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PRACTICAL OBSERVATIONS ON
POSSIBILITIES FOR PPP IN DISASTER RECOVERY AND RISK MITIGATIONCASE STUDY TSUNAMI, JAPANWe encourage all those who deal with Public-Private Partnership far away from disasters totake notice of this report; this is as close you will probably ever get.

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PPP AND RISK REDUCTION AND RISK MITIGATION: CASE STUDY JAPAN TSUNAMI 2011

On the Visit of the UN led delegation to the tsunami affected region of Japan on the role of
PPP in disaster recovery and risk mitigation.
Japan is an active member of UNECE PPP community with a vice chair in the PPP Team ofSpecialist. UNISDR and UNECE are working closely together also on the topic of PublicPrivate Partnerships, PPP. Involvement of the private sector in Risk Reduction is a wellknow area and much has been put in place to make this successful.
But there has been hardly any practical experience on PPP and rebuilding a devastatedcountry which has to find a balance of recovery investments as well as preventing efforts.
Many theoretical models have been designed; may conference and discussions paved theway for this experiment.
UNISDR. UNECE and Japan saw in this tragically event an opportunity to witness what
would happen with Public-Private Partnership the moment a country has been devastated
and the first recovery has set in motion. The report is not on how to do PPP’s, not to invent
new model but to witness what happens or to judge in any way the actions and measurestaken by the country of Japan, or partner, which were significant.
This report is prepared to learn from, how dreadful and painful in many cases, and use
these experience do better, each time when a disaster happens, for us and our children. All
those who worked on this report showed courage to discuss improvements and learningsuggestions while working immensely hard and dedicated to recover from recent mayhem.
We encourage all those who talk about Public-Private Partnership in a safe and secureenvironment, far away from disasters to take notice of this report; you probably never get
closer to reality on PPP.

Palais des Nations, Geneva, 31 March 2012

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Table of Contents
Executive summary ........................................................................................................................ iii
Chapter I

Effect and key learning from the earthquake and tsunami in Japan .........................1

I. Introduction ...............................................................................................................................1
II. Affects of the disaster...............................................................................................................2
III. Actions taken ...........................................................................................................................8
Chapter II

Assessment of the situation and the role of PPP in leading the way forward for the
Tokohu region..........................................................................................................14

I. ‘Fukkyu’ or ‘Fukko’? ................................................................................................................ 14
II. The key actions required for reconstruction ......................................................................... 17
Chapter III.

Key Recommendations ............................................................................................47

I. Better national coordination .................................................................................................. 47
II. Greater use of outsourcing .................................................................................................... 49
III.

Alternative Financing .............................................................................................. 52

IV.
Improved resilience of hardware and soft ware in disaster recovery and risk
mitigation 56
V.

Local governance and capacity ............................................................................... 57

Closing

60

Appendix 1

65

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PPP AND RISK REDUCTION AND RISK MITIGATION: CASE STUDY JAPAN TSUNAMI 2011

Executive summary
What has happened on 11 March, 2011 was a sad tragedy for Japan, especially northern Japan.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the United Nations
International strategy on Disaster Risk Mitigation (UNISDR) with the support of Toyo University
on 15-18 November 2011 dispatched the mission to Tohoku (northern Japan) to observe what has
happened and to explore the role of PPP in the process in disaster recovery and how PPPpractically can be used in the Japanese recovery process.
The mission has researched the facts on the disaster, which includes what could happen in otherparts of Japan with significant size of earthquake and tsunami in Chapter I.
Chapter II assesses the situation: role of and the way forward for Tohoku and Japan. We haveexamined 1) the overall policy that offers vision, leadership, effective coordination andimplementation, 2) building safer and more resilient infrastructure, 3) sustainable development(renewable and smart cities) and green growth, 4) forging regional economic competitiveness and5) PPP and building local and national PPP capabilities.
Chapter III contains the key recommendations to the country of Japan and other nations withthreat of earthquake and tsunami. The recommendations are bold and aggressive but we all felt
they could save the lives and assets of the citizens of the countries.
The country of Japan was prepared for disaster and has done a significant work toward fukkyu(recovery) and fukko (redevelopment) for the citizens of Tohoku and Japan. However, the mission
has examined what other methods and systems using PPP could save more lives and assets ofcitizens in times of disaster and assist the recovery and re-development in post disaster.
Unfortunately, the disasters will happen. It was fourth significant tsunami disaster in 107 years in
Tohoku. It will happen again with global weather change. We sincerely hope that this reportprovides some useful recommendations for not only Japan but also for the countries, which havesuch possibilities of earthquake and tsunami to save lives and assets of the citizens.

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PPP AND RISK REDUCTION AND RISK MITIGATION: CASE STUDY JAPAN TSUNAMI 2011

The working meeting with Vice Mayor of Sendai, Miyagi

Meeting of the UN-led mission with Mayor of Tono City, Iwate

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PPP AND RISK REDUCTION AND RISK MITIGATION: CASE STUDY JAPAN TSUNAMI 2011

The members of the mission:

1.

Geoffrey Hamilton, Chief of the Cooperation and Partnership Section UNECE

2.

Nobuyuki Nagata, Deloitte

3.

Akira Morimoto, Expert, International Recovery Platform

4.

Khalid Mehmood Shaikh, Director Public Private Partnership Unit, Sindh, Pakistan

5.

Arthur Mitchell, Senior Counselor, White & Case Japan

6.

Yoshie Muramatsu, Senior Project Manager, Arup, Japan

7.

Yuji Nemoto, Professor, Toyo University

8.

Sam Tabuchi, Professor, Toyo University

9.

Yu Namba, Senior Research Staff, Toyo University

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PPP Recommendations:

To move forward to use PPPs will require considerable governmental creativity , new thinking
and better capacity, coordination between local and a national 'will' to build back ‘bigger andbetter'. This chapter presents the delegation’s key recommendations for use of PPP inreconstruction are:

Better National coordination

Greater use of outsourcing



Better financing (e.g. infrastructure funds)



Improved resilience of hardware and software in disaster recovery and risk mitigationWish list of projects (most local authorities said they wanted jobs and new factories but
to do what)

Local governance and monitoring of contracts

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Chapter I
Effect and key learning from the earthquake
and tsunami in Japan
I. Introduction

The UNECE in collaboration with Toyo University, organized several delegations in 2011 inorder to find the roles of Public-Private Partnerships in the event of large-scale disaster. The
delegations have met many municipal, regional and national government officials and private
sectors during their visit to the affected areas. Through the visits, the delegations were impressedwith such tremendous jobs been done in response and relief. Meanwhile, even though Japan had
won their credits in building superb infrastructures and having efficient and strong economic
sectors, the country seemed to be bewildered in deciding directions for reconstruction, with theregion’s economy already struggling added to the large deficit of the country. In this regard,
UNECE dispatched delegations consist of PPP specialists to find ways to build back ‘better andbrighter’ through PPP.
PPPs can make a major contribution to the reconstruction is because of the nature of relationshipamong the public and private sectors—a contractual relationship. The private sectors display theirperformance in a comprehensive, whole-life, cost effective, and targeted way based on due
diligence and “value for money” analysis and an integrated and structured risk management
approach. This will drive the projects to be financially viable, economically feasible andsustainable, and avoid haphazard reconstruction of status quo. Its competitive and transparent
process ascertains that the projects are carried put in pursuit of quality and best value.
The role of Public-Private Partnership in disaster has long been recognized. It gained aprominence in the United Nations General Assembly’s Resolution 236 Session 44 (a resolution
designated 1990s as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Risk Reduction); which stated“All governments are called upon to encourage their local administrations to take appropriate
steps to mobilize the necessary support from the public and private sectors and to contribute to
the achievement of the purpose of the Decade”. After more than a decade ago, the Kuala Lumpur
Declaration, a declaration adopted at the third Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk
Reduction (AMCDRR), emphasized the importance of “Mobilizing Resources and Promoting
Public Private Partnership for DRR”. United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction (UNISDR) has recently organized a platform for Public-Private Partnership in disasterrisk reduction.
Even with those recognitions, private sector participation in the event of disaster remained shortterm relief/response and within the framework of CSR activities. UNECE Team of Specialists on
PPP recognizes necessity of private sector’s longer-term participation in disaster reconstruction
and pre-emptive commitment to mitigate future risks and strengthen economic activities. The
UNECE has been active to collect international knowledge and experience in PPP to improve
project deliverability and promote best practices. Main contributors of this report are

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professionals in public private partnerships in basic service provision and infrastructuredevelopments.
In the Japanese context, many private sectors successfully participated and demonstrated theircapabilities in the early response and relief. It has
become clear that not only the international community
but the governments, policy makers and public sectors
have got high expectations on PPP. However, in reality,
it is abundantly clear that lack of experience andknowledge in PPP and sluggish economy in the area
discourage the implementation of PPP forreconstruction.
Therefore, this report focuses on raising key issues inapplying PPPs to reconstruction projects in order toimprove PPP applicability and encourage better andbrighter reconstruction.

Number of articles mentioned “PPP” or“PFI” (The Nikkei Shimbun from March
11 to End of July 2011)

II. Affects of the disasterAround 2.46 pm, 11 March, 2011, a Magnitude 9.0 earthquake shook the eastern Japan. This was
the largest earthquake in Japanese history. Even in Tokyo—more than 500 kilometers away fromthe epicenter—urban functions were paralyzed. But it was the tsunami made the disaster worse.
After about an hour, a TV channel, NHK, started
to broadcast the huge tsunami engulfing
villages, roads, bridges, cars, and everything on
the field. The waves seemed that they would
never stop. At this moment, the TV could capture
the image of what was going on only in/around
Sendai City, the largest city in Tohoku (northeastern) region. But no one could understand the NHK Broadcasted tsunami near Sendai City
situation throughout the Region. And by the around 4 pm
night, people many have sensed that something
really terrible might have occurred in Fukushima 2nd Nuclear Plant. This was the first time
Japan had faced such a compound disaster.

A total of more than 560 square kilometers (138,600 acres) were blooded, and the tsunami at one
point reached the height of almost 40 meters. In this disaster, virtually all the fatalities werecaused by the tsunami. Only less than 5% were killed by injuries caused by collapsing structures.
Even though there may be a discussion that some or many people might had been trapped
in/under the collapse and then killed by the water.
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Figure 1.Causes of deaths in large scale earthquakes

Table 1.Comparison of Damages: Great Eastern Japan Earthquake of 2011 and HanshinAwaji of 1995, and Estimation of damage in Tokai, Tonankai-Nankai Earthquake (As of
December 2011)

Estimated future earthquakes
Great
Eastern
Japan 2011

Hanshin
1995

Magnitude (M)M 9.0

Seismic intensity

7（Miyagi）

Awaji

Tokyo
Metropolitan

Tokai

TonankaiNankai

M 6.9（7.3）

M 7.3

M 8.0

M 8.6

6+
Tokyo ,Saitama,
Chiba, Kanagawa

7
Shizuoka,
Yamanashi7

7（Hyogo）

Shizuoka, ichi,
Mie, Akayama,
Kochi

Lost and Missing

20,425

6,437

11,0009,200

18,000# of Evacuated (Max)470,000

320,000

7,000,000

1,900,000

5,000,000

Destroyed houses

110,000

100,000

850,000

260,000

360,000

Direct Damage 10

Direct Damage 67
Indirect Damage
45

Direct Damage
26
Indirect Damage
11

Direct Damage
43
IndirectDamage 14

EconomicDamage(trillion yen)

Direct Damage 17

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PPP AND RISK REDUCTION AND RISK MITIGATION: CASE STUDY JAPAN TSUNAMI 2011

Table 2.Population and Households in inundated areas
Within inundated area

Prefecture
Iwate Miyako
OfunatoKuji
Rikuzentakata
Kamaishi
Otsuchi
YamadaIwaizumiTanohata
Fudai
Noda
Hirono
Total

Total

% within the inundated area

Population Household Population Household Population Household
18,3787,209
59,44222,50430.9
32.0
19,073
6,957
40,73814,814
46.8
47.0
7,171
2,553
36,87514,01519.4
18.2
16,6405,592
23,302
7,794
71.4
71.7
13,164
5,235
39,57816,09533.3
32.5
11,915
4,614
15,277
5,674
78.0
81.3
11,418
4,175
18,625
6,605
61.3
63.2
1,137
431
10,804
4,355
10.5
9.9
1,582
526
3,843
1,309
41.2
40.2
1,115
380
3,088
1,042
36.1
36.5
3,177
1,069
4,632
1,576
68.6
67.8
2,733
932
17,910
6,117
15.3
15.2
107,503
39,673274,114
101,900
39.2
38.9
Within inundated area

Total

% within the inundated area

Prefecture
Population Household Population Household Population Household
Miyagi Sendai-Miyagino
17,375
6,551
190,485
85,790
9.1
7.6
Sendai-Wakabayashi 9,386
2,698
132,191
58,891
7.1
4.6
Sendai-Tahaku
3,201
1,136
220,715
91,5851.5
1.2
Isinomaki
112,276
42,157
160,704
57,812
69.9
72.9
Shiogama
18,7186,973
56,49020,31433.1
34.3
Kesennuma
40,331
13,97473,49425,46454.9
54.9
Natori12,155
3,974
73,14025,150
16.6
15.8
Tagajo17,144
6,648
62,97924,047
27.2
27.6
Iwanuma
8,051
2,337
44,19815,53018.2
15.0
Higashimatsushima 34,014
11,25142,90813,995
79.3
80.4
Watari
14,0804,196
34,846
10,89940.4
38.5
Yamamoto
8,990
2,913
16,711
5,233
53.8
55.7
Matsushima
4,053
1,477
15,089
5,149
26.9
28.7
Shichigahama
9,149
2,751
20,419
6,415
44.8
42.9
Rihu
542
192
34,00010,8191.6
1.8
Onagawa
8,048
3,155
10,051
3,968
80.1
79.5
Minamisanriku
14,3894,375
17,431
5,295
82.5
82.6
Total
331,902116,758 1,205,851
466,35627.5
25.0
Within inundated area

Prefecture
Fukushima
Iwaki
Souma
Minamisouma
HironoNarahaTomiokaOkuma
HutabaNamie
Shinchi
Total

Total

% within the inundated area

Population Household Population Household Population Household
32,52011,345342,198
128,516
9.5
8.8
10,436
3,076
37,796
13,24027.6
23.2
13,3773,720
70,89523,643
18.9
15.7
1,385
444
5,418
1,810
25.6
24.5
1,746
543
7,701
2,576
22.7
21.1
1,401
552
15,996
6,141
8.8
9.0
1,127
359
11,511
3,955
9.8
9.1
1,278
402
6,932
2,393
18.4
16.8
3,356
1,006
20,908
7,171
16.1
14.0
4,666
1,400
8,218
2,461
56.8
56.9
71,292
22,847
527,573
191,906
13.5
11.9

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PPP AND RISK REDUCTION AND RISK MITIGATION: CASE STUDY JAPAN TSUNAMI 2011...the impact of the tsunami affected both the social infrastructure: hospitals, schools,
houses... as well as the economic livelihoods of the local populations...

(Top left) An elementary school hit by tsunami andburned fire while inundated, (top right) A hospital
flooded to second floor, (second left) Inside of aflooded police headquarter in Kamaishi, (secondright) Inside of a public works building in waste
water treatment center in Otuchi, (left) Destroyed
railways were carried to residential area, (bottom
left)Full of debris in central commercial district,(bottom right) An isolated shopping street looks likea “ghost town”

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Many Municipal governments got paralyzed

Municipalities are the first in the list to be
responsible for securing the lives and supporting
citizens. However in this event, some municipalities
totally lost their functions, and many lost partially. In
Otsuchi town, officials gathered in the front yard of
the town hall for meeting on disaster reaction.
tsunami wiped the town hall, killing one fourth ofmanagement-class officials, including Mayor.
Town Hall of Otuchi where Mayor and many
officials got killed in the front yard

In Rikuzentakata, many young officials were killed,leaving heavy loads of works to management-classofficials. Some members of the mission visited theCity in July, and in a brand-new temporally
administration office building, Director of thedisaster management only had two files as all of his
record and information on public services, which hehas been keeping after the earthquake. All theinformation prior to 11 March was lost, and newly
installed shelves were still empty. The City was
struggling to retrieve these records. The Director told
us that the City had lost residents’ records, and still
could not track all the survivors. In addition, they
only had tax-record as of Fiscal Year 2009 (as ofMarch 2010), which they reported to prefectural
government the previous year. Since the earthquake
occurred in the very end of FY2011, mostindividuals had not filed their tax records, and eventhe entities which they kept the companies’ andRikuzentakata city hall was destroyed
employees’ records have lost them all. Not knowing completely (above) and temporally city hall
how many survivors were remaining within the city, (below)
would be willing to come back to the city or how
much taxes they would pay, were they not able to draw a future reconstruction plan of the city.

While local government officials’ duties have multiplied during disaster response/reaction, no
prefectural governments or national government could respond to these local governments’situation in the earliest stage. This was because of the failure of disaster response system. The
system is designed that municipal government under the damage bears a primary responsibility of
rescuing and protecting citizens’ lives and properties, but never assumed the loss of government
head or paralysis of local government functions. Thus, no system sufficiently supported to fulfill
the human resource demands, especially in middle to long term.
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Not only municipal functions, but other functions of the towns were also lost. Most local businessand commercial districts were hit by the tsunami and banks, supermarkets, gas stands and theothers were destroyed. Because most people lost places to work or shop, even those who did not
get their house flooded, were hardly able to support their lives.

However it was not altogether a disaster story………

The early warning technology for the railways worked well. There was no derailment of the train.
Since the 2004 Mid-Niigata Pref. Earthquake, 50-60 billion yen has been invested in earthquake
disaster prevention measures. Within the JR East area, earthquake measurement equipment has
been improved and increased, and the time from early tremor detection, to electric supply cut has
been reduced from 3 to 2 seconds. Seismographs at 62 locations were upgraded to the latest
models in 2005. New seismographs were installed at 28 coastal locations in 2006. By 2009, allcarriages of the Tohoku Shinkasen were fitted with an early earthquake warning system.
While towns were destroyed almost totally, only around 3 per cent of the overall population
living in the towns lost their lives. Most children survived in Kamaishi City. Participatory disastereducation for elementary school children (with teachers) worked very successfully. Children
followed the saying, “Tsunami Tendenko”, literally means, ‘in a tsunami, flee separately.’

In Kamaishi City 99.8% of school kids survived

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III. Actions taken

1. Slow but gradual progress
Many municipalities in the affectedareas seemed to struggle preparing
and implementing reconstructionplans and projects.
Manymunicipalities seemed reluctant tochange land-use drastically, whilesome seemed to struggle obtaining
consensus or agreement fromresidents. Some seemed simply
struggle with lack of know-how andhuman resources.

Recovery/Reconstruction planning process according toDisaster Countermeasures Basic Act.(provided by Mr. Sanjaya
Bhatia of International Recovery Platform –UNISDR)

However, even one of the worst hit
municipalities has making progress(See Appendix 1). Minamisanriku, atown with 17,431 （2010 National
Census, Approx. 30% over 65 years old）, which lost about 40 of its 160 officials in tsunami, haspublished a reconstruction plan. The town envisions future of the town as safer, greener and lively
community. The cost estimate of these programs sums up to 20 years of the town’s budget inTown’s future vision—Connecting nature, people, work, safety, and prosperity—

Minamisanriku Town Disaster Recovery/Reconstruction Plan
1. Community building for a place where we can continue to live and feel safe(ex. Safe land use, development plan for better risk management and mitigation,
strengthen disaster management systems, safer modal networks, establish information
system networks, secure medical, healthcare and welfare, concentrating public facilities andits functions)
2. Community building for living together with nature Process(ex. Installation of Eco-town, development of renewable and sustainable social system,
creation of new lifestyle, human resources development and community empowerment)
3. Community planning for a flourishing town and livelihood(ex. Early recovery of industrial infrastructures, rehabilitation and revitalization of fisheryindustry, utilization of agricultural land and forest, revitalization of commercial and tourism
industry, create new employment and population growth)
PPP
DRR1 AND DRM IN JAPAN
PolicyPage 8Town government and community collaborate on town planning
Policy 2

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the budget scale of the town was only
8 billion yen)
The town had heavily depended on
fishery (a little shy of 20% worked infishery related industry), thus theradical change of land use –i.e.
prohibiting fishermen to live close to
ocean seemed unlikely. In addition,
the town had one of the weakest
economy and financial condition in
Miyagi Prefecture.

2. New Method Employed
The town now tries to implement projects for recovery of the social infrastructures in an
innovative way. The town contracted out “Support for implementation plan of reconstruction
projects to Pacific Consultants, Nakaba, Land Brain, Pasco JV. This contract includes bothprogram and project management of planning of urban development projects, relocation planningand consensus building, design, land survey, planning, cost estimate of construction, study of
cost- and time-saving method of construction, suggestion of how to select private entities,
deciding specifications, and management of public finance for these projects. Program
management or project management in construction projects are not common in public works
projects in Japan, where most of these managements were done by public bodies. The town
decided to contract out these functions for effective and faster implementation of projects.
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism also announced to apply program or
project management, and construction management in some major reconstruction projects. These
innovative procurement and management methods would enhance implementation of PPPs in theregion.

3. “Partnerships” in disasterIn this earthquake and tsunami, many municipalities got paralyzed and lost their functions.
Municipalities bear primary responsibilities for securing its citizens and properties, but an
extremely severe disaster like this can easily overwhelm the capacity. Thus, it is accentuated thatpublic bodies should prepare partnerships. Our delegation have found that many forms ofpartnerships; vertical or horizontal worked quite efficiently or effectively and encouraging.
Vertical partnerships in public bodies refer to partnerships among different levels of governments,
such as national government and prefectural governments or prefectural governments and local

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(municipal) governments. On the other hand, horizontal partnerships take place in same level ofgovernments, prefectural-prefectural or municipal-municipal.

Case 1: National arrangement for municipal government support
Ministry of internal affairs and communication established a scheme to send officials todevastated municipalities. 72,900 national government officials and 79,000 prefectural andmunicipal government officials have been sent to prefectural and municipal governments in thedevastated area.
Even though Japan national government has been seemed to be very reluctant or unwilling toassign particular prefecture or municipalities to ones in needs, it established a scheme for mid- tolong-term assignment of officials in collaboration with the National Governors’ Association, theJapan Association of City Mayors, and the National Association of Towns and Villages. For the
future large-scale disasters, national government should take

Case 2: Remote logistic support
City of Tono in Iwate Prefecture gained a great reputation for providing effective support for
affected areas. A city of 30,000 population located in the middle of inland-highways and coastal
devastated areas, and has great access to many of the affected cities. Thus, Mayor of the City, Mr.
Toshiaki Honda had planned to set up remote logistic support base in the city when this kind ofenormous disaster strike the region. Tono city and neighboring cities and towns on the coast
established a committee for setting up and building necessary facilities to provide logistic
supports. Even though the plan for constructnecessary building had not realized, Tono Volunteers accommodated in Tono. Tono Social
welfare council and a NGO organized and managed
city and related organizations including the volunteers’ activities.
prefectural government, Self Defense Force,
police, fire and other rescue and relief
organizations conducted emergency drills
for large-scale disasters. The city opened asoccer field and play grounds for Self
Defense Force and other rescuingorganization to station. More than 3500
officials and rescue crews gathered to Tono
within first ten days. The City also provided
a gymnasium and community centers forstorage of relief goods and accommodationfor volunteers. Citizens in the city also
volunteered to provide about 140,000 hot meals in 50 days.

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Case 3: Counterpart support system
Osaka City’s headquarter in Kamaishi
Right after the earthquake, Union of Kansai
City
Governments, an alliance of 7 prefectures in Kansai(south-western part of Japan), decided to send
DMATs and public officials to 3 devastatedprefectures, assigning two to three prefectures to eachdevastated prefectures. They Decided to adapt a“Counterpart system,” which is to pair certain
prefectures to specific affected prefectures in order toavoid overlapping or shortfall of support. Osaka andWakayama Prefecture have been assigned to Iwate
Prefecture, Hyogo, Tottori and Tokushima Prefecture
have been assigned to Miyagi Prefecture, and Kyoto
and Shiga Prefecture have been assigned to
Fukushima Prefecture. This counterpart system i.e.
pairing of prefectures enabled better communication and long-term and sustainable support todevastated municipalities. City of Osaka have set up Headquarter in City of Kamaishi, and haveprovided general clerical support, logistics, public health, disaster inspection, medical care,welfare, temporary housing, educational support, volunteer coordination, shelter management,
and debris handling.

Case 4: Setting up headquarters
While Union of Kansai Governments aimed to long-term support, Shizuoka Prefecture, which is
known for its high risk of earthquake and tsunami for years, showed its preparedness andsystematic correspondence in relief and recovery phase. The prefecture set up support
headquarters in City of Tono, which is about 50 kilometers away from many of the devastatedmunicipalities in Iwate Prefecture. They decided not to set up headquarters within Iwate
Prefectural Government Office, which is more than 1 hour away from these severely damaged
cities and towns, but choose to have better access and mobility. They sent many cars, fuels, andofficials using air freight, so that they could independently establish a means of transporting relief
goods directly to shelters, whereas many supporting municipalities did not have the mobility. This
also enabled to select and send most-needed goods by conducting hearings directly to evacuees inshelters, and avoid sending unnecessary goods or occupying storage spaces with these unwanted
goods. They also provided technical support for recovering social infrastructures, clerical support,
shelter management, physical and mental healthcare, and others. These activities were intended tomake the affected municipalities back to independently handle their duties as early as possible.
These kinds of headquarters have proved better communication among affected public bodies andsupporting bodies, faster decision making, better mobility, quickness and flexibility.
Another conspicuous activities Shizuoka Prefecture has is that they have a “Plan for receiving
wide-area support,” in which they list all the necessary supports in a massive disaster and list
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potential organizations which would provide these supports, and how, when and where theygather and provide services. This plan would enable local government bodies to identify
necessary supports, resources within/outside of the region, and efficiently allocate them. One of
the investigation committee of Central Disaster Management Council 1 suggested the national
government and cabinet to introduce and promote the “receive plan” concept to municipalities
and prefectural governments.

4. Public-Private Partnerships
While some partnerships among public and public entities worked out quite well, partnerships
among public and private entities have proven its effectiveness. Some of the functions which
affected municipalities are expected to provide can be provided better by private entities. (e.g.
management of relief goods and logistic centers, providing communication devices, record
keeping, catering, operating shelters etc)

Case 1: Disaster agreement and Operation Comb
One unique activity in Japan to utilize private sectors in early phase of disaster, is a system called
disaster agreement. A private company and a public body sign agreement on disaster relief
activities.
Our delegation visited Tohoku Regional Development Bureau (TRDB) of Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and learned that the disaster agreement among TRDB andlocal construction companies functioned quite effectively. Several hours after the disaster, TRDB
judged the severity of the tsunami damage and decided to deploy about 60 teams (from 29
companies) for road clearance. In Tohoku region, main In TRDB’s Emergency Management
access routes run inland through north to south. In order Headquarter and monitoring room. Mr.
to gain access to the devastated cities on the coast, Kawashima, Director of policy and planning
section
TRDB decided to clear up rubbish on 15 most crucial
access routes.
It is reported that many local construction companies
voluntarily gathered to offices of TRDB, and asked for
instructions,becausetelephones
and
other
communication devices got cut off. These private sectors
also brought information on the damages in thedevastated area, which helped TRDB to precisely plan
1

The Central Disaster Management Council is one of the councils that deal with crucial policiesof the cabinet and is established in the Cabinet Office. The council promotes comprehensive
disaster countermeasures, verify the actual countermeasures in major disasters and employ thelessons learned to future disasters.
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and allocate resources. Tohoku Branch of Japan Federation of Construction Contractors (JFCC)
had disaster agreement with each of six prefectures in the region, City of Sendai, and TRDB.
Assuming the high probability of mega-scale disaster, JFCC and other parties had agreed toconsolidate these agreements and appoint TRDB as a single point of contact. In this way, theysucceeded to avoid confusion, redundancy, and delay. Private sectors often have disasteragreement with many municipalities where they have business with, thus they may get confused
if a large-scale disaster occurs. Thus, it is crucial to appoint single point of contract in massive
disaster. TRDB, JFCC and Japan Road Contractors Association also procured and distributed
relief goods, heavy equipments, daily goods, and pre-fabricated buildings to be used as city halls
and emergency management headquarters.
Disaster agreements are also rewarding to private bodies. In construction industry, construction
contractors can gain some points in comprehensive bid evaluation. This way, public bodies often
encourage private sectors to sign disaster agreements.

Case 2: Debris handling
Our delegation visited debris segregation and handling site operated by a joint venture consists of
Sangyoshinko, Kajima, and Takeei in Kamaishi City. This segregation plant is designed to collectand handle 38,000 tons of debris in first several months, and expand its capacity. Debris werehandled in the plant, and woods, plastics, metals, concrete, electronics, and dangerous goods arethoroughly segregated. About half or more of the debris became recyclable or reusable. The joint
venture also installed a radiation inspection at their own cost in order to correspond to risingconcern among citizens. They also contributed local economy, hiring locals who lost their jobs inthe disaster.
Even though this project was procured in traditional way, it started by private sector’s initiation.
Japan Project Industry Council (JAPIC), a council of general contractors and steel companies,
established a committee to examine how to segregate reusable items from muddy debris. They
made proposal to national government and municipal governments how to segregate debris andestimated the cost. Ministry of Environment prepared budget for debris handling, and City of
Kamaishi solicited a model project.

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Chapter II
Assessment of the situation and the role of PPP
in leading the way forward for the Tokohu region

The general thesis of the chapter
PPPs can make a major contribution to recovery. Rather than pouring money wastefully into
the region in a haphazard way, the PPP approach in a cost effective, targeted andcomprehensive way which can make sure that the rebuilding is economically efficient andsustainable: ‘Building back better and brighter'. What needs to be avoided is thecommencement of a host of infrastructure projects in places that do not need them and /orhave not met 'value for money' benchmarks. Such projects can become a 'drain' on theeconomy, adding to the Japanese deficit and accelerating regional economic decline. PPP in
the region could by contrast be linked to' green growth' and approaches that are sustainable,
cost- effective and competitive to the regional economy.

I. ‘Fukkyu’ or ‘Fukko’?

One of the members of the international UN delegation, head of the PPP Unit of Singh inPakistan has considerable first-hand knowledge of the devastation caused by earthquakes. Whenvisiting the tsunami affected region—the many little towns on the attractive coastline of northeast Japan that were once full of life and buzzing with activity—he was asked how thedevastation he was witnessing compared with what he had seen in Pakistan. His reply was: 'This
is much worse'. Literally whole towns, communities, businesses had been wiped off the face ofthe map and will have to be reconstructed, that is not individual separate dwellings, schools or
hospitals but quite simply, everything.

In the task of reconstruction it is noticeable that there is a clear difference in views between theresidents who have survived and the policy makers. Many of the former group wish to restore
things to the way they were prior to the disaster (fukkyu), while in contrast many of the local
leaders with a more intimate knowledge of the region as a whole , think that the region must bereconstructed (fukko) in new ways.2 Fukkyu or Fukko?

2such as Governor Murai of Miyagi

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The policy of recreating what was exactly there before (fukkyu) is not tenable—even if it was
feasible. Economically the region is in structural decline. It desperately needs a vision that willusher in significant, new economic activities. It badly needs such activities to support an ageing
population and a young generation who, to date, has been leaving the region in search of better
jobs and livelihoods in the cities. (See box) Policy makers have the huge task of not only coming
up with such a new vision but also of trying to create a consensus amongst citizens many ofwhom have lost everything, on the path to take the region forward.
The economic structure of the Tohoku region
Prior to the disaster, Tohoku did not loom very large in the minds of most Japanese, let alone
foreign observers, due to its image as an area mainly devoted to farming, fishing, forestry andsome tourism. However the worldwide supply chain disruptions that occurred in auto parts,
electronic components, semi-conductors and other products reminded us all that Tohoku playsa critical role in the world economy. The downturns of GDP growth or exports in several
countries after the earthquake were even severer than that of Japan. It has an important
industrial and technological base.
But it also faces many challenges. While six prefectures directly experienced the affects of theearthquake and the tsunami, Miyagi Prefecture alone suffered about 60% of the damage interms of loss of life and property damage. Fukushima Prefecture encountered a meltdown of
one of its nuclear reactors and severe damage to three others. The total population of Tohoku
is approximately 9.8 million people but the average age of most of the population is in excess
of 60. Per capita annual income is 3.5 million yen (U.S. $44,000 @$1:80 yen). The dual
structure of its economy—both leading edge technologically and rural and poor—means that,in some ways, Tohoku is both backward and forward looking at the same time.

The purpose of this report is to set out a road map for the region to reinvent itself and todemonstrate how PPPs can be used to this end. The aim is to ‘build back better and brighter than
before’, that is, to make the regional economy more competitive and to achieve higher rates of
economic growth, taking account as well of the need to reconstruct after the disaster and toaddress the special challenges of finding the necessary financial resources that this task entails.

This chapter reviews:
1.

Some of the challenges facing the regional economy

2.

What is required in the task of reconstruction

3.

The progress of the country and the region in meeting these requirements

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Current Condition: Decreasing/ageing population and a struggling economy

National Average 0.2%

The population was rapidly ageing anddecreasing in most damaged cities,
towns and villages (right). 54% of thedead were over 65. The City of
Kamaishi, Iwate enjoyed its zenith in
the 1970's, based on a strong ironindustry. The population reached
90,000 in 1980; by 2010, this figure
had halved and of that the share of theelderly jumped to 31.2%.

National Average 23.0%

Most towns and villages on the Sanriku coast heavily depend on fishing-related industry andtourism. Even though fishing and aquaculture are coming back gradually after the tsunami, there
is a lively debate on whether or not to redevelop the port and restore it to its original state.

One reason is that the fishing industry in the area has been
struggling because of both the decline in the size of the fish
catch and stagnation in fish prices. A fishing cooperative intsunami-hit Otsuchi went bankrupcy on January 13, 2012.
The cooperative had owed more than one billion yen, even
before the earthquake. 672 fishing vessels were destroyedby the tsunami, and three fixed fishing nets were wiped out.
The total fishing-related damage for the cooperative reached
5.1 billion yen. This is the case not only of Otsuchi. One
newspaper reported that 22 of 24 fishery cooperatives in
Iwate prefecture are losing money because of thedeterioration of marine resources, the ageing of thefishermen, lack of successors, as well as the obsolescentstructure of the cooperatives.

Fish market in Kamaishi

Many fishing vessels washed up on shore (left), and fixed fishing nets destroyed (near Otsuchi)

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Another reason is that the objections from the fishing cooperatives and fishermen. Many
cities/towns have written into their reconstruction plans that they will restructure the fishingindustry in some innovative ways and make the industry stronger. In May 2011, the Governor of
Miyagi Prefecture announced the creation of a “Fishing reconstruction special zone”, in which theprefecture encourages private sector participation in aquaculture. Even though this concept iswritten in national fishing redevelopment plan, many fishermen and fishing cooperatives were
opposed to the restructuring of the fishing industry in such an innovative way.

There is indeed a lesson that should be learned from the past. In the island of Okushiri, which was
struck by a tsunami in 1993, the government tried to restructure the fishing economy, spending
billions of yens on building a levee, fishing port with a huge structure of artificial ground forfishermen’s refuge, and an embankment to move houses from the shore. A fishing cooperative in
Aonae, an area which had most severe damages, was struggling from declining catches even
before the tsunami, and its catch never recovered with all these huge investments. The number offishermen on the island has dropped to under 200 from more than 400 at the time of the tsunami,
according to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. In a decade or two, it isprobable, many of the fishing ports of the Tohoku region, might follow the same road as
Okushiri.

Thus the timing is right for a serious reconsideration of the region's economic future.

II. The key actions required for reconstruction

Five point Action Plan
1. Policy and institutions
2. Security and safety
3. Green economy
4. Economic competitiveness5. PPP

Based on the evidence collected by the delegation during the mission to the region in November
2011 and taking into account the experiences of many recent natural disasters around the world
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such as Hurricane Katrina3, the 5 following points or 'action plan' are especially recommended to'build back better and brighter' :1. Establishing a policy that is built on a coherent vision, strong leadership and good
coordination that results in an effective implementation;
2. Rebuilding a safer, more resilient infrastructure;
3. Building an economic future that is sustainable, based on 'green growth ', the ‘green
economy’, some new industries and new ‘smart’ cities;
4. Forging regional economic competitiveness (open markets, deregulation andliberalization) that translate into a more prosperous region with better quality jobs,
higher standards of care, education etc. for all citizens; and5. Using PPP as a model for rebuilding infrastructure and delivery of public services.

All these aspects are interconnected and have as a common denominator the need to restore
confidence in the region's future amongst the local communities, the country and in particular theinvestor and business community. These actions also need to follow one after another if they are
to promote confidence amongst investors.

Overall, policy is needed to give predictability and 'certainty' to the investor. The investor too
must be assured that to the maximum extent possible, the infrastructure will be able to withstandfuture tsunamis and other natural disasters. The business community will also be attracted to theinvestment opportunities from new fast growing industries that are linked to the 'green economy'.
In addition, the conditions for doing business need to be attractive and competitive in relation toother locations in Japan and outside the country where there are many alternative places investors
can go. Bringing these actions together through building a world-class modern infrastructure
through PPP is also an important component of the revival.

3

There is a considerable literature on the impact and measures needed to address thesecatastrophes. See the following website for some of the important contributions...
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How are Japan and the region currently performing in these Five areas?

1. Overall policy that offers vision, leadership, effective coordination and implementation(i) Bureaucracy and policy making challenge
Since Japan is a democracy, elected officials should naturally play a role in determining which
policy options will be turned into reality in accordance with the national interest. For almost 50
years, the Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”) controlled the government through its majority inthe lower house of the Diet. The LDP’s rule was broken when the Democratic Party of Japan(“DPJ”) obtained a majority in the 2009 general election. Under the LDP administration, policy
issues were handled rather smoothly between the politicians and the career bureaucracy, oftenwith the latter taking the lead in setting the agenda and implementing policies once theappropriate laws were passed by the legislature. Individual ministries also had the final word on
most matters within their jurisdictional domains (tatewari gyosei, i.e. sectionalism), making
decision-making on cross-cutting issues extremely difficult and time consuming. The DPJ tried toestablish a national strategy office under the Prime Minister as a way to bring ultimate policy
decision-making under one roof but this exercise ended in failure. The DPJ also made “oust thebureaucrats” (datsu kanryo) from policy making as one of its main campaign slogans, as a way tobring more democratic accountability to the legislative process. In the aftermath of the 3.11
disaster, the DPJ found it nearly impossible to work without the full cooperation of thebureaucracy.

When the DPJ lost the upper house election in 2009 and ceded control of that body to a coalitionof opposition parties, legislative initiatives became extremely difficult, with the opposition in the
run up to the disaster calling for no-confidence votes against important DPJ ministers andotherwise blocking new legislation. Following the disaster, there was a brief period of national
unity when none of the political parties wanted to be seen as obstructing measures to provide
relief and recovery of the Tohoku area. This period culminated with the passage of two bills (theRenewable Energy Law and bill to finance government debt) which Mr. Kan pushed through inexchange for his resignation as Prime Minister.

(ii) Setting priorities for reconstruction
On 14 April 2011, Prime Minister Kan convened the Reconstruction Design Council in Responseto the Great East Japan Earthquake (the “Design Council”), under the chairmanship of Professor
Makoto Iokibe of the National Defense Academy, and charged it with the duty to formulate
guidelines on reconstruction in the affected regions. On 25 June 2011, the Design Council
published its Report, which stated that seven principles should guide the Reconstruction
Framework (see box)
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Seven Principles for Guiding Reconstruction
1.

remember the tragedy by creating memorial forests and monuments andexamining the causes and lessons learned;

2.

make community-focused reconstruction the foundation of efforts toward
recovery with the national government supporting reconstruction throughgeneral guidelines and institutional design;

3.

pursue forms of recovery and reconstruction that tap into the region’s
latent strengths and lead to technological innovation;

4.

construct disaster resilient safe and secure communities and a naturalenergy-powered region;5.

simultaneously pursue reconstruction of the afflicted areas andrevitalization of the nation;

6.

seek an early resolution of the nuclear accidents and7.

pursue reconstruction with a spirit of solidarity and mutual understandingthat permeates the entire nation.

While some of the seven principles are clearly aspirational, the focus on i) community led
development within a framework of national government support, ii) technological innovation,and iii) resilient communities powered by clean energy, has significant operational implications.
Under a section of the Report entitled “Actors for Reconstruction Projects and Consensus-based
Processes”, the Design Council outlined its vision concerning how redevelopment priorities
should be set. The main actors should be the municipalities themselves, as it is the residents whoare closest to their communities who and understand local characteristics best. The Report went
on to state that the national government should set the overall policy for reconstruction, including
a vision, ideals, and types of assistance. Prefectural governments will take on the role ofresponding to wide-area administrative issues, as the government body that encompasses thevarious municipalities.
(iii) A calendar of key steps in the policy making process1.

On 24 June 2011, 102 days after the disaster, the Diet passed the Basic Act on
Reconstruction in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (the “BasicAct”), which authorized the issuance of “reconstruction bonds” to finance thereconstruction, the creation of Special Zones for Reconstruction and theestablishment of an office, under the Prime Minister, known as theReconstruction Headquarters to guide national government activities. The BasicPPP DRR AND DRM IN JAPAN

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Act also charged the national government with the duty to prepare detailed
guidelines, following the recommendations contained in the Design Council’s
Report and reconstituted the Design Council as an official organ of theReconstruction Headquarters. Finally, the Basic Act requires that theReconstruction Headquarters itself be reconstituted as an Agency of thegovernment (to be known as the Reconstruction Agency) but did not set a
deadline for its establishment or specifically delineate its authority vis a visother government ministries in order to avoid the gridlock that often occurs due
to bureaucratic turf battles.
2.

On 29 July 2011, the Reconstruction Headquarters published a revised versionof its Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in response to the Great East Japan
Earthquake (the “ Basic Guidelines”) (subsequently revised on 11 August 2011)
which adopted most of the suggestions contained in the Design Council’s
Report. It set the timeframe for reconstruction at 10 years and designated thefirst five years as a “concentrated reconstruction period”. The Guidelines callfor a “full scale national response” by “revising the existing administrative
systems, reducing the burden of procedures and providing assistance in the formof financial support, know-how and human resources”.

The Guidelines envision the expenditure of 23 trillion yen (U.S.$ 290 billion @ $1:80yen) over
the ten year period with 19 trillion yen (U.S.$ 240 billion) to be expended over the first five years
and these public expenditures do not include the money that will be needed in connection withdamages caused by the nuclear accident. It is intended that the reconstruction expenditures will be
paid for by the issuance of reconstruction bonds and by the reduction of government
expenditures, the selling of state-owned properties, reviews of special government accounts andpersonnel costs of public servants, further increases in non-tax revenues and temporary taxation
measures.
The Design Council introduced the concept of the “New Public Commons” as a method of
inducing the private sector and civil society to play an active role in reconstruction. Basically thismeans that government, at all levels, should respond to the needs and demands of NPOs, NGOs
and businesses by facilitating their involvement in the creation of projects both in social sectors
and infrastructure. It is hoped that this will encourage new investment and stem the flight ofexisting businesses and people to other areas of Japan or abroad. As participation from all sectors(e.g., domestic and foreign, civil society and business interests, etc.) is encouraged, this process iscalled “Open Reconstruction”. In accordance with the Guidelines, the private sector is expected totake advantage of the provisions of the new special economic zones and participate ininfrastructure projects using the newly amended (April, 2011) law on public private partnerships,
known as the PFI Law.

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Special Reconstruction Zones
Special economic zones were first introduced in Japan during the administration of Prime Minister
Koizumi in 2003 as a way of reducing regulatory barriers to the creation of new enterprises.
Significantly, these zones did not include any tax relief measures. In response to the disaster, a new
system of Special Zones for Reconstruction (fukko tokku) will be established in the Tohoku region,
which will include significant deregulation and tax relief for enterprises which establish operations
there.

Backup Logistic Support
There was a mayor in a small city inland of the coast lines (Sanriku) of Tohoku with 32,000 people.
The mayor was elected in 2002 and with the study of the past history of the region, this mayor decided
that his city can be a backup logistic support center for those coastal areas in case of major tsunami. In
the last 100 years, Sanriku region was hit three times by major tsunamis according to the mayor. His
city is 20 - 30 kilometers inland west from the coast and has road access to those areas. The region’s
major economic area is 20 – 30 kilometers west from his city. Thus, his city is located in the middle ofthe major economic region and the coastal area. He discussed his ides with the citizens of his city andthey agreed with the concept. He then called on the city leaders of the coastal area, prefecture
government, self defense force of Tohoku, Fire/Police recue and the citizens to drill for possible
disaster from tsunami. He did it twice before 2011.
On March 12, a day after, he had over 5,000 rescue crews from the self defense force, police/fire rescue
and other local governments, business and volunteer groups at his city. He dispatched his staff to thosecoastal areas in the night of March 11 and in the morning of March 12, he knew more than anyone
about the conditions of those coastal areas. By the noon time of March 12, there were foods, water,
blanket and other supplies delivered to those severe hit areas. Nobody asked but they were there.
His city hall was also damaged and could not be used. He asked a shopping center with an empty spaceand located parts of his city hall functions to the shopping center. Some citizens comment, “its moreconvenient to come to this shopping center to also visit the city hall”. His city’s sport ground became
the base for self defense and police/fire rescue forces. His gymnasium became the lodging area forthose and citizen volunteers. No residents complained.
Mayor Honda is not trained expert in emergency management or remote backup logistic support center
operations. He thought what he could do and prepared his city for it. We asked Mayor Honda, “if he
had a national government support or legal authority to organize the disaster recovery effort, how could
it be different?” His reply, “I could have done much better for those coastal areas. He lost somecolleague mayor and friends in the coast. He says he tried his best in saving those cities, which themayor and his friends were lost in the disaster.
The disasters and tsunami can hit any coastal areas with earthquakes around the world. The example ofTono City with backup logistic support center operation can be practiced around the world for thereaction process.

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PPP AND RISK REDUCTION AND RISK MITIGATION: CASE STUDY JAPAN TSUNAMI 2011(iv) Some questions on the implementation of such measures(a) Sectionalism within the public administration
As stated earlier, in Japan, ministries with their jurisdictions stipulated in the establishment oflaws and bureaucrats in their own right wield policy primacy, and ministers have less power informulating policy. There is a tendency that the ministers transform themselves into
representatives of their ministries' interests and positions, regardless of their opinions as Diet
members prior to assuming their portfolios. The bureaucracy is very powerful and as noted above
there are attempts (but few successes) in dissolving sectionalism, for example, through improving
ministerial coordination under the direction of Prime Minister, regardless of each ministries
jurisdiction. Overall the existence of sectionalism creates difficulties for Japanese governments toeffectuate appropriate change in policies and systems and in responding to changing situations
swiftly: ministries are the primary actors, and they often put too much emphasis on past records.4(b) Coordination between different levels of government
Whether the national, prefectural and local governments will in generating a new policy
framework for the reconstruction, be able to coordinate their efforts in a timely and efficientmanner?

One of the members of the mission have raised a concern that there was a considerable lack of
coordination between different levels of government. Decentralization policies have been putting
incredible amount of responsibilities to local governments, but in a massive disaster case, norm ofdecentralization did not work in many occasions. The member interviewed several officials in thenational government, and she was told that national government was reluctant to provide amechanism for distribution of human resources to devastated municipalities.

Some officials in devastated cities have pointed out that prefectural governments were not quite
effective in quick reactions because they needed a comprehensive grasp of the situation
throughout the prefecture and react equally to all municipalities in the prefecture. Many
complained that prefectural government asked municipalities to report their damages and tried toevaluate each cities’ damages, and then to allocate goods or personnel. In the very early reactions,4

It also explains why ministers sometimes lack sufficient insight and knowledge in their policy domain and why they
are replaced frequently in a process like periodic personnel transfers in a company. Given this reality, it is nowonder that in the past political parties have fought elections with no concrete platform.

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it will delay the actions if the organizations stick to the norm of being ‘equal and fair’. This is dueto the experience and pre-emptive resource assessment and allocation.

(c) Summary
In summary, with the creation of the Reconstruction Design Council a way to lead policy making
has been defined. Dealing with a strong role played by the Japanese bureaucracy, is a challengethat can delay or even prevent policy implementation.
There are many bodies that would be theoretically included in coordination, but in the need forquick actions coordination has to give way to leadership. In the very early reaction phase, themayor of Tono city took on a leadership role and proved his system was very effective in deliveryof urgent aid to localities in need. But on medium / long term reconstruction, it is difficult to see
how the coordination should take place. The Japan government launched the Reconstruction
Agency, Fukkocho, in February 2012. The Agency was planned to operate about 10 years until
the end of March 2021, mainly dealing with challenges of making reconstruction policy, settling
down the location of special rebuild area, allotting reconstruction funds, and coordinating withother related departments to promote reconstruction. The government also implemented theSpecial Reconstruction Zones, however, it is still unknown how these systems can work
effectively in order to attract private investment.

2. Building safer and more resilient infrastructure

Building safer and more resilient infrastructure is a key element in disaster risk reduction. A
particularly important aspect of resilience is adaptation: the ability to cope with natural disasters.
Disaster risk reduction is about much more than justScale of investment required toemergency management — on the contrary, to be fully
make the future more secure: if
effective it must be integrated into all sectors of
GDP losses are used to assess
development and cover both measures to avoid disasters andthe disaster losses that havemeasures to mitigate damage when they do occur. This is
arisen from the tsunami ofespecially critical in this region which over many centuries
March 2011, the incentive ofis the most vulnerable to tsunamis.
local and national governments
to make such investments in theinfrastructure will increase
Global attention to disaster risk reduction has risen steadily
in recent years. The Hyogo Framework for Action on
disaster risk reduction is an especially important landmark in efforts to assist nations andcommunities in becoming more resilient to disasters and in better coping with hazards thatthreaten development. The Japanese Government is probably the world's leader in disaster risk

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mitigation strategies and a model for other countries. The risk mitigation strategies were indeed
highly effective notably in the case of roads and rail (see box).

(i) The international benchmarks in disaster risk reduction
The following are some of the benchmarks that can be used to determine the region's disaster
preparedness:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Risk management strategies;
Retrofitting and enhancing the most risk-prone infrastructure assets;
Social protection schemes (provides timely capital following disasters,
They help protect households from losses and quicken recovery);Protection provided by conserving the local ecosystem;
Land use planning and building codes (materials, spacing etc.); andPolitical responsibility for taking charge of disaster risk recovery(ii) The key questions
One of the key questions the government will ask in considering the measures needed to make its
infrastructure more resilient is the likelihood of another tsunami of such a severity striking again?
This is an important question because the answer will determine the cost which the Government
will be faced to incur for the rebuilding of the shoreline defenses, which as seen above, were notquite effective to stop a tsunami of this ferocity.

…with no precise answer…
There are number of different replies to this question. Some argue that this type of tsunami is a‘one-off’ occurrence that takes place once in several centuries and more than likely will not be
repeated in our children or our children’ s children lifetimes. Others take the more gloomy view
arguing that based on historical precedence, at least another three tsunamis of differing degrees
can be expected within the next 100 years (and that the next could conceivably happen tomorrowon this scenario). 5…and no clear policy solution.
Both ‘extreme’ positions could be perfectly right and this is precisely the problem. Such
uncertainty is impossible to plan for. Thus, the position the Japanese government have taken - that
5

The workers clearing up after the tsunami in Sendai built an observation platform so that they
could get warning of another tsunami while they were busy cleaning up on the previous one.
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PPP AND RISK REDUCTION AND RISK MITIGATION: CASE STUDY JAPAN TSUNAMI 2011is deciding to rebuild and raise the height of some of the old sea barriers, (but not to the height of
the tsunami of March 2011) is probably the right one and will provide some assurance (not tomention employment in the local construction industry) but will not provide a complete solution
to the risks that future tsunamis will produce.

(iii) Hardware for mitigation, education for better preparedness
The fact that most people were killed by the tsunami is a major challenge for many people whoplan reconstruction and mitigation. The Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995 killed over 5,000
people in the collapse and fire. In that case, the countermeasures were quite clear: stronger
structure, fire-resistance and easier escape. The building standards were changed, many old andweak buildings were redeveloped or retro-fitted, and streets were widened.
However, in this case, it is not that simple. Most cities and towns in the region were considered as
being tsunami-resistant. This area had been hit by tsunamis many times,1933 and 1896 caused byearthquakes in the region and 1960 caused by an earthquake in Chile. Therefore, levees andbreakwaters had been built in the last several decades. But most of these infrastructures failed tohold back the waves. And worse, many civil engineers had stated the damages caused by thetsunami were beyond their knowledge or even imagination, thus it is hard for them to decide how
to resolve the issue.
Oral traditions sometimes save the lives of people far more than the most advanced technologies.
There was a Guinness deepest breakwater in the gulf of Kamaishi. This breakwater was designed
to reduce the tsunami height—largest tsunami height considered was 8.6 meters, which occurredin Meiji-Sanriku Earthquake in 1896—to the top height of on shore embankment (approximately
4 meters). One figure shows this breakwater succeeded to reduce the height of tsunami from 13.7
meters to 8.1 meters and delayed the wave for 6 minutes to reach the city, while a large portion of
the city was inundated.
A famous saying in the region, “Tsunami Tendenko,” meaning ‘run separately and do not worry
about the others,’ saved many lives, especially of youth. In Kamaishi City, while many schools
are flooded by tsunami, more than 99% of elementary and junior high school students were
saved—it is said that that 100%of the students under schools’ supervision were saved, and those
who lost their lives were not under such supervision at the time of tragedy. This was because theCity and Gunma University had been providing an education program to teach students how toreact in large earthquakes and tsunami alert for the preciding three years. Their educational
programme was based on the lessons from past earthquakes and tsunamis. These children werealso taught to tell their parents not to come to schools to pick them up because the children would
have already left the school, while coming to school would put the parents’ own lives in jeopardy.

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A middle school in Kamaishi: flooded to the third floor (top left), A levee destroyed by tsunami(top right), Otsuchi town totally devastated (below)

On the other hand, there is an elementary school in Ishinomaki City, Miyagi that lost 74 children
out of 108. This school was marked “safe” in the City’s tsunami Hazard Map, supposedly
functioning as a refuge for local residents. However, on 11 March, this school’s two storey
building was totally flooded. Principal of the school, who was away from the school on that day,admitted that the school had drilled once every year on how to escape from the school building tothe outside playground in an event of earthquake or fire, but never drilled on how to escape froma tsunami. The school’s Crisis Management manual only stated "flee to higher ground", when thetsunami was expected to occur, and never specified where to go. Only after 40 minutes did viceprincipal and 10 teachers decided to go to a higher ground near Shin-Kitakami Bridge, and soonafter they started to evacuate, most students and teachers were swallowed by tsunami. In thiscase, failure of tsunami Hazard Map and lack of training led to this tragedy.

Another ‘hardware’ failure was the misinformation of tsunami alert. Immediately after theearthquake, the Japan Meteorological Agency(JMA) announced that the Magnitude of theearthquake was 7.9 and alerted tsunamis of six meters in height would strike the shore—it took
several days for the Agency to correct the figure to Magnitude 9.0, and tsunami far exceeded 10
meters. According to the Mayor of Minami Sanriku Town, Mr. Jin Sato, this misinformation was
due to the lack of capability of JMA’s observation and alert system. This system automatically
predicted the tsunami height of 6 meters if the earthquake was Magnitude 8. The tsunami of 6
meters was equivalent to the tsunami caused by the Chilean Earthquake in 1960. Since a
breakwater had been built after the 1960 tsunami, many people, including Mayor Sato himself,
did not consider the tsunami as dangerous as it actually was. The town hall was totally destroyed
and many lost their lives. Mayor Sato continues; “if the first alert announced Magnitude was 9.0,
and predicted tsunami height would be 10 meters plus, many citizens might have escaped and

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been saved”. In response to these fatal results, The government announced that they have changed
warnings not to give false sense of security to audience, especially in the earliest alart.

(iv) Need for action-leading principles
Hardware (civil infrastructures, seismic alert system, hazard map etc.) has limitations. And worse,
even if JMA announces the seismic intensity and tsunami alert, these alerts are not tied to actionleading principals. Many people do not know how to react to these alerts. Thus, it is important toteach people about the limitations, and teach and train based on these principals.
The images compare
JMA’s description ofseismic intensity andPhilippines’
Metro
ManilaDevelopment
Authority’s(MMDA)
description of Typhoonsignals. As these two
example show, while
MMDA’sWebsitedescribes how to react to
Typhoon signals, JMA’s
Website only describes
what kind of effect would JMA’s description on seismic intensity list only states the affect ofoccur in that seismic seismic intensity (left), and MMDA’s “what to do” list during typhoon
intensity or how tsunami signals (right)
warnings would be generated in the event of earthquake. Other organizations, mass transit
operators for example, also only describe how they would stop trains when they observe seismic
scale 5 upper and above, but do not describe how passengers should react while on/off the trains.
There is an urgent need to develop behavior oriented alert system, and in detail evacuation drill
for everyone.
The Government too is fully aware that spending more on risk mitigation is more cost effective inthe long run. According to the World Bank, around 20 % of humanitarian aid is now spent
responding to disasters, whereas a negligible (although rising) 0.7 % is spent on preventive
measures taken to mitigate their possible consequences.

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Need to take account of ideas from outside Japan which can offer some innovative solutions
Applying new technologies and techniques; as the box shows countries are learning to manage
threats much more effectively and innovatively even though meeting such a challenge as
powerful as tsunamis is daunting and nothing really compares. But water management
techniques, (e.g. building levees a few miles away from the shoreline) can halt the progress of thewave, while cities themselves can be designed to 'trap' water and thereby mitigate the worst
effects.
Rotterdam's construction of 'floating buildings'

The Netherlands is at the forefront of water management issues. Rather than relying on dyekes
to water out, Rotterdam, its and Europe's main port is also trying to mitigate the consequences
if water comes in. A 10,000 - cubic -meter tank was built into a new car park, big enough tocatch roughly 25 per cent of the water from a once-in-a- century flood. A public plaza has
been designed to turn into wading pools when it fills with rain water.
In the city's harbour sits a floating pavilion shaped like three halved footballs built on huge
blocks of foam. It is a model for the floating communities the city hopes might one day
repopulate the docklands, whose traditional shipping activities are moving elsewhere. Pieter
Pigdor, one of the pavilion's architects, says floating buildings can be up to seven storeys tall,
are inherently flood proof and can be easily moved.

The Economist

It is also important to make the nuclear infrastructure safer. The aftermath of the Fukushima
nuclear disaster must be dealt with properly so that citizens and private investors feel that theregion is safe. Finally, assurances need to be given that the region will have an adequate supply ofelectric power (see the section below).

In summary, a full evaluation of the benchmarks of risk mitigation strategies is not possible inthis report but the following observations can be made:1. more attention to software of disaster risk mitigation (training of all groups etc.)
needs to be made;2. such training needs to undergo a serious evaluation; andPPP DRR AND DRM IN JAPAN
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3. undertaking of a study to explore other countries risk mitigation strategies ininfrastructure and their lessons for Japan. 6

3. Sustainable development (renewable and smart cities) and green growth

Green growth aims to foster economic growth and development while ensuring that natural assets
and environmental services are protected and maintained. The approach places a premium ontechnology and innovation—from smart grid systems and high efficiency lighting systems torenewable energies including solar and geothermal power—as well as on improving incentives
for technology development and innovation.

Through an emphasis on technology and innovation, various forms of cooperation and the social
environment and institutional framework for low-carbon and sustainable society, green growthprovides multiple options for countries and the global community to realize the vision. It canshape strategies for a response to climate change by reducing carbon emission through thedevelopment, improvement and deployment of various renewable energy sources and efficientenergy use. At the same time, it can stimulate economic growth and equip an economy with better
tools to cope with rapid demographic changes as seen in the Tokohu region, by fostering green
businesses and accompanying synergy effects, and generating green jobs. It can also help asociety to tackle resource scarcity and improve the environment and natural assets, including
ecosystems and biodiversity, through improved and enhanced natural asset and resource
management.

Green growth strategies are also able to produce a more resilient growth model, more capable ofwithstanding external shocks—whether related to climate, energy, food, resources or sudden
demographic change. Green growth could also facilitate greater involvement of all relevant
stakeholders as its successful implementation requires such participation and cooperation. When
it is tailored adequately for each country, locality or region according to its needs and situation,and complemented with social protection to ensure more inclusivity and stability. Finally thegreen economy is a very strong business opportunity and represents the world's fastest growing
sector. This growth is contingent, however, on government policy and its commitment tointroducing robust measures and targets on inter alia climate change etc.
The Economist January 14 2012 ‘briefing Natural Disasters’ P 60. The case is mentioned of
Pass Christian, a resort town in Mississippi, where an apartment complex was destroyed by
Hurricane Camille in 1969, killing 21 people who had taken refuge inside. A shopping centre andcondominiums were later built in the same area, only to be wiped out by Hurricane Katrina in
2005, since when more new condominiums have gone up nearby.
6

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The concept of green growth and the accompanying technologies such as smart grid systems,
energy saving techniques as well as renewable energy systems are promising examples and strong
opportunities for PPPs (see box below) and we take each in turn:(i) Putting PPP into practice for the green economy(a) Smart grids and smart cities:
Climate change poses serious risks for the global environment but presents new opportunities aswell. There are significant benefits that will accrue to the economy as the energy paradigm shifts
from a system based on a low cost of carbon and ever increasing demand for electric power toone of high carbon costs and the need to more efficiently manage energy consumption. The
concept of the smart grid, which will combine information technology with tools to manage
variable renewable power, demand response and distributed power generation, seems ideallysuited to address these issues.
Key smart grid functionalities include:“Wide-Area Situational Awareness” refers to technologies that will give bulk-powersystem operators access to real-time data that will allow them to properly manage
congestion and reliability across the entire system in order to alleviate massive
blackouts such as the one that occurred in the Northeastern United States in 2003.

“Demand Response” will allow system operators to interact with power users to vary
the supply during periods of high demand or unavailability due to variable resources.

“Electric Storage” through new technologies such as reciprocating engines, fuel cells,
micro turbines, and photovoltaic’s can form a new web of distributed energy
resources (DER) which will supplement the generation of power by the utilities

“Electric Transportation”, or the advent of widespread use of electric vehicles, willplace new demands on the power system as millions of cars will need to be charged
over large areas in order to allow seamless transportation networks.

Experiences of this PPP in the Tokohu region:
The evidence of such projects is still very limited however a new resilience for rebuilding cities
will be required involving new city and community design. In some cases, residential areas willneed to be rebuilt farther from the sea. This will not happen overnight as these communities canonly be planned once the national government has cleared the debris and settled on plans forreconstruction of the major transportation links. A number of localities are however considering
the development of “eco towns” which will rely on renewable energy sources and be connectedby the smart grid.

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At least one major 'smart' city planning project, Tago nishi ecology model town in Sendai City ismoving forward in the region to the detailed planning stage, which involves not only PPP but
government-academic-private sector partnership. The 'smart city' will include residential,commercial, and public housing areas, the last being the part where tsunami survivors can bepermanently relocated. The plan is worked out by the three parties (plus community consensusbuilding). Companies can even help with the consensus building part (i.e. allow participants tochange variables and see what happens—e.g. if you move or resize residential areas, re-arrange
disaster prevention hardware, utilities, etc). Those involved have advocated for solar power
generation with a local consumption model, with the plans for solar farms on the outskirts as wellas panels on the roof, energy storage cells so that things would work when the national grid turns
off during disasters.

This sort of PPP might be found within, for example, a newly created private sector cityadministration committee, which will be run by those who built or provided the services(including software companies who build the home networking system, companies who wereinvolved in planning and hardware systems, etc.) who will liaise with the local government aswell as the residential association to keep the city running.

Challenges of applying PPPs in this area:
Integrating the project into the city administration: As it concerns the smart city project thechallenges are: how to graft the area onto existing and neighbouring residential areas (solution:
the city will provide some emergency service options for neighboring communities), making it
economically feasible (it might have to include convincing the public that safety is somethingworth paying a bit more for), making it run like it should in the long term (the admin committee isan attempt at this one), and how to propagate the model beyond the immediately disaster-struck
areas, if and when it proves successful.

Policy risk: Due to rising demand for electric power throughout the world, it is clear thatsignificant bottlenecks will develop if policy makers fail to take action in the near future. For
example, many observers believe that large-scale wind and solar plants must be developed
outside highly populated urban areas but the electricity will not reach customers unless expensive
transmission lines are built. Private investors are unwilling to finance the construction of new,
two-way transmission lines, unless there is a degree of certainty about the economic viability of
renewable power projects. In the absence of a “carbon price” or mandatory interconnection
regulations, the economic viability of such projects is still uncertain.

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New methods for determining returns and rates: Since the smart grid involves the marriage of
information technology and power7 generation and consumption, regulators in the telecom sector
and power sector must carefully coordinate their policy initiatives with tax and consumer
concerns to make sure that they do not work at cross purposes. High-speed data and voice
infrastructure is a fundamental driver of growth in many economies but their development should
be considered alongside power initiatives in order to achieve economies of scale and avoid
redundancies. “Dynamic pricing” using smart grid technologies will also allow customers to pay
for electricity based on the cost to produce it at different times in the day or by variable sources.

Allocation of risks: Stakeholders in the new smart grid environment include customers, theutilities and their shareholders, contractors, suppliers, product and appliance manufacturers andthe regulators. The costs and benefits that can accrue to each must be carefully considered in thedesign of the new regulatory framework to ensure that the risks are allocated to those who are
best able to manage those risks. For example, new technologies, which supplant old methods, cancause significant hardships to incumbents who will have little or no incentive to make necessarychanges if they cannot adequately recover the costs associated with legacy systems. In order toencourage transition to the new smart technologies, the regulators, particularly in deregulated
markets, may need to find ways to mitigate those risks for utilities. For example, in order toensure the security and reliability of the smart grid, interoperability standards between various
parts of the system are necessary.

(b) Public lighting and traffic management lighting networks in non-renewable energy inthe road sector (traffic management and public lighting networks)
Here a private PPP operator optimizes the energy consumption of public lighting and traffic
management systems through a PPP management contract. Thanks to new technology and a more
efficient operating approach it is possible to save 45% of electricity in public lighting, and 85% intraffic management systems. These important savings help to refinance (sometimes 100 per cent)the modernization within a PPP approach, i.e. 1) Immediately have a much better carbon footprint,
2) Achieve overall savings in the medium term, relieving public sector budgets. These projects
are being done in cities all over Europe.

Experience in Tokohu region:
Not widely experienced or known in the area. Some solarpower generater and small batteries areused for lighting up street signs and warning lamps for road constructions, however, many

7(see for example the Annual Report 2011 of the Association of French motorway
concessionaires, ASFA).
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municipalities and public bodies are more aware of wider application of these technologies—evenin Tokyo metropolitan area, lots of confusion had occured because of the “scheduled blackouts”.

Challenges:
The main challenge to this PPP based on experiences in Europe comes from the existing public
utilities and local service providers.

(c) Electric charger terminals/ stations by an alliance of electricity network providers and
PPP operators of parking’s and dedicated charging points.
The stations can leverage the existing electrical grid and home charging is also an option.
Nevertheless, longer drives between cities and towns require a network of public charging
stations or another method to extend the range of electric vehicles beyond the normal daily
commute. One challenge in such infrastructure is the level of demand; an isolated station alongwith a busy highway may see hundreds of customers per hour if every passing electric vehicle has
to stop there to complete the trip. In the first half of the 20th century, internal combustion vehicles
faced a similar infrastructure problem.

Challenges:
While battery storage technology is improving by the day, electric vehicles will not be
manufactured or sold on a massive scale until the smart grid can deliver a multitude of stations
where these vehicles can be charged.

(d) Green PPP motorways (= green design, construction and operation)
The concept of Green Economy is key to the development and maintenance of modern PPP
motorways. Generally speaking, projects and networks should not only be financially sustainable
and viable, but also environmentally. For this purpose, any measure necessary for mitigating
negative external effects, which the infrastructure is likely to cause, shall be included into thescope statement of the PPP concessionaire.

Although the share of necessary environmental funds may vary considerably, depending on thecharacteristics of the individual project, a good example appears to be set by French motorway
operators that allocate 10% of their overall annual investment to sustainability (see for example
the Annual Report 2011 of the Association of French motorway concessionaires, ASFA).

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In a way the concept of Green Economy encompasses green Public Procurement (GPP), which
the UN ECE fully supports and that is also promoted by the European Commission (see theCommunication (COM (2008) 400).
This means:
Conducting an environmental impact assessment, from the outset, as being part of new
project design and devising all necessary measures accordingly and cost-efficiently. In certain
cases the disturbance or even destruction of a biotope may necessitate changes in the locationand scope of a motorway.
Building the project with environmentally friendly construction technology (reducing
emissions, optimizing the use of energy and materials), as well as recycling road construction
materials later on during the rehabilitation phase.
Taking all necessary environmental protection measures, i.e. protecting the natural habitatfrom the network by fences; implementing wildlife crossings and protecting water resources;
not to forget the reduction of noise emissions by barriers and noise absorbing pavements. In
certain cases, green facilities maintenance in the vicinity of the project, as well as thepromotion of environmental protection projects may be needed.
Optimizing traffic management and guidance in such a way that motorists reduce
emissions by optimizing their speed (introducing speed limits as well as fluidifying traffic andavoiding congestion).
Using, as much as possible, whilst being reasonably cost-efficient, renewable energy
production (thermo-solar, photovoltaic and wind panels that provide electricity to all
motorway equipments).

Challenges:
The biggest challenge for this PPP is the highway policies and politics. Japan’s public highway
operators were privatized in 2005, and its very complicated scheme is a headache for PPP
application. In addition, it seems that highway tariff has been highly political issues in recent
administrations, and often used as a tool to attract votes in the election. Thus the highways havebeen ‘excluded’ from infrastructures for concession contracts.

(e) Renewable energy and biomass through PPP
One option in exploring other options to nuclear power is the use of biomass, which can be takenfrom the vast but unexploited forests of Japan. Toyo University and PPP Graduate School arepromoting one biomass industry to be developed in Japan in long term and in Tohoku (northern
Japan) in short term. First, Tohoku is reported having over 20 year volume of debris. The debris
can be processed and burned to covert them to electricity. Second, Tohoku develops biomass,
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namely wood pellet industry using vast area of Tohoku, which are covered by forest. 67% of theland areas of Japan are covered by forest, more so in Tohoku. Third, after the debris are taken
cared, wood pellet produced in Tohoku can be used to generate electricity for Tohoku. Fourth,
after the start in Tohoku, Japan can develop other forested areas with wood pellet industry tocreate jobs, convert to renewable energy and make Japan a resource nation rather than depending
on foreign oil, coal and gas.

Other natural energy sources, such as solar and wind are fine natural resources but they do not
produce employment, which Tohoku needs. Renewable abundant forest woods can create lasting
employment in Tohoku.

In addition, the issues related to biomass are worth considering. For instance, the Tohoku area has
many years of debris from tsunami, which can be converted to energy. A big problem is that the
majority of debris contains salt, and if burned, it produces dioxin and CO2. If there is atechnology, which can convert the debris with salt to energy without dioxin and CO2, it will be awinner. The possible solution can be a plasma technology. Some of the debris (especially grasses
and some soils) contains radiation. If treated, it will thicken the radiation. Plasma cannot solve
this. Presently, the debris are burned and not converted to energy.

Experience:
The government is trying to build 5 power stations in Tohoku, which can convert debris toenergy. The debris is only temporary solution. It will be consumed in few years. The area needs
more sources to be converted to energy after debris. Most of Tohoku is covered by forest. 67% ofJapan is covered by forest. Forests are not being used for woods or for energy. Europe and theNorth America have found biomass from trees and converting to energy close to 100 million tons
(pellet) a year. Japan produces 60,000 ton per year for boilers and pellet stove. Biomass requires
cutting trees, transfer to the factory, replant trees, factory needs workers, the products must be
shipped to power plant, etc. All these produce jobs for Tohoku. With high RPS standard in
Europe, Tohoku can produce their own electricity and export the products to Europe as well.
Japan can follow this move and can produce biomass wood pellet to be converted to energy rather
than depending on fossil power generations.

Challenge:
There are several very small pellet or biomass plants are in Tohoku. But it is often said that mostof them are producing little amount and costly and not feasible. One operator of a biomass plant
told the UN mission that they are eager to withdraw from the biomass plant, once governmental

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subsidiary expires. The key challenge is the need to have appropriate incentives from policy
makers to use renewable.

In summary as the region searches to reinvent itself, it needs to consider new projects and new
economic activities: The green economy is an exciting basis to plan the future. Already the future
green industry it is predicted will be worth billions in the next ten years provided government
keep to commitments to use renewable energy and phase out other sources of energy. The above
listed projects are some of the PPP options that the region may consider.

(f) The key question is whether Energy policy and the need to move to renewable
The future of nuclear power is a matter of intense debate…
As of this writing, the future of nuclear power is the subject of fierce debate. Nuclear energy prior
to the 3.11 disaster, the DPJ controlled national government had decided to greatly increase
Japan’s reliance on nuclear power to approximately 50% but the Fukushima disaster caused
serious reconsideration of this policy. Currently Japan has 54 nuclear reactors. Four of thereactors at Fukushima were damaged due to the disaster. 39 have been shut down for regular
maintenance and the remaining 11 are expected to be shut down for maintenance by the summerof 2012.

...with little consensus on the issue apparent.
Public opinion is quite divided on the issue of nuclear power. Will Japan go the way of Germany
and completely eliminate its reliance on nuclear power or will it find a way to continue but at a
reduced rate of dependence? Local opposition to restarting the nuclear plants seems to be
growing. Local approvals are necessary in order to restart the nuclear reactors that have been shut
down. The government is currently listening to various opinions in connection with its efforts todetermine the best mix of power sources. It is expected that its new basic policy will be
formulated sometime in the summer of 2012.

What is absolutely clear at this stage is that compared to the period before the Fukushima
accident, reliance on nuclear power will decrease and renewable will increase.

Moving to the use of Renewable energy…
The Renewable Energy Law enacted on August 26, 2011, effective July 1, 2012, was a boost for
renewables. The law provides that power companies cannot refuse to enter into a power purchase
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PPP AND RISK REDUCTION AND RISK MITIGATION: CASE STUDY JAPAN TSUNAMI 2011agreement with a supplier of renewable energy, except under certain limited circumstances.
Renewable energy includes solar, wind, small and medium scale hydro, geothermal and biomass.
It is interesting to note that energy from tidal waves is not explicitly covered.

…few exemptions permitted
Power companies will be exempted from the obligation to purchase renewable power if it is likelythat there will be an adverse affect on the profitability of the power company or for other reasons
determined to be reasonable by order of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).
As METI policy on this matter has not yet been determined, this is an important area to watch.
The law provides for a new feed-in-tariff system (FIT) to be implemented to expand the priortariff which was previously limited to solar. The FIT will be applicable to any size facility, fromresidential roof tops to utility-scale projects.
The law requires METI, once per year, after considering the opinions of a third party commission,
to decide the amount of the tariff. While there are no upper or lower limits on the amount of thetariff, METI is required to consider the cost of providing renewable energy, the amount that canbe supplied and profitability of the supplier.
METI will also determine the period in which the FIT will remain in effect. While there is no
minimum period, the law requires METI to make its decision taking into account the useful life ofmajor components of the renewable power facilities.
All users of electricity (both industrial and consumers) will be charged a uniform surcharge forrenewable power; however, larger industrial users may receive somewhat reduced rates.

4. Forging regional economic competitiveness

Providing leadership and a coordinated policy, emphasizing safety and risk reduction andimplementing environmental sustainability strategies makes communities more attractive toinvestment and new jobs. It signals to local citizens and outside investors that disaster-prone
regions are thoughtfully and proactively managing their risks. Many business managers andchamber leaders are highlighting their active risk-management policies as a selling point forpotential investors and customers. On top of this the region should create the conditions forhelping business to get back on its feet and to increase its competitiveness.
Improving competitiveness is primarily task for business to do. In a market economy, the primary
responsibility for improving competitiveness must lie with firms: this is recognized by businessitself. The vast majority of businesses prosper without public subsidy. National governments
provide the overall stable macroeconomic frameworks, open markets, deregulation and legal
frameworks that allow their business to compete successfully. However, the local governments
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too have an important role to play. National policies need to be complemented by local efforts toinsure that they are effective and to help local industries of every area of Japan to become
internationally competitive.

(i) Benchmarks in regional economic competitiveness and PPP
The following benchmarks are the examples by which the performance of local regions can beevaluated:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

examples of diversification and economic growth (the tsunami affected regions
should undertake a transformation of its local economy through process of deep
structural change);
realistic and continual assessment of its strengths and weaknesses;
local economic performance needs to be benchmarked against performance in otherregions of Japan and should not be treated in isolation;
new schemes created to draw local authorities into partnerships with private sector;
local delivery of government services to business (in addition to its role infacilitating local responses to the tsunami, the government is responsible fordelivering a range of services to business at a local level).

(ii) How the region is performing with respect to the benchmarks?
The reconstruction Headquarters have published Guidelines for Reconstruction in response to theGreat East Japan Earthquake (revised on 11 August 2011), which included most suggestions
contained in the Design Council’s Report. The Basic Guidelines envision the expenditure of 23
trillion yen (U.S. $ 287 billion @ $1:80) over the ten year period with 19 trillion yen to be
expended over the first five years and these public expenditures do not include the money thatwill be needed in connection with damages caused by the nuclear accident. These expenditures
are expected to paid for by the issuance of reconstruction bonds and by the reduction of
government expenditures (ex. reduction of personnel costs of public servants), selling of stateowned properties, reviews of special government accounts, imposing reconstruction-tax, andfurther increases in non-tax revenues.
As stated earlier, the Design Council introduced the concept of the “New Public Commons” as amethod of inducing the private sector and civil society to play an active role in reconstruction.
This means all levels of government should respond to the needs and demands of NPOs, NGOs
and businesses by facilitating their involvement in the creation of projects both in social sectors
and infrastructure. This is expected to encourage new investment from other areas of Japan orabroad and retain and strengthen the existing business and people. In the “Open Reconstruction”
process, participation from all sectors including domestic, foreign, civil society and businessinterests is encouraged. In accordance with the Guidelines, the private sector is expected to takeadvantage of the provisions of the new special economic zones and participate in infrastructure
projects using the newly amended (April, 2011) law on public private partnerships, known as the
PFI Law.
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It is also important that PPP schemes to allow private sector investors to receive a market-based
return on their investments in the stricken areas, rather than be limited to “policy-based” returns.
One of the members in the UN mission had meeting with senior members of Keidanren (Japan
Business Federation), and they told that many private entities in Japan had been very skeptical
about economic feasibility, viability, and financial profitability of the projects in the area. In
addition, general public often has negative sentiments toward private sectors which make profits
in providing public services.

5. PPP trends and building local and national PPP capabilities
PPP in the Japanese recovery
A well-planned program of PFI investment for rebuilding the nation’s infrastructure can also
go a long way towards making Japan a more attractive place to put money into long-termsustainable investments. The assets that are created through PFI, once they are up andrunning, generate reliable, annuity-like cash flows from tolls or from availability payments
linked to tax revenue. These cash flows are ideally suited to life insurers and pension funds.
Moreover, these liability-driven investors, both domestic and international, will be attracted
to the low risk, high-yielding securities that provide long-term project financing and to thediversity the investments bring to their portfolio holdings.
There is an estimated $300 billion of investment to be made in fixing Japan’s infrastructure,
though that number is sure to rise further. The Japanese government and domestic insurers
should make PFI a central feature of their long-term planning for the restoration of thephysical and social infrastructure of the affected regions. With the help of private investment,
the country stands a fighting chance of turning this great tragedy into a rallying point for
their people that investors around the world will want to support.
Harry Teitelbaum………….

(i) PPPs are transforming countries around the world...
PFI and PPP is being embraced by central and local governments in many developed countries asa model for leveraging private sector financing for brownfield re-development of public
infrastructure.

…financed by user fees or availability payment from taxation...
In return for lease payments that are financed by tolls or tax revenue, private companies and theirfinancial backers get to operate and maintain the assets they design and build for very long terms,
typically 25 to 30 years.
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…with increased certainty of outcomes in contrast to typical public procurement
This arrangement produces not only better incentives to produce creative solutions and higher
quality assets delivered on-time and on-budget, but creates quality jobs that lift the economy.

PPPs make good sense in disaster recovery…
In a country where vital infrastructure projects will need to be undertaken immediately and formany years to come, PPP/PFI represents a tool for intelligent long-term planning that seems
especially appropriate now.

… and can achieve important policy goals in reconstruction….
PPP can be the means by which these goals of rebuilding a safer infrastructure, creating asustainable future and economic competitiveness, can be realized.

…at the same time avoiding the need for Japan to spend huge resources on non
economically viable projects.
As we see the nature of Japanese political can mean projects starting in regions that are done forpolitical as opposed to economically justifiable reasons which in many cases doing infrastructure
projects where there is no community to serve. PPPs avoid these politically motivated projects
because before they are begun a careful assessment takes place involving economic feasibility
studies and outline business cases so as to ensure economic sense.

PPPs can make the private sector responsible for successfully addressing the wide range ofinfrastructure vulnerability factors.

These factors are the risks in projects that need to be reduced if the natural disaster is not to claim
more lives. They include making sure the projects use the appropriate construction materials,
adopt the correct design of buildings, comply with existing building codes and above all are
regularly and properly maintained.

…and this is important especially now for Japan is in a very difficult financial situation.
Sharply increase the worst effects of the disaster such as Japan’s government debt, at over 225%
of GDP at the end of 2010, was already the world’s highest before the earthquake, tsunami and
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nuclear disaster hit one month ago. While that debt is 90% owned domestically and financed by
Japan’s high savings rate, it will constrain what the government is able to spend onreconstruction.
But PPPs have however complex structures and incur extra costs.Such costs relate to feasibility
studies, advisers and legal fees, meaning that mainly only large companies can afford to bid forsuch concessions and the government lacks capacity in such deal making. It also lacks the senior
management expertise to scrutinize the project after it become operational.

…but despite this the government of Japan is seriously considering the PPP option…
It is recognizing that given the circumstances, an unprecedented level of sustained long-term
private sector financial support will be needed. Also it is starting to prepare tenders for feasibility
studies for PPP in the water and sewerage sector which was badly damaged by the tsunami.8…and fortunately, much of the groundwork for this new engagement has already beenlaid...
Japan was a relative early mover in terms of adopting a framework for engaging the private sector
money and expertise for the delivery and long-term management of public assets through thePrivate Finance Initiative model. Inspired by the success of PFI projects undertaken in the early
1990s in the UK and concerned about tax revenue shortfalls at home, Japan enacted its first PFI
law in July 1999, revised it in 2001 and again in 2005.

…with a track record in PPP already achieved.
Use of the procurement model, which is generally reserved for projects with a value of at least$32 million, has grown dramatically since then, though it remains a relatively modest percentage
of Japan’s infrastructure spending. Even so, as of June 2009, PFI had been used to deliver morethan 400 infrastructure projects, ranging from sea ports, airports, schools and hospitals around thecountry, with more than 200 of these already operational.

8

Orix wins contract, November 2011

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However PPP is still rather new in Tohoku region, the number of municipalities withexperiences of PPP/PFI is limited:… does the country have the local capacity to deliver PPPs for regional reconstruction?
Will local official be able to overcome capacity and institutional constraints that may prevent
them from designing or accepting PPP projects in a timely fashion? Japan however has neither an
effective PPP training programme nor strong national PPP Unit to build local capabilities in
PPPs.

(ii) Some actions have to be taken for wider application of PPP/PFI(a) Establish a mechanism for technical assistance
Almost no municipalities in the devastated area have an experience of implementing a PFI
project. For these municipalities, learning PFI procurement from scratch is a time consuming andtiresome process. Furthermore, many municipalities are struggling with the loss of workforce inthe earthquake or the tsunami, in addition to the administrative reform to reduce the number of
personnel. Therefore, it is crucial to establish a mechanism to provide technical assistance to theinexperienced municipalities. Examples of this organization can be found in many forms,
Infrastructure UK in United Kingdom (consists of both public and private employees), IGD in
France (consists of mainly public employees), Treasury Department’s Advisory Committee inAustralia (public officials and hired private advisors), and PPP Units across many countries.
For example, it should be helpful if Reconstruction Agency or Tohoku Regional Development
Bureau of Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism to establish a PPP Technical
Assistance Office. This office is designed to provide early consultation, coordination among
municipal/regional(prefectural)/national governments, assists pre-implementation studies (e.g.
VfM testing, Feasibility studies, Environmental Impact Assessment etc), assist financial
structuring, as well as sending experienced personnel directly to the municipalities. The office canalso initiate several pilot projects, receive and evaluate unsolicited proposals and build a databaseof PPP projects in Tohoku Region. Those activities can ease the burden on these small
municipalities while it can gain collective knowledge of PPP/PFI that is applicable to othermunicipalities in the area. This office can also provide assistance, lectures/seminars to local
industry and general public, which also lack experience and understanding of PPP/PFI. These
activities can help local economies to participate in the PPP/PFI projects, and consensus building
among general public.

This mechanism should be introduced together with following issues.

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PPP AND RISK REDUCTION AND RISK MITIGATION: CASE STUDY JAPAN TSUNAMI 2011(b) Shorten/omit some bureaucratic procedures in a PFI procurement for reconstruction
In Japan, it usually takes a couple of years before implementing a PFI project. A PFI procurement
is different from traditional procurement, and requires a lot of studies before deciding to
implement a project. These procedures can be affected and delayed by the budgeting timeline andschedules of the local council. Thus, for some specific reconstruction projects, it is recommended
to consider the ways to shorten the process of PFI procurements. For some types of projects
which have less market risks and more predictability of cost and benefit (e.g. municipal
administrative buildings, public housing, etc), it might be possible to omit some of the initialprocedures—i.e. VfM testing and feasibility study, initial policy and implementation policy. Byomitting these processes, it would be possible to shorten the implementation process by half oreven less. It will also ease the workload of officials in the devastated municipalities.

Flexible and wider application of Concession (amending of the PFI Law to implement concession
is in progress)
The Japanese PFI Law was amended in June 2011, and introduced concession contracts in its PFI
scheme. However, in this amendment, concession contracts are only designed to apply to user-fee
based projects, but excluded national highways. In order to widen private sector’s business
opportunities, the national government should consider re-amendment of the PFI Law. ThisPPP DRR AND DRM IN JAPAN

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PPP AND RISK REDUCTION AND RISK MITIGATION: CASE STUDY JAPAN TSUNAMI 2011amendment is to make concession contract applicable to non-user fee based projects andhighways and related facilities.

(c) Special Reconstruction Zones and private participation
Japanese government designated 222 municipalities eligible for the Special Reconstruction Zone.
The government also announced to set up a “Unit for Collaboration with Private Sector for
Reconstruction”. These will help attract industries in the region, with tax breaks and otherfinancial incentives. By the same token however, the national government should consider thefinancial discipline within the region, because global private sectors are now more aware of thecontinuity and sustainability of the local community where they locate their businesses. Even
though the Special Reconstruction Zone includes “private sector’s proposals” within its scheme, it
is still unclear how to utilize the ideas the advantages of private sectors in an open andcompetitive manner.

(d)Improvement of procurement system

There have been many interesting and “innovative” ideas for reconstruction. Even the
Reconstruction Design Council proposed many different ideas and concepts. In a total
devastation, it is hard for municipal government to select and specify adequate level of public
services, including reconstruction projects. Use of unsolicited proposals and negotiation
procedures should promote more innovative ideas.

There has been a discussion to introduce “competitive dialogue” in Japanese PFI procurements.
Some municipalities have introduced negotiation process, but most of them were intended only
for clarification purposes before calling for bids/proposals, and not for selection of the best
bid/proposal. The Cabinet Office just presented the concepts of use of competitive dialogue inJapanese procurement, but the dialogue procedure has not been clearly stated within the country’s
procurement related laws. It is also uncertain whether the national or municipal governments havecapability of transparent and competitive negotiation and evaluate the best proposal according toit. Because the dialogue procedures were not stated in Public Accounting Law and other laws, it
becomes complicated for private sectors to learn each municipalities procedures, which is a huge
distraction for private companies.

In addition, the national government should help encourage public sectors to submit unsolicited
proposals. Often, many countries have included some incentive systems and other ways tocompensate private sectors who submit the original proposal. Incentives comes in many forms.
For example, Korean Republic gives “bonus points” for the original proposer during theirselection of the best proposals, countries like India, Taiwan, and Philippines give the original
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proposer a right for “Swiss Challenge,” in which the original proposer acquire a “right-to-match”
to a better counter proposal. Some other countries give original proposers a chance for “best andfinal offer.” The national government should also provide assistance for municipalities in
evaluating, budgeting, prioritizing, assessing risks and impacts and other related issues.

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Chapter III.

Key Recommendations

But to move forward to PPPs will require considerable governmental creativity , new thinking
and better capacity, coordination between local and a national 'will' to build back ‘bigger andbetter'. This chapter presents the delegation’s key recommendations for use of PPP inreconstruction:

I.

Better National coordination

II.

Greater use of outsourcing

III.

Better financing (e.g. infrastructure funds)

IV.

Improved resilience of hardware and software in disaster recovery and risk
mitigation

V.

Wish list of projects (most local authorities said they wanted jobs and new factories
but to do what)

VI.

Local governance and monitoring of contracts

I. Better national coordination

1.

National budgetary allocation tend to result in too many small infrastructure suchas airports in each local jurisdiction by pork barrel

2.

Solution to make the public infrastructure more efficient is not only to change
ownership of operation from public to private, but also to design the solution as
integrated infrastructure network.

■ Consideration of National Emergency Management Organization

Toyo University and PPP Graduate School is examining the establishment of a national
emergency management organization for Japan. University of Tokyo team of seismologists
announced that the Magnitude7.0. earthquake hitting Tokyo area in 4 years has 70% chance ofoccurring. Other areas (Tokai – Shizuoka to Nagoya and Nankai – Kinki – Wakayama – Osaka –Shikoku) in Japan on the Pacific side have higher percentage. Japan with frequent earthquake andtsunami must have better central control of emergency management.
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There is National Disaster Management Office within the Cabinet Office, which is manned byless than 60 employees on loan from other ministries of Land Transport Infrastructure andInternal affairs, etc. Like other countries, EM is a mainly a responsibility of local governments
according to Japan’s law and with small disasters, it works well.. This time, however many local
governments lost their functions. There are self defense force (national), Police (prefectures) andFire and Rescue (national & local), which can work when such disaster hit the country. There ishowever, a very limited coordination among those involved in EM in Japan nationwide.

The following are the recommendation for Japan to consider according to Toyo study. The study
makes this recommendation from the study of US FEMA – Federal Emergency Management
Agency operation and from a PPP conceptual thinking.

Toyo PPP Concept of Japan Emergency Management Agency - JEMA:

Major Characters of JEMA as follow:

1. There should be one unified command system for national, prefecture and local
governments (cities, towns and villages) in case of a major disaster determined by
the prime minister;
2. Establishment of Comprehensive National EM Plan by JEMA and othergovernments involved (national and local) and others will have their own plans;
3. Director of the agency should not be a politician but an expert in EM supported bymajor political parties;
4. The EM and command system must have no sectionalism/vertical but horizontal
command throughout the national (government, Self Defense Force, fire and police),
prefectural and local governments;
5. Clear responsibility on all levels defined;
6. Prepare appropriate budget for the operation and recovery fund;
7. Establish EM Training Center (EMTC) under the agency in coordination with Self
Defense Force, Fire, Police Operations and train the emergency managers at alllevels;8. The agency can be created without hiring new employees. They can be sent fromother national offices such as MOLTI local offices (approx. 9000 officials
nationwide), which are involved in emergency management and other disaster
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related offices. There could be 9 JEMA offices throughout the country. Head officeshould be located in Tokyo area and sub- head office should be located in Kansaiarea; and9. Each local government appoints 2 – 5 emergency managers (depending on
populations) and trained at EMTC. Within 1 year, there could be minimum of 3600
and possible 5000 (1800 local governments in Japan) local government EM
specialists, who can share the responsibilities under the JEMA command.

The study group of Toyo PPP School believes that establishment of such divisions within the
public organizations will enable them to formulate effective plans based on their high-level future
visions, policies and schemes, identify external capabilities required for executing plans in
consideration of the conditions unique to the individual public organizations, ensure theconsistency of procurement activities comprehensively and broadly, and perform project
management responsibly.

II. Greater use of outsourcing

1. Public sector should leverage the idea and creativity of private initiative from theplanning phase, and outsource recovery effort to private partners moreaggressively; because
2. Rebuilding the tsunami destroyed villages to the compact smart city, which is
infrastructure efficient and friendly to the aged society is critical.

■ Present state of public organizations' collaboration with private sector

Public organizations in Japan, such as the central and local governments, collaborate with private
enterprises in various forms and styles to implement and manage their operations. When a publicorganization procures goods or services from private-sector companies for a project—whether
for road construction, feasibility study or installation of an information system—it usuallyengages in general competitive bidding or designated competitive bidding. Regardless of thebidding process, the public organization must examine the entire plan, identify areas requiringexternal capabilities, and then determine the specifications of the goods or services to be
procured.

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In general, a public organization is structured such that it consists of units such as departments
and divisions (e.g. civil engineering, taxation and information systems divisions) that arevertically divided according to the type of public services. After the departments and divisions
secure the necessary budgets, they decide on what to procure, determine their specifications, thenprocure those goods or services. This is a common process for public organizations. The
procurement procedures are performed in accordance with established rules concerning thedisclosure of relevant information and the method of procurement. As such, public organizations
conduct routine procurement activities on a daily basis.

It should be noted, however, that procurement activities are conducted based on precedent
practices, the discretionary power of the parties entrusted to perform designated duties issomewhat limited, and procurement activities are conducted on a single-year basis so that they are
not planned from a medium-/long-term perspective. Because of these reasons, procurement
activities for upstream value-added tasks that involve the formulation of public policies and theirsystem design and urgent mission-critical operations that must be completed within a limited time
period, are relatively rare.

Furthermore, since personnel are constantly being rotated, the work environment is not likely to
encourage the development of personnel willing to tackle challenging tasks. The culture of thework place with a focus on carrying out activities within the department restricts the horizons of
the public sector to one job, one solution, activities. The procurement through PPP tends tobecome too complicated and require a change in the way of carrying out their routine works. With
regard to routine procurement activities, the reference documents and procedures in standardized
forms are kept so that future procurement activities can be conducted on the same basis. Becauseof the high turnover, there is no institutional memory and these processes, documents andstandards forms are the only basis for doing procurement. Additionally, the procurement process
is insufficient accountability to the population; there is lack of submitting of the procurement
function while the information disclosed to the public is limited..

■ Problems and issues pertaining to collaboration with private enterprises

The above procurement activities of public organizations are plagued with a number of problems
even under ordinary circumstances. Moreover, as previously discussed during emergency periods,
such as earthquake disasters, the following problems emerged:
1.

Determination of procurement specifications was either delayed or not carriedthrough because there was no clarity as to the type of company, individualcompanies or a consortium) that could be allowed to compete in the tender. This ispartially due to the lack of experience the public sector has beyond its typical

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remit. In actual implementation, constraints imposed by the existing rules such as
for the selection method and processes tend to impede quick and flexible
procurement.

2.

Without suitable benchmarks, it became difficult to collaborate with otherdepartments or divisions (e.g. when making decisions on which
department/division should be in charge of promoting disaster response activities
that are cross sectoral) and make adjustments (e.g. fund procurement, cooperation
with other public organizations, assistance to other public organizations, etc.) withother governmental organizations.

Public organizations perform wide range of activities, ranging from simple clerical work such as
tax collections to public undertakings such as the construction of roads, sewage systems, etc. For
the latter in particular, the public organization often acts as a public enterprise in charge of
operating and managing projects, where it has to act efficiently. Nevertheless, since publicorganizations seldom possess permanently established functions for formulating or developing
management plans or promoting or financing the same (counterpart to the strategic planningdepartment, business development department, financial affairs department, etc. in a privatesector company), they are often confronted with management problems due to the lack of such
related capabilities. The problems described previously are considered as manifestations of theabsence of those functions or capabilities.

■ Examination of corrective measures

To resolve the aforementioned issues, we propose the following:

1. Establishment of special divisions in charge of management of public organizations

Public organizations should establish special divisions that respond promptly to changes in the
management environment and collaborate with many departments and divisions in the publicorganizations as well as external organizations, to facilitate cross functional management of theircontinuous operations. Those divisions should be under direct control of the head of the pertinent
public organization and have adequate authorities and responsibilities. The members of thesedivisions should have seasoned knowledge of problems specific to individual publicorganizations, an extensive network of personnel in other departments/divisions, and the ability tomake adjustments from the management perspective, rather than as a liaison, when cooperating
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with external organizations. This is key to alleviate the issues resulted from sectionalism andbench marking precedent practice.

2. Outsourcing to external experts

Activities conducted by the public organizations are indirectly related to all industries andbusinesses. Therefore, it is practically difficult for employees in the aforementioned special
divisions of the public organizations to provide all necessary capabilities. Furthermore, with thenumber of public undertakings for which public organizations are responsible in mind, there is alimit to the capabilities that can be provided by the employees in the special divisions alone.

One way to obtain the necessary capabilities effectively and efficiently is to utilize the privatesector business environment or external experts who are versed in corporate planning, businessdevelopment, business promotion, financial affairs, etc. Areas in which utilization of theknowledge of experts is particularly effective include the stage of formulating a concrete action
plan, determining the specifications of goods or services to be procured externally for a projectand selecting private-sector vendors, as well as project management, financial analysis and others.

As described thus far, key functions for the public organizations are those that enable
understanding of the entire scope of management of the public organizations and allow effective
collaboration with external private-sector companies for implementing the necessary actions; notonly during contingency periods such as earthquakes but also during ordinary operation. Thosefunctions can be improved by outsourcing certain management tasks of public organizations(such as formulation of plans, determination of procurement specifications, project management
and financial analysis) to external experts, as well as utilizing officials of public organizations
who are knowledgeable of the conditions and circumstances specific to individual publicorganizations.

III.

Alternative Financing

Use of institutional investors in infrastructure and new funds that are target at local regeneration
on a business basis.

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■ Present state of funding for public infrastructure investment
1. Conditions surrounding Japan
In Japan, the outstanding government debt exceeded one quadrillion yen (about
US$13 trillion) at the end of fiscal 2011, and budget deficits continue to increase theamount of debt. Moreover, it has been pointed out that huge investment will be
required for the renewal of aged public infrastructure, which the government started afull-fledged construction in 1970s. The investment required during the half century
from fiscal 2011 to 2060 is estimated to be 190 trillion yen (about US$2.4 trillion).9
Under these circumstances, it is necessary to promote the utilization of private funds
and reduce the reliance on government bond issuance for funding for public
infrastructure investment, in order to prevent any further increase in public debt.

The number of cases in which a private-sector consortium or similar uses a PPP/PFI
scheme to raise funds for a public infrastructure project is increasing in Japan, but thescales of such projects remain somewhat limited. Although PFI projects totaling fivetrillion yen (about US$63 billion) were executed after 1999 in Japan, most of the
facilities constructed were school buildings and housing for government workers,
which were provided as "services sold to the public sector." As such, PFI schemes
have not been actively applied to projects for core infrastructure such as roads, watersupply systems and airports.

To promote the active utilization of private funds by the public organizations of Japanagainst this backdrop, the PFI law was revised to expand the scope of facilities andmeasures introduced to promote PFI projects, such as a system to accept unsolicited
proposals from private businesses and one to transfer the operating rights (i.e.
concession rights) for public facilities to private-sector companies.
2. Trends of reconstruction investment demand resulting from Great East Japan
Earthquake and its funding
Large-scale investment is being planned to restore three prefectures in the Tohoku
region that were devastated by the Great East Japan Earthquake. According to the
Basic Reconstruction Plan announced by the government (August 2011), the planned
investment for the five-year period until the end of fiscal 2015 is anticipated to total atleast about 19 trillion yen (about US$240 billion@ $1:80yen), nine trillion yen (about
US$110 billion) of which is scheduled to be spent on the reconstruction of
infrastructure. In addition, the government forecasts that the total investment for the9

White Paper on Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism in Japan, 2009

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decade up to fiscal 2020 will amount to at least 23 trillion yen (about US$290 billion).
Investment in social infrastructure is thus a key element of the reconstruction plan.
Unfortunately, the financial resources necessary for the reconstruction of disasterstricken areas have not been allocated. In November 2011, a reconstruction financing
law came into effect, allowing the government to secure part of the financial resources
necessary for the reconstruction from income tax revenue. However, major issues
remain that impede the smooth funding. Under such circumstances, there is a need toestablish schemes that promote the effective use of private funds in Japan and fromoverseas.

■ Issues pertaining to the promotion of PPP/PFI schemes

Policies that allow the effective utilization of PPP/PFI and those for expanding the range ofpotential fund providers can effectively promote the use of private funds for reconstructionrelated projects.

One of the issues to be addressed is the set of problems imposed by the implementation system
available to the public organizations. To implement PPP/PFI, public organizations must conduct a
series of life-cycle activities such as designing schemes that enable the private sector to makeinvestment, disseminating that information and conducting appropriate monitoring. However,since target businesses for PPP/PFI vary widely and they involve complex procedures such as
examination of project scheme including financial arrangement, there are shortages of personnel
with the skills and experiences necessary for appropriately performing the required tasks. In
addition, these time-consuming and tiresome procedures often distract municipalities to go for
PPP/PFI procurement. For faster reconstruction purpose, the government should consider shorterand easier-to-implement process guideline, as well as providing technical assistances.

The second issue is economic rationality. Investors expect a return on investment; calculated
based on indexes such as IRR and NPV. On the other hand, the financial administrations of the
public organizations seek value for money, while residents request improved levels of services
and enhanced public benefits (universal services, consideration of cost-bearing capability, etc.).

As described above, certain restrictions are imposed on private-sector investment in PPP/PFI
projects in order to realize public interests. This necessitates a system that benefits private-sector
investors, even under such restrictions, but establishing such a system requires adjustment withvarious issues such as regulations imposed by industry-specific laws, constraints due to financing
conditions (interest, financing period) and the burden resulting from heavy corporate tax.
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The third issue is the securing of fund providers. Given the currently limited scope of fundproviders, an environment must be established for accepting funds from the private sector insideand outside Japan, including institutional investors. Although in Japan there are funds set up by
trading firms and those organized by financial institutions in collaboration with overseas partners,
as well as a plan for setting up public-private partnership infrastructure funds by the Tokyo
metropolitan government, the number of funds and the total amount remains small. For instance,
pension funds, which are representative institutional investor, consider infrastructure investment
as alternative investment; however, because no adequate systems for funds have been establishedin Japan, it is difficult to invest such funds or individual projects.

■ Proposal for promotion of PPP/PFI schemes

To solve the abovementioned issues and promote the use of PPP/PFI schemes, we propose thefollowing to the public organizations:

1. Faster and easier implementation procedures
For wider use of PPP/PFI in reconstruction, Japan government do not need to reinvent
completely new scheme of PPP/PFI implementation. However, regular PPP/PFI
procedures require much time and experienced personnel, which are making it harder
to apply PPP/PFIs in reconstruction. For some buildings/infrastructures, some typicalfigures and models can be used to shorten pre-implementation studies and initialdesigning. Deployment of experienced personnel and building a knowledge database
can also shorten the process.

2. Establishment of schemes, dissemination of information and securement of
personnel
We propose that the private sector present a range of risks acceptable to the private
sector and schemes providing benefits commensurate with such risks. If industryspecific laws become a hindrance, they should be amended in order to eliminate theencumbrances, whereupon pertinent information should be disseminated throughout
the private sector, both inside and outside Japan. Furthermore, as we stated in thesection on outsourcing, for securing sufficient personnel necessary to facilitate PPP
operations, experts should be developed or recruited, and private advisors should be
utilized effectively for operations that can be outsourced to the private sector.

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3. Policies designed to enhance the economic rationality of investment
If the return on investment to private-sector investors is inadequate due to the absenceof subsidization systems, various preferential systems such as tax benefits, interest
subsidy and subsidy programs should be adopted for PPP/PFI project participants andunits of procurement should also be consolidated for the purpose of achieving
economies of scale, to ensure the return on investment is commensurate with theamount invested and strengthens the incentive for private sector participation.
As mentioned in Section II 1 of Chapter II, the bill for a special zone act forreconstruction in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake received cabinet
approval. It became into effect and government designated 222 municipal
governments to be able to produce reconstruction promotion plans, reconstructionplans and reconstruction grant project plans. However, as stated in Section II of
Chapter II, the government should make it clearer what the “Unit for Collaboration
with Private Sector for Reconstruction” will do in Public Private Partnerships, how“private sector proposals” are treated, what kind of incentives are given to innovative
proposers, and how these ideas are taken into account in fair and competitive manner.
Also, the government should be aware of financial disciplines. Even with tax breaks
and other economic incentives, private sectors are reluctant to invest in nonsustainable or non-viable communities, such as the ones in Okushiri. We recommend
maximum utilization of the framework for the special zones.

4. Use of infrastructure funds for expansion of the scope of fund providers
Provision of funds from those willing to provide funds but which are subject torestrictions because of the inadequacy of present systems should be promoted. At thepresent, establishment of national-government infrastructure funds is being planned inJapan, as stated in the Basic Reconstruction Plan announced by the government in July
2011. This plan should be realized as soon as possibly in order to establish a systemthat allows the effective use of long-term funds held by pension funds, insurancecompanies and similar.

IV.

Improved resilience of hardware and soft ware in disaster recovery and risk
mitigation

Improved resilience of the hardware and the software in disaster recovery is necessary. Even withthe tragic massive losses, the country should gain confidence with the fact that more than 95% ofresidents escaped and survived overall. This came from the education and evacuation drills
amongst residents. Even though infrastructures such as breakwaters and sea walls succeeded todelay and lessen the severity of the tsunami, on the other hand, it had given the false sense of
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security to some residents and caused unexpected loss. Early warning systems and hazard maps
were also misleading in some cases. Though infrastructures in the affected area were well
prepared for the earthquake itself, but not sufficient for resisting to the tsunami. Hardware or
equipments/tools always have limitations and downsides, and sometimes work in totally opposite
way to its intention. Thus software, including education and training among youth and adults
should be improved.
In addition, better urban planning should be considered. Building high breakwater andembankment and building elderly nursing homes or hospitals near ocean would put the socially or
physically weak in jeopardy. Private sectors, which are very sensitive to economic and social loss
in their basing communities, should be included for safer and economically viable planning anddevelopment.

V.

1.

Spending more tax dollars in creating a false sense of security must be reexamined.

2.

Escape plan, action-based early warnings to be established and training of residents
to escape have to be drilled.

3.

Rescue teams to be trained accordingly

Local governance and capacity

Decentralization and local autonomy is a major norm in Japanese government structure.
However, many municipalities often claim that they are not given enough authority or financial
and human resources to execute the given responsibilities. In addition, longstanding pressures ofrestructuring municipal governments had forced them to reduce staffing, and many had lostcollective institutional knowledge and skills necessary to function adequately in disaster
responseand reconstruction (e.g. civil engineering, urban planning, flood-control etc). Most ofsmall municipalities do not have capability to deal with massive disaster risk control andreconstruction itself, hence, partnerships among different levels of governmental bodies and otherorganizations are necessary.

1. Strategic planning of Public-Private Partnerships and Public-Public Partnerships
In the disaster reaction phase, each local government has their own emergency
management program following the national guidelines. For smaller emergency
occasions, they should be prepared with their own responsibility and preparation.
However, in enormous emergency occasions, demands to municipal governments easily

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overwhelm the capacity. In this earthquake and tsunami, local government officers were
overwhelmed and exhausted with the continuous heavy workloads.
In emergency situations, some functions, such as logistics and supply of goods,
examinations of damaged structures, providing shelters and housings, and other citizenrelated services can be provided by the private sectors as supplemental roles for local
governments. Meanwhile, for massive scale disasters, there are certain needs for localgovernment assistance by other municipality officials in administrative works, because
local government officials can easily and quickly take parts of officials in these affectedmunicipalities. Therefore, local governments should have their own public-public
partnership schema in emergency management. This means, municipalities should planin advance how they will receive helps/assistances from other municipalities and otherorganizations. With this regard, local governments should strategically assess their own
resources and outside resources, and develop partnerships with other municipalities andprivate sectors, which can provide the necessary roles in timely manner.

2. Coordination by national/prefectural governments for optimized resources
allocation
If the impact or scale of a disaster exceeds the capability of municipalities and theirpartnership scheme, prefectural government or national government should provide
coordinating function for faster and optimized allocation of resources. This time, manymunicipalities in the coastal area could not issue the request for assistance to prefecturesor to their partnering cities. Many municipalities came to these areas to help without
requests or coordination. Even though national government developed a scheme for
deployment of mid to long term personnel, such coordinating function is necessary in
the early reaction phase because it is the time when devastated municipalities need helps
the most.

3. Assistance for better governance for consistency and sustainability
To make above stated partnerships amongst organizations, government should develop
a better governance or monitoring structure for these municipalities, and help them
implement it. Partnerships structures, particularly in Public-Private Partnership will
require public entities to have mid- to long-term managing and monitoring functions,which most municipalities do not have. As stated earlier, there should be a mechanism
to provide necessary technical assistances to the devastated communities, which include
the assistances on better monitoring and governance skills. These will help to build alarger capacity among municipalities across Japan.

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VI.

Economic Development with biomass industry creation

Tohoku area needs strong economic development programs for recovery. The area needs jobs,
which are lost by tsunami; fisheries, agriculture, manufacturing and other industries. This report
recommended the introduction of biomass power generation in Tohoku utilizing first the debris
from tsunamis. The plan is under way. Tohoku must produce the products, which can be used atthose power plants after the debris are consumed. Tohoku and Japan are covered by forest, which
can be used for economic development. Biomass industry can be an industry in Tohoku andJapan, which can produce the needed electricity to meet the future challenge for Tohoku andJapan.

At the same time, the wood pellet industry requires jobs. The ratio of the jobs by wood pellet
factory and the tree replanting are 1 to 3. If the factory requires 100 jobs then the tree replanting
requires 300. Transporting the products to the power plant and other related jobs can also create
another 100 jobs. Tohoku can generate these jobs for those who lost jobs by major tsunami hits in
the region. Japan produces 0.06% of the world total wood pellet productions. Tohoku can startand Japan can follow. Only several of nuclear power plants out of 55 plants are under operation in
Japan. It may be very difficult to restart all those power plants in Japan. Japan may not be able torely on the future power needs from nuclear, which counts approx. 30%. There will be limit to
how much more fossil power generation can be built in the country. There should be more solar,
wind, and other more sustainable power generation in Japan. Japan can utilize the 67% of thecountry covering forest to generate additional power for the country.

Biomass also can contribute toward more environmentally controlled and more sustainable power
generation system not only for Japan but also for other developing nations in Asia, which are
growing very rapidly and trying to use more traditional fossil power for the growth. Japan canshow the leadership in developing more sustainable power generation and thus helping othernations to follow so that they may not have to use those environmentally sensitive forests for
growth.

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Closing
I would like to thank all those who joined us in the mission to Japan in July and November lastyear and contribute for the report we are putting together.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) with the support of Toyo
University PPP Graduate School dispatched its first observation mission to Sendai, Miyagi
Prefecture (Capital Sendai) in July, 2011. Second mission was joined by the United Nations
International strategy on Disaster Risk Mitigation (UNISDR) and supported by Toyo University
Research Center for PPP and its PPP graduate school on 15-18 November 2011. The mission has
visited the coastal areas of Iwate Prefecture, most severely affected by tsunami and the coasts of
Miyagi to observe what has happened and to explore the possible role of PPP in the process indisaster recovery and how PPP practically can be used in the Japanese recovery process.

During and after the visit to the tsunami hit areas, the mission members have examined thepossibility of the role of and the way forward for Tohoku with the use of PPP.

The mission members have looked into:1.

The overall policy that offers vision, leadership, effective coordination andimplementation

2.

Building safer and more resilient infrastructure3.

Sustainable development (renewable and smart cities) and green growth4.

Forging regional economic competitiveness5.

PPP and building local and national PPP capabilities.

During the missions to Tohoku in July and November, the mission was informed by Toyo PPP
School that other parts of Japan (Tokai – Pacific Central, Nankai – Pacific West and Tokyo Metroregions have high possibility of the significant size of earthquake and followed by tsunami insimilar and maybe even bigger incidents in the very near future.
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In the end, the mission members have made several key recommendations to the countries withthreat of earthquake and tsunami including Japan and other nations, which have similar threats.
The recommendations are bold and aggressive but the members all felt these recommendations
could save the lives and assets of the citizens of the countries and can better prepare for the futuredisasters.

Unfortunately, the disasters will happen. It was fourth significant tsunami disaster in 107 years in
Tohoku. It will happen again more so with the global weather change. We sincerely hope that thisreport provides some useful recommendations for not only Japan but also for the countries, whichhave such possibilities of earthquake and tsunami to be better prepared for future possibilities.

The report is intended to support the future actions of the countries in the world to consider
against disasters and tsunami but not intended to offend the actions and measures taken by thecountry of Japan, which were very significant.

March, 2012

Geoffrey Hamilton
Chief, Cooperation and Partnerships Section
Economic Cooperation and Integration Division
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

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The UN-led delegations would like to express sincere gratitude to the following people who havekindly devoted their time and shared their experiences and opinions:

July 2011

Development Bank of Japan, Tohoku Branch
Mr. Takahiro Suzuki

City of Sendai
Vice Mayor Mr. Yukimoto ItoNovember 2011

Japan Project-Industry Council/Sangyoshinko, Kajima, Takeei JV
Mr. Junichi Yoshiura, Manager of Debris collection and segregation site in Kamaishi
Mr. Kazuhiko Oka, Senior Manager, Kajima

City of Kamaishi
Mr. Yoshikatsu Yamazaki, Director of Citizen cooperation division
Mr. Yoshikazu Shimada, vice secretary-general, Office of Reconstruction Promotion
Mr. Masanobu Horaguchi, Director of Construction and Civil works

Otsuchi town
Ms. Yuko Suemura, Special Advisor to Reconstruction Department of Otsuchi

City of Tono
Mayor Mr. Toshiaki Honda
Vice Mayor Mr. Masunori Oikawa
Mr. Yasuo Kikuchi Director of Logistic Support Room for Coastal devastated Areas
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Tohoku Regional Development Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Mr. Naoki Kawashima, Director of Planning division

We have also met with:
Kesennuma Reconstruction Association
Mr. Mitsuo Kikuchi, Director of Planing division, City of Rikuzentakata
Japan Platform
Tono Magokoro net and Tono Social Welfare Council

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The Mission Participants and Report Contributors:

UN Mission:
Nobuyuki Nagata, Deloitte Tokyo
Khalid Mehmood Shaikh, Director Public Private Partnership Unit, Sindh, Pakistan
Arthur Mitchell, Senior Counselor, White & Case Japan
Yoshie Muramatsu, Senior Project Manager, Arup Japan

UNISDR contributors:
Akira Morimoto, Expert at International Recovery Platform
Sandra Wu, Wen-Hsiu, President & CEO, Kokusai Kogyo Group Tokyo
Sanjaya Bhatia, Knowledge Management Officer, International Recovery Platform

Toyo University:
Yuji Nemoto, Professor, Toyo University
Sam Tabuchi, Professor, Toyo University
Yu Namba, Senior Staff, Toyo University

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Appendix 1
Year

Month

Day

Public Body

Activities

2011

3

11

National Gov.

Establishment of Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters
Dispatched Self Defense Force and Disaster Medical AssistanceTeams
Declaration of Nuclear emergency, Establishment of Nuclear
Disaster Management Headquarters

3

12

National Gov.

Designation of extremely severe disaster (nationwide), andEstablished Emergency operations center in Miyagi
Notice of Special measures for Small and Medium Enterprises
suffering damages

3

13

National Gov.

Government ordinance on Specific disaster and counter measures

3

16

3

17

National Gov.

Establishment of Livelihood Support HQ for disaster victims

318

National Gov.

Notice of Special allocation tax for accepting evacuee

3

21

3

22

3

24

Re-opened Tohoku Expressway

3

26

Total number of Evacuees 250,000

3

28

3

29

3

30

C of Kuji

Establishment of Fukkyu/Fukko HQ

4

1

C of Sendai

Formulation of Reconstruction basic policy

45

Iwate Pref.

Consultation office for management and rehabilitation ofagriculture

46National Gov.

Estimated amount of debris in 3 prefectures 24million tons

4

7

4

8

Reopened Iwate-Hanamaki Airport for commercial flights

Water supply recovered for 1.2 million households, but stillsuspended for 0.9million
National Gov.

National Gov.

892

Estimation of amount of damage 25trillion yen
Sendai Airport opened for relief teams

Largest aftershock
Miyagi Pref.
National Gov.

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Established Inter-ministry liaison conference for livelihood support
for disaster victims

Prohibited construction of buildings in Tsunami inundated areas
76.2billion yen was distributed to devastated municipalities as
special allocation tax

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4

11

4

13

National Gov.
Miyagi Pref.
C of Ishinomaki
Iwate Pref.
C of Kamaishi

Establishment of Reconstruction Design Council
Working Draft of Reconstruction Basic policy
Establishment of Reconstruction office
Basic policy for reconstruction from earthquake and tsunami
Basic policy for reconstruction design
Sendai Airport partially re opened for commercial flights
Decided exceptional measures for taxing

National Gov.
4

22

National Gov.

Extended duration of building regulation in devastated area to 8
month

4

25

Iwate Pref.

Establishment of Reconstruction Office

4

27

C of Ishinomaki
National Gov.

Basic policy for reconstruction
A special tax-exemption law for disaster victims

428

National Gov.

Set up a database for privately owned housing for refugee
relocation

4

29

5

1

T of Yamada
C of Rikuzentakata
T of Noda
C of Sendai
T of Onagawa

Establishment of Reconstruction promotion office
Establishment of Reconstruction countermeasures office
Establishment of Reconstruction office
Establishment of Reconstruction promotion office
Establishment of Reconstruction planning committee

52National Gov.

1st supplemental budget for FY2011
Act on Special Financial assistance and grant for disastercountermeasures

5

8

T of Minamisanriku

Framework and organization for Reconstruction basic policy

510National Gov.

Reconstruction Design Council published 7 principles forreconstruction

5

13

Diet

Presentation of Organic Act of Reconstruction bill

5

16

C of Rikuzentakata

Basic policy for reconstruction

5

17

CabinetCabinet decided policy guidelines for Japan's Recovery--basic
principles for economy and financial management after thedisaster5

20

T of Ishinomaki

Framework for Reconstruction

5

23

T of Yamada

Basic policies for reconstruction plan

527

National Gov.
Miyagi Pref.
T of Noda

Solicitation for PFI/PPP proposals for reconstruction
Published first working draft of reconstruction plan
Basic policy for reconstruction

Tohoku Shinkansen reopened

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C of Sendai

Published Vision for Reconstruction

6

1

T of Miyako
T of Noda
T of Hirono
T of Fudai
Tawn of Watari
C of Tagajo

Basic plan for reconstruction
Basic plan for reconstruction
Vision for reconstruction
Basic plan for reconstruction planning
Establishment of Reconstruction Committee
Establishment of Reconstruction Promotion Office6

5

C of Natori

Public meeting for Reconstruction

66Fire and Rescue

Finished activities in devastated area (total of 100,000 officials)

69

T of Otuchi

Basic policy for reconstruction

6

11

6

15

National Gov.

7 ministries established Inter-ministry liaison conference forreconstruction planning support

6

17

National Gov.
Iwate Pref.
Miyagi Pref.

Policies regarding disaster-related double loans
Working draft of reconstruction basic plan
1st working draft of reconstruction plan

6

20

Diet

Bill of Organic act of reconstruction passed

624

National Gov.

Estimation of damages 16.9 trillion yen (Buildings 10.4 trillion yen,social infrastructures 2.2 trillion, agriculture, forestry and fishing
related facilities 1.9 trillion, lifelines 1.3 trillion)
Draft Basic Design for disaster-resistant city

15,413 lost, 8,069 missing

C of Ishinomaki
625

National Gov.

Reconstruction Design Council made suggestions to Prime
Minister

626

National Gov.

Central Disaster Management Council published an Intrim reporton earthquake and tsunami measures, based on the lessons
learned from the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake

6

27

CabinetMr. Matusmoto was appointed for Minister in charge forreconstruction
Special lending facility for SMEs
Draft of Basic policy for reconstruction

Miyagi Pref.
T of Minamisanriku
629

T of Yamada

Vision for reconstruction from Earthquake and Tsunami

7

4

C of Sendai

Published basic policy for reconstruction

7

5

Cabinet

Minister Matsumoto resigned and Mr. Hirano appointed

7

8

C of Ofunato
Miyagi Pref.

Decided Framework for reconstruction plan
Committee for reconstruction vision suggested future vision toprefecture

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11

C of Kamaishi

Published basic plan for reconstruction design722National Gov.
Fukushima Pref.

Guideline for land use controls for promoting smooth private
participation
Published Roadmap for recovery

725

National Gov.

2nd supplemental budget for FY2011
Sendai Airport reopened for all domestic flights

729

National Gov.

Decided Basic policy for reconstruction

83National Gov.

Council for Realization of New Growth Strategy published Draft ofStrategy for Revitalization of Japan
Decided draft of Reconstruction implementaion plan and Basic
policy of radiation countermeasures

Iwate Pref.
8

11

Fukushima Pref.
Iwate Pref.
National Gov.

Published Reconstruction Vision
Decided Reconstruction plan and dismissed emergency control
HQ
More than 56,000 public officials from prefectural and municipal
governments had been sent to devastated areas (as of July 1)

813

C of Tagajo

Published Framework of reconstruction plan817

Miyagi Pref.
C of Ishinomaki

Published final draft of reconstruction plan
Framework of basic plan for reconstruction

8

18

National Gov

Enforced Act of special measures for disaster debris handling8

22

C of Ishinomaki

Published basic reconstruction plan for urban infrastructures

826

National Gov.

Decided Master plan for recovery of agricultural industry andagricultural land92National Gov.
C of Natori

Noda Administration took in the officePublished Draft of reconstruction plan

95

T of Watari

Decided Basic policy for reconstruction

911

National Gov.

Extended duration of building regulation in devastated area

912

C of Kesennuma

Public committee for reconstruction suggested reconstruction
projects and proposals to the city

9

16

T of Iwaizumi

Decided Reconstruction plan

922

C of Sendai

Published Interim plan for reconstruction

9

23

Tohoku Shinkansen back to normal timetable

925

Sendai Airport finished rehabilitation and reopened forinternational flights

929

National Gov.

PPP DRR AND DRM IN JAPANCouncil for Social Infrastructure published proposal forreconstruction to realize sustainable society

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T of Fudai
T of Tanohata
101

T of Watari

Published draft of Reconstruction plan

10

4

T of Minamisanriku

Decided Working draft of Reconstruction plan

10

7

C of Kesennuma

Decided Reconstruction plan

10

19

Miyagi Pref.

Published Reconstruction plan

1028

CabinetDecided Bill of financing reconstruction project, Bill of Special
Reconstruction Zones, Bill of Development of tsunami resistantcommunities

10

31

C of Ofunato
C of Miyako

Decided Reconstruction plan
Decided Basic plan for reconstruction

11

1

CabinetDecided Act of establishment of Reconstrcution Agency

11

11

Iwate Pref.

Established Organization for Industry Recovery

1118

T of Rifu

Published Framework for reconstruction plan

11

21

National Gov.

3rd supplemental budget for FY2011

1130

C of Sendai

Final decision on Reconstruction plan, and implementation of
actual projects within FY2011
Passed bill of financing reconstruction projects

Diet
12

7

Diet
Miyagi Pref.

Passed Bill of Special Reconstruction Zones, Bill of Developmentof tsunami resistant communities
Estimated shortage of public officials by 1,262 in 15 cities andtowns, and requested additional support from national gov.

12

8

Miyagi Pref.

Published Restructuring policy of fishery harbors (142 into 60)

12

9

Diet

Passed Bill of Establishment of Reconstruction Agency

12

20

C of Kamaishi

13 households in Toni agreed on relocation plan
Published reconstruction plan

C of Tome2012

Decided Reconstruction plan
Decided Basic plan for Reconstruction

12

26

T of Otuchi
Self Defense Force

Decided reconstruction plan
Withdrew from all disaster affected areas

12

27

Diet

Enforced Act of Development of tsunami resistant communities

127

Miyagi Pref and 34
citiesFiled proposal of Special Zones for promotion of private
investment, in which corporate taxes are exempted for 5 years

210

National Gov.

Establishment of Reconstruction Agency

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3

11

One year anniversary【Confirmed Damage】Lost 15,854, Missing 3,276, Evacuated343,935(Table made from Toyo University’s “1000 days Chronicle”)

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