January | 2024

Voting Matters 2023
Are asset managers using their proxyvotes for action on environmental andsocial issues?

2

About ShareAction
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Acknowledgements
ShareAction gratefully recognises the financial
support of the Stichting Foundation forInternational Law for the Environment towards thework that contributed to the research, writing andpublication of this report. The views expressed arethose of ShareAction.

Authors
Abhijay Sood, Claudia Gray, Felix Nagrawala,
Isabelle Monnickendam, Joe Herbert,
Katie Stewart and Marina Zorila

Contact
research.secretariat@shareaction.org

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Contents
Key information for interpreting the report

4

Executive summary

7

Ranking table

11

Section 1: Support for shareholder resolutions has hit
a new low, with the ‘big four’ and US asset managers
particularly culpable

19

Section 2: Despite the negative outlook, there are somepockets of progress

28

Section 3: Greenwashing is prevalent, and excuses fromasset managers are weak

34

Section 4: Asset managers continue to disregard
pressing social and environmental issues

47

Conclusion and recommendations

55

Methodology

57

List of resolutions

65

References

94Key information forinterpreting the report

Key information
for interpreting
the report4Key information forinterpreting the report5

Key information for interpreting
the report
What is an asset manager and why do they vote?
Asset managers invest money on behalf of their clients, such as pension funds or insurancecompanies. Through their investments they own shares in companies. This gives them theright to vote on resolutions, also referred to as proposals, put forward at a company’s annual
meeting of shareholders.

What is a shareholder resolution, and how does this differ from amanagement resolution?
Most resolutions at a company’s annual meeting of shareholders are put forward by the
management of the company, the board of directors etc. However, resolutions can also
be filed by the shareholders of the company, such as asset managers or pressure groups
that own shares. Often these resolutions concern environmental and social issues that theshareholder(s) believe the company is not sufficiently addressing.

How can asset managers vote on resolutions?
For any given resolution, an asset manager can use its shares in the company to submit a vote
For, Against or Abstain. They can also choose not to vote at all, referred to as a Did Not Vote
(DNV). One share permits one vote. Therefore, asset managers with a large number of sharesin a company, will have a larger say than an asset manager with a smaller number of shares. If
an asset manager votes differently across the votes it holds in a company this is referred to asa Split vote.

What happens if a shareholder resolution is supported byshareholders?
In the US (where the majority of shareholder resolutions are filed), and Canada, if a resolution
receives more than 50% support from shareholders, it is considered to have passed.
These resolutions are not legally binding. However, if a company was to ignore the viewof shareholders it may face reputational risks and escalation from shareholders. In otherjurisdictions, such as many European countries, the process by which shareholders file
resolutions relies on requesting amendments to the company’s articles of association.
As a result, the threshold for a resolution to pass is higher, typically 75%.

Key information forinterpreting the report

6

What does this report cover?
•This report analyses the voting performance of 69 of the world’s largest asset managers.

•

Asset managers were selected based on their assets under management (AuM), with aregional skew towards the geographies ShareAction focuses on: Europe and the UK.

•

Asset managers were ranked and analysed based on their voting across 257
environmental- and social-related shareholder resolutions.

•

Asset managers that voted in favour of a higher percentage of these 257 resolutions had ahigher overall score, as represented in the ranking table.

•

We also studied asset managers’ voting on a further 17 ‘Say on Climate’ resolutions, togauge managers’ engagement with climate transition plans at importantly positioned
companies. These resolutions, both management- and shareholder-proposed, were notincluded in the main sample on which asset managers were ranked so as not to skew
overall analysis.

Executive
summary

Executive
summary

7

Executive
summary

Executive summary
Asset managers are some of the most powerful actors in the world. The 69 managers
ShareAction assessed for this report control a vast amount of wealth, equal to roughly 60%of the world economy1. Through their investments, these companies have unrivalled private
influence on corporate behaviour.
It is well established that the scale of planetary crises necessitates urgent action. Globally,
the record for the warmest summer was broken again, and by some margin, in 20232.
Climate disasters continued to strike worldwide, and are growing in frequency and severity3.
Intense escalations of wars and conflicts have had devastating impacts on human life4.
Yet despite the growing urgency to address these interlinked crises, we found that manyof the most influential asset managers have significantly regressed in their approach to the
problems humanity faces.
We analysed how 69 of the world’s largest asset managers voted on 257 shareholder
resolutions aimed at improving companies’ impacts on some of the most pressing socialand environmental issues. We tracked their performance over time, and coherence with
their own policy commitments.
Our findings are as follows:

Support for key environmental and social shareholder resolutions
has hit a new low• Support for shareholder resolutions peaked in 2021, falling in 2022 and 2023. In 2023,
only 3% of assessed resolutions passed, just eight out of 257 resolutions. This is downfrom 21% of assessed resolutions in 2021.
• The world’s four largest asset managers, who dominate the market, are among themost culpable, backsliding on support for shareholder resolutions. In 2023, the ‘big
four’ (BlackRock, Vanguard, Fidelity Investments, and State Street Global Advisors) only
supported – on average – one eighth of those put forward, a marked drop since 2021.
• US asset managers show particularly poor performance. Asset managers in the US
supported just a quarter of resolutions, on average.

Despite the negative outlook, there are some pockets of progress• Legislative requirements in Europe appear to have improved the voting performanceof European asset managers. European asset managers supported more proposals thanever, voting in favour of 88% of resolutions 2023, on average.

8

Executive
summary• 21 asset managers voted in favour of more than 90% of resolutions. They include
managers of various sizes and investment strategy types. While many large passive
managers are among the poorest performers, including Blackrock and Vanguard, this is
not always the case. Legal & General Investment Management is a large passive manager
and voted in favour of 92% of the proposals in our assessment.
• Asset managers that frequently supported shareholder resolutions, also voted against
directors on environmental and social grounds more often. Comparing the 15 asset
managers common to our assessment and one conducted by non-profit Majority Action,
we found asset managers that voted for the most resolutions in our sample also voted
against directors at a higher number of 1.5C-misaligned companies.

Greenwash remains prevalent, and asset managers provided weakexcuses for falling ambition• Some asset managers hide behind their net-zero commitments while failing to takeaction. Many asset managers have set net zero targets, however failed to translate thisrhetoric into action when it came to voting. Eight asset managers with public net zerotargets supported fewer than half of all climate resolutions.
• The claim that “resolutions are becoming more prescriptive”, used by asset managers
as a rationale for voting against resolutions, does not hold water. Three quarters of allshareholder proposals covered in our study asked only for greater corporate disclosure,including those which some asset managers have deemed overly “prescriptive”. The
other quarter of resolutions ask for movement in line with globally agreed climate goals orinternational human rights standards.
• Some members of Climate Action 100+ (CA100+) repeatedly voted against CA100+
flagged resolutions. While in general CA100+ members showed more support than nonmembers for climate resolutions, some members – including BlackRock and State Street
Global Advisors – repeatedly voted against resolutions flagged by CA100+, including thosethat mandate companies to reduce emissions. This lack of support from certain members
for climate resolutions raises real concerns about whether these asset managers are truly
prepared to move to address climate change.
• Asset managers fail to hold BP to account despite the company’s rollback of climate
commitments. Shareholders approved BP’s transition plan through a managementproposed Say on Climate vote in 2022, yet the company has since rolled back its climate
commitments. In 2023, shareholders failed to hold it to account for disregarding theoutcome of the 2022 vote.

9Executive
summary

10

Asset managers continue to disregard particularly pressing socialand environmental issues• Some asset managers continue to invest in the world’s largest weapons companies
and vote against human rights proposals. Ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Palestine haveresulted in surging share prices for weapons companies. Eleven asset managers which areprofiting from these conflicts through continued investment voted against proposals asking
the companies to report on their human rights impacts.
• Asset managers block efforts to stop the wider financial sector financing fossil fuels.
Resolutions at financial services companies on fossil fuel financing received the lowest
support by asset managers of any climate-related topic.
We urge asset managers to radically rethink their use of voting as a stewardship strategy, forboth shareholder- and management-proposed resolutions. The voting behaviour of the 2023
proxy season cannot be repeated if we are to see change on the scale needed to address
global climate change, biodiversity loss and social inequality.

Ranking table

Ranking table11

Ranking table

12

Rank

Ranking table1

Key: percentage scores

Asset
Manager

EFG Asset Management

CountryUK

Overall
score

100%

Environmental

100%

Social

100%

Lobbying

Votingsplit

87.5 > 100
75 > 87.5
62.5 > 75

37.5 > 50
25 > 37.5
12.5 > 25

50 > 62.5

0 > 12.5100%

2Achmea Investment
Management

Netherlands

98%

100%

100%

90%

3

AmundiFrance

98%

100%

96%

100%

4

Impax AssetManagement Group

UK

98%

100%

100%

92%

5

PGGM

Netherlands

98%

96%

98%

100%

6

Candriam

Luxembourg

97%

99%

98%

94%

7

MN

Netherlands

97%

100%

100%

84%

8

Nordea AssetManagement

Finland

97%

97%

99%

92%

9

Man Group

UK

96%

97%

94%

100%

10

BNP Paribas AssetManagement

France

96%

95%

97%

94%

Key: bar chart percentages
For
No data
No holding
Split
AgainstDNV
AbstainRank

Ranking table1113

Key: percentage scores

Asset
Manager

RobecoCountry

Netherlands

Overallscore

95%

Environmental

95%

Social95%

Lobbying

Votingsplit

87.5 > 100
75 > 87.5
62.5 > 75

37.5 > 50
25 > 37.5
12.5 > 25

50 > 62.5

0 > 12.5

98%

12

Aegon Asset Management

Netherlands

95%

94%

98%

91%

13

Generali Insurance AssetManagement

Italy

94%

97%

88%

100%

14

HSBC Global AssetManagement

UK

93%

90%

95%

98%

15

Eurizon A Capital

Italy

93%

85%

99%

100%

16

Union Investment

Germany

93%

89%

96%

94%

17

Legal & General
Investment Management

UK

92%

89%

92%

100%

18

Santander AssetManagement

Spain

92%

95%

92%

83%

19

Pictet Asset Management

Switzerland

91%

88%

94%

93%

20

Royal London AssetManagement

UK

91%

90%

89%

100%

Key: bar chart percentages
For
No data
No holding
Split
AgainstDNV
AbstainRank

Ranking table

21

14

Key: percentage scores

Asset
Manager

Credit Suisse AssetManagement

Country

Switzerland

Overallscore

90%

Environmental

85%

Social96%

Lobbying

Votingsplit

87.5 > 100
75 > 87.5
62.5 > 75

37.5 > 50
25 > 37.5
12.5 > 25

50 > 62.5

0 > 12.5

94%

22

Swiss Life Asset Managers

Switzerland

90%

92%

89%

86%

23

Deka Investment

Germany

88%

84%

93%

86%

24

APG Asset Management

Netherlands

87%

96%

76%

94%

25

DWS Group

Germany

86%

89%

77%

98%

26

Allianz Global Investors

Germany

85%

83%

86%

93%

27

Manulife Investment
Management

Canada

84%

85%

78%

93%

28

Schroders

UK

83%

84%

81%

83%

29

Federated Hermes*

US

83%

83%

84%

78%

30

UBS Asset Management

Switzerland

82%

82%

82%

82%

Key: bar chart percentages
For
No data
No holding
Split
AgainstDNV
AbstainRank

Ranking table31

15

Key: percentage scores

Asset
ManagerAviva Investors

CountryUK

Overallscore

81%

Environmental

71%

Social90%

Lobbying

Votingsplit

87.5 > 100
75 > 87.5
62.5 > 75

37.5 > 50
25 > 37.5
12.5 > 25

50 > 62.5

0 > 12.5

85%

32

Swisscanto Invest byZürcher Kantonalbank

Switzerland

79%

70%

89%

79%

33

Northern Trust AssetManagement

US

77%

69%

80%

93%

34

Swedbank Robur

Sweden

77%

80%

72%

84%

35

AXA Investment Managers

France

75%

76%

65%

95%

36

SEB

Sweden

73%

58%

84%

73%

37

M&G Investments

UK

71%

67%

74%

73%

38

Fidelity International

UK

66%

64%

62%

84%

39

Coronation Fund Managers

UK

64%

58%

59%

86%

40

Vontobel

Switzerland

62%

64%

57%

69%

Key: bar chart percentages
For
No data
No holding
Split
AgainstDNV
AbstainRank

Ranking table

41

16

Key: percentage scores

Asset
Manager

abrdn

CountryUK

Overallscore

61%

Environmental

63%

Social52%

Lobbying

Votingsplit

87.5 > 100
75 > 87.5
62.5 > 75

37.5 > 50
25 > 37.5
12.5 > 25

50 > 62.5

0 > 12.5

79%42

Veritas Asset Management

UK

59%

67%

41%

100%

43

Morgan Stanley Investment
Management

US

58%

51%

62%

65%

44

Nikko Asset Management

UK

57%

52%

51%

79%

45

Mondrian Investment
Partners

UK

56%

55%

54%

67%

46

Jupiter Asset Management

UK

56%

51%

54%

73%

47

Liontrust AssetManagement

UK

56%

35%

61%

69%

48

Newton Investment
Management

UK

55%

52%

49%

76%

49

Columbia Threadneedle
Investments

US

55%

50%

54%

67%

50

Principal Global Investors

US

54%

49%

49%

76%

Key: bar chart percentages
For
No data
No holding
Split
AgainstDNV
AbstainRanking table

17

Rank

Key: percentage scores

51

Asset
ManagerFranklin Templeton

Country

US

Overallscore

49%

Environmental

48%

Social52%

Lobbying

Votingsplit

87.5 > 100
75 > 87.5
62.5 > 75

37.5 > 50
25 > 37.5
12.5 > 25

50 > 62.5

0 > 12.5

49%

52

MFS Investment
Management

US

42%

36%

45%

53%

53

Invesco

US

39%

35%

37%

52%

54

AllianceBernstein

US

33%

16%

42%

55%

55

Baillie Gifford
& Co

UK

33%

47%

30%

14%

56

Ninety One

UK

32%

38%

22%

44%

57

Wellington Management

US

29%

31%

26%

33%

58

State Street Global
Advisors

US

23%

29%

20%

16%

59

J.P. Morgan AssetManagement

US

23%

26%

11%

41%

60

Janus Henderson Investors

UK

16%

23%

11%

17%

Key: bar chart percentages
For
No data
No holding
Split
AgainstDNV
AbstainRank

Ranking table

61

18

Key: percentage scores

Asset
Manager

Fidelity Investments

Country

US

Overall
score

16%

Environmental

12%Social21%

Lobbying

Votingsplit

87.5 > 100
75 > 87.5
62.5 > 75

37.5 > 50
25 > 37.5
12.5 > 25

50 > 62.5

0 > 12.5

12%62American Century
Investments

UK

14%

16%

11%

12%

63

BlackRock

US

8%

9%

8%

7%

64

Capital Group

US

8%

8%

11%

0%

65

Walter Scott & Partners

UK

7%

0%

12%

0%

66

T. Rowe Price

US

6%

9%

4%

2%

67

Goldman Sachs AssetManagement

US

5%

7%

2%

5%

68

Vanguard

US

3%

5%

2%

2%

69

Dimensional Fund Advisors

US

2%

4%

1%

0%

Key: bar chart percentages
For
No data
No holding
Split
AgainstDNV
Abstain

Note: overall score percentages refer to how many of 257 resolutions asset managers voted in favour of. These 257 resolutions were broken down into three categories: environmental (114 resolutions), social (99 resolutions), and lobbying (44 resolutions).
A sub-score for each category indicates what proportion of resolutions within that category asset managers voted for. A further 17 ‘Say on Climate’ resolutions were analysed but did not feed into any of the scores in the ranking table.
*Representing the voting behaviour of EOS at Federated HermesSection 1

19

Section 1:
Support for shareholder
resolutions has hit a newlow, with the ‘big four’and US asset managers
particularly culpable

Section 1

20

Section 1: Support for shareholder
resolutions has hit a new low, withthe ‘big four’ and US asset managers
particularly culpable.
Finding 1: Support for resolutions peaked in 2021, falling eachyear since.
Figure 1 - In 2023, only 3% of the 257 environmental and social shareholder
resolutions we assessed received majority support

Percentage of shareholder
resolutions

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

2021

2022

% of resolutions that passed2023% of resolutions that failed

In 2023, only 3% of the 257 environmental and social shareholder resolutions we assessed
received majority support, the threshold needed for a resolution to be approved.i This is anotable decrease from the previous two years, with 14% of resolutions passing in 2022 and
21% in 2021 (Figure 1). In 2020, 16% of resolutions passed.
All eight resolutions that passed in 2023 sought only to increase disclosures from theassociated companies (see Appendix).
iOver 50% for ordinary resolutions (over 90% in our sample), and 75% for special resolutions – a resolutionthat seeks to amend a company’s articles of association

Section 1

21

Four of the resolutions that passed in 2023 covered social issues. They included a high-profile
resolution at Starbucks, requesting a third-party assessment of the company’s union practices,
after claims it had fired pro-union employees5.
Three of the resolutions that passed covered climate change, specifically seeking disclosure
on climate-related lobbying. One resolution covered lobbying disclosure more generally.

Finding 2: The four largest asset managers in the world are among
the worst culprits, with their voting performance falling consistently
year on year.
Figure 2 – The ‘big four’ asset managers’ average support for environmental andsocial resolutions has fallen year on year

Percentage of shareholder
resolutions supported

50%

40%

30%
State Street Global
Advisors, 23%

20%

Fidelity Investments,
16%

10%

BlackRock, 8%
Vanguard Group, 3%

0%
2021

2022

2023

The four largest asset managers in the world dominate the sector, holding 39% of the total
assets under management (AuM) of all 69 managers we analysed. The ‘big four’ have showna significant and consistent decline in their support for shareholder resolutions seeking
corporate improvements on important environmental and social issues, supporting – onaverage – one eighth of resolutions in 2023 (Figure 2).
BlackRock, the largest asset manager in the world, only supported 8% of environmental
and social shareholder resolutions in 2023, whereas in 2021 it had supported 40% of such
resolutions (Figure 2).

Section 1

22

Vanguard, the world’s second largest asset manager, showed the weakest performance ofthe ‘big four’, supporting only 3% of resolutions in 2023.
All four asset managers voted significantly more conservatively than advised by the leading
proxy voting advisors, ISS and Glass Lewisii (Figure 3).

Figure 3 – The four largest asset managers voted for a significantly lower
percentage of resolutions than recommended by the market-leading
proxy advisors
100%
90%

Percentage ‘for’ votes

80%

ISS

70%
60%
50%
40%

Glass Lewis

30%
20%
10%
0%
State Street
GlobalAdvisors

Fidelity
Investments

BlackRock

VanguardGroup

Finding 3: 69 additional resolutions would have passed if the fourlargest asset managers had voted for them.
The largest asset managers in the world have an outsized influence on corporate behaviour
through their ownership of the world’s largest companies. These four firms manage over
US$23 trillion in assets6, a figure roughly the same as the GDP of the entire US economy7(Figure 4).

ii

ISS and Glass Lewis hold an estimated 97% of the US market share in proxy voting advice. Of the two,
ISS is the larger, controlling 61% of the market: https://www.ft.com/content/3f064321-138c-4c65-bbb96abcc92adead. Both firms operate globally.

Section 1

23

Figure 4 – The world’s largest four asset managers control around the sameamount of money as the entire GDP of the US economy

Vanguard AssetManagement$7.2tnGDP of the US economy$25.4tn

BlackRock
$8.6tnFidelity
Investments$3.9tnState Street
GlobalAdvisors$3.5tnFor example, together they own more than one third of Lockheed Martin, the largest arms
manufacturer in the world, repeatedly linked to illegal and unethical behaviour8.
Due to the breadth of their holdings, and poor record when it comes to environmental andsocial voting behaviour (Finding 2), 69 additional resolutions would have passed had thesefirms voted in favour of them (Figure 4). This is more than eight times higher than the numberthat actually passed this proxy voting season, which was a mere eight resolutions.

Figure 5 – Eight times as many resolutions would have passed had the four largest
asset managers voted for them257
Total resolutions

69
additional resolutions
would have passed if the
big four had voted in favour

8

Resolutions
actually passed

Section 1

24

The resolutions that would have passed covered important environmental and social topics atsome of the world’s largest companies, including Amazon, Apple, The Coca-Cola Company,
Dow, Pfizer, and Lockheed Martin (see Appendix for full list of resolutions).
The beneficial outcomes for stakeholders and from wider society could have covered
greenhouse gas emission reductions, labour rights improvements, and biodiversity impacts.
A sample of resolutions on human rights and labour rights that would have received over 50%
votes for if the big four asset managers had supported them are displayed in Figure 6. Amongthese are two resolutions which sought greater labour rights disclosures at major consumer
goods retailers.

Figure 6 – A sample of human rights and labour rights resolutions that would havereceived over 50% votes for if the big four asset managers had voted in favour

40%
30%
20%

34.9%

33.3%

31.5%

30.2%

31.8%

10%

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0%

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Percentage ‘for’ votes

50%

Actual votes forBlack Rock potential
votes forFidelity Investments
potential votes forState Street potential
votes forVanguard potential
votes for

Pass thresholdSection 1

25

The Canadian organisation SHARE (Shareholder Association for Research & Education) fileda resolution at Amazon requesting that the company commission an independent third-party
assessment of its adherence to its stated commitments on workers’ freedom of associationand collective bargaining9. Amazon has been frequently accused of anti-unionisation practices,
and in the US, regulators and courts have on multiple occasions ruled that Amazon has
violated labour laws10.
Amazon recommended voting against the resolution, claiming that they have already madesufficient disclosures on this topic. However, the major proxy advisors ISS and Glass Lewis
both recommended voting in favour.
The resolution received 34.9% support, with State Street the only one of the big four asset
managers voting for the resolution. Our analysis found, however, that had BlackRock, Fidelity
Investments and Vanguard voted in favour of the resolution, it would have received just over
50% support.
TJX Companies is a clothing and home goods retailer that operates in several countries,
including the UK, under the name TK Maxx. A North American trade union, the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, filed a resolution at TJX companies in 2023 calling for a report
evaluating the financial, reputational, and human rights risks to the company resulting fromthe misclassification of workers as independent contractors within its supply chains11.
TJX’s opposition to the resolution stated that they expect all third parties they work with tocomply with the law, and that they would conduct a review if an issue came to light12. Glass
Lewis recommended a vote against the resolution, however ISS recommended voting in favour.
All four of the biggest asset managers voted against the resolution, which received 31.8%
support. Our analysis found that, had the big four voted in favour, the resolution would havepassed with 54% support. The resolution could even have passed with the support of justthree of the big four, if BlackRock and Vanguard had voted in favour, along with either Fidelity
Investments or State Street.

Finding 4: US asset managers roll back ambition, supporting fewer
resolutions than in 2022.
Figure 7 – Average votes ‘for’ shareholder resolutions by US asset managers fell
between 2022 and 2023

2022

40%

25%

2023

Section 1

26

The 13 US-based asset managers which were included in all of our assessments since 2021,
supported just 25% of resolutions in 2023, on average (Figure 7). This was a notable decrease
from the previous two years, when support had hovered at around 40%. While these asset
managers are headquartered in the US, all 13 are global businesses with significant presence
across regions.

Falling performance: the ESG backlash andpass-through voting
The backsliding in ambition from US asset managers comes in the context of theso called ‘ESG backlash’, which has seen Republican state officials using the threatof moving their investments, and legal levers, to attempt to prevent asset managers
from allocating capital or engaging with companies based on environmental orsocial grounds.
For example, state officials have withdrawn billions of dollars from BlackRockfunds on anti-ESG grounds, with other states threatening to follow13. Similarly, statelegislators have passed, or have considered passing, laws to block government
pensions funds from investing with asset managers that consider ESG factors.
2023 has also seen the weaponisation of anti-trust laws. In May, Republican
threats of legal action led to a large exodus of founding signatories from the NetZero Insurers Alliance14. Similarly, House Judiciary Chairman Jim Jordan subpoenaed
As You Sow, a member of Climate Action 100+, and the Glasgow Financial Alliancefor Net Zero15. These efforts have no doubt applied a new pressure to financial
institutions that had previously capitalised on the boom of interest in ESG products.
The rise of pass-through voting is particularly interesting in this context. Passthrough voting allows clients to vote directly on shareholder proposals for theirholdings, either by specifying their decision on a vote-by-vote basis or by relying
on the recommendation of a proxy voting advisor. For BlackRock, up to half ofindex equity clients are now eligible, with around 10% currently using this feature16.
Vanguard has introduced this for specific funds only, totalling less than 1% of AUM17.
The implementation of pass-through voting may therefore be an approach tosimultaneously retain ESG interested clients (by allowing them to vote for theirassets directly), while also placating the anti-ESG movement by scaling backambition for the majority of their assets. State Street Global Advisors announced
in May 2023 that they would provide client-directed voting opportunities to their

27

clients18. They were also criticised by the non-profit Majority Action for changing
the wording of their proxy voting guidelines19. We are concerned by the risk that
implementation of pass-through voting facilitates a fall in ambition from asset
managers, rather than primarily empowering clients to exercise their voting rights.

Section 2

28

Section 2:
Despite the negative
outlook, there are somepockets of progressSection 2

29

Section 2: Despite the negative
outlook, there are some pockets
of progress
Finding 5: Legislative requirements in Europe appear to have
improved the voting performance of European asset managers.
Figure 8 – Legislative requirements in Europe appear to have improved the voting
performance of European asset managers
100%

Percentage of shareholder resolutions supported

90%

European
average, 88%

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%

US average,
25%

20%
10%
0%
2021

2022

2023

FranceGermany

Italy

Netherlands

SwedenSwitzerland

UK

European average

US average

Section 2

30

On average, European asset managers voted in favour of 88% of shareholder proposals in
2023 (Figure 8). Asset managers from every European country followed this upward trend,with the exception of the UK, where asset managers’ support for resolutions has hoveredaround 64% on average.
The EU Shareholder Rights Directive, which came into force in September 2020, requires
managers to report on their shareholder engagement policy and how it has been
implemented on a ‘’comply or explain’’ basis. This disclosure should describe voting
behaviour as well as how they monitor investee companies on social and environmental
impact and corporate governance, among other matters.
The relative strength of the regulatory environment in Europe suggests that regulation has
had a positive impact on voting performance from managers in the region, notwithstanding
several areas where the Shareholder Rights Directive can be improved to further drive EU
stewardship standards, which ShareAction has previously highlighted in a policy briefing.

Finding 6: Twenty-two asset managers voted in favour of morethan 90% of resolutions in 2023, significantly more than inprevious years.
Despite overall support for shareholder resolutions falling significantly in 2023 (Finding 1),
more asset managers voted in favour of more than 90% of resolutions than in previous years.
In 2023, 22 asset managers voted in favour of more than 90% of resolutions in our sample.
This is up from 12 asset managers in 2022 and 10 in 2021.
The downward trend in overall vote outcomes (Finding 1), despite the upward trend in thenumber of asset managers voting in favour of over 90% of resolutions, is due to the contrast
in the size of the assets under management of the managers in different regions. All 22 of theasset managers that voted in favour of more than 90% of resolutions are based in Europe,
where support for shareholder resolutions was much higher than in the US (Findings 4 and
5). The overall vote outcomes are being dragged down by large asset managers domiciledin the US (Figure 9).

Section 2

31

Figure 9 – The larger assets under management of US managers is driving theoverall decrease in support for resolutions, despite growing support from European
asset managers
Each circle represents an asset manager. The size of the circle
represents the value of their assets under management.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Average % ‘for’ votes
Americas – US

EuropeFinding 7: Passive strategies are not a barrier to strong voting
performance.
Passive investing is a strategy in which asset managers invest in assets which reflect anexternal index or other benchmark (such as FTSE 100 companies) rather than making active
decisions over individual companies.
Passive managers are often more reluctant to use capital allocation levers to engage andescalate with investee companies, as this may involve deviating from the tracking benchmark.
This means that proxy voting and other escalation tactics may be of particular importance tofulfil stewardship responsibilities over portfolio companies.
One passive manager – Legal & General Investment Management – ranked among the top
third of the sample, backing 92% of resolutions. This shows that it is entirely possible for apassive manager to be proactive in voting in favour of environmental and social resolutions
as part of a stewardship strategy.

Section 2

32

Finding 8: Asset managers who back more environmental or social
resolutions are also using votes against directors more frequently.
Support for shareholder resolutions is important, but not sufficient to achieve positiveenvironmental and social outcomes by itself. A well-rounded and effective engagement andescalation strategy should involve willingness to use a range of tactics to achieve objectives.
For further information, please see our recent RISE guidance paper on escalation.
Voting against directors or other management items (such as remuneration items or audit
reports) has been gaining prominence as an engagement strategy, with some evidence thatit may be effective in achieving objectives20. Voting against directors, specifically, encourages
changes at the company level, partly because of its personal reputational consequences21,22.
However, asset managers are not using these tactics to their full effect. A 2023 report byMajority Action found that large asset managers often supported the full board at criticalenergy and financial service companies which were failing to set appropriate targets to tackle
climate change23. Also, CA100+ signatory-led proposals to vote against management at target
companies, highlighted as part of the initiative’s flagged votes, often received little backing
from investorsiii.
We compared the scores of 13 asset managers who feature in both this report and Majority
Action’s report to assess the relationship between asset managers’ support for resolutions in
our sample, and their votes against directors at companies considered misaligned with thegoal of limiting warming to 1.5Civ.
There is a correlation between the asset managers who voted ‘for’ the most resolutions inthis sample, and the number of companies at which they voted against directors as assessedby Majority Action (Figure 10). Asset managers who backed very few shareholder resolutions
also tended to support management at most companies, and those who voted ‘for’ themost resolutions in our sample also voted against directors at a higher number of
1.5C-misaligned companies.

iii
iv

See: https://www.climateaction100.org/approach/proxy-season/
For a full description of methods, see Majority Action’s report.

Section 2

33

Figure 10 – Asset managers who voted against directors at more companies
backed a greater proportion of sampled resolutions
100%

Percentage of shareholder resolutions supported

90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14 15

16

17

Votes against (one or more) directors at 1.5C-misaligned companies

Chart depicts the number of times an asset manager voted against at least one director at a 1.5C-misaligned company
in the Majority Action study (out of 17 sampled companies), mapped against the score it achieved in this study. Pearson
correlation coefficient = 0.81.

Section 3

Section 3:
Greenwashing isprevalent, and excusesfrom asset managers
are weak34

Section 3

35

Section 3: Greenwashing is prevalent,and excuses from asset managers
are weakFinding 9: Asset managers’ explanations for blocking progress do
not hold up to scrutiny.
We found a number of common excuses in asset managers’ voting rationales and publicstatements defending their votes against environmental and social resolutions.
For example, BlackRock and Vanguard have issued public statementsv offering explanations
for their voting behaviour. Other asset managers provided these in their vote rationales. Our
research shows that often these arguments do not hold up to scrutiny (Figure 11).

Figure 11 – The largest asset managers’ explanations for their reduced support forresolutions do not hold up to scrutiny
The largest asset managers say

We found
73% of shareholder proposals ask only
for greater disclosure (see below).

Resolutions are becoming
increasingly “prescriptive”.

Resolutions are being put forth thathave no economic meritvvi

If asset managers are dissatisfied withthe resolutions, they could file their own,
however only four of the firms we assessed
have done so,vi and none of them are fromthe US.
Climate change poses a long-term systemic
financial risk to universal owners. 40% ofassessed resolutions cover
climate change.

BlackRock statement on fall in support of shareholder resolutions. “In our assessment, there was an uptickin the number of such shareholder proposals that were overly prescriptive or unduly constraining on
management decision-making. The number of single-issue proposals where the request made did nothave economic merit also increased. Importantly, many proposals failed to recognize that companies had
already substantively met their request.” https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/2023investment-stewardship-voting-spotlight.pdf
Amundi, Candriam, HSBC Asset Management, Legal & General Investment Management

Section 3

36

The largest asset managers say

The resolutions’ requests are
already being met

We found
For all of the 257 resolutions we assessed,
some asset managers voted in favour,
indicating they added value to thecompany’s approach.
ISS frequently recommended voting infavour of proposals (78%). Glass Lewis
recommended voting in favour more
frequently than the majority of US asset
managers (36%).

The most common argument we found for asset managers’ voting against resolutions thisproxy voting season, particularly from those the US, was that resolutions have become “tooprescriptive” and are therefore not worthy of support.
This argument is not supported by evidence from our research.
Three quarters (73%) of the resolutions we assessed related simply to increasing disclosure
on environmental and social risks, a similar percentage to 2022 (78%). Indeed, asset managers
identified lack of data as a major barrier to effective ESG integration, as outlined in our Point of
No Returns assessment24.
The 27% of resolutions that we categorised as requesting ‘action’ cover a range of important
topics aligned with globally agreed climate goals or human rights standards. The majority ofthese resolutions focus on climate change. They ask companies, particularly in the energy
sector, to begin aligning, or to better align, their activities with the goals of the Paris Agreement.
Resolutions on social issues require companies to better comply with globally agreed humanrights standards, such as those in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work25 on freedom of association, or the UNGC Principle 526 on preventing the use ofchild labour. We are of the opinion that alignment with these globally agreed standards is anappropriate action for companies to take and not overly prescriptive.

 he claim by asset managers that their fall in support is due to increasingTprescriptiveness of resolutions is not consistent with our assessment of thecontent of shareholder resolutions filed in 2023.

Section 3

37

Finding 10: Many asset managers with public net-zero targets are
failing to back these up with support for climate resolutions
Several asset managers who scored well in our 2023 asset manager benchmark, Point of No
Returns27, because they had public net-zero (by 2050) targets, voted predominantly against
climate resolutions.
Eight asset managers which have a public target for reaching net-zero by 2050 – some ofwhich are specified as aligned with a 1.5C pathway – had weak (or no) fossil fuel exclusion
policies, and voted in support of fewer than 40% of the climate resolutions at companies
which they had holdings in (Figure 12). This raises questions around the integrity of theircommitment to net-zero.

Figure 12 – Eight asset managers with a public net-zero target supported under
40% of climate resolutions

Asset manager

Public netzero target

Net-zerotarget is 1.5CalignedFossil fuelexclusions

Climateresolutions
supported(excl. noholdings)

Capital Group

Yes

No

None

6%

J.P. Morgan AssetManagement

Yes

No

Weak

26%

Wellington Management

Yes

No

Weak

29%

State Street Global
Advisors

Yes

Yes

None

30%

MFS Investment
Management

Yes

Yes

None

33%

Invesco

Yes

Yes

Weak

33%

Liontrust AssetManagement

Yes

No

Weak

33%

Baillie Gifford

Yes

No

Weak

38%

NB: Resolutions at companies where an asset manager did not have holdings are not included in the calculation of theirsupport percentage. ‘Weak’ fossil fuel exclusions designates asset managers who received less than 50% of available
points for their fossil fuel exclusion policies when these were evaluated for ShareAction’s Point of No Returns reportin 2022.

A further seven asset managers which do not hold 2050 net-zero targets or significant fossil
fuel exclusions (according to our 2022 Point of No Returns report) also voted in favour of lessthan 50% of climate resolutions.

Section 3

38

In contrast, 16 asset managers who have a public 2050 net-zero target aligned with a specific1.5C pathway28 voted for over 60% of climate resolutions.
Membership of the Net Zero Asset Managers initiative (NZAMI) appears to have a marginal
beneficial impact on asset managers’ voting performance on climate resolutions. The vast
majority of asset managers we assessed – 52 of the 69 – are NZAMI members. These NZAMI
members voted in support of an average of 62% of climate resolutions at companies in which
they had holdings, while non-members supported on average 48%.
However, 19 NZAMI members voted for fewer than 50% of climate resolutions. Furthermore,
six NZAMI members voted against more than 70% of climate resolutions (at companies inwhich they had holdings): T. Rowe Price (93%), BlackRock (90%), Vanguard (88%), Fidelity
Investments (88%), AllianceBernstein (81%), and J.P. Morgan Asset Management (73%).
While membership of NZAMI is high within our sample of asset managers, then, manymembers do not live up to the initiative’s name in terms of their voting performance.

Finding 11: Asset managers with voting guidelines are not more
likely to support a higher number of resolutions.
Through cross-referencing our voting analysis with the findings of our latest asset manager
benchmark, Point of No Returns 2023 29, we discovered that asset managers with morethorough social and environmental policies aren’t necessarily backing these up with a strong
voting performance on social and environmental resolutions. This leaves them open toaccusations of greenwashing.
For example, while many asset managers have developed guidelines on their approach tovoting on topics such as climate, biodiversity, social issues, and governance, having suchguidelines in place is not correlating with asset managers performing more strongly interms of supporting progressive resolutions on these topics.

Section 3

39

Figure 13 – Three asset managers with formalised voting guidelines on climate,biodiversity, social and governance issues scored well under 50% in our
voting analysis
Formalised voting guidelines
Asset manager

ClimateBiodiversity

SocialGovernance

Overallvotingscore

Goldman
Sachs AssetManagement

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

5%

BlackRock

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

8%

J.P. Morgan AssetManagement

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

23%

Three asset managers who we found to have formalised voting guidelines for four key topics(climate, biodiversity, social and governance issues) still voted against the overwhelming
majority of resolutions we analysed (Figure 13). All three were far short of scoring 50%.
On the other hand, many asset managers who we found not to have clear voting guidelines
nonetheless performed well in terms of supporting the resolutions we analysed.
Therefore, while voting guidelines do not correlate significantly with supporting more
resolutions, asset managers cannot claim a lack of formalised voting guidelines as alegitimate rationale for not voting in favour of resolutions.

Finding 12: Some CA100+ members are repeatedly voting against
CA100+ flagged resolutions.
As part of its engagement strategy, Climate Action 100+ ‘flags’ shareholder proposals andother votes at target companies which are aligned with the goals of the initiative. While itdoes not explicitly recommend voting in favour, these are intended for investors to “take into
consideration” during proxy season. In 2023, CA100+ flagged 20 shareholder resolutions.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, being a member of CA100+ is an indicator of stronger voting
performance on CA100+ flagged shareholder resolutions. Of the 20 CA100+ flagged
shareholder resolutions in our sample, members voted in favour 72% of the time on
average (median 87%), compared to 41% (median 41%) for non-membersvii.

vii Data includes asset managers who have at least 5 holdings relevant to CA100 flagged resolutions. Sample: 50
CA100+ members, 11 non-members.

Section 3

40

Thirteen of the 55 CA100+ members in the sample voted in favour of all flagged shareholder
resolutions for companies for which they had holdings.
However, some CA100+ members are still voting repeatedly against resolutions flagged
by CA100+ (Figure 14). Eleven CA100+ members in the sample voted for fewer than half ofthe flagged resolutions for which they had holdings. BlackRock – the world’s largest asset
manager – voted ‘for’ just two of the 20 CA100+ flagged resolutions (10%).

Figure 14 – Eleven CA100+ members backed fewer than half of CA100+ flagged
shareholder resolutions for companies for which they have holdings
20
18

14
12
10
8
6
4
2

ck
kRo
Blac

ach
an S
dm

Gol

SEB

s

t
tree
te S

Ber
n ce

S ta

in
n s tei te r
Jup

s co
Inve

Allia

I n teF
rnatidelity
iona
l
We
lling
to n

0
Hen Janu
der sson
Thr Columead
nee biadle

CA100+ flagged votes

16

Asset Manager voting direction
For

AgainstAbstain/Did Not Vote

SplitsNo Holdings/no data

Section 3

41

Finding 13: Multiple CA100+ members voted ‘against’ all CA100+
flagged resolutions which would require companies to set stronger
climate targets.
Of the 20 CA100+ flagged shareholder resolutions in the sample, five were considered action-oriented resolutions: resolutions which request companies to adopt policies and set targets
rather than solely disclose information.
All five action-oriented CA100+ flagged resolutions focused on implementing stronger
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets:• Imperial Oil: to adopt a midterm corporate-wide target to reduce absolute scope 1 and 2
GHG emissions30• Martin Marietta Materials: to issue near-, medium- and long-term GHG reduction targets
aligned with the Paris Agreement and covering operational and supply chain emissions31• Shell: to align its existing 2030 reduction target covering scope 3 GHG emissions of theuse of its energy products with the Paris Climate Agreement32• Southern Company: to set targets aligned with the Paris Agreement for the full range of its
Scope 3 value chain GHG emissions33• Total Energies: to align its existing 2030 reduction target covering scope 3 GHG emissionsof the use of its energy products with the Paris Climate Agreement34.
Six CA100+ members in our sample voted ‘for’ every one of these resolutions, while five firms
voted ‘against’ every one (Figure 15).

Section 3

42

Figure 15 – Some CA100+ members are voting repeatedly against resolutions requesting that companies strengthen emissions targets
Asset
managerImperial Oil – GHG reduction

Martin Marietta – Parisalignment

Shell – Scope 3 target

Southern Company– Scope 3 target

Total Energies – Parisalignment

Amundi Asset Management

For

For

For

For

For

HSBC Global AssetManagement

For

For

For

For

For

Man Group

For

For

For

For

For

Manulife Investment
Management

For

For

For

For

For

Robeco

For

For

For

For

For

UBS Asset Management

For

For

For

For

For

AllianceBernstein

AgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstBlackRockAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstGoldman Sachs AssetManagement

AgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstJ.P. Morgan AssetManagement

AgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstState Street Global Advisors

AgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstThis table only includes CA100+ members in the sample which had holdings or available data points in these companies who voted ‘for’ or ‘against’ all five of these resolutions..

Section 3

43

Rationales given by managers who voted repeatedly ‘against’ CA100+ flagged shareholder
resolutions often contained generic statements that the proposal was “too prescriptive”.
Some asset managers also noted that a proposal was “not aligned with the interests ofeconomically-focused investors” (Southern Company); that the company “currently meets therequirements of our proxy voting policy” (Shell, Martin Marietta); or that “disclosures related to
GHG emissions are mostly aligned” with the manager’s existing guidance (Imperial Oil, Total –despite both resolutions asking for enhanced targets rather than disclosures).
This raises questions around some CA100+ members’ commitment to meaningfully reduce
emissions at investee companies, and questions for CA100+ about the commitment ofsignatories to its goals. If CA100+ does not require stronger minimum standards for its
members to remain signatories, the initiative risks enabling laggard managers to greenwash
their operations while continuing to vote against urgent climate action.

Finding 14: Shareholders often side with company management on‘Say on Climate’ resolutions, rather than holding them to account.
Say on Climate is an initiative which aims to give shareholders a vote on companies’ climatetransition plans. This year, we analysed 17 Say on Climate resolutions, although these did notcontribute towards asset managers’ overall scores (see Methodology)viii. Eleven of them weremanagement-sponsored standing votes requesting shareholders to approve the company’s
climate plan. Six were filed by shareholders, requesting the company to adopt an annual
advisory vote on the company’s climate plan.
In 2023, the average level of support for management-sponsored Say on Climate resolutions
was 91%, and the support for shareholder-proposed ones almost five times smaller, at 20%(Figure 16). This was similar to the 2022 figures: 89% and 22%, respectively.
All of the management-sponsored resolutions had majority support from shareholders. The
average approval level of proposals at financial services companies was particularly high, at
98%. The proposal with the least support was Glencore’s, at 69.7% approval. Proxy voting
advisor ISS recommended investors vote against the Glencore proposal, while Glass Lewis
recommended voting in favour. The investors who voted against the proposal often expressedthat the company’s plan was not sufficiently aligned with the Paris Agreement and that its
realisation depended heavily on actions taken after 2035.

viii We did not include Say on Climate resolutions when scoring and ranking asset managers. It is crucial thatinvestors evaluate each climate transition plan on its ambition, accountability, and its compliance with thegoals of the Paris Agreement. This process is now also facilitated by the Transition Plan Taskforce (TPT)
Disclosure Framework, which was published in October 2023 and sets out good practice for robust andcredible transition plan disclosures.

Section 3

44

Figure 16 – Most of the management-sponsored Say on Climate resolutions hadover 80% support, while all shareholder-sponsored ones had under 30%
850% (majority)
support

Number of resolutions

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
0-10%

10-20% 20-30% 30-40% 40-50% 60-70% 70-80%

80-90% 90-100%

Level of shareholder support

Shareholder-sponsored resolutions
Management-sponsored resolutions

Five of the six shareholder-sponsored resolutions were filed at Canadian banks, and one
was filed at the French utilities company ENGIE SA. The latter was tabled by 16 investors
and it received the highest level of support among the shareholder-backed resolutions
analysed: 24.4%. Excluding the French State, the level of approval was 44.5%35. Candriam’s
rationale stated that “the fact that ENGIE’s Board of Directors has decided not to support[the resolution] demonstrates that the resolution is ambitious and pushes the company to go
further in its disclosure.”
Our data shows that when the Say on Climate vote already exists on the ballot, andmanagement recommends that shareholders approve the plan, all resolutions pass. On
the other hand, when shareholders propose that management adopts the initiative – andmanagement disagrees – all proposals fail. This worryingly suggests that investors have
simply been using the Say on Climate vote to agree with the management recommendations,instead of using the initiative to change companies’ behaviour and ask for ambitious andcredible transition plans and disclosures.

Section 3

45

Case study: BP and Shell – accountability crisis as oil
majors scale back climate plans approved throughSay on Climate votes
At its 2022 AGM, BP’s climate transition plan36 received 88.5% support in thecompany’s first Say on Climate vote. However, in February 2023, less than a year
later, the company decided to cut its medium-term emissions reduction goals foroil & gas production – from 35–40% to 20–30% by 2030 (compared to 2019),
effectively reversing the plan shareholders had approved in the 2022 vote37.
BP did not hold a Say on Climate vote at its AGM on 27 April 2023. This suggests
the company does not consider it needs shareholder approval of the viability of
its long-term prospects in oil & gas, despite the need to be aligned with globallyagreed climate targets.
In absence of a Say on Climate vote, civil society organisation Follow This tabled
proposal 25, which received 16.8% support. The resolution asked for BP’s Scope 3
emission targets to be aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement. The investors
that voted in favour of the proposal said that BP’s partial disclosure on Scope
3 targets hinders their assessment of the company’s alignment with the Paris
Agreement goals. BP’s top shareholdersix – BlackRockx, Vanguard, Norges Bank
Investment Managementxi, and Legal & General Investment Management– opposed the proposal.
At the AGM, support for the re-appointment of Chairman Helge Lund decreased
from previous years (96.6% in 2022, 97.7% in 2021) to 90.4%38. Legal & General
Investment Management “explained its vote against Lund on the basis that BP
had slashed its climate targets less than a year after shareholders had approved
its previous, more ambitious climate plans, without offering a new vote on thechanges”39. Five UK pension funds also declared they would vote against Lund’s
re-appointment over the decision to weaken climate targets40.
Unlike BP, Shell held a Say on Climate vote at its AGM on 23 May 2023 – but it thenalso changed some of its plans. Resolution 25 was proposed by management andasked shareholders for the approval of Shell’s Energy Transition Progress41.
ixxxi

On 31 May 2023, according to Refinitiv Eikon data.
BlackRock Institutional Trust Company, BlackRock Investment Management (UK), and BlackRock
Advisors (UK) were in the top ten shareholders.
Norges Bank Investment Management is not in scope for our ranking, therefore we do not haveaccess to its voting data.

Section 3

It received 80.0% approval, and ISS and Glass Lewis recommended a vote infavour. However, Shell’s transition plan did not meet several investors’ expectations:pre-declared rationales for voting against the resolution referenced the insufficientalignment with the Paris Agreement, the lack of detail on Scope 3 emissions,the unclear methodology of the climate scenario analysis, the use of intensitybased targets, and the substantial use of offsets and carbon capture andstorage technologies42.
Follow This also flagged some of these concerns, and filed resolution 26, which
received 20.2% support. The proposal asked the company to commit to reduce
absolute (rather than intensity-based) emissions by 2030, in line with the Paris
Agreement, including its Scope 3 emissions43. Although ISS recommended a voteagainst the resolution, it “fully accepted” its merits and said the “argument that
intensity metrics are not a substitute for absolute metrics is entirely valid” and isechoed by ISS analysis44.
Just one month after Shell’s transition plan was approved, the company shared thatit intended to grow its natural gas business. Executives argued that this was still inline with Shell’s climate goals. Shell also projected stable oil production until 2030,
and stated that it met a goal of reducing production by 20% by 2030, by sellingsome operations to rival ConocoPhillips45.
Actions such as those of BP and Shell risk dangerously diminishing the credibility
and power of the Say on Climate vote as a tool for shareholders to promoteaccountability and to influence company transition plans. If the majority of investors
only use the Say on Climate vote to agree with management plans – and do notreact when these plans are changed or when new plans are made without castinga vote – they fail to exercise their shareholder rights effectively.

46Section 4

Section 4:
Asset managers
continue to disregard
pressing social andenvironmental issues

47

Section 4

48

Section 4: Asset managers continue
to disregard pressing social andenvironmental issues
Finding 15: Asset managers decline to increase human rights
scrutiny on arms industry.
Ongoing wars around the world have led to a period of heightened attention to the arms
industry. Many investors place exclusions on the industry due to the impact its products havein the world: deaths, human rights abuses, and other war crimes. Recently there has been anotable pushback to such exclusions from certain quarters. The UK government, for example,
this year convened asset managers to encourage their investment in the arms industry46.
Many arms companies have seen a significant spike in their stocks since Hamas’ attack on
Israel in October 2023 and Israel’s extensive bombing of Gaza, while both arms companies
themselves and investors including Morgan Stanley Investment Management and TD Bank
have discussed opportunities for increased revenues due to the Israel–Hamas and Russia–
Ukraine wars47. The Guardian newspaper has noted how such statements are seemingly incontradiction with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights48.
Of the resolutions we analysed, three targeted arms companies in relation to the humanrights impacts of their businesses. Resolutions were filed at General Dynamics and Lockheed
Martin, asking each company to produce a report assessing the human rights impacts of its
operations. A resolution filed at Northrop Grumman asked the company to produce a report
evaluating the alignment of its political lobbying activities with its human rights policy.
All three companies have experienced rises in their stock prices following the latest upsurgeof violence in Israel and Palestine49. On top of this, General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin
weaponry have been linked to war crimes and other violations of international law committed
by Saudi Arabia in Yemen, including a 2018 school bus bombing, and by Israel in Palestine50.
Furthermore, both General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman have nuclear weapons
contracts – worth US$20.5 billion and US$13.3 billion respectively – which the resolution
proxy statements note are illegal under international law51. The OpenSecrets research group
documents that in 2023, Northrop Grumman have spent over US$8.5 million52 on lobbying the
US government in their interests, while General Dynamics have spent over US$9 million53, andLockheed Martin, over US$10 million54.

Section 4

49

Figure 17 – Each of the human rights resolutions at arms companies’s AGMs
received 25% or less support
Company

Resolution

Proponent

Votes
againstGeneral Dynamics
Corporation

Shareholder proposal
regarding report on humanrights impact assessments

Franciscan Sisters ofAllegany

75%

Northrop Grumman
Corporation

Shareholder proposal
regarding alignment ofpolitical activities with humanrights policy

School Sisters of Notre
Dame Cooperative
Investment Fund

80%

Lockheed Martin
Corporation

Shareholder proposal
regarding report on humanrights impact assessments

Sisters of Charity ofSaint Elizabeth86%

All three human rights resolutions at weapons companies received 25% or less votes in favour(Figure 17). Eleven asset managers voted against all three resolutions, while State Street Global
Advisors was the one of the ‘big four’ asset managers to support any, voting in favour of theGeneral Dynamics resolution and against the other two (Figure 18).

Figure 18 – Eleven asset managers voted against all three human rights
resolutions at arms companies, while State Street was the only one of the‘big four’ to support any
Asset Manager
State Street Global Advisors
BlackRock
Vanguard
Fidelity Investments
Capital Group
Dimensional Fund Advisors
Goldman Sachs AssetManagement
J.P. Morgan Asset Management
MFS Investment Management
T. Rowe Price
Wellington Management
American Century Investment
Management

GeneralDynamics
For
AgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainst

Northrop
GrummanAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstLockheed Martin
AgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstAgainstSection 4

50

In sum, asset managers are continuing to play a supportive and shielding role in relation to thearms industry. Major asset managers continue to provide finance to the industry, and to block
efforts to establish greater disclosure from arms companies on how their products are usedand how this contravenes the human rights of communities around the world. Some investors
are even asking arms companies about possible benefits to returns following escalationof conflicts55.

Finding 16: Asset managers are blocking action on fossil fuelfinancing.
The average support for environmental resolutions we analysed this year was 23%, and only
three environmental resolutions received majority support. All three were disclosure-based
climate resolutions.
Climate remains the predominant topic addressed in environmental resolutions, with 101 of the
114 environmental resolutions we analysed focusing on climate-related issues. We divided theclimate resolutions into sub-themes: lobbying, reporting, targets, and strategy, and financing.
Other environmental resolutions addressed biodiversity, plastics and packaging, pollution,water, and sustainability pay metrics.

Figure 19 – Resolutions targeting fossil fuel financing received the lowest support
amongst climate resolutions, while resolutions on lobbying were most popular
Average support for climate resolution sub-themes

37%

Lobbying
Reporting23%

Targets

22%
19%

Strategy

16%

Financing
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Section 4

51

The climate resolutions which received comfortably the highest level of average support (37%)
from asset managers were those focused on lobbying (Figure 19). These were disclosurebased resolutions asking companies to produce a report outlining how their political lobbying
activities align with company net-zero targets or other climate commitments. Only two of theresolutions received majority support.
The lowest average support (16%) was for climate resolutions regarding financing, continuing
an enduring pattern of poor support as discussed in our Voting Matters 2022 report56. These
were primarily action-oriented resolutions filed at major banks and insurers, asking them toput forward a plan for phasing out financing for fossil fuel development or underwriting offossil fuel projects.
A rationale given by many asset managers for not supporting financing-related climate
resolutions was that these were “too prescriptive”, and interfered in or distracted fromcompany strategy as set by management (see also Finding 9). However, most of theseresolutions merely asked companies to establish plans to phase out financing for fossil
fuels in line with the Paris Agreement and international scientific consensus around limiting
global temperature rises to 1.5C. The resolutions did not dictate what the details of suchtransition plans should be.
The varying levels of support for different types of climate resolutions reflects a wider patternwhereby asset managers are relatively more supportive of disclosure-based resolutions andare resistant to more action-oriented resolutions which would be required to actually address
real world problems.

Section 4

52

Case study: Shareholder resolution challenges
Glencore on its thermal coal production plans
Ask: Disclosure of thermal coal production alignment with limiting global
temperature increase to 1.5°C
Resolution number in AGM notice: 19
AGM date: 26 May 2023
Result: 29.2% For / 70.8% Against
ShareAction co-filed a resolution at the Glencore AGM, led by the AustralasianCenter for Corporate Responsibility (ACCR), with major investors such as Legal &General Investment Management and HSBC Global Asset Management also cofiling. The resolution asked that Glencore’s 2024 climate report include disclosureof the alignment of its projected thermal coal production with pathways for limiting
global warming to 1.5C57, something that the company has itself statedits commitment to.
ACCR’s research, based on information disclosed by Glencore, found that thecompany’s coal production plans are not aligned with the Paris Agreement58. The
research showed that Glencore’s proposed emissions reduction pathways arereliant on misleading carbon accounting and unrealistic expectations around carbon
capture and storage technology.
Glencore recommended voting against the resolution, based on the claims
that it had already provided sufficient information on progress towards net-zerotargets in its 2022 climate report, and that the resolution was “undermining of
the Board’s responsibility and accountability for the Company’s strategy”59. However,major proxy advisors Glass Lewis and ISS recommended voting infavour of the resolution.
The resolution ultimately received 29.2% support, the second highest vote everrecorded in favour of a climate-related shareholder resolution not supported
by management on the London Stock Exchange60. Support reaching over 20%
required Glencore – under the UK Corporate Governance Code – to formallyconsult with shareholders about the reasons for the result.
Of the ‘big four’ asset managers, only State Street Global Advisors voted infavour of the resolution, while BlackRock, Fidelity Investments and Vanguard
voted against.

Section 4

53

Finding 17: The number of social resolutions that passed in 2023
dropped sharply since 2022.
This year, we included 99 resolutions addressing social topics, compared to 117 in 2022 61.
Within the social category, sub-themes included: civil and social rights, diversity anddiscrimination, human rights, labour rights, public health, and sustainability pay metrics.
The average support for social resolutions was 23%, down from 27% in 2022. However,just 4% of resolutions received majority support, a sharp fall from 14% in 202262.

Figure 20 – The proportion of social resolutions that received majority support fellsignificantly this year

2022

2023

14%

4%

Percentage of social resolutions that received majority suppport

Of the sub-themes addressed by social resolutions, labour rights received the highest average
support, at 35% average votes in favour. Two of the resolutions which received majority
support were labour rights resolutions, while the other two were diversity and discrimination
resolutions. All four resolutions were disclosure-based, rather than action-oriented.
The social sub-theme which received the least support was public health, with resolutions on
this theme receiving an average of only 17% votes in favour.

Section 4

54

Finding 18: Biodiversity remains neglected by resolutions andasset managers.
While climate breakdown and biodiversity loss are closely intertwined processes, previous
research conducted by ShareAction has provided evidence that the biodiversity crisis receives
particularly little consideration from investors63. Our analysis of asset manager voting in 2023
provides no evidence that this neglect of biodiversity is changing.
As in 2022, only two resolutions we analysed this year addressed biodiversity loss
directly, through topics of sustainable materials procurement and deforestation. A further
eight resolutions, on plastic use and pollution, mentioned the threats posed to wildlife or
ecosystems as part of their rationale.
The average support for the ten resolutions was 22%. However, the plastics resolutions
received notably higher average support than the two more directly biodiversity-related
resolutions. While this is a small sample, it suggests a continuing lack of engagementwith biodiversity loss as a major crisis worthy of dedicated consideration on the part ofasset managers.

Conclusions &Recommendations

55

Conclusions &Recommendations

Conclusions &Recommendations

56

Conclusions and recommendations
Our research has shown that the asset management sector fails to use shareholder voting
rights to appropriately respond to ecological and social crises. This raises serious concerns
about the sector’s ability to effectively steward assets to generate long-term value andmitigate the negative impacts of investee companies.
Asset managers rejected 249 out of 257 opportunities to enhance corporate accountability forthe benefit of environment and society, denying efforts to progress on issues such as setting
decarbonisation targets, combatting anti-union practices, and increasing access to medicines.
There is a stark regional disparity: US-based asset managers, particularly the very largest, arethe most culpable.
Voting is a significant lever to influence companies to improve their social and environmental
practices, and the 2023 proxy season represents yet another lost opportunity for improved
corporate action and disclosure. Yet, we also recognise that shareholder resolutions alone
cannot resolve all the social and environmental impacts of corporations.
This bleak scenario represents an intensification of the situation outlined in previous editions of
this report, and from our 2023 asset manager benchmark, Point of No Returns. Given the scale
and urgency of change needed to avoid the most catastrophic effects of climate breakdown,
we need to see much greater use of voting to clearly signal expectations to companies in
the 2024 AGM season. Asset managers must use votes on shareholder resolutions, director
re-elections and management-sponsored proposals effectively as part of a clearly definedengagement strategy. This should draw on all available levers for change, from capital
allocation to filing and voting on resolutions, embedded in an effective, timebound escalation
process. Both this report and Point of No Returns indicate that many asset managers in both
Europe and the US are yet to achieve this. We recommend referring to our RISE guidance
paper on escalation frameworks for further detail on the components of an effective
escalation strategy.
It is clear that the sector fails to self-regulate, and therefore stronger policy is needed.
Legislative requirements in the EU appear to be driving much stronger performance from
European asset managers than their North American peers. However, corporate and financial
sector regulation in all regions must go much further if real world negative impacts are to
be mitigated.
Our general recommendations for asset managers, asset owners, investment consultants
and policymakers remain the same as in previous years, and can be viewed here. The asset
management sector will continue in failing to achieve truly responsible investment unless
impacts on people and planet are taken as seriously as financial risk and return.

Methodology

Methodology

57

Methodology

58

Methodology
Selection of asset managers
We used the Investment and Pensions Europe ranking of the largest 500 asset managers as
an initial list from which we selected asset managers64. As a UK-based charity, we wanted toassess the largest asset managers worldwide as well as the largest European and, specifically,
UK asset managers. We therefore selected a list comprising:
1 The world’s largest 35 asset managers based on AUM
2 The next largest 34 European asset managers based on AUM
3 The next largest 10 UK asset managers based on AUM
Asset managers on this list were excluded if:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Predominantly acting as investment consultants
Wholly or predominantly focused on fixed income
Predominantly providing currency management and advisory services
Predominantly focused on alternative asset classes such as real estate and private equity
A parent company of an independent investment affiliate already included
Data was not available from public disclosure or the Insightia data platform

In total, 79 asset managers were initially selected for analysis. We contacted all of these asset
managers to request their voting data, specifically for the ‘house view’ rather than the voting
policy of individual funds. Asset managers were asked to record the following information foreach resolution:

Select ‘For’, ‘Against’ or ‘Abstain’ if you have voted for, against, or abstained from voting
on the shareholder resolution, respectively.
Select ‘Did not vote’ if you have holdings in the company but did not exercise yourvoting rights.
If you were unable to exercise your voting rights because of share blocking, please
select ‘Share blocked (please explain)’ and provide further details in the ‘Vote
Rationale’ column.
Select ‘No holding’ if you do not have any holdings in the company. You will not be
penalised for not holding shares in companies.

Methodology

59

Select ‘Split’ if voting on this resolution differed between different funds. In this case,please provide the breakdown of votes in the ‘Split vote detail’ column. We would liketo know the percentage breakdown of total available votes (For, Against, Abstain, Did
not vote). E.g. ‘48% proxy votes were For and 52% were Against’.
Please use this option if you would like to share information on votes that have been
directed by clients.
Provide voting rationales as appropriate in the ‘Vote rationale’ column.

Sixty-one asset managers provided their data. The 18 asset managers who chose not toverify the data were: American Century Investment Management, Coronation Fund Managers,
China Life Asset Management Company, Credit Suisse Asset Management, Franklin
Templetonxii, Handelsbanken Asset Management, Janus Henderson Investors, Macquarie AssetManagement, Morgan Stanley Investment Management, Nuveen Asset Management, PGGM
Investments, Ping An Asset Management, Principal Global Investors, Sumitomo Mitsui Trust
Asset Management, Sumitomo Mitsui DS Asset Management (UK), Union Bancaire Privée,
Vanguard , and Veritas Asset Management.
Once asset managers had returned voting data, we verified it and obtained any missing
records from the Insightia data platform. Where there was conflicting data, we defaulted tothe asset manager’s response unless it was clear that a mistake had been made in data entry(e.g. the rationale text suggested that the asset manager had confused two resolutions at thesame company). We then excluded 12 managers for which we had data on fewer than 10% of
resolutions (i.e. when the manager had no holdings or we did not have any data for more than
90% of the resolutions). Where we have analysed subgroups of resolutions (e.g. labour rights
resolutions), we applied a threshold for inclusion of at least 10% valid data, or five resolutions,whichever was higher. This approach is consistent with previous years; this threshold ensures
we have a minimum level of data from which we can calculate representative scores for each
asset manager.
Our final dataset included 69 asset managers, split regionally as follows:
1 The world’s largest 30 asset managers based on AUM
2 The next largest 31 European asset managers based on AUM
3 The next largest 8 UK asset managers based on AUM

xiiFranklin Templeton partially reviewed some of the data collected from the Insightia data platform.

Methodology

60

Selection of shareholder resolutions
We compiled an initial list of shareholder resolutions voted on in the 2023 proxy season,
aiming for comprehensive coverage by drawing from several sources:
•
•
•
•
•

Insightia database
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) 2023 list of resolutions
ShareAction’s Resolutions to Watch
Ceres Engagement Tracker
Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility (ACCR) resolutions database

Our analysts read through all the resolutions, and selected or rejected shareholder resolutions
according to the following principles:
We included resolutions that:•were voted on at Annual General Meetings between 1 Jan 2023 and 1 August 2023.

•

asked for greater transparency and disclosure on environmental and social topics, suchas greenhouse gas emissions, ecological integrity, just transition, civil rights, decent work,
public health and political spending.

•asked companies to set greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets that are Paris-aligned.

•

supported companies in achieving their emissions reduction targets.

•

asked companies to act in line with internationally agreed human rights standards.

We did not include resolutions that:•were on topics outside ShareAction’s focus areas, for example as animal welfare, charitable
donations and nuclear power.

•

stepped into management’s decision-making territory. We acknowledge that someresolutions that make asks of a company that are too prescriptive to merit supporting.

•asked about governance issues that are unrelated to environmental or social impacts
and/or disclosure.

•

were poorly written or unclear.

•

had no accessible information on the filer and wording.

•ShareAction could not articulate a case to vote for (with the exception of Say on Climate
votes, see below).

We conducted enhanced due diligence on resolutions that received less than 5% support.
A very low level of support can indicate that many asset managers have concerns about aMethodology

61

resolution. Where these resolutions were flagged by CA100+, we felt it was acceptable toinclude them in order to assess the voting behaviour of CA100+ members comprehensively.
This year, seven resolutions received less than 5% support.
We recognise that there is a subjective element to our process for the inclusion or rejection ofshareholder proposals. However, a critical requirement for our analysis is that all the resolutions
against which asset managers were scored and ranked are ones that ShareAction believes
asset managers should vote for. In some cases, we found that proposals contradict the
campaign asks and priorities that ShareAction identifies as necessary to benefit people andplanet. For example, we carefully read the resolutions filed in connection to corporate lobbying
campaigns to understand the full breadth of issues being raised to inform our analysis anddiscussion. We have noticed the increasing number of ‘anti-ESG’ resolutions, many of which
actively aim to mirror the language used by traditional ESG resolutions. We understand that
asset managers may hold different opinions as to whether, for example, resolutions callingfor greater transparency should be supported by default, or whether consideration should begiven to the underlying motivation. As we recognise that views may differ on this point, we
excluded such resolutions from our sample to avoid penalising managers who choose thelatter approach.
We therefore confidently believe that the shareholder resolutions selected for inclusion in
our assessment would improve companies’ social and/or environmental impact, or require
the disclosure of information useful for investors. A full list of the selected resolutions can befound in the List of Resolutions. Please also see our Resolutions to watch webpage for detailed
rationales of why we support each resolution.
The final list of resolutions included 257 resolutions on which we ranked asset managers’
performance, plus an additional 17 Say on Climate resolutions, filed across 12 countries.
Resolutions were categorised into four high-level themes: Environmental, Social, Lobbying
and Say on Climate. The table below indicates the categories and sub-themes within eachof these, as well as the number of resolutions in each.

Methodology

62

Total number of shareholder resolutions in each category and sub-theme.
Environmental

114

Biodiversity

2

Climate change – financing

16

Climate change – lobbying

13

Climate change – reporting

30

Climate change – strategy

15

Climate change – targets

27

Plastics and packaging

8

Pollution

1

Sustainability pay metrics

1

Water

1

Lobbying

44

Congruency of political spending

13

Lobbying payments and policy

21

Political contributions

10

Say on Climate

17

Management say on climate

11

Shareholder say on climate

6

Social99

Civil and social rights

33

Diversity and discrimination

21

Human rights

19

Labour rights

12

Public health

13

Sustainability pay metrics

1

Total

274

Scoring and analysis
Consistent with previous years, the support percentage was calculated as: votes in support /(votes in support + votes against + abstentions + did not vote + split votes). Asset managers
were not penalised for not holding shares in a company, having missing data, or for not voting
in a shareblocking market: resolutions for which these conditions applied were excluded fromthe list.

Methodology

63‘Did not vote’ and abstentions
Some asset managers prioritise their voting activity depending on what percentage acompany takes up in their portfolio overall. The asset managers included in the study are
the largest globally and therefore should be voting across all shares they own. Not voting
sends a signal to companies that there is a lack of interest from investors. We therefore
considered did not vote as equivalent to a vote against the resolution.
Abstaining sends a similar signal to management that the investor does not actively support
the resolution. Therefore, for our accounting purposes, abstentions are considered as
equivalent to a vote against when calculating asset managers’ scores.

Split votes
There are three reasons why asset managers listed split votes: individual fund managers may
have responsibility for voting decisions (for example, for sustainable/ESG funds), a portionof votes may have been directed by clients, or voting decisions may be split across multiple
investment arms.
Split votes were counted as ‘for’ where over 75% of the assets held in the company voted
in favour of the resolution. Split votes were counted as ‘against’ where more than 75% of theassets held in the company voted against or abstained. Otherwise, the voting record was leftas ‘split’ when calculating the support percentage. We do not have access to the resolutionof holdings data needed to weight all votes left as ‘split’ by AUM held in each company. While
we support client-directed voting, we recommend that asset managers also establish house
views to avoid different portfolio managers within a firm voting inconsistently.

Say on Climate
Seventeen Say on Climate resolutions were selected, of which eleven were managementsponsored and six were shareholder-sponsored resolutions.
All Say on Climate resolutions were removed when calculating asset managers’ overall scoresand ranking. This is because votes for and against management-backed climate plans are
made for a wide range of reasons. ShareAction has not assessed the credibility of individual
plans and we cannot therefore adopt a position of recommending asset managers vote infavour of these resolutions. These resolutions cannot be included in the calculation of theoverall score as a result.
See the List of Resolutions at the end of this report for a list of the Say on Climate resolutions
analysed.

Methodology

64

Qualitative and quantitative analysis
Where year-on-year comparisons were made, we only included asset managers for which
we had data across all three years of our Voting Matters reports. The scoping and selection
methodology for the resolutions has remained consistent, though the companies targeted,and specific wording of resolutions, may have changed. Therefore we included all resolutionsin the sample for 2021, 2022 and 2023, as we consider these to provide comparable setsof resolutions.
Some of our analyses compared the average score between two groups of asset managers
or two groups of resolutions. However, it is not possible to tell how much the two groups
overlap from the average scores alone, hence we also report the median. To further confirm
the validity of conclusions we have drawn from comparing averages and median, we checked
the spread of the data to confirm that there was an underlying difference between the groups.

List of
Resolutions

List ofresolutions

65

66

List of resolutions
Company

Abbott Laboratories

AbbVie Inc.

AbbVie Inc.

AbbVie Inc.

Activision Blizzard,
Inc

Alphabet Inc

Alphabet Inc

Alphabet Inc

Resolution
NumberFor(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

23.2

76.8

1

Lobbying

Congruencyof politicalspending

Disclosure

15.1

84.9

1.3

Shareholder

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments andpolicyDisclosure

36.3

63.7

1.6

Yes

8

Shareholder

SocialPublic health

Action

29.6

70.4

2.0

Yes

6

Shareholder

SocialLabour rights

Action

35.4

64.6

4.3

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

17.9

82.1

0.6

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange lobbying

Disclosure

14.2

85.8

0.4

Shareholder

Social

Civil and social
rightsDisclosure

7

93

0.7

Country

Proposal topic

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying ReportUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Political
Expenditures and Values
Congruency

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Report

7

USShareholder Proposal
Regarding Extended Patent
Exclusivities and Application
For Secondary andTertiary Patents

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Policy on Freedomof Association

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying ReportUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Activity
Alignment with Climate
Commitments and theParis Agreement

8

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Risks
from Abortion-Related
InFormation Requests

9

7

6

6

SponsorShareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

CA100+
flagged67

Country

Proposal topic

Resolution
NumberSponsorCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Sitingin Countries of Significant
Human Rights Concern

10

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

13.1

86.9

0.7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Human Rights
Impact Assessment

11

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

18

82

1.3

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Algorithm
Disclosures

12

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

17

83.0

0.3

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Assessmentof Audit and Compliance
Committee

15

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

8.4

91.6

0.3

Altria GroupUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Political
Expenditures and Values
Congruency

5

Shareholder

Lobbying

Congruencyof politicalspending

Disclosure

10.9

89.1

1.2

Altria GroupUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Civil Rights Audit

6

Shareholder

Social

Civil and social
rightsDisclosure

30.8

69.2

1.1

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Climate
Risk In Employee Retirement
Default Options

6

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

7.2

92.8

8.1

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on
Customer Due Diligence

7

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

34.2

65.8

0.8

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Just Transition
Reporting

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

27.9

72.1

3.4

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying
Alignment with Climate
Commitments

Environmental

Climatechange –lobbying

Disclosure

23.9

76.1

1.4

CompanyAlphabet Inc

Alphabet Inc

Alphabet Inc

Alphabet Inc

Amazon.com Inc.

Amazon.com Inc.

Amazon.com Inc.

Amazon.com Inc.

10

12

Shareholder

Shareholder

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourYes

CA100+
flagged68

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourCountry

Proposal topic

Resolution
NumberSponsorCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Median Genderand Racial Pay Equity Report

13

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

29.2

70.8

0.7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Third-Party
Assessment of Freedomof Association

16

Shareholder

SocialLabour rights

Disclosure

34.9

65.1

0.8

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on
Plastic Packaging

22

Shareholder

Environmental

Plastics andpackaging

Disclosure

32.3

67.7

1.4

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding the Human Rights
Impacts of Facial Recognition
Technology

23

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

37.5

62.5

0.8

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Revision of Scope
1 and 2 GHG Targets to Alignwith Paris Agreement

5

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reporting

Action

13.8

86.2

1.2

American Express
Company

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Risks
from Abortion-Related
InFormation Requests

6

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

11.5

88.5

2.2

American Water
Works

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Racial Equity Audit

5

Shareholder

Social

Civil and s
ocial rights

Disclosure

40

60

2.2

Yes

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding PoliticalContributions andExpenditures Report5

Shareholder

Lobbying

Political
contributions

Disclosure

45.2

54.8

0.6

Yes

Apple Inc.

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Median Genderand Racial Pay Equity Report8

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

33.8

66.2

0.2

Yes

AT&T Inc.

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Racial Equity Audit

6

Shareholder

Social

Civil and social
rightsDisclosure

21.5

78.5

2.4

Company

Amazon.com Inc.

Amazon.com Inc.

Amazon.com Inc.

Amazon.com Inc.

Ameren Corporation

AmphenolCorporation

Yes

Yes

CA100+
flagged69

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourCountry

Proposal topic

Resolution
NumberSponsorCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

UK

Approval of the Company’s
Climate-related Financial
Disclosure

3

Management

Say onClimateManagement
say on climate

No data

97.1

2.9

1.8

US

Disclose 2030 Absolute
GHG Reduction Targets
Associated with Lending
and Underwriting

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Disclosure

11.5

88.5

1

US

Report on Climate Transition
Plan Describing EfForts to
Align Financing Activities
with GHG Targets

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

Disclosure

28.5

71.5

1.4

Bank of America
Corporation

US

Adopt Time-Bound Policy
to Phase Out Underwriting
and Lending For New Fossil
Fuel Development

10

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

Action7

93

1.3

Bank of America
Corporation

US

Commission Third Party
Racial Equity Audit

11

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

15.2

84.8

0.9

Bank of Montreal

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Say on Climate

Shareholder
Proposal 1

Shareholder

Say onClimateShareholder
say on climate

No data

16.6

83.4

3.4

Bank of Montreal

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Racial Equity Audit

Shareholder
Proposal 3

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

38.1

61.9

2.4

Bank of Nova
Scotia (The)

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Say on Climate

Shareholder
Proposal 1

Shareholder

Say onClimateShareholder
say on climate

No data

17.5

82.5

5.8

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Client
Net-Zero Transition Plans

Shareholder
Proposal 2

Environmental

Climatechange reporting

Disclosure

25

75

1.2

US

Report on Physical andTransitional Climate-Related
Risks and Opportunities

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

26.8

73.2

0.5

Yes

US

Annual Disclosure of Audit
Committee’s Oversighton Climate Risks
and Disclosures

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

18

82

0.5

Yes

Company

Aviva plc

Bank of America
Corporation

Bank of America
Corporation

Bank of Nova
Scotia (The)Berkshire Hathaway
Inc.

Berkshire Hathaway
Inc.

8

9

4

5

Shareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

CA100+
flagged70

Company

Berkshire Hathaway
Inc.

Berkshire Hathaway
Inc.

Bio-RadLaboratories Inc.

BlackRock Inc.

Block, Inc.

Bloomin’ Brands Inc.

Boeing Company(The)

Boeing Company(The)

Boeing Company(The)

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Disclosure

22.8

77.2

0.5

7

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

20.9

79.1

0.5

5

Shareholder

Lobbying

Political
contributions

Disclosure

15.6

84.4

0.2

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

9.6

90.4

1.4

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

14.9

85.1

0.3

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

42.9

57.1

0.2

Yes

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

37.3

62.7

1.8

Yes

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –lobbying

Disclosure

36.9

63.1

5.3

Yes

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

47.4

52.6

1.5

Yes

Resolution
NumberCountry

Proposal topic

US

Report on EfForts to Measure,
Disclose and Reduce GHG
Emissions Associated with
Underwriting, Insuring, andInvestment Activities

6

US

Report on Effectivenessof Diversity, Equity, andInclusion EfForts

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding PoliticalContributions andExpenditures ReportUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on
Pension Fund Clients’Investment Returns

6

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Diversity andInclusion Report

4USShareholder Proposal
Regarding GHG Targets
and Alignment with
Paris Agreement

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying ReportUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Activity
Alignment with theParis Agreement

8

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Median Genderand Racial Pay Equity Report

9

7

7

SponsorShareholder

Shareholder

CA100+
flagged71

Company

Category

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourEnvironmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

32

68

1.7

Yes

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

16.7

83.3

2.5

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –targetAction

21.3

78.7

1.2

Shareholder

Lobbying

Political
contributions

Disclosure

42

58

3.1

Yes

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange targets

Action

32.8

67.2

0.9

Yes

4

Management

Say onClimateManagement
say on climate

No data

96.5

3.5

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Disclosure ofa Board Diversity and
Skills Matrix

9

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

44.1

55.9

0.3

Yes

Denmark

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on
Human Rights

5D

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

2.8

97.2

1.1

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Activity
Alignment with theParis Agreement

Environmental

Climatechange –lobbying

Disclosure

28.4

71.6

1.3

Yes

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Report

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments andpolicyDisclosure

29.2

70.8

1.3

Yes

Resolution
NumberCountry

Proposal topic

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Just Transition
ReportingUK

Approve Shareholder
Resolution on Climate
Change Targets

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Adoption of
Targets to Achieve Net-zero
Emissions by 2050

5USShareholder Proposal
Regarding PoliticalContributions andExpenditures Report

5

CaliFornia Water
Service Group
Holding

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding GHG Targets
and Alignment with
Paris Agreement

6

Canadian National
Railway Company

CanadaAdvisory Vote on Climate
Action Plan

BorgWarner Inc.

BP PLC

Builders FirstSource
Inc.

Caesars
Entertainment, Inc.

Capital One Financial
Corporation

Carlsberg

Caterpillar Inc.

Caterpillar Inc.

7

25

6

7

SponsorShareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

CA100+
flagged72

Country

Proposal topic

Resolution
NumberCanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Activity
Alignment with Net Zero Goal

Shareholder
Proposal 1

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Linking
Executive Pay to Maternal
Morbidity Metrics

6

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Scope 3 Targets

5

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on
WorkForce Racial Equity

Shareholder
Proposal 4

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying ReportUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Medium-Term
Scope 3 Target

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Recalculated
Emissions Baseline

Chevron Corporation

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Just Transition
Reporting9

Chevron Corporation

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Racial Equity Audit

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Policy on Freedomof Association

Switzerland

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Aligning
GHG Reductions with
Paris Agreement

Company

Cenovus Energy Inc

CenteneCorporation

CenterPoint Energy
Inc.

CGI Inc.
Charter
Communications
Inc.
Chevron Corporation

Chevron Corporation

Chipotle Mexican
Grill Inc.

Chubb Ltd

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –lobbying

Disclosure

99.5

0.5

Shareholder

SocialSustainability
pay metrics

Disclosure

12.4

87.6

0.8

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

18.3

81.7

0.6

Shareholder

Social

Civil and social
rightsDisclosure

15.9

84.1

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

31.9

68.1

0.2

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

9.6

90.4

2.5

Environmental

Climatechange reportin–

Disclosure

18.3

81.7

1.6

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

18.6

81.4

7.5

10

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

9.8

90.2

1.7

6

Shareholder

SocialLabour rights

Action

33.3

66.7

0.6

Yes

Environmental

Climatechange –strategy

Disclosure

28.9

71.1

0.9

Yes

5

6

7

14

SponsorShareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

CA100+
flagged73

Country

Proposal topic

Resolution
NumberSponsorCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Switzerland

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Human Rights
Risks and Underwriting
Process

15

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

16.5

83.5

1.1

Chubu ElectricPower Co. Inc.

Japan

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Policy andReport on Capital Allocation
Alignment with Net Zero by2050 Pathway

10

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –strategy

Disclosure

19.9

80.1

0.2

Citigroup Inc.

US

Report on Respecting
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights

8

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

31.5

68.5

1.3

US

Adopt Time-Bound Policy
to Phase Out Underwriting
and Lending For New Fossil
Fuel Development

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

Action

10.1

89.9

1.9

CNX Resources
Corp

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying
Activity Alignment with
the Paris Agreement

5

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –lobbying

Disclosure

23.8

76.2

0.7

Coca-Cola
Company (The)US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Racial Equity Audit

5

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

16.5

83.5

1.2

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Transparency
Report on Global Public Policy
and Political Influence

6

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

13.6

86.4

0.9

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Political
Expenditures and Values
Congruency

7

Shareholder

Lobbying

Congruencyof politicalspending

Disclosure

29.1

70.9

0.9

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report On
Risks From State Policies
Restricting Reproductive
Health Care9

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

13.1

86.9

2.2

Company

Chubb Ltd

Citigroup Inc.

Coca-Cola
Company (The)

Coca-Cola
Company (The)

Coca-Cola
Company (The)9Shareholder

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavour

Yes

Yes

Yes

CA100+
flagged74

CompanyCountry

Proposal topic

Resolution
NumberSponsorCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

ComcastCorporation

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Racial Equity Audit

7

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

10.8

89.2

0.7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Climate
Risk In Employee Retirement
Default Options

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

6.2

93.8

3.4

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding GHG Targets
and Alignment with
Paris Agreement

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

9.8

90.2

0.7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Political
Expenditures and Values
Congruency

Lobbying

Congruencyof politicalspending

Disclosure

19

81

0.6

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Aligning
GHG Reductions with
Paris Agreement

5

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

31.2

68.8

0.7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Circular
Economy For Packaging

6

Shareholder

Environmental

Plastics andpackaging

Disclosure

25.3

74.7

0.8

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding GHG Targets
and Alignment with theParis Agreement

5

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

27.5

72.5

1

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report On
Risks From State Policies
Restricting Reproductive
Health Care5

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

13.3

86.7

4.2

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Methane
Emission Disclosures

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

74.4

25.6

7.3

ComcastCorporation

ComcastCorporation

ComcastCorporation

Constellation Brands
Inc

Constellation Brands
Inc

CoStar Group Inc.

Costco Wholesale
Corporation

Coterra Energy Inc.

8

9

10

6

Shareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourYes

CA100+
flagged75

Company

Category

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourShareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –lobbying

Disclosure

36.8

63.2

0.6

Yes

5

Shareholder

SocialLabour rights

Action

26.2

73.8

2.2

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Third-Party
Assessment of Freedomof Association

8

Shareholder

SocialLabour rights

Disclosure

26.3

73.7

1.8

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Diversity andInclusion Report6

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

16.1

83.9

1

US

Adopt and Disclose a
Freedom of Association andCollective Bargaining Policy

6

Shareholder

SocialLabour rights

Action

32.6

67.4

0.7

Yes

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Median Genderand Racial Pay Equity Report5

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

35.9

64.1

3.4

Yes

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Third-Party
Audit of Worker Safety
and Well-Being

7

Shareholder

SocialLabour rights

Disclosure

67.7

32.3

2.2

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Adoption of
Targets Consistent with
Paris-Aligned Climate Goals

Shareholder
Proposal 3

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

25.9

74.1

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Report6

Shareholder

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

32.6

67.4

2.2

Yes

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Virgin Plastic
Demand5

Shareholder

Environmental

Plastics andpackaging

Disclosure

30.2

69.8

1.4

Yes

Resolution
NumberCountry

Proposal topic

Coterra Energy Inc.

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Activity
Alignment with theParis Agreement

7

CVS Health Corp

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Paid Sick Leave

CVS Health Corp

Danaher Corporation

Delta Air Lines Inc.

DexCom Inc.

Dollar General
Corporation

Dollarama Inc.

Douglas Emmett Inc.

Dow Inc.

SponsorShareholder

CA100+
flagged76

Company

DTE Energy
Company
Electric Power
Development Co.
(J-Power)
Electric Power
Development Co.
(J-Power)

Elevance Health, Inc.

Eli Lilly andCompany

Eli Lilly andCompany

Eli Lilly andCompany
Eli Lilly andCompany
Eli Lilly andCompany

Enbridge Inc.

Category

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

29.7

70.3

0.8

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –strategy

Action

21.3

78.7

0.4

4

Shareholder

Environmental

Sustainability
pay metrics

Disclosure

15

85

0.4

6

Shareholder

Lobbying

Political
contributions

Disclosure

8.1

91.9

0.9

Shareholder

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

31.4

68.6

0.6

Shareholder

SocialPublic health

Action

10.7

89.6

0.9

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –lobbying

Disclosure

22.5

77.5

0.8

12

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

27.1

72.9

0.6

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Third-Party Political
Expenditures Reporting

13

Shareholder

Lobbying

Political
contributions

Disclosure

4.1

95.9

0.7

CanadaSP 1: Report on Lobbying and
Political Donations

Shareholder
Proposal 1

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

18.8

81.2

1.5

Resolution
NumberCountry

Proposal topic

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying ReportJapan

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Aligning Business
Strategy to theParis Agreement

3

Japan

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding How Remuneration
Policies Incentivize Progress
Against GHG Targets

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Third-Party Political
Expenditures ReportingUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Report

7

USShareholder Proposal
Regarding Extended Patent
Exclusivities and Application
For Secondary and Tertiary
Patents

9

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Activities
and Values Congruency

11

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Diversity andInclusion Report

7

SponsorShareholder

Shareholder

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourYes

CA100+
flagged77

Category

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

25.5

74.5

4

B

Shareholder

Say onClimateShareholder
say on climate

No data

24.4

75.6

12.5

6

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

30.8

69.2

3.2

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –strategy

Action

3.6

96.4

0.5

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

57.3

42.7

0.9

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

36.4

63.6

2.2

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

10.5

89.5

2.1

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

18.4

81.6

7.5

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

16.0

84.0

1.5

Shareholder

Environmental

Plastics andpackaging

Disclosure

25.3

74.7

4.4

Environmental

Climatechange –strategy

Disclosure

9.1

90.9

1.6

Country

Proposal topic

Resolution
NumberCanadaSP 2: Disclose the Company’s
Scope 3 Emissions

Shareholder
Proposal 2

ENGIE SAFranceShareholder Proposal
Regarding Annual
Say on Climate andClimate Disclosure

Equifax Inc.

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Racial Equity Audit

NorwayShareholder Proposal
Regarding Climate Risk
Assessment and Strategy

9US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Diversity andInclusion Report

6USShareholder Proposal
Regarding Methane
Emission Disclosures

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Medium-Term
Scope 3 Target

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Recalculated
Emissions BaselineUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Audited Report on
Asset Retirement Obligations

12

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Addressing Virgin
Plastic Demand

13

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Environmental
Litigation

Company

Enbridge Inc.

Equinor ASA
Expeditors
International of
Washington Inc.
Exxon Mobil
Corporation
Exxon Mobil
Corporation
Exxon Mobil
Corporation
Exxon Mobil
Corporation
Exxon Mobil
Corporation
Exxon Mobil
Corporation

8

9

11

14

SponsorShareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavour

CA100+
flagged

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

78

Company

Category

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

16.6

83.4

7.3

12

Management

Say onClimateManagement
say on climate

No data

92.33

7.67

1.71

6

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

25.1

74.9

0.7

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

9.9

90.1

0.9

7

Shareholder

Environmental

Biodiversity

Action

14.4

85.6

1.1

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Racial Equity Audit

5

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

40.3

59.7

3.3

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Extended Patent
Exclusivities and Application
For Secondary andTertiary Patents

8

Shareholder

SocialPublic health

Action

14.4

83.3

1.2

Switzerland

Opinion on the Company’s
Climate Report

13

Management

Say onClimateManagement
say on climate

No data

69.7

30.3

2.2

Switzerland

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Climate Action
Transition Plan at 2024 AGM

Environmental

Climatechange –strategy

Disclosure

29.2

70.8

1.3

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Report5

Shareholder

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

35.6

64.4

0.7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding a Racial
Equity Audit

8

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

11.6

88.4

1.3

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Fossil Fuel Lending
and Underwriting Policy

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

Action

6.9

93.1

1.3

Resolution
NumberCountry

Proposal topic

Exxon Mobil
Corporation

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Just
Transition Reporting

16

Ferrovial SA

Spain

Advisory Vote on Climate
Strategy ReportUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Human
Rights Impact Assessments

General ElectricCompany

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Audited Report on
Net Zero Emissions by 2050
Scenario Analysis

8

General Motors
Company

US

Report on Setting Sustainable
Sourcing Targets

Geo Group Inc (The)US

Gilead Sciences Inc.

Glencore Plc

General Dynamics
Corporation

Glencore Plc

Goldman Sachs
Group Inc. (The)Goldman Sachs
Group Inc. (The)Goldman Sachs
Group Inc. (The)19

9SponsorShareholder

Shareholder

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavour

CA100+
flagged

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

79

Company

Category

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

12.6

87.4

0.8

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

Disclosure

29.9

70.1

0.7

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

31.4

68.6

4.2

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

Action

8.8

91.2

1

Shareholder

Lobbying

Political
contributions

Disclosure

23.5

76.5

0.3

Shareholder

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

25.6

74.4

0.7

Management

Say onClimateManagement
say on climate

No data

98.6

1.4

2.9

Shareholder

Lobbying

Congruencyof politicalspending

Disclosure

31.3

68.7

1.1

6

Shareholder

Environmental

Pollution

Disclosure

13

87

1.8

5

Shareholder

SocialPublic health

Action

5.9

94.1

0.5

Resolution
NumberCountry

Proposal topic

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Absolute GHG
Reduction Targets

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Transition
Plan Report For
Financing Activities

11

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Median Genderand Racial Pay Equity Report

12

USShareholder Proposal
Regarding Fossil Fuel Lending
and Underwriting Policy

4

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding PoliticalContributions andExpenditures Report

5

Hewlett Packard
Enterprise Co

USShareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Report

5

Holcim Ltd

Switzerland

Approve Climate Report

8USShareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Political
Expenditures and Values
Congruency

7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Environmental and
Health Impact ReportUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Policy on Useof Antibiotics in the
Supply Chain

Goldman Sachs
Group Inc. (The)Goldman Sachs
Group Inc. (The)Goldman Sachs
Group Inc. (The)HartFord Financial
Services Group Inc.
(The)HCA Healthcare, Inc.

Home Depot Inc.
(The)

HoneywellInternational Inc.

Hormel Foods
Corporation

10

SponsorShareholder

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourYes

Yes

CA100+
flagged80

Company

Category

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavour

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

36.5

63.5

0.5

Yes

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

3.7

96.3

0.0

Yes

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

4.4

95.6

0.0

Yes

Management

Say onClimateManagement
say on climate

No data

89.9

10.1

2.6

Shareholder

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

48.1

51.9

6.3

Yes

8

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

33.1

66.9

2

Yes

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Median Genderand Racial Pay Equity Report5

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

35.3

64.7

1.4

Yes

US

Report on Impact ofExtended Patent Exclusivities
on Product Access

8

Shareholder

SocialPublic health

Action

14.4

85.6

1.7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Fossil Fuel Lending
and Underwriting Policy

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

Action

8.3

91.7

2.1

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Transition
Plan Report For
Financing Activities

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

Disclosure

35.4

64.6

1.6

Resolution
NumberCountry

Proposal topic

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Report

4

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Absolute MediumTerm Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Target

Shareholder
Proposal 1

Imperial Oil Limited

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Audited Report on
Asset Retirement Obligations

Shareholder
Proposal 2

Incitec Pivot Ltd

Australia

Approval of 2022 Climate
Change Report

6USShareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Report

6USShareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on
Effectiveness of Workplace
Sexual Harassment andDiscrimination Policies

Huntington Ingalls
Industries Inc.

Imperial Oil Limited

International
Business Machines
Corporation (IBM)International
Business Machines
Corporation (IBM)Intuitive Surgical Inc.

Johnson & Johnson

JP Morgan Chase &Co

JP Morgan Chase &
Co

6

9

SponsorShareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Yes

CA100+
flagged81

Category

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavour

Lobbying

Congruencyof politicalspending

Disclosure

32.1

67.9

1.6

Yes

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

12.6

87.4

1.6

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –strategy

Action

16.8

83.2

4.1

6

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

24

76

0.6

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Water
Risk Exposure

5

Shareholder

Environmental

Water

Disclosure

7.8

92.2

0.6

Kroger Company
(The)

US

Report on Public Health Costs
Due to Tobacco Product
Sales and the Impact on
Overall Market

5

Shareholder

SocialPublic health

Disclosure

12.7

87.3

0.8

Kroger Company
(The)

US

Report on EfForts to
Reduce Plastic Use

7

Shareholder

Environmental

Plastics andpackaging

Disclosure

31.8

68.2

0.6

Kroger Company
(The)

US

Report on Gender/Racial
Pay Gap

8

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

51.9

48.1

0.6

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Report5

Shareholder

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

37.9

62.1

1.6

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Risks
from Abortion-Related
InFormation Requests

7

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

15.5

84.5

3.3

Company

JP Morgan Chase &Co

JP Morgan Chase &Co

Kansai ElectricPower Co. Inc.

Kellogg Company

Kraft Heinz Co

L3Harris
Technologies Inc
Laboratory
Corporation ofAmerica Holdings

Resolution
NumberCountry

Proposal topic

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Political
Expenditures and Values
Congruency

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Absolute GHG
Reduction Targets

Japan

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Decarbonization
Through Prohibiting New Coal
Fired Power Generation

27

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Median Genderand Racial Pay Equity Report

11

12

SponsorShareholder

Shareholder

Yes

Yes

CA100+
flagged82

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourCountry

Proposal topic

Resolution
NumberSponsorCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Las Vegas Sands
Corp.

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Disclosure ofa Board Diversity and
Skills Matrix

5

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

18.4

81.6

0.4

Legal & General
Group PLCUK

Approval of Climate
Transition Plan

3

Management

Say onClimateManagement
say on climate

No data

97.7

2.3

2.4

US

Proposal Regarding Reporton Political Expenditures andValues Congruency

5

Shareholder

Lobbying

Congruencyof politicalspending

Disclosure

40.6

59.4

4.5

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Human
Rights Impact Assessments

6

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

14

86

2.3

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Aligning
Value Chain GHG Reductions
with Paris Agreement

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

35.4

64.6

6.7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Just
Transition Reporting

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

16.4

83.6

2.5

Yes

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Audited Report on
Asset Retirement Obligations

10

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

22.8

77.2

0.8

Yes

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Median Genderand Racial Pay Equity Report7

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

23.9

76.1

3.2

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding GHG Targets
Aligned with theParis Agreement

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

32.8

67.2

3.8

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Report

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

28.3

71.7

1.6

Company

Leidos Holdings, Inc.

Lockheed Martin
Corporation

Lockheed Martin
Corporation

Marathon Petroleum
Corporation
Marathon Petroleum
Corporation

Marriott International

Martin Marietta
Materials Inc.

Mastercard
Incorporated

7

9

5

8

Shareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

CA100+
flagged

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

83

Company

McDonald’s
Corporation

McDonald’s
Corporation

McDonald’s
Corporation

McDonald’s
Corporation

Merck & Company
Inc.

Merck & Company
Inc.

Meta PlatForms, Inc.

Meta PlatForms, Inc.

Meta PlatForms, Inc.

Country

Proposal topic

Resolution
NumberSponsorCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Policy on Useof Medically-Important
Antibiotics in the Beef andPork Supply Chain

5

Shareholder

SocialPublic health

Action

16.6

83.4

1.7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding ComplianceWith WHO Guidelines
on Medically-Important
Antimicrobials in Supply
Chain

6

Shareholder

SocialPublic health

Action

18.7

81.3

1.7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Report9

Shareholder

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

50.3

49.7

1.1

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Transparency
Report on Global Public Policy
And Political Influence

10

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

18.4

81.6

1.4

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Third-Party Political
Expenditures Reporting

7

Shareholder

Lobbying

Political
contributions

Disclosure

7.3

92.7

1.6

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Extended Patent
Exclusivities and Application
For Secondary andTertiary Patents

8

Shareholder

SocialPublic health

Action

31.1

68.9

1.7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Human Rights
Impact Assessment

5

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

17

83

1.4

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Report

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

14.6

85.4

0.3

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Activity
Alignment with Net-Zero
Emissions Commitment

Environmental

Climatechange –lobbying

Disclosure

9.8

90.2

0.3

6

8

Shareholder

Shareholder

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourYes

CA100+
flagged84

Company

Meta PlatForms, Inc.

Meta PlatForms, Inc.

Meta PlatForms, Inc.

Meta PlatForms, Inc.

Metro Inc.

Metro Inc.

Mitsubishi Corp.

Mitsubishi Corp.

Mitsubishi UFJ
Financial GroupCountry

Proposal topic

Resolution
NumberSponsorCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Risks
from Abortion-Related
InFormation Requests

9

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

9.6

90.4

0.5

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding a Report on the
Efficacy of EnForcement ofContent Policies

10

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

7.2

92.8

0.3

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Targets andReport on Child
Safety Impacts

11

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Action

16.3

83.7

0.3

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Assessmentof Audit and Risk
Oversight Committee

13

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

6.7

93.3

0.3

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Adoption of
Targets Consistent with
Paris-Aligned Climate Goals

Shareholder
Proposal 1

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

28.5

71.5

0.2

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Human Rights
Impact Assessment

Shareholder
Proposal 2

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

28.6

71.4

0.1

Japan

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Aligning Business
Strategy to the Paris
Agreement

Environmental

Climatechange –strategy

Action

19.9

80.1

0.4

Japan

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Alignment ofCapex With Net Zero by2050 Scenario

Environmental

Climatechange –strategy

Disclosure

12.5

87.5

0.2

Japan

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Aligning
Investments with theParis Agreement

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

Action

17.5

82.5

0.3

5

6

3

Shareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavour

CA100+
flagged85

Company

Category

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

Action

20

80

0.7

5

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

20.7

79.3

2.6

7

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Action

19.9

80.1

2.2

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

Action

4.8

95.2

1.4

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –strategy

Disclosure

29.8

70.2

0.5

Shareholder

Say onClimateShareholder
say on climate

No data

18.2

81.8

8

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

8.8

91.2

5.4

Shareholder

SocialLabour rights

Action

36.3

63.7

3.3

Environmental

Climatechange –lobbying

Disclosure

95

5

1.3

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

31.9

68.1

11.6

Resolution
NumberCountry

Proposal topic

Mizuho Financial
Group Inc.

Japan

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Aligning
Investments with theParis Agreement

2

Mohawk Industries
Inc.

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Racial Equity Audit

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Child
Labor in Cocoa Supply Chain

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Fossil Fuel Lending
and Underwriting Policy

Mosaic Company
(The)

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Aligning GHG
Reductions with
Paris Agreement

7

National Bank of
CanadaCanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Say on Climate

Shareholder
Proposal 1

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Climate
Risk in Employee Retirement
Default Options

7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Policy on Freedomof Association

8

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Activity
Alignment with theParis Agreement

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding GHG
Reduction Targets

MondelezInternational Inc.

Morgan Stanley

Netflix Inc.

Netflix Inc.

New York
Community Bancorp
Inc.
NewMarket
Corporation

6

9

6

SponsorShareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourYes

Yes

CA100+
flagged86

Country

Proposal topic

Resolution
NumberSponsorCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourNextEra Energy, Inc.

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Disclosure ofa Board Diversity and
Skills Matrix

5

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

48.9

51.1

0.9

Yes

Ninety One plc

UK

Approval of Climate Strategy

11Management

Say onClimateManagement
say on climate

No data

98.29

1.71

12.59

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Alignment of
Political Activities with
Human Rights Policy

Lobbying

Congruencyof politicalspending

Disclosure

20

80

1.4

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding GHG Targets
and Alignment with theParis Agreement

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

7.5

92.5

0.7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Activity
Alignment with the Paris
Agreement

6

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –lobbying

Disclosure

47.4

52.6

2.7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding PoliticalContributions andExpenditures Report6

Shareholder

Lobbying

Political
contributions

Disclosure

No
data

No data

No dataUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Risks
from Abortion-Related
InFormation Requests

6

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

15

85

3.2

UK

Approval of the Company’s
Climate-related Financial
Disclosures

18

Management

Say onClimateManagement
say on climate

No data

90.25

9.75

1.98

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Transparency
Report on Global Public Policy
and Political Influence

6

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

18.5

81.5

2

Company

Northrop Grumman
Corporation

OraSureTechnologies Inc.

PACCAR Inc.

Paramount Global

PayPal Holdings Inc

Pennon Group PLC

PepsiCo Inc.

6

6

Shareholder

Shareholder

Yes

CA100+
flaggedYes

87

Company

PepsiCo Inc.

Pfizer Inc.

Pfizer Inc.

Phillips 66

Pilgrim’s Pride
Corporation

Public Storage

Quest Diagnostics
Incorporated

RaytheonTechnologies Corp

Red Rock Resorts
Inc

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourCountry

Proposal topic

Resolution
NumberSponsorCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report On
Risks From State Policies
Restricting Reproductive
Health Care

7

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

16.1

83.9

3.0

US

Report on Impact ofExtended Patent Exclusivities
on Product Access

8

Shareholder

SocialPublic health

Action

30.2

69.8

1.7

US

Report on Political
Expenditures Congruence

9

Shareholder

Lobbying

Congruencyof politicalspending

Disclosure

14.1

85.9

1.8

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Virgin Plastic
Demand5

Shareholder

Environmental

Plastics andpackaging

Disclosure

11.8

88.2

1.2

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding DeForestation
Report7

Shareholder

Environmental

Biodiversity

Disclosure

4.7

95.3

0.1

US

Report on GHG Emissions
Reduction Targets
Aligned with the Paris
Agreement Goal

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

34.7

65.3

0.5

Yes

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding GHG Targets
and Alignment with
Paris Agreement

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

48

52

0.7

Yes

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Aligning
Value Chain GHG Reductions
with Paris Agreement

8

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

37.8

62.2

1.1

Yes

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Board
Diversity Report6

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

6

94

0

5

6

Shareholder

Shareholder

Yes

CA100+
flagged88

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourCountry

Proposal topic

Resolution
NumberSponsorCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Extended Patent
Exclusivities and Application
For Secondary andTertiary Patents

5

Shareholder

SocialPublic health

Action

9.4

90.6

0.5

Restaurant Brands
International Inc

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Report6

Shareholder

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

24.5

75.5

0.9

Restaurant Brands
International Inc

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Plastics

8

Shareholder

Environmental

Plastics andpackaging

Disclosure

36.5

63.5

0.9

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Human
Rights Policy

4

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Action

13

87

17.5

Royal Bank of
CanadaCanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Free, Prior, andInFormed Consent

Shareholder
Proposal 2

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Action

26.7

73.3

1.5

Royal Bank of
CanadaCanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Racial Equity Audit

Shareholder
Proposal 3

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

42.2

57.8

3.4

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding AbsoluteGreenhouse Gas
Reduction Targets

Shareholder
Proposal 4

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

17.2

82.8

5.6

Royal Bank of
CanadaCanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Fossil FuelFinancing Policy

Shareholder
Proposal 5

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

Disclosure

6.8

93.2

4.9

Royal Bank of
CanadaCanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Say on Climate

Shareholder
Proposal 7

Shareholder

Say onClimateShareholder
say on climate

No data

18.8

81.2

5.3

Shell plc

UK

Approval of Energy
Transition Progress

25

Management

Say onClimateManagement
say on climate

No data

80.01

19.99

4.31

Yes

UK

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Scope 3 GHG
Target and Alignment with
Paris Agreement

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

20.2

79.8

4.5

Yes

Company

RegeneronPharmaceuticals Inc.

Rivian Automotive,
Inc. / DE

Royal Bank of
CanadaShell plc

26

Shareholder

Shareholder

CA100+
flagged89

Company

Skechers U.S.A. Inc.

Southern
Company (The)Starbucks
Corporation

Stericycle Inc.

Stryker Corporation

Sumitomo Mitsui
Financial Group Inc

Sun Life
Financial Inc.

Suncor Energy Inc.

Targa Resources
Corp

Category

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Disclosure

12.6

87.4

2.3

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

19.8

80.2

5.7

8

Shareholder

SocialLabour rights

Disclosure

52

48.0

1.3

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding PoliticalContributions andExpenditures Report5

Shareholder

Lobbying

Political
contributions

Disclosure

19.3

80.7

3.3

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding PoliticalContributions andExpenditures Report5

Shareholder

Lobbying

Political
contributions

Disclosure

36.8

63.2

0.6

Japan

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Aligning
Investments with theParis Agreement

3

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

Action

20.9

79.1

0.5

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on HealthImpacts from Investments
in Fossil Fuels

Shareholder
Proposal 1

Shareholder

SocialPublic health

Disclosure

13.7

86.3

0.6

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding CapEx Alignment
with GHG Target and Net
Zero Pledge

Shareholder
Proposal 1

Environmental

Climatechange –strategy

Disclosure

17.7

82.3

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on
Reducing Venting and Flaring

Environmental

Climatechange –strategy

Disclosure

41.1

58.9

Resolution
NumberCountry

Proposal topic

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Aligning GHG
Reductions with
Paris Agreement

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Scope 3 GHG
Emissions Targets

7

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Third-Party
Assessment of Freedomof Association

6

5

SponsorShareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavour

CA100+
flagged

Yes

Yes

Yes

1.5

90

Country

Proposal topic

Resolution
NumberSponsorCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on
Customer Due Diligence

7

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

23

77

1.1

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding GHG Targets andAlignment with the Paris
Agreement

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

40.4

59.6

1.1

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Political
Expenditures and Values
Congruency

7

Shareholder

Lobbying

Congruencyof politicalspending

Disclosure

No
data

No data

No dataUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on
Human Rights Risks from
Supply Chain Employee
Misclassification

6

Shareholder

SocialLabour rights

Disclosure

31.8

68.2

1.2

Tokyo Electric Power
Co. Ltd.

Japan

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Policy andReport on Capital Allocation
Alignment with Net Zero by2050 Pathway

2

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –strategy

Disclosure

9.9

90.1

0.0

Toronto Dominion
Bank (The)

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Say on Climate

Shareholder
Proposal 3

Shareholder

Say onClimateShareholder
say on climate

No data

22.6

77.4

4.9

CanadaShareholder Proposal
Regarding Transition Plan
Disclosure For Financing
Activities

Shareholder
proposal 6

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

24.8

75.2

5.4

FranceOpinion on 2023
Sustainability and Climate
Progress Report

14

Management

Say onClimateManagement
say on climate

No data

88.8

11.24

3.38

FranceShareholder Proposal
Regarding Scope 3 GHG
Target and Alignment with
Paris Agreement

Environmental

Climatechange –targets

Action

30.4

69.6

5.9

Company

Texas Instruments
Incorporated

Texas Roadhouse
Inc.

The Cigna GroupTJX Companies Inc.
(The)

Toronto Dominion
Bank (The)

TotalEnergies SE

TotalEnergies SE

518

Shareholder

Shareholder

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavour

CA100+
flagged

Yes

Yes

Yes

91

Company

Category

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Environmental

Climatechange –lobbying

Disclosure

15.3

84.7

0.5

Environmental

Climatechange –strategy

Disclosure

14.7

85.3

1

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

Action

8.8

91.2

1.3

8

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

35.3

64.7

1.1

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Insuring Law
EnForcement

9

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

10.6

89.4

3.5

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Paid Sick Leave

7

Shareholder

SocialLabour rights

Action

11.7

88.3

1.6

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on
Science-Based GHG Targets
and Alignment with Paris
Agreement

Environmental

Climatechange –reporting

Action

20.4

79.6

2.9

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Linking
Executive Pay to GHG
Emissions Reduction Targets

Environmental

Climatechange –reporting

Action

18

82

1.4

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Just Transition
Reporting8

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

24

76

1.9

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Diversity andInclusion Report11

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

25

75

1.8

Resolution
NumberCountry

Proposal topic

Japan

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Activity
Alignment with the Paris
Agreement and Carbon
Neutrality Goal

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Aligning GHG
Reductions with Paris
Agreement

Travelers Companies
Inc/TheUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Fossil Fuel
Underwriting Policy

7

Travelers Companies
Inc/TheUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Racial Equity Audit

Travelers Companies
Inc/TheUnion PacificCorporation

Toyota Motor Corp.

Travelers Companies
Inc/TheUnited Parcel
Service Inc.

United Parcel
Service Inc.

United Parcel
Service Inc.
United Parcel
Service Inc.

4

6

6

7

SponsorShareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavour

CA100+
flagged

Yes

Yes

92

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourCompanyCountry

Proposal topic

Resolution
NumberSponsorCategory

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

UnitedHealth Group
IncorporatedUS

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Racial Equity Audit

5

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

20.6

79.4

2

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Political
Expenditures and Values
Congruency

Lobbying

Congruencyof politicalspending

Disclosure

28.2

71.8

2

Yes

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Climate
Transition Plan and GHG
Targets

5

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –reportingDisclosure

33.1

66.9

3.7

Yes

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding a Racial
Equity Audit

6

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

11.9

88.1

1.3

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding External Public
Health Costs Created by theSale of Tobacco Products

4

Shareholder

SocialPublic health

Disclosure

10.3

89.7

0.9

Walmart Inc

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Human Rights Due
Diligence Process Report6

Shareholder

SocialHuman rights

Disclosure

5.8

94.2

0.6

Walmart Inc

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Racial Equity Audit

7

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

18.2

81.8

0.5

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Risks
from Abortion-Related
InFormation Requests

10

Shareholder

Social

Civil andsocial rights

Disclosure

5.3

94.7

1

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Report on Political
Expenditures and Values
Congruency

7

Shareholder

Lobbying

Congruencyof politicalspending

Disclosure

36.3

63.7

0.3

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Board
Diversity Report5

Shareholder

SocialDiversity anddiscrimination

Disclosure

23.7

76.3

0.2

UnitedHealth Group
Incorporated

Valero Energy
Corporation

Valero Energy
Corporation

Walgreens Boots
Alliance Inc

Walmart Inc

Walt DisneyCompany

Weis Markets Inc.

6

Shareholder

Yes

CA100+
flaggedYes

93

Company

Wells Fargo &Company
Wells Fargo &Company

Wells Fargo &Company

Wells Fargo &Company

Wells Fargo &Company
Wendy’s Company(The)

Westlake
Corporation

Westlake
Corporation

Yum! Brands Inc.

Country

Proposal topic

US

Report on Political
Expenditures Congruence

Resolution
Number6

7

SponsorShareholder

Sub-category

Action/Disclosure

For
(%)

Against(%)

Abstain/Withhold(%)

Lobbying

Congruencyof politicalspending

Disclosure

28.5

71.5

1

Yes

Environmental

Climatechange –lobbying

Disclosure

32.3

67.7

1

Yes

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

Disclosure

31.1

68.9

1

Yes

Action

8.6

91.4

1.7

US

Report on Climate Lobbying

US

Report on Climate Transition
Plan Describing EfForts to
Align Financing Activities
with GHG Targets

US

Adopt Time-Bound Policy to
Phase Out Underwriting andLending For New Fossil
Fuel Development

9

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –financing

US

Adopt Policy on Freedomof Association andCollective Bargaining

11

Shareholder

SocialLabour rights

Action

35.6

64.4

4.4

Yes

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Report

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

36.5

63.5

3.7

Yes

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Aligning GHG
Reductions with Paris
Agreement

7

Shareholder

Environmental

Climatechange –strategy

Disclosure

11.6

88.4

0.1

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Virgin
Plastic Demand8

Shareholder

Environmental

Plastics andpackaging

Disclosure

9.5

90.5

0.1

US

Shareholder Proposal
Regarding Lobbying Report

Lobbying

Lobbying
payments
and policy

Disclosure

41.9

58.1

1.1

8

7

6

Shareholder

Category

Resolutions
that would
have passed
if the ‘big
four’ voted infavourShareholder

Shareholder

Shareholder

Yes

CA100+
flaggedReferences

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ACCR (2023) Analysis of Glencore’s forward coal emissions profile. https://www.accr.org.au/research/analysis-ofglencore’s-forward-coal-emissions-profile/. Accessed 15 November 2023.
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ACCR (2023) “Impossible for Glencore to ignore”: Coal-mining giant hit with large shareholder vote on thermal coalrisk at AGM. In: ACCR. https://www.accr.org.au/news/“impossible-for-glencore-to-ignore”-coal-mining-giant-hitwith-large-shareholder-vote-on-thermal-coal-risk-at-agm/. Accessed 15 November 2023.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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98

Disclaimer

Authors

This publication, the information therein
andrelated materials are not intended to provide
and do not constitute financial or investment
advice. ShareAction makes no representation
regarding the advisability or suitability ofinvesting in any particular company, investment
fund, pension or other vehicle or of using
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company, pension provider or other service
provider for the provision of investment services.
While every effort has been made to ensurethe
information in this publication is correct,
ShareAction and its agents cannot guarantee
its accuracy and they shall not be liable for any
claims or losses of any nature in connection
with information contained in this document,
including (but not limited to) lost profits orpunitive or consequential damages or claims
in negligence.

Abhijay Sood, Claudia Gray, Felix
Nagrawala, Isabelle Monnickendam,
Joe Herbert, Katie Stewart
and Marina Zorila

About ShareAction
ShareAction is a NGO working globally todefine the highest standards for responsible
investment and drive change until thesestandards are adopted worldwide. We mobilise
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