AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
IIPS

RIPSInstitute for International

The Japan Institute ofResearch Institute for

Policy Studies

International Affairs

Peace and Security

Editorial Advisory Board:

No. 212

Akio Watanabe (Chair)
Masashi Nishihara
Yoshiji Nogami
Taizo Yakushiji

04 June 2015

Editorial Committee:
Taizo Yakushiji
Hisayoshi Ina
Tsutomu Kikuchi
Shujiro Urata andToshiro Iijima
Editor & Online Publisher:
Yoshji Nogami
President, JIIAHOW TO KEEP IRAN FROM CHEATING:
SUPPLEMENTARY RELATIONSHIPBETWEEN VERIFICATION AND POLITICALSTRATEGY
Nobumasa Akiyama
・ It is premature to judge at this moment whether theagreement on April 2 between Iran and the P5+1 onkey ‘‘parameters’ for a Joint Comprehensive Plan ofAction (JCPOA) could actually ensure the breakouttimeline.
・ The implementation of verification measures based on
the Additional Protocol with the IAEA is a prerequisite
for a successful deal with Iran.

However, it would not

be sufficient enough to provide the full confidence inthe success of a deal with Iran.
・ A clear political strategy by the United States for fully
supporting the IAEA, containing nuclear aspirations inthe Middle East, and managing relationships with its
traditional security partners in the region such as
Saudi Arabia and Israel is key.
The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should
not be attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes ofStrategic Studies.

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

The agreement on April 2 between Iran and the P5+1 on key ‘parameters’
for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)1 and the subsequent debate
over the effectiveness of this forthcoming interim agreement rekindled an oldquestion concerning the nature of nuclear proliferation: is it a political issue or atechnical one?
The parameters describe measures to ensure a one-year breakout
timeline, such as limiting the number and types of centrifuges, reducing the lowenriched uranium (LEU) stockpile to 300 kilograms by shipping abroad asignificant portion, and suspending enrichment activities for 15 years. The
proper implementation of technical measures such as intrusive safeguards
based on the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) to restrict and verify nuclear activities would function as the basis forreliable monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities. Keeping such a breakout timeline
should be possible IF such provisions are properly implemented.
The proper implementation of the provisions also serve to prevent“sneak-out” (James Acton, “Who Cares about an Iranian Nuclear Breakout;
Beware of an Atomic ‘Sneak-out’,” The National Interests, November 4, 2014,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/who-cares-about-iranian-nuclear-breakout-be
ware-atomic-sneak-11604)

cases.

Were

covertnuclearactivities

orweapon-related activities ever to be undertaken, they would, on top of Iran’s
existing enrichment capabilities, pose serious threats to the effectiveness of theagreement in ensuring nuclear non-proliferation. The parameters address thisconcern. First, Iran’s enrichment activities are restricted to a single site at Natanz.
This would make it difficult for Iran to justify any clandestine enrichment activities
discovered at other sites.
Second, Iran agreed to implement the Additional Protocol, which would
provide more intrusive access to Iran’s nuclear facilities and sites, including
uranium mines and mills, as well as procurement channels. If continualmonitoring of uranium production and procurement of materials and technology

1

The argument in this piece is based on the fact sheet released by the White House,
although the author is aware of Iran’s account on the parameters.

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary2

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

is combined with other safeguards measures, it would be difficult for Iran toengage in clandestine enrichment activities.
However, it is premature to judge at this moment whether theseparameters could actually ensure the breakout timeline. First, negotiations on alldetails of the implementation of these parameters will continue until the end ofJune. In particular, the specifics of LEU removal, the implementation of theAdditional Protocol and, above all, the conditions for lifting sanctions presumablypose serious challenges for both Iran and the P5+1 if they hope to conclude thedeal in the next few months.
Second, even if the deal is done, this is just the beginning. As history
shows in such instances as the collapse of the Agreed Framework for resolving
the North Korean nuclear crisis in 2003, there are always problems in theprocess of delivering on commitments in such agreements. Skeptics of theJCPOA stress that they cannot count on Iran’s compliance, and that the IAEA
has insufficient ability to ensure Iran’s perfect compliance by detecting
clandestine activities or verifying the correctness of Iran’s declared activities.
Such concerns are all valid. In the meantime, hardliner approaches,including military options, would not ease these concerns. If the negotiations
collapse, which could happen if the P5+1 pursue an unrealistic ‘zero-tolerance’
option for Iran, there would be two possible scenarios. The first scenario would
be to allow Iran to resume its enrichment activities. This would bring Iran muchcloser to acquiring nuclear weapons than in the JCPOA scenario. Obviously, thiswould not be an option favored by the United States and its international partners,
including Japan. The other scenario would be to conduct military strikes on Iran’s
existing nuclear facilities. This could delay Iran’s going nuclear, but it could notnecessarily guarantee that Iran would forego the nuclear option. If military strikes
were to fail in destroying covert nuclear facilities undiscovered by intelligence
activities thereto, the consequences of the military option would be even worse.
Furthermore, such hostile actions would put US policy toward the Middle East ineven more difficult straits.
The verification and safeguards measures stipulated in the parameters
would not guarantee the ‘complete’ absence of Iran’s nuclear development

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary3

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

potential (unless they are all detected by intelligence activities and completelydestroyed). It is impossible to completely eliminate the risk of cheating, but therisk of cheating is not specific to the case of Iran. Rather, it is a general feature of
any arms control/non-proliferation safeguards and verification activities. You may
recall how the United States and the Soviet Union lived with anxiety about thelevel of sufficiency in verification in their bilateral strategic arms control
agreements. The history of these bilateral arms control agreements shows that
pursuing technical measures for verification and building two-way politicalconfidence were mutually reinforcing in reducing the threat level and the risk ofwithdrawal from arms control agreements.
Likewise, if the technical measures stipulated in the parameters are notsufficient to provide the United States and other members of the international
community with an acceptable level of confidence in Iran’s compliance, the gap
between the desirable level of confidence and the level of completeness of theseverification measures should be filled by a political means of building confidencevis-à-vis Iran. Improving confidence vis-à-vis Iran would help elicit further
cooperation from Iran.
To supplement this, the United States needs a political strategy for
involving international partners. Such a strategy should cover such areas asincreasing IAEA capabilities (including intelligence cooperation and additional
financial cooperation), strengthening non-proliferation and nuclear cooperation
for containing nuclear aspirations in the Middle East and, above all, managing
relationships with traditional US security partners in the region such as Saudi
Arabia and Israel. Skeptics in the United States now need to encourage the US
government to craft such a realistic political strategy rather than block theadministration’s efforts in search of the unattainable.

Nobumasa Akiyama is a professor, Graduate School of International Public Policy,
Hitotsubashi University and an adjunct fellow at the Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs.

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary4