PROJECT D-TECT

AI-Generated Image (DALL·E 3)

ANALYSIS

Assessing technologies to counter thediversion of small arms and light weapons
Sarah Grand-Clément (UNIDIR)EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Based on a series of stakeholder engagements, this paper examines the relevance and applicability of 14 technologies to support or strengthen efforts to counter the diversion of smallarms and light weapons (SALW). The technologies examined are: 2D codes, chemical encoding,
DNA coding, document authentication, electronic seals, GNSS and mobile tracking, near-fieldcommunication, radio-frequency identification, sensors, Internet of Things, distributed ledger
technology, big data analysis, natural language processing, and computer vision.
All technologies were assessed as having potential relevance in helping to counter SALW
diversion. The types of technologies identified as most relevant tended to differ depending on
the life cycle stage (i.e., pre-export, transfer or post-delivery) and counter-diversion element(i.e., prevention, detection or identification), with technologies better suited at detecting or
identifying diversion rather than preventing its occurrence. However, because the choice of a
specific technology should be based on context and need, this paper does not recommend
specific technologies, or a combination thereof, to help counter diversion.

The paper provides a non-exhaustive overview of possible options which could be undertaken
to overcome or mitigate these barriers, including strengthening international and regional
collaboration and inter-agency cooperation, building up the evidence and knowledge base,reinforcing or establishing the appropriate physical, regulatory and digital infrastructure, andundertaking institutional capacity-building and individual training.

June 2024

Infrastructural and cost requirements were assessed as posing the highest barriers to thesuccessful implementation of the technologies. Additionally, the adoption of a technology will
also necessitate overcoming several systemic barriers. These include fragmentation among
the multiple actors involved in SALW, practicalities of technology development and adoption,lack of infrastructure (digital, physical, regulatory) surrounding the technology, cost of technology, national security considerations, lack of sufficient knowledgeable personnel, and needfor data and data management.

2
ANALYSIS

Acknowledgements

illicit market, or when redirected to an unauthorised or unlawful end user or for an unau-

Support from UNIDIR’s core funders provides thethorised or unlawful end use. (b) The rerouting

foundation for all of the Institute’s activities. The

and misappropriation of the items can takepreparation of this joint report has been supported

place at any point in the transfer chain,by generous funding for UNIDIR’s Conventional

includingArms and Ammunition Programme by Germany

trans-shipment, storage, assembly, reactiva-

andTechnology

tion or retransfer of the items. (c) The transac-

Programme by Czechia, Germany, Italy, the Neth-tion chain facilitating a change of effective

erlands, Switzerland and Norway, and by Micro-

ownership and/or control can involve various

soft. The Flemish Peace Institute is funded by theforms of exchange, whether directly negotiatedFlemish Parliament.

or brokered – grant, credit, lease, barter, andfor

UNIDIR’s

Security

andtheexport,import,transit,cash – at any time during the life cycle of the
The author wishes to thank the experts who partic-

items.”1

ipated in the interviews, surveys and workshops
and provided invaluable inputs during the course of•

Small arms and light weapons (SALW): “‘Smallthe research. The author is also grateful to thearms and light weapons’ [are] any man-port-

experts who reviewed and provided feedback,able lethal weapon that expels or launches, isincluding Paul Holtom, Nils Duquet, Giacomo Persi

designed to expel or launch, or may be readily

Paoli, Diederik Cops, Hardy Giezendanner, Axel

converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or

Krickow, Dwayne Edghill, Sheena Arneaud, Robprojectile by the action of an explosive,

Hunter-Perkins and Wenting He.

excluding

small

arms

and

light

weapons or their replicas. Antique small arms

Glossary•

antiqueand light weapons and their replicas will bedefined in accordance with domestic law. In no

Components of conventional weapons (CWC):

case will antique small arms and light weapons

A component can be defined as “one of several

include those manufactured after 1899: (a)oris‘Small arms’ are, broadly speaking, weapons

composed”. In the context of conventional

designed for individual use. They include, interweapons, this refers to the different elements

alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles

and items that are used to develop and build aand carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles

conventional weapon. These items could be

and light machine guns; (b) ‘Light weapons’large or major components such as engines,

are, broadly speaking, weapons designed foraeroplane fuselages or turrets, but also smaller

use by two or three persons serving as a crew,

items such as electronic systems or thealthough some may be carried and used by asubcomponents used to construct the major

single person. They include, inter alia, heavy

components.

machine guns, handheld under-barrel and

many

units

of

which

somethingmounted grenade launchers, portable anti-air•Diversion: “The rerouting and/or the appro-

craft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless

priation of . . . conventional arms or related

rifles, portable launchers of antitank missile

items contrary to relevant national and/or

and rocket systems, portable launchers ofinternational law leading to a potential change

anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of ain the effective control or ownership of thecalibre of less than 100 millimetres.”2 Note that

arms and items. Instances of such diversion

this definition does not include or pertain to

can take various forms: (a) An incident of

ammunition.

diversion can occur when the items enter an

3•Technology: There is no single definition oftechnology. For example, the Merriam-Web-

List of abbreviations

ster dictionary defines it in three ways: (1) “the2D

Two-dimensional

practical application of knowledge especially inAI

Artificial intelligencea particular area” or “a capability given by the

ATTArms Trade Treaty

practical application of knowledge”; (2) “aCWC

Components of conventionalmanner of accomplishing a task especiallyusing technical processes, methods, or knowledge”, and (3) “the specialized aspects of aparticular field of endeavor”.3 In the context of

weapons
DLT

Distributed ledger technology

D-TECT

Countering the Diversion of arms
using TEChnology Tools

this report, the definition of technology mostclosely resembles the second definition: “aGNSSGlobal navigation satellite systemmanner of accomplishing a task especially

IATG

International Ammunition

using technical processes, methods, or knowledge”. Specifically, the technologies within theTechnical Guidelines
IoT

Internet of Things

ITI

International Tracing Instrument

context of diversion prevention, although thisNFC

Near-field communication

paper does not examine technologies at the

NLP

Natural language processing

lowest levels of readiness.

PoA

United Nations Programme ofscope of this paper are those that have been
recently developed and are emerging in the

Action to Prevent, Combat andEradicate the Illicit Trade in
Small Arms and Light Weaponsin All Its Aspects
RFID

Radio-frequency identification

SALW

Small arms and light weapons

UN

United Nations

4
ANALYSIS

Section 1 - Introduction
Applying technology as
one of the tools toprevent diversion

Main methods for diversion of
SALW4
SALW are at an increased risk of diversion
compared to other, larger military equipment
for several reasons:•“Their ease of use, as SALW do not re-

The diversion of conventional arms and related

quire particular technical skills or equip-

ammunition, parts and components to unauthor-

ment to operate, making them accessible

ised end users and end uses poses a significant

and attractive to a wide range of users,

threat to societies around the globe. Since the lateincluding but not limited to state and1990s, international attention has focused specif-

non-state armed forces, security forces,

ically on the diversion of small arms and lightpolice forces, and civilians.

weapons (SALW), rather than other types of•

The ease of diversion of such items, giv-

conventional arms (as outlined in the box on thisen their small size, making them ‘easy topage), due to their use in conflict and for criminal

conceal’.

and terrorist purposes. As a consequence, initia-•

tives have been developed at the national, regional

opportunities for diversion across theirand international levels to counter the diversion of
SALW to unauthorised end users or for unauthor-

Their long life cycle, increasing the
lifetime.

•

The high scale of production of SALW,

ised end uses. Preventing diversion is an impor-which can make individual products moretant objective of many national export control

difficult to keep track of.

systems and of transfer controls. It is also a key
objective of several international and regional“In this context, it is also important to

instruments that have been adopted to strengthen

consider that SALW is a broad category

the regulation of the trade in specific types ofcomprising many different types of weapons.

conventional weapon, such as the Arms Trade

Some of these will be at greater risk of diver-

Treaty (ATT), the Firearms Protocol and the Unitedsion, simply because they are more appealing

Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat

to users. Others will pose greater risk to

and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms andinternational security, such as man-portable

Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA).

air-defence

systems(MANPADS)

and

man-portable anti-tank systems (MANPATS),
A combination of systemic and practical measuresdue to their ability to threaten and affectis required to effectively reduce the risk of diver-larger military (and civilian) equipment to asion of weapon systems. A range of non-techno-

greater extent than other SALW.”

5

logical approaches, such as information sharing,is already in place to counter diversion. While
technology could also address the issue of diversion, in practice the general uptake and implementation of technologies to counter the diversionof conventional arms, ammunition and, parts andcomponents remains relatively limited. Overall,there appears to be a gap between, on the one
hand, the increasing discussions of using technologies in counter-diversion efforts and initiatives
and, on the other, their effective wide-scale
implementation.

5

Purpose and scope of
this paper(such as its committees). As such, the primary
intended audience is state authorities. Additional
relevant stakeholders for whom this research is

The relevance of technology to strengthening

relevant include the private sector, civil society,counter-diversion efforts was explored as part ofinternational organisations, and all other stake-the initial phase of the Countering the Diversion

holders involved across the life cycle of SALW andof arms using TEChnology Tools (D-TECT) project.

components of conventional weapons (CWC). A

Project D-TECT aims to develop and test an

summary of the main findings is provided below.

approach to identifying and assessing the utility
and feasibility of using specific technologies forThis paper presents findings from the second

preventing, detecting, negating or mitigating thephase of Project D-TECT, which focuses specifi-

diversion of conventional weapons and theircally on the application of technology to countercomponents. Project D-TECT consists of two

the diversion of SALW. A second paper examining

consecutive phases:

CWC will be released in August 2024.7 Futurephases of research will expand beyond these two•

To identify existing technologies thatspecific types of items and also explore the appli-

could be suited to countering the diversion

cability of the framework to other types of conven-of conventional weapon systems, including

tional weapons, components and ammunition.

SALW, ammunition, parts and components(hereafter referred to as “conventional

This paper presents initial insights into the rele-

weapons and related components”), and tovance and applicability of selected technologies todevelop a framework that makes it possible

support or strengthen efforts to counter the diver-to identify and assess technologies used tosion of SALW. It highlights barriers to the use ofcounter diversion.

technology and possible avenues to overcome
these obstacles. Drawing on the initial longlist of•

To assess, refine and validate the list oftechnologies identified in the first phase oftechnologies identified in phase 1 in rela-

D-TECT, 14 technologies (presented in Table 1

tion to specific types of conventional

along with brief outlines of their various potential

weapon systems.

purposes) are at the centre of the technologicalassessment and the findings presented in thisThe findings and conclusions of Project D-TECT

paper.8

research could be relevant in the context of thedifferent international and regional instruments

In addition to the assessment of the aforemen-that seek to enhance efforts to prevent, detect,tioned technologies, this paper and the subse-

eradicate and address diversion of SALW. In

quent one on CWC are intended as a proof-of-

particular, these findings could have relevance inconcept for the technology-assessment approachthe context of ongoing processes, notably the PoA(as explained in the next section) and its utility inand the ATT, as well as the Firearms Protocol, theaiding reflection on relevant technologies within

Global Framework for Through-life Conventional

the context of counter-diversion of conventional

Ammunition Management, and relevant processes

weapons and their components.

of the UN Security Council and subsidiary organs

Tracking andtracing✔

✔

✔

Accountability

✔

✔

✔

2D codesChemicalencoding

DNA coding✔

Radio-frequency
identification(RFID)

Data
analysis

The wide existing range of sensors includes, e.g., cameras, radars, thermal imaging, x-ray scanners, gas indicators, acoustic sensors, time-temperature indicators, RFID, etc.

These are subsets of artificial intelligence (AI).

‡

†

✔

✔

✔

✔

Data
capture/recordingComputer vision†✔

✔

(End-use)monitoring

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

Identification andcertification

Natural Language
Processing (NLP)†✔

✔

Antitampering

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

Inventory
and storage

Big data analysis†

Distributed
LedgerTechnology (DLT)Internet of Things(IoT)

Sensors‡✔

✔

Near-fieldcommunication
(NFC)

✔

✔

GNSS and mobile
tracking

Electronic seals(e-seals)

Document
authentication

✔

✔

✔

Item-level
identification

Table 1:

Technology

Potential purpose(s)6
ANALYSIS

Longlist of technologies and their purposes

7

Summary of key findings fromphase 1 of Project D-TECT

to the contexts in which they are to be applied andalso against selected attributes that the technologies should possess.

Findings from D-TECT’s first phase demonstratethat taking a needs-driven and context-sensitive

Phase 1 of Project D-TECT also identified an initialapproach to the application of technology forlonglist of technologies (see Figure 2) that could

counter-diversion is crucial.6 In other words, thepossibly be relevant in strengthening counter-di-

selection of technology should not be driven by its

version efforts in international arms transfers ofmere availability.

conventional weapons and related components.
The identification of these technologies was

A three-step framework emerged from the firstguided by their potential relevance and theirphase of the research (see Figure 1). The first stepability to counter diversion. Specifically, these

focuses on understanding the risks of diversion,technologies were selected because they are either

which are tailored to each specific type of conven-(a) used to counter the diversion of weapons but

tional weapon and the context in which it oper-

remain limited in their use and are not wide-

ates. The second step examines the existing

spread; or (b) used in the civilian commercial

technologies that could help prevent or overcome

realm to increase the integrity and security of

the identified risk or risks. The third and final

supply chains but have not been used for sensitive

step assesses the identified technologies according

military or security items.

Figure 1: Framework to identify and assess technologies to counter the diversion of conventional weapons andrelated components

Step 1

Specifying the aim of using technology and mapping item-specific risks of diversion.

Step 2

Identifying potential technologies which could help address the aim(s) and risk(s) identified in Step 1.

Step 3

Analysing the context in which technologies are to be implemented.

Figure 2: Overview of technologies

Less complex
technologies• 2D codes• Chemical coding• DNA coding• Document
authentication

More complex
technologies• Electronic seals (eSeals)• Global navigation
satellite system (GNSS)
and mobile tracking• Near field communi­cation(NFC)• Radio-frequency
identification (RFID)• Sensors• Internet of Things (IoT)• Distributed ledger
Technology (DLT)• Big data analysis (AI)• Natural Language
Processing (NLP) (AI)• Computer vision (AI)8
ANALYSIS

Methodology

part, respondents were asked to assess the technologies’ perceived positive impact on coun-

Project D-TECT adapted an existing methodology

ter-diversion efforts for SALW and for CWC. The

to frame the assessment of the longlist of technol-

second part focused on the potential barriers toogies: the Systematic Technology Reconnaissance,

the successful implementation of these technolo-

Evaluation and Adoption Method (STREAM). As

gies, again with separate assessments for SALW

the name indicates, this approach assesses theand CWC. During the workshops, which took place

relevance of technologies and the possibilities of

online, the survey findings were presented andtheir adoption to fulfil a specific purpose. This

discussed, allowing the participants to elaborate

methodology comprises five steps:

on their reasoning behind their responses and to9

add further insights on the application of tech1.

nology to counter-diversion efforts.

framing of the issue;

2. identification of technologies;
3. characterisation of the issue;

Participants came from a broad variety of back-

4. comparison of options; andgrounds

5. decision.

(licensing) authorities, customs and border control

includingnationaltransfer

controlagencies, United Nations entities (e.g., the Office
Steps 1 and 2 were the focus of the first phase of

on Drugs and Crime, the Office for Disarmament

the project, while this phase focuses on steps 3

Affairs), other international organisations (e.g.,

and 4. Specifically, step 3 involves the following

the World Customs Organization), regional organ-elements:

isations (e.g., the Organization of American

10

States), the private sector, and research organisa1.

assessment of the potential impact of thetions. Participants were not selected for theiridentified

expertise or knowledge on the technologies per se,technologies

oncountering

diversion;

but rather for their experience in international

2. assessment of the potential barriers to thetrade flows, arms transfer controls, and coun-

implementation of these technologies; andtering the diversion of conventional weapons and3. assessment of the costs related to thetheir components.11 There was a different group of

implementation of these technologies.

participants in each workshop, although someexperts did take part in several workshops due to

Step 4 consists of a comparison of the technologies

expertise in different stages. Table 2 provides anbased on the assessment emerging from step 3.

overview of the data-collection approach andparticipation rates.

A sequential exploratory design was used to collectthe data. The project team used surveys to collect

In addition, several semi-structured interviews

primarily quantitative data, which was then usedwere conducted throughout the project. Relevantin online expert workshops. There was a survey

insights from these interviews, as well as conclu-

and an associated workshops for each of threesions drawn from a literature analysis, are used indifferent stages in the typical life cycle of SALW orthis paper to further substantiate insights from

CWC: pre-export, transfer and post-delivery. The

the surveys and the workshop discussions.

selection and definition of these stages is further
discussed in Section 2.

Three key limitations should be noted. First, thefindings are based on only a relatively small

Ahead of each workshop, all workshop partici-

number of survey respondents and workshop

pants were invited to complete an online survey.

participants, who form only a small subsection of

The surveys consisted of two parts. In the first

the wider community involved in counter-diver-9

Table 2:

Overview of the data-collection approach for SALW-specific inputs

WorkshopLife cycle stage

Item types12

Number ofsurvey respondents

Number ofworkshopparticipants13

Date

1

Pre-export

SALW and CWC

171726 February 2024

2

Transfer

SALW and CWC

121814 March 2024

3

Post-delivery

SALW

17

21

26 March 2024sion of SALW. Second, while the project teamSection 4 concludes the report with reflections onsought to ensure a wide-ranging representation of

the key findings on the implementation of tech-perspectives from the participants in terms of

nology to aid in the counter-diversion of SALW.

background,expertiseandgeographicalrepresentation, most of the inputs nonethelessemerged from entities and individuals from theWestern European and Other States regional group.
Third, participants differed in terms of their levelsof knowledge and understanding of each of theSection 2 - Assessing
the technologies

technologies, as well as the different types ofneeds, resources and expectations they consideredThis section presents the main findings drawn

when participating in the research. The findings

from the surveys and workshop discussions. It

presented below have been aggregated, and so doprovides an overview of the participants’ inputs

not allow for such differences to emerge; thus,

regarding the possible impact of technologies onthey may not always be reflective of each indi-counter-diversion of SALW, and the possible

vidual response. Overall, the findings should bebarriers that those seeking to implement theseseen as illustrative rather than authoritative andtechnologies might face. Before the findings areshould not be generalised or extrapolated beyond

presented, the approach used to elicit them isthe constraints of this study. Despite these limita-

briefly explained.

tions, however, it is hoped that the findings andconclusions can nonetheless offer useful insights

Risks and methods of diversion differ according to

into the application of technology to counter-di-

the type of item, the context and location, and theversion efforts and can pave the way for further

stage of the supply chain or life cycle.14 Conscious

research and action in this area.

of these differences, each workshop and its associated survey focused on one of three different
stages of the life cycle, in addition to the two sepa-

Report structure

rate types of items (SALW and CWC). Within thecontext of this research, the stages are defined asfollows:

Section 2 presents the overall assessment of thetechnologies which could be used to counter the1.

Pre-export: This is the stage when national

diversion of SALW, based on the survey inputs andlicensing authorities consider an applica-

workshop discussions. Section 3 then provides antion for a licence for an international

overview of key systemic barriers which emergedtransfer of SALW – i.e., post-manufacture

when discussing the application of technologies tobut pre-shipment of SALW. Methods ofcounter-diversion efforts. It also proposes possible

diversion at the pre-export stage include

avenues to mitigate or overcome these barriers.

unauthorised production, illicit removal or

10
ANALYSIS

theft, use of forged documents, and use ofshell or front companies with a view tohide the effective end user or end use. Oneof the key elements of this stage is a risk

Deep dive: Reflections on theoverall utility of technology tocounter intentional diversion

assessment of the proposed transfer, which

In instances of intentional diversion, actors

will include an assessment of the potential

involved may actively seek to overcome any

for diversion of the SALW. The result of thecounter-diversion measure, whether techno-

assessment will inform the government’s

logical or not. For example, while docu-

decision whether to authorise or deny thement-authentication technology can help tointernational transfer.

ensure authenticity of documents themselves,
this technology does not inherently prevent

2. Transfer: This stage is the transportation

the input of false information into the docu-of SALW (e.g., by land, air or sea) from thements. Similarly, DLT aims to increase trust

country of origin to their country of desti-

and transparency of data, but this data could

nation (possibly via different transit coun-

theoretically be falsified before being enteredtries), including their import into theinto the system.

recipient country. Methods of diversion
during this stage include use of fake docu-

Technology may make intentional diversion

mentation, deliberate misdescription of

more difficult, but all technologies – not justthe goods, rerouting of the goods at transit

document authentication or DLT – could in

hubs, and smuggling or theft.

theory be circumvented with sufficient skill,time and resources. Thus, not every issue can

3. Post-delivery: This refers to the post-ship-

be addressed solely through the addition ofment verification, stockpiling and active

technology;

use of SALW, up until their eventual

whole-of-system – or even whole-of-society

disposal,includingdestruction.

counter-diversion

requiresaHere,– approach, within which technology is but

methods of diversion include theft or

one component. (This is discussed further in

capture, loss from stockpiles – both private

Section 3.)

and government-held – and unauthorised
transfer including re-export and use.
In addition to exploring distinct stages of theOverall, while risks of diversion of SALW exists

transfer life cycle, workshop participants were also

across all stages, the post-delivery stage is often

asked to reflect upon the different elements

identified as the one facing the highest risks ofcomprising counter-diversion, drawing on thediversion of SALW. Furthermore, diversion can beresearch conducted for the first phase of D-TECT.

both intentional and unintentional, with one type

These elements are presented in Table 3.

15

of intentional diversion being state-sponsoreddiversion. Intentional diversion can be achieved
through a range of methods including thosedescribed above, such as deliberate misdescriptionof goods or unauthorised transfer, sale, trade orgift across all stages of the SALW life cycle.16 The

Relevance of technologies
for counter-diversion

next box provides reflections from participants on

Overall, survey and workshop participants consid-

the utility of technology to aid with intentional

ered all 14 technologies to have potential rele-

diversion.

vance

in

helping

SALW

counter-diversion.

Participants did not consider any of the technology

11

Table 3:Elements of counter-diversion17

Element

Description

Prevention

Prevention takes place before diversion effectively happens and involves interventions andmeasures to prevent actors from diverting conventional weapons and related components
from their authorised end user or end use.

Detection

Detection takes place during the diversion efforts and involves measures and interventions todetect when diversion is happening and measures or interventions to prevent the diversion.

Identification

Identification deals with actual cases of diversion; thus, it occurs after diversion has takenplace and involves interventions and measures to identify such cases and to analyse where
the diversion effectively happened with a view to supporting and optimising future diversionprevention efforts and initiatives.

options identified in phase 1 of Project D-TECT as

negligence or capture. Workshop discussions on

having a potential negative impact on counter-di-these two stages also pointed to the fact that tech-version. Participants generally assessed technolo-

nology relevant to counter-diversion within thesegies as providing either a moderate improvement

stages should be applied as early as possible in thein comparison to current capability or practices or,

SALW life cycle. Overall, this demonstrates a needin some cases, negligible or no difference into consider whether and how technologies appliedcomparison to current capability or practices.

in one stage can provide benefits at other stages

Individualin the life cycle – even if these are not necessarily

responses

also

show

that

some

respondents felt some technologies could poten-

apparent at that specific stage.

tially provide significant improvement in comparison to current capability or practices.

The overlap in relevant technologies between
stages partly reflects the slightly artificial divide

More specifically, the types of technologies

between the different stages as conceptualised forparticipants identified as most relevant tended tothis research. This is compounded by the fact thatdiffer depending on the life cycle stage. For

some technologies have multiple areas of rele-example, at the transfer stage, the highest rated

vance and purposes (as shown in Table 1). For

technologies

authentication,

example, there is the potential for additionale-seals, GNSS and mobile tracking, and RFID.

marking information to be present on SALW in the

These scores reflect transfer-specific considera-

form of RFID tags. However, RFID tags could

tions relating to SALW, namely relating to theequally aid with the inventory of individual SALW

ability to identify items and false documentationin stockpiles, as well as in tracking shipments byand the ability to prevent the rerouting or theft ofbeing placed on packaging (see the box on the

SALW. At the post-delivery stage, however, while

next page). Therefore, the various figures below

RFID, e-seals, and GNSS and mobile tracking wereon technology relevance should be read alongsidealso highly rated, document authentication was

the qualitative findings emerging from the work-

not and was instead replaced by sensors andshop discussions, which provide a broader contex-

chemical encoding. These scores reflect a possible

tual understanding.

were

document

response to known risks of diversion from stockpiles or during active use due to inadequate securityof

infrastructure,

theft,

loss

through12
ANALYSIS

Deep dive: Reflections fromworkshop participants on
RFIDs

differentiation in impact between the different

RFIDs scored highly in terms of potential

technologies are better suited to detecting diver-impact; indeed, this is a technology withsion as it occurs or once it has occurred, rather

which most participants appeared to bethan preventing diversion. The perceived effec-

familiar, in addition to it being a technology

tiveness in aiding prevention, detection or identi-

whose use has been proven given that it isfication also varied. For example, the assessedalready used to aid with logistics, particularly

impact of technologies such as IoT, NLP, DLT orin the civilian sector. Within the context of

sensors is closely clustered, indicating that there

SALW counter-diversion, the ability of RFIDs

may be minimal differences in the perceived

to aid with physical security and stockpile

impact of the technologies across the elements ofmanagement was discussed in depth because

counter-diversion. However, there is a greater

they offer the possibility to increase thedifference in the assessed impacts of chemicalfrequency of checks and audits by scanning

encoding, RFID, GNSS and mobile tracking, andmultiple RFID tags at once and not requiring

NFC, indicating that these may be more suited to

the need for physical inspection.

taking a specific role in aiding with counter-di-

counter-diversion elements.
Participants determined that most of the assessedversion.
While acknowledging their possible impact,
participants also raised the possibility for

These results demonstrate the necessity of careful

human errors or biases that could emerge

consideration when selecting a technology tofrom the use of RFIDs, such as over-trust in

ensure that it will adequately fulfil the intended

technology. For example, use of RFIDs to

purpose. Additionally, they also demonstrate

facilitate stockpile checks can lead to fewer

where technology might provide added value

physical inspections. Results from the scanscompared to “traditional” or non-technologicalcan feed into the assumption that all SALW

approaches to countering the diversion of SALW.

are in the storage facility, but issues andSuch approaches tend to focus on preventing

errors could still occur, and physical inspec-

diversion, whereas technologies generally appear

tion and verification would still be needed

to be more suitable for detecting and identifying

periodically to conduct holistic checks.

diversion, hence demonstrating a complementarity between approaches. This data also demonstrates that overall scores on a technology’s

The relevance of technology also varied according

potential impact on counter-diversion do not

to the specific element of counter-diversion (i.e.,

differ significantly between less complex technol-

prevention,Forogies (e.g., 2D codes, chemical encoding andexample, in the transfer stage, participants iden-

document authentication) and more complex

tified technologies that provide additional, item-

technologies (e.g., IoT, DLT and some of thelevel identification (e.g., 2D codes, chemical

AI-related technologies; see Figure 2 above for a

encoding and DNA coding) as being better suited

mapping of technologies according to theirto the identification of SALW. In contrast, they

complexity). The box below provides a specificidentified technologies that provide tracking andoverview of findings on the AI technologies.

detectionoridentification).

tracing capabilities (e.g., RFID, NFC, and GNSS
and mobile tracking) as being better suited toaiding detection over prevention. These differences are illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the13

Figure 3: Impact of the technologies on the various elements of counter-diversion of SALW
(all stages combined)18

Prevention

Detection

Legend:Identification

2D codesComputer vision

Chemical encoding

NLP

Legend:• 4: High impact• 4: High impact• 3: Moderate impact• 3: Moderate impact
2: toLittleto no impact• 2:• little
no impact•
1:
Negative
impact• 1: Negative impact

DNA coding

Big data analysis

Document authentication

DLT

E-seals

IoT

GNSS and mobile tracking

Sensors

NFC
RFID

Deep dive: Reflections from participants on AI technologies
AI technologies tended to be scored as having a slightly lower impact than other technologies. Despite
these scores, participants showed a certain level of interest in AI technologies, particularly aroundtheir potential use in data-heavy processes that occur in the pre-export, transfer and post-delivery
stages. Some participants noted that they could see the utility of AI technologies in helping to verify
licence applications or helping private sector actors to conduct risk assessments, especially in areas
faced with limited personnel or time-consuming tasks. An example provided from the transfer stage
was of a pilot project within a private company to use AI to examine descriptions of items for export
in order to aid with the large amounts of data that require checking at this stage. Although the pilot
has shown some promising results, further work is required to improve the quality of source data
and to reduce the high number of false positives (i.e., identifying more risks or issues than there▲

were in reality).

14
ANALYSIS▲

Barriers to technologicaladoption

Overall, lower impact scores were considered to be, in part, due to unfamiliarity with
AI technology, uncertainty as to how it could
be applied, and a lack of trust regarding theIn addition to examining the potential impact ofpotential for errors. For example, partici-

technology, it is also important and necessary topants were unsure as to how public sector

understand what barriers to adoption each tech-actors could use AI technology. They also

nology may face. To do so, survey respondents

raised concerns about the accuracy of algo-were asked to assess the extent to which each ofrithms. Increased education and under-

the requirements outlined in the next box could

standing of possible error rates compared topose a barrier to the successful implementation ofhumans could therefore be useful, as well as

counter-diversion technology, focusing on tech-specific examples of how this type of tech-

nology-specific barriers to implementation.

nology is or could be applied by a range ofactors.
Errors can of course happen regardless of thetype of technology used. Yet, the significanceand impact of an error can vary depending on
the technology. For example, an error in thedata contained within a 2D code for an indi-

Potential barriers to thesuccessful implementation ofcounter-diversion technology•

Skill requirements: Knowledge of thevidual SALW or an issue preventing the scan-

technology (how to implement it andning of a 2D code is of a different magnitude

how to use it) and the training accessi-

compared to an error made by an AI model

ble and available to gain these skills, asthat is intended to assess diversion risks forwell as having reliable and trustworthy

an international transfer of thousands of

personnel.

SALW. Broader questions for consideration•

Infrastructural requirements: Availability of both the physical and virtual infra-

emerged from this discussion:

structure needed to enable the technol•

ogy to function, such as secure location,

Is human error more acceptable thanelectricity, (security of) connectivity, etc.

errors emerging from the use of an AI
technology?
•••

Cost requirement: Financial costs re-

To what extent are users willing to accept

lated to the development, acquisition

errors caused by technology versus thoseand maintenance of the technology, its

caused by humans?

related enabling infrastructure and theWhat thresholds would users accept for

personnel needed for the technology tofunction.

errors before these undermine a technology’s potential impact or utility?

•

Regulatory requirements: The needto have new or updated regulations orlegislation in place to enable the use andimplementation of the technology.

•

Ethical and social requirements: Societal
trust and acceptance of the technology
to deliver as intended and ensure security of information, and trust between
the partners involved in the use of thetechnology.

15Overall, participants scored the 14 assessed tech-found to face lower barriers to implementation.

nologies as being subject to small- to mediimplementation.

More specifically, participants perceived infra-

However, this assessment could vary depending on

structural and cost requirements as posing thethe different possible use cases, with particularhighest barriers to the successful implementa-

nuances. Namely, the barriers faced by a tech-tion of the technologies. Ethical and social

nology were found to vary slightly depending on

requirements were perceived as posing the lowest

the counter-diversion stage. Table 4 shows thebarriers. This finding was consistent across all

three technologies found to face the lowest barriers

three stages.

um-sizedbarriers

in

their

to implementation versus those with the highest
barriers across the three stages. On the one hand,Yet, low barriers to implementation only show a

DNA coding was consistently found to face highpartial picture of the potential of a technology.

barriers. This was perceived as being mainly related

Selecting technology purely based on its potential

to the cost, infrastructural and skill requirements.

for low barriers can be reductive (as discussed in

High barriers were also noted at the pre-export

the box on the next page). It is also necessary tostage related to regulatory and ethical and social

consider suitability to address the issue at hand,requirements. On the other hand, document

combined with willingness to overcome barriers toauthentication and 2D codes were consistently

implementation.

Table 4:

Technologies assessed as facing the highest versus lowest barriers to implementation, by stage ofcounter-diversion19

Pre-export stage
Highest barriers to implementation

Lowest barriers to implementation

GNSS and mobile tracking

2D codesDNA coding

Document authentication†

DLT

E-seals†

Transfer stage
Highest barriers to implementation

Lowest barriers to implementation

DNA coding

Document authentication

DLT

2D codesComputer vision†

RFID

Chemical encoding†

Post-delivery stage†

Highest barriers to implementation

Lowest barriers to implementation

DNA coding†Document authentication

GNSS and mobile tracking†E-sealsIoT†

2D codes†Big data analysis†

NFC†

These groups of technologies had the same total score for barriers to implementation within their respective stage and respective “category”(i.e., high barriers or low barriers).

16
ANALYSIS

Deep dive: Reflections fromworkshop participants on 2D
codes

account of an entity that used 2D codes

2D codes is one of the least complex technol-

items for identification purposes. However,ogies. It was already well-known among theuse in the field showed limitations in theworkshopapproach: stickers fell off items or became

participants.

2D

codes

could

contain additional information other thanprinted on military-grade stickers as a way
to affix marks on items that had none. These
stickers were therefore added to individual

unreadable.

that required by the International Tracing
Instrument (ITI) and they can be applied atany stage in an international transfer. It wasnoted that this type of marking could bewell-suited for states with lower capacity
because the barriers to implementation are

Assessing technologies’
impact versus barriers

lower and equipment for marking 2D codes
already exists and has been tested on SALWThe survey data and workshop discussions enabled

and other types of items.

an examination of the trade-offs between perceived
impact on counter-diversion versus perceived

However, questions were raised as to thebarriers to implementation. When scores forvalue of adopting this seemingly high impact

impact and barriers are examined together (seeand low barrier technology for SALW. Partic-

Figure 4), all technologies fall in the “high impact”

ipants questioned what information would

quadrants, though with some facing higher

need to be added to such marks that is notbarriers than others. Technologies assessed asalready available. For example, the type of

having a higher impact while facing lower barriers

information that could be useful to include

include document authentication, e-seals, RFIDs(e.g., transfer data) would not be automati-and, to a lesser extent, 2D codes and NFC. Such acally reflected in a 2D code unless that infor-

rating of these technologies may also reflectmation was updated in a wider database thatconcerns with regards to risks and methods ofcould be queried by scanning the 2D codes. In

SALW diversion, namely as regards documenta similar vein, the utility of such a technology

falsification (e.g., of transport documentation or

would only be realised if there is a means to

end-user certificates) or the ability to mitigate orstore and read the data from the codes andprevent loss, theft or illicit transfer of items.

make it searchable across a range of entities

Conversely, the AI-related technologies and otherand stakeholders.

more complex technologies such as DLT or IoT all
feature in the upper right-hand quadrant.

Moreover, the effectiveness of 2D codes to aid
physical security and stockpile management

Examining the trade-offs helps put into context theand reduce time-consuming processes wastechnologies assessed as potentially having a higher

not apparent to participants. Each SALW

impact on counter-diversion. While Figure 4

would still need to be individually scanned,

provides the overall results – merging data across

not to mention the heightened potential forthe three stages and diversion elements of coun-such marks to be rendered unreadable.

ter-diversion – the clustering in the upper two

Participants also noted that 2D marks could

quadrants was consistent even in disaggregated

be

could

data. Within the disaggregated data, the main

impede subsequent tracing of items. The

differences emerged within the stages or coun-

importance of durability is illustrated by an

ter-diversion elements, where different technolo-

intentionally

removed,

which

17

Figure 4: Mapping of technologies by impact versus barriers20
4,0
4,0Higher impact, lower barriersHigher impact, higher barriersHigher impact, lower barriersHigher impact, higher barriers

E-seals
E-seals

3,5
3,5authentication
DocumentDocument
authentication

RFID
RFID
Sensors

DLT
DLT

GNSS
and
mobileGNSS andmobiletrackingtracking

Impact on counter-diversion

Impact on Counter-diversion

Sensors
3,0
3,0

IoT
IoT

NFC
NFC

2D codesBig data
analysisBig
dataanalysis

Chemicalencoding
Chemicalencoding

2,52,5

DNA codingDNA
codingComputer visionvision
Computer

2D codes

NLP
NLP

2,0

2,0

1,5

1,5
Lower impact, lower barriers
1,0

1,0 1,01,0Lower impact, lower barriers
1,5

Lower
impact,barriers
Lower
impact,higher
higher barriers
2,0

2,5

1,5
2,0
2,5
Barriers to implementation
Legend: X-axis:
Y-axis:Barriers to implementation• 4: Insurmountable barrier • 4: High impact• 3: Medium barrier• 3: Moderate impact
Legend: X-axis:
Y-axis:• 2: Small barrier• 2: Little to no impact• 4: Insurmountable barrier• 4: High impact• 1: Not a barrier• 1: Negative impact• 3: Medium barrier• 2: Small barrier• 1: Not a barriergies were assessed as having a higher impact (see

3,0

3,0

3,5

3,5

• 3: Moderate impact• 2: Little to no impact• 1: Negative impact

facing greater barriers than most technologies. One

Deep dive: Reflections fromworkshop participants on
the impact of “visible” versus“invisible” technologies

participant, for example, highlighted that this typeThe visibility – or lack thereof – of tech-of technology could make SALW shipments morenology was discussed at length. The main

trackable, with detrimental implications for privacy

point of reflection was the extent to whichand national security.

application of technology serves as a deter-

Figure 4). For example, in the transfer stage, while
GNSS and mobile tracking was perceived byrespondents as having a potentially high impact on
counter-diversion, it has also been assessed asrent to diversion or reduces the attractiveThis technology mapping reflects several of theness of diverting SALW. Two aspects ofelements discussed above: how familiarity with a“visibility” were examined by participants.

technology, trust in its ability to perform as
expected and knowing that it is used in the context

On the one hand, visibility of a technology inof counter-diversion can have an impact on theterms of its physical presence was discussed.

perception of barriers to the implementation of a

The impact on counter-diversion of the visi-

technology. Further considerations, such as thebility of a technology appears to depend on

visibility and the deterrent effect of technology (asthe type of technology and the intended

discussed in the box on this page), may also havecounter-diversion purpose (i.e., prevention,

played a role in shaping these results. Ultimately,

detection or identification). For example, 2D

as technology develops, improves and democra-

codes were noted as being visible, and there-

tises and as changes also occur in the broader

fore illicit actors would know to remove thesystem including the arms trade, such an assess-marks. On the other hand, non-visible marks

ment may change – thus, this mapping should notsuch as chemical encoding or DNA coding

be seen as static nor absolute.

may be more resilient, in part due to their

4,0

4.0

18
ANALYSIS

invisibility.21 In other words, more covert(e.g., document authentication or DLT). These

markings could be beneficial to avoid coun-

different areas of application are complementaryteraction by illicit actors.

and therefore layering these technologies could
have a compound effect on countering diversion

On the other hand, visibility was alsoof SALW. This could be the case within a specificdiscussed in terms of the wider knowledge

stage of the life cycle, as well as across the SALW

that technology is being used, and not justlife cycle. Certain technologies also need to be inwhat is visible to the naked eye. A deterrent

place before others can be considered. For example,

effect could be achieved by letting potential

digital infrastructure would be needed to enableoffenders know that technology has been

tracking and tracing technologies, which in turnapplied,would need to be in place to enable data-driven

therebyopenlyadvertisingtheelevated risks to these actors of their detec-

technologies such as DLT or AI capabilities.

tion and identification. One workshop participant gave an example of this regarding a

Taking survey responses from the transfer stage

north-eastern African country, where visiblyand examining high-scoring technologies acrossmarked SALW were not used in crimes

subcomponents of diversion, patterns emerge as

because users believed that their use could beto how different technologies can complement

traced back to them. This was not possible,

each other. For instance, use of chemical encoding,due in part to the fact that data on ammuni-

RFID, sensors and big data analysis could help

tion was missing, but the perception none-

fulfil different purposes, such as provision oftheless had an impact on SALW (mis)use.

additional

item-specificinformation,

helping

documentation-heavy processes, tracking andtracing items or their packaging, and helping
increase the security of the goods along the way.

Exploring technology
combinations

Similarly, when looking across the life cycle, technologies that scored highly in terms of their overall
relevance as well as specific relevance in helping
to either prevent, detect or identify diversion (e.g.,

While technologies were examined individuallychemical encoding, RFID, document authentica-

within the survey, they can be combined totion, GNSS and mobile tracking, and DLT) could

leverage their respective strengths and overcome

potentially provide a good combination aimed at

individual weaknesses. This is particularly rele-

addressing different needs.

vant given that the survey data revealed thatdifferent technologies emerged as having a greater

These examples are purely illustrative. Specificimpact for certain elements of counter-diversion

combinations of technologies would differ based

as well as for certain stages of the transfer process.

on the needs assessment, the ability of a tech-Moreover, participants noted that it was highly

nology to respond to this need and the specificimprobable that only one type of technology could

context of implementation, in line with thebe applied across the SALW life cycle to effectively

D-TECT

address all areas of risk.

context in which a technology is applied would

evaluation

framework.

Indeed,theinfluence the benefits or positive impact that a
As illustrated in Table 1, the technologies are highly
diverse. For example, some are meant to be applied
directly on SALW (e.g., chemical encoding), otherson packaging (e.g., GNSS or mobile tracking), or tootherwise improve or strengthen the wider process

technology can have.

19

Section 3 - Systemic
barriers to technology
implementation andways forward

nature of post-shipment verification); and•enabling sufficient data and information
to conduct forensic analysis.

Some participants also expressed the sentiment
that, if technology was not adopted in certain
instances, then the problems will persist, espe-

This section first examines the main systemic

cially regarding traceability and transparency.

barriers to implementing a technology for coun-

Similarly, barriers to technology adoption exist

ter-diversion of SALW that emerged during theand were discussed at length, given how they canworkshops. It then provides an overview ofbe or can seem to be prohibitive to the adoption of

possible avenues that could be explored or under-technology (as described in Section 2). In addition,

taken to mitigate or overcome the barriers. It

the workshops focused particularly on the system-

should be noted that the type and extent of eachwide barriers or limitations to the implementation

barrier differs depending on the stakeholder.

of technology.

While the barriers and the possible ways forward
aim to capture a range of perspectives and issues,these cannot encompass all context-specificbarriers and related ways forward. Overall, theFragmentation among themultiple actors involved in SALW

overarching theme that threads through many, if

During the SALW life cycle, a range of actors are

not all, of the barriers is that of trust – or its

involved, including exporting and importing

absence – and how to build or enable it. Because

states, their national authorities (including bordertrust is multifaceted, it can encapsulate trust incontrol and custom authorities), as well as thethe technology, users, decision-makers or systemmanufacturing entities and industry (as regards

to act in a reliable and secure manner. This issue

SALW), private sector (as regards technologies),

is also linked to a more general lack of knowledge

users of SALW and those involve in their disposal,

or awareness of technologies and their potential

in addition to different types of intermediaries

uses, an element which the options to overcome

such as freight forwarders and brokers.23 Thesethe barriers also seek to address.

different actors may not always operate in a cohe-22

sive and unified manner, leading to a fragmented
landscape. This can have an impact on technology

Systemic barriers totechnology adoption

implementation. For example, some actors could
veto or otherwise hamper the use of (certain)
technologies, which can have a domino effectbeyond their specific remit. Further, the lack of

The workshop participants recognised that tech-coordination can lead to siloed collection and use

nology may be a helpful tool to aid counter-diver-of data. This landscape can also make it difficult

sion efforts. Reasons to use technology are varied

to have conversations as to whether and how costs

and include:

could or should be shared among different actors.
Currently, there are no requirements to use tech-•••

improvingknowledgeofunknowns

nology, although there may be requirements tothrough better use of data;

accept technologies applied by state and non-statecomplementing existing approaches toactors across the life cycle. This can open several

risk mitigation;questions, for example, as to who is responsible

overcoming space and time constraints

for the various costs in such circumstances, or the(e.g., the time-consuming and physicaladditional workforce, if required.

20
ANALYSIS

Practicalities of technology
development and adoption•

lack of a digital infrastructure, such as adigital database management system; and•weak or non-existent political and legal

Technology first needs to be developed or acquired.

frameworks and good governance that

Some types of technologies could be developed

would prevent the enforcement of conse-

in-house (e.g., by skilled personnel or specificquences in cases where diversion has been

entities or departments), whereas others may

uncovered.

require working with the private sector or transferring technology from a trusted partner. Each of

Cost of technology

these approaches has short-term advantages anddrawbacks, as well as longer-term implications.

The (high) cost of technology is an often-cited

On the one hand, this brings to the fore questions

reason for a reluctance to adopt technology. Iton the willingness of states to provide technology

should be noted that costs may fluctuate, and, forto other states, or on finding and selecting an

certain technologies, may reduce over time, forappropriate vendor and thus about the standards

example, if they become more mainstream, with aof technology developed by a non-state actor. On

wider market. Yet, it is not just the cost of a tech-

the other hand, technology should be considered

nology purchase that needs to be factored in, but

as a long-term investment, as the broader system

also the cost of training the personnel meant toin which it would operate would need to adapt andwork with it, the cost of maintenance or replace-change around the technology. The difficulty ofment of elements or the whole solution, and, inchanging existing systems can be a factor thatsome cases, the cost of modernising systems,

prevents the adoption of technology, despite an

training and infrastructure in order to enable theunderstanding that technology can help. An

most recent technologies. Differences in theexample of one such practical issue was illustrated

resource levels of states and private sector actors

by an interviewee, who described a situation

can hamper an equal adoption. Participants noted

where a licensed digital technology had beenthat these costs can be particularly off-putting forprovided to licensing officers. After this tech-

publicnology had been employed for a certain time, there

compounding the cost of technology can alsocame the point where the technology’s licence

include lack of or insufficient resources of entities

required renewal. To avoid this, the unit ended up

interested in technology adoption, as well asinternally developing its own database-manage-

minimal international assistance, which may notment system.

allow funds to be allocated for technology use and24

sectoractors.

Additional

factors

training in technology.

Lack of infrastructure surrounding
the technology

National security considerations

Technology requires a number of elements to be in

There are concerns that use of technology could,

place in order to for it to correctly undertake theon the one hand, lead to exposure of weaknesses

function it is meant to fulfil; indeed, a lack ofthat may have repercussions for broader national

these elements could have an impact on the ability

security and, on the other hand, cause physicalof technology to act as a deterrent beyond just thedamage,technology’s capabilities in themselves. These

Regarding the first point, these concerns mainly

elements include:pertain to digital and connected technologies (e.g.,

such

as

by

triggering

explosions.

DLT, IoT, AI technologies), as well as technologies•

lack of sufficiently robust physical struc-that have GPS functions or an electromagnetic

tures;

signature (e.g., GNSS and mobile tracking, RFID,

21

e-seals). Issues raised include fears that software

the life cycle of SALW.

containing data on SALW could be compromised,such as through cyberattacks or the ability for
SALW to be tracked and traced by harmful actors.
This concern is particularly acute within the

Need for data and data
management

post-delivery stage, when SALW are stockpiled orParticipants discussed at length the centrality ofduring their active use. The second set of concerns

data for countering diversion, including data

relates to fears that the use of certain frequen-collection, record-keeping and background data

cy-emitting technologies could negatively interact

systems. The need for a robust data and informa-with ammunition or other types of weapontionsystems (including potential accidental trig-

indeed, many of the technologies depend upon thegering), primarily during stockpiling, but also

existence of data systems to be used meaningfully

during their deployment. This latter issue isor even to operate. However, issues raised bynotably addressed in the International Ammuni-

participants highlighted the types of barriers

tion Technical Guidelines (IATG) 5.60 on hazards

which exist, such as approaches to robust dataof electromagnetic radiation, which notes thatcollection and management, potential sensitivi-

radio frequencies can be “potentially hazardous

ties and challenges as to where and how the datawhen used in close proximity to explosives thatis stored, as well as open questions regarding data

have an installed electrical means of initiation”.

sovereignty.

25

Lack of knowledgeable personnel
Humans remain central to the use of technology.
Participants stressed that the notion that tech-management

infrastructurewasnoted;

Overcoming systemic
barriers

nology can replace humans in counter-diversion
is incorrect and an assumption to be avoided.

Participants provided ideas and suggestions toTechnology cannot fully replace the need for

mitigate and overcome the systemic barriers. An

skilled individuals or essential procedures: humaninitial, non-exhaustive set of options and avenues

input, intervention and judgement will always be

through which these could be achieved at theindispensable. However, a lack of trained andnational, regional or international levels is offeredknowledgeable individuals can have a negative

below. It is important to stress that the ability to

impact on the implementation and management

mitigate or overcome barriers can differ dependingof the technologies, impeding their effective useon the stakeholders involved, the type of barrier,and ability to achieve the desired end-result.

the extent to which technology needs to beThus, the need to ensure that personnel have theadopted, and the willingness to overcome theappropriate training and skillset and can bebarriers. Even so, it is hoped that demonstrating

retained in the long-term can act as a barrier tothat there are options available to overcome thetechnology adoption. It should, nonetheless, beoverarching barriers can help to advance discus-

noted that the type and extent of training andsions and expand options for technology adoption

skills may differ and be more or less extensivein the context of counter-diversion efforts. More-depending on the technology; this would also thenover, many of these actions can be undertaken

be reflected in the knowledge, training and skills

with a broader focus on counter-diversion. Indeed,

required from individuals. This point is also linked

some of the actions are not only focused on theto a broader one on the overall limited knowledge

goal of technology adoption, nor are they neces-

and awareness of available technology and its

sarily always specific to SALW. This lends suchpotential uses by the multiple actors involved inactions to being well placed to be addressed

22
ANALYSIS

through international treaties which have broader

national

remits, such as the ATT.

including with government agencies

andinternational

levels,(e.g., licensing authorities, customs

Collaboration and inter-agency
cooperation

agencies,

National and international collaboration andestablish day-to-day communicationcooperation between stakeholders are of particularchannels and relationships;

intelligenceorganisations)and the private sector (e.g., producers,
shipping companies, etc.) to improve or

importance in a multi-stakeholder environment,- setting-up partnerships through whichnotably as regards inter-agency coordination,

to seek ways to offset costs or examine

cooperation and information-sharing at national

possibilities for economies of scale orand international levels to counter diversion.

subsidies, for example, through a focus

26

on technologies that could also be•

Gather and share inputs and suggestions

applied for other purposes or withinonpractical

other spheres; alternatively, through antechnologicalinnovation;technological adoption; how specific tech-

examination of whether other actors

nologies could work in practice; the advan-

would be willing to develop and adopt

tages, drawbacks and impact on different

similar technologies, in which case,stakeholders as well as on the system; andcost-sharing could be considered.

good practices and lessons learned. This
could be achieved by:- creating a data-sharing platform, suchas an online tool;- holding multi-stakeholder dialogues orEvidence and knowledgebuilding
In-depth knowledge and understanding of thevarious technologies can vary, including regarding

workshops; or- creating guidance material.

the extent to which they might be relevant andThese avenues could be led by states within

how they could be applied; this could be mitigatedexisting forums and multilateral instru-

by increasing the knowledge base.

ments at the international level. For
example, relevant topics could be included•

Foster common understanding on thewithin the scope of the ATT’s sub-working

different types of technologies aimed atgroup on current and emerging imple-

countering diversion. This could be achieved

mentation issues, in the ATT’s Diversion

by:Information Exchange Forum (DIEF), or in- developing a common lexicon of tech-

the scope of a possible technical expert

nical terms, which could cover what agroup for the PoA/International Tracing

technology means and what it can andInstrument (ITI). Initiatives could also becannot provide in terms of information,

pursuedto increase understanding and trust in

under

instruments

regional

and

SALW-control

regional

cooperation

the various technologies;- developing a platform for the voluntary

frameworks.

sharing of the results of monitoring and•

Enhance collaboration and cooperation

evaluating the use of technology to

between different relevant actors. Thiscounter

could be achieved by:regional and international levels; such a- continuing

consultations

multi-stakeholder

dialoguesatdiversion,

at

the

national,

andplatform can encourage accountability

theand transparency, providing valuable23

sion-making and improving the effec-

Institutional capacity-building
and individual training

tiveness of counter-diversion efforts.

Successful implementation of technology relies

insights and evidence to inform deci-

not just on the technology itself, but also on the•

Conduct studies and assessments on thesurrounding infrastructure, which includes people

potential and actual utility of different

and processes. Thus, learning and development

technologies

are key areas of focus to enable and facilitate

forcountering

diversion

throughout the life cycle of SALW (as wellchange management.

as conventional arms and ammunition
more broadly). Topics discussed among•

Offer long-term incentives, funding andthe participants include:

training to states and the private sector to- conducting context-specific case studies

enable the necessary supporting infra-

and assessments on the technologies at

structure. This could focus on increasing

the local, national or regional levels tonational and regional capacities regarding

examine how they work, the benefits

legal, regulatory and policy frameworks tothey offer, and the drawbacks and costs

enhance effective governance and enforce-

involved in their implementation, use

ment of regulations, as well as on people

and maintenance;

and infrastructure (the latter of which is- examining the extent to which SALW

discussed further below). This could be

becomes less attractive for diversion asachieved by using existing internationala result of technology use;27

and regional cooperation and assistance- ensuring continued research and developmentontechnologies

toframeworks, such as the ATT’s Voluntary

ensureTrust Fund. There is also potential forcompliance and ensure that any innova-

creating new international and regionaltions are duly noted;

cooperation and assistance frameworks to- assessing the cost of non-adoption of

support the use of technology for countering diversion.

technology against the cost of technology adoption or the cost of technology implementation – this could be•

Implement policies that focus on improving

undertaken by considering issues suchthe retention levels of trained personnel

as the size of the problem versus theandcost of the solution, as well as theachieved by putting in place specificpotential benefits versus the cost of theknowledge-management policies, whereby

solution;28

individuals leaving a department or service- undertaking specific testing and pilotingofspecific

technologies

by

their

knowledge.

This

could

be

ensure that their knowledge is transmitted.

states,industry and technical implementers in
order

to

determine

context-specific•

Enhance technology adoption and trust inpractical applicability of technologies

technology use through long-term educa-

thistional and capacity-building initiatives that

could also be undertaken at the regional

focus on skills development and specialised

level.

training among the workforce, at the indi-and determine technical needs;

29

vidual level. These initiatives should ideally
be long-term, to last from several months
to several years. This could be achieved
through train-the-trainer initiatives.

24
ANALYSIS

Physical, regulatory and digital
infrastructure

particularly when it comes to the “identification” element of counter-diversion.
This could be achieved by harmonising

In addition to people and processes, technology

different information-collection and data-requires an adequate physical and digital infra-

sharing systems to ensure interoperability

structure to function, in addition to appropriate

and aid with collaboration and coopera-

regulatory frameworks.

tion.

•

Ensure that core elements and a strategy•

Utilise or implement robust frameworks

for a digital infrastructure are in place,on the adoption and use of technologies, tosuch as power backups and IT infrastruc-also ensure that these can help guide users

ture, including the hardware (e.g., servers),

and frame the use of technology, as well assoftware (e.g., cybersecurity) and humanto ensure enforcement and other actions

expertise. This could be achieved by:possible to act upon the data. This could be- implementing background data-man-achieved by:agement systems to capture relevant- implementing existing guidelines (e.g.,

data – this should include agreement on

IATG 5.60) that provide procedures as to

how the data within these management

the use of such devices in ammuni-

systems and databases is managed andtion-storage areas as well as for tracking

by whom;of weapons or their packaging, including- applying and following strict data-man-on how to apply passive and active

agement regulations to abide by ethical

RFIDs; additionally, implementation ofand legal considerations – this includes

the MOSAIC guidelines on stockpile

applying

management, specifically regarding the

cybersecurity

principles

toprevent cyber incidents and data leaking;

use

of

technology

forweapons- improving the cybersecurity of digital

accounting, could also be considered;30

systems, for example, by ensuring- putting in place systems – whether

proper access control, implementing

technical, human or both – that examine

proper cybersecurity protocols, regu-

the collected data for anomalies or otherlarly updating systems and undertaking

issues and can identify instances ofmaintenance; additionally, focusing on

diversion.

training

personnel

andminimisinginsider risk, by drawing upon existingsources of knowledge and research;- implementing tools to monitor the
performance, availability and security ofSection 4 - Conclusion

technologies, in addition to tools toThis paper presents an overview of whether andconfigure and manage IT resources.

how technology could be implemented to help
counter the diversion of small arms and light•

Establish or strengthen national or evenweapons, including an assessment of which types

regionalasof technologies might be better suited to the task.

through backup systems whether digital

Overall, the 14 technology types identified in the(e.g., cloud infrastructure) or physical, tofirst phase of Project D-TECT, broadly speaking,overcome the risk that use of information

are all potentially relevant to counter-diversion

and communications technologies andefforts. Some technologies are more suitable todigitalaiding detection than to prevention and identifi-

archival

platforms

processes,

weakenssucharchival

processes. Archival material is important,cation.

25

Nonetheless, all technologies face barriers to their• strengthening international and regional

implementation, although the nature and extent

collaboration and inter-agency coopera-of these barriers is context specific. There are also
overarching structural barriers that may impede
adoption of technology more generally, in addition
to technology-specific barriers. These include:tion;• building up the evidence and knowledge
base;• reinforcing or setting up appropriate
physical, regulatory and digital infra-•

arms control infrastructure;•

the nature of the international arms trade,which features a large number of different

structure; and• undertaking

institutional

capaci-ty-building and individual training.

types of actors; and•national security considerations that may

Some of the options proposed could also build on

emerge due to the use of technology.

existing international and regional initiatives andinstruments, such as the PoA/ITI or the ATT.

The paper, however, does not provide a definitive

Moreover, the use of appropriate technology

answer as to what specific technology, or combi-

represents a common challenge for states as wellnation of technologies, should be implemented or

as for private sector actors, thus requiring a coop-prioritised to counter the diversion of SALW. Thiserative approach to develop appropriate options as

is because the most appropriate technology will

well as standards of use.

vary depending on the context and on the needs
behind its implementation. In other words, it isTechnology can act as a supportive tool or as a

not possible to provide an answer to the question

force multiplier to counter-diversion efforts. Asof “which is the most suitable technology” because

shown by the barriers, options and avenues forthe technology and how it is applied is not aaction, its successful application nonetheless relies

one-size-fits-all solution.

on oversight, on an enabling environment, on
enforcement of frameworks, instruments and

The approach taken to assess selected technolo-

processes, as well as on broader political will.

gies was a proof-of-concept. To move beyond

These elements are the “building blocks” that are

illustrative findings, there would be merit inrequired to be in place to enable implementation

replicating such an exercise in a specific countryof technology to aid counter-diversion. Theseor at a regional level to enable the assessment of“building blocks” are also relevant to counter-di-

the technologies against a specific need and withinversion efforts more broadly – and not just focuseda specific context. Indeed, the effectiveness of aon paving the path to technology use.

technology can vary according to its context of
implementation, which is one of the three steps

Ultimately, the application of technology towithin the framework developed to identify andcounter diversion should be an ongoing conversa-

assess technologies to counter the diversion oftion, as both diversion and technology evolve,

conventional weapons.

change, adapt and advance.

There are systemic barriers that can hamper the
implementation and use of technology. Yet, thesebarriers should not be seen as precluding the useof technology. The paper provides a non-exhaustive overview of possible options that could beundertaken to overcome or mitigate these barriers,
including:26
ANALYSIS

Endnotes
1.

UNIDIR, Conflict Armament Research (CAR) and Stimson Center(2023), Strengthening shared understanding on the impact of theArms Trade Treaty in addressing risks of diversion in arms transfers,
Geneva: UNIDIR, https://doi.org/10.37559/CAAP/23/WAM/02, p. 4.

2.

UN General Assembly, Report of the open-ended working
group to negotiate an international instrument to enable states
to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit
small arms and light weapons, A/60/88, 27 June 2005,
https://undocs.org/en/A/60/88, p. 7.

3.

Merriam-Webster, Technology, (n.d.),https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/technology.

4.

Grand-Clément, S. & Cops, D. (2023), Technologies to counter thediversion of small arms and light weapons, and components of
conventional weapons, Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, https://unidir.org/publication/technologies-to-counter-the-diversionof-small-arms-and-light-weapons-and-components-ofconventional-weapons-2/, p. 23  

5.

Wood, B. (2023), The Arms Trade Treaty. Assessing its impact on
countering diversion, Geneva: UNIDIR,
https://unidir.org/publication/the-arms-trade-treaty-assessingits-impact-on-countering-diversion/, p. 17.

6.

Grand-Clément, S. & Cops, D. (2023), Technologies to counter thediversion of small arms and light weapons, and components of
conventional weapons, Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, https://unidir.org/publication/technologies-to-counter-the-diversionof-small-arms-and-light-weapons-and-components-ofconventional-weapons-2/.

7.

Cops, D. (forthcoming), Countering the diversion of components of
conventional weapons. An assessment of potential technologicalsolutions, Flemish Peace Institute.

8.

Some minor changes were made to the technologies assessed aspart of the research for this second phase compared to the longlist
from the first phase. Specifically, Physically Unclonable Functions(PUFs) were not included in the analysis because of its immaturity,
while the broad category of “artificial intelligence (AI)” was disaggregated into three specific types of technologies to increase
granularity. The food-for-thought paper from the first phaseprovides a detailed description of each of these technologies, aswell as their current areas of application and where and forwhat purposes they could be applied to SALW or CWC. See
Grand-Clément, S. & Cops, D. (2023), Technologies to counterthe diversion of small arms and light weapons, and componentsof conventional weapons, Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute,
https://unidir.org/publication/technologies-to-counter-thediversion-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons-and-componentsof-conventional-weapons-2/, pp. 9–17.

9.

Popper, S. W. et al. (2013), Strategic issues facing transportation, vol.
3, Expediting future technologies for enhancing transportation system
performance, Washington, DC: National Academies Press, https://
nap.nationalacademies.org/read/22448/chapter/1.

10.

Step 5 is considered to be a political decision-making process andis thus outside the scope of this research project.

11.

With a view to strengthen participants’ understanding of theselected technologies and to increase the reliability and validity of
their responses, they were all provided with a guidance document
describing the various technologies, the preconditions for theirimplementation, use cases and their potential relevance in counterdiversion efforts. In addition, a short online briefing was offered to allparticipants in which the technologies were presented and room
for questions was foreseen.

12.

For the first two life cycle stages, the workshops discussed both
SALW and CWC (although the surveys examined these two types
of items separately). For the post-delivery stage, separate workshops were held for SALW and CWC. The fourth workshop, on the
post-delivery stage for CWC, is not reflected in the table since it
was not about SALW.

13.

Note that not all survey respondents were able to attend the workshops, and not all workshop participants completed the survey.

14.

Martinez, M. et al. (2021), Diversion Analysis Framework (Arms Trade
Treaty Issue Brief 3), Geneva: UNIDIR, Conflict Armament Research,and Stimson Center, https://unidir.org/publication/arms-tradetreaty-issue-brief-3-diversion-analysis-framework/.

15.

Conflict Armament Research (2018), Typology of diversion,
Diversion Digest, 1, pp. 8–14, https://www.conflictarm.com/
Interwp-content/uploads/2018/08/diversion-digest-01.pdf;
view respondent 1 (UN sanctions expert), 11 September 2022; Interview respondent 2 (UN sanctions expert), 10 November 2022;
Interview respondent 3 (international NGO), 17 November 2022;
Interview respondent 4 (UN sanctions expert), 24 November 2022);
Interview respondent 6 (international NGO), 28 November 2022;
Interview respondent 17 (SALW counter-diversion practitioner), 14
December 2023.

16.

Conflict Armament Research (2018); Cîrlig, C.-C. (2015), Illicit
small arms and light weapons: International and EU action,
Brussels:
EuropeanParliamentary
Research
Service,h t t p s : // w w w. e u ro p a r l . e u ro p a . e u / R e g D a t a /e t u d e s /I DA N /2 0 1 5 /5 6 5 8 6 9 / E P R S _ I DA ( 2 0 1 5 ) 5 6 5 8 6 9 _ E N . p d f ;Stohl, R., Dick, S. & Fletcher, R. (2021), Diversion and the Arms Trade
Treaty: Identifying good practice and opportunities for progress,
Washington, DC: Stimson Center, https://www.jstor.org/stable/
resrep30825; Interview respondent 3 (international NGO), 17
November 2022; Interview respondent 4 (UN sanctions expert), 24
November 2022; Interview respondent 10 (international organisation), 10 January 2023.

17.

Grand-Clément & Cops (2023), p. 7.

18.

The visual shows the aggregate findings across the three stages ofcounter-diversion. The identification stage was not scored for
document authentication, GNSS and mobile tracking, NFC, or RFID,
based on analysis by the project team that suggested that thisparticular stage would be less relevant for these technologies andscoring would be redundant. Respondents were asked to assess
whether the technologies would have a negative impact (“reduction in capability or negative impact in comparison to current practices”), little to no impact (“negligible or no difference in comparison
to current capability or practices”), moderate impact (“moderate
improvement in comparison to current capability or practices”) or
high impact (“significant improvement in comparison to current
capability or practices”).

19.

For each technology, participants were asked to assess the extent
to which these barriers were not a barrier (“the barriers would haveno effect on the successful implementation of the technology”), a
small barrier (“the barriers can be dealt with relatively easily”), a
medium-sized barrier (“the barriers would be difficult or challenging
to carry out”), or an insurmountable barrier (“the barriers would
require action that might not be possible or practicable”) for successful implementation.

20.

The figure shows data aggregated across all three stages and all
three elements of counter-diversion.

21.

It should, however, be noted that invisibility is only one such factor here;
indeed, unlike 2D codes marked on items directly, removal of chemical
encoding or DNA coding would entail destruction of the SALW.

27

22.

For a more in-depth overview on this point in relation to technology,
as well as on other attributes perceived as being important, seeGrand-Clément & Cops (2023), p. 20.

23.

A comprehensive overview of industry and other private sector
actors is provided in Mensah, A., Perkins, R. & Fletcher, R. (2023), The
Arms Trade Treaty: The role of industry and other private sector actors
in efforts to counter the diversion of conventional arms (Arms Trade
Treaty Issue Brief 4), Geneva: UNIDIR, Conflict Armament Research,and Stimson Centre, https://unidir.org/publication/the-role-ofindustry-and-other-private-sector-actors-in-efforts-to-counterthe-diversion-of-conventional-arms-att-issue-brief-4/.

24.

Interview respondent 17 (SALW counter-diversion practitioner),
14 December 2023.

25.

IATG 5.60 includes devices such as “mobile telephones, wirelesscommunication links to high-powered transmitters for voicecommunication, electronic data transmission, asset tracking andradar” as frequency-emitting devices. See UN SaferGuard (2021),
International Ammunition Technical Guidelines: Hazards of electromagnetic radiation (IATG 5.60), New York: UN Office for Disarmament
https://data.unsaferguard.org/iatg/en/IATGAffairs,
05.60-Hazards-electromagnetic-radiation-IATG-V.3.pdf, p. v.

26.

Holtom, P. (2024), The Role of interagency cooperation in the effective
implementation of Arms Trade Treaty provisions: Brainstorming
workshop summary, Geneva: UNIDIR, Conflict Armament Researchand Stimson Center, https://unidir.org/publication/the-role-ofinteragency-cooperation-in-the-effective-implementation-ofarms-trade-treaty-provisions-brainstorming-workshopsummary/.

27.

One example mentioned in a workshop was examining the costdifferential between SALW on which tracking and tracing technology is known to have been applied, and those which do not havesuch technology (including assumed knowledge). If untraceable
items become more expensive, then that is one way to identify the
impact of technology.

28.

For example, for technologies that are placed on items or theirpackaging, the cost of relevant technology may increase as thenumber of items increases. This can help improve understanding as
to the amount of funds that could be put towards technology
implementation, but also to help understand whether the benefits
would outweigh costs.

29.

For example, this could build on work conducted jointly by ConflictArmament Research (CAR) and TTE-Europe GmbH (TTE), which
tested the use of RFIDs to identify individual weapons. To addressconcerns that RFIDs could have an impact on military operations byrendering SALW “visible” to adversaries, CAR developed a dualtagging approach whereby an overt RFID could continue to be
used for stockpile management, and a covert RFID could be used
when in active use. See Conflict Armament Research and TTEEurope (2021), Field forensic firearm exploitation: Developing RFID
solutions in support of stockpile management and post-diversion
tracing, Gentbrugge: Conflict Armament Research, https://www.conflictarm.com/technical/developing-rfid-solutions-insupport-of-stockpile-management-and-postdiversion-tracing/.

30.

United Nations (2018), Modular Small-Arms-Control Implementation
Compendium (MOSAIC) – Stockpile management: Weapons, New
York: United Nations, https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.20-2012EV1.0.pdf

UNIDIR

AuthorThe United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded,autonomous institute within the United Nations. Oneof the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on
disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge andpromotes dialogue and action on disarmament andsecurity. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists theinternational community to develop the practical,
innovative ideas needed to find solutions to criticalsecurity problems.

Sarah Grand-Clément is a Researcher in theConventional Arms and Ammunition Programme andthe Security and Technology Programme at UNIDIR.
Her work focuses on the intersection of technology
with conventional arms, exploring both the benefits
that technology can bring to prevent violent conflictand enable peace, as well as the challenges andthreats technology can pose to international security.
Email: sarah.grandclement@un.org

Flemish Peace Institute
The Flemish Peace Institute was established in 2004 as a para-parliamentary institution within the Flemish
Parliament. It provides thorough analyses, informs and organizes the public debate and promotes peace and theprevention of violence.

Project D-TECTCountering the Diversion of arms using TEChnology Tools (D-TECT) is a joint project by the Flemish Peace Institute(FPI) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The aim of Project D-TECT is to develop
and test an approach to identifying and assessing the utility and feasibility of using specific technologies that could
be used to support or strengthen existing initiatives aimed at detecting, preventing, and mitigating the diversion of
conventional weapons. Project D-TECT consists of two consecutive phases. The first, phase was to identify existing
technologies that could be suited to countering the diversion of conventional weapon systems and develop aframework that makes it possible to identify and assess technologies used to counter diversion. The second phaseis to assess, refine, and validate the list of identified technologies in relation to specific types of conventional
weapon systems.
This current paper is a product of the second phase of the research. It focuses on examining the extent to which
different technologies could help counter the diversion of small arms and light weapons and the barriers to theirimplementation.

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