THE IAEA REPORT ON THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENTAND
THE IAEA ACTION PLAN ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
Japan Nuclear Human Resource Development NetworkAnnual MeetingFebruary 10, 2016
Tokyo, JapanLyn Bevington
Office for Safety and Security Coordination
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security

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International Atomic Energy Agency

OVERVIEW• Background• The IAEA Report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident• The IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety• Observations and lessons• The way forward
IAEA2THE REPORT - KEY FACTS•GENERAL
September 2012 – announcement
by DG AmanoREPORT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL• Executive Summary + Summary Report•~200 pages drawn from TechnicalVolumes•

3 years work•

September 2015 – report released••

DG Report + 5 Technical Volumes

45 key observations and lessons••

What happened + why

Most not new•

IAEA activities + CNS Review Meetings•

5 TECHNICAL VOLUMES
5 Working Groups•

WORKING METHODS
6 rounds of 5 Working Group meetings•

180 Experts 40 Member States•

Consultancy meetings•

Geographical representation•

Expert missions to Japan•~1000 Pages + Annexes•

Bilateral meetings in Japan•

104 observations and lessons•

Information received from Japan•

IAEA website•

Independent advice•

Safety standards extant in 2011

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PARTICIPATION

Approximately 180 experts from over 40 Member States and various
international organizations (including IAEA staff).
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THE REPORT• Report by the Director General• Technical Volume 1
Description and Context of the Accident• Technical Volume 2
Safety Assessment• Technical Volume 3
Emergency Preparedness and Response• Technical Volume 4Radiological Consequences• Technical Volume 5
Post-accident Recovery
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REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL• Executive Summary• Summary Report•

Key messages•

Observations and lessons

Uses safety standards in place at thetime of the accident as a reference.

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WHAT HAPPENED
Description of the events presented inchronological order to highlight theintegrated response to a multi-unit
accident

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SAFETY ASSESSMENT
WHY IT HAPPENED•

Vulnerability to external events•

The defence in depth concept•

The fundamental safety functions•Beyond design basis accidents and severe accidentmanagement•Regulatory effectiveness•

Human and organizational factors•

Operating Experience
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VULNERABILITY TO EXTERNAL EVENTS•••FINDINGS
No apparent damage to SSC’s from earthquake
Tsunami far exceeded design basis causing major damage
External hazards - not in line with international practice
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS••••

Appropriate conservatism to account for uncertainties
Predictions that challenge current assumptions need
prompt corrective actions
Multi-unit and multi-site accidents need to be assessed
Importance of national and/or international independentpeer reviews needs to be emphasized
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THE FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS••••••FINDINGS
Following the earthquake control of reactivity was fulfilled in all
six units
Removal of heat could not be maintained as the operators weredeprived of almost all means of control over Units 1, 2 and 3
The confinement function was lost as a result of the loss of AC
and DC power
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
Robust and reliable cooling needed to remove residual heat
Need to ensure a reliable confinement function to prevent
significant release of radioactive material to the environment
Operators need to be trained to manage severe plant conditions
IAEASEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT••••••FINDINGS
Deterministic and probabilistic treatment was not in line withinternational best practices
PSA results much lower than NPPs in other Member States
Limited scope deterministic analyses led to weaknesses inaccident management procedures
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
Training in the use of emergency equipment under extreme
environmental conditions insufficient to allow for its timely use
Latest guidance from the BWROG not implemented andhampered operators response
Regulatory bodies need to ensure that adequate accident
management provisions are in place
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REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS••••••••FINDINGS
Complex regulatory system - several different organizations
Distribution of regulatory body decision making was unclear
Some activities not in line with international best practices
Inspection program was overly limited in scope and influence
Periodic safety reviews lacked effective regulatory oversight
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
Government coordination
Clear lines of authority and decision making
Regulatory independence, competence, strong legislative
authority and adequate resources, including qualified personnel,
are essential
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HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS•FINDINGS
Basic assumption that plants were safe•

All stakeholders shared and mutually reinforced this belief•••

OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
Individuals + organizations need to continuously question basic
assumptions + implications for safety
The need to be prepared for the unexpected
Regulatory authorities should provide oversight and independent
review of safety culture programs
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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANDRESPONSE•

Initial response in Japan to theaccident•Protecting emergency workers•

Protecting the public•

Transition from the emergency phase•

International responseIAEA17

INITIAL RESPONSE IN JAPAN TO THE
ACCIDENT••••FINDINGS
Separate arrangements were in place to respond to nuclear
emergencies and natural disasters at national and local levels
The earthquake and tsunami and radiation levels made the onsite response extremely difficult
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
Need to consider emergencies that could involve severe
damage to nuclear fuel including those involving several units
Need clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the operatorand local and national authorities
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PROTECTING EMERGENCY WORKERS

•••

•

•

FINDINGS
Legislation and guidance in Japan addressed measures for theprotection of emergency workers but not in sufficient detail.
No arrangements to integrate those emergency workers notdesignated prior to the accident
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
Emergency workers need to be designated, assigned clearlyspecified duties, be trained and properly protected
Arrangements to integrate those emergency workers notdesignated prior to the emergency, and helpers/volunteers
Need to involve non-governmental organizations in establishingadequate emergency arrangements and provide training
IAEAPROTECTING THE PUBLIC•••••••FINDINGS
Criteria for protective actions not expressed in measurable
quantities
No predetermined criteria for relocation
Evacuees relocated several times during the first 24 hours
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
Decisions on urgent protective actions based on predefined plantconditions or monitoring results
Protective actions need to do more good than harm
Medical staff need to be trained in basic medical response to anuclear emergency
Arrangements for decision makers, the public and others tounderstand radiological health hazards in a nuclear emergency tomake informed decisions on protective actions
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INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE••••••FINDINGS
Assistance Convention was not invoked and RANET not used
Different States recommended different protective actions fortheir nationals in Japan in response to the accident
These differences were generally not well explained to the publicand occasionally caused confusion and concern
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
The implementation of international arrangements for
notification and assistance needs to be strengthened byenhanced training and exercises
There is a need to improve consultation and sharing of
information among States on response actions.
IAEA process of assessment and prognosis
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RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES••

Radioactivity in the environment
Protecting people against
radiation exposure•

Radiation exposure•

Health effects•

Radiological consequences for
non-human biota
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RADIOACTIVITY IN THE ENVIRONMENT•FINDINGS
Most of the atmospheric releases were blown eastward ,depositing onto the Pacific Ocean.

•Releases and discharges directly into the sea•••

131I, 134Cs and 137Cs were found in drinking water, food andsome non-edible items
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
Prompt quantification and characterization of releases isneededComprehensive and coordinated programme of long term
environmental monitoring is necessary
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RADIATION EXPOSURE•

FINDINGSThe significant contributors to the exposure of the public were:••••Public doses comparable to levels of natural background
23 000 emergency workers, most below occupational dose limit•••••

External exposure from the plume and the ground; andInternal exposure from 131I, 134Cs and 137Cs

174 exceeded the original dose criterion for emergency workers
6 emergency workers exceeded the revised criterion

OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
Education and training in radiation protection should becontinuous for all stakeholders and should be regularly updated
Personal radiation monitoring invaluable for dose estimates
A robust system is necessary for monitoring and recording
occupational radiation doses
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PUBLIC AND WORKER DOSES

Measured Dose

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Estimated Dose

Occupational DoseHEALTH EFFECTS••••

FINDINGS
No early health effects were observed among workers or thepublic that could be attributed to the accident
UNSCEAR - “no discernible increased incidence of radiationrelated health effects are expected among exposed members of
the public and their descendants”
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
The risks of radiation exposure and attribution of health effects
need to be clearly presented to stakeholders
Need for radiological protection guidance to address thepsychological consequences to members of the affected
populations in the aftermath of radiological accidents
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POST-ACCIDENT RECOVERY••••

Off-site remediationOn-site stabilization andpreparations for decommissioning
Management of contaminatedmaterial and radioactive waste
Community revitalization andstakeholder engagement
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OFF-SITE REMEDIATION•••

FINDINGS
Policies and strategies for post-accident remediation
were not in place
The remediation strategy focused on activities toreduce radiocaesium
Two categories of contaminated areas were defined••••

Special Decontamination Area
Intensive Contamination Survey Area

OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
Strategies and measures for post-accident recovery
need to be prepared in advanceFurther international guidance is needed on for postaccident recovery situations.
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ON-SITE STABILIZATION AND
PREPARATIONS FOR DECOMMISSIONING••••••FINDINGS
A comprehensive, high level strategic plan for stabilization anddecommissioning was developed
Safety functions had been re-established and SSC’s were in place
to reliably maintain stable conditions
Completion of decommissioning ~ 30–40 years
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
A strategic plan for maintaining long term stable conditions anddecommissioning of accident damaged facilities is essential
Establishing and maintaining long term knowledge and technicalexpertise is essential for successful decommissioning.
Decommissioning will take decades and arrangements formaintaining the necessary expertise are needed.
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MANAGEMENT OF CONTAMINATED
MATERIAL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE••••

FINDINGS
On-site decontamination and remediation
efforts result in large quantities ofcontaminated material and of radioactive waste
Several hundred temporary storage facilities
had been established in local communities
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
Strategies for post-accident recovery need
generic strategies for managing contaminatedliquid and solid material and radioactive waste
Generic safety assessments for discharge,storage and disposal
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COMMUNITY REVITALIZATION AND
STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT••••FINDINGS
Evacuation and relocation measures and restrictions
on food involved hardships for the people affected.
The revitalization and reconstruction projects weredeveloped from understanding the socioeconomic
consequences of the accident.
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS
Need to recognize the socioeconomic consequencesof an accident and the protective actions to develop
revitalization and reconstruction projects
Support by stakeholders is essential for all aspects ofpost-accident recovery
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THE IAEA ACTION PLAN ON NUCLEARSAFETY•KEY FACTS
12 key actions, 39 sub-actions•

Unanimously adopted in September 2011•

EBP funded projects:•

52 from Japan•

10 from USA•

7 from Russia•

Over 900 activities completed•~ 40 Million euro since September 2011•

TRANSPARENCY
Mission calendar of peer reviews•

International experts missions reports•

International Experts Meetings reports

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NUCLEAR SAFETY ACTION PLAN
AREAS OF WORK

SafetyAssessments

IAEA Peer
Reviews

Emergency
Preparedness
and ResponseNationalRegulatory
BodiesInternational
Legal
Framework

Member States
Embarking on
Nuclear Power

Capacity
Building

Protection from
Ionizing
Radiation

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Operating
Organizations

IAEA SafetyStandards

Communication

Research &Development

CAPACITY BUILDINGACTION : Strengthen and maintain capacity building• Member States with nuclear power programmes….to strengthen, develop, maintain andimplement their capacity building
programs……to continuously ensure sufficientand competent human resources necessary toassume their responsibility for safe, responsible
and sustainable use of nuclear technologies• The IAEA to assist as requested.
• Such programmes to cover safe operation,
emergency preparedness and response andregulatory effectiveness and to build upon
existing capacity building infrastructures.

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IAEA REPORTS - LESSONS LEARNEDReactor and Spent
Fuel Safety
2012

Transparency &Communication
2012

Human & Organizational
Factors
2014

Radiation
protection
2014

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Protection Against
External Events
2012

Decommissioningand Remediation
2013

Strengthening Nuclear
Regular Effectiveness2013

Preparedness andResponse
2013

Severe accident
management
2015

Research &Development
2015

Assessment &Prognosis
2015

Capacity
Building2015

CAPACITY BUILDING REPORTLESSONS LEARNEDINSIGHTS FROM•The 2014 conference on Human resource Development•

The IAEA peer review services• The Education and Training Review Service (ETReS)• The Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)• The Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)
programme• The emergency preparedness review (EPREV)•

Other IEM reports•••••

Decommissioning
Human Factors
Radiation Protection
Severe Accident Management
Emergency Preparedness

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LESSONS LEARNED
••

•

•

Capacity building needs to be supported by governments
through a national strategy to ensure that all stakeholders
are involvedIncreased emphasis needs to be placed on medium and longterm planning of capacity building and human resource
development
An integrated national HRD plan to be developed andupdated.
R&D activities can be used to identify the needs for capacity
building activities at the national, regional or internationallevels.
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LESSONS LEARNED
••

•

•

All Member States would benefit from a programme of capacity
building in radiation protection.
Importance of human and organizational factors for nuclear training
nuclear plant operators
Need better understand of the systemic approach to safety toensure proper training for dealing with an unexpected nuclear orradiological event.
IAEA Peer review services are an important mechanism forexchanging information and experience at the organizational andnational levels

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IAEA ACTIVITIES TO SUPPORT MEMBERSTATES CAPACITY BUILDING•

Strategic Approach to Education and Training in Nuclear Safety (2013-2020)•

Safety Education and Training Peer Review Service (ETPRES)•Cyber Learning Platform (CLP4NET)•New version of the Education & Training Catalogue•Self-assessment methodology for capacity building activities in Member States•••

Global Nuclear Safety and Security Network Strategic Plan was published in 2014
aimed at supporting capacity building activities
GNSSN promotes knowledge safety networks and sharing lessons learnedPublications•••

Methodology for the Systematic Assessment of the Regulatory Competence Needs(SARCoN) for Regulatory Bodies of Nuclear Installations (IAEA TECDOC 1757; 2015)
The IAEA Report on Capacity Building for Nuclear Safety (2015)
Regulatory Control of Nuclear Power Plants

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IAEA FUTURE ACTIVITIES IN CAPACITYBUILDING•••

Respond to requests from Member States for assistance in self-assessments forcapacity building programmes, including human resources, education andtraining, knowledge management and networks.
Encourage Member States to share their measures to develop, maintain andstrengthen cooperation for capacity building at the regional and internationallevels.
Respond to requests from Member States for assistance in identifying andimplementing necessary improvements in their capacity building programmes in
the areas of•••

Regulatory frameworks,
Operating organizations andNational nuclear power infrastructure, with a view to incorporating lessons learned from theFukushima Daiichi accident.

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THE WAY FORWARD
MEMBER STATES RESPONSE•
Board of Governors + 2015 General Conference•Wide support for the Action Plan activities thepublication of the IAEA Fukushima Report“Important to follow up to ensure the Action Planand IAEA Report contribute to a continuous
improvement in nuclear safety worldwide”“It is essential that the IAEA ensure that themomentum to improve global nuclear safety isimproved and further increased building on
the Fukushima report”

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IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE 2015
Resolution GC(59)/RES/9 September 2015
•Welcomes the publication of the IAEA Report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident,
consisting of the Director General’s Report and five technical volumes•

Requests the Secretariat, in close consultation with Member States, to integrateactions arising from the Observations and Lessons in the Report into the Agency’s
regular programme;•

Requests the Secretariat to continue follow-up on the projects/activities arisingfrom the Action Plan and to build upon the findings, lessons learned, andmeasures implemented from the Fukushima Daiichi accident;•Requests the Agency to continue to build upon:••••

the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety,
the experience of States in implementing the Action Plan,
the observations and lessons contained in the IAEA Fukushima Report andthe principles of the Vienna Declaration,and use them for defining its nuclear safety strategy and its programme of work.

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IMPLEMENTATION••The Agency is developing an implementation plan to facilitate thetransition of the relevant activities into its regular work programme
The aim of the implementation plan is to establish the framework
for the work of the relevant Departments and Divisions of theAgency for the coming years“I believe that this IAEA report will provide a solid
knowledge base for the future and will help toimprove nuclear safety throughout the world. I
hope that governments, regulators and nuclear
power plant operators in all countries will continue
to act on the lessons learned from the Fukushima
Daiichi accident.”
Director General Amano September 2015

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Thank you for your attention

l.bevington@iaea.org