Japanese perspectives on China

Lecturer: Dr. Masayo GotoSummary
Japan-China relations (1951-2005)
Japan-China relations (after 2006)
Contemporary issues and sources ofTension in Japanese-Chinese bilateralrelationsJapanese Prime Minister Hatoyama/DPJand China

Japan and China relations

Japan-China relations (1951-2005)• On September 4, 1951, the US hosted a peace conference
regarding Japan in San Francisco without the participationof China, at which the Peace Treaty regarding Japan wasapproved unilaterally. Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou
Enlai issued a statement on September 18, putting out thatthe treaty as "illegal" and "invalid". On September 8, Japanand US signed the Security Pact and became allies.
• On April 28, 1952, the Japanese government signed a socalled "Peace Treaty" with the Taiwan authorities. On May 5,
Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai issued a statement, expressing
strong opposition to the "Peace Treaty" between Japan andthe Chiang Kaishek authorities.

On June 2, 1957, the Japanese Prime Minister Kishi visited
Taiwan in support for the "recapture" of the Mainland
attempted by the Chiang Kaishek authorities. On July 25,Premier Zhou Enlai denounced Kishi's hostile policy
towards China.
Officially Japan was anti-China, pro- Taiwan to placate theUS.
In 1962 an unofficial trade agreement was signed.
February 1972 visit by Nixon to Beijing to normalise
relations with China
On September 25, 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka visited
Beijing and signed a communiqué establishing full
diplomatic relations. Japan abandoned ties with Taiwan.
The restoration of the diplomatic relations between the twocountries came true.

• On August 12, 1978, China and Japan signed the Treaty ofPeace and Friendship. China indicated it would tolerateJapan‟s security treaty with the United States.On Oct 22,
Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visited Japan. On Oct
23, China and Japan exchanged instruments of ratificationof the Treaty of Peace and Friendship.
• On June 1982, the Japanese Education and Culture
Ministry reinterpreted the history of invading China throughreviewing its textbooks.
Thus the first textbook incident arose.
• On October 23, 1992, Japanese Emperor Akihito andEmpress Michito visited China, the first ever by JapaneseEmperor. It filled in the gaps in the history of Sino-Japaneserelations.

• On August 15, 1995, Prime Minister Murayama made aspeech on the history issue at the 50th anniversary ofWorld War II, stating clearly that Japan recognized andwould face directly the history of its invasion against othercountries. Japanese government expressed deep
introspection and apology over it.
• Since the year 2001, the issues of history textbooks andthe paying of homage to the Yasukuni Shrine have done
severe harm to the China- Japan relations.

Japan-China relations after 2006
Japan-China relations have improved dramaticallysince October 2006
Prime Minister Abe made his first official visit toChina to meet with President Hu Jintao andPremier Wen Jiabao (The first bilateral meeting
between the two countries since 2001).
Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan in April 2007 andPrime Minister Fukuda visited China in December
2007
President HU made an official visit to Japan in May
2008.
The first ice was broken and spring has come……

In 2008, A joint statement: a “mutuallybeneficial relationship based oncommon strategic interests”• An agreement between China andJapan to collaborate on regional andglobal issues (UN Security Councilreform, climate change, human rights)

Contemporary issues and sources ofTension in Japanese-Chinese bilateralrelations

1. War legacy
Japanese lack of appreciation of sensitivity(1) Text book row (1982 and onwards)• Tried to change a phrase that said “Japaninvaded Northern China” to have it read
“Japan advanced...” instead. ⇒ China
protected this attempted censorship.
• There is no mention of the Rape of Nanking

(2) Visit to Yasakuni Shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers

••
•

•

Miki Takoe in 1975, Nakasone in 1985 and Koizumi in
2001-2007 ⇒China and South Korea protested anddemanded Koizumi to visit their countries to apologize.
Yasukuni Shrine was built in 1879 by the Emperor Meiji asa focal point for honouring militarism during the war.
In 1946, the shrine was returned to the Shinto religious
sector.
In 1979 at the 100-year anniversary of its founding, thenames of 1068 convicted WWII criminal were secretly
added to the roster.
Dedicated to those who lost their lives in the name of theEmperor (the spirits of over 2.5 million people, including
several class „A‟ war criminals)

• Emperor Hirohito stopped visiting the shrine afterwards.
• Emperor Akihito has never visited the shrine.
• PM Hatoyama said he would not visit Yasukini Shrine.
• Yasukuni museum presents a strikingly different
interpretation of history from that familiar to Westerners,Chinese, Koreans, or indeed most Japanese (glorifyingJapan‟s aggressive militaristic past?)
Japanese PM Avoids War Shrine Visit
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-OsAwy03bAw&feature=related
Yasukuni Shrine website:
http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/index.html

First post-war visit to China by a Japanese Emperor in1992 to express regret for Japanese atrocities• Akihito expressed an informal apology for the Japanese
atrocities committed during Japanese occupation of China
which resulted in death or injury to an estimated 21 millionpeople.

2. Territorial issues - Senkaku Islands
The Senkaku islands were claimed by Japan in January
1895 because they had been uninhabited and showed
no trace of having been under the control of China.
The dispute appears to date from the 1968
announcement by two Japanese scientists that there
may be large reservoirs of oil under the continental shelf
below the islands.
From the end of World War II, the US occupied Okinawaand controlled the islands. The islands were returned toJapan as part of the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. Since
then, the Senkaku Islands have been under theadministrative control of the Government of Japan.

Japan claims that the 1960 US-Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security applies to territories (includingthe Senkaku Islands) under the administration of Japan.
Recently, Prime Minister Aso said that Japan and the US
would work together to deal with any attack by a third
country on the Sengoku Islands. The islands are Japan's
territory and thus subject to the security alliance with theU.S.
Both China and Japan have offered joint development of
the resources as a means of moving forward withdevelopment, but the areas in which joint development
has been offered have not been agreed to. China hasoffered joint development of the gas fields north of
Senkaku Islands, sidestepping the sovereignty issue.
Japan has offered joint development of theChunxiao/Shirakaba gas field, sidestepping the sea
boundary dispute. To date, neither side has accepted theother‟s offer.

3. Human rights
Not an issue - Tianamen 1989
Japanese position – down graded diplomatic ties
and limited range of sanctions. Behind the scenes
ensured that China was not isolated as believed
economic engagement was the best method toreform the country-4. Trade and economic relations
increased economic interdependency
and desire to expand massive tradeflows.
Yet also a fear of being swamped by Chinese
goods and illegal Chinese migrants (popularperception in Japan is that Chinese gangsters
are bringing in drugs and guns and are
responsible for increase in criminal activity inJapan)- Competition for economic leadership inNorth Asia

5. The rise and fall of the “China
economic threat theory”
China has achieved average annual growth rates of 9.7
percent over the past 30 years and is on course to become
the world‟s second largest economy by 2015. Until recently,
many Japanese policymakers and businesses saw China‟seconomic rise and inexpensive labor force as a threat toJapan‟s economy.
Most large Japanese firms now see the Chinese market not
as a threat but as a valuable business opportunity.
If China‟s economic growth continues at a pace close tocurrent rates, by 2030 China‟s economy will not only havecaught up but will be several times larger than Japan‟s.
Are the Japanese people, who have long enjoyed theircountry‟s reputation as the world‟s second most powerful
economy, ready to accept these changes?

6. China‟s military expansion
Japanese anxiety about China‟s military expansion stems fromtwo distinct but related issues:(1) China‟s rapidly rising defense expenditures andcapabilities• China‟s double-digit increases in defense spending over thelast decade have attracted a substantial amount ofinternational attention. Following a 17.6 % increase (toUS$59 billion) in 2008, China‟s spending now ranks second
only to that of the US.
• Several provocative naval maneuvers by the People‟sLiberation Army (PLA) in and around Japan‟s exclusive
economic zone in recent years, coupled with longstanding
friction over territorial disputes, make it clear why Japan isconcerned about China‟s military strength.

(2) the relative lack of transparency in China‟s defense budget,which exacerbates uncertainties about China‟s strategicintentions.
• a lack of transparency concerning the allocation of funds
exacerbates existing concerns about the rapid pace of its
military expansion.
• Many experts claim that China does not include costs
related to research and development, overseas weapon
procurements, or support of the paramilitary People‟s
Armed Police in its calculation, thus suggesting that theofficial budget represents only a fraction of actualexpenditures.

Unfortunately, however, 10 or 15 years from now the USJapan alliance may no longer be able to provide a sufficienthedge against the military capabilities of China. In order toensure that China‟s rise does not foment instability in theregion, Japan and the United States must work together toconsolidate inclusive multilateral frameworks throughout
East Asia and gradually establish a norm of addressing
problems in a cooperative manner.
Any attempt to contain China would be a suicidal act.

Are China and Japan beginning a new arms race? 01 Sep 07
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iz-RWppsvzE&feature=channel

7. China‟s foreign policy and Regionalism
China seems to be gradually embracing a role as both aregional and a global political superpower.
• resource diplomacy in Africa and South America• Actively push for a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area/ASEAN
Plus 3• Create the Shanghai Cooperation Organization toconsolidate ties with its neighbors in Central Asia. TheShanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was founded in2001 by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. SCO is anintergovernmental mutual-security organization.

China and ASEAN
China entered into TAC in 2003.
China strongly supports the ASEAN＋3
concept for reasons based on maximising its
own economic development and thefacilitation of regional integration
ASEAN receives benefits from Chinese
economic development through regionalism-East Asian states would view China morefavourably and with less apprehension
The key to East Asian regionalism is theimprovement of relations with Japan ??

China will probably maintain its policy of“peaceful development” for the immediate
future. However there are legitimate concerns
in Japan about how China‟s foreign policy line
will change once it has completed its “rise.”Will it become more aggressive once it has
the capabilities necessary to pursue its
interests with force, or will it abide byPresident Hu‟s pledge to pursue its interests
peacefully within the existing global system?

The fact that China is not a liberal democracy limits theextent to which the international community can trust China‟scommitments and the degree to which China can “buildconfidence” with other powers, such as Japan and the UnitedStates.
The illicit entry of a Chinese submarine into Japanese waters in 2004
and the satellite incident in 2007 have raised doubts about the degreeof civilian control over the PLA.

Whether the international community or international system
can sustain and accommodate the thrust of Chinese growthis another concern.
The concept of China as the „Middle Kingdom” – As China
continue to develop rapidly economically and militarily, China
will aim to become the dominant player (hegemony) in Asia,
if not the world.

8. An enhanced triangular structure
has emerged – US-Japan-China• For Japan the triangular structure can enhance Japan‟spolitical status but also represents hazards:• Japan could be by-passed in a US-China power struggle• Japan could be caught in a tug of war between China andthe US.
• Security dialogue with the US will deepen confidencebuilding and promote further transparency of both militarycapabilities and strategic intentions.
• Japan should persuade the US to maintain its militarypresence in the region and stay involved in efforts toconsolidate intraregional ties through such multilateral
initiatives as the East Asia Summit.

Prime Minister Hatoyama/DPJand China

PM Hatoyama and China
Positive attitude toward China.
Hatoyama has indicated that he will not be visiting
the Yasukuni Shrine – will consider building a
religiously and politically neutral “alternativemonument” to remember the war deadHatoyama will not contain China – He has hinted that
he will drop “valued diplomacy” which refers to theneed for Japan to forge a partnership with AsiaPacific countries (The US, Australia, India), which
follow the standard Western democratic model.
However this has been regarded by China as yet
another version of an “encirclement policy”

Sengaku Islands – Hatoyama said Japan and China should
focus on seeking joint economic advancements while
shelving their differences. Regional integration can defuse
territorial disputes. He argues that the fruits of economic
synergy will persuade parties to sovereignty-related
conflicts to opt for joint development by setting aside theirdisagreements.

Will the DPJ prove to be a game-changer
for Japan-China relations?
How soon Hatoyama and his key aides will visit China
How soon China will dispatch Vice-President Xi Jinping(likely succeed Hu Jinatao in 2012) to Japan to bolster goodties.
Financial and economic cooperation (currency swap, ChinaJapan trade in Yen or Yuan, not the US dollar)
Joint development of gas-fields under the East China Sea –President Hu and PM Fukuda reached agreement, however,a formal bilateral treaty has to be signed.

Conclusion
Leaders in both countries have finally come to realizethat confrontation serves neither country‟s interests
and that both have much to gain from enhanced
cooperation.
While the warming of bilateral ties since the autumn of2006 has been remarkable, relations between the twonations remain in a fragile state.

End of lecture