MIRACLE OR MIRAGE?
MANUFACTURING HUNGER AND POVERTY IN ETHIOPIAMIRACLE OR MIRAGE?
MANUFACTURING HUNGER AND POVERTY IN ETHIOPIA

Acknowledgements
This report was authored by Frederic Mousseau with Alice Martin-Prével. Haley Kaplan assisted with research on Afar, andElizabeth Fraser conducted research on sugarcane in Brazil. Sasha Kramer prepared the map of sugar plantations anddams.
The views and conclusions expressed in this publication are those of the Oakland Institute alone and do not reflect opinionsof the individuals and organizations that have sponsored and supported the work.
Copy Editor: Shannon Biggs
Design: Amymade Graphic Design
Cover photo: Omo River in 2012, before the completion of the Gibe III Dam © Oakland InstitutePublisher: The Oakland Institute is an independent policy think tank bringing fresh ideas and bold action to the mostpressing social, economic, and environmental issues.
Copyright © 2016 by The Oakland InstituteThis text may be used free of charge for the purposes of advocacy, campaigning, education, and research, provided thatthe source is acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that all such uses be registered with them for impact
assessment purposes. For copying in any other circumstances, reuse in other publications, or translation or adaptation,
permission must be secured.
For more information:
The Oakland Institute
PO Box 18978
Oakland, CA 94619 USA
www.oaklandinstitute.org
info@oaklandinstitute.org

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Table of Contents
Executive Summary...........................................................................................................................................................4
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................................6
Hunger Persists in Ethiopia.............................................................................................................................................. 7‘Modernizing’ Agriculture for Growth and Transformation.............................................................................................9
A High Toll on Indigenous People and Agro-pastoralists...............................................................................................11
What We Can Learn from the Past: The Disastrous Impact of Plantations in the Afar Region . ................................. 12
Dams: Electricity, Irrigation, and Man-made Disasters................................................................................................. 14
Sugarcane Expansion: Bitter Lessons from Brazil......................................................................................................... 16
An Overlooked Reality: High Cost and Low Benefit of Plantation Agriculture Compared to Pastoralism....................17
Repeating Past Mistakes................................................................................................................................................. 19
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................................20

3

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Executive Summary
In 2016, food crisis in Ethiopia once again topped theinternational headlines, with 18 million people reportedly
requiring food assistance for survival.1 The food crisis has
been widely attributed to climatic events resulting from El
Niño, and presented as an exogenous incident in Ethiopia’s
acclaimed economic miracle and double-digit growth rate.2
This narrative is convenient for the Ethiopian government.
For many years, the regime has used the argument of its
economic success to counter the critics of its development
strategy and repressive rule. It has labeled organizations
such as the Oakland Institute3 as being ‘anti-development’after they exposed the devastating impact of its policies on
the livelihoods and basic human rights of millions, including
many indigenous communities across the country.4
The climatic explanation is also critical for the international
backers of the regime. Ethiopia received on average $3.5
billion annually from donors in recent years, which makes
it one of the largest recipients of international development
assistance.5 Its largest donors, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the World Bank, have been closely involvedin the design of its development strategy and play a key role
within a number of aid mechanisms established to deliverit. Their indefectible support to the regime has not been
affected by the prevalent repression of political opposition
and independent media, and widespread human rights
abuses over various religious and ethnic groups.6
The 2016 crisis is a harsh reminder that despite thetrumpeted economical miracle, Ethiopia has not moved
beyond its tragic history of chronic hunger and famine.
Every year since 2005, 8 to 18 million Ethiopians have relied
on food assistance for their survival. The country still ranks
173rd out of 186 countries in the latest United Nations’
Human Development Report.7
Over the past decade, the government has designed policies
and plans supposed to address chronic food insecurity andto usher in development. The five-year Ethiopia Growthand Transformation Plan (GTP), launched in 2010, had theobjective of eradicating poverty and dependence on food aid
in the short run and lead to the ‘renaissance of Ethiopia.’8
In order to achieve these ambitions, the GTP included efforts
to increase the productivity of smallholder farmers9 – and at
the same time included programs to accelerate agriculturalindustrialization through large-scale farming operations. By
2011, the government of Ethiopia had demarcated 3.6 million

4hectares of land for large-scale agricultural investments.10 It
put in place the Commune Development Program (CDP),
also known as “villagization” program, to resettle 1.5 million
people in lowland areas which were targeted for large-scale
agricultural plantations, including South Omo, Gambella,
Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz and Afar.11 As evidenced by
the Oakland Institute and others,12 the CDP has resulted inforced evictions of local communities, mostly pastoralists
and agro-pastoralists, and the seizure of land and water
resources on which millions of Ethiopians rely for theirlivelihoods. More evictions can be expected in the future
given that beyond the initial 3.6 million hectares earmarked
for large-scale agriculture, the government has announced atotal of 11.55 million hectares being available to agriculturalinvestors.13
Sugar production is a key sector prioritized by the Ethiopian
government. In 2015, the government announced its plan tomake Ethiopia one of the world’s ten largest sugar producers
and exporters by 2023.14 Under the GTP, the government
has pursued the construction of several sugar factories andsugarcane plantations, accompanied by construction ofmultiple dams for irrigation and generating electricity foragro-processing industries.
These are not the first large-scale agriculture and irrigation
schemes that have been established in Ethiopia. In the mid1950s, the imperial regime created sugar and cotton plantations in the Awash Valley in the Afar Region.15 Along withplantations came the building of several hydroelectric dams
and irrigation schemes along the Awash River.16 These projects established on the lush banks of the river, negatively
affected local pastoralists and offer valuable lessons, which
are being ignored by the Ethiopian government in its quest
for development.
Deprived of access to the Awash banks on which they depended for dry-season cattle grazing, the Afar pastoralists
were forced to move increasingly long distances in searchof pasture and water.17 The modification of water flow andseasonal flooding patterns downstream of dams and irrigation schemes further shrank pasturelands, while water contamination by the sugar processing plants and plantations
threatened the wellbeing of humans and animals. Studies
have shown that shrinking land and water resources andthe push for the sedentarization of pastoralists in Afar leadto increased land degradation (resulting from cattle concentration in small grazing areas), food insecurity, and the in-www.oaklandinstitute.org

tensification of inter-ethnic conflicts.18 Even today, recurring
weather variations and food crisis take a high toll on Afar
pastoralists, who are deprived of their traditional strategies
to cope with drought, such as access to dry season pasture,mobility and herd management.19
The Afar Region, thus, provides a valuable example of thenegative impacts of large-scale plantations on people,
livestock, and the environment. Separate research conducted
on plantations in Afar has brought to light additional
evidence that seriously challenges the development
narrative of the government. This research shows with solid
quantitative data that pastoral cattle production is far more
profitable than large-scale cotton and sugar plantations.20
Contrary to the destructive effects of monocrops on soil andwater resources, pastoralism has no detrimental impact on
the environment and instead provides a range of ecologicalbenefits, including soil fertilization with manure.
These lessons have been largely ignored by the Ethiopian
government, which instead seeks inspiration from emerging
economies like Brazil. However, the Brazilian experienceraises more red flags over Ethiopia’s sugar development
plans. Sugarcane expansion in Brazil has resulted inincreased land concentration, displaced indigenous
communities, dangerous and harsh working conditions,destruction of sensitive ecosystems, increased rural-tourban migration, and has mostly benefited large landowners
and agribusinesses at the expense of farm laborers andsmallholder farmers.21
Another alarming aspect of Ethiopia’s development planscomes from the large reliance on dams for irrigationneeds. Five of the nine sugar factories currently running or
under construction in Ethiopia rely on dams for sugarcane
irrigation.22 Scientists and NGOs have warned for many
years that dams create major threats for people’s livelihoods
and the environment. Environmental consequences of large
dams range from destruction of ecosystems and biodiversity

5

to erosion and pollution.23 Social consequences include
population displacements and livelihoods destruction, as
exemplified by the Koka Dam built to irrigate sugarcane
plantations in Afar in 1960. The Koka Dam drastically
impacted river flow and changed flooding patterns and thegrazing land areas crucial for the survival of pastoralists in
the Awash Valley.24
In addition to the Awash Basin, the government has recently
targeted the Lower Omo Valley, a UNESCO World Heritage
Site, to develop one of the largest ever state-led agriculture
schemes in the country: the Omo-Kuraz Sugar Development
project. The project relies on irrigation schemes to beestablished from the recently completed Gibe III Dam andincludes the construction of four to five sugar factories
accompanied by 100,000 to 175,000 hectares of sugarcane
plantations.25 It is expected that Gibe III and irrigation
schemes will affect 200,000 Ethiopian pastoralists andagro-pastoralists who rely on flood-recession agriculture
and grazing lands bordering the Omo River.26 The project is
expected to affect another 300,000 people in Kenya whose
livelihoods depend on Lake Turkana, which receives 90
percent of its water from the Omo River.27
Large-scale agriculture and agro-processing plans constitutean increasingly large amount of the Ethiopian government’s
budget. Between 2010 and 2020, sugar expansion plans will
cost an estimated $11.2 billion.28 Meanwhile, in March 2016,
Ethiopia’s Prime Minister called for more foreign aid to fightthe ongoing food crisis and stigmatized the international
community for its slow response to the emergency
situation.29 The government emphasized its own $380
million contribution to respond to the food crisis,30 but thisis far from the amount of money spent in grandiose agroindustrialization schemes.
The Ethiopian government’s development strategy takes
away key coping strategies from its own people, destroys
natural resources, and impacts the livelihoods of millions.

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Introduction
Ethiopia has decades-long history of chronic hunger andfamine,31 and remains one of the most food insecurecountries in the world. In 2015-2016, the country had to callfor international assistance to provide emergency food relief
to some 10.2 million people,32 in addition to about 8 million
people receiving food or cash assistance through the donorfunded Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP),33 and otherforms of relief aid in various sectors.34
Drought and the effects of El Niño have been put forward
as the main causes of the 2016 food crisis, which has
been portrayed as an exceptional situation. However, theconditions were already primed for crisis before being
exacerbated by extreme weather.
The prevailing food insecurity in Ethiopia is not inconsistent
with the concerns previously raised by the Oakland Instituteand other organizations, questioning the development policy pursued by the Ethiopian government in recent years.35
The food crisis came as dissonant news in the often positive
discourse surrounding Ethiopia – a country praised for its
miraculous economic growth36 and its successful approachto agricultural productivity37 and investment.38 Ethiopia ishailed as one of the top performing African economies – its
economic growth averaged 10.8 percent per year between
2004 and 2014 against a regional average of 5 percent.39
Despite this outstanding performance, the country remains
one of the world’s largest recipients of aid, receiving on
average $3.5 billion of official development assistance every
year between 2008 and 2014.40
A key area of concern has been and remains that current
development plans rely largely on large-scale agriculturalinvestments, in particular for export crops such as
sugar or cotton, and large dams, for both electricity andirrigation. These schemes involve forced evictions of local

6

communities and the seizure of land and water resources on
which millions of Ethiopians rely for their livelihoods.41 The
government’s plans for expanding large-scale agriculture
and agro-processing industries primarily target areas
populated by pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in
Ethiopia’s five lowland regions: Afar, Somali, BenishangulGumuz, Gambella, and Southern Nations Nationalities andPeople’s Region (SNNPR).42 Much of the land demarcatedfor new agriculture programs is communal pastoral land.
In order to make it available for large-scale agriculture, thegovernment of Ethiopia has embarked on a program toforcibly relocate 1.5 million people.43
The government has justified its policy by citing the need toincrease agricultural production and productivity to enableeconomic growth.44 However, it has failed to demonstrate
how large-scale industrial agriculture schemes will address
chronic food insecurity and the vulnerability to climatic
shocks – whether at the local level, where the investments
are taking place, or nationally. The latest food crisis calls foran urgent and objective reassessment of the relevance ofthe strategy implemented.
Such a review can benefit from the large body of independent
research documenting the impact of dams and plantations
in Ethiopia and other countries. Based on this research,
this report analyses some of the key features of Ethiopia’s
development strategy, namely the expansion of plantations
in pastoral and agro-pastoral regions of the country, thenational priority given to sugar production and processing,and the increase of large dams for irrigation and electricity.
This report provides important learning, which should be
the basis for the Ethiopian government’s development
strategy and influence donor governments' financing ofdevelopment programs in the country.

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Women gather to receive World Food Programme relief food distribution in the Somali Region of Ethiopia © WFP/Michael Tewelde

Hunger Persists in Ethiopia
Food crisis in Ethiopia topped the media headlines in 20152016. In December 2015, the Ethiopian government called
for international aid to provide emergency food assistanceto 10.2 million people.45 This was in addition to the ongoinggovernment-led PSNP, financed by international donors,
which will assist 7.9 million food-insecure people in 2016.46
Adding these two figures, over 18 million people were inneed of food assistance in Ethiopia in mid-2016.
Certainly El Niño47 weather conditions have caused drought
and reduced harvests, but alone do not account for the foodcrisis.48 The worst affected zones include pastoral areas of
the Afar and Somali regions and lowland agricultural zones
of East and West Hararghe.49 Crop production dropped by
50-90 percent in some areas,50 and drought-induced cattle
deaths in 2015 reached 200,000.51 According to the United
Nations, up to 450,000 livestock deaths are expected in2016,52 as heavy rains resulting from El Niño’s counter
weather pattern also affect Ethiopia and cause destructive
flash floods.53
Yet before El Niño’s impact on worsening food insecurity,
over the past decade, every year, between 8 and 14 million
Ethiopians have relied on food assistance for their survival(see Figure 1).54

7

Established in 2005, the PSNP is a major channel for thisaid. It is the largest social safety net program in Africa,55
with an estimated cost of over $5.8 billion for 2005-2020.56
The PSNP is a joint effort by the government and international donors to address chronic food insecurity with adevelopment-oriented aid approach.57 The program beneficiaries receive food aid or cash transfers, generally as payments for their participation in labor intensive public work
projects. It was conceived with the expectation that PSNP
beneficiaries would “graduate” out of chronic food insecurity after receiving support for a certain amount of time.58
However, in practice, only a small number of beneficiaries
actually graduate out of the program, which questions therelevance of the safety net as a development instrument.
Rather than lifting beneficiaries out of poverty, the PSNP’s
main achievement is to provide aid at a cheaper cost and ina timelier manner than emergency relief operations.59
In the agricultural sector, the Ethiopian government has
put in place strategies to increase famers’ productivity inorder to meet the food needs of the country.61 The focus has
been on the adoption of chemical fertilizer and commercial
seeds, the use of which more than doubled in Ethiopia
between 2004 and 2014.62 In the past decade, the total area
cultivated expanded by nearly 30 percent from 10.1 million

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Figure 1: PSNP and Relief Beneficiaries Receiving Food & Cash 2005-2016 (millions)60
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1
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Relief Beneficiaries
PSNP Beneficiaries

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

to 12.9 million hectares, while the number of farmers roseby an average of 3.8 percent per year during this period.
These combined factors increased Ethiopia’s agricultural
output by an average of 9.4 percent per year between 2004
and 2014, while yield growth averaged 7 percent.63
However, this reported growth has failed to reduce chronic
food insecurity or to prevent the recent food crisis. In 2015,

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Ethiopia’s spending for cereal imports hit a record high of$767 million.64 Wheat forms the majority of these imports,
with $413 million spent on importing 1.3 million metrictons in 2015.65 The country is expected to import a recordof 2.5 million metric tons of wheat in 2016.66 Since 2004,
the country’s trade deficit in cereals has increased by 315
percent (see Figure 2).67

Figure 2: Ethiopia’s Cereal Trade Deficit, 2004-2015 (in million US dollars)68

800
700
600
500
400
300
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100
0

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2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

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‘Modernizing’ Agriculture for Growth and Transformation
In 2010, the government of Ethiopia released the first Growthand Transformation Plan (GTP I), a five-year strategy driving
the country’s agenda for development. The GTP I, and its
successor, GTP II, aim to turn Ethiopia into a middle income
country by 2020-2025 though a rapid transformation of theagrarian economy into an industry and service-led one.69
The agricultural sector is to form the basis of the country’s
industrialization.
One key element of the consecutive GTPs, besides
increasing smallholder productivity, is the promotion of
investments in medium and large-scale commercial farms
to increase production and supply of raw material for

growing agro-processing industries.70 The first GTP planned
to attract private investors with the establishment of a land
administration and lease system, and the provision of
infrastructure and services to make targeted areas suitablefor investment. It guaranteed, “every effort will be made toensure private investors receive efficient services from thegovernment.”71
Consequently, by 2011, 3.6 million hectares of land –an area larger than Belgium – had been earmarked forinvestments.72 Despite generally poor results of the largescale agricultural projects that were allocated land,73 thegovernment advertised in 2015, 11.5 million hectares ofTable 1: Ethiopian Sugar Factories and Associated Plantations and Irrigation Schemes82

Factory

Location		

Associated Plantations

Associated Irrigation Scheme

Running Factories

Metehara

Oromyia

10,100 ha

Irrigation canals from the Awash River83

Finchaa

Oromiya

Current expansion plans will bring size ofplantation from 18,750 to 21,000 ha

Diversion weir from the Finchaa River84

Tendaho (two-phased
construction. The first phase
was completed and thefactory started production in
2014)

Afar

50,000 ha (25,000 ha cultivated by the factory,
and another 25,000 ha by outgrowers)

Tendaho Dam on the Awash River

KessemAfar

20,000 ha

Kessem Kebena Dam on the Kessem
River (Awash basin)

Arjo Dedessa

Oromiya

20,000 ha

Arjo Dedessa Dam on the Dedessa River

Factories under Construction

9

Wonji Shoa (2 factories built
in the 1960s are in process of Oromiya
being replaced)

Expansion plan started in 2010 to increase
existing plantations from 7,000 to 16,000 ha

Groundwater85

Omo-Kuraz Sugar
Development Project (4-5factories under construction)

SNNPR

100,000 - 175,000 ha86

Gibe III Dam on the Omo River

Belles (3 factories underconstruction)

Amhara50,000 ha87

Diversion weir from the Beles River

Wolkaiyt

Tigray25,000 ha88

May Day Dam on the Zarema River89

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arable land available to investors, emphasizing its “strong commitment […]to avail the country’s fertile land for investment.”74 The GTP II (2015-2020)
continues to encourage large-scale commercial farming, especially for export
and agro-industry development.75 Ethiopia looks to countries such as Brazil,
India, Thailand and China, models of fast economic growth, for inspiration.76
The development of the sugar sector is a key component of the GTPs, withthe goal to make Ethiopia one of the world’s ten largest sugar producers andexporters by 2023.77 To accomplish this goal, the GTP I projected to increase
the level of sugar production from 0.31 tons in 2009-2010 to over 2.25 million
tons by 2015 – a growth of over 614 percent. A state monopoly company, theSugar Corporation, was created in 2010 with the mandate to renovate andexpand several existing sugar factories (notably in Wonji Shoa, Metehara, andFinchaa) and to build 10 additional factories throughout the country.78 The size
and number of accompanying sugarcane plantations is expected to exceed
300,000 hectares in the coming years (see Table 1 on previous page).

Ethiopia’s first Growth and Transformation Plan
(2010-2015) © Federal Republic of Ethiopia

The government of Ethiopia seeks to enhance South-South cooperation inagriculture and hopes to benefit from Brazil’s expertise and investments inthe sugar sector to promote biofuel production.79 In addition, Chinese banks
have played a key role in financing of the Sugar Corporation’s expansion
plans, having committed no less than $1.63 billion for the Omo-Kuraz Sugar
Development Project in the Lower Omo.80 The sector is also supported withloans from India, Israel, and Poland.81

Dams play a key part in Ethiopia’s agricultural modernization plans, as they are combined with irrigation projects toprovide water for large-scale plantations and generate electricity that is vital for agro-processing industries. Details on
current and planned dam constructions are provided in a separate section below.
Figure 3: Sugar Plantations and Associated Dams in Ethiopia90

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Kwegu fishing in the Omo River in 2012, before the expansion of sugar and irrigation schemes © Will Hurd / Oakland Institute

A High Toll on Indigenous People and Agro-pastoralists
According to the first GTP, large-scale agriculture operations are supposed to take place in areas “not occupied
or utilized by people.”91 However, research by the Oakland
Institute and other organizations has shown that, far frombeing constrained to vacant lands, the expansion of largescale agriculture is leading to the displacement of millions
of indigenous people, mostly agro-pastoralists and pastoralists.92 A key element of this plan is the relocation of 1.5
million people from zones targeted for industrial plantations under the government’s “villagization” program, primarily implemented in agro-pastoralist areas of Gambella,
Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, South Omo, and Afar.93
The government has repeatedly claimed that the goal ofvillagization is to improve access to basic services for
local communities and that the process was voluntary.94
However, numerous reports based on extensive fieldresearch document that the program has been enforced
through violence and pressure on local communities tovacate the lands.95

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One key area targeted for large-scale agriculture, especiallysugarcane, is the Lower Omo Valley, with the Omo-Kuraz
Sugar Development Project launched in 2011. The project,
one of the largest agricultural development schemes ever
initiated by the Ethiopian government, relies on irrigation
schemes to be established from the recently completed Gibe
III Dam. It includes the construction of four to five sugar
factories accompanied by 100,000 to 175,000 hectares ofsugarcane plantations.96
The impact of Gibe III and associated plantations on theflow of the Omo River, notably the modification of natural
flooding patterns, will affect as many as 200,000 agropastoralists who depend on flood-recession agriculture
and grazing lands bordering the Omo River.97 The project is
expected to affect another 300,000 people in Kenya whose
livelihoods depend on Lake Turkana, which receives 90
percent of its water from the Omo River resources.98

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The government claims that its plans will bringdevelopment and improve the livelihoodsof the local people.100 Yet, there is ample
evidence from Ethiopia and other countries
pointing to the high toll that expansion ofplantations and dams takes on indigenous
people and the environment.

Figure 4: The Omo-Kuraz Sugar Development Project

Omo-Kuraz sugar factory © Ethiopian Sugar Corporation

Source: Omo-Turkana Basin Research Network/B. Kamskii99

Lessons from the Past: Devastating Impact of Plantations in the Afar Region
The Afar Region, a lowland area in the North East of Ethiopia,
was the first region to see the establishment of large-scale
plantations in the mid-1950s.101 In this relatively arid partof the country, the schemes relied on significant supply of
irrigation water from the Awash River. Sugar and cotton
plantations were expanded by successive governmentsin the following decades through the construction of newdams on the Awash River.102
Over the past five decades, over 400,000 hectares of land in
the Afar Region were seized by the government for various
purposes, including plantations, national parks, wild life

12

conservation areas, and hunting lands.103 This figure does
not account for the loss of pasture land due to the decreasein flooded land downstream of the irrigation schemes. It
is estimated that the 1960s expansion of plantations andthe establishment of the Awash National Park reduced
pastoral grazing areas by 60 percent 104 The construction ofhydroelectric dams on the Awash River reduced further thewater flow downstream and affected the flooding patterns.105
Whereas certain parts of the Afar region are semi-desert, theland taken away for plantations is located along the riverin the lush Awash Valley,106 and constitutes the most fertile
area and the most vital to local livelihoods.

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land has also been a key factor in overgrazing of the sparsegrazing land further away from the valley,113 with both shortand long-term impact on the Afar people’s ability to feed
their livestock.114
The increased vulnerability to drought was made evident
during the 1972-1973 famine,115 when as many as 200,000
people (roughly 25-30 percent of the Afar population) diedas a result of food insecurity.116 As with the current crisis,
this disaster was only partly due to limited rainfall, as thelack of access to grazing land resulted in the inability of
pastoralists to cope with drought.117
The increase in food insecurity and vulnerability among
Afar pastoralists has increased the need for relief aid to theregion. In 2016, as it occurred many times before, Afar wasagain a major recipient of emergency relief for people (foodaid) and animals (emergency forage, destocking, etc.).118

Shephard boy, with his sick cow in Ab’Ala, Afar Region© WFP/Wagdi Othman

The Afar has a population of over 1.7 million people, 90
percent of whom are pastoralists.107 Their livelihoods rely
largely on herding mixed stocks of camels, cattle, sheep
and goats, and many depended on the land in the Awash
Valley for pasture.108 Pastoralists are mobile to adapt to theenvironment and maximize available resources. During therainy season, they use the sparse grazing land further awayfrom the valley, but during the dry season they depend on
the more condensed grazing land near the banks of the
Awash River. These riverbanks are lush from the water thatflows from the highlands.109
Large-scale plantations have had dramatic negative impacts
on the Afar pastoralists. The loss of grazing land110 has beena key factor in growing food insecurity,111 and increased
vulnerability to droughts with the loss of vital dry season
pasture.112 Even if the area covered by agricultural plantations
is relatively limited, the loss of lands that are crucial toensure cattle survival in the dry season jeopardized thesustainability of pastoralism in the entire region. Loss of13

Beyond this direct impact on food security and capacityof resilience, the loss of pasture and land degradation has
dramatically aggravated the pre-existing conflicts between
different ethnic groups in the region.119 Afar pastoralists
have been forced to compete for resources and grazing landwith neighboring pastoral groups such as the Issa-Somalis
and Oromos [Karrayyu].120 Such conflicts have cost many
lives along with large numbers of animals lost throughcattle raiding, and further shrank the availability of pasturefor security reasons.121
The establishment of plantations in Afar has also impacted
the environment including the clearing of forests, thespreading of invasive species,122 as well as land and soil
degradation, causing sodicity, salinity,123 and alkalization.124
By the early 1990s, salinity and sodicity in parts of the Awash
Valley had reached such high levels that 3,000 hectares ofcotton plantations were abandoned.125 On other cotton
plantations, yields decreased from 30 tons to 20 tons per
hectare.126
In addition to the impact on the land, the use of chemical
pesticides, insecticides and herbicides in cotton and sugar
production, combined with the accompanying industrial
waste from the factories have significantly polluted anddegraded the Awash River.127 In a region where pastoralists
and their livestock depend on the river for drinking water,
this pollution has gravely endangered both people andanimal health.128

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Dams: Electricity, Irrigation, and Man-made Disasters
The construction of dams is a centerpiece of Ethiopia’s
development strategy. Several major projects have been
undertaken in the past decade, including the Gibe III Dam
completed in 2015 in Lower Omo.129 By 2017, Ethiopia willcomplete the construction of Africa’s largest hydroelectricdam, the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam on the Blue
Nile River, which is expected to produce 6,000 megawattsof electricity for both export and domestic use.130 Other
mega-dam projects such as Gibe IV and Koysha planned forconstruction on the Omo River, secured financing in spring2016.131 These should help Ethiopia reach its goal to produce
12,000 megawatts of electricity by 2020 – an increase ofover 80 percent from the amount generated in 2015.132 In
addition, over a hundred smaller dams are planned under
the GTP II (2015-2020) to provide electricity for small-scaleindustries and support irrigation schemes.133
Scientists and NGOs have, however, warned for many years
that these plans pose major threats to the livelihoods of millions of Ethiopians.
Environmental consequences of large dams range fromwholesale destruction of ecosystems and biodiversity toerosion, diversion and pollution. Because dams reduce rivers’ flow and hold back sediments, they provoke important
physical transformation of watersheds. Riverbeds and riverbanks erode in downstream areas where the river seeks
recapturing necessary sediment and gravel.134 Dams often
block fish migration, while the depletion of river gravel andsediment affect fish and other fauna’s habitat. The modification of water flow and seasonal flooding patterns also
affects riverside vegetation, including vital dry season pasture land in critical grazing areas. In addition, the deepening of riverbeds can affect groundwater tables, which in turnimpacts vegetation, well levels, and agriculture along theriver.135 Upstream, ecosystems are affected by the formingof vast reservoirs with different temperature, oxygen level
and chemical composition compared to flowing water.136
Smaller dams are often considered more environmentallyfriendly, but recent studies suggest that their cumulative
impacts may be worse per megawatt of electricity generated than that of large dams.137
Meanwhile, it has been shown in many places around theworld that cost-effective alternatives to dams can provide
electricity and irrigation that truly benefit communities.

14

Decentralized systems include micro-hydro schemes, water harvesting techniques, and rooftop solar panels, among
others.138 Larger alternatives such as wind power production, larger solar installations, biomass electricity generation, geothermal plants, and more, have also shown successful results.139
In Ethiopia, warnings over the government’s plans comefrom the research conducted on previous dams such as the
Koka Dam, built in 1960 on the upper Awash River.140 The
Koka Dam drastically reduced river flow and thus changed
flooding patterns and the grazing land areas of the Awash
Valley.141 Prior to the building of the dam, peak water flow
was 700 m3/second. It decreased to 300 m3/second after
the construction of the dam, while minimum water flowthat was 200 m3/second decreased to 30 m3/second.142 The
significant decrease in water flow following the construction of the Koka Dam and the numerous irrigation schemes
upstream shrank the proportion of land flooded in downstream areas, reducing the amount of grazing land andnegatively impacting pastoralists.143
More recently, experts have expressed serious concerns
over the projected impact of the Gibe III Dam and associated sugar irrigation schemes, both in Ethiopia and in Kenya. The Omo Valley and Lake Turkana, two UNESCO World
Heritage Sites, could be affected by a reduction by as muchas 70 percent of the Omo River’s water flow.144 Straddlingthe border between Ethiopia and Kenya, Lake Turkana could

Omo River in 2012, before the completion of the Gibe III Dam© Will Hurd / Oakland Institutewww.oaklandinstitute.org

Fishermen at Lake Turkana, 2012 © Will Hurd / Oakland Instituteundergo a drop in level between 16-22 meters (the average
depth of the lake is 31 meters) due to the dam construction
and water diversion for commercial agriculture.145 It is expected that Gibe III will affect a total of 500,000 indigenous
Kenyans and Ethiopians dependent on the downstream water flow for their livelihoods based on herding, fishing, andflood-recession agriculture.146

15

Large dams were once viewed as potent symbols of development, bringing electrification, water management, employment, and other benefits to countries. Yet, as the research
has mounted in recent years, mega dams have come under heavy scrutiny from scientists, NGOs and communities
impacted or displaced by dams, triggering serious concern
over current and planned investments in Ethiopia.

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Sugarcane Expansion: Bitter Lessons from Brazil
Another red flag comes from Brazil, ironically the source ofinspiration for much of Ethiopia’s plans for the expansionof the sugar industry. Over the past half-century, sugarcane
production for conversion to ethanol have been key elements of the Brazilian government’s development strategy.
As a result, the area of cultivated sugarcane in Brazil has increased from 1.4 million hectares in 1960 to over 10 million
hectares today.147 Proponents of this model of development
have declared that this will help the country in terms of land
use efficiency,148 economics and development,149 food andenergy security,150 and the environment.151 But experience on
the ground reveals a different reality.

ized by large-scale farmers and agribusinesses, with small
farmers largely missing out.158
While many rural laborers have found employment in thesugarcane industry, jobs in the sector are typically seasonal,
and have been notorious for being low wage with slave-likelabor conditions, child labor, and innumerable health andhuman rights issues.159 More recently, technological advancements such as mechanized harvesting have reduced
rural employment in the industry, with estimates that up to200,000 manual harvesting jobs may be lost.160

First, sugarcane expansion has had a massive and devastating toll on indigenous peoples. A poignant example is theplight of the Guarani. For centuries, the Guarani lived off
the land in Brazil, but today they have lost nearly 95 percentof their traditional territories to industrial scale sugarcaneand soy plantations.152 Their ongoing fight to reclaim theselands has been met with arson, violence, intimidation, andthe murder of their leaders. Having lost their traditional livelihoods, many have been forced to work on sugarcane plantations facing horrific work conditions while others havefled to reservations where they are reliant on food aid fromthe government and face malnutrition.153 In 2016, it was reported that nearly 1,000 mostly young Guarani had taken
their own lives in the last ten years, causing one indigenous
leader to describe the situation as a “slow genocide” of his
people.154

Finally, environmental issues relating to sugarcane expansion abound. One issue is land use change and the encroachment of sugarcane onto sensitive ecosystems including large swaths of rainforest. Land use change can bedirect (sugarcane itself expanding into ecologically sensitive regions)161 or indirect (sugarcane expansion displacing
other crops, such as soy, causing the agricultural frontier toexpand into sensitive ecosystems like the Cerrado).162 While
there is legislation to ensure the protection of sensitive biomes in the context of agricultural expansion, experts notethat lack of enforcement “is a widespread problem.”163 Other environmental issues caused by extensive sugarcane cultivation include: soil erosion and compaction, the high use
of pesticides, loss of biodiversity especially around riparianzones, and over fertilization, amongst others.164 In somecases, these issues – for instance, the overuse of aerial pesticides – have negatively affected nearby vegetable farmers,
further impacting rural livelihoods and food security.165

Sugarcane expansion has also exacerbated land concentration in Brazil. In the early 2000s, a mere three percent ofBrazil’s population owned two thirds of its farmland while
25 million people were landless.155 Around the same time,large foreign-owned companies – including agribusiness giants like Bunge and Archer Daniels Midland – began buying
sugar mills and plantations in the country.156 The growth oflarge agribusinesses for sugar and other crops has led tolarger estates, even fewer landowners, and decreased rural employment.157 Ultimately, this has created a situation
where benefits from sugarcane expansion have been real-

Strides have been taken in recent years to address someof the concerns plaguing the sugarcane industry in Brazil.166 However, these improvements do not change thefact that sugarcane expansion has increased land concentration, devastated indigenous communities, had negative
impacts on sensitive ecosystems, increased rural-to-urban
migration, and has mostly benefited large landowners andagribusinesses at the expense of laborers and smallholder
farmers. These bitter lessons cannot be ignored as Brazil isfalsely promoted as a positive model of rural development
worldwide.

16

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Zahara Mohammed, 12, moves her family’s livestock in Afar © UNICEF/Ose

Overlooking Reality: High Cost and Low Benefit of Plantation Agriculture
Compared to Pastoralism
An important 2013 study by the International Institute forEnvironment and Development167 compared the productivity
per hectare of industrial agriculture of sugarcane and seedcotton against pastoral production in Afar.
Looking at the output of a heard of animals (milk, meat,and other animal products)168 on one hectare of land, theresearchers found that agro-pastoralists net return was$542 per hectare for low stocking rates169 and $1,084 perhectare for high stocking rates. When compared to boththe first production form of cotton (seed cotton) and sugar(sugarcane), they found that pastoral output production
was equal or higher. The state-owned cotton plantation
MAADE’s seed cotton production had an annual net lossof $120 per hectare between 1980 and 1990. When the
MAADE plantation was converted into smaller privately
owned cotton plantations, the annual average profit rose
to $135 per hectare between 2004 and 2009. This is still
substantially lower than the livestock low stocking rate
production output. When examining the more processed
lint cotton, research shows higher returns per hectare
in good years, but in bad years the financial losses weresignificantly magnified.
Sugarcane production rates were slightly more profitable
than the seed cotton. The analysis of the production of the
Metahara Sugar Factory and Wonji-Shoa Sugar Estate from17

2001 to 2009 showed that sugarcane production rates wereas profitable as livestock production rates for two out ofeight years and less profitable for the other six years. The
net annual average return over the period was $488, whichis less than the annual net livestock output for low stocking
rates.
The comparison in Table 2 demonstrates that large-scale
agriculture is far less profitable than pastoralism, whereas,
as revealed earlier, it has many devastating effects on theland, the water and the environment in Afar.
The economic contribution of pastoralism has often been
overlooked and underestimated in development policies171
notably because of the lack of documentation of pastoral
activity and of its classification under the informal sector.172
Several experts have claimed that official estimates ofthe share of livestock in Ethiopia’s GDP (10-20 percent
according to the years and estimates)173 are underrated.174
This underestimation limits the amount of investment andsupport to the sector portrayed as less profitable.175 With
much of the cross-border and within border trading of
livestock, milk, meat, skin and hides going undocumented,
it has been argued that actual informal trade of pastoral
products may be about 10 times higher than documented,
formal trade.176

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Table 2: Economic Comparison of Plantation Agriculture and Pastoralism in Afar (Net return per hectare)170
Livestock – lowstocking rates(2009)

Livestock – highstocking rates(2009)

Seed Cotton – MAADE
state plantation (average
1980-1990)

Seed Cotton – private
plantation(average 2004-2009)

Sugarcane (average
2001-2009)$542$1,084

$120

$135

$488

Despite a growing body of evidence that highlights the economic and environmental importance of pastoralism,
few governments are ready to tolerate mobile livestock production and many pursue explicit or inadvertent policies
of settlement. Yet the policy of sedentarization, particularly in the drylands, has been shown time and again to resultin increased environmental degradation, reduced economic potential and eroded social and cultural systems.
Rainfall in the drylands is low and unpredictable, both in terms of when it comes and where it lands, so the only
practicable management system is an opportunistic one: to go where the resources are, when they are available.
Most dryland ecosystems are ecologically grazing-dependent, and a reduction of mobility of graziers or exclusionof such graziers can result in a significant drop in biological diversity and reduced ecosystem health and stability.
Mobile pastoralism has considerable economic value and latent potential in rangelands environments, and iscentral to the livelihoods and well-being of millions of the world’s poor, but the state of knowledge regarding this
sector of the economy is inadequate. This knowledge gap creates weaknesses in understanding what constitutes
value in such systems. The policies that emanate from such misunderstanding continue to devalue mobile
pastoralism, often at significant cost to national economies and to the natural environment.
Adapted from Davies, Jonathan and Richard Hatfield. “The economics of mobile pastoralism: a global summary.” Nomadic Peoples 11.1 (2007)177

This demonstration that Afar pastoralism is a profitableand productive form of livelihood doesn’t even take into
account indirect benefits of pastoralism, such as providing
transportation, food and nutrition, and environmental
services to grazing land.178 The pastoral lifestyle maximizes
the scarce resources in the dryland areas, and has beenfound to be the most sustainable livelihood in the arid
lowlands of Ethiopia.179 Pastoralism has no environmental
costs but rather helps increase biodiversity, fertilize the landwith livestock manure, and protects it from degradation anddesertification.180

Cattle grazing in Mursiland © Will Hurd / Oakland Institute18

This is important given soil erosion and degradation is amajor problem for Ethiopia today.181 According to the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Ethiopia
loses approximately one billion tons of topsoil annually, isfaced with a high rate of nutrient loss in the soil, and 30,000
hectares are lost to water erosion each year.182 The twofold
effect of losing pastoral environmental benefits while adding
industrial plantations intensifies land degradation andreduces the usability of some of the country’s most valuable
land and resources.

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Trucks transporting industrial turbines for development projects © Oakland InstituteRepeating Past Mistakes

19

Driving a massive expansion of sugarcane plantations in
the country, the Ethiopian government is willfully ignoring
the available evidence about the negative impacts and lackof economic benefit. Yet, as seen in Afar, the transformationof pastoral and farm land into sugar or cotton plantations
created hunger and conflict, while it failed to contribute to
local or national food supply.

the project has lead to human and animal collisions withvehicles, engendering retaliation against truck drivers androad blockages.185 The region is also expecting an influx of alarge number of plantation workers (up to 500,000 people,
mainly from the Ethiopian Highlands), another potential
catalyzer for ethnic and social conflict.186

In the Lower Omo Valley, the Omo-Kuraz Sugar Development project, although far from having attained its final
configuration with five sugar factories and plantations onover 100,000 hectares, has already physically and sociallytransformed the area. Echoing the Afar scenario, resource
deprivation and tribes’ displacement is generating conflict
and food insecurity.183 Confrontations have occurred between the Bodi and Konso in the area where the Kuraz I and
II factories are being constructed.184 Clashes have also beenreported in Mursiland, where increased road traffic due to

In Afar, where the expansion of commercial sugar projects
has continued in recent years through the construction of
the Tendaho and Kessem sugar factories,187 the drought isheightening tensions. In January 2016, the federal policearrested and imprisoned 70 drought stricken shepherds
who tried to take their cattle to drink in the Awash River
reservoir.188 This followed the decision of the manager of
the Tendaho factory to stop water release from the irrigation
dam, which resulted in dramatic reduction of water levels
and a threat to local pastoralists and lives of their cattle.189

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in Afar, where plantations have been abandoned due to soil
degradation.
Ethiopia’s colossal agro-industrialization plans cost billionsof dollars. Since 2010, the Sugar Corporation has received$3 billion to carry out expansion plans,193 and needs another$8.2 billion to complete all projects by 2020.194 The damplans are no less expensive: Gibe III cost Ethiopia $1.8
billion,195 and more projects are planned to help expand
irrigation, such as Gibe IV, which will require $1.7 billion in
financing.196 Outside agriculture, the government’s plansfor dams and energy generation could cost up to $25 billion
between 2015 and 2020, half of which would be financed
from Ethiopia’s own coffers.197
Sickly livestock gather in the drought stricken area of Ab’Ala in Afar
© WFP/Wagdi Othman

While indigenous people are paying a high price forthe development of commercial agriculture, there isno evidence that the sugar projects will generate good
economic returns. The Omo-Kuraz Sugar Development
Project has been ill-planned (after five years of construction,
the project’s feasibility studies are still due), whereas the
remoteness of the region and delays in construction are
casting serious doubts about its profitability.190 The impact
on environment and people will increase with the beginningof the sugar cultivation, which will affect water supply andquality through fertilizer and pesticide pollution.191 A 2016
study by the Omo-Turkana Basin Research Network alsoquestioned the viability of the Omo-Kuraz plans, pointing
at difficult drainage conditions and irregular levels of soil
alkalinity and carbon content.192 This mirrors the situation

Meanwhile, the humanitarian requirements to fightEthiopia’s food crisis were reevaluated at $1.5 billion in May
2016.198 In March 2016, the Prime Minister complained
about the slow response of the international community
to the ongoing food crisis and called for more aid.199 The
government emphasized its own $380 million contribution
to fight the crisis,200 but this is far from the amount of money
spent in grandiose industrialization projects.201
The research compiled in this report, including lessons
learnt from Afar, Brazil and elsewhere, raises serious
questions about the choices made by the government andits donors. It warns that “development” projects, supported
by billions of dollars of public money from Ethiopia andits donors, is likely to destroy the livelihoods of millions,cause displacement, lead to increased food insecurity anddependence on food aid, with adverse impacts on natural
resources and the environment.202

Conclusion
The contrast between Ethiopia’s economic boom and continued poverty and food insecurity of its population can be
partly elucidated by the Afar example. In this region, the development of large-scale plantations and associated loss ofland has exacerbated the marginalization of pastoralist andagro-pastoralist groups. Increased food insecurity, vulnerability to droughts, environmental degradation, violations ofland rights, and surge of conflicts should be enough to discourage future irrigation and plantations schemes. The economic comparison makes it even clearer that pastoralism
is a valuable lifestyle and makes a compelling argument for20

the re-evaluation of current plans for resettlement schemes
and large- scale agriculture.
Prevailing disregard of the negative impacts of the past development strategies, however, bounds the Ethiopian government to replicate failed plantation and irrigation schemes
and doom itself to repeat mistakes on a much larger scale
throughout Ethiopia. The costs are likely to increase withworsening climate change and trends of land degradation.
Moving forward, the Ethiopian government would do better to reconsider its plans for development that will actually
benefit all of Ethiopians, including the pastoralists.

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Endnotes
1This figure accounts for 7.9 million food insecure people covered by the
Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) and 10.2 million people in need ofemergency food assistance in 2015 – 2016. See: Government of Ethiopia andHumanitarian Partners. 2016 Ethiopia Humanitarian Requirements Document.
Joint Government and Humanitarian Partners’ Document, December 2015.
http://www.unicef.org/ethiopia/ECO_Ethiopia_HRD_2016.pdf (accessed
June 27, 2016); USAID. “Food Assistance Fact Sheet – Ethiopia.” Our Work.
https://www.usaid.gov/ethiopia/food-assistance (accessed May 27, 2016).

2

World Bank. “Ethiopia” Countries. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/
ethiopia/overview

3

See for instance: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A Week in the Horn. [Weekly
Press Release], March 9, 2012. http://mfa.gov.et/ (accessed April 9, 2013).

4

Horne, Felix. Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Ethiopia.
Oakland Institute, 2011. http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/understandingland-investment-deals-africa-ethiopia (accessed June 27, 2016); Flores,
Luis. Development Aid to Ethiopia: Overlooking Violence, Marginalization, andPolitical Repression. Oakland Institute, 2013. http://www.oaklandinstitute.
org/development-aid-ethiopia (accessed June 27, 2016); Oakland Institute.
Omo: Local Tribes under Threat. A Field Report from the Omo Valley, Ethiopia.
Oakland Institute, 2013. http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/omo-local-tribesunder-threat (accessed June 27, 2016).

5

OECD stats. http://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed June 27, 2016).

6

Flores, Luis. Development Aid to Ethiopia: Overlooking Violence,
Marginalization, and Political Repression. Op. Cit.

7

UNDP. “National Human Development Report 2015 Ethiopia.” Human
Development Reports.http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ETH(accessed June 28, 2016).

8

Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Growth and Transformation
Plan (GTP) 2010/11-2014/15. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,
2010. http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Ethiopia/EthiopiaGTP.pdf(accessed June 27, 2016).

9

Smallholder farmers produce 96 percent of Ethiopia’s agricultural output,
World Bank. Second Agricultural Growth Project – Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia. Agriculture Global Practice, March 2015. http://
www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/
WDSP/IB/2015/03/10/000442464_20150310100025/Rendered/PDF/
PAD10520PAD0P100Boxx385443B00OUO090.pdf (accessed August 8,2016).

10 Horne, Felix. Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Ethiopia. Op. Cit.
11

Flores, Luis. Development Aid to Ethiopia: Overlooking Violence,
Marginalization, and Political Repression. Op. Cit.; Fraser, Elizabeth. Moral
Bankruptcy: World Bank reinvents Tainted Aid Program for Ethiopia. Oakland
Institute, 2016. http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/moral-bankruptcy-worldbank-reinvents-tainted-aid-program-for-ethiopia (accessed June 27, 2016).

12 Horne, Felix. Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Ethiopia.
Op. Cit.; Flores, Luis. Development Aid to Ethiopia: Overlooking Violence,
Marginalization, and Political Repression. Op. Cit.
13 Ethiopian Investment Commission. Ethiopia, A Preferred Location for Foreign
Direct Investment in Africa: An Investment Guide to Ethiopia, 2015. Ethiopian
Investment Commission, 2015. http://www.ethiopianembassy.org/PDF/
Ethiopia_Investment_Guide_2015.pdf (accessed January 4, 2016), p. 30.
14 Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN). Ethiopia Aims to Become
One of the World’s Top 10 Sugar Producers. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service,2015. http://www.fas.usda.gov/data/ethiopia-ethiopia-aims-become-oneworld-s-top-10-sugar-producers (accessed June 27, 2016).
15 Behnke, R. and C. Kerven. Counting the Costs: Replacing Pastoralism with
Irrigated Agriculture in the Awash Valley, North-Eastern Ethiopia. International
Institute for Environment and Development, 2013. http://pubs.iied.org/
pdfs/10035IIED.pdf (accessed June 27, 2016).
16 Little, P.D., Behnke, R.; McPeak, J. and G. Gebru. Retrospective Assessment of
Pastoral Policies in Ethiopia, 1991–2008. Report Number 1: Pastoral Economic
Growth and Development Policy Assessment, Ethiopia. Department forInternational Development, 2010. http://www.future-agricultures.org/search-21

documents/future-of-pastoralism/other-resources-1/1131-retrospectiveassessment-of-pastoral-policies-in-ethiopia-1991-2008/file (accessed June 27,2016).
17 Elias, E. and F. Abdi. Putting Pastoralists on the Policy Agenda: Land Alienation
in Southern Ethiopia. IIED, 2010. http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/14599IIED.pdf(accessed June 29, 2016).
18 Hundie, Bekele. “Conflicts Between Afar Pastoralists and their Neighbors:
Triggers and Motivations.” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 4.1(2010): 134-148; Rettberg, Simone. “Contested Narratives of Pastoral
Vulnerability and Risk in Ethiopia’s Afar Region.” Pastoralism 1.2 (2010): 248273.
19 Overseas Development Institute. Getting it Right: Understanding Livelihoods to
Reduce the Vulnerability of Pastoral Communities. Humanitarian Policy Group,
2009. http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publicationsopinion-files/4307.pdf (accessed June 27, 2016).
20 Behnke, R. and C. Kerven. Counting the Costs: Replacing Pastoralism with
Irrigated Agriculture in the Awash Valley, North-Eastern Ethiopia. Op. Cit.
21 De Andrade, R.M.T. and A. Miccolis. Policies and Institutional and Legal
Frameworks in the Expansion of Brazilian Biofuels. Working Paper 71, CIFOR,
2011. http://www.cifor.org/library/3509/policies-and-institutional-and-legalframeworks-in-the-expansion-of-brazilian-biofuels/?pub=3509 (accessed June
9, 2016); Vidal, John. “Brazil’s Guarani Indians Killing Themselves over Lossof Ancestral Land.” The Guardian, May 18 2016. http://www.theguardian.
com/environment/2016/may/18/brazils-guarani-indians-killing-themselvesover-loss-of-ancestral-land (accessed July 8, 2016); Martinelli, Luiz, A. andSolange Filoso, “Expansion of Sugarcane Ethanol Production in Brazil:
Environmental and Social Challenges.” Ecological Applications, 18.4 (2008):
885-898; Filoso, Solange et al., “Reassessing the Environmental Impacts of
Sugarcane Ethanol Production in Brazil to Help Meet Sustainability Goals.”
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 52 (2015): 1847-1856.
22 Sugar Corporation. http://www.etsugar.gov.et/ (accessed July 8, 2016).
23 World Commission on Dams. Dams and Development. A New Frameworkfor Decision-Making.United Nations Environment Programme, 2000. http://
www.unep.org/dams/WCD/report/WCD_DAMS%20report.pdf (accessed
June 28, 2016); International Rivers. “Environmental Impacts of Dams.” The
Basics. https://www.internationalrivers.org/environmental-impacts-of-dams(accessed June 28, 2016).
24 Gebre-Mariam, Ayele. “The Alienation of Land Rights Among the Afar in
Ethiopia.” Nomadic Peoples: 34/35. (1994): 137-146.
25 Sugar Corporation. “Omo-Kuraz Sugar Development Project.” Projects.
http://www.etsugar.gov.et/index.php/en/projects/kuraz-sugar-developmentproject (accessed June 27, 2016); Kamski, Benedikt. The Kuraz Sugar
Development Project. Omo-Turkana Basin Research Network, Briefing Note
1, 2016. http://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/sites/default/files/field/pubdownload/ksdp_briefing_note_omo_turkana_basin_research_network_1.pdf(accessed June 27, 2016).
26 Oakland Institute. Omo: Local Tribes Under Threat. A Field Report From the
Omo Valley, Ethiopia. Op. cit.
27 Fong, Catherine. A Cascade of Development on the Omo River. Downstream
Effects of the Gibe III Filling and Associated Commercial Irrigation Projects.
International Rivers, 2014. https://www.internationalrivers.org/files/
attached-files/cascade_of_impacts_ir.pdf (accessed June 27, 2016).
28 Davidson, William. “Ethiopia May Ship Sugar in 2016 as India-Backed Plant
Ready.” Bloomberg, November 12, 2015. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-11-13/ethiopia-may-ship-sugar-in-2016-as-india-backed-plantcompleted (accessed June 27, 2016).
29 “Ethiopia Calls for International Help as Drought Bites.” Aljazeera, March 17,
2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/ethiopia-calls-internationaldrought-bites-160317142601295.html (accessed June 28, 2016).
30 Ibid.
31 Flores, Luis. Development Aid to Ethiopia: Overlooking Violence,
Marginalization, and Political Repression. Op. Cit.
32 Government of Ethiopia and Humanitarian Partners. 2016 Ethiopia

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Humanitarian Requirements Document. Op. Cit.
33 USAID. “Food Assistance Fact Sheet – Ethiopia.” Our Work. https://www.
usaid.gov/ethiopia/food-assistance (accessed May 27, 2016).
34 Government of Ethiopia and Humanitarian Partners. 2016 Ethiopia
Humanitarian Requirements Document. Op. Cit.
35 Horne, Felix. Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Ethiopia.
Op. Cit.; Flores, Luis. Development Aid to Ethiopia: Overlooking Violence,
Marginalization, and Political Repression. Op. Cit.; Hathaway, Terry. What Cost
Ethiopia’s Dam Boom? A Look Inside the Expansion of Ethiopia’s Energy Sector.
International Rivers, 2008. https://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attachedfiles/ethioreport06feb08.pdf (accessed June 27, 2016); Horne, Felix. ‘Waiting
Here for Death.’ Displacements and ‘Villagization’ in Ethiopia’s Gambella
Region. Human Rights Watch, 2012. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/ethiopia0112webwcover_0.pdf (accessed June 27, 2016).
36 International Monetary Fund. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
IMF Country Report No. 15/300, September 2015. http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15300.pdf (accessed June 2, 2016); Moller, Lars
Christian et al. Ethiopia’s Great Run. The Growth Acceleration and How toPace It. World Bank Group, 2016. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/
default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2016/02/16/090224b084187906/3_0/
Rendered/PDF/Ethiopia0s0gre0n0and0how0to0pace0it.pdf (accessed June27, 2016).

56 The $5.8 billion estimate aggregates project costs and additional financing
to the PSNP 1 (2004-2006), PSNP 2 (2007-2010), PSNP 3 (2010-2015),
and PSNP 4 (2015-2020). See: World Bank. “Projects- Ethiopia.” Project &Programs. http://www.worldbank.org/projects/search?lang=en&searchTerm=&countrycode_exact=ET (accessed May 27, 2016).
57 World Bank. “Productive Safety Net Project for Ethiopia.” Projects &Operations. http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P087707/productive-safetynets-project-apl-1?lang=en (accessed June 21, 2016).
58 Graduation is defined as follows: “A household has graduated when,in the absence of receiving PSNP transfers, it can meet its food needs
for all 12 months and is able to withstand modest shocks.” 500,000
beneficiaries are said to have graduated from the PSNP. See: Hoddinott,
John. “Operationalising Graduation in Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net
Programme.” IFPRI Presentation, May 7, 2014. https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/
dmfile/5.1.Hoddinott2014-OperationalisinggraduationinEthiopiasPSNPpp
tv228-apr-14.pdf (accessed June 21, 2016).

37 Ibid.

59 UK Parliament. “International Development Committee. Written Evidence
Submitted by Development Initiatives (DI).” Op. Cit.

38 Blumenstein R., Gates, B. and M. Gates. “Bill Gates: GMOs Will End
Starvation in Africa.” [Video] Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2016. http://www.
wsj.com/video/bill-gates-gmos-will-end-starvation-in-africa/3085A8D1-BB584CAA-9394-E567033434A4.html (accessed July 6, 2016).

60 Data for this chart has been retrieved from multiple sources including
humanitarian appeal documents available at http://reliefweb.int/country/eth
and documents from the World Food Programme, World Bank, and various
media outlets.

39 World Bank. “Ethiopia.” Countries. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/
ethiopia/overview (accessed July 6, 2016).
41 Horne, Felix. Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Ethiopia.
Op. Cit.; Flores, Luis. Development Aid to Ethiopia: Overlooking Violence,
Marginalization, and Political Repression. Op. Cit.

61 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Growth and Transformation
Plan (GTP) 2010/11-2014/15. Op. Cit.; Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development. Ethiopia’s Agricultural Sector Policy and Investment Framework(PIF), 2010-2020. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2010. http://
gafspfund.org/sites/gafspfund.org/files/Documents/Ethiopia_5_of_6_
CAADP_Post_compact_Investment_Plan_(PIF)_0.pdf (accessed June 27,2016).

42 Ibid.; Fraser, Elizabeth. Moral Bankruptcy: World Bank Reinvents Tainted Aid
Program for Ethiopia. Op. Cit.

62 Moller, Lars Christian et al. Ethiopia’s Great Run. The Growth Acceleration and
How to Pace It. Op. Cit.

43 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

44 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Growth and Transformation
Plan (GTP) 2010/11-2014/15. Op. Cit.

64 United Nations. UN Comtrade Database. http://comtrade.un.org/data/(accessed June 29, 2016).

45 Government of Ethiopia and Humanitarian Partners. 2016 Ethiopia
Humanitarian Requirements Document. Op. Cit.

65 Ibid.

40 OECD stats. Op. Cit.

46 USAID. “Food Assistance Fact Sheet – Ethiopia.” Op. Cit.
47 El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is a complex weather patternassociated with temperature variations in the Central and East-Central
Equatorial Pacific. El Niño and La Niña are the opposite phases of thephenomenon, sometimes referred to as the cold phase (La Niña) and warm
phase (El Niño). See: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration(NOAA). “What are El Niño and La Niña?” Ocean Facts. http://oceanservice.
noaa.gov/facts/ninonina.html (accessed May 27, 2016).
48 McFerron, W., Almeida, I. and W. Davison. “Food Crisis Looming in Ethiopia
after Worst Drought in 50 Years.” Bloomberg, January 6, 2016. http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-07/food-crisis-looming-in-ethiopiaafter-worst-drought-in-50-years (accessed June 21, 2016).
49 USAID. “Food Assistance Fact Sheet – Ethiopia.” Op. Cit.
50 FAO. Ethiopia Situation Report. February 2016. http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/
user_upload/emergencies/docs/FAO%20Ethiopia_El%20Nino%20
Situation%20Report_February%202016.pdf (accessed June 21, 2016).
51 McFerron, W., Almeida, I. and W. Davison. “Food Crisis Looming in Ethiopia
after Worst Drought in 50 Years.” Op. Cit.
52 Ibid.

22

archives/1754#_edn16 (accessed June 21, 2016).
55 UK Parliament. “International Development Committee. Written
Evidence Submitted by Development Initiatives (DI).” Publication andRecords. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/
cmintdev/657/657vw16.htm (accessed June 21, 2016).

66 Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN). Drought Pushes Ethiopia’s
Wheat Imports to a Record 2.5 MMT. 2016. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service.
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Drought%20
Pushes%20Ethiopia%E2%80%99s%20Wheat%20Imports%20to%20a%20
Record%202.5%20MMT%20_Addis%20Ababa_Ethiopia_1-21-2016.pdf(accessed June 29, 2016).
67 United Nations. UN Comtrade Database. Op. Cit.
68 Ibid.
69 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Growth and Transformation
Plan (GTP) 2010/11-2014/15. Op. Cit.; National Planning Commission.
The Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) 2015/2016 – 2019/2020(Draft). The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2015. https://www.
africaintelligence.com/c/dc/LOI/1415/GTP-II.pdf (accessed June 27, 2016).
70 Agricultural Transformation Agency. “Industrial Park and Agriculture
Transformation.” [Video], 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8i3O3
C8Ttgg&feature=youtu.be (accessed July 6, 2016); Ministry of Finance andEconomic Development. Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) 2010/112014/15. Op. Cit.
71 Ibid.

53 Maasho, Aaron. “Flash Floods Displace Nearly 120,000 in Ethiopia.” Reuters,
May 11, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-drought-floodsidUSKCN0Y22DH (accessed May 27, 2016).

72 A spokesperson for Ethiopia’s Agricultural Investment Support Directorate
indicated that 1.2 million ha were available in Oromia, 1.4 million ha in
Benishangul, 1.2 million ha in Gambella, and 0.3 million ha in SNNPR. See:
Horne, Felix. Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Ethiopia. Op. Cit.

54 Dagnachew Siyoum, A., Hilhorst, D. and G. Van Uffelen. “Food Aid and
Dependency Syndrome in Ethiopia: Local Perceptions.” The Journal of
Humanitarian Assistance, November 27, 2012. http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/

73 According to a 2014 report, only 11 percent of the land transferred toinvestors has actually been developed and commercial farm productivity has
been lower than smallholders’ since the beginning of the GTP. Subsequently,

www.oaklandinstitute.org

the Government of Ethiopia announced in 2016 the suspension of its farmlease program until further review of the scheme. See: Ministry of Financeand Economic Development. Growth and Transformation Plan, Annual Progress
Report F.Y. 2012/2013. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2014;
Maasho, Aaron. “Ethiopia Body Suspends Farm Lease Programme afterPoor Results.” Reuters Africa, March 25, 2016. http://af.reuters.com/article/
topNews/idAFKCN0WR10P?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true (June 27, 2016).
74 Ethiopia Trade and Investment Agency. “Investing in Ethiopia: a Guide
for New Investors.” 2015. http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/trade_and_investment/General%20report-final.pdf (accessed June 27, 2016).
75 Abiye, Yonas. “GTP II Wheels Rolling.” The Reporter, December 26, 2015.
http://web.archive.org/web/20160101145330/http://www.thereporterethiopia.
com/content/gtp-ii-wheels-rolling (accessed June 27, 2016); Ethiopian
Agricultural Transformation Agency. “GTP II Transformation Agenda.”
Transformation Agenda. http://www.ata.gov.et/ta/gtp-ii-overview/ (accessed
June 27, 2016).
76 Alemu, Dawit. “Rising Donors: Can China and Brazil help Ethiopia Achieve
its Development Ambitions?” GREAT Insights, April 2014. http://ecdpm.org/
great-insights/emerging-economies-and-africa/rising-donors-can-china-brazilhelp-ethiopia-achieve-development-ambitions/#fn (accessed June 27, 2016).
77 USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. Ethiopia Aims to Become One of the World’s
Top 10 Sugar Producers. Op. Cit.
78 “Ethiopia: Boosting Sugar Industry.” Welkessa. March 4, 2016. http://www.
welkessa.com/ethiopia-boosting-sugar-industry/ (accessed June 27, 2016);“Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance: Sugar’s Sweet Success.” Foreign Affairs,
May-June 2012. http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/trade_and_investment/
EthiopiaReprintFA.pdf (accessed June 27, 2016).
79 Alemu, Dawit. “Rising Donors: Can China and Brazil help Ethiopia Achieve its
Development Ambitions?” Op. Cit .
80 Davidson, William. “Ethiopia China-Backed Sugar-Export Push Hits Cash,
Design Snags.” Bloomberg, June 13, 2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-06-13/ethiopian-china-backed-sugar-export-push-hits-cashdesign-snags (accessed June 27, 2016).
81 Davidson, William. “Ethiopia May Ship Sugar in 2016 as India-Backed Plant
Ready.” Op. Cit.; Netafim. “Bank Hapoalim Leads Financing Deal for the
Ethiopian Sugar Corp. as Part of Netafim’s $200M Innovative Irrigation
Project.” News. https://www.netafim.com/news-item/225392 (accessed
June 27, 2016); Kassa, Lucy. “Parliament Approves $50m Polish Loan for
Sugar Sector.” Addis Fortune, July 6, 2015. http://addisfortune.net/articles/
parliament-approves-50m-polish-loan-for-sugar-sector/ (accessed June 27,2016).
82 Unless otherwise indicated, all information comes from the Ethiopia
Sugar Corporation website: Sugar Corporation. http://www.etsugar.gov.et/(accessed July 8, 2016).
83 Bishaw, D and Y. Kedir. “Determining Sediment Load of Awash RiverEntering into Metehara Sugarcane Irrigation Scheme in Ethiopia.” Journal ofEnvironment and Earth Science 5.13 (2015): 110-117.
84 Girma, M. M. and S. B. Awulachew. Irrigation Practices in Ethiopia:
Characteristics of Selected Irrigation Schemes. International Water
Management Institute, 2007. http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/Publications/
Working_Papers/working/WOR124.pdf (accessed June 27, 2016).
85 About 90% of the plantation fields have groundwater table above the criticaldepth of 1.5 m below the soil surface. The tables are waterlogged as a resultof their shallow depth. See: Dinka, M. O., Loiskandl, W. and J. M. Ndambuki.
“Status of Groundwater Table Depth Under Long-Term Irrigation in Wonji
Plain: Concerns for Sustainability of Wonji-Shoa Sugar Estate, Upper Awash
Valley, Ethiopia.” Sustainable Agriculture Research 3.3 (2014): 16-27.
86 According to the Sugar Corporation, the Omo-Kuraz Project will have 100,000
hectares of associated plantations. Other recent studies indicate plans for
expansion to 175,000 hectares. See: Sugar Corporation. “Omo-Kuraz Sugar
Development Project.” Projects. Op. Cit.; Kamski, Benedikt. The Kuraz Sugar
Development Project. Op. Cit.
87 Some reports indicate that at least 4,280 households were resettled during
the preparation of the land for the project. See Abraham, D. “Ethiopia’s
Mushrooming Sugar Factories - A Bird’s Eye View.” Aigaforum, April 19, 2016.
http://aigaforum.com/article2016/sugar-factories-041916.htm (accessed June27, 2016).

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88 Ethiopian Investment Agency. Investment Opportunity Profile for Sugar Cane
Plantation and Processing In Ethiopia. 2012. http://ethemb.se/wp-content/
uploads/2013/07/Sugar-Cane-Plantation-and-Processing-in-Ethiopia.pdf(accessed June 27, 2016).
89 Berhane, Fetsum. “Ethiopian Sugar Corporation’s ‘May Day Dam.’” Horn
Affairs, May 21, 2014. http://hornaffairs.com/en/2014/05/21/ethiopian-sugarcorporations-may-day-dam/ (accessed June 27, 2016).
90 The map was prepared using QGIS Geographic Information System. Open
Source Geospatial Foundation, 2009. http://qgis.osgeo.org. Data Layers
for Map: Map Library. “Ethiopian administrative area boundary outlines.”
Ethiopia. http://www.mapmakerdata.co.uk.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.
com/library/stacks/Africa/Ethiopia/index.htm; Global Agricultural
Information Network (GAIN). Ethiopia Aims to Become One of the World’s
Top 10 Sugar Producers. Op. Cit.; RCMRD Geoportal. “Ethiopia Main Rivers.”
Layers. http://servirportal.rcmrd.org/layers/servir%3Aethiopia_river_main (allaccessed July 6, 2016).
91 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Growth and Transformation
Plan (GTP) 2010/11-2014/15. Op. Cit.; Ministry of Finance and Economic
Development. Growth and Transformation Plan, Annual Progress Report F.Y.
2012/2013. Op. Cit.
92 Liu, W., Sinha, G. A. and R. Stern. Unheard Voices: The Human Rights Impactof Land Investments on Indigenous Communities in Gambella. Oakland Institutehttp://www.oaklandinstitute.org/unheard-voices-human-rights-impact-landinvestments-indigenous-communities-gambella (accessed June 27, 2016);
Horne, Felix. Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Ethiopia. Op. Cit.;
Horne, F. Waiting Here for Death: Forced Displacement and ‘Villagization’ in
Ethiopia’s Gambella Region. Op. Cit.
93 Flores, Luis. Development Aid to Ethiopia: Overlooking Violence,
Marginalization, and Political Repression. Op. Cit.; Fraser, Elizabeth. Moral
Bankruptcy: World Bank Reinvents Tainted Aid Program for Ethiopia. Op. Cit.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Sugar Corporation. “Omo-Kuraz Sugar Development Project.” Projects. http://
www.etsugar.gov.et/index.php/en/projects/kuraz-sugar-development-project(accessed June 27, 2016); Kamski, Benedikt. The Kuraz Sugar Development
Project. Op. Cit.
97 Omo: Local Tribes under Threat. A Field Report from the Omo Valley, Ethiopia.
Op. Cit.
98 Fong, Catherine. A Cascade of Development on the Omo River. Downstream
Effects of the Gibe III Filling and Associated Commercial Irrigation Projects.
International Rivers, 2014.https://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attachedfiles/cascade_of_impacts_ir.pdf (accessed June 27, 2016).
99 This map is based on pictures, maps, and information provided by the Sugar
Corporation, but the plantation’s scale and setup may change as the project’s
development unfolds. See: Kamski, Benedikt. The Kuraz Sugar Development
Project. Op. Cit.
100 Sugar Corporation. “Reaping the Fruits of Sugar.” News. http://www.etsugar.
gov.et/index.php/en/news/articles/55-reaping-the-fruits-of-sugar (accessed
June 27, 2016).
101 Behnke, R. and C. Kerven. Counting the Costs: Replacing Pastoralism with
Irrigated Agriculture in the Awash Valley, North-Eastern Ethiopia. Op. Cit.
102 Bondestam, Lars. “People and Capitalism in the North-Eastern Lowlands ofEthiopia.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 12.03 (1974): 423-439.
103 Lautze, S., Aklilu, Y., Raven-Roberts, A., Young, H., Kebede, G. and J.
Leaning. Risk and Vulnerability in Ethiopia: Learning From the Past, Responding
to the Present, Preparing for the Future. Feinstein International Famine
Center, 2003. http://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/risk-and-vulnerability-inethiopia/ (accessed June 28, 2016); Hundie, Bekele. “Conflicts Between Afar
Pastoralists and their Neighbors: Triggers and Motivations.” Op. Cit.
104 Elias, E. and F. Abdi. Putting Pastoralists on the Policy Agenda: Land Alienation
in Southern Ethiopia. Op. Cit.
105 Behnke, R. and C. Kerven. Counting the Costs: Replacing Pastoralism with
Irrigated Agriculture in the Awash Valley, North-Eastern Ethiopia. Op. Cit.
106 Gebre-Mariam, Ayele. “The Alienation of Land Rights Among the Afar in
Ethiopia.” Op. Cit.
107 Author projection based on 2007 census. See: Population Census

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Commission. The 2007 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia: Statistical
Report for Afar Region. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2008.
http://www.csa.gov.et/images/documents/pdf_files/regional/Afar.pdf(accessed June 28, 2016); Ethiopian Government Portal. “The Afar National
Regional State.” Regional States. http://www.ethiopia.gov.et/stateafar(accessed July 28, 2016).
108 Behnke, R. and C. Kerven. Counting the Costs: Replacing Pastoralism with
Irrigated Agriculture in the Awash Valley, North-Eastern Ethiopia. Op. Cit.
109 Ibid.
110 Rettberg, Simone. “Contested Narratives of Pastoral Vulnerability and Risk in
Ethiopia’s Afar Region.” Op. Cit.
111 Little, P.D., R. Behnke, J. McPeak, and G. Gebru. Retrospective Assessment of
Pastoral Policies in Ethiopia, 1991–2008. Op. Cit.
112 Behnke, R. and C. Kerven. Counting the Costs: Replacing Pastoralism with
Irrigated Agriculture in the Awash Valley, North-Eastern Ethiopia. Op. Cit.;
Rettberg, Simone. “Contested Narratives of Pastoral Vulnerability and Risk in
Ethiopia’s Afar Region.” Op. Cit.
113 Gebre-Mariam, Ayele. “The Alienation of Land Rights Among the Afar in
Ethiopia.” Op. Cit.
114 Ibid.
115 The 1972/1973 famine is often referred to as the “Wollo Famine.” Wollo is an
historical Ethiopian province, which was divided in 1995 between the Afar,
Tigray, and Amhara regions. See: Viewchange.org. “About Wollo Province.”
Topics. http://www.viewchange.org/topics/wollo-province (accessed June 24,2016).
116 Little, P.D., R. Behnke, J. McPeak, and G. Gebru. Retrospective Assessment of
Pastoral Policies in Ethiopia, 1991–2008. Op. Cit.;Bondestam, Lars. “People
and Capitalism in the North-Eastern Lowlands of Ethiopia.” Op. Cit.
117 Ibid.; Behnke, R. and C. Kerven. Counting the Costs: Replacing Pastoralism with
Irrigated Agriculture in the Awash Valley, North-Eastern Ethiopia. Op. Cit.
118 Government of Ethiopia and Humanitarian Partners. 2016 Ethiopia
Humanitarian Requirements Document. Op. Cit.; Little, P.D., R. Behnke,
J. McPeak, and G. Gebru. Retrospective Assessment of Pastoral Policies in
Ethiopia, 1991-2008. Op. Cit; Bondestam, Lars. “People and Capitalism in the
North-Eastern Lowlands of Ethiopia.” Op. Cit.
119 Ibid.
120 Hundie, Bekele. “Conflicts Between Afar Pastoralists and their Neighbors:
Triggers and Motivations.” Op. Cit.; Pantuliano, S. and M. Wekesa. Improving
Drought Response in Pastoral Regions of Ethiopia: Somali and Afar Regions
and Borena Zone in Oromiya Region. Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas
Development Institute, 2008. http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odiassets/publications-opinion-files/2043.pdf (accessed June 28, 2016); GebreMariam, Ayele. “The Alienation of Land Rights Among the Afar in Ethiopia.”
Op. Cit.; Hundie, Bekele. “Conflicts Between Afar Pastoralists and their
Neighbors: Triggers and Motivations.” Op. Cit.
121 Ibid.; Pantuliano, S. and M. Wekesa. Improving Drought Response in Pastoral
Regions of Ethiopia: Somali and Afar Regions and Borena Zone in Oromiya
Region. Op. Cit.; Gebre-Mariam, Ayele. “The Alienation of Land Rights
Among the Afar in Ethiopia.” Op. Cit.; Hundie, Bekele. “Conflicts Between
Afar Pastoralists and their Neighbors: Triggers and Motivations.” Op. Cit.
122 Admasu, Dubale. Invasive Plants and Food Security: The Case of Prosopis
Juliflora in the Afar Region of Ethiopia. International Union for Conservationof Nature, 2008. http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/invasive_plants_and_food_security___final.pdf (accessed June 28, 2016).
123 Gebre-Mariam, Ayele. “The Alienation of Land Rights Among the Afar in
Ethiopia.” Op. Cit.
124 Behnke, R. and C. Kerven. Counting the Costs: Replacing Pastoralism with
Irrigated Agriculture in the Awash Valley, North-Eastern Ethiopia. Op. Cit.
125 Gebre-Mariam, Ayele. “The Alienation of Land Rights Among the Afar in
Ethiopia.” Op. Cit.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.; Bondestam, Lars. “People and Capitalism in the North-Eastern
Lowlands of Ethiopia.” Op. Cit.
128 The Afar Human Rights Organisation (AHRO). “Half Million Afar
Pastoralists Risk Displacement and Environmental Disaster in the Awash
Valley of Ethiopia.” Sudan Tribune, July 4, 2007. http://www.sudantribune.

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com/spip.php?article22705 (accessed June 28, 2016); Gebre-Mariam,
Ayele. “The Alienation of Land Rights Among the Afar in Ethiopia.” Op. Cit.;
Bondestam, Lars. “People and Capitalism in the North-Eastern Lowlands ofEthiopia.” Op. Cit.
129 Davison, William. “Ethiopia’s Largest Hydro Plant to Produce Power This
Year.” Bloomberg, March 18, 2015. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-03-18/ethiopia-s-largest-hydro-plant-to-produce-electricity-thisyear (accessed June 27, 2016).
130 Veselinovic, Milena. “Ethiopia’s $5bn Project that Could Turn it into
Africa’s Water Powerhouse.” CNN, October 20, 2015. http://www.cnn.
com/2015/03/06/africa/grand-reneissance-dam-ethiopia/ (accessed June 27,2016).
131 “Gibe IV Secures Finance.” The Reporter, March 12, 2016. http://www.
welkessa.com/gibe-4-secures-finance/ (accessed June 27, 2016); “Ethiopia
Secures Financing for Koysha Hydro Dam.” Esi Africa, April 5, 2016. http://
www.esi-africa.com/news/ethiopia-secures-financing-for-koysha-hydro-dam/(accessed June 27, 2016).
132 “Gibe IV Secures Finance.” The Reporter, Op. Cit.; “Ethiopia Secures
Financing for Koysha Hydro Dam.” Esi Africa, Op. Cit.; International FinanceCorporation. “Ethiopia’s Full Steam Push for an Energy Breakthrough.” News.
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/news_ext_content/ifc_external_
corporate_site/news+and+events/news/za_ifc_geothermal_ethiopia_fiani(accessed July 6, 2016); Maasho, Aaron. “Ethiopia Eyes Extra 12,000 MW
in Power Projects by 2020.” Reuters, June 8, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/
article/ethiopia-power-idUSL5N0YU0SI20150608 (accessed June 28, 2016).
133 Sites for dam construction have already been identified in Gambella, Oromia,
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, Amhara and BenishangulGumuz states. See: “Ethiopia Envisions Building 105 Small Dams in GTP-II
Period.” EBC, January 11, 2016. http://www.ebc.et/web/ennews/-/ethiopiaenvisions-building-105-small-dams-in-gtp-ii-period (accessed June 27, 2016).
134 Asmal, Kader et al. Dams and Development. A New Framework for DecisionMaking. Op. Cit.; Pottinger, Lori. “Environmental Impacts of Large Dams:
African Examples.” International Rivers, October 1, 1996. https://www.
internationalrivers.org/resources/environmental-impacts-of-large-damsafrican-examples-2029 (accessed June 28, 2016).
135 Ibid.
136 International Rivers. “Environmental Impacts of Dams.” Op. Cit.
137 Kibler, K. M. and D. D. Tullos. “Cumulative Biophysical Impact of Smalland Large Hydropower Development, Nu River, China.” Water Resources
Research 49.6 (2013): 3104–3118.; Fenci, J. S., Mather, M. E., Costigan, K.
H. and M. D. Daniels. “How Big of an Effect Do Small Dams Have? Using
Geomorphological Footprints to Quantify Spatial Impact of Low-Head Dams
and Identify Patterns of Across-Dam Variation.” PLoS One 10.11 (2015): 1 –22.
138 Score Sarawak. Alternatives. http://scoresarawak.org/_/alternatives/(accessed July 6, 2016); International Rivers. “Alternatives to Large Dams in
India: Easy and Cheap Options.” Resources. https://www.internationalrivers.
org/resources/alternatives-to-large-dams-in-india-easy-and-cheapoptions-3677 (accessed July 7, 2016).
139 Ibid.; Koberle, Alex. An Alternative Power Development Plan for Guatemala.
International Rivers and El Observador, 2012. http://www.internationalrivers.
org/files/attached-files/energia_ingles_072412.pdf (accessed July 7, 2016).
140 Little, P.D., R. Behnke, J. McPeak, and G. Gebru. Retrospective Assessment of
Pastoral Policies in Ethiopia, 1991–2008. Op. Cit.
141 Gebre-Mariam, Ayele. “The Alienation of Land Rights Among the Afar in
Ethiopia.” Op. Cit.; Behnke, R. and C. Kerven. Counting the Costs: Replacing
Pastoralism with Irrigated Agriculture in the Awash Valley, North-Eastern
Ethiopia. Op. Cit.
142 Gebre-Mariam, Ayele. “The Alienation of Land Rights Among the Afar in
Ethiopia.” Op. Cit.
143 Ibid.; Rettberg, Simone. “Contested Narratives of Pastoral Vulnerability and
Risk in Ethiopia’s Afar Region.” Op. Cit.
144 Fong, Catherine. A Cascade of Development on the Omo River. Downstream
Effects of the Gibe III Filling and Associated Commercial Irrigation Projects. Op.
Cit.
145 International Rivers. “Omo River, Lake Turkana at Risk from Dams andPlantations.” Resources. https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/omo-

www.oaklandinstitute.org

river-lake-turkana-at-risk-from-dams-and-plantations-8199 (accessed June 28,2016).
146 International Rivers. Ethiopia’s Gibe II Dam Sowing Hunger and Conflict.
Factsheet, 2011. https://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/
gibe3factsheet2011.pdf (accessed June 28, 2016).
147 Martinelli, Luiz, A. and Solange Filoso, “Expansion of Sugarcane Ethanol
Production in Brazil: Environmental and Social Challenges.” Op. Cit.; Filoso,
Solange et al., “Reassessing the Environmental Impacts of Sugarcane
Ethanol Production in Brazil to Help Meet Sustainability Goals.” Op. Cit.
148 Cotula, L., Dyer, N., and S. Vermeulen. Fueling Exclusion? The Biofuels Boomand Poor People’s Access to Land. IIED & FAO, 2008. http://pubs.iied.org/
pdfs/12551IIED.pdf (accessed June 28, 2016).
149 Some of the economic and development arguments include: the potential
to increase rural incomes and foreign investment, boost the national
economy, provide long-term poverty reduction, improve the trade balance,development stronger export markets, and enable economic diversification.
See: Cotula L., Dyer, N., and S. Vermeulen. Fueling Exclusion? The Biofuels
Boom and Poor People’s Access to Land. Op. Cit.; Peskett, L., Slater, R.,
Stevens, C., and A. Dufey, Biofuels, Agriculture, and Poverty Reduction.
Overseas Development Institute, March 2007, https://www.odi.org/sites/
odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/3441.pdf (accessed
June 9, 2016); Schneider, Lynn. A Sweeter Alternative for Whom? Sugarcane
Ethanol Production and Rural Livelihoods in Northeast Brazil. American
University, 2010. https://www.american.edu/sis/gep/upload/LynnSchneider_
SRP_Final_1.pdf (accessed June 9, 2016).
150 Food security arguments include increasing farmers’ incomes and yields
and providing higher incomes to rural laborers, while energy security
arguments include protecting countries’ from a reliance on oil. See: Cotula,
L. Dyer, N., and S. Vermeulen. Fueling Exclusion? The Biofuels Boom and Poor
People’s Access to Land. Op. Cit.; Peskett, L., Slater, R., Stevens, C., and A.
Dufey. Biofuels, Agriculture, and Poverty Reduction. Op. Cit.; Schneider, Lynn.
A Sweeter Alternative for Whom? Sugarcane Ethanol Production and Rural
Livelihoods in Northeast Brazil. Op. Cit.
151 Environmental arguments tend to focus on the need for renewable energy
sources and a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions to address climatechange. See: Peskett, L., Slater, R., Stevens, C., and A. Dufey. Biofuels,
Agriculture, and Poverty Reduction. Op. Cit.
152 Vidal, John. “Brazil’s Guarani Indians Killing Themselves over Loss ofAncestral Land.” Op. Cit. ; Survival International. “The Guarani.” Tribes.
http://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/guarani (accessed June 9, 2016).
153 Baccaert, A., Navarro, C., and N. Muñoz. “The Dark Side of Green.” [video]
FIAN, 2012. http://www.fian.org/library/multimedia/dark-side-of-green/(accessed June 9, 2016).

165 Field research conducted by the Oakland Institute researchers in São Paulostate, November 2015.
166 These include, but are not limited to: agro-ecological zoning for sugarcane
expansion, better labor conditions for workers, phasing out the practiceof sugarcane burning, a reduction in fertilizer use, and the emergence ofvoluntary certification schemes like BonSucro.
167 Unless otherwise indicated, the data in this section is from Behnke, R. and C.
Kerven. Counting the Costs: Replacing Pastoralism with Irrigated Agriculture in
the Awash Valley, North-Eastern Ethiopia. Op. Cit.
168 Livestock outputs include milk and meat consumed within pastoral groupas well as livestock products that were sold.
169 Estimates on the forage production of the flood plains in the Awash Valley
range within the scientific literature, so Behnke and Kerven use low and highlevel stocking rates based on the amount of consumable dry matter per
hectare per year. Low-level stocking rates are based on 3 tons of consumable
dry matter and high-level stocking rates are based on 6 tons of consumable
dry matter. See: Behnke, R. and C. Kerven. Counting the Costs: Replacing
Pastoralism with Irrigated Agriculture in the Awash Valley, North-Eastern
Ethiopia. Op. Cit.
170 Ibid.
171 Little, P.D., R. Behnke, J. McPeak, and G. Gebru. Retrospective Assessment of
Pastoral Policies in Ethiopia, 1991–2008. Op. Cit.
172 Davies, Jonathan, and Richard Hatfield. “The economics of mobile
pastoralism: a global summary.” Op. Cit.
173 Ibid.; Aklilu, Y. An Audit of the Livestock Marketing Status in Kenya, Ethiopia
and Sudan. Community-Based Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology(CAPE) Unit, Organization of African Unity/Interafrican Bureau for Animal
Resources (AU-IBAR), 2003. ftp://ftp.cgiar.org/ilri/ICT/Theme%203/
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175 Davies, Jonathan, and Richard Hatfield. “The Economics of Mobile
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176 Little, P.D., R. Behnke, J. McPeak, and G. Gebru. Retrospective Assessment of
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177 Davies, Jonathan and Richard Hatfield. “The Economics of Mobile
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154 Vidal, John. “Brazil’s Guarani Indians Killing Themselves over Loss ofAncestral Land.” Op. Cit.

178 Davies, Jonathan and Richard Hatfield. “The Economics of Mobile
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155 Mark, Jason. “Brazil’s MST: Taking Bank the Land.” Multinational Monitor,
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179 Curtis Kline. “Pastoralism and the Discrimination of Sustainable
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156 De Andrade, R.M.T. and A. Miccolis. Policies and Institutional and Legal
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157 Frayssinet, Fabiana. “Brazil: Agribusiness Driving Land Concentration.” Inter
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158 Peskett, L., Slater, R., Stevens, C., and A. Dufey, Biofuels, Agriculture, andPoverty Reduction. Op. Cit.
159 De Andrade , R.M.T., and A. Miccolis. Policies and Institutional and Legal
Frameworks in the Expansion of Brazilian Biofuels. Op. Cit.
160 Kaup, Felix. The Sugarcane Complex in Brazil: The Role of Innovation in a
Dynamic Sector on Its Path Toward Sustainability. Switzerland: Springer
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161 Filoso, Solange et al. “Reassessing the Environmental Impacts of Sugarcane
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162 De Andrade , R.M.T., and A. Miccolis. Policies and Institutional and Legal
Frameworks in the Expansion of Brazilian Biofuels. Op. Cit.
163 Peskett, L., Slater, R., Stevens, C., and A. Dufey, Biofuels, Agriculture, andPoverty Reduction. Op. Cit.

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164 Martinelli, Luiz, A. and Solange Filoso, “Expansion of Sugarcane Ethanol
Production in Brazil: Environmental and Social Challenges.” Op. Cit.; Filoso,
Solange et al. “Reassessing the Environmental Impacts of Sugarcane Ethanol
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180 Davies, Jonathan, and Richard Hatfield. “The Economics of Mobile
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181 Berry, Leonard. Ethiopia: Extent and Impact of Land Degradation. A Pilot Studyin Seven Countries. Food and Agriculture Organization, 2010. http://www.fao.
org/nr/lada/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=477&It
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182 Berry, Leonard. Ethiopia - Extent and Impact of Land Degradation. Food andAgriculture Organization of the United Nations, Op. Cit.
183 Oakland Institute. Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa. Halfa Million Lives Threatened by Land Development for Sugar Plantations
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184 Kamski, Benedikt. The Kuraz Sugar Development Project. Op. Cit.
185 Ibid.

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186 Undisclosed Authors. South Omo Zone, Ethiopia – Final Report. DAG
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187 Sugar Corporation. “Reaping the Fruits of Sugar.” Op. Cit.
188 “Afar Region Ablaze Due to Drought.” Africa Intelligence, February 5, 2016.
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189 Ibid.
190 Kamski, Benedikt. The Kuraz Sugar Development Project. Op. Cit.; Davidson,
William. “Ethiopia China-Backed Sugar-Export Push Hits Cash, Design
Snags.” Op. Cit.
191 Kamski, Benedikt. The Kuraz Sugar Development Project. Op. Cit
192 Ibid.
193 Davidson, William. “Ethiopia May Ship Sugar in 2016 as India-Backed Plant
Ready.” Op. Cit.
194 Ibid.
195 Maasho, Aaron. “Ethiopia Dam Project Could Start Power Generation
by June.” Reuters, January 1, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/

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idUSL6N0UG08620150101 (accessed June 28, 2016).
196 “Gibe IV Secures Finance.” The Reporter, Op. Cit.
197 Maasho, Aaron. “Ethiopia Eyes Extra 12,000 MW in Power Projects by 2020.”
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198 “Humanitarian Requirements for Ethiopia is up from US$1.4 Billion to
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199 “Ethiopia Calls for International Help as Drought Bites.” Op. Cit.
200 Ibid.
201 Maasho, Aaron. “Ethiopia Readies Record $11 Billion Budget for Fiscal
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202 Fujita, M., Roth, E. A., Nathan, M. A. and E. Fratkin. “Sedentism, Seasonality,
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