JAPAN’S INITIATIVES IN SECURITY COOPERATION IN
THE STRAITS OF MALACCA ON MARITIME SECURITY
AND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:PIRACY AND MARITIME TERRORISM

Andrin Raj
JIIA Visiting Research Fellow
Director for Centre
Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

The Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA)Tokyo, Japan 2009

CONTENTS
1. Acknowledgments ･････････････････････････････････････････････････････ 4
2. Sources and Methodology ････････････････････････････････････････････････5
3. Malacca Straits: Map and Definitions ･･････････････････････････････････････ 6
4. International Maritime Bureau Piracy Map 2008 ･････････････････････････････ 7
5. Executive Summary: Straits of Malacca and its Historical Legacy ････････････････ 8
6. Introduction ･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････ 10
7. Background ･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････ 11
8. Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Straits of Malacca: Regional Trends and the nexusof Maritime Terrorism ･････････････････････････････････････････････････ 14
9. The Straits: A High Risk Zone and the threat from Maritime Terrorism ･･･････････ 16
Appendix: Reported Attacks in 2008 ･･･････････････････････････････････････ 22
1. Chart A: Reported incidents of attacks (Jan-Dec 2008)
2. Table 1: Location of actual and attempted attacks (Jan-Dec2008)
3. Chart B: Monthly comparison on attacks (Jan-Dec 2008)
4. Chart C: Total incidents (Jan-Dec 2008)
5. Chart D: Types of vessels attacked (Jan-Dec 2008)
6. Chart E: Comparison of the type of attack (Jan-Dec 2008)
7. Chart F: Flag states of vessels attacked (Jan-Dec 2008)
10. Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Post Cold War ･･････････････････････ 27
11. Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Relevance of the threat of Piracy and Maritime
Terrorism and the changing structural and economic system ･･････････････････ 31
12. Japan’s Initiatives and Contribution to the Safety of Sea-Lines of Communication inSoutheast Asia: Piracy and Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca ･･････････ 34
1) Japan’s Policy Formulation in Piracy for Southeast Asia
2) Japan’s Earlier Efforts in Southeast Asia on Combating Piracy and Maritime
Threats
3) Japan’s Current Policy on Piracy and the threat from Maritime Terrorism213. Japan’s role and approaches to Piracy and Maritime Terrorism ･････････････････ 38
14. Japan Coast Guard (JCG): Current Capacity-Building Measures and inserts of JCG’soperations on Cooperation, Piracy and Terrorism internationally ･･･････････････ 40
15. Conclusion ･･････････････････････････････････････････････････････････ 46
Appendix: Japanese Self Defense Force current operations and regional efforts in Piracy
and Terrorism ･･････････････････････････････････････････47
Source: 1st Tokyo-Seminar on Common Security Challenges “Future Cooperation among
Defense Authorities in the Region”, 18 March 2009, Tokyo
Appendix: Policies for Sea-Lines off Communication (SLOC) ････････････････････ 49
Source: Provided by the Office of Strategic Planning, Japan Ministry of Defense(JMOD)

Appendix: Japanese Aid to Malaysia – Official Development Assistance (ODA) ･･････ 54
Source: Provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan
Japanese Aid to Indonesia – Official Development Assistance (ODA) ･･････ 58
Source: Provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan
Appendix: International Maritime Bureau – IMO 2008 Annual Report ･･････････････ 63
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Table 2: Actual and attempted attacks by location (Jan-Dec 2008)
Table 4: Status of ships during actual attacks (Jan-Dec2008)
Table 5: Status of Ships during attempted attacks (Jan-Dec 2008)
Table 6: Types of arms used during attacks (Jan-Dec 2008)
Table 7: Comparison of the type of attacks (Jan-Dec 2008)
Table 8: Type of violence to crew (Jan-Dec 2008)
Table 9: Types of violence to crew by location (Jan –Dec 2008)
Table 10: Types of arms used in geographical locations (Jan-Dec 2008)

Notes ････････････････････････････････････････････････････････････････ 683

Acknowledgments
My analysis for this project paper draws considerably upon a wealth of data collected overa 3- month period of my fellowship at the Japan Institute for International Affairs, anaffiliate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, as an Asean Visiting Scholar. I would
also like to take this opportunity to thank the Japan Institute for International Affairs forproviding me with this fellowship. I would like to acknowledge their specific assistance andcontributions as well as their support in working with me as a Visiting Fellow.
In particular, I wish to thank and congratulate the President of JIIA, Ambassador Yoshiji
Nogami, on his new appointment and heading the Japan Institute for International Affairs;
Ambassador Toshiyuki Fujiwara, the Executive Director of JIAA and a colleague of minefrom the Strategic Communications Network (TOD TURKEY) set up in Istanbul, Turkey inspring of 2007, comprising 23 Strategic Centers from the Middle East, Asia and Northeast
Asia, for giving me his constant support over my 3-month stay in JIIA. I appreciated his
exceptionally warm hospitality of welcoming me into a team of highly professional
Research Fellows, Research Assistants and administrative team that looked into the wellbeing of my stay here at JIIA; the former Director General of JIIA, Mr. Seki Tomoda, whorecently retired and was very welcoming, although we only had a little time spent together.
I would like to congratulate and thank the current Director General, Ms. Naoko Saiki on her
new post and appointment as well as the hospitality that she has given me over these couple
of weeks.
I wish to thank current Fellows at JIIA on their support as well as research assistances thatassisted me in many ways and whom I am grateful for their assistance.
I also would like to thank my appointed research assistant, Yayoi Sonoda for taking goodcare of my stay here at JIIA and in Tokyo. She has assisted me in all my meetings, getting
relevant data and information for my project and assisting me whenever possible.
Lastly I would like to thank my advisor and supervisor, Vice Admiral (Ret) Hideaki
Kaneda, whose guidance and support was vital in this project. Admiral Kaneda has given
me his full support in assisting me as well as connecting me with key government officials
and making my research a very rewarding one. Admiral Kaneda is renowned for his
expertise on maritime security and is currently serving as a Senior Research Fellow fornational security at the Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc. Tokyo Japan.
Domo Arigato,Andrin Raj

4Source and Methodology
Much of the underlying for this report was compiled from a team of experts from various
governmental agencies and research associations associated with piracy, maritime terrorism
and terrorism, defense and security as well a the military and the coast guard of Japan under
the supervision of my advisor Vice Admiral (Ret) Hideaki Kaneda. The core experts fromthe Japanese authorities were assigned at respective agencies covering the area of my paper.
This is to ascertain a detailed research protocol designed to ensure the credibility of data.
Some data attained will not carry disclosed source for security reasons. Sources for most
specific statistics and references are cited using endnotes.
Piracy and armed robbery against ships data and graphs are from the ICC International
Maritime Bureau, International Maritime Organization (IMO) and sources from the
Malaysian Piracy Reporting Centre. Maps and definitions provided by MalaysianInternational Shipping Cooperation (MISC). The Japanese data on Piracy and Maritime
Piracy are attained from the Japanese Coast Guard and from the Ministry of Defense Naval
Office, Ministry of Defense Strategic Planning Office and National Institute for Defense
Studies Japan.
Other sources of information on international relations and Southeast Asia relations havebeen derived from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan from relevant departments such
as Maritime Security Policy Division, Southeast and Southwest Asian Affairs DepartmentAsian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Policy Coordination Division-Foreign Policy Bureau
and First Country Assistance Planning Division - International Cooperation Bureau.
Relevant other data was compiled from the Ocean Policy Research Foundation of Japan(OPRF), Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), National Defense Academy andformer retired Rear Admiral Yukinori Togo from the Japanese Navy and who commanded
the Japanese operations in Operation Enduring Freedom in the Gulf of Aden.
Malaysian data compiled by interviews from abroad with the Ministry of Defense Malaysia,
some consultation with the Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency on security related
equipment, US Embassy of Malaysia, Defense Services Office prior to paper write up as
well as with Maritime Experts from the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA).
Sources are also derived from my own experience in researching piracy, terrorism, defense
and security issues. Relevant other issues pertaining to military scope and views are also
derived from my experience as a US Army Cadet Officer and acting as a consultant for
TASK Int. of the UK on special operations training for the Malaysian Special Forces on
countering terrorism. Other sources of information are derived from my colleague Dr.
Rohan Gunaratna, Head of the Centre of Political Violence and Terrorism (ICPVTR).
Actual travels to Thailand and Indonesia on studying terrorist groups in the past and fromon going research on piracy and terrorist activities.

5

MALACCA STRAITS: MAP & DEFINATION

Malaysian International Shipping Cooperation (MISC)

6PIRACY ATTACKS IN 2008
International Maritime Bureau (IMB)

SOURCE: IBM

7

Executive Summary: Straits of Malacca and its Historical Legacy
Piracy in Southeast Asia is as old as seaborne trade that dates back to the early archipelagosettlements around the littoral states in the Straits of Malacca as well as the east towards thePhilippines and during the European colonization. The beginnings of these settlements werealso a haven for the growth of maritime piracy and armed robbery.
Piracy continues to persist in today’s international waters and the threat of maritime
terrorism is steadily growing as well, in particular of the Straits of Malacca where the paper
will concentrate on. The Straits of Malacca have been the main connecting link between
Europe, the Middle East and South Asia on one side and Southeast and East Asia on theother. A constant stream of merchandise and trade has flown through the passage from theEast to West and West to East.
Before the islands and peninsulas bordering the Straits were carved up by colonial powers
from the 16thth century onwards, the Straits linked Sumatra, the Riau Islands and the ThaiMalay Peninsula into one cultural religion with many cross-cutting ethnic ties, trans-straits
kingdoms, networks of trade and religion. These links were somewhat reduced but by nomeans cut by colonial and post-colonial governance, rivalries and systems of domination.
In the early phases of the newly independent littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore andIndonesia, cross-Straits connections declined but started to develop more forcefully witheconomic growth and development in the 1980s. At the same time the Straits of Malacca
maintained and increased its position as the worlds most important shipping lane, more sothat the Panama Canal or the Straits of Gibraltar. Estimate differs, but as of now more than
60,000 vessels per year and more than one third of the tonnage of world shipping passes
through the roughly 100 km of the Straits of Malacca each year. Sea traffic now isregulated but sovereignty is strictly guarded by the littoral states. However the UnitedStates has been politically using preemptive diplomacy towards the littoral states tointernationalize the Straits.
The threat of piracy and maritime terrorism has also been a critical factor in addressing theStraits of Malacca as well as the political dynamics and security approaches that are
increasingly of vital importance to the littoral states, as pressure from the international
community brings forth a new era of security and political concerns. The Straits is now
considered an even more strategic location for acts of piracy and maritime terrorism toflourish and to hinder the economies of the world. As much as the Straits is considered“safe” we must not take this for granted as this will be the “grey” area of a “soft” target by
the Southeast Asia terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah. i
This group has issued warnings and has strong links with the Free Acheh Movement(G.A.M), as well as other terrorist organizations operating in the Southeast Asia region. A
spokes person of the Free Acheh Group has criticized international seafarers of not abiding
with G.A.M’s recognition on its claim to sovereignty and of using its waterways although8than the area of Acheh came under the rule of Indonesia. My paper will highlight the close
proximity of piracy and maritime terrorism in the Straits of Malacca and the importance toacknowledge, that acts of maritime terrorism is in fact a reality and the terrorist group
Jemaah Islamiyah can be intertwine together in respect to the growing threat of terrorism inSoutheast Asia.
The paper will look into the piracy and maritime terrorism in the Straits of Malacca as well
as some area of concern in the sea-lines of Southeast Asia in respect to the Philippines andthe Straits as “high risk” zone. Inserts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Official
Development Assistance (ODA) to Malaysia have been attached for Malaysian viewers.
I will then probe into the security cooperation and the institutions that play a role within the
security aspect of the Straits. Further to that I will draw upon the Japanese current
initiatives in working with Malaysia and the littoral states on a whole. I will then identify
the initiatives taken, the role and approaches to piracy and maritime terrorism from theJapanese perspective.

…………………………………………………………………..

9

Introduction
The geographical location of maritime Southeast Asia has led to its archipelagic waterways
assuming immense global criticality for piracy and maritime terrorism. The Malacca Straits
is one of the world’s most vulnerable areas because of their high potential for politicalconflict and environmental disaster. The effective management of a regional problem forpiracy and maritime terrorism in the Southeast Asian region of the Straits of Malacca
demands understanding of current political dynamics and security approaches.
Cross-boundary social networks are ethnically diverse but closely integrated. Thus, theStraits’ culture and bio-diversity bear great opportunities for the economic and social
development of the littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia as well as for
Thailand. Peace and stability in the region are a precondition for regional development,
uninterrupted energy supplies and international trade between the European Union and EastAsia.
Of immense importance will be the creation of a space for dialogue and contacts between
stakeholders who have interest in coping with pirate and maritime attacks in this region,
whether they be end users of energy resources traversing the waterway or the littoral statestrying to enhance their own security situation.
Piracy continues to persist in today’s 21st century settings and in itself both directly andindirectly manifests a range of related social, historical, geo-political, security andeconomic issues. Piracy has permeated the world of maritime domain throughout history
and in contemporary times, the waters of Southeast Asia serves as a dominant region forboth occurrence of this activity and the challenges it poses as well as its new form of theinvolvement of maritime threats from terrorism.

10

Background
The Straits of Malacca commands a navigational water route for nearly sixty percent of world tradeas well as one of the busiest waterways in the world with more than sixty thousand ships passing
through per annum. The drop in piracy attacks over the couple of years does not necessarily mean asafer passage for vessels with the littoral states assuring its security. As such, the threat of a largescale maritime terrorist attack may be overlooked. Al Qeada and Jemaah Islamiyah have infact sentout warnings on potential attacks on countries economies through navigational routes and thismakes the Straits of Malacca a potential maritime target.
The international community such as the Joint War Committee (JWC) representing the London
marine insurance and Ageis Defense Services has declared in its risk assessment that a maritime
terrorist and piracy attack in the Straits of Malacca is a potential threat. Intelligence and information
gathered from Piracy, Jemaah Islamiyah operating in Southeast Asia and the threats from the FreeAceh Movement (G.A.M) on hijacking vessels, clearly indicates the level of penetration of terrorist
organization infiltrating piracy operations in the Straits of Malacca.
Although the littoral states and to some extend the ship owners association has regretted over thedecision of the JWC, it is without a doubt that we must be prepared for a maritime attack. A
warranted lack of evidence pointing to an immediate threat from maritime terrorism and tocompletely rule out the possibility of an attack in the Straits would be an incorrect assessment.
In one of my previous mentioned articles on the Somali maritime piracy and terrorism issue, these“pirates” are no “Pirates of the Caribbean”. ii The piracy in the Straits of Malacca has been
penetrated by terrorist organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah’s and its role in supporting the
G.A.M. movement in Acheh, in the north part of Sumatra as well as in the region around thePhilippines where the Morro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
have conducted acts of maritime terrorism in Davoa city and Manila Bay. Foreign terrorist
organizations are also working in Southeast Asia as evidence and sources have proved that
“Cheznya” terrorist “modus operandi” was uncovered in a bombing in the Patani area some six
years ago. A relatively important noteworthy quote from a colleague of mine; “Terrorist needs tobe lucky once, we need to be lucky all the time”.
These pirates are well-trained “militia”, incorporating “military style” tactics that no“normal”
pirate is aware of. There is no way a “regular” person can perpetrate this act, as one needs to be
trained in engaging a vessel which is probably more than a hundred feet in length and about fifty
feet in height. One needs skills of engaging a vessel, expertise on boarding a vessel, which means
traveling at a speed, to keep up with the vessels speed and maneuvering next to it.
It is believed that ex-military personnel or renegade soldiers of “special forces” training areengaged in such piracy attacks. They may come from any part of the Southeast Asia region. The
trainings are provided by them as well as Jemaah Islamiyah operating training cells in Southern
Philippines and Indonesia and to some extend in Thailand, which the authorities have come hard
upon after the 911 attacks, and in curtailing the growth of these training cells and the involvement
of JI. Terrorist operatives are well trained and are well prepared for a major maritime attack in theStraits of Malacca. The bombing of the USS Cole off Yemen is not a “failure” but a means ofeducation, learning, and training for a “bigger” attack to come.

11

As the issue of “sovereignty”, is the most controversial issue pertaining to the Straits of Malacca,
the littoral states have to address these issues on the fact that an eventual maritime attack mightcause a massive large-scale economic disaster not only regionally but also globally. The Straits ofMalacca remain vulnerable to the threat of maritime terrorism, as littoral states do not have theexperience neither the capabilities to respond to an attack. If an attack were to occur in the Straits ofMalacca from a hazardous chemical cargo, it would take a couple of weeks to actually respond to it,as there are no measures taken or planned for a maritime attack in the Straits.
Though disaster management trainings are conducted, there is no such facility or organization thatcan be deployed rapidly to a disaster. Appropriate measures need to be taken seriously in terms of
training, responding, information and intelligence sharing among littoral states as well as partneringwith the international community on securing the Straits and to establish an organization within thelittoral states for disaster relief and support. This organization should be solely responsible fordisasters and to manage a pool of expertise as well as with equipment and support salvage andrespond boat or ship units.
The littoral states have to also compromise in the cooperation of international joint patrols and sea
borne trainings offered by many international maritime agencies. The littoral states can monopolize
Asean countries expertise such as the Japanese Coast Guard who has the expertise and experience
accumulated in sixty years. The Japanese Coast Guard has conducted joint patrol trainings with thePhilippines Coast Guard recently as of last year and Thailand will probably be following suit aswell as Singapore. iii The JCG training vessel Kogima will be leaving Japan in April of this year
bound for the Asia region on a capacity building program for a three-month voyage. iv
It is wise to be practical in addressing the issues of piracy and maritime terrorism rather than to harpon “sovereignty” issues. All nations, due to past experiences from war or political issues need todeal, address and to be realistic in the security of the Straits and the fight of the “war on terror”.
The “terrorist” is not going to wait for the littoral states to solve its “sovereignty” problems. As
can be seen from evidence presented above, the Straits of Malacca is “open” access to a possible
maritime attack. One area that concerns me most is the upper north region of Aceh and the coastal
town of Bireuen where potential attacks can be perpetrated due to the lack of surveillance and thewide open international waters leading into the mouth of the Straits and the other at the island off
Pulau Karimun and heading down south into the Indonesian waters towards the east. The other areaof concern is that Al-Qaeda has shown us attacks from land and air with great destruction so as
Jemaah Islamiyah in the Bali bombings. In my opinion, the next attack will be a major maritime
attack.

As much as Piracy is an issue, we must also be aware that maritime terrorism is also a
potential threat in the Straits of Malacca. We have seen maritime terrorism in thePhilippines and acts of terrorism within the Southeast Asia region mainly in Indonesia andSouthern Thailand during which a rein of terror struck in the Southeast Asia and worst hit
in Indonesia and we cannot deny the fact that a maritime attack is possible. The Threat of
Jemaah Islamiyah and its supporting terrorist organizations operating in Southern
Philippines, Southern Thailand and Indonesia is no doubt engaged in preparing for amaritime attack in an effort to cripple the Asian and International economies.

12

Piracy as it remains a hot issue in Southeast Asia has seen more than 60 actual attacks andmore than 19 attempted acts of piracy against vessels in the Straits of Malacca. v Malaysia
too has been victimized by piracy attacks and the Malaysian authorities have been making
great efforts in securing the Straits from threats of piracy. The Malaysian Maritime
Enforcement Agency (MMEA) together with the Marine Police force, the Royal Malaysian
Navy and the Royal Malaysian Customs have been actively cooperating with one another incombating the threats of piracy as well as other forms of transnational crimes operating
within the Straits of Malacca. However, there is a need to upgrade and train the newly set
up MMEA as the lack of resources, expertise, and equipment is hindering some of its efforts.
Among the littoral states, Indonesia has seen some of the worst hit in comparison to otherlittoral states.
The Straits is an important navigational route for Japan’s trade and commerce. Piracy andmaritime terrorism is of particularly a major concern to Japan, because Japan lacks energy
and has to import oil from the Middle East, and this oil inevitably passes through the Straitsof Malacca. Having 50% of its energy resources and some 90% of its oil coming from theMiddle East, there is absolutely a lot for Japan to be concerned about the Straits in terms ofpiracy and maritime attacks. vi
With increasing frustrations at the mostly-ineffective associations of Southeast Asian
Nations efforts at countering and combating piracy, Japan announced its intentions ofsending its Coast Guard vessels to Southeast Asia to conduct joint patrol exercises with
ASEAN nations. Current capacity building programs are in the pipeline with Japan for the
littoral states. One such exercise was conducted last year with the Philippines Coast Guardand to be followed suit with other countries such as Thailand and Malaysia in the near
future. vii
Besides oil, Japan is also the world’s largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG) andIndonesia has traditionally been the world’s largest exporter, though the LNG fields are
now depleting in Indonesia. But nevertheless, a large volume still heads to Japan passing
through the Indonesian waters. The Japanese government has prompted its Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) to consider how it might protect Japanese vessels using these sealanes. According to a study, some 20% of all ships transiting the Straits are said to be ofJapanese owned. viii
Japan’s motivation for mobilizing its forces for anti-piracy efforts has been a source ofspeculation. Japan has been actively canvassing support for the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) to obtain a permanent membership within UNSC. A new proposed
security strategy for Japan, “Multilayered and Cooperative Security Strategy” will be
introduced in the near future and it could very well lay out a new security framework forJapan. This will also allow the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to address the overall security
issues pertaining to Japan as well as elements in the issues to piracy and maritime terrorism.

13

Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Regional Trends and the nexus of
Maritime Terrorism
By the end of the third quarter of 2008, the region in Southeast Asia recorded some 60
cases of piracy and armed robbery incidence for the year. This is one of the lowest incomparison from the last five years. With regards to actual attacks, 18 such attacks
occurred during the third quarter of 2008.
The trends are basically theft and armed robbery that make up the actual attacks during thelast quarter of 2008. Most of the reported cases in 2008 have been in theft and armed
robbery. A report from the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) states, although
there was only one reported hijacking incident during the last quarter of 2008, it serves as areminder “that there are more than just petty thieves in these waters”.
The statement above, may suggests that the theft and armed robbery may not be confined to“poor fisherman” but more of a serious threat to maritime security. We must not becomplacent on the fact that as much as piracy is a main concern in the Straits of Malacca
the possibility and the threat of maritime terrorism should not be overlooked.
On the current attacks reported, no firearms were reportedly used during such attacks in thelast quarter of 2008. ix Basic weapons such as “parang” (sword welding type) and knives
were the weapons of choice. The piracy in the Gulf of Aden, however are much moresophisticated as the pirates are well armed with semi and automatic weapons, Rocket
Propelled Guns (RPG), Global Positioning Systems (GPS), modern and fast speedboats andare acquiring more mileage in terms of its weapons as well as its sophistication methods.
The Asian archipelago is a haven of arms smuggling especially around the Sulawesi waters
and also the southern part of Thailand. In time these pirates will arm themselves withweapons as their counterparts in the Gulf of Aden and it will be a matter of time before they
engage in acts of maritime terrorism. We must note however most of the information
provided for the Asian reports does not literally furnish information related to weapons
used specifically. These are a constant need to gauge information on trends and potential
violence that takes place in the regional waters of the Straits.
The current wave of attacks on vessels transiting the Straits and most susceptible to attacks
are those with lower freeboards, slower speed and with little or none security measures put
in place. Most of the attacks during 2008 in the Southeast Asia region were targeted at
Tankers as compared to other vessels transiting the Straits.
The area where most attacks occurred is in the Indonesian waters, but nevertheless, weshould be vigilant on the whole of the Straits as piracy and maritime terrorism can justabout occur at any juncture of the waterways particularly the Straits of Malacca. A numberof attacks also occurred in the Southern part of the Philippines and in the waters in Vietnam.
In a report by International Maritime Organization (IMO), the last quarter of 2008 reported

14

incidents took place during vessels berthing, but more serious attacks took place further
offshore, targeting steaming vessels. x The last quarter of last year also saw a reported
hijacking incident of the east coast of Malaysia in the Tioman Island where pirates
absconded with a tug after landing crewmembers of the island.
Recently in February of 2009, the first attack and hostage taking took place at the Northernpart of the Straits, where in a previous published article stressed the lack of security andpotential site for an attack. xi The International Maritime Reporting Centre confirmed a
Singapore managed tug and barge had been attacked and two crewmembers had been
kidnapped in the Malacca Straits. xii This is the first attack after a long lull in kidnap-andransom case in the Straits, a once afflicted waterway, between peninsular Malaysia andIndonesia’s Sumatra Island.
The threat of maritime terrorism is a “real” threat in the Southeast Asia region and theMoro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), has proved what terrorist organizations are capable
off in a maritime attack. In April of 2003, the MILF carried out one of the biggest maritime
terrorist attacks in the Philippines. The attack took place at a busy seaport in Davoa City
with major casualties. The MILF has also carried out similar attacks in Philippines shipping
industry, mainly placing bombs on domestic inter-island ferries transporting members of
the Philippine Armed Forces to and fro from the Mindanao Island and other such attacks on
civilian lives around the region as well as the Abu Sayyaf Group on the Super ferry attackin February of 2004. It has been noted that terrorist groups in the Philippines, while
advocating independence in the southern part of the Philippines were making a living as
pirates in the Sulu Seas. xiii
As piracy is frequent in Southeast Asia, terrorists have found it an attractive cover for
maritime terrorism. Although the motives of pirates may differ from terrorist objectives, wemust address the fact that terrorist organizations can and will infiltrate the villages where
pirates operate in order to get their support and in the long term support the villages for“economic prosperity”. The former pursues economic gains but by becoming bolder andstronger in their efforts, may latter advance to political objectives. This is where the issues
pertaining to terrorist objectives can play a hand in assisting the former.
Terrorist groups operating in Southeast Asia, such as Jemaah Islamiyah have strong links to
Al Qaeda and have been operating closely with the Free Acheh Movement (GAM), theMoro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf (ASG) as well as many other small
insurgencies uprising in the Southern Thailand of the Patani United Liberation
Organization (PULO) and Barisan Revolusi National (BRN). There are reports from theThai authorities that the influence is coming from international terrorist organizations. xiv
Groups such as the Kumpulan Mujahedin Malaysia (KMM) a.k.a Kumpulan Militan
Malaysia (KMM) have had strong links to the Al Qeada while operating in Malaysia prior
to the 911 attacks.

15

Terrorist groups regard seaports and Sea-Lines of Communication (SLOC) network an
attractive target because they lie in the intersection of terrorist intent, capability, andopportunity. The growth of commercial shipping in Southeast Asia makes the challenge ofpiracy and maritime terrorism in the region alarming. The U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence
Coordinating Centre has reported in 1999, that it forecasted the world commercial shipping
industry to increase enormously by 2020 and that this will trigger the proliferation oftransnational crime and terrorism at sea. xv
The four major world’s busiest shipping routes are in Southeast Asia, ie: the Malacca
Straits, Sunda, Lombok, and Makansar straits. As stated earlier in the paper, 60% of theworld’s annual merchant fleet transits these straits, and more than 15% of the value ofworld trade passes through Southeast Asia. xvi These figures are projected to grow over theyears and it commands some strategic thinking to protect it from major disasters that may
be potentially harmful to the economies of the world. The Straits of Malacca is a maritime
gateway between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and it will remain a world centreof maritime activity. We must realize that if piracy is capable of many sophisticated attacks,
why terrorist groups can’t be considered the same and the possibility of engaging pirate’s
assistance!
If a terrorist group hijacks a vessel and turn it into a “floating” bomb to destroy ports or oil
refineries (these are many along the Straits of Malacca) the effect would be catastrophic.
And attack such as that would cripple world trade and slow down international shipping aswell as spreading the fear. The prospect of such a maritime incident is not remote.
Container vessels, where, highly vulnerable and the possibilities of its being used as aweapon of mass destruction has been documented. xvii Thus, maritime terrorism in Southeast
Asia and in particular the Straits of Malacca must no longer be considered as a question but
rather of when and where. I have been adamant about the fact that a maritime terrorist
attack is not too far away. We cannot and never be able to stop one from occurring but weneed to strategically think of how to prevent and respond to a maritime disaster.
The Straits: A High Risk Zone and the threat from Maritime Terrorism
A maritime terrorist attack in this economically strategic waterway would certainly havepotential to cause a large-scale economic impact, not just regionally but on a global scale.
The 911 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in September of 2001, brought about amajor discussion with IMO on the vulnerability of shipping to terrorism. xviii The underlying
issues put forth in this meet were to ensure the security and contents of the containers intransit, to vet crewmembers, the transport of biological and chemical weapons, attacks on
vessels and their use as weapons. On this accord, the creation of the International Ship andPort Facility Security (ISPS) code was implemented. The measures taken on this new
security agreement for Port security made it a top priority for all Port facilities to adhere to
the regulations set forth on the pretext of the above set standards.

16

In the wake of the 911 attacks, most government agencies stepped up its security measures
to prevent any further terrorist attacks within their home ground. Such comparison insecurity measures for instance, is the aviation sector that got the most attention and
immediately had a considerable improvement world over. But less can be said about themaritime sector has it seemed to provide terrorist with easy excess of soft targets. Althougha range of security measures have been implemented, it is still much easier for a terrorist to
hijack a vessel or use it as a “floating” bomb than an airplane xix As much as piracy andmaritime terrorism may differ from the views of security experts, there is a distinct fact thatthe two can be of the same in objectives.
Piracy can be defined in a much-concentrated aspect such as “political piracy” motivatedby political ideologies rather than economic gains. The act of political piracy is for the
purpose of generating funds for political ideological or religious struggle. Thus, maritime
terrorism can be perpetrated in order to promote a political, ideological or religious cause.
In contrast to these issues, a number of attacks have occurred in the northern part of
Sumatra near the Acehnese coast and off the coast of the Indonesian down towards thesouth part of Singapore and the Philippines coastal waters near the Mindanao Island
associated with terrorist organizations such as the MILF and ASG.
There are reports that terrorist had used pirates in attacks using their boats as well as using
their expertise to assist a terrorist motivated objective. xx Indonesian’s of origin decent who
are from marginalized groups, mostly perpetrates the current piracy attacks in the Straits
and east towards the Indonesian waters for political and economic gains. In the Southeast
Asian waters and near the Mindanao island, they are mostly perpetrated by the MILF and
the ASG both acting as pirates and terrorist operations for a political and religious struggle.
Earlier pirates from the Philippines were also marginalized groups who turned to piracy fora living. However, it must be noted that the GAM movement has also operated as pirates
and terrorist.
This is relatively by far in comparison of the earlier pirates who were predominately of,from east Asia who settled in the costal area of Malaysia, Sumatra and Indonesia andoperated till the late 20th century. This is not true of the current pirates operating inSoutheast Asia today, as acts of piracy and the nexus of terrorism are intertwined in the
new era of extremist “Jihadism” fighting for a religious course in Southeast Asia. With
regards to these attacks, one can wonder if it is for economic gains or pure political efforts
to help maintain the struggle of a political ideological course that is occurring in the
Acehnese region, the Southern Thai uprising, and the Southern Philippines of the Mindanao
Island where terrorist organizations are operating on a political as well as religious struggle.
In contra to IBM reports on weather GAM’s involvement played a role in certain attacks inthe northern part of Sumatra, we must acknowledge, that there is information given and that
there is information withheld from being given out to certain quarters of the publicpertaining to issues due to security concerns. xxi As operational experts and military expertson the ground, different scenarios are told and kept for security reasons. Another report17

from Washington states that in 2001 and 2002 there were reported cases of kidnappings,
hijacking of vehicles associated with GAM. xxii These incidents of kidnappings andhijackings of vehicles are for a certain perpetrated act that was used for ransom andpolitical trade offs. Vehicles hijacked were for transportation of GAM’s operational
activities and using vehicles for bombing in strategic locations where the Indonesian
military operated prior to the cease-fire and peace accord.
As much as the cease-fire and peace efforts are being established, I am not too sure of thereal political goals of GAM’s leadership! I say this because there is strong evidence thatshows GAM’s involvement in piracy and other acts of terrorism within the Acheh region
and the waters of northern Sumatra. We must note that as much as GAM openly rejects Al
Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah involvement, there is strong support from GAM in regards to
its core religious ideological perspective to Al Qaeda and JI. xxiii
Hence, the same objectives can be driven together in a more profound way in using
maritime terrorism to shape its core ideological goals. Evidence gathered from Jemaah
Islamiyah and supported by Al Qaeda shows prove that the militant religious extremistgroup in this region is indeed set out to make the Southeast Asia region an Islamic
hegemony based on extremeness ideological beliefs. xxiv In keeping with its ideologicalbeliefs, JI will continue to act on all approaches in respect to the call for “Jihadism”
towards the “West” and nations that are allied to the “West” in particular to the UnitedStates. Singapore authorities uncovered plans of an attack on US naval vessels transiting
the Johore Straits in 2001. Seized documents included maps; operational planning andvideo footage had been made for a maritime suicide attack on US naval ships. xxv
Information gathered from intelligence sources, as reported in the media, states that suchpossible maritime attacks are possible than initially imagined. The Director of Indonesia’sState Intelligence Agency in 2004 confirmed that such attacks on shipping in the Straits ofMalacca had been planned by captured JI operatives in detention who had admitted to it. xxvi
US intelligence also reported the same time that they had intercepted JI’s communication
activities revealing a plot to seize a vessel using local pirates. The possibility of using thevessel and arming it with explosives to either direct it towards another vessel or just sinking
it in the busy sea route of the Straits is something not to be overlooked. xxvii This clearly
determines a clear interest for these militant groups operating in the Southeast Asia region
to pursue maritime targets with pirates operating in the Straits of Malacca or even aroundthe SEA region.
In light of Singapore’s view on the nexus of piracy and terrorism, it is convinced by its
intelligence report that piracy and terrorist have joined forces to target the island republics’
port and shipping facilities and hence in December of 2003 warned that an attack in theStraits is real and imminent. In the same statement it concluded that due to the number ofpirate attacks at the southern end of the Straits made it extremely difficult to distinguishcriminal acts of piracy from potential acts of terrorism and that no distinction should
therefore be made between piracy and terrorism. xxviii The discourse from Singapore did not18

warrant a course of concern to either Malaysia or Indonesia, which viewed the issues as nota worrisome threat.
In 2000 the ASG landed on the island of Sipadan and kidnapped twenty-one Malaysian andforeign tourist from the resort island and took them hostage. The incident was a watershed
for Malaysia, has it seemed incapable of safeguarding its sovereign territory from foreign
intrusions. Prior to the press release on the above kidnappings and hostage takings, theauthorities reported that it was “pure act of piracy” and it should not be considered as aterrorist operation. Further to this, what was seen as a “pirate” attack, turned out to be aterrorist “modus-operandi” in full fledge camouflage outfits when they literally landed on
the island, equipped with semi and automatic weapons. The fact also remained that they did
not take food and other essentials was something to be concerned about, as usually pirates
will take whatever they can get their hands on. The reality of these attacks can very welljustify the means of terrorist groups operating within the Southeast Asia region to be of amajor threat to maritime operations and attacks along the coastal waterways of Southeast
Asian waters on the Sea-Lines of Communication (SLOC).
In addition to the high number of pirate attacks in the region, a number of which have
involved the hijacking of more high-risk vessels, such as LNG, crude oil or other suchinflammable chemical containers has led to worry that terrorist could use copycat methods
to takeover a vessel for more sinister reasons. They could also higher local pirates toaccomplish these attacks. A visit by Vice Admiral Terry Cross of the U.S. Coast Guard to
Malaysia in 2005 told the media that the ease with which pirate attacks were taking place in
the Straits of Malacca could “alert terrorist to the opportunities for seizing oil tankers” andthat “these could be used as floating bombs”. xxix Similar remarks have been made by IMO
on the hijacking of the MT Tri Samudra by pirates in the Straits of Malacca on its cargo of
inflammable petrochemical products in 2005. xxx
LNG tankers and their potential role in a scenario of this kind have probably received themost attention from security experts. In its liquid state, natural gas is not explosive, and it is
in is in this form that it is shipped in large quantities via refrigerated tankers. Once in the
open air, LNG quickly evaporates and forms a highly combustible visible cloud. It has beenreported that if ignited the resulting fire could be hot enough to melt steel at a distance of
1.200 feet, and could result in second-degree burns on exposed skin a mile away. xxxi
A fire of this magnitude would be impossible to extinguish and contrary to the littoral statesof preparedness, they would not be able to handle the claustrophobic burning of the LNG.
The fire will burn until all fuel is absorbed. The impact of such an attack in a port like
Singapore would be devastating. There would be loss of life and severe structural damage
in the immediate area. The most likely way a terrorist group would carry out such a major
attack is using an LNG tanker rather than any other cargo, whereby to create an explosion
onboard the vessel as it is rammed into the target. Although crude oil can be devastating, inmy opinion is not of particular interest to terrorist groups to mount an attack using crude oil
containers.

19

The risk from a vessel carrying chemical products is also worrisome. Chemical products
may pose a toxicity risk in addition to being highly volatile. Like LNG tankers, chemical
tankers are designed with maximum provisions for safety. The vessels are designed in sucha way as to maintain space between tank walls to prevent incompatible cargos from coming
into contact with each other. The safeguards in place, however, may not always be
sufficient and may not be designed to guard against deliberate sabotage. In addition,
general cargo vessels and container ships, which do not have such safeguards in place, arealso sometimes used.

Other threats scenarios that terrorist groups can claim are mining the Straits and blocking
sea traffic. There are two variations on this issue, both, which are equally alarming.
Terrorist groups can mine the Straits and alert the authorities or because a ship had hit amine. The second would be terrorist claming to have mined the Straits and simulating amine attack on a ship to add credibility to their claims. After all, if there were little or no
information on the exact locations within the Straits that had been mined, the impact would
be of great concern to seafarers, as it would mount a concern for security in using theStraits. This will force shipping traffic to close and forcing vessels to reroute around theLombok and Sunda Straits. This in turn will cause severe delays to the shipping industry on
their consignments.
The risk is too high to not look into terrorist capabilities. As it has not been widely
discussed, the use of Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM) or Rocket Propelled Guns (RPG) is yet
another threat from terrorist operatives. Terrorist operating from one of the small islands
around Singapore, which are Indonesian territories and the waters near it, are potential
threats to Singapore or even the Malaysian aviation industry. A SAM or an RPG launchedor fired upon from a terrorist boat or a vessel hijacked by terrorist can bring down acommercial airline. This would be of concern to Singapore, as planes coming into land
must make their descent over the busy shipping lanes at the Singapore Straits. Even though
security measures are put in place for this but the same cannot be said on vessels passing
offshore. These SAM’s and RPG’s have a range which puts aircraft landing or in holding
pattern waiting to land well within their targeting capabilities. The shortfalls outweighs thelaw enforcement agencies as they can do very little to reduce this particular type of threat.
The outcomes of such incidents over the past years in regards to piracy and maritime
terrorist attacks taking place within the region greatly identify the current threat it imposeson maritime security. As far as it would seem difficult for JI or other terrorist groups tolaunch a maritime terrorist attack in the Straits of Malacca, such a scenario should by nomeans be disregarded in the efforts to provide safe and secure waterways of the Straits ofMalacca. Although there has not been a major attack in the Straits, there should not be any
doubts about terrorist capabilities to conduct such an attack.

20

The conveyance of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) in cargo containers is within therealm of possibility for terrorist organizations. Al Qaeda in 2003 had seeked information on
cargo containers with WMD cargo and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed the than No. 3 man of Al
Qaeda offered USDA 200,000, in exchange for access to cargo containers heading into theport of New York with WMD's on board. xxxii
Regional authorities should not exclude an endangering nexus between piracy and maritime
terrorism or any other activity that has devastating impact on the maritime trade. It makes
sense in the terrorist drive for a maritime expertise. Cooperation between these two groups
is also rational in terms of mutual gain. The case of Acehness rebels financing theiractivities through piracy substantiates the basis for mutual gain between terrorist and pirates
as a whole. xxxiii
In gauging the threat posed by maritime terrorism lies not only in an assessment of thecapabilities and motivations of the terrorist groups themselves, but also in an understandingof the maritime environment, shipping practices, the vulnerabilities of the commercial
shipping industry and the response capabilities of those agencies tasked with safeguarding
the regions waterways. Uninformed claims regarding potential maritime terrorist risk andthreats, which are based on a misunderstanding or complete lack of knowledge of key
factors, has led to a misinterpretation of the threat from maritime terrorism. This must be
rectified if there is to be any hope of reducing the threat.

21

REPORTED ATTACKS IN 2008
CHART A: the following locations shared more than two thirds of the total reported
incidents: i.e. 216 from a total of 29 reported attacks for the period. The chart
however does not specify acts of terrorism.
Location of major reported incidents

Tanzania, 14

Vietnam, 11
Bangladesh, 12Somalia, 19VietnamBangladesh
Gulf of Aden

Nigeria, 40

Indonesia
Nigeria
Gulf of Aden, 92

Somalia
Tanzania

Indonesia , 28

SOURCE: IMO

TABLE 1: Locations of ACTUAL and ATTEMPTED attacks in Southeast Asia
Piracy & Armed Robbery: January – December: 2003 – 2008
Locations

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

22

SEA Indonesia
Malacca Straits
Malaysia
MyanmarPhilippines
Singapore Straits
Thailand, Gulf ofThailand

121
28
5
12
2
2

94
38
9
1
4
8
4

79
12
3

50
11
10

43
7
9

7
1

6
5
1

6
3
2

28
2
10
1
7
6

SOURCE: IMO

23

CHART B: PIRACY & ARMED ROBERRY – IMO 200824

CHART D: PIRACY & ARMED ROBERRY – IMO 200825

CHART E: PIRACY & ARMED ROBERRY – IMO 2008

26

FLAG STATES OF VESSEL ATTACKS – IMO 200827

Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Post Cold War
Southeast Asia is a relatively stable region in which the maturity of the ASEAN members
had made significant contributions to management of disputes between member states. The
principles set forth in the ASEAN way and “non-interference” was enshrined in the
Bangkok Declaration in 1967 to reaffirm the aims of the United Nations charter to protect
nations from external interferences. It was later supported by the 1971 Zone of Peace,
Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPHAN) Declaration. xxxiv
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the tensions were somewhat forward looking for the
ASEAN members in terms of its economic growth. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
concluded for the peaceful settlement of intraregional disputes in a framework of absoluterespect for states sovereignty and was originally concluded in 1976. xxxv The collapse of thecommunist inspired ideologies and the general reconciliation between the communist andfree market states evolved and hence the communist insurgencies were localized and almost
all of its states had earned unquestioned international legitimacy. xxxvi
The above revolutionary changes that were seen at the end of the Cold War complemented
the regional dynamics already in motion, which included domestic security, rapid economic
development, and maturing of regional identity to produce an environment conducive toincreased cooperation and reorganization of security priorities in Southeast Asia. The
maritime security cooperation developed during the decade following the Cold War termed
as “particularly noteworthy” and notable. xxxvii
Several Asean security measures already in place such as the Five Power Defense
Arrangements (FPDA) and various U.S. security agreements were followed by a handful of
new institutions emerging on security concerns, such as the Indonesia South China Sea
Workshop (SCS) to reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict in the South China Sea, theCouncil for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation Working Group(CSCAP-MCWG), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Working Group on
Maritime Security, and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) tackled theSoutheast Asian security issues within the broader Asia-Pacific maritime context although
the progress was limited to transparency, dialogue and pledges of greater future cooperationand other maritime confidence and security building measures (MCSBMs). xxxviii Of themany military-to-military pairings on operationalized cooperation naval exercise programs
since 1993 the Malsindo operation was seen to be the most operationalized cooperation
between the littoral states of the Straits of Malacca.
The events that took place from 2000 onwards propelled the Southeast Asian governments
into the new millennium of maritime security threats. The first ferry bombing in thePhilippines by the MILF, the bombing of the USS Cole, although this occurred in the Gulfof Aden generated fears of the same in Southeast Asia and the amphibious assault of the
ASG in the Sipadan island of Malaysia kidnapping of western tourist and Malaysians,
demonstrated the capabilities of Southeast Asian terrorist groups in maritime attacks. The

28

events of the September 11 attacks of the Twin Towers in New York, the bombing of theferry Kalifornia in Maluku Archipelago and the Al Qeada plots to attack several
international targets discovered by Singaporean authorities initiated the “age of terror”.
While, some Southeast Asian leaders and captains of the industry remain “in denial”,
terrorism has become the preeminent security threat in the region and maritime terror isrecognized as a serious threat to the Sea-Lines of Communication (SLOC) in the Southeast
Asian waters.
Security cooperation within Southeast Asia is developing rather quickly than before. States
have committed themselves to commitment in expanding MCSBMs and operationalizedcooperation. The security measures that have been oriented are towards transnational
threats such as piracy and maritime threats including terrorism. Several new arrangement
have been created and renewed cooperation include the 2003 ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF) to combat piracy and other threats of maritime concerns and a working program to
implement the “ASEAN Plan of Action” to combat transnational crimes. In 2004,
Singapore’s accession into the “Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety andMaritime Navigation” (SUA) in Rome, Italy and put a step toward a regional acceptance of
the SUA Convention.
The wake of 911 prompted the United States in its counter measures with “operational
interstate cooperation on counterterrorism packages” and in its bilateral exercises with theSoutheast Asian nations. The U.S. sent its naval forces to assist the Philippines in the fightagainst terrorism against the ASG operating in the Mindanao Island of the Philippines. In
light of this, Malaysia and Thailand’s concerns about insurgents and terrorist groups
operating within their shores had invigorated cooperative maritime patrols in the northernpart of the Straits.
The littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia in 2004 took a decisive security
measures to combat the threat of piracy and armed robbery as well as non-traditional threats
to maritime security in the Straits. In July of 2004 the three littoral states signed anagreement on coordinated joint patrols along the Straits and hense“Operation Malsindo”
was established. xxxix The trilateral coordinated patrols are jointly operated by the threelittoral states in patrolling the Straits to combat piracy, armed robbery, and smuggling aswell as to secure the Straits from maritime threats. These Security measures are part of theother existing security measures that have taken place within the Southeast Asia region inregards to maritime security since the cold war ended.
However, the shipping industry privately lamented the bilateral coordination, as little morethan exchange of schedules, to which in many cases, partners did not adhere to theagreement. The fact that the agreement was endorsed strongly by regional media and thepositive public response to the cooperation patrols demonstrated the desire of governments
to appear committed to the program and to give wide spread support to the project. In linewith this security measures, governments of Japan, Thailand, Philippines, India and China
have expressed their willingness to cooperate in the joint patrols. From opinions gathered

29

from sources, it is widely known that the joint patrols are not operating as it should be andtherefore provides ineffective operations to combat such maritime threats.
In response to a more concerned centre for information gathering and sharing, sixteen
countries including ASEAN members and Japan, South Korea, China, India, Bangladesh
and Sri Lanka signed an agreement on the establishment of the Regional Cooperation
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAPP) in
November of 2004. The government of Japan led by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in2001 at the ASEAN-plus Three Summit in Brunei first proposed the agreement. ReCAPP in
which it was to maintain a database, conduct analysis, and act as an information clearing
house was however in months of a deadlock as to where it should be located. There were
underlying issues pertaining to information being misrepresented. This was with regards to
IMO’s reporting centre in Malaysia that reported incidents in Indonesia although it
happened in the waters of Malaysia. xl
After a three-year deadlock from 2001, ReCAPP was finally established in Singapore and it
was open to signatories on the 28 of February 2005. “ReCAPP is the first regional
government-to-government agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy
and armed robbery in Asia”. xli This is a positive step, being an indigenous pan-Asia
initiative devised primarily to deal with piracy, a phenomenon most conspicuous inSoutheast Asia. The location set in Singapore shows the willingness of certain countries tocompromise in order to advance maritime security issues in the Southeast Asia region.
Although, members are not obligated to any specific action other than information sharingthat they deem pertinent to imminent piracy attacks. However Malaysia and Indonesia havenot agreed on signing the memorandum agreement due to “political” issues.
Since it was the Japanese government initiatives initially to set up ReCAPP, thegovernment took a study tour to the Southeast Asia region, meeting with littoral states aswell as with signatory members last year to hear their plight on the issues pertaining to theestablishment of ReCAPP and discovered some flaws within organization. xlii The Japanese
government, although has put in much efforts in the setting up of ReCAPP is currently
rectifying some issues within ReCAPP. The newly established Maritime Division of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan is currently addressing these issues and hopefully
makes some amendments to it. xliii
In March of 2009, Singapore proposed the ASEAN nations within the Asean Regional
Forum (ARF) to move beyond the dialogue issues and hold a Maritime Security Exercise
for the Asean Security Forum to improve its ability to deal with terrorist and other maritime
threats. The Defense Minister, Teo Chee Hean made a statement that a “collectively”
maritime security cooperation is needed within the Asean militaries and their counterparts
to address the security threats in the region’s waters. xliv The move is a bold approach, but
ASEAN nations have to take heed on the statement and collectively move forward in the
dialogue rather than “shuttle” the fact that a maritime threat is not possible.

30

In addressing the issues to maritime threats, these many developments above constitute asignificant progress in securing the Straits as well as the Southeast Asian waters. In respect
to the many developments on dialogue, information sharing and the enhancement of statesfirmly committed in their efforts against maritime threats are still insufficient to counter thegrowing maritime threats in the region. The territorial disputes still surrounding some statesneed to be seriously looked into, as it will have serious implications on the security ofSoutheast Asia. Although most of the territorial claims by Malaysia, Singapore andIndonesia have now been solved through the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Most alarming are the issues pertaining to the South China Sea’s where Malaysia,
Indonesia, Brunei, Philippines, Vietnam, China and Taiwan assert conflicting claims to sea
and island territories. xlv These claimants are deemed to be of vital importance due to thevast petroleum resources available around the archipelagic waters of the South China Sea.
Violent claims of threats from claimant countries of the islands have seen near real life
“open warfare” occurring and in one incident two claimant countries nearly engaged in a
firing incident between each other. xlvi The threat clearly exists and the current volatile
situation can trigger of a political or military event although a declaration from the ASEAN
members and China on the “Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” was agreed on in
2002. Though the code of conduct exists, the South China Sea remains a flashpoint.
As much as the APEC-ARF cooperation is concern, we must note that the original idea of
the APEC was to discuss regional economy, cooperation, trade and investment and the ARF
to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common
interest and concern and to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidencebuilding and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. xlvii
To lump security, maritime threats, piracy and maritime terrorism as well as other security
issues all into “one basket” is not a productive way to deal with the challenges of current
threats surrounding the Asean region in terms of piracy and maritime security threats. We
need security experts and not policy makers, as they are not able to visualize real threats.
We cannot have government officials making proactive decisions, as they can be biased tocertain issues pertaining to their national interest. The Asean charter on non-interference
based on sovereignty issues, which was mandated only in recent times, is of a hindrance fordeveloping states and states within the Southeast Asia region.
From my point of view, the reason of such decisions on matters concerning noninterference by all Asean nations is not so much for national interest but a means topolitically control its nations from outside interference in such affairs pertaining to internal
humanitarian issues, race, religion, freedom of speech and the right to protest against
governments as well as any security threats deemed fit to the political powers in control.
This also boils down to the reason of third world and developing nations in the Asean
region, holding strongly on these fundamentals of non-interference as to stay in power. By
having the charter in place, the international community is refrained from interfering in all
Asean nations, with regards to the above-mentioned issues. The Southeast Asia nations in

31

particular, are very volatile in sense of its political and economic instability. Asean
Secretary General Surin Pitsuvan, in Bangkok made a statement on the issue of noninterference, “The principle of non-interference restricts Asean and limits the group’s
options for preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution”. xlviii It has been noted that“nationalistic” issues can hinder security cooperation within the Asean region. xlix
An example of the above statement can be directed to the developments of the European
Union’s external security policies, on its multilateral efforts in addressing the common
security concerns internally and externally within the EU nations. The common goal
employed, emphasizes on detailed specific security measures rather than a “wide” outlookof many issues in similar organizations within the Asean groupings and the in capabilities
of certain non-functioning agencies in the Asean region.
In view of the current security challenges within the Straits of Malacca and Southeast Asia,
a relatively new framework should be in placed. Such as the establishing of a new multi cooperational body, relative to addressing security cooperation and issues with regards tosecurity and threats within the region, with emphasis “only” on threats pertaining to piracy,
terrorism, maritime security, transnational crimes, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery means and disaster response. The new framework should
include experts from all fields of the security and disaster area and should be from theprivate and public sectors and should be made transparent and not bias on its stand towards
the Asean nations with regards to security measures. This excludes the earlier security
frameworks initiated by Asean. The cooperation can be placed and supported by the
ASEAN nations with funding capabilities as well as foreign aid.
Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Relevance of the threat of Piracy andMaritime Terrorism and the changing structural and economic system
The factors enabling greater cooperation, between the littoral states and the greater
Southeast Asia are due to the reason of structural, normative and economic changes to theregional system within Southeast Asia. This also includes maritime security cooperation.
These changes are a direct result of the global recognition of terrorism as a preeminent
security threat, while others are a continuation of the older regional trends already visible in
the post-Cold War era. The current changes in security cooperation within the littoral statesand in Southeast Asia can be distinguished by factors such as relaxing sovereignty
sensitivities, extra regional power interest, increased prevalence of cooperation norms,
improving state resources, and increasing prioritization of maritime security. Although theabove factors are considered an importance to the regional developments in security, it is
not necessarily distinct, they are analytical concepts used to describe interrelated andcomplementary themes present in the evolving regional trends.
One of the many factors of pertaining the Malacca Straits and Southeast Asia is thesovereignty issue. They are considered to be of top most important in determining anddefining the roles in the foreign policy formulations of these states. The non-interference is32the “bedrock” towards interregional relations and constitutes the most powerful inhibitor ofmaritime cooperation within Southeast Asia. Also most coastal states rely heavily on
offshore economic resources, which is rich in oil. Not surprising, why most of these states
are very sensitive about foreign interference besides the threat on national security.
According to a source from the Malaysian Ministry of Defense, Malaysia is very concerned
about foreign involvement in the Malacca Straits, as it can be a violation of its noninterference policies in its territorial waters and see it as a national threat. The need forcapacity building programs however has been a top priority in the piracy issue as well as inmaritime terrorism. l Although these capacity building programs are viewed as importantmeasures to be addressed, such as joint exercise patrols or information sharing, they are still
cautioned about the idea. There are “tell tale” signs however, that there is a changing
mindset on the issues pertaining to sovereignty in the maritime area in terms of “relaxing”
some issues, in view of the current threats from piracy and maritime terrorism.
Recent developments into a more concerned security need in the Malacca Straits andaround the Southeast Asia region have also seen states need for legal restrictions onshipping in their territorial waters as well as on historical events that saw foreign powers
operating in these waters and to some extent to specifically undermine the security of somestates. Even, as stated above, states have also been increasingly cooperating with one
another and to a certain level to allow some infringement into their sovereignty in the effort
to improve maritime security.
The events such as the Litigan and Sipadan Islands on using the ICJ as a “pacifier” and thepresence of U.S. personnel in their ports shows the willingness of the Asean nations tocooperate amicably. These security measure are also part of the IMO’s and U.S. security
standards of which a few arrangements have been in place in principle. The decision of
Malaysia and Indonesia on the escort operations of the Indian and U.S. warships operatingin the Straits, although it can be construed as a violation of sovereignty sensitive states asakin to law enforcement.
The coordinated patrol termed the “Eye in the Sky” (EIS) initiative commenced in 2004,
with the littoral states and Thailand under the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol (MSSP) allowing
for greater surveillance in the Straits. The coverage however is too large an area torealistically cover most parts of the Malacca Straits due to grey areas and certain
sovereignty issues near the Acheh region for example. This is a likely area of piracy andmaritime threats to occur. However, this new initiative supplements the current joint patrols
on waterborne patrolling by adding aerial anti-piracy surveillance of the Straits. li
In regards to this, EIS welcomes international participation on a voluntary basis. Indonesia
also has set up a coast guard unit called the Indonesia’s National Security Coordination
Agency or in short “Bakorkamla” in order to facilitate coordination among maritime law
enforcement agencies in Southeast Asia. The efforts initiated by the littoral states have seen33

seriousness in combating piracy and maritime threats in the Straits as well as the Southeast
Asia region with practical cooperative measures undertaken.
Efforts by the governments of Japan, South Korea and China have prompted new avenuesof capacity building programs within the states as well as major initiatives currently taken
by Japan in supporting the littoral states and in particular Malaysia on its newly formed
Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA). The Japanese “Official Development
Assistance” (ODA) has been contributing large amounts of funding to Malaysia andIndonesia in respect to piracy and terrorism. This amount of funding is stated towards theend of my paper on the Japanese aid to Malaysia and Indonesia. Similar organizations fromJapan have taken a role in addressing the issues of piracy and maritime terrorism and inengaging in capacity building programs in Malaysia and elsewhere within Southeast Asia.
The U.S. led program on its Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), however, was
not so welcoming and was criticized by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore when Admiral
Fargo in 2004 made a statement in the media on the role of RMSI in having U.S. Special
Forces and U.S. Marines would be deployed to safeguard the Straits. The U.S State
Department concerned about what it will trigger in further diplomacy with the littoral states,
quickly responded that it was a misleading statement reported by the media on the proposed
regional security measure under the RMSI framework. Still at large, this arrangement has
not taken off completely and has been in a deadlock situation ever since, with little or no
significant improvements on its capacity to further strengthen security efforts as well as thelack of support from some Asean nations.
By far, most of the security cooperation within the Southeast Asia and in particular theStraits of Malacca has steadily improved over the post cold-war era. The need to cooperate
on a diplomatic level and to address sovereignty issues is greatly needed to overcome thecurrent volatile region. This makes it more relevant when the threat of piracy is now in thenexus of terrorism and the threat of maritime terrorism is increasing. The Southeast Asia
archipelago and the Straits of Malacca, demand a more practical solution in order to evadethe threat of a maritime attack and other security threats. Responses to and from a maritime
attack needs to be in placed immediately as they are lacking considerably.
Recently, the Ministry of Defense of Japan organized the “1st Tokyo Seminar on Common
Security Challenges: Future Cooperation among Defense Authorities in the Region”. lii In
regards to the forum, issues pertaining to piracy and maritime threats were not specificallyaddressed. The Asean speakers seem to hold an ambiguous view in relation to a possibilityof a major maritime terrorist threat. One cannot but wonder if this is owing to the noninterference policy of Asean. In a statement made by one of the speakers, it was noted that
International Terrorism was not a prime concern and that terrorist activities around theworld and in particular, Southeast Asia was subdued to major enforcement crackdowns.
This is an alarming statement, as International Terrorism does not have to be“internationalized” any longer. The homegrown and sleeping cells in Southeast Asia are34

very much alive and capable of major attacks within their “backyard” and have long been
infiltrated by Al Qeada in its support to JI. We must note however, the second largest
terrorist organization operating in the world in regards to geographical area, remains inSoutheast Asia and Jemaah Islamiyah is of that organization. Evidence attained from
captured JI members has clearly indicated the rise of “Islamic Extremism” and its aim is totransform the Southeast Asia region to a “Pan-Islamic State”. We must not compare,
Hamas, Hezbollah and other terrorist organization to Jemaah Islamiyah as their reach isglobal and Al Qeada uses JI as its main front in Southeast Asia. liii
Japans Initiatives and Contribution to the Safety of Sea-Lines of Communication inSoutheast Asia: Piracy and Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca
1. Japan’s Policy Formulation in Piracy for Southeast Asia
The threat of piracy and maritime security concerns many nations, but it particularly alarms
Japan, a state vitally dependent on the flow of resources through the pirate-infested watersof Southeast Asia. Japan being the third major economy of the world, uses the Straits ofMalacca for most of its trade from the east to the west and in particular oil to its growing
energy needs. The end of World War II saw a turning point in Japanese policies as well as
its formation of the Japanese Self Defense Forces in post World War II.
The Japanese military was seen as one of the most feared and capable force in World War
II in the Asia-Pacific region, although now it has subdued its image after its surrender to theUnited States in 1945, ending the Asia-Pacific wars. The Japanese Self Defense Forces
today, comprising the Army, Navy and Air force still possesses a highly capable force, it ishowever restricted by its constitution from operating as a traditional military force. It alsocommands a high level capability of its maritime force. Japan being a coastal state, has also
one of the most capable Coast Guards in the world in comparison with the U.S. Coast
Guard. The Japanese Coast Guard or rather referred to as the JCG, though not part of the
JSDF is also restrained by antimilitarist prohibitions.
In the mid-1990s, concerns over the piracy threats triggered a change in Japan’s policies
and outlook. This in turn initiated a significant effort aimed at leading a regional effort tocooperatively eradicate the threat of piracy in Southeast Asia. In its earliest initiatives, its
policies did very little and had mixed success in addressing the issues and one of its
proposed efforts was the standing ocean-peacekeeping fleets in conducting multinational
patrols in both territorial and international waters, made very little progress. By far though,at a bilateral level, Japanese initiatives have been quite successful over the years.
In view of the threat posed by piracy and maritime threats including maritime terrorism, theJapanese government took two basic principles on anti-piracy measures. liv

351. Cooperation on global basis
a. Addressing the issues of piracy at meetings related to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Informal
Consultative Process, etc)b. Promotion of the accession of other countries to related conventions, such as
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (Rome Convention)c. Promotion of cooperation in the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
2. Cooperation in Asia
On the basis of the idea that antipiracy measures in Asian waters should be
advanced on the initiative of Asian countries themselves, Japan has implemented
the following specific policies to promote cooperation among Asian countries:
a. Study of the development of a regional cooperation agreement on
antipiracy measuresb. Maintaining the momentum against the piracy problem and engaging the
problem in international meets with the ASEAN + 3 (Japan, China,
South Korea) and calling for the signing of the Rome Conventionc. Support for poverty countermeasures in the region where incidents of piracy
occursd. Support for strengthening of self-protection by ship-owners and cargoowners (cooperation with national ship-owners’ associations in the ASEAN
countries)
2. Japan’s Earlier Efforts in Southeast Asia on Combating Piracy and Maritime
Threats
In 2000, Japan organized the first ever Anti-Piracy meeting in Tokyo inviting the Asian
countries. This was in relevance to the November 1999 ASEAN + 1 (Japan) summit held in
Manila that brought about, then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi’s proposed meeting on
combating piracy and armed robbery against ships.
Following the meeting that took place in Tokyo of 2000, a proposal by than Minister of
Foreign Affairs Yohei Kono, the Japanese government dispatched the “Mission for
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships to the Philippines, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Indonesia to conduct a survey and exchange opinions on specificcooperation and assistance measures with the four Asean countries. lv
Though the Japanese government has initiated certain policies for Southeast Asia, it is notan easy task to develop a proper framework in regional efforts as it directly relates toconcerns of national sovereignty in the region as well as to the littoral states that governed

36the Straits of Malacca. Further to this a similar conference took place in Singapore andBrunei in 2001, which the later developed a proposed a convening of government-levelworking group of experts to study to formulation of a regional cooperation agreement
related to antipiracy measures. lvi The ASEAN side highly evaluated Japan’s initiatives andcooperation on the above issues.
Also in 2000, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Transport (now the Ministry ofLand, Infrastructure and Transport) the Japan Coast Guard organized a regional conferenceon combating piracy and armed robbery supported by the Nippon Foundation. Coast guard
agencies, maritime policy makers, ship-owners associations the IMO and ten ASEAN
members represented the conference. As a result of the conference a “Model Action Plan”
was drawn up in indicating specific guidelines to be followed by maritime policy makers
and private-sector parties in maritime issues pertaining to piracy and armed robbery fromthe coast guard efforts to tackle the problem. lvii
Apart from the above initiatives taken by the Japanese, a follow-up survey team from Japanvisited Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines comprising members of the
Ministry of Transport, the Japan Coast Guard and Japan International Cooperation Agency(JICA). The issues addressed during those visits were based on the promotion of regional
cooperation on antipiracy measures, a follow-up of the regional conference on combating
piracy and armed robbery and Japan’s cooperation and assistance programs andunderstanding the urgent needs from these governments. lviii
In view of this visit the dispatching of maritime coast guards for combined patrol exercises,
the holding of an experts’ meeting, human resource exchange and training as well as
technical assistance and a seminar on maritime law enforcement and coordinated patrols
was put forward and most of it had been carried out since 2000. In 2001, a conference on
Asian Cooperation on combating piracy was held to address the increasingly heinous andorganized crimes relating to piracy and the information was disseminated to theparticipating countries and the also the future regional cooperation measures was discussed.
The conference concluded on a multi regional cooperation, which was indispensable
between the ASEAN countries in a number of factors relating to antipiray. lix
3. Japan’s Current Policy on Piracy and the threat from Maritime Terrorism“Terrorism is an immediate threat to Japan as in addition to the international terrorist
organization A1-Qaeda, there are new threats from extremist in various regions which have been
influenced by Al Qeada’s ideology. International terrorism has occurred in Southeast Asia which
has close ties with Japan and which has accepted many Japanese travelers. Japan has been named
as a target of terrorism in a statement issued by Al-Qaeda. Additionally, in the past, persons
associated with terrorist organizations illegally entered Japan”. lx

Japan’s efforts in the Asean region, in ensuring maritime security with regards to piracy
and terrorism in the Straits of Malacca and Southeast Asia have received a great deal of37attention in recent years by the Asean nations. Japan’s primary concerns and focus within
the Straits and Southeast Asia has resulted in closer cooperation and capacity-building
programs with the 3 littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia as well as its newer
initiatives towards Thailand and the other Asian region in terms of maritime security
cooperation. Although issues pertaining to the divergence of interest in institutional settingspose some obstacles, Japan is still moving ahead with its initiatives in responding to theneeds of the Asean nation, in particular to the threats of piracy and maritime terrorism in
the Straits and Southeast Asia.
As Japan’s economy depends heavily on the safe passage of ships through the Straits ofMalacca, Japan has long cooperated with the littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore andIndonesia in the area of navigational safety and seabed mapping on joint research. The
increased threat of piracy and maritime terrorism in the Straits has resulted in increased
Japanese funding through the “Official Development Assistance” program in anti piracy aswell as in maritime threats from terrorism.
The Japanese Coast Guard has aided in the patrolling of the Southeast Asian waters and has
carried out numerous joint exercise training with maritime counterparts from thePhilippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. lxi The Japanese government’s
engagement within the littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia is emphasizedon the Asean Charter of non-interference on the sovereignty of the 3 littoral states and are
currently focusing on cooperative capacity-building programs. The Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) has been given the task to assist the capacity building
programs together with the Japanese Coast Guard. lxii I will later explain on some of the
training programs proposed by the JCG with regards to JICA’s involvement on the “Brief”
section on the JCG.
Japan’s multilateral efforts in addressing the piracy and maritime terrorism issues have also
promoted bilateral cooperation within the region. The Japanese government for projects on
piracy related issues has financed the IMO significantly in its more forward approach tosecurity measures in the Straits and the Ocean Foundation has also provided assistancefunding for the IMO Anti-Piracy Centre in Kuala Lumpur. The APEC Counter-Terrorism
Task Force, “Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting” was held in Tokyo in 2004.
In 2005 the “Asean-Japan Seminar on Maritime Security and Combating Piracy” was heldin Tokyo to review the progress of the implementation of the International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) code by Asean members.
Japan in a meeting in Kuala Lumpur with the IMO held in 2006, proposed voluntary toshare the cost for safety, security and environmental protection of the Straits of Malacca
and the Singapore Straits. The establishment of the information-sharing centre ReCAPP in
Singapore however does not cover terrorism, smuggling and illegal migration in its
agreement. The rule of the Law of the Sea will be the jurisdiction for this agreement andarmed robbery for which it traditionally belonged to the littoral states. In view of
ReCAPP’s operational personnel, it is represented by the countries signatories voluntarily38

on it’s choosing of either a civilian or by military participation. Japan has also provided
funding contributions to train both civilian and military personnel for ReCAPP’s operationsin Singapore.
In a recent meeting with key officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, a new
Maritime Agency has been established within the Ministry in December of 2008. The
Maritime Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy Bureau will be solely responsible for all
maritime security measures globally. A Director of Operations within the Ministry heads
the agency. The new effort in place by the Japanese government is to address the growing
threats of piracy and maritime security as well as maritime terrorism.
Although somewhat new, the agency has began international visits to Djibouti in the
African Horn to assess the piracy issues as well as to Southeast Asia in meetinggovernment heads in respect to rectifying issues concerning ReCAPP, primarily with thelittoral states of Malaysia and Indonesia. lxiii Apart from the government cooperative
measures, private institutions from Japan have played an important role in assisting thelittoral states with regards to Malaysia, with the Nippon Foundations efforts in providing
funding as well as patrol boats for the newly established MMEA.
As much as Japan’s strategic significance of the Straits of Malacca and the Southeast Asianwaters, Japan has focused primarily on civilian cooperation rather than military cooperationand has refrained from utilizing its Maritime Self-Defense Force in the region other thandisaster relief missions and such as the Tsunami relief efforts in the Straits of Malacca in
2004.
Japan’s role and approaches to Piracy and Maritime Terrorism
In view of the Japanese governments role and approaches towards piracy and maritime
terrorism, it is very clearly represented in the government’s policy to eradicate the current
threats posed by these groups operating in international waters as well as the threat ofterrorism within the nexus of “piracy and maritime terrorism”. Japan has been named as atarget country by terrorist organizations, and the eradication of international terrorism is an
issue for the government of Japan. In line with the United Nations (UN) Security Council
Resolution 1368, which calls for further efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, thecountries of the world including Japan are making efforts as one for eradicating andpreventing terrorism activities.
Terrorism has no national boundaries neither is it restricted to certain nations. It is a major
global issue that directly affects all nations be it developing or the international community
in developed nations. To address the issue further, terrorist groups and their methods arediversifying, making it even more necessary to enhance international cooperation for
countering terrorism activities. Its role of addressing the maritime issues is related closelywith direct threat to Japanese nationals involved in maritime transport and to the Japanese
economy. Japan has engaged in working with improving the laws of enforcement of the39

littoral states, enhancing information sharing, developing human resources and othersecurity measures. This includes its new ReCAPP institution where it played a distinct roleof entering it into force in 2006.
In respect to issues pertaining to piracy and maritime terrorism the government and private
sector in Japan have been working cooperatively in providing assistance to the littoral statesin enhancing safety and security of the Straits. As much as there is a need in for
navigational safety concerns, the private sector will also play a key role in carrying out
various capacity building projects in the region.
A relative new milestone agreement was reached in 2005 and 2006 on co-operation over
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The framework, which includes all three littoral
states in working together in enhancing navigational safety, security and environmental
protection, was formally agreed. lxiv Dubbed the “Co-operative Mechanism” was conveyed
by the IMO in Singapore. The mechanism will provide a basis for dialogue between littoral
states, user States and users of the Straits, which include a structured framework for cooperation with the international community. It will provide a platform for three maincategories such as a forum on regular dialogue, a committee to coordinate and manage
specific projects and a fund to receive and manage financial contributions.
The current activities of the Japan Coast Guard in assisting, in particular the Southeast Asia
nations on the fight against piracy and terrorism have been very much a success. Programs
conducted by them have assisted all the littoral states as well as other stakeholders of theSoutheast Asian nations. The JCG working in its capacity to be a leading role player inaddressing the maritime security threats has remarkably transformed its organization into
multi co operational agency.
Established in 2001, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law became Japan’s security
measures against terrorism in response to the terrorist attacks in the USA in September of2001. Cooperation and support activities, search and rescue activities, relief activities forvictims were stipulated under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. Various activities
were carried out after inception of the law and replenishment activities were also carriedout for various ships operating under the law. This also enabled the JSDF to carry out
military support measures in the Gulf of Aden as well as globally in response to the threatsof piracy and armed robbery and terrorism.
The Maritime Self-Defense Force works as a replenishment support on the Maritime
Interdiction Activities (MIA) for various countries. These replenishment activities arelimited to the support of anti-terrorism relief’s. Current deployment is to the Gulf of Adenfor Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on piracy related incidents. Maritime activities
around the globe includes the Indian Ocean where the Japanese Navy is operating in
assistance to the Indian Navy on intercepting and deterring maritime movements of terrorist,
their weapons and drugs. The Indian Ocean is constantly monitored, and radio inquiries andinspections on board are being conducted to navigating vessels. Beyond the Indian Ocean,40the MSDF have engaged in various other support activities around the world based on theAnti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.

Japan Coast Guard (JCG): Current Capacity-Building Measures and inserts of JCG’soperations on Cooperation, Piracy and Terrorism internationally
The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) headquarters in Hakuda, last year announced a consensus to
support capacity building programs with existing international cost guards around the world
and in particular the Asean and the Indian authorities to help train and provide logisticalsupport. lxv
The Japan Coast Guard is playing a major role in addressing the threat of piracy and armed
robbery, smuggling and terrorism. They have engaged in many capacity building programsaround the world as well as to provide trainings for major governments. One of themissions is the initiative taken for the Straits of Malacca in assisting the new-formed
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) in capacity building and training
programs of MMEA personnel.
The Japan Coast Guard has been in existence for the last sixty years and is capable inproviding the region in particular of the Straits with its expertise in addressing the piracy
threats. The three littoral states comprising Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia have had the
JCG assist in many different capacity building programs. Current joint patrol trainings haveincluded the Philippines and Singapore as recent as last year
The second initiative is the “New Maritime Training Program” that will be introduced by
the JCG in April of 2009. The program will be launched in the third quarter of 2008 and thefirst thirty personnel will come from Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines as thesecountries have been classified as a Maritime Agency organization. The constitution ofJapan on support of such nature should not be related to miltary as well as the adherence of
the Japanese government on the non-interference charter.
JCG requires a member for this training purpose to be free from military jurisdiction andrun separately by an appropriate ministry not related to military. This will be a long-term
endeavor by JCG. In line with the trainings conducted in Tokyo, the JCG hopes that in thelong run, officers trained by JCG can return home to train new personnel in their homebases.
The program is entrusted under the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for aperiod of 3 years and will be closely monitored by JCG. These trainings will be run by the
JCG at their training facility. After the initial 3 years, more countries will be included into
the program. The program will run for 6 months and the first training program willcommence in August of 2009. Selection of personnel will take effect in April of this year.
The program is wholly sponsored and supported by the JCG.

41

With regards to the above training programs and cooperation, the Kogima, a training JCG
vessel has been engaged in joint patrol trainings with the Philippines and India since lastyear. The Kogima leaves on a 3-month voyage for its capacity building cooperation visits
around the world. Littoral states can take the initiatives to request the Kogima from the
JCG’s office of education and training department for courtesy call visit to their ports.
The JCG has also provided government based technical cooperation and international
disaster relief systems such as:
JCG’s Technical Training Program
1.
2.
3.
4.

Group training course in Maritime Search and Rescue and Disaster Prevention (from 1983)
Group training course in Marine Pollution Surveillance and Control (from 1983)
Group training course in Oceanography and Data Processing (from 1971)
Country focused training course in Maritime Law Enforcement Seminar (from 2001)

JCG’s Disaster Relief System

42

JCG’s Dispatching of Long-term Experts
1. JCG dispatched the following long term experts in 2006:- Indonesia from 2003 for the Ministry of Communication to strengthen
Maritime Safety System- The Philippines from 2000 for the Maritime Search and Rescue System
JCG’s Dispatching of Long-term Experts-Technical Cooperation Projects
1. Philippines from 2002 and from 2008 – Philippines Coast Guard
2. Malaysia from 2005 – Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency
3. Indonesia from 2008 – BAKORKAMLA: Maritime Security Coordination Board &Maritime Search and Rescue System
From the above, the littoral states and the Southeast Asia nations can leverage on thecapacity building program offered by the Japanese government on addressing threat ofpiracy, maritime terrorism as well as disaster relief operations and trainings. Below are thecurrent capacity building programs initiated by the JCG in its international joint program.

43

JAPANESE COAST GUARD (JCG)
Cooperation with Relevant Foreign Organizations

44

JAPANESE COAST GUARD (JCG)
Cooperation with Relevant Foreign Organizations

45

JAPANESE COAST GUARD (JCG)Countering Terrorism and Piracy Countermeasure46

Conclusion
The threat of piracy and the nexus of terrorism should not be separated and should beconsidered in the same principle. Terrorism remains a serious threat that no nation shouldcome to compromise, especially when civilian lives are concerned. Any threats of terrorism
be it political or religious should be addressed accordingly with no exemptions on any bias
towards these extremist groups operating internationally. Regions in the Southeast Asia
should come hard on extremist group operating within their boundaries and should
illegalize any group that portrays any signs of extremism.
Due to political and religious reasons, some Asean nations are reluctant of illegalizing
groups that have been branded by the international community as terrorist groups due tosensitivity issues. Current terrorism activities in Indonesia have had a major affect on the
countries tourism, foreign direct investment, trade and other areas for example. This could
happen to any nation within the realm of terrorist control.
The threat of maritime terrorism is real and the Straits of Malacca is a potential risk zone
for a major attack. The international community is making great efforts against maritime
terrorism. However everything is prevention and treatment of an anticipated attack. The
efforts of the international community must continue to foster better understanding of theissues and to eradicate the threat of piracy and terrorism.
We have noted the many obstacles hindering the security concerns of the Asean nations, thecooperative stand of the Japanese government support to the Malacca Straits and theSoutheast Asian nations on piracy related issues and maritime security threats fromterrorism. One significant challenge, which needs to be dealt urgently, is the issue of the
non-interference charter. Distinct and specific directions are needed to stop maritime
terrorism and deterrence to terrorism.
Issues with regards to regional security and the redress of terrorism is a primary concernthat should also be carefully examined by government authorities. A new framework
should be in placed with regards to Piracy and Maritime Terrorism, which deals specificallyon the threats of Piracy and Terrorism. With regards to the littoral states, excluding
Singapore on the pretext of its views in improving the security of the Straits, Malaysia has
in many ways also moved forward and its changing attitude towards international assistancemay or even encourage the policies of its larger and more reluctant littoral neighbour,
Indonesia, to follow suit.

47

Japanese Self Defense Force current operations and regional efforts in Piracy andTerrorism
Appendix: Source; 1st Tokyo-Seminar on Common Security Challenges “Future
Cooperation among Defense Authorities in the Region”, 18 March 2009, Tokyo

48

49

POLICIES FOR SEA-LINES OF COMMUNICATION (SLOC) - JMOD

50

51

52

53

54

JAPANESE AID TO MALAYSIAOFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA)55

JAPANESE AID TO MALAYSIAOFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID (ODA)

56

57

58

Japanese Aid to Indonesia
Official Development Assistance (ODA)59

Japanese Aid to Indonesia
Official Development Assistance (ODA)60

Japanese Aid to Indonesia
Official Development Assistance (ODA)61

Japanese Aid to Indonesia
Official Development Assistance (ODA)62

Japanese Aid to Indonesia
Official Development Assistance (ODA)

63

64

65

66

67

68

Notesi

Maritime Terrorism and Piracy in the Straits of Malacca: A Potential Risk That Needs To be Taken
Seriously; Turkish Weekly Journal; Andrin Raj, Visiting Research Fellow, Japan Institute for International
Affairs and Security & Terrorism Analyst, Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centreii
The Somalian Straits and Maritime PT Syndrome Linked to Terrorist Organization and the Use of Private
Military Companies; The Turkish Weekly Journal; Andrin Raj, Visiting Research Fellow, Japan Institute forInternational Affairs & Security & Terrorism Analyst, Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centreiii
Source: Japan Coast Guard; interview with Director Education & Training & Division, Osamu Etani
iv
Source: Japan Coast Guard; interview with Director Education & Training & Division, Osamu Etani
vi

Source: Interview with Mr. Michio Harada, Director, Maritime Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2009vii
Source: Japan Coast Guard; interview with Director Education & Training & Division, Osamu Etani
viii
David Adam Stott; “Japan and Indonesia Boost Military Ties as Ship Arrives in Jakarta” Shingetsu
Newsletter No.19, June 20,2005
ix
International Maritime Bureau (IMO); Piracy Reportsx
IMO 2008 Annual Reportxi
Maritime Terrorism and Piracy in the Straits of Malacca: A Potential Risk That Needs To be Taken
Seriously; Turkish Weekly Journal; Andrin Raj, Visiting Research Fellow, Japan Institute for International
Affairs and Security & Terrorism Analyst, Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centrexii
IMO press statement February 2008 News Straits Times
xiii“The Threat of Maritime Terrorism and Responses: The Zone of Threat and the Sea-Lanes in a Global
Strategy Map”; by Kazumine Akimotoxiv
The Jamestown Foundation: www.jamestown.org
xv
U.S. Coast Guard Report: Official Paper
xvi
Naval War College Review: 2005
xvii
Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-Related Terrorism in the Age of Weaponsof Mass Destruction 2004
xviii
Jayant Abhyankar; Piracy, Armed Robbery and Terrorism at Sea: A Global and Regional Outlook
xix
Stefan Eklof Amirel; Political Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: A Comparison between the Straits ofMalacca and the Southern Philippines: Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits 2006xx
Source: Undisclosed
xxi
Stefan Eklof Amirel; Political Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: A Comparison between the Straits ofMalacca and the Southern Philippines: Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits 2006
xxii
Kristen Schulze, “The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization”, Policy
Studies 2 (Washington D.C: East-West Centre Washington, 2004
xxiii
Source: Undisclosed
xxiv
Source: Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre: Training Manuals
xxv
White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrest and the Threat of Terrorism, Ministry of Home Affairs of theGovernment of Singapore (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003)
xxvi
A.M. Hendropriyono, “RI-S’pore ties: Opportunity Lost”, Jakarta Post, 25 August 2004
xxvii
Philip Sherwell, Massoud Ansari and Marianne Kearney, “Al Qaeda terrorist plan to turn tanker into afloating bomb”, The Telegraph, Internet edition 12 September 2004
xxviii
Piracy equals terrorism on troubled waters: Minister” Agence France Presse, 21 Dec 2003;
www.singapore-window.org
xxix
The Straits Times, April 18, 2005
xxx
The Business Times Singapore, March 15, 2005
xxxi
Council of Foreign Relations, February 11
xxxii“The Threat of Maritime Terrorism and Responses: The Zone of Threat and the Sea-Lanes in a Global
Strategy Map”; by Kazumine AkimotoxxxiiiGraham Ong; Pre-empting Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia; 29 November 2002

69

xxxiv

Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond The Asean Way; Melly Cabarello, Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies
xxxv
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia Indonesia, 24 February 1976; Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations: www.aseansec.org/1217.htm
xxxvi
Muthiah Alagappa, “ The Dynamics of International Security in Southeast Asia: Change and Continuity”,
Australian Journal of International Affairs 45,no.1 (May 1191), p.1
xxxvii
Stanley Weeks, “New Initiative for Maritime Cooperation,” paper presented at the Institute for Defense
and Strategic Studies, Maritime Security Conference 21 May 2004
xxxviii
Sumihiko Kawamura, “International Cooperation for SLOC Security,” Maritime Security Cooperation in
the Asia-Pacific toward the 21st Century, ed. Dalchoong Kim, Seo-Hang, Lee and Jin-Hyun Paik (Seoul:
Yonsei Univ.2000, p.96
xxxix
Yaleglobal online: www.yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.articlexlGary R.M. Yusof, “Upaya Indonesia Memenangi Terrorism Sebagai Inplikasia Keputusan Politik
Internasional/Regional’, paper presented at Maritime Terrorism Seminar, Indonesia, 25 September 2003
xli
“ Fact sheet On The ReCAAP Agreement On Combating Piracy & Armed Robbery Against Ships In Asia”;
www.apt.mot.gov.sg/data/ReCAPP
xlii
Source: Undisclosed
xliii
Source: Interview with Mr. Michio Harada, Director, Maritime Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2009xliv
http://wwwaseansec.org/afp/100p.htm
xlv
The islands in question include the Spratly, Paracel, and the Natuna archipelagoes, with the Spratly
Archipelago being the most contentious
xlvi
Source: Undisclosed
xlvii
http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/AboutUs/tabid/57/Default.aspx
xlviii
http://www.straitstimes.com/vgn-exttemplating/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=409787f9f97cf110VgnVCM100000430a0a0aRCRD&vgnextchannel=04f0
758920e39010VgnVCM1000000a35010aRCRD
xlix
Dr. Seiichiro Takagi, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan: “1st Tokyo Seminar on Common
Security Challenges: Future Cooperation among Defense Authorities in the Region”; organized by the
Ministry of Defense, Japan, March 18, 2009 at the Keio Plaza Hotel, Tokyo (note: the region was not
specified in the forum)lSource: Ministry of Defense, Malaysiali“Eye in the Sky” Initiative; www.marinetalk.com/articles-marine-companies/art/Eye-in-the-Sky-InitiativeB1 3/16/09
lii“1st Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges: Future Cooperation among Defense Authorities in the
Region”; organized by the Ministry of Defense, Japan, March 18, 2009 at the Keio Plaza Hotel, Tokyo (note:the region was not specified in the forum)
liii
Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre: Training Manuals
liv
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/piracy/problem0112.html, 2/20/2009lv
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/piracy/problem0112.html, 2/20/2009
lvi
Ibid
lvii
Ibid
lviii
Ibid
lix
Ibid
lx
Statement by the Japan Ministry of Defense in their published folder on terrorism
lxi
Source: Japan Coast Guard; interview with Director Education & Training & Division, Osamu Etani
lxii
Ibid
lxiii
Source: Interview with Mr. Michio Harada, Director, Maritime Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2009lxiv
Source: Ocean Policy Research Foundation; “Briefing 29/2007,18 September 2007
lxv
Source: Japan Coast Guard; interview with Director Education & Training & Division, Osamu Etani

70

Andrin Raj (andrin.raj@stratad.net) is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) &Director/Security and Terrorism Analyst for Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre (SAPSC). The views expressed are of
his own and does not reflect those of JIIA and SAPSC. No part of this paper is to be reprinted or reproduced except bypermission of JIIA or by the author.

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