2023 Biorisks, Biosecurity
and Biological Disarmament
Conference Report
4–5 JULY 2023
EDITED BY DANIEL FEAKES, MARIA GARZON MACEDA, ALEX LAMPALZER,
JADE MASON, SOATIANA RAJATONIRINA, JAMES REVILL, ANNA LAURA ROSS,VERONICA ROVEGNO, EMMANUELLE TUERLINGS, TAYLOR WINKLEMANWe would like to dedicate this report to Jade Michelle
Mason, who sadly passed away in July 2024.
Jade was the driving force behind this WHO-UNODAUNIDIR event and organized the discussion withdedication, commitment, insight, and good humour.
She will be greatly missed by us all.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
UNODA would like to thank the Government of France for its voluntary contribution, whichenabled several UNODA Youth for Biosecurity Fellows to participate in this conference. The
WHO Science Division would like to acknowledge the financial support of Global Affairs
Canada for the workstream of activities on ensuring responsible use of life sciences
research, mitigating biorisks and governing dual-use research.
Support from UNIDIR core funders is the foundation for all the Institute’s activities. The
workstream on chemical and biological weapons of the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Programme is supported by Effective Giving.

ABOUT UNODAThe United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) supports multilateral efforts
aimed at achieving the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under strict andeffective international control. UNODA provides substantive and organizational support
for norm-setting in the area of disarmament through the work of the General Assembly
and its First Committee, the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmamentand other bodies. It fosters disarmament measures through dialogue, transparency andconfidence-building on military matters, and encourages regional disarmament efforts. It
also provides objective, impartial and up-to-date information on multilateral disarmamentissues and activities.

ABOUT WHO
Founded in 1948, WHO is the United Nations agency that connects nations, partners andpeople to promote health, keep the world safe and serve the vulnerable – so everyone,
everywhere can attain the highest level of health. WHO leads global efforts to expand
universal health coverage; directs and coordinates the world’s response to healthemergencies and promotes healthier lives for all based on the best scientific evidence.
WHO is an organization of 194 Member States and WHO’s Secretariat includes experts,
staff and field workers at the Geneva-based headquarters, six Regional Offices and otherstations located in 150+ countries around the world.

ABOUT UNIDIRThe United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded,autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide
focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on
disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community todevelop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems.

ii

UNIDIRCITATION
Daniel Feakes, Maria Garzon Maceda, Alex Lampalzer, Jade Mason, Soatiana Rajatonirina,
James Revill, Anna Laura Ross, Veronica Rovegno, Emmanuelle Tuerlings, Taylor Winkleman(eds) (2024), 2023 Biorisks, Biosecurity and Biological Disarmament Conference Report,
UNIDIR, UNODA, WHO, Geneva. https://doi.org/ 10.37559/WMD/24/CBW/01

NOTE
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United
Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in
the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual authors. They do not necessarilyreflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR or WHO or of their staff
members or sponsors.

List of acronyms
BWC

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

ISU		

Implementation Support Unit

UNIDIR

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

UNODA

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

WHO

World Health Organization

WOAH

World Organisation for Animal Healthwww.unidir.org | © UNIDIR 2024
© All photos credited to UNODA/Mariia Koroleva

2023 BIORISKS, BIOSECURITY AND BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE REPORTiii

Table of contents
List of acronyms ........................................................................................................................................................................... iii
About the authors and editors .......................................................................................................................................... vi
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
Opening Remarks ....................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Mélanie Régimbal, Chief of the Geneva Branch, UNODA ........................................................................ 2John Reeder, Director, Research for Health Department, Science Division, WHO ................. 2
Robin Geiss, Director, UNIDIR .................................................................................................................................... 3
Panel I: Advances in science and technology: assessing the risks and opportunities ............ 5
Assessing risk and opportunities ............................................................................................................................ 5
Scientific advisory mechanisms .............................................................................................................................. 6
Governance ............................................................................................................................................................................ 6
Panel II: Transparency and national implementation: lessons learned and good practices ...... 7
Thematic challenges ........................................................................................................................................................ 7
Key takeaways and recommendations ............................................................................................................... 7
Panel III: Dual-use governance: taking stock and looking forward ....................................................... 10
Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines ................................................................................................................................... 10
WOAH Guidelines for Responsible Conduct in Veterinary Research ............................................. 10
WHO Global Guidance Framework for the Responsible Use of the Life Sciences ................. 11
Looking forward .................................................................................................................................................................. 12
Remarks by Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representativefor Disarmament Affairs, UNODA .................................................................................................................................. 13
Panel IV: High-level roundtable ........................................................................................................................................ 15
Ninth BWC Review Conference ............................................................................................................................... 15
Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention ....................................................................... 15
Multi-stakeholder approaches and holistic collaboration ....................................................................... 16iv

UNIDIR

Panel V: Detection, surveillance and reporting of disease outbreaks ................................................. 17
Detection ................................................................................................................................................................................. 17
Surveillance ............................................................................................................................................................................ 17
Reporting ................................................................................................................................................................................ 17
Disease outbreak policies ............................................................................................................................................ 18
Panel VI: International cooperation in biorisks, biosecurity and biological disarmament ......... 19
Imperatives for strengthening international cooperation ..................................................................... 19
Overcoming barriers to cooperation .................................................................................................................... 20
Panel VII: Monitoring and verification of the BWC ............................................................................................ 22
Technological opportunities (and limits) ............................................................................................................. 23
Changing nature of the life sciences ..................................................................................................................... 23
After detection, what? .................................................................................................................................................... 23
Expectations for the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention ....................... 23
Annex: Conference programme ...................................................................................................................................... 25

2023 BIORISKS, BIOSECURITY AND BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE REPORTv

ABOUT THE AUTHORS AND EDITORSALEX LAMPALZER Deputy Head, Biological Weapons Convention Implementation
Support Unit
ANNA LAURA ROSS Unit Head, Emerging Technologies, Research Prioritisation and Support,
Research for Health Department, Science Division, World Health Organization
DANIEL FEAKES Head Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit
EMMANUELLE TUERLINGS Technical Officer, Emerging Technologies, ResearchPrioritisation and Support, Research for Health Department, Science Division,
World Health Organization
FATIMA AZIZ Innovation Fellow, Pandemic Tech
FELIX MORONTA-BARRIOS Senior Programme Assistant, International Centre
for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology
JADE MASON Consultant, Office of the Executive Director, Health Emergencies
Programme, World Health Organization
JAMES REVILL Head of Programmes, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Space Security
Programmes, UNIDIRJOSÉ GARZA MARTÍNEZ Fellow, Youth for Biosecurity Programme, United Nations
Office for Disarmament Affairs
JUDITH OKOLO Assistant Chief Research Officer, National Biotechnology
Development Agency
MARIA GARZON MACEDA Project Coordinator, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Programme, UNIDIR
MARIIA KOROLEVA Consultant, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
MAYRA AMENEIROS Research Associate, King’s College London
RYAN TEO Research Assistant and Doctoral Candidate, University of Birmingham
SHIZUKA KURAMITSU Graduate Professional, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Programme, UNIDIR
SOATIANA RAJATONIRINA Technical Officer, Emerging Technologies,
Research Prioritisation and Support, Research for Health Department, Science Division,
World Health OrganizationTAYLOR WINKLEMAN Consultant, Office of the Executive Director, Health Emergencies
Programme, World Health Organization
VERONICA ROVEGNO Technical Officer, Office of the Executive Director,
Health Emergencies Programme, World Health Organization
YORGO EL MOUBAYED Program Coordinator, The International Genetically Engineered
Machine Foundationvi

UNIDIR

Introduction
Advancements in science and technology are
occurring at an unprecedented rate, offering
crucial solutions and vital contributions tomajor societal challenges. However, thesetransformative developments across various
fields can also present risks to society. Therefore, it has become increasingly important tomonitor both the opportunities and the risks
that emerging science and technology poseto the biosecurity regime. This cannot be
undertaken by a single entity; it necessitates
the collaborative efforts of States, civil society, academia, industry and other key actors.
To facilitate multi-stakeholder engagement
around biological risks, biological security
and biological disarmament, the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research(UNIDIR), the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the World
Health Organization (WHO) co-organizeda stakeholder conference designed to bring
together actors from civil society, academia
and industry, as well as diplomats, to stimulate
the exchange of ideas and thinking aroundhow to build biosecurity and bolster biologicaldisarmament. The Biorisks, Biosecurity andBiological Disarmament Conference took
place in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4–5 July
2023. The event provided an opportunity
to discuss ongoing diplomatic processes
and current and upcoming issues in theareas of biorisk, biosecurity and biologicaldisarmament.
More than 80 individuals from 30 countries,
representing 60 institutions, participated in
the discussion in person, and a further 334
individuals joined the discussion virtuallyfrom around the world. The participants
included diplomats, public health professionals,
security experts and scientists from a wide
range of organizations.
The Conference consisted of seven substantive panels, which explored a range of topics,
centred on advances in science and technology and their related risks and benefits,biosecurity implementation, dual-use governance, disease response, international cooperation, and verification technologies. The
discussions that took place during all seven
panels are summarized in this conference
report.

2023 BIORISKS, BIOSECURITY AND BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE REPORT

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Opening remarks
Opening remarks were delivered by Mélanie
Régimbal (Chief of the Geneva Branch,
UNODA), John Reeder (Director, Research for
Health Department, Science Division, WHO)and Robin Geiss (Director, UNIDIR).
MÉLANIE RÉGIMBAL
Chief of the Geneva Branch, UNODA
On behalf of UNODA, opening remarks weredelivered by Ms. C. Mélanie Régimbal, Chief of
the Geneva Branch. Ms. Régimbal started her
remarks by expressing gratitude to UNIDIR
and WHO, co-organizers of the Conference,and commented on their valuable contribution
towards the biological and health security domains, as well as biological disarmament. She
later noted that the event was taking place at
the Maison de la Paix – the House of Peace –in Geneva, Switzerland, a venue designed tofoster synergies in search of innovative andeffective solutions for the promotion of peace,
human security and sustainable development.
These values and goals are still relevant
nowadays, amid multiple and interconnected
global challenges such biorisks, whether of anatural, accidental or deliberate nature.
Ms. Régimbal remarked that the COVID-19
pandemic had clearly highlighted the vulnerabilities of modern societies to bio-events.
She stressed that the international community must therefore cooperate and seek
expertise from a broad range of perspectives
through a whole-of-society approach. At thesame time, Ms. Régimbal noted that thedramatic advances in life sciences, alongwith emerging trends in artificial intelligence,
have the potential to bring great benefits tohumankind and opportunities for international
cooperation while shaping global ethical,
safety and security concerns.
Ms. Régimbal also acknowledged theimportant contribution of the Conference inaddressing the issue of future biologicalrisks in a comprehensive manner, bringing in2

UNIDIR

disarmament and health security-related
angles and ensuring multi-stakeholder participation. Furthermore, she noted that theevent was taking place at a timely moment for
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BWC), namely a month before the second
session of the Working Group on theStrengthening of the Convention.
Taking note of the Conference’s themes andthe diverse audience representing multiple
States, numerous regional and internationalorganizations, the biotech industry, nongovernmental organizations, and civil society,
Ms. Régimbal expressed her confidence thatthe event would provide valuable food forthought for discussions at the Working
Group’s future meetings. Ms. Régimbal
concluded her opening statement by wishingall participants a successful discussion thatwould lead to tangible and forward-looking
recommendations.
JOHN REEDER
Director, Research for Health
Department, Science Division, WHO
Professor John Reeder, Director, Research for
Health Department, WHO Science Division,
thanked UNIDIR and UNODA for co-organizing
this stakeholder conference with WHO andfor their continued collaboration in theseareas of work and welcomed the participants.
Professor Reeder started by underlining that
advances in science and technologies are
occurring at an unprecedented rate. Thesedevelopments hold great promise for improving global health, supporting healthier
populations worldwide, addressing global
challenges and achieving the health-related
Sustainable Development Goals. New scientific information and techniques are crucial
for responding to public health emergencies,
but scientific knowledge and technologies
can also pose risks to society, including safety
and security risks.

As this conference acknowledges, addressing these risks cannot be done by any one
actor alone. Rather, it will require actors tocome together, with collaborative efforts by
Member States; the United Nations; partners
and stakeholders from civil society, academia
and industry; and other actors to facilitate
multi-stakeholder engagement around biorisks, biological security and biologicaldisarmament. Professor Reeder emphasized
the need to leverage our collective strengths
to address these risks.
In the area of biorisk mitigation, WHO is
supporting Member States in several areas.
The WHO Science Division aims to harness
the power of science and innovation and toensure that WHO gets ahead of the curve interms of the latest scientific developments.
The objective is not only to have a reactive
approach to new scientific developments andtechnologies but to proactively engage andprovide governance tools that help Member
States respond to scientific developments ina timely manner to optimize their benefits
and mitigate the risks. WHO also engages
with other United Nations and non-United
Nations entities in the areas of biorisks
through the United Nations Biorisk Working
Group, co-chaired with UNODA.
Professor Reeder concluded by underlining
the need to act together. Preventing andmitigating these risks is a shared responsibility and involves many stakeholders withdifferent capacities. International collaboration and coordinated actions across sectors,
disciplines and actors at different levels
should be fostered to support and strengthencountries and stakeholders’ capacities in biorisk mitigation. This is essential to promotetrust, to proactively address challenges toglobal health and to keep us safe from theglobal health threats of the future. Altogether,
these efforts will contribute to leveraging themany opportunities that the life sciences canoffer to improve our health and to keep ourworld safe.

ROBIN GEISS
Director, UNIDIR
Dr. Robin Geiss, Director of UNIDIR, began byoutlining the wider context, pointing out thatthe event was taking place at a challenging
time in which we were witnessing the ratcheting up of geostrategic tension to a level notseen since the Cold War. This has generated
considerable pressure on multilateral institutions, including the international arms
control and disarmament architecture.
Dr. Geiss noted that in parallel, biology wasadvancing, converging and diffusing at an
unprecedented rate, creating opportunities
to address major societal challenges related
to health, hunger and sustainable development. However, he indicated that thesechanges in biology present challenges toefforts to build a global biosecurity regime
and advance biological disarmament. He
further added that all this takes place inthe wake of a global pandemic, which has
demonstrated the power of biology to cause
death, incapacitation and socioeconomic
disruption on a staggering scale and exposedsome of the challenges of dealing with disease
outbreaks.
In his remarks, Dr. Geiss indicated that, fortunately, States and stakeholders are working
to address these challenges through several
strands of activity. He noted that earlier in
2023 WHO Member States had begun negotiations on a global accord on pandemic
prevention, preparedness and response; that
States were in the process of updating theInternational Health Regulations to better
prepare for, and respond to, disease outbreaks
and other public health incidents; and that,
following the success of the Ninth Review
Conference of the Biological Weapons
Convention,1 States had begun preparations
for substantive work in the newly establishedWorking Group on the strengthening of theConvention, which will meet in Geneva next
month.

1 Referred to hereafter in this report as the Ninth BWC Review Conference.

2023 BIORISKS, BIOSECURITY AND BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE REPORT

3

Dr. Geiss suggested that all these activities
are important, so much so that they cannot
be left to any one actor, nor could they bedealt with in silos. Rather, there is a needto continue to foster collaborative work
between States and stakeholders. For thesereasons, events such as the Biorisks,
Biosecurity and Biological Disarmament
Conference are particularly important as they
provide an informal space in which different
communities of practice – scientists, diplo-

4

UNIDIR

mats, public health experts, safety and security officers, and industry actors – can bebrought together to take stock of various
activities, share lessons learned and goodpractices, build common understandings
around risks and responses to such risks, andbetter understand one another.
Dr. Geiss concluded by thanking colleagues in
UNODA and WHO for their cooperation andcollaboration in putting this event together.

Panel I: Advances in science and technology:
assessing the risks and opportunities
Rapporteurs: Mayra Ameneiros and Yorgo El Moubayed
The first panel of the Conference discussed
the various risks and opportunities of advancesin science and technology. The discussion wasaugmented by several online tools, including
an online survey of participants to gauge theirperceptions of risks and opportunities.
Panellists recognized that advances in the life
sciences can have both positive and negative
implications for biosecurity and biologicalweapons disarmament. In terms of positive
implications, the panellists highlighted theimmense potential of the life sciences toprovide opportunities in addressing global
health, sustainability and security challenges.
These opportunities occur at the convergenceof emerging technologies and ground breaking discoveries in diverse scientific fields. Innovative technological advances are facilitating
the eradication of infectious diseases, theresilience and sustainability of the global foodchain and the verification of adherence toglobal norms. Gene drives and synthetic biology can combat vector-borne diseases suchas malaria. This can be achieved by using
genetic control technologies directly on mosquitoes to introduce a pathogen-blocking
bacteria or modify their genome and thenrelease them back into the environment.
Vaccines and medical diagnostics offer exciting possibilities for improving global healthand combating both new and endemic
diseases. In addition, the applications of thesetechnologies extend to various sectors beyond
health care, including agriculture and environmental conservation. They enable the development of sustainable products, improve foodsecurity and increase nutritious crops, thereby
contributing to a more resilient and prosperous
future. In security and confidence-building
sectors, machine learning tools could beapplied to contribute to the development of averification system for the BWC.

Notwithstanding the positive developments
and implications of scientific and technological advances, the panellists raised serious
concerns and identified biorisks acrossmultiple domains, such as (i) the potential
misuse of gene-editing techniques that could
lead to the creation of novel pathogens,the enhancement of specific characteristics(like host susceptibility and transmissibility)
or even the reconstitution of eradicated or
extinguished pathogens; (ii) the implicationsof the convergence of artificial intelligenceand machine learning with the life sciences;and (iii) the lowered barrier of entry for new
actors to access and use technologies thatcan produce or modify pathogens, risking
exploitation for hostile purposes.
Assessing risk and opportunities
The panel stressed the importance of regularly
monitoring technological developments andanalysing their risks and benefits. The range ofpossible risks – including that of malicious use,
health inequities and access – poses a challenge in assessing them. Panellists noted that
one mitigation method is to incorporate adiverse range of perspectives in risk assessments, a step that can contribute to identifying
a range of concerns. Another factor to keep
under consideration is the complexity andunpredictability of life science research, which
complicates risk assessments. Such complexity can present an important barrier to thehostile use of advanced biology.
The panellists discussed different approaches
to assess risks and opportunities arising fromthe advancement of the life sciences in a more
efficient manner. WHO and several United
Nations entities, for example, have implemented
notable mechanisms – including horizon scanning and foresight exercises – to identify
potential future scenarios, assess techno-2023 BIORISKS, BIOSECURITY AND BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE REPORT

5

logical risks and shape optimal developmentsfrom innovations.2 Such exercises are of
considerable value, especially when thesetools involve a geographically representativeand intersectoral set of participants who bringa diversity of perspectives to be consideredin assessing risks and opportunities. One

panellist stressed that tools like foresight are
not about accurately predicting the future,
but rather about using tools and methods toanalyse trends, anticipate developments andmobilize timely actions to shape optimal
outcomes.

Scientific advisory mechanisms

Governance

The role of scientific advisory mechanisms
was highlighted as a way of bringing together
diverse perspectives and viewpoints toaddress potential biases and ensure effective
decision-making. These mechanisms canhelp create a trustful environment, facilitate
dialogue and increase credibility and visibility
among stakeholders. However, one participant noted that there are limitations to scientific advisory mechanisms and distinguishedbetween “policy for science”–which adressed
the process of scientific oversight–and
providing “science advice to inform policy”,
for example through facilitating treaty
implementation.

The panellists further discussed the need for
responsible governance, noting there was aneed for effective regulations, guidelines andtransparency in research, especially in regions
where national regulations may be lacking.
Panellists identified tools that could contribute to governance, including education,awareness campaigns, incentives, regulations, ethical frameworks and codes (such as
the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codesof Conduct for Scientists and The Hague
Ethical Guidelines). These tools can help
promote responsible behaviour and alignincentives and motivations to mitigate risks
arising from human actions and decisionmaking. Improved scientific communication
was also identified as important in facilitating
the active engagement of wider stakeholders, including the public, in wider scientificdiscussions and decision-making processes.

2 WHO (2021), Emerging Technologies and Dual-Use Concerns: A Horizon Scan for Global Public Health, World HealthOrganization, Geneva, https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240036161.
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Panel II: Transparency and national implementation:
lessons learned and good practices
Rapporteurs: Judith Okolo and Alex Kyabarongo
The second session focused on transparency
and national implementation of measuresrelated to biosecurity. In this session, panellists were invited to share their experiences
around the approaches, challenges andstrategies for effective implementation andtransparency. Several ongoing initiatives
related to transparency and national implementation were identified, as summarizedin Table 1.

Table 1. Example initiatives designed to support transparency and national implementation.
ORGANIZATIONINITIATIVEDESCRIPTION

United Nations
Supporting Universalization
Office forand Effective ImplemenDisarmament Affairs tation of the Biological
Weapons Convention
in Africa (2022–2026)

This initiative involves, inter alia, promoting the universalizationand effective implementation of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BWC) in Africa, supporting the preparationof confidence-building measures submissions, and facilitating thedesignation and effective functioning of national contact points.3

St Petersburg
University

Strategic and Arms
Control Studies

This master’s programme bridges the gap between social scienceand life science students through the introduction of the former
to the scale and speed of biotechnologies as well as to thesignificance of a science and technology review process, while
improving the latter’s understanding of the social and politicaldimensions of scientific progress.4

European Unionand United Nations
Interregional
Crime and Justice
Research Institute

EU CBRN Risk Mitigation
Centres of ExcellenceThis initiative supports, inter alia, countries in completing their
CBRN national action plans through a series of workshops andtabletop exercises to identify the priorities, challenges, gaps
and needs in the context of responding to biological threats
and biological incidents.5 ￼

United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Researchand VERTICBWC National Implementation Measures Database

Intended to strengthen implementation of the BWC, thedatabase builds an understanding of what has previously been
done and allows stakeholders to better understand different
approaches to national implementation from around the world.6

United Nations
Office on Drugs
and Crime

Global Initiative on
Strengthening Strategic
Trade and Export Control
Infrastructure to Prevent
Proliferation and Terrorism
while enhancing Regional
Strategic Trade Enforcement Capacities

The project was designed to support selected United Nations
Member States in building national legislative and enforcement
capacity to prevent the acquisition of CBRN materials essential
to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The project
is focused on assisting operational entities to identify strategiccommodities, including dangerous biological pathogens, andenhancing and strengthening national surveillance systems to
aid the threat reduction process.

3 UNODA, “Global Partnership Support,” accessed November 2023, https://disarmament.unoda.org/global-partnership-support.
4 St Petersburg University, “Strategic and Arms Control Studies Master’s Degree,” accessed November 2023,
https://english.spbu.ru/admission/programms/graduate/strategic-and-arms-control-studies.
5 EU, “Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation,” accessed November 2023,
https://cbrn-risk-mitigation.network.europa.eu/eu-cbrn-centres-excellence_en.
6 UNIDIR, “Soft Launch of the Biological Weapons Convention National Implementation Measures Database,”
accessed November 2023, https://unidir.org/events/soft-launch-biological-weapons-convention-national-implementation-measures-database.

2023 BIORISKS, BIOSECURITY AND BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE REPORT7

At the outset of the session, it was noted thatthe national implementation of the BWC
depends on several contextual factors,
including the legal system, the state of development of its bio-industry or trade and thetype of bio-activities the State carries out.
It was also noted that effective national
implementation facilitates the developmentof peaceful activities, including biologicalresearch. One panellist observed that resources
are often limited, and those bodies tasked
with implementing biosecurity measures areoften responsible for dealing with multiple
issues and have many competing priorities.

Thematic challenges
Several thematic challenges emerged during
the discussion. First, panellists indicated that
there was no one-size-fits-all approach tonational implementation. Rather, approaches
to national implementation vary, in part
because different countries are addressing
different risks. Therefore, States need toadopt tailored approaches that take into
consideration different national priorities andrisks and that tie national implementation of
the BWC to real and practical scenarios. The
tailoring of measures should extend to cooperation and assistance activities that support
national implementation, with one panellist
noting that such activities should be “needs
based” and be aligned with national plans.
Second, panellists’s views largely convergedon the importance of a comprehensive integrated–One Health approach–to ensuring
global health security. Related to this point,
panellists indicated that the complexity ofbiorisks was such that an interdisciplinary
approach to implementation was often criticalto the effectiveness of measures.
Third, the panellists stressed the importanceof coordination at the national level throughinterministerial collaboration and the establishment of a functional network of focal
points. Panellists also opined that activities
should not be treated in silos and underlined
the benefits of a bottom-up approach thatengages all relevant stakeholders.

8

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Finally, panellists stressed the importance oflegislation as providing a fundamental basis
for implementing the BWC. It was proposedthat undertaking legislation gap analysis
could be an important first step in efforts tofacilitate national implementation. This would
identify critical pieces of law required fornational implementation.
Panellist further identified specific challenges
that hinder national implementation andtransparency. These included (i) the difficulties arising from competing priorities, on
which panellists acknowledged that national
administrators have many competing priorities given the multiple issues they deal with;(ii) the tendency to emphasize biosafety
rather than biosecurity, in part because actors
are less familiar with dealing with deliberateissues; (iii) a lack of communication between
the science community and policymakers,
requiring further efforts in strengthening
cross-sectional dialogue between life sciencesand diplomacy; and (iv) the potentially lengthand arduous process of passing legislation,
which requires cross-ministerial efforts.

Key takeaways and recommendations
The following key points and recommendations, based on the experience of the panellists, were identified during the discussion.
First, national implementation and international
cooperation and assistance are closely connected. As such, further efforts should bemade to foster the full implementation of
Article X of the BWC. Interregional cooperation and the encouragement of partnerships
between countries can assist in these efforts.
Second, for effective implementation, identifying and engaging with local champions is
critical. In addition, providing opportunities
for showcasing good practices and sharing
information can be an effective way to makeprogress in national implementation.
Third, panellists underlined the importance ofengaging youth in the national implementation process through early awareness raising,outreach and disarmament education. Several

concrete initiatives in this area were noted,
including the Youth for Biosecurity Initiative.7

among educators. The significance of private
sector engagement was also stressed.

Fourth, panellists recognized the importantrole that academia and the educational sector
could play in national implementation, andit was proposed that there is a need for aplatform to regularly exchange best practices

Finally, the panel discussions underlined theimportance of a continual review of efforts
made at the national level to strengthen
regulations and fully and effectively implement the BWC.

7 UNODA, “The Youth for Biosecurity Initiative,” accessed November 2023,
https://disarmament.unoda.org/biological-weapons/eu-support-to-the-bwc/youth-for-biosecurity-initiative.

2023 BIORISKS, BIOSECURITY AND BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE REPORT

9Panel III: Dual-use governance:
taking stock and looking forward
Rapporteurs: Fatima Aziz, Ryan Teo, José Garza Martínez and Felix Moronta-Barrios
The third panel explored governance initiatives related to the life sciences, drawing
from key initiatives including the World
Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH)
Guidelines for Responsible Conduct in
Veterinary Research (2019);8 the Tianjin
Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct
for Scientists (2021);9 and the WHO Global
Guidance Framework for the Responsible
Use of the Life Sciences: Mitigating Biorisks
and Governing Dual-Use Research (2022).10
Panellists recognized that rapid advances in
the life sciences and associated technologies
hold great promise for global health but could
also raise biorisks. These biorisks include biosafety and biosecurity risks with the potentialof causing harm–accidentally, unintentionallyor deliberately–to humans, animals, plants
and the environment. In addition, panellists
noted there were gaps in the governanceof and a lack of awareness of biorisks anddual-use research.
This panel was divided into two sessions: thefirst was aimed at setting the scene, withthree presentations on key governanceinitiatives; the second was a dialogue on
the operationalization of the different governance initiatives at regional, national andinstitutional levels.

Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines
In the first session, one of the initiatives
outlined were the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists.
These guidelines comprise 10 principles and8standards designed to promote responsible
science practices and strengthen biosecurity
governance at national and institutional levels.
Developed collaboratively between scientists
and stakeholders at Tianjin University (China)
and the Johns Hopkins Center for Health
Security (United States of America), and endorsed by the Interacademy Partnership, theguidelines aim to provide a set of principles
and a standard of conduct, to raise awarenessof biorisks among the general public, toeducate young scientists in biosciences andto facilitate the implementation of the BWC.

WOAH Guidelines for Responsible
Conduct in Veterinary Research
The WOAH Guidelines for Responsible conduct
in Veterinary Research were discussed bypanellists as another notable recent initiative.
The guidelines were published in 2019
and were the product of a working groupcomposed of experts from the veterinary andsecurity spheres. The guidelines promote theuse of a risk analysis approach throughout
the scientific research life cycle. This approachentails the engagement of a range of stakeholders, including individual researchers, hostinstitutions, research funders and the hostnational government. In addition, the WOAH
guidelines promote the integration of theconcerned researcher into existing review
processes, thereby increasing the awareness of other risks (including those of animal
welfare and health) and incorporating dualuse concerns. These in turn would strengthen
established review processes.

WOAH (2019), Guidelines for Responsible Conduct in Veterinary Research, World Organisation for Animal Health,Paris, https://www.woah.org/app/uploads/2021/03/a-guidelines-veterinary-research.pdf.
9 Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, Tianjin University Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, andthe Interacademy Partnership, The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists,
https://www.interacademies.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/Tianjin-Guidelines_210707.pdf.
10 WHO (2022), Global Guidance Framework for the Responsible Use of the Life Sciences: Mitigating Biorisks andGoverning Dual-Use Research, Geneva, https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240056107.

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WHO Global Guidance Framework for
the Responsible Use of the Life Sciences

Operationalization of the different
governance initiatives

The WHO Global Guidance Framework was thenext initiative presented, and its key elements
were outlined. The framework consists of aset of tools and mechanisms for biorisk governance, as well as checklists, scenarios and casestudies designed to achieve diverse goals andengage different stakeholders. These governance tools include laws and regulations,standards, guidelines, best practices, codes of
ethics, research review processes, awarenessraising activities, training and education.
The framework also outlines nine values andprinciples, and their associated commitments,that underpin the framework and should guidethe development and implementation of effective biorisk management policies by Member
States and the actions of relevant stakeholders. The framework also considers foresight approaches to mitigating biorisks andmanaging research, as well as balancing risk
and benefits, something that is difficult given
the inherent uncertainty in some aspects oflife science research and the increasingly
complex, valuable and populated life science
research landscape.

In the second session, the panel turned toa discussion on ways of addressing thechallenges and gaps in dual-use governanceand the operationalization of the different
governance initiatives from various stakeholders’ perspectives. Panellists indicatedthat mitigating biorisks and governing dualuse research is a global issue that impacts
all countries; however, countries often havedifferent needs and priorities and are startingfrom different points. Moreover, context
matters, and differences in social, cultural andreligious beliefs and ethical values means that
there are no one-size-fits-all approaches togovernance.
Accordingly, collaboration among different
actors and sectors needs to be encouraged
from the global to local levels to share goodpractices. However, activities need to be
tailored to specific needs and contexts.
Panellists generally agreed that capacitybuilding was required to enhance knowledge
and strengthen skills, along with greater
engagement with stakeholders to bolster
legal and regulatory frameworks related todual-use technologies.

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Looking forward
The panel generated several ideas for moving
forward with dual-use governance. One panellist emphasized the value of using scenarioand case-based approaches to illustrate
the challenges and priority actions in thegovernance of biorisks and dual-use research.
Others suggested there was a need to develop monitoring and evaluation processes by
establishing a baseline from which to gauge
the efficacy of education and training programmes designed to ensure scientists areequipped with the latest knowledge and bestpractices. The convergence of different disciplines such as nanotechnology, chemistry andartificial intelligence with the life sciences was
also emphasized. This expanding scope ofdual-use highlights the need for a broad
governance perspective.

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The importance of integrating risk assessment and risk management strategies intodual-use research planning and execution
was stressed as a means to minimize potential hazards. While again recognizing there isno one-size-fits-all approach to dual-use
governance, panellists largely agreed on thevalue of collaboration at the local, national,
regional and global levels to support a One
Health approach to dual-use governanceand to promote a multisectoral response
to biorisks at the human, animals and ecosystems interface.
Further engagement, including public engagement and awareness campaigns as well as
early education, was recognized as importantin fostering a culture of responsibility andaccountability in research.

Remarks by IZUMI NAKAMITSU
Under-Secretary-General and High Representativefor Disarmament Affairs, UNODA

The Biorisks, Biosecurity and Biological
Disarmament Conference is an important
initiative enabling us to discuss the mounting
challenges associated with biological risks
and explore potential solutions.
We are observing a dramatic evolution in biological risks, with security challenges posedby biological threats becoming increasingly
complex. The COVID pandemic added prominence to issues relating to biological risks anddemonstrated the catastrophic impact that
infectious disease has on the global scale. The
pandemic also demonstrated the disruptionthat could be caused if biological agents were
to be used in a deliberate manner, as weaponsof war or terror. For these reasons, the pandemic brought into stark relief the importanceof the BWC and the need for it to be fully
operationalized, properly institutionalized andfit for purpose.

It is worth recalling that the BWC was the firstinternational treaty to effectively prohibit anentire class of weapons of mass destruction.
It is not only a pillar of disarmament and international security but also contributes tostrengthening global health security. The
effective implementation of the BWC canstrengthen the attainment of the Sustainable
Development Goals, as strong public healthsystems are a necessity to prevent andcombat naturally occurring diseases. However,for this, the BWC needs to be strengthened
and its institutional weaknesses addressed.
The Convention does not have an internationalverification regime nor its own separate international organization to facilitate the full andeffective implementation of the Convention.
The Convention operates on annual budget ofaround 2.1 million USD, and is serviced by asmall, four-person Implementation Support
Unit within UNODA. These institutional weaknesses need to be urgently addressed, if weare to be able to deal effectively with themounting challenges posed by biorisks. Thisway, we can ensure that the norm against themisuse of biology remains strong and ensurethat the opportunities provided by rapid
advancements in science and technology areused only for good.
The Convention’s Ninth Review Conference
last year set out a new approach to strengthening the BWC, and discussions in Geneva
have begun with a positive tone. Now is thetime to work towards taking effective action
on the topics agreed under the Working Groupon the Strengthening of the Convention.
While the BWC is a necessary and pivotal
pillar of biosecurity, it is by no means, on its
own and by itself, sufficient. We also need toconsider the BWC within the wider framework of the international architecture toaddress and combat biological risks.

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One added value of the Biorisks, Biosecurity
and Biological Disarmament Conference is its
convening of experts dealing with multiple
aspects of biorisks and the international
response to them, presenting an opportunity
to connect the dots in our thinking on threats
to global health security. It is therefore opportune that this conference is taking place in
Geneva, where the health and disarmament
communities can have more regular interactions. I hope that this event can help link thetwo communities better.
While naturally occurring diseases will continue
to present the main challenge, intentional useof disease as a weapon should not be ignoredin these discussions. Distinguished participants, I am a strong believer in the need forcomprehensive and cross-cutting approaches
to global challenges, and in the unique rolethat the United Nations and relevant multilateral organizations can and should play.
When confronting global challenges therefore, we cannot limit ourselves to our traditional and comfortable bureaucratic silos. In
the case of biological risks and global healthsecurity, our discussions should address all
potential sources of risk, whether natural,
inadvertent or intentional.
For its part, the United Nations system has
been trying to address these issues holistically through the establishment of a United
Nations Biorisk Working Group, which Dr.
Michael Ryan from WHO and myself co-chair.

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The group is an example of the kind ofcross-cutting approach we need to effectively
face such challenges. During last year’s informal thematic consultations organized by thepresident of the General Assembly on Our
Common Agenda, the United Nations wasinvited to develop a New Agenda for Peace,in close consultation with Member States andin collaboration with relevant partners as partof the preparations for the summit of the
future. Since then, I have had several roundsof consultations to seek views from a broad
range of stakeholders. Improving global preparedness to address biorisks has been afrequent matter of discussion and raised as apriority for many. I am hopeful that the New
Agenda for Peace – which should be issued
soon – will be able to include a new ambitious
vision and pragmatic solutions for biosecurity.
Dear participants, it is my firm belief that
addressing biorisks is a collective and global
responsibility, responding to multiple factors
and requiring a multiplicity of actors, many ofwhom are present in this conference.
As I conclude my remarks, therefore, I remain
confident that the deliberations will be
fruitful and will take us closer to our collective
goal of biosecurity. Thank you.

Panel IV: High-level roundtable
Rapporteurs: Mariia Koroleva and Yorgo El Moubayed
The discussion during the fourth session
featured senior representatives from BWC
States Parties and civil society and revolved
around experiences of the Ninth BWC
Review Conference and the contribution ofperspectives for the work of the Working
Group on the Strengthening of the Convention.

Ninth BWC Review Conference
Panellists agreed that, despite the challenging
geostrategic climate, the short time available
for preparations for the Review Conference
and the wider challenges in the arms control
and disarmament landscape, the Ninth BWC
Review Conference was able to reach tangible outcomes and adopt a substantive final
document. The final document included theestablishment of the Working Group on theStrengthening the Convention and agreement on a mandate for a new intersessional
programme.
Gender and youth aspects were introduced
into the discussions for the first time, which
was also considered a positive step. The
cooperation, commitment and engagement
shown by all States Parties was also seen as a
crucial factor leading to the adoption of the
final document. The significant role of crossregional cooperation, which transcended
the traditional groupings, was identified ascontributing to the Review Conference’s
successful outcome.
However, panellists regretted that no agreement was reached on a number of ambitious
proposals, despite considerable cross-regional
support. Panellists also expressed disappointment that the Review Conference was unable
to agree on the traditional article-by-article
review of the operation of the Convention to
be included in the final document.

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Working Group on the Strengtheningof the Convention
The Working Group on the Strengtheningof the Convention has the mandate to identify,
examine and develop several specific measures, including possible legally binding measures, and to make recommendations tostrengthen and institutionalize the BWC in all
its aspects.11 Of particular note, for the firsttime in two decades, States Parties will
formally address the topic of compliance andverification. Panellists stressed the importance of making the most of the opportunity
presented by the Working Group, particularly
given the rapid development in science andtechnology related to the BWC.
Panellists’ expectations for the Working
Group were cautiously optimistic. It was notedthat the 100-year anniversary of the adoptionof the Geneva Protocol and the 50-year
anniversary of the BWC’s entry into force–both in 2025–provides a unique opportunity
to harvest some early accomplishments fromthe Working Group, most notably with respect
to mechanisms on Article X and the review ofscientific and technological developments.
Panellists further suggested that successfully discussing these topics will influence
progress in other topics. The panellists
regarded the establishment of the Working
Group as a symbol of commitment to thefurther strengthening of the BWC by all States
Parties.
Various positions were expressed in thediscussion about the factors required for a
successful outcome of the Working Group.
Some panellists stated that progress must be
made on the first set of issues to be discussed
at the Working Group’s second session in
August 2023 to sustain momentum, particularly

Final Document of the Ninth Review Conference,” BWC/CONF.IX/9, 22 December 2022,
https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.IX/9.

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as more controversial topics–such as compliance and verification – will be addressed during
the third session in December 2023.
It was pointed out that underlying financial
and organizational issues must be taken into
account when discussing various topics inrelation to strengthening the BWC. According
to one panellist, for the Working Group to

Discussions also addressed the topic of international cooperation and assistance under
Article X of the BWC. One panellist highlighted
different approaches by States Parties tothe role of Article X, which were sometimes
at odds and impeded consensus aroundinternational cooperation. In this regard,
the importance of recognizing the nexus
between arms control and disarmament on
the one hand and sustainable developmenton the other was pointed out. Such recognition would allow States to approach the BWC
as a part of wider multilateral global governance aimed at sustainable development.
To ensure the success of the Working
Group, reconciling the different approaches
to assistance and cooperation and ensuringmulti-stakeholder cooperation on the matter
will be important.

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succeed, existing approaches to verificationneed to be reviewed and adapted to the realities of the twenty-first century. The panellists
unanimously agreed that creating a positive
atmosphere at the outset of the Working
Group and engaging in constructive discussions would be vital for the success of subsequent meetings.

Multi-stakeholder approaches
and holistic collaboration
Throughout the discussions, panellists drewattention to the need for cross-regional andmulti-stakeholder collaborations to enable
the BWC to achieve tangible results inaddressing current challenges. One panellist
also emphasized that in the case of biorisks
and global health security, discussions should
address all potential sources of risk, whether
natural, inadvertent or intentional.
It was observed that there is no single, unified
non-governmental organization’s vision within
the BWC community and that non-governmental organizations are diverse, with each
entity driven by its own agenda and objectives. It was noted that the BWC has imposed
a comprehensive ban on biological weapons
and, as such, civil society involvement in the
BWC is focused more on community-building
activities than on advocacy campaigns.

Panel V: Detection, surveillance and reportingof disease outbreaks
Rapporteurs: Felix Moronta-Barrios and Fatima Aziz
The experience with COVID-19 led to significant advances in technologies related todetecting, monitoring and reporting disease
outbreaks. This panel explored these technologies and mapped out how they could
support biosafety, biosecurity and biologicaldisarmament. The panel further discussed
the important role of understanding thepolicies that should exist around these technologies and how best to protect human,
animal and ecosystem health.
To facilitate this objective, the panel session
employed a scenario-based discussion format,
which envisioned a hypothetical spillover
zoonosis in the year 2026. The scenario was
broken into three parts, focusing respectively
on detection, surveillance and reporting. Eachpart was guided by a specific question, anda policy-centred discussion followed thecompletion of the scenario.
Over the course of the session, the panellists
were presented with six questions, and their
responses–coupled with the participationof the audience–shed light on the key considerations in combating such outbreaks
effectively.

Detection
The first question examined the geographicalareas where we should direct our attention.
The panel emphasized the significance ofthe following: (i) extreme densities of human–
animal populations, (ii) deforestation, (iii) small
island States or States with limited capacity,(iv) water supply and reservoirs, (v) wet
markets, (vi) historical precedence of spillovers, and (vii) tropical areas due to the threatof climate change. These locations pose ahigher risk, and it was argued that it is vital tofocus efforts on proactive surveillance andprevention in these areas.

The second question delved into the criteria
used to identify the disease. The panel underscored the importance of considering factors
such as the type of pathogen, its propensity
for weaponization, transmission modes(e.g. airborne), integration of animal healthsurveillance data, high transmissibility, and theexistence of medical countermeasures.
The next question examined the methods
employed in disease detection. The panelstressed the need for integrated animaland human health surveillance and reporting
platforms, open-source public health intelligence, omics technology, chemical and toxin
identification enabled by artificial intelligence,drones for sampling, blockchain for surveillance, and clinical diagnostics. These tools
could play a vital role in our ability to swiftly
identify and monitor disease outbreaks.

Surveillance
In the hypothetical scenario, the disease
had subsequently spread to two additionalcountries. The fourth question, therefore,
examined the new surveillance tools thatwould become available. The panel highlighted
the importance of wastewater surveillance,
use of non-traditional sources for information,
remote sensing technologies, in situ genomic
sequencing, monitoring of airborne diseases
and leveraging of artificial intelligence. These
innovations enhance our ability to track the
spread of the disease and respond effectively.

ReportingTo aid in this critical mission, the fifth question
explored the technologies that can support
reporting efforts. The panel identified automated reporting systems and well-positioned
reference laboratories for timely diagnosis as
crucial components of an efficient response.

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Disease outbreak policies
The final question asked the panel to examine
the policies that would be instrumental in
addressing disease outbreaks. The panellists
emphasized the importance of improving
biosafety standards, increasing education andoutreach initiatives, standardizing and streamlining digital surveillance systems, enhancing
mobile connectivity, encouraging collaborative
surveillance efforts, improving equitable
access to technologies, mitigating the economic impacts of pandemic reporting, andfunding for the development of broadspectrum medical countermeasures. These
policies form the backbone of a robust andcoordinated response to outbreaks.

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UNIDIRIn summary, the panel underscored theimportance of engaging in cross-sectoralcollaborations, raising awareness within theveterinary sector, and implementing subnational initiatives to enhance surveillancecapabilities. The panellists emphasized that
although technology plays a critical role in thedetection, surveillance and reporting of
disease outbreaks, the way the technology isused is equally vital. The need to adapt to new
scenarios and address the inequities brought
to light during the COVID-19 pandemic werehighlighted. By doing so, it is possible tobolster preparedness for future outbreaks
and ensure a more equitable and effective
response.

Panel VI: International cooperation in biorisks,biosecurity and biological disarmament
Rapporteurs: Shizuka Kuramitsu and Mayra Ameneiros
The sixth panel of the Conference delved into
the complexities of international cooperationin the realms of biorisks, biosecurity andbiological disarmament. Comprising four
experts, the panel unfolded through a dynamic
formatthatinterspersed
moderated
questions with real-time audience feedback
collected via a semistructured survey. This
interactive approach not only enriched thediscussion with diverse viewpoints but also
encouraged a two-way dialogue, eliciting acomprehensive discourse on the strategicenhancement of global cooperative mechanisms in these critical domains.
Panellists unanimously acknowledged thepressing need to cultivate international
cooperation in addressing biorisks, biosecurity
and biological disarmament, emphasizing
the profound implications for global peaceand security. The discussion, enriched bya spectrum of perspectives from both thepanel and the audience, highlighted diverse
strategies and identified key areas demanding concerted efforts to bolster collaboration. The ultimate consensus of the room wasthat achieving substantive progress in international cooperation is both crucial and complex, necessitating a multifaceted approachto navigate the various challenges presented.

Imperatives for strengthening
international cooperation
The panellists and audience members pinpointed several critical areas where international cooperation must be enhanced, as wellas what would help improve it.

Upholding international norms:
There was broad agreement on the imperative of supporting and maintaining international norms to prevent the development
and use of biological weapons, including theeffective implementation of the BWC at
global, regional and national levels. Effective
national implementation of instruments suchas the BWC is crucial and can support andfacilitate compliance with other internationaland regional obligations.
Fostering innovation and collaboration:
To stimulate critically needed innovation andbroad-based engagement, it is essential tofacilitate multidisciplinary collaboration andinclude diverse stakeholders, including
the private sector. Enhanced intersectoral
communication is crucial in this regard.
Contextual understandingfor effective communication:
Cooperation should also take into accounteconomic and political factors. A comprehensive understanding of these elements,
as well as the historical context of biosecurity
issues, is key to developing effective
communication strategies. The example ofvarying levels of capacity in national vaccine
development programs throughout history
underscores the influence of scientific andtechnological progress in responding to andcontrolling infectious disease outbreaks,
revealing a complex interplay between
research, innovation and global health security
policies.

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Overcoming barriers to cooperation
The panel identified four major obstacles that interfere with the promotion of international
cooperation:
Figure 1. Perceived barriers to international cooperation. Audience feedback collected via asemistructured survey.

1. Funding challenges:
The issue of securing sufficient funding wasa recurring concern. Long-term investments,
essential for sustained biosecurity initiatives,often require governmental support. However, government systems, particularly indemocracies, may lack the foresight or mechanisms for such investments. The postanthrax attack scenario in the United Statesof America illustrated this dilemma, where
the quest for new antibiotics drove private
firms to bankruptcy, underscoring the needfor effective stewardship in resource allocation and access.

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2. Communication gaps:
Bridging communication divides between
various sectors is vital to minimize miscommunication, which can escalate tensions and
impede efficient collaboration – a reality
starkly highlighted during the COVID-19
pandemic. The panel emphasized the necessity of mutual understanding and of making
sure the language used is clear and direct,
given the distinct interests and terminologies
across different sectors.

3. Transparency issues:
Panellists largely agreed that to overcome
the challenges of biorisks, biosecurity and biological disarmament, increased transparency
is critical. When it comes to the BWC, thenational reports of States Parties help build
confidence in their compliance. In general,creating a culture around transparency (basedon dialogue and trust) is a necessity. This is key
not only in the disarmament context with the
BWC but also in the context of the International
Health Regulations from WHO as well as otherinternational norms and standards.

4. Export control measures:
The discussion touched on the role of export
controls and their influence on international
cooperation. Panellists highlighted that there
are diverse opinions on the impact of thesemeasures. One panellist suggested adoptinga systematic approach in examining possible
solutions to the challenges posed by export
controls, emphasizing that this could offer
fresh perspectives on how to potentially ease
these limitations.

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Panel VII: Monitoring and verification of the BWC
Rapporteurs: José Garza Martínez and Judith Okolo
This final panel, on monitoring and verification of the BWC, began by noting the lack ofan agreed understanding of what constituted
verification of the BWC and the different expectations of what verification could achieve.
Nonetheless, panellists presented elementsof a working definition for BWC verification,suggesting the following: “Verification is anagreed process of collecting and analysing
data with a view to informing judgments on a
State’s compliance with its obligations underthe BWC.”12 It was suggested that verification
was, in part, a technical process of collecting
and analysing data but often involved a political judgment.

Panellists touched on the history of the BWC
and presented challenges in complianceand verification, highlighting some of thelimitations with the current tools available
in building confidence in compliance, such as
the confidence-building measures. Panellists
stressed the need to improve the existing
BWC regime, including through institutional
strengthening and exploration of the opportunities presented by new (and established)technologies to build a layered approach toverification and compliance.

Figure 2. Growth in biotechnology institutions, patents and publications.

1222James Revill (2023) “Verifying the BWC: A Primer”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/
WMD/23/Bio.verification.primer1.

UNIDIR

Technological opportunities (and limits)
The panel touched on the potential of several
emerging technologies to enhance BWC
verification, including artificial intelligence,
bioforensics and open-source information.
It was suggested that these tools could help
in collecting information to develop, inter alia,
a baseline of data around States’ activities orto investigate suspicious disease outbreaks.
There is much that can be learned fromtechnological tools used in verification andmonitoring in other regimes; however,there are also limits on the transferability of
approaches in regimes dealing with chemical
and nuclear weapons.
While such technologies are important in any
discussion on verification, technologicalopportunities need to be discussed in the
broader social and political context. There
are also limitations with technologies, which
need to be considered by States Parties. It
was noted that technology is not a solution
unless embedded in the system with agreed,
acceptable and reliable techniques and procedures. Moreover, many old technologies
and existing processes (e.g. confidencebuilding measures), or tools used elsewhere
including declarations, would still haveconsiderable value in efforts to build confidence in compliance.

Changing nature of the life sciences
Panellists recognized that understandingof verification would also need to consider
changes in the life sciences and wider
research landscape that could have a bearing
on efforts to verify the BWC. It was notedthat over the past 20 years there has beena dramatic increase in the number of
researchers, institutes and patents related totechnology (see Figure 2). Biological weapons
can take many forms and serve different
purposes and can therefore be pursued in
facilities with very different “footprints”.
As such, efforts to verify the BWC will alsoneed to consider what a biological weapons
programme might look like.

After detection, what?
One panellist highlighted the importance of
disarmament verification as a cooperative
endeavour and acknowledged that challenges
will emerge in circumstances where cooperation in investigations may not be forthcoming. Related to this point was the issue of
how to address non-compliance and put inplace suitable and effective sanctions. To
move verification forward, it was stressedthat States Parties need to carefully consider
what to do in non-routine situations.

Expectations for the Working Groupon the Strengthening of the Convention
The Working Group on the Strengthening of
the Convention was recognized as the beginning of a new process that opened a windowof opportunity for States Parties to advancework around monitoring and compliance.
However, panellists recognized that the broad
mandate coupled with the limited time available to the Working Group meant it would
not be able to resolve everything in the monitoring and compliance sphere of the BWC.
It was noted that there are numerous ways
in which confidence in compliance could betaken forward, not all of which necessarily
required a legally binding or multilateral route.
As one panellist remarked, there are several
existing ways a State Party can demonstratecompliance.

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Panellists presented several suggestions forwhat can be expected from the Working
Group. It was suggested that through theWorking Group, States Parties could generate a road map for advancing the BWC
and begin to generate sustained high-level
attention on the BWC. Engagement withwider expertise in civil society was also
important; though, as one panellist noted,
outreach may be required to bring new sets

24

UNIDIRof expertise into the discussion. Panellists
generally agreed that achieving progress
requires States Parties and stakeholders
to prepare for meetings and showcase willingness to work towards compromises onmonitoring and verification issues, as there
remain various–sometimes starkly contrasting
perspectives on what can and should beestablished and accomplished within the
BWC.

Annex: Conference programme
Biorisks, Biosecurity and Biological Disarmament Conference
4 and 5 July 2023, Geneva and Online
DAY 1: 4 JULY 2023
09.30-10.00: Registration and morning refreshments (30 min)10.00-10.30: Welcoming remarks (30 min)The conference will start with welcome addresses from WHO, UNODA and UNIDIR
representatives.
Speakers:• Melanie Regimbal, Chief of the Geneva Branch, UNODA• John Reeder, Director, Research for Health Department, Science Division, WHO• Robin Geiss, Director, UNIDIR
10.30-12.30: Panel 1 – Advances in science and technology: assessing the risks
and opportunities (2 hours)
This panel will explore key advances in the biological sciences and their positive and negative
implications for biosecurity and biological disarmament. The panel will include a discussion
around foresight and will be followed by a survey of participants on their perceptions of key
risks and opportunities.
Speakers:• Beyza Unal, Head of Science & Technology Unit, UNODA (virtual)• Sandra Matinyi, Project Officer, SynBio Africa• Marion Laumonier, Technical Officer, Emerging Technologies, Research Prioritisationand Support, Research for Health Department, Science Division, WHO• Jonathan Forman, Science and Technology Advisor, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,
Seattle Washington, USA
Moderator: James Revill, Head of Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme, UNIDIR
12.30-13.30: Lunch Break (1 hour)2023 BIORISKS, BIOSECURITY AND BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE REPORT25

13.30-15.00: Panel 2 – Transparency and national implementation:
lessons learned and good practices (1.5 hours)
This panel will discuss best practices and lessons learned related to building transparency,
implementing biosecurity measures at the national level, and identifying gaps that need tobe addressed.
Speakers:• Sonia Drobysz, Co-programme Director for National Implementation, VERTIC• Alexander Hamilton, CBRN CoE Regional Coordinator for Southeast Asia, UNICRI• Peter Ahabwe Babigumira, Technical Advisor, Uganda Ministry of Health (virtual)• O’Neil Hamilton, Expert on Non-Proliferation, Strategic Trade Management and Export
Control Development, UNODC, and the Proliferation Prevention Program, Stimson Center• Yvette Issar, Political Affairs Officer, UNODA• Anastasia Malygina, Associate Professor, St Petersburg University (virtual)
Moderator: Alex Lampalzer, Deputy Chief of the BWC Implementation Support Unit, UNODA
15.00-15.30: Coffee break (30 min)15.30-17.00: Panel 3 – Dual-use governance: taking stock and looking forward (1.5 hours)
This panel will explore governance initiatives related to the life sciences, drawing from ongoing
initiatives such as the WOAH’s Guidelines for responsible conduct in veterinary research (2019),
the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists (2021) and the WHO Global
guidance framework for the responsible use of the life sciences: mitigating biorisks and governing
dual-use research (2022).
Part 1: Presentations – Setting the scene (40 min)Speakers:• Leifan Wang, Assistant Professor, Tianjin University (virtual)• Keith Hamilton, Head Preparedness and Resilience Department, WOAH
• Filippa Lentzos, Associate Professor, King’s College London
Moderator: Soatiana Rajatonirina, Technical Officer, Emerging Technologies, ResearchPrioritisation and Support, Research for Health Department, Science Division, WHO
Part 2: Panel discussion – Dialogue on operationalization of the different initiatives (50 min)Speakers:• Halima Benbouza, Professor, Director, National Council of Scientific Research
and Technologies of Algeria• Maria Espona, Professor, Director, ArgIQ, Argentina• Irma Makalinao, Professor, University of the Philippines (virtual)• Emmanuel Turyatunga, Office of the Prime Minister of Uganda
Moderator: Emmanuelle Tuerlings, Technical Officer, Emerging Technologies, ResearchPrioritisation and Support, Research for Health Department, Science Division, WHO

26

UNIDIR

DAY 2: 5 JULY 2023
09.00-10.00: Panel 4 – High-level roundtable (1 hour)
This panel will focus on the Biological Weapons Convention by taking stock of lessons identified
from the Ninth BWC Review Conference, as well as sharing forward-looking perspectives on
the recently established Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention.
Speakers:• Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament
Affairs, UNODA (virtual message)• Flavio Damico, Ambassador, Special Representative of Brazil to the Conference
on Disarmament• Leonardo Bencini, Ambassador, Special Representative of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament• Jonelle John S. Domingo, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of the Philippines to the UN• Filippa Lentzos, Associate Professor, King’s College London
Moderator: Simon Cleobury, Head of Arms Control and Disarmament, GCSP
10.00-11.30: Panel 5 – Detection, surveillance and reporting of disease outbreaks (1.5 hours)
The experience with COVID-19 has led to significant advances in technologies related
to detecting, monitoring and reporting disease outbreaks. This panel will explore thesetechnologies and map out how they could support biosecurity and biological disarmament.
Speakers:• Tomoko Steen, Director of the Biomedical Science Policy and Advocacy program,Georgetown University (virtual)• O’Neil Hamilton, Expert on Non-Proliferation, Strategic Trade Management and Export
Control Development, UNODC, and the Proliferation Prevention Program, Stimson Center• Karl Schenkel, Unit Head for Strategy and Guidelines at Health Emergencies Programme, WHO
Moderator: Taylor Winkleman, Consultant, WHO
11.30-12.00: Working coffee break (30 min)12.00-13.30: Panel 6 – International cooperation in biorisks, biosecurity and biologicaldisarmament (1.5 hours)
This panel will discuss challenges and opportunities for international cooperation in biorisks,biosecurity and biological disarmament. Panellists will discuss cooperation to date and whatsteps could be taken to foster collaboration and cooperation in the future.
Speakers:• Andrew Nerlinger, Executive Director, Global Health Security Fund
• Kirk Douglas, Director of the Centre for Biosecurity Studies, University of the West Indies• Maria Garzon Maceda, Associate Researcher for the WMD Programme, UNIDIR• Nadya Wells, Senior Research Adviser, Global Health Centre, Geneva Graduate Institute
Moderator: Veronica Rovegno, Technical Officer of the Health Emergencies Preparedness
and Response Unit, WHO2023 BIORISKS, BIOSECURITY AND BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE REPORT27

13.30-14.30: Lunch Break (1 hour)
14.30-16.00: Panel 7 – Monitoring and verification of the BWC (1.5 hours)
This final panel will focus on technological opportunities to contribute to investigating
suspicious disease outbreaks and verifying compliance with the BWC.
Speakers:• James Revill, Head of the WMD Programme, UNIDIR• Melanie Reddiar, Head of Secretariat, South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of WMD• Ryan Teo, Research Assistant, University of Birmingham• Jez Littlewood, Independent expert (virtual)
Moderator: Una Jakob, Senior Researcher, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)
16.00-16.30: Taking Stock (30 min)
To take stock of the conference, rapporteurs will provide short remarks of each panel’s main
take-aways.
Speakers:• Panel 1: Mayra Ameneiros• Panel 2: Judith Okolo• Panel 3: Fatima Aziz
• Panel 4: Mariia Koroleva• Panel 5: Felix Moronta Barrios• Panel 6: Shizuka Kuramitsu• Panel 7: José Garza Martínez
16.30-16.45: Closing Remarks (15 min)• James Revill, Head of the WMD Programme, UNIDIR• Alex Lampalzer, Deputy Chief of the BWC Implementation Support Unit, UNODA• Veronica Rovegno, Technical Officer, Office of the Executive Director, Health Emergencies
Programme, World Health Organization
16.45-17.00: Farewell coffee (15 min)28

UNIDIR2023 Biorisks, Biosecurity and Biological
Disarmament Conference Report
4–5 JULY 2023
EDITED BY DANIEL FEAKES, MARIA GARZON MACEDA, ALEX LAMPALZER, JADE MASON,
SOATIANA RAJATONIRINA, JAMES REVILL, ANNA LAURA ROSS, VERONICA ROVEGNO,EMMANUELLE TUERLINGS, TAYLOR WINKLEMAN@unidirgeneva@UNIDIR

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