation and through full respect
for the individuality of each country.. Nonalignment , in
the Arab point of view, did not mean isolation from theEast and W e s t .-*-31
Saudi Arabia participated in the preparatory con­ference in Cairo, as we said, and also in Belgrade.

King

Saud did not go to Belgrade himself - it was reported that
tribal heads and religious leaders had opposed his goingto a country which had officially adopted the communistatheist creed.

Shaykh Ibrahim Al-Swayl, the Foreign

Minister, appeared at the Conference as the King's personal
representative.

In his speech, he stressed Saudi's policyof nonalignment and his desire for international justiceand security, participation in the fight against imperialism
and cooperation with the United

N

a

t

i

o

n

s

.

^^2

Both Amir Faisal and King Saud e a c h , when officiatingas Prime Minister,. asserted the country's wish for absolute
neutrality.

-L33-F. a . Sayegh, The Dynamics of Neutralism in the
Arab W o r l d , 1964, pp. 229-255. •.
l^^Tel-Aviv University, Middle East Rec o r d , 1960,
V. I, p. 427.

117
King Saud said on November 12., 1960;"As regards

the outside world, we shall continue to pursue our frankand clear policy of befriending.

We.proclaim to all, ourpolicy of neutrality."133
King Saud declared on November 12, 1961:"Our

foreign relations are conducted on. the basis of mutual
respect and absolute neutrality in cooperation with theAfro-Asian bloc and by stressing the principles ofBandung."134
From the table, we can see Saudi Arabia's policy
transition now in the process of.moving away from a given
form of neutralism.
Islamic Pact - new policy of Saudi A r a b i a .

Oneof the aspects of Saudi Arabia policies is the callingfor Islamic solidarity.

It is represented in the area of

the Islamic bloc and this policy had been adopted recently
for ten years - but the activity of Saudi rulers started
in 1965.

If we looked for the reasons to adopt thispolicy, apparently they remain the following:
1.

Saudi Arabia is the original home for Islam and fromhere the Islam started and established its empire.

' 133I b M . , V. I, p. 427.
134Ibid., V. II, p. 380.

■

■

y
....

'

Table 6.

Classification of neutralist and participation in gathering andmajor initiatives.*

UN DisClassification BanCasaBelCoarmament Neutralistof Saudi. dung Brioni blanca Cairo grade Cairo Cairo lombo ComProposal
Neutralist
1955 1956
1961
1961
1961 1961
1962 1962 mittee
A/4522
Originally-,outside bothcold war
camps

X

X

* —

-

_

X

X

X

X indicates participation in gatherings or initiatives.
- indicates non-participation.
*Combination of two tables f r o m 'Sayegh, F. A., The Dynamics of Neutralism in the
Arab World, 1964, pp. 16-20.

119
2,

Direction of five prayers daily to the Muslim -every corner in the world, and .it has the center of pil­grimage andThe

the Holy Cities.
idea for an Islamic Pact started in 1956 when :King Saud, President Nasser of the United. Arab Republicand President of the Republic of Pakistan, Skander Mirza,
signed the Charter* of the Islamic Congress.
Charter, there are three main points;

In this(1) The Isl a m i c .

Conference represents the Muslim group from their dif­ferent countries.

(2) From the Conference it founded:(a) High Council, (b) General Secretariat.
Council is headed by
Mecca.

(3)

The High

Saudi Arabia with headquarters in

The "main purpose of

the Conference is tow o r k ,to organize the Muslim peoples and to develop a faithful
relationship between Islamic countries. . The charter,
signed on March 15, 1956, was the end of the story until
1965.

After ten years, Saudi Arabia recalled the Islamic

Pact or Islamic Alliance.

In Saudi Arabia, there is a

Muslim, world League and its constituent assembly which"were formed during the pilgrimage in 1962.

v

This assemblycomprises representatives from Arab countries, Pakistan,
India, Nigeria, Indonesia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Mauritania,
Philippines and Bengal.

The aim of the assembly, which*See Appendix G for text.

.

has been calling for an Islamic Summit. Conference since
its foundation, is to serve the cause of Islam and tocontact Islamic societies in various., parts of the world.
To coordinate their cooperation among leading members
are Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt and Northern Nigeria.-^5
In 1966, King Faisal had travelled to Iran, Jordan,
Pakistan, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey and Mali, preaching"Islamic Solidarity", a movement whose political goals
are clear - whose religious appeal is to "Traditional
Islamic Principles."This is what, the Prime Minister of Sudan, Azhari,said about the Islamic Pact when he paid a State visit to
Saudi Arabia:"We are strengthened and encouraged to carryout our role, especially after the upholding of the Islamiccall for solidarity and King Faisal, who exhorted us torally around it."136
If we look at the publications issued by Saudi
Arabia's Government, or its newspaper, we see how they callfor an Islamic Summit.

An article in a Saudi magazine

said:
Out of much discussion, there arose the suggestion
from Somalia that there should be a meeting of^•^^Regional News Services, Middle East Mirror,
1966, V. 18, p. 4.
. ..
-*-3^ S a u d i
Arabia Office of Publication, In­formation, Saudi Arabia, 1966, V. Ill, No. 1 3 7 k pp. 137-138V

121
the Heads, of the Islamic States. Since all
Islamic States are not Arab, such as Pakistan,
the Islamic Summit, as it was called, has been
widely discussed since then".
There is no doubtt h a t 'Faisal does occupy a special position in, Islam.137.
The following is another example of a Saudi
newspaper editorial:\

When the Islamic Nation marches' on the sameroad, when the Islamic call for solidarity isrealized, it will be possible for the unified.Islamic Nation to attain a decisive victory inorder, to serve Islam.
The forces opposing theIslamic call undoubtedly realize.that themeeting of the Islamic Nation, on one target
means the end of all designs contradictoryt o 'the Islamic message.138
From these statements, we can understand that there
are opposite sides for the call of an Islamic Summit orIslamic Alliance.

The extremist nationalists opposed thecall for Islamic Alliance.

It would be better to startfrom the beginning with President Nasser about the Islam.
Nasser, in his book Philosophy of Revolution s a i d :When I went with the Egyptian delegation to theKingdom of Saudi Arabia, my belief in the possi­
bilities of the strength of the Islamic tie
grew very strong.
Kabba should become an in­stitute of great political p o w e r . The pilgrimage
is vital because of its functions as a periodical
political conference in which the envoys ofIslamic State leaders met in order to lay down

137Ibid., V. Ill, No. 2.
138Ibid.,, V. II, No. 2, p. 6.

. 122in this "Islamic World'Parliament" the broad
liyes of their national policies'.
I rememberthat 1 mentioned s o m e .of these thoughts to
His Majesty, the King S a u d . H 9
In the next year he sighed the charter of the Islamic
Conference».

Later he opposed the Islamic Alliance, whenKing Faisal arose to the call of the Islamic Summit in
1966.

Nasser attacked this c a l l .

o f ■an Islamic Alliance?
reject it?

Why?

What is the harm

Why does the United Arab Republic

As the United Arab Republic can play as abridge between African States and the Arab States, Saudi
Arabia can play the same rule between the extremist Arabnationalist States and Islamic countries.

Saudi Arabia

can follow two policies because it is both a religious
and nationalist State.

It. is the Home Land of Islam.

wasser, Philosophy of Revolution, 1953,pp.

in-113.'

i': -

:

'> '

■

i

CHAPTER VIIISUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONSThe Saudi history may be divided into three phases.
The first phase lasted from 1747-1818.

There were two

events which' took place that.affected the future of the
Saudi family as a strong power in Arabia.
1.

The Saudi family and the founder of the Wahhabi

movement were allies.

This was very successful.

The Saudi

family is indebted to this movement for the spread of theirpower among the tribes.
by two means:

The orientists could be controlled(a) a very strong political leader with thesword in his h a n d , or(b) a religious leader who could

affect their spiritual life. • In other w o r d s , the Saudi
ruler carried the sword in one hand and the word in theother.

He is both the temporal and spiritual leader.

He

is the King of the Nation and the Imam of the believers.
2.

The second event was the Egyptian campaign.

was a destructive expedition.

It

The Sublime Port wanted to

put an end. to the emergent State.

The Saudi control spreadfrom coast to coast, going from north to *south to the Holy
Places in the Hijaz where it destroyed the tombs of thesaints and the innovations.

The Sharif of Mecca led acampaign in 1791 to suppress the Wahhabis but he failed. .
. '

,

123

„

" '

124
Iraq led another expedition in 1798. . T h e .Wahhabi Empire
reached its zenith in 1811 but Mohamed^Ali's expedition•

put an end to the Wahhabi Empire in 1818„
The second phase lasted from 1818-1891.
greatest leader in this period was Turki.

The

This phase wasended by civil war in the royal family.
The third phase, with which we were mainly concerned,
started from 1902 when Ibn-Saud regained the throne.

He

was the strongest man that the Saudi family has ever seen. ■He was well trained in politics during his refuge in Kuwait.
He was a capable commander in the battlefield. He succeeded' '■,.
in retaking all the territories which came under the controlof the first Empire1.

He united most of Arabia in modern

history which had never had this experience before except
in the time of Mohamed and the Orthodox Caliphate.
The Sublime Port faced a critical international
position in that time.

It tried to suppress the new emergent

State in Arabia by supporting the Turkish puppet, IbnRashid.

■

However, Ibn-Saud succeeded in driving the Turksfrom Qasim Province in 1904.
from Al-Hasa Province„

In 1913, he also drove them

Ibn-Saud Was the first ruler inmodern history to drive the Turks from central and eastern
Arabia„. The British contacted Ibn-Saud and concluded atreaty with him in 1915,

During this period, the British

125
also contacted t h e .Sharif of Mecca,.

They induced him torise against the Turks. . Al--Hussein Ibn-Ali over-estimatedhis power.

He declared himself the King of the Arabs andtalked about the Arab Kingdom.
power of Ibn-Saud.

He ignored the growing

He declared himself the Muslim Caliphate.

Ibn-Saud enumerated Hussein's faults.
aroused the conflict.

The border's problem

The British Left their ally alone

to face his fate with the new master of Arabia.
captured the Hij a z ,Ibn-Saud

The Sharif abdicated to Ibn-Saud on

December 17, 1925.
Ibn-Saud turned his attention south to A s i r .

Hesigned a treaty in 1926 with the Idrisi, who transferred
the suzerainty of the region to Ibn-Saud.

In 1934, thewar broke out between Ibn-Saud and.Yemen where the Saudi
troops swept the Yemeni army; the war concluded with atreaty of friendship in 1936.
Ibn-Saud signed a chain of .treaties fixing thenorthern borders with Iraq,. Kuwait and Jordan.

In 1926,

Ibh-Saud issued the Constitution of the Kingdom of the .
Hijaz.

It was divided i n t o .eight parts.

The departmentsof the Kingdom of the Hijaz were the Legislative Assembly,
Councils of Jiddah and Medina, General Municipal Councils
and the Council of Deputies.
In 1927 he issued a Royal Order constituting theSultanate of Najd and its Dependencies into a Kingdom and126
uniting it with the Hij a z .

Another Royal Ord e r , issued in

193 2, changed the name of the country to the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia.

In 1953, Ibn-Saud established the Councilof Ministers because of the increase in the obligations
and responsibilities placed on the. State.

In 1953, Ibn-

Saud died, after he established this strong State.
tried his best to modernize'the country.

He

He settled thenomadic tribes and instituted the use of many modern in­ventions.

He exploited the country's resources.

He wasa very successful politician when he kept his country fromthe political implications in the oil concession to theforeign companies.

He was succeeded by his.eldest son,Saud, who continued from 1953-19 64, when he was dethroned.
■ The Department of Foreign Affairs was founded in
1926 and changed to a Ministry in the first ten years? it
was not very active until World War II.

It opened many

Embassies arid,Consuls in cities such as P a r i s , Washington,
Rome and Tehran. ' Saudi Arabia signed the protocol of the
Arab League, in 1945.

It is. very active and follows afirm policy of solidarity with the Arab States.

It isdevoted to the Arab League charter and has signed most of
its treaties.

1

Saudi Arabia tried to maintain friendly relations
with the Arab States - Egypt, Syria, Jordan,
Gulf States, North African States and Yemen.

Iraq, Persian127
After the Republic of Yemen was .declared in 1962,
the United Arab Republic became invo l v e d .in Arabia's
affairs.

The relations were complicated between Yemen, theUnited Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia.
Yemen was extremist.

The new regime in

They claimed Saudi territory.

Jizan and the Egyptians attacked Saudi territories.

Najran,The

Imam of Yemen is still alive, therefore,' Saudi Arabia held
its recognition of the Yemeni Republic, as did the United
Kingdom.

Saudi Arabia put a condition for ending the con­flict by withdrawal of all foreign armed forces.

The

United Arab Republic had been offered three opportunities
to put an end to the civil war and the withdrawal of its
troops:(a) United States recognition,(b) United Nations'observers coming to help with t h e 'withdrawal, .(c) Jiddah
Peace Agreement, and(d) the last opportunity which cameafter the Arab Summit Conference in.September, 1967, and the
new agreement for peace in Yemen.
Saudi Arabia contacted the British when they got
a foothold in the Persian Gulf in the regime of Saud theGreat.

In the second Saudi State, Turki made direct contact

with the British.

■ In 1831, his son renewed the relations.

The British resident in the Gulf visited Riyadh in 1865,
In the third Saudi State, modern period, the British Con­sulate in the Persian Gulf was in' favor of putting a firm
policy toward the new emergent strong man in Arabia.

Ibn-Saud asked to sign a treaty with the British but the
British delayed until.World Wax I broke but; they signed
a treaty in 1915,

It continued until 1927 when Ibn-Saudsigned another treaty which renewed automatically,
Saudi-British relations.were friendly; in 192.81930 a riot arose against Ibn-Saud.in his realm.

Therebellions caused a conflict on the Saudi-Iraqi borders.
The British bombed Saudi p a r t s ;Later the rebels got a

refuge in Iraq but Ibn-Saud insisted that they hand him
the rebels.

The British agreed and handed them over.

The only problem which.caused.difficulty in the
Saudi-British relations was the dispute over Buraimi Oasis.
The Saudi control goes back to 18 08 in the regime of; Saudthe Great.

..

The problem of suzerainty over the oasis arosein the modern period.

The Turkish-British Treaty of 1913

did not affect Ibn-Saud's position.

The dispute became

complicated in the 1950's when the search for oil started.
The Saudi Government signed a treaty.for arbitration in
1954.

The problem went to the United Nations but until now

it still hangs.

'•

Saudi-American relations were influenced by economic
factors.

In 1933, Ibn-Saud g a v e .oil concessions to theSouthern California Oil Company.
In 1933, Saudi-American
'.
:
'
\
.
1
■'
diplomatic relations were established.
. ...._...,

129
Other further steps for close .relations with theUnited States' came in 1943 when Ibn-Saud.gave certain air­craft passages' and oil supplies to the Americans at Dahran
airport.

In 1945, Ibn-Saud and P.. D. Roosevelt met.

Saudi

Arabia has no diplomatic relations with the Eastern bloc.
It has trade relations with some Eastern countries.
The principal findings of this study are as
follows:
1.

The political-religious alliance founded a verystrong State extending from coast to coast from the Red
Sea shore to the Persian Gulf and from the Syrian plains •in the north to the edge of the empty.quarter in the south.
2.

The most important contribution of the Saudi familyis the unity of most of the Arabian peninsula, instead ofthe.weak Amirates and the local Sheiks of the tribes.

It

became a State with centralized authority.
3.

•

The Saudi State stood strongly in.the face of

foreign ambitions and interests; against the Turks and the
Egyptians in the first Saudi State and in the modern period
It succeeded in driving away the Turks and the Egyptians
and their puppet shadows like Ibn-Rashid.
4.

The Saudi family history faced some conflict inside

the royal family which led to decline,

such as the quarrel

between Fais a l ’s sons in the second State and the dif­ferences between Saud and his brothers in the third State;

130
however,strong leaders united the family in the face ofthe foreign •danger's and also kept the unity of the State. .
Saudi policy can be summarized as this.:1.

In the Islamic cycle, it calls for an Islamic Pact
.
;
{
. '
'
'
V
and Islamic solidarity.
It wants to act. as a bridge
between extremist Arab nationalist .States to get the supportof the Islamic countries'' for Arab problems.
2.

In regional policy, Saudi Arabia pledges devotion

to the Arab League charter,

strong support for Arab

problems, liberation of Arab lands, political and financial
support for Algerian liberation, Oman,, and southern Arabia's
strong stand on the Palestine question.
3.

In international politics it pledges devotion to

the United Nations' charter and support for peace inAfrica-Asian Arab blocs .
4.

It does not want entry in the two cold war camps -East and W e s t .
5.

It maintains good relations with the West and theUnited States.

There is no prejudiced attitude toward

the Russians, but no diplomatic relations exist.

There

are, however, trade relations with some Eastern countries.
Saudi Arabia is not in either of the two satellites.
This can be shown clearly in the United Nations' voting
records; for example, Saudi Arabia.voted in favor of a
Soviet amendment to the 43 Power Resolution concerned with

' ,

131

ensuring complete independence of colonial peoples -This

proposal is not contradictory to.‘the. Saudi foreign policy
and its principals.

It also voted .in favor of a similar

proposal of 43 Afro-Asian States' condemning alien sub­jection, affirming universal .right to. self-determination.
Saudi Arabia, now that it has seemingly, solved
its internal problems and has become a. united nation withcertain definable goals and policies, hopes to become aleader in helping the Western and.Eastern blocs of nations
find solutions to their problems.

\

APPENDIX AROYAL PRONOUNCEMENT CONCERNING THE POLICY OF

A

THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA WITH RESPECT TO THE
SUBSOIL AND SEA BED OF AREAS IN THE PERSIAN GULF
CONTIGUOUS TO THE COASTS OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA*
We,

1Abd a l - 1Aziz ibn 'Abd al-Rahman Al Faisal Al Sa'ud,

King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
After reliance on God Almighty, being aware of theneed for the greater utilization of the. world's natural .
resources which are the bounty of God,, and of the desir­ability of giving encouragement to efforts to discover andmake available such resources,
Recognizing that by God's providence valuable re­sources may underlie parts of the Persian Gulf off thecoasts of Saudi Arabia, and that modern technology by thegrace of God makes it increasingly practicable to utilize
these resources,.Appreciating that recognized jurisdiction over such
resources is required in the interest of their conservationand prudent utilization when and as development is undertaken?

*Middle East Institute, Middle East Journal, V. 4,
1950.
■' •

"

.132

;

'

.

-

■■

'

. 133

Deeming- that the' exercise of jurisdiction over such
resources by the contiguous nation., is .resonable and justrsince the effectiveness of measures' to utilize or conserve
these resources would be contingent upon cooperation andprotection from the shore and since self-protection compels
the coastal nation to keep close watch.over activities off
its shores which are of a nature necessary for the utili­zation of these resources; and,-Considering that various other nations now exercise
jurisdiction oven the vs.ubsoil and sea bed of areas con­tiguous to their coasts, Declare the following policy of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia with respect to the subsoil, and sea bed ofareas of the Persian Gulf contiguous to the coasts of Our
Kingdom:

1

y"

.

'

•

The subsoil and sea bed of those areas of the
Persian Gulf seaward from the coastal sea of Saudi Arabia
but contiguous to its coasts, are declared to appertain.

to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to be subject to its
jurisdiction and control.

The boundaries of such areas

will be determined in accordance with equitable principles
by Our Government in agreements with other States having
jurisdiction and control over the. subsoil and Sea bed of•

V . . '

adjoining areas.

, h

:

'

t

.

:

'''

/

:

'

\

^

f

.. -

:

The character as high seas of the watersof such areas, the right to the free and unimpeded navigation

,

134

of such: waters and the air space above those waters, fishingrights in such wate r s , and the' traditional .freedom of
pearling by the peoples of the "Gulf, are in no way affected.
This Pronouncement .is made for the information andguidance of all whom it may concern,-

May the Faithful always put their trust in GodI
Promulgated in our Palace at Riyadh on the firstday of the month of S h a 1ban of the year of the •Hegira
1368, corresponding to the twenty-eighth day of the monthof May in the year 1949,

APPENDIX B
ROYAL DECREE REGARDING TERRITORIAL WATERS OF SAUDI ARABIA*
We,

1Abd a l - 1Aziz ibn 1Abd al"-Rahman Al Faisal

Al Sa'ud, King or the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, after
reliance on God Almighty and in view of our desire todefine the territorial waters of the Kingdom, have de­creed as follows:
Article 1,

For the purposes of this Decree,(a) The term "nautical m i l e " is the equivalent of1852 meters;(b) The term "bay" includes any inlet, lagoon or
Other arm of the sea;(c) The term "island" includes any islet, reef,rock, bar or permanent artificial structure not submerged
at lowest low tide;.
(d) The term "shoal" denotes an area covered byshallow water, a part of which is not submerged at lowest
low tide; and.

(e) The term "coast" refers to the coasts'of the

Gulf of Aqaba, the Persian Gulf and the Red S e a „1950.

*Middle East Institute, Middle East journal, V v 4,
.
.
,

; •
Article 2,

.

136.

The territorial waters of Saudi A r a b i a r

as well as the air space above and the' soil and subsoil 'beneath them, are under the sovereignty of the Kingdom,
subject to the provisions of international law as to theinnocent passage of vessels of other nations through thecoastal sea.
Article 3.

The territorial waters of Saudi Arabia

embrace both the inland waters and the coastal sea of theKingdom.

'

Article 4.

The inland waters of the Kingdom include:(a) the waters of the bays along the coasts of
Saudi Arabia;(b) the waters above and landward from any shoal
not more than twelve nautical miles from the .mainland orfrom a Saudi Arabian island;(c) the waters between the mainland and a Saudi
Arabian, island not more than twelve nautical miles fromthe mainland; and(d) the 'waters between Saudi Arabian islands not
farther apart than twelve nautical miles.
Article 5.

The coastal sea of Saudi Arabia lies out­side the inland waters of the Kingdom and extends seaward
for a distance of six nautical m i l e s .
Article 6.

The following are established as the base­lines from which the coastal sea of Saudi Arabia is measured

137(a) where the shore of the mainland or an island
is fully exposed to the open sea, the lowest .low-water markon the shore;.

(b) where a bay confronts the open sea, lines drawn
from headland to headland across the mouth of the bay;(c) where a shoal is situated not more than twelve
nautical m i l e s ‘from the mainland or from a Saudi Arabian.

island, lines drawn from the mainland or the island andalong the outer edge of the shoal;(d)' where a port or harbor confronts the open sea,lines drawn along the seaward side of the outermost worksof the port or harbor and between such w o r k s ;(e) where an island is not more than twelve nautical
miles from the mainland, lines drawn from the mainland andalong the outer shores of the island;(f) where there is an island group which may be con­nected by lines not more than twelve nautical miles long,of which the island nearest to the mainland is not morethan twelve nautical miles from the mainland, lines dr^wn
from the mainland and along the outer shores of all the'islands of the group if

the islands form a chain, or

along

the outer shores of theoutermost, islands of the group if

the islands do not form a chain; and(g) where there

is an island group which may be c o n - .

nected.by lines not more than twelve nautical miles long,138
of .which the island nearest to the mainland is. more thantwelve nautical miles' from the mainland, lines' drawn along
the outer shores of all the islands of the group if theislands form a chain, or along the outer shores of theoutermost islands of the group if the islands do not forma chain.
Article 7.

If the measurement of the territorial

waters in accordance with the provisions of this- Decree
leaves an area of high sea wholly surrounded by territorial
waters and extending not more.than twelve nautical miles
in any direction, such area shall form part of the terri­torial waters.

The same rule shall apply to a pronounced

pocket of high sea which may be wholly enclosed by drawing
a single straight line not more than twelve nautical
miles long.
Article 8.

.
If the inland waters described in Article

4, or if the coastal sea measured from the base-lines fixedby Article 6, should be overlapped by the waters of anotherState, boundaries will be determined by Saudi Arabia inagreement with the State concerned in accordance withequitable principles.
Article 9.

With a view to assuring compliance withthe laws of the Kingdom relating to security, navigation,and fiscal matters, maritime surveillance may be exorcisedin a contiguous zone outside the coastal sea, extending v .

■

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'

.

139

for a further distance of six nautical miles' and measured
from the base-lines' of the coastal .sea,, provided howeverthat nothing in this Article shall be deemed to apply tothe rights of the Kingdom with respect to fishing.
Article 10.

Our Ministers of Fore i g n .Affairs and of

Finance are charged with the execution of this Decree.
Article 11.

This Decree will come into effect asfrom the date of its publication in the official gazette.
Promulgated in our Palace at Riyadh, on the firstday of the month of S h a ’ban of the year of the Hegira
1368, corresponding to the twenty-eighth day of the monthof May in the year 1949.

.

APPENDIX CROYAL DECREE NUMBER 2716
SEPTEMBER 18., 1932*
Relying on God and compliance with the telegrams
submitted to us by our various subjects in the Kingdom ofthe. Hijaz, Najd and its Dependencies and in deference topublic opinion in our country and in view of our desire tounite the sections of this Arabian Kingdom we have ordered
the following:
Article 1-

The name of the Kingdom of Hijaz, Najd

and its Dependencies shall be changed to THE KINGDOM OFSAUDI ARABIA and our title shall be henceforth the Kingof the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.***M. Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League,
I 9 6 0 , -V. I, pp. 242-243.
**In this book, two signatures appeared.under theRoyal Decree: Abdul Aziz (countersigned Faisal, Crown
Prince) . In another periodical.. Middle East Rec o r d , V. I,
the signature of Abdul Aziz only appeared.

140

APPENDIX DANGLOSAUDI ARABIAN BURAIMI ARBITRATION AGREEMENTJULY 30, 1954*
I

‘

'■

;

‘

The Government of the United Kingdom of GreatBritain and Northern Ireland and the Government of theKingdom of Saudi Arabia;
Considering‘that there is a dispute as to the locationof the common frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi
and as to the sovereignty of the Buraimi Oas i s ; that Abu
Dhabi is a State for the conduct of whose foreign relations
the Government of.the United Kingdom is responsible; andthat His Highness the Sultan Said bin Taimur has appointed
the Government of the United Kingdom to conduct all nego­tiations and proceedings on his behalf for the settlementof the dispute in so far as it relates to the territory
in the Buraimi Oasis claimed- by him to belong to Muscat
and O m a n ;Considering that it has proved impossible to settle
the dispute by direct negotiation;• Desiring nevertheless to find a permanent solution
by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the*M. Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League,
V. II, pp. 586-691, and from J. B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian
Frontiers, pp. 281-289.
141

142

United Nations and with the tradition of- friendhsip andgood will that has long existed between them;
Have accordingly decided to submit the dispute to
an independent and impartial tribunal for arbitration;
and/ for this purpose.
Have agreed as follows:
Article I.

The Tribunal shall consist of five members

selected as follows:(a) Each of the two Parties to the present Agree­
ment shall nominate one Member, provided that if either
Party fails to nominate its Member within 60 days from thedate on which this Agreement comes into force, the otherParty may ask the President of the International Court ofJustice to make the nomination.
(b) The three remaining Members, none of whom shallbe a national of either Party,

shall be chosen by agreement

between the two Members nominated under paragraph(a) ofthe Article; of the three, one shall be designated by theselecting Members as President of the Tribunal.

If, withina period of 90 days from the date on which the appointmentof the last-named Member under paragraph(a) is notified

to the other Party, the membership of the Tribunal is still
incomplete or the President has not been designated, either
Party may request the President of the International Courtof Justice to make the appointments or designation required.

143(c) If any Member, of the .'Tribunal should die, resign,or become unable to act before the Award has been given, thevacancy shall be filled by the method laid down in this
Article for the original.appointments.
(d) If the President of the International Court ofJustice is a national of either Party, or is prevented
from acting as requested in paragraphs(a) and .(b) of this

Article the Vice-President of the Court may be requested
to take the necessary action.

Any nomination, appointment,

or designation made by the President or Vice-President of
the Court under this Article shall be final and binding on
both Parties.
Article II.

The Tribunal is requested to decide:(a) The location of. the common frontier between
Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, within the line claimed by the
Saudi Arabian Government in 1949 and that claimed on behalfof Abu Dhabi at the Dammam Conference in 1952;(b) Sovereignty in the area comprised within acircle whose center is in Buraimi village and whose cir­
cumference passes through the point of junction of latitude
24 degrees 25 minutes north and longitude 55 degrees and
36 minutes east.
Article I I I .

Each Party shall be represented before the

Tribunal by an Agent, who shall be responsible for its partin the proceedings.

Each Agent may. be assisted by such

advisers, counsel, and staff as he deems necessary.

144

Article IV,

In conducting its proceedings and informulating its A w a r d , the Tribunal•shall have due regard
to all relevant considerations of law,, fact, and equity
brought to its attention by t h e .Parties under Article V and
VI or disclosed through the exercise o f .the powers conferred
upon it by Article VII.

In particular,, but without being

limited thereto, it shall take into account the following
factors in so far as it deems them relevant;(a) Historical facts relating to the rights of His
Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia and his forefathers andthe rights of the other Rulers concerned and their fore­
fathers,(b) The traditional loyalties of the inhabitantsof the area concerned.
(c) The tribal organization and way of life of thetribes inhabiting the area concerned.
(d) The exercise of jurisdiction and other activities
in the area concerned.
(e) Any other considerations brought to its atten­
tion by either Party.
Article V.
(a)Within a period of six months from a date tobe fixed by the President of the Tribunal as soon as possible
after the organization,of the Tribunal, each of the two
Parties shall present simultaneously to the Tribunal a

145
Memorial setting out its submissions regarding- the ter^ritories and frontier's in dispute, and.the considerations
on which its submissions are founded..
(b) After the period fixed in paragraph(a) of this

Article, each of the two Parties .
,shall .have, the right,
within a further period of six m o n t h s , to present to the
Tribunal a Reply to the Memorial presented by the otherParty.

. .
(c) On the application of either Party, theTribunal may, if it thinks fit, grant an extension ofeither or both of the periods fixed by paragraphs
and

(a)

(b) of this Article.
(d) The Tribunal shall be responsible for communi­

cating the Memorial and the Reply of the .'one Party to theother Party and shall inform the Parties how many copies
are required.
(c)

After the submission of the Reply, of each Party

there shall be no further written submissions, except asprovided for in Article VII(b) or Article X (b), unless

the Tribunal otherwise directs, and then only, within such
limitations as the Tribunal may prescribe.

If either

Party is permitted to make further written submissions ;under this paragraph, the other.Party shall.have an oppor­
tunity of commenting upon them and of submitting documents
in support of its comments.

146
Article VI-,(a) Subsequent to the conclusion of the written
proceedings.called for in Article V, the Tribunal shallsit for the purpose of hearing oral, arguments by theParties. . Subject to the provision that each Party shallhave an equal opportunity to'be h e a r d , both on principal
argument and in rebuttal, the.Tribunal shall prescribe
the procedure and time limits to be observed.
(b) With the consent of both Parties, the Tribunal
may dispense with oral arguments.
Article VII(a)

In addition to considering the submissions of

the Parties, the Tribunal shall have power on its own
initiative to call witnesses(other than the Ruler of anyof the territories concerned), to conduct enquiries, andto visit particular localities in the area in dispute
whenever it deems such proceedings useful.

Any suchexamination of witnesses, enquiry, or visit may be delegatedby the Tribunal to one.or more of its Members or t o .one ormore other impartial persons whom it may appoint for that
purpose.

"The area in dispute" means that area referred

to in Article II (b) .'of the present Agreement and all otherland claimed by both Saudi .Arabia and Abu Dhabi between the
Saudi 1949 claim arid the claim put forward on behalf of theRuler of Abu Dhabi at the Dammam Conference in 1952.

147(b) The Tribunal shall, inform.each Party wheneverit resolves to exercise 'any of the powers, specified inparagraph(a) of this Article,' and each Party shall havethe right to appoint representatives' .(not exceeding fourin number)for visits to the area, in dispute to be present

at the proceeding; to put questions to any witness, under ■the control of the Tribunal or person or,persons conducting
the enquire; and to receive any reports of enquiries orvisits and to comment thereon orally or in writing.
(c) Either Party may request the Tribunal to exercise
with respect to any particular witnesses'., localities, or,subjects of enquiry, any of the powers ..specified in paragraph(a) of,this Article, but the Tribunal may decline at its
discretion to accede to such a request.
Article VIII.
(a) Any written submission by either Party shallcontain a statement certifying the authenticity of the
documents quoted or referred to therein and copies .of all
such documents quoted or referred to therein and copiesof all such documents shall, where possible/ be annexedto the submission.
(b) At the request of 'the- Tribunal, either Party
shall, if possible, produce the original or an authen­ticated copy of any document referred to in its written
submissions or oral argument, and if unable to do so shall

148

explain to the Tribunal the reasons for such inability.
Inability to produce the original or an authenticated copyof any document shall not preclude its consideration by
the Tribunal in determining the weight to be given to the
document concerned,(c)

The Tribunal shall satisfy itself as to theauthenticity of any documents disclosed in the course ofany proceedings which it may conduct under the powers
conferred on it by Article VII.
Article IX.
(a) The Parties shall present their written sub­missions and any documents annexed, thereto in both English
and Arabic, together with a translation, into such otherlanguage or languages as the Tribunal.may request.
(b) The Parties shall present their oral argumentsin either English or Arabic.

The Tribunal shall make sucharrangements for ..translation and interpretation as it deems
necessary.
.(c) The Tribunal shall provide for the keeping ofa verbatim record of each of its sittings, other than its
private deliberations.

Copies shall be made available to

the Parties as soon as possible.
Article X.
(a)

If the Tribunal considers it necessary, it shal

have the right to arrange for an expert opinion to be given
by any person or persons selected by it.

149

(Jo)

Any. expert opinion given under .paragraph (a)of this Article shall either be in writing and communicatedto the Parties, or be given orally before the Tribunal in
the presence of the Parties’.

In either case the Parties

shall have the right to comment upon the opinion and, under
the control of the Tribunal, to put questions to the person
or persons responsible for it.
Article XI.

The Tribunal may, if it thinks fit, de- :termine the location of the frontier in dispute section bysection, and may give its Award in respect of each section
when it is ready to do so without waiting until it is ina position to give its Award .in respect of the whole
frontier in dispute.
Article XII.

The Tribunal shall have the power todetermine all questions of procedure not regulated in thepresent Agreement, including the power to fix the dates
and places of its sittings and to decide upon the public or
private character of each.
Article XIII.
(a) The Award of the Tribunal, and all decisions
on questions of procedure, shall be given by majority vote.
(b) The Tribunal shall give the reasons for its
Award.
(c) The Award shall be given in the language selectedby the Tribunal and shall be printed and communicated to the.

150 ■
Parties simultaneously.

There shall be communicated to theParties at the same 'time 'translations of t h e .Award into
English or Arabic or, if the Award be given', in some otherlanguage f into English and Arabic,.

The Tribunal shallstate which text.or texts are to be regarded as authentic.
The original of the Award and all official translations
thereof shall bear the certification of.the President of
the Tribunal.
(d)

The Award of the Tribunal shall be final,

binding upon both Governments(including the Rulers on

whose behalf the Government of the United Kingdom is .
acting) and without appeal.
Article XIV.
(a) As part of its Award, the Tribunal shall appointan expert commission, composed of one member nominated byeach of the Parties, and a neutral chairman nominated by the
Tribunal, to direct the demarcation on the ground of thefrontier line fixed by the Tribunal.

If either Party fails

to nominate its m e mber'of the commission within 90 days
after the Tribunal has requested, it to do so, the right tomake the nomination shall pass to the Tribunal.
(b) The demarcation commission thus appointed shallerect such markers and take such other steps as it deems
necessary to demarcate the frontier line adequately in
relation to the needs of the various areas through which it .

-

151 .
may pass.

The chairman o f .the commission shall have power

to authorise slight, deviations from the' line defined by .
the Tribunalz not to exceed at any one place one kilometre
to either side or five kilometres in length/ where the natureof the terrain presents unusual difficulties to.demarcation.
(c) The demarcation commission shall endeavour tocomplete its work within, two solar years from .the date of
the Award of the Tribunal.

On completion, it shall submit. to both Parties a full report of its activities,

includingsuch m a p s , photographs and other data as will enable thefrontier line to be accurately maintained thereafter.
(d) The members of the demarcation commission shallbe remunerated at a rate to be fixed by the Tribunal at thetime of their appointment.

The remuneration and all expensesof the commission and its work shall be borne by the two
Parties in equal shares, to be paid in such manner as may
be arranged between the Parties and the commission. (e) In the event of the death, disability or
resignation of either the Saudi or the British member of thecommission, his Government shall name.a successor within 90
days after receiving notice thereof, and if it fails to doso the other Party may request the President of theInternational Court of Justice to make the nomination.

Inthe event of the death, disability, or resignation of theneutral chairman, either Party may request the President

of the .International Court of Justice to appoint a successor.
If the president of the International Court of Justice isa national of either Party or is unable to act for the
purposes of this paragraph, the Vice-President may be re­quested to take the necessary action.
Article XV,

After t h e 'Tribunal has given its award,

either Party may publish any of the proceedings in the case.
Article X V I •(a) The Tribunal shall have the power to engage
such staff, and at such remuneration, and to rent suchpremises and purchase such equipment, as it considers
necessary, and to make all such arrangements as may berequisite for the holding of any oral hearings, or for visits
to any particular localities by the Tribunal or by any
person or persons appointed by it under Article VII(a).

(b) The records and papers of the Tribunal and thepersonal effects of its Members, as well as the records,
papers and personal effects of each Agent, shall be con­sidered inviolate, and shall be exempt from all d u e s ,inspections or border formalities.
Article XVII.
(a ) The President and the other Members of the
Tribunal shall be entitled to payment of their .expenses
and to remuneration on a scale to be agreed by the Parties.
(b) The remuneration of the President and Membersof the Tribunal and the expenses of the Tribunal shall be153borne by the Parties' in equal shares", and shall be paid insuch manner and at such times',as may be. arranged between
the Parties and the Tribunal.'. The Tribunal shall ,subsequent
to its Award, deliver a final account of all the expenses
incurred.
Article XVIII.

Each Party shall pay.the expenses ofthe presentation and conduct of its own case before the
Tribunal. ■Article XIX.

.
The Tribunal shall have the power todecide any question that may arise as to the interpretationof any provision of the present Agreement.
Article XX.

The present Agreement shall come into

force on the date of signature.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly
authorised by their respective'Governments, have signed
the present Agreement.
Done in duplicate at Hedda this thirtienth day ofJuly, 1954, corresponding to the twenty-ninth day of
Dhu'al-qada, 1373, in the English and Arabic languages,
both texts being equally authentic,
G. C. Pelham, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
Faisal, Minister for Foreign Affairs of theKingdom of Saudi Arabia. 'APPENDIX EEXCHANGE OF ■NOTES BETWEEN THE KING OF SAUDI ARABIA
' '

; .

AND THE PRESIDENT(TRUMAN)*

Note from the King of Saudi' 'Arabia' to
the President, October 1 5 / T946
In my desire to safeguard and strengthen in every
way possible the friendship which binds our two countries
together, and which existed between the Tate President
Roosevelt and which was renewed with Your Excellency, I
reiterate my feelings on every occasion when this friendshipbetween the United States on the one h a n d , and my country
and the other Arab countries on the other h a n d , is en­
dangered, so that all obstacles in the way of that friend­ship may be removed;'•.

On previous occasions I wrote to the late President
Roosevelt and to Your Excellency, and explained the situationin Palestine; how the natural rights of the Arabs therein .■go back thousands of years and how the Jews are only
aggressors, seeking to perpetrate a monstrous injustice,at the beginning, speaking in the name of humanitarianism,^Department of State, Bulletin XV, p. 848, and inDocuments on American Foreign Relations,V. VIII, 1945-1946.
154

'

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155

but later openly proclaiming their aggressiveness by force
and violence as is not unknown to. your Excellency and the•American people,'Moreover, the designs of the Jews are notlimited to Palestine o n l y , but include the neighboring
Arab countries within their scope, .not even excluding ourHoly Cities.
I was therefore astonished, at the latest announce­
ment issued in your name in support of the J e w s .in Palestineand its demand that floodgates' of immigration.be opened
in such a way as to alter the basic situation in Palestinein contradiction to previous promises'.

My astonishment

was even greater because the statement described to Your
Excellency contradicts: the Declaration which the American
Legation in Heddah requested our Foreign Office to publish
in the Government's official paper Omm A l -Qura in the nameof the White House, on August 16, 1946, in which it wasstated that the Government of the United States had notmade any proposals for the solution of the Palestine
problem and in which you expressed your hope that it would
be solved through the conversations between the British
Government and the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States,on the one hand, and between the British Government and thethird part on the other, and in which you expressed thereadiness of the United States to assist the displaced
persons among whom are Jews.

Hence, my great astonishment

when I read your Excellency's statement and my incredulity

V

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v';'

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. ■ 156

that it could haye come from you, because it contradicts
previous promises' made by the Government of the UnitedStates and statements made from the .'White' H o u s e .
I am confident that the American people who spent
their blood and their money freely to resist'aggression,
could not possibly support Zionist aggression against afriendly Arab country which has committed no crime except
to believe firmly in those principles of justice ande q u a l i t y f o r which the United Nations, including theUnited States, fought, and for which both your predecessor
and you exerted great efforts.
My desire to preserve the friendship of the Araband the East towards the United States of America has
obliged me to expound to Your Excellency the injusticewhich would be visited upon the Arabs by any assistanceto Zionist aggression.
I am certain "that Your Excellency and the American
people cannot support right, justice, and equity and fightfor them in the rest of the world while denying them to theArabs in their country, Palestine, which they have inheritedfrom their ancestors from Ancient Times.
Note from the President to the King of Saudi Arabia,
October 2 8 , 1946
I have just received the letter with regard to
Palestine which Your Majesty was good enough to transmit

.
...
.
...
/
■:
to me through the .Saudi Arabian Legation under date ofOctober 15, 194.6, and have, given careful consideration
to the views expressed therein.
. I am particularly appreciative of the frank mannerin which you expressed yourself in your letter.

Your frank­

ness is entirely in keeping with the friendly relations
which have long existed between our two countries, and withthe personal friendship between Your Majesty and my dis­tinguished predecessor; a friendship which I hope to retainand strengthen.

It is precisely the cordial relations be­

tween our countries and Your Majesty's own friendly attitude
which encourages me to invite your, attention to some of theconsiderations which have prompted this Government to follow
the course it has been pursuing with respect to the matterof Palestine and of the displaced Jews in E u r o p e .
I feel certain that Your Majesty will readily agree
that the tragic situation of the surviving, victims of Nazi
persecution in Europe presents a problem of such magnitude
and poignancy th.at it cannot be ignored by people of good
will or humanitarian instincts.

This'problem is worldwide.

It seems to me that all of us have a common responsibility•
for working out a solution which would permit, those un­
fortunates who must leave Europe to find new homes where
they may dwell in peace and security.
Among the survivors in the displaced persons centersin Europe are numbers of J e w s , whose plight is particularly:

158
tragic inasmuch as they represent the pitiful remnants ofmillions who were "deliberately selected by the Nazi leaders
for annihilation.

Many of these persons look to Palestine

as a haven where they hope among people of their own faith
to find refuge, to begin to lead peaceful and useful -lives,
and to assist in the further development of the Jewish
National Ho m e .
The Government and people of the United States’ havegiven support to the concept of a Jewish. National Home inPalestine ever since the termination of the first World War,which resulted in the freeing of a large area of-the Near
East, including Palestine, and the establishment of a numberof independent states which are now.members of the United
Nations.

The United States, which contributed its bloodand resources to the winning of that w a r , could not divest
itself of a certain responsibility.for the manner in which
the freed territories were disposed of, or for the fate of
the peoples liberated at that time.

It took the position,

to which it still adheres, that these peoples should be
prepared for self-government and also that a national home
for the Jewish people should be established in Palestine.
I am happy to note that most of the liberated peoples are
now citizens of independent countries.

The Jewish National ,Home, however, has not as yet been fully developed.

159
It is only natural, therefore/ that this Government
should favor at this time the' entry into Palestine ofconsiderable numbers of displaced Jews' in Europe, not onlythat they may find shelter there,,' but also that they may
contribute their talents and energies to the upbuildingof the Jewish National Home.'
It was entirely in keeping' with the traditional
policies of this Government that over a year ago I began
to correspond with the Prime Minister of Great.Britain in
an effort to expedite the solving of the urgent problem of
the Jewish survivors in the displaced persons camps by thetransfer of a substantial number, of them to Palestine.

It

was my belief, to which I still adhere, and which is widely
shared by the people of this country, that nothing would
contribute more effectively to the alleviation of the plightof these Jewish survivors than the authorization of theimmediate entry of at least 100,000 of them to Palestine.
No decision with respect to this proposal has been reached,but this Government is still .hopeful that it may. be possible
to proceed along the lines which I outlined to the Prime
Minister. ■.

At the same time there should, of course, be aconcerted effort to open the gates of other lan d s , including
the United States, to those unfortunate persons, who are ■now entering upon their second winter of homelessness

160
subsequent to the termination of hostilities.

I, for mypart, haye made it known that I am prepared t o .ask theCongress of the United States', whose cooperation must be
enlisted under our Constitution, for special legislation
admitting to this country additional, numbers of these
persons, over and above the immigration quotas fixed byour laws.

This Government, moreover, has been actively

exploring, in conjunction with other governments, thepossibilities of settlement in different countries outside
Europe for those displaced persons who are obliged toemigrate from that continent.

In this connection it has

been most heartening to us to note the.statements of various
Arab leaders as to the willingness of. their countries toshare in this humanitarian project by taking a certain
number of these persons into their own lands.
I sincerely believe that it will prove possible toarrive at a satisfactory, settlement of the refugee problem
along the lines which. J have mentioned a b o v e .
With regard to the possibility envisaged by Your
Majesty that force and violence may be used by Jews inaggressive schemes against the neighboring Arab countries,
I can assure you that this. Government.stands opposed toaggression of any kind or to the employment of terrorism
for political purposes.

I may add, moreover, that I am

convinced that responsible Jewish leaders do not contemplatea policy of aggression against ..the’ Arab countries adjacent
to Palestine,'L

I cannot agree with Your Majesty that my. statementof October 4 is in any way inconsistent with the position
taken- in the statement issued on my behalf on August 16.
'In the latter statement the hope was expressed that as aresult of the proposed conversations, between the British
Government and the Jewish and Arab representatives a fairsolution of the problem,of Palestine could, be found and
immediate steps could be taken to alleviate the situationof the displaced Jews in Europe.
have not been realized.

.Unfortunately, these hopes

The conversations between the

British Government and the Arab representatives h a v e , I
understand, been adjourned until December without a solution
having been found for the problem of.Palestine or without
any steps having been taken to alleviate.the situation of
the displaced Jews in Europe.
r

In this situation it seemed incumbent upon me tostate as frankly as possible.t h e .urgency of the matter andmy views both as to the direction in which a solution- based on reason and good will might be .reached and theimmediate steps which should be taken.

This I did in mystatement of October 4.
I am at a loss to understand ..why Your Majesty seems
to feel that this statement was in contradiction to previous

promises or statements made by this Government.

It may bewell to recall, here that in the past this Government, inoutlining its attitude on Palestine./ has given assurancesthat it would n o t take any action.which might prove hostile
to the Arab people, and also that in its .view there should ,be no decision with.respect to the basic situation in
Palestine without prior consultation with both Arabs and Jews.
I do not consider that my urging of the admittanceof a considerable number of displaced Jews into Palestineor my statements with regard to the solution of the problem
of Palestine in any sense represent an action hostile to the
Arab peo ple.

My.feelings with regard to the Arabs when I

made these statements w e r e , and are at the present time, of.
the most friendly character.

I deplore any kind of con­flict b e tween.Arabs and Jews, and am convinced that if
both peoples approach the problems before them in a spiritof conciliation and moderation these problems can be solved
to the lasting benefit of all concerned.

,

I furthermore do not feel that my statements in any
way represent a failure on the-part, of this Government, tolive up to its assurance that in its view there should be
no decision with respect to the basic,situation in Palestine
without consultation with both Arabs and J e w s .

During thecurrent year there have been a number of consultations withboth Arabs and Jews.

163

Mindful- of the great interest which your country,
as■well as. my own, has in the settlement of the various
matters which I have set forth above,.1 take this oppor­
tunity to express my earnest hope, .'that .Your Majesty, who
occupies a position of such eminence in the Arab world,
will use the great influence which you .possess to assist
in the finding in the immediate future of a just and lasting
solution.

I am anxious to do all that 1 can to aid in thematter and I can assure Your Majesty that the Government
and people of the United States are continuing to besolicitous of the interests and welfare of the Arabs, upon
whose historic friendship they place great v a l u e .
I also take this occasion to convey to Your Majesty
my warm personal greetings and my best wishes for thecontinued health and welfare of Your Majesty and yourpeople.

APPENDIX FEXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHN F . KENNEDY AND',AMIR FAISAL, PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF SAUDI ARABIA*Your Highness:. ■" ■As Your Highness assumes new and important respon­
sibilities upon your return to Saudi Arabia, I wish torecall,your visit to the White House on 5 October.

I thentold you and wish to reiterate now that Saudi Arabia canrely upon the friendship and cooperation of the United
'

.•

■:

:

.

■

■

■■■

States in handling various tasks confronting your country
in the future.

The United.States is firmly and deeply.concerned with the stability and progress of Saudi Arabia.
,I am confident that Saudi Arabia, under, your resolute andwise leadership, will go ahead successfully.with the modern
development and reform which you obviously desire.

Bypursuing this course, you may be certain of the full
support of the United States in safeguarding the entityof the Saudi Arabian kingdom.
I am well aware that to attain your objectives
you should enjoy the indispensable peace afforded by an*Council for Middle East Asia,' Middle Eastern•Affairs, V. 14, 1963.

'

':

'165

atmosphere free of vituperation, and.agitation from withinor outside the' country.

1 share .your anxiety over thetension now prevailing in the region, which hinders yourplan to strengthen the government.machinery and social
progress in Saudi Arabia.

As I told you in Washington,

the United States desires to be helpful in finding means
to ease such tensions,.

What I am looking forward to for the two countries
in the future is not merely maintaining, the friendly re­lations which had a good start during the era of yourexalted father, His Majesty the late Abd al-Aziz.

I amalso looking forward to a new chapter in Saudi-American
relations, whereby the bond linking the pursuit of enlight­
enment shall be firmly applied through out mutual belief
in mankind and our support for the firm rights of selfdetermination, progress, and freedom.
I wish you success and extend to you my personal
regard.

I pray God that He may protect you and the Saudi

people and grant you pea c e .
Sincerely,
JOHN F. KENNEDYYour Excellency:
I received the text of the cable which you addressed
to me and which was submitted to me by His Excellency yourambassador in Jidda on 8 November 1962.

In this message, your Excellency has reminded me ofthe visit which I. had the' opportunity, to pay to the WhiteHouse on 5 October, during which.you mentioned to me - andyou have repeated this in your.recent, message - that the
Saudi Arabian Kingdom could rely.on the .United States'
friendship in handling the various, tasks which it will facein the future.

This was because the United States isanxious.to see stability and progress prevail in the Saudi
Arabian Kingdom.
,■ . .,. .

You also expressed your confidence that.the govern­

ment which I head will, continue to adopt, modern methods 'and
proceed in the reforms which a r e .our obvious, desire, andthat in our march toward these goals we Can. rely on U.S.
support to safeguard the entity of the Saudi Arabian
Kingdom.

As Your Excellency said, to achieve these goals it

is necessary to create an atmosphere of calm and safety
which cannot be disturbed by hostile campaigns, accusations,and provocations.

You also added that you share with me theanxiety regarding the tension.which is surrounding the region
and which might hamper our determination to strengthen theregime in our country and lead our society toward progress.
You also pointed out what Your Excellency told me during
our meeting in Washington:that the United.States desires

to find means which would lead to decreasing this tension.

167
Your Excellency has also expressed your hope not
only to maintain the sincere relations between our countries
which had a fruitful start during.the reign of my latefather. King Abd al-Aziz - but also to .start a new era ofAmerican-Saudi relations.

This era.will be distinguished by

the fact that the link between our two .states is to be
based on the continuous and enlightened pursuit by each of
us of his interests with a profound belief in mankind's
indisputable right to realize its wish for progress andfreedom.
I express to Your Excellency my deep thanks for thegood and sincere feelings toward my country and the goodwishes for its progress and development contained in yourmessage.

I also thank you for your sentiments with regard

to myself.

I wish to remind you that the strengtheningof the sincere relations and cooperation between the UnitedStates and this country obtaining since my father laid its
foundation, has been and continues to be the subject of ourattention and caret
I was happy to see in your message to me and during
our meeting in the White House your determination tostrengthen these relations further.

.Onvour part, we donot spare any effort to strengthen these relations on
the basis of an awareness of the real interests of our two
countries.

For this purpose, my government will continue

168
to strengthen the traditional relations of .friendship and. sincerity and increase and develop avenues for fruitfulcooperation between the two countries in various fields.
We appreciate Your Excellency's awareness of theprevailing atmosphere of tension.in the region and of the ,futile accusations and grudges' which, .in our opinion, would
only dissipate constructive and fruitful efforts and divert
attention from the actual and fundamental, questions of theregion's peoples.

Such questions, .are.:,combating back­wardness, raising the- standard of living of .the population,
exploiting all their resources, increasing their national
income, and providing them with democratic channels of. power, under which they can express themselves, theirhopes, and aspirations in a constructive freedom aimed atrealizing their capabilities in various fields.
We are confident that righteous men have no doubtthat we had no share in stirring up such attacks, campaigns,
and accusations.

While expressing our deep regret at sucha situation, we wholeheartedly desire to remove and uproot
its causes.
Nevertheless, we are determined to implement our
resolution to provide our country.with modern governmental
establishments suitable to and consistent with our country
and its nature, under which the citizen.will.enjoy his
fundamental human rights and become aware of and utilize

:

■

169

his potentials for his own benefit and that of his society.
We are also determined to implement our comprehensive reform
policy, which will benefit all classes of the people.

To

realize these objectives', we will depend upon our. own
efforts and upon bur latent energies .in.particular.
However, the present society is almost,unified, and its
borders have been or are about to. .be eliminated.

We a r e ,therefore, resorting to friendly,states to. accord us theirresources and past e x p e r i e n c e f o r e m o s t among which is theUnited States of America.
No obstacles will hinder our comprehensive reform .
policy.

We sincerely hope that the factors which compel us

to devote a greater part of our efforts and resources todefend our existence against any attempts and campaigns
will abate so that we may direct all our potentials andenergies to constructive development.
Finally, I thank Your. Excellency once again foryour letter and for the good wishes for the welfare of thetwo countries' and all mankind.

It pleases me to extend to

you similar feelings and hop e s .

I take this opportunity

to wish Your Excellency once more good health and happinessand productive growth and constructive prosperity for the
future.of the two countries'

relations.
- Sincerely,
FAISAL'APPENDIX G
THE CHARTER OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE SIGNED BYSAUDI ARABIA, PAKISTAN AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC,MARCH 15, 1956, IN MECCA

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APPENDIX I■ MAPS
Following are two maps illustrating the areas
covered in this study;
East, and

(1) Saudi Arabia and the Near

(2) Buraimi.

176

177

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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books' in' Arabic
A l k a d r i N." The Great' Challenge
1966.
...

(Attahdi Alkabir) .

BeirutBishr, 0.
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Almajd Fii Tarich N a j d ) . V o l . .2, Cairo, 1955.
Hathlul, S.
History of the Kings of A l -Saud (Tarich Muluk
Al-Saud). Riyadh Press, Saudi Arabia, 1961.
Khariabah, M.
Introduction to Modern A r a b 1s History(Moquadimah Fii Tarich Al-Arab Al-Hadith).
Damascus University P r e s s , Damascus, 1960.
Madi, 'M. A. Modern Renaissance in Arabia - Saudi Arabia(Annahadat Al-Haditha Fii Jazirat Al-Arab, AlMamlakah Al-Arabiah As-Saudiyah).
Rebirth Arabic
Book House, Cairo, 1952„
Nasser, J.
Philosophy of Revolution, Cairo, 1953 ,(Falsafat Athaworah).

Sadik, M„ T.
The Development.of Government and Adminis­
tration in Saudi Arabia (Tatawour Nizam Alhukam
wa Al-Idarh Fii Al-Mamlakah aA-Arabiah as-Saudiyah)
Najd Commercial Press, Riyadh, 1965.
Wahba, H.
The Island of the Arabs in the 20th Century(Jazirat Al-Arab Fii Al-Karn Al-Ishrin). Cairo,
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Walter, L.
The Soviet Union and the Middle East (AlIttihad Al-Sofiati wa Al-Shark Al-Ousat). Arabictranslation. Commerce Office, Beirut, 1.959.
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Antonius, G, , The Arab Awakening. Khayat's College Book
Cooperative, Beirut, 1955.
DeGaury, G.

Faisal.

F. A. Preager, New York, 1967.
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DeNova, J, A, American Interests and Policies in the
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Dickson, H .R . P . Kuwait and Her Neighbours.
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Donpertz. The Middle East Today.
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G. A . Unwin

Holt/ Rinehart andEddy, W. A.
Franklin D . Roosevelt Meets Ibn-S a u d .
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Hagarth,.D. G.

Arabia.

Clarendon Press, London, 1922.

Harari, M.
Government and Politics of the Middle E a s t .
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.
Haworth, D.

The Desert K i n g .

McGraw Hill Book Co., 1964.

Ingrams, H.
The Yemen History.
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Kelly, J. B.
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Kheiraila, H. G. Arabia Reborn.
v
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F. A. Preager,

New Mexico University

Lenczowski, G.
The Middle East in World Affairs.
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Cornell

Lipsky, beorge Arthur.
Saudi Ara b i a . .New Haven Press,
Connecticut, I96 0.
'
Macdonald, R. N.
The League of the Arab States.
University Press, New Jersey, 1965.
Philby, J. B .
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Arabian Days.

Princeton

Robert Hale LtdV, London,

Saudi Arabia. - F. A. Preager, New York, 1955.
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Regional Development for Regional

Sanger, R. H.
The Arabian Peninsula.
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Sayegh, F , A.
The Dynamics of Neutralism in the ArabW o r l d . Chandler Publishing Corporation, 1964.
Smith, W. C.
Islam in Recent History.
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Princeton University

Spencer., M.
Political Evaluation in the Middle E a s t .
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Islamic Literature.
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United Nations' Office of Public Information. Every M a n 1s.. United Nations. United Nations Publications,1964. •- \General Assembly. No. 341-343, 1957-1961. ., :. U N

Review.

Vol. 31, 1956«

Year Book. - 1965,.

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1966.

Williams, W.
America and the Middle East. -Rinehart Inc.,' • 1958, .
' 'Winder, R. B . Saudi Arabia in the 19th Century.
:
Martin's Press, 1965. .

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Documents
Hurewitz, J . C . Diplomacy in the Near East and Middle■ Ea s t . A Documentary Record, 1535-1956, D. Van
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The Arab States and the Arab League. A
Documentary Record, Khayats> Rul-Bliss, Beirut,
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, ' .
- '
"Arabia Felix", The Economist, October 27, 1962, pp. 212-213
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"Crowded Arabia", The Economist, November 17, 1962, p. 645.
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\
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Ill, No.. 138, 1966.

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;.
"Peace Push", The Economist, December 11, 1965, p. 1194.

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Lectures in political science in Riyadh Uni­
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